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


1940

Volume II

GENERAL
AND EUROPE

Department of State
Washington



Foreign Relations
of the
United States
Diplomatic Papers
1940

(In Five Volumes)

Volume II
General and
Europe



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GENERAL

(Continued from Volume I)

NEUTRALITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND REPRESENTATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS

I. NEUTRALITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES¹

[For texts of proclamations concerning United States neutrality proclaimed during the year 1940, see the following citations:

- (1) Definition of a Combat Area, April 10, 1940; 54 Stat. 2693.
- (2) Proclamation of a State of War Between Germany and Norway, April 25; 54 Stat. 2698.
- (3) Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War Between Germany, on the One Hand, and Norway, on the Other Hand, April 25; 54 Stat. 2699.
- (4) Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, April 25; 54 Stat. 2699.
- (5) Proclamation of a State of War Between Germany, on the One Hand, and Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, on the Other Hand, May 11; 54 Stat. 2703.
- (6) Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War Between Germany, on the One Hand, and Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, on the Other Hand, May 11; 54 Stat. 2704.
- (7) Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, May 11; 54 Stat. 2705.
- (8) Proclamation of a State of War Between Italy, on the One Hand, and France and the United Kingdom, on the Other Hand, June 10; 54 Stat. 2706.
- (9) Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War Between Italy, on the One Hand, and France and the United Kingdom, on the Other Hand, June 10; 54 Stat. 2707.
- (10) Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, June 10; 54 Stat. 2707.
- (11) Definition of a Combat Area, June 11; 54 Stat. 2708.

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 656-716.

(12) Control of Vessels in Territorial Waters of the United States, June 27; 54 Stat. 2711.

(13) Proclamation of a State of War Between Italy and Greece, November 15; 54 Stat. 2763.

(14) Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War Between Italy, on the One Hand, and Greece, on the Other Hand, November 15; 54 Stat. 2764.

(15) Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, November 15; 54 Stat. 2764.

For texts of executive orders "freezing" foreign assets issued during the year 1940, see the following citations:

(1) Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, with respect to Denmark and Norway, *Federal Register*, April 12, 1940, page 1400.

(2) Executive Order No. 8405, May 10, with respect to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg; *Federal Register*, May 11, 1940, page 1677.

(3) Executive Order No. 8446, June 17, with respect to France; *Federal Register*, June 19, 1940, page 2279.

(4) Executive Order No. 8484, July 15, with respect to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, *Federal Register*, July 17, 1940, page 2586.

(5) Executive Order No. 8565, October 10, with respect to Rumania, *Federal Register*, October 12, 1940, page 4062.]

II. REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AGAINST APPLICATION OF CONTROL MEASURES INTERFERING WITH TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES²

740.00112 Navicert/18½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Grady)

[WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1940.

The British Ambassador³ called on me by appointment this morning and I informed him as follows:

"On October 16, 1939 Sir Owen Chalkley⁴ informally presented to the Department of State a statement⁵ that he had been 'authorized by His Majesty's Government to make the preliminary arrangements for the institution of a Navicert System, the object being to facilitate the legitimate trade of American exporters' and that it was hoped 'that the institution of this system will be welcomed and considered helpful by the United States Government'.

² Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 793-820.

³ Lord Lothian.

⁴ Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 761.

"After careful consideration of this proposal from the standpoint of its numerous aspects in relation to the legitimate trade of the United States with other countries, we informally notified Sir Owen Chalkley on November 9⁶ that, at that time we rather regarded 'the proposed system as a matter between those American exporters who may desire to take advantage of it and the appropriate British authorities' and that the Government of the United States had 'no desire to take a position' at that time with reference to the introduction of the system. It was added that 'these comments are, however, based on the assumption that the following assertions are correct:

"1. The proposed Navicert system will in no sense be used to interfere in any way with the normal volume of exports of genuine neutral character from the United States to any neutral country.

"2. The proposed Navicert system will not be used in any way to discriminate against the United States and United States exporters.

"3. The granting or rejection of a Navicert shall be conditional upon circumstances related solely to the character of the goods and conditions in the country of importation and in no respect upon conditions related to American exporters or to the United States.

"4. Whenever applications for Navicerts are rejected, a clear, concise statement of the reasons for such rejections shall be given to the applicant for the Navicert."

"This statement was accepted by the representatives of His Majesty's Government with the sole comment that it would be referred to London where it would receive careful consideration. This Government was given no indication that the conditions imposed were in any manner objectionable.

"On November 18 His Majesty's representatives in Washington informally presented to the Department a statement which it was the intention of His Majesty's representatives to give 'to the press on Tuesday, November 21'. The Department of State naturally recognized that statement as an acceptance of the conditions specified in the Department's statement of November 9, 1939, upon which, alone, its acquiescence in the institution of the Navicert System was indicated.

"It was, therefore, with great surprise that the Department of State received on December 14 a communication from a United States Senator notifying it that in reply to the request of an American exporter for an explanation of reasons as to why certain of his applications for Navicerts had been rejected, he had received a communication from the British Embassy in Washington reading in part as follows:

"With reference to your letter of December 8th, I am directed by His Majesty's Ambassador to inform you that he regrets that he is unable to give any explanation for the rejection of any applications for Navicerts."

The Department's astonishment in this connection was intensified by a subsequent oral statement of Sir Owen Chalkley that the above quoted communication from the British Embassy represents British policy in this respect.

"The Department of State must, however, decline to accept such an explanation of so important and far-reaching a departure from what appeared to be a clear understanding between the two Governments with respect to the conditions under which the Navicert system would

⁶ See memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, November 9, 1939, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 771.

be instituted within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Department of State is, therefore, left no alternative than to ask for a clear and specific statement of the British Government's attitude concerning each of the four assertions set forth in the oral statement of November 9, 1939."

The Ambassador wanted some clarification of the above statement, which I made. He replied that he would look into the matter and discuss it with his people. He will shortly go into the matter with us again. He said that he understood our position very well but on the other hand he felt that the practice of giving reasons for the refusal of Navicerts would lead to all sorts of difficulties and possibly to lawsuits. The Ambassador informed me, confidentially, that according to the figures on Navicerts issued in December, there were 4,932 applications, 3,121 of which were granted, 40 were refused, and the balance are still under consideration. He said that it was his impression that there had been little or no complaint of the operation of the system and there possibly would be none other than an occasional protest to Senators by a few exporters.

H[ENRY] G[RADY]

740.00111A Combat Areas/113

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1940.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning.

The Ambassador said that he had two matters which he wished to take up with me. The first, he said, was an instruction he had received from his Government to inform me, for the moment unofficially, that the British Admiralty was working out a plan as a result of which the British Navy in the future would refrain from taking American merchant vessels for inspection into ports within the combat area. The Admiralty at first, he said, had intended to designate Halifax as the port to which American ships, the cargoes of which the British desired to inspect, would be taken, but inasmuch as Halifax was within the combat area, the Admiralty was now settling upon either St. Johns, Newfoundland, or another port the name of which the Ambassador thought was Yarmouth and which he believed was in New Brunswick. The Ambassador said that navicerted ships would of course be examined on the high seas and that only ships whose cargoes had not been navicerted would be taken for inspection to the two ports he had in mind.

The Ambassador was also instructed to inform this Government that the British Government had informed the Government of Finland that surplus agricultural products, et cetera, which the Govern-

ment of Finland would be enabled to buy through the credits facilitated by the Federal Loan Agency, would be purchased by the British Government to the extent at least to which the British Government required such supplies. The Government of Finland had first been informed that payment would be made by the British Government in sterling, but as a result of discussions which had proved that the British Government could not spare the munitions which Finland desired from its own stocks, the British Government had later informed Finland that payment would be made in dollars so as to make it possible for Finland to purchase the munitions it required in the United States. The Ambassador added that Great Britain had already sent to Finland 70 airplanes and a considerable amount of anti-aircraft artillery, et cetera, but that it was not in a position to send more because of the constantly increasing demands being made upon Great Britain by her own allies, notably Turkey and Portugal.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00111A Combat Areas/124

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1940.

The British Ambassador called to see me today at his request. The Ambassador reminded me that in our last conversation he had informed me that the British Admiralty was considering taking American vessels which had not received navicerts to certain ports in Nova Scotia or Newfoundland for inspection of their cargoes in order to avoid taking American ships for inspection into ports within the combat area. The Ambassador said that on consideration the British Admiralty felt that the port of St. Johns in Newfoundland was an inconvenient place for such inspection and desired to have the inspections take place in Halifax. The Ambassador said that Halifax was within the neutrality zone laid down in the Declaration of Panama⁷ and asked whether this Government would object if Halifax were selected.

I replied that the Declaration of Panama implied abstention on the part of the belligerents from all belligerent activities within that zone and that obviously the diverting of the passages of American vessels within that zone was clearly a belligerent activity. I said that I would have the matter given consideration in the Department and communicate the views of this Government in the matter to the Ambassador in the near future.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. v, p. 36.

740.00111A Combat Areas/124

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1940.

Subject: Inspection of American Vessels.

I took up this question with the President on January 15 and the President instructed me to tell the British Ambassador that this Government could not even tacitly acquiesce in the taking of American ships to Halifax for inspection since Halifax was a port included within the zone laid down in the Declaration of Panama. The President requested me to add in my conversation with Lord Lothian, which I did immediately thereafter, that if St. Johns were the port selected by the British Admiralty, the Government of the United States would hold the British Government accountable for any damages which might be incurred by American vessels being so diverted from their normal course through the danger of icebergs or collisions in the fog which was so frequent in that region. The British Ambassador informed me that he would communicate the opinions of this Government to his Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

841.711/2945

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary
of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1940.

The British Ambassador called to see me today, at my request. I said I was sorry to ask him to call on an unpleasant matter. I said that our people were becoming increasingly unhappy and concerned about the delays of American shipping at Gibraltar, where the average delay amounted to approximately twelve days per vessel, with loss which must, of course, be obvious. Even conceding that war measures frequently resulted in confusion, there has been plenty of time to clear this up.

Further, I said, we were reluctantly forced to the conclusion that these delays were discriminatory, and perhaps intentionally so. Not only that, but the Italians were aware of this and were making capital out of it. As an instance, I read him, but without giving names and dates, the letter of December 29th, 1939 addressed to George H. MacFadden & Brothers from Battistel-Amiotti (file No. 300.115(39), MacFadden & Bro., Geo. H.—121), in which the Italian buyers required shipment by Italian steamer, on the ground, among other things, that their vessels are quicker released from Gibraltar.

I said that instances of this kind naturally led our people to wonder whether the Gibraltar station was being operated for purposes of contraband or for other purposes, and that I trusted the situation would be promptly cleared up.

I then handed him the *Aide-Mémoire*.⁸ Lord Lothian said that he would not comment, because he was not aware of the facts; but that he regretted the situation and would see if he couldn't do something about it. He then said that there was, of course, always the difficulty of the Italian nuisance value in the Mediterranean.

I said that the Ambassador would do me justice to note that I had not brought that matter up; but since he had done so, I felt bound to say that instances of this sort gave rise to the feeling that the British government presumed on our friendship, and sacrificed our legitimate interests to the Italians. Lord Lothian agreed that there was this danger; and that in any event matters ought to be so handled that there was no discrimination; that he would send a cable to his government; and he hoped the situation would be corrected.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

300.115 (39)/452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1940.

13. The following *Aide-Mémoire* was handed to the British Ambassador today:^{8a}

"This Government feels constrained to express its serious concern at the treatment by the British authorities of American shipping in the Mediterranean area, and particularly at Gibraltar. It has already made clear its position as regards the legality of interference by the British Government with cargoes moving from one neutral country to another, in its Ambassador's Note Number 1569 of November 20, 1939.⁹ In addition, it now regrets the necessity of being forced to observe not only that British interference, carried out under the theory of contraband control, has worked a wholly unwarrantable delay on American shipping to and from the Mediterranean area, but also that the effect of such action appears to have been discriminatory.

"Since ample time has elapsed to permit the setting up of an efficient system of control, it would seem that the present situation can no longer be ascribed to the confusion attendant on early organization difficulties.

"From information reaching this Government it appears that American vessels proceeding to neutral ports en route to or from ports of the United States have been detained at Gibraltar for periods vary-

⁸ See *infra*.

^{8a} The *aide-mémoire* was dated January 19, 1940.

⁹ See telegram No. 1446, November 17, 1939, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 806, and footnote 84, *ibid.*, p. 807.

ing from 9 to 18 days; that cargoes and mail have been removed from such ships; that official mail for American missions in Europe has been greatly delayed; that in some instances American vessels have been ordered to proceed, in violation of American law, to the belligerent port of Marseilles to unload cargoes, and there to experience further delays. It is further reported that cargoes on Italian vessels receive more favorable consideration than similar or equivalent cargoes carried by American ships, and that Italian vessels are permitted to pass through the control with far less inconvenience and delay.

"There is attached a list¹⁰ of American vessels en route to neutral ports detained by the British Contraband Control during the period November 15th to December 15th, from which it will be seen that the average delay imposed has amounted to approximately 12.4 days. From information in possession of this Government, it is established that Italian vessels detained during the same period were held for an average delay of only 4 days.

"This Government must expect that the British Government will at least take suitable and prompt measures to bring about an immediate correction of this situation. It will appreciate receiving advices that the situation has been corrected."

It is expected that its contents will be made public within the next few days.

Your telegram 43, January 19, 10 a. m.¹¹ Please continue sending reports of this nature.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/1941

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Grady)

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at my request and gave me the attached memorandum¹² of his oral statement to me with regard to the working of the navicert system. I told him that we would study his memorandum and get in touch with him later.

740.00112 European War 1939/1941

Memorandum of Oral Statement by the British Ambassador (Lothian) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Grady)

On January 4th [2d?] Mr. Grady discussed the working of the Navicert System with the British Ambassador and stated that the absence of any advice to the contrary had led the Department to believe that the four assumptions in regard to the working of the system

¹⁰ For list of nine ships detained, with pertinent information as to each case, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 27, 1940, p. 94.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² *Infra*.

which had been informally notified to Sir Owen Chalkley on November 9th were correct. The British Ambassador explained that from the account given to him immediately afterwards by Sir Owen Chalkley and the other representatives of the British Embassy who had been present at the meeting at the State Department on November 9th he was quite certain that there had been a misunderstanding and that on the British side it had not been understood that the absence of a reply would be interpreted as an acceptance of the four assumptions.

The exact meaning of the four assumptions had then been discussed between Mr. Grady and the Ambassador. As a result of consultation with His Majesty's Government the Ambassador had been instructed to reply that it is not possible for the British Government to accept the four assumptions in the form in which they were formulated but to submit the following explanation of the working of the Navicert System which it is hoped will meet the questions at issue.

1) Where agreements for the limitation of imports have been entered into between Great Britain and neutral states such as Sweden and Norway, the issue of navicerts is governed by the limits set forth in these agreements. Where it has proved impossible to reach agreements, usually because of the neutrals' fear of German reprisals and consequent preference to be compelled to submit to *force majeure*, the rationing or restrictions of imports into these countries is effected by the contraband controls set up at Kirkwall, the Downs, Gibraltar and elsewhere. The sole purpose of these controls is to prevent supplies essential to the prosecution of the war from reaching Germany. Statistics show that neutral countries contiguous to Germany have since the outbreak of war been importing many essential commodities in quantities far in excess of the normal. A case in point is that of lubricating oils the statistical position as regards which in Scandinavian countries, and in Belgium and Holland is causing His Majesty's Government much anxiety. The rationing of neutrals therefore is not effected through navicerts issued in the United States but by the system of contraband control and by the contraband control stations in European waters. The navicert is in effect simply a visa to facilitate the rapid transit of goods through the contraband control points by making unnecessary in all ordinary cases their examination there. American importers are of course at liberty to export goods to neutral ports without a navicert. Navicerts are simply a convenience to everybody to obviate the delays which would otherwise be inevitable at the contraband control points if the character of the goods or cargoes had to be examined there instead of being investigated before shipment.

2) The British Government understands that there is a natural anxiety on the part of the State Department lest the Navicert System should be used directly or indirectly to transfer trade from American

to Allied firms or from the United States to other countries. His Majesty's Government have authorised the Ambassador to give an assurance that it would not be so used.

3) At his last interview the Ambassador explained that it was impossible to give explanations to every applicant for a navicert whose application was rejected, because it would lead to endless controversy and probably litigation. His Majesty's Government would be willing, unless there were strong reasons to the contrary, to acquaint the United States Government unofficially with the facts in regard to any cases in which they are especially interested or which may involve particular difficulties. They suggest however that as the decisions about navicerts are taken in the main in London and not in Washington these enquiries should ordinarily be made through the United States Embassy in London which can approach the Department concerned direct, though there may be cases in which it would be possible for the Ministry to supply answers through the British Embassy in Washington.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1940.

740.00111A Combat Areas/140: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 29, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received January 29—1:20 p. m.]

265. Personal for the President from Naval Person.¹⁴

"I gave orders last night that no American ship should, in any circumstances, be diverted into the combat zone round the British Islands declared by you. I trust this will be satisfactory."

JOHNSON

740.00111A Combat Areas/167

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1940.

The Canadian Minister¹⁵ called to see me at eleven o'clock today, at his request. He wished informally, but officially, to ascertain our attitude regarding the establishment of a British contraband control station in Canada. Dr. Skelton¹⁶ and he had been to lunch at the British Embassy the previous day; Lord Lothian had requested their

¹⁴ Code name for Winston Churchill, British First Lord of the Admiralty.

¹⁵ Loring Christie.

¹⁶ Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

view. He indicated that the Canadian government was not pleased at learning that the establishment of a contraband control station in Canada had been discussed for some time by the British government and mentioned informally to us, although the Canadian government had not been consulted until Lord Lothian threw it out thus casually.

The Minister asked whether we would care to let him know our attitude towards such a control station. He added that in his personal view the Canadians might not be too happy at having to assume the onus of that kind of a station, which might affect the special friendship which existed between the United States and Canada.

I said that while I had heard that the matter had been discussed occasionally, I did not believe that this government had determined its policy and that I therefore was not in a position to give him our attitude. I would, however, take the matter up with the Department and would endeavor to communicate with him.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

740.00111A Combat Areas/142: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 30, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received January 30—8:30 a. m.]

267. My 265, January 29, 7 p. m. Personal for the President from Naval Person.

"I trust that the information I gave you last night about the orders sent to British ships will not be made known until measures have been concerted which will remove appearance of discrimination. It has been pointed out to me that my signal to fleet can only be maintained if measures are taken to ensure in advance of their departure that United States ships carry no objectionable cargo. Moreover, in exceptional cases it may be necessary to divert United States ships if we have definite ground for suspicion against them. It would be most helpful if same arrangement could be reached with Lothian on these lines, and meanwhile all publicity avoided."

JOHNSON

740.00111A Combat Areas/148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1940.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador referred to the message I had communicated to him from the President some two weeks ago to the effect that were Great Britain to select St. Johns, Newfoundland, as the port at which

American flag ships would be inspected for contraband, the Government of the United States would hold the British Government responsible for any damages which might be incurred by these ships or their passengers as a result of such deviation from their normal course. The Ambassador said that he had been informed by his Government of the message which had been conveyed to the President from Mr. Churchill, namely, that no further American flag ships would be taken to Kirkwall within the combat zone for such inspection.

I told the Ambassador that such a message had been received and that the message had suggested that the details as to the solution of this problem might appropriately be discussed between Lord Lothian and this Government.

Lord Lothian inquired whether the President's message was to be regarded as an indication that this Government would object to the use of the port of St. Johns for such inspection.

I said that the President's message, I felt, spoke for itself and that no objection to St. Johns as a port of inspection could be raised by this Government on the ground that it was within the combat zone prescribed by the present Neutrality Act.¹⁷ On the other hand, I said, this Government naturally would maintain all of its rights under generally accepted international law insofar as the inspection and diversion from their course of American ships bound from the United States to a neutral port by the warships of the British Navy were concerned.

The Ambassador inquired whether I had any objection to a representative of the Embassy discussing the technical aspects of this question with officials of this Department and I said that I had no objection whatever to make to conversations of that character.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00112 European War 1939/1031

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1940.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador stated at some length the importance which his Government attributed to the embargo decree upon the exportation from Germany of German goods. He adverted once more to the dire straits in which Germany found herself through her inability to obtain foreign exchange, and stated that the blockade was becoming more and more effective. He said that if the embargo were relaxed in any one point, much of the advantages already gained by the Allied Powers would be lost, and that it was for this reason that the British

¹⁷ Neutrality Act of 1939; 54 Stat. 4.

Government attributed such vital importance to the embargo and to the prevention of Germany obtaining foreign exchange through the mails. The Ambassador stated that he was very anxious to avoid any further flare-up on the part of public opinion in this country or on the part of the American press, and that he had, consequently, advised his Government to delay making any reply to our note upon the subject of the embargo for a week or ten days.

I said to the Ambassador that the importance of this advice, in my judgment, would appear to hinge upon the contents of the British reply.

The Ambassador said that the reply of his Government would maintain the position previously taken, but would assure the United States of every consideration in specific cases where the interests of the United States were involved.

To this I made no comment.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00112 Navicert/31

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1940.

The British Ambassador called this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador referred to the question of navicerts. He said he was afraid that there was a lack of comprehension in the Department of State as to what the navicerts really were. He said he had explained the matter fully to Assistant Secretary Grady and that the Counselor of his Embassy ¹⁸ had had a conversation on the same subject yesterday with Mr. Moffat ¹⁹ but that he felt there was misinterpretation on the part of the authorities of this Government as to the system involved by the issuance of navicerts. The Ambassador said that the creation of this system during the present war was due to the initiative taken by the Secretary of State himself ²⁰ who had suggested to the Ambassador in the early days of the war that such a system be created by the British authorities and had termed the documents to be issued by the British authorities in the United States as "letters of assurance". The Ambassador felt that this title might have been preferable, but said that the system itself was only that proposed by Secretary Hull. He wished to make it clear, he stated, that the issuance of navicerts within the territory of the United States implied no exercise of sovereignty on the part of the British authorities since the exercise of sovereignty by Great Britain only occurred when American flag vessels were taken

¹⁸ Neville Butler.

¹⁹ Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

²⁰ See memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 4, 1939, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 718.

by British warships to British ports for inspection. That, he said, was the control and not the issuance of navicerts. He reiterated that the application for navicerts was entirely voluntary and that no American shipowners nor exporters needed to apply for navicerts, but that of course if they did not, the ships carrying cargoes which were not navicerted were liable to diversion from their course by British war vessels to a British port, which from now on, in the case of United States flag vessels, would be St. Johns, Newfoundland. He said the sole purpose of the system was to avoid inconvenience and undue delay to American exporters and to American vessels and that he trusted this aspect of the situation would be clearly apprehended by the United States authorities. I said to the Ambassador that Mr. Moffat had sent me a memorandum²¹ of his conversation with the Counselor of the British Embassy yesterday but that I had not yet had an opportunity of studying it. I felt, I said, that the subject was one of considerable complexity and of very great importance and I did not want to give him any final impression with regard to what he had just said until I had had an opportunity of consulting with the Secretary of State and with the appropriate officials of this Department.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00111A Combat Areas/162

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1940.

The Canadian Minister called to see me this morning at his request. He said that he had received an urgent instruction from his Government to inform me that the Canadian Cabinet was having a meeting this afternoon at 3:30 p. m., in which would be taken up the request of the British Government that Canada consent to the use of the port of St. John, New Brunswick, as a port for contraband control. The Minister said that the Canadian Government were informed that the British Ambassador had discussed this question with the Department of State, and that they desired the Minister to inform me, first, that the Canadian Government itself had no interest in the matter and was not anxious itself to undertake any form of contraband inspection or control, and, second, that before reaching a decision, they wanted to ascertain what the views of this Government might be.

I told the Minister that I greatly appreciated this friendly and courteous message from the Canadian Government and that the best answer I could make would be to inform him fully of the conversations

²¹ Not printed.

which had taken place between the British Ambassador and the Department of State, in most of which I had taken part. I said that the possibility of the utilization of a Canadian port for this purpose had been first broached to me by the British Ambassador some three or four weeks ago. Lord Lothian at that time had told me that the British Government were concerned by reason of the protest made by the United States concerning the taking by British warships of American flag ships into the port of Kirkwall for examination inasmuch as that port is within the combat area laid down by the President in accordance with existing neutrality legislation and into which American flag ships were prohibited from entering. The British Ambassador had then said that the British Admiralty were considering requesting the Government of Canada to permit the use of either the ports of Halifax, St. John's, Newfoundland, or some port in Nova Scotia, the name of which Lord Lothian at that time did not recall. I said that I replied to the Ambassador stating that the use of the port of Halifax would be clearly objectionable to this Government inasmuch as Halifax lay within the restricted area laid down by the Declaration of Panama. With regard to the other two ports, I had said that the utilization of either one or the other of those ports would avoid the objection which this Government had legitimately raised against the utilization of British ports for inspection purposes inasmuch as the two Canadian ports²² referred to were not within the combat area. I had told the Ambassador, however, that if the British Government determined to use one of these Canadian ports for inspection control purposes, I should make it clear that this Government would reserve all rights accruing to it under international law.

I told the Minister that I laid the suggestion subsequently before the President, and that the President had instructed me to inform Lord Lothian that if one of the two Canadian ports mentioned were used as a port of inspection and if American ships were taken there by British naval vessels, this Government would likewise reserve all of its rights to present claims against the British Government in the event that there was any injury caused to the lives or properties of American nationals through weather conditions or because of any other mishap.

I stated to the Minister that St. John, New Brunswick, had never been mentioned to me by Lord Lothian as a port of inspection, and that in my more recent conversations with the British Ambassador he had always referred to St. John's, Newfoundland.

The Minister said that he would transmit this information to his Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

²² St. John's, Newfoundland, was not at that time part of Canada.

300.115 (39)/565

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*²³

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador has now received instructions in regard to the points set forth in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of January 19 [20th]. His Majesty's Government greatly regret the delays which have been imposed on American shipping entering and leaving the Mediterranean and hope that by the methods set forth below these delays will be greatly reduced. They also declare that there is no substance in the contention that they have discriminated against American ships in favour of Italian ships, as the considerations advanced in this *Aide-Mémoire* will, it is hoped, clearly establish.

His Majesty's Government regret, of course, that it is necessary to impose any controls at all on American shipping, but the exercise of the contraband control in its various forms is the main instrument whereby at present the Allied Governments are exercising pressure on Germany in order to compel it to free Poland and Czechoslovakia and to relieve the threat to the liberties of the world involved in German military aggression. In order to exercise this control in a manner involving the least delay and disturbance to neutral shipping, and especially that of the United States, His Majesty's Government fell in with the suggestion made by the Secretary of State very early in the war that they should consider whether some system of investigating cargoes before they left the United States, similar to that which operated in the last war, could not once more be established. The outcome was the institution of the navicert system which has now been in operation for just over two months. The navicert system is not a method of rationing neutral countries, nor does it involve any control by the British Government of American trade or traders. In so far as there is interference with normal freedom of movement, that is effected by the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London, acting through the controls exercised at the contraband control bases, such as Kirkwall, the Downs, and Gibraltar. The navicert system is simply a method whereby delays of the kind referred to in the *Aide-Mémoire* under reply can be obviated, because it enables shippers to ascertain before shipment whether their consignments will be regarded as objectionable or not by the contraband controls. The consignments of shippers who do not avail themselves of this facility before shipment can only be investigated after they arrive at the control base, with consequent delay not only to the particular shipment, but to all other

²³ Handed by the British Ambassador to the Under Secretary of State, February 9, 1940.

consignments in the same ship, even though these last have been navicerted and therefore call for no further investigation. The navicert system therefore is one which works for the maximum convenience of all concerned. American shippers, of course, may ship without navicerts direct to any port, but, if they do so, delays and refusals are inevitable at the contraband control bases.

The *Aide-Mémoire* produces as evidence of discrimination between Italian and American ships figures showing that, whereas American ships have been delayed at Gibraltar for periods varying from 9 to 19 days, Italian ships were delayed for only 4 days. The reason for this difference is the fact that the Italian Government and shipping lines have been availing themselves more and more of the navicert system and, in the case of non-navicerted consignments, of the "Black Diamond" guarantee. Thanks to the latter, cargoes in respect of which the control authorities may not be entirely satisfied, are allowed through the controls, and the ship carrying them released, on the condition that they are held back by the Shipping Company at the port of destination, until the order for release has been received from London. Italian ships therefore get quick clearance because they have availed themselves of facilities also open to American ships.

As all navicerted consignments have been investigated before they are loaded at an American port, it follows that if a ship carries a completely navicerted cargo, the latter normally requires no further investigation on its arrival in the Contraband Control Base, and such a ship will therefore be cleared with a minimum of delay. When any part of the cargo is not navicerted that part needs to be investigated, and a measure of delay is therefore inevitable. From the time when the contraband control authorities can first consider a ship whose cargo is not completely navicerted there will, in the absence of other arrangements, be in most cases a delay of from two to three weeks before the enquiries regarding its non-navicerted consignments can be completed and the ship released. This delay is inevitable in the case of mixed unnavicerted cargoes, and occurs whatever the nationality of the ship.

This is the delay of which complaint is made in the *Aide-Mémoire*, but it can be reduced, though in the absence of completely navicerted cargoes, not eliminated, in two ways:

(1) The date on which a ship's cargo is first considered by the Contraband Committee depends entirely on the date on which full information about it is available. If shipping companies produce advance copies of their manifests in time, the Committee is able to consider the cargo simultaneously with, or even before its arrival in the Control Base. In the case of 14 American ships detained at Gibraltar, which were considered by the Contraband Committee between early December and January 22nd, the manifest in respect of seven did not reach the Ministry of Economic Warfare until after

the arrival of the vessel. In two cases it was received simultaneously with the arrival, and in only one case more than two days before arrival. To some extent this is no doubt due to the suspension of the Clipper service owing to bad weather last month. Nevertheless, one reason for the shorter detention of Italian ships at Gibraltar has been that the Italian Lines have arranged that, in every case where air mail information would not reach the Ministry a week before the arrival of the ship at Gibraltar, their agents cable to London entire cargo lists from ports of loading in North and South America.

(2) A second method is the provision of a holdback or Black Diamond guarantee by the shipping companies. Only in the most exceptional cases are these refused. The vast majority of the Italian vessels are guaranteed in this way either before or simultaneously with their arrival at Gibraltar. Italian companies have inserted in their Bills of Lading a clause protecting them from consignees in such cases. These facts, and the fact that some Italian ships carry bulk cargoes, which is hardly ever the case with American ships, are the reasons for the speedier passage of Italian ships. There has, in fact, been no discrimination against United States ships in favour of Italian or other ships at Gibraltar, and His Majesty's Government instruct me to deny emphatically that there has been any discrimination.

In the list of nine American vessels reported to have been detained by the British Contraband Control, which was attached to the *Aide-Mémoire*, it is noticed that no less than eight belonged to the American Export Line. This Embassy has now had an opportunity of speaking to a representative of the American Export Line. He did not appear previously to have understood the working of the navicert system, or to have appreciated the facilities which, if fully employed, it could provide for his company. His Majesty's Government hope, therefore, that the delays in dealing with the vessels of this company will be greatly reduced through its making fuller use of these facilities.

His Majesty's Government recognise that some of the American Shipping Lines may not at first have fully understood the nature of the navicert system, but believe that a better understanding is now general among them, and they are confident that, if the system thus devised for the convenience of shippers were used by all American ships in the way in which it is being increasingly used by some and by ships belonging to other nations, the delays arising out of the contraband control will be very substantially reduced, and any appearance of discrimination between American and other neutral ships removed. His Majesty's Government are doing everything in their power to expedite the clearance of ships at Gibraltar, as at the other control bases, not only because they want to place neutral ships at the smallest possible inconvenience, but because delays involve great congestion and other difficulties at Gibraltar

itself. They believe that by these means the situation described in the *Aide-Mémoire* under reply will speedily disappear.

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1940.

711.41/453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He handed me an elaborate memorandum²⁴ in regard to the problem of British purchases of American agricultural products and the slowing down of these purchases recently, which he said the Embassy here had prepared on its own initiative. The Ambassador stated that he would be glad if the State Department would examine the memorandum, and then we could have a further conference in regard to the matter. I thanked him and said we would be pleased to do so. I again emphasized the extreme importance of working out something reasonably satisfactory with respect to all phases of this question. He seemed to appreciate my viewpoint.

There was some general conversation about the war situation but nothing of special moment was developed. In the course of references to British-American difficulties, I said that I would be glad, in the interest of both Governments, to emphasize three points: first, that in whatever regulations or restrictions or other new methods or policies that might be adopted by the British Government during the war, our Government was particularly concerned to know that such changes and innovations would not be hurtful to this country after the war; second, that no blacklisting practices in this country would be carried on by his Government; and third that the British Government would not apply the slogan "this is necessary to win the war" to a great variety of minor practices which would affect the United States.

The Ambassador made a note of the three points mentioned above and seemed to appreciate my making these suggestions.

He concluded by saying he would discuss further with Mr. Berle some minor phases of the relations between our countries.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

300.115 (39)/665

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1940.

The British Ambassador came in today, at his request. After discussing certain other points (reported in memorandum of conversa-

²⁴ Not printed.

tion of even date herewith ^{24a}), we then proceeded to a discussion of the *Aide-Mémoire* of February 8th, 1940, which he had handed to Mr. Welles. I stated to the Ambassador orally the substance of the memorandum a copy of which is attached. The Ambassador's principal comment was confined to that part of the statement which referred to the Secretary of State's suggestion that a system be worked out which would minimize interference with American commerce. He said that the Secretary had used, in conversation with him, the phrase "letters of assurance". It is true that his suggestion contemplated meetings. Two such meetings had actually been had. A memorandum had been given by our people to theirs as to the bases of the Navicert system. No letter had been sent by the Embassy to us indicating that they did not accept these assumptions; the Ambassador thought it was a mistake not to have sent such a letter. The fact was that the assumptions had not been accepted. The establishment of the Navicert system had been done unilaterally, but it had been done because the Embassy had gained the distinct impression that the State Department did not wish to carry discussions further, since it did not wish to be in a position of agreeing to anything.

I confined myself to stating that this would have to be the subject of a further discussion covering the entire Navicert system.

At the close of the discussion I said that I had understood the Ambassador wished to keep his *Aide-Mémoire* confidential; that we would, however, in due time answer it with more complete discussion; that the object, of course, was not to have a dispute, but to get a result; and that I sincerely hoped that the results, namely, elimination of discriminations and delays and the like, would be such as to make reference to it unnecessary. On the other hand, without some such result our people felt that they were entitled to full information as to the status of affairs.

I added that there were a number of minor but unhappy cases which I thought we should have to discuss in the future. These, it seemed to me, were matters which we should be able to solve, since quantitatively they did not seem to me important. They related to the stoppage of German shipments which had already been paid for by our people; and to the refusal to permit passage of certain goods because they were supposed to be absolute contraband, which led to a controversy over a very small shipment of dental supplies to a European neutral because they contained rubber; and to the shipment from Germany of certain supplies of humanitarian and other articles of similar importance which could not be obtained elsewhere. I said that I did not wish to open this matter today, but that we should wish to get at it in the future.

^{24a} *Supra*.

Lord Lothian said that he fully agreed that these matters should be taken up and promptly settled, since he did not consider that they were of great importance practically.

As to the outgoing shipment of German goods, he noted that the principle applied to the date of the Order of [*in*] Council; goods paid for before that time he felt should be released, others not. I said that we naturally reserved our position that any blockade of outgoing goods was contrary to international law; but that in any case I did not think our people would feel themselves charged with knowledge of the date of the British Order in Council. In these cases the situation was that Americans had paid for materials; no advantage could accrue to the Germans, accordingly, from the shipment of these goods, and the only effect, therefore, was to inflict loss on our people. The Ambassador said that he agreed that was so, although the practice might grow up of paying for goods in advance and then insisting that the goods come through. I said that I thought few, if any, American business men were likely to pay for goods in advance and then take a chance on getting them out.

The only other observation of importance made was that I took occasion to emphasize that we understood the phrase in his *Aide-Mémoire* disclaiming any attempt to control "American trade or traders" must be taken to exclude any possibility of a black list; that our people were extremely sensitive in such matters. We had already had a situation in which Navicerts were issued for shipment to a neutral European, and made available to a number of American shippers but withheld as to one American shipper, which would seem to indicate that the objection was not to the consignee, but to the shipper.

Lord Lothian agreed that the only test was the consignee; though he said there might be certain cases of American shippers who were obviously enemy concerns, like the North German Lloyd. I said there would be no practical difficulty in the cases where the American shipper was very obviously an agent of the German government, but we could cross that bridge when we came to it. In general, I was glad to note their acceptance of the fundamental point of view that no black list would be undertaken as regarded American traders.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON, February 14, 1940.]

We expect to make a more careful and detailed reply to the *Aide-Mémoire* of the British Embassy, dated February 8th, at a later time. The following comment may be regarded as preliminary.

At the outset, note must be taken of the fact that the position of the British government is based almost entirely on the so-called Navicert system. This system is in the course of separate discussion; and it is perhaps sufficient to say now that the assurances which the Ambassador communicated to Mr. Grady on January 20th last are not considered adequate, and the present basis of the system does not conform to the understanding which this government had of the matter at its inception. It is expected that more extended discussion of this matter will be had within a few days.

Exception must be taken to the statement that the establishment of this system was due to the fact that "His Majesty's Government fell in with the suggestion made by the Secretary of State very early in the war" etc. It is unnecessary to remind the Ambassador that the Secretary's suggestion was that the two governments designate experts to confer, with a view to determining whether a certificate system along the general lines prevailing during the World War might not contribute to lessening interference by Great Britain with the commerce of the United States. This contemplated bilateral exploration, whereas the Navicert system was established by unilateral act, which in certain important fundamentals ignored the conditions suggested by our experts as essential.

We are pleased to observe that the British authorities are in direct contact with the American shipping lines whose vessels have been chiefly affected, and that it is believed that thereby any appearance of discrimination between American and other neutral ships may be removed. In this connection it is appropriate to observe that this government has been careful not to approve any arrangement which the American shipping lines might feel it to their interest to accept; and neither has it undertaken to exercise any influence preventing the entry to such arrangements, and naturally reserves to itself the right to scrutinize such arrangements, bearing in mind the contentions with which the Ambassador is familiar. Among these may be mentioned specifically the interest that any system, whether with or without agreement, which may obtain shall not become a method of controlling American commerce or commercial relations, or an attempt to ration neutrals with which this government has normal commercial relations; and we are happy to observe that the *Aide-Mémoire* disclaims any intention to permit the systems in force to achieve such result. The Government of the United States definitely understands that the disclaimer of any intent to control American trade or traders means that nothing in the nature of a black list shall be applied to American shippers.

Nevertheless it seems appropriate to make certain observations in this connection.

We are unable, first, to accept the suggestion of His Majesty's government that shipments on American vessels destined to neutrals are deemed to be contraband, subject to seizure, until the contrary is proved. In our view, the legal presumption is precisely the reverse. The case of a vessel delayed for fifteen days during examination, at the close of which no single item of its cargo was found to be contraband, whereupon the vessel was released, demonstrates, in our view, not the necessity that such cargo should have been certified in advance, but the complete lack of justification for holding the vessel in the first place.

Further, the implication that American shipping is obliged to co-operate with the British blockade rests on the essential theory that the American shipping lines should become a part of the British blockade mechanism, which of course cannot be accepted.

It would seem, accordingly, that though mention of belligerent rights is made, there ought to be an equivalent recognition of belligerent obligations. It may also be added that since the working of the control station, especially at Gibraltar, appears to be carried on entirely from London, and that its operation is therefore entirely within the knowledge of the British government and entirely unknown to us, we are obliged to judge the system by its actual results.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

740.00111A Combat Areas/195

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1940.

The Canadian Minister came in to see me today, at his request. He said that his inquiry about the possible use of a Canadian port as a British control station was already answered by Mr. Welles; that he now understood the British were considering the port of St. John, New Brunswick; that he had personally suggested that the British admiralty had better take over complete control of the station, rather than leaving it to the Canadian authorities, so that disputes about the operation of the station might continue to be between the British government and our own. He indicated that there was some slight irritation against the British in Ottawa as to the way in which the matter had been handled.

He likewise observed that he understood the Canadian government was working on the draft St. Lawrence Waterway treaty²⁵ and that he hoped that they would have some views in another week.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

²⁵ See vol. III, section under Canada entitled "Arrangements between the United States and Canada regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Waterway . . ."

740.00112 European War 1939/1092: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 22, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received February 22—12:30 p. m.]

437. Department's 1561, December 7, 2 p. m.,²⁶ and my 2565 December 8, 1 p. m.²⁷ Following signed note dated February 21st received today:

"I have the honour to invite a reference to the note Number 1646 which you were so good as to address to me on the 8th December²⁸ and to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given the most careful and systematic consideration to the views expressed by the United States Government on the subject of the operation of the Order in Council of the 27th November²⁹ providing for the seizure of goods of German origin or ownership upon the high seas.

(2) His Majesty's Government are not less anxious than the United States Government that the established principles of international law should be maintained at a time when the security of peace-loving nations is threatened by a growing tendency towards disrespect for these principles in international relations. Indeed it is in defence of these principles that His Majesty's Government are engaged in the present war and on that account they venture to hope that they may count on some measure of indulgence from neutral countries in their struggle against Germany which has so repeatedly shown its contempt for its international obligations.

(3) Since the outbreak of the war German submarines have repeatedly sunk merchant vessels not only British and Allied but neutral in violation of the rules contained in the submarine protocol of 1936³⁰ to which Germany is a party. More recently merchant vessels British, Allied, and neutral have been sunk by mines laid by German forces indiscriminately and without notification in contravention of the provisions of the Hague Convention Number VIII of 1907³¹ to which likewise Germany is a party. The sinking of these vessels has been effected without regard to their nationality or destination or to the nature, ownership, or destination of the cargoes and these acts have already resulted in grave loss of noncombatant life, British, Allied, and neutral alike. At the date when the Order in Council was issued not less than 10 neutral vessels had been sunk by German action while on their way to or from ports in the Continent of America and by the

²⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 786.

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ See telegram No. 1561, December 7, 1939, 2 p. m., to the Chargé in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 786, or Department of State *Bulletin*, December 9, 1939, p. 651.

²⁹ See telegram No. 2481, November 29, 1939, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 783.

³⁰ For correspondence regarding signature of procès-verbal, November 6, 1936, relating to Part IV (Rules of Submarine Warfare), London Naval Treaty, signed April 22, 1930, see *ibid.*, 1936, vol. I, pp. 160 ff.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1222.

end of January this figure had increased to not less than 19. In the majority of these cases the ports both of origin and destination were neutral and in 5 cases the ship was outward bound to America. In the last few days there has occurred the case of the Netherlands S. S. *Burgerdyk* which was torpedoed by a German submarine while on a direct voyage from New York to Rotterdam. It is only too clear that the German Government have deliberately embarked upon a policy of endeavouring to destroy all sea-borne trade between the Allied and other countries by a ruthless use of the forces at their disposal contrary to the laws and customs of war, the rights of neutrals, and the dictates of humanity. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have no alternative but to take retaliatory action and in view of their adversaries' patent disregard of the rules of war His Majesty's Government are amply justified under international law in taking such measures of retaliation. Although however the essence of retaliation is a departure from the ordinary rules as reprisal for illegal action by the enemy the actual measures contemplated by His Majesty's Government differ essentially from those adopted by Germany seeing that they do not involve the destruction of innocent vessels with their cargoes and passengers. His Majesty's Government would in any case be debarred by the most elementary considerations of humanity no less than by their respect for the general principles on behalf of which they are fighting from imitating the methods adopted by their opponents. The German Government's object then being to stop all sea-borne trade with the United Kingdom without distinction between exports and imports or between ships of belligerents or of neutrals His Majesty's Government by imposing an embargo upon German exports in addition to the contraband control which they have been exercising for some months can claim with justice to have had recourse to the type of retaliatory action exactly appropriate to the illegal action by Germany which has necessitated it. His Majesty's Government in fact are adopting measures whose object is to impose on German commerce restrictions and impediments similar to those which the German Government are attempting to impose on the commerce of this country. In His Majesty's Government's view the measures which they have decided to adopt constitute the very minimum of retaliation for meeting the settled policy of illegalities and outrages embarked on by the German Government. His Majesty's Government greatly regret that their action may be such as to cause injury to neutral interests but after giving the matter their most serious consideration they were forced to the conclusion that no means of retaliation could be devised which did not in some degree affect the interests of neutrals.

(4) In actual fact it will I am confident be found that the measures which His Majesty's Government have decided to apply are so far as concerns the legitimate interests of neutrals of a moderate character; and they have I know been framed and will be applied with all possible consideration for those interests. The fears expressed in paragraph 5 of your note will therefore I trust prove groundless. I can assure you that every effort will be made to ensure that inconveniences and damages to which innocent neutral trade and commerce will be subject will be reduced to the very minimum which is compatible with the attainment of the object which His Majesty's Government have in view namely the enforcement upon Germany of respect for her

treaty obligations and for the rights which other nations are entitled to enjoy under the recognized rules of international law.

(5) I would venture to call your attention to the clauses inserted in the Order-in-Council specifically in order to provide for the legitimate trade industry and commerce of neutrals. Although their decision to take action against German exports and property was announced on the 21st November and the Order in Council was made on the 27th November the measures in question are not applied to any ships which left port before the 4th December; and provision is made for the release of any goods which the prize court is satisfied had become neutral property before the 27th November and also for release in other cases with the consent of the proper officer of the Crown. Moreover if it appeared at the time when the vessel was being examined that a given consignment was of such a character that its release (should it be placed in prize) would probably be ordered it would be the desire of the competent authorities to avoid discharging consignment at all provided they were supplied in adequate time with all the necessary details and always excepting cases in which special reasons required the discharge of the goods. Further the Order in Council provides not for the confiscation but only for the detention of goods of German origin or ownership ordered to be discharged and at the end of the war they are to be dealt with as the prize court may think just; nor is any penalty for the vessel prescribed on account of the carriage of the goods. Every application for exemption from the reprisals Order in Council will be treated by His Majesty's Government on its merits. I can assure you that they will always be willing to have regard to humanitarian, educational, and scientific considerations as grounds on which exemption may be granted and that they will also take into account the possible effect on the country importing German goods of the refusal of an exemption. His Majesty's Government will always be ready to give rapid consideration to any applications for exemption which may be addressed to them on behalf of United States interests and will do their utmost to meet any reasonable request that may be put forward. It will be appreciated however that the necessity for carrying out the policy of the reprisals Order-in-Council must be the primary consideration.

(6) It is noted that paragraph 3 of your note suggests that as United States vessels are now prohibited by American law from engaging in any kind of commerce with ports on the west coast of Europe lying between Bergen on the north and the northern coast of Spain on the south the likelihood of such vessels carrying goods destined for or emanating from Germany is greatly diminished. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the force of this argument. At the same time they feel bound to point out that it is easily possible for goods of the utmost value to Germany to pass to and from Germany through neutral ports in the Mediterranean and northern Scandinavia which are outside the limits mentioned above and the very fact that United States vessels are prohibited from trading with ports more directly contiguous to Germany may well increase the probability of shipments by those more indirect routes. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will appreciate why it is that they feel unable to forego their right of visit and examination in respect of ships bound to or from ports on such routes.

(7) His Majesty's Government have taken note that the United States Government have reserved all its rights and the rights of its nationals whenever and to the extent to which they may be infringed. While His Majesty's Government cannot admit that legitimate exercise of their belligerent rights can give rise to claims I can assure you that if any persons interested in the ships or cargoes consider that they have good ground for a claim it is open to them to make it in the Prize Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Prize Court rules of 1939.³² The court has full jurisdiction to award damages in those cases where it finds a claim to be well-founded and any claim put forward by United States' interest will receive the fullest consideration."

JOHNSON

711.41/456

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He said that his Government and he himself were becoming concerned to an increasing extent about the explosive statements by statesmen and others in this country and by the increasingly acrimonious state of mind growing out of what are mainly minor circumstances, such as those relating to the search of mail.³³ The Ambassador and his Government seemed to have the impression that there was some kind of concerted movement to arouse and array public opinion against Great Britain and that it might prove very damaging, especially at some later and more serious stage of the war. The Ambassador made it clear that he and his Government were very much aroused and concerned in this respect.

I replied, first, by saying to him that Senator Pittman³⁴ does not consult the State Department in any way with respect to newspaper interviews he gives out from time to time, including those of recent date; that other senators and congressmen also do not consult the State Department in similar circumstances; and that there is in fact no concerted idea or effort on the part of statesmen and officials here in Washington, so far as I am advised, to array public opinion against Great Britain in the war. Then I proceeded to say that many of the small occurrences are more responsible for irritating expressions in this country and influence public opinion more than major considerations. For example, I referred to the search of mail at Trinidad which had reached Bogota. The Ambassador replied to this with the statement that he had just heard from his Government on this point and that the oral agreement of sometime ago to the effect that the British Gov-

³² United Kingdom, Statutory Rules and Orders, 1939 (No. $\frac{1466}{L.23}$).

³³ See vol. III, section under United Kingdom entitled "Representations to the British Government with regard to censorship of American mail."

³⁴ Key Pittman of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

ernment would not search mail due for South and Central America at Trinidad or elsewhere was being complied with; that the mail complained of at Bogota had been censored somewhere on its way from Europe and had then gone on to Bogota and was not censored or opened at Trinidad.

I further stated that, referring to another phase, I had just today requested Mr. McDermott, in charge of our information division, to get out some clarifying facts calculated to correct the impression in this country that it was unlawful for a belligerent to interrupt mail in the manner referred to, and also to clarify the mail situation in certain other respects, so that there would be less misunderstanding, with its resulting criticism.

I then inquired when the harbor at Halifax would be available for the examination of American cargoes destined for northern Europe instead of at Kirkwall. The Ambassador replied that the matter had been delayed because Canada was in the throes of an election and had read about the British purpose in the press before the British made it known officially to the Canadian Government. He added that he thought the matter would be cleared up very soon so that this harbor would be available. I expressed my gratification.

I stated to the Ambassador that without in any way abandoning our contention about goods which Americans were seeking to bring out of Germany, I wondered whether the British Government could not promptly let all goods come out that have been paid for in good faith within the proper period and he said he agreed with me about the advisability of affirmative action by his Government. I inquired why his Government could not let come out of Germany any extremely important commodity or article that was only manufactured in Germany and which is of almost indispensable need in this country. He expressed himself as entirely in favor of this idea and thought that both propositions could be handled by his Government. I again disclaimed any purpose to weaken in the slightest our contention about all goods in Germany in which Americans are interested but sought to clear up these two propositions at once. The Ambassador said that he differed with Senator Pittman about the right of a belligerent to take a merchant vessel of a neutral into port for examination, etc., etc. I replied that I had requested Mr. Hackworth, our counselor, to assemble all of the law on the recent incident out of which this question arose.

I then said to the Ambassador that since he was discussing the effects of adverse opinion in this country on the British war situation at this stage, I was reminded to bring to his attention the real possibilities of bad relations between the two countries sometime later when

the war situation may be much more acute and serious than it is at present. I proceeded to say that I should forever despise myself if I was in the slightest degree unreasonable or unjust to his country in what I said recently to the Ambassador about the shutting off of agricultural exports from this country to Great Britain.³⁵ I added that 50 percent of our entire agricultural exports ordinarily go to Great Britain and that at one swoop the British Government has cut off probably 90 percent of our total agricultural exports to Great Britain; that this is easily capable of starting an uprising of the farm population and the resulting arousal of nation-wide sentiment of an unfavorable and unfriendly nature; and that the British Government in expending four to five billions of dollars a year might find it extremely important to consider what would be almost a nominal amount of this sum as an allotment for the purchase of agricultural exports in this country. The Ambassador was very much interested in what I said and questioned to some extent my statement that 90 percent of our exports were shut out by the British Government. He seemed greatly interested in having this matter favorably dealt with and indicated definitely that he would continue to do his level best to bring about such a development.

740.00111A Combat Areas/177 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 28, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received February 28—3 p. m.]

490. Strictly personal for the President from Naval Person.

"Very many thanks for your most kind letter of February 1 [2?].³⁶ Since on January 29 I gave orders to the fleet not to bring any American ships into the zone you have drawn around our shores, many of the other departments have become much concerned about the efficiency of the blockade, and the difficulties of discriminating between various countries. The neutrals are all on them and they are all on me. Nevertheless the order still stands and no American ship has been brought by the navy into the danger zone. But you can imagine my embarrassment what [*when?*] Moore McCormack Line actually advertise in Norway that they do not have to worry about navicerts or Kirkwall, and when all the Scandinavian countries complain of discrimination in American favor. I wonder whether there is any way in which the Moore McCormack Line could be persuaded, in addition to accepting navicerts as a general rule, not to carry mails for Scandinavia until the arrangements we are trying to make at St. John,

³⁵ See vol. III, section under United Kingdom entitled "Representations to the British Government on effects of import controls on American business and agriculture."

³⁶ Not printed.

New Brunswick, or elsewhere, are ready. All our experience shows that the examination of mails is essential to efficient control as only in this way can we get the evidence of evasion. I do hope that I may be helped to hold the position I have adopted by the American shipping lines availing themselves of the great convenience of navicerts which was an American invention and thus enable American trade to proceed without hindrance.

It is a great pleasure to me to keep you informed about naval matters, although alas I cannot have the honor of a talk with you in person."

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/1188

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] February 29, 1940.

I have read and considered carefully the British reply to our protest of December 8 last against their interference with exports from Germany. A copy of the Embassy's telegram quoting this note is attached.³⁷ I consider this note a combination of misstatements of international law and propaganda. It would be comparatively easy to draft a reply to this note taking issue with a number of their statements of law, but I do not believe that we would get anywhere; and I recommend that this note be filed without reply. I suggest that instead of replying to this note we press for favorable action in individual cases.

This being a British note, obviously we can take no action in the matter of making it public; if the British wish to make it public, they will of course do so.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

740.00111A Combat Areas/177: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1940—3 p. m.

418. Your 490, February 28, 8 p. m. Please convey following message to the Naval Person from the President:

"Upon my return to Washington, I received your message. I deeply appreciate your efforts. I am having the situation thoroughly studied and will communicate with you further as soon as possible."

HULL

³⁷ Telegram No. 437, February 22, 3 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 24.

740.00112 European War 1939/1405

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert B. Stewart of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1940.

Representatives of the British and French Governments called at the Department today to discuss the question of American interest in exports from Germany. The following persons were present:

State Department representatives:

Mr. Berle
Mr. Dunn ³⁸
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. Yingling ³⁹
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Stewart

British representatives:

Mr. F. Ashton-Gwatkin ⁴⁰
Mr. A. K. Helm, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. R. Reid-Adam, Commercial Secretary, British Embassy

French representatives:

Professor Charles Rist ⁴¹
Mr. Maurice Garreau-Dombasle, Commercial Counselor,
French Embassy
Mr. Jacques Dumaine, First Secretary, French Embassy

Mr. Dunn opened the meeting with the statement that Mr. Berle had been called to the White House and would join the meeting later. He asked Mr. Hackworth, whose office has been handling this subject in the first instance, to outline to the group our interest in securing exports from Germany and our experience in dealing with the British authorities.

Mr. Hackworth discussed in some detail instances in which goods are held in neutral ports awaiting approval of applications filed with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. He pointed out that of some forty cases which have already been passed upon applications have been approved in only about six and in only one of these cases was the quantity or value of the goods of any consequence. Mr. Hackworth said that these goods have already been paid for and Germany has already received foreign exchange for them. He believed, therefore, that the release of such goods to the United States could not possibly aid Germany nor would any injury accrue to Great Britain.

Mr. Hickerson said that this government had been very much gratified with the assurances which it had received from the British Gov-

³⁸ James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

³⁹ Raymond T. Yingling, Assistant to the Legal Adviser.

⁴⁰ Adviser on policy to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

⁴¹ Economic Adviser to the French Ministry of Blockade.

ernment last November that every effort would be made to minimize inconvenience to neutral shippers and merchants. We had also been pleased with the more explicit assurances which the British Government gave in its note of February 21, 1940. As a matter of fact, however, these good assurances simply have not been implemented in actual practice. The British Government has not yet replied to our note of January 17 [19], 1940.⁴² Furthermore, it has declined to give reasons for its refusal to grant applications. Hence we are completely in the dark as to the British Government's attitude toward certain broad types of cases which were mentioned in the note of January 17. Mr. Hickerson thought it would be helpful to us, therefore, if Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin could tell us very candidly what the British authorities were aiming at and on what basis they were operating.

After certain general introductory remarks Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin read a summary of the British draft reply to the January 17th note. He said that this was merely a draft; that it had not yet been dressed up in diplomatic language, but that he would be glad to leave a copy with us for our information.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin read this summary again after Mr. Berle had joined the group and Mr. Berle commented on various arguments put forward, emphasizing particularly that we could not of course admit that a British Order in Council could be binding upon American nationals.

Mr. Hackworth said that he hoped very much we could reach some conclusion and could agree upon a public announcement with regard to goods awaiting shipment in neutral ports. It was agreed that Mr. Helm, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Yingling would draft a statement on the subject which might be given to the press.

Mr. Berle said that aside from the goods within the above category there were many types of special cases which had to be dealt with and he wondered whether or not the British Government could not give assurances regarding these special types of goods. He asked Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin if he did not consider this a practicable approach to the problem. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that the British authorities, as already pointed out in their note to us, preferred to consider each case on its own merits subject to the general assurances which had been given.

Mr. Hickerson at this point repeated his earlier statement that we had no complaint whatsoever with regard to the assurances which the British Government had given but that there is a wide discrepancy between assurances and performance. He called attention particularly to the Sonotone Corporation's application for permission to import certain special types of carbon from Germany which this

⁴² See telegram No. 13, January 20, to the Ambassador in Italy, p. 7.

company had always used and which it considers necessary for the manufacture of hearing devices. He said that this was typical of cases involving obvious hardship to this country and with which he believed the British Government should readily admit their obligation to refrain from interfering.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin suggested that it would appear advisable to set up some machinery to deal with individual cases. He thought such machinery should be established in London so that the American Embassy could deal directly with the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Mr. Berle added that he too had been thinking along the lines of establishing some machinery but that he felt that whatever machinery might be set up should be established in Washington rather than in London. First of all irritated American citizens do not like the thought of going to London to request permission from the British authorities to do something which they feel they have a perfect right to do. Secondly, the problem could be more effectively handled here because the interested parties and the evidence relating to their cases are here and could be presented directly. Mr. Berle asked Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin to look into this possibility further before our next meeting on the subject.

841.711/3189

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert B. Stewart of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1940.

Representatives of the British and French Governments called at the Department today to discuss the question of diversion and detention of American ships and cargoes and the interference with American mails. The following persons were present:

State Department representatives:

Mr. Berle
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Stewart

British representatives:

Mr. F. Ashton-Gwatkin
Mr. N. M. Butler, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. A. K. Helm, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. R. Reid-Adam, Commercial Secretary, British Embassy
The Honorable Loring Christie, Minister of Canada

French representatives:

Professor Charles Rist
Mr. Maurice Garreau-Dombasle, Commercial Counselor,
French Embassy
Mr. Jacques Dumaine, First Secretary, French Embassy

Mr. Berle opened the discussion with the subject of detention of ships at Gibraltar. He said that we had already complained to Great Britain about the long detention, and particularly about discrimination in favor of Italian lines. He added that while the situation has now improved considerably, it has improved on Britain's own terms, the improvement resulting from (a) Black Diamond or holdback guarantees; (b) navicert arrangements. Mr. Berle said that we reserved the right to scrutinize all such agreements, to see particularly that they do not involve black-listing or discrimination against American shippers. Moreover, we have reserved all our rights under international law and have already taken the position that the burden of proof is on the belligerent to prove enemy destination of cargo passing from one neutral country to another. The contraband control system, on the other hand, works the other way around. Our silence must, therefore, not be construed as consent to the legality of the system. However, we have been pleased to note a considerable improvement in the situation at Gibraltar.

Mr. Hickerson added that the average period of detention had now been reduced from more than twelve days per vessel during October to 3.7 days during the first half of February.

Mr. Berle then mentioned the recent ruling announced in the Department of Commerce's circular to Collectors of Customs on February 29. Under this ruling no merchant vessel, foreign or domestic, departing from the United States may proceed into any foreign port, including a contraband control station, except in stress of weather, distress, or under military or naval compulsion without having cleared for belligerent ports. A clearance will be granted only if title to cargo has been transferred. Mr. Berle said that Scandinavian boats have been calling voluntarily at British control stations and that he was now obliged to tell them that they must discontinue this practice unless title to cargo has been transferred. The other alternative, he added, is for them to be taken in under force and we are trying to work out a recognition of the mildest form of coercion.

Mr. Maurice Garreau-Dombasle asked if a radio command sent from Kirkwall would be regarded as coercion or *force majeure*.

Mr. Berle thought that this would depend upon whether or not the British were actually in a position to enforce the command and he felt that the boats might want to run fairly close to Kirkwall and have radio commands sent which they could log, otherwise they would face a dilemma of either trying to run the British control or of violating American law.

Mr. Hickerson said that the Scandinavians were quite frantic about the situation. They came to him a few days ago and he explained to them the system at Gibraltar under which each American ship is given

a command at close range to go into Gibraltar. The ship logs the command and goes in. Since the British ships are actually there to enforce the command it is unquestionably a case of coercion. Mr. Hickerson said that he had suggested that the Scandinavian ships make certain that they had an order from the British and that this order should be entered in the log before going in.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin, returning to the subject of interference with shipping in the Mediterranean, stated the British position as follows: (1) Britain does not accept the contention that the burden of proof with regard to cargo passing between neutral countries rests with the belligerent; (2) as regards the Black Diamond guarantee he gave explicit assurances that there is no black-listing and no discrimination involved; (3) as to alleged discrimination in favor of Italian ships, this is merely a suspicion which has arisen from the fact that the Italians have provided advance information and have accordingly been released with shorter delays. Also, Italian ships have given Black Diamond guarantees more readily and have carried block cargoes while American ships have been carrying miscellaneous cargoes.

Mr. Berle said that we were glad to accept Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin's assurances and that we did not desire to go over the ground again; that we did want to reserve our position and certainly would not admit that guarantees and arrangements of the above nature could be substituted for the right of search under international law.

Mr. Dunn agreed that we were prepared to rest on this position.

Mr. Berle next brought up the subject of diversion. He thought that if the navicert and holdback arrangements were working no question of diversion would arise except for the question of mails. He said that we recognize the right of a belligerent to divert ships under certain circumstances which have been set forth in our notes to the British Government but we have never recognized that the right of diversion could give rise to an additional right of censoring mails.

Mr. Berle said that an added complication had just arisen with the refusal of Scandinavian vessels to carry American mails. Under American law ships may be refused clearance if they decline to take mails tendered to them.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin asked whether there might be a possibility that American ships would discontinue carrying mail to Scandinavia and leave this to Great Britain and other neutrals.

Mr. Berle said he thought that American ships will very likely be coming to us presently as the Scandinavian lines have done to say that they don't want to carry the mails.

Professor Rist asked whether this was not the real solution of the problem.

Mr. Dunn replied that we were dealing with a public service and that he did not regard the suggestion as a practicable one either from a public point of view or from the view of the Post Office Department.

Mr. Hickerson felt that this government would be subject to severe criticism if such a solution were adopted. He said that there is a limit beyond which we could not hope to go. The Moore-McCormack Line has agreed already not to carry passengers. Moreover, American vessels to Scandinavia do not carry mails to Germany. The Post Office Department, very obligingly to Great Britain, sends all mails to Germany through Gibraltar.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that this merely meant that persons wishing to evade the censorship would try all the harder to get mail to Germany via Scandinavia. He added that the censorship is a vital question to Great Britain and is intimately bound up with contraband control—so intimately that he could not conceive of a contraband control without a control of mails. He wanted to mention in passing that trade secrets of American firms were not being used improperly by the British authorities.

Mr. Berle said he was glad to accept this assurance but that it did not cover the situation. He agreed with Mr. Hickerson that it would be unwise to accede to any request of the Moore-McCormack Lines to discontinue carrying mails.

Professor Rist repeated the view that mail control is an indispensable accompaniment of contraband control and that they know a great quantity of mail is being flown from Germany to Madrid.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that since Kirkwall seemed to be out and since American ships apparently could not discontinue carrying mail he could see only two possible solutions: (*a*) that all mail pass Gibraltar or (*b*) that a control base be established somewhere in Canada. He thought the first of these would involve less delay.

Mr. Berle said we did not have instructions to do more than take note of any proposal which the British and French might make on the second point. Mr. Dunn added that he thought we would like to have any suggestion in somewhat greater detail. For example, they had mentioned only one possible port. There might be others that might well come into the picture.

Mr. Christie stated that Canada had been asked by Great Britain whether it would agree to a control base at St. John, New Brunswick, and that Canada has replied that it would acquiesce in such an arrangement on condition that this would contribute to a solution of some of the problems pending between the United States and Great Britain.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin suggested that if such a base were established American mail might be taken off at St. John and forwarded by the next fast British boat.

Mr. Berle said that that involved exactly the thing we were trying to avoid, acquiescence in a system which would enable the British to censor our mail.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that his government maintained the right to bring ships in, even into the combat zone, but that for convenience they were willing to establish another base. Mr. Berle thought that Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin had skipped a point, and repeated that we do not recognize any right of the British to take ships in for censoring mails.

Mr. Hackworth asked whether in fact the censorship operations revealed information of any moment and Mr. Hickerson wanted to know whether the value of mail censorship to Great Britain was sufficient to off-set the tremendous neutral irritation. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin answered yes to both these questions. He said he would be glad to show us some evidences of the kind of information they secure from the mails.

Mr. Butler asked if St. John were established as a control base whether the United States would object to American ships carrying mail there.

Mr. Dunn suggested that a subcommittee be appointed to consider some of the questions involved in establishing a base on this side. He said he thought there were certain considerations which the British Government would certainly want to have in mind before reaching any decision on the question. It was agreed that such a subcommittee would meet tomorrow.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin then raised the question of mails from Europe to the United States and stated that he was instructed to inform us in confidence that his government was going to start censoring outward bound mails from Europe. Mr. Hickerson observed that this was getting quite a distance from contraband control.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin then raised the question of air mails and the possibility of intercepting air mails. He said that this was a new question but if mails were free to go by air then there certainly could be no blockade.

Mr. Berle said that of course Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin was familiar with the reaction in this country to a recent case of interception of American mails which had voluntarily come into British territory. He said that we did not need to indulge in any imagination in order to picture the reaction which would result if a squadron of British planes appeared over Portugal and fired a shot at an American plane. He hoped, therefore, that the matter would be threshed out before anything was done and that the British would not present a *fait accompli*. He said that we were acutely aware of the situation and of the British problem and that he personally approached the subject with sympathy.

Professor Rist stressed the view that the principle of looking for mails in planes is the same as looking for mails in ships. Only the technique is different. Mr. Berle thought that there were distinct limits to which this argument might be carried and referred to certain new practices in 1916 which the German Government indulged in and attempted to justify on the basis of new circumstances.

Mr. Berle added that if the British Government claimed the right to intercept planes with air squadrons the other side might decide to put squadrons in the air also. He thought it was by no means certain who would control the situation in this case. This point he thought the British Government might wish to consider before reaching any conclusions.

740.00111A Combat Areas/230

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert B. Stewart of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1940.

Representatives of the British, French and Canadian Governments called at Mr. Berle's office today to discuss the question of establishing a contraband control base on this side of the Atlantic and the question of moral embargoes of this country. The following persons were present:

State Department representatives:

Mr. Berle
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Stewart

British representatives:

Mr. F. Ashton-Gwatkin
Sir Owen Chalkley, Commercial Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. N. M. Butler, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. A. K. Helm, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. R. Reid-Adam, Commercial Secretary, British Embassy

Canadian representatives:

The Honorable Loring Christie, Minister of Canada
Mr. R. Ronald Macdonnell, Third Secretary, Canadian
Legation

French representative:

Mr. Jacques Dumaine, First Secretary, French Embassy

(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTRABAND CONTROL BASE IN CANADA

In opening the meeting Mr. Berle first took up the question of a contraband control base on this side of the Atlantic and asked the subcommittee, which had been considering this question, to report.

Mr. Dunn replied that the subcommittee had canvassed the various possibilities but that it did not reach anything definite. It was found that there were at least some objections to any port which might be set up as a contraband control base. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin asked if this meant that all possibility of finding a base in Canada were ruled out. Mr. Berle answered that he could not say that and that it was not within our province to rule out automatically anything which the British and the Canadians might work out together.

Mr. Dunn then emphasized something which he had pointed out in the subcommittee meeting, namely, that any base which should be established should not be set up as a mails control base.

Mr. Hickerson said that establishing a mails station would, of course, place us in an impossible position.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin replied that any base established would of course be a contraband control station. Referring to the Kirkwall base, he said that he believed American ships had not called there voluntarily. Similarly, it was his understanding that if a base were established on this side ships would not call voluntarily.

Mr. Hickerson added that they could not enter voluntarily, even at St. John, New Brunswick, with arms, ammunition, and implements of war on board. Furthermore, Scandinavian ships carrying American goods could not enter a British control base voluntarily unless title to the goods had passed.

Mr. Berle said that we wondered just what the British were doing to the Scandinavian shipping people. He referred particularly to the Icelandic ship *Goderfoss* now awaiting clearance in New York. The ship was refusing to take mail apparently on the basis of an agreement with the British Government under which the Line is forbidden to carry American mails. Mr. Berle said he hardly believed that an agreement between two foreign countries regulating the carrying of American mails would have been entered into without informing or consulting this country.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin replied that he believed there is such an agreement between Great Britain and Iceland under which Icelandic ships would not carry American mails. Mr. Berle asked whether the Scandinavian Lines in declining to accept American mails were acting under similar agreements with Great Britain. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin replied that they were not.

Mr. Hickerson asked what earthly interest Great Britain could have in binding the Icelandic Line not to carry American mails. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that speaking frankly this restriction seemed to him to be a rather foolish one.

Mr. Berle said that under such an arrangement as this any two countries could control our mails.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin asked if it were not an issue between the United States and Iceland. If these ships carry United States mails then Great Britain feels that they should come into Kirkwall.

Mr. Berle replied that the question wasn't nearly so simple as that. As a privilege for using our ports foreign ships are expected to carry mails which our Post Office Department tenders to them.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin stated that he wanted to stay out of this fight and that he would take it up with his government and ask them to keep out of the fight. He added that of course the Icelandic agreement had no relation to the other cases of refusal to carry American mails.

Mr. Berle said that we could not accept this last statement because ships of all countries may claim equal treatment in American ports and under American laws; therefore, if we exempt Icelandic ships from carrying American mails we will have to grant similar exemption to ships of other countries. As a result of agreements of this kind, Mr. Berle added, the British Government is actually increasing the difficulty of the very problem for which we are now trying to find a solution, the censorship of mails, because such agreements would tend to divert mails to American ships.

Mr. Hickerson asked why Scandinavian ships are so anxious to avoid Kirkwall. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin replied that this was because Mr. Hitler has said he would sink them on sight if they go to Kirkwall.

Mr. Berle asked Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin if there was any reason why he could not cable his government and ask if the agreement with Iceland was not unnecessary. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that he would so cable his government. Mr. Berle repeated that we could not take the position that an agreement between foreign countries regarding American mails does not concern us and he hoped that an appropriate telegram to London would enable this Icelandic vessel to clear and would settle the general problem.

Returning to the question of a contraband control base, Mr. Berle observed that Scandinavian ships apparently do not wish to go to Kirkwall nor do we want our ships to go to Kirkwall. Indeed, we don't want them to have to go to any belligerent control base. However, he thought that it was not up to a neutral power to make suggestions as to how these difficulties might be met.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that he would be very grateful for any suggestions. He asked if there was nothing to choose between the various Canadian ports and whether they are all equally objectionable. He referred to St. John in particular.

Mr. Dunn replied that the subcommittee had canvassed all possible ports and that he could not think of any port which would not be objectionable from some point of view.

Mr. Berle said that the problem might be tackled from a different point of view: the Post Office Department would like to have the quickest and cheapest mail service available. This at the moment appears to be by the Scandinavian Lines. He said he would leave the subject there for the further contemplation of the British and French and that they might be able to work something out which we could agree upon here. The matter was of course primarily for their consideration. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin thanked Mr. Berle for this suggested approach and said they would see whether this thought could be developed.

(2) MORAL EMBARGOES

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin then brought up the subject of moral embargoes and said that he would like very much to have some information on this subject. Mr. Berle handed him some press releases and other materials covering this subject. Mr. Berle also made a brief statement outlining the historical development of the moral embargo in this country. It began in June 1938 at which time we objected to the bombing of civilian populations from the air.⁴³ In July 1938 we addressed letters to airplane manufacturers suggesting that planes, aircraft armaments and aircraft accessories not be sold to countries engaged in bombing of civilian populations. On December 2, 1939, a day or two after the invasion of Finland, a further statement was issued⁴⁴ adding materials essential to airplane manufacture to the scope of the policy which by the terms of the statement applies to countries which are engaged in the bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air. These statements were intended to apply to Japan and the Soviet Union. Many companies, however, have interpreted them to include Germany.

There exists also a moral embargo on strategic and critical raw materials. This applies to exports to any country except shipments in normal quantities to normal customers, which means that certain quantities are being exported to countries in the western hemisphere. Mr. Berle said that so far as we were advised there has been no transshipment of these strategic and critical raw materials from countries in this hemisphere to other areas.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin wanted to know what materials might not be exported without an export license. Mr. Hickerson answered that tin plate scrap and helium gas, which are covered by special legislation, are the only materials other than arms, ammunition and implements of war for which an export license is required.

⁴³ See statement by the Acting Secretary of State, June 3, 1938, *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. I, p. 595.

⁴⁴ Press release issued by the White House, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 202.

Mr. Berle, continuing his statement, said that in connection with the bombing of open cities we considered it illogical to place a moral embargo on selling airplanes and airplane parts and at the same time to enable countries so engaged to manufacture high test aviation gasoline. We asked companies which were selling technical information to Japan and the Soviet Union to abstain from making that sale.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin wanted to know what happens to people who don't obey the moral embargo. Mr. Berle answered that a little persuasion usually convinces a party that he ought to conform to a policy which this government has announced. A moral embargo, he said, is in its own particular way perhaps even more effective than all the legal provisions one could devise.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that copper was something that interested them very much and asked if there was any restriction on its export. Mr. Berle replied that there was none.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said there was another commodity about which he wanted to make special inquiry, namely, industrial diamonds. This, he said, is connected with mails censorship. He believed that the United States Post Office Department prohibits industrial diamonds from going by air mails. He would like to know definitely whether this was so and whether this rule might not be extended to all mails.

Mr. Berle said that we would be glad to furnish any information available concerning existing postal regulations on this subject.

Sir Owen Chalkley said that it was really a question of re-export of industrial diamonds. This would not come under the question of moral embargoes but under strategic materials prohibitions. He thought the Army and Navy Munitions Board would be interested in considering industrial diamonds from the point of view of strategic materials. According to information of his government industrial diamonds come from Brazil and are then forwarded by American mails to Germany.

Mr. Berle said we would of course be glad to have any information from the British on this subject and any explanation of their views. As regards letter mail, the sending of articles of value to belligerent territory without transfer of title is illegal. Any shipment to a belligerent country is illegal unless there is filed a declaration, under oath, of transfer of title.

740.00111A Combat Areas/231

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division
of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1940.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin came in to see me this morning at twelve o'clock following a meeting in Mr. Grady's office. He said that he wished to tell me about his conversation in Ottawa in respect to a contraband control station. He said that the Canadian Ministers are not particularly happy about having a contraband control station located in Canada. He said that they will not make any decision on the subject until after the elections next Tuesday, March 26, but that after considering Halifax, Saint John, New Brunswick, Shelburne, Nova Scotia and eliminating these three ports, it now appears likely that the port of Sydney, Nova Scotia will receive serious consideration. He commented that Sydney is north of the neutrality belt and not subject to objection on that score. He said there was a good harbor there, and facilities were, he understood, satisfactory.

He then referred to the information which I had given Mr. Butler yesterday ⁴⁵ to the effect that Saint John's, Newfoundland was, subject to the general reservations which I had made, the least objectionable port for a contraband control station from the American point of view. He inquired whether Sydney, Nova Scotia might not be no more objectionable to us than Saint John's, Newfoundland. I told him that I would confer with Messrs. Dunn and Berle, and let him know our joint conclusion.

740.00111A Combat Areas/233

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert B. Stewart of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1940.

British representatives:

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin
Mr. Helm
Mr. Reid-Adam
Mr. Butler

French representatives:

Professor Rist
Mr. Dumaine

Canadian representatives:

The Honorable Loring Christie
Mr. Macdonnell

⁴⁵ Memorandum of conversation not printed.

State Department representatives:

Mr. Hickerson

Mr. Stewart

Following the discussion of Britain's blockade of German exports (see separate memorandum of Le)⁴⁶ Mr. Butler, Mr. Christie and Mr. Macdonnell joined the group which then took up the question of a contraband control base in Canada. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin opened the discussion on this topic by saying that the control base question was becoming a rather difficult and complicated one. Two ports—St. John, New Brunswick, and Halifax, Nova Scotia—which seemed best suited to the British appeared to be objectionable from the point of view of the United States. St. John's, Newfoundland, and Sydney, Nova Scotia, which have also been considered, were less desirable because of ice and fog. Their use, moreover, would result in taking ships into the convoy route.

Mr. Hickerson said that he understood that Sydney is ice-bound at the present time and asked whether this were correct. Mr. Christie replied that Sydney was not really ice-bound but that there are at certain times, as at present, a certain amount of ice in the harbor which makes navigation somewhat difficult. However, only twenty-five miles from Sydney there is the port of Louisburg which is not troubled by ice.

On the general question of establishing a control base Mr. Hickerson said that, subject to all the reservations which we have made regarding interference with American ships and their diversion into belligerent ports, there are three ports which from our point of view are in the same category as "least objectionable"—St. John's, Newfoundland; Sydney, Nova Scotia; and Louisburg, Nova Scotia. Mr. Christie observed that it really came down to two ports since, if Sydney should be chosen, Louisburg would be used only as a subsidiary or alternative port when Sydney is not clear of ice.

Mr. Hickerson said that with regard to the difficulty of crossing the convoy route Louisburg and Sydney seemed to him to be neither more nor less objectionable than the other ports because ships going to Bergen would have to cross the convoy route somewhere anyway and he saw no reason why they should not just as well cross it near this side of the Atlantic. With the navicert and holdback system operating effectively there would be little necessity for ships actually to go in. The threat of taking ships in would accomplish the British purpose just as well as actually taking them in.

Mr. Butler said he was afraid it would be necessary to take the ships in for the purpose of checking the cargo against navicerts. Also, his government would want to check the ships' stores. Mr.

⁴⁶ Memorandum of the Office of the Legal Adviser not printed.

Hickerson said that if the whole cargo were navicerted, it was his understanding that there would be a ship navicert. The last Moore-McCormack ship that sailed, he believed, had about sixty percent of its cargo navicerted. The rest was covered by holdback guarantees. In cases like this, if there are no mails or passengers, he could see no reason whatsoever for taking these ships in. Mr. Helm said that if the percentage of navicerted cargo should reach, say, ninety percent or more then they might find it less necessary to take ships in.

Professor Rist asked whether it would be possible for us to bring pressure of some kind to increase the percentage of navicerted cargo. Mr. Hickerson answered that this was a difficult proposition. He mentioned the 1916 law ⁴⁷ under which vessels may be denied clearance if they refuse to accept cargo when space is available. This law, he added, is discretionary and its application rests with the Secretary of the Treasury. If we reach some understanding on the operation of the navicert system, the American Government would not take a position in respect to the system; we realize that the practical effect of this will be to give the whole system our unofficial blessing.

Returning again to the necessity of actually taking the ships in, Mr. Hickerson said that we in the Department have been referring to the proposed base as a "phantom contraband station". We have thought that in the overwhelming number of cases there would be no necessity to take vessels in and we have understood the British position to be that if the cargo is covered by navicerts or drawback agreements the British would not want to take in every ship.

Mr. Butler replied that they would certainly have to take in most ships. It must be more than a phantom station. He said that they had to remember the Scandinavian shipping lines and if American ships were exempted, Scandinavian ships would expect similar treatment. He thought that we in the Department had not realized the embarrassment which the British Government had experienced in letting American ships go to Scandinavia without diversion into Kirkwall while Scandinavian ships were taken in. The proposal to establish a contraband control base on this side had, after all, been in deference to American law. He had hoped that we would not find it necessary to raise the question of the neutrality belt. He thought it inconceivable that there could be any protest if, say, a Canadian warship sank a German submarine off the Canadian coast. If Shelburne, for example, were established as a control base would it not be for the safety of American citizens and mails? It seemed to him that if any question arose our government would have no difficulty explaining these points, which appeared to him most reasonable, to the American people.

⁴⁷ 39 Stat. 728, 733.

Mr. Hickerson said that while Mr. Butler had made a convincing presentation, he must point out that the President and Mr. Welles had considered the question of a control base in respect to the neutrality belt and had taken a strong position in this regard which had been made known to Lord Lothian. Any question respecting this position should be taken up by Lord Lothian with Mr. Welles.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin said that the first problem was to discuss the question of the availability and desirability of certain points with the Canadian Government. He thought that we could not go any further in our discussions on this until he had talked to Ottawa again.

It was agreed that this subject would be discussed again at 2:30 next Friday afternoon after Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin's return from Ottawa.

740.00111A Combat Areas/212

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the
Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1940.

MR. WELLES: During the conversations we have been having with Professor Rist and Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin, the question of the establishment of a contraband control base on this side of the Atlantic has come up. We have made it clear to the representatives of the French and British Governments that this is a matter upon which we maintain all our reservations as to our neutral rights. In order to avoid taking American ships into Kirkwall, the British and French insist that it will be necessary to establish a contraband control base in Western Atlantic waters, and they have mentioned several ports at which such a base could be established, including the following ports, starting from the most northerly: St. John's, Newfoundland; Sydney, Nova Scotia; Louisburg, Nova Scotia; Halifax, Nova Scotia; Shelbourne, Nova Scotia; and St. John, New Brunswick. In order to be frank with the British and French representatives, we have informally and entirely unofficially pointed out to them certain objections to all of these ports. These objections, as you will recall, range from dangers to navigation by reason of ice and fog in the case of the first three ports, and in the case of Halifax and Shelbourne to the fact that they are within the zone laid down under the Declaration of Panama; finally, in the case of St. John, New Brunswick, to the fact that it is so close to the American border and is almost within the confines of the Bay of Fundy that any belligerent activities so close to our own coast would be decidedly objectionable. I might add that St. John, New Brunswick, has apparently been dropped from consideration by the British and Canadian authorities.

Messrs. Rist and Ashton-Gwatkin requested us to indicate to them which of these ports, taking everything into account, was the least objectionable from the American point of view. After careful consideration, we informed them that St. John's, Newfoundland, was the least objectionable, but we were careful not only to reserve all of our rights, but to lay special emphasis upon the President's statement about our holding the British responsible for any damage to American ships caused by ice or fog conditions at that port. A little later, we were informed by Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin that facilities at St. John's, Newfoundland, were inadequate and that active consideration was being given to Sydney and Louisburg, Nova Scotia. These ports are both well north of the neutrality belt and we informed him that, subject to these same general reservations which we had made in respect to St. John's, Newfoundland, we had no special objection to either Sydney or Louisburg.

Throughout all of our discussions it has been apparent that the British really desired to have their contraband control station either at Halifax or Shelbourne, Nova Scotia. As regard these ports, we have simply taken the position that in view of your statements some time ago to Lord Lothian, it would be necessary for the Ambassador to take up with you anything they had in mind along these lines.

Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin has made two trips to Ottawa to confer with the Canadian authorities in regard to the choice of a port. He returned to Washington today, and we have just concluded a meeting with him. He informed us that after careful consideration the Canadians feel that of all the ports which have been discussed, Shelbourne, Nova Scotia, is the only one to which they can agree. He read from a confidential memorandum prepared by Canadian Naval officers discussing each of these ports and stating the reasons why it was necessary to eliminate every one other than Shelbourne. We informed him that in that case it would be well for the Ambassador to take up the question with you. At all stages of our conversations with the British, French, and Canadians, we have worked under the direction of Mr. Berle. Before reaching a final decision on the matter, you may wish to discuss with him, and perhaps with us, the further phases of this problem as they have developed during our conversations.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

740.00111A Combat Areas/213

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1940.

The British Ambassador, accompanied by the Canadian Minister, called to see me this afternoon. The Ambassador commenced the conversation by saying that he assumed the question of a contraband control base in Canada was now more or less of a theoretical problem in view of the situation which had just occurred in Scandinavia.⁴⁸ I told the Ambassador that that was my impression since it seemed to me highly probable that the President would have to modify the combat zone so as to include the entire Norwegian coast and that if this were done, it would make it impossible for American ships to travel from the United States to Norwegian ports. I stated that this matter would, of course, have to be determined later and that for the time being that was my impression.

I said, however, that, by instruction of the President, I wanted to make it clear both to the Ambassador and to the Minister that in the event a contraband control base were to be set up in some Canadian port, this Government would not agree to the selection of the port of shelter as proposed by the British and Canadian Governments since that port lay within the restricted zone laid down by the Declaration of Panama, and that this Government, of course, could not acquiesce in any infringement of the terms of the Declaration. I stated further that the President wished me to say that he believed that any contraband control base should be to the north of Halifax and that consequently Sydney and Louisburg, Nova Scotia would seem to be the most desirable ports from every point of view. The Canadian Minister undertook some discussion as to the respective merits of various ports, but finally agreed that both Sydney and Louisburg could be made practicable bases of contraband control. He said that he would inform the Canadian Government of the statements I had made so that they might be fully aware of the point of view of this Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00112 European War 1939/1298: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1940—7 p. m.

662. Your 904, April 10, 5 p. m., and Department's 643, April 9, 5 p. m.⁴⁹ Another conversation with representative of British Embassy

⁴⁸ For correspondence regarding the invasion of Norway, see vol. I, section I under Extension of the European War, entitled "Invasion of Norway and Denmark by Germany."

⁴⁹ Neither printed.

has just taken place in the Department on the subject of exports from Germany to the United States. We reiterated our position that draft press statement briefed in telegram above referred to would be considered highly unsatisfactory by American importers whose orders and payments therefor substantially complied with requirements of British "notice to traders" issued last November. We strongly feel that establishment by importers of the fact that shipments were definitely contracted for before November 27 and paid for before January 1, 1940, should be sufficient to effect release of goods. We feel that new requirement as contained in draft press statement that "the payment made or credit issued shall have been legally due under the original contract" is definitely a new element of which American importers were not aware and had no reason to expect when they made payment before January 1, 1940, in line with the British notice to traders. We feel further that the qualification quoted above would result, if strictly adhered to, in the rejection of practically all requests for releases as it is not customary in business to include in contracts of this type the requirement that payment shall be legally due by a certain date but that it is the generally followed practice to require payment to be made when goods are placed aboard ship or when delivered at port of destination. It is furthermore obvious that it was not possible for the goods to be placed aboard ship because they were not acceptable to shipping companies unless the permits had been issued by British authorities for their transportation to the United States.

We have presented our case to the British Embassy and Ashton-Gwatkin as clearly as we possibly could, but they tell us their rigid instructions from London hold out no hope that there will be any modification of the requirements for new requests as set forth in the draft press statement.

Wholly apart from our general position on this subject, we foresee that if no relief is afforded the American importers concerned they will undoubtedly feel very strongly that they are not being given fair and equitable treatment, and we feel also that it would be impossible for the Department to take any other course than to support their contentions.

HULL

740.00112 Navicert/77

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁵⁰

VERBAL STATEMENT

In the course of the informal discussions which have recently taken place with the State Department in regard to the introduction and operation of the navicert system in the United States, the British Embassy has been gratified to learn that the explanations given by Lord Lothian in the Oral Statement which he handed to Mr. Grady on January 20th are satisfactory to the Department insofar as concerns the first two of the four assumptions, subject to the acceptance of which the State Department in its Oral Statement of November 9th stated that the United States Government did not desire to take a position in respect of the introduction of the navicert system in the United States.

The State Department has, however, indicated that, as regards the remaining two of these four assumptions, it cannot regard the explanations so far given as satisfactory. In the hope of reconciling the points of view of the United States Government and of His Majesty's Government in the matter of these two assumptions, Lord Lothian has sought the further instructions of his Government by whom he is now authorized to inform the State Department:

(a) That as the primary object of the Allied contraband control, insofar as concerns exports from the United States, is to prevent supplies necessary for the prosecution of the war from reaching enemy territory and territory under enemy occupation or control, and as the navicert system is designed to enable shippers who avail themselves of it to ascertain in advance of shipment whether their goods when shipped will be permitted to pass through the control to their destination, navicerts will be withheld only in cases in which the Allied Governments have reason to believe that the goods in question are directly or indirectly destined for enemy territory or because of conditions affecting such goods in the neutral countries of destination.

Evidence to this effect and the negative decision flowing from it would be based in the essence on the proposed consignment and on the conditions affecting it in the neutral countries of destination and not on conditions relating to American exporters or to the United States.

(b) That if the Allied Governments should in connection with their contraband control policy decide temporarily not to issue navicerts in respect of any particular commodity or commodities destined for one or more neutral countries, their decision will be made known and the reasons for it explained to interested United States shippers by the

⁵⁰ Handed to Assistant Secretary of State Grady by the British Ambassador. A letter of April 6 from Mr. A. K. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy, to Mr. John D. Hickerson of the Division of European Affairs indicates that this statement was prepared on consultation between officers of the British Embassy and the Department of State and was "most reluctantly agreed to" by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. (740.00112 Navicert/74½)

quickest and most practicable means available. Insofar as concerns the rejection of individual applications for navicerts, the British Embassy would be prepared to give to each applicant a statement of the reasons for such rejection.

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1940.

740.00112 Navicert/91

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government have been considering the possibilities of allowing shipping to enter the Mediterranean with neutral cargoes bound for Balkan countries. At the moment no ships are being allowed to enter with cargo for these countries, either through Gibraltar or Suez, owing to the danger of capture by Italians in Straits of Messina or in the Dodecanese.

In the first place everything depends of course on such cargoes being able to reach their destinations safely, and it will be up to the Balkan countries to make what arrangements they can to this end with the Italian Government. Provided, however, that this can be done and that the Balkan countries carry out their undertakings in other matters, His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider allowing neutral cargoes for these countries to enter the Mediterranean if the following conditions can be satisfied :

(a) His Majesty's Government must be reasonably certain that the goods will actually reach their destination. For this reason it will only be possible to admit a very few ships at a time and to hold up any others until the safe arrival of earlier vessels has been reported. It would be necessary to supervise loading at the port of shipment and unloading of cargo at port of destination.

(b) The quantities of key commodities fixed in the various rationing agreements might serve as an upper limit, but the practical difficulty of arranging approved shipments would probably prove the real limiting factor in most cases.

(c) Cargoes will have to be suitably balanced, i. e. it will not be safe to allow any one ship to carry too large consignments of German or Italian deficiency commodities. Cargoes of each ship would have to be agreed in advance with the Government of the importing country and loading checked by British authorities at shipping port, who would then issue a special pass to the ship.

It has been suggested that the Embassy might discuss the foregoing with the United States authorities, more particularly as any arrangement, such as that contemplated in the preceding paragraph, would be subject to such loading inspection or checking being made with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government. The latter's agreement, if given, would provide an invaluable precedent

for obtaining similar facilities in South American countries. Although inspection by the United States Customs authorities would meet the case as regards shipments from the United States, it would not be regarded as satisfactory in the case of shipments from South American countries.

His Majesty's Government have also enquired whether, in the spirit of helpfulness, the United States Government would be prepared to prevent neutral ships sailing for the Mediterranean without a special pass in order to avoid inconvenience arising from their detention at Gibraltar. Cooperation to this extent would be valuable though His Majesty's Government do not regard it as essential.

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1940.

740.00112 Navicert/91

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1940.

Mr. Butler and Mr. Helm came in to see me, at their request.

They left with me the attached memorandum⁵¹ relating to shipments of goods from the United States to Balkan countries. Their blunt desire was to have the United States put in a restriction by which no such boat is allowed to sail, unless a British inspector inspects the cargo and agrees to clear the vessel. It was decorated somewhat, but this is what it comes to.

I said I would study the matter, but frankly I thought this was going too far. Their memorandum points out that they wish us to do this in order that they may make similar agreements with all the South American countries. (I believe this would be fatal. Further, I doubt if there is any sense in trying it. The Italians will take the bulk of the goods, because they will need them more than the Balkans will. The real thrust of this, of course, is that the British are no longer in a position to blockade, except at Gibraltar.)

A. A. BERLE, JR.

740.00112 European War 1939/1591

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

In the altered situation following the capitulation of France, His Majesty's Government regard it as vitally important for the success of their war effort that supplies of all kinds should be denied to Ger-

⁵¹ *Supra*.

many and Italy and to all territories, including France, now occupied by them. A corollary to this is that all supplies to "dangerous" neutral destinations, i. e. to countries from which supplies could reach Germany and Italy and occupied territories, should also be strictly limited.

Hitherto the Allied Governments have sought to achieve this end by contraband control. On account of recent developments, however, the prevention of shipments to Europe by naval action may become increasingly difficult and incomplete. It is therefore extremely desirable and it may soon become essential to relieve as far as possible the actual machinery of the blockade. The only effective means of doing this is by the strictest possible control at the source.

His Majesty's Government realise that the immediate economic export problem confronting the United States and other American Governments is different in origin from their own, which is one of blockade. The two do, however, overlap. The sole object of the blockade is to embarrass totalitarian aggression and to bring the war to the earliest possible successful conclusion. His Majesty's Government, who have no intention of using the blockade for their own commercial interests, believe that the deterioration of economic conditions in Europe will be the most important influence in rendering German successes illusory, and in lessening their capacity for economic, political and military aggression on the American continents or elsewhere. This is the object of their policy, and a review of the factors as they exist today has convinced them that success can only be attained with the active cooperation of the United States Government. They therefore earnestly hope that the United States Government will regard it as an American interest to extend to the Allies full economic support by denying all supplies, direct or indirect, to Germany and Italy and to countries under German and Italian control, and by endeavouring to induce other American countries to take the same line.

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1940.

740.00112 European War 1939/1634 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 31, 1940.

[Received July 31—8:55 a. m.]

2487. Minister Economic Warfare ⁵² announced in Commons yesterday Tuesday extension contraband and enemy export control. All

⁵² R. H. Cross.

shipping crossing Atlantic as well as that approaching or leaving Mediterranean and North Sea to be subject to control. To avoid imposing unnecessary inconvenience to shippers and shipowners by diverting vessels to contraband control bases the navicert system is extended to all seaborne goods consigned to any European port as well as to certain Atlantic islands and to certain neutral ports in North Africa and in addition a ship navicert must be obtained at last port of loading. Any consignment or ship not navicerted will be liable to seizure by British patrols. The same procedure will apply to outgoing trade. All ships sailing from any European port or from the specified Atlantic islands or specified neutral ports in North Africa will be liable to seizure together with uncertificated items of cargo unless all goods carried are covered by certificates of non-enemy origin. Minister also announced that for purposes of contraband and enemy export control all metropolitan France and Algeria, Tunisia and French Morocco will be treated as enemy controlled territory. Goods destined for these areas are therefore liable to be seized as contraband and goods originating in, or owned by persons in these territories are liable to be placed in prize. In application of above measures Minister explained that where supplies can reach neutrals without risk of falling into enemy hands navicerts will be granted to allow imports adequate for domestic consumption but not for re-export to other countries and it would be policy of British Government not merely to allow such adequate supplies to pass through the controls but to assist neutral countries to obtain them. Order in Council giving effect to above measures will be issued shortly possibly later today. Any additional details will be telegraphed as soon as available. At same time Minister Shipping announced that effective immediately a scheme for issuing passes or ships warrants which will assure vessels not under British and Allied control continued access to available commercial shipping facilities under British control such as provision of bunkers, dry docking and repairing, insurance, stores and miscellaneous services has been instituted. Possession of a ships navicert for every voyage to which the navicert system applies will be essential to granting of such ships warrant and in addition ship owners will be required to give satisfactory undertakings to the British Government with regard to the character of the trade on which the ships are engaged. Ships not in possession of ships warrant will be subject to separate inquiries on each occasion on which they desire facilities under British control and these inquiries will mean at least delay and inconvenience. Minister explained that these measures have been taken to ensure so far as possible shipping not controlled by the Allies will not find employment in trades which would in any way benefit the enemy.

KENNEDY

740.00112 European War 1939/1634: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1940.

2634. Your 2487, July 31, indicates that British will seize goods from any European port unless covered by certificate of "non-enemy origin". The Department assumes that this has no effect on applications approved by the Minister of Economic Warfare covering goods of German origin and that permits covering such goods will be issued when shipping facilities from a neutral port are available. However, since some importers whose applications were approved are apprehensive about the matter endeavor to obtain confirmation from Ministry of Department's understanding.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/1814

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1940.

Several days ago Mr. Helm, while in my office discussing a number of other matters, brought up the subject of the application of the British blockade to trade destined to certain countries in the Mediterranean. In talking to me he read, from time to time, from a telegram which the Embassy had received from the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

As regards exports destined to Hungary he said that the British Government was at the present time passing "practically nothing". He said that the Ministry of Economic Warfare had stated that they would be prepared to allow goods destined to Hungary on special occasions, particularly in connection with barter deals, when they had satisfactory guaranties that the goods destined to Hungary would not, directly or indirectly, enhance the German and Italian military effort. He added, however, that generally speaking the Ministry proposed to let almost no goods at all through to Hungary.

As regards shipments destined to Rumania, he said that in general a policy similar to that in regard to Hungary would be followed. He said that the telegraphic instructions stated that if Rumania "helped out on oil" a more lenient attitude might be assumed; but he went on to say that this telegram had apparently been written before the latest developments in Rumania and there seemed to be no real ground for expecting cooperation from the present Rumanian Government on oil.

A similar policy, he stated, would be followed in general in respect to goods destined to Bulgaria, but that the Ministry of Economic Warfare would look with favor on deals to purchase oil seeds from Bulgaria, and would be disposed to pass shipments to that country if it could be established that such shipments would actually move oil seeds out of Bulgaria. The motive of course is to prevent oil seeds from getting to Germany and Italy.

In respect to shipments destined to Yugoslavia Mr. Helm stated that the Ministry of Economic Warfare anticipates that there will be little demand for goods originating outside of the Mediterranean area because, he stated, the shortage of shipping and exchange make it almost impossible for Yugoslavia to purchase goods outside of Europe. He commented that the British Government has an agreement with Yugoslavia under which the United Kingdom has preempted the purchase of certain minerals and has promised to supply raw materials in payment for these minerals.

As regards Greece Mr. Helm stated that the British Government is disposed to follow a more liberal policy than in respect to any of the other countries mentioned above, but owing to the uncertainties surrounding Greece's political situation he intimated that there might be a rapid change in attitude.

Mr. Helm went on to say that with the foregoing paragraphs as a background he had been instructed to sound us out very informally with the view to finding out what would be our attitude if they should present a proposal to us that all shipments to Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania of the following products be made, irrespective of the source of the goods, through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation:

- jute and manufactures
- rubber and manufactures thereof
- tin and tin plate
- raw cotton, cotton yarn, thread and
cotton piece goods
- wool noils, tops and yarns
- tea
- coffee

Mr. Helm stated that the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, as I probably recalled, was a concern organized by the British Government to handle trade between the United Kingdom and the Balkan countries, with particular reference to correlating purchases in such a way as to be of the greatest possible utility in furthering the work of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. He said that their instructions pointed out that the advantages of funneling all shipments of the above-mentioned products into the countries listed through this Corporation would be as follows: (1) It would give the British Govern-

ment the bargaining power for acquiring oil seeds and other goods which Germany needs; (2) it would lead to the most effective utilization of shipping space; (3) the British Government might reap a certain amount of political credit in the Balkans since the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation is known to be controlled by the British Government. He concluded by stating that if such an arrangement were made the British Government would of course give us complete assurance that American trade would in no sense suffer because of the channel through which it reached the purchasers in the Balkans.

I replied at once to Mr. Helm that my immediate personal reaction to such a proposition was a most unfavorable one. I told him that in my opinion it would be resented by American commercial interests, and that every deal which was made by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation would probably lead to some criticisms that the trade of one supplying country had been favored at the expense of others. I commented that these objections which I saw to the project were based on practical grounds and that I would make no comment whatever on the proposal in so far as international law and neutral trade rights were concerned. I added, however, that this reaction on my part was my preliminary personal reaction and that if he liked I would think the matter over and consult with various of my colleagues at a later date. He said that he would be glad if I would do so.

I have a feeling that the personal reaction which I displayed to this proposal was more or less what Helm expected I would say.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

740.00112 Navicert/186: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1940—5 p. m.

3300. The Finnish Government has urgently requested us to support its application in London for navicerts to permit the import into Finland from the United States of certain goods which are badly needed to maintain Finnish national economy and life so far as is possible under present conditions. Included are cereals, animal food-stuffs and especially raw cotton and fats, the last of which are a most pressing need. Petroleum products are also badly needed for the maintenance of the Finnish transport services between Petsamo and the nearest railhead some 250 miles away.

Our study of such facts as are available leads us to believe that the Finnish estimates of their vital requirements are not exaggerated and that failure to obtain at least a substantial portion will impose severe hardships upon the Finnish people with unpredictable results.

The arguments which have been advanced against the dispatch of foodstuffs to certain other European countries are not in our opinion applicable with the same degree of force to Finland. For one thing the geographic situation of Finland and the sea routes leading thereto permit of close supervision over the flow of supplies which in any case could not because of limited transportation facilities be of sufficient volume to warrant their becoming the subject of belligerent action.

The Finnish Minister ⁵³ here has informed us that he discussed the matter with Lord Lothian before the latter's recent departure from Washington and was given to understand that Lothian would support the Finnish case while in London.

After discussing the matter with the Finnish Legation in London (and in your discretion with Lord Lothian to ascertain what steps he may already have taken) we wish you to bring to the attention of the responsible British officials our interest in supporting the Finnish request for an amelioration of the difficulties now in the way of their obtaining from the United States a reasonable quantity of necessary supplies.

HULL

740.00112 Navicert/186

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the
Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 30, 1940.

Mr. Helm came in to see me at 12:00 noon today to discuss a number of miscellaneous matters. While he was here I read to him our telegram no. 3300 of October 29, 5 p. m., to the Embassy at London in regard to shipments from the United States to Finland via Petsamo.

After listening to this telegram Mr. Helm said that he had a number of comments to make, which he made in the following sense:

(1) Some days ago Mr. Helm had mentioned to me in strict confidence the fact that the British Government would probably stop all shipments to Finland and Sweden via Petsamo in retaliation against the control of outgoing shipments from Petsamo by Germany. He said that he could now tell me that, for the present at least, the British Government proposes to take no such action, and that navicerts will continue to be issued for shipments destined to those countries through Petsamo. I told Mr. Helm that I was very glad indeed to learn this because of the fact that the more I thought about what he had said to me the more I became convinced that the action which they had had in mind taking was unwise, even from the British point of view, from the long term aspect. I continued that I frankly did not

⁵³ Hjalmar J. Procopé.

see that the British Government had any sort of right to stop shipments of necessary foodstuffs to neutral countries like Finland and Sweden provided that adequate guaranties had been given that the goods would not be transshipped from the country or replace domestic exports which had been sent to Germany or German controlled territory. I added that several of my colleagues also felt strongly on the subject, and that since his Government had decided not to take the action it was not necessary for me to comment further.

(2) Mr. Helm stated that as regards petroleum products to maintain communications between Petsamo and the railhead in Finland he could assure me that every ship traveling from the United States to Petsamo was permitted by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare to carry enough gasoline and lubricating oil to transport the entire cargo of the ship to the railhead and to return the transporting trucks to Petsamo. He said that therefore there should be no question of any lack of gasoline or lubricating oil to maintain transportation facilities for goods moving between the United States and Petsamo.

(3) As regards fats, he said that a quota had been established for Finland, which was at the moment filled. He said that when the Red Cross approached the British Embassy concerning shipments of certain foodstuffs to Finland by that Organization, including lard, the British Government took the position that the Red Cross shipments had to be deducted from the quota. I asked the size of the quota, and he said that he did not know, but this was a matter which had been discussed in some detail between the Finnish Government and the British Government in London.

(4) Mr. Helm said that the Red Cross had also asked for a navicert for a consignment of raw cotton to go to Finland, and that this had, on instructions from London, been refused; he added that the Red Cross had been informed that while they could not approve the shipment of raw cotton they were prepared to consider a navicert for manufactured cotton goods.

(5) As regards cereals, Mr. Helm said that navicerts had been issued for a cargo of miscellaneous cereals destined to Petsamo for distribution by the Red Cross, and that the vessel was now being loaded in Baltimore.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

740.00112 Navicert/196: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 5, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received November 6—8:05 a. m.]

3629. Your 3300, October 29, 5 p. m. Recent difficulties affecting the granting of navicerts for shipment of American goods to Finland arose primarily from (1) the German-Finnish agreement concluded about 3 weeks ago permitting German troops to transit Finland and

(2) restrictions placed by Finland under German pressure on the exportation of certain Swedish goods through Finland.

Negotiations have been proceeding between the Finnish Legation London and the Minister of Economic Warfare to overcome these difficulties and progress reasonably satisfactory to both parties appears to have been made.

The Ministry informed the Embassy today that arrangements have been made for British supervision of the disposition of supplies and the issuing of navicerts covering American goods for Finland has been resumed on as generous a scale as seems justified by the somewhat complicated situation obtaining in Finland. The Ministry expresses the fullest sympathy with Finnish requirements and the intention to permit as large a flow of supplies as practicable with especial regard for the need for fats.

The Finnish Legation here on its part appears to feel that the British authorities have given the most sympathetic consideration to Finnish needs and that the arrangements being worked out will reasonably meet their requirements even though perhaps not wholly satisfying them.

For additional background reference is made to the Embassy's 2634, August 9, 4 p. m., and 3323, October 4, 7 p. m., in reply to the Department's 2162, August 3, 2 p. m. and 2932, September 27, 7 p. m., respectively.⁵⁴

JOHNSON

III. REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, SWEDEN, AND FINLAND TO GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPMENT OF WOOD PULP TO THE UNITED STATES⁵⁵

740.00112 European War 1939/1573 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Sterling) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, May 3, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received May 3—3:25 p. m.]

434. From Commercial Attaché.⁵⁶ For our information and to answer repeated inquiries from Swedish firms dependent on American trade we would appreciate advice as to any negotiations undertaken by the Government of the United States looking toward agreements with belligerents to allow resumption of direct trade between the United States and Sweden. Large tractor and other orders awaiting the possibility of import and it has been suggested that Vladivostok and

⁵⁴ None printed.

⁵⁵ For previous correspondence, see section on representations to the German Government against detention of neutral ships and cargoes destined for the United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 821 ff.

⁵⁶ George C. Howard.

trans-Russia route could be utilized and information as to this possibility also urgently needed.

STERLING

740.00112 European War 1939/1573 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Sterling)

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1940—5 p. m.

140. Your 434, May 3, 5 p. m. We have instituted no negotiations of the character referred to in your telegram. Should the Swedish Government, however, approach the British, French and German Governments with a view to facilitating the resumption of Swedish sailings between the United States and Sweden we might feel warranted in supporting the Swedish representations through an approach of our own based on the adverse effect upon American commerce caused by the present situation.

HULL

740.00112 Wood Pulp/19

*The Swedish Legation to the Department of State*⁵⁷

MEMORANDUM

An attempt will be made in the near future to re-establish shipping connections between Sweden and the U. S. A. Four Swedish vessels are now completing loading in the south of Sweden and are expected to be ready to sail early in June. All four vessels have cargoes of woodpulp for the U. S. A. and affidavits by the consignees establishing U. S. destination of the different shipments are now being prepared and will be submitted by the Swedish Legation to the State Department in the next few days.

Representations through diplomatic channels will be made in Berlin and London in order to facilitate the passage of these vessels. The representations in Berlin will refer only to the outward voyage, while in London the question of the vessels' return voyages to Sweden with American goods will also be raised.

The Swedish Government should be grateful if the United States Government would be in a position to support the representations by the Swedish Government in Berlin and London. The Swedish Legations at Berlin and London have been instructed to defer any *démarche* in the matter until the American Embassies have been informed by the State Department of the American Government's attitude.

⁵⁷ In acknowledging this memorandum on May 31, the Secretary of State informed the Swedish Minister that appropriate instructions had been issued to the American diplomatic representatives in Berlin and London authorizing them to associate themselves in the representations being made by their Swedish colleagues.

The Swedish Government intend shortly to open negotiations with the British and German Governments looking toward the re-establishment of regular shipping connections between Sweden and the U. S. A. The Swedish Government would greatly appreciate it if the United States Government could see its way to lend its support in the representations with this aim in view.

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1940.

658.6231/110: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 25, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 4: 15 p. m.]

1512. Department's 1112, April 30, 7 p. m.⁵⁸ An official of the Swedish Legation informed the Embassy on May 24 that negotiations would start in Berlin on May 27 for a new Swedish-German commercial agreement, that Germany has refused to permit Swedish ships to leave the Baltic and Scandinavian ports since April 9, alleging that the ships would be seized by the British and French and consequently Swedish wood pulp exports to the United States have ceased, and that the question of the release of Swedish wood pulp carriers and the resumption of this trade with the United States would probably arise during the negotiations. He added that he had been notified by his Foreign Office, that the American Minister at Stockholm has informed the Swedish Government that if it approached the German, French and British Governments with a view to having the wood pulp trade resumed, the Department might feel justified in making representations towards that end on the basis of the detrimental effect of the present situation upon American commerce. The official said that it is the understanding of his Foreign Office that Germany would not oppose a request for permission for Swedish ships to leave for the United States with wood pulp cargoes and he inquired whether the Embassy is authorized to make representations in the premises. The Department's instructions are respectfully requested.

KIRK

740.00112 Wood Pulp/18

*The Finnish Minister (Procopé) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁹

The Minister of Finland presents his compliments to His Excellency The Secretary of State and has the honour to inform that, according

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ In acknowledging this note on May 31, the Secretary of State informed the Finnish Minister that appropriate instructions had been issued to the American diplomatic representatives in Berlin and London authorizing them to associate themselves in the representations being made by their Finnish colleagues.

to a communication just received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki, four vessels loaded with wood pulp and paper will be ready to sail for the United States within a few days.

Representations through diplomatic channels are intended to be made in London and Berlin in order to facilitate the passage of vessels bound for the United States from Finland, and it would be highly appreciated if the United States Government could see their way to support the representations by the Finnish Government.

Instructions will be given to the Finnish Legations in London and Berlin to get in touch with the United States Embassies in order to be advised about the United States Government's attitude in this matter.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1940.

740.00112 Wood Pulp/18: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)*⁶⁰

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1940—3 p. m.

1041. With reference to our telegram of today⁶¹ regarding Swedish wood pulp we have been informed by the Finnish Minister that the Finnish Legation in London is being instructed to consult with you in connection with representations which the Legation will make to the British Government with a view to facilitating the passage of vessels bound for the United States from Finland. We understand that four Finnish vessels are now loading and will be ready to sail for the United States within a few days.

Because of the United States interests involved you are authorized to associate yourself with the representations of your Finnish colleague limiting yourself, however, to expressing the hope that the passage of the cargoes will be facilitated.

HULL

740.00112 Wood Pulp/19: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1940—4 p. m.

1042. 1. We are informed by the Swedish Minister⁶² here that in connection with an attempt to reestablish direct shipping connections between Sweden and the United States, the Swedish Legations in

⁶⁰ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, as No. 1445 on the same date to the Chargé in Germany.

⁶¹ Telegram No. 1042, 4 p. m., *infra*.

⁶² W. Boström.

London and Berlin have been instructed to make representations to the British and German authorities, respectively, with a view to facilitating the passage of Swedish vessels engaged in the Swedish-American trade. The representations in Berlin will refer only to the outward voyage of four vessels now loading wood pulp for the United States, while in London the question of the vessels' return voyage to Sweden, laden with American goods, will also be raised.

2. In view of the importance which we attach to a resumption as far as possible of our normal trade with Sweden, and especially because of our urgent need of Scandinavian wood pulp, you are authorized in general to associate yourself with the representations of your Swedish colleague. Pending the receipt of further instructions, however, you should refrain from making representations regarding outward bound United States cargoes and limit yourself at this time to expressing the earnest hope of this Government that Swedish cargoes destined to the United States will not be seized or molested. In this connection reference is made to the Department's 1310, October 27, 10 p. m.⁶³ and to your 2202, October 28, 4 p. m.⁶⁴

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/1496 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Heath)

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1940—4 p. m.

1446. Your 1512, May 25, 4 p. m.

1. American consumers of imported wood pulp have been severely crippled by the interruption in the flow of pulp from Scandinavian countries, especially from Sweden. Furthermore, the almost complete cessation of direct sailings between the United States and Scandinavian ports has been a severe blow to our general commercial interests. You are accordingly authorized to discuss the problems involved with the German Foreign Office, stressing particularly the interest of the United States Government in facilitating the passage through the German Naval Control of vessels carrying pulp cargoes destined for American consumption. Our 739, October 20, 7 p. m.⁶⁵ contains background material on the wood pulp situation as it affects the United States. You should, of course, keep in close touch with your Swedish colleague and with the representatives in Berlin of the other interested northern and Baltic countries. We understand that four Swedish vessels are now loading wood pulp for the United States.

2. In discussing the matter with the Foreign Office please say that we very earnestly hope that they will now find it possible to dispense

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ Quoted in telegram No. 122, October 30, 1939, 3 p. m., to the Consul General at Hamburg, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 832.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 825.

with the expensive and time consuming procedure instituted last autumn of requiring American importers to telegraph through the State Department affidavits relating to the American destination, et cetera, of Scandinavian pulp cargoes. If the Foreign Office insists on our resuming this procedure we will of course do so, as our primary interest is in breaking as soon as possible the log jam blocking our pulp imports, but we hope that the German authorities are now satisfied, on the basis of the experience of last autumn, that our imports of Scandinavian pulp are, because of our domestic necessities, consumed solely in the United States.

3. We are instructing the Embassy at London to consult with the Swedish Legation there and to express to the British authorities our hope that shipments of pulp destined to the United States will not be seized or molested. You will recall that we obtained such assurances from the British Government last autumn.⁶⁶

HULL

740.00112 Wood Pulp/20: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 3, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received June 3—6: 15 p. m.]

1494. I have seen Halifax⁶⁷ regarding your 1042, May 31, 4 p. m., and he feels of course there will be no difficulty from the British point of view, but we are following it up. Appropriate Foreign Office officials stated later that it would be very helpful to them to know from what ports in Sweden the ships carrying Swedish cargoes to the United States will sail.

KENNEDY

740.00112 European War 1939/1497: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 4, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 5: 21 p. m.]

1658. Department's 1446, May 31, 4 p. m., and my 1601, May 31, 4 p. m.⁶⁸ In accordance with the Department's instruction under reference I spoke yesterday afternoon with Ambassador Ritter who represents the Foreign Office in German naval blockade measures affecting Cairo [*sic*] and shipping of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries. He

⁶⁶ See telegram No. 122, October 30, 1939, 3 p. m., to the Consul General at Hamburg, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 832.

⁶⁷ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁸ Latter not printed.

said that he could not give me a definite answer in the matter until he had consulted the German naval authorities, which he would do promptly. He added that it was in the interest of both Germany and the Scandinavian and Baltic countries that the latter renew on the one hand their characteristic exports such as wood pulp to transatlantic countries and that they be able on the other hand to import overseas foodstuffs and raw materials. Soviet [*German?*] Ambassador noted that the difficulty from the German point of view was that there were only two outlets for such trade, one through the Kattegat, which had been mined both by the Germans and the British, and the other through the Kiel Canal, and that the merchant vessels would not have one chance in a hundred of safely traversing a German mine field. "From another source I hear that German naval authorities are resolute in refusing to disclose to neutral vessels of any country the safety lanes through the mine fields." He added that Germany could not grant general permission for any considerable volume of merchant ships to utilize the Kiel Canal which is fully occupied by German naval units, but that it might be possible that some shipments would be permitted as an exception to traverse the canal. He remarked that there was, however, the danger that the canal had been the object of Allied bombing attacks which so far had been without result, but conceivably might be successful in strict neutrality and that the German naval authorities could only allow neutral ships to use the canal after they were thoroughly satisfied that such ships did not contain explosives which could be used to block the canal.

He concluded by stating that consideration would be given to the Embassy's observations, but that a *sine qua non* of acceptance would be not only creditable assurances from the British Government that its ships would not be molested on the outward or return voyage, but also that they would not be taken to any Allied port by Allied naval units for examination.

HEATH

740.00112 European War 1939/1504: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 5, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received June 5—9: 55 a. m.]

1670. My 1658, June 4, 1 p. m. Information from other sources raises considerable doubt as to the complete candor of the statement of the German Reich with regard to overseas trade of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries reported in my telegram under reference. It appears that certain Baltic shipowners say that the risk of running the German mine fields is relatively small and one which they would

willingly undertake. Recently a rather large ship started through the mine fields but was compelled to turn back by German patrol aircraft and taken to Kiel. Requests for permission to use the port of Trondhjem for Baltic overseas shipments by utilizing Swedish and Norwegian railways was refused on the grounds that Trondhjem was in the war area. Experienced observers also doubt that the Kiel Canal is as occupied by German naval units as claimed. The real objection was possibly revealed by an official who in replying to a request from representatives of an interested country stated that it was understood that the Allies were finding it difficult and expensive to obtain Canadian pulp because of American competition for the Canadian supply and that if American consumption of imported pulp could be largely satisfied by a resumption of shipment of this commodity from the Baltic area more of Canadian production would be available for Allied use.

HEATH

740.00112 Wood Pulp/28: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 1, 1940—midnight.

[Received July 1—8:08 p. m.]

1920. Your 1042, May 30 [31], 4 p. m. Letter received today from Foreign Office refers to Lord Halifax's statement that there would be no difficulty from British point of view in passage of Swedish vessels engaged in Swedish-American trade and in particular to outward voyage of four vessels loading wood pulp for the United States (my 1494, June 3, 11 p. m.). Foreign Office states that German Government, however, has definitely refused to allow Swedish ships to trade outside the Baltic and in view of this attitude there is nothing the British can do to help.

KENNEDY

REPATRIATION OF AMERICANS AND OTHERS FROM BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES AND ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

I. EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR THE REPATRIATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD WITH THE SPREAD OF WAR IN EUROPE¹

340.1115A/371b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1940—3 p. m.

4. Repeat following by mail to all missions in Europe.

Refer Department's circular telegram to Bern no. 124, November 30.² All remaining undrawn balances of emergency funds allotted to missions and to consular offices under their jurisdictions for assistance to American citizens are hereby withdrawn (except in case of Helsinki).

The following missions should report to Department by mail concerning status of each such allotment granted to them and to consular offices under their jurisdictions: Belgrade, Berlin, Bern, Brussels, Bucharest, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Paris, Riga, Rome, Stockholm, and Warsaw. The reports should state for each "authorization number" the amount drawn by draft; the amount repaid to offices by borrowers; the amount of such repayments already transmitted by offices to Department; and the amount of cash on hand derived from such drafts and repayments.

HULL

125.0040/28a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1940—2 p. m.

11. Repeat following by telegraph to London and Berlin and by mail to all other missions in Europe and the Near East.

1. The Department appreciates that conditions in Great Britain and Germany may appear to chiefs of mission sufficiently threatening to justify the continued evacuation of the wives and minor children of officers and American employees. Nevertheless the threat of danger has not yet materialized at posts in these countries and may not do so

¹ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. i, pp. 574 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 634.

for an indeterminate time. Meanwhile, per diem allowances, which in most cases were commenced over 5 months ago, continue to be paid. The Department has intended that its funds should be available for the temporary evacuation of its personnel and their families from posts subjected to military attack, air raids, et cetera, as at Warsaw and Helsinki. Its funds are not sufficient to provide per diem allowances for protracted periods to large numbers of persons; nor has it the authority which would justify, in the absence of military attack or air raids, the indefinite prolongation of such allowances.

2. In view of the foregoing and after careful consideration of all phases of this very difficult problem, the Department has reached the conclusion that the families which have been evacuated from posts in Great Britain and Germany should either return to their posts or proceed to the United States. The Department will be glad to authorize transportation to their homes in the United States of the wives and minor children of any officer or American employee serving at a post in Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. The Department's specific prior authority should be obtained, however, in each individual case. Transportation of effects cannot be authorized. Per diem will terminate upon arrival at the family's home in the United States, and the Department regrets that it cannot furnish per diem or other special allowances in connection with the family's residence in the United States.

3. If, in spite of the above, the chief of mission or individual officer or employee concerned decides that a family evacuated from a post in Great Britain or Germany should neither return to the post nor proceed to the United States, the Department will not disapprove the continuation of per diem allowances. It is compelled, however, to reduce the rates established in the circular telegram of October 24, 1939 to Bern, paragraph 4.³ Effective February 16, 1940, the following rates are prescribed: for wives of officers and American employees, two dollars; for minor children of officers and American employees, one dollar.

4. The reductions prescribed in paragraph 3 above are applicable only in the cases of wives and children evacuated from posts in Great Britain, France, Germany and Czechoslovakia. Wives and children evacuated from Warsaw and Helsinki will continue to be paid per diem at the rates defined in the telegram of October 24 since it is manifestly impossible for them to return to their posts.

5. The Department realizes that the new rates established in paragraph 3 above will in many cases not provide full reimbursement for the subsistence of the wives and children concerned. These rates are the highest, however, that are possible and justifiable while pres-

³ See telegram No. 1278, October 23, 1939, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations, 1939*, vol. I, p. 630.

ent conditions endure. Nor can the Department give any assurance that it will be able to continue the allowances indefinitely. However, if danger should become so acute at posts in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Czechoslovakia that evacuation is imperative, the Department will endeavor to authorize the resumption of payment at the higher rates prescribed in the telegram of October 24.

6. The concluding sentence of paragraph 4 of the circular telegram to Bern dated October 24, 1939 is cancelled as of March 1, 1940, and the following provision in lieu thereof will be effective from that date:

"In no case shall the per diem allowance to dependents exceed 150 dollars a month for any family and in no case shall it exceed the official compensation (defined as basic salary, rent allowance, and cost of living allowance) of the officer or employee."

HULL

138 Emergency Program/679a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1940—3 p. m.

15. Circular to principal consular officers in Near East for transmission to consular officers under their jurisdiction.

Passports American citizens who desire proceed from Near East to Italy or other neutral southern European country solely for purpose of embarking for United States may be validated for travel to such country and such other countries as may be necessary in order to reach the country of embarkation for United States. Sea travel must only be upon American vessel or upon neutral vessel which will not enter combat area.

HULL

138 Emergency Program/759a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1940—5 p. m.

27. With reference to the Department's telegrams of November 17, 6 p. m. and November 22, 6 p. m., 1939,⁴ the Department desires that no passport be validated for the journey through the combat zone of the North Atlantic en route to the United States without permission being first obtained from the Department.

Please so inform offices in Europe.

HULL

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 706 and 709, respectively.

340.1115A/512a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1940—8 p. m.

28. Department desires facilitate evacuation Americans with utmost energy. Arrangements being made with Scantic Lines to make available for repatriation purposes freighters, *Flying Fish* at Bergen and *Mormacsea* at Trondhjem, each with possible emergency passenger-carrying capacity around 100. Authority will be granted for issuance emergency consular certificates for these vessels under provisions of Department's circular March 28, 1939, diplomatic serial 3047.⁵ Department consulting with company regarding passenger rates and will inform you.

Passengers having funds will be expected to bear cost of transportation. Department will grant you allotment for loans to those not having sufficient funds, against promissory notes, in accordance with provisions of the secret memorandum accompanying the Department's confidential circular of March 21, 1939.⁶ Loans may only be made to persons whose bona fide American citizenship is fully established but they may be advanced to the American head of a family to cover transportation expenses also for an alien wife and minor unmarried children in such cases as are necessary.

Please telegraph immediately (1) whether use of vessels indicated for repatriation is possible, considering accessibility of Bergen and Trondhjem for evacuation of Americans, (2) probable number of Americans needing repatriation from Norway, (3) your advices as to how you propose to handle repatriation problem, (4) what Department can do here to facilitate your efforts, and (5) estimate of allotment which you desire for making loans to citizens requiring funds for repatriation expenses.

HULL

340.1115A/513 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Sterling)

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1940—9 p. m.

62. Your 48, April 10, 3 p. m.⁷ The answer to your numbered questions⁸ is No, except as to number 3 which will be answered tomorrow.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 585.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

⁷ Telegram No. 48, not printed, was sent by the Consul General at Stockholm.

⁸ Questions 1, 2, and 4 were as to validating passports for Americans to return to the United States from Göteborg on Swedish-American Line, by air service, if reestablished, Stockholm-Copenhagen-Amsterdam, or on Norwegian Line if service were reestablished from Bergen.

In view of the dangers attending passenger transportation through northern waters, it has been decided that Americans desiring return from the Scandinavian countries must proceed south to embark from Mediterranean ports. Consequently passports may be validated only for such travel for Americans desiring to return to the United States. Tralleborg-Sassnitz route appears desirable. Air service Stockholm-Berlin if neutral line also approved. Department is asking Embassy Berlin endeavor facilitate speedy transit visas for Americans from Scandinavian countries proceeding to United States via Mediterranean ports.

Department desires to afford you every possible assistance in arranging repatriations. Therefore please telegraph as soon as possible (1) estimated total number of Americans desiring return to the United States (2) estimate of allotment you need for making loans to citizens requiring funds for repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the secret memorandum accompanying the Department's confidential circular of March 21, 1939^{8a} and (3) recommendations as to action Department may take to facilitate repatriations.

In regard to (2) above, persons having funds will be expected to bear cost of transportation. Loans may only be made to persons whose bona fide American citizenship is fully established except that they may be advanced to the American head of a family to cover transportation expenses for an accompanying alien wife and minor unmarried children in such cases as are necessary.

HULL

340.1115A/513a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1940—9 p. m.

29. Department is confident you are doing everything proper and possible to expedite and facilitate the repatriation of Americans from Denmark. In that connection you are advised that in view of the dangers attending passenger transportation through northern waters, it has been decided that Americans desiring return from the Scandinavian countries must proceed south to embark from Mediterranean ports. Consequently, passports may be validated only for such travel for Americans desiring to return to the United States.

[The two paragraphs here omitted are the same as the last two paragraphs of telegram No. 62, April 10, 9 p. m., to Sweden, printed *supra*.]

HULL

^{8a} *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 574.

340.1115A/513 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Sterling)

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1940—4 p. m.

65. Your 48, April 10, 3 p. m.,⁹ and Department's 62, April 10, 9 p. m. With respect to query number 3 German vessels Tralleborg-Sassnitz route may be used when neutral vessels not reasonably available.

HULL

340.1115A/521 : Telegram

The Minister in Norway (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, April 15, 1940.

[Received April 15—7:31 p. m.]

91. From Cox.¹⁰ Department's 28, received 13.

(2) Estimated about 30.¹¹

(3) Evacuation American citizens dependent reopening railroad connections with Sweden, no communication whatever at present with Bergen and other Norwegian centers. In view of above no definite plan can be formulated.

(4) Cooperation Berlin authorities essential.

(5) Estimate approximately 225 requiring all or part transportation expenses particularly during present banking restrictions limiting withdrawals 500 crowns weekly 20,000 dollars.

HARRIMAN

340.1115A/523a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Cudahy)

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1940—6 p. m.

43. In view of the dangers attending passenger transportation through northern waters it has been decided that Americans desiring to return to the United States from northern Europe must proceed south to embark from Mediterranean ports. Consequently, passports may be validated only for such travel for Americans desiring to return to the United States.

Department is confident you have been and are doing everything proper and possible to facilitate the departure of Americans in Belgium desiring to return to the United States. In view of recent

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Raymond E. Cox, First Secretary of Legation in Norway. Cox was signing for the Ambassador, Mrs. Florence J. Harriman, who after the German invasion of Norway entered Sweden on April 10, 1940.

¹¹ In telegram No. 291, May 6, the Chargé in Norway informed the Department that this estimate was 300, not 30, but had then been reduced to 250 (340.1115A/579).

European developments and the possible spread of hostilities the Department desires to renew its efforts, in combination with yours, and without causing undue alarm, to expedite the return of Americans from Belgium. Therefore, please telegraph as soon as possible (1) estimated number of Americans desiring to return to United States, (2) estimate of allotment you need for making loans to citizens requiring funds for repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the secret memorandum accompanying Department's confidential circular of March 29 [21], 1939,¹² and (3) brief advice regarding possible arrangements for evacuation of citizens from Belgium and their transit to Mediterranean ports, including indication of possible routes and facility in obtaining necessary visas, after consulting other missions as necessary in connection therewith, and (4) recommendations as to any action Department may take to facilitate repatriations.

In regard to (2) above, persons having funds will be expected to bear cost of transportation. Loans may only be made to persons whose bona fide American citizenship is fully established except that they may be advanced to the American head of a family to cover transportation expenses for an accompanying alien wife and minor unmarried children in such cases as are necessary. Loans may not be made for subsistence and removal from place to place of Americans remaining abroad. They may only be made for transportation and for temporary subsistence in connection therewith. Procedure indicated in basic instruction of March 21, 1939, as modified by circular telegrams to Bern numbers 52,¹³ 55,¹⁴ 75,¹⁵ 78,¹⁶ and 90,¹⁷ relating to investigation of ability of friends, relatives, or employers in United States to furnish funds in each case must be followed.

Repeat to Legation at The Hague as applying to the Netherlands also.

HULL

340.1115A/527 : Telegram

The Minister in Denmark (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

COPENHAGEN, April 17, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 5 : 52 p. m.]

96. Department's 29, April 10, 9 p. m. I find my Dutch colleague has a number of citizens anxious for repatriation to Holland. We are of the opinion that representations from us to the appropriate authorities might secure a special train leaving Denmark for Holland.

¹² *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 574.

¹³ August 26, 1939, 7 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 591.

¹⁴ August 30, 1939, 8 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 592.

¹⁵ September 12, 1939, 7 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 600.

¹⁶ September 15, 1939, 4 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 602.

¹⁷ September 29, 1939, 2 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 616.

This train might be locked and under German guard while traversing Germany as was the case with the recent diplomatic evacuation train when German visas were not required. The exchange situation would be simpler in evacuating these American citizens from Holland to a Mediterranean port than from Denmark. I learn from a contact in the German Legation that it is very unlikely American citizens would be given visas to travel through Germany to Italy without considerable delay except as a group since each application would have to be considered separately in Berlin. Therefore the evacuation of Americans from Denmark to Holland if possible as above might prove the most practical route. Have I authority to approach the appropriate authorities on this general plan?

I am not able yet to determine the number of Americans who desire to leave. I am unable to state how many Americans will require assistance until I know whether the Department authorizes me to attempt evacuation from here to Holland with attendant travel expenses of American citizens only that far.

ATHERTON

340.1115A/532: Telegram

The Minister in Denmark (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

COPENHAGEN, April 18, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 8:27 p. m.]

105. Department's 29, April 10, 9 p. m. From the 500 inquiries made it is estimated 123 Americans with valid passports, etc., have sufficient funds to return to the United States. Twenty additional without funds.

Forty valid American women citizens with Danish husbands or families desire return providing Danish members permitted proceed to the United States. Half of these only possess funds.

Sixty cases unrebutted presumption including wives and families desire return of whom half have funds.

Undoubtedly other Americans desiring return who cannot yet communicate with Copenhagen but above named groups alone might require \$15,000 for full return fare.

Families Major Hohenthal¹⁸ and Consul General Sauer¹⁹ have received German permission for departure.

Although various travel agencies here are professedly hopeful of arranging group visas for Americans across Germany to Genoa, the Legation has no assurances as yet to give to American citizens. Local German authorities, however, hopeful they can arrange group visas in due time without reference each individual case to Berlin.

ATHERTON

¹⁸ Maj. William D. Hohenthal, Assistant Military Attaché in Germany.

¹⁹ Emil Sauer, Consul General at Frankfort on the Main.

340.1115A/535 : Telegram

The Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon) to the Secretary of State

THE HAGUE, April 19, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received April 19—12:12 p. m.]

128. Department's 43, April 16, 6 p. m., to Brussels.

(1) Out of a very closely estimated total of 757 Americans holding valid passports or entitled to passports for return to the United States who are now on the way to The Netherlands—the great majority are of Dutch extraction or married to Dutch citizens—it is estimated that, in view of their failure to respond to repeated urgent warnings at critical moments in the past, 330 would still vacillate and probably delay departure until an actual invasion took place and 332 would probably want to remain even after an invasion. The remaining 95 (87 in the Amsterdam district and 8 in the Rotterdam district) constitute the number estimated as desiring to return to the United States immediately and all of these are believed to require loans for repatriation. In addition there are estimated to be 14 alien wives and minor unmarried children in the Amsterdam district who should be added to the latter total.

(2) It is estimated that \$26,689 will be needed for loans to the latter 95 citizens and 14 alien dependents (Amsterdam \$24,745 and Rotterdam \$1944). These amounts include minimum United States Lines fare as quoted here of \$200 Genoa-New York.

(3) Prior to invasion no difficulties are foreseen in evacuating citizens via Belgium and France to Mediterranean ports. After invasion this route might well be closed immediately. While in such a contingency there is a slight possibility of evacuation by automobile through north Holland to Germany and thence by train to Italy such a possibility cannot of course be counted on. If both these routes should be closed the only remaining route would be by sea.

(4) The Department could facilitate repatriations after invasion if land routes were cut by arranging prompt despatch of vessels to Rotterdam or Amsterdam to take evacuees to a place of safety. Repatriation activities will also be facilitated if funds for repatriation are allotted by the Department direct to consulates for disbursement and accounting on their own responsibility.

GORDON

340.1115A/527 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1940—6 p. m.

62. Your 96, April 17, 3 p. m.

1. Department cannot provide funds for special evacuation train as you suggest. Americans having funds are expected to bear cost of

transportation. With respect to those needing funds for repatriation, Department contemplates allotting you amount from which loans to such citizens may be made in accordance, as stated in the Department's 29 of April 10, 9 p. m., with the provisions of the secret memorandum accompanying the Department's confidential circular of March 21, 1939. Procedure indicated in the memorandum as modified by circular telegrams to Bern nos. 52, 55, 75, 78 and 90, relating to investigation of ability of friends, relatives, or employers in the United States to furnish funds in each case, must be followed. Temporary subsistence may be granted during investigation, transportation expenses being subsequently advanced against promissory notes should investigation prove negative. With the understanding, therefore, that the Department cannot undertake the hiring of a special train and that Americans proceeding on such a train must pay their own traveling expenses, either from their own funds or, in the cases of persons without private funds, from loans made by you according to the foregoing instructions, you may approach the appropriate authorities on your plan for evacuation of Americans by special train. You will of course keep the Legation at The Hague informed in this connection.

2. In view of the uncertainty of future developments in the Netherlands it is inadvisable for Americans to go from Denmark to the Netherlands unless they are proceeding to the United States and have sufficient funds for the entire journey. In that connection you are advised that as the Department cannot provide funds for subsistence and removal from place to place of Americans remaining abroad, allotments made for loans may not be used for such purposes. They may only be made for transportation expenses to the United States and for temporary subsistence in connection therewith.

HULL

340.1115A/549a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1940—6 p. m.

36. Repeat to all missions in Europe by telegram for their repetition to the Consuls.

Department will assume that in each case of a telegram received from the Field requesting that relatives, friends or employers be asked to provide funds for travel expenses to the United States, the American citizenship of the person desiring the funds has been satisfactorily established, unless the telegram contains an indication to the contrary as in the case of an alien husband, wife or minor unmarried child of an American citizen.

HULL

340.1115A/532: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1940—7 p. m.

63. Your 105, April 18, 5 p. m.

1. Bona fide American women citizens with alien husbands and unmarried minor children are to receive equal treatment, with respect to repatriation loans, as men citizens having alien wives and children. However, loans are not to be made for expenses for alien spouses and children until they are properly documented for admission into the United States, after having been found to be admissible under the immigration laws. In that connection and in amplification of last paragraph of Department's 29, your particular attention is directed to the "public charge" provision and you are instructed that funds provided for loans are not to be used for facilitating the admission into the United States of aliens who may become objects of either public or private charity, even though they may be members of the immediate families of American citizens.

2. Persons resting under un rebutted presumption not entitled to protection or loans.

3. In the light of the above statements please submit revised estimate for loan allotment.

HULL

340.1115A/542: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State

BRUSSELS, April 20, 1940—noon.

[Received April 20—10: 03 a. m.]

88. The Department's No. 43 of April 16, 6 p. m., and my No. 86 of April 18, 5 p. m.²⁰ Investigation of situation in Belgium in regard to Americans disclosed that greater number have permanent business connections and have expressed intention to remain until such time as this country is actually involved in hostilities.

There are a number of others of small means who have small properties or incomes here and have resided in Belgium for many years. They have no occupation or close family ties in the United States. A large number would in my opinion become public charges if transported to the United States at this time.

The following information in reply to Department's telegram should be considered in the light of the above observations:

(1) Estimated number of Americans and the members of their families who might be prevailed upon to leave Belgium to return to the United States prior to an invasion: 136.

²⁰ Latter not printed.

(2) Of these possibly 121 have no funds or insufficient funds for the journey and could probably not obtain them from the United States. Minimum cost of journey from Belgium to the United States approximately \$275 per person. An allotment of \$28,000 would be necessary to cover the total cost of transportation of 74 persons and a substantial portion of the cost in the case of 37 others.

(3) Evacuation of American citizens via France to Mediterranean ports at present involves no serious difficulty.

(4) Every effort short of advancing money to pay for transportation has already been made to persuade Americans to leave the country. Even if funds are to be provided for transportation there are some cases of alien wives and children who are likely to become public charges and the Consulate General is of the opinion that they would not be eligible for immigration visas under the existing law and regulations.

CUDAHY

340.1115A/545: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, April 20, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 6:37 p. m.]

1068. Your 907, April 11, 4 p. m.²¹ The contents of telegram under reference have been communicated to Foreign Office, and several conversations have been held with Foreign Office officials concerning granting of transit visas for Americans from Scandinavian countries. Oral assurances have been given that the Foreign Office will do its best to expedite the issue of visas but cannot make any definite statement as to the time involved as each must be referred to Foreign Office. However, it was stated that no effort will be spared to handle the matter satisfactorily.

The Foreign Office suggests that applications made at German Missions and Consulates abroad by Americans for transit visas may be telegraphed by such offices to the Foreign Office at the applicant's expense, in this way expediting action.

American Legations in Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen informed.

KIRK

340.1115A/549b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1940—3 p. m.

24. The following telegram, *mutatis mutandis*, has been sent to the Legations at Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Athens: ²²

²¹ Not printed; it contained instructions to request appropriate authorities to expedite granting of transit visas for Americans from Scandinavian countries proceeding to the United States via Mediterranean ports (340.1115A/513).

²² Sent April 19, 1940, 6 p. m., to Belgrade (No. 20), to Bucharest (No. 106), to Budapest (No. 78), to Sofia (No. 16), and to Athens (No. 66).

"In view of recent developments and possible spread of hostilities the Department wishes you to review the situation concerning the return of Americans from Yugoslavia. Therefore please telegraph as soon as possible: (1) Estimated number of Americans who might desire to return to the United States; (2) brief advice regarding possible arrangements for evacuation of citizens from Yugoslavia to the United States including indication of most logical routes and possibility of obtaining transit visas. The Department of course leaves to your judgment the ultimate decision with respect to the time and method of again advising American citizens to return to the United States, knowing that you will bear in mind the two factors of political developments and the difficulties of egress from Yugoslavia."

In as much as a considerable number of American citizens may have to proceed from the Balkan countries to and through Istanbul, you are requested to advise the Department, after consultation with the missions named, regarding possible arrangements that might be made for such movement.

The contents of this telegram should be kept in strictest confidence.

HULL

340.1115A/547: Telegram

The Minister in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 20, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received April 20—3:38 p. m.]

71. Department's telegram No. 66, April 19.²³ It is provisionally estimated that of about 140 Americans here and 40 in Salonika not more than 60 would desire to leave even if hostilities were extended to this area. These figures do not include persons of dual nationality of whom there are perhaps 3,800 nearly all with established domicile in Greece. As long as Mediterranean shipping continues to operate, vessels of the American Export Line can be counted on to handle evacuation. Thereafter with Mediterranean Sea and European routes impracticable American citizens still in Greece may have to remain for the duration. Possibilities of overland travel to India may exist so long as transport in the Aegean or in Thrace is feasible and this is being studied.

In view of recent developments I called a confidential meeting of the committee of keymen on April 16 and another is scheduled for the 22d after which it may be possible to report more fully.

MACVEAGH

²³ See footnote 22, p. 79.

340.1115A/546 : Telegram

The Minister in Yugoslavia (Lane) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, April 20, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received April 20—7:40 p. m.]

134. Department's 20, April 19.²⁴ Our estimate of the number of Americans in Yugoslavia who might desire to return to the United States is 450. Of these about 134 would be without funds and would not leave unless at Government expense.

In view of the present situation another circular letter similar to the one sent last fall is being sent to all Americans in Yugoslavia suggesting that they consider returning to the United States.

In my opinion the most logical route for the evacuation of American citizens from Yugoslavia to the United States is via Italy to Genoa for departure on a vessel of the United States Lines. Transit visas are of course obtainable under present conditions. Failing this I should suggest evacuation from an Adriatic, Yugoslav port by an American vessel. Despite recent developments I do not feel that the situation yet warrants evacuation of all Americans. The wives and children of the staffs of the Legation and Consulates are remaining in Yugoslavia for the time being.

While we are prepared for emergencies I do not anticipate an immediate crisis.

LANE

340.1115A/552 : Telegram

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, April 22, 1940—noon.

[Received 3:06 p. m.]

142. Department's telegram No. 106, April 19, 6 p. m.²⁴ It is estimated that there are now 550 Americans residing in Rumania divided roughly into two classes: (a) Professionally employed with large American companies, journalists, missionaries and the Legation Staff. Including families which are not numerous these number 125. (b) Naturalized or native born American citizens of Rumanian origin who have either not yet claimed their passports or who have not returned to the United States for financial reasons.

The majority of the first category will either be required or wish to remain here as long as possible although further efforts will be

²⁴ See footnote 22, p. 79.

made to have as many leave now as can. The Brazilian Legation last week sent out further warning to its nationals. These Americans are for the most part concentrated in Bucharest or nearby Ploesti.

The second category is scattered throughout the country mostly on small agricultural properties. They are usually unable to speak English and without sufficient ready funds to reach the United States. It is very doubtful that they could be quickly concentrated or moved in a crisis.

My despatch No. 1151 of December 6, 1939,²⁶ discusses in detail the three possible routes of evacuation in an emergency. All of these are practical at present. However, in the case of hostilities the one to be used will depend on the directions from which the attack or attacks come. Should the war become as rapidly comprehensive as in Poland all roads will be dangerous and it is probable that the best course will be to concentrate the remaining Americans at an interior point of relative safety to prevent road casualties from bombardment and machine gunning from the air until such time as movement is possible.

The Department's perspective is of course wider but judged from this angle danger would not appear to be so imminent as seems to be supposed elsewhere.

GUNTHER

340.1115A/550 : Telegram

The Minister in Hungary (Montgomery) to the Secretary of State

BUDAPEST, April 22, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received April 22—1 p. m.]

83. Referring to Department's 78, April 19, 6 p. m.²⁷ I estimate that there are in Hungary some 400 Americans who might desire to return to the United States should the war spread. Of this number some 250 are without funds and would have to be expatriated at Government expense.

The most logical route would be through Yugoslavia to Italy unless those countries become involved, otherwise probably the best route would be through Germany to Switzerland or Holland. Transit visas now available.

I have circularized Americans warning them of the difficulty of egress from Hungary should the war be extended to southern Europe.

MONTGOMERY

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ See footnote 22, p. 79.

340.1115A/551 : Telegram

The Minister in Bulgaria (Earle) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, April 22, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 7 : 22 p. m.]

38. Department's 16, April 19, 6 p. m.²⁸

(1) Estimate 55 Americans, of whom approximately 16 are indigent and have no relatives, friends, et cetera, from whom to obtain funds, might desire to return to the United States.

(2) The direction of possible invasion of Bulgaria would determine logicity of alternative evacuation routes via Greece, Turkey or Yugoslavia and Italy, and possibility of obtaining transit visas would depend on situation at the time. Danger would be minimized for persons possessing funds but the position of indigents would be difficult. For example, transit visas would probably be refused. In addition, I doubt whether in the event the Department should authorize loans to such indigents after hostilities commenced the National Bank of Bulgaria, if it did not suspend operations entirely, would have American currency available to purchase drafts drawn by the Legation. I fear sale of such drafts for any other currency would be useless. The foregoing considerations prompted my telegram No. 32 of April 13, 5 p. m.,²⁹ requesting the immediate allotment of funds for the repatriation of these people.

Have again strongly urged Americans to return to the United States.

EARLE

340.1115A/553 : Telegram

The Consul General at Stockholm (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 22, 1940.

[Received April 23—1 : 35 a. m.]

81. Following summary regarding evacuation Americans my despatch 432, February 26.²⁹ Notice sent Americans January 24 resulted in returning home about 200. Notice sent out April 16 and uncertainty present situation has caused many others plan return home; about 60 Americans intend leave soon as they get German visas which still take about 2 weeks to obtain, many others have sent their families to places interior Sweden considered safe; have made every possible plan aid Americans who may be left here to evacuate from Stockholm in case of emergency, April 16 notice gave details of these plans and other advice; see also my despatches October 20, October 26, April 19.³⁰

²⁸ See footnote 22, p. 79.

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ None printed.

Have arranged with Foreign Office that Swedish Consul Oslo give visas all Americans in Norway desiring come here provided passports vouched for by our Legation Oslo. Foreign Office expects American Government will repatriate any such Americans who are unable arrange own passage.

JOHNSON

340.1115A/555 : Telegram

The Minister in Denmark (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

COPENHAGEN, April 23, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received 4:39 p. m.]

132. Department's 63, April 19, 7 p. m. has very much clarified our situation and we estimate now 13 bona fide American citizens completely lacking funds and 7 lacking half necessary funds requiring total \$5000.

Department's instructions, however, do not cover cases of American children of alien or un rebutted parents of whom to date there are 9 not included in the above estimate.

May passports be issued under rule (g) to persons resting under un rebutted presumption.

Frontiers remain closed for passage to Germany without permission German military authorities; however, some Swedes have been permitted to return home.

I am hoping by the end of this week the German transit visa situation may be much clearer.

ATHERTON

340.1115A/542 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Cudahy) ³²

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1940—4 p. m.

46. Your 88, April 20, noon.

1. The duty of the Government toward its citizens in a war area is accomplished when it has advised them of the dangers of the situation and invited them to leave, while affording those who choose to go every possible assistance in obtaining transportation and such protection as may be possible to those who choose to remain. There must be no insistence upon the departure of any citizen since the Government may not compel the return of its citizens and the decision whether to remain or to depart is one for each individual himself to make. Accordingly,

³² Telegrams containing somewhat similar instructions were sent on April 26 to Norway and Denmark; on May 6 to the Netherlands; and on May 10 to Yugoslavia, with instructions to repeat to Athens, Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Ankara.

as it appears that Americans in Belgium have been given due notice of the situation and invited to return to the United States and that none who have remained is as yet desirous of proceeding, no allotment for repatriation expenses will be made to you at this time. You will, of course, present to the Department from time to time as they appear the cases of individuals desiring financial assistance for repatriation, in accordance with the instructions contained in the third paragraph of the Department's 43.³³

2. Persons resting under un rebutted presumption are not entitled to protection or loans.

3. Bona fide American women citizens with alien husbands and unmarried minor children are to receive equal treatment, with respect to repatriation loans, as men citizens having alien wives and children. However, loans are not to be made for expenses for alien spouses and children until they are properly documented for admission into the United States, after having been found to be admissible under the immigration laws. In that connection and in amplification of the third paragraph of the Department's 43, particular attention is directed to the "public charge" provision and you are instructed that loans are not to be made for facilitating the admission into the United States of aliens who may become objects of either public or private charity, even though they be members of the immediate families of American citizens.

HULL

340.1115A/578: Telegram

The Minister in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, May 3, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received May 3—4: 58 p. m.]

77. My telegram No. 71, April 20, 7 p. m. Investigation shows that 72 native born Americans now in Greece would desire to leave the country if hostilities extend to this area. The difficulties of evacuation under such conditions and the desirability of departing beforehand have personally been made clear to all of them. In addition, a circular is being mailed to them as well as to all Greek-Americans registered at the Consulates here and at Salonika, urgently repeating the advice given last summer and stating the facts concerning the present curtailment and possible future stoppage of transportation facilities.

MACVEAGH

³³ April 16, 6 p. m., p. 73.

340.1115A/553: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Stockholm
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1940—6 p. m.

100. Your 81, April 22. The Department greatly appreciates the facilities being granted by the Swedish Government for the admission of Americans into Sweden from the dangerous areas in Norway. However, it is not the policy of the Government to repatriate citizens at Government expense and Congress has not appropriated funds for the purpose. Consequently, the Department cannot enter into an engagement to do so. As an emergency procedure, the Department has used special funds available to it to advance loans to Americans in dangerous areas needing funds for repatriation expenses. The Department is willing so to assist Americans entering Sweden from Norway so long as it considers an emergency situation exists in Norway involving Americans there. Such assistance will only be rendered bona fide Americans desiring repatriation whose citizenship is satisfactorily established and who are found to be entitled to passports, and to their accompanying alien spouses and unmarried minor children properly documented for admission into the United States. Loans will not be made until after investigation has determined that the persons concerned do not have funds of their own and are unable to obtain them from relatives, friends or employers here. In this connection you are referred to the Department's telegrams 62,³⁴ 77 and 104³⁵ and telegram 251 sent to Stockholm for Oslo, the provisions of which latter telegram are to be considered equally applicable in Sweden.

You may inform the Swedish authorities in the above sense and, in your discretion, point out to them that this Government has long followed a practice of temporarily admitting aliens into its territory in emergency cases, without documentation and without requirement for their repatriation by their respective governments.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/2769: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 10, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received May 10—7:22 a. m.]

324. I called on Ciano ³⁶ this morning and asked whether the European developments were causing any change in the Italian Govern-

³⁴ Dated April 19, 6 p. m., p. 76.

³⁵ Telegrams No. 77 and No. 104 not printed.

³⁶ Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ment's position as a non-belligerent. I said that I had not only the responsibility of keeping you accurately advised but also responsibility towards the numerous Americans resident in Italy.

The Minister who had come from Mussolini ³⁷ informed me that no change had been decided upon or was under contemplation. While Mussolini desired to carry out his obligations with Germany required by the Italo-German alliance ³⁸ no situation had developed which called for the entry of Italy into the war. With regard to the American residents in Italy he was very positive in expressing his opinion that there was no need whatsoever to disturb them. He assured me that he was still hopeful that Italy's present position could be maintained in the future but he did not attempt to give me any assurance in this regard.

Repeated to London, Paris, Belgrade, Bern.

PHILLIPS

125.0056/33b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1940.

77. Your 168, May 11, 1 p. m.³⁹ We naturally leave all decisions regarding protection and welfare to your discretion in the present situation, knowing that the safety of American officials and that of their families is a paramount consideration with you as it is with us. From this distance it looks as though the time might have arrived when it would be advisable to concentrate in one place the wives and children of all American officials and other Americans, if practicable, as it is easier to identify and obtain respect for one location than it is for many. As soon as conditions warrant, please work out arrangements for the evacuation of the families of American officials whose duties cause them to remain at their posts to such places outside the theater of hostilities as may seem safest, as for instance Switzerland.

HULL

125.0040/33c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*⁴⁰

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1940—noon.

42. Repeat following by telegraph to 11 offices named, inserting appropriate "authorization number" in paragraph 4 in each case, and

³⁷ Benito Mussolini, Italian Prime Minister.

³⁸ Signed May 22, 1939, G. Fr. de Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3e sér., tome xxxvii, p. 323.

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Telegrams No. 46, May 14, and No. 57, May 23, 6 p. m., to the Minister in Switzerland requested that this telegram be repeated to Algiers, Tunis, and Tangier, and to Gibraltar and Malta, respectively (125.0040/33b, 47a).

request acknowledgment: Ankara 179; Athens 180; Beirut 181; Belgrade 182; Bern 183; Bucharest 184; Budapest 185; Cairo 186; Jerusalem 187; Rome 188; and Sofia 189.

1. Refer circular instruction of March 21, 1939, part 2,⁴¹ as amended by circular telegrams to Bern of October 24, 1939⁴² and No. 11, February 9, 1940.⁴³

2. Travel expenses and per diem during direct journey from post of duty to homes in United States, and in accordance with the travel regulations, are hereby authorized for wives and minor children of officers and American employees of the State Department (but not of other Departments) at all posts under your jurisdiction. This authority may be availed of now or later without Department's specific prior approval as required by paragraph 2 of Bern circular no. 11. Foreign vessels may be used if American vessels are not immediately available. Transportation may be purchased by the post of duty or by any offices visited en route and accumulated per diem may be paid by such offices. Transportation requests should not be used for any part of the journey. After arrival in United States travelers may submit claim to Department for further expenses and per diem. Per diem terminates on arrival at home in United States. No allowances are payable in United States and Department can give no assurance whatever that it will be able to pay the expenses of the family's return to the post at some future date. Telegraph names of travelers, dates of sailing, and names of vessels promptly in every case. Department endeavors whenever possible to notify Fyfe⁴⁴ and relatives.

3. The chief of mission or principal consular officer is hereby authorized, in his discretion if the war extends to his country or if serious danger threatens the post, to order the temporary evacuation to places of safety of wives and minor children of officers and American employees of State and other Departments. Travel expenses to and from the place of safety are payable. Per diem during travel and while at place of safety may be granted at following rates: for wives, three dollars; for minor children, one dollar fifty. Telegraph names and destinations. Department endeavors to keep relatives in United States informed.

4. Charge all expenses incurred under the authority of the two preceding paragraphs to authorization number blank—1938/1940. Draw separate drafts; render separate accounts.

5. Repeat to all consular offices under your jurisdiction.

HULL

⁴¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 574.

⁴² See telegram No. 1278, October 23, 1939, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *ibid.*, p. 630.

⁴³ *Ante*, p. 68.

⁴⁴ Howard Fyfe, United States despatch agent.

740.0011 European War 1939/2920: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 14, 1940—noon.
[Received May 14—9: 02 a. m.]

341. . . .

I felt at once however that something more serious was in the air and I asked Ciano whether he would not speak to me with complete frankness.

He said that whereas a week ago he had thought the chances of Italy's remaining out of the war was 50-50 the chances were now about 90 to 10 in favor of Italy's participation. He was not in a position to tell me exactly when the step would be taken but I certainly got the impression that it might come very quickly. I mentioned my responsibility with regard to American residents and he did not indicate as he did during my last interview that it was entirely unnecessary for me to urge them to depart. On the contrary he expressed no opinion and this leads me to believe that I should take action in this respect. This I shall do as quietly as possible although it is my understanding that all United States vessels are booked full for the next few days. Ciano told me that Mussolini had made up his mind with regard to Italy's participation, that Hitler's ⁴⁵ information with regard to the progress of his campaign had always been correct and that the information received this morning clearly showed complete German victories in Belgium and Holland. He referred to the warlike manifestations which were taking place throughout Italy as an indication that the majority of the country were in favor of participation and that there was merely a small minority holding the opposite view. Finally he impressed upon me that he did not know when Italy would enter the war and that there was still a chance but apparently slight for her to remain a non-belligerent. Yet his whole manner was such as to indicate that events were moving rapidly towards an early state of war. In conclusion I said that this was the first time that I was leaving his office thoroughly depressed. He made no comment beyond saying that as long as he remained Foreign Minister he hoped that I would keep closely in touch with him.

Repeated to Paris and London, Berlin, Bern, Belgrade.

PHILLIPS

⁴⁵ Adolf Hitler, German Chancellor.

340.1115A/604b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)*⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940—3 a. m.

117. Please telegraph best estimate of the number of Americans who will leave Italy following your warning and number for whom special arrangements may have to be made should the Mediterranean be closed to American shipping.

HULL

340.1115A/617a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940—10 a. m.

47. S. S. *Washington*, United States Lines, now at Genoa planning sail Saturday. Ship has sold many passages but has some additional space and has 800 cots. Consular certificate being issued and ship prepared to accommodate passengers aboard ship until boat sails. This information is sent you for the benefit of Americans in your district desiring repatriation and who may desire to avail themselves of the sailing of the *Washington*.

HULL

340.1115A/614c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Pell)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940—6 p. m.

33. Department has telegraphed Embassies London⁴⁷ and Paris⁴⁸ and Legation Bern⁴⁹ stating that at the present time and in view of the possibility of the extension of hostilities to the Mediterranean area, it considers it advisable that all Americans desiring to return to the United States should be advised to congregate in Bordeaux, southwestern France, and that they should move as expeditiously as possible to that area where, in the event of hostilities breaking out, Department contemplates sending American ships for repatriation of citizens to the United States at their own expense.

Americans may also proceed through Spain to Lisbon for embarkation. Keep Department promptly informed of situation with respect to Americans who may thus arrive in Lisbon in order that the Department may, when deemed advisable, make proper arrangements for sending American ships there for repatriation of citizens to the United States at their own expense.

HULL

⁴⁶ Sent on the same date to the Consul General at Genoa (No. 120), the Ambassador in Italy (No. 118), and the Ministers in Yugoslavia (No. 28) and Hungary (No. 97).

⁴⁷ Telegram No. 860, May 14, 6 p. m., not printed.

⁴⁸ Telegram No. 869, May 14, 8 p. m., not printed.

⁴⁹ Telegram No. 44, May 14, 6 p. m., not printed.

340.1115A/614b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940—6 p. m.

376. Reference Department's 369, May 14, 8 p. m.⁵⁰ Please have Consul Bordeaux keep you fully and promptly advised of numbers of Americans arriving in his district desiring return to United States, for your communication to Department in order that Department may consider when arrangements should be made for sending American ships there for evacuation purposes.

HULL

125.0040/33a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940—6 p. m.

49. Repeat following by telegraph to all missions in Europe.

If serious emergency such as invasion, air-raids, bombardment, et cetera, occurs at your post, you are requested whenever possible to keep the Department informed from time to time by telegraph regarding the welfare and whereabouts of officers and American employees and their families. The last names of personnel and families should be stated in your telegrams in every case.

Posts to which personnel or families may be evacuated should report their arrival to the Department by telegraph, giving names.

Department desires this information for itself and in order that it may notify relatives and friends in United States.

Repeat to all consular offices under your jurisdiction.

HULL

340.1115A/610 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 16, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received May 16—7:40 a. m.]

1228. Your 860, May 14, 6 p. m.⁵⁰ It is extremely unlikely that we are going to be able to evacuate Americans via Bordeaux. The plane service to Paris has been suspended. There is one ferry service still in operation, but sailings have been reduced to three small vessels a week, and these are likely to be pulled off any moment. Havre is be-

⁵⁰ Not printed, but see telegram No. 33, May 15, 6 p. m., to the Minister in Portugal, p. 90.

ing bombed, and we have just learned that the ferry which left Southampton last night is 4½ hours overdue. We are also faced with a difficult situation regarding French visas. The French Consulate has been ordered to give no visas without approval from Paris in each case. This may mean a delay of 10 days or so on each application. Even if we are able to get people to the French coast, it is going to be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for them to get to Bordeaux. The Paris Embassy reports that they can give no assurance that passengers arriving at Havre can get even to Paris and that, if they reach Paris, they can get to Bordeaux. Paris is strongly opposed to any plan for evacuating Americans now in England by way of Bordeaux, unless they can be taken to Bordeaux by water. That does not appear to be at all possible. Even if we could, by hook or crook, manage to get our people to Bordeaux, I question the wisdom of this procedure. This is a dangerous and expensive journey to require Americans in the British Isles to make. The ferries, of course, fly a belligerent flag; they traverse the most dangerous stretch of water now being used by any passenger service in the world; and they land at a port which is being bombed. I believe that it would be bad to tell our people to leave England until and unless we are able to offer them some means of leaving England. For that reason I would appreciate immediate instructions (1) as to whether, in view of the danger and of the attitude of the Paris Embassy, we should still attempt to send people to Bordeaux, and (2) what alternative plan we have to offer if, as appears likely, our people are unable to get across the Channel. This matter is becoming imperative here. We do not dare to give out a warning until we have something more definite to offer than the instructions thus far received.

KENNEDY

840.1115A/612: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 16, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received May 16—10:24 a. m.]

360. Department's telegram No. 117, May 15, 3 a. m. Our Consuls apparently find it exceedingly difficult to formulate estimates desired. Based on incomplete returns from all Consulates except Naples estimate in first category is 500 and in second category 1000. Should free transportation be furnished the latter number would of course be greatly increased by indigent naturalized citizens.

The question of students especially in the Rome district is complicated due to their unwillingness in many cases to interrupt their courses.

I am today requesting all Consulates to send out notices stating that they have been directed by the Embassy to call the attention of American citizens to the advisability of returning to the United States at the earliest possible moment. This follows circular instructions which I sent May 14.

PHILLIPS

340.1115A/613 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 16, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received May 16—12:28 p. m.]

361. My telegram No. 360, May 16, 1 p. m. The Consul General at Genoa has furnished Embassy the following information by telephone at noon today.

1. The *Conte di Savoia* sailed from Genoa for New York last night with 1061 passengers. Her normal capacity is 1846.

2. The *Exeter* sails tonight booked to full normal capacity. Consul General considers it to be too late to issue emergency certificate for this ship; so far as he knows there has been no demand for such emergency space.

3. The *Washington* scheduled to sail May 18 is booked to full normal capacity. Five hundred not 800 additional passengers can be accommodated in cots but thus far there has been no demand.

4. The next American sailing is the *Excambion* due in Genoa May 29. The Genoa office of the American Export Line believes that this vessel is booked full with passengers from eastern Mediterranean.

5. The Consul General states that as yet there is no congestion in Genoa with respect to the repatriation of Americans residing in Italy. The great majority of those embarking come from other countries.

6. It is of course to be expected that the demand for space on American vessels will increase as soon as the notice referred to in my No. 360 begins to take effect.

PHILLIPS

340.1115A/614 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 16, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received May 16—12:44 p. m.]

38. My 37, May 16, noon.⁵² Consulates now estimate 700 potential evacuees under proposed plan. In addition thereto there are others already booked on United States Lines sailings from Genoa on May

⁵² Not printed.

18 and June 1. United States Lines, Genoa, reported objecting informally to advice being given to Americans to congregate in Bordeaux area since they are still offering sailings from Genoa.

Consulates report many Americans especially those with children hesitant to proceed to Bordeaux area unless assurances are given that there will be sailings therefrom regardless of whether hostilities break out in the Mediterranean.

HARRISON

340.1115A/622a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Yugoslavia (Lane)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940—5 p. m.

30. 1. Considering late developments and the possible extension of hostilities to other areas, including your own, than are already involved, you may deem it advisable now to invite Americans in your district to return to the United States while there still remains opportunity for them to do so.

2. In the event that Italy should come into the war, you will advise Americans in your district desiring to return home not to proceed via continental Europe or through the Mediterranean.

Repeat to:

[Here follow detailed instructions for repetition to Athens, Bucharest, Budapest, and Sofia.]

HULL

340.1115A/622c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940—5 p. m.

14. London is being authorized to advise American citizens to proceed to Eire as a place of greater safety under existing circumstances. London will communicate with you and will probably indicate approximate number of evacuees. Please notify consuls and exercise agencies at your command to render assistance to evacuees that they may secure lodgings in cities or in countryside at their own expense and advise Department as to number of such persons in Eire.

Department will consider advisability of sending a ship to a west coast port with the idea of making available to them facilities direct to the United States at their own expense.

Detailed instructions will be sent in due course.

HULL

340.1115A/622d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)*⁵³

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940—6 p. m.

37. 1. In view of recent developments and of the possible extension of hostilities to other areas, including your own, than are already involved, you may consider it advisable to invite Americans in your district to return to the United States while there still remains opportunity for them to do so. In that connection you should bear in mind that the duty of the Government towards its citizens in a war area is accomplished when it has advised them of the dangers of the situation and invited them to leave, while affording those who choose to go every possible assistance in obtaining transportation and to those who choose to remain such protection as may be possible. There must be no insistence upon the departure of any citizen since the Government may not compel the return of its citizens and the decision whether to remain or to depart is one for each individual himself to make.

2. In the event that Italy should come into the war, you will advise Americans desiring to return home in your district not to proceed via continental Europe or through the Mediterranean.

Repeat to Beirut, Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.

HULL

340.1115A/622b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the
United Kingdom (Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940.

873. Your recommendation in telephone conversation with Welles⁵⁴ to the effect that Americans should evacuate from England to Ireland there to await an American ship supersedes your earlier recommendations that they be permitted to sail from English west coast ports on belligerent ships. Considering your report in telephone conversation with Welles and your 1228, May 16, 1:00 p. m., and considering general situation and certain marine dangers, your recommendation over the telephone is approved and you are authorized to advise that as many Americans as may do so proceed to Ireland. We will then consider the possibility of sending vessels to repatriate them at their expense from the west coast of Ireland. Such Americans as may be

⁵³ The same, with a request to repeat to Tunis and Algiers, sent on the same date to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (No. 10).

The same, as telegram No. 3, May 24, 7 p. m., to the Consul at Malta, with an added paragraph requesting information as to number of Americans who might desire to return and possible arrangements for such evacuation.

⁵⁴ Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State.

unable to proceed to Ireland we believe should be advised in your discretion to seek accommodations in less congested areas and away from metropolitan centers and points which might be considered strategic. This authorization is extended on the information that the French are withholding further visas for Americans to pass through France and that airplane service is discontinued and that Channel ferries have practically stopped running.

Please advise how many Americans will be remaining in London, approximately the number proceeding to Ireland and if possible the number seeking shelter in countrysides and any other facts which we should have.

Dublin is being advised and appropriately instructed. You will please communicate with Dublin to cooperate with you regarding lodgings for evacuees at their own expense.

HULL

340.1115A/629 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1940—5 p. m.

896. Your 1259, May 18, 1 p. m.⁵⁵ The President is taking a keen interest in the evacuation of Americans and has read your telegram and requests that you be advised of the following:

First, that he is not satisfied with either Galway or Cobh as points of departure. The objection to Cobh is very apparent. The objection to Galway is for similar reasons and while not so apparent they are nevertheless sufficient to convince the President and the Department as to the inadvisability of using Galway.

Instead of using either of those ports, Bantry Bay is suggested by the President as being desirably located from the point of view of protection, good harbor with plenty of depth and accessible by rail. Realizing there are no facilities in the immediate vicinity for accommodating evacuees, nevertheless arrangements could be made for a special train to carry them from the larger centers. While there are no docking facilities for a large ship, passengers could be embarked from small boats. The appeal lies in its favorable location and its protected geographical position as well as the sheltered harbor and adequate depth.

The Navy has been consulted and from the point of view of that Department it is accessible and adequate for the purposes.

⁵⁵ Not printed; it stated there were two ports from which Americans could be evacuated from Ireland: Galway and Cobh. The Ambassador pointed out that while Cobh was nearer to the belligerent area it had advantages as to accessibility, steamship operation, and facilities.

We are awaiting information from Dublin as to the number of probable evacuees before making arrangements. It may take several weeks for a boat to arrive there, and the boat will not be selected until it will be known approximately how many persons need to be accommodated.

There are many people in different localities in south Atlantic European ports and still in Mediterranean ports, and they are being evacuated with American-flag ships, but the same ship cannot proceed to Ireland. Consequently an entirely different ship and one adequate to the circumstances will be selected as soon as information is available and every arrangement facilitated with the hope and expectation that Bantry Bay will prove satisfactory.

HULL

340.1115A/657a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1940—5 p. m.

54. Your 38, May 16, 4 p. m. For your information and that of consulates in Switzerland, the Department has telegraphed Consulate Genoa on May 18 as follows:

"129, 18th. The Department is informed that the following cargo vessels will be in Genoa on approximately the dates mentioned and might be used for the purpose of evacuating American citizens:

Exhibitor—American Export Lines; May 22.

Scottsburg—Lykes Bros. Steamship Company—to sail May 20;

West Cohas—Lykes Bros.—due Genoa May 20;

Saccarappa—South Atlantic Steamship Company—due Genoa May 20.

Information from Maritime Commission indicates that all these vessels, with the possible exception of the *Saccarappa*, could be equipped in an emergency to carry 35 to 50 passengers.

Informed also that cargo vessels *Pan Royal* and *Peter Kerr* due at Savona May 20 and May 16, respectively.

If it is necessary to use these vessels for the evacuation of American citizens, you should, after consultation with the local agents, make request to Department for authority to issue emergency consular certificate in accordance with Diplomatic Serial no. 3047, March 28, 1939."⁵⁶

Arrangements for evacuation Americans from Bordeaux remain under consideration pending determination number Americans congregating there.⁵⁷ Until Italy should enter war Americans in Switzerland may proceed to Genoa for embarkation.

HULL

⁵⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 585.

⁵⁷ In telegram No. 739, May 18, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in France had reported that up to noon of that day only 30 Americans had reported to the Consul at Bordeaux (340.1115A/630).

340.1115A/1010

The Consul at Tunis (Heisler) to the Secretary of State

No. 415

TUNIS, May 20, 1940.

[Received June 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 37 of May 16, 1940, 6:00 p. m., to the American Legation, Tangier, which has been repeated to this Consulate, relative to the advisability of suggesting to American citizens in this country an early return to the United States, and to report that all American citizens in Tunisia have now been advised by the Consulate to give immediate consideration to an early return to their homes in the United States, while transportation facilities remain available.

The total number of American citizens in Tunisia is not large, estimated at approximately ninety-five, registered and not registered.

Most of the citizens in this country, it is believed, will make no attempt to return to the United States, preferring to remain at their places of residence in various parts of the country. Several missionaries have indicated their intention to remain in Tunisia, even though war comes to this country, and the small number of American business men here have no immediate plans of returning to the United States. Furthermore, children born in the United States of Italian parents are largely in the position of being unable to return to the United States at this time, since their parents are still Italian subjects and they are without adequate financial resources to travel and, moreover, have no near relatives in the United States. Hence it is possible that very few American citizens now in Tunisia will attempt to return to the United States in the immediate future.

Citizens in Tunisia are also faced with the difficult proposition of obtaining passage from Tunis to the United States, and this difficulty will be further increased if Italy enters the war on Germany's side. As it is now, no shipping to the United States is available from Tunisian or Algerian ports. Thus Americans in this country wishing to return to the United States must proceed to Italy or take the long journey across North Africa to Tangier or Casablanca. Passage from Italy will not be available if hostilities commence in the Mediterranean area.

Respectfully yours,

CHARLES H. HEISLER

340.1115A/650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 20, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

1277. Your 896, May 18, 5 p. m. You may want to pass on to the President the following information on Bantry Bay.

The Naval Attaché informs me that a vessel of any size would have to anchor 4 or 5 miles from the town. The anchorage is exposed to southwesterly winds which frequently make boarding from small boats hazardous. In the opinion of shipping people here, it would be dangerous for passengers to board a ship in Bantry Bay from small boats except in very good weather.

Consul Smale of Cork reports that there are no accommodations except a 20-room hotel, that there is no tender available, that the facilities for servicing ships are extremely limited, that for 8 or 9 hours out of each 12 hours, it is impossible to reach vessels because of mud flats, and that there are no facilities except one small crane for handling baggage and stores. I doubt if it would be feasible to embark perhaps over 1,000 people or more in small boats. For that reason, if Bantry Bay is selected, it will undoubtedly be necessary to bring a tender around from Cobh.

I realize, of course, that the military angle is the most important one. Consul Smale has taken this matter up with the appropriate authorities and is of the opinion that the west of Ireland is definitely less desirable from this standpoint than is Cobh.

There is a feeling of tension in Ireland that may even necessitate reconsidering Ireland as a temporary place of refuge.

KENNEDY

340.1115A/659: Telegram

The Consul General at Genoa (Balch) to the Secretary of State

GENOA, May 21, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received May 21—2:15 p. m.]

69. The four steamers named below which have sailed from Genoa for New York this morning carried the following numbers of American and alien passengers coming from all parts of Europe: *Excalibur* May 2, Americans 57, aliens 27; *Manhattan* May 4, Americans 317, aliens 504; *Exeter* May 16, Americans 81, aliens 49; *Washington* May 19, Americans 483, aliens 588, making a total of 938 American citizens and 1,168 aliens.

Should American passenger ships now sailing from Mediterranean ports continue existing sailing schedules and carry only Americans as

passengers I believe that they can carry American citizens from all European countries who may wish to go to the United States as a result of war conditions even if their sailing schedules are modified to include Bordeaux and Cobh. Except for government officials and their families and some representatives of American business concerns most other Americans now in Italy and elsewhere in Europe live here permanently and it is believed that a large proportion of them will not leave regardless of conditions.

BALCH

340.1115A/671a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Pell)

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1940—6 p. m.

41. Department desires to know whether new regulations governing the granting of Portuguese visas to American citizens will permit American citizens evacuated from other countries of Europe to proceed to Lisbon to embark upon an American vessel should the emergency arise.

Should Italian ports be closed to American ships which would be the case in the event that Italy entered the war the Department would wish to have American ships call at Lisbon to evacuate Americans stranded in that area.

HULL

340.1115A/671b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1940.

55. After consulting offices in Switzerland please cable whether American citizens are able to proceed promptly to Genoa from Switzerland for embarkation United States. Is there any difficulty in obtaining Swiss exit visas or Italian entrance and exit visas?

HULL

340.1115A/667 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 22, 1940—11 a. m.
[Received May 22—8 : 36 a. m.]

46. Department's 55, May 21. American citizens with valid passports able to proceed promptly to Genoa from Switzerland to return to the United States. No Swiss exit visas or Italian entrance and exit visas required for American citizens. Through car rail connections between Zurich and Genoa re-established yesterday via Saint Gotthard. Convenient connections also between Bern, Geneva, Lausanne and

Genoa via Simplon with single change at Milan. Duration of journey Bern Genoa 9½ hours.

HARRISON

340.1115A/663 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 22, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received May 22—8:32 a. m.]

20. Consul's preliminary estimate indicates probably less than 600 Americans in Ireland desirous to return. No new arrivals.

GRAY

340.1115A/715

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1940.

I talked with Admiral Stark⁵⁸ several times on the telephone about convoy for the *Roosevelt*.⁵⁹ The President had sent word to me through General Watson⁶⁰ that he expected the matter to be solved through the Navy as it was an operating problem and the Navy Department was to make the decision. I presented the question to Admiral Stark on that basis and after consideration the Admiral called me back on the telephone and said that if we sent notice that the ship would sail fully lighted at night, would carry the American flag prominently displayed, and if we gave a general direction of her course, the dates of intended departure and probable arrival, and as much information as possible to the belligerent nations, he thought it was wiser not to convoy the ship and that she would be safer that way than with a convoy. He said he was unable to say that there were no dangers en route or near the coast of Ireland. They had not heard of mines recently in that neighborhood. However, there was always the danger of submarines and at least mistaken identity. Nevertheless he felt it wiser not to convoy the *Roosevelt* and so finally decided, although they had a ship ready and awaiting orders.

In the light of this conversation I read to him over the telephone the text of Department's 941 of the twenty-second to London,⁶¹ which went also to each of the other belligerents, and he thought the text was adequate under the circumstances. After conversing with Admiral Stark, the message was dispatched.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

⁵⁸ Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

⁵⁹ Ship assigned to evacuate Americans from Ireland.

⁶⁰ Gen. Edwin M. Watson, military aide and secretary to the President.

⁶¹ *Infra*.

340.1115A/680a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*⁶²

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1940.

941. You will please notify the Government to which you are accredited that the steamship *President Roosevelt* of American registry is proceeding from New York to Galway, Eire, on the great circle route for the purpose of repatriating American citizens and their families, sailing from New York May 24 arriving Galway probably May 30.

On the eastward voyage the vessel will carry no cargo. On the westward voyage she will carry no cargo and only American citizens and their families as passengers. The vessel will carry the American flag prominently displayed and will proceed fully lighted at night. The vessel is unarmed and moving without convoy. The Government of the United States expects this vessel to make its eastward and its westward voyages without interruption or molestation by the air, naval or military forces of any belligerent.

Please also notify the Netherlands Government.

HULL

340.1115A/680b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1940.

942. The following has been sent to the American Legation at Dublin:

"The steamship *President Roosevelt* of American registry is being dispatched from New York for the purpose of repatriating Americans. The vessel probably will leave late the night of May 23 and will proceed to Galway, Eire. Detailed instructions will be sent you within the next few days. The vessel should arrive in Galway about May 30 and when loaded with those desiring to proceed to the United States at their own expense will sail without cargo directly for New York. You will please communicate this information to the government at Dublin and ask the authorities there to facilitate the arrival and departure of the ship and the movement through Eire of American citizens desiring to board the vessel for the voyage to the United States. The vessel will carry on her eastward voyage no cargo. On her west-

⁶² The same, with the omission of the last sentence, on the same date to the Ambassador in Germany (No. 1363), to the Minister in Norway (No. 423), and to the Ambassador in France (No. 452) with instructions to notify the Belgian Government and to repeat to Angers for notification of the Polish Government. Department's telegram No. 947, May 23, added that the *Roosevelt* would carry no mail on the eastward or westward voyage (340.1115A/700a).

ward voyage she will carry no cargo and only passengers. About 500 can be accommodated in regular berths and 500 more on emergency cots."

HULL

340.1115A/672 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 23, 1940—noon.
[Received May 23—8:48 a. m.]

1330. Your 942, May 22. I want to thank the Department and Maritime Commission for their prompt action in getting a vessel to repatriate Americans from Great Britain and Ireland. People have been reluctant to proceed to Eire until we could give them something definite about ship. News of the sailing of the *President Roosevelt* has greatly simplified our task. It has also made a splendid impression on our citizens here. You may rest assured that every American here appreciates your cooperation.

Please advise us as soon as possible if the United States Lines are to book for the ship here. Also fares to be charged. We assume aliens can be carried as heretofore if they are members of families in which there are citizens. Does that include alien servants taken home by American families? Should we continue to carry Latin Americans and if so should we make them wait for a later ship? We do not expect many Latin Americans but we have had a few inquiries.

We are proceeding on the assumption that, if the *Roosevelt* cannot accommodate all those desiring to leave, she will make a second voyage. Is this right?

KENNEDY

340.1115A/678 : Telegram

The Consul General at Dublin (Davis) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 23, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received May 23—2:25 p. m.]

Referring to Department's telegram of May 21, 6 p. m. Please advise whether following classes of aliens may accompany Americans on special vessel. This information urgently required as some aliens distantly located will have to apply for immigration visas if permitted to sail.

- (1) Alien parents of minor American children and minor alien children of such parents.
- (2) Alien parents of adult American citizens.
- (3) Minor alien accompanying adult or minor American brother or sister.

- (4) Minor alien accompanying any adult or minor American relative.
- (5) Elderly or infirm adult alien accompanying any adult or minor American relative.
- (6) Minor or adult alien needed to care for any adult or minor American relative.
- (7) Minor or adult alien needed to care for unrelated minor or adult American.

DAVIS

340.1115A/687b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)*⁶³

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1940.

951. Department's 942, May 22. The steamship *President Roosevelt* is about to sail from New York proceeding to Galway for the purpose of affording facilities to American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland to proceed to the United States at their own expense. Arrangements may be made by those desiring repatriation directly with the agents of the United States Lines Company in Great Britain and in Ireland.

Furthermore, notice has been sent to each belligerent indicating the general course the ship will follow, the date of her intended sailing from New York, the date of her probable arrival at Galway, including the statement that she carries no cargo outward bound and on the homewardbound voyage no cargo and only American citizens and their families as passengers. Furthermore, they have been notified that the vessel carries the American flag prominently displayed and will proceed fully lighted at night and that the vessel is unarmed and moving without convoy.

While the Government of the United States has given this notice to belligerent governments, and while this Government has every hope that this vessel will proceed without incident on its trip to Ireland and return, nevertheless, the American Government can make no guarantee that the vessel will safely arrive at Galway or that it will safely proceed from Galway on its return trip to the United States. There are dangers which are unknown to the officers and agents of the Government of the United States. These dangers are of such character as to preclude the United States from guaranteeing a safe passage for its citizens on board this vessel. It has been deemed wiser and in the interests of the intending passengers that the vessel proceed openly and that we frankly advise the authorities of the belligerent govern-

⁶³ A similar telegram regarding the sending of the S. S. *Washington* to Bordeaux and Lisbon was sent as telegram No. 88, June 5, to the Consul at Bordeaux and, *mutatis mutandis*, as No. 60 to the Minister in Portugal.

ments that she is unarmed and without convoy, but we are all cognizant of lurking dangers and the possibilities at least of accident.

The vessel itself is in excellent physical condition. Its crew is competent. Diligent watches will be maintained and every precaution of skilled navigation will be taken by the officers of the ship to the end that it reach Galway safely and that it return safely to New York.

However, under the circumstances existing in the neighborhood of the continent of Europe, the Department instructs you to advise the American citizens who are intending to take passage on this vessel that the American Government can make no guarantee as to the safety of the voyage and that each passenger must assume the risk for himself. You may give this advice individually and confidentially.

Repeat to Dublin.

HULL

340.1115A/672 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1940.

960. Your 1330, May 23, noon.

1. United States Lines will book for the *President Roosevelt* from London Office which is being advised regarding fares. Ship will take American citizens and alien spouses and unmarried minor children accompanying American spouses or parents and finally, in remaining accommodations, citizens of the American republics. (In latter connection reference is made to your 1317, May 22, and 1333, May 23.⁶⁴) No other aliens are to be taken.

2. All persons desiring transportation on board must themselves bear all costs. Considering assistance offered by the Department for months after outbreak of hostilities to Americans in the British Isles to return and the repeated advice given them to return while accommodations remained available, Department does not intend therefore to provide financial assistance from its limited funds for the transportation of those who chose to remain and now may desire to return.

3. Department leaves to you and to the Minister at Dublin, with the assistance of the consuls, notification to all Americans of this opportunity afforded them for returning to the United States on an American ship, and arrangements for the embarkation of those wishing to return.

4. Department does not have in mind at present the dispatch of the *Roosevelt* or another ship for a second voyage.

Please repeat to Minister at Dublin.

HULL

⁶⁴ Neither printed.

340.1115A/685 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 24, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received May 24—5 : 25 p. m.]

1362. Your 960, May 23. With regard to aliens, we have a few cases where inability to take foreign nurses will cause serious hardship, or even prevent Americans from leaving. Some cases involve small children being sent home in care of a governess; others involve invalids unable to travel without a nurse. At least one is a stretcher case. May we use discretion in authorizing passage at individual expense of course, for foreign attendants, where these attendants, in our opinion, are necessary to enable the passenger to make the trip? The United States Lines began to accept bookings this afternoon and reservations are being made rapidly. We do not anticipate any difficulty in filling this ship, although some persons state that they are unable to pay the fares asked. Dublin reports that out of approximately 600 desiring repatriation in Eire, not more than 100 can afford to pay \$300. The steamship offices are remaining open over the week-end to facilitate bookings. We expect to have figures by Monday night. We will book the ship full and then notify you of the number still awaiting transportation.

I question the wisdom of attempting to put one thousand people on the *Roosevelt* unless the situation is truly desperate. The ship apparently can accommodate 655 above decks. Any people carried in excess of that number will have to be accommodated in the hold. Three quarters of those going home are women and children, including many babies. There are also many elderly people. I do not believe that these people can be put in the between decks, except in the direst kind of emergency. Unless the [Department?] decrees otherwise, we will not put women and children in the hold unless bombing has actually started.

We will turn the ship around as quickly as possible. There may be some difficulty with regard to tenders, but we hope to get the ship out within 36 hours.

KENNEDY

340.1115A/705a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1940—1 p. m.

136. In view of the uncertainties of the moment and our great concern for the safety of American citizens and ships in the Mediterranean the Department requests that you approach Ciano informally and

confidentially and state that we would appreciate being kept closely informed of any developments which would affect these American citizens and ships.

HULL

340.1115A/692 : Telegram

The Consul at Malta (Henry) to the Secretary of State

MALTA, May 25, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

11. Department's telegram No. 3, May 24, 7 p. m.⁶⁵ Am publishing notice advising American citizens to leave Malta but expect little result as probably less than 10 are in a position to leave unless the Department finances them and there is much apprehension of travel at this time. American citizens here probably number less than a hundred with few exceptions of Maltese birth or extraction and have close ties here. So far four are known to be considering return to the United States.

Via Italy appears to be the only practicable route from Malta to the United States at the present time and should Italy enter war departure would probably be impossible for some time. My family intend to remain. I assume American passports may be validated for any vessel leaving Malta for a non-European port.

Local government prepared and tense. Special services to be held in all churches tomorrow.

HENRY

340.1115A/685 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1940.

980. Your 960, May 23. Department is exceedingly anxious not to open the door to situation where aliens, even though nurses and governesses, are accepted at expense of American citizens. There may be great difficulty in providing adequate, quick facilities for removal of all Americans and it is therefore suggested that you consider this in connection with possibility of placing children in care of Americans in lieu of alien nurses or governesses. The matter, however, is left to your judgment in view of all the difficult conditions which you confront.

Your 1362, May 24, 8 p. m. Department has considered that maximum capacity of *Roosevelt* should be utilized in view of difficulty of procuring sufficient transportation facilities. We assume that hold

⁶⁵ See second paragraph of footnote 53, p. 95.

accommodations will be utilized for men and that women, children and elderly people should be provided the best accommodations. You will undoubtedly take into consideration these facts and the matter is left to your determination and judgment under conditions as you know exist there. The Department, however, stresses desirability of having maximum passages booked because of situation. You will consider that this government has assured belligerents only American citizens will be passengers.

HULL

340.1115A/702a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1940.

485. Department considers it advisable for you to inform Waterman⁶⁶ that it is considering the possibility of immediately diverting freighters or others vessels to either Bordeaux or Bilbao to more speedily evacuate Americans and ask Waterman to advise what means are available to transport by rail, motor or water Americans to Bilbao in case that were considered necessary. Department, for consideration of these plans, desires this or other supplementary helpful information as soon as possible to guide plans here. Department suggests you advise Waterman to communicate with Department direct to avoid delay.

Intending passengers must bear all costs of transportation. Government funds will not be provided therefor.

HULL

340.1115A/715a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1940.

984. Personal for Ambassador Kennedy. [From Davies.⁶⁷]

"Reference your 1330, May 23 and Department's 960, May 23, fourth paragraph. For your personal information Department is desirous of avoiding a situation where Americans desiring to return might not avail themselves of the present voyage of the *Roosevelt* in the hope of getting better accommodations later or for other reasons and wishes to place you in a position where no assurances can be given as to the availability of later ships. However, if conditions warrant and in your judgment it is required government will undoubtedly take necessary action. You are doing a grand job. Regards. Davies."

HULL

⁶⁶ Henry S. Waterman, Consul at Bordeaux.

⁶⁷ Joseph E. Davies, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

340.1115A/699: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 26, 1940.

[Received May 26—10:05 a. m.]

886. Your 485, 25th. It seems to me that something more specific should now be offered to the two hundred odd Americans waiting in the Bordeaux area for transportation than the advice that our Government is still considering the possibility of diverting freighters or other vessels to either Bordeaux or Bilbao for the purpose of their evacuation. May I inquire whether the S. S. *President Roosevelt* is completely booked by Americans planning to sail from Galway, and if not, whether it would not be possible to divert the S. S. *President Roosevelt* to Bordeaux. The stream of refugees pouring into southwestern France renders the situation of our nationals awaiting sailing in the Bordeaux area extremely uncomfortable to say the least. Traffic over the Spanish frontier is rigidly controlled and visas are granted after considerable delay and in most cases only for transit. In my opinion whenever [*whatever?*] ship or ships our Government in the immediate future sends for the repatriation of our citizens in the southwest of France should put into the port of Bordeaux thus avoiding the complications of crossing into Spanish territory. Waterman concurs.

BULLITT

340.1115A/710: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 27, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

1536. My 1526, May 27, 11 a. m.⁶⁸ I am informed by persons present at the press conference this noon that the Foreign Office spokesman called attention to the alleged British plot to sink the *President Roosevelt* and said that information was accumulating hourly which proved England's intention to resort to another *Athenia* trick. He added that he hoped to be able to tell the correspondents tomorrow the story of how the German Government has been in communication with the American Embassy in Berlin regarding the case.

With regard to the last statement the only communication thus far received from the Foreign Office with reference to the *President Roosevelt* is that reported in my 1510, 25th.⁶⁹

HEATH

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ Not printed. The Foreign Office acknowledged receipt of the Embassy's notes regarding the voyage of the S. S. *Roosevelt* to Galway and stated that it had informed the appropriate domestic authorities. (340.1115A/691)

340.1115A/712 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 27, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received May 27—5:51 p. m.]

1537. My No. 1536, May 27, 5 p. m. The Foreign Office spokesman in conversation late this afternoon said that he had been misinformed at this morning's press conference when he had indicated that the Foreign Office had been in communication with the Embassy regarding the alleged British plot to sink the steamship *President Roosevelt*, but intimated that a communication in the matter would shortly be sent to the Embassy. It is evident that considerable effort is being made to obtain foreign press interest and space for the report of the alleged plot which spokesmen here stated may be released tomorrow.

HEATH

340.1115A/706 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 27, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received May 27—3:08 p. m.]

423. Department's 136, May 25, 2 [1] p. m. When I asked Ciano this morning to keep me informed confidentially of any developments which might affect our citizens or ships in the Mediterranean he seemed to think it wholly unnecessary at present for us to delay or cancel sailings of American vessels.

PHILLIPS

340.1115A/699 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1940—8 p. m.

502. Your 886, May 26. Department is equally concerned with you for Americans waiting transportation in the Bordeaux area and is investigating urgently every possibility for providing speedy transportation for them. S. S. *President Roosevelt* will probably be completely booked and therefore unavailable for dispatch to Bordeaux. Your experience last fall will inform you that ships which are available for sending to Bordeaux are not acceptable to Americans desiring repatriation, and ships other than those then sent difficult to find. Department now informed that S. S. *Manhattan* due Naples today and Genoa tomorrow and scheduled sail for New York June 1 may have some passenger-carrying space available, perhaps for 400. If so, she will be diverted after passing Gibraltar to call at Bordeaux. There also exists possibility which Department is considering that the

S. S. *Washington* due New York May 28 can make a quick turn around to Genoa and return via Bordeaux. You will be kept promptly informed of dispositions.

HULL

340.1115A/713 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 27, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received May 27—2:51 p. m.]

1399. Your 980 and 984, 25th. Everything above decks on the *Roosevelt* has been taken. We plan to offer cots between decks to 150 to 200 men. That many men may not be available, however, as about nine-tenths of the passengers thus far booked have been women and children.

There are several hundred people here and in Eire who want to go home but who simply can not pay the fares asked. It creates an ugly impression to make the safety of these people contingent upon their ability to pay high fares. Is there any way in which we can help them?

Gray⁷⁰ suggests that we charge lower rates for cots in the hold. I concur but local United States Lines office fears complaints from those occupying inferior third-class accommodations.

I should be very glad to get the Department's views on these matters.

KENNEDY

195.6/406a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1940.

146. Please repeat following to Genoa immediately and to all diplomatic missions or principal consular offices in Mediterranean countries for their repetition to consuls under their jurisdiction:

"Reference Department's circular instruction, March 28, 1939, diplomatic serial no. 3047,⁷¹ regarding emergency evacuation of American citizens by sea.

Since the purpose of emergency consular certificates is to permit rapid evacuation of American citizens, allowing American vessels to carry an increased number of passengers for that purpose, there should not be issued an emergency certificate for any American vessel except for the purpose of carrying bona fide American citizens and the certificate, when authorized by the Department, should be restricted to

⁷⁰ David Gray, Minister in Ireland.

⁷¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 535.

cover only such citizens together with alien spouses and unmarried minor children who may be accompanying their American spouses or parents.

No general circulation is to be given to these instructions."

HULL

340.1115A/707 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1940—3 p. m.

513. Your 909, May 27, 7 p. m.⁷² S. S. *Washington* arrived New York this morning. Will be turned around immediately and leave noon May 30 proceeding directly Bordeaux due to arrive there June 4 and embark passengers at Le Verdon. She will then call Lisbon.

Ship may then proceed into Mediterranean, conditions permitting, where cabin passages have already been sold for return trip from Genoa. All extra spaces afforded by use of Consular certificate are reserved first for American citizens, second (and this only in case of specific request) for citizens of Latin American Republics. Third, the category you mention about distinguished persons of other nationalities unfortunately we are unable to authorize. There are so many Americans at both Atlantic and Mediterranean ports and so many complications and restrictions of the Neutrality Act⁷³ even as concerns cargo prohibitions that Department is unable to accede to your suggestion and regretfully withholds authority.

HULL

340.1115A/731 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 28, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 8:12 p. m.]

1550. My 1537, May 27, 7 p. m. The following is an advance copy of a communiqué handed me this afternoon at the Foreign Office with the statement that it would subsequently be released to the press.

"The Government of the United States of America has officially informed the governments of the belligerent countries through its Embassies that the American steamer *President Roosevelt* left New York for Galway in Ireland on May 24th in order to fetch American citizens from Europe. The American Government expressed the expectation that the unarmed ship, which is not travelling in convoy is lighted at night and is specially marked as an American vessel, will not be molested by the forces of the belligerent powers.

⁷² Not printed.

⁷³ Approved November 4, 1939; 54 Stat. 4. For correspondence concerning the neutrality policy of the United States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 656 ff.

[“]The Reich Government thereupon informed the American Embassy in Berlin as follows: vessels which cautioned their voyagers in the manner announced by the American Government are in accordance with the principles of German conduct of the war not exposed to any danger from German forces. In view of the fact that this American ship will travel through war zones otherwise avoided by American ships the German Government has informed its forces of the steamer's intended voyage and issued strict orders that it may carry out its voyage without any hindrance. Moreover there are no German forces on the route being taken by the steamer on its outward and return voyage.

“Any danger to the American ship from the German side is therefore out of the question.

“Beyond this in every particular the Reich Government drew the attention of the American Embassy to reports which have already found their way into the press and which are in accord with certain information which has reached the Reich Government according to which an attack on the *President Roosevelt* is being planned and prepared by the governments of the countries which are at war with Germany ‘in view of the fact that the enemies of Germany have already attempted for transparent motives to interfere with German-American relations by attacks on steamers with American passengers and laying the blame therefore on Germany the Reich Government has drawn the attention of the United States to these reports.’ In this connection it expressed the expectation that the American Government which itself has the greatest interest in preserving the lives of its citizens will accordingly for its part likewise do everything to avoid a disturbance of German-American relations and take suitable measures to thwart such criminal plans of Germany's adversaries.”

HEATH

340.1115A/727: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 28, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received May 28—6 p. m.]

1551. My 1550, May 28, 5 p. m. I called by invitation this afternoon on Ritter⁷⁴ at the Foreign Office who handed me an advance copy of the German press communiqué with regard to the steamship *President Roosevelt* affair the text of which was transmitted in my telegram under reference. After orally assuring me along the lines of the communiqué that all precautions had been taken to prevent molestation of the steamship *Roosevelt* by German naval units he said that he did not know whether the stories that his Government had heard of the British plot to sink the *Roosevelt* were true, but that he felt obliged to inform the Embassy that such stories had been received and that he hoped that the American Government had taken all precautionary measures to prevent the occurrence of any development of this nature

⁷⁴Karl Ritter, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry.

since it was the desire of his Government to avoid by all means in its power any incidents which might unfavorably affect German-American relations.

No written communication regarding the *President Roosevelt* other than that reported in the Embassy's telegram No. 1510, 25th,^{74a} has been received and Ritter indicated that no formulation of the German Government's position regarding the vessel need be expected beyond the foregoing oral statement which he had just made to me.

HEATH

340.1115A/713 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1940.

1015. Your 1399, May 27, 8 p. m. \$20,000 hereby allotted for advances as loans against promissory notes in accordance with existing instructions for temporary subsistence and transportation expenses of bona fide American citizens without necessary funds desiring repatriation on S. S. *President Roosevelt*. You may reallocate sums from this allotment as may be necessary to offices under your jurisdiction and to Dublin for Dublin and Cork with delegation of authority for them to advance loans in cases of citizens applying to them. Telegraph for each case names and addresses of relatives, friends and employers in United States together with amount of funds advanced so that Department may communicate with them and endeavor to obtain prompt reimbursement. It is expected that every care will be exercised to keep monies advanced from this allotment to lowest possible minimum, with thorough investigation made in each case to determine funds which applicant may possess or be able quickly to obtain. Those who can pay a part of their transportation will of course be required to do so. Balance remaining from allotment should be returned to Department by telegram after departure of ship.

Render separate accounts, draw separate drafts and charge authorization number 37, 1940.

Regarding lower rates for cots in the hold, this is a matter for the steamship officials and not one over which the Department has control.

HULL

^{74a} See footnote 69, p. 109.

340.1115A/749a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1940.

515. From Long.⁷⁵ *Washington* will have maximum capacity of about 1800 of which approximately 100 are to be reserved for Lisbon. We want to give you every possible available space but in order to do so and to arrange for it, it will be necessary for us to know approximately how many passengers you expect to desire evacuation. Consequently, please estimate the number which will be remaining, if any, after *Washington* sails with 1700 from Bordeaux. Please let us know as quickly as possible in order that supplementary arrangements may be made. But if made, they will not be on a ship like the *Washington* but it may be possible to send a ship similar to, but not identical with, those which served for repatriation duty last fall.

Please advise Department at your earliest possible convenience.

HULL

340.1115A/749b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Genoa (Balch) ⁷⁶

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1940.

140. You will please make every effort to get aboard the *Manhattan* every single American who can be crowded on the ship in any possible accommodation before the ship leaves that port.

Thereafter, if there are any bona fide Americans remaining in your jurisdiction you will please direct them to proceed as quickly as possible to Bordeaux. American Consul at Bordeaux will be advised of the probable arrivals of American ships at that port for the exclusive use of American citizens returning to the United States at their own expense.

Please repeat to Embassy, Rome for its information.

HULL

340.1115A/751 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, May 29, 1940—4 a. m.

[Received 1:45 p. m.]

27. Have cabled Kennedy warning against repercussions of steamer *Roosevelt* charging same price for cots in hold as for cots in public rooms, newspaper correspondents aware of this injustice. Damaging

⁷⁵ Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

⁷⁶ The Minister in Switzerland was informed of this instruction by telegram No. 61, May 28, for repetition to Geneva and such other points as might be benefited by the information (340.1115A/749c).

scandal bound to follow, conditions at best bound to create indignation. Steamer announced from America as being sent by Government. No disclaimer will relieve Government of responsibility in public mind. Please show President this telegram if necessary.

GRAY

340.1115A/734 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 29, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 12:24 p. m.]

1558. Department's 1393, May 24.⁷⁷ This additional information was communicated to the Foreign Office by note on May 25. The Foreign Office has now formally acknowledged receipt of this note and has stated that it has not failed to communicate the contents to the competent domestic authorities.

HEATH

340.1115A/735 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 29, 1940.

[Received 1:54 p. m.]

1433. Passengers for the *Roosevelt* are proceeding in an orderly way to Eire. All available space will be occupied above decks and we expect to put about 100 men between-decks. The United States Lines have about 300 people who wish to go home and who could not be accommodated on the *Roosevelt*. A telegraphic canvass of all consular districts in Great Britain and Northern Ireland shows a total of 900 who have indicated their desire to go home at once. Of these people, 400 are willing and able to take passage at rates charged on the *Roosevelt*. The remainder state that they will be unable to go home unless they can get much cheaper rates. Gray reports that they have a minimum of 300 or 400 people in Eire who would go home "if the price were right". Few of them can pay a \$300 minimum. If another vessel is sent over, some provision should be made for cheap fares. It would take a lot of people out if fares could start at \$150. In any event, the minimum should not exceed \$200. Many of these people, especially those in Ireland, came over on £18 tickets. They cannot possibly go home on £75 tickets. I do not believe that loans will be of much use, as many people will not obligate themselves for such a sum as \$300 and could not repay it if they did.

KENNEDY

⁷⁷ Not printed; it contained the information that the *President Roosevelt* had sailed May 24 and would arrive at Galway June 1 (340.1115A/693a).

340.1115A/756½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 29, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received May 29—5:40 p. m.]

947. For the President and the Secretary. In view of the certainty that Italy will enter the war during the first week of June unless we send the Atlantic Fleet to Tangier, it would be folly to permit the *Washington* to enter the Mediterranean.

I consider it inhuman and indecent to refuse to permit embarkation on the *Washington*, after all Americans are embarked, of aliens who have fulfilled all visa requirements and I trust that before the *Washington* arrives in Bordeaux you will have authorized me to permit the embarkation of carefully selected aliens who have every right to seek refuge in our country. I can assure you that I will use such authority with discretion.

BULLITT

340.1115A/751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1940—6 p. m.

25. Your 27, May 29, 4 a. m. Costs of passages a matter entirely in hands of steamship company and for arrangement between its agents and prospective passengers. The vessel left without cargo or passengers and is returning without cargo and consequently a loss is expected on the voyage. It is not expected persons will object to paying proper charges for an exceptional service after warnings to leave have been repeatedly given for 6 or 7 months.

HULL

340.1115A/800a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) ⁷⁸

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1940.

1037. You will please notify the government to which you are accredited that the S. S. *Washington* of American registry sailed from New York on May 30 for Bordeaux in France for the purpose of repatriating American citizens and their families. The vessel is ex-

⁷⁸ The following instruction was added to this telegram: "Please also notify the Netherlands Government."

Sent on the same date to the Ambassador in France (No. 536) with instructions to notify Belgian Government and repeat to Angers for notification to Polish Government; to the Ambassador in Germany (No. 1444) with instructions to repeat also to American Embassy, Brussels, and the American Legation, The Hague; and to the Minister in Norway (No. 447).

pected to arrive at Le Verdon about June 4. She may thereafter proceed to Lisbon in Portugal to take on board there additional American citizens and their families for the United States.

The vessel is carrying no cargo or passengers for Bordeaux except two American Red Cross representatives and Red Cross supplies to be landed there. The vessel carries the American flag prominently displayed and is proceeding fully lighted at night. She is unarmed and moving without convoy. The Government of the United States expects this vessel to make its eastward and its return voyage without interruption or molestation by the air, naval or military forces of any belligerent.

HULL

340.1115A/775 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 1, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received June 1—1:50 p. m.]

995. Marseilles and Lyons have just been bombarded by planes of unidentified nationality. One ship in the harbor of Marseilles is on fire. The *Washington* positively must receive orders at once not to enter the Mediterranean.

BULLITT

340.1115A/807a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Aden (Timberlake)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1940—7 p. m.

9. Your 9, May 28, noon.⁷⁹

1. In view of recent developments and of the possible extension of hostilities to other areas, including your own, than are already involved, you may consider it advisable to invite Americans in your district, without causing undue alarm, to return to the United States while there still remains opportunity for them to do so. In that connection you should bear in mind that the duty of the Government towards its citizens in a war area is accomplished when it has advised them of the dangers of the situation and invited them to leave, while affording those who choose to go every possible assistance in obtaining transportation and to those who choose to remain such protection as may be possible. There must be no insistence upon the departure of any citizen since the Government may not compel the return of its citizens and the decision whether to remain or to depart is one for each individual himself to make.

⁷⁹ Not printed.

2. In the event that Italy should come into the war, you will advise Americans in your district desiring to return home not to proceed via the Red Sea, the Mediterranean or continental Europe.

HULL

340.1115A/797b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)*⁸⁰

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1940.

1071. Refer to Department's telegram directing you to notify the government to which you are accredited regarding departure of S. S. *President Roosevelt* for Galway and inform that government that the vessel left Galway on its return journey to the United States on June 2.

HULL

340.1115A/802a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1940.

552. Urgently request French government to facilitate every possible way granting transit visas to American citizens in Italy and Switzerland desiring to proceed to Bordeaux for embarkation on American vessel en route United States.

HULL

340.1115A/886a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1940.

1060. Alien mothers or fathers resident in United States and properly documented may be embarked on board S. S. *President Roosevelt* with accompanying American children. Please advise offices concerned including Galway in reply to its telegram of May 31.⁸¹

HULL

⁸⁰ The following instruction was added to this telegram: "Please also notify the Netherlands Government."

Sent on the same date to the Ambassador in France (No. 562) with instructions to notify Belgian Government and repeat to Angers for notification to Polish Government; to the Ambassador in Germany (No. 1463) with instructions to repeat also to American Embassy, Brussels, and American Legation, The Hague; and to the Minister in Norway (No. 454).

⁸¹ Not printed.

340.1115A/802 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 3, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 6:41 p. m.]

1644. My 1641, June 3, 4 p. m.⁸³ I was requested to call at the Foreign Office this morning by Ritter who stated that prompt orders had been issued to the German naval units to prevent any molestations of the S. S. *Washington* and in amplification of his remarks handed me a copy of the press communiqué transmitted in my telegram under reference. He said that while he could not guarantee the *bona fides* of the story of a Franco-British plot to sink the *Washington* as well as other American vessels the information had been received from what the Foreign Office regarded as trustworthy sources. He further asserted that according to German information the alleged plot involved both the use of a time-bomb within the ship and a torpedo attack from outside.

HEATH

340.1115A/817c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1940.

27. As S. S. *President Roosevelt* appears to have sailed with considerable number of emergency accommodations untaken although those accommodations (approximately 500) were offered at rate of \$150, please telegraph reasons and how many were taken and how many untaken.

HULL

340.1115A/788 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1940.

583. Your 1001, June 3, noon.⁸³ Your understanding that no aliens will be permitted to embark on *Washington* until after all American citizens have been accommodated is correct. Order of embarkation should be as follows: First, American citizens, including their alien spouses if any and unmarried minor children accompanying them. Necessary alien nurses and companions for Americans may also be embarked in accordance with the Department's 556 of June 1;⁸³ Second, American children with their accompanying alien parents; Third, citizens of the American Republics whose diplomatic repre-

⁸³ Not printed.

sentatives have specifically requested assistance in obtaining transportation. United States Lines being advised.

Following telegram dated June 3 from Legation, Lisbon:

"Number of passengers at Lisbon for *Washington* about 50. Expect others to arrive and think possible full allotment will be filled before arrival of ship."

HULL

340.1115A/820 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, June 5, 1940.

[Received June 5—3:45 p. m.]

33. *Roosevelt* sailed with 721. Irish authorities permitted after careful survey 813; of these 655 could be accommodated in usual living quarters and public rooms, 158 hold. Sixty-six were actually booked in hold leaving 92 hold accommodation unfilled. The Department is informed [*misinformed?*] as to 150 dollar rate. No accommodation offered at less than 300. Saturday morning steamship agents received cable instructing them to forbid holders of hold accommodation to board ship. Much excitement as baggage of some was already on board, others had wives and children in above deck accommodation, all had paid 300 dollars. Klemmer⁸⁴ telephoned Commissioner Truitt⁸⁵ Washington and about 3 p. m. steamship agents received order to accept the hold passengers understanding that 150 rebate was promised. Failure to fill ship due in our opinion to failure to announce the 150 fare at beginning. However only 92 more could have been carried instead of 500 as you had been informed. Presumably this figure arrived at on basis of life saving equipment additional to life boats which Irish surveyor found to provide for 1044 passengers, his figure of 158 hold passengers in his view was maximum of those who could reach upper decks safely in case of accident. Recommend that in any future embarkation minimum fare be announced at outset. There are some disgruntled nationals here who ignored Department's former warnings but would probably have sailed had the cut fare been available. Protests generally based not so much on amount of fare as for charging the same minimum for hold as for cots in public rooms. Reference my telegram 27, May 29. Expensive delays in embarkation due to improper port facilities. Cobh only 32 miles farther could have embarked in 1 day.

GRAY

⁸⁴ Harvey Klemmer, United States Maritime Commission.

⁸⁵ Max O'Rell Truitt, Vice Chairman, United States Maritime Commission.

340.1115A/824 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 6, 1940—noon.

[Received June 6—6:57 a. m.]

1520. My 1433, May 29. We are being swamped with enquiries regarding transportation to the United States. It is imperative that we give our people some sort of an answer, one way or another, without delay.

We have enough people to fill another boat like the *Roosevelt*. If the *Washington* is sent here, I believe we can produce between 500 and 800 passengers, more if some provision is made for lower fares.

Military developments, of course, could change these figures overnight but that is the way it looks today. The *Washington* would solve many of our difficulties. I hope we can have her.

The loan authorization of \$20,000 reached us too late to be used for the *Roosevelt*. May we use this fund for other vessel?

Ninety per cent of those coming to the Embassy still inquire regarding the possibility of travelling on belligerent vessels.

KENNEDY

340.1115A/824 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1940.

1113. Your 1520, June 6, noon. Arrangements are being made to have the *Washington* proceed direct to Ireland from Bordeaux and Lisbon. You will be advised later of approximate date of arrival.

Washington will probably have available about 1000 accommodations for passengers from Galway counting emergency accommodations. Ship will likely have 900 passengers aboard upon leaving Lisbon. Bookings for departure from Galway will be made from United States Lines Office, London. Lines will fix rates.

It has been our experience in the past that every vessel which we have dispatched abroad for the purpose of returning Americans to the United States has returned with unoccupied space. The Government cannot continue the practice of dispatching such vessels for persons who have been repeatedly warned since the outbreak of hostilities that they should depart for the United States and who have not taken advantage of the means which the Government has provided them at considerable expense and at risk to the crews and ships in traversing dangerous waters to repatriate them. This should be made clear in your notification of the *Washington's* approaching arrival to Americans still in the British Isles.

Use of loan authorization for *Washington* approved.

American citizens inquiring at the Embassy regarding the possibility of traveling on belligerent vessels should be informed that such travel is against the law of the United States and permission will not be granted for it.

You will warn each passenger as instructed in regard to the voyage of *S. S. Roosevelt* that they travel at their own risk.

HULL

340.1115A/841h : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1940.

594. Reference Department's 583, June 4. Since *Washington* after departure from Lisbon will proceed another port for embarkation additional American evacuees estimated at 800, aliens additional to those already specifically authorized by Department should not be embarked at Bordeaux. Lisbon reports expects approximately 100 Americans for embarkation there.

HULL

340.1115A/832 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 7, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received 12:50 p. m.]

1710. Following message received from The Hague through the Foreign Office:

"Following for Department: 233, May 29, 4 p. m. The paramount outstanding problem here at the present moment is the evacuation of the Americans remaining in this country. My best estimate, in which Lee⁸⁶ and Lord⁸⁷ concur, is that we must count on about 400 to 500 Americans and 100 to 150 of their immediate alien dependents requiring evacuation. In view of the material losses suffered by many of them it is probable that the estimated figure of approximately 27,000 dollars necessary for repatriation loans (see my 128, April 19, 1 p. m.) will have to be materially increased—my present guess would be by something approaching 30 percent.

While I have dealt with this subject in previous telegrams I have as yet had no answer thereto. I trust that answers to my telegrams on this point, as well as instructions indicating a comprehensive plan for evacuation of Americans here, together with authorization for repatriation loans in adequate amount having already been sent to me by the Department and that they are now in Berlin or elsewhere en route awaiting the moment when they can be transmitted. The radio announcement that the liner *President Roosevelt* would be sent to the

⁸⁶ Frank C. Lee, American Consul General at Amsterdam.

⁸⁷ John H. Lord, American Consul at Rotterdam.

hitherto proscribed area of the Irish coast to take off Americans has of course raised high hopes in the American colony here that arrangements can similarly be made to send an American ship into the port of Rotterdam or at least Antwerp where there would be just as many Americans ready to board her as could fill the *President Roosevelt* (see my 204, May 14, 6 p. m.,⁸⁸ and also my 170, May 11,⁸⁹ last paragraph). Gordon."

HEATH

340.1115A/833 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, June 7, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received June 7—1:16 p. m.]

481. My 465, June 5, 3 p. m., and 459, June 4, 11 a. m.⁹⁰ In reply to my inquiry this morning Ciano informed me definitely that the *Rex* would not sail and added that I had been right in recommending that the *Washington* should not plan to enter the Mediterranean.

PHILLIPS

340.1115A/830 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 7, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received June 7—12:05 p. m.]

1539. Your 1113, 6th. Thank you for the *Washington*. It will take a big chunk out of our problem. We have plenty of people to fill her, but many cannot pay the fares. We will use the \$20,000 in accordance with instructions contained in your 1015, 28th.

I presume your references to unoccupied space concerns the *Acadia* and *St. John*. We reported before that people simply would not travel on these ships. I cannot say that I blame them. Every other vessel which left these shores, including belligerent vessels, carried as many people as it was found practicable to put on.

We have warned all Americans still here that the *Washington* may be their last opportunity for returning home and that those who do not take advantage of this opportunity remain at their own risk.

KENNEDY

⁸⁸ Not found in Department files.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

⁹⁰ Neither printed.

340.1115A/883a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*⁹¹

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1940.

1138. Referring Department's telegram of today regarding departure of steamship *Washington* for Galway, Ireland, Legation at Lisbon has telegraphed that the *Washington* left there 5 p. m. June 10. The ship is proceeding on the following route :

One from Cape Roca course 322 true to latitude 42 n 12—50w thence course 346 true to latitude 45 n 14 thence course 360 true to 50 n 14 thence course 43 true to black head.

Notify accordingly government to which you are accredited.

HULL

340.1115A/871 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Hare) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 12, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received June 12—3 : 51 p. m.]

102. *Excalibur* is now in Alexandria.

(1) Assuming vessel returns via Mediterranean should warning be given in accordance with paragraph No. 2, Department's telegram No. 37, May 16, to Ankara.

(2) If vessel proceeds via Red Sea should similar warning be given.

(3) If Department's authorization is required for validation of passports of persons desiring to proceed to the United States through the new combat zone as implied by Department's 27, March 25, to Bern, blanket authorization is requested covering passengers sailing from Egypt on *Excalibur*.

HARE

340.1115A/868 : Telegram

The Consul General at Genoa (Balch) to the Secretary of State

GENOA, June 12, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received June 12—4 : 16 p. m.]

82. After *Exochorda* sails tomorrow it is estimated by American Export Line, the United States Line, and the American Consulate

⁹¹ The following instruction was added to this telegram: "Please also notify the Netherlands Government."

Sent on the same date to the Ambassador in France (No. 630) with instructions to notify Belgian and Polish Governments; to the Ambassador in Germany (No. 1558); and to the Minister in Sweden for the Minister in Norway (No. 467).

Similar instruction was sent on the same date to the Ambassador in Italy (No. 169).

General that there will be between 400 and 500 Americans from all parts of Europe to evacuate from Genoa to New York. *Excalibur* will arrive at Genoa June 26 three-fourths full and can take from here about 75 additional Americans. Freighters now available in the Mediterranean will accommodate between 50 and 100 mainly from eastern Mediterranean ports. This leaves at least 275 Americans unprovided for and at least 150 Latin Americans urgently requesting accommodations. It is therefore strongly recommended that ship accommodations be arranged. It is impossible for these people to proceed to Lisbon or Bordeaux.

BALCH

340.1115A/874 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 12, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received June 12—8:51 a. m.]

1814. My 1812, June 12, 6 p. m.⁹² Since the published DNB communiqué now received necessitates certain corrections in the two announcements as transmitted in my telegram under reference the full text thereof is quoted below :

"A German submarine operating in the Atlantic encountered at dawn on June 11 a steamer⁹³ proceeding on a northerly course. The German U-boat commander took the steamer for a Greek vessel which had already been stopped by him and had been provided with course instructions in accordance with prize laws and which had evidently not followed this course and sought to escape. He ordered the steamer to stop. There then took place an exchange of flashlight signals during the course of which the U-boat commander ascertained that it was not the supposed Greek steamer but the United States steamer. The U-boat thereupon after the customary exchange of greetings left the steamer free to proceed.

"In this connection the State Department in Washington has announced that the course for Ireland which the American ship was following at the moment of the encounter with the U-boat had been notified before to the belligerent countries.⁹⁴ In this respect the American State Department is in error as far as Germany is concerned. The German Government has been informed by the American Embassy in Berlin only of the vessels voyage to Bordeaux, Lisbon and back. The German Government was first notified that the steamer would proceed to Ireland on the afternoon of June 11, that is to say after the encounter."

HEATH

⁹² Not printed.⁹³ i. e., S. S. *Washington*.⁹⁴ Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1940, p. 645.

340.1115A/882a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Heath)

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1940.

1590. Please repeat following to Legations, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, The Hague and Brussels.

Americans in Europe have been continually warned from the outbreak of hostilities to depart for the United States while they could obtain transportation. Practically all means of transportation to the United States for them have now been cut off by Italy's entry into the war. The Department therefore will not further authorize loans from its limited funds for repatriation expenses pending further developments.

HULL

 340.1115A/876 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 12, 1940—midnight.

[Received June 13—9:45 a. m.]

1815. My number 1814, June 12, 11 p. m. With regard to the Foreign Office statement communicated in my telegram under reference, Ambassador Ritter through whom all communications regarding the *Roosevelt* and the *Washington* have been handled asked me to call on him at 10:30 a. m., June 10, and stated that the Foreign Office was in receipt of conflicting information regarding the sailing dates and course of the *Washington* and asked that exact and complete information be furnished as far in advance of sailing dates as possible as it was frequently a matter of delay and difficulty to communicate with submarine units, many of which were as much as 14 days out of port. I accordingly sent my Rush telegram number 1769, June 10, noon,⁹⁵ and at the same time the Embassy managed to get in communication by telephone to Bern with the Embassy at Paris where it was stated that the *Washington* was scheduled to leave Lisbon June 10 or 11 for Galway.

I had informed Ritter that I would apprise him immediately of any information received and sent him the following communication, marked Personal and Urgent, which he received around noon of June 10.

"Dear Mr. Ambassador: With reference to our conversation this morning I have to inform you that I have as yet had no reply from Washington as to the movements of the Steamship *Washington* but according to information which I have just received telephonically

⁹⁵ Not printed.

through our Legation in Bern from the American Embassy in Paris the *Washington* departed from Bordeaux on Saturday June 8 at 8 p. m. for Lisbon. The ship is scheduled to leave Lisbon today or tomorrow for Galway, Ireland, which port she should reach on June 12 or June 13. I imagine that the ship will depart from Galway on June 13th or 14th for the United States.⁹⁶

The Department's instruction No. 1554, 10th,⁹⁶ was received at 11:30 p. m., June 10, and its instruction No. 1558, 10th,⁹⁷ giving the *Washington* exact sailing date and course reached the Embassy at 6 o'clock in the morning of June 11 and were textually communicated to the Foreign Office by *note verbale*.

I spoke informally with Ritter this evening who said that the Foreign Office communiqué quoted in my telegram under reference was occasioned by the statement reportedly issued at the Department that all belligerent governments had been notified as to the course and scheduled voyage of the vessel whereas he said the exact course and sailing dates (which were communicated in the Department's instruction No. 1558, 10th) reached the Foreign Office only after the ship had been stopped. He said that he had not transmitted the contents of my letter to him to the German naval authorities because the "requested information not having been furnished by the American Government was not official and because the exact course was not given." He expatiated on the difficulties of communicating with submarine units which were available for radio instructions only for brief periods and in situations permitting them to remain on the surface during times of schedules transmission. He expressed great regret at the occurrence.

I have refused requests of representatives of the American press for my comments on the Foreign Office statement.

HEATH

340.1115A/868 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Genoa (Balch)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1940—6 p. m.

162. Your 83 [82], June 12, 7 p. m. Americans in Mediterranean area have remained there despite warning they should leave while there was time and the Government cannot now undertake to send additional American shipping for them into the dangerous combat zone.

HULL

⁹⁶ Not printed.

⁹⁷ See footnote 91, p. 125.

340.1115A/871 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Hare)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1940—8 p. m.

55. Your 102, June 12, 6 p. m. Americans may travel on neutral ships proceeding out of Mediterranean through combat areas but they do so at their own risk and contrary to Department's advice.

Blanket authority hereby given you to validate passports for one journey through combat area on neutral ships for Americans choosing so to proceed.

HULL

340.1115A/903 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) ^{97a}

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1940.

1229. Reference previous telegrams regarding departure steamship *Washington* from Galway, Consul Galway advises ship left Galway for New York 7 a. m. June 15. Confirm sailing government to which you are accredited.

HULL

340.1115A/913 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 16, 1940.

[Received June 17—1 a. m.]

683. Embassy recommends that future purchases of transportation for Americans being repatriated from Soviet Union and Soviet occupied Poland include rail transportation from place of residence in Soviet Union, or from Lwow if evacuee resident in Soviet occupied Poland, to Vladivostok and rail steamer transportation thence to United States west coast port via Japan. Transportation should be prepaid in United States if possible.

[Here follow details as to services and costs.]

THURSTON

^{97a} The following instruction was added to this telegram: "Notify also Netherlands Government."

Sent on the same date to the Consul at Bordeaux (No. 148) with instructions to notify also Belgian and Polish Governments; to the Ambassador in Germany (No. 1638) with instructions to notify also American Embassy at Brussels and American Legation, The Hague; and to the Ambassador in Italy (No. 199).

340.1115A/959 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Pell) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, June 21, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received June 21—3:21 p. m.]

81. Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 76, June 19, 6 p. m.,⁹⁸ informed now from Bordeaux and Madrid that at least 600 or 700 American refugees awaiting repatriation most of these expecting to come through Lisbon. Lisbon housing facilities exhausted, Portuguese Government will not permit transit unless we can guarantee a ship. They are also giving preference in over-crowded conditions to British, Dutch and Belgian refugees who would be liable to internment in France. Urge again that *Manhattan* or other ship be sent at once and that announcements be made that it will call at Lisbon, Bilbao and if possible St. Jean de Luz. Again repeat Portuguese Government having several hundred thousand visa applications and a food shortage in prospect cannot justly be asked to grant anything but strictly transit facilities.

PELL

340.1115A/957 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 21, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received June 21—2:40 p. m.]

224. Spanish authorities agree to admit American refugees at French frontier with or without Spanish visas provided their exit from Spain is assured. Legation at Lisbon states that Portuguese authorities are [not] willing to give transit visas to such refugees to enter Portugal unless or until there is an American vessel in Lisbon which can take them off.

In view of the fact that the radio reports indicate that France is being bombed up to the Spanish frontier and since there are believed to be a considerable number of Americans in and around the area Biarritz, Hendaye, Saint Jean de Luz, et cetera, I have suggested that the Legation request the Admiral⁹⁹ to send immediately a large naval vessel to Bilbao to take off such Americans as arrive at that port whereupon we would be in a position to insist that the Spanish authorities admit American refugees in transit for Bilbao and could see to it that any Americans entering proceed direct to that port.

I urgently request that this matter be taken up with the Navy Department in Washington and that a vessel be sent at once.

WEDDELL

⁹⁸ Not printed.

⁹⁹ Presumably Rear Admiral David M. LeBreton, in command of Navy Squadron Forty-T, operating in southwestern European waters, based at Lisbon.

340.1115A/960 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)*¹

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1940—2 p. m.

101. Your 224 and 225, June 21.² Dispatch of special ship to Lisbon being considered. Telegraph immediately your best estimate number Americans in your jurisdiction desiring return United States, paying own expenses, and include any alien spouses and unmarried minor children accompanying them. It is not contemplated ship will call elsewhere than at Lisbon for direct return to New York.

You may express to Spanish Government Department's sincere appreciation for its courtesy in permitting entry of American refugees into Spain for evacuation.

Naval vessels now in European waters cannot be effectively used for large scale evacuation and are not, therefore, being dispatched to Bilbao or to French ports.

HULL

340.1115A/973 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 22, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received June 22—2: 50 p. m.]

231. My telegram No. 224, June 21, 7 p. m. Have finally been able to arrange with Spanish authorities that the Chief of the Spanish frontier at Irun will in cooperation with Morgan,³ permit any American citizen recommended by Morgan to enter Spain en route to the United States with or without a Spanish visa and without the necessity of a Portuguese visa.

It has been agreed that such Americans will be concentrated for the moment, probably at Bilbao, until such time as a vessel can either call at Bilbao to take them off or until the Portuguese authorities will permit their entry into Portugal to take ship from that port.

As soon as final arrangements as to place of concentration have been made, the Department will be promptly advised.

In the meantime, Morgan, Smythe,⁴ and Gilbert⁵ are endeavoring to make as complete as possible lists of all American citizens passing the frontier, their destination and their addresses in the United States. Lists will be telegraphed at intervals to the Department.

WEDDELL

¹ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, with the omission of the second paragraph, to the temporary Embassy at Bordeaux as telegram No. 32.

² Telegram No. 225 not printed.

³ John H. Morgan, Consul at Madrid.

⁴ David M. Smythe, Vice Consul at Bilbao.

⁵ Charles Gilbert, clerk in Embassy at Madrid, Vice Consul at San Sebastian June 29, 1940.

340.1115A/1154a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*⁶

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1940.

1418. 1. As you were advised by Mr. Long by telephone today, S. S. *Washington* will return to Galway for the purpose of evacuating remaining Americans from British Isles. It is expected that the ship will leave New York Friday, June 28, and will arrive at Galway on July 4. Bookings for departure from Galway for New York will be made from United States Lines office, London. Lines will fix rates.

2. You will advise all Americans in British Isles most emphatically that the Government cannot continue to dispatch American vessels with their crews into dangerous waters to repatriate citizens unmindful of warnings and assistance repeatedly given them to return to United States and who persist in remaining in the danger area, and that they should take this opportunity, which may well be the last given them, to return home.

3. American passports for persons proceeding to United States on the *Washington* may be validated to cover journey over combat water to Ireland, thence over combat water to United States, thus avoiding validations in Ireland for journey to United States. Validations should specifically state that journey is over combat water to United States on S. S. *Washington*. Inform all consuls under your jurisdiction and American Minister, Dublin, for consuls under his jurisdiction.

4. There may be embarked on board the following categories of passengers only: American citizens, alien spouses and unmarried minor children accompanying American spouses or parents; alien parents domiciled in United States and properly documented for return traveling with American children; and alien nurses and companions properly documented for admission into United States accompanying American passengers, provided the medical condition of the passenger is such as to render the nurse's or companion's traveling necessary. In remaining accommodations citizens of the other American republics may be embarked upon the specific request of their governments' diplomatic representatives in each case. No provision is to be made for the embarkation of citizens of the other American republics referred to until all American citizens have been given an

⁶ In telegrams of June 28 to the Minister in Portugal as No. 113 and to the Consul at Bordeaux as No. 374, instructions were given as to the voyage of the S. S. *Manhattan* from New York July 2, due in Lisbon July 8 or 9. Arrangements were similar to those for voyages of the *President Roosevelt* and the *Washington*.

opportunity to return on the ship and accommodations have been provided those who wish to embark. Permission herein given for the embarkation of citizens of the other American republics should not be advertised.

5. With respect to question of loans for repatriation expenses, please telegraph immediately balance remaining from \$20,000 authorized for previous trip of *Washington* so that Department may consider what amount for this voyage may be necessary. In that connection please note that Franklin of United States Lines agreed today to make available 200 steerage accommodations on ship at a rate of \$100 each. These accommodations are to be allotted under your direction only to American citizens to whom loans of Government funds for transportation may be advanced and to those financially unable to purchase other accommodations. Loans for partial or complete cost of transportation may not be made for more expensive accommodations until the allotment for the 200 is exhausted.

6. You will please notify persons taking passage on the *Washington* that each assumes the risks of the journey for himself in the sense of the Department's 951, May 23 to you concerning the voyage of the *President Roosevelt*.

7. Authority is hereby granted to issue emergency consular certificate for the *Washington* in accordance with procedure outlined in Diplomatic Serial No. 3047 of March 28, 1939.⁷

8. You will please notify the government to which you are accredited and also the Netherlands, Polish and Belgian Governments of the voyage of the ship along the lines indicated in the Department's telegrams relating to previous voyages of the steamships *President Roosevelt* and *Washington*.

9. Please prepare a full and exact list of passengers leaving on *Washington* together with their addresses and indication of nationality, grouping families, and mail same to Department on board ship but be prepared to telegraph list in case it is requested.

10. Telegraph promptly time of sailing of ship on return voyage in order that belligerent governments may be informed in advance of such sailing.

11. Franklin requests you please inform United States Lines office at London of foregoing and you are authorized to supply office with copy of this telegram. Also notify Minister, Dublin and cooperate with him in allotments of the steerage passengers.

HULL

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 585.

340.1115A/1017 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 27, 1940.

[Received June 27—7:08 p. m.]

2124. From the Hague.

"241, June 22, 11 a. m. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. The Department in its telegram No. 77 of May 11, referred to the paramount consideration of the welfare and safety of American citizens. Since then I have sent various telegrams (notably my 204 of May 14, 6 p. m.,⁸ 233, May 29, 4 p. m.,⁹ 234, June 8¹⁰ and 238, June 14¹⁰) bearing exclusively on this point and requesting answers giving an indication for the Department's views—at least some information which can be presented to American citizens in this country evidencing their Government's concern with their welfare.

No answer referring to the cables above listed has been received.

As predicted in my 239 for June 15,¹⁰ we have again been entirely incommunicado throughout the week until the arrival this morning by mail from Berlin of numerous welfare inquiries accompanied by the Department's 1590, June 12, to the Berlin Embassy. While I see that this instruction refuses to authorize repatriation loans until further notice I trust that it is not to be taken as an answer to my specific cables above referred to concerning assistance from the American Government with respect to evacuation of American citizens anxious to return home and able to pay for their transportation—in fact I do not see how this instruction can be taken as answering my cables dealing with this specific point.

After long discussions the local German authorities now state that Berlin is willing in principle to permit the evacuation of American citizens from Holland. They request detailed information concerning such eventual evacuation but until I get some reply from the Department to my suggestions concerning evacuation by boat from a northern continental or a Scandinavian port, or possibly eventually from a western Atlantic port, I can make no answer to these authorities. Incidentally I am still refused permission by the Germans to go to Brussels—primarily to confer on joint evacuation possibilities—or to Berlin (see my 238, June 14).

In connection with Berlin's stated willingness in principle to let Americans leave Holland it is of course to be borne in mind that all requests by the Legation for permission for individual Americans to leave the country are being refused and the Germans state that they will continue to be refused until evacuation en bloc is arranged for.

If the Department is under the impression that the situation here is perfectly normal and gives no cause for concern it is under a misapprehension. In the short time since the occupation of Holland the Germans have absorbed such an amount of Dutch stocks that bread, meat, butter, sugar, fuel and many other necessities of life have already been severely rationed and of course the scope and extent of this rationing will rapidly increase. The situation in this respect is already bad for children and all but the most robust women, and soon

⁸ Not found in Department files.

⁹ See telegram No. 1710, June 7, 10 a. m., from the Chargé in Germany, p. 123.

¹⁰ Not printed.

it will be definitely precarious. I feel it my duty to urge upon the Department a realization of the fact that even a message saying only that the Department has in mind the situation of the American citizens in this country and is endeavoring to work out a solution thereof would be of great assistance. Many of the Americans in this colony are upstanding citizens representing bona fide American interests; they did not get caught here as a result of vacillation, inertia or failure to heed warnings to leave, but were ordered by their various principals to remain here on duty. The consistent lack of any word from their Government—when it is public knowledge that such word could have been sent to our Berlin Embassy prior to June 13 and brought here by Kennan¹¹ (let alone the receipt of no word since that date)—creates a very unfortunate situation.

I again request an immediate answer of some kind to this cable. Gordon."

HEATH

340.1115A/1017: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon)*¹²

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1940.

353. Your 241, June 22, 11 a. m.¹³ The Department has always been mindful of the welfare of American citizens in Holland and their predicament has been the subject matter of considerable concern to the officers of the Department. However, under the circumstances which existed and which isolated The Hague from communication with Washington and the condition of warfare which existed on the continent of Europe in intensified form until this week have prevented the Department from visualizing the possibilities of facilitating the return of those persons to the United States. It is not safely possible to send a vessel to a Channel port or a North Sea port and no such sailing is contemplated, as you were informed by Department's 64 of May 6, 3 p. m.¹⁴ Within the last few days, however, a change in conditions of actual warfare have developed on the continent and it may now be possible to arrange the departure en bloc of the American citizens by train to the port of Lisbon. The S. S. *Manhattan* will arrive at the port of Lisbon on July 7 and after embarking passengers there will sail directly for the port of New York. It is not contemplated to especially divert another vessel to Europe. The American Export Line is instituting a regular weekly service between New York and Lisbon.

The Department has not paid the transportation of persons desiring to return to the United States. The Department has, however, arranged with the operating companies that vessels be sent to Europe

¹¹ George F. Kennan, First Secretary of Embassy in Germany.

¹² A similar telegram was sent July 6, 4 p. m., to the Chargé in Germany for the Ambassador in Belgium.

¹³ See telegram No. 2124, June 27, from the Chargé in Germany, *supra*.

¹⁴ Not printed.

in order to enable American citizens to purchase their passage home. It ought to be possible to make arrangements now for bona fide American citizens in Holland to be transported by rail to Lisbon at their expense. In case any of the persons have insufficient funds you may telegraph their names and addresses in the United States and the names of their families, friends or employers. The Department will endeavor immediately to obtain from the families, friends or employers sums for their passage and on failure to receive same will authorize you to lend such persons against their promissory notes funds sufficient to enable them to pay their transportation to the United States partly by rail and partly by water.

If you are able to make arrangements with the appropriate authorities for travel individually or en masse from Holland through France and Spain to Lisbon, you may be assured that the Spanish authorities have agreed to facilitate the entry at the border of American citizens and that the Portuguese authorities are glad to facilitate the entry of Americans across their border provided they are assured of accommodations upon a vessel.

The difficulty in communicating with The Hague has naturally interfered with arrangements but if you will telegraph the names and addresses of persons who are in need of funds so that the Department can make the necessary inquiries in this country every effort will be made here to expedite the possibility of those arrangements.

HULL

340.1115A/1025 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940—1 p. m.

1484. Your 1877, June 28.¹⁵ We will allot you an additional \$10,000. It is preferable for several reasons to do it that way.

After you have accommodated the American citizens and such citizens of the American republics as have been specifically requested and if there is thereafter any space available you may utilize it for the British refugee children under 16 years of age.

HULL

340.1115A/1005 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940.

1486. Reference Department's 1418, June 26. Philippine citizens as American nationals are of course to be accommodated on the *Wash-*

¹⁵ Not printed.

ington the same as American citizens. However, loans are not authorized for them.

HULL

340.1115A/1053a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Heath)

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1940—5 p. m.

1816. For Gordon from Long. Summarizing telephone conversation. First, American citizens may be evacuated singly, in groups or en masse. Second, Department expects The Hague to make arrangements possibly with the cooperation of Berlin. Third, if the evacuation is not completed before you may leave The Hague the Consulate can complete the arrangements. Fourth, visas to be granted sparingly to dependent children or husband and wife only. Fifth, telegraphic requests for individual applications for financial relief should be made by telegraph as advised in former telegram for authorization by Department before loan is granted. Sixth, you will be very careful about extension of visa privilege as per circular telegram which should have been received by you before now which left Department Saturday, June 29.¹⁶ Seventh, route through Switzerland and Southern France approved if practicable. [Long.]

HULL

340.1115A/1049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 2, 1940.

[Received July 2—8 : 07 a. m.]

1926. For Assistant Secretary Long. Status of the *Washington* is approximately as follows: first class—550 sold out of 1200 available, tourist—650 sold out of 700, steerage—200 sold out of 200, that is 1400 sold out of a total of some 1900. These figures are as of last night. Today the first class is selling better than the tourist class. It looks like we might have about another couple of hundred which makes a total of about 1600. Now as to the British refugee children. As under the immigration law nobody can pay the fares of an immigrant, the possibility of sending a couple of hundred children who cannot afford to pay is out of the question. I called Shakespeare¹⁷ representing the British Government's evacuation scheme and offered to take care of at least 100 refugees but he informed me that administratively they could not put any children on the boat. We have several families

¹⁶ Circular telegram, June 29, 1 p. m., p. 231.

¹⁷ Geoffrey Shakespeare, British Under Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

now who can afford to pay their way but in most cases we will have to send either a nurse or mother along with them, children in some cases being as young as 7 months old. There is not going to be any great number of these cases, but we are working hard to get the boat as nearly filled as possible. Is there any objection to my giving permission to mothers or nurses if absolutely necessary to enable the children to sail?

KENNEDY

340.1115A/1047: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Heath)

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1940—1 p. m.

1825. Your 2268, July 1, 11 p. m.¹⁸ You are authorized to make urgent request of the Foreign Office for assurances that permission will be accorded individual Americans or small groups of Americans to leave Holland en route to the United States. You may give whatever assurances are possible and necessary that these Americans will proceed forthwith to the United States.

HULL

340.1115A/1049: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1940—4 p. m.

1521. Your 1926, 2d. From Long. Glad to hear about the fine number of bookings.

Concerning refugee children it is now considered that in view of your conversation with Shakespeare and in view of the limitations of our statutes you might gracefully withdraw. There is no technical difficulty about alien mothers coming with the children and that could be arranged, but in view of the statement of Shakespeare and in view of the possible political inquiries which might develop here it seems best now that these children be not placed on this particular boat and that only American citizens be accommodated. However for your general information and use as regards British boats the above situation about alien mothers may be helpful. [Long.]

HULL

¹⁸ Not printed.

340.1115A/1046 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)*¹⁹

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1940—6 p. m.

127. Following received from Legation, Lisbon :

"96, July 1, 6 p. m. In connection sailing of *Manhattan* and various Export Line ships Portuguese Government has agreed to issue blanket transit visas to groups of Americans coming from southern France and Spain but asks that our Consular officers in Marseille, Bayonne, Bilbao, et cetera, be instructed to make lists of American citizens with the greatest care and detail and to vouch personally for each person on the list. Suggest that these various Consular officers be instructed to get in touch at once with their Portuguese colleagues and with the agents of the steamship companies who have been informed."

You will, of course, take such action as is possible and appropriate in the circumstances. While the Department cannot authorize you to vouch personally for each person, you should exercise every care to include only bona fide Americans destined for the United States, and you may inform your Portuguese colleague that the Department is endeavoring to facilitate in every possible way transit of Americans proceeding to Lisbon to embark for the United States.

Repeat to Consul at Bilbao.

HULL

340.1115A/1066 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, July 3, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received July 3—1:44 p. m.]

2311. Following from Gordon.

"Will Department please instruct Harrison in Bern to request the Swiss Government to issue instructions to the Swiss Minister to The Hague to grant visas with no more than a few hours delay to Americans who may be given a sudden chance of evacuation and regarding whom the Legation at The Hague will give assurances to the Swiss Minister there that these Americans are only crossing Switzerland in transit on their way to a port of embarkation for the United States. Gordon."

HEATH

¹⁹ The same, on the same date, to the Consul at Bordeaux (No. 459) and the Consul at Marseille (No. 62).

340.1115A/993 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1940—6 p. m.

Your telegram, June 25, 5 p. m.²⁰ Department informed that Maritime Commission has authorized carriage of passengers from Capetown on *President Polk*, sailing July 5.

HULL

340.1115A/1070 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, July 4, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 2:05 p. m.]

2331. Department's 1825, July 2, 1 p. m. I called at the Foreign Office and made an oral communication in the sense of the Department's telegram under reference leaving also an urgent memorandum. He excused the delay in replying to our previous communication by saying that it had been necessary to consult the Civil Government of Occupation in Holland.

If no reply to my two *notes verbales* on the subject is received by July 5, I recommend that I be authorized to deliver a signed note in the following sense:

"I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's attention that the Embassy's two *notes verbales* requesting assurances that exit visas would be granted without delay to American citizens desiring to leave Holland to return to the United States have remained without reply.

These notes pointed out that this question is daily becoming more urgent and acute. The matter has been taken up on various occasions by the American Legation in The Hague with the German authorities there who stated that they saw no difficulty whatsoever in granting the requested permission but that they would have to refer the matter to Berlin. Accordingly it is not understood why the matter should again be referred back to The Hague nor why any further delay in reaching a decision should be necessary.

Furthermore the American Government fails to see that any German interest can be served by continuing to refuse to allow American citizens who will only cross German territory in transit en route to a port of embarkation for the United States permission to leave the Netherlands.

In view of the foregoing I again request Your Excellency to be so kind as to cause instructions to be issued that the required permis-

²⁰ Not printed.

sion and visas be granted to American citizens desiring to leave Holland under the conditions above stated."

Please cable triple priority answer.²¹

HEATH

340.1115A/1133 : Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, July 9, 1940—noon.

[Received July 9—9:55 a. m.]

65. Referring to the last sentence of my telegram No. 56, June 27,²² reliable sources of information confirm the activity of Italian submarines in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. One was rammed recently at the entrance of the Gulf by a British destroyer and another spotted in the Gulf is being searched for today by British bombing planes. Steamer service between Iraq and India is uncertain and fully booked for at least next 6 weeks. I am encouraging Americans evacuating through here to travel when possible by air to Karachi and thence by rail to Bombay.

KNABENSHUE

340.1115A/1053 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1940—5 p. m.

Your July 2, 11 a. m.,²² and Department's July 3, 6 p. m. As you were informed in Department's telegram of June 13, 7 p. m.,²² authorization for vessels of the American President Lines to embark passengers at Capetown will be considered for each individual vessel on the basis of existing conditions. With respect to future sailings, it is suggested that you keep in close touch with the President Lines agents in Capetown and that the line make application to the Maritime Commission in advance of each sailing if the demands of American citizens for passage make this action necessary.

With respect to future sailings of the line, the Department has authorized the American Consul at Bombay to issue emergency consular certificates to the *President Garfield* and *President Monroe* to accommodate American citizens who have proceeded to Bombay from the Near East, and it may be that no space will be available on these vessels when they reach Capetown.

HULL

²¹ In reply, the Department in its telegram No. 1861, July 5, 6 p. m., stated: "No objection delivery note in sense quoted."

²² Not printed.

340.1115A/1163 : Telegram

The Consul at Bordeaux (Waterman) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, July 11, 1940.

[Received July 12—6: 47 a. m.]

398. Department's 502, 5th.²⁴ Border Hendaye opened 10th for Americans from occupied territory. Those from unoccupied territory should cross at Cerbere. Local German authorities anticipate no further immediate difficulties. Repeat Lisbon, Madrid.

WATERMAN

340.1115A/1190 : Telegram

The Consul General at Amsterdam (Lee) to the Secretary of State

AMSTERDAM, July 16, 1940.

[Received July 16—9: 12 a. m.]

339. Arrangements have now been completed by this office whereby individual transit visas for Americans en route to the United States via Berlin, Switzerland, France, Spain and Portugal now being issued and departures began morning July 14th.

LEE

811.111 Quota 56/276 : Telegram

The Consul General at Amsterdam (Lee) to the Secretary of State

AMSTERDAM, July 17, 1940.

[Received July 17—12: 08 p. m.]

340. My 201, 3d, via Berlin and 323, 11th, direct ²⁵ as well as Department's 47, June 28 ²⁶ and its reply ²⁷ to Legation's 241, 22d regarding evacuation of Americans.

Authorization is now requested to issue nonpreference visas under Netherland quota to about 60 nonquota relatives of approximately 40 Americans whose departure is being or will be delayed by formalities required to establish nonquota status. Reference note 141 to section 361 Consular Regulations it is not certain that Netherland quota will not be exhausted but small number involved in documenting close relatives of Americans would make but little material difference and would greatly facilitate departure of Americans. Evacuees named in my 201, 3d, most pressing. Can Department expedite?

LEE

²⁴ Not printed; it inquired regarding a report that the Germans had closed the border at Hendaye and that seven Americans were prevented from crossing to Spain. It instructed that the German authorities be urged to allow the Americans to cross. (340.1115A/1101a)

²⁵ Neither found in Department files.

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Telegram No. 353, June 28, p. 135.

340.1115A/1203 : Telegram

The Consul General at Amsterdam (Lee) to the Secretary of State

AMSTERDAM, July 18, 1940.

[Received July 18—3:04 p. m.]

348. I have been informed by the local foreign passport office that beginning this afternoon no further German transit visas will be granted to foreigners including Americans. About 37 Americans in the Netherlands have received visas but I understand all have not yet left.

LEE

740.0011 European War 1939/4755 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1940—3 p. m.

1. Consulate at Lagos reports that according to captain of American steamship *Zarembo* 2 British warships entered Pointe Noire and took over 2 French passenger vessels carrying 650 persons each, including American citizens. Please investigate and report, particularly as to whereabouts of American passengers.

2. The Department would be glad to have an informal estimate of number of American citizens in Congo or nearby French colonies who might desire to return to the United States if transportation should be made available.

WELLES

857.0011/54a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)*²⁸

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1940—5 p. m.

2001. 1. The United States Army troop ship *American Legion* is being sent to Petsamo, Finland for the purpose of repatriating American citizens.²⁹ The vessel will leave New York at 2 p. m. Standard Time, Thursday, July 25, and is expected to arrive at Petsamo about August 6, 1940.

2. The vessel will proceed to Petsamo on the following course:

²⁸ Sent on the same date to the Ambassadors in France (No. 140) and Italy (No. 330) and the Chargé in Germany (No. 2037).

The following instruction was added to No. 2001 to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom: "Please notify also the Netherlands, Belgian, Polish and Norwegian Governments."

²⁹ For additional correspondence regarding the trip of the S. S. *American Legion* to Petsamo, see vol. I, section I under Extension of the European War, entitled "Invasion of Norway and Denmark by Germany."

(1) Ambrose Lighthouse to Nantucket Lighthouse: Latitude 40—10 north, Longitude 70—00 west

(2) Nantucket to Cape Race: Latitude 46—30 north, Longitude 53—00 west

(3) Cape Race to Iceland: Latitude 65—05 north, Longitude 13—05 west

(4) Iceland to North Cape: Latitude 71—50 north, Longitude 24—00 east.

3. The identification of the *American Legion*, which is unarmed and moving without convoy, is as follows: The ship is white; 535 feet long; 72 feet beam. Height from water to flying bridge 69 feet. Flush deck forward and aft; each has 2 sets of high king posts abreast. Smoke-stack of black; top bound with red, white and blue stripes. Has one island deckhouse on poop deck. Large deckhouse amidship. American Flag on both sides of the ship centrally located, and lit up at night. American Flag on stern end of ship also lit up at night. Standard speed of ship 16 knots.

4. The Government of the United States expects this vessel to proceed on its journey and to return without interruption or molestation by the air, naval or military forces of any belligerent.

5. You will please notify the Government to which you are accredited accordingly. Inform Department triple priority when notification given.

WELLES

340.1115A/1223 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, July 24, 1940.

[Received July 24—6: 11 p. m.]

3140. Department's 1861, July 5, 6 p. m.³⁰ Following reply in translation received from Foreign Office concerning transit of American citizens through Germany: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Embassy of the United States of America in reply to its *notes verbales* numbers 1229 and 1244 of July 1 and July 3, 1940, respectively that arrangements have been made for the necessary visas to be issued with the greatest possible speed to American citizens traveling alone or in smaller groups and desiring to leave the Netherlands and proceed through Reich territory to Italy in order to return to the United States. Foreign Office states orally travel need not necessarily be via Italy and may be performed by any desired route.

KIRK

³⁰ See footnote 21, p. 141.

340.1115A/1224 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, July 24, 1940.

[Received July 24—8:50 p. m.]

3139. At request of American Legation at Kaunas on July 10, Embassy requested Foreign Office to facilitate passage American citizens resident in Kaunas in transit through Germany; assurances have been received from Foreign Office that issuance of visas would be facilitated if citizens pass through Germany in groups under leadership of an individual who would hold passports. Group to be accompanied by police officers at expense of United States Government. Transmitting this information to Kaunas suggesting that perhaps expenses of accompanying police officers could be paid with funds raised by group as it is believed no United States funds available in case of individual applicants for visas. Their cases must be first referred to Foreign Office for approval.

KIRK

340.1115A/1228a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1940—3 p. m.

176. Rome telegraphs as follows:

"During recent weeks American citizens travelling from Italy to the United States have generally been able to obtain Spanish and Portuguese visas only upon my intervention. This matter has been discussed with my Spanish and Portuguese colleagues and the latter has now assured me that Portuguese visas will be granted to American citizens without delay upon presentation of steamer or plane tickets to the United States. The Spanish Consul however still requires a recommendation from the Embassy and moreover charges approximately 200 lire for a transit visa. Could the Department take this matter up with the Spanish Government?"

You will please explain the situation to the appropriate authorities and ascertain whether in these circumstances and in view of the emergency the issuance of visas to Americans in Italy desiring to pass through Spain to Portugal in transit to a port of embarkation for the United States may be facilitated. The Department is endeavoring to assist in every possible way the transit of Americans proceeding to such ports and you may assure the Spanish Government that anything that may be done to further this end will be greatly appreciated.

WELLES

138USSR/599 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 26, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 7:10 p. m.]

914. My 573, May 23, noon.³¹ The Soviet authorities have consistently refused to permit American citizens in Soviet-occupied Poland to come to Moscow thereby depriving those Americans with expired passports or without passports of any opportunity to appear at the Embassy in order to apply for new passports, and limiting the Americans who can be evacuated from the above-mentioned area to those bearing valid passports. This situation which has obtained since the Soviet forces entered Poland more than 10 months ago is now entering its next logical phase, the forcing of these marooned Americans to accept Soviet passports and Soviet citizenship in order to keep a roof over their heads and to obtain a means of making a [livelihood].

The first of these cases of the new phase is that of Edward Krysiak—bearer of Warsaw Consulate General passport No. 3300 issued on November 10, 1937, and now residing at Bialystok. His passport expired on November 10 last year since which date he has been unrelenting in his efforts to obtain from the authorities at Bialystok permission to travel to Moscow. He now telegraphs to the Embassy that the Militsiya at Bialystok wants him to accept a Soviet passport. The Embassy has telegraphed the following message to Krysiak in the Russian language:

“You should explain to the Soviet authorities at Bialystok that the Embassy is prepared to furnish you a valid passport upon your personal appearance in Moscow and that the only reason for your not having a valid American passport today is the failure of the authorities to grant you permission to travel to Moscow. With regard to the efforts of the Soviet authorities to prevail upon you to accept a Soviet passport in the event efforts are made to force you to accept a Soviet passport involuntarily you may inform the Soviet authorities that any attempt on the part of those authorities to force any American citizen to bear a Soviet passport involuntarily is a matter of the gravest concern of this Embassy and will be brought to the urgent attention of the Government of the United States of America.”

During the past 2 months the Embassy has addressed invitations to Krysiak and 216 other persons in Soviet-occupied Poland requesting that they appear in person at the Embassy for the purpose of applying for passport services. The Embassy informs the Foreign Office in writing of the name and address of each person thus invited and solicits the good offices of the Foreign Office with a view to facilitating that person's travel to Moscow but as stated above the Embassy's efforts in this regard have thus far been fruitless. It is believed that

³¹ Not printed.

an examination of further documents and correspondence which have been received from or with regard to alleged American citizens in Poland will enable the Embassy to issue similar invitations to some 30 to 40 more persons in the course of the next few days. The total number of Americans in Soviet-occupied Poland is still unknown as correspondence establishing new cases is received daily.

Inasmuch as no reply has been received to my No. 573 under reference I shall appreciate receiving the Department's instructions.

THURSTON

811.111 Quota 56/276 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Amsterdam (Lee)

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1940—10 a. m.

128. Your 340, 17th. You are authorized to issue nonpreference visas under the Netherland quota in urgent cases to nonquota relatives of American citizens.

WELLES

340.1115A/1241 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 30, 1940—1 a. m.

[Received 1:45 p. m.]

408. Department's 176, July 25, 3 p. m. Following telegram has been sent to American Embassy at Rome.

"July 30, 1 a. m. Your 722, July 15, 5 p. m., to the Department.³² Spanish Ministry of Interior will not waive requirement of recommendation by American Embassy or Consulate as a matter of principle. However the Ministry states that if this Embassy will inform it of the number of American applicants for Spanish transit visas in the various cities at which we have offices the Ministry will authorize the Spanish Consuls to visa American passports up to this total without requiring individual recommendations. Your Embassy and the several Consular offices may then submit to the Spanish Consulates lists containing the names of the American applicants together with number, date and place of issuance of their passports. The Spanish Consuls will then visa without individual recommendation the passports of Americans whose names appear in these lists. Your Embassy and the Consulates may of course submit a series of lists if necessary.

For your information this is approximately the same procedure by which this Embassy was able to obtain the passage through Spain of some 800 Americans stranded along the Franco-Spanish frontier. This Embassy will inform the Ministry of Interior immediately upon receiving your estimate of the number of Americans who will present themselves at our several offices."

WEDDELL

³² Not printed.

857.0011/82 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, July 31, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received July 31—1:30 p. m.]

2489. Your 2001, July 24, 5 p. m., and my 2380, July 25.³⁴ Following signed note dated today received from Foreign Office:

"1. I did not fail to refer to the competent authorities of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom Your Excellency's note No. 2436 of the 25th June regarding the voyage to Petsamo of the United States army troop ship *American Legion*.

2. I now have the honor to inform you that the necessary instructions have been given to ensure that this vessel will not be intercepted or molested on her outward journey by the armed forces under the control of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

3. I have the honor to observe however that the ship in question would appear to have been routed across mine fields, to the laying of which I invited your attention in my note No. W8843/98/49 of the 16th July owing to fortuitous circumstances, the existence of which I should be grateful if you have any reason regard as confidential, the ship will not on this account be endangered on her outward journey, but she is likely to incur the gravest risk if she returns by the same route.

4. It is with the object of obviating this contingency that I beg you to be so good as to inform me of the vessel's proposed departure from Petsamo as long in advance as possible in order that I may be in a position to inform you of any alteration in her route which it may be necessary to suggest.

5. I have at the same time the honor to request that ample notice may in future be furnished to me of the movements of United States ship for which safe passage is sought in order that a recurrence of the above dangers may be avoided and that the competent authorities may be enabled to take all the precautions necessary in order to ensure as far as is possible the safety of the ships concerned."

The Foreign Office circular note referred to in numbered paragraph 3 above repeated to Department in my telegram No. 2220 of July 17.³⁵

KENNEDY

340.1115A/1281a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Sterling)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1940—5 p. m.

265. Your 776, July 30, 11 a. m.³⁵

1. In case accommodations are available on *American Legion* after American citizens have been provided for, following additional categories of persons may be embarked:

³⁴ Latter not printed.³⁵ Not printed.

(a) Alien parent domiciled in the United States and properly documented for return traveling with unmarried minor American child.

(b) Properly documented alien parent accompanying unmarried minor American child, joining American spouse in United States.

2. Embarkation alien spouses not accompanying American spouse or child disapproved.

3. Italian persons mentioned may not be embarked as their embarkation would give rise to complaint and possible complications with belligerent governments.

WELLES

138 U.S.S.R./602 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 2, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 8 : 12 p. m.]

953. My 914, July 26, 3 p. m. The Chief of the Consular Section of the Foreign Office today stated orally that he will endeavor to obtain permission for the travel to Moscow of those Americans in Soviet occupied Poland bearing expired passports and who possess the necessary funds and transportation for repatriation. A list of the three Americans meeting these qualifications is being sent to the Foreign Office. He added that there is no likelihood that permission for travel to Moscow will be granted to those American citizens in Soviet occupied Poland not in possession of either valid or expired American passports.

THURSTON

340.1115A/1277 : Telegram

The Consul General at Florence (Putnam) to the Secretary of State

FLORENCE, August 3, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received August 3—10 : 05 a. m.]

23. For the President from Myron Taylor.³⁶

"For your personal information may I advise that reports I have from Lisbon from Dr. Whipple³⁷ and others who have been attempting to leave for home, are that there is great congestion there and much dissatisfaction that a sizeable ship that would take those waiting for passage is not provided for the accommodation of American citizens. Many of them are not well supplied with funds and all are having difficulty to obtain reasonable living accommodations while waiting in Lisbon. Air service has been interrupted to the extent that Dr. Whipple, who left Rome by air on the 23d and should have been home last Saturday was still in Lisbon on the 30th. According to advice this

³⁶ Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

³⁷ Dr. Allen O. Whipple, chief surgeon of the Presbyterian Hospital, New York City.

morning August 2 he has not reached the United States yet. You are doubtless aware that there are also many in Italy who are unable to reach Lisbon, a number of whom came to take the last sailing on the *Manhattan* and *Washington* which were canceled and who find themselves in a difficult position."

POTNAM

340.1115A/1333a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy) ³⁸

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1940—4 p. m.

220. 1. Since the President's proclamation ³⁹ under the Neutrality Act listing France as a belligerent is still in effect, please request the Foreign Office to inform you for the Department how many days advance notice it desires be given it of the sailing date and course of American ships such as the *American Legion* now proceeding to Petsamo specially dispatched to repatriate Americans, and American Red Cross steamships such as the *McKeesport*, in order that the French authorities may take all necessary precautions to insure that such ships will not be subjected to interruption or molestation on their voyages by the French forces.

2. You will point out to the Foreign Office that these ships prominently display the American flag and other American insignia, that they proceed fully lighted at night, and that they are unarmed and move without convoy; consequently, they are easily identifiable as American and neutral ships, and attack upon them by any belligerent vessel could result only from a failure on the part of the attacking force properly to assure itself beforehand that it is not attacking a neutral ship.

3. However, as a matter of extra precaution for the safety of the ships and their passengers, the Department has followed the practice of notifying the belligerent governments when such vessels sail and the course they will take. In the future, the Department will endeavor to give the notification, together with indication of the distinguishing characteristics of the particular ship and its speed, such number of days in advance as the belligerent governments may require in order to inform their fighting forces, with the understanding that the ship will be free safely to proceed when the stated number of days have expired after presentation of the notification to the Foreign Office.

4. The Foreign Office will appreciate that the exact date of departure from European ports cannot be determined positively until the

³⁸ The Embassy was temporarily established at Vichy, France, on July 14, 1940, with consular section remaining at Paris.

³⁹ Dated September 5, 1939, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 685.

ship has arrived at the port and arrangements have been completed for the embarkation of the passengers in the case of a ship sent to repatriate Americans or for unloading of cargo in the case of a Red Cross ship. It is obviously desirable that the ships should not be obliged to remain in the port for an extended period. Therefore the Department desires to know whether indication of a tentative sailing date will suffice with the understanding that the ship will not sail before that date but may safely proceed subsequently. To illustrate, the *American Legion* is expected to arrive at Petsamo on August 6 and to be able to return on August 8, but the Department cannot be sure at this moment that the departure will not be delayed to a later date since the ship may experience delay in arriving on August 6 and delay may occur in embarking its passengers, and weather conditions may also delay departure. As there are no hotel accommodations at Petsamo, the arriving passengers must proceed immediately on board the ship and remain there until sailing.

5. You will make it clear to the Foreign Office that this matter has reference only to the American ships mentioned in the first paragraph, that is, those specially dispatched to repatriate Americans, and Red Cross vessels.

6. Please obtain immediate reply and cable it triple priority. The Department is similarly communicating with other belligerent governments.

HULL

340.1115A/1287: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Sterling) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 6, 1940—noon.

[Received August 6—8: 46 a. m.]

797. The number of American evacuees furnished us by the various missions for passage on the *American Legion* enabled the Legation to consent to the passage of about 15 prominent nationals of American republics from all countries including the Mexican Minister here and family and other diplomats. The various offices have now increased number of Americans wishing passage but it would create great difficulties to turn down Latin Americans at this late date when they have made all preparations and some are already en route. I fear, therefore, that a few disappointed Americans may make complaints. This telegram is only a forewarning.

STERLING

811.111 Quota 60C/462 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 12, 1940—noon.

[Received August 12—10:56 a. m.]

1002. Department's 425, August 9, 8 p.m.⁴⁰ Prior to August 2 the Chief of Consular Section of the Foreign Office informed the Embassy repeatedly that under regulations issued by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs no non-Soviet nationals in "Western White Russia" and "Western Ukraine" may travel to Moscow for the purpose of applying for non-Soviet passports and that no persons, Soviet or non-Soviet, in these areas may travel to Moscow for the purpose of applying for foreign visas. On August 2, as reported in my 953 of that date, he modified his previous statements by stating that he would endeavor to obtain permission for the travel to Moscow of only those Americans in these areas bearing expired passports and possessing the necessary funds and transportation for their repatriation. When it was brought to his attention on August 10th that the Embassy continued to receive telegrams from the three persons mentioned in my 953 above mentioned stating that they are unable to receive permission to travel to Moscow he stated that the Commissariat for Internal Affairs had thus far not modified in favor of Americans bearing expired passports its basic regulation restricting all travel from these areas to Moscow.

THURSTON

340.1115A/1341 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

STOCKHOLM, August 12, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received August 12—2:41 p. m.]

825. Number of passengers sailing on *American Legion* recorded here follows: Finland 138, Estonia 22, Latvia 18, Lithuania 102, Sweden 250, Norway 182, Denmark 84, Germany 88, Netherlands 13, total 897. Of these 16 are Latin Americans.

The capacity of the ship is reported at 905 including temporary cots. The ship's master requested that a small percentage less than capacity be allowed to permit him latitude in making assignments to the distinguished guest⁴¹ and party.

The last group left Stockholm at 1418 today.

GREENE

⁴⁰ Not printed.⁴¹ Crown Princess of Norway; see vol. I, section I under Extension of the European War, entitled "Invasion of Norway and Denmark by Germany."

340.1115A/1474

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Visa Division (Coulter) ⁴²

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1940.

Mr. Foster of the British Embassy telephoned on August 10 concerning an inquiry received from the Foreign Office at London regarding the cases of British refugee children having dual nationality. Mr. Foster stated that the Embassy at London had apparently taken the position that as these children are regarded as American citizens, they may not be granted visas as British subjects. In this connection, Note 2 of the Visa Regulations, Supplement A, Part II, Foreign Service Regulations, points out that American citizens should not be documented as aliens. Mr. Foster stated that as the Embassy in London regards the children as American citizens, they have been unable to obtain transportation by American vessels in view of the neutrality law. These children, therefore, are at a disadvantage as compared with British children, in coming to the United States. Mr. Foster asked that he be advised regarding the procedure which these children should follow in being evacuated.

E[LIOT] B. C[OULTER]

340.1115A/1369 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk) ⁴³

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1940.

2235. 1. The United States army transport *American Legion* which was sent to Petsamo, Finland, for the purpose of repatriating Americans will sail from Petsamo on August 16, as scheduled, on the course as indicated in the Department's telegram of August 8 ⁴⁴

⁴² Addressed to the Chief of the Passport Division, the Special Assistant in Charge and the Administrative Officer of the Special Division, and the Assistant Secretary of State.

Marginal notes: "These children have had many opportunities to return on the Am. ships sent over. R[uth] S[hipley, Chief of Passport Division]. They can now come out on plane to Lisbon, France by Am. ships."

"They may fly to Lisbon like any other American citizen. B[reckinridge] L[ong, Assistant Secretary of State]."

⁴³ Sent on the same date to the Ambassadors in the United Kingdom (No. 2371), Italy (No. 392), France (No. 301) and the Soviet Union (No. 450).

The following was added to No. 2235 to the Chargé in Germany: "You will please advise the German Government that the subject of the course to be followed by this vessel and the several communications on the subject received from the German Government have had the serious and protracted consideration of the Government of the United States. However, no other practical course exists for this vessel to follow. Consequently, the Government of the United States reverts to the original communication of the German Government on the subject and takes note of the fact that the German Government has brought the voyage of this vessel to the attention of its appropriate agencies.

Any additional distinctive markings of the ship which the German authorities may desire to suggest for her identification will be adopted if practicable (which you will please cable triple priority)."

⁴⁴ Not printed.

which is hereby repeated as follows: (a) 70 degrees north, 1 degree 30 minutes west; (b) 61 degrees north, 1 degree 30 minutes west; (c) 59 degrees north, 5 degrees no minutes west; and thence between N. Rona and Cape Wrath to (d) 46 degrees 30 minutes north, 53 degrees no minutes west; (e) 40 degrees 10 minutes north, 70 degrees no minutes west.

2. The captain of the vessel has been instructed to make the passage from north of the Shetland Islands by daylight and be well out westward into the Atlantic Ocean before dusk.

3. In addition to the other markings of the ship given in the Department's telegram of August 8, the ship will fly the American flag from each masthead as well as from the stern and she will proceed fully lighted at night.

4. The Government of the United States repeats that it expects this vessel to proceed on its return journey without interruption or molestation by the air, naval or military forces of any belligerent.

5. You will please notify the appropriate authorities accordingly and cable the Department triple priority that you have done so, repeating this telegram verbatim back to the Department so that it may be sure that it has been correctly received by you.

WELLES

340.1115A/1374 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 16, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received August 17—9 a. m.]

3559. My 3555, August 16, 1 p. m.⁴⁵ Following is a translation of a *note verbale* just received from the Foreign Office dated today.

"The Foreign Office has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of note number 1398 of August 16, 1940 concerning the voyage from Petsamo of the American military transport *American Legion*.

The Foreign Office concludes from this note that the Government of the United States of America insists upon having the *American Legion* return via the route it had already indicated although it had been promptly and urgently warned of the very great dangers inevitably connected with a voyage through the zone of military operations around England and despite the fact that the German Government has urgently advised that the ship return by another safe route.

The German Government points out emphatically that the ship is entering the zone of military operations around England warned and with full knowledge of the danger. It declines any responsibility whatsoever for harm which may occur to the vessel on account of so daring an undertaking. The responsibility therefore is borne exclusively by the Government of the United States of America.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

The German Government feels all the more obliged to make this declaration because it did not receive final notification of the ship's departure from Petsamo on August 16 until noon of this same day although the American Embassy in Berlin had been informed that August 15 was the latest date for such notification of the intended route."

KIRK

340.1115A/1374: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1940—4 p. m.

2255. Your 3559, August 16, 10 p. m. Please communicate the following to the German Foreign Office:

"By a telegram dated August 16 I informed my Government of your *note verbale* of that date with further reference to the voyage from Petsamo of the United States Army transport *American Legion*. My Government instructs me to make the following communication in reply thereto:

"The Government of the United States desires first to point out that the course on which it was proposed that the *American Legion* should sail from Petsamo to New York was indicated to the German Government through the American Embassy at Berlin on August 9, together with a statement of the distinguishing characteristics of the ship for her ready identification and a statement that she was scheduled to sail from Petsamo on August 16, in sufficient time for the German Government to notify the appropriate German authorities so as to assure the vessel against attack by the German fighting forces. The United States Government was informed on August 13th⁴⁶ that the German Foreign Office had stated that the appropriate German authorities had been informed of the date of departure, course and description of the *American Legion*, the understanding being that the vessel would depart on August 16 and, if she should depart at a later date, then the Foreign Office would again have to be notified 3 days before the actual departure since otherwise it would not be possible to give informatory instructions to the appropriate German authorities. The German Foreign Office called attention to its previous communications to the American Embassy on the subject of the *American Legion*, in which the Foreign Office had stated that instructions to the German combatant forces with respect to possible action against neutral ships were, in accordance with international rules, and the German Prize Law Codes, limited to merchant ships. The Foreign Office had further stated that it was, therefore, out of the question that German forces should stop neutral vessels of war or take any other measures against them, and that in view of those facts there was no occasion, in the opinion of the German Government, to give any special assurances with regard to a neutral war vessel. The German Government was, however, prepared to notify the German forces for their information in order to avoid confusion with enemy warships that an American

⁴⁶ Telegram No. 3498, August 13, 5 p. m., from the Chargé in Germany, not printed.

war vessel (namely, the *American Legion*) would travel on a specified course at a specified time.

'Subsequently, and not until the late afternoon of August 14, as reported to the American Govt. that same day, the Foreign Office stated that the German Air Force had pointed out that the proposed course of the *American Legion*, passing between N. Rona and Cape Wrath, would bring the vessel into the field of dangerous air operations, and that the German authorities, therefore, recommended a more northern route. Upon inquiry of the Foreign Office as to how much advance notice of the change of course of the vessel would be required by the Foreign Office in order that it might effect complete notification of all German combat units the vessel might encounter, the answer was made that if such notice were received by noon, Berlin time, August 15, there would be time to effect proper notification and the vessel could leave Petsamo August 16 as scheduled.

'Under instructions of the U. S. Government, on August 14 the attention of the Foreign Office was invited to the assurances which it had given that the appropriate German authorities had been duly informed of the date of departure, course and description of the *American Legion*, and it was asked to stand by its original acceptance of the course of the *American Legion*. In reply, Dr. Ritter of the Foreign Office stated that if the American Government insisted on the ship following the proposed course, then the German Government had nothing to do but accept the decision, pointing out again the great danger involved. Dr. Ritter also stated that the Foreign Office had merely agreed to notify the appropriate German authorities for their information of the course and description of the vessel, and that it had never guaranteed the safe conduct of the vessel for assurances of safe conduct could only be given in the cases of merchant vessels and not in the cases of naval vessels, in which category the *American Legion* falls. The U. S. Government considers, in that connection, that Dr. Ritter's statement was hardly in line with the previous communication of the Foreign Office, referred to above, when the Foreign Office stated that there was no occasion, in the opinion of the German Government, to give any special assurances with regard to a neutral war vessel since it was out of the question that German forces should stop neutral vessels of war or take any other measures against them, and that the German forces would be notified in order to avoid confusion of the *American Legion* with enemy warships.

'Following the U. S. Government's learning of Dr. Ritter's conversation, and of the American Chargé d'Affaires' communication of the Foreign Office's note in confirmation of the conversation, the subject of the course to be followed by the *American Legion* had the serious and protracted consideration of the U. S. Government. However, it was determined that no other practical course existed for the vessel to follow than that proposed, the vessel to sail on August 16 as scheduled and already notified to all the belligerent governments. As instructed by his Government, the American Chargé d'Affaires informed the German Foreign Office on August 15 accordingly, and stated that the Government of the United States consequently reverted to its original communication to the German Government on

the subject and took note of the fact that the German Government had brought the voyage of the vessel to the attention of its appropriate agencies.

The U. S. Government is of the opinion, therefore, that the German Government received sufficient advance notice of the sailing of the *American Legion* from Petsamo on the date scheduled and the course to be followed, to take every precaution against attack on the vessel by the German combat forces. The German Government acknowledged the receipt of this notification prior to the vessel's departure and stated that the appropriate German authorities had been informed of the date of departure, course, and description of the vessel. The German Government did not give assurance of safe conduct for the vessel but explained that there was no occasion to give any such assurance with regard to the vessel as it was out of the question that German forces should stop the vessel or take any other measures against her. All the other belligerent governments have given assurance of safe conduct for the vessel for her sailing on the date scheduled and on the course indicated.

The German Government now points out that it did not receive final notification of the ship's departure from Petsamo on August 16 until noon of that day and that the American Embassy at Berlin had been informed that August 15 was the latest date for such notification of the intended route. However, the stipulation of the German Foreign Office that it be notified by noon, Berlin time, August 15, with respect to the vessel's course was in reply to the Embassy's inquiry as to how much advance notice of the change of course of the vessel would be required by the Foreign Office. Since no change was made in the course of the vessel, further advance notice became entirely unnecessary.

Stated briefly, the German Government has on several occasions during the conversations about the voyage of the *American Legion* stated that the vessel in question as a public vessel of the United States, actually being a transport of the United States Army, needed no safe conduct from the German Government because safe conducts were reserved only for merchant vessels. The German Government having repeatedly made that statement and having stated also that they would notify their armed forces of the route on which it was informed the vessel would proceed and of the date of her departure from Petsamo and of the description of the vessel, and having assured the Government of the United States that it had actually notified its armed forces of the route, date of sailing and description of the *American Legion*, and in continuing reliance upon the original statements of the German Government, the American Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to inform the German Government that under the circumstances above related the Government of the United States expects that the vessel will not suffer molestation by any action undertaken by the German armed forces.' ”

340.1115A/1375 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1940.

2402. Your 2785, 17th.⁴⁷ The attitude of the British Government in the matter is appreciated but it is hoped that their interest will not proceed to the length of guiding the vessel by any naval unit or giving any manifestation of their interest which might be misconstrued by a belligerent that a public vessel of the United States was being convoyed. You may present this matter delicately and informally but definitely to the appropriate authorities.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/1744

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1940.

The German Chargé d'Affaires called this morning by appointment and delivered to me the attached translation of a note addressed by the German Government to the seafaring neutral nations.⁴⁸ He pointed out that a similar note would not be addressed to the United States because the question had already been taken care of by this Government through its neutrality legislation.⁴⁹ It will be noted that the Germans define a danger zone which is roughly the combat zone determined by the President's proclamations in pursuance of the Neutrality Act. In brief this runs from the French Brittany coast out into the Atlantic, then north and east between the Shetland and Faroe Islands half way in the North Sea towards the coast of Norway and from there down to the port of Ostend. At the same time that he gave me this translation the German Chargé d'Affaires made the following oral statement to me:

"I have been instructed by my Government to advise the Government of the United States that any assurances of safe conduct in respect of individual American vessels given prior to the date of this notification will remain valid. As far as the German Government is able to ascertain, there are, however, at this time, no vessels with a German guarantee of safe conduct in the area defined in the notification of the present note."

⁴⁷ Not printed; it reported a Foreign Office note which merely stated that the necessary instructions had been given to the British air and sea forces for the American Legion to proceed on its course without interruption.

⁴⁸ Not printed.

⁴⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 656 ff.

I immediately stated that this raised in my mind the question of the *American Legion*. He said he also had thought of this but he had no knowledge that we had addressed a note to the German Government on the subject of the voyage of the *American Legion* and he assumed the route of this ship lay well to the north, presumably north of Iceland. I said that we had indeed advised the German Government through our Embassy in Berlin as to the voyage of the *American Legion* and had a reply quoting a *Note Verbale* which had been delivered by the German Foreign Office on August 16. He did not ask the contents of this note nor did I ask him whether he had knowledge of it; but he said he would inform his Government that he had visited the State Department in this connection today and that the immediate question had been raised by the State Department of this danger zone and the route of the *American Legion*, which had been the subject of discussion between the American Embassy and the Berlin Foreign Office.

RAY ATHERTON

740.00112 European War 1939/1744

The Department of State to the German Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The German Chargé d'Affaires called on the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs on August 17th and left with him a copy of a note which was being addressed by the German Government to seafaring neutral nations. The German Chargé d'Affaires explained orally that a copy of this note was not being addressed to the United States since the situation had been covered by the neutrality legislation of this country.

The Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs informed the German Chargé d'Affaires that the combat zone established by the President's proclamations in pursuance of the Neutrality Act is a purely internal regulation of the United States.

Mr. Atherton subsequently drew attention to announcements which had on various occasions been made by the Secretary of State to the effect that the restrictions imposed on American shipping in pursuance of domestic legislation of the United States should not be understood as impairing in any way the rights of the United States and its nationals under international law. Mr. Atherton added that although the German note was not being delivered to the United States, he felt impelled, in the circumstances, to invite the attention of the German Chargé d'Affaires to this complete reservation of the rights of the American Government and its nationals under international law.

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1940.

340.1115A/1398 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 20, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 8:35 p. m.]

3657. Department's 2255, August 17, 4 p. m. Following is translation of communication dated August 20 which has just been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"The Foreign Office has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the note of the Embassy of the United States of America of August 18, 1940, number 1403.

The description of events in that note requires a clarification in two points:

(1) The reason why the Reich Government saw no reason for giving a special assurance with regard to the *American Legion* was the following: under international law the German forces have the right to intercept neutral merchant vessels and under certain circumstances to molest them. No such right exists with respect to vessels belonging to the armed forces of neutral countries. It is therefore not only superfluous but also contrary to reason to give an assurance that vessels belonging to the armed forces of a neutral country will not be intercepted or molested. Such an assurance would in this case be contrary to reason because it would imply the possibility that German forces, contrary to the rules of international law, might intercept or molest a vessel of neutral armed forces.

The *note verbale* of the Foreign Office and the oral statements of Ambassador Ritter are in complete accord on this point. To place any other interpretation on the oral statements of Ambassador Ritter would be entirely erroneous.

(2) The requirement that a definite notification of course of the *American Legion* must be made not later than noon on August 15 is to be explained as follows: on the afternoon of August 14 the attention of Mr. Heath of the Embassy of the United States was drawn orally to the very great dangers which would be connected with the voyage along the route first indicated. In this connection two other and non-dangerous routes were suggested. Mr. Heath then asked what was the latest time that the German authorities must be informed as to which of the three routes now in question the *American Legion* would finally choose. The reply was then made to the Embassy of the United States on the same evening that this must be done by noon on August 15. Consequently the Foreign Office could not assume that after the explicit warning the *American Legion* would keep to the course originally notified. Instead the question of the course had then to be regarded as open so that the German forces had to receive a new and final notification. This would have to have been done by noon on August 15. But the notification from the Embassy of the United States was only received at noon on the 16th and not as asserted in the Embassy's note of August 18, 1940 on August 15, 1940.

In conclusion the Foreign Office must point out that the attempt implicit in the note of August 18, 1940, to impute to the Reich Government an inconsistent or unclear attitude in the matter is without any foundation. The Reich Government treated this case with the accustomed care just as it treated the previous cases in which the American Government approached the Reich Government with wishes regarding American vessels. The American Government, on the other hand, when making its communications to the Reich Government regarding the voyages of these vessels has again and again failed to observe the necessary speed and accuracy and has thereby exposed these vessels to unnecessary dangers."

With regard to point 2 of the Foreign Office note Heath absolutely denies the account of the conversation with respect to the date of final notification of the course of the *American Legion*. His exact question was "What is the latest hour at which any change in the route of the vessel must be notified to the Foreign Office". In reply the statement was given that such notification must be made by noon on August 15.

KIRK

340.1115A/1398 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1940—8 p. m.

2287. Department does not intend, for the present, at least, to make any reply to Foreign Office communication referred to in your 3657 of August 20, 7 p. m. Please inform Heath that Department has every confidence in the accuracy of his statements. It greatly appreciates the efficient help and extra time which you and Heath gave to the handling of the entire matter.

WELLES

340.1115A/1411 : Telegram

The Consul General at Amsterdam (Lee) to the Secretary of State

AMSTERDAM, August 24, 1940.

[Received August 24—8 p. m.]

473. Department's 187, 22d.⁵¹

1. Not a single exit permit for travel from Netherlands to Lisbon or any other southern European port has been issued to Americans on applications filed since July 18th in spite of the assurances that issuance would probably be resumed beginning "in about 2 or 3 weeks" from that date. Permits were granted readily enough for evacuation via Petsamo on authority from Berlin but unfortunately as Department knows through my 406, 407, and 429⁵² only 12 could be so evacuated although some 30 actually received the permits. The remaining

⁵¹ Not printed.

⁵² Dated August 3, 5, and 9, respectively; none printed.

permits were not valid for traveling south. These questions have had the constant attention of the Consulate General and repeated representations have been made here to local authorities but it is apparent that action must come from Berlin. Therefore I have on several occasions discussed the difficulties by telephone and in my 23 of August 14 to Embassy I urged action with Foreign Office looking towards renewal of a previous similar authority on which permits were granted for travel south. Apparently nothing will be done here without great delay until that is received and Embassy says it will press for action. At present about 47 Americans able to finance journey desire leave while an additional 67 who would go if their alien relatives numbering 53 are issued permits (this latter matter is also receiving Embassy's attention) there are 15 cases totalling 19 persons of Americans desiring to return but requiring financial assistance in addition to those reported in Benton's ⁵³ 257, July 2 and 311, July 4.⁵⁴ These cases are being reported immediately. There is at present residing in Netherlands total of 57 Americans including 7 rule G cases ⁵⁵ who desire to return but require financial assistance; 69 Americans in same category but who have 66 alien close relatives for whom no immigration visas could be obtained on L P C ⁵⁶ grounds; 18 Americans with 8 alien close relatives who might be expected to obtain immigration visas; a total of 144 Americans in these classifications. Number requiring funds may be expected to increase because of delay in departure, difficulty in obtaining dollar exchange and the increased cost of transportation. The cost of third-class transportation Amsterdam-Lisbon about dollars 90 of which dollars 70 may be paid in guilders. As no minimum rate steamship accommodations available before early October travel agencies estimate subsistence and miscellaneous costs Amsterdam to ship at dollars 80 payable only in foreign currency making total estimate cost journey to Lisbon and awaiting passage dollars 170.

3. Because of inability obtain funds from United States an increasing number of Americans are becoming destitute and have only been saved from privation by an unofficial fund raised by this office. It is therefore noted with regret that Department is reluctant to approach charitable organizations for relief and is not contemplating despatching another army transport to Europe.

Copy mailed to Berlin.

LEE

⁵³ J. Webb Benton, First Secretary of Legation in the Netherlands.

⁵⁴ Neither printed.

⁵⁵ Naturalized American citizens residing abroad longer than periods allowed under the 2d paragraph of Section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1907, if not covered by other exceptions, could apply to the Consul for an American passport under rule G—by giving assurances they were ready to depart immediately and would reside permanently in the United States.

⁵⁶ Likely to become a public charge.

340.1115A/1415 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1940—2 p. m.

2331. Embassy, Vichy, requested repeat to you its 413, August 23, noon, and 430, August 26, 1 p. m.⁵⁷ Upon receipt please request German Foreign Office urgently to consider the situation of Americans in France desiring to return to United States, who are being prevented from doing so by delay in obtaining exit visas from German authorities and restrictions on exportation of currency. With respect to latter restrictions, as it appears to be impossible for Americans in France to purchase through transportation there to United States, they should at least be allowed to depart with sufficient dollars or other currency to enable them to proceed through Spain and Portugal and purchase transportation to New York from Lisbon.

HULL

340.1115A/1438 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 31, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 5 p. m.]

464. From Paris. August 30. Reference Vichy's telegram 413, August 23, noon.⁵⁸ Arrangements have now been made with the German authorities which will expedite exit permits for American citizens.

We have also obtained an informal local agreement whereby departing Americans will be allowed under certain restrictions to take with them the foreign exchange equivalent of 25,000 francs.

MATTHEWS

340.1115A/1437 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 31, 1940—noon.

[Received 3 : 25 p. m.]

3835. Following is a paraphrase of a telegram received from Antwerp for transmission to the Department :

"240, August 27. Around 150 American citizens accompanied by approximately 25 alien wives and children wish depart immediately from Belgium for the United States. Since mid-July I have been trying to prevail on the German authorities to give permits for these persons to travel either individually in groups by train or by automobile through occupied France to Spain and Lisbon. I have impressed on the German authorities that while these Americans have

⁵⁷ Neither printed.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

been forced against their will to remain in Belgium new decrees have been promulgated which order the surrender of foreign currency. I have been insistent that these Americans be allowed to remain [*depart?*] and carry with them all of their foreign currency. My efforts have been without avail and the German authorities in Belgium now inform me that they have no authority to allow American citizens to leave Belgium. It appears essential, therefore, that this request be presented in Berlin and my recommendation is that the Department make vigorous insistence upon the right of Americans in Belgium to be repatriated and to take with them their holdings of foreign currency. Sussdorff."⁵⁹

I have taken up with the Foreign Office the question of exit and exchange permits for American citizens in Belgium reported in the foregoing telegram from Antwerp and the matter is also being brought to the attention of the appropriate German authorities by the German travel agency, the Mittel Europaeische Reise Büro, which in conjunction with the Consulate at Antwerp has prepared tentative travel schedules.

KIRK

340.1115A/1439 : Telegram

The Consul General at Marseille (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

MARSEILLE, August 31, 1940.

[Received August 31—11:30 a. m.]

351. Consulate informed by Commissaire Special at Cerbere Spanish frontier closed. Group of Americans estimated 20 citizens now at Cerbere en route. Barcelona and Lisbon informed. Barcelona wired yesterday frontier situation unclear, apparently now closed to all persons transiting to Portugal. Probably duration situation unknown.

HURLEY

340.1115A/1456 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1940.

439. Your 499, 5th.⁶⁰ After the period of active warfare Department discontinued the practice of providing loans for transportation expenses for Americans who have declined many opportunities afforded them for return to United States. It continues willing upon receipt of names, addresses and amounts desired to communicate with relatives, friends or employers in United States to obtain necessary funds.

HULL

⁵⁹ Louis J. Sussdorff, Consul General at Antwerp.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

138 USSR/604 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1940—6 p. m.

558. If the situation reported in your 573, May 23, noon,⁶¹ 914, July 26, 3 p. m., and 1002, August 12, noon, still prevails, you are instructed to make emphatic representations to the Soviet authorities with a view to obtaining permission for American citizens in Soviet-occupied Poland to proceed without hindrance to Moscow whenever necessary for obtaining citizenship services. You may desire to point out that these American citizens are not under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Government through their own volition but only because of a situation resulting from war and occupation of certain Polish territories by the Soviet Army. You may, at your discretion, add that refusal to permit Americans to proceed to Moscow for citizenship services is inconsistent with the rules of international comity and raises grave doubts as to the safety of American citizens in any territories under Soviet control; that restrictions upon their freedom to travel to Moscow for this purpose are considered analogous to detention and is a matter of grave concern to this Government; and that granting of Soviet citizenship to American citizens in Soviet-occupied Poland who have endeavored to proceed to Moscow to obtain American citizenship services would in general be considered by this Government as having been granted under circumstances amounting to duress and consequently invalid from the standpoint of this Government.

Message of the character telegraphed to Edward Krysiac approved. Similar message may be addressed to other American citizens.

HULL

340.1115A/1502 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, September 23, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received September 23—10:06 a. m.]

3169. The situation regarding Americans here is getting acute again. Although none of our people have been hit yet many have had narrow escapes and it is only a question of time until some of them get killed or injured. There is no way to get out of here now except by plane to Lisbon and these planes are booked 6 months ahead.

⁶¹ Not printed.

We have about 400 people now asking for transportation home. I have no doubt that if a vessel were provided there would be many more. We have not held out any hope to these people but I believe that in view of the intensive bombing now going on we should review the situation in the light of changed conditions. Those still in England are principally persons who have been here for a long time. Many are married to foreigners. Others have spent most of their lives in the upbuilding of American interests abroad. Naturally, these people hung on to the last minute in the hope that events might take a turn that would permit them to remain and thus save something from what was in many cases their life's work.

If a vessel is sent and if any room remains after American citizens have been accommodated we have plenty of English children waiting to go to America. The American Committee now has 2000 registered, 934 of whom have been visaed and are awaiting transportation.

KENNEDY

340.1115A/1509 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 25, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received September 30—5 p. m.]

889. From Paris. Department's 1190.⁶² The Embassy now knows definitely of 168 Americans including wives and children (a few wives are not American citizens) in the Paris area who desire to depart for the United States but do not possess the necessary funds or have any hope of obtaining funds except through governmental or charitable aid. It is believed that there are a further 50 persons in the Paris area claiming American citizenship, either through marriage or American parentage, whose cases are deserving of serious consideration in connection with any steps that may be taken to repatriate needy Americans from France. Investigation in the north and Bordeaux consular district will probably reveal a further 50 such cases.

With the worsening of the international situation Americans in occupied France are becoming increasingly concerned about the problem of their immediate future. There are daily departures for the United States of Americans with funds. Those who do not possess the necessary funds to defray the cost of travel to the United States and who know of no means by which such funds can be obtained for them in the absence of governmental or charitable aid, are the more disturbed because of the predicament in which they find themselves. Their situation is really a discouraging one. They are by and large without any means of livelihood because of the war or for reasons of longer stand-

⁶² Dated September 12; not printed.

ing, and the possibility that the situation will improve for them in the foreseeable future is non-existent. Looking after them is not a matter of temporary assistance. Urgent repatriation is the only solution and by all odds the best step to consider at this time. We will have to come to it in the end if serious embarrassment to the Government and American charitable enterprises is to be avoided. Conditions in France for a long time to come will preclude the absorption of foreign unemployed. Local charitable assistance for these people in the absence of American relief activity here will not be forthcoming.

Allen⁶³ and Barnes⁶⁴ therefore urge in the strongest manner possible that the Department and the Red Cross confer once again on this subject with a view to providing funds for the immediate repatriation of between 250 and 300 persons from occupied France. Over 90 of these people are ex-service men and their families.

MATTHEWS

340.1115A/1510: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, September 27, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received September 28—11:48 a. m.]

4179. My 4143, September 26, 2 p. m.⁶⁵ The following telegram has been sent today to the Embassy at Madrid and is repeated for the information of the Department.

"Several American citizens desiring to return to the United States via Spain and Portugal were refused transit visas yesterday and today by the Spanish Consulate in Berlin. Situation is serious by reason of the fact that travel route indicated is the only practical one remaining. Conferences with the Spanish Embassy and consular officials in Berlin indicate that Americans desirous of obtaining Spanish transit visas must submit applications written in Spanish, a language not known to most applicants and a delay of several weeks will ensue before these applications can be acted upon by competent authorities.

Alternative plan suggested by the Spanish Embassy is that this Mission communicate to you by telegram the number of Americans planning to leave for the United States via Spain whenever such cases arise which is frequently and ask you to be good enough to take the matter up with the Spanish Foreign Office with the view to having telegraphic instructions issued to Spanish authorities here for the granting of group visas.

For the reason that the alternative suggested by the Spanish authorities here also involves serious delay and is complicated it will be appreciated if you would urge upon the competent Spanish authorities the necessity of instructing Spanish Consulate here to issue

⁶³ Richard F. Allen, Red Cross delegate to Europe.

⁶⁴ Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy in France.

⁶⁵ Not printed.

transit visas to American citizens upon presentation by latter of letters from this office indicating that the purpose of the journey is for their transit only and stating that evidence has been presented that steamship reservations have been made for their trip to the United States.

It would be appreciated if this matter could be taken up immediately with the Spanish authorities by reason of the fact that numerous Americans here will lose their steamship reservations unless the situation can be remedied without further delay."

KIRK

340.1115A/1510 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1940—5 p. m.

239. Berlin's telegram to you September 27. Department supports Berlin's request and hopes Spanish Government will find it possible expedite issuance visas to Americans returning via Lisbon.

HULL

340.1115A/1523 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1940—7 p. m.

3058. Reference your 3169, September 23, 4 p. m. and your 3338, October 8.⁶⁶ Despite the facts outlined in Department's no. 3026, October 7th ⁶⁷ with reference to the Sperling situation ⁶⁸ and reasons cited therein, Department has been giving serious and sympathetic consideration to the recommendations which were implied in your inquiry contained in your no. 3169, September 23d. The problem has been considered in connection with the possibility of evacuating other Americans on the continent through France. The situation is being explored to ascertain actual number of passengers that could be counted on so that Department may be assured that the ship will sail full, in contrast to previous sailings.

For your confidential information, the problem has been further delayed and complicated by the continuing possibility of developments in the Far East and the imminent necessity there of providing ships to evacuate women and children from that area who have not

⁶⁶ Latter not printed.

⁶⁷ Not printed; it stated that "Americans who did not avail themselves of previous opportunities to return in spite of repeated warnings and provision financial facilities for those unable defray cost of passage cannot expect further special facilities to be provided for them. Route via air to Lisbon still open to them." It also stated that Consuls should be instructed to express policy of the Government. (340.1115/30090)

⁶⁸ Alexander Sperling, an American who requested immediate transportation from England.

up to this time had the privileges that have been repeatedly extended to Americans in Europe. That problem is more acute today than heretofore.⁶⁹

However, the Department for its guidance would like to have your estimate of the exact number of evacuees that could be counted on from England and your recommendation with reference to the situation in view of recent developments. It is needless to say that your judgment would have great weight with the Department here and would be followed if at all possible when considered in conjunction with necessities now existing in the Far East.

HULL

340.1115A/1534 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 14, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received October 14—9 : 08 a. m.]

3390. Your 3058, October 9th. The position of Americans here becoming increasingly critical. They are now organizing into a group to be known as the American Exiles Association, for the purpose of publicizing their plight. It does not do much good for us to remind them now that they had opportunities to go home before and failed to take advantage of them. The only thing that matters at this point to them is that they are in danger, that they want to go home and that their Government does not seem to be in any hurry to help them.

We are contacting all Americans known to be in England in order to get an exact figure of the number now awaiting transportation. It will probably be another week before this figure is available. Meanwhile it appears that approximately 700 have registered at the U. S. Lines offices, at the London Embassy, the Dublin Legation and at Consulates in Great Britain and Eire. I believe that this is a rough approximation of the number who will take advantage of any ship that may be sent over now.

KENNEDY

340.1115A/1539b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1940—6 p. m.

2731. Department is contemplating the dispatch of the S. S. *President Roosevelt* to Galway or some other practicable western or southern port in Ireland to evacuate additional Americans in the

⁶⁹ For correspondence regarding the evacuation of American citizens from the Far East, see vol. iv, pp. 930 ff.

British Isles to the United States. The ship will carry no cargo or passengers on its outward journey from the United States. Please immediately communicate informally to the appropriate German authorities and ascertain whether the German Government would be willing to grant safe conduct for the vessel on its voyage for the purpose stated. If so, this Government will instruct you formally to request safe conduct. It will then also state the date of sailing of the ship, the course to be followed by it to Ireland and the probable date of arrival in Ireland. The vessel will, of course, proceed with the usual identifying characteristics as on its previous voyage to Galway. Telegraph reply triple priority.

HULL

 340.1115A/1437 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1940—6 p. m.

2734. Reference last paragraph your 3835, August 31, noon, please telegraph Department present status of the question of exit and exchange permits for American citizens desiring to depart for the United States, with particular reference to those in Belgium and the Netherlands.

HULL

 340.1115A/1544 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, October 17, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

4356. Department's 2734, October 15, 6 p. m., and my 3835, August 31, noon. American citizens in Germany are having no difficulty in obtaining exit visas but except in rare instances are not being allowed to purchase foreign exchange unless they are able to show that they brought the exchange into Germany with them or unless the funds come within the purview of the German assurances with respect to inheritance transfers.

There has been no recent information from Brussels or Rotterdam regarding the departure of American citizens and the Consuls in those two cities are being requested to report.⁷⁰

MORRIS

⁷⁰ In despatch No. 434, November 7, the Vice Consul at Brussels reported that the first group of Americans left Brussels en route for Lisbon on October 22 but that various difficulties regarding money and Spanish visas continued.

In despatch No. 753, November 28, the Consul General at Amsterdam reported that the problem of evacuation of the American colony in the Netherlands had been practically liquidated. (340.1115A/1679, 1748)

340.1115A/1542 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1940—4 p. m.

258. You may inform Spanish Government that Department earnestly supports request of Embassy Paris (Vichy) in its telegram no. 753, October 15, 7 p. m.,⁷¹ repeated to you, and hopes the Spanish Government will find it possible to expedite the issuance of visas to Americans in France desiring to return via Lisbon.

If Spanish Government finds it impossible to authorize its consular officers to grant transit visas to Americans on simple presentation their passports and evidence of arrangements for trip to United States, you may suggest an arrangement such as that put forward by American Embassy at Berlin in first paragraph section 2 of its 4179, September 27.

Please report action taken by Spanish Government to meet this problem.

HULL

340.1115A/1553 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, October 21, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received October 21—4:27 p. m.]

4393. My 4339, October 16, 5 p. m.⁷¹ The Foreign Office this afternoon orally and it was emphasized “informally and unofficially” informed the Embassy that because of the battle situation (*Kampflage*) in the area of operations around the British Isles it was impossible to give any sort of assurance of safe-conduct for an American vessel to proceed to and return from a western or southern Irish port for the repatriation of American citizens from the British Isles.

MORRIS

340.1115A/1556 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, October 23, 1940—noon.

[Received October 23—10:42 a. m.]

4419. Department's 2804, October 21 [22], 7 p. m.⁷² In accordance with the Department's instructions the Embassy presented its official inquiry informally and the Foreign Office availed itself of this cir-

⁷¹ Not printed.

⁷² Not printed; referring to telegram No. 4393, October 21, 6 p. m., *supra*, the Department requested the Chargé to expedite an official reply (340.1115A/1553).

cumstance to make its reply oral, informal and unofficial, presumably to leave itself in a position of being able to deny that any definite official request for safe conduct had been made to or refused by it despite the fact that the informal request for assurances was presented to the same officials of the Foreign Office who would receive and reply to a formal communication. Therefore, if the Department contemplates any further steps in consequence of the German attitude it might seem preferable to provoke a formal reply (presumably a refusal) beforehand.

MORRIS

340.1115A/1564a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris) ⁷⁴

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1940—6 p. m.

2836. Please address the following first person note to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Excellency: Pursuant to the discussions which I have had with the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I am directed by my Government to inform Your Excellency of the importance and urgency which it attaches to its desire to dispatch an American vessel to a port in Ireland for the purpose of evacuating to the United States American citizens in the British Isles, and I am instructed formally to request that the German Government give consideration to the granting of a safe conduct for an American vessel destined on a voyage of this nature.

"The vessel which the United States Government desires to send would proceed unarmed and without convoy, would bear the American flag painted on its sides and would move fully lighted at night. Particulars concerning the vessel as well as the course to be followed can be furnished the German Government as soon as safe passage is assured.

"I am directed to express the earnest hope of my Government that the German authorities will grant assurances that the vessel will be able to proceed without interruption or molestation on the part of the air, naval or military forces of Germany, and to request that an early answer be given to this communication in order that arrangements for the evacuation of the American citizens concerned may be begun as quickly as possible."

The above refers to your telegram No. 4419, October 23, noon. For your information it may be stated that the *President Roosevelt* is no longer available but should safe conduct be obtained, it is contemplated that another vessel, possibly the *Manhattan*, may be sent.

HULL

⁷⁴ Similar instructions were sent October 26, 3 p. m., to the Ambassador in Italy (No. 511).

340.1115A/1568 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1940—6 p. m.

2895. Reference Department's 2836, October 25, 6 p. m. regarding safe conduct for American vessel to proceed to Ireland. In response to identic communication to the Italian Government, Embassy, Rome, under date October 29 ⁷⁵ advises of receipt of third person note, essential parts of which read in translation as follows:

"The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to advise the Embassy of the United States that in the specific case there can be no grant of a true and real safe conduct but rather of assurances that the Italian military authorities have been informed of the voyage of the vessel in order to allow free passage.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to state that in principle there are no difficulties in accomplishing the necessary steps but in order to take up the matter with the competent military authorities it will be necessary to have all of the information referred to in its previous *note verbale* of September 3."

You may inform German Foreign Office accordingly and say that we would appreciate similar assurances from the German Government.

Information regarding American evacuating vessels which Italian Government desired according to its *note verbale* of September 3 comprises following: notification of voyage at least 10 days before departure; ports of departure, of transit, of destination and the pertinent dates with the greatest possible approximation; the course on the high seas, speed, the name and flag of the ship, the characteristics of the vessel (length, beam, number of funnels, paintwork), day and night distinguishing marks. It was further stated that if because of bad weather conditions or for other reasons such vessels must delay their movements beyond the date previously announced it will be opportune that such delays be notified immediately.

HULL

340.1115A/1582a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1940.

676. For Allen of Amcross. State Department in daily conference question repatriation Americans. Pending decision you are authorized to make grants emergency subsistence those willing return America, but Amcross cannot assume continuing support Americans

⁷⁵ Telegram No. 1036, October 29, 3 p. m., not printed.

unwilling leave. If you prefer we will place funds in hands of State Department to cover this commitment. Prefer you telephone November 8 or November 11 usual time. Amcross 1345.

HULL

340.1115A/1583 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, November 6, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received November 6—12: 18 p. m.]

4620. My 4568, November 2, noon.⁷⁶ Dr. Ritter of the Foreign Office today handed a member of the Embassy the following third person note.

"The Foreign Office has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the notes of October 27 and November 1 regarding the voyage of an American ship to repatriate American citizens from an Irish port.

On the basis of the previous statement of the German Government to the effect that the areas around England are areas of military operations the Reich Government is not in a position to furnish any sort of assurance of the nature requested."

On delivering the note Ritter asserted that the matter had been carefully studied by the German military authorities whose conclusion was that in view of the intensive military operations it was impossible to give any assurance of safe passage for the vessel. His Government could not offer any encouragement to the proposed voyage because of the disastrous political consequences which would result from any accident to the vessel if it proceeded on the basis of some semi-assurance. The Italians not being involved in that area of the war could venture to give a semi-assurance. He added that he was surprised at the Italian action in the matter (Department's telegram No. 2895, October 30, 6 p. m.) which should not have been taken without prior consultation with the Reich Government. He apologized for the delay in replying to the Embassy's note but asserted it was necessary to refer the matter to Ribbentrop⁷⁷ who had been 3 days absent from Berlin.

MORRIS

340.1115A/1591 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, November 8, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received November 9—8: 40 a. m.]

4650. I have been informed that it was stated by the speaker at the Foreign Office press conference today that the refusal to give safe con-

⁷⁶ Not printed.

⁷⁷ Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

duct in the waters around the British Isles to an American vessel was in no sense intended as an anti-American gesture. It was pointed out by the speaker that there are two types of offensive sea weapons—those still in the control of men and those that have left the control of men. He stated that in fact a complete safe conduct can never be given for a ship in a war zone and that the belligerents only can instruct their fighting forces to take care not to injure the ship and advise the ship where it is least likely to encounter danger from the second class of weapons mentioned by him. In view of the refusal of the *American Legion* to heed the warnings and advice given as to the course it should follow the speaker said that his Government did not feel that it could take any part in the responsibility for the safety of another American ship in the war zone.

MORRIS

340.1115A/1617: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at
Glasgow (Davis)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1940.

79. Your 57, 18th.⁷⁸ Government unable at this time to dispatch another vessel to British Isles to evacuate Americans due to refusal of German Government to assure safe passage. In view of intent and purpose of neutrality law to prevent travel in combat areas and increasing perils of travel therein, Department declines authorize travel in such areas on vessels of any character at this time.

WELLES

340.1115A/1644: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1940.

3607. Department is receiving requests from interested persons here desiring to know whether accommodations on British commercial planes, London to Lisbon, cannot be increased for Americans in British Isles desiring use such transportation for return to United States. Department is, of course, anxious that all Americans who desire to use such transportation should be assisted in every proper and possible way in obtaining accommodations. Please make appropriate inquiry whether there is any possibility for increased accommodations and telegraph Department reply.

HULL

⁷⁸ Not printed.

340.1115A/1635: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 29, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received November 29—7: 55 p. m.]

3907. Department's 3607, November 27. The Air Attaché informs me that the airline to Lisbon is not a real commercial service. It ceased to be such on the outbreak of war and is now a quasi-governmental service operated by British Overseas Airways Corporation for the Government. The Air Ministry dictates the routes, number of passengers to be carried, etc. There are only two short flying boats available weekly for this service, all other planes having been commandeered by the Government for military purposes from November 27 to December 25 inclusive. We have 18 Americans scheduled to travel on this service at the request of this office. There are in addition 16 American newspaper correspondents booked between these dates by the Ministry of Information. During that period there should be, weather permitting, 11 flights with 8 passengers per flight making a total of 88 passengers of which 34 will be Americans. In addition, we have requests for 8 or 10 pending who cannot possibly be taken care of until sometime in January next. The Civil Air Administration states that each British Government department has requested that it be guaranteed at least one place on each plane for officials traveling on Government business but due to limited number of aircraft and limited number of passengers that can be carried on each plane this request cannot be complied with.

If the British are successful in obtaining the use of the Dutch KLM Douglas DC3's a great deal of the congestion should be relieved. The British will not, however, permit the Dutch aircraft to be manned by Dutch crews whose families are still in Holland as they do not trust the complete loyalty of these pilots and crews. The Dutch Government refuses to turn over machines to the British to be flown by British personnel because it resents British suspicion of their own people.

There is no doubt that those Americans here who desire to go face almost unsurmountable difficulties in obtaining transportation from England to the United States. The Embassy has made every effort to assist them and the British air transport authorities have been accommodating particularly in cases of officers and employees of our Government; but efforts to induce the British to remove their own priority passengers who are almost invariably traveling on business connected with prosecution of the war to make room for American private citizens involves obvious difficulties and embarrassment.

There will of course continue to be complaints from Americans unable to leave and they will become more frequent and less patient as time goes on and living conditions in England become harder. It will be possible as at present to answer some with reminders of former opportunities to leave by American ships that were not availed of and to some it will be polite to respond with greater circumspection; but all can, if the Department concurs, be told that this is not a problem which the British, involved in a major war, should be asked to solve for us, and that their misfortune in being barred by the Neutrality Act ⁷⁹ from traveling in accordance with their desires would not justify the Embassy, except in cases of unquestionable urgency or unusual hardship, in pressing priority claims for them for passage on the Lisbon planes.

JOHNSON

340.1115A/1635 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1940—9 p. m.

3688. Your 3907, November 29, 10 p. m. Department appreciates your clear and helpful discussion of situation and approves position taken by you as indicated in final paragraph. Please communicate any further developments.

HULL

130 Kuszniér, Walter : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, December 1, 1940.

[Received December 2—1 : 42 a. m.]

1655. Department's 814, November 28th.⁸⁰ Notwithstanding Embassy's continuous efforts on their behalf Kuszniér and some 500 other persons in Soviet Poland who claim American citizenship but do not bear American passports have been unsuccessful in obtaining permission from Soviet authorities for their travel to Moscow to apply for American passports. Authorities decline issue such permits unless applicant therefor possesses valid American passport or expired American passport which was valid not more than 3 years ago. If, as Kuszniér alleges, he was registered as American citizen in 1937 with Warsaw Consulate General, the Department's confirmation of his allegation would probably be helpful in pressing his particular case.

STEINHARDT

⁷⁹ Approved November 4, 1939; 54 Stat. 4.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

340.1115A/1644a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1940—5 p. m.

790. Please repeat following to Embassy Paris and Consulate General Marseille.

1. American Red Cross and Department are supplying funds for repatriation by Department's officers of destitute Americans now in France, with the understanding that neither the Red Cross nor the Department can undertake to maintain those refusing the opportunity now offered them to return to the United States and choosing to remain abroad. Red Cross funds which have been made available to the Embassy at Paris and the Consulate General at Marseille are to be used for transportation expenses of the repatriates to Lisbon where they will await the obtaining of transportation for them to the United States by the Consul at Lisbon. The Consul at Lisbon is being allotted Red Cross funds for temporary maintenance of repatriates at Lisbon while awaiting transportation. Department is allotting him funds for payment of their steamship transportation and he will pay the necessary amounts therefrom as loans against promissory notes in accordance with existing instructions. The persons concerned will be requested to sign the notes at Lisbon as transportation is obtained for them. They will not be expected to repay the Red Cross funds used for their transportation to Lisbon and maintenance there awaiting transportation. Department has instructed Consul at Lisbon to utilize lowest priced accommodations available on board American or other neutral shipping lines. Each person accepting this Red Cross and Departmental assistance should be informed accordingly before proceeding to Lisbon. It is desirable that the repatriates should await transportation at Lisbon rather than in France in order that they may take advantage of shipping accommodations whenever the Consul at Lisbon can obtain them and because they should leave France, under present conditions, as soon as possible. Accordingly, they should be routed to Lisbon as soon as their cases are individually acted upon, the Consul at Lisbon being notified promptly in advance of each arrival so that he may make arrangements for lodging at Lisbon and transportation reservations.

2. Only bona fide citizens not resting under un rebutted presumption, together with such alien spouses and unmarried minor children⁸¹ properly documented under the immigration laws for admission into the United States as may accompany them, are to be repatriated under these arrangements.

⁸¹ In response to an inquiry from the Consul General at Marseille, the Department replied in telegram No. 1311, December 23, that this instruction did not contemplate inclusion of adopted alien children in the repatriation plan (340.1115A/1686).

3. Cases arising at other offices in occupied France will be referred by the Consuls concerned to the Embassy at Paris with recommendation for the necessary funds which the Embassy will furnish upon approving the recommendation. Similarly, cases arising at other offices in unoccupied France will be referred to the Consulate General at Marseille.

4. The Red Cross has authorized its representative at Paris to furnish funds to the Embassy as required. The Consulate General at Marseille has Red Cross funds on hand which are to be utilized for repatriation purposes as indicated and may telegraph Department for further Red Cross funds when needed. Under no circumstances, however, are obligations or commitments to be undertaken in excess of funds actually on hand. Red Cross funds received through Department should be accounted for in accordance with Section V-8, Note 1, Foreign Service Regulations. Red Cross funds received locally from Red Cross representatives should be taken up on Form 334 as special deposits.

5. As the Consul at Lisbon is being furnished with Red Cross funds for temporary maintenance of repatriates at Lisbon awaiting transportation, repatriates will only be furnished with transportation from France to Lisbon and minimum of incidental traveling expenses. Officers concerned will take every possible precaution to insure that transportation funds provided are used for that purpose, obtaining and furnishing transportation orders rather than advancing money therefor, whenever and as far as possible. They will, of course, also see to it that the repatriates have the necessary visas or other permits for their journey through to Lisbon.

6. It is expected that officers will exercise every care to keep disbursements at lowest possible minimum, with thorough investigation made in each case to determine that applicant does not possess or cannot obtain funds otherwise to provide all or part of his repatriation expenses. Those who can pay any part of such expenses should, of course, be required to do so.

7. Officers will immediately consider the application of these arrangements to the cases of needy Americans within their respective districts, affording all such persons opportunity to take advantage of the offer with the statement that they must do so immediately and that if they choose instead to remain in France neither the Red Cross nor the Department can be expected justly to provide support for them there. There must be no circularization or advertisement of this offer which is intended solely to provide necessary means for immediate removal from France to the United States of bona fide Americans in destitute circumstances whose continued stay in France under present conditions there would be embarrassing to the local authorities and to this Government.

8. This offer will remain open only until January 31, 1941. At the end of December and again at the end of January the Department desires a prompt airmail report from the Embassy at Paris and the Consulate General at Marseille listing the names of the persons who have been repatriated under these arrangements, giving the ages of accompanying children, nationality of accompanying alien spouses and children and addresses in United States.

9. Embassy Paris and Consulate General Marseille will advise offices in their respective areas of these arrangements. Department will be glad to receive and consider any suggestion in modification of these arrangements for their improvement.

HULL

340.1115A/1674a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Lisbon (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1940—5 p. m.

1032. 1. Department has forwarded following telegram to Vichy for Embassy Paris and Consulate General Marseille:

[Here follows text of telegram No. 790, December 3, 5 p. m., to the Chargé in France, printed *supra*.]

2. You will, accordingly, arrange for temporary lodging at Lisbon of repatriates in question and their prompt transportation Lisbon to United States. Department is obtaining funds from Red Cross for allotment to you for payment maintenance at Lisbon. You are hereby allotted \$10,000 Departmental funds for payment steamship transportation expenses as loans against promissory notes you should obtain from repatriates prior to their embarkation, in accordance with existing instructions. Draw separate drafts up to that amount, charging authorization no. 99, 1941 and render separate accounts.

3. Lodging provided must be minimum commensurate with American standards of living. Lowest priced accommodations aboard American or other neutral shipping lines are to be used. Department is endeavoring to arrange with American Export Lines to have emergency accommodations at low rate on board Export steamers placed at your disposal and it understands that accommodations costing approximately \$175 are available now on Portuguese and Spanish ships sailing from Portugal which you may also utilize.

4. Please forward airmail reports to Department similarly to those requested in above telegram to Paris and Marseille.

5. Department will be glad to receive and consider any suggestion from you for improvement these arrangements.

HULL

340.1115A/1641 : Telegram

The Consul General at Lisbon (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 4, 1940.

[Received December 4—4:45 p. m.]

843. For Long from Murphy.⁸² After thorough investigation of facilities for the repatriation of destitute American citizens now in France Wiley states that adequate space will be available from Lisbon on steamers of American Export Line. Wiley states that preliminary survey shows accommodations available as follows: January 17th 65 persons; January 24th 30 persons; January 31st 50 persons; February 4th 150 persons. [Murphy.]

WILEY

340.1115A/1650c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1940.

814. According to reports received by the Department from returning Americans, there are a number of Americans in France, particularly along the Riviera, of sufficient financial means who are disposed to return to the United States but are not doing so because of some fancied or real difficulty in obtaining remittances of funds from the United States or steamship accommodations or other reason connected with travel to Lisbon. Department desires that the officers in occupied and unoccupied France should communicate with remaining Americans in their respective districts and offer to assist them in any necessary and proper and possible way to return to the United States.

If the persons in question should encounter difficulty in having remittances for transportation expenses made to them direct by their depositories in the United States, the Department will be glad to receive remittances for this purpose from the depositories and forward them to its offices in France for payment, the Department having blanket authorization from the Treasury Department for the transmission of private funds for American citizens in France for subsistence and transportation expenses. The Department is now telegraphing the Consulate General at Lisbon for a report regarding steamship transportation accommodations for Americans at Lisbon and will inform you regarding the situation and such amelioration of it as may be obtained, if necessary. It is also telegraphing the Embassy at Madrid to keep you currently informed of conditions

⁸² Robert D. Murphy, Consul at Paris.

and requirements for travel through Spain including information regarding various means of travel.

Please repeat to officers in occupied and unoccupied France.

HULL

340.1115A/1681a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1940—9 p. m.

857. Please repeat following to Embassy Paris and Consulate General Marseille for immediate circularization to all offices in France.

Telegrams from the offices in France relating to the number of Americans whom it is proposed to repatriate under the arrangements indicated in the Department's 790 December 3, 5 p. m. to Vichy and to certain categories of persons to be included, have caused the Department to become apprehensive that the officers in France are not sufficiently investigating the right of persons applying to them for repatriation to receive, as bona fide American citizens, the assistance afforded by the arrangements, and not extending the benefit of the arrangements only to such persons whose right thereto is fully established. The Department's telegram of December 3 placed that responsibility upon the Department's officers alone, as was agreed upon with the Red Cross officials here. The telegram in paragraph 2 clearly stated that the repatriation privilege was to be accorded only to bona fide citizens not resting under un rebutted presumption, together with such alien spouses and unmarried minor children properly documented under the immigration laws for admission into the United States as may accompany them. Persons resting under un rebutted presumption may not be afforded the benefit of the arrangements including the loan of Government funds to qualify under Rule G. Bona fide citizens are those citizens who are in complete and unquestioned possession of their citizenship rights, including the right to passports and the full protection of this Government, who have ties in the United States and who have continually held themselves out while abroad as American citizens and are in every way identifiable as such. They are citizens temporarily abroad desiring to return home. They are not persons merely possessing some circumstantial claim to American citizenship which they have not validated by residence and maintenance of ties in the United States and by truly identifying themselves abroad as bona fide citizens of the United States. The affording of transportation to the United States to the latter class of destitute persons, particularly with the aid of funds of this Government, would undoubtedly cause just public criticism of the action and is not the intent of the Department. Each and every officer concerned will take careful note of these instructions

and be prepared to give the Department evidence as may be desired by it of his compliance therewith in any case which he should pass for repatriation.

HULL

340.1115A/1682 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Lisbon (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1940—7 p. m.

1159. Your 919, December 19, noon.⁸³ From the outbreak of hostilities the Department, through instructions to its officers, has urged Americans in Europe to return promptly to the United States and it has afforded them every assistance to return, including the sending of special ships and the authorization of loans from its limited special funds for transportation expenses of destitute citizens. It feels that all have had opportunity and help to return and that those who have remained have done so of their own will. There is no obligation of the Government to provide transportation for its citizens and no appropriation has been granted by Congress for that purpose. The Department cannot continue indefinitely to afford financial assistance for their transportation from its limited special funds upon which there is heavy demand for other and more national requirements for which they were appropriated. Accordingly it does not contemplate the extension of the loan procedure to Americans in Europe other than those in France, as indicated in the Department's 1032, December 3, 5 p. m., to you. The loan procedure was extended to destitute Americans in France for a limited period and because of their particular situation as indicated in the telegram.

The Department has been unaware that destitute Americans have been arriving in Lisbon and desires a brief telegraphic report from you of the circumstances and their points of origin in order that it may inquire of its officers at those points further with respect to the circumstances under which the officers may be forwarding such persons.

For your further information and guidance there is quoted as follows the Department's telegram 857, December 18, 9 p. m., to the Embassy at Vichy for circulation to all officers in France:

[Here follows text of the telegram printed *supra*.]

Department remains willing contact relatives, friends or employers of destitute Americans and endeavor obtain transportation funds from them upon receipt from you by telegraph names, addresses and amounts required, and to afford any other possible assistance in obtaining private funds here available to destitute Americans.

⁸³ Not printed.

Lump sum drafts may be drawn against allotments already made you of Departmental and Red Cross funds for use of Americans in France only as instructed.

Supply forms desired being forwarded.

HULL

340.1115A/1713 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 30, 1940.

[Received December 31—1 : 30 p. m.]

2193. From Paris. Department's 870, December 21, 8 p. m., to Vichy.⁸⁴ 415 adults and 128 children in occupied France are registered for assistance under the plan set forth in the Department's telegram 790 to Vichy. It is estimated that perhaps as high as 25% of these will decide not to leave as the moment of their departure approaches. It is estimated that 10% will be able to pay part or all of their expenses. Barring unforeseen obstacles all should reach Lisbon by the end of January. The first contingent of 50 will leave on January 5.

It is estimated that an additional 50 to 75 Americans whose departure is in no way connected with the repatriation scheme will leave occupied France for Lisbon during January. Barnes.

MATTHEWS

II. EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE REPATRIATION OF ALIENS FROM BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES⁸⁵

740.00115 European War 1939/215 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 10, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received January 10—4 : 40 p. m.]

48. Following telegram has been sent to Berlin :

In reply to the proposals contained in the German notes of December 7 and 16 to the Swedish Government⁸⁶ and the German memorandum of December 12 to your mission⁸⁷ the Foreign Office in a note dated January 6 communicated its desire to reach an accord embracing the following points :

(1) A general exchange of all females whatever their age and those male children under 15 years who are in a position to be repatriated and who themselves or whose parents or legal guardians so desire.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 637-655.

⁸⁶ Neither printed.

⁸⁷ See telegram of December 18, 1939, 9 a. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 655.

(2) A person-for-person exchange of those male children 15 and 16 years of age who are in a position to be repatriated from the Embassy whose parents or legal guardians so desire.

(3) A person-for-person exchange of men over 60 years who are in a position to be repatriated and so desire.

(4) A general exchange of all cripples and the incurably sick.

(5) The exchange would apply to French nationals of the above categories now in Bohemia, Moravia, and German-occupied Poland.

(6) The exchange would apply to German nationals of the above categories in French overseas possessions including mandated territories and to French nationals natives of these territories now in Germany, Bohemia, Moravia and German-occupied Poland.

Furthermore the Foreign Office wishes to ascertain the German intentions as to the practical aspects of the exchanges, particularly the financial one. The Foreign Office points out that in order to meet the German proposals the original French proposals have been broadened by making the exchange of women general instead of person-for-person and by lowering the age limit on old men from 65 to 60. It earnestly desires that an accord be reached in the shortest possible time on the above points which it regards as preliminary to possible future agreements embracing other categories of civilians.

Copy and translation of note by next courier.⁸⁸

BULLITT

740.00115 European War 1939/216 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 10, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 6:40 p. m.]

87. My 2474, November 28, 6 p. m.⁸⁹ The further note from the Foreign Office dated January 9 refers to Lord Halifax's note of November 24 (my 2454, November 25, 1 p. m.),⁹⁰ and states that Lord Halifax "has the honor to confirm that the terms of the latter note were intended to convey the agreement of His Majesty's Government to the proposal of the State Department for the reciprocal release of civilians of military age." It continues:

"As regards the question of principle, His Majesty's Government would prefer to adopt the method suggested by the State Department in paragraph 5 of the *aide-mémoire* under reference, rather than the alternative suggestion made by the German Government that the state concerned should undertake not to call such men to arms."

Repeated to Berlin.

JOHNSON

⁸⁸ Not printed.

⁸⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 651.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 647.

740.00115 European War 1939/223 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, January 16, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 11:28 a. m.]

108. I should appreciate being advised whether the Department desires that the substance of London's 87, January 10, 10 [1] p. m., be communicated to the German Government.

As the Department is aware from my 2209, December 2, 6 p. m.,⁹¹ I communicated the British note of November 24 and the Department's suggestions as set forth in its 973, November 28, 4 p. m.,⁹² to the German Foreign Office on December 2. To date no reply has been received from the Foreign Office and it may be that the German Government is awaiting a statement of the French attitude toward the original American proposals for treatment of civilian enemy aliens.

The Department indicated in its 936, November 22, 6 p. m.,⁹³ and 972, November 28, 3 p. m.,⁹⁴ its intention to ask the French Government to reconsider this matter in view of the generally favorable attitude of the British.

In the absence of any subsequent information on this point I should appreciate instructions as to whether this Embassy should discuss at the Foreign Office the possibility of effecting an arrangement between the British and German Governments only on the basis of the points set forth in the Department's 973 or whether the matter should rest pending the determination of the French attitude.

KIRK

740.00115 European War 1939/223 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1940—7 p. m.

118. Your 108, January 16, 11 a. m. You may discuss with the Foreign Office the question of agreement between the British and the German Governments without waiting for the reply from the French Government. You need not be confined by the instructions and comment in Department's 973. You may proceed with the general discussion of the matter based on Department's original proposal and subsequent correspondence taking into consideration the near approach to agreement indicated by the attitudes of the British and German Governments.

⁹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 653.⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 650.⁹³ Not printed.⁹⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 650.

Department would be very much gratified if these two Governments could agree upon and could carry out in practice a humanitarian policy which would alleviate the condition of civilian enemy aliens and which would result in as close approximation as possible to complete freedom for repatriation.

You may express the deep interest of this Government in the possibility of an agreement between the British and German Governments and the hope of this Government that in due course the German Government and the French Government may also find themselves in accord.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/283 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 2, 1940—10 p. m.
[Received February 2—5:30 p. m.]

Following telegram has been received from Brussels:

52, February 2, 5 p. m.; [Berlin] 46, February 2, 9 a. m. Notify Foreign Office and repeat to Department. Your 33, January 24, 6 p. m.⁹⁵ Information given in the British letter of January 23 was communicated to the Foreign Office on January 27 but no answer has as yet been received as the German Foreign Office is presumably considering it in connection with the information set forth in the British note of December 20 to the Swiss Legation.

In a conversation today with the competent official of the German Foreign Office it was orally stated that the police authorities had been instructed to grant departure permits to all British women, boys under 18, and men over 60 of the United Kingdom who desire to depart. It was stated that this action is at present fully under way and that many permits should be granted in the near future. The Foreign Office official, however, declared that of the 380 names which had been submitted by this Embassy as persons desiring to depart many of them were now refusing to avail themselves of this opportunity. The Embassy assumes that British subjects who are able to depart from Germany but who do not do so should not receive any further financial assistance and in the absence of instructions to the contrary the Embassy and Consulates will adopt this policy.

It was also stated at the Foreign Office that the German Government was not yet willing to release the Palestinian and Australian women still held in jail, in the absence of information that German women had been released from confinement in Palestine and Australia. Any information respecting the release of German women in these territories would obviously facilitate the Embassy's endeavor

⁹⁵ Not printed; it quoted a British note, dated January 23, conveying information concerning the number of Germans who had left British territory since the beginning of the war (362.4115/117).

ors to obtain the release of Australian and Palestinian women still confined. Furthermore the Embassy should be notified if German women, children and old men are being released from Canada and India. Kirk. Cudahy.

JOHNSON

740.00115 European War 1939/259 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 7, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received February 7—5 : 30 p. m.]

331. Embassy's 2454, November 25, 1 p. m.^{95a} The following telegram has been sent to Berlin as 48, February 7, 7 p. m. :

"With reference to Mr. Herschel Johnson's notes No. 1657 of December 11 (your 251, December 9, 10 a. m.)⁹⁶ and No. 1683 of December 16 (your 262 of December 14)⁹⁷ regarding the release by the German Government of British women and children and persons over 60 and under 18 years of age, [apparent omission] has the honor to state that no obstacle other than that of consideration for national security will henceforth be placed in the way of the grant of exit permits to all German citizens in these categories in the United Kingdom, British colonies, overseas territories, protectorates, mandated territories in respect of which the mandate is exercised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and India, provided that the German Government reciprocates as they have undertaken to do in the United States Embassy's note No. 1683 of the 16th December.

2. Arrangements have been made to ensure that the German citizens concerned should not be removed from ships during their homeward journey, always provided that any individual whose detention may be found to be desirable in the interests of national security may be removed at any time."

A further note of the same date offers observations for your guidance in dealings with the question of the release of British subjects from Germany and German-occupied territory. It states :

"2. Practical difficulties connected with the coordination of procedure as well as transport arrangements in the various colonies, protectorates and mandated territories and India have until now prevented His Majesty's Government from making a concrete reply to the proposals made by the German Government as reported in the United States Embassy's notes of September 12 (your 19, September 11,

^{95a} *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 647.

⁹⁶ Not printed.

⁹⁷ See telegram of December 18, 1939, 9 a. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 655.

9 p. m.),⁹⁸ September 18 (your 33, September 16, noon)⁹⁹ and September 25 (your 42, September 22, 5 p. m.)¹ in their *aide-mémoire* of October 4 (Department's circular telegram of September 29)² however the United States Embassy made certain suggestions regarding the treatment of enemy aliens and the concurrence of His Majesty's Government with these suggestions was communicated to the Embassy in Lord Halifax's note of November 24 (my 89, November 28, 11 p. m.)³ that of the German Government had been conveyed to the United States Embassy at Berlin on October 14.

3. Although the formal reply to the German proposals has had to be postponed, His Majesty's Government have given practical effect to principles in accordance with those laid down in the United States *aide-mémoire* of the 4th October. So far as possible German citizens have been allowed to depart from the United Kingdom and territories within the British colonial empire and India: no one has been kept in internment except for sufficient reasons in each individual case; and no reprisals have been taken.

4. No less than 3572 German citizens have been allowed to leave the territories in question since the outbreak of war, whereas the German Government have allowed to depart so far as the Foreign Office is aware 34 women and 109 men including 107 Lascar seamen. They have interned, or were proposing to intern, approximately 140 men and 120 women, apparently as a reprisal for British internment of Germans, in spite of the undertaking not to resort to reprisals which is inherent in their acceptance of the principles of the United States *aide-mémoire* under reference.

5. His Majesty's Government have now formally stated their intention to release forthwith women and children and persons over 60 and under 18, subject to the proviso that any individual may be retained for reasons of national security, but this is dependent on reciprocal action by the German Government. His Majesty's Government have given evidence of their good faith in this matter in releasing large numbers of Germans in advance of an undertaking; and they consider that it is now for the German Government to respond by immediately releasing from internment all British subjects, especially women, with the possible exception of any individuals they may consider it necessary to detain for reasons of national security, and permitting with similar exceptions the departure of all British women and children and persons over 60 and under 18 who may wish to leave.

6. This is in fact no more than has been promised in the 2nd paragraph of the German note to the United States Embassy in Berlin on October 14, but in view of the action of the German Government in

⁹⁸ See telegram of September 12, 1939, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 638.

⁹⁹ See telegram of September 17, 1939, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *ibid.*, p. 639.

¹ See telegram of September 23, 1939, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *ibid.*, p. 640.

² *Ibid.*, p. 641.

³ For text of Foreign Office note of November 24, 1939, see telegram No. 2454, November 25, 1939, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *ibid.*, p. 647.

using internment as a reprisal the Foreign Office await concrete evidence of the German Government's intentions in this matter. The Foreign Office would remind Mr. Johnson that the German Government consider that the exchange of British subjects and German citizens should not consist of exchanges of a number of British subjects for an equal number of German citizens, nor of exchanges proportional to the total number of enemy civilians in either country. The Foreign Office concur in this view and are of opinion further that the exchanges should not be on a territorial basis. British Indian subjects for instance should not be detained until the arrival of German citizens from India. The Foreign Office consider that any claim to justify such a procedure on the ground that British subjects might all be released before the arrival of German citizens from distant places would not only be contrary to the undertaking given by the German Government but has been already compensated in advance by the release of a large number of German citizens in distant places of whom many have already reached Germany. Mr. Johnson will observe that the territories contained in the United Kingdom, British colonies, overseas territories, protectorates and mandated territories in respect of which the mandate is exercised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and India form a whole, and that there is no intention of negotiating individual exchanges in respect of any particular territory comprised therein. Separate representations have already been made, as Mr. Johnson is aware, in respect of the Dominions."

JOHNSON

740.00115 European War 1939/261 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 8, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received February 8—8:48 a. m.]

335. My 331, February 7, 7 p. m., and Berlin's 46, February 2, 9 a. m., to London.^{3a} It appears that the proposals contained in the Department's telegram 1107, September 29, 5 p. m.,⁴ concerning the treatment of civilian enemy aliens are now being given practical effect by the British and German Governments except as concerned able-bodied men of military age. I am orally advised by a competent official of the Foreign Office that a further note accepting the proposals for the release of such men made in the Department's telegram and in the German memorandum of October 14 (Berlin's 1727, October 16, 5 p. m.)⁵ is in course of preparation.

JOHNSON

^{3a} For the latter, see telegram of February 2, 10 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 187.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 641.

⁵ See telegram No. 1272, October 19, 1939, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, *ibid.*, p. 642.

740.00115 European War 1939/267 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

PARIS [undated].

[Received February 13, 1940—4:35 p. m.]

From Berlin:

Foreign Office advised of 37, February 12, 9 a. m.⁶ My 33, February 6, 5 p. m.⁶ There follows a summary of a German Foreign Office note dated January 26 but just received which is in reply to the French note of January 6th in respect to exchange of civilians:⁷

Beginning of Summary: Since hostilities began the German Government has constantly declared its willingness on the basis of reciprocity to permit civilian enemy aliens to depart and therefore accepted the American proposal of October 2 to this effect. For the same reason the German Government through the Swedish Government declared that it would assure reciprocity on the French proposals to permit women, children under 17, men over 65 years of age, and cripples and incurably sick persons regardless of age to depart. The French Government has modified its former statements by proposing (here follow the six points of the French note of January 6).

The German Government is unable to see any reason to justify a person-to-person exchange instead of a general exchange of males of 15 and 16 and men over 60 years of age. The total number of persons here involved is so small in proportion to the total population and the armed forces of each country that they are of no significance in the prosecution of the war. The German Government is therefore of the opinion that a general exchange should be agreed upon for these persons as well but would have no objection on this basis of reciprocity to giving assurances that male children returning home should not subsequently on reaching the age of military service be called to arms during the war.

The German Government regards the solution of this question as particularly urgent as the German Government upon inquiry informed the Swedish Legation in Paris that the French authorities do not grant assistance to the families of interned Germans or to the needy Germans in France and that before this question is reconsidered it is desired to await the development of the exchange proposals now pending. *End of summary.* (It was later stated orally at the Foreign Office that this statement had been drafted before the French note of January 7 [6?] on this point had been received.)

Begin Summary: The French Government has been informed that all enemy aliens not interned in Germany are assisted by the welfare authorities in the same manner as Germans.

This question should not, however, delay the general exchange of women, children and incurably sick persons and the German Government is prepared to carry out this exchange immediately upon receipt of the statement that the French Government will take the same measures. French nationals leaving Germany will receive the same benefits as those granted to British subjects and in this connection it is assumed that the French authorities will permit German nationals

⁶ Not found in Department files.

⁷ See telegram No. 48, January 10, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 184.

to take such funds as are necessary for their return home. Should the French Government be willing to make it possible for destitute Germans to travel as far as the German frontier the German authorities would grant the same benefits to destitute French nationals.

Respecting the return of Germans from overseas French possessions and mandated areas it appears expedient that the French Government should make proposals on this point as the German Government lacks the necessary information.

The question of a later understanding respecting the transfer of persons in question remains unaffected. *End of Summary.*

Text of German note with translation will be forwarded immediately by mail. Kirk.

MURPHY

740.00115 European War 1939/276: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 19, 1940—3 p. m.
[Received February 19—11:30 a. m.]

Following from Berlin via Brussels and is Berlin's 438, February 17, 2 p. m., to the Department.

76, February 18, 1 p. m.; 68, February 17, 2 p. m.; Department's 973, November 28, 4 p. m.;⁸ and my 2209, December 2, 6 p. m.,^{8a} respecting treatment of civilian enemy aliens.

A reply has been received from the German Foreign Office to the Embassy's memorandum of December 1 which was based upon Department's 973. This reply also refers to an Embassy *aide-mémoire* of January 23 which was presented to the Foreign Office in accordance with the authorizations and directives given in Department's 118, January 16, 7 p. m. The *aide-mémoire* of January 23 conveyed certain supplemental information on this general subject received from London, reiterated the interest of the American Government as expressed in the last two paragraphs of Department's 118 and concluded with the statement that the American Government would welcome any German observations on the memorandum of December 1.

The German reply under date of February 13 reads in translation as follows:

"The Foreign Office has the honor to confirm to the Embassy of the United States of America the receipt of the memorandum of December 1, 1939 with two enclosures and of the *aide-mémoire* of January 23, 1940, and to inform it as follows:

"The German Government has taken note with special interest of the efforts of the Government of the United States of America aiming by the conclusion of agreements to alleviate the lot of enemy civilians in the territory of the belligerents.

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 650.

^{8a} *Ibid.*, p. 653.

"The German Government is prepared, provided that reciprocity is granted, to recognize as binding upon itself in relation to Great Britain the following principles in the treatment of the British civilians in the Reich:

(a) No retaliatory measures will be taken against British civilians for acts for which they are not personally responsible.

(b) No mass internments of British civilians will take place.

(c) The internment of British civilians will be ordered by the competent authorities only after careful examination of the individual case. Every British civilian has the right to lodge a protest against his internment. The protest will be decided on after careful examination of the case, by the authority superior to the authority ordering the interning.

(d) Every British civilian who so desires will be granted permission to leave the country. British civilians subject to military service may return home after making a declaration that they will not bear arms for the duration of this war. Departure will be refused only to those British civilians against whom penal proceedings have been initiated and as long as these proceedings are pending or until the penalty imposed in such proceedings is performed.

(e) Interned persons will be treated according to the principles of the Geneva Convention concerning the treatment of prisoners of war of July 27, 1929.⁹ Under Article 86 of this convention the power protecting British interests may have the camps inspected by representatives or delegates.

"The above principles will also be observed by Germany, in case reciprocity is granted, with regard to British civilians from the overseas possessions. The German Government welcomes the proposals of the United States of America to make the above principles the subject of an agreement between the belligerents especially since their observance has always been regarded as necessary by Germany and they have constantly been observed since the beginning of hostilities. Thus male British subjects in Germany were given an opportunity to depart up to September 5, 1940 and other British subjects until September 7, 1940. This opportunity was used on a large scale. Departures were prohibited only after it became known that Reich nationals in Great Britain had been prevented from returning home and even women had been arrested beginning as early as September 2, 1939. When it further developed that in default of the granting of reciprocity it was not possible as originally intended, to release from Germany those British subjects who could not be left at liberty for reasons of public security, they had to be interned. In this process each individual case was carefully investigated with the result that a large number of British subjects were not interned. The cases of the interned persons have also been constantly re-examined subsequent to consideration being given particularly to the representations of the power protecting British interests and the complaints of the interned persons.

"The consequence was that a number of interned persons were released. In anticipation of reciprocity which has not as yet been assured by Great Britain the interned personnel have constantly been

⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

treated according to the principles of the Geneva Convention concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.

"The Government of the United States of America is aware that the German forces have always been prepared, in case reciprocity is granted, to permit enemy aliens to depart. In the interests of expediting a settlement of the matter it drops to [*the?*] proposal it has hitherto made that the departure of persons subject to military service be made dependent on a declaration by the countries involved that they will not enlist them for service under arms and accepts the original proposal of the Government of the United States of America to permit persons subject to the military service to return home as soon as they themselves have made a declaration that they will not bear arms during this war.

"In agreeing to the departure of British citizens from Germany if they so desire, the German Government makes the sole exception that British civilians against whom penal proceedings have been initiated may not depart as long as these proceedings are pending or until a penalty imposed in such proceedings has been performed. The German Government has so decided in order clearly to circumscribe and restrict the cases of exception and to insure in practice that they be judged by the lawful provisions of penal procedure.

"As soon as there is a declaration from the British Government that it also recognizes as binding upon itself the principles listed above under (a)-(e), the necessary measures can be taken by both sides without delay to enable the persons concerned to depart.

"The German Government would be pleased if a corresponding arrangement could be brought about with regard to the Dominions as well."

This German memorandum of February 13 it was orally stated at the Foreign Office had been drafted and approved before information set forth in a telegram from the Embassy at London number 48, February 7, 7 p. m., had been received by the German Government. The British Note of February 6 contained therein on this subject is now under consideration at the Foreign Office where it was pointed out that the German memorandum is in many respects responsive to the British note under reference.

Above transmitted for your information. Kirk. Cudahy.

JOHNSON

740.00115 European War 1939/277 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 19, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received February 19—6:40 p. m.]

420. Berlin's 438, February 17, 2 p. m.¹⁰ Does the Department wish me to make any specific observations in communicating the substance of Berlin's telegram under reference to the British Foreign Office?

¹⁰ See *supra*.

I believe that it should be communicated to the Foreign Office without delay.

JOHNSON

740.00115 European War 1939/277 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1940—6 p. m.

329. Your 420, February 19, 11 p. m. The Department agrees that the substance of Berlin's 438 should be brought to the attention of the Foreign Office without delay. In doing so, it is suggested that you transmit the German observations as the enclosure of a note to the British Foreign Office stating that the Government of the United States is much gratified at the apparent meeting of minds between the British and German Governments on the question of treatment of civilian enemy aliens. The American Government earnestly hopes, you may add, that this meeting of minds will be consummated by formal agreement at the earliest possible moment so that the civilian enemy alien population may promptly take advantage thereof. Not only is it gratifying in respect to these unfortunate persons but it is to be hoped that the accord reached will establish a permanent record for international law which will stand as a future example of the humane treatment to be accorded civilian enemy aliens in case of belligerency.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/289 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, February 23, 1940.

[Received February 23—5 : 36 p. m.]

Following telegram has been sent to Berlin :

9, February 23, 5 p. m. In reply to the German note of January 26th ¹¹ the Foreign Office in a note dated February 22d states that the German and French points of view are so little divergent that there are no serious obstacles to an agreement and communicates its willingness to accept a general exchange of boys 15 and 16 years old and men over 60 the former to be subject to no special restrictions when they reach military age.

It is requested therein that you convey the following points to the German Foreign Office.

1. German nationals in France will be allowed to draw from their own funds sufficient to enable them to return home and the

¹¹ See undated telegram from the Chargé in France, p. 191.

French Government will help those who are destitute to reach the German frontier.

2. No difficulty should arise concerning the return of German nationals in French overseas possessions and mandates since the French Government has agreed to their repatriation and proposes that they travel to Europe on French or neutral ships under the same financial arrangements as contemplated for German nationals in France.

3. Boys who have reached their 17th birthday since the 3d of September last should be included in the exchange.

The note adds that the competent French authorities are drawing up lists of German nationals who wish to return home and expresses the desire that this mission cooperate with the French authorities and the Swedish Legation on the practical aspects of the exchanges.

It was stated orally at the Foreign Office that the lists would probably be completed next week and it would be helpful in this were you to inform us of the procedure to be adopted in Germany for the return of French citizens eligible for repatriation.

Text of note going forward by courier tonight.

MURPHY

740.00115 European War 1939/293: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 28, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received February 28—2: 30 p. m.]

485. My 331, February 7, 7 p. m. The following telegram has been sent to Berlin as 81, February 28, 6 p. m.

"British interests. A note of February 27 from the British Foreign Office after referring to the statement in your 30, September 14, 5 p. m.,¹² that the German Government would base its treatment of the nationals of the Dominions on the treatment given in the Dominions to German nationals, and to the statement contained in the note of February 6 upon which paragraphs 1 and 2 of my 48, February 7, 7 p. m., were based that no obstacle other than that of consideration for national security would be placed in the way of the departure from certain British territories of German women and children and German males over 60 and under 18 years of age, continues:

'Lord Halifax has now the honor to state that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand likewise undertake that no obstacle other than that of consideration for national security will be placed in the way of the departure from the Dominion of New Zealand of German nationals falling within the categories mentioned in the preceding paragraph.'

Repeated to Department."

JOHNSON

¹² See telegram of September 15, 1939, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 639.

740.00115 European War 1939/295 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1940—7 p. m.

522. Pertinent portion last paragraph Berlin's 46, February 2, 9 a. m., to Brussels¹³ communicated to Australian Government through Consul General at Sydney who in a telegram dated March 4 states that the Department of External Affairs has assured him that the seven German women interned in Australia have all now been released; that the Commonwealth Government has also decided that no restriction will be placed upon the return of any German woman to Germany should she desire it; and that the Commonwealth Government has under consideration the question of treatment of males under 18 and over 60 and will inform him of its decision when reached. Department will communicate decision to you when received.

Repeat to Berlin and inform Foreign Office.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/313 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, March 20, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received March 20—11 : 36 a. m.]

695. Department's 522, March 19, 7 p. m. Communication between the Embassy at Berlin and the Australian Government concerning the detention of German and Australian women has hitherto been effected through both Embassy and the British Foreign Office. The substance of the Department's telegram under reference except as concerns males was communicated to this Embassy in a Foreign Office note of March 5 and immediately telegraphed to Berlin. In response to a further telegram from Berlin dated March 11 stating that the Australian women detained in Germany had been released and would be permitted to leave the country as soon as the German women detained in Australia were permitted to return to Germany, the following telegram was sent to Berlin under date of March 19:

"100, March 19, noon, British interests. Your 95, March 11, 10 a. m. A Foreign Office note of March 18 states that the contents of your telegram under reference were communicated to the Australian Government and requests you to inform the German Government that it will place no restrictions on the return of any German woman to Germany if she so wishes. It continues:

¹³ See telegram of February 2, 10 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 187.

'Of the seven German women previously interned who have been at liberty for at least 3 weeks four do not wish to leave Australia. Of the remaining three, one is actually applying for formal permission to leave which will be granted, another is seeking the consent of her husband to her return and the third although at liberty to leave does not wish to do so.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia expect that the Australian women now detained in Germany will at once be allowed to go free and they would be glad if the German Government could be reminded that whereas out of 2,160 German women in Australia only seven were interned and have been for several weeks at liberty, a considerably higher proportion of the fewer Australian women in Germany were interned and are still being detained.['']"

Unless the Department has particular reasons for wishing to deal with Australian interests in Germany through the Consulate General at Sydney the procedure hitherto followed would appear preferable. It is certainly more expeditious.

KENNEDY

740.00115 European War 1939/313: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1940—7 p. m.

542. Your 695, March 20, 3 p. m. Department's communication with Dominions was intended to expedite action in behalf of their interned nationals and not to alter existing procedure of negotiations which Department agrees should continue as heretofore.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/28: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy) ¹⁵

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1940—7 p. m.

229. Department's 1107, September 29, 5 p. m.¹⁶ Please inquire at Foreign Office and report present status of negotiations.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/318: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, March 27, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received March 27—4: 10 p. m.]

396. Department's 229, March 26, 7 p. m. The French and German Governments have come to a firm agreement for the mutual repatriation of the following categories of civilians:

¹⁵ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, as telegram No. 565, March 26, 7 p. m., and to the Chargé in Germany, as telegram No. 738, March 26, 11 p. m.

¹⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 641.

1. Females.
2. Boys under 17 years of age and those whose 17th birthday has occurred since September 3, 1939.
3. Men over 60 years of age.
4. Cripples and the incurably sick regardless of age.

The practical arrangements have been worked out and the first convoy of Germans will leave France on April 9.

The Department will recall that in response to representations made by the Embassy on the general subject of the treatment to be accorded civilian enemy aliens, the French Government advanced proposals for an exchange of certain categories of civilians, which exchange, in its final form, is about to be consummated. At the same time the French Government stated that it considered this first exchange, if consummated, as a preliminary to proposals affecting other categories of civilians. (Reference is made to my telegram No. 2971, December 13, 10 p. m.^{16a} and my despatch No. 5786 [5486] of December 20, 1939¹⁷).

We have of course been maintaining close contact with the Foreign Office on this subject. This morning the competent official rehearsed the French policy towards civilian enemy aliens and reiterated the French Government's willingness to propose further exchanges as soon as the execution of the present one is under way.

MURPHY

740.00115 European War 1939/318 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 27, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received March 27—1 : 45 p. m.]

750. Department's 565, March 26, 7 p. m.¹⁸ The Embassy has frequently inquired of the Foreign Office as to status of the matter, emphasizing the desirability of an early reply to the German note of February 1 (Berlin's 438, February 17, 2 p. m.¹⁹). The competent officials have today stated that the British Government is prepared to agree to all points of the German note except (d) but they are pessimistic as to the chances of an early reply or of persuading the military and naval authorities to agree to that point, upon which any general exchange appears to depend.

It is understood that there are at present some 2,000 British subjects in Germany and German occupied territory of whom less than 150 are interned and of whom the majority are naturalized Pales-

^{16a} *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 654.

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ See footnote 15, p. 198.

¹⁹ Transmitted in telegram of February 19, 3 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 192.

tinian citizens or persons who are legally British but German or Polish by ancestry and family ties. The British now have approximately 2,000 German citizens interned of whom nearly 90 percent are captured merchant seamen and the remainder persons whom they desire to keep for reasons of national security. I am advised that the number of captured merchant seamen is continually growing, that the Admiralty is not disposed to release them and that the War Office is less favorably disposed than formerly to the release of men of military age owing to objections by the French.

While the chances of a general exchange appear to have lessened perceptibly the Foreign Office states that German women, men over 60 and children under 18 are currently being permitted to leave Great Britain (my 331, February 7, 7 p. m.) despite the limited extent of German reciprocity. I will continue to follow the matter closely. In the meanwhile the Foreign Office is using this Government's interest as an additional argument with the military authorities.

KENNEDY

740.00115 European War 1939/321 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, March 30, 1940—noon.

[Received March 31—2 a. m.]

777. Department's 738, March 26, 11 p. m.²⁰ The present status of the negotiations between principal belligerent governments for the release of civilian enemy aliens is as follows:

1. While the German reply to the Department's original proposals for release and treatment of civilian enemy aliens was virtually a complete acceptance (Embassy's 1727, October 26 [16], 5 p. m.)²¹ the French and British replies were more restricted as to categories of enemy aliens which would be allowed to depart. Subsequently both the French and British Governments indicated the conditions under which agreements on this question might be reached and after protracted negotiations which were the subject of communication between this Embassy and the Embassy in London the following arrangements are in effect or are about to go into effect:

2. An Anglo-German arrangement was effected by (a) a German memorandum of December 12, 1939,²² wherein the German Government stated its willingness to permit the departure of British women and children and persons under 18 or over 60 years of age provided reciprocity is granted and provided there exists no objection in in-

²⁰ See footnote 15, p. 198.

²¹ See telegram No. 1272, October 19, 1939, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 642.

²² See telegram of December 18, 1939, 9 a. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, *ibid.*, p. 655.

dividual cases from the standpoint of national security and (b) a British note of February 18, 1940,²³ which stated that no obstacle other than national security will henceforth prevent the departure of German women and children and persons under 18 or over 60 years of age in the United Kingdom, colonies, overseas territories, protectorates, mandated territories and India provided reciprocity is granted. After circularizing all Consulates the Embassy transmitted to the German authorities lists of British subjects of the categories stipulated desiring to be released. Departures are taking place regularly from Germany of such persons. This agreement appears to be in full operation with the possible exception of Palestinian women still detained in Germany pending the receipt of information respecting the release of German women from Palestine.

3. The departure from Germany of approximately 400 Lascars detained in Hamburg and Bremen was arranged for and effected under a special agreement whereby the British Government gave certain guarantees respecting non-participation of Lascars in combat activity or enrollment on British ships. All Lascars have been evacuated except two who are hospitalized.

4. A German-New Zealand agreement²⁴ has been effected on the same basis as the Anglo-German agreement in (2) above.

5. After protracted exchange an agreement has been reached for the reciprocal release from imprisonment and eventual departure of German women confined in Australia and Australian women confined in Germany.²⁵ The Australian Government is still considering the question of a reciprocal release of males under 18 or over 60 years of age.

6. No agreement respecting Canadians has been reached although the German Government has indicated its willingness to conclude an arrangement on the same basis as (2) above. In this connection reference is made to Department's 407, February 17, and Embassy's 596, March 9, 11 a. m.²⁶

7. A Franco-German arrangement will probably be concluded shortly.²⁷ After protracted negotiations a note of March 7 stated that the German Government is prepared on the basis of reciprocity to permit the departure of French women and children and males under 17 or over 60 years of age, cripples and the incurable sick regardless of age. This note was drafted on the basis of several French pro-

²³ Apparently based on the telegram to Berlin quoted in telegram No. 331, February 7, 7 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 188.

²⁴ See telegram No. 485, February 28, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 196.

²⁵ See telegram No. 695, March 20, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 197.

²⁶ Neither printed.

²⁷ The Chargé in Germany reported in telegram No. 857, April 8, noon, that the Franco-German arrangement went into effect April 3 (740.00115 European War 1939/323).

posals and German counterproposals and awaits only the formal acquiescence of the French Government in order to go into effect. Advances have recently been received from Paris that this acceptance is now being prepared. Lists of French nationals falling within the categories stipulated desiring to depart have already been submitted to the German authorities.

8. In addition to the foregoing arrangements for certain categories of civilian enemy aliens the Embassy has concomitantly impressed upon the German Government the desirability of enlarging the repatriation possibilities for enemy aliens in accordance with the directives set forth in the Department's 605, September 29, 5 p. m.,²⁸ and 973, November 28, 4 p. m.²⁹ The results of these efforts were described in my 438, February 17, 2 p. m. (which was also sent to London as 68, February 17, 2 p. m.)³⁰ and contains the German reply under date of February 13 to the Embassy's communication of December 1. Since the receipt of this German note of February 13 competent officials of the Foreign Office have repeatedly expressed the hope that an agreement along the lines indicated therein might be reached. They also expressed the hope that the American Government would again approach the British and French Governments with a view to obtaining such an agreement. To date no reply has been received to this German note either from the Department or from London.

In the course of discussions on these questions foreign officials pointed out that perhaps the fact that there were many more Germans in French and British territory than vice versa has made the French and British Governments reluctant to agree to the general release of enemy aliens. Of the thousands of Germans in enemy territory however it was said that only several hundred in each enemy country are of interest to Germany and that the vast majority would not return if they could. Consequently the actual numbers of persons exchanged would approximately equalize and the German proposal would not therefore result in any great numerical disparity in exchanges. It was further contended that as the total exchanges would probably not amount to more than several thousand persons that an agreement for a general release of enemy aliens including males of military age would have no appreciable effect on the conduct or the outcome of the war. In these circumstances the German officials indicated their willingness to widen the scope of the repatriation arrangements and expressed the hope that the American Government would continue its efforts to this end.

²⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I. p. 641, footnote 62.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 650.

³⁰ See telegram of February 19, 3 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 192.

I should welcome any observations the Department may desire to make with special reference to my 438, February 17, 2 p. m.

KIRK

740.00115 European War 1939/318: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1940—7 p. m.

257. Please repeat to London and Berlin your 396, March 27, 5 p. m. and request them to repeat to you and to each other respectively their 750, March 27, 6 p. m. and 777, March 30, noon.

Department notes with pleasure that French and German Governments have agreed to certain exchanges under practical arrangements to be given effect within a few days and that French Government is willing to propose further exchanges as soon as the execution of the present one is under way. Inform Foreign Office.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/425a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1940.

1446. *New York Times* on June 20 carried an article to the effect that British Government intends to remove German prisoners of war and civilian internees from Great Britain to Canada and quoted Prime Minister Mackenzie King as supporting the proposal.

In this connection Department recalls that British Foreign Office note of May 10 (your telegram 1170, May 11, noon³¹) mentioned the "great surprise" with which the British Government learned of the intention of the German Government to send from Denmark to Germany for internment British subjects of military age who were in Denmark at the time of the German invasion. In the same note the British Government added that it could not but feel that the German authorities were thus proposing to act with a harshness toward British subjects in Denmark that was totally out of keeping with the consideration which it was stated the British Government have shown to German civilians in their hands. The British Government's note of May 10 was, in accordance with its request, duly communicated to the German Government.

In bringing the foregoing circumstances to the attention of the British Foreign Office, you may add that if the proposal mentioned

³¹ Not printed. The Department of State acted as a medium of transmission between the British and German Governments regarding British subjects in Denmark. (740.00115 European War 1939/353)

by the *New York Times* is put into effect it may lead the German Government to retaliate and perhaps even to resort to reprisals against British nationals in Germany which might have far-reaching and distressing consequences for many British nationals, and might well prejudice this Government's ability to protect the British interests entrusted to its care.

It is, of course, possible that the British Government has no intention of putting such a plan into execution. However, if such a move is in prospect, the Department hopes that serious thought will be given to the foregoing considerations.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/422: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1940.

1447. Following from Embassy Rome:

"644, 27th. British interests. Italian Government has been informed by the Brazilian Government that the British Foreign Office stated to the Brazilian Embassy in London that 1,500 Italians interned in England are to be transferred to Canada in order to be treated as prisoners in accordance with 'international convention of 1929'. If this project is carried out it is absolutely certain that the Italian Government will retaliate in some manner against more than 1,000 British subjects believed remaining in Italy. Consequently I should appreciate it if Department could verify British intentions in this regard and obtain full details and explanations for communication to Italian Government. This Embassy is already greatly handicapped in its efforts to protect British subjects because of reports reaching the Italian Government of mistreatment of Italian subjects in England."

Please refer to Department's 1446, 27th and inform Foreign Office.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/424: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, June 28, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received June 28—8:15 p. m.]

1882. Your 1446 and 1447, 27th. Notes based on your two telegrams given Foreign Office today. The Foreign Office had previously given the Embassy informally a copy of a communication addressed under date of June 22d to the Swiss Legation stating that the British Government had "come to the conclusion that is desirable, that 2633

German civilian internees and 1823 combatant prisoners of war should be transferred to a part of His Majesty's Dominions where they will be outside the area of hostilities," that the Canadian Government had agreed to accept them, that the prisoners of war would be treated in accordance with the terms of the 1929 convention ³² (of which Canada is a party) and that civilian internees would be treated "in general as at present in accordance with the principles of the convention."

A similar note was sent to the Brazilian Embassy concerning 1500 Italian civilian internees.

The Foreign Office today confirms that the Government's intentions in this matter are quite definite and that the first group of Germans has already sailed. The Foreign Office holds that there is a considerable difference between removing civilians caught in a neutral country to internment camps in Germany and transferring prisoners of war and interned civilians from one part of the British Empire to another. It emphasizes that its action is entirely in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the 1929 convention, that the prisoners and internees are merely being moved "outside the area of hostilities" and that the action is in no sense punitive. It holds that any reprisals by the German or Italian Governments other than moving British subjects to places of greater safety where they would receive treatment at least as good as at present would be entirely unjustified and would cause the British Government to consider retaliatory measures.

The Swiss Legation and the Brazilian Embassy have received no instructions from the German and Italian Governments to protest and are apparently not concerned over the move. The Swiss Legation, in advising the German Government of it, took care to emphasize that the prisoners and internees were being moved outside the area of hostilities. The Brazilian Embassy merely cabled the text of the Foreign Office note but the Brazilian Counselor states that he will attempt to reassure the Italian Government.

KENNEDY

740.00115 European War 1939/440 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 9, 1940.

[Received July 9—12:48 p. m.]

2062. Your 1446, 27th, and my 1882, June 28, 11 p. m. Foreign Office note dated July 8 after referring to the considerations advanced by the Department, including the possibility of reprisals, states:

³² International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

"3. Lord Halifax has the honor to state that in sending German prisoners of war and internees to Canada, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are not acting in any way contrary to the provisions of the Prisoners of War Convention, still less with harshness. The climate of Canada is good, there is an abundance of food, the prisoners will be, as was pointed out in Lord Halifax's note to the Swiss Legation of the 22d June, of which a copy was sent to the United States Embassy on the 22d June, outside the area of hostilities, and Canada is a party to the Prisoners of War Convention and is prepared to observe its stipulations in the case of prisoners of war, and generally, in the case of interned civilians. Every effort will be made to ensure that these men are not exposed to any unnecessary risk on the voyage but of course His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept responsibility if the lives of these men are endangered by the armed forces of the enemy failing to comply with the rules of warfare which oblige belligerents to ensure the safety of the passengers and crew of any merchant ships sunk. The names of the Germans sent to Canada will be communicated to the German Government as soon as possible, and facilities will, no doubt, be given by His Majesty's Government in Canada to the representative of the power which is in charge of German interests in that Dominion, to visit the internment camp or camps on the arrival of the internees or prisoners of war, so that they can satisfy themselves as to their treatment.

"4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be unable to admit that there is any parallel between the seizure of British subjects by the German forces in a neutral country which they had invaded and their transfer to Germany for internment, and the transfer of prisoners of war and enemy civilians from one part of the British Commonwealth of Nations to another. To resort to reprisals would, therefore be an entirely unjustifiable act on the part of the German Government.

"5. Lord Halifax trusts that the United States Government will appreciate the force of these arguments and that the United States Embassy at Berlin will be able to give such information and explanations to the German Government as may convince them that the transfer of German prisoners of war and internees to Canada is in no way prejudicial to them but rather the contrary, and that there is, therefore, no ground for any retaliatory action against British prisoners of war or British internees in Germany."

Not repeated to Berlin.

KENNEDY

740.00115 European War 1939/441 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 9, 1940.

[Received July 9—12:35 p. m.]

2063. Your 1447, 27th and my 1882, June 28, 11 p. m. Foreign Office note of July 8 after referring to Phillips' observations states:

"3. Lord Halifax is much obliged to the United States Ambassador at Rome for the friendly interest which he has shown in this question. He would be grateful if he could be informed that in sending Italian internees (no prisoners of war are in question) to Canada, His Majesty's Government are not acting in any way contrary to the spirit of the Prisoners of War Convention which it is their intention to observe. Not only in the case of prisoners of war but also, in general, in the case of interned civilians, still less are they acting with hardness towards the Italian internees. The climate of Canada is good, there is an abundance of food, the internees will be, as was pointed out in Lord Halifax's note to Senhor Moniz de Aragao, outside the area of hostilities, and Canada is a party to the Prisoners of War Convention and is prepared to give effect to its provisions not only in the case of prisoners of war but also in general, in the case of interned civilians. Every effort will be made to ensure that these men are not exposed to any unnecessary risk on the voyage but of course His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept responsibility if the lives of these men are endangered by the armed forces of the enemy failing to comply with the rules of warfare which oblige belligerents to ensure the safety of the passengers and crew of any merchant ships sunk. To resort to reprisals would, therefore, be an entirely unjustifiable act on the part of the Italian Government. The names of the Italian civilians sent to Canada will be communicated to the Italian Government as soon as possible and facilities will no doubt be given by His Majesty's Government in Canada to the Japanese Legation or Consuls in Canada to visit the internment camp on the arrival of the internees so that they can satisfy themselves as to their treatment.

"4. Lord Halifax much regrets to learn that the United States Embassy at Rome is greatly handicapped in its efforts to protect British subjects because of unfavourable reports reaching the Italian Government concerning the treatment of Italian subjects in England. All possible consideration has been shown to the Italians having regard to the circumstances in which their internment has been found necessary.

"5. His Majesty's Government hope that it will be possible to make arrangements for the return to Italy of a large number of Italian subjects though, of course, they reserve to themselves the right to retain in this country any person on grounds of national security."

Repeated to Rome.

KENNEDY

III. COOPERATION WITH THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE
ON REFUGEES TO ASSIST PERSONS FORCED TO EMIGRATE, PRI-
MARILY FROM GERMANY, FOR POLITICAL OR RACIAL REASONS³³

840.48 Refugees/2041

*The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the
Secretary of State*

No. 1117

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, January 18, 1940.

[Received January 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival in Ciudad Trujillo on January 16 of Mr. James N. Rosenberg of the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, Inc., accompanied by Messrs. Robert T. Pell and Stephen V. C. Morris, of the Department, for the purpose of signing a contract with the Dominican Government on behalf of the Association to settle Jewish and non-Jewish refugees. Mr. Pell, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, is acting as personal representative of the Chairman of the American Delegation to the Intergovernmental Committee, while Mr. Morris is representative of Lord Winterton³⁴ and the Inter-governmental Committee.

Mr. Rosenberg was also accompanied by his assistant Mr. Harold Linder, his secretary, Mr. Clancey, while three agronomists and electrical experts, Dr. Rosen, Dr. Pearlstein and Mr. Trone, were already here awaiting his arrival. Señor Carlos Dávila, former President of Chile, and now adviser and publicity agent to General Trujillo,³⁵ is expected to join the group tomorrow, while a free lance journalist, Mr. George Abel, arrived on the same boat with the group.

Mr. Rosenberg and his group have been put up as guests of General Trujillo who has already had several cordial interviews with them regarding the settlement project. He has informed Mr. Rosenberg that he wishes to give to the Association the tract of land he owns near Sosúa³⁶ of 25,000 acres, while the Government is willing to give an option on some 300,000 tareas of land adjoining Sosúa at the rate of about forty cents a tarea. Mr. Rosenberg regards this offer as distinctly favorable and has already given the General a tentative draft of the contract between the Association and the Dominican Government. The tenor of this contract is to allow the Association to settle permanently the land it acquires with several hundred refugees looking toward further expansion should the project work out, the settlers to be maintained and administered by the Association and later assume Dominican citizenship.

³³ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 55-160. For correspondence regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine, see vol. III, section under Palestine entitled "Effect of the European war upon the situation in Palestine; British policies regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine."

³⁴ Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee.

³⁵ Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Chief of Staff, Dominican Army.

³⁶ On the north coast, to the east of Puerto Plata.

Mr. Rosenberg states that General Trujillo in his conversations seems to have the idea of creating an agricultural bank, apparently hoping this might not only take care of certain Government funds but also act as a banking house for the refugees.

Mr. Rosenberg and his group expect to spend the weekend looking over the Sosúa and other properties and to conclude the contract shortly with the Dominican Government. Meanwhile they are the object of considerable entertainment and hospitality on the part of the Dominicans.

Respectfully yours,

EUGENE M. HINKLE

840.48 Refugees/2045

*The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the
Secretary of State*

No. 1127

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, January 26, 1940.

[Received January 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatch no. 1117 of January 18, 1940, reporting the arrival in Ciudad Trujillo of Mr. James N. Rosenberg for the purpose of signing a contract with the Dominican Government for the settlement of refugees in this country.

Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Linder, and Mr. Stephen V. C. Morris, representing the Inter-Governmental Committee, accompanied by the three technical experts, departed from the city on January 19 and personally looked over land near Sosúa belonging to General Trujillo as well as other lands in the vicinity. They were apparently all much impressed by the prospects and quality of the land.

Mr. Rosenberg and General Trujillo then had an exchange of correspondence wherein the former has offered to endow a chair at the University and the General as his personal contribution offered his property at Sosúa for use of the Association. While General Trujillo paid the United Fruit Company \$50,000 for this land, he values it, in view of improvements, at \$100,000. Mr. Rosenberg has not accepted the gift outright as yet and it is quite possible that General Trujillo will be made a stockholder in the Dominican Republic Settlement Association to the extent of his gift.

The first draft of the contract prepared by Mr. Rosenberg along the lines of the letter addressed to him by Minister Pastoriza ³⁷ last November, the contents of which are known to the Department, was given to General Trujillo on January 18. The Dominicans felt that the contract was too complicated and detailed and have since that time submitted a counter-draft apparently based on suggestions by Don Carlos Dávila who has now arrived here as a guest of the General.

³⁷ Señor Don Andrés Pastoriza, Dominican Minister in the United States.

This counter-draft made no fundamental changes in the ideas presented by Mr. Rosenberg but incorporated the same privileges and immunities in simpler language than the first draft. The counter-draft was received by Mr. Rosenberg on January 23. Since then, however, certain modifications have been introduced by Dr. Troncoso de la Concha, Vice President of the Republic, and Dr. Julio Ortega Frier, chosen by General Trujillo to act as legal counsel for the Commission. At the present moment it does not appear that there are any fundamental differences of opinion which cannot be reconciled by appropriate drafting.

The contract will become effective upon ratification by the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, Inc., and upon the promulgation of appropriate immigration regulations covering such settlement associations. It is expected that the contract will be signed today or tomorrow and this will be made a formal ceremony attended by the representatives of the interested countries.

There has been little newspaper comment. Señor Gimbernard, whose extreme rightist tendencies and scurrilous writings are known to the Department, has attacked the proposed settlement in his organ *Cosmopolita*. *Diario del Comercio* carried an editorial on January 22 expressing the hope that these immigrants will not form a separate nucleus of resident foreigners but will become assimilated as Dominicans.

Respectfully yours,

EUGENE M. HINKLE

033.5511: Van Zeeland, Paul/46

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan) to the Secretary of State

No. 205

CARACAS, January 26, 1940.

[Received February 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that, having noted several references in the local press to a proposed visit to Venezuela on the part of former Premier Van Zeeland of Belgium, I felt it might be of interest to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs³⁸ and the Belgian Minister³⁹ concerning this matter.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that his Government had not been officially advised of this visit by the Belgian Government although it had received a cable from one of its officers in Europe stating that Mr. Van Zeeland was coming to investigate the possibilities for settling European refugees in Venezuela. Dr. Gil Borges added that while ex-Premier Van Zeeland would be received with every courtesy and his visit made pleasant, there was no possi-

³⁸ E. G. Borges.

³⁹ Fernand Gobert.

bility of success for his mission. He said that the experience with Jewish refugees had not been satisfactory, that many of them had been admitted on sufferance and with the promise on their part that they would work on farms or would engage in similar occupations. This promise had not been kept and virtually all of them were now in Caracas or other large centers of population. He again stated Venezuela's oft-repeated immigration policy to the effect that it was seeking immigrants of the farming or artisan class rather than those who would engage in commerce in the cities. "Venezuela," he concluded, "is not anti-Semitic and is willing to establish a small quota of Jewish immigration but it must control the type of immigration which is needed by this country."

The Belgian Minister informed me that he had no official instructions or even information concerning the visit of ex-Premier Van Zeeland. He stated that he understood he was coming as a member of the Evian Committee on Political Refugees but that his work would be solely in connection with this Committee and that he had no official mission as far as the Belgian Government was concerned. The Belgian Minister appeared reticent to comment on Mr. Van Zeeland and I received the impression that possibly his activities were not particularly sponsored by his own Government.

Due to the burning of the Italian liner *Orazio* on which ex-Premier Van Zeeland was to have sailed, his trip perforce was postponed and it is not known as yet when it will take place.

The proposed visit has awakened considerable interest in the press and half a dozen editorials have appeared which are surprisingly bitter and in some cases quite unreasonable in tone. The general tenor of the comment gives the same view as that expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs only in a much less moderate manner. It is a curious fact that while the crying need for immigration to Venezuela is realized and elaborate laws and regulations have been prepared to that effect so far very little real inducement has been offered to attract immigrants.

Respectfully yours,

FRANK P. CORRIGAN

840.48 Refugees/2047 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the Secretary of State

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, January 30, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received 2:32 p. m.]

9. For Moffat ⁴⁰ from Pell. Rosenberg is telegraphing the President reporting the successful results of the negotiation here which have

⁴⁰ Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

far exceeded all expectations and include a pledge on the part of the Generalissimo that existing general legislation discriminating against Jews will be repealed. It would be of invaluable assistance to Rosenberg and his associates in their dealings with the Generalissimo from this point on if acknowledgment could be made of this message. [Pell.]

HINKLE

840.48 Refugees/2048: Telegram

The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the Secretary of State

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, January 30, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received 6:23 p. m.]

10. Referring to the Legation's despatch No. 1127, January 26, 1940, an agreement was signed today in the presence of General Trujillo, the Vice President, the Cabinet, leading dignitaries, and chiefs of diplomatic missions, between the Dominican Government, represented by the Ministers of the Interior⁴¹ and Agriculture,⁴² and the Dominican Republic Settlement Association represented by Messrs. James Rosenberg and Rosen. The contract was witnessed by Morris for the Inter-Governmental Committee, and by Harold Linder for the Coordinating Foundation. Pell expressed appreciation to the Dominican Government on behalf of the American delegation to the Inter-Governmental Committee—the final text of his statement has been sent by air mail to the Department—and General Trujillo replied at the close of the speaking with a statement of his aims for the development of his country.

The contract, which is placed under the auspices of [*sic*] aegis of the Inter-Governmental Committee, provides for the immediate settlement of 500 Jewish and non-Jewish families and settlement of further contingents up to 100,000 persons as conditions warrant. The association assumes full financial responsibility for the settlement and the Republic waives all taxes, fees, and duties. The contract will become effective upon ratification by the board of the Association and upon promulgation of appropriate Dominican legislation.⁴³

The decisions relating to the land to be used for settlement are set forth not in the contract but in an exchange of letters between Mr. Rosenberg and General Trujillo whereby the latter "contributes his Sosúa property in exchange for shares in the Dominican Settlement Association.[""]

Text of agreement by air mail.⁴⁴

⁴¹ J. García.

⁴² A. R. Carbuccia.

⁴³ The agreement and three laws implementing the agreement were ratified by the Dominican Congress on February 21, 1940.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

The negotiations leading up to the signing of the agreement were carried out with notable good will and cordiality on both sides.

HINKLE

840.48 Refugees/2073

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations (Thomson)

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1940.

Mr. Warren ⁴⁵ called to discuss the program for placement of refugees in the Dominican Republic. He stated that Mr. Rosenberg who is now in the Dominican Republic was studying the possibility of accompanying the program by some cultural gesture such as the donation to the Government of the Dominican Republic of one or two important documents on Columbus.

Mr. Warren explained that the committee to date, in outlining plans for refugee settlement in the Dominican Republic, had necessarily worked largely through General Trujillo and the success of the experiment was largely dependent on the General's ability to take a far-sighted view of the degree to which these refugees might contribute to the economic development of the country. The General has repeatedly indicated that he desires to augment the white population of the island. Mr. Warren stated that the committee recognizes that it needs a wider and more secure basis of support if the eventual success of the project is to be assured. Consequently it desires to educate general public opinion in the country on the matter and to arrange that correct factual information is furnished to members of the political opposition, to avoid misunderstanding in that quarter. Mr. Warren stated that the committee had been disturbed by reports fathered by General Trujillo that 100,000 refugees were to be introduced into the Dominican Republic. At present the settlement of only 500 families is being considered and estimates made for the committee indicate that a maximum of 28,000 persons is all that the country could absorb. Of these it is possible that 60% might be Jewish. All the money which has been made available for the program to date is Jewish, although efforts have been made to interest Catholic and Protestant groups. Mr. Warren declared that the committee fully recognizes the necessity of proceeding slowly and making sure that the initial group of refugees, as well as subsequent groups, are wisely settled in a way to assure their continuing welfare. The committee further recognizes that it would be fatal to the long time success of the program to introduce a number of refugees so

⁴⁵ George L. Warren, Executive Secretary of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.

large as to affect harmfully the general welfare of the Dominican people.

The problem for the committee is complicated by the permission granted on the part of the Dominican Government for the entry of Spanish refugees. Two thousand have already been introduced with inadequate provisions for their settlement. It is expected that two additional groups of 2,000 each will soon be brought to the country making a total of 6,000 Spaniards.

With respect to the education of public opinion in the island on the program Mr. Thomson suggested that statements published in organs such as the *New York Times*, *La Prensa* of New York City, and *La Nueva Democracia* of New York City, might be expected eventually to sift through to a certain number of leading persons in the Dominican Republic. He also offered, if such a move were approved by the officers in the Department charged with the responsibility for refugee matters, to make available in a personal capacity to Dr. Angel Morales, leader of the Dominican opposition, a factual statement outlining the program of the committee and its desire to take every precaution to develop the project in a way which would be ultimately beneficial to the Dominican people.

840.48 Refugees/2071b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle)

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1940—3 p. m.

12. Please convey the following message to Mr. James N. Rosenberg:

The President has received your telegram ⁴⁶ and is highly gratified to learn of the happy conclusion of your arrangements with the Dominican Government looking toward the settlement of refugees. The success of this venture will augur well for a gradual and progressive solution of this great humanitarian problem.

HULL

⁴⁶ Telegram from Ciudad Trujillo, January 30, 1940, 1:43 p. m., in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N. Y. It reported that a highly satisfactory settlement contract had been signed that morning with the Dominican Government and that Generalissimo Trujillo had been very cooperative, contributing personally a large tract with adequate facilities for the settlement, and promising to recommend early repeal of discriminatory legislation.

840.48 Refugees/2063 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 17, 1940—3 p. m.
[Received February 17—10: 56 a. m.]

408. Winterton believes that a full meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee should be held during the spring or early summer. The Foreign Office is in tentative agreement but before taking any final decision Winterton wishes to obtain Mr. Taylor's ⁴⁷ views as to a convenient time and place. Winterton believes that the French will be agreeable to having the meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay and is writing to Mr. Taylor at Rome suggesting that the meeting be held in Paris at a date convenient to him. It is believed that he has in mind merely an annual meeting to discuss such progress as has been made and that no important new proposals are contemplated.

Repeated to Rome for Mr. Taylor and Mr. Moffat.⁴⁸

JOHNSON

840.48 Refugees/2082 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, February 28, 1940—8 p. m.
[Received February 28—3: 21 p. m.]

135. From Taylor. Reference London Embassy's telegram No. 408, February 17, 3 p. m. I concur in the suggestion that a meeting of Intergovernmental Committee be held at Paris, Monte Carlo or other suitable place in the late spring, the date and place of meeting to be determined later.

The reason for this meeting is to keep the Committee alive. The Washington meeting was of officers only; the full Committee as such has not met since last August. Repeated to London. [Taylor.]

PHILLIPS

840.48 Refugees/2082

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Pell)

[WASHINGTON,] February 29, 1940.

The Intergovernmental Committee, which began as a consultation of thirty-three Governments at Evian ⁴⁹ in order to determine what, if anything, might be done to solve the problem of political refugees,

⁴⁷ Myron Taylor, personal representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII and United States representative on the Intergovernmental Committee.

⁴⁸ Mr. Moffat was instructed to sail for Europe on February 17.

⁴⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 740 ff.

was given a more permanent form for one primary reason, that was the desirability of marshalling governmental opinion behind negotiations for the purpose of persuading the German Government to relax the pressure on its minorities. When the war broke the principal justification for the continued existence of this consultative body ceased. The negotiation with Germany ended abruptly. The contact with the German authorities was finally halted. From that moment the English and French Governments looked upon the Committee as a platform from which to denounce Germany and involve this Government in that denunciation. In other words, they looked upon the Committee as a political instrument rather than an organization to help in the solution of the refugee problem.

The British and the French made their position very clear at the meeting of the officers of the Committee in October. They took the ground that the Allies were fighting, among other things, to oblige the Germans to take back the refugees and that the immediate role of the Committee should be to support the British and French in bringing about a condition where the refugees might return to their original homes. They showed scant sympathy toward our viewpoint (which was supported by other neutral representatives) that no matter how the war resulted there would be a vast refugee problem, perhaps involving many millions of people, and that in any event there was the immediate problem to solve of resettling the large numbers of refugees who had left Germany but were waiting to emigrate from countries of temporary refuge.

This fundamental cleavage was smoothed over on that occasion by the use of broad and rather meaningless language but there is every reason to believe that the cleavage remains and that the British and French wish to develop at the proposed meeting at Paris their thesis that they are fighting the war for the refugees and that pending the outcome of the armed struggle nothing further need be done.

Our delegation, in short, would be placed in a position where it would have either to subscribe to or oppose the Anglo-French position; that is, it would have to take a political position in a time of great uncertainty and there does not seem to be any good reason why an issue with such serious implications should be raised in connection with the problem of refugees.

The question, in brief, is whether this Government is genuinely interested in the solution of the refugee problem or whether it, like the British and French, wishes to use the refugee problem for the development of policies hostile to Germany. Assuming that this Government is genuinely concerned with ways and means of contributing to the alleviation of the political refugee situation, it must be said with all frankness that the practical approach is not through

a meeting of a number of Ambassadors and Ministers under the aegis of Lord Winterton at Paris or some other point. These gentlemen, as in the past, will make pretty speeches, or in most cases will not speak at all. Mr. Taylor will offer a large banquet. A few of the representatives will make reports to their Governments, but most frankly admit that they do not even do that. The hopes of the unfortunate refugees will be raised by the announcement that a meeting is to be held and, as on previous occasions when the Committee has assembled, will be dashed to even lower depths after the session.

It would seem that the moment for oratory and exchange of compliments in relation to the refugee problem has passed. The problem at the present moment is specific. The approximately 140,000 German refugees in countries of refuge have to be resettled. The Spanish refugees still in France have to be found new homes. Lithuania, Roumania and Hungary which are feeling the brunt of the Polish migration must be relieved. The solution must be found partly in the stimulation of infiltration and in part in settlement projects such as Mr. Rosenberg's Dominican project, Mr. Hochschild's Bolivian project and Mr. Liebman's Philippine project. The work has to be done primarily by private persons who have the enterprise and money to undertake projects of this kind. The Government can assist in a multitude of small ways and at least can support and encourage the men who are really contributing to the solution of the refugee problem in a concrete manner. To participate in elaborate (and incidentally expensive) diplomatic meetings is not only a sheer waste of time but is a source of disillusionment to those who are working on the refugee problem and to the refugees themselves.

Should it, however, be decided that this Government will participate in a further meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee it should be very carefully considered whether it would be advisable to agree to Paris as the place. Paris is the capital of a belligerent nation and the atmosphere is obviously not conducive to objective discussion of a scientific problem. It should be recalled that a majority of the Governments represented in the Committee, including all the Governments of the Americas, are neutral and most certainly will not wish to be drawn into a situation where they will join with England and France in attacking Germany from the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. If we are to participate in the meeting we might propose a neutral capital in Europe (although it is highly doubtful if any of the smaller European neutrals will agree to this in view of the hostility of Germany to the Committee) or, stretching a point, Mr. Taylor's proposal of Monte Carlo might be considered, although in that event most of the Governments members of the Intergovernmental Committee would be represented by Consuls or possibly not at all.

Since the question of governmental participation in the solution of the refugee problem has been raised by these telegrams, serious consideration might be given to the possibility of transferring this activity from the Committee (which was set up primarily for the purpose which no longer is extant of negotiating with the German Government) to the Permanent International Committee on Migration for Settlement which Governor Winant⁵⁰ is setting up under the International Labor Office and which is to hold a meeting in the spring. There are distinct advantages in removing the problem from the realm of politics to the realm of objective scientific organization and there is every advantage in avoiding a duplication of effort. Might it not be a solution to designate Mr. Taylor, if he wishes it, as the American representative on the Permanent Committee and put the Intergovernmental Committee quietly to sleep.

To sum up:

1) The Intergovernmental Committee, a consultative body of governments, was given a permanent form at Evian for the primary purpose of supporting an approach to Germany in the matter of refugees;

2) Under the Committee's terms of reference it deals exclusively with involuntary emigrants from Greater Germany (efforts to broaden the scope have failed due to consistent opposition by Great Britain and France);

3) With the outbreak of war in Europe, the conversations with the German Government, which had made progress, were interrupted;

4) From this time the Allies have taken the ground that they were fighting the war in order to enable the refugees to return to their homes in Germany and have sought to enlist our support of this contention;

5) The Allies are categorically opposed to our thesis that there will have to be transfers of population on a major scale at the close of the war and have made it clear that they will not even discuss this possibility during the war period;

6) A meeting of the Committee runs the risk of open cleavage between our position and the position of the Allies which will benefit no one except the Germans.

7) The possibilities might be considered of transferring this activity from the Intergovernmental Committee, which is a political body, to the Labor Office's Permanent International Committee on Migration for Settlement, which is a scientific body.

840.48 Refugees/2091

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1940.

I do not agree with the memorandum from the Division of European Affairs.⁵¹ The American position from the very beginning has

⁵⁰ John Gilbert Winant, former Governor of New Hampshire; Director of the International Labor Office, Geneva.

⁵¹ *Supra.*

been far broader than a mere negotiation relating to German pressure on the Jews or the problem of political refugees. Nor can I agree with the statement that "When the war broke the principal justification for the continued existence of this consultative body ceased".

It is true, as the Division states, that the British and French showed scant sympathy toward our viewpoint that no matter how the war resulted there would be a vast refugee problem. I cannot see why we would be "placed in a position where we would have either to subscribe to or oppose the Anglo-French position".

This government is genuinely interested in the solution of the refugee problem in its broadest sense, i. e., not merely those unfortunate people who are forced by government action to leave their homes and their countries, but also all those who, at the end of this war, will for a thousand other reasons find it desirable voluntarily to seek new homes in new lands.

Even if this proposed meeting only "makes pretty speeches" it is worthwhile keeping this Committee very definitely alive. The Division, I fear, is thinking in terms of the immediate needs of a definite number of German, Spanish, Polish, Czecho-Slovak individuals and families and fails to appreciate the enormous importance of the long-range view which will take into consideration new home seekers from France, Great Britain and even the United States. It will be time enough later on to consider the question of transferring certain activities from Mr. Taylor's committee to Governor Winant's committee but, in the meantime, I am not yet ready to "put the Intergovernmental Committee quietly to sleep".

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

840.48 Refugees/2082: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1940—4 p. m.

1. For Myron Taylor. Reference Embassy's telegram 135, February 28, 8 p. m. and London Embassy's no. 408, February 17, 3 p. m.

You may inform Winterton that this Government is prepared to accept an invitation to attend a full meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee at some time in the spring. As to the place of the meeting we prefer a neutral to a belligerent capital or would accept Monte Carlo.

Repeat to London.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/2114

The Consul at Trinidad (Hall) to the Secretary of State

No. 431

TRINIDAD, March 18, 1940.

[Received April 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that in the course of a conversation on March 9, 1940, Sir Wilfrid Jackson, the Governor of British Guiana, stated that the project for the settlement of European refugees in British Guiana was, for the moment, in abeyance, but except for the question of financial support by the British Government, he could see no reason why the project could not be proceeded with, in spite of the existing war conditions. He further expressed the belief that by setting aside all the territory south of latitude 5° for settlement, and the administration of this settlement independently of the Georgetown Government,⁵² it would be not only more satisfactory for the refugees, but would prevent any possible internal difficulties.

Americans and others familiar with the interior, appear to believe that a European settlement could be satisfactorily established and that transportation, while admittedly exceedingly difficult, would not be an insurmountable objection. It is suggested that the proposed canal and river system, utilizing the Berbice and Rupununi Rivers, could be brought into operation for not more than \$3,000,000.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. HALL, JR.

840.48 Refugees/2115

The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the Secretary of State

No. 1185

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, March 29, 1940.

[Received April 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatch no. 1180 of March 21, 1940⁵³ in which it was reported that the Executive had been granted the power to establish immigration quotas by Law 220 of February 24, 1940.

No announcement, either in the press or in the issues of the *Official Gazette* which have appeared to date, has been published concerning the setting of any quotas, and it is believed that none have officially been established. However, a German refugee at present residing in Ciudad Trujillo has received the following letter from the Secretary of State for the Interior and Police in response to his request for permission for the entry of his wife and child. It reads in translation:

"In answer to your letter you are informed that in view of the fact that the quota established for individual Semitic immigrants in the

⁵² Government of British Guiana with capital at Georgetown.

⁵³ Not printed.

Republic has been already filled, your application for the immigration of your relatives into this country should be made through the Dominican Republic Settlement Association of 165 Broadway, New York."

The conclusion to be drawn from this letter is that Article 3 of Law 220 is to be used to bar absolutely from entry into the Dominican Republic all persons of Semitic origin who do not come here under the auspices of a settlement association. Any indications to the contrary will be promptly reported.

Respectfully yours,

EUGENE M. HINKLE

840.48 Refugees/2116: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 3, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received April 3—2:38 p. m.]

833. Your No. 1, March 9, 4 p. m., to Rome for Myron Taylor.

1. The place and time of the proposed meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee was discussed yesterday by Winterton, Emerson,⁵⁴ Carvell⁵⁵ (who has taken over refugee matters in the Foreign Office) and Achilles.⁵⁶

It was apparent that the suggestion for a meeting had been Winterton's own and that neither he, Emerson, nor the British Government had any specific plan in mind. Winterton, while believing that a meeting should be held some time this year, wished to meet as far as possible Mr. Taylor's and the Department's wishes as to place and time. It was agreed that a neutral capital would be preferable, despite the probable difficulty in finding a neutral State adjacent to Germany willing to extend hospitality, and Emerson will discreetly sound out the Belgian and Swiss Governments; Monte Carlo was not regarded as particularly appropriate though perhaps acceptable as a last resort.

It was recognized that the nature of the principal topics for discussion would have an important bearing on the time when the meeting might be held. Carvell indicated that the Foreign Office saw no objection to a meeting but was in some doubt as to what subjects could profitably be discussed in the near future, Emerson expressed a similar view. Except for such progress as could be reported concerning the Dominican, Philippine and other less advanced projects, it appeared that the field of discussion would be limited largely to that of the Washington meeting, i. e., the relative importance of efforts to move

⁵⁴ Sir Herbert Emerson, Director of the Intergovernmental Committee.

⁵⁵ John Maclean Carvell.

⁵⁶ Theodore C. Achilles, Third Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom.

refugees from countries of refuge or from Germany and the question of preparatory study for migratory movements after the war. Winterton referring to the strong objections voiced in Washington, and still held, by the French and British to discussion of possible postwar migrations. Emerson raised a question as to the technical staff needed for such major studies. It was the consensus of opinion that a meeting at which there was little progress to report and which was marked by sharp divergence of opinion between the American delegation and the Allied and European neutral delegations as to the Committee's future course of action would be of little service.

It was felt that a meeting somewhat later in the year might be more fruitful and Winterton believed that in any event none need be held before July which would be a year after the last full meeting. He suggested that the subject be discussed again informally in perhaps 6 weeks' time and expressed the hope that the American Government's views as to the principal topics to be discussed could be communicated to him at that time.

2. The financial position of the Committee was also discussed. Emerson indicated that the current expenses of the Committee were small and that at the present rate of expenditure the balance in hand would last a long time. Carvell indicated that the Foreign Office planned to state in reply to Emerson's circular letter of March 5⁵⁷ that the British Government was prepared to pay "up its full contribution in accordance with the need." Emerson objected that failure of the British and American Governments to pay their full contribution for this year would set an unfortunate example for the future. Occasion was taken to point out that failure of the British to pay their full contribution would also make a bad impression in Washington. Carvell and Winterton expressed confidence that full payment of the British contribution could be arranged.

Repeated to Rome.

KENNEDY

840.48 Refugees/2127a

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Paul Van Zeeland called to see me today to tell me of the progress made in the work of the Refugees Committee.

He told me that in the course of his recent visit to Europe, whence he returned only three days ago, he received formal assurances from the Secretary of the Colonies in England⁵⁸ and from the Secretary of the Colonies in France⁵⁹ that the British and French Governments

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ Malcolm MacDonald.

⁵⁹ Georges Mandel.

would respectively make available for settlement British Guiana, New Caledonia, and the Marquesas. Mr. Van Zeeland said that with these areas now available for settlement, together with the areas which will be available in the Philippine Islands and the area already under development in the Dominican Republic, the moment had come when he felt it imperative to commence the collection of the initial amount of capital required for the work involved. He added that detailed plans had been prepared for settlement projects in all of the areas mentioned.

He asked me to tell you confidentially that Lessing Rosenwald had given him formal assurances that the Rosenwald family would subscribe several millions of dollars in the purchase of the proposed refugee bonds. He was further assured that if Bernard Baruch and Mr. Ittleson would subscribe equivalent amounts and an announcement could be made to that effect, a very considerable number of other individuals would be willing to subscribe for lesser amounts. He thought that by these means between fifteen and twenty millions of dollars could be obtained as the initial capital investment toward the realization of the various settlement projects.

Finally, he stated that there was no one but yourself who could give the necessary impulse to the attainment of these objectives. His feeling was that if you were willing to suggest to Mr. Baruch that he meet with Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Ittleson at a confidential meeting at the White House under your auspices, both Mr. Baruch and Mr. Ittleson would equal the subscription already promised by Mr. Rosenwald.

I told Mr. Van Zeeland that I would lay his suggestions before you and that I believed you would let me know for Mr. Van Zeeland's confidential information what your decision in the matter might be.

In conclusion I may say that Mr. Van Zeeland will attend a meeting of the Migrations Committee of the League in Geneva in July and from what he tells me, he has succeeded in coordinating the work of that committee with the work of the Refugees Committee. He feels very strongly that if through the subscription of the initial amount of capital needed, a concrete demonstration can be given at the meeting of the Migrations Committee this summer that the Refugees Committee is seriously undertaking the work devolving upon it, there should then immediately be held a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee since he believes that many of the Latin American governments would be willing to take a more active interest in the project if they saw that capital funds really existed for the development of the enterprises involved.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

840.48 Refugees/2127½

President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1940.

I am glad Mr. Van Zeeland is making progress and I think the best thing would be for me to send a personal request to Mr. Baruch that he meet with Mr. Van Zeeland and possibly with Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Ittleson—preferably in New York. I will tell Mr. Baruch, however, that the general plan has my full approval.

Will you let me know what you think?

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

840.48 Refugees/2127½

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With reference to your memorandum to me of today's date concerning Mr. Van Zeeland's suggestion, I am afraid that the plan you proposed would not cover what Mr. Van Zeeland had in mind.

He told me specifically and very emphatically that unless you saw personally the three men he mentioned and indicated in this way your own interest in immediate and effective action, there would be little likelihood that the plan he outlined could be carried out.

I hesitate to suggest anything which imposes any additional demand upon your time, but from my knowledge of the gentlemen concerned, I think he may probably be right. Would it not be possible for you some time next week or the week following to let the three of them meet with you at the White House some afternoon with Van Zeeland himself preferably present. That will give Rosenwald the opportunity of saying to you that he and his family were prepared to make initially this large subscription, and presumably the other two would then have to define their position concretely.

I forgot to mention in my earlier letter to you on this subject that Mr. Van Zeeland said that all of the members of the Rosenwald family were meeting on May 12 to determine the exact amount which each member of the family should put up and that, consequently, he thought if it proved convenient for you, and you desired to adopt his suggestion, the suggested meeting with you might be fixed for some date after May 12.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

840.48 Refugees/2127

The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the Secretary of State

No. 1227

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, May 4, 1940.

[Received May 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatch no. 1185 of March 29, 1940 in which it was reported that the Dominican Government had referred a prospective immigrant to the Dominican Republic Settlement Association as the proper entity to which to make an immigration application.

The Legation has now been informed that the Settlement Association has recently learned that it can apply to the Government for the admission of any immigrants who will not engage in any gainful occupations, and who will receive guaranteed regular support from abroad. Any such applications coming through the Association will be granted visas on condition that in each case a letter from one of the banks with a branch in Ciudad Trujillo is attached to the application stating that satisfactory arrangements have been made through them that the applicants will receive from specified relatives a certain monthly allowance during their stay in the Dominican Republic. In this connection, the Government wants a minimum guarantee of \$40.00 per month for a single person and \$75.00 per month for a family of not over three people. Persons entering the Republic in this manner will not in any way be connected with those coming for the foundation of an agricultural colony.

It is anticipated that refugees will start arriving under this plan very soon, for the Association is at present working out details with the banks and will shortly be in a position to recommend persons for visas. Actually, it has already done so in a few emergency cases where there was no doubt of the individual's ability to maintain himself, but no large volume is expected for a time yet. It is anticipated that a large proportion of the refugees who arrive under this scheme will be elderly people and persons waiting for visas to enter the United States, and it is quite possible that they may come in very large numbers. However, the Association is anxious not to have this phase of its work overshadow the primary function of setting up an agricultural colony, and any large extension of it may be limited by that consideration.

It is planned in so far as possible to place these temporary immigrants in small communities outside of Ciudad Trujillo, and the town of Jarabacoa in a more healthful climate about 1800 feet above sea level has been mentioned. If circumstances warrant, the Association may assist certain of the refugees already in the Dominican Republic to set up boarding-houses for the persons who will come.

An arrangement similar to the one projected here was in operation in England previous to the war, and at the time it stopped functioning there were approximately three million dollars in guarantees on deposit and two thousand families involved.

Respectfully yours,

EUGENE M. HINKLE

840.48 Refugees/2125 : Telegram

The Consul General at Florence (Putnam) to the Secretary of State

FLORENCE, May 7, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received May 7—2: 18 p. m.]

4. For the President from Myron Taylor.

"Referring to suggestion of meeting of Intergovernmental International Committee, after considering present uncertainties it might be advisable to hold a meeting of officers similar to Washington meeting at Brussels or even Paris at end of month. Full reports of past months and of present situation could be presented by Emerson and others, the full committee being promptly thereafter circularized with copies of proceedings. This would avoid bringing together at this moment so large a body and avoid possible extension of the field of discussion for which no adequate preparation could be reasonably foreseen. A meeting of the full committee at a later date could be forecast in the minutes of the proceedings. I am sending copy of this message to Achilles for his information. [Taylor.]"⁶¹

PUTNAM

840.48 Refugees/2138

The Minister in Guatemala (DesPortes) to the Secretary of State

No. 1249

GUATEMALA, May 8, 1940.

[Received May 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that it was announced on May 7th that by a decree of May 2, 1940, the Guatemalan Government had determined to withdraw its representative from the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees.

This act of the Guatemalan Government is, of course, of little real significance in view of the fact that for nearly a year Guatemala has not been receiving any refugees, and only agreed to take one hundred families in the first place. I understand that it was determined to

⁶¹ In a letter of May 8 transmitting this telegram to President Roosevelt, Under Secretary of State Welles approved the suggestion for a meeting of the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee and suggested that it be held late in June and that the meeting place should be Dublin (840.48 Refugees/2133a).

withdraw the Guatemalan representative principally in order to save the small quota which Guatemala was paying as its share of the maintenance of the Committee. I also understand that instructions have been given to notify the Committee of this action.

Respectfully yours,

FAY ALLEN DESPORTES

840.48 Refugees/2135 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 10, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received May 10—3:10 p. m.]

18. For the President from Myron Taylor. In view of changed conditions the meeting of Intergovernmental Committee suggested in my telegram yesterday ⁶² may be impracticable therefore will await on events before taking further action.⁶³

PHILLIPS

840.48 Refugees/2151

The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the Secretary of State

No. 1245

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, May 18, 1940.

[Received May 21.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatch no. 1227 of May 4, 1940, and to its telegram no. 73 of May 9, 1940,⁶⁴ concerning the activities of the Dominican Republic Settlement Association.

The Legation has now been informed that the new activities of the Settlement Association which were outlined in the despatch under reference are being developed rapidly. The original plan of an agricultural settlement, while still considered of primary importance, is now being flanked by other refugee relief work which is assuming large proportions. The recently conceived scheme of bringing in temporary immigrants who have an income guaranteed by bank deposits has been changed slightly, due to difficulties in making the proper banking arrangements. Instead, the Settlement Association is accepting deposits at its New York office of approximately one thousand dollars per person per year, and with this money it is guaranteeing directly to the Dominican Government that temporary immigrants who come to the country under its auspices will not lack the necessary funds to live comfortably without employment. Under this system the Association has secured visas for about 75 persons, and it is expected

⁶² Not found in Department files.

⁶³ There was some further discussion as to time and place for a meeting but apparently no meeting was held in 1940.

⁶⁴ Latter not printed.

that at least 100 temporary refugees will arrive in Ciudad Trujillo on the *Neptunia*, which is scheduled to sail from Genoa on May 24. Presumably, these persons will be applicants at this office for visas to enter the United States.

In addition to these temporary immigrants, the *Neptunia* is expected to bring about 150 permanent settlers, destined for the agricultural colony at Sosúa. This will be the second and much the larger contingent to arrive in Sosúa. An officer of the Legation had the opportunity of visiting Sosúa last week a few hours before the arrival of the first group of settlers. Although beds, rudimentary furniture, and refrigerators had been set up in preparation for the arrival, he was not particularly impressed by the foresight or administrative abilities which had been demonstrated in readying the place for the reception either of the first group or of those who are following so soon afterwards. Nevertheless, it is not felt that this lack of preparation is a serious matter, and it is expected that once the first group is established they will form a nucleus about which a more efficient organization can be built.

The Settlement Association is now investigating the possibilities of still another field for the absorption of refugees into the life of the Dominican Republic. As Dr. Rosen states, "Not all of the refugees who arrive here are going to be agriculturists," so it is hoped that some persons can be given a start in founding new and non-competitive industries throughout the country. While such a project has many obvious advantages, both for the refugees and the Republic, the Legation feels that it will be necessary to proceed on this plan with the utmost caution. Strictly speaking, no new industry can be completely non-competitive with those already in existence, and every Dominican who feels he is being damaged by one of them is a potential enemy of all further plans for use of the Dominican Republic as a refugee haven. Refugees already in the country have formed numerous small businesses independently in Ciudad Trujillo which many Dominicans feel have been detrimental to themselves, so that an officially and openly conducted program such as that projected seems certain to breed a considerable amount of ill-will.

Respectfully yours,

EUGENE M. HINKLE

811.111 W. R./1: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1940—6 p. m.

In view of the international situation it is essential that all aliens seeking admission into the United States, including both immigrants and nonimmigrants, be examined with the greatest care.

Effective immediately, all applications for diplomatic and non-immigrant visas, transit certificates and limited entry certificates, except as hereinafter specified, shall be executed in triplicate on Form 257, under oath administered by the Consul. A signed photograph will be attached to each copy of the form and impressed with the legend machine or impression seal. The visa or certificate will be stamped on the original form no. 257 to be given to the applicant for surrender at the port of entry. In no case should the visa or certificate be stamped on, or the visaed form be attached to, the travel document. The triplicate application will be retained in the files of the office and the duplicate form shall be transmitted promptly to the Department.

In the case of aliens bearing passports or other travel documents issued by governments recognized by the United States, there may be placed thereon a notation indicating the issuance of the nonimmigrant visa or certificate. For this purpose the impression of the rubber stamp specified in note 98 to Supplement A, may be suitably amended and used.

Accredited diplomatic and consular officers and their families, and such other high government officials as the officer in charge shall determine in his discretion, are excepted from the foregoing procedure. The applications of these groups shall be handled in the same manner as heretofore and visas will be stamped on the passports. Reports covering the issuance both of diplomatic and section 3 (1) visas shall be continued as heretofore, except that in each case they will be transmitted in quadruplicate and on separate sheets of paper or on a prepared form.

All applications for nonimmigrant documentation should be carefully scrutinized in the light of war conditions and other factors affecting the purpose of the applicant's proposed entry into the United States. A visa should be issued only when the applicant conclusively establishes a legitimate purpose or a reasonable need for his presence in this country (rather than his departure from abroad). Each applicant should be required to specify in his application what places he intends to visit in the United States and how long he intends to stay in each place.

Each applicant shall also be required to present conclusive evidence that upon his departure from the United States he will be admitted into the country of his nationality or some other foreign country to which he intends to return or proceed. Such evidence may include written assurance from the appropriate foreign authorities or confirmation obtained at applicant's expense through American diplomatic or consular representatives in third countries. Specific reference to authorization for applicant's admission into foreign country should be made on form 257.

The last sentence of the application on form no. 257 is hereby amended to read as follows: "I solemnly swear that the foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I understand that I shall be required to depart from the United States at the end of my temporary sojourn." The supply of forms on hand should be amended accordingly, except with respect to diplomatic and section 3 (1) applications.

In the case of journalists, including newspaper representatives, freelance reporters, and writers, the advance authorization of the Department shall be obtained before issuing a nonimmigrant visa or certificate. Requests for such authorization may be made by telegraph at the applicant's expense and should include a statement regarding his identity and affiliations, which should be carefully verified.

Subdivisions (a) and (d) of note 5, to Supplement A, Part II of the Foreign Service Regulations are cancelled, effective July 1, 1940, and thereafter the aliens referred to therein shall be required to obtain appropriate documentation before being admitted into the United States.

The last paragraph of note 69 to Supplement A, is also cancelled as of July 1, 1940 as well as circular instruction February 1, 1939, diplomatic serial 3028.⁶⁵

Visa fee agreements with Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, and the reduced fee for Belgians, are held to be in suspension. Fees amounting to 10 dollars should be collected for the issuance of passport visas to nationals of these countries.

HULL

839.55/118 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Hinkle) to the Secretary of State

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, June 12, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 1:37 p. m.]

98. The Minister of Foreign Affairs today said that under authority given the President by the immigration law no further visas will be granted any European immigrants except those settlers coming under the Dominican Republic Settlement Association's contract.

HINKLE

⁶⁵ Not printed.

840.48 Refugees/2175

The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to Brig. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, Secretary to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1940.

DEAR GENERAL: I have read the correspondence attached to your memorandum of June 20, 1940⁶⁶ relative to the desire of Mr. James N. Rosenberg to expand the activities of the Dominican Republic Settlement Association to include refugees from England and France.

The plans for the Dominican Republic Settlement Association for the evacuation of refugees from England to the Dominican Republic have the full approval of the British and Dominican Governments and form a constituent part of the extensive plans now in progress for the evacuation of refugees from England. Although France was specifically mentioned in Mr. Rosenberg's letter, it may not be possible at the present time effectively to evacuate persons from that country. All means of egress from France are closed for the moment but it is to be hoped that the time will come when at least some persons may be evacuated.

I am enclosing a draft of a suggested reply which the President may wish to send to Mr. Rosenberg.⁶⁶ The correspondence which you sent to me is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

811.111 W.R./108a : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940—1 p. m.

Nonimmigrant visas issued prior to June 6, 1940 must be revalidated by an American consular officer unless the holders are on the high seas en route to the United States. Transportation lines should be informed. The validation shall consist of a gratis endorsement on the visa with the notation of validating office and date. Record on form 257 should be retained in the office and copies sent to Department. In revalidating such visas a most careful examination will be given to ascertain that the alien's entry would not be contrary to the public safety and to ascertain that the entry involves a reasonable need or legitimate purpose.

All applications for immigration visas must be examined with extreme care and during the present period of emergency no such visa should be issued if there is any doubt whatsoever concerning the alien. Although a drastic reduction in the number of quota and nonquota

⁶⁶ Not printed.

immigration visas issued will result therefrom and quotas against which there is a heavy demand will be underissued, it is essential to take every precaution at this time to safeguard the best interests of the United States.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/2220

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Pell)

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1940.

Mr. James G. McDonald, the Chairman, and Mr. George Warren, the Secretary, of the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, have asked for an appointment respectively with Mr. Welles and Mr. Long on Friday. Mr. Warren came in to give me a preview of their mission.

Mr. Warren said that the President's Advisory Committee had more or less come to the conclusion that it would have to assume direct responsibility in the matter of political refugees in Europe who were desirous of seeking asylum in the United States. Committees were springing up on every hand, each committee with a list of candidates for admission to the United States, and already they were beginning to fight among themselves and accuse the Government of favoring one side or the other.

Warren cited the Jay Allen-Kingborn Committee, which has enlisted the interest of President Conant of Harvard, and will have as its representative in Washington one of Justice Frankfurter's secretaries. This committee was looked upon with suspicion by the Catholic groups because of Allen's activities in connection with the Civil War in Spain and so the Catholics were setting up their own committee. A committee had been formed to help Austrian refugees and Archduke Otto had already been to the Advisory Committee to complain that this committee was "too far to the left" and that he was setting up an Austrian "rightist" committee under the aegis of Archbishop Spellman of New York. Another committee was being set up to further the interests of French refugees and this was already splitting into several parts according to the political opinions of the sponsors. Representatives of the British (official) Czech Trust had arrived in this country with a list of 500 names of prominent Czechs now in England who wish to come to the United States. There were Italian and Spanish committees; and Belgian and Dutch committees, all contending for favorable treatment for their respective candidates and most of them panning this Government either for doing nothing or for favoring political opponents. For instance, Archduke Otto told the Advisory Committee that a C. I. O. list had been sent to the

American Consulate at Lisbon and the persons on this list were being given precedence over everyone else.

In short, there will soon be a highly chaotic condition which may give rise to political embarrassment if the situation is not taken in hand. The President's Advisory Committee is most anxious to have the views of the Department before it takes action and for this reason the appointments on Friday have been requested.

811.111 Refugees/193 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic
and Consular Officers*⁸⁸

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1940.

The following procedure has been adopted by the Department of State and the Department of Justice with a view to extending every facility and assistance permitted under the law to alien refugees living under difficult conditions who desire to come to the United States either as immigrants or as non-immigrant temporary visitors or transients, where the applicants are qualified under the law, are coming to the United States for a legitimate purpose and do not intend to engage in any activity inimical to the United States.

The procedure will be applicable only to individuals whose cases have been previously approved by joint action of the Department of State and the Department of Justice. The names of such individuals will be cabled to the appropriate consul in the country of the applicant's residence, with a reference to this instruction. If immigration, visitor's, or transit visas, cannot be immediately issued to such individuals, and to their wives, children, and other accompanying members of their families, the consuls are directed to notify the Department at once concerning the nature of any difficulty which has arisen in order that all practicable steps may be taken to remove such impediment to the issuance of the visas.

Before names are cabled to consular officers for action pursuant to this instruction the individuals in question will have been approved in Washington with respect to: first, the propriety of the purposes for which they seek to enter the United States; second, the matter of their departure from the United States at the conclusion of the period for which they shall have been permitted entry, in cases in which they are eligible only for visitors' visas or transit certificates; and third, the existence and adequacy of assurances that they will not become public charges.

⁸⁸ Sent to the diplomatic officers at Lisbon (No. 186), London (No. 2038), and Dublin (No. 51), and to consular officers at Oporto (No. 15), Marseille (No. 169), and Bordeaux (No. 706).

Immigration visas will be issued in all cases in which quota numbers are available for persons of the applicants' registration dates, and in which an immigration visa is desired. In cases in which quota numbers are not available and the applicants desire to apply for temporary entry, their cases should be considered under such categories as follows: Transit certificates may be issued to aliens in possession of visas with which they will be permitted to enter another country. In all other cases visitors' visas may be issued.

In all cases in which visitors' visas or transit visas are issued, the consul will inform the applicant that he is assuming the obligation to leave the United States as soon as it is possible for him to do so and to make immediate efforts in good faith to secure travel documents to this end. The application for a visa shall contain the statement that the application is made upon this understanding.

Particular attention is called to the fact that Section 7 (c) documents, including passports, military and police certificates and birth certificates, which are not readily available, may be waived under Note 87, Supplement A, Part II, Foreign Service Regulations. It is anticipated that under present conditions some or all of such documents will not be available.

Cases of other refugees than those covered by this procedure may be given every consideration in the light of their particular facts and evidence submitted by mail or telegraph relating to support and intention and ability to proceed to a third country at the conclusion of their visit.

You may in your discretion, and possibly upon request of the applicant, inform the authorities or other persons regarding the issuance of visas or the favorable preliminary consideration of cases, for possible assistance to the applicants in obtaining transit visas to place of embarkation.

WELLES

840.48 Refugees/2552

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Pell) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1940.

MR. WELLES: After the meeting⁶⁹ I arranged a luncheon which included M. Van Zeeland, McDonald, Warren, Hart and Mr. Coulon (who is M. Berenger's alternate on the Intergovernmental Committee).

Mr. Coulon explained in some detail the extent of the present problem in France. He said that most if not all the German and Jewish refugees from Paris have been successful in reaching unoccupied territory. Most of these were in hiding because of the fear that

⁶⁹ Presumably meeting of the President's Advisory Committee.

the Pétain Government would, under the Armistice agreement,⁷⁰ turn them over to the Germans. There were however many thousands of the less prominent Jewish and German refugees who were living openly in Marseilles and in the South of France. Most of the Spanish refugees had been drafted into French industry and with the collapse they had made their way for the most part to the unoccupied districts and were wandering loose at the present moment. Many non-Spanish refugees, notably Belgian and Dutch and former Austrians, were making their way to Spanish territory and of course a great many had arrived in Portugal. Mr. Coulon said that the hardship was very great and that the problem, from the standpoint of the French Government, was desperate. Mr. Coulon said that most of the old civil service, notably in the Ministry of the Interior, was intact and he was certain that the subordinate officers, despite the change of regime, would facilitate the task, to the best of their ability, of those wishing to help the refugees.

Mr. van Zeeland confirmed Mr. Coulon's information and said that time was of the essence of the situation. It was a moment for action not talk.

Mr. McDonald told Mr. van Zeeland of the meeting with the Acting Secretary and the decision to entrust the President's Advisory Committee with the responsibility of submitting names of political refugees to the Department. Mr. McDonald observed that Mr. Warren could not do this work single-handed and wondered if Mr. van Zeeland could be helpful in this respect. Mr. van Zeeland said that he would take the matter up immediately with his board and he was sure that funds would be forthcoming for the employment of a staff to support Mr. Warren.

After further consideration of the problem it was decided that Mr. van Zeeland would concentrate his efforts on blue-printing the situation as to the numbers of refugees, the means of transportation and the possible places of refuge outside of Europe. He would consult Mr. Basil Harris⁷¹ and others on the question of transportation at once.

840.48 Refugees/2237a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1940—4 p. m.

357. Solomon Trone, representing the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, will visit Vichy in the near future for the purpose

⁷⁰ Armistice Between France and Germany, signed June 22, 1940; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, document No. 523, p. 671.

⁷¹ Member of President's Advisory Committee; vice president, International Mercantile Marine Co.

of expediting the departure of settlers for Sosua in the Dominican Republic and arranging the passage of others now in Switzerland. This settlement is being conducted under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Committee in furtherance of the President's Evian program. Please extend to Mr. Trone such assistance as may be practicable and appropriate.

HULL

811.111 Refugees/260

The Minister in Portugal (Pell) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

LISBON, September 6, 1940.

[Received September 10.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have either met or heard of many cases of deserving persons who I feel could and would contribute to the good of the United States and I am in sympathy with the purpose of "The President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees". I believe that a committee of this kind can be of great assistance in recommending special consideration to deserving cases. I feel it my duty to tell you, however, that in practice this system and the system by which the Department is passing on visa cases in conjunction with the Department of Justice as outlined in telegraphic instruction No. 186 of July 26, 11 p. m.,⁷² is not working out with the results which it was originally intended to achieve. In the opinion of all of us here in the Legation and Consulate General it is resulting in visas being granted in many cases to the least desirable element and those against whom there is evident ground for doubt. Desirable individuals presenting themselves at the Consulate are often unable to qualify for visas since they do not have organizations to push their cases in America. Incidentally I regret to say that some of the most active organizations pushing immigration cases are racial.

I fully realize that today we face a special situation in which our traditional policy of granting entry into America to political refugees is necessarily involved despite our strict immigration laws. Nevertheless I venture to recommend that, if practicable, instruction No. 186 of July 26, 11 PM., be modified and that the Consulate General here be instructed again to act in accordance with the instructions contained in the telegrams of June 5, 6 PM., and June 29, 1 PM.,⁷³ and in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act. Furthermore I beg to suggest that the appropriate officers of the Department should inves-

⁷² See footnote 68, p. 233.

⁷³ *Ante*, pp. 228 and 231, respectively.

tigate this matter as the Consulate is now being urged to consider the cases of certain individuals against whom there are good reasons to have the greatest doubt, although proof is not readily available, and of others who have left France, Belgium, Holland, Austria and Czechoslovakia probably as agents of the German Government.

In a number of cases visas have been refused to applicants either because there were no quota numbers available or because they had not submitted any corroboratory evidence regarding their previous activities. Subsequent to the refusal many of these persons have been able to make arrangements through organizations in the United States to have their names put on special lists for favorable consideration. They have then appeared at the Consulate General to demand that a visa be issued and often say openly that they have been able to overcome the restrictive provisions of the immigration laws. In many cases the applicants have boasted when they were first refused that they were in a position to make arrangements to have orders come from the Department to grant visas to them.

This situation has made it very difficult if not impossible to maintain any consistent policy and it has been embarrassing to the officers who have tried to put into effect the Department's announced policy and to protect the interests of the United States. I, therefore, offer as a suggestion that, in accordance with the law, instructions be given to the Consulate so that the burden of proof be placed on the applicants to show what activities they were engaged in prior to departing from their own countries and what activities they propose to engage in if they are admitted to the United States. Considering that it is possible that many of the persons now applying may not always have acted in the best interests of their own countries, I believe that it would be in the best interests of the United States to demand such proof.

In any event I believe that the problem should receive immediate consideration. The matter is already a subject of general Lisbon gossip and may become an open scandal. Those desirous of visas congregate and talk. It is openly and frequently said that the Consulate can be overruled by anyone able to use influence in the United States and it is suggested that this influence is purchased.

Many have come to the Legation and in spite of my explanation that the whole business of passports is the Consul's affair and not mine, have threatened me with reprisals and asserted that they had sufficiently powerful friends to get special instructions issued which were quite frequently forthcoming. The American colony is incensed as are the local representatives of American newspapers.

Respectfully yours,

HERBERT C. PELL

811.111 Refugees/260

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to President Roosevelt*⁷⁴

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Secretary Hull has asked me to present to you the proposal to modify slightly the procedure we have followed in regard to recommendations from the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.

Under the system that has been in operation since July 26 the Committee has satisfied itself as to various persons who were in the category of "political, intellectual or other refugees" in special peril in Europe. Having come to its own conclusion the Committee has recommended names. Their list is sent to the Department of Justice for checking against the files in that Department, and the list is then checked against our own records in order to determine whether or not there is any information in this country to indicate that the persons recommended would be undesirable as residents. Under the procedure we have then cabled to our officers abroad more or less mandatory instructions to grant visas to those persons.

There has come to the attention of the Department substantial evidence to indicate that a number of the persons who have been passed in this manner have had records of activity abroad which indicate that their activities here would not be in entire accord with our policy and that for other reasons they were not properly within the category of intellectual leaders of the liberal movement in Europe and in imminent danger. It is reported to us that there are a number of persons who our officers abroad feel are not of the desirable element and against whom there is evident ground for doubt as to the propriety of their admissibility.

For instance, a German citizen recommended by the President's Committee who had resided in Paris for sixteen years was suspect to our officers because of various circumstances in her past activity. The question was raised as to whether she would be able to proceed to any country outside of the United States at the expiration of the temporary visitor's visa. She shortly returned to the Consulate with a letter from the German Legation in Lisbon stating that she would be able to return to Germany at the end of the period. On the face of it she was either not a refugee and in imminent danger or she was acting in the interests of the German Government.

Another instance was that of two French citizens who were recommended by the Committee and sponsored by substantial banking houses in this country. Under the existing procedure they obtained their visas in spite of the fact that certain documents which they ordinarily should

⁷⁴ Returned by the President with the notation: "OK."

have had were lacking. It subsequently appeared that their interests were in two Panamerican holding companies which it might be suggested were formed to avoid American legal requirements and control by the S. E. C.⁷⁵

These are simply two of a number of instances which have been brought to the attention of the Department.

Under the circumstances we feel that in the interests of our national defense a more careful check should be made abroad by our officers in Europe of the persons whose names we send to them on the recommendation of the President's Advisory Committee. We feel that a more careful examination of the individuals abroad would contribute largely to closing the loopholes against the penetration of German agents or the use of the courtesy and hospitality of the United States for ulterior purposes.

I am attaching a letter ⁷⁶ drafted for the signature of the Secretary addressed to Mr. McDonald, Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, indicating the change of procedure which the Department feels it desirable and advisable to adopt. The Secretary felt that you should be cognizant of it and, if you agree, give the matter contained in the letter your approval in as much as it was directed to the members of your Committee.

In closing may I say that since July 26 and up to September 17 we have authorized 2,583 visas over and above the quota (not including visas granted to children in Great Britain). This number was largely made up of:

a) A list of the American Federation of Labor, guaranteed by William Green, and consisting of labor leaders and their families to the number of 1,131. This list has been closed, and Mr. Green will not ask for any more.

b) Two lists of Jewish Rabbis, alleged leaders of the intellectual thought of the Jewish religion and leading exponents of the Talmudic schools and colleges together with their families. One list consisted of 156 and another of 576 names. These lists have been closed and no further names are to be accepted.

c) The President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees has submitted 561. These names are being augmented by a considerable number every week.

Considering that the other lists have been closed and that by this time most of the outstanding leaders of the liberal movement in Europe must have had their names on one or the other of these lists, it seems to us reasonable and desirable that the list of the President's Advisory Committee be closed for unlimited recommendation—except that names of refugees in imminent danger who are intellectual leaders of

⁷⁵ Securities and Exchange Commission.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

the liberal movement in Europe may continue to be presented by the Committee. This would continue the function of the Committee to pass upon outstanding intellectual refugees. Other refugees would apply in the usual manner to our Consuls, and the usual precaution would be taken in the future.

It seems that our Consular officers abroad who are on the ground and who have access to information which we do not have and who come in contact with the persons should be able to exercise their judgment as to whether or not the person desiring to come to the United States is, as a matter of fact, within the category you had in mind in setting up the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.

In brief, it seems to us that there should be in the future some latitude of judgment left to our Consular officers abroad rather than to send them mandatory instructions from here to admit persons who are known to very few people in this country and about whom there is no record here of their past activity.

If you approve the proposal, I shall be very glad to advise the Secretary so that he may sign the letter.

Faithfully yours,

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

811.111 Refugees/260 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers ¹⁷

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1940—7 p. m.

Refer to Department's circular telegrams of June 5, 6 p. m.; June 29, 1 p. m.; and July 26, 11 p. m.

To correct any misunderstanding regarding visa work, all visa applications should be carefully examined and if any doubt exists regarding alien's activities in the past and possible activities in the United States which might be inimical to the United States, action in the case should be suspended and the alien should be requested to present clear evidence to establish essential facts. In considering lists of alien refugees transmitted by Department with assurances of the sponsoring organization regarding support and arrangements to proceed to third country, you should carefully examine cases as to applicants' past and future activities and as to aliens' status as refugee intellectuals or labor leaders or refugees in particular danger of their lives, and if any doubt exists action in the cases should be suspended.

HULL

¹⁷ Sent to the diplomatic officers at Lisbon, London, Moscow, and Stockholm, and to consular officers at Bordeaux, Lyon, Marseille, Nice, Casablanca, Oporto, and Zurich.

840.48 Refugees/2266 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Haiti (Mayer)

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1940—7 p. m.

157. Your despatch no. 1011, September 18,⁷⁸ particularly the first paragraph on page 5. The Department desires you to discourage at every opportunity and in a manner which can leave no doubt in President Vincent's mind all projects for bringing additional European refugees to Haiti under the circumstances that have prevailed in the past. It has been evident for some time that the Haitian Government possesses very limited facilities for judging the political connections of such refugees or of determining their financial status.

The position of this Government, which has been communicated on numerous occasions to the Haitian Minister in Washington and, it is thought, by your Legation to President Vincent, is that existing conditions in Haiti hardly warrant the migration to that country of additional European refugees. The Department therefore would deplore further interest by the Haitian Government in the admission of refugees among whose numbers will doubtless be found elements prejudicial to the safety of the Republic of Haiti and this country, while at the same time ineffective measures are taken in Haiti to deal with the subversive activities which are reputedly engaged in there by these migrants.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/2273

The Chargé in Haiti (Sparks) to the Secretary of State

No. 1040

PORT-AU-PRINCE, October 2, 1940.

[Received October 7.]

SIR: In connection with the Department's telegram No. 157 of September 30, 7 p. m., 1940, directing that I discourage all projects for bringing additional refugees to Haiti, I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1016 of September 23, 1940,⁷⁸ reporting a conversation with President Vincent relative to a scheme for the entry into Haiti of one hundred refugee families. It will be noted that I employed every argument to convince him that a scheme of the nature he described was not in the interest of Haiti or Hemisphere Defense, and that it could not be viewed with favor by the American Government. While I felt that I did convince him, it seemed desirable that I should be instructed to say that the plan, after being considered by the Department, had been disapproved, and I requested instructions in that sense.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

The Department's telegraphic instruction of September 30 provides the authority I requested and I conveyed the views expressed therein to President Vincent this morning. During the course of the conversation I made the following points: One, all refugees from Germany are at most only anti-Hitler; two, pressure can be exerted on those still having property in Germany to do the bidding of the German Government; three, further pressure can be brought to bear on them through acts or threats against their relatives still in Germany; four, German agents have been sent out in the guise of refugees; five, since few refugees succeeded in removing their capital from Germany, those well supplied with funds should be regarded with even greater suspicion; and, six, the means available to the Haitian Government for investigating their political and financial antecedents appear to be limited. Therefore, we regard these refugees as suspects and cannot view with approval their migration from place to place. I added that since my Government is spending in excess of twelve billion dollars for the defense of the United States, and the Western Hemisphere, it would be unreasonable to expect that we would view without concern the uncontrolled movement of alien suspects.

President Vincent appeared finally to be convinced, but he observed that he could not understand how the American Government permitted additional refugees to enter the United States where there are already so many. I explained that the large number of refugees already in the United States was due to our humanitarian approach to the refugee problem. However, during the past few months as a result of international developments and our knowledge of Fifth Column activities, our policy had changed and it is now incumbent upon American Consular officers to require every alien desiring to enter the United States to demonstrate that his presence there will not be contrary to the public interest. In addition, we have taken measures to insure completely the control of these aliens after their arrival in the United States.

President Vincent also exhibited a lack of comprehension of the statements contained in the letter that Mr. Pell addressed to Harry E. Pendleton of Chicago, Illinois, on August 23, 1940,⁸⁰ to the effect that "this Government cannot intervene with any Government in respect of the admission into the territory of that Government of immigrants for settlement. Each Government, in its sovereign right, must determine what persons shall and what persons shall not be received under its immigration laws and practices". As pointed out in my despatch No. 1016 of September 23, 1940, Mr. Salmon⁸¹ seized upon these statements of our policy and emphasized to President Vincent

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ George H. Salmon, Haitian Consul General at Chicago.

that the Department of State had expressed itself definitely as having no concern in the matter and, therefore, the only thing remaining to do was to insure that each individual refugee was not pro-Nazi, pro-Fascist or Communist. I explained that it was quite natural that the Department should thus limit itself in the statement made to Mr. Pendleton, since the American Government had already made known its views on this subject to the Haitian Legation in Washington and that it was now reiterating those views, through my intermediary, to the President of Haiti.

President Vincent may now desist from further action looking toward the entry of the one hundred refugee families, but it is feared that, because of the financial gains involved, this will be a recurring problem in one form or another.

Respectfully yours,

EDWARD J. SPARKS

840.48 Refugees/2305a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1940—7 p. m.

3510. You may, at the request to us of interested Jewish groups in the United States, make a *pro forma* inquiry of the Foreign Office as to the veracity of reports which have been received by Jewish circles from Syria to the effect that the British authorities in Palestine will not permit 1700 refugees of German and Austrian origin to land from a Greek ship now off the Palestine Coast and are suggesting that they proceed to Mauretius.

WELLES

840.48 Refugees/2317

The French Ambassador (Henry-Haye) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

The recent arrival of several thousand Israelites expelled from Germany in the zone of French territory which is not subject to German authority has considerably increased the difficulties of a demographic order which the French Government has to face.

These refugees have come, indeed, to join the three and one-half million aliens who have found asylum in France in the course of recent years. (White Russians, Assyro-Chaldeans, Armenians, Jews, people from the Saar, Germans, Austrians, Czechoslovaks, Spaniards and Poles).

The effort thus accomplished by France has created for her a situation which was already grave before the opening of hostilities and which today appears in a form of extreme acuteness. The war has, as

a matter of fact, brought about movements of population which have resulted in the grouping in the free zone of all the foreign elements residing in France. The problem of supplying them with food has thus become particularly difficult to solve.

The French Government hopes to be able to count upon the assistance of other States to aid it in solving the problem which is of concern to the community of nations. Only a fairer distribution of the foreign refugees, particularly of the Israelites, among the different countries will facilitate the settlement of the problem.

The Inter-Governmental Committee which, on the initiative of the President of the United States, met at Evian in July 1938, was able to establish, in the course of its work, that aside from the United States, several States of Central and South America were in a position to receive a very considerable number of refugees.

In the present impossibility of calling the Inter-Governmental Committee together again, the French Government would like to be able, taking as a basis the Evian deliberations, to study with the United States Government means calculated to permit the emigration to the American continent of foreign nationals, principally of German nationality, now settled on French territory.

The Ambassador of France has the honor to bring these considerations to the knowledge of His Excellency the Secretary of State, while expressing the desire to be informed of the views of the United States Government on the matter. He wishes to state that the French Government has refrained from any steps directed toward the other American Governments, thinking that it pertains to the Government of the United States, if it deems it apropos, to lay the question before them through the channel of a Pan American Conference or any other means suitable to it.

Mr. Henry-Haye is happy to avail himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable Cordell Hull the assurances of his very high consideration.

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1940.

840.48 Refugees/2381a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1940—9 p. m.

3768. For Achilles. Please tell Lord Winterton and Sir Herbert Emerson that a full dress meeting will be held on January 30, 1941, in the Dominican Republic to celebrate the anniversary of the signing of the contract between the Dominican Government and the Settle-

ment Association. The Governments members of the Intergovernmental Committee will be represented. Van Zeeland and Warren will be among those present and messages from the most prominent personalities associated with the development of the Evian program will be read. It is hoped that Winterton and Emerson will send messages and that they will agree that Wagg⁸² may represent the Intergovernmental Committee on this occasion. Mr. Myron Taylor concurs.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/2317

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*⁸³

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose the text of a note which has been received from the French Embassy⁸⁴ asking the assistance of this Government in (1) removing the German Jewish refugees recently forced by the German authorities into French unoccupied territory from Baden and Wurttemberg and (2) enlisting the support of the other American Governments in the "more equitable distribution" of these people.

I attach also a text of a reply⁸⁵ which, if it meets with your approval, I propose to send to the French Ambassador. This memorandum, in a brief word, stresses that this Government and the other American Governments are doing the maximum under their respective laws and practices to relieve the pressure of refugees in Europe, points out that the French Government has not always cooperated in the realization of this task and rejects, while leaving the door open for calm discussion of the problems of migration and resettlement when conditions warrant in the future, the French proposal for bilateral or multilateral discussions of these problems.

It is my view that the French in making this *démarche* are acting under German pressure. Reports have reached the Department for some time through the Coordinating Foundation and other channels that the Germans were preparing to force our hand on the refugee problem. The first step was the despatch to French unoccupied territory of more than ten thousand German Jews of all ages, from a baby of two days to a woman over one hundred years old, without any advance provision for their support or consideration of the hardship caused to them or to France. The second step is this note.

It seems clear to me that this is a repetition of the tactics followed by the Germans in 1937 and 1938 when they forced Jews in the dead

⁸² Alfred Wagg, Secretary of the Intergovernmental Committee.

⁸³ Returned by the President with the notation: "OK."

⁸⁴ *Ante*, p. 243.

⁸⁵ *Infra*.

of night across various points on the Netherlands, Belgian, Swiss and French frontiers. Wherever they found a weak point they would repeat the process in the following nights, but instead of forcing through groups of ten or twenty they would drive, at gun's point, hundreds of people, then many hundreds, through the breach, increasing the number nightly as long as the breach remained. Now the process is being repeated on a larger scale and the attack is on the Western Hemisphere. Were we to yield to this pressure all the evidence indicates that in the wake of the ten thousand Jews recently forced into France the Germans would drive on the French the remaining Jews from Germany and the occupied territories, hundreds of thousands of persons, in the expectation that the French in turn would persuade this country and the other American countries to receive them.

I am sure that you will agree with me that we must think above all of the tragic victims of the German measures. Information reaching us is conclusive that if we or the other American Republics yield to these blackmailing totalitarian tactics the Germans will inaugurate something approaching a "reign of terror" against the Jewish people, not only those remaining in Germany but those as well in countries under occupation or which may be occupied in the future. Thus hundreds of thousands of unhappy people will be dispossessed of their homes and their goods to be used as pawns in a German maneuver calculated to embroil opinion in the democratic countries overseas.

For this reason I have stressed in the enclosed note to the French Ambassador that an approach on this question must ultimately be made through the Intergovernmental Committee in which both this and the French Governments participate.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

840.48 Refugees/2317

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Henry-Haye)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note of November 25, 1940 requesting the assistance of the Government of the United States of America in the solution of the problem of refugees, primarily those of German origin, now in unoccupied France.

[Here follows summary of the French Ambassador's note of November 25, printed on page 243.]

5. While this Government appreciates the serious predicament in which the French Government finds itself as a consequence of the forced migration in mass of German nationals to French territory

and while it is disposed to assist in solving the refugee problem to the full extent of the existing laws and practices of this country it believes that, in order that there may be no misunderstanding of its position, it is desirable to reiterate on this occasion the basic principles underlying President Roosevelt's invitation of March, 1938⁸⁶ to the American Governments and others to consult on ways and means of relieving the pressure brought to bear on all countries by the chaotic unregulated migration from Germany and the countries under its control of German citizens who for political, racial or religious reasons were regarded by the German Government as undesirable. The basic principles enunciated at that time and which were accepted as fundamental by the Intergovernmental Committee throughout its sessions and are controlling in the relations in respect to migration between this Government and the other American Governments are (a) that no distinctions shall be made between refugees on grounds of race, nationality or religion; (b) that no country shall be asked or expected to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by prevailing practices and existing laws.

6. In other words the fundamental principles on which action looking to the orderly migration of numbers of people to the Western Hemisphere have been and continue to be founded are (a) equality of treatment in the resettlement of refugees from Europe of all races, nationalities and creeds; (b) full respect for the sovereign rights of the immigration states in regulating migration currents according to their individual interests and in strict accordance with their respective laws.

7. At no time in its deliberations has the Intergovernmental Committee admitted the possibility that a distinction can be drawn between one and another category of refugees.

8. It has been recognized throughout the intergovernmental discussions that the right of determining the type and extent of immigration into a given country cannot be delegated to any outside authority. Moreover, it has been made plain repeatedly that this Government would not wish to suggest or be party to any international action which might be interpreted as placing pressure on any Government or Governments to take action in the field of migration contrary to or irreconcilable with their practices and laws.

9. Subject to these considerations and the added fact that the laws of the United States regarding immigration are quite explicit and do not permit of any further liberalization this Government is prepared to make and is making every consistent effort to contribute effectively to relieve the pressure caused by the overconcentration of refugees in

⁸⁶ See telegram No. 1, March 23, 1938, 1 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, p. 740.

certain countries, including France. A maximum number of persons who can fulfill the requirements is being received in this country under the present quotas established by American law and in addition very many persons are being admitted permanently to the territory of the Philippine Commonwealth and temporarily to American territory as visitors or in transit to other countries.

10. It is noted in this connection that many persons who have fulfilled the requirements for admission to the United States and have received visas have not been able to leave French territory owing to the fact that the French Government has been unwilling or has failed to grant the required exit permits with the consequence that these persons have not been able to proceed to the United States and remain on French territory where they must be cared for and fed.

11. It is the impression of this Government, moreover, that the other American Governments are likewise receiving persons in substantial numbers who can qualify for admission to their respective territories under their laws and practices and that persons qualifying for admission to these other American countries have, too, encountered difficulties in receiving exit permits from the French Government and, as a consequence, remain to be cared for and fed on French territory.

Finally, reference should be made to the fact that in addition to the persons who are being received in various American countries by infiltration, settlers who can fulfill certain specified requirements are being admitted in increasing numbers to the settlement established upon the invitation of the Dominican Government, under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Committee and at the direction of an American association at Sosua, in the Dominican Republic. These persons who are carefully selected in Europe by an agent of the Dominican Republic Settlement Association have also in many instances failed to receive the necessary permission of the French authorities to leave and remain to be supported in France.

12. The basic aim of the action undertaken by this Government through the Intergovernmental Committee and otherwise has been to bring order out of chaos in the migration of persons driven from their countries or countries of origin who must be resettled elsewhere. In fulfilling this aim the American Government has made it clear from the outset that it could not support or be party to any measures which would encourage the spread from points outside the Western Hemisphere to the Western Hemisphere of forced migration in which people in great numbers are intended to be driven anarchically upon the receiving states with unhappy consequences to the economic and social equilibrium of all. To permit the spread of this condition to the Western Hemisphere would be to impede not promote the solution of a problem which ultimately must be settled in an orderly manner and in

calm consultation by Governments of countries where there is said to be overpopulation, Governments of countries of temporary reception and Governments of countries of final settlement.

13. Accordingly, while this Government holds the view that the time will come when such conditions of order and peace will prevail in the world as will warrant a humane and orderly approach to the migration problem by the Governments collaborating in mutual confidence and mutual respect, it does not believe that any useful purpose can be served by discussing migration problems bilaterally with the French Government or multilaterally with the several Governments at this time. Present world conditions operate to cause governments in many instances to forego the free exercise of their authority and the essential requirements for a constructive solution of the fundamental problems of migration and resettlement do not prevail.

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1940.

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES

I. PLANS TO ACQUIRE ADEQUATE STOCKPILES OF STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS AND TO PROHIBIT THEIR EXPORT¹

811.24 Raw Materials/533

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to bring to your attention the enclosed statement approved unanimously by the members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic Materials with respect to appropriations for the purchase of reserve stocks of strategic materials under the authority of the Act approved June 7, 1939.²

In view of the present world situation, I have no hesitation in commending the statement and recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee. It is my judgment that there should be no unnecessary delay in acquiring minimum reserve stocks of those materials, essential to American industry and the national defense, which would be most difficult to secure from abroad in the event that warfare is extended or intensified.

The problems now faced by industry in securing adequate supplies of essential raw materials, and the prospect of even greater difficulties as the war continues, indicate the urgency of prompt action.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

Statement by the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic Materials Regarding Appropriations for the Purchase of Reserve Stocks of Strategic Materials

1. The Act approved June 7, 1939 (Public No. 117, 76th Congress) authorized to be appropriated, for the purchase of reserve stocks of strategic materials, the sum of \$100,000,000 during the fiscal years June 30, 1939 to June 30, 1943.

¹ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 848 ff.
² 53 Stat. 811.

2. With the approval of the President and the Budget Bureau, the budget estimate for the Treasury Department for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1939 included an item of \$25,000,000 for this purpose. This sum was cut to \$10,000,000 by the appropriation committees of the two houses of Congress however and only that amount was appropriated.

3. Approximately \$8,000,000 of this sum was obligated by the end of December and it is anticipated that the entire amount will be obligated by the end of January, 1940.

4. Much could be said in favor of the immediate appropriation of the entire remaining portion (\$90,000,000) of the authorized total of \$100,000,000. The Committee believes it highly advisable that Congress be requested to appropriate at least an additional \$40,000,000, preferably \$15,000,000 as a deficiency appropriation to be made available immediately and \$25,000,000 for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1940. The considerations which, in the opinion of the Committee, strongly indicate the desirability of at least this minimum immediate program are, briefly:

(a) Due to the present heavy production schedules, commercial stocks in this country of many vital raw materials are now considerably below normal.

(b) In the case of many materials American industry is experiencing difficulty in securing sufficient supplies to make possible the reaccumulation of stocks; releases of materials from foreign sources of supply have quite generally been limited to the point where only current consumption requirements in this country can be met, at least without serious price increase.

(c) The difficulties in supply and transportation following the outbreak of war have now largely disappeared and prices on most materials have receded. Judging from the experience of the World War however, difficulties in both supply and transportation and high prices are likely to be encountered in the case of many strategic materials if the present war continues and increases in intensity. If this Government does not accumulate minimum reserve stocks of strategic materials as rapidly as possible, it may quite possibly be faced with much higher prices and perhaps the impossibility of securing the necessary supplies, either because they may be cut off at the source or shipping may be interrupted.

(d) Should unlimited warfare on sea and in the air develop, the possession of a reserve of essential materials might prove to be of vital importance to this country, not only in support of the national defense, but also as a means of strengthening a policy of neutrality.

(e) The use of funds for the purchase of these materials at this time should be looked upon as an investment and not an expenditure. It will always be possible to turn the materials into cash, and in the event of an emergency they will be worth much more than their cost.

- DR. HERBERT FEIS, *Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Department of State, Chairman;*
CAPTAIN H. E. COLLINS, *Director, Procurement Division, Treasury Department;*
COLONEL HARRY K. RUTHERFORD, *Director, Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War;*
COMMANDER A. B. ANDERSON, *Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department;*
MR. JAMES W. FURNESS, *Chief of Branch and Chief Engineer, Metal Economics Division, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior;*
MR. JAMES W. YOUNG, *Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce.*

811.24 Raw Materials/5461

Joint Statement Released by the Army and Navy Munitions Board on Exports of Essential Raw Materials, January 19, 1940

In view of recent activities involving the export of certain strategic materials, the Honorable Charles Edison, Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War, authorized today the following statement by the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

"On October 11, 1939, the Army and Navy Munitions Board in an official release³ called attention to the possibility that abnormal exports of certain materials classified as strategic might weaken the national defense position of the United States with respect to such materials in spite of the best efforts of the Government to assure an adequate supply of these commodities.

"While there has been a cessation of abnormal exports of some deficiency materials since that statement, the situation in regard to others has become more difficult.

"In the case of crude rubber, for example, there is evidence of a strong demand for unusual exports, especially to European nations. Furthermore the greatly increased re-export of pig tin from the United States to European nations has in the past few weeks become a matter of much concern.

"While the more patriotic and responsible dealers and manufacturers in the United States are cooperating with the Army and Navy Munitions Board in its effort to maintain an adequate supply of these materials in the United States, others, apparently through a lack of appreciation of the situation, or for other reasons, are continuing to engage in export activities detrimental both to the industrial economy of the Nation and to the national defense.

"The War and Navy Departments believe that unless the method of voluntary cooperation can be counted upon to operate with complete effectiveness it will become necessary to use other means to deal with the situation which has developed with respect to the export of crude rubber and tin."

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 855.

811.24 Raw Materials/717

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of January 15, 1940, enclosing a statement by the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic Materials, recommending the earliest possible procurement of minimum reserve stocks of materials essential to American industry and national defense, which would be most difficult to procure from abroad in the event that the war in Europe is intensified or extended.

After most careful consideration of all the financial needs confronting us, particularly those of national defense, I felt that \$15,000,000 would permit reasonable progress during the next year in building up our stocks of these essential materials and that we could hardly afford a heavier immediate expenditure for this purpose. Accordingly, I recommended an appropriation in this amount in the 1941 Budget.

The 1941 Treasury Department Appropriation Bill, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee and as passed by the House, reduced the amount for strategic materials to \$12,500,000, thus indicating an unwillingness to proceed even as rapidly as the original Budget estimate would permit. However, under date of February 14, 1940, I addressed a communication to the President of the Senate requesting that the amount of \$15,000,000, originally recommended by me, be restored to the bill and that this sum be made immediately available.⁴

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

811.24 Raw Materials/963

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*⁵

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The problem of our continued supply of strategic materials has once more come to the fore because of recent developments. The materials which are of greatest concern to us at the present moment are tin and rubber, which come very largely from the Middle East, and which would be difficult to secure if hostilities broke out in that area or if there were any interruption to shipping

⁴ However, the Appropriation Act for the Treasury Department approved March 25, 1940, provided \$12,500,000 for strategic and critical materials, of which amount only \$3,000,000 was to be immediately available; 54 Stat. 55, 70.

⁵ Attached to the file is a memorandum dated May 3, 1940, for the Secretary of the Treasury from President Roosevelt stating: "Will you speak to me about this at Cabinet today?" On the margin of the memorandum is the following notation in long hand: "S. W. OK—Tell Dir. of Budget & J. Jones & H. M. Jr. F. D. R." J. Jones was Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce and Director of Federal Loan Agency; H. M., Jr., was Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

over the very long supply routes from the Netherlands Indies and British Malaya.

Rubber stocks on hand in this country would meet current consumption requirements for only three months, whereas the minimum safety level would be twelve months' stocks. We are securing 87,000 tons of rubber from the British Government for a Government reserve, but the minimum safety level of such reserves should be 250,000 tons, and commercial stocks, now at the unusually low level of 150,000 tons, should be maintained at well over 300,000 tons.

Tin on hand in this country would supply consumption requirements for a little over three months, but the War and Navy Departments estimate the minimum safety level at approximately twelve months' supply. A Government stockpile of 4,000 tons has already been purchased under the Strategic Materials Act, but this reserve should be at least 50,000 tons.

Fortunately, additional supplies of both rubber and tin will be available from the primary sources of supply over the next few months. The production rate of both tin and rubber was greatly increased during the past six months in order to meet the high rate of consumption following the outbreak of the war. The consumption level has now fallen off considerably, however, and producers will have surpluses available for stock-piling.

The present situation has been carefully canvassed by the agencies charged with responsibility in this field in the various departments, and I believe you will wish to give consideration to the following suggestions which they set forth urgently:

1. Of the total amount of \$12,500,000 appropriated under the Treasury Department Appropriation Act approved March 25, 1940, for the purchase of strategic and critical materials, only \$3,000,000 was made available immediately. It is believed that the remaining \$9,500,000 should also be made available for immediate expenditure. It is the opinion of officials in the Procurement Division of the Treasury, and in the other interested Government agencies, that this amount could be expended with the best effect during the present period of slack commercial demand, and that contracts for such materials should be let without delay so that delivery can be made before there are interruptions in production or transportation.

2. It is believed that Congress should be requested to appropriate at least an additional \$12,500,000 to be made available at the beginning of the 1941 fiscal year. There is no doubt but that a much larger sum could be used to good purpose during that fiscal year, but you may consider it desirable to withhold a request for a larger amount at this time.

3. The sums mentioned above would be expended principally for tin and certain other strategic minerals. The purchase of expensive stocks of rubber would not be feasible with only such limited funds available, and it is suggested, therefore, that a formal approach be made to the British Government regarding the possibility of a fur-

ther agreement for the exchange of American agricultural surpluses for additional stocks of rubber.⁶

4. As an immediate means of bringing about an increase in the rubber stocks in this country, it is believed that the American rubber manufacturers could be encouraged greatly to increase their holdings of rubber if the Reconstruction Finance Corporation could make available to them sufficient funds to cover the major part of the cost of acquiring such additional stocks.

Is it your desire that this problem be attacked along the lines suggested? If you wish to consider the matter further before coming to a decision, I shall be glad to have additional material supplied or to arrange whatever discussion of the subject you may desire.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

811.24 Raw Materials/959

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1940.

DEAR HENRY: I have been able to secure the following information on the question raised in your inquiry of May 7, 1940,⁷ namely, as to whether anything had been heard from the Attorney General about the reexport of tin and rubber:

I understand that the Tin Trade Association, the Rubber Trade Association, and the Commodity Exchange, dealing in tin and rubber, had had under consideration the possibility of requiring clauses in contracts of sale providing that the tin or rubber sold should not be reexported in conflict with this Government's policy, but that the membership of these organizations had hesitated to adopt such a measure because of their fear that it would be contrary to the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,⁸ and that, therefore, they would be liable to either criminal or civil suits. This matter was taken up informally with the Department of Justice, and not long ago Mr. Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, advised that the Department of Justice is not able to give in advance approval to any combination or agreement in restraint of trade on the assumption that it would be reasonable and therefore legal, but that it recognizes that it is necessary to give whatever protection can be given under the law to business men who act in good faith, and he suggested procedure under which the proposed action could be brought formally to the attention of the Department of Justice.

⁶ See pp. 261 ff.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Approved July 2, 1890; 26 Stat. 209.

This Department has transmitted to the three associations mentioned above the information furnished by Mr. Thurman Arnold and invited them to place the entire matter before the Attorney General by letters transmitted through this Department, so that supporting memoranda prepared in this Department and in the War and Navy Departments might be sent to the Attorney General at the same time. The matter is now before the two trade associations and the Commodity Exchange, and presumably they will submit letters to the Attorney General shortly unless they find too much opposition to this action within their membership.

Officers in this Department who have been following this matter closely advise me that discussions and correspondence with the interested parties have brought out the fact that the formal inclusion in contracts of the proposed clauses governing reexports will be relatively ineffective as a deterrent to undesired exports, since such action would be supported by no penalty which could be enforced in the courts. Presumably, the main problem is still in securing the voluntary cooperation of all of the private interests concerned in this country, and I am told that very good progress has been made in that direction. The large exports of tin and rubber which took place soon after the outbreak of war are not continuing, and the Amtorg Corporation⁹ in particular is now finding it difficult, if not impossible, to secure either commodity in this market.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

811.24 Raw Materials/963

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1940.

DEAR HENRY: Arrangements are being completed for going forward with the proposal to ask Congress immediately to increase appropriations for the building up of reserve stocks of strategic raw materials as presented in the letter I sent the President on May 1, and which he in turn sent on to you. For convenience I am enclosing a photostat copy of this correspondence.

As a result of the meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic Raw Materials with representatives of the Bureau of the Budget and the Procurement Division of the Treasury, I understand that the Bureau of the Budget is now preparing the request for deficiency appropriation on Treasury account and appropriate accompanying letter of transmittal from the President to Congress. This is the form in which present appropriations are handled, as you might

⁹ Agency of the Soviet Government.

know. I assume that this is completely in accord with the understanding reached at the Cabinet meeting.

I am hopeful that by the combined effort of all Departments the deficiency appropriation will be awarded by Congress without delay.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

811.24 Raw Materials/964

The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1940.

DEAR SUMNER: Please accept my thanks for your letter of May 8, 1940, concerning arrangements being made to ask Congress immediately to increase appropriations for the building up of reserve stocks of strategic raw materials.

An estimate of \$12,500,000 has been included in the Treasury Deficiency Bill, which will be presented to the Budget in the near future. This estimate will be defended before the Appropriations Committee by the Procurement Division of the Treasury and assistance will be given in such defense by representatives of the Army, who are thoroughly cognizant of the uses to which the raw materials purchased will be put and the reasons for the kinds of material that are acquired.

With you, I share the hopes that the combined efforts that may be put behind this Deficiency Bill will result in the appropriation by Congress of the funds sought.

Sincerely yours,

H. MORGENTHAU, JR.

811.24 Raw Materials/964a

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to refer again to our conversation yesterday afternoon regarding the purchase of strategic materials, and to your intention to request Congress to appropriate an additional \$65,000,000 as already authorized for such purchases.

I understand that the Procurement Division of the Treasury feels that these all-important purchases could be made much more advantageously and expeditiously if the Division were free to negotiate purchases directly with the producers or in some instances, with the assistance of this Department, directly with foreign governments. This could be done by specifically freeing such purchases from the limitations of Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes,¹⁰ which requires

¹⁰ 41 U. S. C. 5.

a rather cumbersome procedure of advertising for bids. The Procurement Division also recommends certain other minor changes in existing legislation which would facilitate the purchase and storage of these materials.

Such action would seem to be eminently desirable, and I understand that the War and Navy Departments are also in agreement. If this is also your view you may wish to include a paragraph along the following lines in your national defense message to Congress:¹¹

The Congress recognized, in enacting the bill approved June 7, 1939 (Public No. 117, 76th Congress), that the acquisition of reserve stocks of strategic and critical materials is essential to the common defense of the nation. That act authorized the appropriation of a total sum of \$100,000,000 for the purchase of such materials. Of that amount only \$22,500,000 has so far been appropriated. On May 10 I transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a supplemental estimate of an appropriation, under the authorization of this act, of an additional sum of \$12,500,000 for the fiscal year 1941. When this action is taken there will still remain unappropriated, of the total amount authorized to be appropriated for this purpose, a sum of \$65,000,000. I am now submitting to the Congress a supplemental estimate for the appropriation of the full \$65,000,000 for the fiscal year 1941, together with recommendations for certain minor changes in existing legislation designed to facilitate and expedite the purchase and storage of strategic materials.

If this has your approval this Department will immediately proceed to clear the matter with the Secretary of the Treasury, and also with the Bureau of the Budget so that it can proceed with the preparation of the necessary estimates and recommendations.¹²

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/1057a

*The Chairman of the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy
(Grady) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Executive Committee on Commercial Policy has, as you know, been giving continuing and serious attention to the problem of our agricultural surpluses with particular reference to diminishing markets for these products in Europe. It has also, as have many other Departments and agencies of the Government, been concerned with the problem of acquisition of adequate supplies of strategic and critical materials.

¹¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1940, p. 529.

¹² The supplemental appropriation for national defense, approved June 26, 1940, contained an additional amount for strategic and critical materials of \$47,500,000 immediately available and provided that purchases could be made with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury without reference to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes; 54 Stat. 599, 600.

At its meeting this morning the Committee considered a report of one of its subcommittees on a possible method of dealing with both of these problems simultaneously and after discussion of the proposal, it was the consensus of the Committee that the plan be approved in principle and that such a plan could be implemented by a measure along the lines of the enclosed draft bill.¹³ Briefly, this proposal would authorize the President to enter into agreements with foreign countries providing for an exchange of not more than 3½ percent of the present gold stocks, to be taken from the stabilization fund, for an emergency reserve supply of imported strategic and critical raw materials, with the proviso that under such agreements foreign countries would be permitted to obtain title to the gold, in advance of the actual delivery of the strategic and critical raw materials, if such gold is used exclusively for the purchase of raw and manufactured agricultural products produced in and exported from the United States.

If the principle embodied in the foregoing proposal and the enclosed draft should appear desirable to you and to the Cabinet, the Committee would be glad to give some further consideration to the details of the suggested bill as well as to incorporate such changes as you or the Cabinet might consider desirable.

It is not the thought of the Committee that this suggested plan should conflict with or act as a substitute for any other plan for the speedy acquisition of strategic materials which may be under consideration.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY F. GRADY

811.24 Raw Materials/983b

The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission (Land)

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1940.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LAND: As you probably know, at the last meeting of the Cabinet decision was reached to treat the matter of the prompt acquisition of adequate supplies of strategic and critical raw materials as one of urgency and of great national importance. In accordance with the President's instructions, we are therefore working along two lines: (a) To expedite the movement into this country of such commodities as rubber and tin as may already have been bought by American interests that are awaiting shipment to this country, and (b) to develop adequate plans for the purchase of the needed supplies. As I already indicated in a previous letter, it is important that the movement of these supplies be not delayed by shortage of shipping either in

¹³ Not printed.

the immediate present or over the next few months when the larger program may come into effect. The Department will be glad to keep the Maritime Commission advised of estimates of the particular amounts of rubber and tin awaiting movement to the United States.

As of the present moment immediate effort must center on the matter of the expeditious movement of rubber and tin already in American possession to this country. For that reason inquiries have been addressed to the shipping centers in the East and the advices received I forwarded to you last week. I have now received a later report which would appear to indicate that the one point where shortage may arise in the immediate future is in regard to shipments of agreement rubber from the Netherlands East Indies. You will note that the Consul calls attention to the fact that the Isthmian Line has scheduled only one sailing for June which I understand to be less than the ordinary schedule. In our agreement with Great Britain whereby this rubber was acquired it was specified that it should be transported to this country in American ships and now the prospect that there will be only one sailing in June would appear to be a matter requiring consideration.

May I therefore ask the Maritime Commission to consider again whether in its judgment this service is adequate to carry out the policies laid down by the President. This Department must necessarily rest on the judgment of the Maritime Commission.

Sincerely yours,

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

811.24 Raw Materials/1184½

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Executive Committee
on Commercial Policy (Grady)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. GRADY: This is in reply to your letter of May 17 describing a proposal for dealing simultaneously with the problem of our agricultural surpluses and the problem of acquiring adequate supplies of strategic and critical materials. You stated that this proposal had been approved in principle by the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy.

You have probably noted that bills which substantially accomplish the objectives of the proposal you outlined have recently been favorably reported from committee in both Houses of Congress. These provisions are incorporated in the bills to amend the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act. (H. R. 9958 and S. 3938).¹⁴

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹⁴ Act approved June 25, 1940; 54 Stat. 572.

[On July 2, 1940, the President approved the May Act providing authority for the control of exports from the United States of munitions, materials, and machinery essential to national defense; 54 Stat. 712. For texts of proclamations issued during 1940 under this authority, see Department of State *Bulletin*, as follows: July 6, 1940, page 12; July 27, page 49; September 14, page 213; October 5, page 279; December 14, page 529; and December 21, page 559.]

II. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RUBBER REGULATION COMMITTEE, THROUGH THE BRITISH AND NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS, FOR ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF RUBBER¹⁵

811.24 Raw Materials/526a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1940—1 p. m.

72. The Department is giving consideration to releases of rubber that should be made by the International Committee to supply American requirements during 1940 and is carrying on a series of discussions with Mr. Viles¹⁶ and rubber manufacturers. The following is offered for your background information at the present stage and it is requested that you supply the Department with your own thoughts and suggestions and all available information as to the thinking of British Government officials and members of the International Committee regarding the matter.

It is expected that American consumption during 1940 will average at least 150,000 tons per quarter. In addition it is believed that commercial stocks (which were about 135,000 tons at the end of December) should be increased by upwards of 100,000 tons as promptly as may be done without putting pressure on prices. Since apparently there will be about 60,000 tons of agreement rubber¹⁷ to be delivered after the first quarter, it seems that there will be ample justification for an 85 percent rate of release for at least the second and third quarters, which probably would make possible an addition of approximately 40,000 tons to commercial stocks in each of those two quarters.

HULL

¹⁵ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 858-905.

¹⁶ A. L. Viles, American representative on the advisory panel of the International Rubber Regulation Committee; president of the Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc.

¹⁷ i. e., rubber to be delivered under the Anglo-American agreement for the exchange of rubber and cotton, signed June 23, 1939, Department of State Treaty Series No. 947, or 54 Stat. 1411. For correspondence concerning the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 234 ff.

811.24 Raw Materials/553 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 23, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received January 23—6:14 p. m.]

212. Department's 72, January 12, 1 p. m. In talks with the British officials concerned with rubber the Embassy has among other things emphasized the fact that American stocks dropped about 20,000 tons between the outbreak of war and the close of the year, leaving American manufacturers with only about two and a half months' supply, a fact that was disturbing to the American Government from the point of view of national safety. After discussions with Campbell,¹⁸ Figg,¹⁹ Clauson,²⁰ and Pawson,²¹ it would seem that at the present time the British Government as such has no preconception against an 85% rubber quota. On the contrary the disposition is at present favorable, although no detailed consideration has yet been given to the ensuing statistical position.

Campbell gives the impression of a beaten man as far as the Committee is concerned and it may be hard even for his own Government to induce him to get in and fight at the next meeting. In the conversation with him he kept emphasizing how the Committee had turned him down on three occasions. But Figg who is now in the Colonial Office is prepared to do "groundwork" before the meeting.

An opportunity presented itself to have a word with Clauson, who is now an Under Secretary of the Colonial Office, and he was disposed to give serious consideration to the question of instructing Campbell to use his statutory voting powers for Malaya but at the same time he pointed out that this would serve no useful purpose unless the Dutch were willing to go along and not oppose an 85% quota, that the combination of the Dutch plus the British unofficial members could block such action. Clauson informally expressed the hope that we would take suitable steps at The Hague. . . .

The meeting is scheduled for February 20 and if Viles himself can come over it would obviously be desirable. Incidentally Campbell complained that Beharrel²² has not made a forceful and adequate presentation of the consumers' case at the post-war meetings and stated that the minutes of the meetings give the impression that Beharrel has been better than in fact he was.

¹⁸ Sir John Campbell, Chairman of the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

¹⁹ Sir Clifford H. Figg, member of the Ceylon delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

²⁰ Capt. Gerard L. M. Clauson, alternate member of the Malayan delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

²¹ A. G. Pawson, Secretary of the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

²² Sir George Beharrel, British representative on the advisory panel of the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

In any case the Embassy would appreciate in any instructions given it prior to the meeting that at the same time it be accorded discretion as to whether or not the representation should be committed to writing and be of a formal or informal character. Needless to say the present attitude of the British Government is conditioned by the statistical picture at the year's end and the course of American consumption in the period prior to the meeting may prove to be an important consideration. Consequently it would be helpful if the Embassy could have as soon as available the January consumption figures and the future estimates. Incidentally the British rubber buyer²³ is now finding it difficult to obtain first quarter rubber.

Not repeated to The Hague.

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/621 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 14, 1940.

[Received February 14—2:40 p. m.]

387. The following letter has been received today from the Ministry of Supply:

"I have been discussing with Riddell the question of future purchases of barter rubber. You are of course aware that there remains about 40,000 tons still to be purchased and that he has already bought about 18,000 tons for shipment during the second quarter. There have, I believe, been considerable forward purchases, more particularly by your own manufacturers, and just at the moment Riddell is receiving relatively few new offers. Nevertheless I anticipate that he will be able to purchase substantial further amounts for shipment in the second quarter. I feel sure however that if he were to remain tied to purchasing the whole of the additional 40,000 tons by the end of June, it would have a very disturbing effect on the general stability of the market. His difficulties in buying without creating such disturbance are of course accentuated by the fact that he is limited to a narrow range of grades.

I should therefore be glad if you would raise with your Government the question of an extension of the buying period into the third quarter. This was the suggestion made when the question was first raised in my letter to Mr. Ferris²⁴ on the 10th November last (Embassy's 2329, November 10, 7 p. m.²⁵) the concentration of barter buying in the first half of the year means undue pressure on the market for the time being, followed by a market drop in the latter half of the year. This is good neither for the manufacturers nor for the producers. For this reason I suggest that we should have a wider spread of the barter buying period.

²³ John Riddell.

²⁴ Walton C. Ferris, Consul at London.

²⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 892.

I hope therefore that it will be possible to agree that Riddell should continue his present policy of buying as rapidly as possible consistent with the maintenance of the general stability of the market, but that he should be allowed to extend his buying into the third quarter so far as this may be necessary to achieve that object."

The Embassy has discussed this request and the general position with the appropriate officials of the Colonial Office. A meeting of the official and unofficial British members of the Rubber Committee is to be held tomorrow for the purpose of acquainting them with the British Government's view that the quota for the second quarter should not be reduced.²⁶ A good deal of groundwork has been done and a written commitment has been obtained from Hay ²⁷ that he will support 80 percent. Hart ²⁸ has apparently been talking of 75 percent but Campbell proposes to arrange the procedure at the forthcoming meeting of the Committee so that 80 percent will be more or less established before Hart is called upon to give his views.

In all the circumstances and particularly in view of the postponement of the cotton deliveries, the Embassy does not feel that the Ministry of Supply's request can be appropriately refused. Furthermore there is every indication that the Committee would in any case be unwilling to increase the quota beyond 80 percent. As indicated in my 337 of February 8,²⁹ Hay has committed himself in public against any increase and the British Government also feels that 80 percent is the appropriate level. In the absence of specific figures the Embassy did not comment upon this aspect of the situation, particularly as a 5 percent increase in the quota would not permit the agreement rubber purchases to be completed during the second quarter unless the American rubber manufacturers restricted their buying.

However before passing the Ministry of Supply's request to the Department, the Embassy obtained an assurance from the Colonial Office that should the Committee authorize 80 percent and should the American Government extend the period of rubber delivery through the third quarter, the British Government would promptly take steps to obtain a reconvening of the Committee if, for any reason, a shortage of rubber developed and was reflected in a sharp price increase. The Colonial Office also expressed the firm opinion that in these circum-

²⁶ In telegram No. 394, February 15, 6 p. m., the Chargé in the United Kingdom reported that at the meeting it was agreed practically without discussion that 80 percent was the appropriate quota level (811.24 Raw Materials/623).

²⁷ Sir John Hay, member of the Malayan delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

²⁸ G. H. C. Hart, head of the Netherland delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

²⁹ Not printed; it quoted a statement made by Sir John Hay at the annual meeting of one of his companies (811.24 Raw Materials/607).

stances it was clear that the purchasing of the agreement rubber could be completed during the third quarter.

A copy of this telegram has not been sent to The Hague.

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/621: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1940.

283. Your 387, February 14. This matter has been discussed in full with the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Army and Navy Munitions Board who approve the following position which you may communicate to the Ministry of Supply.

It is believed that a release of at least 80 percent for the second quarter is essential to allow the gradual reaccumulation of stocks in this country by commercial buying, in addition to delivery of agreement rubber. If such action is taken by the International Committee and if the British Government will support a quota for the third quarter sufficiently large to allow the continued gradual reaccumulation of stocks, this Government will be prepared to agree to an adjustment of the period of delivery of agreement rubber along the following lines:

1. The rubber buyer should continue his present policy of buying as rapidly as possible consistent with the maintenance of the general stability of the market.

2. It is anticipated that, with an 80-percent quota, the rubber buyer should be able to secure for delivery during the second quarter the bulk of the agreement rubber yet to be purchased, but if it becomes apparent later that the entire amount cannot be secured before the end of June without placing undue pressure on the market, then at such time the rubber buyer might announce that he would accept bids for delivery during the third quarter.

3. In any event it is desired to secure as much rubber as possible during the second quarter and this Government would not wish to agree to a proportionate "spreading" of rubber purchases over the third quarter even though as suggested such action would have the advantage of tending to stabilize production.

In conversations regarding this matter the Embassy may wish to stress the anxiety of this Government to secure agreement rubber, and to encourage reaccumulation of commercial stocks, as rapidly as possible in view of uncertainties in the international situation and the present low level of stocks here. It is regretted that this anxiety makes it impossible to agree to the suggestion frequently put forward, especially on behalf of producers, that the buying of agreement rubber should be used as a sort of balance wheel to cushion the ex-

pected decline in world demand for rubber during the last half of this year.

For your own information the Department is convinced that Viles has been very conservative in his preliminary estimates of consumption requirements in this country during the third and fourth quarters and understands that he himself expects later to be able to raise this estimate very considerably. It is understood that the estimate reflects only the certain consumption requirements in this country irrespective of business conditions; an active trade demand here or orders from abroad would require additional supplies of crude rubber.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/634 : Telegram

The Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon) to the Secretary of State

THE HAGUE, February 19, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received February 19—2:50 p. m.]

63. I yesterday received a telegram from the Embassy at London transmitting under instructions from the Department³⁰ "the necessary background for an effort to secure Dutch support for 80% for the second quarter." In the absence of Hart I took up the matter with the Foreign Minister and he at once had the Chief of the Commercial Division of the Foreign Office take it up with the Ministry of Colonies and also telephone the Dutch Legation in London; this latter official has just informed me that he now considers it likely that an 80% release will be authorized.

Repeated to London.

GORDON

800.6176/153 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 20, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received February 20—12:55 p. m.]

423. The International Rubber Regulation Committee authorized 80 percent release for the second quarter.

It may be of use for future reference that Campbell privately informed the Embassy after the meeting that in the absence of Hart, Bolderhay³¹ headed the Dutch delegation and advocated a 75 percent release. He informed Campbell prior to the meeting that he would

³⁰ Telegram No. 286, February 16, to the Chargé in the United Kingdom, not printed.

³¹ Member of the Netherland delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

do so and at Campbell's request he agreed not to vote against an 80 percent release if the other members of the Committee favored it but he insisted on stating his point of view.

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/916 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1940.

855. Department has been exploring over a period of weeks the alternative steps which might be taken immediately toward building up rubber stocks in this country.

Since manufacturers' stocks are still not much more than half of what has usually been considered "normal" they have been urged to take action and in view of the present world situation they are now in a mood to do so. The financing of such stocks was a problem but arrangements are now being made for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to assist. Details must be worked out but Viles hopes to have a fairly definite proposition to place before the International Committee at least by May 21.

In view of the uncertainty as to whether such action by manufacturers will be put into practical effect, and as to whether it would be prompt or adequate, the Department began the preliminary discussions regarding another Government agreement noted in the Department's no. 845 of May 11.³² These discussions have indicated that another deal could be worked out involving delivery to this Government of something like the same amount of rubber as involved in the present agreement. The Department is inclined now, however, to believe that it would be preferable to proceed with the rebuilding of manufacturers' stocks before further Government rubber is acquired, holding another governmental deal in reserve, to be brought forward in the event that there is any hitch in the manufacturers' plans or as a means of supplementing later the amount of rubber secured for stocks by the manufacturers.

Please inform the appropriate officials of the British Government that the United States will be prepared to acquire large additional stocks of rubber, as rapidly as they may be made available, and that some definite proposal regarding this matter will probably be ready for presentation before the International Committee meets on May 21.

³² Not printed; it contained the information that the Department had asked the British Embassy whether the British Government would be agreeable to another transaction involving the exchange of rubber for agricultural products now held by the U. S. Government; and that the British Embassy on May 8 had presented a memorandum indicating a willingness to consider such a transaction.

This will necessitate a quota, beginning with the third quarter, considerably above that necessary to meet consumption requirements and you should lay the groundwork so that the International Committee will be prepared to take such action. The Department will telegraph as much in advance of May 21 as possible regarding the quota question.

In the meantime, the Department is now preparing with the other interested agencies an instruction regarding a possible government exchange which will be telegraphed for your information within a day or two, at which time it is hoped to inform you whether to proceed or not with the active negotiation of such an agreement. In the event that the special purchase by the manufacturers should be delayed the Department would then request you to go ahead immediately with negotiations; in any event, it will be desirable to explore with the British in a tentative way the details of a government agreement, so that it could be put through with a minimum of delay.

You can assure the British authorities that it is the considered desire of this Government to keep large quantities of rubber for reserve stocks flowing into this country during the next year or more, that American interests will be in a position to acquire this rubber and hold it, and that only the details remain to be worked out if the British Government and the International Committee are prepared to cooperate.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/944b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940.

875. The primary concern of this Government and of American manufacturers is to get the maximum amount of rubber into the United States as rapidly as possible. By one means or another, we will be prepared to acquire all rubber available above consumption requirements over a considerable period of months. In the Department's opinion it is likely that this acquisition will be in the form of purchases by the rubber manufacturing industry, probably acting through a central corporation which would be prepared to take responsibility against the rubber overhanging the market since manufacturers are as anxious as producers to avoid price fluctuations. Should there be delay or difficulty in arranging this method of purchase, then this Government would be prepared to take the available rubber in exchange for American agricultural products along the general lines which will be indicated in a further telegram to be sent to

you within a few hours.³³ If the British Government is prepared in principle to enter into such an exchange arrangement, then they should feel that our willingness to take rubber in that way will serve as adequate assurance that excess rubber for stocks will be removed from the market even though definite details regarding a stock purchase by manufacturers cannot be worked out before the International Committee's meeting.

For your own information, it is quite possible that fairly large sums will be available for direct purchases of reserve stocks of rubber by this Government in the event that other methods prove to be inadequate. Nothing definite on this point can be said however until the desired appropriations are secured.

It now seems clear that this Government will wish to place before the British Government, at least by May 20, a formal request that the International Rubber Regulation Committee set the quota for the third quarter at 90 percent. This request will be based on the assumption that we will be in a position later to request that the quota for the fourth quarter be maintained at that level or above.

The details of ways in which rubber in excess of consumption requirements released by such quotas would be taken for stocks here will be ready for presentation at the earliest possible moment although almost certainly not before May 21.

The Rubber Manufacturers Association statistics for April and their latest estimates for the third and fourth quarters will be available shortly. It is understood that these conservative estimates will indicate that a 70 percent quota for the third quarter and 60 percent for the fourth would supply all the rubber required for consumption. It is quite possible that consumption will be considerably higher than that estimated but even in the event of low consumption during the rest of the year, we will want and will be in a position to take for stocks all of the excess rubber available with a 90 percent quota.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/946: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 17, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received May 17—12: 50 p. m.]

1248. The substance of your 875 of May 16 has been conveyed to the Colonial Office which immediately called a meeting of the British Government Departments concerned, following which the Embassy

³³ Telegram No. 888, May 17, not printed; it stated that the Department was not yet in a position to authorize the Ambassador to negotiate a further agreement, but it transmitted for his consideration bases for a new agreement to be used for exploratory discussions (811.24 Raw Materials/956b).

has been requested to send representative to a meeting to be held at the Colonial Office at 12 noon tomorrow May 18, at which such representatives of the Committee as Hay and Miller³⁴ will be present. Therefore it is necessary for the Embassy to receive in advance of that time any further instructions. Can I take it that your 875 constitutes a specific commitment, for instance as indicated in its second sentence.

My own feeling is that given the time element and the tide of events the discussion and conclusion in the near future of a complicated exchange of commodities arrangement is impracticable and that in effect our offer should be to ask the British Government—which to some extent in practice also means the International Rubber Regulation Committee—to [apparent omission] on the passage of appropriations which will permit of the implementation of the second sentence of your 875. However, people like Hay and Miller will immediately ask who will come in the moment that the Committee announces its quota releases and buy and what will they buy as regards grades and to what extent. If America is not in a position to immediately absorb the offerings of futures are we to ask the British Government to authorize its rubber buyer to act on our behalf. Not only are the producers on the Committee interested in the price *cum* supply situation but the British Treasury in terms of foreign exchange assets.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 18, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received May 18—9:35 a. m.]

1263. Department's 886, May 17,³⁵ and Embassy's 1248, May 17. At the meeting this forenoon besides officials of the Colonial Office, Campbell, Hay, Miller, and Rawson [*Pawson?*] were present and there was an evident desire on the part of all concerned to cooperate in the matter of making rubber available to the United States to the extent practicable and for the purposes and under the commitments defined. The following proposals evolved from the ensuing discussions: (1) that Sir John Hay be authorized by the Rubber Committee and designated by the British Government to proceed immediately to the United States to negotiate a detailed arrangement with the American Government or the corporation to be set up by it in conjunction with the American rubber industry; (2) that at the meet-

³⁴ H. Eric Miller, member of Malayan delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

³⁵ *Post*, p. 292.

ing of the Rubber Committee (and subject to the concurrence of the Dutch) an 80 percent quota to be announced for both the third and fourth quarters and licenses therefor to be issued for both quarters together.

The British representatives stated that it was their previous intention to authorize a 70 percent quota for the third quarter and 60 percent for the fourth and that consequently this would mean an addition to world stocks of 172,000 tons during the third and fourth quarters. Furthermore there are stocks available which could and would move on the issuance of such licenses.

Hay was particularly anxious that no announcement be made either by the Rubber Committee, the British or American Governments as to governmental American purchases or as to his mission. Both Hay and Miller emphasized that all heads of rubber companies had previously let their agents know that they anticipated a reduced demand during the second half of this year and if the news of this reversal of policy was broken too drastically there would be immediate competition for available labor estates "stealing tappers" for each other with the result that production itself would suffer. Hay and Miller claim that under existing labor conditions and without prior notice to effect arrangements they can produce little more than about 80 percent during the third quarter and 90 percent during the fourth quarter. They are quite prepared if the rubber is to be taken by us under suitable conditions to make every effort to increase this output. They feel that the announcement of quotas for the next 6 months will warn the industry of higher production and they are aware that reports of the discussions between the American rubber industry and the American Government will percolate through. It was of course understood that an 80 percent announcement by the Committee would be a tentative minimum pending the conclusion of Hay's mission but it was not the sense of the meeting that this would be so announced in the communiqué of May 21.

Hay and Miller were also anxious to have the position of these reserve stocks defined and, while the Embassy did not go into details, for that would fall within the province of Hay's negotiations at Washington, it used the authority contained in the Department's 875 that we "would be prepared to take responsibility against the rubber overhanging the market" and drew the analogy to the arrangements made in connection with the cotton for rubber agreement.

The Colonial Office also referred to the shipping problem and pointed out that the "cash and carry principle" must apply and that the rubber producers would assume no responsibility for ensuring that the rubber was shipped to the United States, that that must be the responsibility of the American Government. In this connection Miller pointed out that even f. o. b. rubber did not ensure cash to the producer but that

cash in go-down did. The Colonial Office expressed agreement with the view that violent price fluctuations either way ought to be avoided, that there was a good deal of discussion as to whether the issuance of 6 months' licenses at once would not have a depressing effect on the price but the consensus of the British representatives at the meeting was in the end that the demand by American rubber manufacturers plus the rubber buyers' agreement requirements, and some unspecified but presumably British Government demand, would ensure orderly marketing at 80 percent.

The Colonial Office states, in confidence, that discussions are now proceeding with the Dutch and given the changed Anglo-Dutch relations should succeed which would permit of the institution of a complete licensing system of the exports of rubber and that this mechanism should permit of a more controlled marketing of rubber in connection with any arrangements ultimately resulting with the United States.

It is important to have your comments on the above by Monday morning London time.³⁶

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/949 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1940—2 p. m.

894. Your 1263.

(1) The arrangements you report would appear to afford a basis for working out satisfactory arrangements. Department takes note of the fact that the 80 percent announcement by the Committee would be a tentative minimum pending the conclusion of Hay's mission.

(2) That mission should serve a useful purpose. Department hopes by the time he arrives the plan will be in specific and definite form but cannot be certain of this.

(3) We will make no announcement as to the Hay mission or as to our prospective purchasing program but as Embassy recognizes the discussions which are scheduled between this Government and the American rubber manufacturers are almost certain to become known.

(4) In regard to the question of the protection of the market against overhanging stocks, obviously we should want to be able to use these stocks to take care of any serious difficulties that may arise and must have freedom to do so. On the other hand of course it would be as much to the interest of the American manufacturers and Government to avoid any marked decline in the value of these stocks as it is to the producers.

HULL

³⁶ May 20.

811.24 Raw Materials/949 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1940—10 p. m.

915. Department's 894, May 18, 2 p. m. The International Rubber Regulation Committee may find it possible to release some third-quarter rubber immediately so that stocks now held in reserve on estates might be available for June shipment. The Embassy understands of course the desire here to increase shipments of rubber as rapidly as possible and will know how to proceed in this matter and whether it is desirable to press the suggestion.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/969 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, May 21, 1940.

[Received May 21—2:25 p. m.]

1308. The International Rubber Regulation Committee took the quota action indicated in the Embassy's 1263, May 18, 3 p. m. Before the meeting the Embassy put the substance of the Department's 915, May 20, 10 p. m., to the Colonial Office in the form of a query and the Committee has in its communiqué urged the governments concerned to issue as soon as possible export permits for the whole period, and the Colonial Office is supplementing this by telegrams to the various governments reinforcing the above and suggesting that shippers who anticipate permits should not be penalized. It was also stated in the communiqué that "under the scheme of regulation it is open to the Committee to revise their decisions from time to time if for any reason this should in its opinion be desirable." Sir John Hay has received the necessary authorization and is now making his plans for departure which will be passed on to the Department as soon as possible.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/1131a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1940—noon.

1277. Sir John Hay arrived a few days ago and conversations with him are now under way.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and rubber industry have formed a joint corporation to which they both contribute capital. The

prospective purchases of rubber will be financed by loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to this corporation. The current discussions are centering upon the method by which the added extra supplies can be most certainly and speedily procured and also upon the possibility of a price understanding.

Since these discussions may take some days, Sir John Hay and Jones³⁷ agreed that it would be mutually advantageous, if it is practicable, to have existing stocks of rubber estates in the East shipped immediately either to the United States or Canada. Sir John Hay has suggested to his group in London that such shipments might be consigned to him unless some other more satisfactory basis can be arranged. The thought is that full details of the purchase agreement will be worked out before the rubber actually arrives on this side.

Hay anticipates that this suggestion is now being discussed by members of the Rubber Committee and the Colonial Office.

We greatly hope that a favorable decision will be reached and such shipments commenced as early as possible. We think that if shipping should prove to be a problem we can greatly facilitate that.

We give you this for information and for such action as you may deem advisable looking towards the end of getting favorable and speedy decision.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/1132: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 20, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received June 20—12:48 p. m.]

1753. Upon receipt of your No. 1277, June 19, noon, the situation was discussed with the Colonial Office which made available Hay's telegram and the proposed reply which was drafted by the Colonial Office after consultation with Miller and Milne and which no doubt will be approved by an interdepartmental committee meeting today. As originally drafted this reply for the most part emphasized the impracticability of acting on Hay's suggestion without offering a constructive alternative suggestion. But after some discussion the draft was altered to include an offer to take the necessary steps provided the United States guaranteed a minimum price pending the conclusion of the final arrangement; this was designed to overcome the difficulty of rubber exporters being unable or unwilling to ship without some immediate monetary consideration.

³⁷ Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator; also appointed Secretary of Commerce, September 19, 1940.

The Colonial Office seems well disposed and the Embassy took occasion to emphasize that not only is quick action needed but that for the first time powers are available which permit action and that the traditional inabilities of the past should be put aside.

KENNEDY

811.20 Defense (M)/74a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1940.

1528. There follow for the Embassy's confidential information and guidance texts of the agreements signed by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and representatives of the rubber and tin industries:

[For text of the rubber contract signed June 29, 1940, see *The History of Rubber Regulation, 1934-1943*, edited by Sir Andrew McFadyen for the International Rubber Regulation Committee (London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1944), page 210. For text of the tin contract, signed June 29, 1940, see *post*, page 297.]

The new American corporations to be constituted will have suitable purchasing organization. It is part of the understanding that the Tin Committee would immediately lift the production quota to 130 percent (which is virtually unrestricted production) and would undertake to take all steps vis-à-vis the interested governments and local authorities to assure that production would attain the largest possible measure.

A similar understanding exists as regards rubber but no decision has been reached as to the exact quota to be established at the meeting on Friday. This matter is receiving immediate attention and Embassy will be further advised.

It is important that both the British and Dutch Governments clearly understand and will facilitate these arrangements which are believed to be of a generous character. We have met in full and firm form the request of the Tin and Rubber Committees that they be assured of a market at a fair price for all increased production of tin and rubber. It is now up to them to assure increase in production. In the event that the Colonial Office still is confused make it clear to them that these agreements were negotiated as a result of continuous discussion in the case of rubber between Mr. Jones, Sir John Hay, Mr. Viles and the leading American rubber manufacturers; in the case of tin, Mr. Jones, Messrs. Lowinger and Van den Broek, and leading steel manufacturers. They represent the complete agreement of all parties to the discussion.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/628: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 7, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received November 7—1: 55 p. m.]

Following from Singapore:

"November 5, 6 p. m. Malayan rubber shipments during October totaled 70,352 tons; destinations as follows: United Kingdom 10,097; United States 46,789; Europe 620; British possessions 9,576; Japan 1,414; elsewhere 1,856. In view of publication of figures by destinations I wish to repeat that such statistics are confidential and not for public dissemination. Therefore, if publication is repeated figures will no longer be available. Please caution Commerce. Present demands for rubber in excess of supplies and prices steadily increasing. Unless a larger release is forthcoming shipments during the next 2 months expected to be extremely low. Large turnover of export rights and coupons at 17¾ Straits cents per pound by sterling companies. These companies on orders from London are disposing of rights to avoid paying excess profit taxes. Rights are being purchased by medium size Asiatic estates or transferred to locally incorporated companies. Large areas of small holdings out of tapping. Although final decision has not been made government officials reluctant to release first quarter rights 1941 for shipment during fourth quarter this year as it is feared that Malaya will exceed the 5 percent allowable under control scheme. In order to overcome this situation competent authority suggests that United States Government insist that the International Committee make a retroactive release for the fourth quarter on the basis of 120 percent of basic quota or some other high figure so that article 5 of the agreement³⁸ will be effectively operative and the scheme remain in force. To obtain the desired results this announcement should be made at the next meeting of the Committee which is reportedly scheduled for next week in order that the rubber can be produced before coming holidays and the decline expected owing to winter season. Such an announcement should be accompanied by an announcement of high rate of release for first half of 1941 in order to stimulate output necessary to meet United States reserve requirements within maximum price limits. Reiterate previous telegraphic reports that value of coupons must be reduced [omission?] if production is to move upward and that high quota release over long term necessary. Such policy would result both in fair price to producers and saving to Government and manufacturers of the United States. Patton.[""]

JOHNSON

³⁸ Signed October 6, 1938, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxvii, p. 437.

811.24 Raw Materials/1361 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 12, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received November 12—6:17 p. m.]

3709. (1) The following comment has been received from the Colonial Office on Singapore's November 5, 6 p. m., which was repeated to the Department November 7:

"Very many thanks for your letter of the 7th November enclosing an extract from a telegram which you have just received from Singapore. We have discussed this question pretty often, and I feel we know each other's views fairly well. As you know, our wish is to give you all possible help in getting the rubber that you want as soon as it can be produced, provided that this is done in an orderly fashion and that the future of the industry is not prejudiced. It seems to me that the proposal to increase the quota for the fourth quarter from 90 to 120 percent in order to look after a possible small excess export from Malaya in the fourth quarter on the present basis is an extreme example of taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut. My present inclination is to give the Governor a private tip that he should send out as much rubber as he can, even if it involves a technical breach of the agreement, affably to send in the most profuse apologies afterwards. However, as you probably know, there is a meeting of the International Committee on the 19th instant, and I am passing on your letter to Campbell and Figg so that they may consider what will be the wisest course to adopt at that meeting."

(2) The International Rubber Regulation Committee is most anxious to have Hay present at its next meeting and will in fact defer the meeting if he does not arrive on time. Since the Clipper had not left New York when last news was received deferment of the meeting seems probable. The Committee has supplied the following copy of Hay's telephonic communication of November 7 and a reference to this has been made in the Embassy's reply to the Colonial Office letter quoted above:

"Despite the Committee's earlier action in releasing bigger quantities of rubber, the Rubber Reserve Company are finding it difficult to purchase any considerable quantities within the prescribed price limit and they draw the conclusion that supplies are hardly equal to demand. At a meeting on Tuesday³⁹ Mr. Jesse Jones (the Minister of Commerce and Administrator of Reconstruction⁴⁰) urged upon me the desirability of releasing rubber in such volume as will permit of the accumulation of stock within the United States at a greater rate than that stipulated for in the agreements of June and August;⁴¹

³⁹ November 5.

⁴⁰ Secretary of Commerce and Administrator of the Federal Loan Agency.

⁴¹ For text of the contract signed August 15, 1940, by the Rubber Reserve Company, see *The History of Rubber Regulation, 1934-1943*, p. 213.

he informed me that he is being subjected to increasing pressure, particularly in the form of a demand to finance projects for the production of synthetic rubber in large quantities and he feels that the most effective answer to such demand would be the possession of large stocks of physical rubber within the borders of the United States. I am of the opinion that the statement has greater significance than a good tactical argument.

I have explained to him that the Committee in deciding upon releases must have regard to the probable consequences in producing territories of an abrupt and severe drop in production, which it seems to the Committee must follow on the completion of the United States' abnormal demand. To ameliorate this situation, Mr. Jones is willing to increase the purchases of the reserve company by 100,000 tons above the amount stipulated for in the agreements of June and August, and I have received a letter from him to that effect.

In respect of this quarter I again recommend that the Committee should at once encourage not only Malaya, but also the Dutch East Indies and any other territory, to exercise their right under article 5 (1) and I am asked that in respect of the first quarter of 1941, the Committee should most seriously consider whether they cannot permit releases to the extent of 100% or as near thereto as practical of realization.

The United States estimated consumption for 1941 :

<i>Quarter</i>	<i>Long Tons</i>
1st	159,000
2nd	157,000
3rd.....	146,000
4th.....	150,000
Total	612,000

I can amplify the foregoing after my arrival, but I hope that by this message I shall be successful in giving an understanding of the situation here. My relationships with all concerned here continue to be cordial and very friendly. The present rubber situation is regarded here as an opportunity for practical cooperation between the principal countries concerned to the general advantage of all."

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/1383 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1940.

3487. Your 3709, November 12. The Department has received the following memorandum from H. J. Klossner, President of the Rubber Reserve Company :

"Mr. A. L. Viles in a telephone conversation suggested that the State Department request the Embassy to arrange a meeting in London in cooperation with the Colonial Office for the purpose of explaining our

attitude regarding the need for a greatly increased flow of rubber, or in other words, a higher quota for the first quarters of 1941 and such other steps as might be taken immediately regarding the fourth quarter of this year, particularly to invoke Clause 5 (1) of the Treaty specifying the regulatory provision of the I. R. R. C. and whatever steps may be necessary to implement this clause at once. In the interest of complete coordination and understanding we wish to emphasize that the Embassy again in cooperation with the Colonial Office might suggest to the International Rubber Regulation Committee through such channels as are normally used that it is most essential that Sir John Hay be invited to attend this meeting in his capacity as the Plenipotentiary Representative of the I. R. R. C. in negotiating the agreements with the Rubber Reserve Company and also because of his clear understanding as of today regarding the needs of the Rubber Reserve Company, the manufacturing industry in the U. S. A. and the joint aim of the company and the industry in building emergency stocks in this country. Sir John Hay booked passage on the Clipper due to leave Thursday last week. Flight postponed to Saturday to Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and probably Saturday of this week, Campbell advises meeting will await Hay's return. However Hay is safeguarding against continued delay New York, Bermuda, Azores or Lisbon wiring Campbell tonight if delay continues Committee should act immediately on recommendations Hay and Viles. In such circumstances conference should be held prior to action by the Committee and should include Chairman or such other representatives of International Committee as may be designated."

For your further information, Mr. Viles sent the following cable on November 8 to Campbell of the I. R. R. C.:

"With respect next meeting Committee situation here becoming more serious and we again emphasize our opinion in telegram 6th November that meeting not be held until Hays return. Only small quantities crude rubber available for purchase at top price range June agreement. If buying Rubber Reserve Company and industry continues normal rate quite obvious prices would so far exceed agreed range execution of agreement would be seriously hampered and perhaps nullified. Mister Jesse Jones has presented the views of our Government to Sir John Hay and as member Advisory Panel presenting opinion manufacturing industry we earnestly request favorable consideration invoking clause 5 (1) also postponing indefinitely any deduction account excess shipments we believe it is most essential that supplies come forward in quantities that will permit of industry maintaining stocks within terms of agreement between our Government and Committee therefore we ask favorable consideration of 100% quota first quarter 1941 as our consumption and purchases for first quarter and year sufficient preclude even slight danger of severe reduction in demand."

The Department has noted with satisfaction that it is the wish of the Colonial Office to give this Government all possible help in obtaining the rubber which it requires and it agrees with the proviso "that this be done in an orderly fashion". It should be clear from the

foregoing that there is no wish on the part of the Department or the Rubber Reserve Company to disturb the orderly operation of the industry. The primary concern of the Department in this matter, however, remains that of securing the rubber believed vital for our defense purposes as rapidly as possible, and the evidence suggests that this is not being done. Therefore, please do your utmost to secure the necessary action.

WELLES

811.24 Raw Materials/1375 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 15, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received November 15—4:08 p. m.]

3758. Since the Clipper on which Hay is to travel is not yet reported to have left New York it has become increasingly likely that the Rubber Committee meeting will have to be deferred for a few days. In view, however, of the possible action that the Committee may take in consequence of Hay's conversations with Secretary Jesse Jones (Embassy's telegram 3709, November 12, 7 p. m.) the earliest possible date after his arrival is already fixed. It seems very unlikely that the Committee will wish to go as far as the ideas broached in Singapore's November 5, 6 p. m., to London (repeated to Department on November 7, 7 p. m.), for the reasons indicated in the Colonial Office letter quoted in the Embassy's 3709, November 12, 7 p. m. However, some action to meet the new situation raised by the Hay-Jones conversations is likewise to be taken. Most of those concerned seem impressed with the necessity therefor and with the fact that for the time being the interests of the producers and of the American consumers nearly coincide in respect of continued production at a high level and of price stability. There is, of course, differences of opinion as to the quota levels that may be desirable and there is apt to be little support here for risky fourth quarter increase, the course that seems at this moment most likely to be followed being a quota increase to perhaps the region of 100 percent for the first quarter combined with availability of 1941 licenses immediately, thus permitting early export of substantial amounts of rubber that are or may be available in Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and Ceylon before January. This would naturally mean that no effort to dispose of 30,000 tons over exports would be in prospect until at least the second half of 1941. That much, and even more rubber—probably up to 50,000 tons—would probably be available over and above the amount that could be exported in accordance with the terms of the agreement if steps were not taken to make 1941 licenses usable in 1940.

It seems not unlikely that Hay will return with an attitude very different from that of last year and that the way is consequently open for a period of closer cooperation between the American consumers including the Rubber Reserve Company and the Committee here than seemed likely not so many months ago. There is no present basis here for a guess as to whether the Committee will act on Hay's suggestion for an increase under section 5 (1) of the rubber agreement but there is considerable opposition to that course.

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/1379 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 16, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received November 16—10:50 a. m.]

3762. Department's 3487, 15th.

1. Rubber Committee meeting postponed to Friday, November 22, which is about last date at which the action that is necessary now can be taken.

2. There was a meeting yesterday at the Colonial Office at which the whole ground was gone over with the Dutch who are described in spite of the present political situation as being still in a position to block anything they do not like. There was agreement at the meeting (a) to release the statutory extra 5 percent in the fourth quarter; (b) to fix the quota at 95 percent for the first quarter; (c) to contemplate a progressive reduction in the quota during 1941 from 95 to 85 to 75 to 65 percent, which steps would be necessary to reach in a gradual and orderly fashion the figure of 60 percent which is deemed to be the logical one for 1942. Even with the extra 100,000 tons to be purchased by the Rubber Reserve Company only 16,000 tons would remain to be purchased by it in the fourth quarter of 1941, assuming the above quota figures.

3. The Dutch delegates were apparently not easy to convince as to the necessity for even such contemplated action in the first quarter, which they are described as disliking very much but which they are recommending to Batavia out of loyalty to their allies and which will probably be accepted by Batavia on that basis.

4. The proposals stated in (1) above were the result of a compromise between the British and the Dutch. The latter hated to be rushed and the British consented to defer the meeting until Friday as their part of the compromise.

5. The figure of 95 percent for the first quarter is stated by the Colonial Office to be the highest which in fact can be produced in

view of the winter season as well as the highest with which the Dutch could be brought to agree.

6. The Rubber Reserve Company's and Viles' proposals as communicated by the Department to the Embassy will be discussed with Clauson at 11 a. m. Monday ⁴² and it is hoped that any comments the Department may wish to make upon this telegram reach the Embassy Monday morning.

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/1384 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 18, 1940.

[Received November 18—6:40 p. m.]

3779. Department's 3487, 15th.

1. There were present at the Colonial Office this morning only Clauson and Figg, and unless instructions to the contrary are received from the Department in the light of the contents of this telegram, no conference in the sense suggested by Klossner will be held. In the existing circumstances and particularly since it now appears likely that Hay will be present at the Committee meeting, it is believed to be best to leave direct contacts with the Committee in Clauson's hands.

[2.] Before this morning's meeting Klossner's memorandum quoted in the Department's 3487 was conveyed nearly textually to Clauson by letter in which the following points were stressed:

(a) the outstanding importance of the future trend in American demand for consumption and re-stocking, the strength of which was much underestimated by the Committee a year ago;

(b) the difficulty of visualizing an early return to prewar quota levels (i. e., the 60 percent for 1942 mentioned in the Embassy's No. 3762, November 16, 2 p. m.) during the continuance of the war, in view of the fact that British and American demands on the American armaments industry have doubtless not reached their peak; and

(c) the great importance of considering as tentative any advance conclusions on quota, pending the arrival of Hay with the intimate acquaintance which he now has of the present and prospective needs for rubber in the United States.

The letter concluded with a paragraph almost identical with that of the final paragraph of the Department's No. 3487.

3. The Colonial Office made it very plain that it regards the statistical case for the quota proposal mentioned in the Embassy's No. 3762, November 16, 2 p. m., as perfect.

⁴² November 18.

Reckoning the absorption in 1942 at 1,000,000 tons which would allow the United States 55,000 tons a month it estimates that a 55 percent quota would fulfill actual needs in 1942 but contemplates a 60 percent quota in that year to be on the safe side. It adds that stepping down in 10 percent jumps from 95 percent in the first quarter to 65 percent in the last quarter of 1941 the Rubber Reserve Company stocks would accumulate by the following amounts by quarters: 126,000 tons, 88,000 tons, 50,000 tons, 16,000 tons; and that total American stocks including Government stocks at the end of 1941 are estimated at 580,000 tons which would be substantially one year's supply.

Ninety, 95, and 100 percent quotas are the only three possibilities, given the fact that the Dutch are in a position to block anything over 90 percent and that the British are in a position to block anything under 90 percent (which they have every intention of doing). Of these possibilities there seems to be every prospect of 95 percent being chosen since the British wish to meet us in increasing above 90 percent and it is likely that Dutch consent will be obtained. Ninety-five percent, however, the Colonial Office regards as "the top" and it feels that 100 percent would only be "window dressing".

To the extent that 1941 rights are used during the fourth quarter of this year the amount available for export in the first quarter will be reduced, but the Colonial Office nevertheless feels that 95 percent is practicable.

4. When asked as to why, in its estimation, Hay and American spokesmen have become convinced of the need for a 100 percent quota in view of the statistical estimates above referred to, the reply was that since there is no apparent justification therefor in the probable consumption and restocking demands in the United States, such a conviction could only be attributed to fears regarding the Far Eastern situation; and in the course of a short statement on this point, it was made very clear that the Colonial Office regards the Far East as a good deal safer than it was before Taranto and also regards the British situation in the Mediterranean as generally improved by recent events.

It was also made plain that even assuming that war may come in the East, temporarily cutting off supplies by usual routes, (a) both the United Kingdom and the United States will for a time be able to live on their stocks, and (b) there will be every likelihood of the British being able to move rubber by coasting vessels around Burma and thence to Calcutta in spite of the Japanese fleet.

Consequently, on the present views of the Colonial Office, it seems unlikely that it would fall in with changes in present quota plans asked for solely on the basis of the Far Eastern situation. If those plans are to be changed, it will probably have to be as a result of a factual case brought by Hay, capable of rebutting the one summarized above.

JOHNSON

811.24 Raw Materials/1390 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1940—6 p. m.

3527. Your 3762, November 16 and 3779, November 18. In view of the information regarding the alleged attitude of the Dutch delegates, you are requested to bring to the attention of the appropriate Dutch authorities, through the American Chargé d'Affaires to the Dutch Government, the position of this Government as outlined in our 3487 of November 15.

The Rubber Reserve Company adheres to the desirability of the proposals embodied in our 3487 and is fully convinced of the necessity for such action which it is confident Hay will also confirm to the British Government and the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

WELLES

811.24 Raw Materials/1390 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, November 21, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received November 21—5 : 35 p. m.]

3811. Department's 3527.

(1) Achilles⁴³ urged on Hart this morning the position given in the Department's 3487, 15th, with particular respect to a 100 percent quota for the next quarter and the application of clause 5 (1). Emphasis was placed upon the Rubber Reserve Company's desire to accumulate stocks faster than contemplated in the June and August agreements and its difficulty in obtaining substantial quantities within the prescribed price limits. He was advised that the Department fully concurs in the desirability of an orderly purchasing program but that speed is considered essential. He was reminded of pressure for expanding production of synthetic rubber and of the unfortunate impression which might be produced were the British prepared to meet our wishes but the Dutch held out.

Hart indicated firm opposition to a 100 percent quota even though regarding it as possible of fulfillment, stating that his Government and the Dutch delegates would be forced to oppose that figure even if the British agreed to it. They would not oppose 95 percent the first quarter and 85 the second, but would prefer 90 percent for both and would themselves follow that course in administration as permitted

⁴³ Theodore C. Achilles, Third Secretary of Embassy at London.

by the International Rubber Agreement. They intend to follow the course of demand closely and might even be prepared for 90 percent in the third quarter although not now anticipating that there would be justification for such a quota.

Hart also objected in principle to the utilization of 1941 coupons during the present quarter. Although the issuance of coupons will begin shortly after the meeting it will not be far from the end of the year when their distribution is completed, and the Dutch do not wish to have them used before the end of the year. (This divergence from the preliminary position taken by the Dutch and reported in the Embassy's 3762, November 16, 2 p. m., is evidently the result of Hart's conversation with Batavia yesterday. The British Colonial Office when informed of Hart's views today reiterated the British position that the pre-issue of 1941 coupons is the only appropriate means of accelerating export under clause 5 (1) and their intention of pressing for this course at the Committee meeting in spite of Dutch opposition. The Colonial Office also referred in this connection to Clauson's letter of November 11, repeated in the Embassy's 3709, November 12 showing that the Governor at Singapore was asked some time ago to send out rubber as rapidly as possible.

Hart stated that his Government had always endeavored to meet our reasonable wishes but that they were convinced from the statistical position that a 90 percent quota for the first half of 1941 would provide all the rubber we could take. It was evident that his views were partially influenced by a rather optimistic view of the Far Eastern situation.

(2) I personally talked to Clauson before Achilles went to see Hart and he said that we had his blessing in our effort to obtain Dutch consent to the quota changes proposed. I believe that most of the opposition comes from the Dutch.

(3) It is now evident that Hay will not arrive in time for tomorrow's meeting but it seems likely that there will be an adjourned session as soon as he arrives so that the Committee may hear his views.

JOHNSON

800.6176/163 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 27, 1940—10 a. m.
[Received November 27—8:35 a. m.]

3856. The interview with Hay yesterday took place at a luncheon, which was also attended by Clauson, Campbell, Figg, and Hart.

In a most forceful presentation, Hay urged adoption of a 100 percent quota for the first quarter, as well as recourse to article 5 (1).

The latter point was the subject of very little argument, Hay appearing to be satisfied with the pre-issue of 1941 coupons, and Hart indicating that technical difficulties prevented his Government from following the British example.

Hay's argument for 100 percent based largely on impressions gathered from the leading American negotiators, particularly Secretary Jesse Jones (by whom he was evidently deeply impressed, and whom he described as a man of "sympathetic approach, understanding, large capacity and wisdom") and on what he estimates would be the probable reaction in the United States to a refusal by the Committee to accede to the American request for such a quota. He urged that the question be considered in its broad political aspects rather than solely as a technical and statistical question, and dwelt at some length upon the connection between this quota question and that of synthetic rubber.

Addressing himself particularly to Hart—who at the beginning of the conversation asserted very positively that his Government would never consent to 100 percent for the first quarter—Hay described the present situation as ticklish, in which either solution chosen [could be?] held dangerous: going to 100 percent would bring the danger of labor troubles and of a too rapid readjustment when the inevitable time came for much lower quotas; but refusing in present circumstances to go to 100 percent (which incidentally he described as a more moderate request than some of the suggestions he had heard from Washington) held dangers which seemed to him considerably greater.

It was in this context that he said that the American interest in synthetic rubber was based upon the widespread popular demand for adequate supplies of rubber and other essential raw materials in the United States. This demand has been growing rapidly in recent months, Far Eastern developments having given rise to apprehension as to future rubber supplies. Aside from the possibility of war in the Western Pacific, there were fears of interference in production, shortage of shipping space, and increasing risks at sea. Whether or not these apprehensions were well founded was, he said, immaterial; they existed in fact and resulted in pressure upon the United States Government in general and Secretary Jones and the Defense Commission in particular to see to it that adequate supplies of rubber were physically in the United States as soon as possible. If by Committee action the plantations could be induced to supply enough natural rubber to satisfy this demand well and good; if not it would have to be satisfied by recourse to stimulating synthetic rubber production. Hay cited the limitations of synthetic rubber, which he said were also appreciated by Secretary Jones and the principal companies; but he expressed the conviction that, should a nation of the power and financial resources of the United States go in for it

seriously, efforts to achieve a high synthetic production would be persisted in in spite of high costs and other difficulties, vested interests would be created which later would not easily let go, and in the end the results might be very carefully considered for the natural rubber industry.

Hay referred comparatively little to statistics, confining himself in answering Hart's observations based on final report to reiterations of his confident belief that (a) the present demand for rubber, especially in the United States, was greater than the supply, and (b) 100 percent export (as distinguished from production) in the first quarter, and probably in the last month of the fourth quarter, was practicable. (On this point all present were in agreement, in view of inclusion in the quarter of exports of rubber produced in December and January, two excellent producing months; but all also foresaw the need for quota reduction in the second quarter.)

He concluded his statement by asserting that, in the present situation, none could know for sure whether 95 or 100 percent was scientifically correct; and that even though the decision taken should happen not to be correct, 5 percent was a small thing to boggle at in view of the more important political issues involved.

There followed statements by Clauson, Campbell, and Figg each of whom committed himself to 100 percent. Clauson said that last week he had been a 95 percenter, solely because he was convinced that that was the figure calculated to produce the most rubber; but that since he was now convinced that 100 percent would be possible he had changed his mind. He had been all along in favor of giving the United States the maximum amount of rubber during the next 4 months and that, he said, was the view of the British Government. This view he attributed frankly to nonstatistical reasons, i. e., a desire to help the United States in its desire to achieve security for itself, and to play its part in the common venture in which, he said, Britain, Holland, and the United States were all involved, although in different respects and to different extents. He urged a spirit of mutual accommodation, referred to the fact that there had been no hesitation on the American part in agreeing to furnish 50 percent of its airplane production (when it might have insisted upon 45 or some other percentage), and felt that in some considerably smaller issue it was up to the Allied Governments to comply with the American request.

During all this discussion Hart interjected questions and remarks designed to support his position, and each brought a quick rejoinder from either Hay or Clauson. Hart criticized American buying policy as unreasonable and uncoordinated, whereupon Hay strongly dissented, stating that in spite of an individualistic approach by the large rubber companies, Viles had succeeded in large measure in coordinating purchases.

Hart said that there could be no rubber shortage in the United States at present because there was available in the non-Government stock rubber which the Rubber Reserve Company might acquire. Hay's reply was "not within the price range", and Campbell added that he had from the first regarded the 150,000 non-Government stock figure as too low. Hart felt that neither his Government nor the Committee was under any obligation to supply more rubber when the statistics did not show a probable demand for consumption sufficient to justify a high release; that if the demand was merely, as he supposed, to permit of the building up of stocks high enough to make the consumers temporarily independent of the producers, he saw no reason to satisfy it. Hay reminded Hart that he had gone to the United States not as a British representative but for the Committee and all its members (at which point Hart interjected an expression of his and his Government's approval of Hay's actions and the contracts he had entered into), and expressed the view that the Committee, under the contracts, had an obligation to meet the American requests if at all feasible.

In every particular Hart, whose objections had been growing less forceful, suggested that Hay present his views personally to the Netherlands Colonial Minister, and forthwith arranged an appointment for tomorrow. Since Hart began by indicating that 90 percent was as far as he could advise his Government to go, and ended by agreeing to favor 95 percent, it is evident that some progress was made.⁴⁴

JOHNSON

III. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TIN REGULATION COMMITTEE, THROUGH THE BRITISH AND NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS, FOR ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF TIN ⁴⁵

800.6354/202 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 20, 1940—8 p. m.
[Received February 20—6: 15 p. m.]

428. The Embassy has had an informal talk with both the Colonial Office and with the Chairman of the International Tin Committee regarding the outlook. Todd ⁴⁶ sent a copy to the Embassy of his

⁴⁴ In telegram No. 3874, November 28, the Chargé in the United Kingdom reported a first quarter rubber quota of 100% (800.6176/164).

⁴⁵ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 906-947. For correspondence regarding the purchase of tin from Bolivia, see *ibid.*, 1940, vol. V, section under Bolivia entitled "Negotiation of a contract guaranteed by the Bolivian Government for the purchase of tin ore . . ."

⁴⁶ William B. Todd, representative of the Steel Export Association of America, resident in London.

telegram of February 9 to Campbell⁴⁷ in which he advocated the maintenance of the present quota for the second quarter.

There is absolutely no chance of the Committee taking such action. During January the Dutch became so concerned at the manner in which world stocks would increase at present production level that they asked Campbell to call a special meeting to retroactively reduce the quota to 90%. Campbell refused. According to Campbell they are now talking about a quota for the second quarter below estimated consumption for that quarter. Patino⁴⁸ has sent a telegram to Campbell advocating "drastic reduction" of the quota for the second quarter.

The statistical position as now seen by the Colonial Office is that at the present rate world stocks are increasing by about 5,000 tons a month and will continue to do so until May. The Colonial Office estimates current world consumption at between 15,000 and 15,500 tons, of which American consumption accounts for between 6,000 and 6,500 tons and world production at about 21,000 tons. World stocks at the end of the year were estimated at 50,000 tons and are therefore expected to be about 70,000 tons in May. Both Campbell and the Colonial Office feel that a quota of 70% would about balance consumption and production but that the situation would be different from that of last September due to the subsequent increase in stocks. Incidentally China is supposed to have 4,000 tons for which export licenses have recently been authorized but it is a matter of doubt as to whether these will move to world markets or be acquired by Russia.

In the course of these informal conversations the Embassy has pointed out the danger in view of possible war developments of a new fear psychology arising which might reproduce, though to a lesser extent, the panic buying of last autumn and that the presence of a buffer stock pool without any tin would permit of a quota decision on the liberal side. The situation is obviously somewhat fluid and two unknowns are (a) the course of American business activity and (b) the course of American consumers buying particularly as affected by a war psychology.

The meeting is scheduled for February 26 and information on the above points and guidance as to the Embassy's attitude would be appreciated.

The Colonial Office and the Metal Controller⁴⁹ are both at this time inclined to favor a slightly higher quota than Campbell or apparently the Dutch, and the Colonial Office informally stated that any efforts we might care to make at The Hague would no doubt be helpful. At

⁴⁷ Sir John Campbell, Chairman of the International Tin Regulation Committee; also Chairman of the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

⁴⁸ Antenor Patiño, member of the Bolivian delegation on the International Tin Regulation Committee.

⁴⁹ Capt. Oliver Lyttleton, British Controller of Non-Ferrous Metals, 1939-40; President of the British Board of Trade, 1940-41.

the same time the Colonial Office also referred to the Dutch attitude towards rubber as reported in my 423, February 20, 4 p. m.⁵⁰

JOHNSON

800.6354/202 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1940.

336. Your 428, February 20, 8 p.m. Your analysis of the situation seems sound. The Department suggests stressing the following points both in London and The Hague and suggests that they be repeated to The Hague:

1. The course of tin consumption in the United States during the next few months is uncertain but the trade expects higher consumption during the second quarter than at the present time.

2. The estimates of American consumption during the last quarter of last year and during January as indicated by Lyttleton appear to be low.

3. A quota designed to hold production below consumption or to balance the two would create grave dangers, especially since there is no tin in the buffer pool.

4. Arrangements for purchases for the buffer pool, in the event that excess tin were not purchased for consumers' stocks and became a depressing factor on the market, should afford adequate price protection for producers.

5. In view of the above points and the probability that Bolivian production will not be increased, a quota of 100 percent or near that point would seem justified from the standpoint of the producers. The interests of consumers would be endangered by greater restriction at this time.

6. Should it prove possible and desirable to build up the buffer stock again in the near future, every effort should be made to have that stock held in whole or in large part in the United States and to maintain a large proportion of the stock as Straits tin.

HULL

800.6354/203 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, February 24, 1940—noon.

[Received February 24—8:30 a. m.]

451. Department's 336, February 21, was transmitted to The Hague and discussed with the British Colonial Office which seems genuinely

⁵⁰ *Ante*, p. 286.

apprehensive that the Dutch will press for a quota figure below the rate of consumption estimated at the equivalent of 70 percent. The Colonial Office favors a quota rate above consumption level both because it wishes to avoid a repetition even in a minor way of the experience which consumers suffered last fall and because British tin interests, unlike the Dutch, are not so unified and therefore cannot from an operations point of view adjust easily to drastic changes. That is not to say that there is any support here for a 100 percent quota. Given the amount that world stocks will aggregate in May, support can only be obtained for a moderate addition to those stocks by the second quarter export quota.⁵¹

As reported in paragraph 2 of the Embassy's 243, January 25 [26], 6 p.m.,⁵² it is intended when the buffer pool begins to operate to hold a substantial amount of the stock in the United States. The detailed arrangements to effect this are yet to be worked out since at the present time the pool is in pounds (sterling) and any tin held by it in New York would be equivalent to holding dollars.

JOHNSON

800.6354/220 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 15, 1940.

[Received May 15—2:12 p. m.]

1220. The Colonial Office states that it has seen American newspaper reports to the effect that Mr. Hopkins⁵³ is looking into the tin situation with a view to increasing American stocks; it pointed out that the next meeting of the Tin Committee would be on May 27 and that if American Government purchases are to be made it would be one of the relevant factors to be taken into consideration at that meeting. The Colonial Office indicated it would accordingly appreciate being advised prior to the meeting if there is any intention to make such purchases.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/955 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940.

876. Your 1220, May 15. As in the case of rubber⁵⁴ there is a definite intention of increasing tin stocks in this country as rapidly

⁵¹ In telegram No. 469, February 26, the Ambassador reported that the quota was fixed for the second quarter at 80 percent (800.6354/205).

⁵² Not printed.

⁵³ Harry Hopkins, Secretary of Commerce until September 1940.

⁵⁴ See telegram No. 875, May 16, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 268.

as possible, and arrangements for doing so are being worked out both through the private tin consuming industries and through Government agencies. Specific instructions on this point are in preparation and will be communicated to you at least within a few days. There is no doubt, however, but that the Department will request that all quota restrictions on tin be removed for the third quarter and from the date of the Tin Committee meeting if possible, and that at the same time it will be in a position to give at least general assurances that all of the tin available above current consumption requirements will be acquired for reserve stocks in this country, probably both by the Government and by the industry.

No doubt you will have an opportunity to prepare the way for more definite proposals along these lines later, bearing in mind that in all probability both the Government and private industry will expect to secure especially favorable prices on bulk purchases for reserve stocks.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 17, 1940.

[Received May 17—11:03 a. m.]

1247. Telegram has today been sent Todd by his office stating "Lytleton suggests and Campbell agrees proposal for third quarter quota should be 100 percent."

Since tin meeting not until May 27 and in view of paragraph 1 of Singapore's telegram of May 16, 6 p. m., to the Embassy,⁵⁵ which was repeated to the Department, I am taking no action on your 876 of May 16 pending further and more specific instructions.

In the atmosphere of London at this moment it seems to me little use to lay backgrounds for deals. What is helpful is to have specific proposals to make which can be implemented.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/944 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1940.

886. Your 1247. For your information, the Federal Loan Administrator has been instructed by the President to do whatever is neces-

⁵⁵ Not printed; it reported low stocks of tin at mine heads and stated that new Chinese mines must be opened to provide any sizable increase of production and to maintain output at 80 percent international quota (811.24 Raw Materials/942).

sary to assure the acquisition of adequate additional stocks of rubber and tin in the United States as soon as may be feasible. To this end he is discussing with the interested industries the creation of new corporations to carry through the necessary buying program with the support of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

This problem of organization is a novel one and requires education in the interested industrial circles. It is impossible to tell exactly how promptly it can be organized and brought into effective action. The President's desire is that it be done with all urgency. There is no doubt that this purchase program will be carried through either by this method or by some other and you are authorized to give assurances to that effect to the British authorities.

It is unlikely that in the case of rubber the new organization will be able to step into the market as early as the 21st. We are willing to give prompt consideration here to the possibility of the issuance either here or in London of a statement revealing the American Government's buying intentions in general with the idea of sustaining the market subsequent to quota announcement.

As part of the defense program it is important from our point of view that the needed additional stocks be procured at a reasonable price and we fully expect that the British authorities will respond to this wish and by their quota decision meet it. It may well be however that when the corporation is formed it will wish to negotiate on a specific price and quantity basis with the British and Dutch authorities.

If as the dates for the Rubber Committee and Tin Committee meetings approach there is hesitation on the part of the British authorities to support the full quota releases requested on the score that our buying arrangements are still too tentative, it may be possible to work out with them an arrangement whereby an extra quota release could be announced for the purpose of supplying American stocks to be available as soon as American plans are definitely arranged.

Confidential for your guidance: The President now believes that the question of the acquisition of sufficient reserve stocks of all strategic raw materials is of the utmost national importance. We will do everything possible to satisfy the British and Dutch authorities as to the maintenance of a satisfactory price situation. But if because of the complications to be overcome, the specific form of assurance at any given moment should not be complete, and the producers face some price risk, we should still feel ourselves justified in asking the British authorities to proceed anyway with adequate quota releases. The President has not been consulted on this particular point but I am of the opinion that he would press this matter with the full weight of all our influence upon the British Government.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 20, 1940.

[Received May 20—4:20 p. m.]

1278. The purport of the Department's 876, May 16 and 886, May 17, regarding tin has been informally conveyed to the Colonial Office which is looking into the question. In the meantime it would like to know what is the amount of the addition to American stocks which is desired and during what period of time, i. e. both stocks of American tin consumers and the reserve stock in which the Government would be involved. In this connection see the Embassy's 1247 of May 17.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/955 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1940—1 p. m.

917. Department's 876, 16th. Since the situation with respect to tin largely parallels that affecting rubber, the International Tin Committee may be prepared to act along the following lines:

1. Announce at least a 100-percent quota for the third and fourth quarters, thus indicating to producers that demand will be sustained and that therefore they will be justified in expanding operations.

2. Make third-quarter quotas available immediately so far as stocks might be released for June shipment.

3. Send a representative to the United States to negotiate regarding specific reserve-stock purchases here.

4. Announce any additional quota that may be necessary to cover reserve-stock purchases here as soon as definite arrangements can be set up.

Discussions are proceeding actively between the steel interests and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (although no publicity is being given to this effort) regarding the establishment of a private corporation to purchase tin reserves. In the event that this method proves inadequate, the Government will be prepared to acquire reserves directly. The quantities under consideration are large (ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 tons) and it will be desirable to secure the stocks as rapidly as possible, and particularly to expedite shipments during the next few months.

HULL

811.24 Raw Materials/1001 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 24, 1940.

[Received May 24—1 : 50 p. m.]

1359. Department's 886, May 17, and 917, May 21. At a meeting this afternoon besides officials of the Colonial Office Campbell, Lyttleton, and Lowinger⁵⁶ were present and there was an evident desire on the part of all concerned to cooperate in the matter of making tin available to the United States to the extent practicable and for the purposes and under the commitments defined. The following proposals evolved from the ensuing discussion.

1. That Lowinger and Van den Broek⁵⁷ be authorized by the Tin Committee and designated by the British and Dutch Governments respectively to proceed shortly to the United States to negotiate a detailed arrangement with the American Government or the corporation to be set up by it in conjunction with the American steel industry. Incidentally Lowinger is an intimate friend of Hay's⁵⁸ and there is an evident desire on the part of the British Government to keep the two negotiations in step. Campbell hopes to be able to obtain similar wide plenipotentiary powers for Lowinger and Van den Broek as were accorded by the Rubber Committee to Hay.

2. That at the meeting of the Tin Committee (and subject to the concurrence of the Dutch) a 100 percent quota be announced for the third quarter and licenses therefor be issued immediately. The British were unwilling to deal with the fourth quarter at this time but agreed to reconvene the Committee immediately provided an unanticipated demand developed which was reflected in a decided price movement.

3. That the Committee authorize a 120 percent quota for the third and fourth quarters as soon as an arrangement is concluded for the reserve stock. It was pointed out that the industry already is aware of the United States Government's intentions and therefore will be taking individual action to put itself in a position to produce fully and it was particularly emphasized that a 120 percent quota really constituted unlimited production. Incidentally Lyttleton pointed out that 25,000 tons represents the maximum possible addition to stocks in the third and fourth quarters with unlimited production.

⁵⁶ Victor A. Lowinger, member of the Malayan delegation on the Tin Regulation Committee; Chairman of the International Tin Research Council.

⁵⁷ John Van den Broek, member of the Netherlands East Indies delegation on the International Tin Regulation Committee.

⁵⁸ Sir John Hay, member of the Malayan delegation on the International Rubber Regulation Committee.

It was evident that the British have in mind as part of the agreement for a reserve stock an undertaking on our part to buy in such a manner as to maintain a given minimum price.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/1011 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 27, 1940.

[Received May 27—12:38 p. m.]

1396. Embassy's 1359, May 24. The Tin Committee announced the third quarter quota fixed at 100 percent and recommends to the signatory governments that export rights at this rate should be issued as soon as possible and that exports against these rights should be permitted prior to the beginning of the third quarter but subject to adjustment later against export rights for that quarter.

KENNEDY

811.24 Raw Materials/1101 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 14, 1940.

[Received June 14—4:27 p. m.]

1652. In paragraph numbered 2 of the Embassy's 1359, May 24, there is set forth the assurance of the Colonial Office that if an unanticipated demand developed which was reflected in a decided price movement the Tin Committee would be reconvened. On that day the price of tin in London was £267 per ton. Today it opened at £290. Several days ago I telephoned the Colonial Office and drew attention to the trend of tin prices and to its previous assurance, not requesting any action but to get the officials adjusted to the idea of possible action. Today I asked the Colonial Office what it proposed to do about tin. In a talk with Lowinger, just before he departed,⁵⁹ the Embassy took occasion to dissect the Tin Committee's recent past and to point the moral of immediate action in future to meet the requirements of a situation before it gets out of hand. I feel sure that if the facts of the tin situation in the United States as known to you are put before him he will telegraph a recommendation to London.

KENNEDY

⁵⁹ He left England for Washington on June 5, 1940.

811.20 Defense (M)/74a

Memorandum of Agreement

Memorandum of Agreement dated as of June 28, 1940 between the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (herein called the "Corporation"), the Metals Reserve Company, a corporation created by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (herein called the "Company"), and the International Tin Committee (herein called the "Committee") :

First,

In order to aid in the National Defense Program, the Corporation agrees that it will make a loan or loans to the Company upon satisfactory terms and conditions in such amount as may be necessary to enable the Company to purchase all of the tin available under the increased quota as hereinafter set forth as rapidly as the same is available for purchase.

Second,

The Company undertakes and agrees :

A. To effect the purchase of tin as set forth in paragraph First hereof and to purchase all tin offered in accordance with, and which is acceptable under, the terms of this agreement, at a price of \$.50 United States Dollars per pound, c. i. f. United States ports (as specified by Company), the insurance to cover all insurable risks, including war risks.

B. To hold the tin acquired in accordance with the terms of this agreement for a period of not less than three years from January 1, 1941.

C. To notify the Committee of its intention to liquidate its stocks of tin as more particularly hereinafter set forth and at the end of each three month period during the course of such liquidation to inform the Committee regarding the progress of such liquidation and the quantity remaining to be liquidated.

Third,

The Committee undertakes and agrees :

A. To increase the quota of permissible tin exports to 130% of the Standard Tonnages effective as of July 1, 1940 and to maintain such quota at such rate for a period of one year from July 1, 1940.

B. To recommend to all Governments which are parties to the International Tin Control Scheme that they should employ all means at their disposal to stimulate production and to encourage the sale of all available tin at not in excess of the price set forth in this agreement and in furtherance of such purpose to provide for the release of stock of tin in the producing countries, and adopt such measures as they can under the circumstances to insure the production of tin and its avail-

ability to the Company within the period fixed for the purchase of tin as set forth in this agreement and at the price named herein.

C. That the Company at any time after the expiration of the aforesaid three year period (commencing January 1, 1941) shall have the right to liquidate its stock of tin, provided that it gives written notice thereof to the Committee and agrees that not more than 5% of such stock of tin with a maximum of 5,000 tons shall be liquidated in any three month period, beginning from a date three months after the date such notice has been given.

D. That during the period of liquidation of the stock of tin held by the Company the quota of permissible tin exports shall be adjusted in such manner as to facilitate liquidation in an orderly manner.

Fourth,

It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that:

A. Tin acceptable under the terms of this agreement for purchase under the terms specified in paragraph Second A hereof shall be all brands of tin acceptable under the specifications of the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department (Form S 14) dated December 15, 1939. Such price shall apply to all purchases from prompt to ninety days forward shipments. The Company may purchase other qualities of tin with proper price differentials. Tin acceptable under this agreement and tin of other qualities (which may be purchased as herein provided) may be purchased by the Company on such other bases as for example ex works, f. a. s., f. o. b., with proper price differentials.

B. The Company shall have the right to inspect, sample and analyze any delivery or brand of tin.

C. The tin acquired by the Company may be released upon request of the United States Government for use by the United States Government and may be released to private consumers in the event of a national emergency which in the opinion of the Company requires such release.

D. The obligation of the Committee under paragraphs Third A and B hereof and the obligation of the Company under paragraph Second A hereof with respect to making tin available for purchase by the Company, and the purchase by the Company of tin, shall terminate on June 30, 1941 unless sooner terminated by the Company at any time upon giving three months' notice in writing to the other parties hereto, provided that a total of not less than 75,000 tons shall have been purchased and retained as a reserve prior to the date of giving of any such notice.

E. In the event of extraordinary circumstances which may operate to affect the terms and conditions of this agreement, the parties hereto

agree to consult for the purpose of determining what action shall be taken with respect to the provisions of this agreement.

RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION

By EMIL SCHRAM

Chairman

METALS RESERVE COMPANY

By CHARLES B. HENDERSON

THE INTERNATIONAL TIN COMMITTEE

By VICTOR A. LOWINGER

By J. VAN DEN BROEK

Approved:

JESSE H. JONES

Federal Loan Administrator

Dated: June 29, 1940.

811.20 Defense (M)/696

*Statement by the Federal Loan Administrator (Jones), Released
July 1, 1940*

Under authority of the amendment to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act approved by the President June 25, 1940, which gives to the RFC, when requested by the Federal Loan Administrator with the approval of the President, the right to create corporations with power to acquire and carry strategic and critical materials in order to aid the Government of the United States in its National Defense Program, the RFC on Friday, June 28, created two such corporations, the Rubber Reserve Company and the Metals Reserve Company, each with a capital of \$5,000,000.

The Rubber Reserve Company will acquire and carry a reserve supply of crude rubber, and the Metals Reserve Company will acquire and carry a reserve supply of critical and strategic materials, principally tin and manganese.

The Rubber Reserve Company has agreed with the International Rubber Regulation Committee, represented by Sir John Hay, that it will buy a reserve stock of rubber of 150,000 tons over a period of months, at a price range basis between 18 and 20¢ a pound, c. i. f. New York.⁶⁰ This 150,000 tons, with the 85,000 tons recently acquired through the barter agreement with Great Britain in exchange for cotton, will provide a reserve supply of rubber in the United States of approximately 235,000 tons, in addition to current stocks held by the industry.

⁶⁰ For text of rubber contract signed June 29, 1940, see *The History of Rubber Regulation, 1934-1943*, p. 210.

The capital of the Rubber Reserve Company will be owned one-half by the RFC and one-half by the principal rubber manufacturers, and the reserve supply will be acquired from additional production of rubber allowed by the International Rubber Regulation Committee as a result of this contract, so that there will be no lack of rubber to meet current demands, and no occasion for unusual competitive bidding by the industry for normal requirements.

The RFC has authorized loans to the Rubber Reserve Company of \$65,000,000 to purchase and carry the rubber. The rubber producing countries are: Malaya; Netherlands Indies; French Indo-China; Ceylon; India; Burma; North Borneo; Sarawak; and Thailand.

The Metals Reserve Company has agreed with the International Tin Committee, represented by Victor A. Lowinger of London and John Van den Broek of Batavia, that it will buy 75,000 tons of tin which it will hold as a reserve stock. The world supply of tin is controlled by the International Tin Committee and the agreement calls for an increase in world production of tin so that the reserve can be acquired without interfering with the current demand for tin or affecting the current price. The Metals Reserve Company has agreed to buy its reserve stocks at 50¢ a pound, c. i. f. United States ports to be specified by the company.

The RFC has authorized loans to the Metals Reserve Company of \$100,000,000 with which to buy and carry the tin and other metals. The tin producing countries parties to this agreement are: Belgian Congo; Bolivia; French Indo-China; The Malay States; Netherlands East Indies; Nigeria; and Thailand.

IV. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF COPPER FROM OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS FOR DEFENSE NEEDS

825.51/12478

The Chilean Embassy to the Department of State

[Translation]

NITRATE AND COPPER

Existing conditions for the avoidance of greater external and internal disturbances of the public order moved the President of Chile to announce to the nitrate and copper industrialists the decision of his Government to refuse any reduction in the production of these industries.

It is to be noted:

- 1st That the refined copper is a United States investment;
- 2nd That United States investments in the nitrate industry comprise approximately 50% of the present production;

3rd That both these industries provide Chile with the necessary exchange for the payment of the foreign government debt;

4th That the copper industry provides approximately \$5,000,000 for service on the foreign obligations of the Development Corporation;

5th That the copper industry employs approximately 40,000 men and the nitrate industry about 25,000.

The anxiety provoked in the Government and public opinion of Chile, by a possible reduction in the production of these industries, is understandable.

The Chilean Government deems it prudent to call special attention in order to obtain, at least, a maintenance of the present production quota.

A favorable measure for the nitrate problem would be that of bringing about an increase in prices on the part of American producers to the same level of Chilean nitrate, as has always been done up to now. Another emergency measure would be that the United States Government absorb an annual quota of 300,000 tons.

With reference to copper, the Chilean Government has been given the impression that the United States would not be in a position to absorb any part of the production of Chilean copper, which will, undoubtedly, aggravate the copper problem. The Chilean Government is anxious to know the attitude of the United States Government in regard to the nitrate and copper problems and what their policy would be in order to obtain new world markets for these products.

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1940.

811.20 Defense (M)/941

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM ON COPPER

1. His Majesty's Government in the U. K. made arrangements at the outbreak of the war whereby they secured virtually the whole of their requirements of copper from British Empire sources.

This was of great advantage because (1) Long term contracts were made at a low price; (2) Payment was largely in sterling.

2. Since the collapse of France His Majesty's Government have entered into an agreement with the Belgian Congo whereby they acquire from the Union Miniere de Haut Katanga 10,500 tons a month.

3. The tonnages taken under these arrangements covered the entire requirements of the British Empire for Raw Copper—except for certain small tonnages which were ordered in the U. S. A. for prompt shipment in the summer months of 1940.

4. The British Government have been anxious for many months to do all that lies in its power to help relieve the problems of maladjustment of supply to demand which the shutting off of the European market has created for the South American producers of raw commodities; and in His Majesty's Ambassador's memoranda of July 3rd, 1940,⁶¹ suggestions were made to the U.S. Government for cooperation to help solve these problems. In the opinion of the British Government copper is one of the commodities which calls most urgently for consideration.

5. Since Japan joined the Axis Powers,⁶² His Majesty's Government have taken steps to limit the free importation by Japan of certain key commodities produced within the British Empire and in accordance with what it believes to be the trend of U.S. policy it has proposed to the State Department, informally, that parallel action by His Majesty's Government and the U.S. Government should be taken to limit Japan's acquisition of war reserves, or "stock pile".⁶³

6. For the purposes cited under (4) and (5) above the British Government now wish to make certain proposals to the United States Government on the subject of copper in order to meet:—(1) The problem created for Chile by the collapse of its copper export market. (2) The problem of preventing Japan from exploiting Chile's need of an export market in copper and thereby acquiring a substantial war reserve of copper. The urgent need for this arises from the fact that since July 15th Japan has ordered 100,000 tons of copper in the U.S.A., mostly of Chilean and South American origin and has in fact shipped some 80,000 tons. 100,000 tons of copper is about 6 months normal consumption by Japan.

His Majesty's Government wish to ask whether the U.S. Government would be prepared to arrange with the U.S. copper companies operating in South America to

(1) Limit production to 400,000 tons per annum (which is approximately their total export figure of 1939) divided as follows:—

Peru and Mexico	80,000 tons
Chile	320,000 tons

divided as to

Kennecott and Anaconda	300,000 tons
Independents	20,000 tons

(2) Permit annual exports of this 400,000 tons as to

Spain and Portugal	15,000 tons
Japan and Russia	115,000 tons

⁶¹ *Ante*, p. 52, and vol. III, section under United Kingdom entitled "Anglo-American relief and international control of commodities".

⁶² A pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy was signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p. 165.

⁶³ See vol. IV, pp. 565 ff. *passim*.

(3) Cooperate with the U.S. and British Governments in regard to the disposal of the balance of 270,000 tons.

7. In order to assist in the disposal of this 270,000 tons, His Majesty's Government would wish to know

(a) if they on their part should buy 100,000 tons per annum from Chile to replace a similar quantity released by the British Empire producers, would the U.S. Government for their part buy 170,000 tons: *or*, failing this, how much of the 170,000 tons would the U.S. Government be prepared to buy.

(b) if the U.S. Government are willing to undertake a joint copper buying policy in South America of this nature, (for the double purpose outlined in paragraphs (4) and (5) above) at what price the South American copper can be bought.

8. His Majesty's Government would greatly appreciate receiving an answer to the above questions at the earliest possible moment, and without the knowledge of these proposals coming to the U.S. companies concerned.

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1940.

811.20 Defense (M)/860b

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) ⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1940—11 p. m.

225. The following press announcement was issued this afternoon:

"Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator, today announced that the Metals Reserve Company has contracted to purchase 100,000 tons of Latin American copper as follows:

From the Anaconda Copper Mining Company—	57,000 tons
From the American Metals Company	—10,000 tons
From the Phelps-Dodge Corporation	—5,000 tons
Total	—72,000 tons

at 10 cents per pound f.a.s. New York on the condition that if at any time the cost of freight and insurance exceeds $\frac{1}{2}$ cent per pound such excess will be borne by the Metals Reserve Company. Mr. Jones stated that the remaining 28,000 tons of copper was purchased from the Kennecott Copper Corporation at $9\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound f.a.s. Chilean ports on the condition that such portion of this copper as the sellers can furnish transportation for, the Metals Reserve Company will allow sellers $\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound for transportation, war and marine insurance, making the total cost on such portion 10 cents per pound f.a.s. New York. On such portion as the sellers are

⁶⁴ The same on the same date as No. 151 to the Ambassador in Peru with substitution of the following for the final paragraph:

"Since details of the contracts have not been completed, the division of these purchases between countries is not yet certain but Peru will receive proper consideration." (811.20 Defense (M)/860a.)

unable to furnish transportation for, the Metals Reserve Company will make its own arrangements for transportation at the best rates obtainable."

Since details of the contracts have not been completed, the division of these purchases between countries is not yet certain. Chile, of course, will receive the largest amount, and consideration is being given to the producers of copper concentrates.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/928a

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Deputy Federal Loan Administrator (Clayton)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. CLAYTON: Reference is made to the arrangements recently announced by the Metals Reserve Company for the purchase of 100,000 tons of copper from the other American republics, and to conversations between officers of the Department and officers of the Federal Loan Agency with respect to the distribution of these purchases.

It is the Department's opinion that purchases should be distributed among the principal producing nations in accordance with the following schedule:

From Chile	—At least 75 percent
From Peru	—Not less than 9 percent
From Mexico	—Between 5 and 10 percent.

With respect to purchases from Chile, the Government of Chile has, as you are aware, indicated its great interest in having all of the copper concentrates produced by Chilean nationals acquired by the United States. It has indicated that it could take steps to facilitate the purchase of such concentrates by American concerns for the purpose. It is the opinion of the Department that, if such arrangements can be satisfactorily made by the Chilean Government, it would be highly desirable that the entire production of copper concentrates by Chilean nationals, amounting I understand at the present time to 12,000 to 14,000 tons annually, be acquired by the Metals Reserve Company.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/941

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Memorandum on Copper from the British Embassy dated November 22, 1940.

Taking cognizance of the increased demand for copper attendant upon the defense effort of the United States Government, Mr. Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator, announced on December 19, 1940 that the Metals Reserve Company, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, had contracted to purchase 100,000 tons of copper produced in the other American republics. It is understood that deliveries will take place over an eight months' period beginning in March, and copper thus purchased will go into stock pile.

This agreement as announced on December 19th last has its origin in a note dated August 12, 1940, presented to the United States Government by Señor Oscar Schnake, Minister of Fomento of the Government of Chile. This note referred to the high importance of the copper industry to the Chilean economic structure, the loss of normal export markets, and urged that consideration be given to purchases by the United States. Having in mind the desirability of extending all possible economic aid to the other American republics in accordance with the resolutions adopted at the Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held at Havana in July,⁶⁵ this Department immediately took up the matter of possible copper purchases in Chile with the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and other interested agencies of the Government.

In December, after negotiations had been in progress for some time, it became increasingly apparent that domestic copper supplies were not adequate to meet the requirements for national defense and normal civilian usage in this country. This situation is illustrated by statistics for October (latest available) which show that production of refined copper amounted to 83,076 tons, whereas domestic deliveries were 103,771 tons. In other words, there is a deficiency of approximately 20,000 tons per month, and in reflection thereof, stocks of refined copper have declined steadily from 215,823 tons at the end of July to 164,618 tons at the end of October. Consequently, the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense urged that action be taken to relieve the impending shortage. The agreement evolved did not confine purchases to Chile alone, although that country will furnish the bulk of them.

From the foregoing, the British Government will understand that the agreement developed for the purchase of copper from the other American republics was motivated primarily by considerations of a strictly economic nature related to the defense program of this Government.

The Department weighed carefully the contents of the Embassy's memorandum of November 22, and it was given consideration through-

⁶⁵ See resolution XXV, Economic and Financial Cooperation, *Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940: Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 80.

out the negotiations leading up to the recent copper purchase agreement. The British Government will understand, however, that the proposals embodied in this memorandum for a joint agreement for the purchase of copper contain considerations of a nature which could not at present be comprehended within the field of American action, as thus far developed.

The Department will, of course, be glad to keep in touch with the Embassy on the subject and discuss any related matters which may arise in the future.

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1941.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN PROPOSALS FOR
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NON-POLITICAL AC-
TIVITIES OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS; QUESTION
OF TRANSFERENCE OF CERTAIN TECHNICAL SERV-
ICES TO THE UNITED STATES¹

500.C/999a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1940—5 p. m.

3. The Department understands that the Committee studying the Bruce Report² is contemplating placing the Opium Advisory Committee under the direction and supervision of the proposed new Central Committee. In our opinion this would materially reduce the usefulness of the Opium Advisory Committee and adversely affect its composition.

Please investigate and report by telegram.

HULL

500.C/1000 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, January 15, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received January 15—2:10 p. m.]

4. Department's telegram 3, January 12, 5 p. m. It is contemplated that all the technical work of the League including opium will be placed under the direction of the Central Committee except those matters for which other provision is specifically made by international conventions. The Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body remain unaffected and will continue as heretofore. As regards the Advisory Committee and the Opium Section of the Secretariat it is expected that the Central Committee will assume the functions and powers relating thereto hitherto exercised by the Council. In the exercise of these powers and functions the Central Committee will presumably be guided by the same considerations and principles which in the past have formed the basis of the Council's action.

¹ For previous correspondence regarding interest of the United States in the non-political activities of the League of Nations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 52 ff.

² League of Nations, *The Development of International Cooperation in Economic and Social Affairs, Report of the Special Committee* (Doc. A. 23. 1939).

It appears unlikely that the composition of the Advisory Committee will be reconsidered in the near future. The reports of the Advisory Committee to the Central Committee will probably continue to be distributed by the Secretary General to meetings of the Assembly as a basis for the opium discussions of that body. Naturally definite statements concerning the Central Committee's functions and policies relating to opium cannot be made until the Committee has been constituted, has drawn up its rules of procedure and started operations. The foregoing, however, seems a reasonable forecast in the light of discussions with interested persons here.

The members of the Opium Section do not anticipate that the new system will have any adverse effects on the opium work but rather expect it to continue successfully along lines similar to those followed in the past.

For general discussion of the Central Committee, see Consulate's despatches 27, 33, and 43, Political, dated November 10, November 25, and December 28, respectively.³

TITTMANN

500.C/1000 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1940—5 p. m.

5. Your no. 4, January 15, 5 p.m. If the Central Committee is authorized to exercise greater control and direction over the activities of the Opium Advisory Committee than there is at present in practice exercised by the Council, the Department is apprehensive lest this will tend to influence Governments more and more to entrust their representation on the Opium Advisory Committee to representatives resident in Switzerland who have no experience in narcotics work and who are not in daily contact with narcotics control in their respective countries, a development which would greatly diminish the usefulness of the Opium Advisory Committee.

It is understood that the Canadian Government is likewise concerned over the future of the Opium Advisory Committee under the proposed new arrangement. Please keep the Department informed by telegram of any new developments in this connection and in particular of any proposals made by the Canadian delegate.

HULL

³ None printed.

500.C1/133 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, January 18, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received January 18—3 p. m.]

6. Consulate's despatch No. 43, Political, dated December 28, 1939.⁴ I have just been informed that at the instance of Hambro, President of the Assembly, the Secretariat of the League sent out notices last night by telegram to the states members of the Organizing Committee on Economic and Social Questions to the effect that with their approval the Organizing Committee would meet at The Hague on February 7 next. The Organizing Committee is composed of the representatives of the following 10 states: Australia, Belgium, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey and Argentina, and forms the nucleus of the Central Committee. Although it was at first contemplated that the meeting would be held in Geneva, Hambro felt that since the Supervisory Commission of the League was going to meet at The Hague anyway on February 9 it would be generally more convenient for both meetings to take place there.

Charron⁵ who is handling Central Committee matters at the Secretariat informs me that the following is the tentative agenda for the Organizing Committee: (1) selection of the 14 other members to compose the Central Committee and 8 unofficial members; (2) establishment of rules of procedure to be followed by the Central Committee; (3) draft of a plan of work for the Central Committee.

I have been approached on several occasions (by Charron himself today) as to whether I could not find it possible to be in The Hague at the time of the meetings of the Organizing Committee which are expected to last 2 or 3 days. It is apparently the desire of the Secretariat to have some one from this Consulate who is familiar with the League and the Bruce Report to report to the Department on the proceedings. I have been discouraging in my replies.

TITTMANN

500.C1/133 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1940—1 p. m.

6. Your No. 6, January 18, 5 p. m. The Department entirely approves your efforts to discourage the League Secretariat with regard to the advisability of your presence at The Hague at the time of the meetings of the Organizing Committee. We do not feel that it is

⁴ Not printed.⁵ René Charron, Chief of the Economic Section of the League of Nations.

either desirable or necessary that anyone from the Consulate proceed to The Hague for this purpose.

HULL

500.C/1005 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, January 23, 1940—noon.

[Received January 23—9:08 a. m.]

8. Your No. 5, January 18, 5 p. m., in regard to the Opium Advisory Committee in relation to the Central Committee. The acting permanent delegate of Canada yesterday addressed informally the following letter to Mr. Wilson of the League Secretariat:

"It will be remembered that in the special committee of the Twentieth Assembly which dealt with the Bruce Report I asked if it was the intention of the Bruce Committee that the work of the League for the control of the traffic in drugs should be placed under the direction of the proposed Central Committee. In reply the chairman said

'It should be clearly understood that the sole object of the Bruce Committee's proposals was to place under the supervision of the Central Committee those bodies that were now under the supervision of the League Council. The Permanent Central Opium Board was an independent body and would remain independent. The supervision and direction of the Central Committee would only apply to the technical committees under the League Council.'

The report of the discussion in the Committee was duly transmitted to Ottawa. It is not felt that the chairman's reply fully answers the question. It is possible that the distinction between the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Advisory Committee is more apparent than real. It is true however that the board is an independent body but it is not entirely independent of the Council which makes appointments to it. On the other hand the Advisory Committee may be said to have a separate existence in relation to the various drug conventions.

I am now informed that the Canadian Government would object to subordinating the work of the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to the proposed Central Committee. A memorandum explaining the Canadian position is being transmitted by mail to the Canadian permanent delegation and will be communicated to the Secretary General as soon as it is received."

TITTMANN

500.C/1006 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, February 1, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received February 1—11:45 a. m.]

13. My No. 8, January 23, noon. Canadian delegate has telegraphed his Government pointing out that the memorandum mentioned in the telegram under reference could not arrive in Geneva before meeting

at The Hague on February 7 and suggesting that Canadian Minister at The Hague present Canadian Government's views there. The telegram continues as follows:

"I am informed Secretary General suggests that Organizing Committee might leave definition of relationship between Committees to first meeting Central Committee on which Canada would presumably be represented or alternatively might reserve treaty and administrative functions of Advisory Committee. He thinks that Central Committee should be the forum accrediting [*forum for*] general discussion of narcotics problems as the Committee of the Assembly has been.

I am of the opinion that complete separation of narcotics work from Central Committee undesirable and in any case would not be agreed to. I would suggest asking Bourquin (Chairman of Organizing Committee) for statement of constitution and special functions of Advisory Committee rather than hope for self-denying action by Central Committee."

TITTMANN

500.C/1006 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1940—1 p. m.

9. Your telegram No. 13, February 1, 4 p. m. Please ascertain if possible and report what the attitude of the British and French was toward proposed transfer to Central Committee of control and direction of the Opium Advisory Committee's deliberations and recommendations.

Bearing in mind the Department's apprehensions as set forth in the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 4 [5] of January 18, 5 p. m., you are authorized within your discretion, should occasion arise, to intimate informally that the Department for its guidance in determining whether or not to continue attendance of an American representative at the Opium Advisory Committee seeks clarification as to the limitations which the proposed subordination to the Central Committee will place on the Opium Advisory Committee's hitherto enjoyed liberty at any time to investigate and make recommendations to the Council on any subject which it sees fit connected with suppression of the abuse of narcotic drugs.

HULL

500.C/1007 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, February 5, 1940—noon.

[Received February 5—9:36 a. m.]

14. Consulate's 13, February 1, 4 p. m. The Canadian delegate has addressed a letter to Bourquin in which he states that

"In the opinion of the Canadian Government it would be desirable for the Organizing Committee to defer the definition of the relationship between the Central Committee and the Advisory Committee on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs until the latter Committee has had the opportunity to discuss the whole matter at its next meeting in May.

Should this suggestion not prove to be acceptable I am instructed to state that the Canadian Government wishes to reserve its position in respect to any changes which might be recommended by the Organizing Committee for the new Central Committee and which might affect the independence and autonomy of the Opium Advisory Committee in the exercise of its administrative and treaty functions."

TITTMANN

500.C1/133 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon)

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1940—3 p. m.

17. A committee appointed by the Assembly of the League of Nations to inaugurate a plan for the reorganization of the League's technical work will meet at The Hague beginning February 7. For your strictly confidential information, the Department has not yet determined the attitude it will adopt toward the new organization and would prefer not to be approached on the subject at this time.

HULL

500.C/1009 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, February 7, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received February 7—2:20 p. m.]

16. Department's telegram No. 9, February 5, 1 p. m. With reference to question raised in paragraph 1, the British and French have given no evidence here of concern with regard to the proposed transfer to the Central Committee of the supervisory functions with regard to the Opium Advisory Committee which have hitherto been exercised by the Council.

With reference to the question raised in paragraph 2, responsible officials of the Secretariat have expressed their conviction that the Central Committee will place no limitations on the Opium Advisory Committee's hitherto enjoyed liberty to conduct investigations and make recommendations on any subject which it sees fit connected with suppression of the abuse of narcotic drugs.

TITTMANN

500.C1/134 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, February 14, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received February 14—1 p. m.]

20. It is understood that the Central Committee at its recent meeting at The Hague decided to defer any decision with regard to its relation to the opium work until after the meeting of the Opium Advisory Committee in May.

TITTMANN

500.C1/133 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1940—6 p. m.

13. Your 6, January 18, 5 p. m. Please convey informally to Avenol⁶ and, in your discretion, to Charron and Bourquin, the following:

This Government has followed with great interest the proposals for the reorganization of the technical and nonpolitical activities of the League and is in complete sympathy with the efforts being made to improve and to continue them as fully as possible during the war. It appears, however, that membership on or participation in the work of the proposed Central Committee would involve an automatic financial obligation on the part of this Government. Such obligation cannot under our laws be incurred without prior authorization of Congress. This Government would not desire to participate in the work of the Central Committee, even through an observer, without bearing its full share of the expenses and reasons of domestic policy make it inexpedient to request the necessary authorization from Congress at this time. (Moreover, it may be noted that a refusal by Congress to pass authorizing legislation might prejudice the more limited collaboration in the League's technical activities that has been maintained in the past.) It is hoped, therefore, that the question of collaboration of this Government in the work of the Central Committee will not be raised at this time.

For your own information, this Government is prepared to continue its past cooperation with specific technical activities of the League if desired provided that no automatic financial obligation is thereby incurred. (The Department is giving separate consideration to the work of the Opium Advisory Committee. See telegram No. 9, February 5, 1 p. m.) Please report, after discussing the matter informally with officials of the Secretariat, whether in your opinion such continued collaboration will involve legal financial obligation by reason of the adoption of the new plan as evolved by the Bruce Committee.

⁶ Secretary General of the League of Nations.

The Department intends to make a voluntary contribution toward the expenses of the technical activities of the League in which it participated officially or unofficially in 1938 and 1939 upon the same basis as the contribution made for the years 1936 and 1937, and you are instructed to request informally from the appropriate League authorities a statement of such expenses for 1938 and 1939 for transmission to the Department. Should the collaboration of the United States in the technical activities of the League be continued in 1940 the Department would likewise be prepared to make a similar voluntary contribution to the expenses thereof.

This Government will be prepared to reconsider the question of participation in the work of the Central Committee whenever, in the opinion of this Government, developments indicate such action to be expedient.

HULL

500.C1/139 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, February 24, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received February 24—8:28 a. m.]

23. Charron of League Secretariat has informed me as follows with regard to the Central Committee:

At the Hague meeting of the Organizing Committee, Colijn⁷ was co-opted by the Committee in his personal capacity, was then chosen Chairman of the Organizing Committee, and was charged with the task of taking preliminary steps toward selecting 8 states (in addition to the 10 on the Organizing Committee) and 3 or 4 persons of special competence (in addition to himself) to comprise the Central Committee. Six state memberships and 3 or 4 personal memberships on the Committee will be left vacant for the time being thereby providing opportunity in the future for the inclusion of states and individuals not now likely or in a position to accept membership. Among those chosen for special competence will probably be a representative of labor and a representative of employers. Date of first meeting of Central Committee is tentatively set for June and Colijn in consultation with the Secretariat will prepare plans for that meeting.

Charron indicated that the Hague meeting accomplished little of a concrete character other than as set forth in the preceding paragraph. The programme of economic and social work to be undertaken under the direction of the Central Committee is still in a formative stage and he indicated that much depended upon the future attitude

⁷ Hendrikus Colijn, ex-Prime Minister of the Netherlands.

of governments in determining the character and scope of the Committee's work and mentioned particularly the British and the French Governments which, up to the present, have been reserved in their approach to the problem.

EVERETT

500.C1/140 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, February 27, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received February 27—3 : 03 p. m.]

24. Department's telegram 13, February 19, 6 p. m., section 2, paragraph 1.⁸ I have discussed this matter with Avenol, Lester,⁹ and Charron. Each was categorical in stating that the situation hitherto prevailing as regards collaboration in specific technical activities by non-member states remains unchanged at least until the Central Committee has met and drawn up its rules and regulations and that our continued collaboration will not involve any legal financial obligation prior to the meeting of the Central Committee and will not involve any such obligation subsequent to such meeting unless the Committee should adopt rules imposing such an obligation. They consider it improbable that the Central Committee will undertake to establish rules imposing an automatic financial obligation in connection with collaboration such as ours has been and certainly not without prior consultation with us under the terms of article 5 of the Committee's constitution. Furthermore they are categorical in stating that any rules the Committee may establish in this connection would not have a retroactive force as such a procedure would be entirely contrary to principles of law and to League practice.

I am inclined to the opinion that foregoing views are sound. The legal situation in this respect as based on the language of the Bruce Report is too vague to justify the assumption that a legal obligation exists prior to action by the Central Committee and in particular under article 5 of its constitution. The situation is similar to that which was created by the adoption in 1937 of the amended article 22 of the financial regulations. The Secretariat's position on this question was from the outset that this article could not be binding without the prior consent of the non-member states concerned. This view was confirmed by the fourth committee in its report to the 1937 Assembly.

Practical considerations reinforce the views stated above by the Secretariat officials. It is highly improbable that the Bruce Committee in drafting its report desired to impose in advance a rigid financial

⁸ Paragraph beginning "For your own information," p. 313.

⁹ Seán Lester, Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations.

obligation on non-member states irrespective of the manner and degree of their participation. Moreover although the date of the first meeting of the Central Committee has been tentatively suggested for June it is not yet certain that it will meet then.¹⁰ It was to meet such an indeterminate situation that the Council on December 14 renewed for 1 year the membership of all the League's technical committees. In other words all the circumstances seem to indicate that the *status quo* will be maintained pending the moment when the Central Committee will be able to give consideration to these questions and that even then it is unlikely an effort will be made to alter the conditions under which we have collaborated in the past.

EVERETT

500.C/1013 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 10, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 3:30 p. m.]

81. Avenol, Secretary General, League of Nations, has had brought to his attention letter dated April 14, 1940, understood to have been published June 1st, written by the President to Dr. Mary E. Woolley regarding technical work of League of Nations.¹¹ Avenol would be grateful if it could be found possible to convey to the President his deep appreciation for the interest taken in this matter.

TITTMANN

500.C/1011 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 10, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received June 10—3:16 p. m.]

82. Avenol tells me that he expects to continue to keep the League personnel, which has been reduced from about 750 in 1938 to less than 100 today, in Geneva until a "new situation arises." By the latter phrase he means until either he is invited by the Swiss Government to leave or Switzerland is invaded or communications are cut off. Should the League be obliged to leave Switzerland Avenol plans to transport the Opium Section to some neutral country where it may continue to function intact. With regard to the future of other technical sections his plans do not appear to be well defined. Provided

¹⁰ On May 1, 1940, Mr. Charron advised members of the Consulate at Geneva that the first meeting of the Committee would be held in September rather than as tentatively planned in June (500.C1/145).

¹¹ S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (eds.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. II, July 1939–June 1940 (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1940), p. 607.

a quorum can be counted on it is planned to convene the Supervisory Commission of the League on June 14th.

TITTMANN

500.C115/1412 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 14, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received June 15—5:43 a. m.]

90. For State and Labor from Commissioner¹² and Labor [Consul]:

Refer to our Consulate telegram 80, June 7th.¹³ Before taking steps toward consulting Governing Body regarding possible relocation, Winant¹⁴ wishes to know whether the United States Government would be willing to invite ILO staff to the United States to enable continuation of its work. Number of staff members transferred would not exceed 100 and no individuals would be sent who are not now permitted to pass through France.

This does not imply that any decision to move has been taken but an answer is urgent and essential as a basis for judgment here and for Governing Body consultation which may have to be by telegraph.

TITTMANN

500.C/1015 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 15, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 4:30 p. m.]

91. The Secretary General of the League of Nations has received a joint telegram dated June 12 [11] from President Dodds of Princeton University, Carl TenBroeck, Director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, and Frank Aydelotte, Director of the Institute of Advanced Study, inviting the Secretary General to transfer the technical sections of the League to Princeton and offering facilities for continuing the work there.¹⁵

Avenol is replying direct to this telegram and is declining.¹⁶ He has asked me to inform the Department of the foregoing and to state that for a number of reasons he feels that he should not accept the invitation under the present circumstances. He added, moreover, that

¹² Carter Goodrich, United States Labor Commissioner at Geneva; Chairman of the Governing Body of the International Labor Office (ILO).

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ John G. Winant, Director, International Labor Office, Geneva.

¹⁵ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. III, July 1940–June 1941, p. 640.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 642.

at no time and under no circumstances would he consider such an invitation without prior understanding with our Government.

TITTMANN

500.C115/1413 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 18, 1940—11 a. m.
[Received June 19—1:50 a. m.]

92. For State and Labor from Commissioner and Consul:

Commissioner expresses appreciation for telegram No. 64, June 15, 5 p. m.,¹⁷ indicating prompt attention to question raised in our telegram No. 90 of June 14.

No recommendation was included in the cable transmitting the Winant request. The Commissioner in the present message urges the most favorable possible consideration of the request. Present circumstances in his judgment demonstrate that the transfer of ILO staff to the United States offers the one promising chance of preserving the organization as a functioning democratic institution. Unless a decision can be reached before armistice terms are settled it may become very much more difficult if not impossible to transfer most valued members of the staff.

TITTMANN

500.C115/1412 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1940—6 p. m.

67. Your 90, June 14, 8 p. m. From State and Labor:

Please inform Winant that we regret that it is not possible at this time to extend such an invitation.

HULL

500.C115/1417 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 23, 1940—noon.
[Received 12:08 p. m.]

98. The following personal message for the Secretary from Winant:

"I was given your message and understand difficulties but I want you to understand the situation here as I see it. The International Labor Organization is an agency of democracy. The United States is its most powerful member and both the chairman of the governing body and the director are citizens of the United States. Since I

¹⁷ Not printed.

accepted office the organization has not only supported the democratic principles upon which it was founded but without deviation has also supported the international policies you have advocated. Progress has not been easy in the present world. The totalitarian states withdrew from the Organization and the personnel from these countries is no longer on the office staff. The International Labor Organization was created in response to the demands of labor to further social justice at the end of the last war. This humanitarian effort was only possible because of the sacrifices for democracy then made. The present administration accepted membership for the United States. Three-fourths of the governments of the world are still members. I ask for your help and that of the United States in continuing the Organization and conserving the specialized personnel who have been devotedly loyal to the principles and practices of democracy and who are authorities in national and international social legislation and procedure. The over-all number for carrying on work elsewhere could be reduced to some 60 persons, excluding citizens of the Americas. You will recognize that practical continuance here is impossible. There is real work to do and an increasing obligation to do it. I believe it can be best accomplished in North America. I would appreciate your discussing this message with the President, as I accepted office here under your joint approval. John G. Winant."

TITTMANN

500.C/1021

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1940.

Mr. Reid ¹⁸ telephoned and said that the Canadian Government understood that the Secretary General of the League of Nations had received an invitation from Princeton University and other institutions in Princeton to transfer certain of the technical services of the League to that city. He said that his Legation had been asked whether this invitation had been sent with the knowledge or approval of the State Department. After consulting Mr. Gray ¹⁹ and Mr. Dunn ²⁰ I informed Mr. Reid that representatives of several institutions at Princeton had called upon the Secretary and had asked him if he would transmit an invitation along these lines to the Secretary General. I said that the Secretary had told them that he could not transmit the invitation and that the Government could not come into the matter in anyway but that they were, of course, free to send an invitation directly to the Secretary General if they cared to do so. I went on to say that I could tell him quite informally that this matter had come up on several occasions in connection with other international

¹⁸ Escott Reid, Second Secretary of the Canadian Legation at Washington.

¹⁹ Cecil W. Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State.

²⁰ James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

organizations and that our general attitude was that an international organization which, because of its charter necessarily had a more or less autonomous and independent character, would not wish to locate in the United States unless it were assured that such independent character could be preserved. I said that the question might arise as to whether such assurance could be given without the specific approval of Congress.

I pointed out that in the particular case of the Princeton invitation, we had considered that this was simply a question of private organizations in this country offering to assist in making facilities available and that the Department had not gone into the questions which would have arisen had the matter come up officially. I added that I understood that Mr. Avenol had replied to the Princeton invitation to the effect that he did not have the authority to accept it.

Mr. Reid said that he quite understood the position and would inform his Government accordingly.

500.C/1018 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, June 27, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received June 27—3:35 p. m.]

100. Consulate's 91, June 15, 1 p. m. Avenol has today received a communication from the British Minister at Bern in which the British Government urges him to accept the Princeton invitation for the transfer of the technical services of the Secretariat. The Secretary General explained to the British Minister the position he had taken, namely, that he could not undertake to transfer to another country the technical sections unless their continued functioning as an international and intergovernmental organization could be insured and that for such a condition to be fulfilled he felt it essential to receive a formal invitation from the government of that country. He told the Minister that in view of this official step by a member state he would take the matter up with me. Accordingly Avenol has asked me to inquire whether our Government is prepared to extend such a formal invitation. An early reply would be appreciated.

TITTMANN

500.C/1018 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940—5 p. m.

74. Your 100, June 27, 7 p. m. The Department is not in a position to advise you that the Government could extend such an invitation.

To do so would, as Mr. Avenol has pointed out, involve an obligation to make possible the continued functioning of the technical services of an international and intergovernmental organization of which this government is not a member. We do not feel that we could assume such a responsibility without the approval of the Congress and we do not consider that it would be possible to seek the agreement of the Congress at this time.

As you well know, there are a number of political questions associated with the League of Nations and the activities of the United States Government in connection therewith. These questions are of such a nature that, in spite of the great interest of this government in the technical and non-political work of the League, serious doubt is held in the Department that the transfer of the technical sections to this country would be entirely understood and approved by members of the Congress and by large sections of the people of the United States.

HULL

500.C115/1417 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1940—4 p. m.

76. Your 98, June 23, noon. Please deliver the following message to Mr. Winant:

"I was glad to receive your message and I have discussed it with the President. I wish to assure you categorically that our decision with respect to the proposed transfer of part of the staff of the International Labor Office to the United States was in no sense a reflection upon the Office or upon your administration of it. We feel, however, that the Office is a part of an Organization which by its international character and the nature of its constitution must have an independent and autonomous status which could not be assured to it here without a thorough understanding of the situation by the Congress. I am sure that you will realize that we could not request such agreement at this time.

The transfer of the Office is a matter which is quite independent of the question of our membership. We recognize that recent developments have raised fundamental problems for the Organization and as a member we are prepared, in conjunction with the Department of Labor, to give them our careful consideration. In view of the fact, however, that over half of the members of the Governing Body are nationals of belligerent states or states that are under the domination of Germany, it would seem impossible to attempt any determination of the future role of the Organization at this time.

I know that you will appreciate the urgency and gravity of the issues which now confront us and that you will understand that all other problems must be subordinated to them."

HULL

500.C/1020 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, July 6, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 1:52 p. m.]

107. I had an occasion to talk with Avenol today who told me that it was his intention gradually to reduce the staff of the League of Nations to about 40 persons, to close the main building and to move the offices into the Library. The Secretary General said that he himself would like to resign now but that he felt it his duty to remain under present circumstances. He emphatically denied rumors current in Geneva to the effect that he was preparing to turn over the League to the totalitarian states should they indicate a desire to make use of it or that as a corollary to this he was endeavoring to force the resignation of all British nationals in the Secretariat. Avenol of course realizes that the future disposition of the League and its buildings is unpredictable but that his task is to maintain a nucleus in being as long as possible.

TITTMANN

500.C/1020 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1940—4 p. m.

78. Your 107, July 6, 11 a. m. When information is available, please telegraph an indication of the extent to which it is proposed to maintain the various activities of the Secretariat. In particular, will the League continue to register treaties and is it desired that we continue to transmit statistics regularly supplied by the Department of Commerce.

HULL

511.4A2A/972 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1940—5 p. m.

79. Your telegram no. 107, July 6, 11 a. m. Is the Department correct in assuming that Secretary General is continuing to supply adequate staff for the Permanent Central Opium Board and for Drug Supervisory Body? Keep the Department informed by telegraph should there be any indication that either of these bodies may be hampered by lack of staff or facilities.

HULL

500.C/1023 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, July 11, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received July 11—1:50 p. m.]

113. Department's telegram 78, July 9, 4 p. m. Avenol informs me that technical activities of the League (in particular the economic and financial intelligence service and opium) will be maintained as far as war conditions permit and as long as funds are available. He estimates that he has sufficient funds to carry on for another year.

The answer to last paragraph [*sentence*] of the Department's telegram is affirmative as regards both questions.

TITTMANN

500.C/1026

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr.,
of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1940.

Participants: Mr. Winfield Riefler, Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton, New Jersey;
Mr. James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations;
Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Riefler called to discuss the invitation extended to the League of Nations by certain institutions at Princeton to transfer the technical services of the League to Princeton. After giving his views on the desirability of effecting the transfer and the advantages which would accrue to the United States from such a step, Mr. Riefler said he thought that Mr. Avenol had raised legalistic objections which could be overcome if there existed a real desire to do so. He urged that the Department put the matter up to the Secretary General in such a way that he would be obliged either to make possible the transfer or clearly accept the responsibility for preventing it.

Mr. Dunn explained that Mr. Avenol had insisted that the League's technical sections could only be transferred here pursuant to a formal invitation from this Government which would insure their operation as a part of an international and intergovernmental organization. He said that we had informed the Secretary General that we were not prepared to issue such an invitation. He did not feel that the Department could reopen the question as the invitation of the Princeton group was a private one and of course this Government was not a member of the League. Mr. Dunn said that if the Princeton group

wished to approach the Secretary General again it was free to do so. He said he also felt that it was highly desirable that the technical sections of the League be preserved and that while he could not speak for the Government, he thought that if the Secretary General were willing to let the personnel of the technical sections come here temporarily to carry on research work but not to be controlled from Geneva or to operate as a branch of the League, we might be able to make the necessary arrangements.

Mr. Thompson pointed out the difficulty which would arise in connection with visas. The League officials would be coming for an indefinite period and could scarcely be considered temporary visitors. In addition the contract labor clause would apply. They could not qualify for visas as Government officials unless they were accredited to this Government and they could only receive diplomatic visas if they were on an official mission to this country.

Mr. Dunn said that the visa laws and regulations would have to be complied with. Before attempting to obtain a definite decision on this, however, it was agreed that the Princeton group might address another message to the Secretary General. It was made quite clear that the position of the Department was entirely reserved and that if arrangements were made for any of the League personnel to come to the United States, they would have to comply fully with the visa laws and regulations.

A copy of the draft message which Mr. Riefler proposes to send to the Secretary General in the name of the Princeton group is attached.²¹

500.C115/1430 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 14, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received July 14—11 : 50 a. m.]

2160. Winant informs me very confidentially that he proposes, with support of the Foreign Office here, to move International Labor Office to Canada if the Canadian Government is agreeable and that Massey²² is today telegraphing Ottawa recommending that an invitation be issued.

KENNEDY

²¹ For text of message sent July 12, 1940, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. III, July 1940–June 1941, p. 642.

²² Vincent Massey, Canadian High Commissioner at London.

500.C/1024 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, July 17, 1940—noon.

[Received July 17—11:29 a. m.]

119. Consulate's telegram No. 107, July 6, 11 a. m. I have been keeping in frequent contact with Avenol and other members of the Secretariat but they have been able to vouchsafe little of a factual character in regard to the future plans for the League and the whole situation remains extremely fluid and obscure. However one cannot ignore the rumors which have become more persistent in the last few days that a general liquidation of the League Secretariat is being considered. Among the higher officials of the Secretariat there is an obvious difference of opinion in regard to what should be done. Avenol, I feel, favors liquidation but he may be persuaded to defer to the desire of a number of the other officials who are anxious to hold the organization together somehow. Some of the latter find attractive the Princeton offer as a partial solution.²³

TITTMANN

511.4A2A/977 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, July 23, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received July 23—4:25 p. m.]

122. Consulate's 117, July 15, 2 p. m.²⁴ Felkin, Secretary of the Permanent Central Opium Board, now tells me that the Secretary General of the League of Nations has authorized him to state that it is his (the Secretary General's) continued intention to carry out the provisions of article 20 of the 1925 convention.²⁵ Both the Secretary General and the Treasurer are satisfied that funds amounting to a quarter of a million Swiss francs will be available for the work of the Board and supervisory body for the whole of 1941. Felkin adds that the staff is adequate for essential work and will be reinforced when this becomes necessary shortly.

The interest shown in the Department in the future of the opium control is greatly appreciated here and Felkin expresses the hope that in view of uncertainties here this interest will continue.

TITTMANN

²³ For text of cable dated July 26, 1940, from the Secretary General of the League of Nations to the President of Princeton University, accepting the Princeton offer, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. III, July 1940–June 1941, p. 644.

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LXXXI, p. 317.

500.C/1034 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

GENEVA, August 5, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 8:44 p. m.]

139. Consulate's number 136, August 2, 4 p. m.²⁶ I had a conversation with the Secretary General of the League of Nations today who told me that during his conversation with the Swiss Federal Councilors in Bern on August 2d Pilet-Golaz, President of Switzerland, had assured him that Switzerland had no intention of leaving the League of Nations and that the Germans so far had exerted no pressure whatsoever on the Swiss Government with regard to the League of Nations. While expressing hope that any action tending to raise the question of continued presence of League on Swiss territory could be avoided President of Switzerland stated that Swiss Government was anxious to have the Secretariat remain in Geneva and that it continues to be interested in technical work, especially opium. According to Avenol the Federal Councilors displayed throughout conversation friendly attitude toward the League of Nations and toward himself personally. . . .

TITTMANN

511.4A2A/987

*The Counselor of the British Embassy (Butler) to Mr. Samuel Reber
of the Division of European Affairs*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1940.

DEAR MR. REBER: As you will be aware, in June three institutions at Princeton cabled a generous invitation to the Secretary General of the League of Nations at Geneva offering to provide room at Princeton for all the technical services of the League; these, I believe, included health, economics, finance and opium. Since then, according to our information, the Secretary General has agreed that Loveday, who is head of the economics section, should proceed to Princeton with certain members of his staff.

My Ambassador²⁷ yesterday received two telegrams from the Foreign Office in London. One asked him to convey a message from Sir Atul Chatterjee, President of the Permanent Central Opium Board, to Mr. Herbert May, Vice President of the Board. It repeated to Mr. May the text of a telegram which Sir Atul had telegraphed to Felkin of the Opium Board in Geneva. The second telegram said that Lord

²⁶ Not printed.²⁷ Lord Lothian.

Halifax²⁸ would be grateful if Lord Lothian would ascertain informally from the State Department whether there would in fact be any objection to the Secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board coming to the United States.

Lord Halifax suggested that Lord Lothian should also let the State Department know informally that he was in favour of officials of the Supervisory Committee, as well as of the opium section of the League Secretariat, availing themselves of the Princeton invitation.

I should be very glad to get from you in due course any informal reactions of the State Department to the above, and would of course be very ready to come and talk to you about it at any time.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE BUTLER

511.4A2A/990

*Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of
European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1940.

After consultation with Mr. Long²⁹ and Mr. Fuller³⁰ I informed Mr. Butler orally that, in the Department's opinion, there were two problems presented by his letter.³¹

(1) The first relates to the Opium Section of the League Secretariat. The Department understood that the invention sent to the League by the three institutions of Princeton included the Opium Section. This was a private matter of which the Department had been informed but which concerned, in the first instance, the League and the organizations in Princeton. It was understood that members of the Economic Section of the League Secretariat had already accepted the invitation and were at present en route to the United States. The Department had no information to indicate whether the Opium Section would also avail itself of the Princeton invitation.

(2) With regard to the Permanent Central Opium Board, an organization entrusted with functions under the terms of a treaty to which the United States is a party, it is understood that the Princeton invitation had not included the Permanent Central Opium Board, the officers of which at the present time were discussing the future work of the Body. The Department has not yet been informed of their decision and no approach has yet been made to this Government in regard to the matter. Until such approach has been made the Department is not in a position to give a definite indication of its position.

²⁸ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²⁹ Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

³⁰ Stuart J. Fuller, Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

³¹ *Supra*.

Mr. Butler asked if he could be informed of the Department's views at some later date. I said that I would communicate with him as soon as any further information were available.

500.C/1040 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, August 15, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 10:44 p. m.]

149. Consulate's telegram No. 145, August 14, 5 p. m.³² Costa du Rels, President of the Council of the League of Nations and Bolivian delegate who I understand is in Geneva on behalf of several Latin American member states in order to watch developments in League circles, confirmed my feeling in a conversation last night that the British were doing all they could to have the League's technical services transferred to the United States contrary to the desire of Avenol; and that Hambro, the President of the Assembly, was supporting this move. He said that he thought that the Latin American States would not look with disfavor upon the possibility of the League operating in the United States but that they would not feel that it was compatible with the dignity of member states if it were generally regarded that the Secretariat were going there on sufferance with a status not unlike that of refugees. He intimated that this was an important psychological consideration insofar as Latin America was concerned.

Costa du Rels had been to Bern recently where the Swiss authorities had taken occasion to express to him their regret at the haste with which the League's services were apparently being dispersed but at the same time they had made it clear that they wished no formal meetings of any kind in connection with the League to take place in Geneva at the present time. The German Minister to Switzerland in a conversation with Costa du Rels also had shown surprise at the precipitate exit of the International Labor Office and of the economic and financial intelligence services of the League.

I understand that a League budget for 1941 is being prepared by Jacklin, the Treasurer, and that it will probably be discussed at the contemplated meeting of the Supervisory Commission at Lisbon in September.

TITTMANN

³² Not printed.

500.C115/1443 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, August 31, 1940—noon.

[Received 5 p. m.]

163. Gallois, in charge of ILO here, informs me that in reply to Winant's notification of the provisional transfer of a part of the personnel of the ILO to McGill University at Montreal the French Government expressed reservations concerning the partial transfer of the International Labor Office to a belligerent country and requested that the officials of French nationality be instructed to return to Geneva. Gallois states that no ILO French officials are yet in Montreal but that some are waiting passage at Lisbon. He intimated that he hoped to be able to prevail on the French Government to reconsider its position and allow them to proceed.

The Swiss Government also expressed reservations concerning transfer to a belligerent country but did not request that its nationals be recalled.³³

TITTMANN

500.C/1044 : Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, September 3, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 5:12 p. m.]

165. Lester, the Deputy Secretary General, has now assumed complete charge of the administration of the League of Nations as the result of the resignation of the Secretary General which became effective August 31. Avenol therefore has no further connection whatsoever with the League and has merely been given an office in the Library in order that he may wind up his personal affairs. Lester told me this morning that sufficient funds are available to carry on until the end of this year but that thereafter the financial situation is problematical. A budget for 1941 has been prepared and it is now necessary from a legal point of view to find some way to have it approved according to the constitution. Lester still hopes that it will be possible to hold a meeting of the supervisory body in Lisbon for this purpose but if that falls through approval might yet be effected through obtaining the approval of the individual members of the body for submission to the member states. Lester tells me very definitely that it is his intention to keep League of Nations Covenant in being and that insofar as he is concerned liquidation would only take place on the initiative of the member states.

TITTMANN

³³ By telegram No. 123, September 27, 5 p. m., the Department instructed the Consulate at Geneva to arrange to have the U. S. Labor Commissioner's office closed November 1 (500.C115/1448a).

511.4A2A/1008

The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Secretary Hull has requested me pointedly to bring one matter directly to your attention. Having failed to reach you on the telephone, I adopt this method of reaching your attention.

The Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body—derivatives of the League of Nations, but in effect agencies for the enforcement of opium control—are fearful of their ability to continue to function in Geneva. They desire to retire to the United States and to continue their function here, and propose to set up an office in New York for that purpose.

The continuance of their function contemplates the exercise of certain political power and a modified form of judicial power.

The United States Government and the people of the United States have always been interested in opium control. Secretary Morgenthau³⁴ has expressed the interest of his Department and his desire that it be done with the proviso that the operation might be postponed temporarily, say for the next month or so. Secretary Hull has asked me to say that he sees no objection to outweigh the interest which the Government and the people of the United States have in the continuance of the activity.

The two bodies concerned, through their spokesman, Mr. May, indicate that the restrictions upon the use of the mails and the difficulties of communication are hampering them in their work at Geneva. They feel that they could operate much more freely and effectively in a neutral country and particularly in this country.

Related to the proposal are the following facts:

(a) The International Labor Organization, also an unofficial offshoot of the League of Nations, moved to Canada instead of coming to this country in order to continue its functions.

(b) The Economic and Financial Section of the League and the Health and Opium Section (the latter an actual body of the League and the parent of the two bodies in question) have come to this country and have accepted the private invitation of Princeton University to continue their "studies" and to be provided facilities for that purpose on the campus at Princeton. They accepted the invitation after the Government had been informally advised but without the necessity for the American Government to take any action.

Considering the widespread interest in the United States in the control of opium and the official desire of the Government that the excellent work which has been done in the past shall not be jeopardized,

³⁴ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

Secretary Hull asked me to ascertain from you whether in your opinion the advantages to be derived from the continued functioning of these bodies outweighed any possible disadvantage—even temporary—which might ensue from the functioning on American soil of a political agency of the League of Nations.

If you approve, Mr. May might be informed that the United States does not desire to interpose an objection to the presence in the United States of the members of the committee and to the pursuit of their ordinary activities in connection with the suppression of the opium trade and that they may take up their temporary residence here together with a few of their necessary clerks during the fall of 1940.⁸⁵

Faithfully yours,

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

511.4A2A/1044: Telegram

The Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, December 18, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 9:05 p. m.]

233. For his guidance in making plans for the future of the opium work Lester, the Acting Secretary General of the League of Nations, would appreciate information regarding Department's consent to certain members of the staff of the [Permanent] Central Opium Board and of the Drug Supervisory Body going to the United States. He understands from May that one of the conditions is that the work should not be carried on at Princeton and that Washington instead has been suggested. He also understands that accommodations can be made available in Washington. For administrative reasons, particularly as related to economy and accounts, Lester would have preferred to have services concentrated at Princeton whence original invitation came but if Department has serious objections to Princeton he will agree. Lester is grateful for and appreciates all that is being done to help maintain opium services.

Any clarifications or suggestions on the subject that the Department might care to make would be welcome and helpful.

TITTMANN

⁸⁵ Marginal notation on original: "B. L. OK to come here but no expense to us. F. D. R."

On September 16, 1940, Mr. Long told Mr. May "that there would be no objection if some of the persons connected with the work of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body should come from Geneva to the United States and that we would give them visitors' visas." (511.4A2A/-1005)

511.4A2A/1045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Geneva (Tittmann)

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1940—9 p. m.

166. Your telegram no. 233, December 18, 6 p. m.

(1) Department authorized Bern to grant diplomatic visas for Steinig, Felkin, Renborg, Curry, Atzenwiler and Siebert. (Telegrams nos. 117, July 25, 5 p. m., 21, September 23, 6 p. m., 186, October 15, and 198, November 1.)³⁶ Steinig, Secretary Felkin and Statistician Blumenfeld are already here.

(2) Department has informed May as Vice President of Permanent Central Opium Board that the Department will raise no objection to the functioning through branch offices in the United States of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body as independent bodies operating under drug treaties to which the United States is a party.

(3) May states that neither board has been invited to go to Princeton. Department hopes that they will not be. It is understood that the League employes now at Princeton are engaged in continuing research and are not functioning administratively. In this connection see Department's telegram no. 74 of June 29, 5 p. m. The two drug boards are located in New York.³⁷

(4) You may inform Lester accordingly.

(5) For your information and guidance, the Department considers it preferable that the branch offices of the two drug boards should be entirely separate from other establishments in order to obviate any question of administrative functioning in the United States of international organizations operating under conventions to which the United States is not a party.

HULL

³⁶ None printed.

³⁷ By telegram no. 170, December 27, 4 p. m., the Department informed the Consul General that it was keeping in touch with the two drug boards through May in New York and that the boards had not yet opened offices in the United States (511.4A2A/1047).

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE ANTARCTIC ADVANCED
BY CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS¹

800.014 Antarctic/502

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

No. 718

BUENOS AIRES, May 29, 1940.

[Received June 13.]

SIR: Referring to the Embassy's despatch no. 538 of March 12, 1940² in regard to Argentine claims in the Antarctic, I have the honor to report that by a Presidential decree of May 20 last there has been created under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship a National Antarctic Commission. The announced purpose of the Commission will be to coordinate activities regarding matters connected with the protection and development of Argentine national interests in the Antarctic region and to make studies and recommendations on the subject.

I enclose clippings, with translations, from *La Prensa* of May 21 containing a news article reporting the decree aforementioned, and of May 22 containing an editorial commenting upon the establishment of the Commission.³

Respectfully yours,

NORMAN ARMOUR

800.014 Antarctic/534a

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Now that Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd has returned to the United States, I desire to bring to your attention his splendid achievement as Commanding Officer, The United States Antarctic Service. The Service, under his able direction and in pursuance of your instructions, has established two bases in the Antarctic regions, and active scientific and economic investigations at each base are either now being carried out or will be initiated as soon as weather conditions permit. The establishment of these bases, together with the noteworthy flights made by Admiral Byrd early this year, which resulted in the discovery of a great extent of hitherto unknown

¹ For previous correspondence regarding reservation by the United States of American rights in this region, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 1 ff.

² Not printed.

³ None printed.

stretches of the Antarctic coast, goes far towards strengthening any territorial claims which the United States may desire to make in the American segment of the Antarctic Continent. In this connection it should be observed that West Base is situated in an area which has been claimed by New Zealand, although American activities have been extensive in that general region, and that East Base is in an area claimed by Great Britain. The United States has never recognized either British or New Zealand sovereignty in the Antarctic areas claimed by those Governments.

The accomplishments of the Antarctic Service to date have been chiefly due to the generous and loyal spirit in which Admiral Byrd placed his experienced services at the disposal of his Government, as well as to the efficient teamwork which his qualities of leadership inspired in the men under his command. The operations of The United States Antarctic Service have been a credit to the Government of the United States.

In addition to his services in the Antarctic, I also desire to bring to your attention the extent to which Admiral Byrd fostered goodwill for the United States during his sojourn in Chile. Ambassador Bowers has sent me the most glowing reports of the cordial reception given Admiral Byrd by the Chilean Government and people, and the excellent impression he made upon them as a representative citizen of this country.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

800.014 Antarctic/546

The Minister in Australia (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 28

CANBERRA, September 18, 1940.

[Received October 11.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction dated April 30, 1940⁴ and addressed to the American Consular Officer in Charge, Sydney, with reference to the limits of longitude of certain Antarctic lands. The Department desired knowledge of the authority for the limits as furnished by the Commonwealth Government to the Royal Geographic Society and published by it in the *Geographical Journal*, September, 1939.

The matter was taken up with the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, who has supplied the answer to the Department's direct question in a letter dated September 18, 1940, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. The enclosures to that letter, a copy of the Acceptance Act of 1933 and a copy of an Order in Council of August 14, 1936, are supplied in single copy only. The following additional information was supplied orally:

⁴Not printed.

The original Act simply accepted for the Commonwealth Government a strip of land extending from 45 degrees E. to 160 degrees E., with the exception of Adelie Land, a strip recognized as French but which had not been delimited by agreement or otherwise. Agreement was reached with the French Government in January 1938 as to the limits of Adelie Land. The subsequent naming of the limits of the six other lands included within the scope of the original Act was undertaken with no other purpose than to show on the latest map the work which was believed, after much investigation and study, to have been accomplished by each individual explorer. The discoveries are shown in small italics on the Commonwealth Government's map of Antarctica which was enclosed with despatch no. 690, dated February 28, 1940, from the American Consul General at Sydney.⁵ The names assigned to the various lands have therefore no political significance.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. GAUSS

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs (Hodgson) to the First Secretary of the American Legation in Australia (Minter)

CANBERRA, September 18, 1940.

DEAR MINTER: With reference to the letter of 30th April, 1940, addressed to the American Consular Officer in Charge, Sydney, concerning the delimitation of various areas in the Australian Antarctic Territory, I desire to inform you that, in April 1939, the Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society was informed that the Commonwealth Government had assigned the following limits to the "lands" in the Australian Antarctic Territory.

Enderby Land	45° - 55° E.
Kemp Land	55° - 60° E.
MacRobertson Land	60° - 73° E.
Princess Elizabeth Land	73° - 86° E.
Kaiser Wilhelm II Land	86° - 91° E.
Queen Mary Land	91° -102° E.
Wilkes Land	102° -136° E.

The limits mentioned above were formally determined by the Department of External Affairs on 18th January, 1939, in pursuance of the authority to administer the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933 vested in it by Order in Council made by His Excellency the Governor-General on the 13th day of August, 1936, which

⁵ Not printed.

was published in the *Commonwealth of Australia Gazette* on Friday, 14th August, (*Gazette* No. 67 of 1936). Copies of the Act and Order in Council are enclosed herewith.

Yours sincerely,

W. R. HODGSON

800.014 Antarctic/548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State

SANTIAGO, [November 7, 1940—5 p. m.]

[Received 6:55 p. m.]

265. Mora ⁶ today handed me a note setting forth claims and expectations of Chile in the polar region saying he assumed that our position is for the purpose of heading off claims of a European character and that Chile is taking this step on the assumption that Argentina will do something of the sort. Note will be sent by pouch Sunday.⁷

BOWERS

800.014 Antarctic/550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

BUENOS AIRES, November 9, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 12:11 p. m.]

534. The Argentine press devotes considerable space to press despatches from Santiago following the announcement of Chile's claims in the Antarctic.

La Nación today quotes the Argentine Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs as stating that the Chilean Government had given Argentina information on its claims and had proposed the establishment of two technical committees to study Antarctic problems and to reach a friendly agreement on any differences which might arise. The Argentine National Antarctic Committee will meet today to consider the channel claims.

⁶ Marcial Mora, Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Despatch No. 957, November 9, 1940, not printed. Enclosed with the despatch was a copy of note of November 7 from the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the Chilean Government favored the desire of the United States to study on mutually satisfactory bases the possibilities of developing and utilizing the natural resources to be found in Antarctic regions. There was also enclosed a copy of a Chilean decree of November 6, 1940, setting forth Chilean Antarctic claims as follows:

[Translation] "Chilean Antarctica or Chilean Antarctic Territory comprises all lands, islands, keys, reefs, ice-packs and all other discovered and to be discovered [territory] and the respective territorial sea, existing between the limits of the area falling between meridian 53° longitude west of Greenwich and 90° longitude west of Greenwich." (800.014 Antarctic/533)

On November 12, the Chilean Ambassador, under instructions from his Government, presented a copy of this decree to the Secretary of State (800.014 Antarctic/552).

A somewhat blunt and naturalistic [*nationalistic*] editorial in *La Prensa* states that in the Antarctic area Argentina has undisputed claims which are set forth in detail and the editorial calls on the Government to study the Chilean decree closely with a view to protecting Argentina's interests. Air mail despatch follows.⁸

ARMOUR

800.014 Antarctic/556

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

No. 1543

BUENOS AIRES, November 15, 1940.

[Received November 22.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch no. 1524 of November 9, 1940⁹ with reference to Argentina's attitude toward the Chilean Government's decree of November 6, 1940 by which Chile claimed sovereignty over certain Antarctic regions, I have the honor to enclose the text, with translation,¹⁰ of a note addressed by the Argentine Government to the Chilean Government on November 12, 1940, accepting Chile's suggestion for a meeting of the competent authorities of both countries to consider their respective claims.

It will be observed from the note that Argentina bases its claim to the Antarctic areas in question on, 1) continuous occupation through maintenance of an observatory in the South Orkneys established 37 years ago; 2) certain expeditions made by its Navy, and 3) the geographic proximity of the area to the archipelago of the Falkland Islands which it asserts "is also part of our national territory".

The note refers to a communication which the Argentine Government addressed to the British Government on September 11, 1940 suggesting that an international conference be held to establish the juridical-political status of the Antarctic region, and to another communication which it sent on March 9, 1940 to the Government of the United States¹⁰ regarding its claims in that region. The note concludes

"the Argentine Government understands that the situation created by the unilateral claims to zones of the Antarctic made by various States, to which Chilean claims are now added, can be satisfactorily settled from an international point of view only by means of a conference of the interested States and through an agreement among them on the basis of their just claims and rights. With the aggregate of antecedents supporting its claims, the Argentine Government could doubtless have adopted a similar attitude had it not considered that a unilateral act would in no way have strengthened this claim. From

⁸ Despatch No. 1524, November 9, not printed.

⁹ Not printed; see telegram No. 534, November 9, 11 a. m., *supra*.

¹⁰ Not printed.

this same point of view it cannot consider the Chilean claim without reservations, although this does not imply any intention to deprive that friendly nation of its rights to a portion of the region in question.

"Fortunately the explanation which the Chilean Government gave after the issuance of its declaration, in the sense that the competent authorities of both countries could enter into contact in order to reach a solution taking into consideration the aspirations of both nations, will enable us, within the best tradition of our relations, to revise and settle by common agreement the limit which is to define our just claims. The Argentine Government therefore accepts the friendly suggestion of the Chilean Government in the hope that the agreement which may be reached will also serve to guarantee the rights of both countries with respect to the other interested nations."

Respectfully yours,

NORMAN ARMOUR

800.014 Antarctic/555 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1940—5 p. m.

205. Personal from the Under Secretary. Please thank Bianchi¹² for his friendly courtesy in informing you of the memorandum by which the Japanese Government reserves its rights in the Antarctic. You may mention to him entirely informally that I believe it might be advisable from the viewpoint of the joint interests of all the American republics to mention in acknowledgment to the Japanese Chargé, if Bianchi has not made acknowledgment and expects to do so, that acknowledgment of the Japanese memorandum is not to be construed as any recognition of Japanese claimed rights in the Antarctic. [Welles.]

HULL

800.014 Antarctic/565

The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State

No. 1027

SANTIAGO, December 7, 1940.

[Received December 13.]

SIR: With reference to my despatch No. 973 of November 16, 1940,¹³ concerning Chilean claims in the Antarctic, I have the honor to forward a copy of a note and translation thereof which the Chilean Government sent to the Argentine Government on December 3,¹³ inviting the latter to initiate studies on the subject and offering the hospitality of Santiago for eventual joint discussions.

The continued interest in the Antarctic is indicated by the fact that Señor Julio Bustos Navarette, Director of the Chilean Govern-

¹² Manuel Bianchi, Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹³ Not printed.

ment Observatory at Salto, delivered a lecture recently at the University of Chile on the importance of the Antarctic for Chile. Dr. Bustos, who limited himself almost entirely to discussing the region concerned as a field for meteorological experiment, paid high tribute to the studies made there by the Byrd Expedition.

Respectfully yours,

CLAUDE G. BOWERS

[In his despatch No. 1151, February 6, 1941, the Ambassador in Chile transmitted to the Department a note of January 23, 1941, from the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Ambassador's note of December 10, 1940, presented on the basis of instructions of December 2. No definite assurance was given to the proposals of the United States regarding arrangements for participation by the American Republics in the development of the resources of the Antarctic or for calling a meeting of those Republics most directly interested. The Department decided to make no further approach to the Chilean Government since no immediate practical objective was involved. (800.014 Antarctic/584, 603)]

STATUS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEBTS OWED THE UNITED STATES BY REASON OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR¹

[For exchanges of correspondence in connection with amounts due the United States under arrangements effected by the World War Foreign Debt Commission, see Department of State *Bulletin*, as follows:

Belgium: June 15, 1940, page 654; December 21, 1940, page 566.

Estonia: June 15, 1940, page 655.

Finland: June 15, 1940, page 651; December 7, 1940, page 501.

France: June 15, 1940, page 648; December 21, 1940, page 567.

Hungary: June 15, 1940, page 652; December 21, 1940, page 569.

Italy: June 15, 1940, page 650; December 21, 1940, page 570.

Latvia: June 15, 1940, page 655.

Lithuania: June 15, 1940, page 656.

Poland: June 15, 1940, page 657; December 21, 1940, page 571.

Rumania: June 15, 1940, page 658; December 21, 1940, page 572.

United Kingdom (Great Britain): June 15, 1940, page 649; December 21, 1940, page 568.

Yugoslavia: June 15, 1940, page 651; December 21, 1940, page 572.

In view of governmental conditions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, no statements of sums due and payable December 15, 1940, were rendered to those countries. The amount scheduled to be paid by Finland December 15, 1940, was postponed under the option of postponement extended to Finland by Public Resolution No. 84, 76th Congress, approved June 15, 1940 (54 Stat. 398).]

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, p. 51.

FUNCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE PROMOTION OF AMERICAN TRADE

166.091/52a

*Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹

[WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1940.

The following is offered as of interest to foreign Government agencies, and to foreign business individuals and concerns, who may desire to purchase goods produced or manufactured in the United States of America, and who may not be fully acquainted with the character of the work performed by American Government agencies in placing foreign purchasers in touch with American suppliers.

American diplomatic and consular officers are instructed to keep constantly on the alert to submit reports on trade opportunities. When such opportunities arise, the officers transmit them, with all the information obtainable (including, if possible, the exact specifications of the articles desired) to the Department of State at Washington, which sends them without delay to the Department of Commerce. The latter disseminates the information to American traders and manufacturers.

Any American trader or manufacturer is at liberty to interest himself in foreign trade opportunities or not. The responsibility of the Government agencies ceases after the information relating to opportunities has been collected abroad, transmitted to Washington, and made available to the American business world. It is then for American business concerns, if interested, to get in touch with the organizations or individuals abroad who desire to be supplied.

American Government agencies cannot undertake to urge American suppliers to interest themselves in trade opportunities. To do so would tend to make this Government responsible for their successful outcome. The preparation of the estimates and of correspondence which results from an active interest in a trade opportunity naturally involves expense. A prospective supplier must be free to judge whether from his point of view the incurring of such expense is justifiable.

¹This memorandum was transmitted by the Chief of the Division (Murray) to the Chargé in Iran (Engert) in a letter of January 30. Mr. Murray stated that the memorandum had been shown to the Commercial Office of the Department and to officials of the Department of Commerce and had their informal approval.

This consideration applies of course with even more force to the necessity Government agencies are under to refrain from urging American business men to invest funds and to devote efforts to the production and supply of goods for foreign account. Here again, the manufacturer must be free to decide whether to supply or not to supply, since he it is who furnishes the necessary effort and capital, and he alone suffers loss if the transaction turns out badly.

In brief, American business operates by private initiative and private responsibility. As regards foreign commerce, the Government serves business by transmitting to it trade information. The Government's agents, in other words, form a connecting link between foreign Government agencies, foreign business concerns or business men, and American suppliers, nothing less and nothing more. In consequence, Governmental or other organizations abroad who wish to encourage American suppliers to interest themselves in trade opportunities, to expedite action in regard thereto, or to arrange details, will find it to their advantage to communicate directly with the suppliers concerned, or else to utilize their own agencies in this country or any other agencies that may be open to them, for these purposes.

In order that American suppliers may participate in foreign adjudications, enough time must be allowed so that they may have an opportunity to receive the specifications, to formulate their respective offers, and to communicate them.

Except in the few instances where bids are invited on commodities subject to well-known standards, American suppliers naturally are not in a position to draw up estimates and to submit offers until the complete specifications are received.

The American producing system has been built up gradually by free enterprise and competition and at present supplies the needs of the 135,000,000 people who now live in continental United States.

Most of the products are designed for use in all parts of the country, which varies greatly from place to place in climate, altitude, land forms, vegetation, et cetera. Consequently these products, not being designed for a restricted set of conditions, are suitable for use in most localities abroad.

By and large, the American public has always formed a "quality market" rather than a "price market", for the reason that true economy is considered to result from the purchase of products of sound design and construction which are durable to a high degree. It has been possible to manufacture goods of high quality, to pay relatively high wages to labor, and to place the goods on the market at reasonable prices owing to the economies that result from mass production for the large domestic market.

EUROPE

DENMARK

ESTABLISHMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF A PROVISIONAL CONSULATE IN GREENLAND

125.0059 B/4

*Memorandum by Mr. Ralph W. S. Hill of the Office of the
Legal Adviser*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1940.

A question is raised as to whether this Government can send a consular officer to Greenland.

The Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Denmark of 1826¹ which, with the exception of Article V, is still in force between the two countries, provides in Articles VIII and IX as follows:

(Art. VIII) "To make more effectual the protection which the United States and His Danish Majesty shall afford in future to the navigation and commerce of their respective citizens and subjects, they agree mutually to receive and admit Consuls and Vice-Consuls in all the ports open to foreign commerce, who shall enjoy in them all the rights, privileges and immunities of the Consuls and Vice-Consuls of the most favoured nation, each contracting party, however, remaining at liberty to except those ports and places in which the admission and residence of such Consuls may not seem convenient."

(Art. IX) "In order that the Consuls and Vice-Consuls of the contracting parties may enjoy the rights, privileges and immunities which belong to them by their public character, they shall, before entering on the exercise of their functions, exhibit their commission or patent in due form to the Government to which they are accredited; and having obtained their exequatur, which shall be granted gratis, they shall be held and considered as such by all the authorities, magistrates and inhabitants in the consular district in which they reside."

These treaty provisions, which are binding upon the two countries, regulate the manner in which their respective consular officers may be sent and received. It will be observed under Article IX that in order for consuls or vice consuls to enjoy their rights, privileges and immunities, they must, before entering upon the exercise of their functions, exhibit their commission or patent in due form to the Govern-

¹ Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 3, p. 239.

ment to which they are accredited and that having obtained their exequatur, they shall be considered "as such" by the authorities, et cetera, in the district in which they reside. In other words, before an American consular officer in Danish territory to which consuls may be sent can enter into his consular functions, his commission must be submitted to the appropriate authorities of the Danish Government and an exequatur issued to him.

By article VIII the two parties agree mutually to receive consuls and vice consuls in all ports "open to foreign commerce". It is further agreed that each party remains at liberty to except those ports and places in which admission and residence of consuls may not be convenient. It is apparent, therefore, that the United States has specifically recognized by treaty that Denmark, as well as this Government, may reserve ports and places to which consuls may not be sent. Furthermore, Article VI of the Convention expressly provides that the Convention shall not apply to the northern possessions of Denmark including, among others, Greenland, and reserves the right to regulate the direct intercourse with these possessions and places. Therefore, it seems that the United States has by treaty recognized the right of Denmark to regulate direct intercourse with Greenland.

It is understood from information furnished by the European Division that Greenland is a Danish colony and that its trade is a monopoly of Denmark, its ports not being open to foreign commerce. In this connection, reference may be made to an inquiry made of the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen on August 17, 1939,² acting under instructions from the Department, as to whether the consular jurisdiction of the American Consul General at Copenhagen was recognized as extending over Greenland. In reply, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a note dated August 22, 1939,² stated that the said functions in the opinion of the Ministry did not extend over Greenland. The Minister also stated that "trade with Greenland is a Danish Government monopoly" and added that "it is the sentiment of the Ministry that it is incompatible with the special situation of Greenland resulting from this fact and from the rules in force for travelling to and in Greenland to extend consular functions over Greenland."

In view of the foregoing treaty provisions and the status of Greenland, it is believed that an American consular officer could not formally function in Greenland without the assent of the Danish Government being obtained, with which we continue to maintain diplomatic relations.

² Not printed.

It might be possible, should the exigencies of a situation require, for this Government to send someone informally to Greenland where, so long as he was not sent out by the authorities he could remain and perform such functions as may be permitted there by these authorities.

125.0059 B/4

*Memorandum by Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of the Division of
European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1940.

Under normal circumstances the procedure to be followed in establishing an American consular office in a foreign country is quite clear. Application would be made through the American diplomatic mission for provisional recognition of the consular officer concerned. Subsequently he would transmit his commission to the appropriate foreign authority and receive his formal exequatur.

During 1939, in reply to inquiry addressed to the Danish Foreign Office, we were informed that in view of the special status of Greenland the jurisdiction of the American Consul General at Copenhagen was not considered to extend over Greenland; that in fact there was no record of any application having been made of the Danish Government by a foreign government for permission to establish a consulate in Greenland.

It may be assumed, therefore, that should a request now be made of the Danish Government for recognition of an American consular officer in Greenland, such application would be refused. However, if, as is understood to be the case, the policy of the United States Government is to consider the Danish Sovereign and Government as unable under present circumstances to exercise their authority in Danish possessions beyond the seas, there would seem to be no necessity, either from the standpoint of policy or as a practical matter, to approach the Danish Government itself with regard to recognition of an American consular officer having jurisdiction in Greenland.

The Danish Sovereign and Government being unable, in the view of the United States Government, to exercise their authority in Greenland, this Government would appear to be complying to the extent practicable with customary international usage if it sought and obtained provisional permission for the establishment of a consulate in Greenland from the local authorities in Greenland. In the absence of information to the contrary it may be presumed that these authorities are now in *de facto* control of the Greenland administration.

Since there appears to be no single official exercising authority in Greenland (other than the Director of the Greenland Administration residing in Copenhagen and now unable to fulfill his functions due to

the military occupation of Denmark by German troops) it would seem that the *de facto* authority in Greenland is now vested jointly in the Resident Commissioners for the Provinces of North Greenland and South Greenland.

125.0059 B/2a

The Secretary of State to the Danish Minister (Kauffmann)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1940.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that in view of existing circumstances the United States Government desires temporarily to establish a consulate in Greenland.

I would appreciate being informed whether the provisional establishment of such an office would be satisfactory and whether provisional recognition might be given to the consul to be placed in charge whose jurisdiction would extend over all of Greenland.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

859 B.01/170

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1940.

The Canadian Minister⁴ came in this morning, at my request.

I said that in accordance with the understanding reached between him and Mr. Dunn,⁵ I wished to inform him of the steps we were considering with respect to Greenland. We had asked the Danish Minister whether it would be satisfactory to send a consul to Greenland. We understood that he was communicating with the Greenland councils in respect to this request. Such information as we had indicated that the advice would probably be favorable and in that case we would send the consul.

I stated, further, that yesterday the Danish Minister had come to the Department and had shown us a copy of the press release announcing the formation of a Greenland Committee. He had asked whether we had any objections or observations, and I had replied that we had no advice to offer. We saw no reason to object; on the other hand, we did not see that it was any affair of ours.

The Minister thanked me for the information. He said he was particularly interested in the announcement of the Greenland Committee. The Danish Minister had spoken to him, indicating that the formation of the Committee had the "approval" of the United States Govern-

⁴ Loring C. Christie.

⁵ James C. Dunn, Advisor on Political Relations.

ment, but had so put the matter that he, Mr. Christie, was not clear whether that meant affirmative approval or merely the fact that we saw no reason why we should interfere in the matter. The statement made had cleared that question up. He said he would promptly report this to Ottawa, lest any nervousness appear there.

He asked whether we understood that the Committee could have any political functions. I said that I did not see how it possibly could have any such functions; that as I understood it this was a committee of Danes or their friends, who merely wished to act in an advisory capacity in connection with any special needs of Greenland which might arise. However, I said, this was entirely a matter for the Danish Minister.

So far as political authority was concerned, I said, we were proceeding on the theory that such political functions as there were resided in the Greenland councils and their governors, who were now cut off from the Copenhagen government by reason of the occupation.

Mr. Christie observed that this was his view, also. He saw no reason, for instance, why the Danish consul in Canada, if he took the same line as de Kauffmann, might not constitute a similar committee, or why a trade commissioner might not be sent to represent the Canadian interests. To this I made no comment, except to observe that I presumed the Danish authorities of Greenland were free to make their own arrangements in Canada.

In leaving, the Canadian Minister asked whether we had been consulted as to the personnel of the Greenland Committee. I said we had not; that I had known of its membership for the first time when the Danish Minister had presented his proposed press release. We had not been consulted nor had we taken any part in the formation of the Committee.

The Canadian Minister said that this was his understanding, also, and he was very glad to have it confirmed.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

125.0059 B/3

The Danish Minister (Kauffmann) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1940.

SIR: In your note of April 26th you have informed me that in view of the existing circumstances the United States Government is desirous temporarily to establish a consulate in Greenland, and you have asked me whether the provisional establishment of such an office would be satisfactory and whether provisional recognition might be given to the consul to be placed in charge, with jurisdiction over all of Greenland.

In reply I have the honor to inform you on behalf of the Governors of Northern and Southern Greenland, to whom the matter has been duly submitted by me, that the Greenland Government will feel honored to receive a United States' consular representative in Greenland and will be pleased to grant him provisional recognition in this capacity.

The Governors have asked me to convey to you their sincere appreciation of, and their gratitude for, the interest in the welfare of Greenland shown by the United States Government, in establishing such consular office; as well as for the helpful and understanding general attitude of the United States towards Greenland's problems in the present emergency.

I avail myself [etc.]

HENRIK KAUFFMANN

859B.01/172

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1940.

Supplementing his conversation with me of this morning, Mr. Reid ⁶ telephoned this afternoon and said that he had received an inquiry by telephone from Ottawa as to the procedure we had followed in getting the consent of the Greenland authorities for the opening of an American Consulate at Godthaab, and the form of credentials we would give our Consul, Mr. Penfield.

I told Mr. Reid that we had inquired of the Danish Minister in Washington whether the provisional establishment of an American Consulate in Greenland would be satisfactory, and had received from him a note saying that he had taken the matter up with the Governors of Greenland who said that they would welcome the establishment of such an office and the consular officers assigned to that office.

I told Mr. Reid that in our opinion this constituted provisional recognition of Consul Penfield and Vice Consul West, and that we had no present intention of going any further and having them request of the Greenland authorities formal recognition and the issuance of an exequatur. I also said that we were not at all sure that it would be necessary to issue formal assignment commissions to the two officers concerned, and in fact would have some difficulty in finding the appropriate wording to insert in such commissions if issued.

In reply to my question, Mr. Reid said that he was uncertain whether Ottawa wanted the foregoing information in connection with the assignment of a Canadian Consul or a Canadian Trade Commis-

⁶ Escott Reid, Second Secretary of the Canadian Legation.

sioner, but had been told that he would be given definite information to transmit to us by the end of the week.

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125.422 H/9a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1940—5 p. m.

192. The Minister of Denmark in Washington has informed us that some question has arisen in the Danish Foreign Office regarding the action of this Government in sending American consular officers to Greenland without beforehand obtaining exequatur for them from the Government of Denmark.⁷ We assume, however, that as the American Consulate at Godthaab was established on a provisional basis only, the Foreign Office has in mind the question of "provisional recognition" of the American consular officers sent to Greenland and not the question of formal exequatur for them.

This Government has of course taken no action which would impair the validity of the Declaration made by the Secretary of State on August 4, 1916⁸ to the effect that no objection would be made to the extension by the Danish Government of its political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland. The occupation of Denmark during April 1940 by the armed forces of a belligerent nation, which forces are still in military control of the Continental territories of the Kingdom including the seat of the Royal Government, did, however, create a new situation with respect to Greenland requiring consideration by the Government of the United States. A full appraisal of all the facts upon which such consideration could be based was handicapped by the disruption, and for a time the severance, of direct communication between this Government and its representatives in Copenhagen as a result of the military occupation of Denmark by foreign troops.

During this period the authorities in Greenland on their own initiative, expressing their concern over the effect upon Greenland of the course of events in Denmark by which Greenland had been deprived of free communication with Copenhagen, of the possibility of obtaining food and other supplies for the Greenland population, and of facilities for placing Greenland exports on the Danish market, approached the Government of the United States.

⁷ Mr. J. K. Penfield, instructed by the Department of State on May 7, 1940, to proceed to Godthaab to establish an American Consulate, arrived there May 22. On May 27 and July 1 the Governors of North Greenland and South Greenland, respectively, authorized Penfield, Consul, and George L. West, Vice Consul, to perform consular services in these regions.

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 700.

In response to this approach the United States Government, in agreement with the Greenland authorities, concluded that the numerous questions arising with respect to the welfare and needs of the inhabitants of Greenland and of Greenland's exports to the United States could, from a practical standpoint, best be met through the provisional establishment of an American Consulate in Greenland. The establishment of this office will not operate to the injury of any legitimate interests.

In your discretion and when a suitable occasion arises you should orally bring the foregoing to the attention of the appropriate official of the Foreign Office.

WELLES

125.422 H/13

The Chargé in Denmark (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

No. 221

COPENHAGEN, August 7, 1940.

[Received September 9.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegrams No. 192, July 27, 5 p. m. and No. 196, July 30, 6 p. m., and to the Legation's reply thereto, No. 443, August 1, 4 p. m.,⁹ on the subject of the establishment in Greenland of an American Consulate upon a provisional basis.

In accordance with the Department's instruction, I left in the Foreign Office on July 31st a memorandum of the information contained in the Department's telegram of July 27, 5 p. m. A copy of this memorandum is respectfully enclosed herewith.¹⁰

Inasmuch as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Under-Secretary were both engaged in a conference, it was suggested in the Foreign Office that I call upon Mr. Hvass, Chief of Protocol. After reading the contents of the memorandum, Mr. Hvass stated that he noted the contents thereof, particularly the statement that the Consulate in Greenland had been established on a provisional basis. He also noted with appreciation the declaration that the establishment of a Consulate would not operate to the injury of any legitimate interests.

Since leaving the memorandum with Mr. Hvass, I have received no further communication upon the subject of Greenland from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Respectfully yours,

MAHLON F. PERKINS

⁹ Telegrams Nos. 196 and 443 not printed.

¹⁰ Not printed.

125.422 H/11 : Telegram

The Chargé in Denmark (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

COPENHAGEN, August 17, 1940—noon.

[Received August 17—11:10 a. m.]

471. Referring to Department's telegram No. 196, July 30, 6 p. m. Following *note verbale* dated August 16, 1940, received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the memorandum of the American Chargé d'Affaires under date of July 31 referring to the establishment of an American Consulate in Greenland.

The Ministry take note of the declaration contained in the said memorandum to the effect that this action of the United States Government had not in any way imperiled the validity of the declaration made by the Secretary of State on August 4, 1916 concerning the Danish rights over Greenland.

The Danish Government wish to express their sincere appreciation of the humanitarian motives which have prompted the American Government to come to the assistance of the Greenland population under the present abnormal circumstances and to provide them with supplies of such foodstuffs and other necessities which may be lacking as a consequence of the cessation of direct communication between Denmark and Greenland.

The fact mentioned in the said memorandum that telegraphic communication between the State Department and the American Legation at Copenhagen was interrupted by the entry of foreign troops on Danish soil explains why the American Government have thought fit to dispense with formality of the recognition of the newly appointed consuls in order to expedite the relief actions.

As the communication between the American Government and its Legation in Copenhagen has now been reestablished and functions normally the Danish Government expect that the American Government will in future if wishing to undertake further measures in connection with the provisioning of Greenland submit such plans to the Danish Government through the channel of the American Legation in Copenhagen.

The Danish Government note with satisfaction the assurances given in the memorandum that the Consulate at Godthaab has been established on a provisional basis and will not operate to the injury of any legitimate interests."

PERKINS

859B.01/293

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1940.

The Danish Minister came in to see me today at his request. The principal object of his visit was to say that he had prepared a report for the Danish Government covering Greenland matters. He realized

that the Danish Government was so closely in German hands that anything he wrote must be assumed to reach German sources as well as his own Government. Accordingly he was giving a straight factual summary and letting matters go at that.

He said, however, that he wished to be reassured as to our own line in respect to Greenland.

Originally we had dealt directly with the Greenland Government, through him, without going through Copenhagen. Since our advice to the Copenhagen Government that we had appointed consuls in Greenland—which had been explained by a lack of communications—the Danish Government had indicated that it expected Greenland matters in the future to be taken up through Copenhagen. He wondered whether we had changed our line in this respect.

I said at once that we had not.

We recognized the sovereignty and independence of Denmark; but we recognized that the Danish Government, being within the lines of the German military occupation, was not in a position to exercise full sovereignty. On the other hand, the elements of the Danish Government which lay outside those lines, and which chose to do so, were in a position to act autonomously. On no other theory, I said, could we recognize the neutrality of Greenland; for if Greenland were being controlled from Denmark it would obviously be under the control of a belligerent, namely Germany. Accordingly, we were forced to make a distinction between our dealings with Greenland which went direct, so long as Greenland undertook to maintain its full independence of action, and our dealings with Copenhagen. I pointed out that were Greenland to be recognized as under the control of the German-occupied Copenhagen, it would be difficult for us to object if the British or the Germans undertook to occupy it.

The Danish Minister seemed satisfied with this.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF MEASURES FOR THE DEFENSE OF GREENLAND AFTER THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF DENMARK ¹¹

859B.01/143

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1940.

The British Ambassador ¹² called at my request. I said that I thought it would be well in the interest of both countries to bring

¹¹ For correspondence regarding the establishment by the United States of a provisional Consulate in Greenland, see pp. 343 ff.

¹² Marquess of Lothian.

the Greenland situation up to date as it related to the Monroe Doctrine from the standpoint of this Government; that there was already propaganda by anti-British or pro-German individuals and by extreme isolationists demanding some expression as to the attitude of my Government on this question; that this will probably increase to the harm of the United States and Great Britain as well.

I then recalled President Monroe's message announcing the Monroe Doctrine to the effect that it covered this hemisphere without qualification. I referred to the fact that, in 1916, when this Government purchased the Danish West Indies,¹³ it recognized the right of Denmark to exercise sovereignty over Greenland;¹⁴ that later when called upon to do likewise, Great Britain stated that it would agree to the same proposition, provided Denmark would notify Great Britain in case it should be disposed to alienate or dispose of Greenland; thereupon this Government intervened and denied the right of any third government to reserve or have the right to purchase or otherwise obtain sovereignty over Greenland, and Great Britain agreed that Denmark might exercise complete sovereignty over Greenland. However, while abandoning the first condition, Great Britain reserved the privilege of requesting that it be informed in case of the proposed alienation of Greenland by Denmark.

I stated that there is the express application of the Monroe Doctrine by this country regarding Greenland; and that there appeared to be no serious question about Greenland forming a general part of this hemisphere as contra-distinguished from the European side of the Atlantic.

The Ambassador seemed very much interested in the matter, and we both agreed that a record in writing of the position of the United States Government should be made and also of the correspondence between the two Governments in its entirety. I accordingly sent the Ambassador by personal messenger, after he had left the office, a memorandum of our conversation (copy attached ¹⁵).

The Ambassador treated the matter in the friendliest spirit and incidentally remarked that, of course, this could be worked out without friction or serious discussion.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹³ Convention Between the United States and Denmark for the Cession of the Danish West Indies, signed August 4, 1916, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 694.

¹⁴ Declaration by the Secretary of State accompanying cession convention, *ibid.*, p. 700.

¹⁵ Not printed.

859B.01/140

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1940.

The Minister of Canada ¹⁶ came in at my request. I proceeded to review the course of the relations of this Government, and to a certain extent of the British Government, with Greenland and the Danish sovereignty over it. I called attention to the agreement of this Government with Denmark when it purchased the Danish West Indies to the effect that it recognized the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland. I then referred to the action of the British Government, when requested to do likewise, in imposing a condition that Great Britain was to be notified by Denmark in the event Denmark should have under consideration the alienation of Greenland; also the agreement of the British later on to abandon this condition. I then pointed out the gist of the notice given by this Government to the Government of Great Britain on June 5, 1920,¹⁷ to the effect that this Government was not disposed to recognize the existence in a third government of a right to acquire the territory of Greenland, should the Danish Government desire to dispose of it, and that this Government reserved for future consideration the position which it might take in such an eventuality. I called attention to the fact that the British Government still reserved the right to be consulted should the Danish Government at any time contemplate alienation of the territory in question. I handed to the Minister a copy of an *aide-mémoire* delivered to the British Embassy (copy attached) ^{17a} in order to place in the written records the current attitude of this Government with respect to this entire matter. The Minister seemed to be appreciative to have the benefit of this information.

I then said that the German military forces occupying Denmark could easily cause the Government of Denmark to issue orders about any phase of the Greenland situation, as they could about any phase of the entire Danish shipping interests spread throughout the world; that for that reason it is important that Greenland receive attention in the manner aforesaid; that furthermore my Government feels disposed to see to it through the Red Cross that the small population of Greenland does not suffer from hunger or lack of absolute necessities since its supplies are now cut off from Denmark, and also to see whether they need any cooperation pending the restoration of Denmark to its own independence and sovereignty to the end that its sovereignty over Greenland would automatically revert to it with its full integrity and force.

¹⁶ Loring C. Christie.

¹⁷ See telegram No. 590, June 5, 1920, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. II, p. 1.

^{17a} Not printed.

The Minister said in this connection that he had recently talked over the telephone with Dr. Skelton of the Foreign Office at Ottawa and that the Canadians seemed to have their mind on the Greenland situation; that Dr. Skelton stated he was sending a message or a communication of some sort to the Canadian Minister at Washington in regard to the matter, and that Dr. Skelton finally remarked that if there was anything special to do with respect to the Greenland situation, the Government of the United States might well be looked to to do it. The Minister said finally that when he received the communication from Dr. Skelton, as referred to, he would acquaint me with anything that might be of interest to us.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

859B.01/144

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1940.

The Danish Minister¹⁸ called to see me this afternoon. The Minister said that he had three main questions to take up.

The Minister raised the question of Greenland as his third point. I told the Minister, in order that he might have no further apprehension, that both the British and the Canadian Governments had been reminded by the United States of the policy announced by this Government in the year 1920, namely, that the United States would not be disposed to recognize the existence in any third government of the right to acquire Greenland, and that the position of the United States Government today was identical with that which it had assumed in the year 1920. I stated that this Government did not see that there was any imminent possibility of Germany making any effort to attempt to allege the right to control Greenland because of the existing occupation of Denmark, but that if such a situation arose, the position of this Government would be made entirely clear along the lines indicated.

The Minister said that he was tremendously relieved to have this information and that he felt this would settle the question in a manner entirely satisfactory to the best interests of his own country.

He stated that the people in Greenland had stocks of food supplies sufficient to last for at least 2 years and that, consequently, he did not believe that any relief questions arose at this moment. He said, however, that he intended to have a talk with Mr. Norman Davis¹⁹ in the near future to canvass the situation with him.

¹⁸ Henrik de Kauffmann.

¹⁹ Chairman of the American Red Cross.

He further stated that the situation of the people in Greenland would be greatly alleviated if normal trade between the United States and Greenland could continue and that one of the great sources of income for the Greenland people was the sale of kryolith [*cryolite?*] to American buyers. He said that such sales totalled about \$800,000 a year and that certain American interests normally buying these supplies had already approached him in the matter. He stated that he would like also to have a talk with the appropriate officials in the Department concerning this problem, and I said the Department would be very glad to confer with him on this matter whenever he so desired.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

859B.01/155

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1940.

The Canadian Minister came in this morning by appointment and left with me the attached *aide-mémoire*²⁰ on the subject of the position of Greenland.

The Minister explained that this message was not a reply to the statement made to him Saturday, April 13, by the Secretary, which stated the attitude of this Government with regard to the rights of a third government to acquire Greenland. Mr. Christie explained that the message contained in the attached *aide-mémoire* had already left Ottawa before the Secretary made his statement of last Saturday to the Minister.

Mr. Christie further explained that while the Canadian Government would like a reply to the message contained in the attached *aide-mémoire* as soon as this Government could conveniently communicate it to them, it would be a matter of two or three weeks before it would be possible to take any action along the lines of sending a ship or ships to Greenland, and there was therefore time in which to make this reply at our convenience. The Minister further stated, however, that his Government felt it would be well, even though the action finally decided upon could not be taken immediately, that the decision as to the plans to be followed should be arrived at as soon as possible.

The Minister said he particularly wished to point out the temporary character of the establishment of the proposed guard service in the Canadian message. He also read out some data with regard to the population and trade and commerce of Greenland, all of which seemed

²⁰ *Infra.*

to me to be in line with the information already at the disposal of the Department.

I asked the Minister whether we could assume that no action would be taken by Canada with regard to Greenland either along the lines of the suggestion contained in the message he presented or in any other way until this Government had had an opportunity to inform the Canadian Government of its attitude with regard to any such proposed action. The Minister replied that he was perfectly certain that the Canadian Government would not take any action whatever before they had our reply, or in any event if that were not forthcoming within a reasonable time, he was sure they would notify us at the time they might intend to take any action.

I told the Minister that I would report his message immediately to the Secretary and that he would, in due course, be informed of this Government's response to the Canadian Government's message.

Upon my reporting to the Secretary the above conversation with the Canadian Minister, the Secretary said that he wished to have those in the Department concerned with this question duly informed and that he would, within a very few days, call for a discussion of the matter in order to formulate the reply to the Canadian Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

859B.01/155

The Canadian Legation to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

One. The Canadian Government has been urgently considering Greenland's position and that of its inhabitants because of Germany's aggression against Denmark. The three aspects of the problem which, in the Canadian Government's view, are of great importance not only to Canada but to other countries are as follows:

First. There is the danger of there being established in Greenland a base for German submarines, surface or other raiders;

Second. There is also the danger of attack by German landing parties at Ivigtut on the unique cryolite mines there. The result of any interference with the output of this strategically vulnerable property would be a serious disruption in the production of aluminum, a large proportion of which is manufactured in the United States and Canada.

Third. Humanitarian grounds make it necessary that the inhabitants of Greenland who are cut off from markets for exports and from their normal source of supply be provided for.

Two. The Canadian Government is considering, as a result of this situation, whether it would be necessary to send to Greenland a small

defence force to guard against the above mentioned dangers and to co-operate with the local administrations in North and South Greenland in providing for the needs of the native inhabitants. These measures would not be intended as affording the basis for any future claim to acquire a titular sovereignty but would be purely of an emergency character. For the duration of the war the Canadian Government would be acting as trustee for a restored and independent Danish Government and full accounting would be maintained for that Government.

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1940.

859B.01/157

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1940.

MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to your instructions, I asked the Canadian Minister to come in this morning. I referred to the *aide-mémoire* the Minister had left with me on April 16th, with regard to the position of Greenland, and said that with respect to the specific suggestion made in that *aide-mémoire* that the Canadian Government was considering whether it would be necessary to send to Greenland a small defense force to guard against the danger of the establishment in Greenland of a base for German operations; for the protection of the mines there; and to look out for the needs of the residents of the island, that this Government was extremely anxious that no action of this kind be taken by the Canadian Government. I stated that you had informed the British Ambassador of our attitude along these lines with respect to any similar action by the British Government and that you desired that the Canadian Government be informed in the same sense. I went on to say that the President, as the Minister already knew, had asked Mr. Norman Davis, Chairman of the American Red Cross, to acquaint himself with the necessities and requirements of the civilian population of Greenland and that a study of those requirements was now being carried forward by Mr. Davis. I told the Minister for his confidential information that in making a survey of the requirements of the inhabitants of Greenland we would, of course, be in a position to look into any and all aspects of the situation there which might come to our attention with regard to their human needs and with regard to the economic situation upon which they depended for their existence.

I explained to the Minister that for the present it was perfectly possible that there would be no publicly announced plan of action by this Government with regard to Greenland other than the attention which

would be given to the needs of the inhabitants by the American Red Cross, and that we fully intended to move very carefully in going forward with any action with regard to Greenland, as we did not wish to have any action taken with regard to that territory used as a basis for action which might be taken by other large countries with regard to colonial territories which might be affected by the occupation of the European mother country as a result of the extension of the present war. I said that we considered it therefore essential that no action be taken with respect to Greenland by Canada or any other country which might affect a possible similar situation in other parts of the world. I told the Minister that his Government could rest assured that we would be prepared to give consideration to any aspect of the situation in Greenland which might arise and that we would be very glad to learn from the Canadian Government that they felt that it was entirely unnecessary for them to take any action whatever with regard to that colonial territory.

Mr. Christie asked whether it would be possible to exchange information with regard to developments in Greenland. I replied that we would be very glad to have any and all information they might wish to furnish us with regard to the economic situation and welfare of the inhabitants of that territory, as such information would be helpful to us in our study of conditions there. I also said that as we realized the interest of the Canadian Government in certain products of Greenland, we would be very glad to keep them informed of any developments with regard to those aspects of the situation in which we knew the Canadians had such an interest.

The Minister said that he understood perfectly the position of this Government on the subject and would accordingly inform his Government, remarking that, for his own part, he did not see why it would not be perfectly possible to leave the matter in our hands, provided we assumed sufficient responsibility to take care of the dangers which the Canadian Government apprehended with regard to activities in Greenland by other powers.

Mr. Christie asked if I might inform him with regard to certain rumors his Government had heard to the effect that a Committee on Greenland was being formed in New York, under the direction of the Danish Minister in Washington, which was to receive the approval and backing of this Government in assuming control of the trade and communications with Greenland. I said that for Mr. Christie's confidential information, a suggestion as to the formation of such a committee had been made but that this Government had taken no action whatever with regard to approving its formation or underwriting its activities. I said that he could inform his Government that no action along these lines had received the approval of this Government nor

had any action been taken with regard to such matters as the control of the trade and commerce with Greenland nor with respect to the administration of that territory. I said that, as stated before, we had not gone further than ask the Red Cross to look into the matter of the welfare of the population of the colony and that we would be very happy to keep him confidentially informed of any actions we might take which we knew would be of interest to the Canadian Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

859B.01/154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1940.

The Danish Minister called at his request. He made some reference to the question of a protectorate over Greenland, to which I promptly replied that this Government has been opposing protectorates generally, principally because of the fact that nations engaged in military conquest are seizing smaller nations under the pretext that they are merely protecting them, but in fact such action is taken with the definite purpose of the permanent domination of the seized territory. Naturally, nations bent on conquest are looking for precedents established by those nations which criticize and condemn their course, and by precedent is not meant a bona fide precedent for seizure and occupation by force, but any kind of precedent that could be distorted into use for this latter purpose. The Minister said he perfectly understood.

He then brought up the question of a committee of Danish and American citizens to be organized by him for the purpose of collaborating and cooperating under his direction in looking after the conditions and welfare of the people in Greenland. I said that, of course, I assumed that he was not asking this Government for an opinion on that question, to which he replied that he was not, but was merely informing me of what he had in mind.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

859B.01/152

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1940.

The Danish Minister called today, at my request.

We discussed the matter of Greenland. The Minister said that he was now in direct communication with Greenland, and left me a copy

of the memorandum which he has now received from the two Governors in Greenland.²¹ Further action was expected from the Greenland councils, which will meet early next week. He asked our attitude in the matter.

I said that we were still considering the matter but that our inclination was to accept the action of Greenland officials as the action of the Danish government, so far as Greenland was concerned, on the theory that it was the surviving remnant of the Danish government. Were the Minister to present authorization from the Greenland authorities to act, we should consider that authority, and not impossibly would recognize authority derived from that source. The Minister observed that the Greenland councils seemed anxious to cooperate and he showed me his proposed telegram to them (copy of which is annexed ²²). He raised the particular question as to the last two sentences regarding the proposed request from the Greenland councils to the United States to give protection. I pointed out that protection was a word which had acquired an unpleasant meaning; but I said we would of course receive and pass upon any request which the Greenland authorities might make for a statement of our position in the matter, and that I thought that any request they might make for consideration of their special situation would receive sympathetic attention here. The Minister told me that he was telegraphing, accordingly, in the general sense that he will present to the United States government any statement which the Greenland councils care to make, together with any request they may make for a statement of our position, and any request they may make for consideration of their peculiar situation.

The Minister expressed the hope that we might find it possible to send a ship to Greenland, more or less for the purpose of reassuring the population there. He indicated that the Greenland officials apparently were prepared to give him direct authority to act for them in commercial matters, and that they might go so far as to authorize him to take over and administer under his own name, of course pursuant to their instructions, any funds which might be derived from the trade of the Danish monopoly.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

²¹ Memorandum not printed; the District Directors of Greenland agreed, provided the Greenland Council would consent, to apply to the United States for political and maritime protection.

²² Not printed.

859B.01/193

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1940.

The Canadian Minister came in to see me today. . . .

The Minister likewise commented on the conversations which Prime Minister Mackenzie King had had with the President. He observed that they had discussed the possible protection of the cryolite mines in Greenland from sabotage; and likewise the possibility that an armed force might appear (for instance, from a German raider) to take possession of all or some part of Greenland. The Canadian Government had understood certain statements made here to mean that the United States Government would, if necessary, meet force or aggression in that part of the world by force. In the conversation between Mr. King and the President, the President seems to indicate that in such case the British navy would be expected to take care of the matter. The Canadian Minister therefore was somewhat at a loss, and wished to know what our policy would be.

I told him I would arrange to have the matter considered and talk to him further about it. I pointed out that the Consul we were sending would be sent on a Coast Guard cutter; and that other Coast Guard cutters would follow; this ought to take care of any minor problems which might arise. Plainly, I could not, without further discussion, take any definite position or make any commitment as to the use of the naval forces of the United States in the contingency he had suggested. We would, however, I said, discuss the matter further with him.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

859B.01/178a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield), Then
on Board U. S. Coast Guard Cutter "Comanche"*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1940—noon.

1. The Canadian Government continues to be concerned over the possibility that the cryolite mine at Ivigtut might be put out of commission by a raiding force. We have agreed in principle to the specific Canadian suggestion that the local authorities in Greenland mount and man a gun or guns together with suitable fire control and range-finding apparatus at the mouth of the harbor at Ivigtut. The gun and equipment might be purchased from the United States or Canada and the gun crew recruited in Greenland from Danes and Greenlanders who have had naval experience.

While we are keeping in close touch with the Canadian Government and exchanging with them information regarding Greenland, we believe that it would be preferable if the Greenland authorities should make their request for assistance and advice in connection with plans for the defense of Ivigtut to the United States Government rather than to the Canadian Government. The Navy Department is now drawing up a minimum defense project for Ivigtut and we are trying to work out a procedure which would permit the sale of guns and equipment to the Greenland authorities at a nominal figure if we should be requested by them to do so. The foregoing is for the present for your information only as we do not wish you to discuss the matter with the Greenland authorities until you arrive at Godthaab and we are able to establish confidential communication with you and through you with the Greenland authorities.

We hope that during your stay at Ivigtut you will establish contact with the local authorities and the officials of the cryolite company and make so far as is possible recommendations based on your examination on the spot with regard to the minimum defense needs of Ivigtut against attack by a raider or a submarine. The Commanding Officer of the *Comanche* may be able to give you technical assistance in this connection. Information is also desired regarding plans for the future movements of the two Danish government vessels now at Julianehaab and whether their crews have had naval training.

Your stay in Ivigtut should be as brief as possible consistent with the foregoing instructions, as we are anxious to have you in direct communication with the authorities at Godthaab at an early date.

HULL

859B.01/179 : Telegram

The Consul at Godthaab (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

GODTHAAB, May 20, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received May 21—4:20 p. m.]

3. Department's No. 1, May 18, paragraph 1. Only practicable way to put mine semi-permanently out of commission would be flooding sea side of pit by blasting, bombing, or shelling. This might be accomplished by (1) a submarine or raider approaching the settlement and shelling mine or landing a force, or (2) landing a force in one of nearby fjords and endeavoring to surprise the settlement by land automotive vehicles. Organization of the 100 Danish miners now here (an additional 25 may arrive later in the season) into a defense company armed with machine guns cooperating with a system of native lookouts stationed at approaches to Arsuk Fjord and supplemented by one 3-inch gun mounted at Upernjuik, point southwest of

the mine, would probably provide reasonable defense against a raid by any but a large armed raider. Elaborate range finding and fire control apparatus would probably be unnecessary. It is our opinion that although there appears to be no great danger of a raid on Ivigtut, the carrying out of the above described defense measures might be advisable. However, if the authorities in Godthaab exhibit no more anxiety than the local authorities, who display little concern over the possibility of a raid, and take no initiative along the lines suggested in the Department's telegram under reference, the project might well be held in abeyance for the time being. Commanding officer of *Comanche* has assisted in the preparation of and concurs in the above [plan?].

2. Controller Fischer, highest local official, himself brought up the subject of defense and stated in reply to discreet questioning that he has no fear of any "fifth column" activity here; that "a majority" of the workers here have had military training; and that the only arms are a few rifles. Although he seems to regard a raid on Ivigtut as improbable he is somewhat concerned over the almost total lack of defense.

3. The two Danish ships now in Greenland usually make several trips each season between Greenland and Denmark but it is planned to use them this year for carrying coal from Disko Island and in other local trade. The total personnel of these ships is believed to be about 40 of whom "a good number" have had naval training. It is possible, of course, that some of these men could be used as gun crews and their places filled by Greenlanders.

4. I will treat this matter discreetly along the above lines in conversation with the authorities at Godthaab but will not discuss the specific points covered in the Department's telegraphic instruction under reference until further instructed.

5. Expect to leave Ivigtut May 21 and arrive Godthaab May 22.

PENFIELD

859B.01/179 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1940—6 p. m.

4. Your 3, May 20, 7 p.m., fourth paragraph. In developing any conversations which you may have with the Governor of South Greenland on the subject of the defense of Ivigtut or any other point in Greenland, you are authorized to say that you will be glad to transmit to your government any views which the Governor may have on this subject and, if desired by the Greenland authorities, to inquire of your government as to what steps it might be in a position to take

to be of assistance in formulating defense plans for Greenland (to be carried out, of course, by the Greenland authorities themselves) and to make available appropriate defense equipment.

HULL

859B.01/184 : Telegram

The Consul at Godthaab (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

GODTHAAB [undated].

[Received May 24, 1940—3 a. m.]

8. Called on Governor Svane. Brought up the question of defense of the cryolite mine, emphasized the vulnerability of the mine and expressed fear that sabotage might be attempted by Nazi sympathizers at Ivigtut. He asked whether it would be feasible for an American military detachment to be stationed there as soon as possible, and as an alternative suggested the stationing of an armed ship such as a Coast Guard vessel at Ivigtut. He stated that it would undoubtedly be possible to organize a defense corps of Danes to patrol the mine property. He also expressed some concern over the possibility of a raid on Ivigtut. I said that it was my impression that the United States Government would hesitate to station a military force in Greenland but that it might consider extending other assistance in connection with defense measures for the mine. In view of Fischer's statements outlined in my telegram No. 3 Svane's fears may be somewhat exaggerated. However, the latter does not appear to be an alarmist and he states that he has discussed the matter thoroughly with Governor Brun of North Greenland who is in entire accord with him. In view of Svane's obvious concern in regard to this matter and other factors of which the Department is aware, it is respectfully suggested that as favorable consideration as possible be given to Svane's request.

The Department will be kept informed of developments.

PENFIELD

859B.01/184 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1940—3 p. m.

8. Your undated telegram was received May 24.

(1) Please inform Governor Svane in confidence that in response to his intimation to you of his concern over the defense of Ivigtut the Navy Department has been glad to make an estimate of the minimum equipment which would be necessary to arm a small defense corps and to protect the cryolite mine against attack from the air or a raiding vessel. The equipment suggested by the Navy is as follows:

- 1 3-inch 50-caliber antiaircraft gun (which is susceptible of use against both air and surface craft)
- 1 pedestal mount
- 150 rounds 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition
- 150 rounds 3-inch common ammunition
- 8 Lewis machine guns
- 39 drums, capacity 94 rounds each
- 3680 rounds 30-caliber ammunition
- 50 Springfield rifles
- 6000 rounds 30-caliber ammunition.

(2) This Government is prepared to make the foregoing supplies immediately available to the Greenland authorities for the nominal sum of \$10,000, which is less than one eighth of its value, and to arrange for its transportation to Ivigtut. The cutter *Campbell*, which was due to sail this morning, is being held for this purpose should the Greenland authorities desire to accept our offer.

(3) With regard to payment, we suggest that the best procedure would be for the necessary funds to be put at the disposal of the Danish Minister, Mr. Kauffmann, who, after receiving appropriate instructions from the Greenland authorities, could conclude the transaction with the United States Government. We have discussed this matter with Beale of the Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company, who is willing to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in arranging for the necessary transfer of funds. Beale states that even if the Greenland authorities have not sufficient funds in hand at this time they will have ample resources after the arrival in the United States about June 15 of the first cryolite shipment valued at about \$125,000.

(4) In our opinion the Greenland authorities would be fully warranted in expending \$10,000 on defense measures, especially since the entire proceeds of the cryolite sold this year will be at the disposal of the Greenland authorities instead of being divided with the Copenhagen company, as was formerly the case.

(5) We will discuss this matter with Kauffmann later today and telegraph you his views. We will suggest to him that any communications in the premises which he may wish to send to the Greenland authorities be transmitted through us in order that they may be kept confidential. You should make a similar suggestion to Governor Svane.

HULL

859B.01/194b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1940—5 p. m.

9. Kauffmann has expressed his complete approval of the project outlined in our 8, May 26, 3 p. m. We expect shortly to receive a

message from him for Governor Svane to be transmitted through you.

HULL

859B.01/194c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1940—9 p. m.

10. Our telegram No. 9, May 27, 5 p. m.

(1) You may say to Governor Svane that we have been informed by Minister de Kauffmann that he not only approves of the transaction and believes its conclusion to be in the best interest of Greenland, but is prepared to sign the necessary documents and pay the purchase price of \$10,000 from funds now available to him, immediately upon receipt through you of the authorization of the Greenland authorities.

(2) Please tactfully attempt to expedite this matter as we wish to despatch the *Campbell* to Greenland waters as soon as possible.

HULL

859B.01/190 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1940—7 p. m.

12. Your 17, May 27, 11 p. m.²³

1. Transaction concluded today and *Campbell* expected to sail tonight or tomorrow with arms mentioned in our 8, May 26, 3 p. m. on board. No publicity is being given here.

2. We propose to have the *Campbell* proceed directly to Godthaab, there embarking Governor Svane and proceeding to Ivigtut where Governor Svane would be in a position to determine the distribution of the arms to reliable individuals. Please telegraph Governor Svane's opinion of this proposal which has the approval of the Danish Minister.

HULL

859B.01/191 : Telegram

The Consul at Godthaab (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

GODTHAAB, May 31, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

18. Department's No. 12, May 29, paragraph 2.

1. Svane approves of the Department's proposal. It is respectfully suggested that I be authorized to accompany Svane to Ivigtut on the *Campbell*.

²³ Not printed.

2. Although Svane has yet made no requests in connection with the transaction he is, judging from his remarks, considering *inter alia* the following questions: (a) would it be possible to return to the United States Government small arms in excess of those needed for a guard of not more than 20 persons, the cost price to be refunded or applied as part payment for another 3-inch gun to be mounted on the point just west of the mine property; and (b) would it be possible to resell the equipment to the American Government at a reduced figure after the war. I have told him that I am sure that the American Government will adopt a fair and reasonable attitude regarding this matter.

PENFIELD

859B.01/191 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1940—3 p. m.

14. Your 18, May 31, 10 a. m.

1. You are authorized to accompany Governor Svane to Ivigtut on the *Campbell*.

2. We will inquire informally whether it would be possible to apply cost of excess small arms towards payment for another 3-inch gun. We suggest, however, that no decision be made on this point by Governor Svane as yet as small arms not needed in Ivigtut might be usefully employed at other points in Greenland.

3. We can of course make no commitment regarding purchase of this equipment by the United States Government after the war.

HULL

859B.01/199 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1940—1 p. m.

16. Your 22, June 3, 11 p. m.²⁴

(1) *Campbell* has been ordered to increase speed and will probably arrive Godthaab sometime on Friday, June 7.

(2) On Monday before the receipt of your telegrams nos. 19 and 20²⁵ we discussed separately with representatives of the British Embassy and the Canadian Legation the reports which we had received of the presence of Canadian police and possibly soldiers on board the *Nascopie* and of British naval officers on board the *Julius Thomsen*. At our request the British and Canadian representatives undertook to ask their respective governments for further information regard-

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Neither printed.

ing these reports. We hope that when the replies are received their contents will be of such a nature as to allay the present nervousness of the Greenland authorities. As you are aware we would be averse to landing an armed force at Ivigtut except under special circumstances. We will of course, however, give every consideration to the Governor's request with a view to determining what further steps we may properly take.

HULL

859B.01/199 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1940—7 p. m.

20. With further reference to your 22, June 3, 11 p. m.²⁶ we have been informed today by the Canadian Legation that a temporary British guard was placed on the *Julius Thomsen*, (a) to prevent sabotage and (b) to insure that the vessel would in fact proceed to Greenland in accordance with the orders given her at Kirkwall.

The Legation also assures us that there are no Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers on board the *Nascopie*; no soldiers except the artillery officer of whose presence you have already been informed; and only two police constables together with four civilians who have been deputized to handle two machine guns. These machine guns, a few rifles, and one spar (*sic*) are the sole defense equipment carried by the *Nascopie*. The whole complement of the *Nascopie* will return with that vessel to Canada.

The Legation, on instructions from Canadian Department of External Affairs, also repeated the previous statement made to this Government that Canada has no intention of occupying Greenland.

You may inform Governor Svane of the foregoing.

HULL

859B.20/1 : Telegram

The Consul at Godthaab (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

GODTHAAB, June 13, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

34. Svane, Fischer, and Corp, general manager of the mine, feel strongly that adequate protection for mine can be provided only by landing of an American force. They advance the following arguments: (1) the 120-odd workers here are all members of a union and are not well disciplined; (2) at this time last year 10,000 tons of cryolite had already been shipped and if even 40,000 tons is to be exported this season it will be impossible to spare sufficient laborers for

²⁶ Not printed.

the time necessary to train them as gun crew and defense corps; (3) they are convinced that the Canadians would land a force on the slightest excuse (such as alleged inadequacy of a local Danish defense corps) and in fact would have already done so had it not been for the presence of the *Comanche*; and (4) the stationing of an American ship in the harbor, while better than nothing, would be not entirely satisfactory as it could not stay during the winter and even during the summer would have to take refuge during heavy weather in a fjord some miles away where it would not be immediately available in case of emergency. Although not mentioned in our conversation I gather that the fear of sabotage by dissatisfied workers is also an important factor in their minds. They obviously have little confidence in either the ability or reliability of the union laborers here. They state that the crews of the two Danish vessels now in Greenland waters have already joined the local union and that they are similarly unsuitable as defense corps members.

I have reiterated and emphasized the points mentioned in the Department's telegram No. 20, June 5, but the three urgently renew the request of the Greenland authorities that an American armed force be landed. They suggest that if it is not feasible to land a regular guard they would welcome a "military mission" or a "group of instructors."

Neither the Canadian Consul nor the personnel of the *Nascopie* or *Julius Thomsen* appear to have any definite instructions, clear idea of their mission here, or probable future movements. British subjects on both ships resent having been refused permission to go ashore. The Canadian Consul states that he understands that he is to be stationed here ²⁷ rather than in Godthaab.

This confused situation has of course contributed to the nervousness of the Greenland officials and on the basis of information available here it appears probable that their fears in regard to Canadian intentions are unduly exaggerated. I have been unable to form a definite opinion in regard to the practicability of using workers as defense corps members. I feel that some further gesture to quiet the fears of Svane and his colleagues would be desirable.

PENFIELD

859B.20/1 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield)

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1940—6 p. m.

26. Your 34, June 13, 4 p. m.

1. We have been repeatedly assured by the Canadian Legation that Canada has no intention of landing forces in Greenland, although

²⁷ Presumably this telegram was written at Ivigtut.

Canada is of course interested in the protection of the mine and in preventing the use of Greenland as a base for enemy operations. The British have given us similar assurances. Accordingly we have no reason to believe that either the British or the Canadians will land forces in Greenland and in any case certainly not without prior notification to the United States Government.

2. You may repeat to Svane that we are still averse to stationing an armed guard or uniformed men ashore in Greenland except under exceptional circumstances which we must determine for ourselves in the light of the exigencies of the occasion when it arises. We are, however, looking into the possibility of getting in touch with a few reliable men, preferably men with previous military training, who might be employed by the Greenland authorities as "mine guards". If we can locate such men and they might possibly be augmented by some Canadians of a similar type, this might be a satisfactory solution.

3. Please discuss this with Svane in confidence and telegraph us his reaction together with your estimate of (a) the number of men necessary to operate the antiaircraft gun and preserve order in Ivigtut (we have in mind not over a half dozen or so) and (b) the pay and housing, et cetera, which the mine authorities might be expected to offer such guards if they can be obtained. It is doubtful if reliable men could be employed for less than \$100 per month in addition to their housing.

HULL

859B.20/16 : Telegram

The Consul at Godthaab (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

GODTHAAB, June 28, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received June 28—9 p. m.]

48. My confidential telegram No. 39, June 19.²⁸ Governors Svane and Brun state that they are prepared to accept the suggestion outlined in paragraph 2 of the Department's telegram No. 26, June 17, although they feel that a total of three 3-inch guns and at least 40 men are needed. They would prefer to defer final decision in the matter until the arrival of Governor Brun in the United States, but would appreciate preliminary arrangements being made now in order that suitable defense and police measures may be instituted as soon as possible. They are not sure of themselves and are somewhat confused in their approach to the problem, but they are essentially reasonable and I believe that when Brun arrives in the United States and obtains authoritative advice it will be possible speedily to agree upon a [solution to?] the problems presented.

²⁸ Not printed.

Preparations for the setting up of the 3-inch gun are going forward and arrangements for manning the machine guns in an emergency are being made.

PENFIELD

859B.801/15a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1940—6 p. m.

220. Recent developments affecting Greenland which have taken place through the Department's cooperation are:

(1) The United States Coast Guard Cutter *Northland* is now off Julianehaab and will sail shortly to visit settlements on the East Coast of Greenland as far north as Angmagssalik. At the request of the Greenland authorities she is carrying food and medical supplies as well as a Greenland official who desires to make this trip.

(2) At the request of the Greenland authorities we have given them assistance in obtaining the services of a limited number of qualified American citizens to be employed by the Ivigtut Mine Company as police. These men have already sailed for Ivigtut.

HULL

859B.00/15

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul at Godthaab (Penfield),
Temporarily in Washington*

[WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1940.

Participants: Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark
Mr. Aksel Svane, Governor of South Greenland
Mr. Berle
Mr. Penfield, Consul at Godthaab

Governor Svane opened the conversation by thanking Mr. Berle for the interest which the United States has shown in Greenland and for the assistance which this country has extended to that colony since the German invasion of Denmark. Mr. Berle said that the United States is anxious that the present status of Greenland be preserved to the end that it may, when and if circumstances permit, return to its former status. Mr. Berle also observed that Governor Svane and Governor Brun are in a most unusual position, in that they are in effect almost sovereigns. Our view is that Denmark is occupied by a hostile force and that the Danish Government is not a free agent; therefore, Governors Svane and Brun, representing free Denmark, are in a sense regents carrying on the true Danish sovereignty.

Mr. Penfield said that he had passed on to Mr. Berle the substance of some of Governor Svane's remarks on subjects which the Governor is anxious to discuss and that Mr. Berle therefore had some background in regard to these matters. Governor Svane said that perhaps he had better start by giving the substance of two telegrams which he had just received. The first gave the names and residences of all the foreigners residing in East Greenland north of Scoresby Sound, a total of 18 Danes and 7 Norwegians. The second telegram was from the radio operator at the Ella Ø station, who reported that on November 10 a gray land plane with a wing insignia consisting of a blue and white double cross flew over Ella Ø and dropped a penciled note signed "C. Hansen". The note stated that the Greenland Office inquired whether the operator knew anything of the whereabouts or welfare of four Danish hunters supposed to be in East Greenland, and gave instructions for signaling a reply from the ground.

Brief mention of the activities of German controlled Norwegian ships on the East coast of Greenland followed and it was generally agreed that the inquiry dropped from the plane probably referred to personnel landed by one of these ships.

Governor Svane stated that the first matter which he wished to mention was the question of the defense of Ivigtut. He said that he had decided that a more adequate defense of the mine was needed as the cryolite income is vital to the well-being of Greenland and capture or destruction of the mine would be catastrophic. He had also decided that Greenland could afford to buy and man one more three-inch gun and asked if the American Government would be willing to sell such a gun to the Greenland authorities on the same basis as the first gun had been sold, as well as to facilitate the recruitment of a few more men in the mine guard to man this gun. Mr. Berle said that we should be very pleased to be of all possible assistance in connection with this matter and asked Mr. Penfield to take the necessary steps to obtain expert advice on the subject through the War Plans Section. He wished, however, in this connection to make a few remarks on the general subject of defense. Two three-inch guns would probably be sufficient to repel any casual small raider of the type which operated on the East coast this summer but against any craft mounting six-inch guns they would hardly be able to provide any defense worthy of the name and that therefore the question arises whether some defense measures beyond the resources of the Greenland authorities should not be instituted. Mr. Berle said that he had not considered exactly what form this might take but presumed that it might be in the nature of some sort of base which would permit the conduct of adequate naval patrols. He added that he merely wished to put forth this idea, which is obviously a rather definite departure from previous policy of this Government, for the consideration of Minister de Kauff-

mann and Governor Svane and that there was of course nothing definite in mind as yet. Minister de Kauffmann agreed that this idea represents a decided change in American policy and he and Governor Svane agreed that they would discuss the matter more at length. Governor Svane indicated that before he made a definite commitment in regard to another three-inch gun he would like to have a further exchange of views in regard to the larger project after a more definite crystallization of policy had been achieved.

Governor Svane stated that in this connection he had been somewhat worried about seamen from the foreign merchant ships which now come into Godthaab with supplies, that these seamen had upon several occasions this past summer disturbed the customary peace and calm of Godthaab, and that he would like to be in position to have police in Godthaab for the short periods when these ships are in port. The personnel of the mine guard at Ivigtut would be quite suitable for this duty but their service in Godthaab would raise the question of their status as employees of a mining company rather than of the Greenland Government. Mr. Berle said that this appeared to him an internal matter of administration which the Greenland authorities could solve either by exercising the well recognized right of a state to call into the state's service private police when public policy demands, or by changing the permanent status of the guard from that of private mine employees to that of state-employed police, in other words a "nationalization" of the mine guard.

Governor Svane said that the next matter which he wished to bring up concerned the desire of the Greenland authorities to put into commission the two Danish naval patrol boats now tied up at Godthaab. These boats would be most useful for checking up on foreign fishing fleets on the banks off the West coast of Greenland and for patrolling the coast, but to put them into commission the Greenland authorities would need armament and a gunner for each ship. Mr. Berle stated that we would be glad to arrange for the purchase of the necessary armament (recommendations regarding this matter have been drawn up by Commander Smith of the *Northland*). It was agreed that the Greenland authorities would endeavor through Minister de Kauffmann to locate two qualified Danish gunners in this country, perhaps from the Danish training ship, *Denmark*, now stranded here, but that if they were not successful in this Mr. Berle would arrange for the employment by the Greenland Government of two qualified men. Mr. Berle asked if any radio equipment was needed for these ships. Governor Svane said that he believed that the radio equipment formerly on board had been taken back to Denmark but that he was not sure what type of equipment would be suitable. Mr. Berle asked Mr. Penfield to arrange for the Coast Guard to ask Commander Smith for detailed recommendations on this subject.

Governor Svane stated that a few cases had come to his notice of unfortunate and not completely accurate statements having found their way back to Denmark via private letters and that he was anxious to prevent such occurrences, but that the institution of a formal censorship of mail would not only be completely foreign to all Danish ideals and traditions and thus create strong feeling in Greenland but would also be most difficult technically due to the shortage of personnel in Greenland. Governor Svane said, however, that with respect to radio traffic he had issued strict orders that all suspicious messages to points outside of Greenland must be submitted to him before dispatch and prohibiting all code messages except official messages. Mr. Berle said that he agreed completely with Governor Svane, that censorship is also completely foreign to all American ideals and traditions, and that he thought that the regulations in regard to radio messages covered the situation satisfactorily.

Governor Svane said that he wanted, if possible, to make arrangements for the eventual turning over to the appropriate Danish authorities of the weather and seismological information now being supplied the American Government by the Greenland authorities. Mr. Berle said that he did not see why this would not be both just and practical and suggested that with regard to the weather data Governor Svane talk informally with Mr. Francis W. Reichelderfer, Chief of the Weather Bureau, who would be at luncheon today. With regard to the seismological information, Mr. Berle asked Mr. Penfield to see that Governor Svane was put in touch with Captain Heck, Chief of the Division of Terrestrial Magnetism and Seismology.

Governor Svane said that his final question was in regard to the crews of Greenland vessels coming to the United States. He is aware that there are certain restrictions in regard to the entry into the United States of persons not of the white race and he wondered if it would be possible for Greenlanders members of the crews of these ships to enter the United States as seamen. Mr. Berle said that he was not aware of any laws or regulations which would cause trouble in this connection but asked Mr. Penfield to take this matter up with the Acting Director of Immigration and obtain a definite and authoritative ruling for Governor Svane.

Mr. Berle said that Mr. Penfield had mentioned the possible desire of the Greenland authorities to bring families of some of the workers at Ivigtut over to Greenland and perhaps have them stay in the United States several months en route. Mr. Berle said that as far as the immigration regulations go he saw no objection but that we are, of course, anxious that there be no possibility that any persons coming from German-occupied territory would engage in subversive activity. Governor Svane said that he appreciated this point, that no attempt would

be made to bring the families over until next spring, that if their exit from Denmark could be arranged then houses would be built for them at Ivigtut and they would stay in the United States until these houses were completed.

The conversation closed with an exchange of amenities.

859B.801/15a Suppl. : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1940—6 p. m.

268. The Danish Minister has received an inquiry from the Foreign Office in Copenhagen regarding the accuracy of reports that Canadian and American "police troops" have been sent to Greenland. We have told him that such reports are untrue and suggested the possibility that they probably refer to the employment by the Ivigtut Mine Company of the policemen mentioned in paragraph numbered 2 of the Department's 220, August 4 [24], 6 p. m.

If you have not already done so, you may inform the Foreign Office orally of the contents of the above-mentioned telegram and add that we understand that a total of 15 American citizens have been employed by the Mine Company. These men are now engaged in ordinary police duties in and about the mine property and have been armed by the Greenland authorities.

HULL

FRANCE¹

MAINTENANCE OF RELATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AT VICHY

740.0011 European War 1939/4325

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1940.

The Ambassador of France² called at his request. He said that he desired this Government to urge the importance to the British of agreeable relations between the British and French Governments. I replied that while I would not make any commitments, but speaking individually there was no harm but, on the contrary, nothing but possible good could come from the preservation of friendly relations between the two governments at this time and that I would keep especially in mind what the Ambassador said.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.00/2042 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 29, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received July 30—4:33 p. m.]

201. I had a long conversation today with Laval,³ who has been suffering from a bad cold. He told me that the reports which circulated on his return from Paris to the effect that he was discouraged as a result of his recent trip to Paris were totally unfounded. He said he was extremely tired and uncomfortable from a cold when on his return he was met by about 40 journalists who interpreted his irritation and fatigue as discouragement.

At Paris he said his conversations were limited to Abetz⁴ and Turner. He was accompanied from Moulin by a German officer and met at the railroad station by a detachment of German troops. He said that every honor and courtesy were accorded him during the visit. He stopped at the Ministry of Public Works which is occupied by Ambassador Noll.

¹ For correspondence regarding the invasion of France by Germany and collapse of French resistance, see vol. I, section under Extension of the European War entitled "Invasion of France by Germany and collapse of French resistance."

² Count de Saint-Quentin.

³ Pierre Laval, French Vice President of the Council of Ministers.

⁴ Otto Abetz, German representative at Paris.

According to Laval his discussions with Abetz and Turner covered the ensemble of current political and economic problems. The question of the return of the Government to Paris is only one of the elements. He made no attempt during this informal visit to obtain an appointment with the Fuehrer or Von Ribbentrop⁵ and he understood in advance that his conversation would be limited to Abetz and Turner. He understands that Abetz enjoys Hitler's complete confidence and that the Fuehrer depends on him in most matters regarding France.

Laval is convinced that Germany has no intention to crush France. He said that he told Abetz that if such an intention lurked somewhere in the German mind it was fundamentally an error. France is defeated and Germany can for the moment trample on her at will. If she does the cycle will revolve and sooner or later, but inevitably, the French people will find ways and means of working the destruction of Germany.

Laval left Paris assured that the Germans entertain no such notion but that their plan contemplates a European federation of states in which France will play an important role compatible with its dignity and tradition.

Abetz left immediately for a conference with Hitler which extended over several days. Laval was due to return to Paris July 30 but the Germans have suggested that he postpone his return until the end of this week as the Fuehrer with his multiple preoccupations of the moment has not had time to study all of the subjects which were discussed by Laval. These subjects related principally to the economic life of the country which Laval emphasized could not continue without the resumption of free transport between the occupied and unoccupied zones.

Laval said he hoped for a better understanding on the part of the United States of France's problems. He said that in selecting Henry-Haye as French Ambassador in Washington he had particularly in mind that Henry-Haye was better qualified than any Frenchman he knew to explain to Americans the terrible defeat which France has suffered and its need for American sympathy and support in the solution of the hard problems which face it.

I asked Laval about the program concerning war guilt and he said that Mandel⁶ who is now under detention at Mek [*Meknès*], Daladier,⁷ Reynaud,⁸ Blum,⁹ Léger¹⁰ and many others would be tried before the

⁵ Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁶ Georges Mandel, French ex-Minister of the Interior.

⁷ Edouard Daladier, French ex-President of the Council of Ministers.

⁸ Paul Reynaud, French ex-President of the Council of Ministers.

⁹ Léon Blum, French Socialist leader and ex-President of the Council of Ministers.

¹⁰ Alexis Léger, ex-Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

tribunals established for this purpose. He said "I do not want their lives but the country demands that the responsibility for the errors committed in persuading France to enter the war for which she was not prepared and the aims of which she did not clearly understand be fixed and that those responsible be punished. If this is not done voluntarily by the Government in an orderly fashion the country will rise up and accomplish it by revolutionary force and violence." Daladier, he said, is undoubtedly an honest man but it is clearly demonstrated that he is incompetent and as Minister of War for a period of 4 years his responsibility is unquestionable.

We then discussed Anglo-French relations and Laval launched into a lengthy exposition of the reasons for his dislike and distrust of the English. He said that he thought that the campaign against England was due to start and believed it would begin about August 1. (The Germans yesterday ordered the stoppage of all train service between occupied and unoccupied territory.) Speaking personally and off the record, he said he had announced it before and did not hesitate again to say that "he hoped ardently that the English would be defeated." He said that France had suffered too often as a result of British dishonesty and hypocrisy. He spoke with a deep-seated conviction resulting he said from his personal experiences as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In 1931 when the British Chargé d'Affaires in Paris came to him at 1 o'clock in the morning in a state of extreme perturbation and said that his Government urgently needed French financial assistance as the Bank of England was in an insolvent condition Laval told him that the doors of the Bank of France were open and that England could have all the assistance that France could afford. He said that the British Chargé Campbell left his room with his eyes streaming with tears of gratitude but that England had never manifested the slightest bit of gratitude. On the contrary it countered through smug Baldwin ¹¹ and dilettante Eden ¹² by using every subversive means to defeat Laval's Italian policy.

Laval said that the quality of the British which he feared more than their hypocrisy and dishonesty is their stupidity.

British-Italian policy during the past years has amply demonstrated their capacity for stupidity. The blind policy of sanctions against Italy was followed by the British master stroke of concluding secretly with Germany the Naval Pact of 1935—a glowing example of perfidious Albion.

The British conduct since Munich has been a series of blunders which resulted in pushing France into a war for which she was to-

¹¹ Stanley Baldwin, former British Prime Minister.

¹² Anthony Eden, British Secretary for Dominion Affairs.

tally unprepared at a time when Britain was without an army and for a reason which baffled and left unconvinced a large section of the French people. Laval said that he and many of his compatriots had never agreed that the Versailles arrangement of Danzig and the Corridor was sensible and to wait for such an issue to plunge the country into war was just another example of English stupidity.

The capstone to the British edifice of errors is British post armistice treachery which included a belated effort through British consular representatives in North Africa to bribe French officials to mutiny followed by a blundering attempt on French naval units and the senseless and barbarous machine gunning of helpless French sailors, said Laval.

Laval feels that if secret conversations are not now going on between England and Germany it is not at all impossible that if the first German attack does not succeed, the Churchill Government will fall and be replaced by one which will include such men as Lloyd George.

Laval said that France will go slowly with political and civic reforms hoping to act in consonance with the development of public opinion. He said that while France hoped to adapt its political forms to the best it could derive from the American Constitution and the German and Italian forms of government, he also had distinctly in mind the customs and habits of the French people. He, therefore, had no intention to build a political structure hastily which would only meet with public discontent later on.

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/5021 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 7, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received August 8—2 p. m.]

277. I had a brief conversation today with Marshal Pétain¹³ in which he expressed the opinion that France's position is greatly misunderstood in the United States. At the same time he expressed indignation over the brutal selfishness of England. He blamed in large part English disregard and ignorance of the interest of continental countries [in] its rash declaration of war, for which it was unprepared, for the present state of affairs in Europe and France's tragedy. He said that all members of his Government eagerly desired to return to Paris but that the Germans were causing difficulties.

MURPHY

¹³ Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

740.0011 European War 1939/5152: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 16, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

351. Henry-Haye who has just returned to Vichy from Paris planning to depart for Washington by clipper early in September tells me that every indication in the Paris area points to an imminent attack against England on a grand scale. He says, however, that some of the holiday air which prevailed among the German forces immediately after the occupation has disappeared and that an appreciation of the seriousness of the forthcoming operation is evident. For example at one hotel in Versailles some 200 German air officers are quartered. This week 35 failed to return after a raid. The gloom among the balance was very apparent.

Politically, he said, it becomes increasingly evident that German opinion regarding France is divided. The military group stand definitely for a ruthless separation of French territory and oppressive methods which they believe permanently will eliminate France as a military opponent of any consequence.

Goebbels¹⁴ and his adherents straddle the question, advocating a mixture of suppression and collaboration.

Hitler, Goering,¹⁵ and Ribbentrop view the problem over the longer term and picture the future of the French people as a happy integrated part of a new European order under the benevolent domination of Germany.

Henry-Haye states that he and other prominent Frenchmen have warned Abetz that if a policy of trampling on the French nation is adopted by Germany it may succeed for a few years but sooner or later the French nation which cannot be eliminated will rise up and destroy the oppressor.

From both official and private sources I have reports that the scientific looting prosecuted by the German military in occupied France who are methodically purchasing with German paper currency vast stocks of all types of merchandise is having a violent effect on the French population. Individuals who enjoyed a certain initial jubilation over escaping alive now realize the tragedy of their situation. Shopkeepers are sullen and incidents of opposition and friction frequent. Sympathy with the British cause is growing. The attacks on the Vichy Government by the German controlled Paris press fail to conceal from the population the fact that the Pétain Government is prevented from administering the country and returning to Paris only by the German authorities.

MURPHY

¹⁴ Joseph Goebbels, Reich Minister for National Enlightenment and Propaganda.

¹⁵ Hermann Goering, Reich Minister for Aviation.

740.0011 European War 1939/5434 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 9, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 7:17 p. m.]

528. My telegram No. 475, September 2, 5 p. m.¹⁶ The French Government has now publicly announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the four Governments concerned, to which has been added Poland. The communiqué states that,

"The German Government drew the French Government's attention to the presence of diplomatic representatives in France of Governments which no longer exercised authority in their respective countries and no longer resided there since said countries are occupied by the German Army." The communiqué adds that the German Government had requested the French Government to put an end to the situation and that the French Government "recognized that the reasons were justified in fact due to the situation created by the armistice and that the diplomatic missions in question could not at present carry on normal activity." The French Government therefore decided to take the requested step and "had informed the persons concerned of its decision not without regret, since it recognized their correct and courteous attitude."

MATTHEWS

741.51/413 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 19, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received September 20—2 a. m.]

590. At a luncheon which he gave exclusively to American newspaper correspondents in Vichy today Baudouin made a prepared speech which dealt largely with an effort to convince his hearers of the sins of French pre-armistice governments and system of government and the fact that the present regime representing not only the right but the obligation to work constitutes the real democracy, et cetera. In the course of his remarks he stated that the duty of France toward Germany and Italy was one of scrupulous compliance with the armistice terms, "its duty toward England is silence", and with respect to the rest of the world to confine itself to the defense of its Empire. He was naturally questioned with respect to the statement on England and after a moment's hesitation stated: "Well,

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported that Baudouin, the French Foreign Minister, had informed representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Norway, that the French Government was compelled "temporarily" to break off diplomatic relations with their Governments (740.0011 European War 1939/5350).

it represents a change in policy." I am told that, he went on to explain, while not definitely characterizing it as a *quid pro quo*, that the British are showing a less rigid attitude on the blockade of France and are permitting certain supplies to slide through.

This plea for "silence" with respect to Great Britain from the man who has been loudest in his denunciation of the British and British blockade as the primary cause of France's misfortunes may be significant—or it may be eye wash.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/5816 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 30, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

668. My 655, September 28, 3 p.m.¹⁷ Charles-Roux¹⁸ sent for me this morning and again complained of the attacks on the French Government by the British radio "to both the French and English broadcasts of which he apparently listens quite frequently—along with the rest of unoccupied France." He said it looks as though in the face of critical decisions now pending in Spain the British were really attempting to bring about an actively hostile attitude on the part of France. The BBC recently reported Italian demands supposedly presented in the colonies requiring complete demobilization of French colonial forces and the turning over of French planes to Italy and of general French acquiescence therein. These charges said Charles-Roux have been made up out of whole cloth with no basis in fact whatsoever. (Please compare my telegram No. 545, September 11, 8 p. m.¹⁷) He said that these constant attacks were merely strengthening the hands of the anglophobe elements in France and were making the position of the moderate elements in the Government more and more difficult. He asked urgently that I again report his views to you presumably in the hope that some tactful suggestion may be conveyed to the British.

I have of course only a small part of the picture here. I am inclined to feel however as I have previously reported that future changes in this Government may not be for the better, whatever its current faults. It is certainly true as I have emphasized that the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen are far from sharing the Government's resentment against British tactics. On the other hand the attacks do give ammunition to the Laval-Darlan-Baudouin advocates of more active cooperation with France's present masters.

MATTHEWS

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

711.51/132

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 7, 1940.

The French Ambassador ²⁰ called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador commenced the conversation by complaining again, this time in extremely bitter tones, of the ever-increasing misrepresentation of his Government that was appearing in the American press and the totally false and mendacious statements which were emanating from the British radio and news services tending to show that the French Government was under the complete control of Germany and was acting as a puppet for the German Government.

French denial of presence of German officers in Dakar

The Ambassador then read to me three cables. The first cable flatly denied that there were either German soldiers or German officers at Dakar and that our own consular representative in Dakar could confirm this information. The Ambassador said that the only German officers who had ever been in Dakar since the Armistice were the members of the German mission which had gone there under the terms of the armistice agreement to verify the munitions that existed there.

Alleged demands by Italy on France for submarine and air bases and demobilization of troops

The second cable the Ambassador read to me was from his Government stating that the reports alleging that Italy had made demands on France for the installation of air bases in Syria, submarine bases in North African French possessions, and the complete demobilization of all French forces in Syria were totally false. The French Foreign Minister by means of this cable informed the French Ambassador to inform this Government that no demands of any character with regard to Syria or other French African possessions had ever been formulated by Italy.

Alleged intention of French Government to fortify Martinique

With regard to the third cable, the Ambassador stated that reports sent by the United Press correspondent from Vichy alleging that the French Government intended to undertake large military and naval fortifications in Martinique were totally unfounded.²¹ The Ambassador said that the report was probably due to the fact that the correspondent had read the budget for the year 1941, which had included

²⁰ Gaston Henry-Haye.

²¹ For correspondence pertaining to concern of the United States over the fate of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, see pp. 493 ff.

the provisions insisted upon by M. Mandel when he was Minister for Colonies and which budget had been approved by the French Chambers before the armistice, providing for the undertaking of military and naval fortifications in Martinique as well as in many other French colonies. The Ambassador said that this budget, of course, was now a matter of past history and the present French Government could not attempt to carry out any of the provisions thereof. The Ambassador was instructed to state that the French Government had no intention of undertaking any military or naval fortifications in Martinique and that the only work to be undertaken there was the dredging of the harbor at Fort de France and the improvement of certain of the docks for commercial purposes. The Ambassador specifically stated that the submarine base which had been planned for Martinique had been completely abandoned. In brief, the French Government desired this Government to know that under no conditions would they agree to any of their possessions in the Western Hemisphere becoming, directly or indirectly, the source of disquiet or of danger to the United States.

Neutralization of French colonies in the Western Hemisphere

The Ambassador then referred to his conversation with the President of the other day and the suggestion made by the President that the French Government declare publicly that its possessions in the Western Hemisphere would be neutralized. The Ambassador said that he had this morning received a reply from his Government with respect to the suggestion made by the President and that in this reply the French Government declared that it desired to cooperate in every way with the United States so that the United States could assure itself that French possessions in the New World could in no event become a source of danger to the security of the United States. The French Government, consequently, made the following proposals:

1. The French Government would agree that United States official observers might be stationed in French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and St. Pierre-Miquelon, and that all facilities would be given these United States observers by the local French authorities to find out exactly what was going on and to assure themselves that no steps were in progress which could result in endangering the security of the United States.

2. The French Government would instruct Admiral Robert, the French commander at Martinique with full authority over all of the other French colonies of the Western Hemisphere, to undertake with an American high ranking officer to be sent to Martinique for that purpose, the study and determination of such military steps as might in the judgment of the United States be required to avoid any disquiet on the part of the United States Government. The Ambassador stated that owing to the present situation of France anything in the nature of a written contract or treaty would have to be avoided but

that such oral arrangements as might be arrived at with Admiral Robert would be meticulously complied with.

3. The French Government was appointing General Bonavita as Military Attaché in Washington, and should the American Government so desire, the General would be instructed to leave immediately for the United States to cooperate in the coordination of such measures as might be agreed upon by Admiral Robert and the American officer to be sent to negotiate with Admiral Robert.

4. The French Government believed that in all of the French Colonies in the Western Hemisphere there was now a minimum of military forces stationed. In the opinion of the French Government, complete neutralization in the sense that the existing minimum military forces would either have to be sent away or be demobilized would be likely to stir up revolution in many of the colonies, or at least social disorder, since the implication would be understood by the native populations as being an invitation to license through the removal of all symbols of authority.

5. While the French Government would not discard the possibility of the issuance of an official statement by France with regard to the neutralization of the French colonies in the Americas, it desired to know before reaching a final decision whether, if the measures above set forth were undertaken, the President still believed that such a statement would be necessary.

I stated to the Ambassador that I would be glad to submit to the President the reply of the French Government as delivered to me and that at first glance it seemed to me that some of the steps suggested, if faithfully carried out, would undoubtedly remove some of the grounds for disquiet which this Government had possessed. I said that I was glad to note the friendly and cooperative reaction evidenced by the French Government to the suggestion made by the President.

Purchase of munitions, etc., in the United States for French Indo-China

The Ambassador then said that he had received a further telegram from his Government on another matter which had occasioned him surprise. He said this message was to the effect that the German Government had given permission to the French Government to purchase munitions in the United States for the use of the authorities in Indo-China and that he had, consequently, been instructed by his Foreign Minister to take up the negotiations recently conducted by Colonel Jacomy on behalf of the Indo-China Government and to ascertain whether the munitions for the French authorities in Indo-China could now be obtained in the United States. The Ambassador said that upon receipt of this message he had sent a telegram to his Government inquiring whether this implied that the German Government would permit the shipment of the planes now in Martinique to Indo-China. He said that he had not received any reply to this inquiry

as yet. The Ambassador thereupon inquired whether this Government would be prepared to facilitate the purchase by the French authorities in the United States of munitions for Indo-China.

I said to the Ambassador that it must be as evident to him as it was to me that the situation had changed completely since the time some weeks ago when Colonel Jacomy had been informed that this Government would permit the sale of such munitions as might be available to the Government of French Indo-China. I said that since that time the Japanese forces had occupied many points in Indo-China and it would be the obvious thing for this Government to want to know what practical assurances could be given that the munitions that might be bought here, or the planes that might be sent from Martinique, would not fall into the hands of the Japanese authorities in Indo-China rather than into the hands of the French authorities. I said, furthermore, that in as much as all evidence of French resistance to the Japanese occupation had ceased, what reason could now be evidenced by the French Government that the dispatch of the munitions or aviation matériel was of any practical or urgent need.

The Ambassador replied that Indo-China would not only resist further aggression on the part of Japan, but would also probably soon be forced to resist aggression on the part of Siam.

I said that I was sure that the Ambassador must possess the feeling that any action taken by Siam under present conditions must be action taken at least with the tacit acquiescence of Japan. I asked, consequently, whether the Ambassador could for a moment believe that Japan would permit the French Government in Indo-China to acquire munitions at this moment which might be utilized either in resisting Japan or in resisting Siam. I also asked what explanation the Ambassador could give me as to why the German Government should accord permission for the purchase of these munitions at this particular moment when the French Government had been either unable or unwilling to obtain the acquiescence of the German Government six weeks ago to sending perfectly new and powerful airplanes to China before the actual occupation by Japan had begun. To all of these inquiries the Ambassador had no ready reply, and merely stated that he would give me further information as to the situation in Indo-China as a result of an inquiry which he would address to Admiral Decoux, the Governor General.

Airplanes in Martinique ²²

In speaking again of the airplanes in Martinique, the Ambassador said that he was informed that these airplanes had now deteriorated to such an extent that they would require a great deal of repair work before they could fly again.

²² For other documentary material pertaining to concern of the United States over the disposition of French airplanes in Martinique, see pp. 505 ff.

I said that this was not my information, but that on the contrary I was informed that the airplanes were being protected and that mechanics were looking after them.

The Ambassador thereupon stated that should this Government desire to send a competent expert to look into the condition of these airplanes, he would be very glad himself to authorize the dispatch to Martinique of such an agent of the United States Government.

Blocked French funds in the United States

The Ambassador then inquired whether I had been informed by the President of his conversation with the Ambassador with regard to the request for the unblocking of French funds in this country so as to permit the French Embassy here to pay from these funds the expenses of French diplomatic and consular establishments in the Western Hemisphere and in certain countries of Europe, and also to utilize \$1,500,000 for the purchase of beef in Argentina to be used in feeding French prisoners of war in Germany and in French occupied territory. The Ambassador also asked whether I had any information concerning his recent conversation on this subject with the Secretary of the Treasury.

I replied that while the President had spoken to me concerning certain features of his interview with the Ambassador, the President had not spoken with me concerning the question of blocked funds.

The Ambassador thereupon stated that he had outlined the situation to the President and that as he was leaving, the President had said "I hope you will work out satisfactorily the question of your diplomatic and consular establishments on the American continent".

I said to the Ambassador that I had spoken only this morning with the Secretary of the Treasury on the telephone and that I was afraid the Ambassador had misunderstood the President, since I was informed by the Secretary of the Treasury that the President had made no commitment in that regard whatever. I then went on to say that I would have to inform the Ambassador that he could expect no relaxation by this Government of the blocking of French funds in so far as the suggested purchase of beef by France for the relief of French prisoners of war was concerned. I said that under the accepted rules of international law and in accordance with various international agreements, the German Government was obligated to undertake the proper feeding and care of the prisoners of war under its control. I stated that there seemed in the judgment of this Government no justification whatever for the purchase by the French Government of large quantities of beef to be used in the feeding of prisoners of war, thus relieving the German Government of its valid obligations in this regard and making it easier for the German Government to feed its own troops and its own civilian population. I said that with regard

to the facilitation of funds for the payment of diplomatic and consular establishments of France in the Western Hemisphere, I could at this time give him no definite reply. I said that all I could add in this regard was that questions of this character could undoubtedly be more readily solved if the French Government showed a more friendly and cooperative spirit in its dealings with the United States and that I trusted that the reply made by France as communicated to me this morning by the French Ambassador with regard to French colonies in the Americas would seem to the high officials of this Government as an indication of such desire on the part of the Vichy Government to cooperate to our mutual advantage.

The Ambassador then launched into a very long and exceedingly vehement tirade. He stated that the refusal of this Government at this juncture to release funds for the payment of French diplomatic and consular missions in the American continent was tantamount to a desire on the part of the United States to liquidate such establishments and as proof that this Government did not regard the Vichy Government as a sovereign government. He said that our refusal to permit French funds in the United States to be used for the purchase of food supplies to relieve the situation of French prisoners of war was a proof that this Government had no humanitarian interest in the fate of these unfortunate individuals and that our action in this regard would be equivalent to a sentence of death for them.

I said to the Ambassador that with regard to the first point, it seemed to me preferable that it be not discussed, that it seemed to me that it was for many reasons inadvisable to discuss the nature of the independence and sovereignty of the present French Government and that I believed that on full reflection he would agree with me that no useful purpose could be served thereby. With regard to the second point, I said that I could assure him, as I had in a previous conversation, that while the American people possessed to a full degree their traditional friendship for the French people and were animated as they had been throughout their history by a humanitarian desire to relieve distress and suffering of peoples in other parts of the world, it was the considered policy of this Government that no step should be taken which would in any sense facilitate or aid the Government of Germany in its prosecution of the present war.

I said that it was well known to me that Germany had been exporting from occupied France many thousands of head of cattle for her own use and that if we agreed to permit France to send into the occupied zone very large quantities of beef, this would obviously only make it easier for Germany to pursue this course. The Ambassador immediately contradicted me and said that Wayne Taylor²³ had told

²³ Wayne Chatfield Taylor, American Red Cross Delegate in Paris.

him that while the Germans had commandeered cattle in the occupied zone, these cattle were being utilized for feeding German troops in that area.

I replied that while I would not agree in any way that my information was incorrect, I could not see the slightest difference in the two cases presented. Here was the Ambassador demanding that the French Government be permitted to send beef into the occupied zone to feed the French prisoners of war, and yet at the same time admitting through him that the cattle in that region which might be used for this purpose were being utilized for the feeding of German troops of occupation. I said that what the Ambassador had just stated confirmed me positively in my belief that the step which was proposed was merely a means of relieving Germany of her inescapable obligation to feed properly and give humanitarian treatment to the French prisoners of war under her control without assistance from the outside world.

The Ambassador then said that this made a "very grave situation".

I said that if he referred to the relations between the two countries, as I assumed he did, and had made this remark on the pretext that this Government was not giving friendly consideration to all the requests of the French Government, I might remind him that public opinion in the United States and the opinion of this Administration had been profoundly affected in a manner adverse to the present French Government by three things: first, the determination of the French Government with regard to the disposition of the French fleet as included in the terms of the armistice; second, the refusal of the French Government to return the airplanes in Martinique to the United States on the allegation that the terms of the armistice made it necessary for all French munitions in French territory to remain where they were at the time of the signing of the armistice, when only a few weeks ago the American public had been informed that French airplanes in large numbers had left French possessions in Northern Africa in order to undertake the bombardment of Gibraltar; and third, the negotiation by the Vichy Government of an agreement with Japan which provided for a change in the *status quo* in the Pacific by the occupation of Indo-China, although it was well known to the French Government that the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Far East was a matter of peculiar concern to the United States.

Furthermore, I said, did the Ambassador think that the statements made by his Foreign Minister in an interview with the press which the Foreign Minister was said to have given on the evening of October 4 in Vichy and in which M. Baudouin is alleged to have stated, among other things, "Japan is a great nation. Its preponderant position in the Far East cannot be denied by any realistic statesman, etc.", was the expression of a point of view which would be well re-

ceived by American public opinion, or which would tend to bring closer together the policies of the Government of the United States and the Government of France.

At this point the Ambassador interjected to say that he was sure that his Foreign Minister had been misquoted again and that he would check up to ascertain whether such a statement had actually been made. I remarked to the Ambassador that I had been careful to say that his Foreign Minister had been "alleged" to have made this statement and that if this statement was not accurate, I would be glad to be informed accordingly.

In conclusion, I said to the Ambassador that as soon as the President returned to Washington I would submit to him the reply of the French Government with regard to French colonies in the Western Hemisphere and that I would again discuss with him the question of the release of funds sufficient to meet the expenses of the French diplomatic and consular establishments in the American Republics. For that reason, I said, I would prefer to withhold any further discussion on these problems until this conversation had taken place, and I said that I would ask the Ambassador to come to see me as soon thereafter as might be possible.

Finally, I said that I trusted, in view of the cooperative spirit shown by the French Government in its latest communication to us, that the way might yet be found for a more friendly and understanding feeling between the two Governments than had seemed, at least on our part, possible because of the recent policies pursued by the Government of Marshal Pétain.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851.00/2127 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 14, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received October 15—8:15 a. m.]

744. There is no doubt that French Government circles are considerably worried over the possible effect in the United States of the phrases in the Marshal's message ²⁴ that France must liberate herself from "traditional friendships." Charles-Roux sent for me this morning and read me a circular telegram which had been sent to various countries including the United States, endeavoring to explain the meaning of the phrases. He stated that this telegram had been carefully drawn up by himself in consultation with Baudouin and that it represented the Marshal's personal views. I presume that Henry-

²⁴ Marshal Pétain's message to the nation on October 11, 1940, defining policy of the Vichy Government.

Haye may have communicated its contents to the Department in accordance with the suggestion contained therein. It implied that France had been injured in the past by certain "pernicious ideologies often backed by selfish interests" on grounds of friendships.

The allusions to foreign policies, said the telegram, merely meant to imply that certain of these friendships or enmities were not "obligatory or necessary by dogma". There is to be, however, it continued, no change in the "spiritual or material ties" with a great number of countries. Furthermore, French nationalism as defined by the Marshal implies no "obstacle to international collaboration", reads the telegram, but was on the contrary the "first and surest bases" for such collaboration.

He then showed me, and insisted that I take notes thereon, a further message to Henry-Haye urging upon him patience and perseverance in his task, telling him not to expect that he could persuade our Government or our public opinion to understand France's true situation all at once.

The telegram stated that the Vichy Government, however, attaches much importance to a "better understanding" on the part of our Government and public opinion of the "factual situation resulting from Germany's victory and the unintelligent attitude of Great Britain"; Henry-Haye is to explain how the work of "national reconstruction is necessitated by the internal political decomposition of the previous regime". He was also instructed to stress that French "intentions and sentiments toward the United States are above all suspicion and that the French Government hopes to have both our friendship and our solicitude."

When Chauvel ²⁵ finished talking about the Far East (my telegram No. 743 of today ²⁶) he brought up the question of the Marshal's message and seemed eager to know the effect in the United States. He said, "It was a great error: I wish our people would stop talking so much." He said he felt quite sure that no reference to the United States had been intended in the message and that the Marshal himself was surprised at the "interpretation" given it. He hopes very much that "too much importance" [apparent omission]. He said "that simultaneously with the message instructions were given to our representatives at Wiesbaden to be stiffer in resisting German demands." I said that it was precisely because I knew what the reaction would be at home that I had called on Charles-Roux the other day and had transmitted his explanation.

Army and other official circles in Vichy seem equally anxious to make it clear that the paragraph was not directed at us (I have even heard suggestions that it was meant to apply to Poland or to Yugo-

²⁵ Jean Chauvel, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the French Foreign Office.

²⁶ Not printed.

slavia !). Even Guérard ²⁷ called in the American press and attempted to explain it away. Tonight's *Le Temps* devotes a leading article to French foreign policy stating in concluding that because France is thus pursuing a policy essentially French, it does not mean a severing of ties with other nations: "The traditional friendship of France and the United States, which Marshal Pétain has recalled on several occasions in warm terms is evidence of this. A policy entirely French is compatible with a sincere friendship for all nations of good will but is not at the mercy of any influence foreign to French interests."

Thus the struggle within the French Government continues. The one school of thought led by Laval works ardently for complete acquiescence in Germany's wishes and an active pro-German policy; at the other extreme are the weak and uninfluential friends of the British who have the real but inarticulate support of the overwhelming majority of French opinion (especially in the occupied territory). In between, the Marshal and his entourage who are willing to forget and forgive past enmities with Germany but insist with dignity that Germany must do her part in return. Which of these tendencies will have a victory for the moment is difficult to say. A feeling that the whole present political setup in France is entirely ephemeral is held by the French people.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6171 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 20, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received October 21—1 : 35 a. m.]

783. My telegram 762, October 17, 5 p. m.²⁸ An official of the Foreign Office who was in England in a military capacity during the war and who is pro-British in sentiment asked to see me this morning. He said that the political sections at the Foreign Office are quite impressed by the fact that the British have not "reacted" more strongly in the face of recent heavy German bombardments. They feel that British air resistance is growing rapidly weaker. He said that the persons concerned are likewise convinced that the British will soon suffer serious defeat in Egypt. An atmosphere of great depression exists in the Foreign Office and he only hopes that the British can give some tangible and convincing evidence to counteract it.

He went on to say that this "pessimism" as to British chances might have an important influence on the future attitude of the French Government. He mentioned, for instance, the German demand for utili-

²⁷ Chief of Cabinet in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

²⁸ Not printed.

zation of a highway from Paris to Marseille, adding that he presumed "they want the highway for troop movements." He fears that the Marshal who is "somewhat tired" may finally be brought to accept that condition as well as some control of present free frontiers. Any convincing demonstration of British strength at this immediate juncture might therefore weigh materially in the balance of future French policy.

Baudouin's strongly anglophobe Chef de Cabinet Guérard has resigned for personal reasons and has been replaced by Boissoner whose views and policies are at least somewhat less anti-British than his predecessor.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6246 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 25, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 11 : 27 p. m.]

820. My telegram 682, October 3, 6 p. m., 762, October 17, 5 p. m., and 783, October 20, 1 p. m.²⁹ German propaganda which has been so effectively and assiduously spreading around Vichy to the effect that British resistance is nearly broken, that the Royal Air Force will soon be without pilots or planes, that "the expected American help" won't arrive until too late and then in [too] insufficient quantities really to count, has unquestionably proved effective in governmental and other circles in this little isolated capital. It has more than offset the more pleasing stories of deteriorating German morale, damage done to German concentrations along the French and Belgian coasts, and minor incidents in the occupied territory. Those who so ardently hope for a British [victory?], both in and out of the Foreign Office, have lately become visibly depressed. They are skeptical both as to the timing and the amount of our aid and, in true French practical style, want facts and dates and figures. Roughly, 50% of the Havas news despatches from abroad are forbidden to be published in unoccupied France and sometimes the proportion is much greater. On the President's speech at Philadelphia last night [*October 23*],³⁰ just 3 inches appear in most of this morning's newspapers. The phrases emphasized in headline are: "Roosevelt declares 'it is for peace that I have worked and for peace that I shall work every day of my life'", the denial of the existence of any agreement which could "involve the United States in war for any reason whatsoever." These phrases, taken from their true context, are utilized

²⁹ Telegrams No. 682 and 762 not printed.

³⁰ For text, see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1940 volume, p. 485.

by the advocates of complete surrender to the German's will as evidence that the one "remote possibility" of a British victory, namely the full military as well as industrial weight of the United States on Britain's side is removed. While 1916 is recalled by a few, in general, the feeling of "too late and too little" is convincing the pragmatic Frenchman that a German victory is not far off and that his lot will be better on the side of the victor. There are many who reason cynically: "If the Germans win, we will be much better off by accepting the terms we can get now. If the British win they will need a strong France anyway."

That the trend is toward agreement with the Germans, I am afraid, is clear. As a straw in the wind, General Requin came straight from General Huntziger last evening to see our Military Attaché. His theme song was that those who understood the true position of France and her helplessness before the Germans, and consequently the necessity for reaching some agreement should explain this position to the United States.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/533 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 26, 1940.

[Received October 26—10:12 a. m.]

3537. The BBC picked up at 12:32 today following message given out by Trans-Ocean dated from Vichy:

"Pétain Government decides to accept Hitler's terms for permanent peace and agrees to German Axis-sponsored Pan-European bloc designed to force Great Britain to end war."

Foreign Office would greatly appreciate any confirmation or denial it might be possible to obtain to above broadcast from any authoritative source, particularly from Vichy.

JOHNSON

740.00119 European War 1939/530 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 26, 1940—noon.

[Received October 27—7:25 a. m.]

832. Peace in Europe and a long-deferred chance to return to a previous way of living is the bait cleverly dangled by Hitler to a France that in its great majority has wished for it more than anything else since the tragic collapse of June. At first it was thought by the great

mass [of] Frenchmen, subconsciously unwilling to admit that others could "take" more than they, that a British surrender would inevitably soon come. This was followed by a combined admiration for British courage, by increased harshness by France's German masters and by a dawning hope and realization that British victory meant the saving of France. This second phase which I have so emphasized in recent weeks is, I fear, through active and intelligent German propaganda methods in the course of changing to a third: A new fear that British resistance cannot long continue and a new hope that a drawn peace may soon come about. We must not forget that there are 2,000,000 French prisoners of war, that the division of the country materially, physically and morally has brought, thanks to German severity, much hardship, unemployment and discouragement. France has been led to fear the loss of much territory and many colonies and even her existence as more than a puppet state. In this carefully prepared setting and I presume in the light of his failure to invade or defeat England Hitler has come to offer the hand of friendship and a not too bedraggled dove of peace—a dove perched on the pedestal of the new Europe in which his propagandists emphasize order, discipline, and work, three words dear to the heart of the Marshal and close to the lips of his associates. Such is the background.

As to the facts Laval returned shortly after noon and the Council of Ministers began about 5. It terminated near 7 with the issuance of two communiqués. The first stated that Marshal Pétain and Hitler had a meeting with Laval and Ribbentrop present in which the Marshal was treated "with utmost courtesy". The two Chiefs of State, continued the communiqué, reached an agreement "on the principle of collaboration for the reconstruction of peace in Europe". The details are to be discussed later. This communiqué confirms the earlier impression reported in my telegram No. 826, October 26, 1 p. m.³¹ and subsequent reports reaching me that nothing definite was signed. It was followed shortly by a second stating that the Marshal and Laval informed the Council of Ministers of their interview with Hitler and that the Council "unanimously approved their statements".

Certainly the developments of the last several days have served materially to strengthen the position of Laval and his authority within the Government. His enemies and other wellwishers of France must be discouraged at the ascension to power he is making and his approach to the side of the Marshal. He will, of course, largely direct French "foreign policy" if it can so be termed in the future. It seems that he is annoyed at Baudouin's disgruntled offer of resignation and has threatened to make his position difficult if he persists (it would obviously sound a note of discord in the present harmony of German appeasement to have the Foreign Minister resign at this time).

³¹ Not printed.

As for the terms of future Franco-German relations only one important fact has yet transpired: Before agreeing to receive the Marshal, Hitler, I hear, insisted that all French naval bases be surrendered to German control; this includes Marseille, Toulon, Bizerte, and Oran.

The utilization of the French Fleet actively against the British is as I have previously indicated not specifically insisted upon in the present negotiations though I am convinced that Laval has discussed it; it will be employed ostensibly to "defend" the French coasts and colonies and assist in "breaking" the British blockade. One of my sources maintains that German control over Dakar is included but I have not yet been able to confirm this. As to other conditions, emphasis is placed upon a sort of customs union between France and Germany (whatever that may mean under present conditions!) in which Spain and Italy are soon to join. The Germans as previously reported will annex Alsace but a small part of Lorraine including Nancy may be left to France. The Italian claim to Nice was definitely rejected by the Marshal and Hitler is reported to have promised "to use his influence" on Mussolini to relinquish that claim: The question has been left "in suspense". It is also reported that France will keep Corsica, though granting equal status to the Italian language there and the proposed "condominium" over Tunis seems confirmed (my telegram number 812, October 23, midnight³²).

It will thus be seen that Hitler's offer to his conquered foe has all the ostensible generosity that we feared. (My telegram 816, October 25, noon.³²) That this sugar-coated Slovakization of France may meet with some approval by the uncomprehending and peace seeking masses is, I fear, all too likely. Under these circumstances the details yet to be worked out for the return of the Government to Paris seem relatively unimportant.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/538 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 27, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received October 28—7:45 a. m.]

836. My telegram No. 832, October 26, noon, and previous. Laval denied last night to Heinzen³³ that any agreement had been reached with the Germans covering the various reported concessions concerning naval bases, fleet, colonies, etc., and personally authorized the denial story to be sent. While the denial may be technically correct, and I believe that nothing has actually been signed, I take these statements

³² Not printed.

³³ Correspondent for the United Press.

with large and numerous grains of salt: I believe he has made many verbal commitments during his talks with German leaders. Laval spoke of the "excellent impression" which Hitler had made both on him and on the Marshal, of his "consideration" for the Marshal's age and of his "broad understanding of the problems in Europe", of his "cold logical reasoning". How much of it is due to the Führer and how much to Laval's other German associates I do not know but they convinced him completely that a British defeat is imminent, that the future of a pro-German France is bright and that unemployment—a grave problem today—can be virtually eliminated in a German-directed economy. According to Heinzen, Laval said he quoted figures on German industrial and military production, German plans, et cetera, given him by Hitler and pounded the table in his insistence on early British defeat; that he thus so bulldozed the Council of Ministers that his thesis was accepted in its entirety.

As to the President's message³⁵ he told Heinzen that he was much shocked at "its rude and disrespectful tone to the Marshal" and indicated that the only reply that would be made would probably be a statement to the press—either here or in Paris. (Heinzen, as you know, is not always reliable. I am inclined, however, to give credence to the foregoing account of Laval's conversation with him.)

Further reflection and further conversations have only served to strengthen my conviction that the French Government, which means Laval behind the glorious name of the aging Marshal, is plunging definitely along the road of subservience, disguised perhaps but nonetheless complete, to the Axis and that there will be no real or effective reaction on the part of the French public until tempered to turn.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/533 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1940—7 p. m.

3284. Your 3537, October 26. Following has been reported by Embassy at Vichy:

Two communiqués were issued after the return of Laval to Vichy. According to the first, the two Chiefs of State reached an agreement upon the plan of collaboration for the reconstruction of peace in Europe. The details are to be discussed later.

The second communiqué stated that Marshal Pétain and Laval informed the Council of Ministers of their interview with Hitler and that the Council "unanimously approved their statements."

HULL

³⁵ See telegram No. 636, October 25, noon, to the Chargé in France, p. 475.

740.00119 European War 1939/559 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 1, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 4:18 p. m.]

864. My telegram No. 857, October 31, noon.³⁶ Georges Bonnet³⁷ who as the Department is aware has maintained some contact with the Germans sought an interview with me this morning accompanied by Jules Henry³⁸ in order to plead the cause of peace and appeasement. It was the usual story that Europe could not afford a war every 25 years; that France's present situation is intolerable and she must seek collaboration with her German neighbor and that the continuance of war in Europe for any period of time will result in such destruction of lives and material wealth that Stalin alone will be the victor. He said that he hoped our Government would see the situation "in its true light" and that we would bring our influence to bear in favor of an early peace—if not now perhaps in 3 months—"certainly the sooner the better for France." The British he said might be ready for a "reasonable" peace, unless the United States ["]push them too far and encourage them too much." (Incidentally he admitted the "probability" of a British victory.)

I left him in little doubt as to where we stood or as to how American opinion would view a peace offensive with Germany dominating the continent of Europe.

MATTHEWS

711.51/145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1940.

The French Ambassador called and handed to me, for delivery to the President, the reply of Marshal Pétain of the French Government at Vichy to a previous communication of the President to Marshal Pétain, contained in a telegram to the Chargé d'Affaires at Vichy on October 25, 1940.³⁹ I thanked the Ambassador and said that I would transmit the communication to the President.

The Ambassador then brought up in a general way the subject of the relations between our two Governments and said that Marshal Pétain felt somewhat hurt at the tone of the President's message, and that we should appreciate the desperate situation of the French Government at Vichy and not be too severe in judging it.

³⁶ *Post*, p. 478.³⁷ French ex-Minister of Justice.³⁸ French Ambassador to Turkey.³⁹ For President Roosevelt's message to Marshal Pétain, see telegram No. 636, October 25, noon, p. 475; for Marshal Pétain's reply, see telegram No. 872, November 1, 5 p. m., from the Chargé in France, p. 480.

I spoke somewhat in general terms and repeated our frequent statement about the traditional friendship between France and the United States and our anxious desire to preserve in the most genuine manner that spirit of friendliness and of mutual cooperation in every way that might be at all practicable and mutually desirable. I said that the chief trouble seems to be that high-ranking officials in the French Government seem disposed to keep entirely away from this Government in most everything that relates to normal relations, and at the same time to keep extremely close to Hitler and to show every sympathetic interest in his plans and purposes, revealing all the while the utmost antipathy toward Great Britain and the cause for which she is fighting. I stated that this Government has the usual normal relations with all other governments except those at Tokyo, Berlin, Rome and Vichy; that I can always understand readily the attitude of all the other governments and can get legitimate information promptly and voluntarily from all of them with the exception of the four mentioned; that Vichy, along with Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, is just the opposite in its disposition to be frank and friendly. I said that I receive many rumors and reports about the attitude of the Vichy Government contrary to the interests of this country, but nothing direct, and I am obliged to look to other rumors and reports, direct and indirect, coming through the press and through foreign offices in various parts of the world, in order to get any real grasp of what is actually taking place at Vichy that is calculated seriously to affect this Government. I added that the French Government in adopting this sort of attitude and practice will not get 2 inches in carrying on its relations with the Government of the United States. The Ambassador said he supposed I referred to Mr. Laval in connection with the foregoing. I remarked that, of course, the Ambassador knew that the definite impression created here and everywhere by Mr. Laval is that he is an extreme partisan of Hitler and Mussolini and very bitter toward Great Britain; that he is reported to favor strongly a permanent rejection of the so-called "old order" in Europe, and the embracing of Hitler's political, social and other policies with totalitarian autarchy a basic part. I said that Mr. Laval had the privilege of becoming an ally and associate of Hitler and the monstrous things for which he stands, but that he must not imagine that this Government does not know what his attitude and purpose are. I added that we propose to be on our guard with respect to acts of the Vichy Government, inspired by Mr. Laval, that are intended to aid by French connivance the military activities of Hitler, such as the supplying of naval and air bases, or other help given by the land, sea or air forces of France; that in any event this Government has had nothing resembling satisfac-

tory information from the French Government about what is really going on that would constitute legitimate information to us from any government at all disposed to be friendly.

I then said that our Government thus far has retained its high regard for Marshal Pétain and its anxious desire to be of help to the French people to the fullest practical extent; that this Government recognizes the unfortunate situation of France as a captive nation and it recognizes to the fullest extent the duty of the French Government to conform to the armistice terms along with other functions and requirements of a captive nation, but that in so doing this Government maintains strongly its original position that the French Government has no justification of any sort to render the slightest military aid to Germany; that the French Government has no right in its acts and utterances to go beyond and outside the armistice terms for the purpose of making itself a partisan of Hitler, as between Hitler and non-belligerent countries, such as the United States, unless the French Government intends to abandon its friendly relations with other nations which are antagonistic to Hitler's movements of conquest.

The Ambassador stoutly contended that they had no plan or purpose thus to go beyond their legitimate functions, as I had described them, and he reiterated fairly often the attitude of his Government to the effect that it would not in any circumstances lend aid to the military plans of Hitler. I said that Mr. Laval may think that he can appease Mr. Hitler just as others heretofore have imagined that they could appease him; that that was his affair; that this Government, however, recognizing the great misfortune of the French Government in not pursuing the long-view objectives within sufficient time for its safety, does not propose to trust Hitler for one split second to fall in with any government on a course of appeasement; that the French Government, therefore, should understand the position of this Government and its determination to take no chances. I went on to say that this Government is not remotely thinking about minor considerations between our two Governments, such as freeing some French assets, etc., etc., but that it had a supreme and firm purpose to have no relations with any government, such as that of Vichy, which would give the slightest encouragement to Hitler, either directly or indirectly. It is manifest, therefore, that, if Marshal Pétain feels aggrieved at the President's recent message to him, he might well review and take cognizance of Mr. Laval's extreme pro-German plans and efforts, as reported in various ways to this Government, and which have been concealed in the main by the French Government, and only reached this Government to a limited extent, directly or indirectly.

I said that there must be a spirit of candor and a willing disposition to confer back and forth with full exchanges of information in a thoroughly accurate and candid manner, so that this Government will know exactly what the Government of France is doing insofar as it relates to possible aid to Hitler over and above the terms of the armistice and the function and duty of a captive of war. I said it would be a mistake for Marshal Pétain, knowing what is going on in his Government at the instance of Mr. Laval, to expect good relations between our countries to continue to exist, while he takes exception to any act of utterance of this Government in its strong protest against the reported policies and purposes of Laval.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Laval was merely attempting to procure the release of French prisoners and some other things that would be helpful to France. I said that again there comes up the matter of attempted appeasement of Hitler; that Hitler in the end would do what he pleased with all of his captive nations regardless of whether they offered him gifts and other appeasement considerations; that he would take such nations and then at some future time retake them if his past acts are to be judged fairly; that this again brings back the question of rendering aid to Germany over and above the terms of the armistice, and that the Government of France must understand that this Government is too much concerned about possible future attacks by Hitler to acquiesce in the slightest with acts of the French Government that would aid or encourage Hitler in still wider conquest, especially in the direction of this hemisphere. It is on this broad position that our Government rests its attitude toward France. This applies to Martinique and other possessions. In the case of Martinique, for example, if the French Government is in earnest about the absolute observance of the temporary agreement between officials of this Government and those of the French Government in regard to the *status quo* of Martinique,⁴⁰ there should not be the slightest hesitation on the part of the French Government to give to this Government such assurances as would leave no doubt or uneasiness on the part of this Government, such as removing some of the parts of the ships anchored there, or a large portion of the seamen from the vessels, or to permit American vessels to inspect the properties at any reasonable time, such as the airplanes and the gold. The Ambassador professed to agree entirely and insisted that it should be done. I replied that we would see what happens with respect to all the matters mentioned in our conversation.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁴⁰ See pp. 505 ff.

740.00119 European War 1939/606 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 14, 1940—9 p. m.
[Received November 16—9 a. m.]

954. My telegram No. 949, November 14, 1 p. m.⁴¹ Laval asked me to call this afternoon and in the presence of Rochat.⁴² We talked for approximately 45 minutes. He said that the notes which Rochat had given him—which he had before him—of the Secretary's statements to Henry-Haye had "surprised and pained and shocked" him and that he felt they were "unjust" as regards himself. He said he had talked to Barnes⁴³ in Paris yesterday but had not realized how far the rift between our two countries had developed. He continued that the Secretary's remarks to Henry-Haye showed a misunderstanding of his policies and aims.

First he wanted it understood above everything else that he is interested solely in the welfare of France; he was in no sense the tool of Hitler and Mussolini. As to Great Britain he made no secret of his personal bitterness and his strong convictions that British policy since 1935 had been in large part responsible for France's downfall. He talked at some length, but without undue display of feeling, of his policies and aims in 1935 and how the British "let him down".

He then came on to lack of British help during the war, the "treachery" of Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar and their continued backing of the "traitor De Gaulle". This, however, was all a matter of sentiment and belonged to the past; sentiment had nothing to do with his policies which are to make the best possible peace for France. She had been pushed into this "senseless and needless" war by the British and on "other bad advice" on the worst possible pretext (Danzig) and at a time when, thanks to the criminal errors and negligence of the Front Populaire, France was in no sense prepared for a war. German industry had been working for the war machine at full speed for years while France was indulging in the luxury of strikes; on the day war broke out she had but nine modern bombers. Germany, he is convinced, is going to win the war. He recognizes that our help to the British will be great but it will arrive too late. Hitler, he said, spoke to him "with great assurance of victory and of what Germany can and will do" and he believes Hitler is right. Even taking the opposite hypothesis, however, of a possible British victory the British would never be able to invade the continent and march to Berlin and the problems of the new Europe would remain. He had always worked

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² Charles Rochat succeeded Charles-Roux as Secretary General of the French Foreign Office on November 1, 1940.

⁴³ Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy in France.

for European collaboration; the luxury of a war every 20 years and what it means to France is something we cannot understand. He had, he said, "no mission" (and he repeated this statement several times during the interview) but he had the definite hope that he could bring about in this new Europe a collaboration of the United States. He had spoken frankly on this subject to his German friends and they too saw no reason why such an agreement is impossible. He had no such feelings towards us as he has towards the British who have so often and at such cost deceived France. On the contrary he feels both a real liking and a real admiration for us. He said that, as he "had told his friend Heinzen of the United Press: 'Je m'en fous de l'opinion americaine'" (my telegram No. 902, November 6, 4 p. m.⁴⁴). This is because he realizes we do not at all understand France or her problems. We would, however, some day have to come to the point of collaboration and certainly the sooner the better to avoid needless slaughter and suffering. I asked him how he envisaged this "collaboration" and what it involved and he replied that he had as yet no definite ideas and much depended on future circumstances. He felt, however, that he could be useful in bringing Europe and America together to build the future on this sound and lasting foundation he has been seeking since 1935. He then asked me whether I believed in a British victory and I replied, "Emphatically yes." His answer then was "When?—in another Hundred Years' War?" I asked when he expected the German victory and he merely shrugged his shoulders and said unfortunately he was no prophet. He reiterated that he knows what our industry is capable of in eventual help for the British but that it would come too late; we too were slow.

Turning the notes before him he said that the disappearance of the "old order" aroused no regrets in him nor was he frightened by the [apparent omission] of totalitarian autarchy. The word "democracy", which is so often repeated, as far as France is concerned leaves him completely cold. He had been surprised that during the entire war there was only talk that France was fighting for "democracy"; not that she was fighting for France; that, he said, was why France was beaten. He had seen enough of so-called democracy in France in the past few years and the state to which it had brought his country, the vile and criminal demagoguery into which it had degenerated under the Front Populaire ever to wish to see it again.

He seemed struck likewise especially by our "lack of confidence in Hitler". He was not of a too trusting nature himself, he said, but he felt that Hitler was a man he could deal with. In any event France had no option. "How", he said, "could France defend herself and what could she do, and I am fighting," he said, "to hold for France her

⁴⁴ Not printed.

entire metropolitan territory and in addition her colonial empire—hardly a modest ambition for a man leading a defeated country. In none of my discussions with the Germans has there been any question of negotiating a peace before the end of the war with England. There has been no discussion of the cession of any territory, even Alsace-Lorraine. There has been no question of giving up air and naval bases but I should like to ask you if Germany decides to take such bases what can we do to stop her? France has no army and no means of defense.” (This rhetorical question he asked as one of a number and with no particular emphasis but its importance and pertinence in the present situation struck me forcibly.) “You may say that in the long run a people cannot be kept down and that is true but it is only in the long run. For the present we can do nothing.”

He was struck also by the reference to the acts of the Vichy Government “inspired by Laval” and asked what acts we meant. He said again he was sorry to see such a misunderstanding of France and of his objects, aims, and policies. I interrupted to point out that this misunderstanding was due in large part to the fact that we had at no time received any information whatsoever from his Government as to its plans, hopes, or even what was under discussion. He said: “As I have indicated to you nothing definite has been discussed other than a general policy of collaboration and as you must have gathered from this evening’s communiqué (see my telegram No. 953, November 14, 6 p. m.⁴⁵) that is not always easy. Hitler offered me collaboration in a spirit rare in a conqueror. We have accepted that collaboration but no details have been worked out. If you want any information, however, come straight to me at any time and I will tell you.”

“Do you think my policy unreasonable?”, he continued; “I hope that you will explain it to your Government and endeavor to correct the injustice that is being done me. I think you over there have listened too much to the propaganda of those miserable people who fled France—most of them Jews—who are now conducting such abominable and traitorous propaganda in the United States.”

I said that I would cable you fully of his views; that I saw, however, not the slightest possibility of the collaboration between the United States and a German-dominated Europe such as he hoped for. We could appreciate the difficulties of France’s position. On the other hand we differed from him decidedly and fundamentally on two basic points: we have not the slightest trust in Hitler’s word nor any belief that a Hitler Europe would mean anything but slavery for other peoples including France. Secondly as concerns the British there has in the past, I said, been strong anglophobe sentiment in parts of the United States and we have not always agreed as he must know

⁴⁵ Not printed.

with British policies. That feeling, I emphasized, has now completely disappeared: England we know is fighting our battle and that of the civilized world and in view thereof she will receive every possible bit of our rapidly growing material assistance; we believe in British victory. (His reply was: "Well, the British may be fighting your battle; they certainly did not fight ours.") The interview closed with a reiteration on his part of the request that I fully explain his viewpoint and his hopes and report how pained and surprised he had been by the Secretary's remarks.

Possibly because of this he was calm throughout, moderate in speech at times, serious at others, genial and never unfriendly. He pleaded his cause with considerable eloquence considering the false premises on which it is based, namely, belief in German victory, belief that a German "led" Europe is better for France than a British Europe and a completely defeatist attitude on the question of any present day French resistance. He has, I gathered, considerable confidence in his ability to outwit and outnegotiate his German adversaries and there is little doubt in my mind that Hitler has convinced him of the certainty of a German victory. They have also apparently flattered him to good effect. For example, he said: "My friend Abetz one day, as we rode to Fontainebleau to see Von Brauschitz,⁴⁶ remarked: 'We feel deeply that it should not be you who has this task today; it is people like Sarraut'⁴⁷ and he was right. I am the last one who should be faced with the job of trying to save France, for I am the least responsible for her defeat."

Rochat told me afterwards that he was delighted we had let him make clear to Laval the Secretary's feelings. "Those notes," he said "really considerably moved him. When he said he had been surprised, pained, and shocked he meant it. I saw his reaction when I showed them to him and it was just that. It has, I feel, considerably cleared the atmosphere and I am really most grateful. I am delighted you had this talk."

In spite of Laval's assurances of his willingness to talk to us freely and frankly of what Franco-German collaboration involves the Department will have noted that aside from his negative statements of what had not been discussed he gave no details whatsoever of what his lengthy negotiations with his German friends have covered. His offer therefore, it seems to me, should be savored with several grains of salt.

In conclusion at the risk of repetition I should like to emphasize that as long as Laval retains his present position of authority and influence the gulf between France and the United States will be great.

⁴⁶ Gen. Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German land forces.

⁴⁷ Albert Sarraut, French ex-Minister of Education.

There is only one thing which will deter him from his present course: conviction that the British may win the war and a knowledge that we have both the will and the means to assure that victory. A breach in Franco-American relations would make his position almost untenable; the fear of a serious breach therefore might slow him in his march towards Hitler's new Europe.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6705 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 15, 1940—noon.
[Received November 16—4:24 p. m.]

956. Following this morning by courier:

From Paris. 1628. November 13, 8 p. m. I attended an off the record luncheon given this noon by the American Press Association of Paris for Vice Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Ambassador of France Fernand de Brinon.⁴⁸ Before accepting this invitation I had made it clear to the Press Association that I did not wish to assist at a seance of indoctrination against American policy and in support of the point of view that America can only do harm in Europe if she entertains misgivings with respect to Franco-German "collaboration" and continues to support the British war effort. After the Association had consulted with Ambassador de Brinon, I was given every assurance that nothing would occur which might prove embarrassing to me.

In conversation across the table with Mr. Laval during the luncheon many points of Franco-American relations as they are affected by Mr. Laval's policy of "collaboration" with Germany were touched upon in a friendly and sometimes humorous way, but with a certain note of serious undercurrent. Laval was in marvelous form, his eyes sparkling, his wit very much to the point and his humor of the best. He said at one point that I could measure his friendship for America best by knowing that on leaving the United States in 1931⁴⁹ he had said to himself if he were a young man and had his way to make he would want to be an American citizen. He also expressed the most friendly personal feelings towards Ambassador Bullitt, and asked me to send on his behalf to the Ambassador a message of "amitié".

Immediately the Vice Prime Minister began his talk I had the distinct impression that he had decided "to shoot the works" and not to follow what he had previously thought out as an appropriate state-

⁴⁸ Fernand de Brinon, with the title of Ambassador, handled the political relations between Vichy and Germany with Otto Abetz, the Ambassador of the Reich.

⁴⁹ For correspondence regarding Pierre Laval's visit to the United States in 1931, see *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, pp. 237 ff.

ment to make to the American journalists. I therefore feel that there was no premeditation in what followed. The Vice Prime Minister's speech appeared to all of us there as being addressed to me personally. Rarely during his talk, which he made seated at table, did he take his eyes off mine. The atmosphere was more in the nature of a one-sided personal conversation between two people which was pitched by the talker on a high emotional level and which was not intended for other ears but due to circumstances had to be conducted in the presence of others. On numerous occasions when a particularly pungent point was made with respect [to] American policy the Vice Prime Minister smiled broadly but pleasantly at me as if to emphasize the point that he liked us all but that we were babes lost in the European woods.

He said in effect about everything that I have surmised concerning his policy and have tried to report in my despatches. His initial point was that when [he?] was thrown out of power by "occult forces" in 1936 it was apparent to him that Europe had to choose between fascism and bolshevism and that he had chosen then for fascism. He contended that France might have been justified in making war over the remilitarization of the Rhineland, because of the *Anschluss* or even because of the destruction of Czechoslovakia but that she foolishly made war merely because of the Corridor and Danzig. He stated explicitly that in his opinion France had declared war in September 1939 without any justification whatsoever; that she had been led to do so by England and not by a valid reason of her own. He remarked parenthetically that as we were "chez nous" he felt no reticence in saying that he detested England.

From this point on Mr. Laval devoted himself entirely to America and to what he termed our mistaken ideas about Europe. While both before and after luncheon he spoke of his resentment against President Roosevelt's assumption that he, and therefore the present French Government, were not free agents in dealing with Germany he emphasized in his talk that France was without arms and therefore must "collaborate" or court destruction. But he added when Hitler offered me his hand and the opportunity of collaboration at Montoire, a thing that no other military conqueror had ever done in history toward the leader of a conquered race, he had realized that out of this war might grow the very thing that Europe had been striving for for centuries, notably a permanent peace and general cooperation. It was in this connection that he appealed to America and particularly to President Roosevelt to comprehend the revolution that has occurred in Europe during the last 4 years and to work with it. He said that American public opinion would not carry one gram of weight with him in the event it continued to manifest its mistaken view of what is happening in Europe. He said he had no interest or desire in receiv-

ing an "injection" of American support; that such treatment could cause only a temporary reaction and that then France and Europe would relapse into their old illnesses.

As we had talked openly and most amicably across the table during nearly the whole of the luncheon, I decided toward the end of the Vice Prime Minister's talk that I should take the opportunity to observe to him and to the others gathered around that the American people feel that the word of the German leaders does not inspire the confidence necessary to an understanding with them, that we Americans love our country just as Frenchmen love theirs and that we had misgivings with respect to the future and that as a freedom loving people we still resist Fascist doctrines for ourselves. This opportunity was denied to me by the action of the president of the Association, but not by the Vice Prime Minister, who realized after several words had passed between us over the table at the end of his talk that he had gone too far in so obviously addressing his remarks to me and in going to the length that he had in subjecting American policy to a critical analysis by inference and direct statement. The upshot was that we made an engagement to meet later in the afternoon.

At 5 o'clock I was received by Mr. Laval at the Hotel Matignon. I began the conversation by stating that I had been impressed by the fact that almost every German I had met since the occupation of Paris had asked me how I could explain the fact that neither the French Government nor the French people had taken seriously Germany's efforts prior to the outbreak of the war to convince both the French Government and the French people that Hitler "meant business["] and that he possessed the instruments and supplies of war necessary to victory.

I said that I had grave misgivings that Americans might some day be asking similar questions of the French with respect to a period in Franco-American relations. I asked the Vice Prime Minister how closely informed he was kept with respect to the development of American official and popular opinion on these relations. He replied that Henry-Haye sent him nothing.

I thereupon told him somewhat fully of the Secretary's conversation of November 4 with the French Ambassador. The Vice Prime Minister said that he was not surprised at the tone the Secretary had taken now that the question of mutual comprehension had been brought to his attention and that it was obvious that immediate steps were necessary looking to a mutual revelation and understanding of policies and ideas. He said that he would like to put aside all the clap-trap of diplomacy and speak as a Frenchman to an American. He said that he would like to have me report our talk by telegram and present it in the form of a message of clarification from him to the Amer-

ican Government. He asked me to emphasize the point that he had talked to Hitler and to Ribbentrop as a proud Frenchman, that he was definitely still a proud Frenchman despite France's defeat and that when he talked to any Government his pride as a Frenchman would play an important role. He said that it was for this reason that he had reacted unfavorably to the suggestion in the President's message that the present French Government was a prisoner government that might dishonor its word.

What he desired to have set forth as a message of explanation may be summarized as follows:

1. He had not sought the interview with the victorious leader and his Minister for Foreign Affairs. Hitler had taken the first step and France beaten, disarmed and disorganized as she is had to take the step to meet this gesture.

2. He, Laval, is convinced of a British defeat even though the United States augments material aid to Britain to the utmost and even ultimately becomes a belligerent. Ergo, not only was it necessary at the moment to meet Hitler halfway but considerations of the future impose a collaboration that may lead to France regaining her rightful place in Europe as the first Latin power. In connection with his belief that Hitler is bound to be the victor he asked me to point out that he by no means underestimates the importance of the aid that the United States can give to England. But he said Germany's victory in Europe to date is so great that full victory by Germany is now inevitable.

3. The Vice Prime Minister asked me what my own view was with respect to the outcome of the war. I said that I personally was convinced that Germany would lose. He said that if this personal view represented the view generally held in the United States it was of course clear why the Vichy Government and the Washington Government sensed a lack of mutual comprehension. He said that he personally felt there was a way out of the present dilemma without total defeat and total victory and that he would like to work with the American Government to this end. I told him that in my personal opinion this would be extremely difficult because of the absence of the necessary confidence in the word of the German leaders and because those leaders had become what might even be described as "untouchables" for many Americans. He said that he realized this, but that nevertheless he knew it was his duty to protect the French people from [as much] suffering that [as?] he could and he felt sure that a similar feeling must constitute the major preoccupation of President Roosevelt and the American leaders with respect to the American people. At this point the Vice Prime Minister reiterated that he was prepared to be frank and open with the United States Government at any time and stated that he would give the United States Government whatever information it asked for about his own ideas and plans at any time.

4. The Vice Prime Minister said that he was in a position in view of his current discussions with the German leaders to tell them at any time that he was requested to do so what the American view might be with respect to questions under consideration relating to the future

of Europe. He explained this statement by pointing out that he recognized that a revolution had occurred on the Continent of Europe and that he believed in the possibility of a new European order with which the United States could and should work and cooperate.

5. I told the Vice Prime Minister that opinion in the United States was determined against appeasement. He said that this new order need not be appeasement, that surely a pledge or a guaranty could be found.

6. At about this point in our talk I said that I would like to speak even more frankly and more personally with him than I had yet done thus far in a conversation that was no more than a talk between a Frenchman and an American. I then said that in my own personal opinion collaboration and appeasement would fully lead to a situation in which one might easily envisage the possibility of a rupture between the French and American Governments. After a few moments of reflection Mr. Laval said that such a development "would be horrible". It was then that he emphasized with great vigor his desire that a report be sent by me that would take the form of a message of explanation from him, and his parting words to me, when I left at 6:00 o'clock, were "You must try with the greatest care to tell your Government accurately what are the thoughts that have been and are passing through my mind and you must take even greater care that there shall stand out over and above all you record my deep felt desire to safeguard the relations between our two countries."

I left the Vice Prime Minister with the feeling that the very serious view taken by the American Government of the present state of our relations with the Vichy Government and the reasons therefor had struck home. This does not imply that he is less convinced of Germany's victory and the need to work with Germany. But I do believe that he has begun to reflect again on the American position and to realize that perhaps he has not given sufficient attention to the role of the United States. The Vice Prime Minister is frank to admit that the mass of the French people are not with him. He himself refers to times in the past when he was "thrown out of office" by acts and statements outside France. [Barnes.]

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6725 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 16, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received November 17—8:02 p. m.]

965. After the statements reported in my 964, November 16, 5 p. m.,⁵⁰ Marshal Pétain continued to talk of his present problems with the greatest seriousness and at times emotionally. He was obviously depressed and weighed down by a sense of the enormous and tragic responsibilities which face him in trying to save what he can for France.

⁵⁰ *Post*, p. 488.

He said that his policy of "collaboration" with Germany had been much criticized and misunderstood in the United States. By "collaboration" he said he means only economic collaboration and in no sense military aid to Germany in her war against the British nor cession of bases. So far, his offer of "collaboration" had brought nothing until a few moments ago. He had just learned that Germany has agreed to release those prisoners who are fathers of four children or who are the oldest of four children whether [*where?*] the father is dead. That at least was something. He had also heard that there are to be certain facilities granted for communication between the two zones though he was not sure just what. (I presume, though he did not so state, he had obtained this news from Laval who is due back in Vichy tonight or tomorrow.)

On the other hand, he continued, as I probably knew, the Germans were sending thousands of the poor loyal inhabitants of Lorraine down to unoccupied France with no prior notice, permitted them to take but 2000 francs and 50 kilos of luggage, and imposing on France the additional burden of caring for and feeding these people. I asked if this was what the Germans meant by "collaboration" and he replied sadly that so far that seemed to be the case; that they talked of the fruits of collaboration mainly as something to come when their war against Great Britain is won and peace is made. He went on to say that for these poor people from Lorraine and the prisoners, work must be found and they must be fed and that is why he hopes to get French industry started again a little. The Germans, however, are placing on France the burden of reimbursing these poor people from Lorraine for the loss of their property in addition to the 400,000,000 francs a day obligation France is now paying.

He has sent, he said, a definite statement to the Germans that France cannot continue to pay this sum of 400,000,000 a day. What the result will be and what the Germans will do he does not know: "They are capable of anything. But you may be sure that I will never agree to anything that will dishonor France or to assist Germany in a military way in her war against the British."

As for the British he said they have behaved badly toward France. They had helped to push her into a war for which she was in no way prepared but they had not helped her much once she was in it. Their air force has now shown what it can do but they did not send that air force to help France. Since the armistice they had given their support "to the traitor De Gaulle"; they had engaged in a cowardly, cowardly attack on Mers-el-Kebir. France owed little to the British. In spite of all that he bears them no hate, on the contrary, from what he has seen of German behavior, a British victory is what France must

hope for. They are fighting a good fight now and he does not believe that they will ever yield. On the other hand they cannot land on the Continent, he said, and invade Germany. He therefore sees after much tragic destruction a drawn peace. The sooner that could come the better, for France will pay the price. I said that regardless of any errors of the past the British we feel are now fighting our war, that they will be victorious and that we shall give them all possible material aid. He reacted immediately: "Of course, and I hope your aid will be very great. After what they have done, I cannot help them; but I say again that a British-American victory is what France must wish. I have no love for the British and I shall defend French territory against them. But their victory is much better for France than that of Germany. The Germans are becoming each day more exigent in their demands and I do not know where we shall end." He repeated as though to emphasize the seriousness of the situation: "They may finish by putting me in prison. I shall however never agree to anything contrary to the honor of France. Many people even in France today criticized me for signing the armistice. It was the only policy and by it I have saved what I could of France. Otherwise the Germans would have occupied my entire country and we know what their occupation means."

He then talked a little of our association in Spain and asked that his very cordial regards be sent to Ambassador Weddell for whom he expressed his esteem. "Spain," he said in reply to my inquiry, "is in a very serious situation. There is really hunger there too. [Apparent omission] much common sense and will not come in unless forced to—just as I would have wanted no war. The task which has fallen on me is as great as that which ever faced a man. It is Blum, Daladier and others brought to Riom, who are responsible for this war and should have to bear the problems of today instead of me. They and the others who have so misgoverned France for the past 20 years." (The Department may be interested to compare the similarity of these last statements with those made to me by Laval—see my telegram 954, November 14, 9 p.m.)

In reply to my offer to communicate at any time any information or message which he cared to send us he concluded our talk with an expression of appreciation and by saying with great seriousness: "I want you to tell your President whose words have at times been hard that I shall do all in my power to keep the friendship of your country and to maintain as good relations as may be possible."

I have reported this conversation in some detail and even some repetition because they are the words of the one man who today for all his age can alone speak for France, and who alone possesses the prestige and affection of his people. Without him this Government

would not last 10 minutes. A defeatist in some respects history shows him to be, but I came away with the firm impression that he will never consciously agree to any step which by his lights and standards and in his words is contrary "to the honor of France". He sold me completely on that.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/7068 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Murphy)*⁵¹ to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 9, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received December 10—9:20 a. m.]

1109. Laval, who is leaving this evening for Paris, received me today and discussed for over an hour several phases of the situation which are of especial interest. He commenced by a reference to American sentiment regarding France which he hopes is improving. Laval said with some feeling that he believed that the efforts of a number of discredited French *émigrés* now in the United States, plus the antagonism of certain American and foreign Jews, are doing much to obscure the verities of the French situation and to endanger the friendship which he hopes will continue between our two countries. He expressed no bitterness except for a passing reference to the bluntness of the Secretary's November conversation with Henry-Haye saying that time alone will demonstrate the facts in the European situation and the merits of Laval's policy. He hoped that the Secretary would understand from the reply he personally drafted that he is motivated by no desire to play Germany's game but merely to protect French interests and to retain intact France's Colonial Empire. Malicious stories to the effect that he is eager to do the German bidding, that he even goes farther in subservient compliance than the Germans demand are the mouthings of the ignorant and uninformed. He is French he said and the best interests of his own people are his only goal.

At this point I referred to the reference made by the Secretary that he felt frequently that Laval had failed to keep our Government advised of his policies and his negotiations especially those relating to matters of direct mutual concern such as Indochina. He said he regretted if we believed there was any desire on his part to conceal from us matters which would be of mutual interest. Often the rapidity of events and the pressure under which he worked caused him to overlook and neglect many important items. He was resolved that there should be a better understanding on our part of his acts and inten-

⁵¹ Murphy returned to France for a few days in December, after an extended visit in the United States, before going to his new assignment in North Africa.

tions; that later in the discussion he would give me proof of his sincerity in this regard. I said he had been quoted as saying "Je m'en fous de l'opinion americaine." He replied that it is always easy to pick a phrase out of a conversation and twist its meaning. I could hardly consider him so unintelligent as to belittle the importance of the United States. His reference in that connection was simply to his conviction that whether the American people liked or did not like it the German success is a hard fact and not a theory. The French Government has to deal unfortunately with the facts, and in that respect if American public opinion was critical, it simply could not be helped.

Laval asked what the prevailing sentiment is on the part of the Administration and the American public concerning "that war between England and Germany". I replied that there is no change—that the belief in a victory was growing and that we were committed to give all possible aid to Great Britain short of entry into the war. We believed our best interests and those of humanity would be served by a victory.

Laval said that he had thought we believed in a victory "less and less" and that he personally believed in a German victory "more and more". One of his principal reasons he said in indulging in such a hope is that in such case Britain will pay the bill and not France. Laval added that in his conversation with Hitler the subject of the eventual conditions of peace had never been discussed, even in the most preliminary fashion, but that he is convinced that Hitler is far too astute to wish the ruin of France. He said that while it is obvious that Germany has no intention of relinquishing Alsace-Lorraine, Germany, he is convinced, had no intention to destroy the French Colonial Empire.

Laval went on to deplore what he believes is a lack of understanding in the United States that an economic and political revolution is under way in Europe; that it was bound to happen and would continue whether Hitler and associated personalities ever existed or whether they disappear.

European order would have fallen in any event he said and the sooner the United States understands that fact the quicker some of the problems will be solved. Their solution will only be delayed, he believes, if through American aid the war is prolonged and Europe reduced to a shambles. What good, he said, will Europe be to itself or to the United States, whose best customer it has been, if it is nothing but a cemetery.

Laval inquired about our interest in the French fleet and asked why we could not believe that it would be preserved to retain the French Empire intact, and would never fall into German hands.

I replied that we entertained no doubts of the good intentions of his Government to prevent the fleet falling into German hands but it was a question whether in view of all the circumstances France could in an eventuality execute its intentions. Laval said we could feel secure in our minds that the only use which would be made of the French fleet would be the protection of France's empire, that it would be used to repel any aggressive action just as it would any stupid British or De Gaulle attempt to seize and occupy French territory.

At this point I mentioned to Laval the interest which so many elements in the United States attach to the North African situation, Martinique and to Indochina.

Laval replied that that brought him to something of importance which he wished to convey to the Secretary. Japan, he said, has offered its arbitration to settle the present difficulties between Thailand and Indochina. Laval said Arsène-Henry⁵² would inform the Tokyo Government in 48 hours that France prefers to settle the difference directly with Thailand or if necessary resort to the good offices of the United States. Laval would also request Henry-Haye to inform the Secretary fully in this connection.⁵³

Laval said that he wishes by this action to make plain to the Secretary that he is fully conscious that the power of the United States is the bulwark protecting Indochina against Japanese aggression. At the same time he said that he thought our Government should support the French demand that colonial troops be allowed to proceed to Indochina from Djibouti, this demand having been rejected by Britain without any intelligent reason. Laval added that he hoped that aviation equipment could be sent from the United States to Indochina to strengthen the French position. I asked at this point whether he had ever seriously considered sending the modern planes of American manufacture now in Martinique⁵⁴ to Indochina as would be the French right under the armistice convention. (I emphasized that this was only a personal inquiry as I had no instructions from my Government to raise the question.) Laval said that he was glad I had mentioned the matter—he would like to see it done and would bring up the question again after a discussion with his colleagues. Personally he saw no objection and did not believe the Germans would oppose. He said he found amusing many of the American press reports on the subject of Martinique. In fact he said some of the criticism of France, as unjust as it might be, appearing in the American press occasionally pleased the Germans and made it easier for Laval to obtain concessions from them.

⁵² Charles Arsène-Henry, French Ambassador in Japan.

⁵³ See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, December 11, p. 532.

⁵⁴ See pp. 505 ff.

Laval emphasized his recognition of our interest in Martinique and his desire in every way to please our Government in that regard.

The conversation then swung to North Africa ⁵⁵ with a question from Laval regarding the reported visit, said to be under contemplation, by Colonel Donovan ⁵⁶ to North Africa. I replied that I was without information except for a radio report on the subject but that Colonel Donovan is a well-known private American citizen whose judgment is respected in the United States.

Laval said we would find no German interference in French African affairs—the Germans had been absolutely correct and circumspect regarding French African interests, much more so than the British. There are no Germans at Dakar, he said, and only one civilian observer near Casablanca. The Italians, he is confident, are also withdrawing completely. Laval is certain that France with some minor exceptions (I inquired about Spanish demands but he brushed the question aside saying he would revert to it some other time and it was nothing to worry about) will retain her African interests practically intact. He said with a bland smile: “My friendly efforts with the Germans are bearing some fruit.”

I seized the opportunity to mention that an inspection of our consular establishments in North Africa was long overdue and was desired by my Government. I would probably make it shortly and this would give me an opportunity to see the actual conditions. Laval ended the conversation by saying with a grimace that the French and American policies seemed to differ only in respect to the “small question” of a British victory but that for him American friendship, in any event, would always be a cornerstone in France’s foreign policy.

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/7090 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 11, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 9 : 54 p. m.]

1119. The Government distribution of radio news this morning includes a quotation from the British Broadcasting Company’s emission through Daventry on December 10 of a statement that “the nomination of Robert Murphy to the French Government is interpreted as a gesture on the part of the United States to reenforce Marshal Pétain’s influence at the expense of Laval and collaboration with Germany. Mr. Murphy is to visit North Africa before arrival at his post where he

⁵⁵ For correspondence regarding the situation in North Africa, see pp. 570 ff.

⁵⁶ William J. Donovan, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in Southeastern Europe, December 1940–March 1941.

will meet General Weygand to discuss with him the attitude of the United States toward France. He will emphasize that America's friendship for France will be sacrificed if France realizes collaboration with Germany."

The effect of this broadcast locally is bad. It has attracted German attention and is embarrassing to the French.

It seems from here, at least, that it would be most useful if the Department could suggest to the British Embassy that the British censorship avoid broadcasts regarding efforts on our part to impede collaboration with Germany. Such publicity, as we view it here, can only defeat its own purpose.

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/7140 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 12, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received December 13—5:35 p. m.]

1124. Marshal Pétain received me this evening and for over an hour made a *tour d'horizon* of France's problems. He was most cordial but unhappy over France's predicament.

The Marshal said he is delighted about Admiral Leahy's impending arrival.⁵⁸ I mentioned that the Ambassador's coming raised the question of place of residence as we had been informed that the Marshal was leaving for Versailles next week. He replied that it is a fact unless the Germans change their minds that he plans to proceed to Versailles for a stay of about 2 weeks. He plans to make subsequent visits to Versailles. This involves no change in the status of the Diplomatic Corps which will remain at Vichy. He emphasized twice that Admiral Leahy should plan to reside at Vichy. The Marshal promised to facilitate finding appropriate residential quarters for Admiral Leahy.

The Marshal said he could see no outcome of the war but a drawn peace. He said the Germans had not abandoned their planned invasion of England and he thought they would attempt it next spring. He said he thought that England would hold but on the other hand he can see no prospect of a German military defeat.

The Marshal said that he bore the English no ill will; he admired their courage and hoped they would win although he, as a military man with some experience, could see nothing but a drawn peace. He recognized, he said, that the ill-advised actions of Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar were attributable to the snap judgment of "Winston Church-

⁵⁸ Admiral Leahy had been recently appointed Ambassador to France.

ill who is capable of almost any rash act when drunk as he frequently is", said the Marshal.

The Marshal said the Germans have acted miserably toward France, ruthlessly taking every advantage to pillage the country scientifically by means of the issue and arbitrary fixed value of German occupational money in terms of francs. He said, "We are under their heel and we are unable to oppose them in many things but there are limits beyond which they cannot go and they know it." A number of advances have been made by them, he said, regarding the French fleet, all of which he had firmly repelled. There is unanimity of opinion, he believes, on the part of the Government and the French population that the fleet will be preserved to protect the French colonial possessions. The Marshal said: "I hope your President understands that I have kept and will continue to keep the solemn promise I made that the French fleet will be scuttled before it is allowed to fall into German hands." The Marshal said that the Germans had missed their great chance of *rapprochement* with France and again demonstrated their inability to administer a foreign people. The German Army, he said, is continually at sixes and sevens with the German civil administration, constantly requiring Hitler's personal intervention.

I asked the Marshal about General Weygand's mission to North Africa. The Marshal said: "I sent Weygand to Africa to quell the dissident movement which had begun to assume alarming proportions." The Marshal believes it was only Weygand's presence and activity there that reestablished French authority which starting at Dakar was badly shaken.

The Marshal then added a most significant remark to the effect that Weygand is now organizing an expeditionary force to defend the Chad against any expedition, British or De Gaulle, which may be operating in that territory. (This dovetails with Baudouin's reference to the visit to Paris by General Huntziger and Admiral Darlan for the purpose of obtaining German approval of an increase of French military effectives in North Africa—see my 1110, December 10, 10 a. m.⁵⁹)

I asked the Marshal how long it was intended to retain Weygand in Africa and he replied "as long as his mission there seems justified."

I told the Marshal that the Department wished me to inspect our consular establishments in North Africa including Dakar; that we were greatly interested in the economic aspects of that territory. He wished me luck and said every facility would be accorded.

I brought up the question of Martinique in a general way emphasizing our interest. The Marshal said: "For us Martinique is really of small importance, when our present problems are considered. You

⁵⁹ Entire text not printed; for extract, see p. 627.

may assure your Government that I have every disposition to please and to work in harmony with your Government in that connection."

The Marshal said he has had several conversations with the Spaniards who were demanding concessions of French Moroccan territory. The conversations were not coupled with threats by the Spaniards who, the Marshal is certain, have no wish to enter the war. "However," he said, "the Germans have promised them Gibraltar and who knows what Spanish pride and necessity may oblige them to do."

I congratulated the Marshal on his splendid physical condition and he remarked that when he fought the war 20 years ago he thought that he had finished. He doubted that he would have the years and energy to lead "the crusade facing France which will be long."

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/7090 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1940—9 p. m.

844. Your telegram No. 1119, December 11, 7 p. m. The question of the B.B.C. broadcasts relating to American policy, particularly as regards France, has been taken up with the British authorities.

In this connection an interview by Jay Allen with General Weygand, which was published yesterday throughout the United States in a syndicated article may be cited. The General expressed himself as being very displeased at the trend of American and British propaganda as regards his departure for Africa and his command there and the apparent intention to create the false impression that there was a lack of harmony between his policies and those of Marshal Pétain. He insisted that the contrary was true and that he was in Africa to serve France, the only France, that of Marshal Pétain.

In connection with your projected visit to North Africa and your possible call upon General Weygand, I wish to recall that, as you know, there is no effort on the part of this country to create any impression that he is not acting in accord with Marshal Pétain.

As you are aware, the position of this Government is that the United States is clearly and openly opposed to the methods and dissemination of National Socialist doctrine of force and conquest. There has been no change whatsoever in the established traditional friendship of the United States for France, whose continued independence and position of leadership in the civilized world is a matter of deep concern not only to the Government but to the people of this country. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the United States is giving all possible assistance to Great Britain and to other nations that are defending their freedom. Public opinion in this country, desirous as it is of helping France in any way, would, however, not feel justified in doing

anything that might assist the forces of destruction and aggression against England and the free nations of the world, including the United States.

HULL

851.00/2171 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 14, 1940—3 a. m.

[Received 11:26 a. m.]

1133. Laval returned unexpectedly from Paris at 11:45, December 13. A Cabinet meeting was called at 5 p. m. and there was a Council of Ministers at 8 during which the discussion is said to have been violent. Minister of the Interior Peyrouton left in the midst of the discussion and the meeting adjourned at 8:55. In the interim a considerable group of Sûreté Nationale blocked the Parc Hotel. Laval is said to have been taken into custody by the Sûreté Nationale at 11:30 Friday for an unknown destination. He had evidently planned to return to Paris at midnight.

At about the time of Laval's arrest Vichy was cut off from telephone and telegraphic communication with the outside world.

It is not possible at this late hour to communicate with any responsible member of the Government. A host of rumors are afloat: among them one to the effect that Germany demanded permission for the passage of its troops through French territory to Italy; that Laval's arrest is a *coup de police* engineered by Peyrouton; that the Marshal finally decided that Laval had made unauthorized concessions to the Germans; et cetera. It is impossible to obtain official confirmation of any of these rumors.

Madame Laval and her daughter José de Chambrun came to the lodging of an American newspaper correspondent for advice stating that their home at Chateldon had been surrounded by the Garde Mobile which had cut the telephone connection and were searching the premises for Laval's records.

MURPHY

851.00/2175 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 14, 1940—noon.

[Received 5:23 p. m.]

1135. My 1133, December 14, 3 a. m. Rochat confirms Laval's resignation as Vice President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs last evening. Laval is at present under house arrest for a minimum period of 3 days at Chateldon.

Rochat said that at the Council of Ministers last night all of the Ministers had assembled and were grouped around the Marshal when Laval entered the room. The Marshal told Laval bluntly that he had lost his confidence and he would have to request his resignation. He said that for some time distrust of Laval on the part of his colleagues and himself had been developing and that the Marshal felt that Laval was not keeping him fully advised of his official actions. Laval thereupon tendered his resignation and returned to his office. Subsequently taken into custody by the Sûreté Nationale and transferred to his home at Chateldon where the police authorities had already instituted a search for documentation.

I asked Rochat who would probably succeed Laval as Foreign Minister, and he said he had no doubt but that it would be Pierre Étienne Flandin. He said that Baudouin would probably be made Minister of Press and Propaganda, and that otherwise he thought there would be no other changes. (I believe it is possible that Peyrouton, Minister of the Interior, or Alibert, Minister of Justice, may be appointed Vice President of the Council.)

I am also informed that according to Baudouin, the French Government despatched last night an emissary whose name is not yet divulged to convey the news of the foregoing proceedings to Chancellor Hitler with the explanation that this action represents no change in the French policy of collaboration but is the result of a personal difference between Marshal Pétain and Laval. This emissary is to say that Marshal Pétain regards himself as the active head of the Government; that he believes Laval has not kept him informed of many of his official actions and that the present change is necessary in order to emphasize that he is in no sense to be considered a figurehead.

This culmination of growing distrust of Laval on the part of his colleagues and by the public at home and abroad seems to be an organized effort to placate the Germans and simultaneously raise the stock of the French Government at Washington and London. Flandin has certainly been an ardent proponent of the policy of collaboration but at the same time he has never manifested the anglophobia of Laval. He apparently, however, believes that there is no possibility of a British victory (see my telegram 1110, December 10, 10 a. m.).

Rochat assures me that telegraphic and telephone communication with the outside world will be reestablished at noon today. He said that the elaborate police precautions were taken on the theory that Laval's friends might attempt an ill-advised action.

Vichy is tranquil and the foregoing events have been accompanied by no disorder whatever.

MURPHY

851.00/2177 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 16, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received December 17—12: 40 p. m.]

1145. Baudouin, who is in a high humor over Laval's downfall, told me today in the strictest confidence that the immediate reason for Pétain's dismissal of Laval is the evidence adduced by Peyrouton, Minister of the Interior and others in the Cabinet that Laval planned, after Marshal Pétain's arrival in Versailles, to effect his *de facto* sequestration and obtain from the Marshal his signature to documents which would constitute Laval head of the French State. When the evidence of this conspiracy on the part of Laval was brought to the Marshal's attention he decided it was time for Laval to leave.

Baudouin hopes that the Marshal's plan for the constitution of a consultative legislative body to be called the "Conseil National" will find general approval in the United States. He said that the decree constituting this body would be issued this week.

The Conseil will consist of 150 members selected by the Marshal from Senators, Deputies, representatives of syndicates and in fact all shades of public opinion. It will not initiate legislation but will act in an advisory capacity.

Baudouin expressed the hope that this proof that France has not surrendered its democratic ideals but will go as far along the return to democratic principles as present circumstances permit will be well received in the United States.

Baudouin also said that German Ambassador in Paris Abetz will arrive in Vichy this afternoon to make contact with the French Government and undoubtedly discuss the situation created by the removal of Laval. He said, wink, that full military and other honors will be accorded Abetz who is flattered by these manifestations of French good will.

Laval and his personal staff remain under house arrest.

MURPHY

851.00/2179 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 18, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received December 19—6: 05 a. m.]

1154. While of course for obvious reasons the press in unoccupied France has not been permitted to indulge in the slightest expression of elation at the elimination, however temporary it may turn out to be, of Laval from the position of power he has so obviously and effectively enjoyed during the past few months the feeling of relief and hope

which has been aroused by his dismissal is except for his little group of immediate "collaborators" unanimous throughout France. It would be hard to exaggerate the unpopularity of the Auvergnat "Dauphin" all over the country and the uneasiness over the lengths that he might go in his boasted policy of Franco-German collaboration. His departure from the scene and the firm and abrupt method by which it was brought about have greatly strengthened the Marshal's prestige and popularity and have given rise to a new hope and a new feeling, something akin to "self-respect", that the country and its Government have not sunk to the degradation of Nazi enslavement. That at least is the reaction one hears on all sides in conversation; even in ordinarily timid and discreet Government circles no attempt is made to disguise the delight which Laval's dismissal elicited.

There is, however, another side to the picture. Considerable uneasiness, to put it mildly, exists as to German reaction and what steps the occupying authorities may decide to take. While the brief visit of Abetz to Vichy was viewed with frigid eyes on both sides—and his carload of guards with sub-machine guns hardly served to thaw the atmosphere—there was real fear lest his coming presaged either the reinstatement of Laval or the occupation of the entire country. The feeling here today is that immediate danger of either alternative has for the moment largely been removed; an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion, however, naturally still persists. In the occupied territory I understand German "annoyance" has created the impression that the Marshal's days as active Chief of State are numbered. Déat⁶⁰ for instance is openly rejoicing at this prospect. I am told that by German order no reference has yet been made in the Paris press to the "resignation" of Laval and that similar orders which were promptly disregarded here, were issued for the unoccupied zone. In fact Abetz was quoted in the press of the former capital as stating that the "one man" who could really engineer the true Franco-German collaboration which both sides so ardently desired was Monsieur Laval.

Thus the recent change has placed the Government in a difficult and delicate position: the temporary elimination of Laval from the picture, whatever the final incident that really caused it, means at bottom recognition of the unpopularity of his enthusiastic and determined march down the path of collaboration with the Nazis and of the bad name which that policy is giving France abroad (especially in the Unites [*United States?*]). But it is more than that: Laval was the inspirer and the genius of the present French system of government. It was he above all who in the critical days of Bordeaux fought with great determination and success against the removal of the Government to Africa; it was his persuasive powers that engineered the

⁶⁰ Marcel Déat, editor of French newspaper *L'Oeuvre* under German control.

death of the Third Republic and organized the new regime, and it was he who hoped behind the dignified and patriotic façade of a tired and aged Marshal to go the whole way in aid to Germany. His anti-war sentiments were well known to Hitler and he has been the close and intimate collaborator of Abetz during the past months, and presumably also prior to the latter's expulsion from France shortly before the war. The rough treatment given him therefore (partly in the nature of Peyrouton's and Baudouin's revenge) was in Abetz' eyes not only a political affront to his Führer, but a personal blow to himself.

To allay German misgivings that the line of French policy in the future will diverge too far in another direction, is the difficult task of the Marshal and his Government. The appointment of Flandin, "acceptable" as he is in German eyes, is clearly, perhaps all too clearly, designed to save France from further grinding of the German boot. The next few days, or at most weeks, should indicate whether the game has succeeded, or whether Germany, disregarding the probable effect on the French African colonies, the French fleet and the additional administrative burdens involved, decides that the time has come to occupy the whole of a "hostile and unappreciative" France or to show her resentment in some other unpleasant form.

A discreet press and radio in Great Britain and the United States can assist the Marshal in his task to an important degree. Any note of exultation at the recent change is therefore to say the least highly inopportune.

MATTHEWS

123 Leahy, Wm. D./30½

*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*⁶¹

WASHINGTON, [December 20, 1940?]

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: As Ambassador of the United States near the French Government, you will be serving the United States at a very critical time in the relations between the United States and France. I impose entire confidence in your ability and judgment to meet all situations which may arise. Nevertheless, for your general guidance I feel that I may properly outline some of the basic principles which at present govern the relations of the United States with France.

(1) Marshal Pétain occupies a unique position both in the hearts of the French people and in the Government. Under the existing Constitution his word is law and nothing can be done against his opposition unless it is accomplished without his knowledge. In his de-

⁶¹ Handed to Admiral Leahy in Washington on December 20, 1940, by the Secretary of State. Admiral Leahy arrived in Vichy on January 5, 1941.

crees he uses the royal "we" and I have gathered that he intends to rule.

Accordingly, I desire that you endeavor to cultivate as close relations with Marshal Pétain as may be possible. You should outline to him the position of the United States in the present conflict and you should stress our firm conviction that only by defeat of the powers now controlling the destiny of Germany and Italy can the world live in liberty, peace and prosperity; that civilization cannot progress with a return to totalitarianism.

I had reason to believe that Marshal Pétain was not cognizant of all of the acts of his Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Laval, in his relations with the Germans. There can be no assurance that a similar situation will not exist with the new Foreign Minister.⁶² Accordingly, you should endeavor to bring to Marshal Pétain's attention such acts done or contemplated in the name of France which you deem to be inimical to the interests of the United States.

(2) I have made it abundantly clear that the policy of this administration is to support in every way practicable those countries which are defending themselves against aggression. In harmony with this principle this Government is affording and will continue to afford to the Government of Great Britain all possible assistance short of war. You may wish from time to time to bring to the attention of Marshal Pétain and members of the Government concrete information regarding the American program to this end.

(3) I have been much perturbed by reports indicating that resources of France are being placed at the disposal of Germany in a measure beyond that positively required by the terms of the armistice agreement. I have reason to believe that aside from the selfish interests of individuals there is unrequired governmental cooperation with Germany motivated by a belief in the inevitableness of a German victory and ultimate benefit to France. I desire that you endeavor to inform yourself with relation to this question and report fully regarding it.

You should endeavor to persuade Marshal Pétain, the members of his Government, and high ranking officers in the military forces with whom you come into contact, of the conviction of this Government that a German victory would inevitably result in the dismemberment of the French Empire and the maintenance at most of France as a vassal state.

(4) I believe that the maintenance of the French fleet free of German control is not only of prime importance to the defense of this hemisphere but is also vital to the preservation of the French Empire and the eventual restoration of French independence and autonomy.

⁶² Pierre Étienne Flandin succeeded Laval upon the latter's dismissal on December 13, 1940.

Accordingly, from the moment we were confronted with the imminent collapse of French resistance it has been a cardinal principle of this administration to assure that the French fleet did not fall into German hands and was not used in the furtherance of German aims. I immediately informed the French Government, therefore, that should that Government permit the French fleet to be surrendered to Germany the French Government would permanently lose the friendship and good will of the Government of the United States.

Since that time I have received numerous assurances from those in control of the destiny of France that the French fleet would under no circumstances be surrendered.

On June 18, 1940, Monsieur Paul Baudouin, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured Ambassador Biddle "in the name of the French Government in the most solemn manner that the French fleet would never be surrendered to the enemy."

On July 1, 1940, President Lebrun informed Ambassador Bullitt that "France would under no conditions deliver the fleet to Germany." On the same day Marshal Pétain assured Ambassador Bullitt that orders had been issued to every Captain of the French fleet to sink his ship rather than to permit it to fall into German hands, and Admiral Darlan told Ambassador Bullitt that he had "given absolute orders to the officers of his fleet to sink immediately any ship that the Germans should attempt to seize."

When Marshal Pétain came into power as Chief of the French State I received renewed and most solemn assurances that the French fleet would not be surrendered to Germany. Vice Premier Laval reiterated these assurances to Mr. Matthews on November 14 when he said that "the French fleet will never fall into the hands of a hostile power."

On November 16 Marshal Pétain, when the subject was again raised, told Mr. Matthews: "I have given the most solemn assurances that the French fleet, including the *Jean Bart* and the *Richelieu*, should never fall into Germany's hands. I have given these assurances to your Government. I have given them to the British Government, and even to Churchill personally. I reiterate them now. They will be used to defend French territory and possessions. They will never be used against the British unless we are attacked by them." And most recently Marshal Pétain, in a conversation with the present Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Mr. Murphy, said on December 12: "I hope your President understands that I have kept and will continue to keep the solemn promise I made that the French fleet will be scuttled before it is allowed to fall into German hands."

I feel most strongly that if the French Government after these repeated solemn assurances were to permit the use of the French fleet in hostile operations against the British, such action would constitute

a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith to the Government of the United States.

You will undoubtedly associate with high officers of the French Navy. I desire, therefore, that in your relations with such officers, as well as in your conversations with French officials, you endeavor to convince them that to permit the use of the French fleet or naval bases by Germany or to attain German aims, would most certainly forfeit the friendship and good will of the United States and result in the destruction of the French fleet to the irreparable injury of France.

(5) You will undoubtedly be approached from numerous quarters regarding food for the French people.

There is no people on earth who have done more than the American people in relieving the suffering of humanity. The hearts of the American people go out to the people of France in their distress. As you are aware we are continuing our efforts to arrange for the forwarding through the Red Cross of medical supplies and also tinned or powdered milk for children in the unoccupied regions of France.⁶³ Nevertheless, the primary interest of the American people, and an interest which overshadows all else at the moment, is to see a British victory. The American people are therefore unwilling to take any measure which in the slightest degree will prejudice such a victory. Before the American people would be willing to have influence exerted upon the British Government to permit the shipment of food through the British blockade to France, it would be necessary that the American people be convinced beyond peradventure that such action would not in the slightest assist Germany.

(6) In your discussions regarding the French West Indies and French Guiana⁶⁴ you should point out that our sole desire in that region is to maintain the *status quo* and to be assured that neither those possessions nor their resources will ever be used to the detriment of the United States or the American republics. To accomplish this we feel that it is essential that the naval vessels stationed in the ports of those islands or possessions be immobilized and that we have adequate guarantees that the gold which is at present stored in Martinique be not used in any manner which could conceivably benefit Germany in the present struggle.

(7) I have noticed with sympathetic interest the efforts of France to maintain its authority in its North African possessions⁶⁵ and to improve their economic status. In your discussions you may say that

⁶³ For correspondence regarding food relief to France, see pp. 537 ff.

⁶⁴ For correspondence on interest of the United States in the fate of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, see pp. 493 ff.

⁶⁵ For correspondence regarding the interest of the United States in political and economic conditions in French North Africa, see pp. 570 ff.

your Government is prepared to assist in this regard in any appropriate way.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

851.00/2199

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me this afternoon.

The Ambassador said that he wished to give me a résumé of recent events in France. He read to me excerpts from a telegram which he had just received from M. Flandin, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In this telegram the Ambassador was informed that the dismissal by Marshal Pétain of Laval had been due to the fact that Laval had been assuming authority which was in derogation of Marshal Pétain's own authority as Chief of State, and had been proceeding towards a policy of collaboration with Germany far in excess of what Marshal Pétain approved or desired. The word "plot" was not specifically mentioned by the Ambassador, but I drew the implication from his remarks that Laval had entered into some kind of understanding with the German authorities which, if carried out, would have reduced Marshal Pétain to a figurehead without any power to act.

M. Flandin's telegram went on to say that after Laval's dismissal, the German Ambassador in Paris, Herr Abetz, had immediately come to Vichy and had made two demands, one that Marshal Pétain receive Laval in order that the two might have a personal conference, and the other that Laval be reinstated in the Pétain Government. The Marshal had flatly refused even to discuss the second demand, but had consented to receive Laval. The conversation between Pétain and Laval, instead of improving relations between them, had caused a complete breakdown in their personal relations. Laval had then gone to Paris with Abetz. Three days later, De Brinon had returned to Vichy from Paris and conveyed what was in essence an ultimatum to Marshal Pétain from the German Government. Apparently the ultimatum consisted of a demand that Laval be reinstated in the French Government or else all cooperation between Germany and France beneficial to the latter would be impossible. Marshal Pétain had again refused to discuss the demands or the reinstatement of Laval and had informed De Brinon for communication to the German Government that if the Germans persisted in this attitude, the terms of the armistice would be violated by them and the Pétain Government would regain freedom of action, for whatever that might be worth. That, the Ambassador said, was the situation at the moment, and it

was, of course, clear that the Germans would not now take any steps towards releasing French prisoners of war or relaxing the stringent barriers between occupied and unoccupied France.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/7300 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 27, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received December 28—2:25 p. m.]

1185. It is perhaps surprising in the light of the recent wholesale expulsion of the inhabitants of Lorraine (and the continued expulsion of Alsatians: Sholes⁶⁶ reports that two trainloads a day pass through Lyons) the refusal to grant more than the most shadowy concessions with respect to French war prisoners, and the many daily evidences of what Nazi domination means, that the Germans have recently succeeded to an important degree in certain French circles in selling their familiar doctrine: the new Europe can be but a simple choice between Nazi direction and bolshevism. This doctrine is being assiduously spread and increasingly accepted in the upper levels of French economic and social spheres particularly in the occupied territory. The influence of these elements under present circumstances is great. France has a Government which established itself on the ruins of a prostrate country by running with the strong tide of popular disgust with the leaders and systems which had brought her to her present plight; it is a Government which has neither a broad popular base nor as yet an effective centralized authoritarian organization. The weight of the large industrialists and of the aristocracy, with their emphasis on "order" rather than "freedom", of the anti-popular front elements of "Cagoulard" fame, should not therefore be underestimated. Their argument runs that while the Germany of the postwar period will for a few years exercise an unpleasant and restrictive influence over French economic and political life, this unhappy period will soon be transformed by the resurgence of a strong new France. Those who accept this theory—and they are many—show a confidence in certain undefined and intangible qualities of French character which make it seem to them inevitable that they will soon outwit their blundering and less civilized German neighbors. While it is difficult to pin them down to any logical basis for this confidence—they point vaguely to France's glorious past—the belief here is nonetheless real. The alternative they say is communism or chaos, and they believe they will save more for themselves from under the Nazi yoke than in a Red Europe on the Russian model. The majority of this class are convinced that a British

⁶⁶ Walter Sholes, Consul General at Lyon.

military victory on the Continent is impossible but, admitting its possibility for the sake of argument, they say it can only be accomplished at the cost of a complete social breakdown in Germany which will soon spread over the rest of the Continent. The horrors forecast are reminiscent of similar nightmares depicted in 1918. These dangers will inestimably become more acute they say as the duration of the war is extended and destruction increases; an early peace and a drawn peace are therefore what France must strive and wish for, a peace in which France will have a certain arbitral influence. That is why any intimations that the early termination of the war is possible are greeted eagerly by these elements particularly in the occupied territory and that is why reports tending to play up isolationist sentiment in the United States, to minimize both the timing and amount of our aid to the British and to emphasize suggestions for sounding out peace possibilities, are carefully circulated by the D. N. B.⁶⁷

I have dwelt on the foregoing at some length because it represents such an important body of thought within the French Government. As I have stressed in the past, the overwhelming majority of the French people fervently hope for a British victory and instinctively feel that such a victory is France's only salvation. The strength of this feeling will in the future as it has in the past in the heyday of Laval restrain the Government from going too far along the path of Franco-German collaboration, but the Government itself stands more for early peace and "appeasement".

Among those who hold the view described above—that France after a few unpleasant years of German control will somehow again be in the driver's seat—is Admiral Darlan. Please see my telegram No. 1140, December 14, 8 p. m.⁶⁸ This fact is important since the role of the Admiral following Laval's elimination has become increasingly important. The Germans apparently prefer him to Flandin; they are well aware of his personal anglophobe sentiments, of his belief that Germany cannot be defeated and they like his blunt manner of speaking. It is not unlikely that they also regard him as something of a political babe in the woods and knowing that he enjoys the loyalty and devotion of "his" French Navy for the building and efficiency of which he was principally responsible hope that if carefully handled he may be "amenable". (For instance from his conversation with me I believe that the Admiral would favor under certain circumstances forcible convoying of French supply ships or other direct action to break the British blockade of France.) While the Marshal and Admiral Darlan at least since the days of June have largely seen eye to eye on important matters and are friends of long standing, he is growing to enjoy I believe the Marshal's increasing confidence. He is already

⁶⁷ Deutsches Nachrichten Büro, German news agency.

⁶⁸ *Post*, p. 490.

spoken of as the new "Dauphin" and the man who would step into the breach should anything happen to the Marshal. At any rate he is at the present time coming to the forefront of the French political scene as the fact that he has twice been sent by the Marshal to Paris to treat with German leaders in the past week already shows.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/7324½ : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 28, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received December 28—8: 05 p. m.]

4232. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Foreign Office would be grateful if following message or paraphrase thereof from Dupuy, Canadian Chargé d'Affaires to Vichy Government now in London, may be sent in cipher urgently to American Embassy Vichy.⁶⁹

"Following for M. Jacques Chevalier, Minister of Public Education, to be handed by him personally to Marshal Pétain.

I have been requested by the Prime Minister to transmit to you the following most secret message.

1. If at any time in the near future the French Government decide to cross to North Africa or to resume the war there against Italy and Germany, we would be willing to send a strong and well equipped expeditionary force up to six divisions to aid the defence of Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis. These divisions could sail as fast as shipping and landing facilities were available. We now have a large, well equipped army in England, and have considerable spare forces already well trained and rapidly improving, apart from what are needed to repel invasions. The situation in the Middle East is also becoming good.

2. The British Air Force has now begun its expansion, and would also be able to give important assistance.

3. The command of the Mediterranean would be assured by the reunion of the British and French fleets and by our joint use of Moroccan and North African bases.

4. We are willing to enter into staff talks of the most secret character with any military representatives nominated by you.

5. On the other hand, delay is dangerous. At any time the Germans may, by force or favour, come down through Spain, render unusable the anchorage at Gibraltar, take effective charge of the batteries on both sides of the Straits and also establish their air forces in the aerodromes. It is their habit to strike swiftly, and if they establish themselves on the Moroccan coast, the door would be shut on

⁶⁹ The following message was transmitted to the Chargé in France in telegram No. 898, December 29, 1 p. m., with instructions that in delivering message he should "make it clear that this Government is acting only as transmitting agent and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for contents of the message." (740.0011 European War/7345a)

all projects. The situation may deteriorate any day, and prospects be ruined unless we are prepared to plan together and act boldly. It is most important that the French Government should realize that we are able and willing to give powerful and growing aid. But this may presently pass beyond our power. Dupuy."

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be most grateful if the Department would transmit the foregoing to Vichy as soon as may be possible.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/7335 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 30, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received December 31—8 a. m.]

1199. Preliminary reactions indicate that the President's speech ⁷⁰ has struck France like a veritable bombshell. It has been received, of course, with the greatest joy by the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen who have so far learned of its nature and likewise in most spheres of the Government. It should put an end to the effectiveness of the recent German campaign here designed to prove that our Government was wavering in its policy of aid to Britain, that a growing body of opinion in America was favoring complete isolationism, that at best our aid would be too little and too late, et cetera.

It has been received by us here in the Embassy with particular delight as a complete vindication of what we have been endeavoring to impress upon our Foreign Office and other French friends is the real policy of our Government and the real pulse of our nation; it is a complete answer to those in high Government places who, for reasons indicated in my telegram No. 1185, December 27, 5 p. m., and others have insisted that appeasement is possible, that in reality we would view efforts in that direction with a friendly eye.

After playing up the importance of the forthcoming address in yesterday's press the French information center has found itself in a dilemma all day long. Havas has finally issued a one-page communiqué in which the President's speech has been boiled down to 181 words of direct quotation. This is evidence of the anxiety in certain Government circles including some of those friendly to the British cause lest the German reaction to this forthright enunciation of policy may result in further retaliation against this beaten country which realizes it has not yet felt the full force of the German boot—especially in unoccupied France.

⁷⁰ For text of radio address by President Roosevelt, December 29, 1940, the "arsenal of democracy" speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941, p. 3.

Perhaps that feeling may best be illustrated by the following cautious understatement with which Havas concludes its brief commentary: "The vigor of the President's statements goes beyond the customary limits of official style and will certainly arouse throughout the world impassioned commentaries."

My only regret is that it has so far reached such a small element of the country. All of the many persons who have congratulated us today have deplored the fact that the speech has not reached the public in full text and some have urged that the BBC⁷¹ continue to hammer out quotations from it for at least several days. The largest of the growing BBC audiences in France are those of the Daventry medium wave French broadcasts in spite of all efforts to block it.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/7347§ : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*⁷²

VICHY, December 31, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1941—2 p. m.]

1208. My 1205, December 31, noon.⁷³ Chevalier asked me to call at 5 this afternoon. He said that he had seen the Marshal twice, once this morning, which was unfortunately in the presence of Flandin, and again alone this afternoon. At the first interview he said there had been much discussion but he could not of course go into details. At the second the Marshal had told him exactly what to reply through me.

As for the message contained in the Department's telegram 899,⁷⁴ the Marshal was deeply touched and desired to express his appreciation to "Lord Halifax" that the British were "considering the possibility of relaxing somewhat the blockade" as the question is one of the greatest importance to France. As to the message contained in the Department's telegram 898,⁷⁵ Chevalier quoted the Marshal's exact words: "We have not received it." Chevalier himself pointed out that there was a distinction between this answer and a statement that the message "was not receivable.[""] (My paraphrase he said had been burned at once.)

He then expanded somewhat and said that the Marshal's reactions had been exactly the same as his, as he knew they would be. He had

⁷¹ British Broadcasting Company.

⁷² The text of this telegram, except for parenthetical remarks, was transmitted to the Chargé in the United Kingdom as Department's telegram No. 13, January 2, 1941, 5 p. m.

⁷³ Not printed; it reported delivery of message to M. Chevalier contained in telegram No. 4232, December 28, 11 p. m., p. 432.

⁷⁴ December 29, 2 p. m., not printed; it contained a preliminary favorable reply to a Vichy proposal for the meeting of British and French experts in Madrid. (740.0011 European War 1939/7346a)

⁷⁵ See footnote 69, p. 432.

carefully explained to the Marshal in reply to the latter's inquiries that the message did not come from our Government, that I had made no comment thereon and that he likewise had made no comment to me nor shown me any reaction (which is quite accurate as reported in my No. 1205). He went on to say that in case of any future messages he would deliver them only in the presence of the Marshal alone and that it was unfortunate that Flandin had been there, but since the Marshal had asked him to be present as the matter concerned foreign fields, he had not felt it possible to object. Chevalier's sentiments toward the British were well known and they were shared by the Marshal, he said. They both had the greatest esteem for Lord Halifax. There were however limits beyond which they could not go and for one thing they could not stand for De Gaulle or his movement.

France is at present completely "under the German boot" and for the moment there is certainly nothing she can do. It is considerably embarrassing to him for the BBC to quote from his works and make public radio appeals to him, as the only possible result will be German insistence on his separation from the Cabinet. "Then," he said, "the Marshal would be alone which is certainly not what the British want."

It is likewise time, he said, that people disabuse themselves of the feeling that the Marshal or he himself would ever under any circumstances remove to North Africa. He had discussed the question a number of times with the Marshal and they were both resolved that their duty lay in France whatever might happen, whether the country is completely occupied or not. I should like to add parenthetically my own conviction that the Marshal, come what may, will stick to his Bordeaux resolution never personally to leave metropolitan France. What action he might under certain circumstances advise the fleet or colonies to take I do not know.

The Germans, he said, had several times threatened him with occupation of the country if he did not remove or replace certain Alsatian professors and he had each time firmly told them he could not do what they wanted; the threat had proved empty. "They do not occupy the rest of the country," he said, "solely because it is not to their advantage to do so." In conclusion he reiterated his desire to maintain the best possible relations with the British that existing circumstances would permit and his approval of the transmission of the messages "from Lord Halifax and our friend Dupuy" through the same channel. (Incidentally he said the Marshal found Dupuy "nice but ingratiating.")

Flandin's reaction to our by-passing him I have not yet learned. Chevalier said, however, that his colleague did not seem pleased with his, Chevalier's, role as intermediary.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/7369 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 31, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1941—12:20 p. m.]

1209. My telegram 1199, December 30, 7 p.m. Chevalier, the Minister of Education, told me that the force and forthright frankness of the President's speech had greatly impressed the members of the Government and confirmation of this fact comes to me from various sources. The Marshal, he said, was "not at all displeased." The latter looked upon it in part, he implied, as a vindication of his dismissal of Laval (who as the Department will recall was the strongest believer in a complete and early German victory and who based his entire policy on that theory). Some other members of the Government he said, however, were "disturbed". They found it too strong, they feared German reaction, and it put an end to their hopes for an early negotiated peace. (Please see my telegram 1200, December 30, 8 p.m.,⁷⁶ reporting Flandin's remarks to me and my telegram 1185, December 27, 5 p.m., with respect to the "appeasement" tendencies of the Government.)

The mass of the French people continue to be delighted and in the words of a former prefect, a personal friend of mine who has just called to extend his congratulations: "It has given new hope to a despairing nation to look forward to 1941."

MATTHEWS

CONTINUATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF EMBASSY FUNCTIONS
IN FRANCE AFTER FRENCH CAPITULATION TO GERMANY

740.0011 European War 1939/3274½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 23, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 3:28 p. m.]

831. For the President and the Secretary. The news from the front this morning is good. Daladier⁷⁷ informed me that at dawn the Germans made an attack on Huntziger's army in the Reims district which was repulsed with catastrophic losses for the Germans and that Huntziger's army was counterattacking successfully. Other French and British attacks in regions which I must refrain from specifying are going well.

It is obvious that the fighting of the next 3 or 4 days will result in a victory as important, one way or the other, as the victory in the first

⁷⁶ Not printed.⁷⁷ Edouard Daladier, named French Minister for Foreign Affairs May 18, 1940.

battle of the Marne. If French and British counterattacks should be successful the German forces would be diminished greatly. If on the other hand the Germans should be successful a German advance on Paris would be possible within the course of a week.

Mandel ⁷⁸ who has resumed the power over the domestic life of France that he had when Clemenceau was Prime Minister said to me today that he did not fear that there would be a demand among the people of France for acceptance of a German offer of a separate peace even though the present battle should result in disaster. He felt on the other hand that there would be great danger if the French should be obliged to abandon Paris. Many of the men who were most vociferous now in demanding war to the bitter end would be in favor of peace at any price if Paris should be lost.

He thoughtfully expressed the opinion that if the battle now in progress should be lost Paris could not be defended successfully.

In this connection he said that he would like to speak to me seriously about a matter which he considered of the utmost importance. He went on to say that I did not perhaps realize how much it meant to the French Government and to French resistance to have me personally in constant contact with the members of the French Government. He understood perfectly why even in case of a German occupation of Paris I should wish to stay in Paris. He felt however that it would be absolutely essential to have close to the French Government in case the French Government should be obliged to leave Paris some one who spoke French perfectly and at the same time had the confidence of the French Government and of the President and yourself.

I told him that in case of a German occupation of Paris I intended to send to follow the French Government a staff of Embassy Secretaries.

Mandel said that he felt this would be altogether inadequate and he asked if it might not be possible for you to appoint someone to be temporarily a representative of the President of the United States at the seat of the French Government wherever that might be. (Incidentally he expressed the opinion that the French Government would not go to the region of Tours where great preparations have been made for an evacuation of the Government but would go either to Bordeaux or the Massif Central. Daladier expressed the same opinion to me this morning.[])

Mandel developed his idea at length and I think it should be considered seriously.

I recommend therefore that in case the French Government should be obliged to leave Paris and in case I should be cut off from contact

⁷⁸ Georges Mandel, French Minister of the Interior.

with you as the result of the occupation of Paris by German troops you should appoint Tony Biddle as special representative pro tem of the President of the United States to the French Government.

Biddle's relations with Paul Reynaud ⁷⁹ and other members of the French Government are as excellent as his French.

BULLITT

124.51/129½ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1940—10 a. m.

494. Your 831, May 23, 3 p. m. The President has been glad to approve your suggestion that in the event the French Government leaves Paris it might be advisable to have at the temporary seat of the Government an official of high rank, and that Biddle should assume this task. We feel however that he should act not as "special representative pro tem of the President of the United States" but, following the precedent established in September 1914 when Garrett ⁸⁰ was sent to Bordeaux, he should act as your deputy or assistant. Such junior secretaries as you might send out of Paris would work under Biddle's direction. The Department will approve his assuming these duties in addition to the functions he is normally pursuing as Ambassador to the Polish Government. You may informally talk this over with the French Government. Final orders however will not be sent to Biddle until the contingency foreseen has actually arisen.

HULL

124.51/132 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 10, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received June 10 (11?), 5:15 a. m.]

1136. The Foreign Office by note of June 9, 1940, received at noon June 10 in reply to an inquiry made by the Papal Nuncio, advises that the French Government has no objection to the departure from Paris of Chiefs of Mission and their personnel to establish themselves in the provinces. It suggests that the Chateau de Candé is provided for the Embassy.

The bulk of the French Government's offices has departed for different points in Western France. The majority of diplomatic missions have also departed and as the Department is aware I have assumed charge of the interests of Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, Union of South Africa, Egypt and Luxemburg.

⁷⁹ French President of the Council of Ministers.

⁸⁰ John W. Garrett, at the time Special Agent of the Department of State in Europe for matters relating to care of American refugees.

I have accordingly ordered the following to proceed to Candé and vicinity: H. Freeman Matthews, Hugh S. Fuller, Daniel J. Reagan, Leigh W. Hunt, Ernest Mayer, Douglas MacArthur, Woodruff Wallner, Hulda Cousins, Germaine Lambeser, Robert Cunningham, Raymond Bastianello, Marguerite Grasset, Florence Palmer, Daniel Eswilder, Anthony Zuber, J. Dawson Kiernan, Albert George, Josephine Finlay, Henry Hochart, Margaret Menzel, Germaine Debon, Marie Therese Hauteur, Franklin Falvey, Charles Anderson, Sam Maggio. I request a per diem of \$6.00 for each employee.

I have instructed the following to proceed to Bordeaux to assist in the work of the Consulate there: Charlotte Beloeuvout, Joseph Degenhardt, René Dyersbrayer, Simone Hardy, Jeanne Kahan, Marie Lelievre, Taylor Gannett, Marguerite Metz, Eugene Masuret, Annette Wiemer, Helen Rodgers.

Under the congested, very expensive conditions now existing in Bordeaux I urge the per diem of \$6.00 for each employee detailed there.

BULLITT

124.51/134: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1940—9 p. m.

648. For Bullitt from the President. It is strongly recommended that if all foreign chiefs of mission follow French Government to its temporary Capital, you should do likewise. Because it is impossible here to know last minute developments on the wishes of the French Government, I must rely on your discretion and assume you will make your decision in the best interests of the United States and of humanity.

As long as you are in communication with French Government you remain in full charge of relations between the two Governments. If in Paris or elsewhere you are cut off from access to French Government, Biddle will temporarily act as representative of United States.

No authority can be given to you to act as a representative of the French Government or local government, but again, being on the spot, you will, as a red-blooded American, do what you can to save human life.

We are doing everything possible in regard to your dispatches about Red Cross arrangements.

On behalf of the Government of the United States I salute you in this hour of crisis and personally you have my ever affectionate regard. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/3766 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 13, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 4:45 p. m.]

1836. The American Minister at Bern⁸¹ telephoned the Embassy at 2:15 p. m. this afternoon that he had received the following telephone message from Ambassador Bullitt at 11:30 a. m. Swiss time with the request to transmit it to this Embassy for immediate communication to the German Government:

"Paris has been declared an open city. General Hering, Military Commander of the Paris District is withdrawing his army which has been defending Paris. All possible measures are being taken to assure a security of life and property in the city. The *gendarmerie* and police are remaining and the firemen are also remaining to prevent fire. General Dentz is remaining as Commander of the Paris area but without troops simply with the *gendarmerie* and the police.

"Ambassador Bullitt is remaining in Paris with the *gendarmerie*, Military and Naval Attachés, the Counselor of Embassy and six Secretaries of Embassy as the representative of the Diplomatic Corps. Mr. Bullitt hopes to be of any assistance possible in seeing to it that the transfer of the government of the city takes place without loss of human lives. This entire communication is made at the personal request of General Dentz."

The sense of the message was communicated by telephone to Secretary of State, Weizsaecker, who asked that it be communicated personally and in writing to him at 4:15 this afternoon.

In addition to a note communicating the foregoing, I am sending a separate communication to the Foreign Office repeating the information concerning plans of the Ambassador and a portion of his staff to remain in Paris.

Since dictating the foregoing, I have received another telephone call from the American Legation in Bern which stated that Mr. Bullitt had said that he was without radio or cable communication with the United States.

HEATH

124.51/134a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle)*⁸²

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1940—5 p. m.

1. The French Government has been informed that when Ambassador Bullitt finds it impossible to communicate with the French Government you are to act temporarily as representative of the United

⁸¹ Leland Harrison.⁸² At this time in Angers.

States near the French Government for the purpose of maintaining communication with that Government. Therefore, when you are informed by the French Government that they are no longer in communication with Ambassador Bullitt you should assume this temporary function. Report immediately when you assume these duties.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/3775 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 13, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received June 14—12:38 a. m.]

1843. My 1836, June 13, 4 p. m. Having been unable to reach the Under State Secretary at 2:30 I called, in accordance with the appointment I made during my telephone communication to him, on State Secretary Weizsaecker at 4:15 this afternoon and handed him a copy of a note embodying the substance of my telegram under reference and directly quoting the telephonic communication from Ambassador Bullitt which had been repeated by telephone to this Embassy by the American Legation at Bern.

Weizsaecker who showed plainly his displeasure at my insistence on delivering urgently the message to him received me in a very cold manner. He appreciated your message and said that he took no position with regard to the communication but he could point out several features: (1) that it was not a communication from my Government; (2) that it was not an official communication since it did not come from the French Government; (3) that the interposition of the American Ambassador at Paris in the circumstance was not clear. He added he could make numerous other comments such as the propriety of the action of the French General in question and in addition there were several points in the "message" which were not clear such as how the American Ambassador in Paris could act as representative of the Diplomatic Corps and the use of the phrase "the government of the city". He inquired how the city of Paris could have a government.

After these comments he asked, "And what is the name of the Ambassador at Paris." To my reply he said that it is a name "we have often heard of here."

I informed the State Secretary that I had delivered the message without delay in view of Ambassador Bullitt's statement to the American Legation at Bern that he was cut off from communication with the United States and because of the urgent character of the communication which prevented me from awaiting instructions from my Government as the protecting power for French interests.

He then repeated his former statement that he took no position as regards this communication and I stated that I had felt impelled to

deliver it immediately in view of the interest of my Government in sparing civilians from unnecessary bombardment, a point of view which I understand his Government shared.

HEATH

740.0011 European War 1939/3768 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

TOURS, June 14, 1940—7 a. m.
[Received June 14—3 : 54 a. m.]

10. I was telephoned at 5:30 this morning that French Government is proceeding to Bordeaux region today. I am now en route to see Reynaud some 70 kilometers distant and will telegraph as soon as possible thereafter.

BIDDLE

124.513/1335 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

TOURS, June 14, 1940.
[Received June 14—2 : 13 p. m.]

14. My 13, 14th.⁸³ In view of the impossibility of moving so many people under present conditions of transport and congestion of roads, the entire group of Embassy personnel with the exception of myself, Matthews, MacArthur, Wallner and Bastianello, is remaining in this area and in the following properties: (1) Chateau de Candé at Monts; (2) Chateau Dazay sur Indre at Azay sur Indre; (3) Manoir Le Becheron at Sache Azay Le Rideau; (4) Manoir de Laboulaye at Villaine near Azay Le Rideau. They are all in the Department of Indre et Loire in the neighborhood of Tours and will be clearly distinguishable by American flags flying from the roof[s].

Elbrick is remaining at my house at Prunier near Bouche Maine, 6 kilometers from Angers.

Please so advise the German Government for the information of the German military authorities.

BIDDLE

124.513/1335 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Bordeaux (Waterman)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1940.

150. For Ambassador Biddle. Your 14, 14th. The Embassy at Berlin has been instructed to inform the appropriate German authorities.

⁸³ Vol. 1, section under Extension of the European War entitled "Invasion of France by Germany and collapse of French resistance."

The Department assumes that you will arrange for the personnel now at the four chateaux named to follow you to the temporary seat of the French Government as soon as their presence in the Tours region no longer serves any useful purpose.

HULL

123 Biddle, Anthony J. D./231 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 22, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 7:40 p. m.]

68. My telegram No. 66, June 22, 10 a. m.⁸⁴ It appears highly probable that the German terms will be accepted and that any plans of the Government to move elsewhere have been abandoned. We may expect German occupation of Bordeaux immediately. It would seem that my mission, Deputy Ambassador near the French Government, is about to terminate. I therefore respectfully request that you cable me immediately whether I should stay, if absolutely necessary, at Bordeaux or endeavor to [go to?] Spain to await further instructions.

I assume that in the absence of contrary instructions, it is your wish that the members of the Paris Embassy attached to my staff, including Naval and Military Attachés remain here, to return to Paris with the French Government to rejoin Ambassador Bullitt if and as soon as practicable.

Please inform War and Navy.

BIDDLE

123 Biddle, Anthony J. D./236 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle),
at Bordeaux*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1940—11 a. m.

34. Your 68, June 22, 11 a. m. Your designation as representative near the French Government was special and for the emergency period during the time the French Government was separated from the capital by military necessity. The President now desires that you proceed to Bilbao or some other point in Spain until such time as you may find it possible to arrange safe transportation to England in order to resume your post near the Polish Government.

We will telegraph later instructions regarding the staff.

HULL

⁸⁴ Not printed.

123 Biddle, Anthony J. D./237 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 25, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 10:11 p. m.]

93. Your No. 34, June 24, 11 a. m. I informed the Foreign Minister at 12:40 this noon of the termination of my mission.

I propose to leave for Bilbao as soon as I can bring down by truck my effects now at Angers and Candé which I expect will arrive within 48 hours.

BIDDLE

123 Biddle, Anthony J. D./242 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 27, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received June 28—7 p. m.]

105. Your telegram No. 34, June 24, 11 a. m. The Government now plans to leave Saturday morning early for Royat near Clermont-Ferrand. The Foreign Office will be located at La Bourboule some 35 miles away and the Diplomatic Corps at Mont-Dore some 5 miles from the latter.

No instructions have yet been received with respect to my staff.

Unless contrary instructions, therefore, are received by Friday evening they will all, including the Military and Naval Attachés, proceed Saturday morning to Mont-Dore.

Bordeaux will probably be formally "occupied" by the Germans Saturday or Sunday.

BIDDLE

124.51/150a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940.

683. Please report immediately what facilities have been made available to you in order to permit you to perform your usual functions at the Embassy.

HULL

124.513/1378a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle),
at Bordeaux*

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940—6 p. m.

54. Your 104 [105?], June 27, 5 p. m. Movement of those members of the Embassy staff now at Bordeaux to Mont-Dore approved.

Message from War Department regarding certain members of Military Attaché's staff are being sent separately.

Department desires senior officer of the Embassy staff to report arrival and telegraph address at Mont-Dore.

For Biddle: Your movements will be guided by our telegram No. 34, June 24, 11 a. m., instructing you to proceed to Spain. When you reach Spain advise Department by cable of your whereabouts and await further instructions. For the time being the Polish Embassy here provides means of communication with the Polish Government.

HULL

123 Bullitt, William C./615: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Heath)

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1940—1 p. m.

1812. From the time of the occupation of Paris by German forces the Department has received no communications from Ambassador Bullitt other than the oral messages transmitted through you. So far as the Department is aware, none of the instructions sent to Ambassador Bullitt by telegram have been received by him since no replies to the many inquiries sent him have been obtained.

You are requested to call at the Foreign Office and express to the German Government the concern of this Government by reason of this long delay in obtaining communication with its Ambassador in Paris. There would seem to be no excuse for a continuation of the situation now that hostilities in France have ceased and that an armistice has been signed by Germany and France.

In as much as the French Foreign Office is now established in Mont-Dore, the Department desires to instruct Ambassador Bullitt to leave Paris and establish contact with the French Foreign Office in that city. You are requested to inform the German Government accordingly and endeavor to communicate to Ambassador Bullitt the Department's instructions in this sense.

Please telegraph immediately the reply which may be made to you, as well as the steps which you were able to take in the sense desired.

HULL

123 Bullitt, William C./617: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, July 1, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

2265. Department's 1812, June 30, 1 p. m. I called on the Under Secretary of State this afternoon in accordance with Department's instruction under reference and impressed upon him the concern of

the Government over the long delay in obtaining communications with Paris and expressed the definite expectation that satisfactory regular communication with the American Embassy in Paris would be established without further delay. He excused the delay as due to the confusion resulting from the military operations and said that the Foreign Office itself has as yet no direct telegraphic communication with Paris but had to transmit messages by imperfect radio service. He referred to the permission granted Kennan⁸⁵ to travel to Paris and he said that the Embassy would be enabled as soon as possible to have regular courier and other types of communication. He heard without comment my communication as to the Department's desire to instruct Ambassador Bullitt to proceed to Mont-Dore.

HEATH

124.51/154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

LA BOURBOULE, July 4, 1940.

[Received July 7—4:15 a. m.]

17. Your 683, 29th. I presume you refer to facilities granted me at Paris. German authorities permitted freedom of movement in the Paris area for me and my staff. There is local telephone and postal service but at time of my departure⁸⁶ there was no long distance or telegraph service and no mail service outside the occupied territory. The Minister in charge of the reopened German Embassy informed me that he would accept for transmission via Berlin a limited number of clear telegrams but that courier service could not be permitted. The German Embassy requested that we communicate with the German authorities through its medium. The German Embassy also agreed to accept letters to our Embassy in Berlin containing whereabouts and welfare telegrams for transmission to the Department. A number of such letters were handed the German Embassy but we do not know whether they were ever received by our Embassy in Berlin.

Every facility was granted to communicate American citizens in the Paris region. By and large American property has been respected and our citizens not molested. The Embassy has issued approximately 700 certificates which have been affixed to business and residential properties owned or controlled by our nationals. As far as we are able to ascertain these have been respected by the German

⁸⁵ George F. Kennan, First Secretary of Embassy in Germany.

⁸⁶ Mr. Bullitt left Paris June 29 to visit the American Embassy near the French Government in the vicinity of Clermont-Ferrand. Soon after, he crossed border into Spain and on July 16 left Lisbon, Portugal, by clipper for Washington for consultation with Department. He remained in the United States, submitting his resignation November 7, which was not accepted until January 7, 1941.

military. Several American organizations such as the American hospital, the American church, the American Red Cross, et cetera, continue to function and a small number of American business organizations are resuming activity.

BULLITT

124.51/172 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 5, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received August 6—7: 18 a. m.]

258. Following telephoned by Barnes⁸⁷ from Paris :

"At a luncheon at my house yesterday Achenbach, from the German Embassy, somewhat laughingly observed that of course my position in Paris was a rather delicate one as strictly speaking Paris was no place for foreign diplomats—in reality they should all be with the French Government at Vichy. However, said he, we are willing for the time being 'to indulge in a little make believe' and treat with the members of the foreign missions who have been left in Paris as if they did enjoy diplomatic status. This observation was made in connection with a half amusing discussion of the difficulty of operating an Embassy in Paris at this time. It followed on my statement that we had just received by courier from Berlin some 250 telegrams that had been accumulating there for this Embassy since about July 5. Achenbach proceeded to make the point that while the German authorities were at the present moment willing to indulge in 'diplomatic make believe' with us, the time might come when this would have to cease, at least with respect to communication. He said that if military action should so develop as to require complete secrecy, the missions in Paris would be deprived without hesitation of all means of communication with the outside.

In connection with the foregoing it is interesting to note that the Secretary General of the Ministry of Communications has announced in the Paris press this morning that in conformity with orders of the German high command, postal communications are suspended provisionally between the occupied zone on the one hand and the free zone, the French colonies and foreign countries on the other. Postal communication is authorized within the limits of the occupied zone for letters, postal cards, printed material, circulars, samples, parcel post, newspapers, registered letters and declared valuables, as well as articles in silver.

There might be no telegraph service available to the public or to us within the occupied zone and telephone communication is restricted to a very limited area around Paris."

MURPHY

⁸⁷ Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy in France.

124.51/176 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 1, 1940.

[Received October 1—8:20 p. m.]

992. From Paris. Yesterday's developments in the form of refusals to permit MacArthur⁸⁸ to return for the time being to occupied France and to permit Frazier to continue his courier trips to Lisbon show straws in the wind pointing to progressive limitation of the field of action open to us for the protection of legitimate American interests. These are by no means the first indication that our field of action is being circumscribed. Recently there has been considerable increase in the occupation of American property by the military and a corresponding increase in the negative response to our efforts to have property returned to their owners. From the outset of the occupation the German Embassy here with respect to which our activity has become increasingly centered (Zeitschel, the former diplomatic liaison officer, stepped out of the picture several weeks ago) has revealed a constant inability or unwillingness to answer our written communications or to give us anything more in the way of a verbal reply than a promise to consider or investigate. The failure of the German Embassy thus far to respond to our urgent inquiry about Miss Lewis (see Department's telegram 1363, September 27th⁸⁹) is a good case in point. I am today informing the German Embassy that I have been instructed by the Department to report further on this matter at once and in the absence of a reply I shall merely state that our communications have thus far been ignored. I shall of course couch this statement in a pleasant form. Shortly after Zeitschel had been replaced by a secretary of the German Embassy it was suggested to me that the so-called principle enunciated by Zeitschel of freedom in general for American property from expropriation or occupation by the German military authorities must be reviewed by higher authorities. Since then the German Embassy has remained mute on this subject.

A further example of the straws in the wind to which I refer is the fact that for weeks we have been trying to get some action on the present question of fuel oil for the chancery and for the Embassy residence. Even with cold weather upon us we are still without a reply on this question although I know from our oil company that there is a considerable quantity of this oil in France under German sequestration. [Barnes.]

MATTHEWS

⁸⁸ Douglas MacArthur 2d, Third Secretary of Embassy in France.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

124.51/176 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1940—4 p. m.

2667. We have been experiencing increasing difficulty in maintaining communications with our establishment in Paris. Telephone communication exists between Vichy and Paris but there are no telegraph or mail facilities and the German authorities continually obstruct communication by courier. Also it is occasionally necessary for our officers in France to cross from occupied to unoccupied territory on official business. The Germans have become increasingly uncooperative in such matters.

For some time we have wanted MacArthur to return to Paris and we now desire that Thompson⁹⁰ proceed temporarily to Vichy. Necessary German authorizations have not been forthcoming.

Also Barnes reported on October 1 that his field of action has become so circumscribed by German refusal to cooperate that American interests in occupied territory are definitely prejudiced. He reports a considerable increase in occupation of American property by the military and decreasing effectiveness of his representations, which receive in reply only a promise to consider or investigate.

The matter of MacArthur and that of the courier who was at the time in Paris awaiting German permission to cross the frontier into Spain was taken up orally with an officer of the German Embassy here and he has reported that the Embassy here has cabled its Foreign Office urging remedial action.

We are disturbed by this situation. If our officers in occupied territory are to function efficiently in the protection of American interests it is essential that adequate communication be maintained and that couriers and officers be permitted to cross the Spanish frontier and that between occupied and unoccupied territory when the occasion arises and without undue delay.

We desire, therefore, that unless you perceive reasons to the contrary, you take this matter up with the Foreign Office formally or informally as you deem best, and insist as strongly as possible that this situation be corrected.

HULL

124.51/178

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1940.

Dr. Thomsen⁹¹ came in this afternoon at his own request. He stated that Mr. Beam⁹² had taken up with the Embassy here the difficulties

⁹⁰ Tyler Thompson, Third Secretary of Embassy in France.⁹¹ Hans Thomsen, German Chargé d'Affaires.⁹² Jacob D. Beam, Foreign Service Officer detailed to the Department.

we are encountering in obtaining permission for Mr. MacArthur to return from Vichy to our Embassy in Paris. Dr. Thomsen said that he had taken this matter up with his Government, and had been informed that the German Government did not consider that any of the officers of the Embassy who left Paris before the occupation to accompany the French Government now formed a part of our establishment in Paris, and therefore declined to permit any such officers to return to the occupied zone for the purpose of resuming their duties at the Paris Embassy.

Dr. Thomsen then referred to another subject Mr. Beam had brought up with him, that is, the difficulties we are having in obtaining permission for the establishment of a direct courier service from Paris to Lisbon. The German Chargé d'Affaires stated that he had also taken this matter up with his Government, and had been informed that in view of the military operations now proceeding in the occupied zone of France, the German Government could not see its way clear to permitting the functioning of such a direct courier service through this territory. Dr. Thomsen went on to say that this refusal was not to be considered an unfriendly act, as the same principle was being applied to all countries, and further, the German Government hoped that this situation would be only of a temporary nature and that at some time in the future it would be possible to permit the functioning of such courier service.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

124.51/177 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, October 10, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received October 10—3 : 35 p. m.]

4283. Department's 2667, October 5, 4 p. m. I have presented both to the State Secretary and to the Acting Chief of Protocol the difficulties experienced by our establishments in occupied territory with special reference to Paris and have furnished detailed data on the interruption or delay in courier communications with France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway. I was given the explanation that these difficulties were due to war conditions but was assured that the matter as presented would receive sympathetic study with a view to furnishing such facilities as might be found possible by the German authorities in the circumstances.

KIRK

123 Bullitt, William C./724 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 11, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 10:36 p. m.]

930. Under a Vichy date line a German news telegram states that "all the French press comments on the refusal of Ambassador Bullitt to return to Vichy" and "insinuate that during the war Mr. Bullitt worked in favor of England which would be incompatible with his new diplomatic mission" here. The despatch adds: "French political circles would receive with pleasure a new Ambassador who could interest the American Government in the problems of Europe and the future France which will rise as a result of the Franco-German agreements."

There seems little doubt that the absence of an American Ambassador here is causing the Vichy Government both embarrassment and a certain amount of misgiving. The number of inquiries I receive from simple people as to whether the Ambassador is returning or when a new Ambassador is coming would seem to indicate that the significance of the present situation and its resemblance to a similar lack of Ambassadors at Rome and Berlin is not fortunately lost upon the French public.

MATTHEWS

611.8131/55 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 12, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

942. My telegram No. 919, November 8, 6 p. m.⁹³ Monick⁹⁴ who called today to say good-bye told me that his suggestion that the Marshal might desire to send a personal representative to the United States fell on fertile soil. He said it was given serious consideration in Government circles. It was, however, firmly vetoed by Laval.⁹⁵

The latter he said explained that his son-in-law René de Chambrun is now in Washington, that he goes frequently to the White House and that he is in a position to keep the Government well informed of what goes on in the United States. Monick went on to say that in spite of the "low opinion" in which young de Chambrun is held here the Marshal and others in the Government were impressed by Laval's picture of his ready access to the highest Government quarters in Washington. He said he felt the only other procedure for bringing

⁹³ Not printed.

⁹⁴ Emmanuel Monick, Secretary General of French Morocco.

⁹⁵ Pierre Laval, French Vice President of the Council of Ministers.

about a "better understanding" between France and the United States would be for the President to send a personal representative to Vichy "in the nature of a Colonel House".⁹⁶ I interrupted to say that in my purely personal opinion, given the present state of feeling in the United States, the sending of any such personal emissary was entirely out of the question. That it seemed to me, furthermore, that since France was the country which felt itself misunderstood any initiative should come from this side. I said that he had drawn a picture for me of growing resistance within the Government to Laval's policies.

The fact, however, that Laval had been able to "veto" the suggestion to send an emissary—which apparently even had the serious consideration of the Marshal—seemed just one more bit of evidence of the powerful position which he occupies here today.

In conclusion Monick said that he had not yet given up hope that some personal friend of the Marshal would be found and sent soon. He admitted that frankly he did not know of a man sufficiently in the Marshal's confidence to fill the bill. Apparently for one reason or another the General Laure mentioned in my telegram 918 [919] would not do.

MATTHEWS

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE DISPOSITION OF THE
FRENCH FLEET AFTER THE GERMANS INVADED FRANCE

740.0011 European War 1939/327476 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1940—4 p. m.

493. The President desires that you communicate immediately the sense of the following to Reynaud⁹⁷ and to Daladier:⁹⁸

While we still hope the invasion will be checked, if the worst comes to the worst, we regard the retention of the French fleet as a force in being as vital to the reconstitution of France and of the French colonies and to the ultimate control of the Atlantic and other oceans and as a vital influence towards getting less harsh terms of peace. That means that the French fleet must not get caught bottled up in the Mediterranean. Those ships in the east Mediterranean must be in a position to exit through the Suez Canal. Those at Toulouse, Tunis, and Algiers must be able to exit past Gibraltar and be in a position, if the worst comes, to retire to the West Indies or to safe ports in the West African possessions.

⁹⁶ Colonel Edward M. House, sent to Europe in January 1915 by President Wilson as his private and personal representative to seek peace between belligerents.

⁹⁷ Paul Reynaud, French Minister of National Defense.

⁹⁸ Edouard Daladier, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The same thought is being conveyed in the strictest confidence to the British regarding the British fleet.⁹⁹

Finally, if the Germans hold out alluring offers to France based on surrender of the fleet, it should be remembered that these offers are of no ultimate value and that the condition of France could be no worse, but in fact would be far stronger, if the fleet were removed as a whole to safe places.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/3343₇₀ : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 28, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received May 28—9:33 a. m.]

916. Personal for the President only. During the course of our conversation this morning Reynaud's remarks about the American Fleet enabled me to bring up the question of the French Fleet. It took very little conversation to convince him of the truth of the arguments that you advanced in your 493, May 26, 4 p.m.

I believe as strongly as I have ever believed anything that you will be unable to protect the United States from German attack unless you have the cooperation of the French and British Fleets. I believe that one of the surest ways to obtain such cooperation would be by sending our Atlantic Fleet to the Mediterranean.

In any event I ask you solemnly and urgently to send immediately a cruiser to Bordeaux for two purposes: First, to bring to Bordeaux immediately from 5 to 10,000 Thompson submachineguns caliber .45, model 1928 A-1, and one million rounds of ammunition; and second, to carry away from Bordeaux the entire French and Belgian gold reserve. The French reserve is 550 tons. The Belgian 100 tons.

The reason for the request for these arms is that both Reynaud and Mandel¹ now expect a Communist uprising and butcheries in the city of Paris and other industrial centers as the German Army draws near. The Paris police have no weapons except antiquated single shot rifles.

Mandel appealed to me personally this morning to obtain the sub-machineguns at the earliest possible moment.

I told him to have orders sent to Purvis² at once in Washington to purchase these weapons and munitions on behalf of the French Ministry of the Interior for the use of the French police. Please ask Henry

⁹⁹ See vol. III, section under United Kingdom entitled "Concern of the United States over the fate of the United Kingdom and the British Fleet after the collapse of France".

¹ Georges Mandel, French Minister of the Interior.

² Arthur Purvis, president of the Anglo-French Purchasing Board in the United States.

Morgenthau³ to round up every available weapon of this kind he can to the number of 10,000 and please put them on cruiser tomorrow. Take them from Navy stocks if you have to and replace them. Incidentally, we have exactly two revolvers in this entire Mission with only 40 bullets and I should like a few for ourselves.

.

The French have no ships available on which to send their gold reserve. I know where it is and it is out of harm's way for the moment. Please tell this to Henry Morgenthau. If you cannot send a cruiser of the *San Francisco* class at once to Bordeaux please order the *Trenton* at Lisbon to take on fuel and supplies at once for a trip to America and order her today to Bordeaux.

Reynaud has just said to me that if we can send a cruiser to Bordeaux or to any other port he will put the entire gold reserve on it and send it to the United States.

BULLITT

740.0011 European War 1939/3352½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 28, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received May 28—1:40 p. m.]

921. Personal for the President. If you will carefully consider from the point of view of the defense of the United States and the consequences of permitting France and England to be defeated without establishing fleet cooperation I think you will feel that the risk involved in sending the Atlantic Fleet to Lisbon is entirely outweighed by the benefits to be gained.

BULLITT

740.0011 European War 1939/3343⅞ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1940—3 p. m.

534. Your 916, May 28, 1 p. m. The President desires me to let you know that it is absolutely impossible to consider sending the fleet to the Mediterranean. The presence of the fleet in the Pacific at this time is a very practical contribution to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. The value of this contribution is fully appreciated by the British Government and, it is assumed, by the French Government as well.

What vessels we have in the Atlantic are required under present circumstances either for patrol duty or for special service in South

³ Secretary of the Treasury.

and Central American waters. From the strictly practical aspect, the presence of an American fleet at this time in the Mediterranean would result in very serious risks and hazards and it would be impossible, for reasons which are, of course, apparent, for the fleet to base itself on any ports in or near the Mediterranean should Italy enter the war. Finally as you will recognize, unless any fleet sent were sufficiently large to be effective the impression created would be the reverse of that desired.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/344 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 17, 1940—2 a. m.

[Received 10:36 a. m.]

12. My telegram No. 11, June 16, midnight.⁴ Baudouin⁵ sent for me at midnight to inform me that 1 hour before in the name of the Pétain⁶ government he had requested the Spanish Government to ask the German Government on what terms it would grant an armistice. The communication to the Spanish Ambassador which he later read to me urged that the request be transmitted at the earliest possible moment and that the bombing of French cities might cease immediately.

In his exposé of the reasons compelling his Government to take this grave step he said that the French Army "is completely smashed"; that slaughter of further thousands must be stopped; that the fight was hopeless. If the terms of surrender received however are "unworthy of the honor or dignity of France" they will be made public and their unacceptability made manifest to the French people. This would give them courage to continue the "moral struggle"; the military battle was over. As to the fleet he assured me formally that it would never be surrendered to Germany; as guarantee Admiral Darlan whose views he said are well known on this subject had been named Minister of Marine. (His appointment to the post is I feel largely for the purpose of reassuring the British and ourselves. The Admiral's new Government associates hardly inspire complete [confidence?] that the French Fleet will remain a bulwark against Nazi aggression.)

He concluded with repeated assurances of the cardinal policy and ardent desire of the new Government to continue the closest collaboration with the British and ourselves. "Nothing," he said in conclusion, "has changed"—a viewpoint with which many of the sons of

⁴ Vol. I, section under Extension of the European War entitled "Invasion of France by Germany and collapse of French resistance."

⁵ Paul Baudouin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁶ Henri Philippe Pétain, French President of the Council of Ministers.

France will take serious issue; they will agree with Reynaud's remark to me: "The new Government will dare nothing".

BIDDLE

740.0011 European War 1939/26914a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Bordeaux (Waterman)

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1940—5 p. m.

3. Please deliver following message immediately to Ambassador Biddle:

"The President desires that you obtain immediately an interview with Admiral Darlan and subsequently, if possible, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and state that the views of this Government with regard to the disposition of the French fleet have been made very clear to the French Government on previous occasions. The President desires you to say that in the opinion of this Government, should the French Government, before concluding any armistice with the Germans, fail to see that the fleet is kept out of the hands of her opponents, the French Government will be pursuing a policy which will fatally impair the preservation of the French Empire and the eventual restoration of French independence and autonomy. Furthermore, should the French Government fail to take these steps and permit the French fleet to be surrendered to Germany, the French Government will permanently lose the friendship and good-will of the Government of the United States."

Telegraph any reply that may be made to you and all information available in this regard.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/406

*The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Baudouin) to the French Ambassador in the United States (Saint-Quentin)*⁷

[Translation]

BORDEAUX, June 17, 1940.

For several days the French army has borne, almost alone, the pressure of the German army which had a crushing superiority in men and material at its disposal. Fighting day and night against the ever-renewed reserves of the enemy, the French soldiers have been able to save only honor. All their heroism could not suffice, at the cost of the most sanguinary sacrifices, longer to protect the territory.

This situation has constrained the Government of the Republic to seek information regarding the enemy's intentions. The Government, headed by Marshal Pétain, assisted by General Weygand and Admiral

⁷ This message was handed to Under Secretary of State Welles by the French Ambassador on June 18.

Darlan, through the intermediary of the Spanish Government, requested Germany to cease hostilities and to make known its peace terms. This step was made known to the Italian Government through the intermediary of the Holy See.

The British Government and the American Government have been kept informed.

The French Government is, however, resolved not to yield to any condition contrary to national honor, dignity or independence. If, in reply to the overtures made to Germany, unacceptable demands should be returned, it is with fierce resolution that the whole country, preferring to suffer what it could not accept, would continue the struggle on bases in the French empire until the day when the common effort of all free peoples would lead to its liberation.

740.0011 European War 1939/2691‡ : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 18, 1940—noon.

[Received 11:25 p. m.]

20. Your No. 3, June 17, 5 p. m. to Consul and my flash via Press Wireless that message had been delivered to Admiral Darlan. I called the Minister for Foreign Affairs from the Council of Ministers which is now meeting to consider this and other questions of grave importance. He said that Darlan had already placed your message before the Government. He wished to assure me in the name of the Government in the most solemn manner that the French Fleet would never be surrendered to the enemy: "La question ne se pose pas." He must tell me though that the last sentence of the message had "deeply pained" the French Government (I believe, however, that in spite of this natural feeling the effect thereof was highly salutary at this juncture).

Baudouin added that he could not, however, say that the French Fleet would join the British Fleet; it might be sent overseas or it might be sunk. That question is now before the Council of Ministers. I urged with all possible emphasis that the fleet be moved to safety rather than destroyed.

No reply has yet been received to the request for armistice terms. He said that he understood from the Spanish Government that the answer "might be forthcoming tomorrow".

The Germans are now in the outskirts of Lyons. Herriot^s tells me the city was bombed last night. The atmosphere of tension and anxiety in Bordeaux is naturally increasing.

BIDDLE

^s Edouard Herriot, President of the French Chamber of Deputies.

740.0011 European War 1939/3973 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 19, 1940—2 a. m.

[Received 5:35 a. m.]

26. My telegrams Nos. 20, June 18, noon, and 23, June 18, 7 p. m.⁹ Mandel also told me that he "greatly fears" that the French Fleet will be scuttled and I gathered that his confidence in Darlan whom he characterized with his usual cynicism as "an anglophobe like most French naval officers" is not unlimited. This feeling as to the fate of the French Fleet is shared by many here and emphatically so by the British Ambassador.

BIDDLE

740.00119 European War 1939/394 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 22, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received June 22—6:10 p. m.]

1792. Personal for the Secretary. Article VIII of proposed Franco-German armistice agreement¹⁰ as telegraphed by Sir Ronald Campbell¹¹ to the Foreign Office deals with the French Navy and is substantially as follows:

The French Fleet except a portion to be left free to safeguard French interests in the colonial empire is to be collected in ports to be specified in metropolitan France, demobilized and disarmed under German or Italian control. The German Government solemnly declares it has no intention of using for its own purpose during the war the French Fleet stationed in ports under German control except those units necessary for coast surveillance and minesweeping. The German Government declares, however, that it will have claims to make respecting the French Fleet at time of negotiation of final peace treaty. Except those ships allowed for colonial service, all naval units must be recalled to ports in France itself.

Following receipt of foregoing from Campbell, urgent instructions were sent to him to following effect:

French Government apparently helpless. Our only hope is Admiral Darlan. Proposed terms put fleet entirely at German command. No reliance possible on German promises. Campbell must insist to Admiral Darlan that if fleet cannot be surrendered to Great Britain or United States, it must be scuttled. Synopsis of other proposed agree-

⁹ Latter not printed.

¹⁰ For text of the agreement of June 22, 1940, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, document No. 523, p. 671.

¹¹ British Ambassador in France.

ments follow immediately. No official confirmation at Foreign Office of press report that agreement was signed at 6:50 p. m., but they think it probable.

KENNEDY

740.00119 European War 1939/434

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1940

The French Ambassador ¹² called this morning. The Ambassador told me that he had tried to see me urgently yesterday at my house but that inasmuch as I was at the Department at the time, he could not reach me until I had left for lunch. The reason for his desire to see me yesterday was to inform me that his Government desired to appoint Monsieur Paul Reynaud as Ambassador to the United States to replace Monsieur de Saint-Quentin. Subsequently a further telegram had been received by the Ambassador cancelling the earlier instruction and requesting him to remain.

The Ambassador then asked if I had any information with regard to the terms of the Italian armistice.^{12a} I told him that I did not except in very general terms and that I was not certain that the early information sent the Department by Mr. Biddle could be regarded as accurate. The Ambassador said he had no word in the matter from his Government.

The Ambassador then commenced to speak about the general situation in France showing the utmost contempt for and opposition to the decisions reached by the present French Government. After some questioning on my part, he expressed particular bitterness with regard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Baudouin. The Ambassador said that he was beginning to hear reports that Monsieur Baudouin was the real cause of the policy pursued by the French Government in its capitulation. I asked him if he could explain, since this was his opinion, why Monsieur Paul Reynaud had brought him into his own Cabinet. The Ambassador replied that Monsieur Paul Reynaud had undoubtedly been in close contact with Monsieur Baudouin during the time that the former was Minister of Finance since Monsieur Baudouin was one of the French Inspectors of Finance, a group of men whom the Ambassador said were outstandingly competent. While the Ambassador did not state so specifically, I gained the very definite impression that he believed Monsieur Baudouin, notwithstanding his financial situation, had succumbed to German influence.

¹² Count de Saint-Quentin.

^{12a} Armistice agreement between France and Italy, June 24, 1940; for text, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, July 1939-June 1940, vol. II, p. 436.

I told the Ambassador that I felt it was obligatory upon me to ask him a very frank question and that was how the Ambassador could explain the formal and specific assurances conveyed to this Government through him the week before,¹³ as well as through Ambassador Biddle in Bordeaux, to the effect that the French Cabinet had unanimously voted never to permit the French fleet to pass into German hands, and, nevertheless, the terms of the armistice which the French Government had now signed apparently threw the entire fleet directly into German hands. The Ambassador at first attempted to quibble by stating that the terms of the armistice contained the solemn assurances on the part of Germany that the French fleet would never be utilized by Germany against England. I inquired of the Ambassador whether he believed that these assurances were of equal value as the assurances given by Germany after the Munich agreement that she would seek no further territorial domination of Czechoslovakia, as well as the other official assurances so solemnly proclaimed by Germany time and again and which time and again had been cynically disregarded at the first appropriate moment. I further asked whether the Ambassador believed that the German statement in the armistice terms that Germany reserved the right to make claims against the French fleet when peace terms were negotiated did not in itself, apart from the other consideration I had mentioned, involve a direct violation by France, through her signature thereto, of her official assurances to us. The Ambassador threw his hands in the air and said he had never known of this provision. He seemed utterly dejected and without a further word to say in defense of his Government.

The Ambassador gave me every indication that he believed the continuation in power of the present French Government was a matter of only a short time and that probably thereafter the government of the extreme right, perhaps presided over by Monsieur Laval,¹⁴ would come into being. He made no reference to French balances in this country nor did he ask any question as to what the policy of this Government might be with regard to the French Government after the armistice had become effective.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/4228 : Telegram

The Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

BORDEAUX, June 27, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received June 28—12:28 a. m.]

106. French naval sources of the Deuxième Bureau informed my Naval Attaché this afternoon that the French Fleet with few excep-

¹³ See message handed to Under Secretary of State Welles on June 18, p. 456.

¹⁴ Pierre Laval, ex-Premier of France.

tions is in North African ports (principally Bizerte, Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca) and will remain there until the mixed armistice commission decides details of their further movements. The French members of the commission leave for Wiesbaden tomorrow morning.

The merchant marine has been recalled to home ports in accordance with armistice provisions. Docks at Bordeaux now filled.

Please inform Navy and War.

BIDDLE

840.51 Frozen Credits/246

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1940.

The Ambassador of France called at his request. His real point was one of complaint against the Treasury Department in connection with the freezing of French assets by the Treasury.¹⁵ I replied that the matter rested primarily with the Treasury, but that I would be glad to speak with the Secretary of the Treasury in regard to it.

The Ambassador very earnestly urged me to speak with the Treasury about the urgent need of his Government for some of the money or assets which have been frozen by this Government, acting through the United States Treasury. I replied that the Treasury has entire control over this matter, or virtually so, but that I would keep the matter in mind when I had occasion to speak with the Secretary of the Treasury on any subject.

I pointedly inquired of the Ambassador about the status of the French fleet. He said he recognized our interest in the matter of its disposition. I thereupon interrupted him and said that the French recovery both at home and in the colonies would depend primarily on the disposition of their naval and merchant fleet. Otherwise they would come completely and hopelessly under the domination of Hitler and his economic policies of totalitarian autarchy. I said I should be frank to say very earnestly and definitely that this country is greatly interested in France not permitting Germany to get control and possession of the French fleet for the reason that we have made clear to the world our interest in and our aid to France in this contest; that if having incurred the ill-will of Germany by reason of this fact, France should hand to Germany a cocked gun to shoot at us, it is naturally a matter of very great importance, especially when the French say that our fleet in the Pacific is of real value to French interests in the Far East, which are very great.

The Ambassador agreed entirely with what I said, but tried to make it appear that Germany would be more or less harmless under her

¹⁵ See Executive Order No. 8446, June 17, 1940, *Federal Register*, June 19, 1940, p. 2279.

promise not to use the French ships for military purposes. I replied that, of course, nobody would trust Hitler on a promise of that sort.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/4361½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

LA BOURBOULE, July 1, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received July 10—3:15 a. m.]

6. Personal for the Secretary and the President. I had long conversations today with Lebrun,¹⁶ Pétain, Darlan, and Chautemps;¹⁷ and also spoke briefly with Weygand,¹⁸ Pomaret,¹⁹ Marquet²⁰ and many Senators and Ambassadors. The impression which emerges from these conversations is the extraordinary one that the French leaders desire to cut loose from all that France has represented during the past two generations, that their physical and moral defeat has been so absolute that they have accepted completely for France the fate of becoming a province of Nazi Germany. Moreover, in order that they may have as many companions in misery as possible they hope that England will be rapidly and completely defeated by Germany and that the Italians will suffer the same fate. Their hope is that France may become Germany's favorite province—a new *Gaul* which will develop into a new Gaul.

This mental disorder yesterday was accompanied by a physical disorder in living conditions and office arrangements which was fantastic. As you know the French Government arrived in Clermont-Ferrand yesterday. Displeased by living arrangements it left today for Vichy. In view of the disorder none of the statements which were made to me today should be taken as indicating any fixed line of policy or opinion. The truth is that the French are so completely crushed and so without hope for the future that they are likely to say or do almost anything.

1. I called on Lebrun at 11:30. When he entered the room he had a telegram from the United States (Atlanta, Georgia) imploring him not to surrender the French Government [*Fleet?*] to Germany. He said that he had received hundreds of such telegrams. I replied that these telegrams unquestionably had shown him the terrible shock to American public opinion that had been produced by the idea that France could deliver into the hands of her enemy a weapon with which

¹⁶ Albert Lebrun, President of France.

¹⁷ Camille Chautemps, appointed Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, June 16, 1940.

¹⁸ Gen. Maxime Weygand, appointed French Minister of Defense, June 16, 1940.

¹⁹ Charles Pomaret, French Minister of Labor.

²⁰ Adrien Marquet, Mayor of Bordeaux; he became French Minister of the Interior on July 15, 1940.

to cut the throat of her ally, England. He immediately became very excited and said that the French positively would not deliver the fleet to Germany for the Germans intended to carry out the clauses of the armistice and that he was certain that they would not take and employ these warships.

He then said that the United States had done nothing to help France which had been fighting the battle of all the democracies and that criticisms from the United States were in extremely bad taste.

I replied that we had done all that we could; that we had made it clear to France from the beginning that we would not enter the war; that the people of the United States could understand that the French Army had been obliged to surrender and that this action was considered as bad as the action of the King of the Belgians in withdrawing his army from the battle at Dunkirk which had been vigorously condemned as an act of treachery by the French. The permitting the fleet to fall into German hands was, however, much more serious. It meant providing means to destroy an ally.

Lebrun flew into a passion and said that the British had given almost no help whatsoever to the French. They had sent 10 divisions incompetently officered which had proved to be deficient in fighting spirit. They had run from the Somme and the British Government had withdrawn the British pursuit planes from the battle of the Somme. The British would soon suffer the same fate that the French had suffered. It would then be the turn of the United States and he would like to see whether either Great Britain or the United States would stand up to the Germans as well as France.

He then suddenly, without mental continuity, stated that in his belief the British would be able to beat off the German attack and that he heartily hoped they would be able to. He then launched into a description of the pitiable plight of the refugees, which is indeed horrible, and stated that if the fleet had been sent to England the Germans unquestionably in retaliation would have destroyed Paris, Lyon, and every other city in France.

I have never seen Lebrun in such a state of nervous excitement and it was obviously wearisome to carry the conversation further.

I then called on Marshal Pétain who was calm, serious [?] and altogether dignified as a [?] great [?].²¹ After I talked for an hour the Marshal asked me to take luncheon with him and as a result I talked with him for 3 hours.

The Marshal first asked me about conditions in Paris which I described in great detail and made a number of recommendations all of which he noted. He then said that he desired to thank me most profoundly for having remained in Paris and for [having?] arranged

²¹ This sentence obviously garbled.

the orderly occupation of the city. He said that he personally and all other Frenchmen owed me a deep debt of gratitude for this act. He then said that he felt that the main outlines of the future were clear. The Germans would attempt to reduce France to a province of Germany by obtaining complete control of the economic life of France and by maintaining France in a condition of permanent military impotence. It had been obvious to him when he had returned from his Embassy in Spain that the war was lost. He had attempted to persuade Reynaud to ask for an armistice the moment the British had refused to send their pursuit planes to participate in the fighting on the Somme. The truth was that the British had scarcely participated in that decisive battle of the war. Their troops had run, and although they had had 40 squadrons of pursuit planes in England they had sent only 5 to participate in the battle. French losses of material in Belgium and on the French frontier had been such that the French troops outnumbered 4 and 5 to 1 had finally been without munitions. The French Army had disintegrated and there was nothing to do except to make peace.

The Marshal then went on to say that the question of the fleet had been a terribly difficult one. He himself had taken the position that the French Fleet would never be surrendered to Germany and he wished to tell me that orders had been given to every captain of the French Fleet to sink his ship rather than permit his ship to fall into German hands.

He thought that German conduct in France indicated a desire to obtain the collaboration of the French as the chief conquered province of Germany. He did not believe that the Germans would break the terms of the armistice and he thought that they would on the contrary do everything to obtain the good will of the people of France and their cooperation in a subordinate role.

Pétain then went on to say that he thought that it would be a good thing for France if the parliamentarians who had been responsible not only for the policies which had led to the war but also for the relative unpreparedness of France should be eliminated from the French Government. He intended to dismiss every politician who had been connected with the Blum²² Government. He felt that the system of government in France must be changed. In his opinion one of the chief causes for the collapse of the French Army was that the reserve officers who had been educated by school teachers who were Socialists and not patriots had deserted their men and shown no fighting spirit whatsoever. A sense of courage and duty must be reintroduced into France.

²² Léon Blum, President of the French Council of Ministers, June 5, 1936, to June 20, 1937, and again for a short period in 1938.

Marshal Pétain went on to say that he expected Germany to crush England rapidly and he believed that Germany would make her chief demands at the expense of England. Germany probably would annex certain portions of France and would probably control the whole of France through economic arrangements but he felt that England would be [?] destroyed by Germany and that while Germany would take French Morocco and other French possessions on the Atlantic coast of Africa she would also take South Africa, India, and Canada if the United States should be defeated. He believed that the Italians would take Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria and perhaps some portion of continental France. He felt that Algeria would be permitted to remain in French hands. He expressed great bitterness against Churchill²³ and General de Gaulle.²⁴

Pétain added that he had just asked the German Government to permit the French Government to establish a sort of Vatican City at Versailles from which France could be governed much more efficiently than from Vichy.

3 [*sic*]. Admiral Darlan was intensely bitter against Great Britain. He said he felt that the British Fleet had proved to be as great a disappointment as the French Army. It was directed not by a man, but by a board of directors who could never make up their minds about anything until it was too late. He had spent a month trying to discover who was responsible for the fiasco of the Norwegian expedition and he was unable to pin the responsibility on any single Englishman since the board of directors had taken the responsibility collectively.

His most intense bitterness apparently had been aroused by an experience of his own son who was with the French Marines (*fusiliers marines*) at the Somme in direct contact with the British.

He said that his son who had been taken prisoner near Calais had managed to reach Bordeaux and had told him that the British troops on the Somme had run to the Bresle before the Germans had fired a single shot and had blown up the bridges behind the French Marines.

Darlan went on to say that he felt absolutely certain that Great Britain would be completely conquered by Germany within 5 weeks unless Great Britain should surrender sooner. It would in his opinion be entirely impossible for the British to send a single ship into the port of London or into the ports of Plymouth, Southampton, and Portsmouth. The Germans could take Ireland easily and close the ports of Glasgow, Liverpool, Cardiff, and Bristol. Great Britain would die of asphyxiation even without a German invasion. For his

²³ Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister.

²⁴ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French forces.

part, he did not believe that the British Government or people would have the courage to stand against serious German air bombardments and he expected a surrender after a few heavy air attacks.

I remarked that he seemed to regard this prospect with considerable pleasure and when he did not deny this remark but smiled I said that it seemed to me that I had observed that the French would like to have England conquered in order that Germany might have as many conquered provinces to control as possible and that France might become the favorite province, he smiled again and nodded.

I then asked Darlan if he expected an attack on the United States. He said that he felt certain that Hitler would attack the United States shortly after disposing of England and equally certain that the defenses of the United States would prove to be as vulnerable as those of England. He then said that he felt that the President of the United States had made a great mistake in criticizing the French Government's agreements with regard to the fleet. He, Darlan, had sent word to the officers of the fleet before the armistice negotiations that he would take one of two courses. If the Germans should demand the fleet and insisted on the demand they would be ordered to leave at once for Martinique and Guantánamo to place the fleet in the hands of the United States. If on the other hand it should be possible to keep the fleet out of the hands of the Germans and in French hands he would prefer such a solution. Under no conditions would he send the fleet to England since he was certain that the British would never return a single vessel of the fleet to France and that if Great Britain should win the war the treatment which would be accorded to France by Great Britain would be no more generous than the treatment accorded by Germany.

He added that he had given absolute orders to the officers of his fleet to sink immediately any ship that the Germans should attempt to seize. He said that preparations for the sinking of the ships had been made on every French vessel.

I said to him that I did not see how the French could have any control over any French vessel which might return to French ports under German control. He replied that there would always be aboard the vessels sufficient Frenchmen to sink them and that they would be on the alert.

I asked what vessels he expected to send back to Toulon. He replied that he expected to send both the *Dunkerque* and *Strasbourg* to Toulon. I expressed the opinion that this means that the two most valuable units of the French Fleet would soon be in German hands since the Germans could always say that one term of the armistice or another had not been carried out and that they were justified therefore in disregarding the other terms of the armistice.

Darlan replied that he had just as little confidence as I had in any German promise. But all the behavior of the Germans since their conquest of France had indicated that Germany desired to make France a willing vassal of Germany. It was in his opinion certain that Hitler intended to bring the entire continent of Europe including England into a single customs union and that he desired to make France his leading vassal state. France could do nothing but accept such a position for the moment. Hitler might spread his empire from one end of the earth to the other including the United States but all such empires eventually broke up because the masters in each subordinate country began eventually to sympathize with the country in which they were resident. He did not believe, therefore, that German domination of the earth would be permanent although it might be long. However disagreeable this prospect was it had to be faced.

Darlan then went on to say that the British Government was refusing to permit a French cruiser and two torpedo boats which were in the harbor of Alexandria to leave for French ports. He added that he intended to give immediate orders to these ships to shoot their way out if necessary.

He commented that he felt that when England should be forced to submit to Germany's will we should find the British eager to see the United States in the same subordinate position.

Darlan then said that French Army had not only been defeated but completely disintegrated. The French Fleet had not been defeated and its spirit remained intact and he hoped and believed that the officers corps of the French Navy would play a great role in rebuilding France. Every report from the front since May 10 indicated that the French soldier still had all the courage and ability that he had ever had. In his opinion the soldiers of 1940 were fully equal to the soldiers of 1914. But the entire system of parliamentary government in France had been rotten and the high commander of the army had proved to be equally rotten. A complete change in French ways of life was needed.

Darlan said that he had positive information that in the immediate future German troops would pass through northwestern Spain to attack and seize Portugal. He thought that Portugal would be turned over to Spain with the exception of Lisbon which would be kept permanently in German hands. He stated that he had just been informed authoritatively that German troops had already crossed into Spain.

Immediately after talking with Darlan I had a long talk with Lequerica, Spanish Ambassador to France. I told him without naming Darlan that I had heard this report. He replied that there was not a word of truth in the statement that German troops had crossed the Spanish frontier. Moreover, he did not believe that German

troops would cross the Spanish frontier. He felt, however, that it was very important for Spain to bring the present war to an end as rapidly as possible and he hoped that a cooperation between the United States and Spain to this end might be established. In confirmation of his statement that there was no truth in the report that German troops had entered Spain he said that he had talked with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs by telephone to Madrid at 12:30 today and that the Minister had assured him that the report was entirely false.

Chautemps and Senator Henry-Haye gave me a concrete description of the present plan to change the French Constitution. Chautemps said that Pétain had asked him to join his government and he had done so but he was gradually being shoved aside as an adviser of Pétain by Laval. He said that Pétain, Weygand, and Laval intended to abolish the present French Constitution and to introduce a semi-dictatorial state in which Parliament would play a small role. The model would be probably the German Constitution when Hindenburg had been President and Hitler Chancellor. Pétain would be Hindenburg and Laval would be Hitler. Pétain, Weygand, and Laval all believed that if a dictatorship of this kind should be introduced in France before the peace France would obtain much better terms than could be obtained under a parliamentary regime.

Henry-Haye said that all the Senators and Deputies would be summoned to a constitutional convention to establish this new form of government.

I also talked today with one of the few men in France in whose integrity, intelligence, and wisdom I have absolute confidence. I deliberately omit his name. He stated to me that he felt that the coming man in France was General Huntziger who is now in Germany at the head of the French Armistice Commission. He believed that there would be exploratory changes in French life and that the democratic parliamentary system of government was doomed. It had produced in public life too many men who had cleverness but no character; too many men who regarded their own interests and disregarded the interests of the country. It would take an extremely long time to rebuild a strong France of character and convictions and there would be strange aberrations and eruptions but he was absolutely confident that the French soldier and the French peasant were as sound as they had ever been.

I received a long letter tonight from General Requin who commanded at the end the superb French resistance at Rethel where his troops stood until they had not one cartridge left. It gives the same impression. I have talked with many soldiers who fought until they were totally without munitions and then charged with the bayonet.

The simple people of the country are as fine as they have ever been. The upper classes have failed completely.

BULLITT

740.0011 European War 1939/4694

*The President of the French Council of Ministers (Pétain) to
President Roosevelt*²⁵

[Translation]

VICHY, July 4, 1940.

MR. PRESIDENT: A serious and grievous event occurred yesterday. A powerful British squadron appeared before Oran and sent an ultimatum to the French warships that were there, calling upon them either to join the British fleet or to scuttle ship. Six hours were granted them to comply with one or the other of those injunctions. When the admiral in command of our vessels stationed at Oran replied that he would oppose force with force, the British vessels opened fire at the expiration of the period of time provided for, after having had magnetic mines laid down by their seaplanes to bottle up our ships, on which they fired while they lay at anchor. One French battleship blew up; another, the *Dunkerque*, was set afire. The number of casualties was considerable.

The British navy has indulged in an act of hostility against the French navy. I should like to believe that it did so without instructions from its Government, but this illusion is precluded by the preparation which this inglorious operation must have called for, the choice of British battleships to which it was entrusted, and the very manner in which it took place.

Nothing could justify this hateful aggression. Before, during, and after the bipartite armistice negotiation, of which the British Government could, better than any, appreciate the imperative necessity for us, the Government which I headed freely gave it the assurance that in no case would the French naval forces be used against Great Britain. It knew that in order to obtain that result we stoically subjected ourselves to general armistice conditions the severity of which should not have left it indifferent. It was not unaware either of the fact that our adversaries had recognized that they could not demand the use of our fleet against Great Britain, or of the fact that the Mediterranean ports of Metropolitan France and of French North Africa were to remain free of any foreign occupation. However, it was into one of those ports, that of Oran, that its vessels came and surprised our fleet at anchor, and opened fire on our warships, which were unable to defend themselves.

²⁵ Handed to President Roosevelt by the French Ambassador.

Since I came to power, setting it as my aim first to assess the incapable consequences of a hopeless military situation, then to put to work all those elements of recovery which France is fortunate enough to possess, I have constantly striven to reconcile the situation into which I had been forced, by circumstances well known to the British Government, with the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between France and Great Britain. I have on many occasions charged our Ambassador in Washington to express to your Government my intention in that regard.

It was no fault of mine that this was not accomplished. In view of a *coup de force* for which there was no excuse and which threatens to leave me without means for attaining my aim of equitable mutual understanding, I felt that I should establish the responsibilities for a situation which I deplore, and it is with confidence that I lay the case before you, Mr. President, whose active friendship for France will not, I am sure, fail my country in the cruel misfortune from which I have undertaken to extricate it.

MARSHAL PÉTAIN

740.0011 European War 1939/4556 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

LA BOURBOULE, July 5, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received July 10—7:38 a. m.]

19. I had long conversations with Pétain, Laval, Chautemps, Baudouin, General Requin, and others yesterday. Pétain was engaged in preparing a message to you stating the facts from the French point of view with regard to the British attack on the French Fleet. Since there will be a delay of at least 12 to 24 hours on all my messages, as I am obliged to return to La Bourboule from Vichy to send them, I assume that you already have all the facts and Pétain's message and will, therefore, omit them.

The reaction produced by the news of the British attack on the French Fleet was, of course, violent in the extreme. Several members of the present Cabinet advocated immediate acts of war against England. Baudouin stated to me that he had led the fight in the Cabinet to prevent any act of war; but I learned later from three of his colleagues that he had advocated an act of war. Pétain was resolutely opposed to anything more than a break in diplomatic relations with England. Orders have been sent recalling the French Chargé d'Affaires in London.

The Germans and Italians were quick to try to take advantage of the violent wave of anti-British feeling. They lifted the armistice clauses with regard to the French Fleet and French Air Force and

also permitted the French to stop demobilization of that portion of the French Army still remaining intact on the Italian frontier. Moreover, Pétain informed me that the clause forbidding him and the Government to use the radio for broadcasts had been lifted.

Baudouin in commenting to me said that he hoped I would not forget that henceforth there would be a chasm between France and Great Britain which it would be impossible to bridge. He added that France hoped to pursue good relations with the United States.

The British action strengthened greatly the hands of those who desire to establish as rapidly as possible a full and complete cooperation with Germany and Italy, and correspondingly weakened those who desire to continue a policy of cooperation with Great Britain and the United States. The latter indeed are in despair.

Pétain recognizes that only a defeat of Hitler by some other power can restore independence to France. He is, therefore, sincerely desirous of a British victory. Pétain was inclined to minimize "breach" by attributing it to Churchill's personal lack of balance. Incidentally, Darlan was opposed to acts of war against England on the ground that the French Fleet could not now fight except by receiving its supplies entirely from German and Italian hands and he was unwilling to take any such assistance.

Pétain and Laval both said to me that the Chamber and Senate would meet on Monday next and that the vote giving full powers to the Marshal to establish a new constitution would come on Wednesday. Incidentally Pétain has left the nature of this National Assembly entirely to Laval and, if Laval should be unable to obtain a majority for the abolition of the present constitution, Pétain is apparently prepared to dissociate himself from Laval, force Laval's resignation and remain himself leader of the French nation.

Pétain has told me that in view of the new concessions made to France yesterday by Germany and Italy, he again hoped that it might be possible for the French Government to return to Paris in the near future.

BULLITT

740.0011 European War 1939/4771 : Telegram

The Consul at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, July 8, 1940—noon.

[Received July 20—8:30 p. m.]

66. I have had several conversations with Monsieur Édouard Daladier. He does not consider that the Oran affair has changed the situation in any way; the great enemy of democracy everywhere is Germany, and he fervently hopes that we shall give all possible as-

sistance to Great Britain. He is anxious that the President, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Bullitt know exactly how he feels. He does not think that there will be war between France and Great Britain.

GOOLD

740.0011 European War 1939/4626 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 12, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received July 13—9:40 a. m.]

359. Following from Bullitt.

"For President and the Secretary: The intense anger caused in France by the British attacks on the French Navy is so universal at Vichy, even among the Frenchmen who have been intensely pro-British, that little stands between French acts of war against British except the good sense of Marshal Pétain. During the last week I have said to each member of the French Cabinet that in my opinion he must realize that only a British victory can restore the independence of France. In each case the member of Cabinet in question has agreed, but Baudouin is apparently anxious to bring France into war on the side of Germany and argues that as an ally of Germany, France could obtain much better terms than as a defeated enemy. Laval is not far from acceptance of this point of view.

If the British should continue acts of aggression against France which should further arouse French opinion, I am not sure that Marshal Pétain would be able to hold back the tide."

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/4787½

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Saint-Quentin)

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: The President has asked me to request that Your Excellency be good enough to inform Marshal Pétain that his message of July 4 regarding the naval action at Oran, which you handed personally to the President, has been read with interest.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/4756 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 18, 1940—9 p. m.
[Received July 19—7:39 p. m.]

100. The Foreign Office has now issued an official communiqué on the subject of Franco-British relations to the following effect:

After the British attack at Mers-el-Kebir, the French Government decided to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the French Chargé at London was instructed on July 4 to communicate this decision to the British Government. Because of the disturbed telegraphic service De Castellane was able to transmit the message to Lord Halifax²⁶ only on July 8 and the latter then suggested that normal relations between the two countries be reestablished.

The French Government replied immediately that the request of the British Government could eventually be taken into consideration only if it fulfilled certain conditions, that is, restitution of the French shipping seized or sequestered by Britain as well as full reparation for the victims of the British aggression and for the damage caused by it.

These conditions were not published by the French Government but the frequent references in British broadcasts to negotiations on this subject without specifying the terms compel the French Government publicly to state its position.

According to the communiqué information from London indicates that the British Government is not disposed to release French shipping considered essential by the French Government. There can be no bargaining on this point because the French Government is bound to respect its obligations under the armistice agreement.

The communiqué terminates with the statement that the arrangements made by the French Chargé in London will permit him to depart from England on July 20th.

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/4787½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me at his request. The Ambassador brought with him a copy of the note dated July 16, signed by the Secretary of State, acknowledging the receipt by the President of the letter handed to the President recently by the Ambassador and sent to him by Marshal Pétain.

The Ambassador said that this communication had been a great surprise to him inasmuch as he had understood from the President that his reply to Marshal Pétain's letter would be in the form of a personal letter and he asked what the reason for this communication might be. I told the Ambassador that, as he knew, I had been away during the past week and that I would have to ask the President for

²⁶ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

such information. I said, however, that the Ambassador could certainly assume that this communication would not have been sent except at the desire of the President himself. The Ambassador said that Marshal Pétain would be very much aggrieved that his personal communication did not merit a reply inasmuch as it was the practice for a chief of state to acknowledge a personal communication from another chief of state. To this I made no reply and merely stated that if the President desired me give any further explanation to the Ambassador, I would be glad to do so.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/6166 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 21, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received October 21—11:25 a. m.]

3482. Personal for the President from Former Naval Person:²⁷

"We hear rumors from various sources that the Vichy Government are preparing their ships and colonial troops to aid the Germans against us. I do not myself believe these reports, but if the French Fleet at Toulon were turned over to Germany it would be a very heavy blow. It would certainly be a wise precaution, Mr. President, if you would speak in the strongest terms to the French Ambassador emphasizing the disapprobation with which the United States would view such a betrayal of the cause of democracy and freedom. They will pay great heed in Vichy to such a warning.

You will have seen what very heavy losses we have suffered in the northwestern approaches to our last two convoys. This is due to our shortage of destroyers in the gap period I mentioned to you. Thank God your 50 are now coming along, and some will soon be in action. We ought to be much better off by the end of the year, as we have a lot of our own anti-U-boat vessels completing, but naturally we are passing through an anxious and critical period with so little small craft having to guard against invasion in the narrow waters, with the very great naval effort we are making in the Mediterranean, and the immense amount of convoy work."

KENNEDY

²⁷ Code name for Winston Churchill.

740.00119 European War 1939/530a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1940—noon.

636. For your information. The following personal message was delivered yesterday to the French Ambassador ²⁸ from the President with the request that it be transmitted immediately to Marshal Pétain: ²⁹

“In the opinion of the United States Government the fact that the French Government alleges that it is under duress and consequently cannot act except to a very limited degree as a free agent is in no sense to be considered as justifying any course on the part of the French Government which would provide assistance to Germany and her allies in their war against the British Empire. The fact that a government is a prisoner of war of another power does not justify such a prisoner in serving its conqueror in operations against its former ally.

The Government of the United States received from the Pétain Government during the first days it held office the most solemn assurances that the French fleet would not be surrendered. If the French Government now permits the Germans to use the French fleet in hostile operations against the British fleet, such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the United States Government.

Any agreement entered into between France and Germany which partook of the character above mentioned would most definitely wreck the traditional friendship between the French and American peoples, would permanently remove any chance that this Government would be disposed to give any assistance to the French people in their distress, and would create a wave of bitter indignation against France on the part of American public opinion.

If France pursued such a policy as that above outlined, the United States could make no effort when the appropriate time came to exercise its influence to insure to France the retention of her overseas possessions.”

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/550½ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1940—2 p. m.

637. Department's 636, October 25, noon. In view of the uncertainty that the President's message as communicated to you was accurately delivered to Marshal Pétain, please obtain at the first possible moment an audience with the Marshal and repeat to him the contents of the President's message.

HULL

²⁸ Gaston Henry-Haye succeeded Count de Saint-Quentin on September 11, 1940.

²⁹ President Roosevelt informed Prime Minister Churchill of the substance of this message to Marshal Pétain in a message transmitted by telegram No. 3241, October 24, 7 p. m., to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (740.0011 European War 1939/6166).

740.0011 European War 1939/6240½ : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 26, 1940—10:30 a. m.

[Received October 26—8:05 a. m.]

824. Department's triple priority 637, October 25, 2 p. m. I delivered the message personally to the Marshal at 10:15 a. m. this morning. The text transmitted through Henry-Haye has not yet been received.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6247½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 26, 1940—noon.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

591. Following is second transmission of Embassy's telegram No. 590, October 26, noon, in one section: In connection with Priority, strictly confidential for the [Secretary?] and Under Secretary.

The British Ambassador has just called on me and handed me a memorandum reading as follows:

A most critical position has arisen in which Hitler has demanded of Pétain the complete dismemberment of the French Empire including the cession of Dakar to Germany and the use of the French Fleet against Great Britain. Pétain has refused the demand, but half his Ministers are in favor of acceptance. It is most essential that every possible pressure should be put on him to stand firm. The King of England has, therefore, sent him a personal message appealing to his honor as a great soldier and the ties that in peace and war have in the past united France and Great Britain and other governments that Great Britain will not end the war until the greatness of France is re-established. Could the President at once send a similar message direct to the Chargé d'Affaires at Vichy. The message should recall the visit of the Marshal to the United States and the friendly personal feelings between him and the President. The more personal the message the better. It is a question of hours as the French Council of Ministers will be discussing the position immediately.

He said that he of course left the treatment of the matter entirely to my Government but that he had jotted down his ideas so that I might have them fully before me.

The Ambassador has maintained a close and cordial contact with his French colleague here and it was through this channel that the King's message was sent to Pétain. The British representative seems to be aware of Marshal Pétain's great admiration for the President and said that because of this he felt that a message to the Marshal might have great weight, that now if ever his arms must be held up.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/6242½ : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 26, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

830. My telegram No. 826, October 26, 1 p. m.³⁰ Charles-Roux³¹ sent for me for a "friendly and private chat" in company with Saint-Quentin, Jules Henry,³² and Seguin.³³ He said he had not seen the Marshal or Baudouin since delivery of the message and could not therefore speak for them. He said that while he well understood the motives which prompted it (and they were all apparently in accord therewith) he could not but regret both the "painfully curt" terms in which it was couched and the substance, too. He feared that the effect might be contrary to that desired and whereas, if it had been phrased with some understanding of France's difficulties and what the Marshal is up against, it would have been more effective. As to the substance, he felt that our assumption that the fleet would be turned over to Germany was not warranted—also that the problem was much more complex than merely the question of the fleet. Saint-Quentin interrupted to explain at this point the importance which both our Government and our people attach to the question of the fleet and Jules Henry backed him up. Charles-Roux went on to say the King's message, which was received last evening, had addressed the Marshal in a sympathetic understanding and "almost affectionate tone". They all expressed the fear that if the text of our message is published, it will have a "very deplorable effect on French opinion", Seguin remarking that "the Germans would pay considerable to have it made public".

They read me a portion of the telegram received from Henry-Haye; while apparently it was similar in substance it did not indicate that the message was personal from the President or that it was addressed to the Marshal rather than Baudouin. Also, he wrapped it in softer phraseology.

They all begged as friends of our country and as "on our side" that we endeavor to understand the French position and show a little more confidence in the Marshal. I said by way of reply that while I had the greatest respect and admiration for Marshal Pétain, I could not feel the same confidence in some of his associates and that I hoped that they in turn would try to reach a better understanding how we viewed the problem and what the possibility of a hostile French Fleet means to us.

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ François Charles-Roux, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

³² French Ambassador to Turkey.

³³ Jean Seguin, Chief of the American Section of the French Foreign Office.

The lobby of the Parc Hotel is jammed with the curious, anxious for crumbs of information concerning what today's critical discussions may produce.

The latest rumors are that Baudouin is definitely out of the Government and that Laval³⁴ will take over the portfolio of Foreign Minister.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/553 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 31, 1940—noon.

[Received 7:25 p. m.]

857. Ambassador Jules Henry who is off in a few days for his new post at Ankara dined with me last night. He said that he felt that we should take a calmer view of things in the United States and should try to understand the frightfully difficult position in which France finds herself. He pleaded in particular that we place full faith in Marshal Pétain not to plunge the country into war against Great Britain and not to turn over the French Fleet or French air and naval bases to Britain's enemy. He referred to the Marshal's brief message broadcast to the French people last night as evidence that he and not Laval is controlling the country's destiny. The message he said had in part been destined to calm the country's suspicions that Laval may be selling it out. (The Department will have noted the significant closing paragraphs: "The armistice after all is not peace. France is held by many obligations vis-à-vis her conqueror. At least she remains sovereign. This sovereignty imposes upon her the duty to defend her soil, to extinguish differences of opinion, to reduce dissidence in her colonies. This policy is mine. The Ministers are responsible only to me. It is I alone whom history will judge. I have spoken to you hitherto in the language of a father. I speak to you today as your leader. Follow me. Keep your confidence in France eternal.")

I told him in reply—and he will no doubt pass the remarks along—that I had heard much complaint in the last 3 months of our unwillingness or inability to understand France's position and to place in her Government the confidence which they felt they deserved. I remarked that it seemed to me that little effort and little desire had been demonstrated to understand the viewpoint of the United States. In the Marshal's integrity and patriotism we had full confidence; we had the greatest admiration for the personal sacrifice he is making for his country. He must bear in mind, however I said, that the Marshal

* Pierre Laval had been appointed Vice President of the French Council of Ministers on July 15, 1940.

was a man of considerable age (Henry himself had asked me whether I had seen him "in the morning when his mind was clear or in the afternoon") and that we could not place equal confidence in other members of his Government. The British, we feel, are fighting our battle and the British cause is our own. The man who has today the greatest authority in the French Government after the Marshal and who has just had himself made Foreign Minister is Pierre Laval. Laval, I went on, had expressed himself with great vehemence and sincerity first to Ambassador Biddle at Bordeaux, later to Ambassador Bullitt, to my predecessor Murphy (telegram No. 201, July 29, 5 p. m.³⁵) and to both the French and American press that France's only salvation lay in a British defeat and in complete collaboration with Germany. It was all very well to say that neither the Marshal nor the country would permit the fleet and air and naval bases in unoccupied France and North Africa to serve Germany's aims. The fact remained that in spite of the armistice clauses which gave Germany the right to compel the dismantling of the French Fleet and the demobilization of its personnel the Germans had shown themselves only too anxious that the fleet be maintained 100% in commission and that not one man be demobilized. The fact could only mean that Germany hoped some day to use that fleet against the British and we quite naturally felt that if means could be found to make it possible without stirring up a revolt or the separation of the colonies Laval would be glad to "collaborate" fully to that end. I said that furthermore French industries including airplane factories are now actively engaged in producing planes and war material to strengthen Germany's war machine; that I understood that one of the principal topics in Laval's discussions in Paris was the question of "fuller collaboration" of French industry for German account. It seemed to me therefore that the French Government could hardly wonder at our anxiety with respect to a question so vitally important to our own security as the fate of the French Fleet and French and North African bases.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/562 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 1, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

866. For OPNAV from Glover.³⁶ During last 2 days have had long conversations with head and liaison officer second section of Navy

³⁵ *Ante*, p. 377.

³⁶ For Chief of Naval Operations from Lieutenant Commander Cato Glover, Assistant Naval Attaché in France.

Department during which I have insisted on the utmost frankness because of the prevailing rumors concerning discussions pertaining to the disposition of the French Fleet and the Mediterranean and African bases. Most positive assurances have been given, based on a recent message from Admiral Darlan to the fleet subsequent to the recent conversations between Hitler and Pétain, that no commitments have been made which involve the use of Mediterranean or African naval bases by the Germans, the use of the French Fleet against the British, the turning over of any part of the French Fleet to the Germans. Every emphasis has been placed on holding in a position of *status quo* the French Empire and in defending it against any aggressor. Recent naval orders have been again issued to defend to the end and that ships must be prepared to scuttle themselves rather than surrender. The head of the section stated that the Germans would not dare ask for such concessions from the fleet or bases as they know full well that these would not be granted. He is decidedly anti-British as is Darlan, but not to the extent that they prefer further German control. However, he pointed out that because of the general situation in France, an economic accord with Germany was absolutely necessary.

It was stated that there is no intention of moving the ships now at Fort de France nor is there any intention to move the *Jean Bart* from Casablanca to Toulon. The promise has been made that should any such move be contemplated prior notification will be given through the proper channels. It appears probable that even if the Government moves back to Paris in the near future the three Ministries of National Defense will remain in Vichy for some time and at least until Paris is completely evacuated. Information concerning the conversations between Hitler-Pétain and Laval has been held in such strict secrecy that apparently no one here other than the latter is completely informed.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/564 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 1, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received November 3—9 a. m.]

872. My telegram No. 861, November 1, 11 a. m.³⁷ The Marshal's reply to the President's message was sent off late last night to Ambassador Henry-Haye. I learn that it was written in part by the Marshal himself and that probably Laval had a hand in its composition. An earlier draft couched in less brusque phraseology written by Charles-Roux and Rochat³⁸ I hear was rejected.

³⁷ Not printed.

³⁸ Charles Rochat succeeded Charles-Roux as Secretary General of the French Foreign Office about November 1, 1940.

In view of the importance of the reply and the fact that the President's message was transmitted to Vichy by Ambassador Henry-Haye in somewhat different form (my telegram No. 1830 [830], October 26, 2 p. m.), I quote the text in translation as sent me with a covering Foreign Office note today:

[Here follows a translation of Marshal Pétain's message to President Roosevelt differing verbally but not in substance from translation printed *infra*.]

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/651

The French Embassy to the Department of State ^{38a}

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1940.

The Chief of the French State has received the message which President Roosevelt sent to him through the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States.

Moved by the desire to preserve the friendship which since the founding of the United States has bound the French people to the American people, he will refrain from calling attention to what in the said communication might cause him to doubt the equitable dispositions of the American Government.

To reply to the preoccupations of President Roosevelt, he wishes to state that the French Government has always retained its independence of action and can only wonder at an opinion which is as inexact as it is unfair. The French Government has declared that the French fleet would never be given up and there is nothing which today can warrant questioning this solemn promise. President Roosevelt speaks of operations directed against the British fleet; he forgets doubtless that operations at sea have indeed occurred, but they were, and in the most unexpected manner, begun by the British fleet.

Moreover, England has taken a position against France and against her Government to which the French people cannot consent. His Majesty's Government is in fact lending its cooperation to Frenchmen in rebellion against their mother country and whose action, thanks to the support of the British fleet and air force, is a blow against the unity of her empire.

France—and her Government can give assurance thereof—will not take part in any unjustifiable attack; but, conscious of her duty, she will know how to enforce respect, with honor, for her essential interests.

^{38a} Handed to the Secretary of State by the French Ambassador on November 4.

The French Government remains very much attached to the maintenance of the traditional friendship which unites our two countries and will strive under all circumstances, to avoid misunderstandings or interpretations such as those which doubtless led President Roosevelt to address this message to us.

740.00119 European War 1939/585a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1940—6 p. m.

689. The French Ambassador called November 4 to hand me Marshal Pétain's reply to the President. He brought up the subject of the relations between our two Governments and said that the Marshal was somewhat hurt at the tone of the President's message and that we should appreciate the situation of the French Government at Vichy.

In general terms I reiterated the traditional friendship between France and the United States and our anxious desire to preserve in the most genuine manner that spirit of friendliness and mutual cooperation in every way that might be practicable and mutually desirable. I remarked that the chief trouble seemed to be that high-ranking officials in the French Government seem disposed to keep entirely away from this Government in almost everything that relates to normal relations and at the same time to keep extremely close to Hitler and to show every sympathetic interest in his plans and purposes, revealing all the while the utmost antipathy toward Great Britain and the cause for which she is fighting. I stated that this Government has the usual normal relations with all other governments except those at Tokyo, Berlin, Rome, and Vichy; that I can always understand readily the attitude of all the other governments and can get legitimate information promptly and voluntarily from all of them with the exception of the four mentioned; that Vichy along with Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome is just the opposite in its disposition to be frank and friendly. I said that I receive many rumors and reports about the attitude of the Vichy Government contrary to the interests of this country, but nothing direct, and I am obliged to look to other rumors and reports, direct and indirect, coming through the press and through foreign offices in various parts of the world, in order to get any real grasp of what is actually taking place at Vichy that is calculated seriously to affect this Government. I added that the French Government in adopting this attitude and practice will get nowhere in its relations with the Government of the United States. In answer to the Ambassador's query I remarked that he knew that the definite impression created here and everywhere by Laval is that he is an extreme partisan of Hitler and

Mussolini and very bitter toward Great Britain; that he is reported to favor strongly permanent rejection of the so-called "old order" in Europe, and embracing of Hitler's political, social, and other policies with totalitarian autarchy a basic part. I added that we proposed to be on our guard with respect to acts of the Vichy Government inspired by Laval that are intended to aid by French connivance, military activities of Hitler, such as supplying of naval and air bases or other help given by the land, sea or air forces of France; that in any event this Government has had nothing resembling satisfactory information from the French Government about what is really going on that would constitute legitimate information to us from any government at all disposed to be friendly.

I then said that our Government thus far has retained its high regard for Marshal Pétain and his anxious desire to be of help to the French people to the fullest practical extent; that this Government recognizes the unfortunate situation of France as a captive nation and it recognizes to the fullest extent the duty of the French Government to conform to the armistice terms along with other functions and requirements of a captive nation, but that in so doing this Government maintains strongly its original position that the French Government has no justification of any sort to render the slightest military aid to Germany; that the French Government has no right in its acts and utterances to go beyond and outside the armistice terms for the purpose of making itself a partisan of Hitler, unless the French Government intends to abandon its friendly relations with other nations which are antagonistic to Hitler's movements of conquest.

I said that Laval may think he can appease Hitler just as others heretofore have imagined that they could appease him; that that was his affair; that this Government, however, recognizing the great misfortune of the French Government in not pursuing the long-view objectives within sufficient time for its safety, does not propose to trust Hitler for one split second to fall in with any government on a course of appeasement; that the French Government therefore should understand the position of this Government and its determination to take no chances. I went on to say that this Government is not remotely thinking about minor considerations between our two Governments, such as freeing some French assets, etc., etc., but that it had a supreme and firm purpose to have no relations with any government, such as that of Vichy, which would give the slightest encouragement to Hitler, either directly or indirectly. I told the Ambassador that it was manifest that if Marshal Pétain feels aggrieved at the President's recent message to him, he might well review and take cognizance of Laval's extreme pro-German plans and efforts as reported in various ways to this Government and which have been concealed in the main by the

French Government, and only reached this Government to a limited extent, directly or indirectly. I added that there must be a spirit of candor and a disposition to confer back and forth with full exchanges of information in a thoroughly accurate and candid manner, so that this Government will know exactly what the Government of France is doing in so far as it relates to possible aid to Hitler over and above the terms of the armistice and the function and duty of a captive of war. I said it would be a mistake for Marshal Pétain, knowing what is going on in his Government at the instance of Laval, to expect good relations between our countries to continue to exist, while he takes exception to any act or utterance of this Government in its strong protest against the reported policies and purposes of Laval.

The Ambassador endeavored to explain the reasons for Laval's action and I said that again there comes up the matter of attempted appeasement of Hitler; that Hitler in the end would do what he pleases with all of his captive nations regardless of whether they offered him gifts and other appeasements; that he would take such nations and then at some future time retake them if his past acts are to be judged fairly; that this again brings back the question of rendering aid to Germany over and above the terms of the armistice, and that the Government of France must understand that this Government is too much concerned about possible future attacks by Hitler to acquiesce in the slightest with acts of the French Government that would aid or encourage Hitler in still wider conquest, especially in the direction of this hemisphere. I said that it is on this broad position that our Government rests its attitude toward France.

The above background material may also be of use to you in considering the problem mentioned in your 874, November 3, 11 a. m.³⁹

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/6587 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 10, 1940—10 p. m.
[Received November 10—6: 55 p. m.]

3690. Personal for the Secretary and the Under Secretary. I have been furnished a copy of the following message to the President from the Prime Minister which I am informed is being sent tonight to Washington through the Foreign Office:

“Message from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Immediate.

³⁹ Not printed; it refers to a possible return of the French Government to Paris and move of the Diplomatic Corps to Amboise.

(1) We have been much disturbed by reports of the intention of French Government to bring *Jean Bart* and *Richelieu* to Mediterranean for completion. It is difficult to exaggerate the potential danger if this were to happen, and so open the way for these ships to fall under German control. We should feel bound to do our best to prevent it.

(2) We conveyed a warning to French Government through Ambassador Madrid a few days ago on the following lines:

Such a step would greatly increase the temptation to the Germans and Italians to seize the French Fleet. We doubt not the good faith of the French Government, but their physical ability to implement their assurances that they will not let the fleet fall into enemy hands. We particularly wish to avoid any clash between British and French naval forces and therefore hope that if they had thought of moving the ships they will now refrain from doing so.

(3) As we said to French Government, we should not question good faith of assurances, but even if we accept assurances we can feel no security that they will in fact be able to maintain them once the ships are in French ports in the power or reach of the enemy, and I must [apparent omission] that the desire of French Government to bring these ships back, if this turns out to be well-founded, seems to me to give cause for some suspicion.

(4) It would be most helpful if you felt able to give a further warning at Vichy on this matter, for if things went wrong it might well prove of extreme danger for us both.

10th November, 1940."

JOHNSON

851.34/162a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1940—2 p. m.

708. Information has reached us from a highly reliable source that the French Government is planning to transfer in the immediate future for reconditioning the warships *Jean-Bart* and *Richelieu* from Dakar to a Mediterranean port.

You are requested to obtain at once from the appropriate officials of the French Government a confirmation or denial of this report, pointing out to them that it is of vital interest to this Government that the vessels in question remain in stations where, while protecting France's interests in its colonial empire, they will not be exposed to control or seizure by powers which might employ them to ends in conflict with the stated interests of the United States of America in the future of the French fleet.

If the French officials with whom you discuss this matter deny the authenticity of the information which has reached us you should express the satisfaction of this Government that it is the intention of the French Government to retain its full liberty of action under Article

VIII of the Armistice Agreement between Germany and France and maintain out of jeopardy such units of the French fleet as were "released" for the protection of French interests overseas.

If, however, the officials whom you approach in the first instance confirm the report you should immediately convey to the Marshal an expression of the grave concern of this Government that these vessels which now are engaged in a mission with which this Government is wholly sympathetic of supporting French interests in the colonial empire may be removed to points where there will not be adequate safeguards regarding their future use. You should say that your Government is mindful of the community of interests which for more than a century has bound France and the United States and is hopeful, therefore, that if it is necessary for purposes of reconditioning or repairs to move the units in question of the French fleet from their present stations they will avail themselves of those facilities which this Government understands exist at Casablanca and will not transfer the *Jean-Bart* and *Richelieu* to places where conceivably they might be subject to control inconsistent not only with the best interest of France but with the ultimate interest of the United States as well.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/6587 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1940—4 p. m.

713. By direction of the President you are requested orally and informally to let the appropriate French authorities know that the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider purchasing the *Jean-Bart* and *Richelieu* if the French Government is willing to dispose of them. In such event you may state that your Government would be willing to agree that these warships would not be used during the present war.

I believe that the preferable method for you to follow in undertaking this approach would be by means of a personal conversation with the Marshal if you can arrange for a private interview.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/6587 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1940—4 p. m.

3457. Please transmit the following message from the President to the former naval person :

"I have received your message with regard to the possible transfer by the French Government of the *Jean-Bart* and *Richelieu* to the Mediterranean for completion. Instructions have been sent immediately to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Vichy to obtain a confirmation or a denial of this report and to point out that it is of vital interest to the Government of the United States that these vessels remain in stations where they will not be exposed to control or seizure by powers which might employ them to ends in conflict with the interests of the United States in the future of the French fleet.

If the report is confirmed, the Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to convey to Marshal Pétain an expression of the grave concern of this Government and to point out that the Government of the United States, mindful of the community of interests which has existed for more than a century between France and the United States, believes that if it is necessary, for purposes of reconditioning or repairs, to move the units in question the French authorities will not transfer the *Jean-Bart* and *Richelieu* to places where they would be subject to a control inconsistent not only with the best interests of France but with the ultimate interests of the United States as well.

It will also be made clear, should the report be confirmed, that such a step on the part of the French Government would inevitably seriously prejudice Franco-American relations.

For your personal information only, I am letting the French Government know that this Government would be prepared to buy these two ships if they will dispose of them to us. I will let you know the result."

WELLES

851.34/165: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 14, 1940—10 p. m.
[Received November 15—11:40 a. m.]

955. I took up this morning with Rochat the matter raised in the Department's 708, November 12, 2 p. m.

Laval read me this afternoon a brief memorandum obtained from Admiral Darlan. It stated that the French Admiralty has no present intention of moving either the *Jean Bart* or the *Richelieu*. The memorandum went on to say that if it becomes advisable to move those ships at some future time the French Admiralty alone will decide the question. It reiterates previous assurances that the French Fleet will never fall into the hands of any hostile power.

(I could not refrain from pointing out to Rochat the inconsistency of this last statement and Laval's earlier remark to me—my 954, November 14, 9 p. m.⁴⁰—that France could do nothing if Germany decided to take air and naval bases by force. Rochat said that he too had noted this inconsistency and "had squirmed in his chair". He went on to give however the usual assurance that if any attempt is

⁴⁰ *Ante*, p. 403.

made to seize the ships they will be scuttled and that strict orders in this sense have been given.)

MATTHEWS

851.34/164 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 16, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 10:11 p. m.]

964. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Department's 713, November 13, 5 [4] p. m. I was received alone by Marshal Pétain this afternoon and presented to him as persuasively as possible our interest in purchasing the *Jean Bart* and the *Richelieu*. He listened with keen attention. When I had finished he replied as follows:

"I have given the most solemn assurances that the French Fleet, including these two ships, shall never fall into Germany's hands. I have given those assurances to your Government; I have given them to the British Government, and even to Churchill personally. I reiterate them now. They will be used to defend French territory and possessions. They will never be used against the British unless we are attacked by them. I cannot sell those ships even if I wanted to. The terms of the armistice prevent it and even if they did not the Germans would never permit it. We are under their heel and powerless. If I were free I would gladly sell them to you, on condition that they be returned to us after the war and thus save them for France. Under present circumstances I must repeat I have neither the right nor the possibility of selling them."

He said this with great seriousness but with no sign either of surprise or resentment at the suggestion. He then talked for half an hour of France's present situation which I am reporting in a separate telegram.⁴¹

MATTHEWS

851.34/164 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1940—9 p. m.

733. Your 964, November 16, 5 p. m. In your next interview with Marshal Pétain please state that the Marshal's reply to you as set forth in your telegram under reference has been given careful and appreciative consideration by the President. You may further say, by direction of the President, that should the vessels in question return to Toulon two eventualities might arise: (a) that the presence of the vessels there under present conditions might give rise to serious misinterpretation and concern on the part of public opinion in this coun-

⁴¹ See telegram No. 965, November 16, p. 411.

try, or (b) that the present situation with regard to unoccupied France might change in a sense unfavorable to the liberty of action of the present French Government and thereby involve the assertion of direct control by the German Government over the movement of these vessels. With these two possibilities in mind the President desires to make it clear to Marshal Pétain that the offer previously communicated to him by you remains open insofar as the Government of the United States is concerned both with regard to either the purchase or lease by the United States of these vessels, as well as any other vessels in the French Navy.

WELLES

851.34/166 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 21, 1940—8 p. m.
[Received November 22—8:51 a. m.]

1003. Department's strictly confidential telegram 733, November 18, 9 p. m., and my telegram 1002, November 21, 7 p. m.⁴² At my interview with Marshal Pétain this afternoon I conveyed to him as by direction of the President the point of view set forth in the Department's telegram under reference. His reaction was immediate: "Then why not leave those vessels at Dakar and Casablanca where they now are? I shall keep them there and if there should be any change in this plan I will give you previous notice."

MATTHEWS

851.34/166 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1940—4 p. m.

3572. Please transmit the following message from the President to the former naval person:

"I believe you will be interested in a report which I have just received from the American Chargé d'Affaires in Vichy of an interview which he had with Marshal Pétain on November 21 in order to emphasize further the concern felt by the Government of the United States regarding the movements of the French warships. Marshal Pétain stated categorically that he would keep the vessels now at Dakar and Casablanca where they are and that if there should be any change in this plan he would give the Government of the United States previous notice. Please regard this assurance to us as in the highest degree confidential."

WELLES

⁴² Latter not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/7156 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 14, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received December 15—9:09 p. m.]

1140. Matthews lunched alone today with Admiral Darlan and his confidential aide at the latter's request. In view of the importance of the Admiral's position as Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet and of his close association with the Marshal it is felt here his views merit reporting at length:

The Admiral opened the conversation by asking why we would not release some of the gold at Martinique for payment of French expenditures in South America including those for foodstuffs. We [He?] went on to express in detail his views on the situation and with respect to our policy. The Germans he said would probably win the war. He is completely convinced that the British can never win on the Continent though he does not anticipate their collapse. In any event the British Empire is finished. Canada and probably Australia and New Zealand will draw closer and closer to us; India will become independent as will South Africa and the former may well be the cause of a future war. This being the case the future of Europe will be governed by collaboration between the United States and France; for even if Germany wins the present war France will, given the strength and character of her people and German weaknesses, eventually be the dominating continental force—a view curiously enough shared by a number here. A German victory is really better for France, he said, in reply to a direct question than a British victory. In the latter case the British would certainly demand “much” of France—probably Madagascar and Dakar—and in the former case he believes Germany will take nothing but Alsace-Lorraine “which are lost anyway” and the Cameroons and British Nigeria. For the Germans, he said, realize that after all “they are not colonial administrators”. They will leave the rest of France's colonial possessions untouched. He has had too [much?] experience, he said, with the British and “their dishonesty” ever to trust them. His family during previous generations was five times—and never by the Germans—ruined by the British and he himself has had enough experience with the British to know them thoroughly. He talked at length and with some feeling of the “imbecility” of the British High Command, of General Alexander's “failure to protect the French rear at Dunkirk” in spite of British assurances, of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound's ignorance, of the “drunkard Churchill who had crawled to him on his knees during 10 months only to turn on him at Mers-el-Kebir”. The only way to deal with the British he said “is to hit them on the head” and if the Marshal had let him “bombard Gibraltar after [Mers-el-Kebir?] there would have been no Dakar”.

He himself would never again shake the hand of an English sailor. Laval had favored declaring war on the British after Mers-el-Kebir though he had opposed it, and in spite of his feelings it is quite possible that his Government's future policy might again, for reasons of state, be pro-British. For the present he asked only that "the Anglo-Saxon countries leave him alone". It is to our interest, he said, to have a strong independent French Colonial Empire because if there is any dissident movement in North Africa, it will be the Germans who will "arrive first" (he repeated this several times in the course of the conversation). He had given solemn assurances as had the Marshal that the French Fleet would never fall into German hands and he wished to repeat those assurances. In fact, he said he recalled the President's message to him at Bordeaux last June to which he would gladly have replied with these assurances had it not been for the "threats contained in the last paragraph". The same applied to naval bases in Africa. He added: "The Germans well know we are determined to defend both our fleet and our bases and they have accordingly made no request for them." (Contrast Peyrouton's statements—Embassy's telegram 1116, December 11, 4 p. m.⁴³). He had hoped the British would understand and he had talked frankly to Dupuy⁴⁴ (Embassy's telegram No. 1100, December 7, 2 p. m.⁴⁵) but they "had proved so stupid in the past" that he could not overemphasize that if the British made further efforts against French colonial possessions, they would be quickly repaid. The same applied to the blockade. "They are being all right for the moment in letting supplies come through from North African colonies to metropolitan France though they stop occasional ships. If they insist, however, on a complete blockade, we may attack Gibraltar and with Spanish and German help the Rock wouldn't hold out long." (He said that the Germans have three divisions massed on the Franco-Spanish frontier and that matériel is already on Spanish trains—the gauge of Spanish railways as the Department is aware is broader than French.) He hoped that we would understand the wisdom of supplying France's North African colonies with much-needed sugar and gasoline and avoid the necessity of seeking them from Germany. He had asked Dupuy to have a representative of the British blockade sent to Madrid for discussions but no action had yet been taken (telegram No. 1100, December 7, 2 p. m.).

⁴³ Not printed; in this telegram the Chargé reported a conversation with Marcel Peyrouton, French Minister of Interior. The comment regarding the French Fleet was as follows:

"He said, quite inadvertently I think, during the course of the conversation which followed, that the Germans had made it apparent recently that they desired the delivery of the French Fleet. I asked whether this had been put in the form of an official request and he hastened to say no, but that they had made their intention quite clear. He said the French Government was united in opposition to the suggestion." (740.0011 European War 1939/7082)

⁴⁴ Jean Dupuy, Canadian Chargé in Vichy.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

Returning to Martinique, he said that upon Admiral Leahy's⁴⁶ arrival (and he was delighted he is coming) he was going to ask him whether we would not agree to exchange the two cruisers now there for two others as the former are badly in need of dry docking. As to the airplanes on the *Bearn* about which we asked, he said that all experts had agreed they were now "nothing but scrap iron". In answer to a direct question, he indicated that the Germans and Italians had "refused" to allow the planes to be shipped back to the United States. He likewise said that they would not serve for use in Indochina for which colony he was hopeful we would sell France a few new planes. He was unable to understand why the British refused to permit the battalions of Senegalese to proceed from Djibouti to defend French Indochina.

He said he had nothing but admiration for the destroyer-naval base exchange⁴⁷ which he characterized as "the greatest piece of business the United States had ever done". He realized the great importance of those bases for our protection and said that "the age and quality of the destroyers, some of which he had seen at San Diego, proved to him the desperate position of the British in giving up those bases in exchange for such junk". He knew, he said, that we had always cast longing glances at Fort de France and probably in the future "under other circumstances" France would be willing to cede us a base there but now, of course, given the German attitude, any such step was impossible.

As to the Italians "they are about finished; the end of the war may well see France holding Piedmont, and Germany, Trieste". He does not believe the Germans wish to see the Italians forced out of Albania but doubts if they will lend much assistance beyond that point. As to Spanish claims on French Morocco, the Germans "are defending the French" against both the Spanish and against Italian claims elsewhere. The British "fool themselves" completely if they think their blockade is really bothering the Germans. The latter have "all the gasoline they want for instance as any trip to occupied France will show" and as German bombing raids against Great Britain have conclusively demonstrated. The British, he understands by the way, are running short of bombs.

He said that the *Richelieu* is in good condition to defend herself and that she will remain at Dakar. The *Jean Bart* will not be finished for some time. She lacks four of her big guns which cannot be mounted at Casablanca but he has no intention of moving her at present. He was proud of her trip from Saint Nazaire in June from which point she started at a speed of 4 knots and ended at 21 knots.

⁴⁶ Appointed United States Ambassador to France November 22, 1940.

⁴⁷ See vol. III, section under United Kingdom entitled "Negotiations for transfer of American destroyers . . ."

He was, of course, bitter about De Gaulle⁴⁸ and the whole movement but would say nothing specific about any future effort to recapture the Tchad. He remarked with a wink that De Gaulle, however, had not been without usefulness, and quoted the Marshal as saying that "if he had not existed, he would have had to be invented[?]. (Please compare statements made to Dupuy as to the importance of keeping up, at least externally, Franco-British unfriendliness—telegram 1100, December 7, 2 p. m.)

In conclusion, he stated that he had spoken frankly as a sailor and emphasized that the Marshal held views identical to his: "Tell your Government that neither the French Fleet nor French bases will fall into German hands; that we will defend our colonies against all comers including the British, and if necessary the United States. Help supply our African colonies as well as France herself for that is to your advantage. And remember that France and the United States must collaborate in the future Europe whether there is a German victory or drawn peace—for the British can't win on the Continent."

We endeavored to impress upon him that we consider the British are fighting our war; that our own security is involved; that we believe the British will win thanks to our assistance in matériel; and we reiterated our great and natural interest in the French Fleet and the French colonies. He remained unconvinced on the question of British victory and skeptical as to the threat to our security—particularly with our new naval bases—of a war-weary Germany regardless of the outcome. He was in excellent humor except for the very real bitterness of his references to British "untrustworthiness and treachery" and cordial throughout. He said that while his remarks were frank and "free from Foreign Office protocol and red tape" he hoped that we would make his views known to Washington in the interest of better mutual understanding.

MURPHY

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE FATE OF THE FRENCH POSSESSIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFTER THE INVASION OF FRANCE BY GERMANY

710.Consultation (2)/204b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Bordeaux (Waterman)

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1940—11 a. m.

171. Please communicate the following message immediately to Ambassador Biddle:⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French forces.

⁴⁹ Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Deputy Ambassador in France.

"The President desires you to inform the Prime Minister⁵⁰ at the earliest possible moment that in view of the decision of the French Cabinet to ask for the terms of an armistice from Germany, the President feels sure that the Prime Minister will bear in mind the traditional policy of the United States with regard to the Western Hemisphere which would make it impossible for the United States to recognize any transfer or to acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power.

Should conditions in the judgment of this Government make such a step necessary, the United States would be prepared in conjunction with the other American Republics to undertake to constitute an inter-American trusteeship for the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, this trusteeship to be of a temporary character and to continue only until such time as the complete autonomy and independence of France were fully restored."

Please telegraph the results of your conversation in this sense with the Prime Minister.

A statement of the position of the United States in this regard has been likewise officially communicated to the Governments of Germany and of Italy.

HULL

710. Consultation (2)/2a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)*⁵¹

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1940—11 a. m.

1652. You are instructed to communicate in writing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following communication in the name of this Government:

"The Government of the United States is informed that the Government of France has requested of the German Government the terms of an armistice.

The Government of the United States feels it desirable, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, to inform Your Excellency that in accordance with its traditional policy relating to the Western Hemisphere, the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power.

I avail myself, etc. etc."

Please telegraph immediately the reply made to this communication.

HULL

⁵⁰ Henri Philippe Pétain, appointed President of the French Council of Ministers on June 16, 1940.

⁵¹ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date to the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 210.

710. Consultation (2)/68 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, June 24, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received June 24—1:25 p. m.]

619. Your telegram number 210, June 17, 11 a. m.⁵² Reply dated June 22 received today merely states "I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note number 1521 of June 18. Accept, et cetera,".

PHILLIPS

710. Consultation (2)/67 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, June 24, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

2074. Department's 1652, June 16 [17], 11 a. m. Under Secretary of State Woermann telephonically inquired this afternoon whether notes with respect to European possessions in the Western Hemisphere similar to the one received from the Embassy had been sent to other governments. In reply I read to him the statement with regard thereto contained in radio bulletin No. 146, June 19, 1940.⁵³

HEATH

710. Consultation (2)/144 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Heath) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, July 2, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

2293. Department's No. 1652, June 17, 11 a. m., and my No. 2074, June 24, 6 p. m. There follows the translation of a note dated July 1 which was received this afternoon from the Foreign Office:

"Mr. Chargé d'Affaires.

"In your communication of June 18, No. 1176, you stated on behalf of your Government that it would not recognize any transfer of a geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power and would not acquiesce in an attempt at such a transfer. I have the honor to reply to you as follows.

"The Reich Government is unable to perceive for what reason the Government of the United States of America has addressed this communication to the Reich Government. In contrast with other coun-

⁵² See footnote 51, p. 494.

⁵³ Radio bulletin No. 146 carried the statement that the Government of France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands "had been informed in the same sense". No record of such a communication to the British and the Netherlands Governments has been found in Department files. The message may have been conveyed orally to the respective Embassies in Washington.

tries especially in contrast with England and France, Germany has no territorial possessions on the American Continent and has given no occasion whatever for the assumption that it intends to acquire such possessions. Thus as far as Germany is concerned the communication addressed to the Reich Government is without object (*gegenstandlos*).

"In this case it may also be remarked that the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine implicit in the communication of the Government of the United States would amount to conferring upon some European countries the right to possess territories in the Western Hemisphere and not to other European countries. It is obvious that such an interpretation would be untenable. But apart from this the Reich Government would like to point out again on this occasion that the nonintervention in the affairs of the American Continent by European nations which is demanded by the Monroe Doctrine can in principle be legally valid only on condition that the American nations for their part do not intervene (*einmischen*) in the affairs of the European Continent.

"I also avail myself of this opportunity to assure you Mr. Chargé d'Affaires of my most distinguished consideration. (Signed Ribbentrop)"⁵⁴

HEATH

710. Consultation (2)/381

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 17, 1940.

The French Ambassador called and made inquiry about the program of the forthcoming Habana Conference⁵⁵ next week as it might affect the French colonies in this hemisphere. I replied that the program would be general; that, of course, it contemplates no interference with governments in this hemisphere by any foreign government regardless of whether such interference relates to colonies owned by foreign or American governments prior to and since the Monroe Doctrine. The Ambassador desired to know whether we would personate [*designate?*] any French colonies at Habana in our defensive acts. I said that I knew of no such intention at present, but that he must understand that the Habana Conference would be opposed to any violation of the Monroe Doctrine and that this would include any methods of any foreign government to undermine or overreach or otherwise become a material factor in any of the American nations, or to undertake to dominate to a material extent the governments of the island possessions of foreign nations such as the French.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁵⁴ Secretary Hull did not answer Ribbentrop's note as he believed no useful purpose would be served by further exchange of views with him. But in reference to the note Secretary Hull did make a public statement on July 5, for text of which see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 6, 1940, p. 3.

⁵⁵ See vol. v, pp. 2 ff.

710.Consultation (2)/435 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 24, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received July 25—3:15 p. m.]

145. Your 58, July 12, 9 a. m.⁵⁶ was received on July 19, 7 p. m. I conveyed the President's message contained in the Department's 171 of June 17, 11 a. m., to Baudouin⁵⁷ on July 20. Ambassador Charles-Roux, Secretary General of the Foreign Office, today handed me in reply a note dated July 24 which in translation reads as follows:

"By letter dated July 20th you were kind enough to transmit the text of a communication addressed on June 17th last to His Excellency Mr. Biddle by the Secretary of State on the subject of the French colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

As you suppose in your letter the communication in question had not yet been delivered to the French Government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs nevertheless was aware of the *démarche* made on June 19th [18th?] in respect of the German and Italian Governments for the purpose of informing them of the wishes of the United States Government not to recognize any transfer of American territory by a non-American power to another non-American power.

In the second paragraph of its communication of June 17th the United States Government examines the eventuality of the constitution of an inter-American trusteeship for the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere should conditions make such a step necessary. In the present state of the affairs the French Government does not understand all such conditions in [apparent omission]. The political status of the French possessions in Guiana and the Antilles is not affected by the terms of the armistice;⁵⁸ the inhabitants of these colonies who are French citizens demonstrate their loyalty in many [ways?].

The French Government does not ignore the present considerations which the United States Government have in mind as well as their desire to maintain peace throughout the New World. As in the past it desires to adapt its own policy to the principles which happily have preserved pacific [relations?] on all sides until this day in these regions. It is in this spirit and on the basis of mutual respect of the sovereign rights of each state that it remains disposed to examine the different problems which may arise in the Western Hemisphere.

Accept Mr. Chargé d'Affaires the assurances of my highest consideration. Signed Paul Baudouin."

In handing me the foregoing note Charles-Roux said that his Government totally failed to comprehend the necessity for our communication. He said frankly that it seemed that ever since the debacle

⁵⁶ Not printed.

⁵⁷ Paul Baudouin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁸ For text of the Franco-German armistice agreement of June 22, 1940, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, document No. 523, p. 671.

leading to the armistice that the American Government, one of the oldest and most esteemed friends of his country which had not even expressed the faintest note of the disaster which had overtaken France, apparently was inclined rather to weaken his Government's position than to strengthen it. France is engaged, he said, in a terrible struggle to maintain its independence and its colonial possessions. Our present attitude in respect to the western possessions serves to weaken the French position in regard to all French possessions at a time when support from an old friend is most to be expected. He said that our lack of sympathy was manifest not only from the failure of our Government to express even its sympathy over France's misfortune but that the American people and the press also had neglected to manifest a spirit of friendship and understanding.

I told Monsieur Charles-Roux that he could rest assured of profound American sympathy for the people of France of which there could be no doubt even in the absence of formal protestations. I emphasized that communications have been totally inadequate and that it is difficult from here to estimate American sympathy laboring as it must be under the shock of events. Ambassador Bullitt would, I know, convey to the President a true picture of conditions. I was certain that many Americans did not understand France's failure to transfer its naval forces to its ally prior to the armistice negotiations. Charles-Roux restated the French position. I replied that a great many Americans, I was sure, did not doubt the French intentions in respect of the naval units. They permitted themselves possibly the luxury of doubting German intentions and French ability under the circumstances of sinking the ships as [*at*] a given time as they had planned.

Charles-Roux asked a number of questions regarding the volume of assistance the United States is at present supplying the British and whether the American Government intended to intervene. I replied that cut off as we are from sources of authentic information concerning developments in the United States I had no idea.

The Secretary General said that the proposition for the return of the French Government to Paris-Versailles has now been before the Reich Government for the past 11 days with no indication from the latter as to its intentions. He said that curiously enough the proposition originated with the Germans who evidently believed then that it would not be acceptable. When the French accepted the Germans grew reluctant. Charles-Roux said that it was true that the Reich had proposed a *quid pro quo* which included the use of French naval and air bases in North Africa but that the Germans had not requested the right to reoccupy Lyon and Clermont-Ferrand as rumored.

He added that the rumor that Daladier⁵⁹ and Mandel⁶⁰ were under arrest at Marseille is unfounded. The commission for the investigation of war guilt has not yet been established but it is under consideration by the Council of Ministers.

MURPHY

710. Consultation (2)/632

The French Ambassador (De Saint-Quentin) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

Pursuant to instructions from his Government, the Ambassador of France has the honor to make the following communication to His Excellency the Secretary of State:

Under the terms of the Act and of the Convention adopted on the 30th of July, last, by the Habana Conference, the Governments of the American Republics reserve to themselves the right to judge in certain eventualities whether the American possessions of European States shall be subjected to a system of provisional administration in the name of those Republics.⁶¹

The French Government, the national patrimony of which includes a certain number of territories forming part of the American Continent, deems it necessary to define in an official manner its position regarding the resolutions voted at Habana. It does so in full consciousness of the traditional friendship which binds France to the American Republics.

The French territories in America have constituted, since the seventeenth century, an integral part of France, which has constantly shown them even in the dark moments of her history an attentive solicitude. She has been recompensed therefor by the affection and the devotion of the inhabitants who have long possessed the quality of French citizens.

The clauses of the armistice conventions do not at all affect the political situation of those territories and there is no reason to believe that the treaties of peace will modify those statutes. The French Government does not disregard either the present preoccupations of the American Governments nor their anxiety to safeguard the pacific development of the new continent. As in the past, it is disposed to collaborate with them with a view to the maintenance of peace and security in those regions but that collaboration must have as its basis mutual respect for the sovereign rights of each State.

⁵⁹ Edouard Daladier, ex-Premier of France.

⁶⁰ Georges Mandel, French ex-Minister of the Interior.

⁶¹ See Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 199, or 54 Stat. 2491.

The conviction of the French Government is that in the state of instability in which the whole world finds itself it is to the common interest to respect in America the established order. Any attempt, even one presented as a provisional measure, to modify that order against the will of one of the interested parties might occasion not only in the territories in question but also at other points in the world reactions the course of which would be capable of adding new and serious possibilities of disturbance to the present difficulties.

The French Government has particularly in view the repercussions which any modification of the established order in America might have on the Far East where the maintenance of the *status quo* appears to be to the interest of the United States as well as to that of France.

Mr. de Saint-Quentin is happy to avail himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable Sumner Welles the assurances of his highest consideration.

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1940.

710. Consultation (2)/632

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (De Saint-Quentin)

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the communication which His Excellency the Ambassador of France, pursuant to instructions from his Government, delivered on August 14, 1940 with reference to the Convention signed on July 30th last by the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American republics at Habana and in accordance with which the American republics reserve to themselves the right to judge in certain eventualities whether the American possessions of European States shall be subjected to a system of provisional administration in the name of those republics.

The Secretary of State has read with interest and is in full agreement with the statement of the Ambassador of France with regard to the relationship which has prevailed for several centuries between France and certain of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. The Ambassador of France will recall that this relationship has consistently enjoyed the cordial acquiescence of the United States and of the other American republics.

The Secretary of State desires to assure the Ambassador of France that basic among the tenets of the foreign policy of the United States and of the other American republics are respect for the established order and determination that its change should be sought only by peaceful means in accordance with international law. These principles have not only been stressed, but have repeatedly been given prac-

tical application by the American republics, especially during the past few years. Yet, in the state of instability in which, as the Ambassador of France justly observes, the whole world finds itself, account must unhappily be taken of attempts to vary the established order by means other than those recognized by the American republics. These attempts have been too frequent to justify the American republics in failing to take precautionary measures and to announce their position to the world. The Act and Convention of Habana are precautionary measures of this nature.

The measures adopted by the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American republics held at Habana last month were designed to protect the peace and insure the security of the American republics and, in the case of the Act of Habana and the Convention related thereto, of the American possessions of European States in this Hemisphere. The Act of Habana recognizes that the course of military events in Europe and the changes resulting therefrom may create grave danger that European territorial possessions in America may be converted into strategic centers of aggression against nations of this continent. It further declares that when such possessions are in danger of becoming "the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty, the American nations, taking into account the imperative need of continental security and the desires of the inhabitants of the said islands or regions, may set up a régime of provisional administration" under certain stated conditions. It also declares that as soon as the reasons requiring the taking of such a measure shall cease to exist, and in the event that it would not be prejudicial to the safety of the American republics, such territories shall be organized as autonomous states or be restored to their previous status, "whichever of these alternatives shall appear the more practicable and just." The Convention contains similar provisions.

The Secretary of State wishes to assure the Ambassador of France and requests him to inform the French Government that the Government of the United States will not take the initiative in the adoption of measures designed to alter the established order in the Western Hemisphere particularly as that order affects the European colonies and possessions in the Americas but that, in common with the other American republics, the Government of the United States reserves the right to judge when the acts or the consequences of the acts of others are such as to endanger that established order and to justify the adoption, on behalf of the peace and security of the sovereign republics of the Western Hemisphere, of those measures which the American republics believe to be applicable in that event.

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1940.

851D.01/3 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 4, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 5:40 p. m.]

3001. General de Gaulle left London secretly a day or two ago for a destination outside the British Isles. Admiral Muselier, who has been in charge of the French naval and air forces here, is at the head of the "Free French" organization in De Gaulle's absence.

The Admiral today requested a member of my staff to call upon him urgently and stated that he wished to advise our Government "officially" as to what was happening or contemplated in French Guiana. He read a telegram stated to have been received from his agent at Cayenne through British Guiana dated August 22. The gist of it was that the Governor and the very small military force in French Guiana were wavering, that most of the civil servants favored the Vichy government but that the population, presumably the white population, was adverse to the Vichy government and prepared to announce adhesion to "Free France". The telegram stated that the dispatch to Cayenne of one Free French vessel would clinch the matter.

Admiral Muselier emphasized repeatedly that he and General de Gaulle wished to do nothing which might displease us and that they wished to avoid the possibility of naval action between Frenchmen anywhere, particularly in our neutrality zone. They had, therefore, decided not to send a vessel. He was most anxious to ascertain, however, whether the terms of the agreement reached with Admiral Robert at Martinique⁶² precluded the possibility of any "Vichy" ships there going to French Guiana. I would appreciate any information on this point which I might properly give him.

He stated that he had just received information that two emissaries of the Vichy government, Revoil, former Governor of Algeria, and Carde, apparently a former Governor of French West Africa, had left Lisbon a week or 10 days ago by clipper en route to French Guiana. He said that he was therefore forced to act before they arrived.

He read a telegram which he said that he was sending immediately to his agent in Cayenne instructing him to act at once if possible in agreement with the Governor but in any event to seize control of the colony to arrest Revoil and Carde upon their arrival and to intern immediately all German and Italian men of military age.

He stated that he believed internal action in a French colony as distinct from naval action in the neutrality zone would not be objectionable to us. He stated that the instructions he was about to send merely

⁶² See despatch No. 6, August 7, from the Vice Consul at Martinique, p. 513.

put the finishing touch on a long prepared plan and that it would be necessary for him to send them in any event. He nevertheless wished us to be fully informed in advance and hoped that we would have no objection. He was advised that I naturally could not express either approval or disapproval of such action but that you would be immediately advised.

He also wished us to know that Indochina was prepared to join "Free France" but that he and De Gaulle were withholding action until they were reasonably confident that the colony could be held against the Japanese. He believed that the Japanese could not spare more than 50,000 men for an attack and that the forces now in the colony were sufficient to hold it if they could be adequately supplied. He said that the Chinese Government had offered 500,000 men should the Japanese attack Indochina but that De Gaulle had declined the offer as he did not wish a Chinese army to enter the colony. The main difficulty was aviation gasoline and he was endeavoring to persuade the British to permit its transport from Burma.

KENNEDY

851D.01/3 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1940—8 p. m.

2628. Your 3001, September 4, 4 p. m. You may discreetly inform Admiral Muselier that while the terms of the informal agreement between the representative of this Government and Admiral Robert would permit the movement of the French vessels now in Martinique and Guadeloupe to French Guiana in case of necessity for the purpose of local administration or defense, it is provided that notification in advance of such movement shall be given through the French Embassy in Washington, as well as to the United States naval observer in Martinique.

Any overt insurrectionary movement in French Guiana which might threaten the above working arrangement or lead to naval or air action in the neutrality zone would in the opinion of this Government be unfortunate.

With regard to the arrest of Revoil and Carde upon their arrival, this appears to be a matter relating purely to the internal administration of the colony. On the other hand, any move to intern all German and Italian men of military age might, in our opinion, give rise to repercussions which would definitely and adversely affect the present balance in the Caribbean area.

HULL

851D.01/4 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 8, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received September 8—12: 15 p. m.]

3039. The substance of your 2628, September 5, 8 p. m., has been communicated orally to Admiral Muselier who appreciates the information given. He had withheld his telegram pending receipt of your views and says that he will not send it and will hold his hand until he believes that Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana can be "converted" simultaneously. He reiterated his desire to do nothing to which we would object.

KENNEDY

811.34551B/1 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, October 27, 1940—8 a. m.
[Received 8: 30 p. m.]

The following is transmitted in translation at the personal request of General de Gaulle.

"American broadcasts have announced that all American Republics signatories to the Treaty of Havana, have put confidence in the United States to take necessary measures with respect to the French colonies in America should the Vichy government strengthen its ties with the Axis.

In the name of all Frenchmen who, rejecting the armistice, faithful to alliances of France and representing the true soul of captive France, have decided to continue the struggle against Germany and Italy, General de Gaulle wishes to submit to the President of the United States and to the Department of State the following comments:

First, the Antilles and French Guiana as well as the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are among the oldest French colonies. The occupation of these colonies by the forces of a friendly power such as the United States, if that occupation were decided upon unilaterally, would cause profound grief to all Frenchmen and would hurt all the more in that it would happen in an hour of distress and humiliation for France.

Second, De Gaulle understands all the motives which make it indispensable to the United States and to the peoples of the American hemisphere to be assured that the French colonies in America shall not be utilized by the Axis Powers.

Third, De Gaulle has available naval, military and air forces exclusively French sufficient, in cooperation with the American Fleet, to assume the protection of the French colonies in America.

Fourth, De Gaulle will announce on [in?] October [or] November the formation of a council of defense of the French Empire of which

the principal members will be General de Gaulle; General Catroux, former Governor of Indochina; the Reverend Father D'Argenlieu, Provincial de France de L'Ordre des Carmes; Professor Cassin, President of the Federal Union of the Mutilated of the War of 1914; Eboue, Governor of the Chad; General de Larminat, Governor General of French Equatorial Africa; General Leclerc de Haute Clocque, Governor of French Cameroon; Vice Admiral Muselier, Commander of the Free French naval forces; Governor Sautot, High Commissioner of the French colonies of the Pacific; Medical General Sice.

Fifth, the *raison d'être* of the Council of Defense of the French Empire is the fact that the Vichy government is neither constitutional nor free. This Council will therefore exercise in the French territories which refuse to submit to the armistice all the powers that belonged to the last Free French government, which powers its members already hold in fact.

The Council already has a territorial nucleus consisting of French Equatorial Africa, Cameroon, and the French colonies of the Pacific excluding Indochina. It has troops and substantial supplies.

In the name of France the Council of Defense of the French Empire proposes to the President of the United States that in case the policy adopted by the Vichy government should make it necessary that the American hemisphere be guaranteed against any possibility of the securing of a foothold by the Axis Powers in the French colonies in America, the responsibility for the administration of those colonies shall be assumed by the Council. Furthermore, Free French forces are able to contribute to the defense of these same colonies.

Sixth, on this basis the Council of Defense of the French Empire is prepared to negotiate an agreement with the Government of the United States granting to the United States the use of air and naval bases in the French colonies in America, which agreement could be instilled with the same spirit as those agreements which have been recently concluded for the same purpose by Great Britain for certain of its possessions situated in the United States hemisphere."

MALLON

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE DISPOSITION OF FRENCH WAR VESSELS AND AIRPLANES IN MARTINIQUE AFTER THE CAPITULATION OF FRANCE TO GERMANY

851B.01/4

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1940.

The British Ambassador ⁶³ called at his request. I brought up the Martinique situation by saying that this Government was concerned about possible developments of an undesirable nature there; that it had been reported to me that two British cruisers were blockading the principal harbor of Martinique, where a French plane carrier with many planes sold by this country to France and Great Britain jointly

⁶³ The Marquess of Lothian.

was anchored and also one or two French cruisers; that it also had been reported that a French merchant vessel was prevented from entering the harbor by British vessels; that the theory of our Navy was that the British may seize these French vessels and also occupy the islands with military forces, and that this would involve real trouble between this Government and Great Britain. The Ambassador promptly disclaimed any idea whatever of this kind and added that he did not consider that British ships were blockading the port but were merely observing the situation. I stated that I desired to make a suggestion for my Government to the effect that an agreement between the British and others concerned be worked out so that the French vessels and their cargo might peacefully sail to and into an American port and be interned by the United States Government, and the airplanes on the plane carrier be turned over to Great Britain, or to the American manufacturer, who could turn them over to Great Britain. The Ambassador said that he would present this proposal to his Government at once. He stated that he thought it might be accepted, although he said his Government was very much in need of the plane carrier.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851B.01/6

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1940.

The French Ambassador⁶⁴ called to see me today at his request. The Ambassador told me that subsequent to our last conversation, he had at once transmitted to his Government by telegram the personal and unofficial suggestions I laid before him, namely, that in order to avoid the possibility of hostilities in the Caribbean, which would be a matter of grave concern to this country, the French warships now in or near Martinique might proceed to ports in the United States where they would be interned for the duration of the war, with the understanding that the British Government would agree to refrain from attacking or impeding the movements of these vessels on the way to the United States and would likewise agree not to interfere in any way with the government of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and with the further understanding that the airplanes on the French airplane carrier *Bearn*, which had been previously owned by the United States Government, would be returned to the private manufacturers from whom they had been obtained in order that they might then be released to the British authorities.

⁶⁴ Count de Saint-Quentin.

The Ambassador said that there was now an interminable delay in receiving any reply from his own Government to his messages and that he had not yet received a reply from his Government in this question. The Ambassador said, however, that he himself had been thinking the matter over and discussing it with his Military and Naval Attachés and that he had now reached the conclusion—which was counter to the impression he had given me in our last conversation—that such a step on the part of the French navy would not be consistent with “French honor”. I stated that I could not see that the question of French honor was involved since the internment of warships in neutral ports was a practice well established and recognized by international law over a period of many generations and that it would certainly seem to me to be more in the interest of France to have preserved intact this portion of her navy until the conclusion of the war rather than to have it badly damaged or possibly destroyed by British warships. The Ambassador however insisted that the steps should not be taken since all that France now had left was her “honor intact”. I refrained from making the obvious reply to this statement.

The Ambassador then said that he had thought up another solution, however, and that was for the French Government to request the United States to send a commission of American naval officers to Martinique to take charge of the French warships in that port, with full authority to control the vessels in order that this might serve as a guarantee to the British that the French vessels would not fall into German hands until at least after the conclusion of the war. The Ambassador said that on his own initiative and without mentioning this to me, he had already telegraphed this suggestion to his Government. I stated that I would await such further word in this matter as he might have to offer.

Subsequently, in a telephone conversation with the President, I mentioned the new suggestion made by the French Ambassador and the President stated that he would be satisfied with either one of the two suggestions formulated.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851B.01/8

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1940.

I inquired somewhat pointedly of the Ambassador⁶⁵ what the French Government proposed to do about the Martinique ship situation. He spoke rather indistinctly for a time and said very little, if

⁶⁵ The French Ambassador.

anything. I then inquired very pointedly what the French Government proposed to do, if anything, about the ships now in the harbor at Martinique. He said that the French Government would like to get permission from the German Government for these ships at Martinique to be exempted from the requirements of the armistice agreement⁶⁶ so that they might be used for merchandising and other services for the benefit of French colonies and the French Government. I inquired why they had not made this request before now, and he replied that they first desired to know whether it would be agreeable with this Government. I stated that, of course, this Government would be obliged to have a commission in charge of these ships before it could give sufficient assurance to the British and to our own Government that these ships would not depart at some time and possibly fall into the hands of Germany. I then added that the French Government appeared now to decline the proposal which the Ambassador made some days ago to the effect that we might send a commission to keep the ships in charge, or under observation, with the result that the French Government proposed nothing except for us to have a consul in Martinique. I said we were getting very impatient and disappointed at the course of the French Government in this regard; that we have worked for some weeks in an effort to bring about an amicable adjustment of this matter for the benefit of all concerned, but that the French appeared to be as far away from doing anything now as at the beginning. I said, furthermore, that it seemed that the French, having insisted on taking their own course, the British and this country would presumably take their own respective courses. The Ambassador seemed disappointed that something could not be done about it. I made rather sharp complaint against his Government about its course in the matter and related it back to the bitterly disappointing course of his Government with regard to the disposition of the French Navy under the armistice terms, after pledging me and others that in no circumstances would the French fleet be permitted to fall into the hands of Germany.⁶⁷ I stated that there was confusion about this situation, just as there seemed to be increasing confusion about all other phases of the situation in Europe, including the question of the needs of the suffering people and the possibility of any practicable plans for ministering to them. The Ambassador at first professed to think I was referring only to France and its Government, possibly because I had been criticising the Government in connection with the naval situation at Martinique, as well as abroad.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁶⁶ For text of the Franco-German armistice agreement of June 22, 1940, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. IX, document No. 523, p. 671.

⁶⁷ See pp. 452 ff.

851B.01/10

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He desired first to know what had taken place between the French and this Government in regard to an adjustment of the ship situation in the harbor of Martinique. I repeated to him in disgust and disappointment my conversation with the French Ambassador on this subject on July 16. He said nothing except to express the view that in pursuing this course of nonaction the French Government was probably taking orders from the German Government in relation to the ship situation at Martinique. I replied that that might be true and that we were giving attention to that phase and to all similar phases along the Atlantic Coast.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851B.01/10½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me at his request. The Ambassador referred to his recent conversation with the Secretary of State during which, he said, the Secretary of State had advanced certain arguments with regard to French policy and the situation of the present French Government which he, the Ambassador, had found very distasteful. He said that whatever the Secretary of State might feel with regard to the situation of France, the fact remained that the Pétain⁶⁸ government was the legitimate government of France; that it was confronted with an appalling situation and that it was doing the best it could under existing conditions. The Ambassador said he had had a rather difficult conversation with the Secretary of State whom he characterized as having been in a very nervous condition. I said that the Secretary of State obviously reflected as usual, with complete precision, the point of view of this Government, which was one of very real disquiet with regard to the situation in Martinique.

The Ambassador said that he had now received instructions from his Government in the matter and he was authorized to make the following proposal:

1. The French Government would request the German Government to release it from the terms of the armistice so as to permit the French Government to give an official guarantee to the United States that the French war vessels now in Martinique would not leave French territorial waters.

⁶⁸ Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

2. If, in the event that at any time the French authorities considered it necessary for one of these war vessels to leave the territorial waters of Martinique in order, for example, to preserve order in Guadeloupe, the French Embassy in Washington would notify the United States Government in advance of any such movement.

3. An American naval officer would be stationed in Martinique attached to the American Consulate and this officer would be given full "facilities" by Admiral Robert, the French naval commander, to assure himself at all times that the terms of this understanding would be complied with.

The Ambassador asked me what my reaction to this proposal was. I said that I naturally would wish to discuss it with the President and with the Navy Department, but at first glance it seemed to me totally unsatisfactory. I said in the first place it was all contingent upon the agreement of the German Government and what assurance was there that such agreement would be given. I further stated that the connotation that the German Government could decide what should or should not be done on one of the islands of the West Indies was exceedingly distasteful to me as a proposition. In the second place, the American naval officer who it was suggested should be sent to Martinique under the terms of the proposal would have absolutely no authority and would apparently have no further function than that of a watchman. I reminded the Ambassador that in his own proposal the commission of American naval officers who he had suggested would go to Martinique would have been given entire jurisdiction over the French naval vessels. In the third place, I said, no reference whatever was made to the airplanes and I reminded the Ambassador that this in my judgment was one of the most important features of the entire question.

The Ambassador argued about the matter for some time, but I merely limited myself to stating that I would hope to speak with the Ambassador again early next week and give him the views of this Government with regard to his proposal.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851B.01/12½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request. I told the Ambassador that I had discussed the Martinique problem fully with the President and that the President had authorized me to say to the Ambassador that a friendly agreement between the French Government and the United States comprised of the following points would be satisfactory to this Government.

1. The French Government will request the German Government to modify the armistice terms so that the French warships now at Martinique and Guadeloupe need not return to continental France.

2. The French Government will officially assure the Government of the United States that the French warships at the two French islands will not leave the ports where they are now at anchor.

3. In the event that the French commander-in-chief should at any time consider it imperative for reasons of internal order that the ships in question undertake any movements, the Government of the United States will first be informed through the French Embassy in Washington.

4. A high ranking naval officer of the United States will be attached to the American Consulate in Martinique for the purpose of supervising the carrying out of this agreement and will be accorded every facility by the French commander-in-chief to fulfill his mission. The officer in question will be accorded full diplomatic privileges involving particularly complete freedom of radio communication with his government in Washington. He will be accorded every opportunity to inspect the French vessels in question.

5. The French Government will immediately return to the factories from which they came, all of the airplanes of American origin on the French airplane carrier in Martinique with the exception of the five airplanes purchased by the Belgian Government. When the airplanes are returned to the private manufacturers in the United States, payments will be made therefor to the French Government in liquid funds with the understanding, however, that the sum so obtained by the French Government will be utilized solely for expenditures within the United States.

The French Ambassador stated that all of the points above enumerated were satisfactory to him with the exception of point 5 and that while in principle he was entirely in accord that point 5 should be complied with, he feared that his Government would state that it was counter to the provision in the armistice signed with Germany which provided that the French Government would agree not to sell or transfer outside of French territory any armaments of any kind or description.

I stated to the Ambassador that however this might be, I must firmly insist that this point was essential and that my Government attributed the greatest importance to it.

The Ambassador said he would immediately communicate this proposal to his Government by telegram and would advise me as soon as a reply was received.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851B.01/17

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me this morning.

The Ambassador brought up the subject of our discussions with regard to Martinique. The Ambassador hesitated a good deal before he started the conversation and I interjected to say that I had been informed by the Navy Department that a conversation was held yesterday between the French Naval Attaché and officers of the Navy Department with regard to the Martinique question. I said that to my regret it appeared that the conversation had been exceedingly unsatisfactory.

The Ambassador then said in great confidence that his Naval Attaché, Captain Benech, in whose personal loyalty and devotion he had the utmost confidence, had been very ill treated by the French Naval Ministry which had sent to him a series of highly insulting telegrams. The Ambassador said he believed they were taking pot shots at him, the Ambassador, in the person of his Naval Attaché. The Ambassador said that the feeling of the French Naval Ministry about this question seemed to be intense. I replied that while the feeling here was perhaps not intense, it was nevertheless very strong in the belief that a satisfactory settlement must be found in order to avoid the possibility of serious complications arising.

The Ambassador then stated flatly that his Government could not agree, under the armistice terms, to the sending back to the United States of any of the planes bought from the United States. I reiterated to the Ambassador the insistence of this Government that these steps should be taken, and I reminded him that at a great sacrifice the Navy Department had made a number of the planes in question available, and that, at a time when our own national defense requirements were uppermost, it seemed incomprehensible that the French Ministry of Marine would refuse to find the proper way in which these planes could now be sent back to the United States inasmuch as the French Government itself no longer required them. The Ambassador said he quite agreed as to the principle involved, but he did not see how, under the terms of the armistice, this could be done.

I then stated that with regard to the four other points which we had previously discussed, it seemed to me that many of these involved questions of a technical character and that I believed it would be desirable without further ado for the American naval officer, whom the French Government had agreed should go to Martinique, to proceed there to enter into immediate discussions with Admiral Robert as to the best solution of the problems presented and then to formulate his recommendations to this Government through the Navy Department

in Washington. The Ambassador said he fully agreed with this recommendation, and I said I would advise him as soon as plans had been completed for our own naval officer to proceed to Martinique.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851B.01/10a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Martinique (Blocker)

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1940—5 p. m.

Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, United States Navy, has been designated to undertake for this Government certain highly confidential negotiations with Vice Admiral Robert and other French naval authorities in Martinique. He will carry instructions from the Navy Department in this regard which have been approved by this Department, and will maintain close liaison with you.

Arrangements have been made with the French Naval Attaché in Washington, Captain Benech, for Rear Admiral Greenslade, who will arrive in San Juan, Puerto Rico, by Pan Air plane Sunday, August 4, to proceed from San Juan to Fort de France by naval patrol plane. The Admiral will carry with him only civilian clothes.

You are requested to inform the French authorities in confidence of the Admiral's arrival and to confirm the above arrangements. Please extend to Admiral Greenslade any assistance which he may require as respects office space, clerical assistance, et cetera.

HULL

851B.01/16

The Vice Consul at Martinique (Blocker) to the Secretary of State

No. 6

FORT-DE-FRANCE, August 7, 1940.

[Received August 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that it has been my pleasure to accompany Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade, United States Navy, when calling upon Admiral Robert, High Commissioner for the French West Indies, and to be present at the conversations held under dates of August 5, 6, and 7, 1940, in connection with the military and naval situation in the French West Indies.

Rear Admiral Greenslade, accompanied by myself, first called upon Admiral Robert on August 5, 1940, and, as a preliminary step before going into the matter in all its details, Admiral Greenslade obtained from Admiral Robert an assurance that the American built planes brought to Martinique aboard the Carrier *Bearn*, and which had since been landed ashore at Fort-de-France, would not be transported, and that the warships would not be moved other than essential for

administration in local waters; it was also agreed that the senior representative of the United States in the French West Indies would be given notice forty-eight hours in advance of any proposed movement on the part of the larger units—*Bearn*, *Emile Bertin*, *Jeanne d'Arc*, the latter unit being at Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe.

These assurances were given in respect to the maintenance of neutrality and the neutrality limitation established by the Pan American Republics on the part of the United States.

The discussion held on the morning of August 6, 1940, dwelt chiefly with the disposition of the planes at Martinique. Admiral Greenslade presented to Admiral Robert the viewpoint of the American Government as regards the situation at Martinique, and of the desire of the United States that the neutrality limitation recently established by the Pan American Republics⁶⁹ be respected. To this end he requested:

(1) That the High Commissioner request the French Government to obtain from the German Government such release from the terms of the Armistice as to enable the High Commissioner to guarantee to the United States that the French ships now in the West Indies will not return to Continental France or to French West African Ports, but to remain in the vicinity of the French West Indies, within the limits of restricted areas to be determined in mutual agreement.

(2) That the ships remain in their present positions, unless the High Commissioner should find it necessary to move them in the interest of local administration or emergency, in which case the United States Government be notified through the French Embassy in Washington prior to such movement.

(3) That a United States Naval Officer be received in Martinique and be given every facility for inspection and observation, to insure that any guarantee given to the United States by the French Government, in a mutual effort to maintain the aforesaid neutrality and respect its limitations, is being carried out.

(4) That the American built planes brought to Martinique on the Carrier *Bearn*, be returned to the private manufacturers in the United States, the French Government to be reimbursed in the amount of the full purchase price.

At this same interview Admiral Greenslade presented to the High Commissioner a memorandum, reiterating the understanding and agreement arrived at on August 5, 1940, and submitting proposals relative to a further clarification of the situation, a copy of which memorandum is attached.⁷⁰

In the discussions had on August 6, 1940, the High Commissioner made it clear that he was honor bound by the terms of the French-German Armistice and that it was his intention to strictly adhere to

⁶⁹ See vol. v, section entitled "The Inter-American Neutrality Committee."

⁷⁰ Not printed.

the terms thereof. He said that no foreign Power should have the slightest pretext to fear that the airplanes and naval forces at Martinique would ever fall into German hands or be sent to Continental France, inasmuch as the terms of the Armistice strictly forbids any such movement. He stated further that orders had been given to all French Commanders to scuttle their ships rather than to let them fall into the hands of the Germans, and that this order was still effective. As a further proof of his intentions, he stated that he had ordered that all of the planes which were aboard the *Bearn*, be taken ashore, where they are exposed to the elements, and, so he says, will soon deteriorate and become useless through neglect.

After having lunch with the High Commissioner, Admiral Robert invited Admiral Greenslade and me to inspect the American built planes landed from the *Bearn*.

We found the planes in the condition as represented, that is, ashore, exposed to the elements and uncared for. There were some 112 planes in all, about 44 of which were Curtiss dive bombers.

Later in the day Admiral Robert presented Admiral Greenslade with a written memorandum in reply to Admiral Greenslade's memorandum above noted, copy of which is also attached.⁷¹

From this memorandum it will be noted that Admiral Robert simply confirmed what he had said on the morning of August 6, 1940, that is:

(1) That in compliance with the armistice terms, the planes and naval units at Martinique would not be allowed to leave the proximity of the French West Indies, with the exception of the movement of such vessels as necessary for local administration, in which case the United States would be given advance notice through the French Embassy at Washington.

(2) That under the terms of the armistice a Colonial Force is to be created, the exact composition of which has not yet been determined; that the United States will be notified just as soon as it is known what ships will be designated for the Force; that the ships will in no case return to Continental France, but may be ordered by reasons of administration, or maintenance, to leave for French Colonies, in which case advance notice of departure of the ships will be given to the United States.

(3) That the High Commissioner is agreeable to the designation of a United States Naval Officer at Martinique, to whom will be given every facility for the fulfilment of his mission.

(4) That the terms of the armistice strictly forbid the sending of the French planes to any foreign country; that the land planes taken ashore at Fort-de-France have been rendered useless by the fact that there is no landing field on the island; that the planes cannot be used on the Carrier *Bearn*; and that due to the lack of proper shelter and maintenance, the planes will soon deteriorate and thereby be rendered absolutely useless.

⁷¹ Not printed.

Admiral Robert gave his solemn pledge to act in full conformity with the conditions of neutrality, and to carefully avoid any action which could be used as a pretext for another Power to break that neutrality.

A farewell call was made to Admiral Robert on the morning of August 7, 1940, after which Admiral Greenslade departed for San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Conclusion.

It is felt that the result of the conversations between Rear Admiral Greenslade and the High Commissioner were productive of a clear and mutual understanding on the part of the two representatives, and that Admiral Robert will continue to fulfil the desires of the United States with reference to the neutrality limitation as established by the Pan American Republics.

Respectfully yours,

V. HARWOOD BLOCKER

851B.01/21

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1940.

As suggested, Mr. Hackworth,⁷² Mr. Atherton,⁷³ and I met this morning with a view to determining possible policy in regard to the Island of Martinique.

We already have at hand the reports from Kennedy⁷⁴ in London.

We agreed that Martinique might be treated in a manner somewhat similar to Greenland.⁷⁵ It is, of course, a French colony and we fully recognized that. On the other hand, the French Government is not in full exercise of its sovereignty; we have Pétain's own word for it that it acts under compulsion. The Island of Martinique is cut off from effective communication with its home government through the operation of the British blockade. It is likewise within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine, and of the Act of Havana.⁷⁶ We could, accordingly, proceed on the theory that our consul there could deal with the Governor of Martinique directly rather than through the Vichy Government, exactly as we had dealt with the Governors of Greenland direct, rather than through Copenhagen.

⁷² Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

⁷³ Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

⁷⁴ Joseph P. Kennedy, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁷⁵ See pp. 352 ff.

⁷⁶ July 30, 1940; see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 199, or 54 Stat. 2491.

Once this relationship had been established, it would seem logical then to open negotiations for the repurchase of the four hundred odd airplanes which are now in Martinique.

The method of operation should be the following :

(1) Our consul in Martinique ought to be directed to make an immediate report as to political conditions there. Instructions have already been drafted.

(2) He should then be instructed to call on the Governor of Martinique, and to establish a relationship of direct dealing, explaining the situation, and pointing out that the Governor now has, in some degree, sovereign functions so long as he is cut off from his home government.

(3) As soon as this is done we shall then be in shape to open negotiations for the re-acquisition of the planes.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

851B.00/19

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1940.

With regard to Martinique, the Ambassador⁷⁷ sought to assure us that they would preserve order in the French islands. I raised the question of the ninety airplanes out in the weather deteriorating on the island of Martinique which the French Government purchased from American manufacturers, and stated very earnestly to the Ambassador that, according to every rule of fair play and reasonableness, the French Government should turn these planes back to the American manufacturers and perhaps get the benefit of the forty or fifty million dollars that had been paid out for them. I said that this Government had gone far out of its way and denied its own needs almost to an extreme extent in order to enable the French Government to make this purchase and to aid it in its emergency war situation. Therefore, I must very emphatically request that the French Government take this step.

The Ambassador, in a somewhat apologetic tone, stated that he would take the matter up further with his Government and that he earnestly hoped something could be done. He then proceeded at length to elaborate on the binding nature of the armistice agreement with the German Government, which he said might interfere with the return of these planes. I remarked that it would be a strange thing if the French Government has gone that far in its armistice agreement, especially in the light of the relief needs of France. I stated that here there was at least forty or fifty million dollars worth of

⁷⁷ Gaston Henry-Haye called at the Department on September 11 to present his credentials as the new French Ambassador to the United States.

French property going to waste and never a more urgent need for money with which to buy foodstuffs and other needed commodities, while somebody suggests that to placate Germany or to give the narrowest construction to the armistice agreement, this vast amount of money should be thrown into the ash hopper or sinkhole. The Ambassador repeated that he would take this matter up in earnest. I stated that it was due him that he should know in this connection and in several similar connections where the question of the real attitude of his present Government towards Germany and towards Great Britain might come up, directly or inferentially, that his Government is anti-British primarily, and, in some respects going beyond all the requirements of the spirit or the letter of the armistice agreement, pro-German. I said I merely called this to his attention for the reason that as we go along this Government and the American people, responding to the ancient friendship that has always existed and to this day fully exists between the Governments and the peoples of the two countries, will be extremely desirous to do anything and everything at all practicable and reasonable for the French people in their terrible misfortune. Then I added that the American people, however, look on Mr. Hitler as the most devastating and all-pervading conqueror and destroyer within a thousand years and that there is no geographical limit whatever to his infamous plans and purposes; that, therefore, the people of this country do not propose to say or do one single thing knowingly that would aid or encourage him and his ruthless forces of destruction to the slightest extent. I said this feeling on the part of the American people began when they discovered that the French Government had signed away to Germany the entire French Navy, and after this country had aroused the hostility of Hitler by its every possible aid to France in her war emergency, it was impossible for the American people to understand why the French Government would hand to Mr. Hitler a loaded gun with which to shoot at their best friends; that I had emphasized this phase to the French Government for sometime before and until the last split second before they signed away their Navy to Germany; that, of course, we in this country could not possibly have been more deeply disappointed in the action of his Government.

The Ambassador made labored efforts to point out that the French fleet was sent to the African harbors where Germany could not reach it, and that all plans were made so that, in the event of any German attempt to get possession of it, it could either flee or scuttle itself, and that in no circumstances could Germany ever get it. To this I replied that no matter how good may have been the intentions of the French Government the theory that Germany could never get the French fleet was wholly fallacious. I then emphasized the point that the German

power to prevail on the French to sign away their fleet for the period of the armistice would even to a more clinching extent enable Germany to require, and, if necessary, compel the French Government to turn over the French fleet, lock, stock and barrel, to Germany in the final peace agreement that Germany will write for her and France. I said that the fleet could not be more securely in Germany's hands than it is now, and I should repeat the great disappointment that we feel in that respect; that, of course, when Germany comes to write the peace terms for France, probably its paramount purpose will be to secure possession and use of the fleet, and, of course, the French Government will feel far more obliged to sign on the dotted line and thus transfer the fleet, than when it signed the armistice and, regardless of the question of intention or desire, made certain its later transfer to Germany. The Ambassador never did attempt seriously to controvert or answer this statement.

At all stages I made clear to him the continued existence of the ancient friendship between our Governments and our peoples and of the earnest desire of my Government to be of any use at all reasonable or practicable to the French in their unprecedented misfortune with which everyone sympathized. I repeatedly made it equally clear that the American people are profoundly of the opinion that the French will have no really feasible way to recovery and restoration, except to a wholly inadequate extent, save through the halting by force of Hitler's onward march of conquest, devastation and destruction; that, therefore, the people of this country observe with instant concern any reported act or utterance of other governments, including the French, which regardless of the actual facts, on their face, purport to be hostile to Great Britain in her struggle to check Hitler, or favorable and friendly to Hitler beyond any reasonable or legitimate requirements in the case of the French, of the armistice terms. They know in their own minds from past observation that there is no such thing as appeasing Mr. Hitler any more than a squirrel can appease a boa constrictor; that those poor little countries in Europe, with which the Ambassador is familiar, have had that identical experience; that this country is proposing to expend some 15 billions of dollars and organize a vast army on account of Mr. Hitler, and the French Government, of course, will realize that this is a most serious business for this country and its Government, if it has not realized it from its own experience and that of its neighbors.

The Ambassador appeared to take in the best of spirit these statements thus made to him and assured me that he would do what he could to clarify and clear up any and all questions presented.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851B.01/22

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1940.

Participants: Secretary Hull;
the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian; and
the Australian Minister, Richard G. Casey.

The Ambassador inquired about the status of Martinique, and I replied that thus far they seemed to be maintaining law and order there, and that the French naval commander is utilizing the influence of his ship and its seamen and officers to that end, and that we are keeping in close touch with the situation, having in mind the ninety airplanes that are deposited on the island, together with definite ideas as to their ultimate disposition. The Ambassador inquired as to what we would do if an internal fight should develop between the forces supporting the Pétain Government and those opposed, to which I replied that we would observe the objects and purposes of the Act of Havana and the declaration accompanying it, but that I would not undertake at the moment to elaborate further on this phase.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.248/409*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1940.

When Mr. Dumaine ⁷⁸ called this morning I referred to an inquiry made of him in the course of a telephone conversation yesterday as to whether the Vichy Government had been informed of Ambassador Haye's conversation with Secretary Hull, more especially that part dealing with the airplanes in Martinique. I mentioned to Mr. Dumaine that I was glad to see him this morning again, and to remind him in this connection that in his conversation with the French Ambassador Mr. Hull had assured Mr. Haye that these planes would not be reexported to Europe, and also that when Mr. Haye raised the question of blocked credits, the Secretary had also pointed out that these planes, if repurchased by the United States firms concerned, did represent a possible credit of some four or five million dollars in the United States.

I indicated to Mr. Dumaine that not only did the United States authorities have a natural interest in these planes, in view of the fact that priority had been waived in delivering them to France, but also in view of the fact that they were now stored on the beach at Marti-

⁷⁸ Jacques Dumaine, First Secretary of the French Embassy.

nique and that deterioration would be rapid. Mr. Dumaine said that of course the position of the Vichy Government in this matter was difficult, since under the terms of the German Armistice these planes must remain where they were. I said that while that might be true, certainly at the moment of the Armistice they could have been returned to the United States, and furthermore, the Armistice did not call for the leaving of these planes on the beach at Martinique without any storage facilities.

Mr. Dumaine asked me if I felt that the shipping of these planes to Indochina for possible use there would be countenanced by this Government, although, he said, it was almost idle to ask, since naturally the planes would have to be shipped and convoyed by a French man-of-war. I replied that it seemed to me to be a late moment to ask this question, since it was only academic, but I did feel that the Secretary's assurance to the French Ambassador that the planes would not be reexported, once returned to this country, might have weight with his Government. Mr. Dumaine said that the Ambassador had not reported that fact to him and he would do his best to see that it was brought to the attention of the Pétain Government.

He again repeated that Vichy's hands were tied because of the terms of the Armistice and he did not feel that the Germans would be willing that these planes be returned to the United States.

This conversation was at the Secretary's instigation.

RAY ATHERTON

851.248/410

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 20, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me this morning. I had been out of town when he arrived and this was my first formal interview with him.

The Ambassador spent a considerable period of time in expressing to me his chagrin at the nature of the reception he had been accorded in the United States and at the impression held so generally in this country with regard to the Government which he represented. He expatiated in great detail upon his personal career, upon his many previous visits to the United States, and upon the fact that in French political life he was always referred to as the "American". The Ambassador further gave me at length the incidents which had occurred when as Mayor of Versailles he had had to receive the German officers commanding the German troops of occupation.

The Ambassador likewise spoke of his desire to cultivate the American press more than his predecessors had done and also of his hope that because the Vichy Government was in its present parlous situation the American press would not indefinitely believe that the men who composed the Vichy Government were in the slightest degree influenced in their own beliefs by the German Government.

To all of the above I made no reply.

The Ambassador then said that after his earlier conference with Secretary Hull he had communicated with his Government inquiring whether the French airplanes in Martinique could not be returned to the American manufacturers, or at least be shipped for use in Indo-China. He said that his Government had given him a negative reply to both of his requests and had informed him that either of the two alternatives suggested would, under the terms of the armistice with Germany, require the explicit agreement of the German Government. Since the Vichy Government knew beforehand that the German Government would refuse its acquiescence, it did not desire to risk an official rebuttal.

I took occasion to say that it seemed to me in the highest degree ludicrous that the French Mission from Indo-China should now be imploring the Government of the United States, with the support of the French Embassy, to furnish munitions, and particularly airplanes, to French Indo-China, when at this very moment 90 new planes, manufactured in the United States and the property of the French Government, were rotting on the hill sides of Martinique.

The Ambassador said he quite agreed.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

840.51 Frozen Credits/689

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1940.

Mr. Truelle⁷⁹ came in today, at his request, to plead for an immediate release of funds to pay the French diplomatic establishments in the American hemisphere.

I replied bluntly that the question of the Martinique planes was not settled yet.

Mr. Truelle said that he saw no logical connection between the two, and continued his plea.

I said that I ran into this as an obstacle in every attempt to reach solutions of these questions.

⁷⁹ Jacques Truelle, Counselor of the French Embassy.

Mr. Truelle said that he did not see that the existence of planes in Martinique threatened us at all; that they could not be moved, and we had, in any event, overwhelming power in the Atlantic. I said that that maybe suggested a solution. Since the excuse for not letting the planes come back was that it might lead to reprisals, possibly they would like to be in a position of our taking the planes, rather than asking for them. I said we did not want another Dakar incident, but that if it would help any for us to "take" the planes, maybe that could be worked out. Truelle said that he could not comment.

I said that what we really wanted, of course, was the return of the planes; we might send them to Indo-China, were they useful there; otherwise keep them here for our own national defense. I was aware of Mr. Welles' conversation with the French Ambassador, and begged to note that the effect of the Vichy government's refusal to do something about these planes had, in substance, amounted to helping the Indo-Chinese government to hand over the province to the Japanese, in the sense that it had left them undefended before an invading army. For this reason I could not see any real reason why some solution could not be found in the matter.

Mr. Truelle continued to plead for his money.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

851B.01/26

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1940.

The Ambassador⁸⁰ came in at his own request. He inquired about the Martinique situation, to which I replied that we were giving the matter, including the airplane question, every attention at all practicable. I said we were endeavoring to deal with this problem as we are with the general French situation, with a view to acquiring the best results without giving the Vichy Government an opportunity to arouse prejudice or bitterness against us among the French population and military forces; that the test of the limit of our efforts in Martinique is the extent we can go without accomplishing more harm than good in the foregoing respect; that, therefore, we are observing closely the airplane situation as well as other matters, realizing that when the French naval commander at Martinique gets a message from Vichy it might well be in fact a message from Berlin in disguise.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁸⁰ The British Ambassador.

851B.20/6: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 4, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

690. My telegram No. 688, October 4, 5 p. m.⁸¹ Seguin, Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office, volunteered this afternoon the information that Henry-Haye has cabled that the President desires the issuance by the French Government of a statement "of the neutralization of the French Antilles." He said that the question is now receiving the consideration of the French Government. He personally feels that in view of the German stranglehold on France—with appropriate gestures—it would be very difficult to make any such declaration. He felt however that much might be accomplished and "practical results obtained" through conversations with Admiral Robert, whom he understands enjoys the "full confidence of our Government." He was not specific as to the type of statement desired or the background. I did not feel it advisable to pursue the matter in view of my own lack of information but I pass the foregoing along for what it may be worth.

MATTHEWS

851B.20/9: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 7, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received October 8—11:55 a. m.]

701. My telegram 690, October 4, 7 p. m. Seguin sent for me this afternoon and said that night before last "he" had sent a cable to Henry-Haye setting forth the nature of the reply to be made to the President's suggestions.⁸² Seguin said that as he understood it the President had raised three points: (first) he had suggested the "neutralization" of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere; (secondly) he had suggested the demilitarization of those possessions; and (third) that American observers be permitted to be stationed therein. (I have of course no way of knowing the accuracy of the foregoing but feel that the Department may be interested in having the impressions with respect to Martinique circulating in Vichy.)

With respect to the last he said Henry-Haye had been instructed to agree to the stationing of observers in French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Saint Pierre-Miquelon. They could be he said either

⁸¹ Not printed.⁸² See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, October 7, of a conversation with French Ambassador Henry-Haye, p. 384.

military or naval officers but they should operate "very discreetly" and possibly might preferably be clothed as "consuls or vice consuls".

As to demilitarization he said that France has in effect no fortifications worthy of the name in the Antilles (my telegram 688, October 4, 5 p. m.⁸³). There are, he said, some 600 men stationed at Guiana, some 2,400 at Martinique and Guadeloupe and "four gendarmes" at St. Pierre-Miquelon. All these men were in reality needed he felt to maintain French prestige and order among the native populations and certainly could constitute no menace to anyone's security. To this end Admiral Robert was being authorized to discuss any "demilitarization" in which we might be interested—if for instance the guns taken from the French auxiliary cruisers (my telegram 688) had been mounted so as to constitute any sort of threat—and his authority which already carried all but Saint Pierre-Miquelon would be extended to include those islands.

Seguin went on to indicate that under present circumstances local authorities such as Admiral Robert are given considerable leeway: "Cables do not arrive or are subject to revision et cetera" he hinted and he felt that as far as "practical considerations" were concerned we would find no difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory agreement.

"Neutralization" was, he said, the most difficult point. He did not believe as a matter of fact that real or complete "neutralization" would be really in our interest; we already had observers there and "neutralization["] would imply a similar right for the Germans to have observers, which was obviously not what was wanted. I remarked that I supposed he was intimating that the Germans would resent such a move at the present time and the French were fearful of resultant reprisals or tightening of the German noose. He admitted that this was the case.

He said that while the foregoing had been cabled to Henry-Haye he had not in his cable gone into the question of neutralization "quite so frankly". He said that the telegram had been sent off in a great hurry and should be regarded only as preliminary with room for discussions; it had been sent because he "was under the impression that events were developing with great rapidity these days".

It is quite obvious to me that with the Government's present policy of attempted collaboration with the Germans—or at least ready acquiescence in their suggestions—its leaders are inclined to make no move in the contrary direction regardless of the real sympathies of the permanent officials of the Foreign Office. Laval,⁸⁴ for instance, seems to become daily less interested in the effect of his policies on American public opinion.

MATTHEWS

⁸³ Not printed.

⁸⁴ Pierre Laval, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers.

851B.01/30½

The Chief of Naval Operations (Stark) to Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade, United States Navy

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1940.

Upon your arrival Martinique you will inform Admiral Robert in substance as follows:

(1) That the President understands that Admiral Robert's promise given to Admiral Greenslade, as the representative of the United States Government, means that the French warships in Martinique and Guadeloupe will not move except to the French Colonies in the Caribbean and then only after advance notice, of at least twenty four hours, has been given through the French Embassy in Washington to the State Department, and that these ships will not further engage in hostilities. That, although every confidence is placed in Admiral Robert's promise, it is necessary, in view of recent developments to ask him frankly the following question—"If he should receive orders from his government for the French warships to depart to a destination other than the French Colonies in the Caribbean or to depart without prior notification, is he in a position to guarantee that his present promises will be fulfilled".

(2) That the United States Government has informed the Vichy Government that if Admiral Robert's promise is not fulfilled the United States is prepared to take steps accordingly.

(3) At an opportune time you should tell Admiral Robert that although we feel full trust in his promise, we must, of necessity, take reasonable precautions to observe the movements of French ships and therefore will dispose our forces accordingly.

851B.01/29a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1940—5 p. m.

688. For your confidential information. The Under Secretary told the French Ambassador October 31 that in view of this Government's disquiet in regard to the status of the French colonies in the West Indies, it had determined not to await the arrival of General Bonavita but had decided to send Admiral Greenslade to Martinique to discuss very frankly with Admiral Robert the situation as this Government saw it and that also this Government had decided to send an airplane carrier and patrol planes to St. Lucia in order to observe day and night the movements of French naval vessels at Martinique. Mr. Welles added that in the opinion of this Government the time had now come

for the French Government if it wished to reassure the United States, as it had recently frequently stated it so desired, to give through Admiral Robert reinforcement of these assurances. The Ambassador was informed that while the form of this concrete reinforcement could be determined by Admiral Robert and Admiral Greenslade, this Government could under no conditions permit any indirect alien control to be exercised in Martinique or in the other French colonies in the Western Hemisphere and that it most decidedly could not agree to any modification of the existing agreement regarding the movement of French naval vessels nor the transfer of French gold and other assets on the Island so that these assets could pass into German hands.

Admiral Greenslade reported yesterday to the Department on his return from Martinique. In an extended and satisfactory conversation Admiral Robert had confirmed to him all the assurances stated in Department's 652, October 29, 8 p. m.,⁸⁵ and extended them to include removal of gold now held in Martinique for the account of the Bank of France. By further agreement a United States Naval plane will call each day at Martinique to contact United States Naval Observer and Consul stationed there also carry mail and messages.

HULL

851B.01/31: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 16, 1940—noon.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

961. Seguin called this morning to tell me confidentially that the Germans through Wiesbaden have asked the French for information concerning the sending of an American observer to Martinique and the sending of our destroyers to that island and Guadeloupe. The Foreign Office is replying, he said, along the lines that in its present difficult position with respect to the French Colonial Empire, France is subject to "various pressures" from neighboring powers and is compelled to make arrangements as best she can; that the purpose of the visit of Admiral Greenslade concerns negotiations for the food supplying of Martinique and the question of time charters.

Seguin went on to say off the record that he hoped in any press conferences or public statements we would endeavor as far as possible to avoid giving any impression that we are "satisfied" with the way negotiations are proceeding with respect to the Antilles. Any indication that we are "mediators" he said will result in further difficulties for the French from the German side.

⁸⁵ Not printed.

Incidentally Seguin went on to say that early reports reaching the Foreign Office as to the Molotov⁸⁶ visit to Berlin are not "encouraging"; the Greeks and the Rumanians are both apparently unhappy and the Turks likewise seem anxious.

MATTHEWS

851B.01/43

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me at my request.

The Ambassador stated that he had been in New York during the past three days but that the Counselor of his Embassy had informed him of the message I had sent concerning my preoccupation by reason of the reports received that Admiral Robert, the French Commander in Chief at Martinique, was planning to ship to South America a portion of the gold fund held in Martinique ostensibly for the purchase of food supplies for the civilian population in Martinique, as well as for the purchase of food supplies to be sent to France. The Ambassador said that he had authorized his Counselor to send a message directly to Admiral Robert requesting him to refrain from taking any action in that sense and that the Ambassador had followed it up with a personal telegram to Admiral Robert urging him to take no action which would create any disquiet and misunderstanding on the part of the United States Government.

I said to the Ambassador that I thought it was essential that the Ambassador and I have a very clear understanding of the situation regarding the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere and particularly the situation in Martinique. I said that we had shown the French authorities in Martinique, and particularly Admiral Robert, every possible consideration by sending high ranking officials of this Government to confer with them, and that it had been my hope that, as a result of those conversations, agreements had been reached which, while neither as conclusive nor as far-reaching as I had anticipated, at least gave some assurance to the United States with regard to the taking of measures which safeguarded the security and national defense of the United States insofar as the French colonies were concerned. I said to the Ambassador that it had been my understanding in all of my conversations with him that the French Government and the local authorities in Martinique had given positive assurances to the United States that the *status quo* in Martinique and in the other French colonies would be maintained, and that the term *status quo* as I employed it embraced not only the agreement with regard to the

⁸⁶ V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

movement of ships, et cetera, but also all other questions, including the maintenance intact in Martinique of the gold funds deposited there. I asked the Ambassador specifically whether my understanding was correct. The Ambassador replied, equally specifically, that my understanding was entirely correct. He added that from the outset of our discussions concerning Martinique, he had insisted upon this point of view in his communications to his own Government, and that he had likewise insisted that if the French Government desired to reestablish friendly and helpful relations with the United States, it was imperative that not a single step be taken with regard to the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere which could create the slightest suspicion of disquiet on the part of the American Government.

The Ambassador went on to say that he regretted the statements which Admiral Robert had made concerning the possibility of shipments of gold from Martinique, but that he trusted that I would understand that these statements had been premised upon the belief of Admiral Robert that, while he had given all reasonable assurances within his power to Admiral Greenslade concerning the maintenance of the *status quo*, the assurances received from Admiral Greenslade with regard to the sending from the United States of sufficient food supplies to prevent the civilian population from starving had not been carried out. I asked the Ambassador how this misunderstanding could have occurred in view of my own belief that all of the necessary funds had been released by the Treasury Department here from the French blocked balances in order to permit the shipment from the United States of the stores of food, et cetera, necessary to prevent any distress in Martinique. The Ambassador stated that this was the case; in fact that what had occurred was that after the French liner *Fort de France* had loaded the cargo of food supplies, et cetera, and was preparing to depart from New York, the British authorities in New York City had obtained a court order holding up the vessel until certain claims owing the British by the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique had been paid. Consequently, the Ambassador said, it had been necessary to procure an American vessel and transfer the food supplies to that vessel and Admiral Robert had not understood the reason for the delay. These facts had now been explained to Admiral Robert, the Ambassador said, and he felt sure there was no further misunderstanding.

The Ambassador went on to say that the officials of the French Embassy who had conferred this morning in Dr. Berle's office with certain officials of the Department of State for the purpose of reaching an agreement for the monthly release to the French Embassy of a definite sum sufficient to provide food for the civilian population in Martinique, gasoline for the local industries and oil for the French naval vessels

in Martinique had been very much disturbed because they had been asked whether the authorities in Martinique were loyal to the Vichy Government, a point which they believed had been satisfactorily settled by the conversations which had been held between the American officials sent to Martinique and Admiral Robert. They had likewise been perturbed by the statement made to them that no settlement on this point would be reached until after Admiral Leahy⁸⁷ reached Vichy.

I stated to the Ambassador that I believed many of his difficulties in matters such as these had arisen because of the fact that the French Embassy was giving the impression to the Department of State that it was continually trying to evade the officials responsible for the determination of these questions by sending various members of the staff of the French Embassy to various officials of the Department of State who were not primarily charged with these questions. I said that as the Ambassador knew, the agreements that had been found had been reached primarily between the Navy Department and Admiral Robert and that both Mr. Atherton and myself were fully prepared at any time to discuss the questions which might arise as to the carrying out of these agreements. I said consequently that in the future I preferred that the French Embassy discuss these questions either through the French Naval Attaché with the Navy Department or through the Ambassador with Mr. Atherton and myself, and that I would explain these circumstances to Dr. Berle and my other associates in the Department since the course so far followed by the French Embassy had given rise to much confusion and unnecessary delay.

In concluding this portion of our conversation the Ambassador repeated that the French Government would definitely maintain the *status quo* in Martinique in accordance with the spirit of the agreements reached upon the understanding that sufficient funds would be released from the French blocked balances in the United States to provide what, in the opinion of this Government, was a reasonable monthly quantity of food supplies and industrial material for the civilian population in Martinique and that sufficient oil be procured for the French naval vessels there to carry out the agreement reached between Admiral Greenslade and Admiral Robert.

851B.01/35

The Vice Consul at Martinique (Blocker) to the Secretary of State

No. 59

FORT-DE-FRANCE, December 9, 1940.

[Received December 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that our Naval Observer, Commander Blankenship, and I had the pleasure to visit

⁸⁷ Adm. William D. Leahy, appointed Ambassador to France November 29, 1940.

President Roosevelt on December 8, 1940, when his ship, the U. S. S. *Tuscaloosa*, passed near Martinique.

We talked with the President for about one hour, answering his questions and giving him as best we could a general idea of present conditions in Martinique and in Guadeloupe.

The President suggested that Admiral Robert be questioned with reference to his attitude on the following matters :

1. Whether the French Government would consider a sale of the American made airplanes, now resting ashore at Fort-de-France, to some South American country, the credit for same to be used in purchasing foodstuffs for France and for French colonies.

2. Whether Admiral Robert would be willing to grant authorization for two American Naval operators to come to Martinique and operate a radio sending station in the offices of the American Consulate, to transmit official message[s] of Commander Blankenship and myself.⁸⁸ It is to be understood, of course, that upon the installation of such station, the American Naval Patrol off Fort-de-France would be discontinued, as well as the discontinuance of the daily calls of the U.S. Naval Patrol Planes.

The President stated that he is greatly concerned that no German control or influence be exerted in the French West Indies, be it either military, commercial, financial or otherwise.

Immediately upon coming ashore from the visit with the President, Commander Blankenship and I called upon Admiral Robert and, after extending greetings from the President, informed him of the President's suggestions above noted. Admiral Robert stated that he would have to communicate with his Government before giving a reply to the suggestions. The Admiral left shortly thereafter for an inspection visit to Guadeloupe aboard the French auxiliary cruiser *Barfleur*. It is understood that he will return Martinique on December 11, 1940.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum submitted by Commander Blankenship to Admiral Robert concerning the subjects in question.⁸⁹

I shall inform the Department immediately upon a receipt of the desired information from Admiral Robert.

Respectfully yours,

V. HARWOOD BLOCKER

⁸⁸ In despatch No. 88, February 2, 1941, the Vice Consul at Martinique reported the receipt of a communication from Admiral Robert expressing regret that he was unable to concede the establishment of a radio sending station in the Consulate (851B. 01/47).

⁸⁹ Not printed.

851.248/438

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1940.

The French Ambassador called on me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador brought up the subject of obtaining munitions for French Indochina.⁹¹

I told the Ambassador quite bluntly that after full consideration by the appropriate authorities of this Government it had been found impossible to permit the exportation to Indochina of the various categories of munitions listed in the memorandum which he had left with me some ten days ago.

The Ambassador took this without any argument. He then read to me a telegram he had received from the Governor General of Indochina urging that the United States be requested to sell to Indochina the ten airplanes which had been destined for Thailand but which had been held up in the Philippines.

I told the Ambassador that there could be no question of selling these airplanes to Indochina since they were going to be utilized by the United States Army, and that if it were found that any old planes now in the Philippines could be spared, they would be sold to China. I took occasion to state that it seemed to me amazing that the French Government would continue to permit the 100 new military planes purchased in the United States to go to pieces in Martinique when these planes would be of enormous value to Indochina in resisting aggression either on the part of Japan or on the part of Thailand. I said I had been very much interested in Mr. Laval's comments on this possibility in his conversation with Mr. Murphy,⁹² referred to in Mr. Murphy's telegram of December 9.⁹³ I read the pertinent portions to the Ambassador.

The Ambassador thereupon burst into a state bordering upon frenzy. He shouted that he had sent ten telegrams to his Government on that subject insisting that the terms of the armistice made possible the shipment to Indochina of the planes in Martinique and that each time he had been turned down flatly with the statement that the terms of the armistice would not permit. Now, he was informed that Mr. Laval was taking a contrary view. He said he would immediately telegraph his Government and insist that steps be taken at once to ship these planes to Indochina.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁹¹ See vol. iv, pp. 35-250 *passim*.

⁹² Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France.

⁹³ No. 1109, December 9, 5 p. m., p. 414.

851.248/427 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 19, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received December 20—9:05 a. m.]

1160. Chauvel⁹⁴ asked me to call this afternoon and was in a state of considerable perturbation. He read me portions of a telegram from Henry-Haye concerning his latest talk with the Under Secretary. Henry-Haye telegraphed that "the State Department persists in subordinating the question of American aid in supplying airplanes for Indochina to a settlement of the question of Martinique and the airplanes on the *Bearn*." Further on, after inquiring whether there are any "important reasons" why the latter matter could not be settled favorably, he again emphasized that "as has many times been made clear" the State Department according to his strong impression would take no action to help the defense of Indochina until the question of the airplanes on the *Bearn* has been settled.

Chauvel expressed first of all some annoyance at Henry-Haye. He said it was the first time that he had been given any indication that the question of our selling airplanes to aid Indochina was contingent upon disposal of the airplanes on the *Bearn*. He said that frankly he was perplexed as [to] just what [our?] position is. In the first place the situation in Indochina was one of extreme urgency. The French have again been cut from telegraphic communications with their Minister at Bangkok and he does not know whether it is the Thailandese or the British over whose cables such messages pass who are holding them up. While the whole matter of the airplanes on the *Bearn* is outside his field and he is not too familiar therewith, he does know that any negotiations with respect thereto with the Germans would take considerable time and any solution would be reached far too late to be of any help in the present emergency. It seems to him either that we are interested for our own reasons of policy in seeing the French maintain the integrity and independence of Indochina or we are not. If we are he hopes we can other way atmosphere⁹⁵ to selling the 30 or 40 airplanes, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank guns requested immediately. If we are not in a position to give this assistance the French will have to modify their policy, possibly accepting the Japanese offer of mediation which has just been rejected (please see Embassy's telegrams numbers 1109, December 9, 5 p. m.,^{95a} and 1141, December 15, 6 p. m.⁹⁶). But they do want to know where they stand.

⁹⁴ Jean Chauvel, Minister Plenipotentiary Second Class in the French Foreign Office.

⁹⁵ Sentence apparently garbled.

^{95a} *Ante*, p. 414.

⁹⁶ Not printed.

The second question which puzzled him was again (my telegram No. 1150, December 17, 5 p. m.⁹⁷) that of the British attitude. Henry-Haye reported that on this question as on that of the transfer of the Senegalese troops from Djibouti and as "on all other questions today" the Department had consulted the British but had as yet received no reply. Looking at the question quite objectively he found it difficult to see just what advantage the British would have in hindering French defense of Indochina—he had seen no indications of any De Gaullist movement—but the indications seemed to point to the fact that they were (my telegram 1150, December 17, 5 p. m.).

The French Minister at Bangkok apparently felt that Crosby's⁹⁸ game is to bring about a situation of such chaos and unrest in Indochina that we would be compelled to intervene more rapidly in the Far East but he, Chauvel, is not inclined to believe this. He went on to say that whatever the situation he had asked me to call to emphasize the urgency of giving the French means to defend themselves in Indochina or at least of letting them know whether or not such aid may be forthcoming.

I said that frankly I was not *au courant* of what our attitude is with respect to the air planes on the *Bearn* and I could not therefore discuss the question in detail. I knew, however, that the matter was one in which not only our Government but also our public opinion is extremely interested. It seemed to me from past conversations (please see my telegram number 701, October 7, 7 p. m.) that the French Government has not been entirely frank with us on this question and has not clearly informed the Department of just what the situation is. I said that he and Monsieur de Seguin who joined us at that point insisted that the Germans would not permit the French either to cede or to transfer these airplanes but I wondered whether the question had ever been specifically taken up at Wiesbaden and whether Ambassador Henry-Haye had ever been instructed to explain clearly the French position. I urged that such an explanation be telegraphed Henry-Haye and this both Chauvel and De Seguin promised to do. The latter brought out a thin file and showed me a letter from the Minister of Colonies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated September 4, in which the former requested that the latter obtain through the French Ambassador at Washington authority and assistance from us in transferring the *Bearn* planes to Indochina as they were "urgently needed there".

He likewise read me excerpts from a letter of Admiral Darlan⁹⁹ to the Armistice Commission stating (1) that the planes in question after 3 months' exposure to tropical weather were seriously damaged, (2)

⁹⁷ Not printed.

⁹⁸ Sir Josiah Crosby, British Minister in Thailand.

⁹⁹ Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet.

that their repair locally at Martinique was impossible and (3) that their re-embarkation was quite impracticable. In a third document dated October 19 Admiral Darlan stated to the Foreign Office the planes were completely useless (please compare Darlan's statements to me—my telegram No. 1140, December 14, 8 p. m.¹) and that the proposal to send them to Indochina should be abandoned. I told them that I understood from Murphy that our experts took an entirely different view as to the serviceability of the planes in question and, repeating that I was not familiar with the background, I said that it seems to me difficult to explain to Washington why the French had seemed so reluctant at least to broach the matter at Wiesbaden; that quite aside from any question of making the one matter "subordinate" to the other it must seem strange to the Department that while on the one hand the French urgently beseech us to give them assistance on a question in which they are decidedly interested, namely, the defense of Indochina, while at the same time they show no disposition apparently even to explain why they are unwilling to make any move on a matter which for one reason or another is of considerable importance to us. Chauvel thereupon dug up a note from the Armistice Commission meeting of September 20, in which is quoted a specific reply from the Germans refusing a French request to strengthen their defenses in Indochina by utilization of existing war material stocks in metropolitan France, North Africa, and "overseas". The same reply, however, acquiesced in the French request for permission to purchase arms and war material for the defense of Indochina in the United States. In reply to the French delegate's inquiry as to the reasons why existing stocks could not be used if new purchases could be made in the United States, the German delegate merely answered that he did not know; that the instructions came from Berlin. I gather that probably an account of this will be included in Chauvel's telegram to Henry-Haye.

It would considerably facilitate my task in dealing with these and related questions if the Department could furnish me with such information as it feels it properly can on the following questions either for my confidential information or for background purposes: (1) Does it fit in with our policy and are we in a position to furnish the French with airplanes and other means of defense for Indochina? (2) Is the question of such aid in reality contingent, as reported by Henry-Haye, upon a "settlement" of the question concerning the airplanes on the *Bearn* and if so what is the "settlement" we desire? (De Seguin remarked that he found it difficult to understand why we should want French war vessels maintained at Martinique but the planes shipped out to Indochina.) (3) Does British policy favor assistance to the

¹ *Ante*, pp. 490, 492, paragraph beginning "Returning to Martinique".

French in defending Indochina or do they feel that additional arms and armament may merely fall into Japanese hands?

MATTHEWS

851.248/427 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1940—7 p. m.

869. Your 1160, December 19, 8 p. m. The Department believes that for the time being at least discussions of this matter with the French, especially as it relates to Indochina, can most advantageously continue to be carried on here. We of course find most helpful your reports of statements made to you by the French.

For your background however you should have in mind that the war material production of this country is not yet at peak and that the supplies available are not sufficient to meet our own needs and the many requests received from various foreign governments. Each request made of us receives most careful and sympathetic consideration. Decision is reached on the merits of each case considered in the light of our own national defense needs and of the declared policies of this Government. When practicable, requests made by the French Government are approved and French Indochina continues to be supplied from this country with a number of items needed by it. When the French Government comes to us with an urgent request for airplanes and other war material for Indochina, it is only natural that we should wonder why the French do not endeavor first to use the planes, war material and ships which it has in existence and available in Martinique and elsewhere in the Colonial Empire. Although the French Ambassador here has raised the question of sending to Indochina the ships and planes in Martinique since last September, as did his predecessor earlier, we have received no evidence that the French Government has pressed the matter of utilizing its own existing resources of planes and war materials.

Referring expressly to your question numbered 3, this Government from time to time exchanges information with the British Government with regard to events in the Far East including Indochina. However, we cannot speak for British policy. We naturally ask ourselves what assurance there is that new equipment, if and when supplied to Indochina, would be devoted to useful purposes and would not fall into undesired hands.

In discussing with the French Ambassador here matters relating to French Indochina, our position has been based upon and has revolved about the factors outlined above.

HULL

CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEM OF GIVING FOOD RELIEF TO FRANCE
WITHOUT AIDING GERMANY

840.48/3995

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have recently been examining the question of relief for territories under German control, and feel it important that the results of this examination should immediately be known to the United States Government.

His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion that they must treat Germany and the territories under her occupation on the same footing, since supplies admitted to the occupied territories must inevitably either fall into German hands or release other supplies for the enemy.

There is no doubt that Germany has it in her power to see that the inhabitants of her occupied territories are adequately fed: there may be scarcity, but Germany has or can obtain from sources immediately accessible sufficient supplies to avert famine. The Germans indeed boast of their ability to feed the conquered territories and as recently as June 27th a German broadcast went so far as to say that, while Mr. Hoover's ² plans for relief in France, Belgium and Holland deserved commendation, the German authorities had already taken all the necessary steps for the feeding of the populations.

While, therefore, His Majesty's Government appreciate to the full the humanitarian ideals which inspire the desire now becoming apparent to supply relief to the stricken territories, they are convinced that it would be entirely mistaken policy to lengthen the war by allowing Germany to be assisted in the difficulties which confront her and which are of her own creation. Painful as the decision is, they have, therefore, decided that no exemption from contraband control can be accorded for relief goods.

For the reasons given in the second paragraph above, His Majesty's Government feel obliged to treat unoccupied France for all contraband control purposes in the same way as occupied France. France is well known to be self-supporting in essential foodstuffs and any willingness to allow relief supplies to enter would simply be an encouragement to Germany to remove supplies from France for her own use. His Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, contemplate any general scheme for facilitating the passage of foodstuffs to the former, although in view of the special problems caused by the influx of refugees into unoccupied France and the dislocation of communications,

² Herbert Hoover, former President of the United States.

they have agreed to give safe conducts to Marseilles for certain ships already en route for France with cargoes of food.

His Majesty's Government realise that their decision may lay them open to criticism, the sincerity of which is beyond question. But their intention is to win the war in the shortest possible time and so to liberate the peoples from Nazi oppression. They believe that this decision will help them to achieve this. They therefore hope that the United States Government will be able to see the question in this light, not as a measure which will inflict avoidable hardships on the helpless, but as one which will shorten the struggle and hasten the day when Germany's victims can regain their liberty and the world enjoy a prospect of lasting peace.

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1940.

840.48/3995

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1940.

The British Ambassador³ called at his request and handed me an *aide-mémoire* (copy attached⁴), the substance of which is that the British Government will not undertake to give its consent to relief by neutral countries in German military-controlled territory or German-controlled territory. I thanked him and then inquired whether the British proposed to strengthen the basis of their action by a statement to the effect that so long as German methods and policies are in force a relief undertaking at this time would really be for the benefit of Germany, German armed forces, and German citizens. The Ambassador said, "I will bring this to the attention of my Government."

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.48/109

The French Ambassador (De Saint-Quentin) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

The Ambassador of France has the honor to advise His Excellency the Secretary of State that the economic situation and, in particular, the food situation, which is daily becoming more difficult, creates for the French Government an imperative duty toward the population of all parts of its territory.

The French Government, resolved not to evade this duty in any case, proposes to organize the regular supply of its territory with

³ Lord Lothian.

⁴ *Supra*.

products originating from the French possessions and some non-belligerent overseas countries.

It wishes to settle this problem in accordance with the British Government by asking for the application of the system of navicerts to ships going to its free ports and by giving, on the other hand, full guarantees that the merchandise thus imported into non-occupied territory will not be used either directly or indirectly by Germany.

These guarantees would be based on principles similar to those which at present allow Great Britain to authorize the supplying of the Balkan countries. They would comprise, essentially:

1. The establishment of associations of importers which would be authorized, to the exclusion of all other organizations, to effect importation of overseas products, the transportation of which is subject to British control.

2. The drawing up of certificates attesting that the overseas products imported into France will be reserved exclusively for the use of the French population. These certificates, visaed by a French governmental authority, would be sent into the exporting country to the sellers, who could turn them over to the British services in charge of the issuance of navicerts.

The foregoing guarantees appear to meet all legitimate requirements as far as concerns unoccupied France and French North Africa. These territories where, in fact, the French Government maintains its rights of sovereignty in full, are in the same situation with respect to the belligerents, *de facto* as well as *de jure*, as neutral territories.

On the other hand, as there is no interference with the passage of merchandise from the unoccupied zone into the occupied zone, on the part of the French authority, the French Government offers, as far as concerns overseas merchandise intended for consumption in the occupied zone, the special guarantees indicated in the two following paragraphs:

3. It would ask the German Government to refrain from any requisition of the overseas merchandise imported into the free zone and transferred to the occupied zone. (This assurance has already been obtained at Wiesbaden with respect to petroleum products.)

4. The associations would send into the occupied zone the overseas merchandise imported into the unoccupied zone only to meet the immediate needs for civilian consumption.

Lastly

5. The French Government would be disposed to make known the maximum tonnage of each class of overseas merchandise needed during a given period of time for the supplying of our country.

In return for these various guarantees, the British Government would give to the French Government the assurance that it would freely permit to pass toward the ports in unoccupied French territory

the overseas merchandise with respect to which such guarantees had been given.

By order of his Government, the Ambassador of France would be grateful to His Excellency the Secretary of State if he would be good enough to transmit to the British Government, supporting them with his high authority, these proposals which tend to settle a problem the importance of which for the supply and the very existence even of France is capital.

Mr. de Saint-Quentin is happy to take this occasion to renew to the Honorable Cordell Hull the assurances of his high consideration.

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1940.

851.01/112 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

VICHY, August 11, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 5:25 p. m.]

311.

Baudouin ⁵ said also that the German Government had yesterday assumed the obligation not to requisition any food supplies imported for French civilians from non-belligerent countries. He said that it is most distressing that an artificial distinction is being built up in the United States between Frenchmen needing relief in the occupied and non-occupied zones. The French Government, Baudouin said, would prefer to see the entire French population reduced to a common state of starvation rather than to feed those in the south and neglect those in occupied territory. Aside from the humanities involved such discrimination if admitted by the French Government would be for obvious reasons a political error of the first magnitude. He hoped that the Americas (the Argentine Ambassador was also present) would understand the problem and cooperate in aiding France effectively.

MURPHY

851.48/109½

The Chief of State of France (Pétain) to President Roosevelt

[Translation]

VICHY, August 27, 1940.

MR. PRESIDENT: France knows today the most tragic hour in her long history. Three-fifths of her soil are occupied. Rare are the

⁵ French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

households which are not waiting anxiously for the return of one among the two millions of prisoners held by Germany. Millions of refugees who have come from the most fertile regions of France, bringing with them nothing but the train of their weariness and wretchedness, await the hour of deliverance when they can return to their abandoned homes. Today they share with Belgian, Czech, Austrian, Spanish and Polish refugees settled on our territory, the sorrows and privations of the French people of free France.

The war has ravaged within a few weeks half of our soil, bringing about the destruction of our bridges, our roads, our railway stations and a great part of our factories,—a case without precedent in the annals of our history.

Our land, the cradle of a civilization which astonished the world, is today crushed and in mourning.

To the echo of the voices of those who only yesterday sustained the French with illusory and optimistic words, succeeds the sad voice of one who cannot speak except of his misfortunes and of his privations without, however, despairing of the future.

The principal preoccupation of my Government, its daily anxiety, is to aid all French people to bear the load of their afflictions. I know that our task will be a heavy one, but we shall not consider that we have succeeded within a modest measure until we can give to each man, to each woman, to each child, whether rich or poor, a régime less hard than that of the day before.

In this work of relief and assistance to the people of France your generous country, which is bound to mine by century-old friendship, and which has already accomplished an immense effort, would perhaps be desirous of taking its share tomorrow.

Problems of purchase of provisions, of supervision over the final destination of such provisions, of relief, of efficiency, of transportation and of coordination of individual charitable efforts will arise in France and in America.

I have thought that a disinterested person might collaborate in this work of succor and assistance in complete accord with our Embassy at Washington and the organizations of the American Red Cross and of the French Red Cross.

I have just asked Mr. René de Chambrun,⁶ a citizen of our two countries, kindly to devote his time to this task, in case you and the American charitable organizations should think that his collaboration might be of some use.

I ask you to accept [etc.]

PH. PÉTAÏN

⁶ Son-in-law of Pierre Laval and descendant of Lafayette.

851.5018/38 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 13, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received September 14—7:15 a. m.]

562. Department's telegram No. 402, August 30, 6 p. m.⁷ It is extremely difficult to obtain accurate or definite data with respect to food transfers from France to Germany from either occupied or unoccupied France. Such transfers have undoubtedly taken place on a large scale from occupied France and I am convinced in not inconsiderable amounts from unoccupied France. There has been no transfer of food from occupied to unoccupied France and such transfers are not [apparent omission] the Germans.

From Paris I learn that hardly a day goes by without stories of removal of supplies of both food and raw materials for industry from sources that would ordinarily be given full credence. Even accepting these stories with considerable reservation, it is certainly true that supplies of all kinds are being taken from France steadily and in considerable quantities. This includes especially all reserves of butter fats. On the other hand, while other edible vegetable and animal fats do not appear to have been taken in large quantities the residue of acid fats from the processing thereof has been taken to Germany and the French soap industry will soon be suffering from a marked shortage. Supplies on hand will carry soap factories in occupied France only until sometime late in October at the present rate of production of 30 percent of normal output. Meat has likewise been taken large quantities. There is an eye-witness account that on one day out of 1200 animals slaughtered at Paris 1000 carcasses were shipped to Germany. As a yardstick this percentage is probably exaggerated. Similarly large quantities of potatoes have been taken from occupied France: there were considerable stocks and this year's crop was not too bad but commission agents state that stocks of potatoes are now quite low.

As for unoccupied France it is equally difficult to obtain reliable data. From the area around Lyon, I am told that there has been constant "pumping" of food and food products into the occupied zone and presumably to Germany. I have heard of a case where 12,000 head of sheep at Millau (Aveyron) were taken over by the Germans. Local cattle dealers at Lyon estimate that the shortage of fresh meat in the unoccupied zone will be severe within 2 or 3 months. The Bel-fort Kommandantur calls regularly at Lyon for fruit and vegetables and there are sizeable purchases of potatoes in Lyon and in Theisere. These may well be for the army of occupation rather than shipment

⁷ Not printed.

to Germany. Of more importance is the statement made to me by an acquaintance connected with the Ministry of Agriculture that the Germans have demanded 1,000,000 head of cattle and 500,000 pigs from unoccupied France. My friend of the Armistice Commission has confirmed the above figure as to cattle but says that the number of pigs demanded from unoccupied France is 1,500,000. I regret the impossibility of giving more specific data at the present time. I shall continue to report any facts of importance which I am able to dig up.

In this connection see my telegram No. 555, Sept. 12, 11 p. m.⁸

MATTHEWS

851.5018/39 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 16, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 10:22 p. m.]

577. My telegram No. 652 [562], September 13, 7 p. m. Fifteen hundred carloads of potatoes have been shipped out of the Vichy area in response to German demands in the past few days. This information comes confidentially from the Foreign Office. (They are consequently extremely scarce here at the present time.)

MATTHEWS

851.5018/33 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1940—5 p. m.

484. Your 482 of September 3rd, 2 p. m.⁸ The French Government has now issued a categorical denial of the report regarding the agreement to deliver from unoccupied territory 58 percent of all cattle, horses and mules. Please inquire confidentially of Senator Bardoux who was indicated as the source of your information what basis he had for his statement to you.

The Department desires to ascertain whether there is a flow of food-stuffs actual or impending from unoccupied France to Germany, or to the German Army of Occupation in northern France. It understands the practical difficulties in the way of such investigation but it believes that some verification should be possible of the several rumors on this subject such as that mentioned in your 562 of September 13. It is noted from that telegram that you are convinced that not inconsiderable amounts of foodstuffs have been transferred from unoccupied France to Germany. The Department desires you to elaborate on this statement mentioning the facts on which it is based.

⁸ Not printed.

With reference to your 577 of September 16, 6 p. m. regarding the report that 1500 carloads of potatoes have been shipped out of the Vichy area in response to German demands, kindly indicate the name of your informant and if possible the source of his information.

Please understand that the Department desires in all fairness to ascertain the facts of the food situation in unoccupied France. It wishes to be able to answer the question whether surplus American food products should or should not be both sold and given to relieve suffering in unoccupied France on the part of French and refugee civilian population, particularly women and children, during the coming winter months. It understands from telegrams such as your 472 of September 1st, 3 p. m.¹¹ that you entertain no doubt that the population in question will suffer from food shortage during the months ahead unless imported foodstuffs are available. There is widespread opposition in the United States to the shipment of foodstuffs to unoccupied France if such shipments merely replace quantities of food products transferred from that area to Germany.

Your telegrams on this subject are appreciated and it is desired that you transmit all pertinent factual information including that obtainable through official and private sources, the American Red Cross and Quaker organizations.

HULL

851.5018/42: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 18, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received September 19—4:30 p. m.]

586. Department's telegram No. 484, September 17, 5 p. m. Senator Bardoux is unfortunately in Paris and I must therefore delay further inquiry of him. I have, however, been unable to obtain corroboration of his 58% figure from any source.

Meanwhile I feel that I should give the Department a clearer picture of the impossibility of obtaining full information with regard to the flow in foodstuffs from unoccupied France to Germany or to the German army of occupation. As I stated in my telegram No. 555, Sept. 12, 11 p. m.¹¹ (to which the Department does not refer) French officialdom is extremely reluctant to discuss German demands on any question and particularly with respect to foodstuffs. In the first place the Germans themselves insist on a secrecy with which the present Government is ready to comply and in the second place revelation of substantial German demands would merely tend to confirm British claims that the severity of blockade restrictions as applied to France

¹¹ Not printed.

is essential to keep supplies from reaching German military or civilians. The Department in this connection is familiar with Baudouin's principal theme namely that it is the British blockade rather than Germany which is responsible for the starvation of France. In this connection please see Murphy's telegrams numbers 311, August 10 [11], 5 p. m., and 376, August 19, 4 p. m., as well as Baudouin's speech reported in my telegram No. 407, August 22 [20], 5 p. m.¹² To admit that Germany is requisitioning or "purchasing" foodstuffs in unoccupied France is of course to admit the fallacy of Baudouin's arguments for Franco-German collaboration and his denunciation of the British blockade.

I have been compelled therefore to seek information from either unofficial sources or minor officials not impressed with the Government's contentions who may be willing to talk privately. I have endeavored as far as possible to avoid reporting mere idle rumors which reach me from numerous quarters of important food shipments to the Germans from unoccupied France. Such cases as I have mentioned in my telegrams 490, September 3, 9 p. m.,¹³ 562, September 13, 7 p. m., and 577, September 16, 6 p. m., I have had substantiated either by our Consuls in unoccupied France, our Embassy at Paris, the aforesaid officials or the American Red Cross. I showed my telegram No. 562, September 13, 7 p. m., to Richard Allen of the Red Cross,¹⁴ in whose common sense and objective viewpoint I have great confidence, before transmission. He said that in his opinion it gave an accurate picture of the situation and that his own efforts to obtain fuller information on food shipments out of unoccupied France had met with no success.

Since receipt of the Department's telegram No. 484 this morning I have seen both my friend from the Ministry of Agriculture and the official on the Armistice Commission referred to in my telegram No. 462 [562] and both repeated their statements with respect to cattle and pigs. The latter person informed me that in addition the Germans are insisting that French food restrictions this winter provide a diet 30 per cent [under] German rations. I shall endeavor to ask whether the Franco-German agreement which the Minister of Agriculture told me was under negotiation (my telegram No. 555) has yet been concluded and what it provides and to obtain such "verification" as I can on this whole question. I am well aware of its importance and can well appreciate the Department's disappointment with the inadequacy of the data available.

Since writing the foregoing, section 2 of the Department's 484 has been received (there was nothing to indicate section 1 was not a complete message).

¹² Telegrams Nos. 376 and 407 not printed.

¹³ Telegram No. 490 not printed.

¹⁴ Representative of American Red Cross in France.

My informant with respect to the carloads of potatoes was the person described in my strictly confidential telegram No. 490, September 3, 9 a. m. [*p. m.*] He repeated this morning that the information was given him personally by an official of the French Foreign Office—with which he has been working since his return to Vichy—but he naturally was reluctant to name him. (Confirmation of this substantial potato shipment has just come to me from a non-official Frenchman who is a friend of the Embassy.)

I have, of course, kept in close touch with the American Red Cross in my efforts to ascertain the situation. Unfortunately the Quakers organization has no representative at Vichy.

The Department is correct in its understanding that I entertain no doubt that the French civilian and refugee populations particularly women and children will suffer severe hardship from food shortage during the coming winter months unless imported foodstuffs are available. It is likewise my personal opinion that the quantity of foodstuffs which Germany may acquire either through the agreement under negotiation or by requisitioning for German civilian population or German forces in France will vary in negligible amount whether the French civilian population receives imported foodstuffs or not: in other words that Germany will take what she wants and needs with little regard to French necessities. As set forth in his letters transmitted with my airmail despatch of August 28¹⁵ Richard Allen urged upon Laval on August 24 (as well as upon Marshal Pétain in personal conversation) the importance for the French Government to obtain assurances from the Germans that some Franco-American supervisory organization such as the Secours Americain aux Victimes de la Guerre be given full authority for the distribution of any supplies sent to France. Up to the time Allen left for Paris on September 14 he had received no indication that the French Government had made any *démarche* whatsoever in the sense suggested. If there is a possibility however that food supplies may be forthcoming from the United States or that at least the question may be presented to the British blockade authorities presumably the French Government can be induced to take some action in the sense desired.

MATTHEWS

851.5018/43 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 20, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received September 21—9:40 a. m.]

596. Department's 484, September 17, 5 p. m. And my telegram 586 September 18, 5 p. m. I called on Caziot, the Minister of Agri-

¹⁵ Not printed.

culture, this afternoon and referred to our conversation on September 12 (my telegram 585 [555], September 12, 11 p. m.¹⁶). I asked whether the French Government has reached the agreement then under negotiations with the German Government with respect to quantities of foodstuffs to be turned over. He replied in the negative and stated that the Germans were quite unwilling to talk definite figures or commit themselves to specified limits. He said that an agreement of a different sort had however been reached which would be the subject of the communiqué quoted below to be issued today. It means "severe" rationing for the French population and he admitted that the figure is "approximately" 30 percent under German rations (see my telegram number 586, September 18, 5 p. m.).

In return for French rationing which will apply in both occupied and unoccupied territory the Germans have agreed to permit delivery to France of some wheat and potatoes. He admitted too that the Germans had taken "some" potatoes from unoccupied France (my telegram No. 577, September 16, 6 p. m.) in the recent past and he likewise admitted that the Germans had demanded delivery of a million hogs and at least half a million head of cattle but stated that the French had rejected these demands and had sufficiently impressed the Germans that livestock in these quantities could not be furnished; that pressure had temporarily at least been relaxed. He admitted further that they had endeavored to take considerable foodstuffs from unoccupied territory but claimed that the French had succeeded in keeping such purchases or requisitions down to relatively modest quantities and thought they had found means of checking further shipments. He said that French farm animals as a whole are now in number 25% below normal and the figure for horses "in view of the enormous German requisitioning of horses in the occupied territory" was even considerably higher. He said that frankly the French Government has no idea what the Germans had taken in the occupied territory but that the quantities were very considerable.

He read me then the original communiqué which he had proposed to issue on the subject of this agreement a number of passages of which the Germans had insisted on deleting. These passages referred to "massive requisitions by the Army of Occupation" and in general conveyed a truer picture to the French that the rationing agreement was the result of German dictation. In commenting he said: "The Germans do not want the agreement to appear to the public as a *diktat* but it is in reality a *diktat* and nothing else."

In concluding our interview he emphasized the misery which will face France this winter and the hope that supplies would be forthcoming from overseas. He likewise hopes that the several hundred

¹⁶ Not printed.

thousand tons of peanuts awaiting shipment at Dakar will be permitted by the British to pass Gibraltar. He said (I have heard from my Armistice Commission friend that the Germans are eager for the oil to be made from them) the Germans had agreed not to take this. He displayed, however, a healthy skepticism of all German assurances.

The French communiqué in the form approved by the Germans is as follows:

"The consequences of the war and the defeat now appear in their tragic reality; the Government is endeavoring by all means in its power to lessen the severity concerning food supplies but it can only do so within the limit of supplies which remain to us and by distributing them among all categories of Frenchmen.

Destruction of all sorts in the zone of war operations have greatly reduced the harvests, livestock and means of work. A portion of stocks have been destroyed or has deteriorated and large quantities of poultry and hogs have been lost in certain regions of the north and east. (The original stated they had been taken by the armies of occupation.) The production of milk has dropped in enormous proportion in view of the difficulties of trucking and the diminution in the number of milk cattle and in certain places on account of hoof and mouth disease.

To this must be added the misfortune of a bad crop, especially in the free zone and the loss of approximately two-thirds of our sugar production consequent upon the abandonment of beet culture during several weeks.

The English blockade only aggravates an already bad situation as regards certain foodstuffs. Thus, of an average annual per capita consumption of fats (butter, grease, oil) of 17 kilograms only 7 kilograms were produced in France, 10 kilograms coming from the colonies and abroad. The blockade has deprived us of imports and we are reduced to between 5 and 6 kilograms. Our deficiency in sugar, meat and dried vegetables has increased. There is a complete absence of exotic products such as rice and coffee. Soap can only be manufactured in very small quantities. We hope in every particular that imports may lessen this enormous deficiency.

It is pertinent to state that German occupation troops have agreed not to requisition in the occupied zone more than their needs in grains for the making of bread and part of the meat necessary while their supply of foods, sugar and potatoes shall be provided exclusively from the effective date of rationing by shipments from Germany.

It should also be added that French prisoners of war at present in Germany are fed by means of supplies emanating from German crops and stocks.

If a severe rationing were not established we would be faced with grave difficulties before the next harvest would be available.

In order to avoid, under present circumstances, intolerable injustices the establishment of ration cards will assure the same rights to each person whatever his position or fortune. It has been necessary to establish these rations on extremely severe bases which will be strictly controlled.

The hardship will in any case be very severe for everyone. Efforts will be made to increase the amount of rations as soon as possible. All foodstuffs which can be imported rapidly will be imported. The French Government confidently asks all Frenchmen to accept this ordeal with courage, discipline and dignity. Each one must do his duty by complying with the regulations which will be published on September 23 for private individuals and September 30 for restaurants.

The Government will see to strict compliance with these regulations.

The Marshal appeals to the spirit of solidarity, energy and courage of the peasants.

He asks them to make an exceptional effort to produce more and to lessen the privations with which all Frenchmen are faced.

If production is not increased rations will be reduced to a point which might seriously impair the general health of the country and in particular the development of its youth."

The rations (which modify those with respect to sugar, macaroni, et cetera, rice and soap which have been in effect since the first of September) are the following: bread 350 grams a day; sugar 500 grams a month; coffee 300 grams mixed a month (children excepted); macaroni, et cetera, 250 grams a month; rice 100 grams a month (for children only); cheese 50 grams a week; fats 100 grams a week; butchers meat, pork sausage, et cetera, 360 grams a week; soap, 125 grams a month. Milk is likewise to be rationed but the amount is not yet given.

In the future restaurants will be required to request the corresponding coupons before serving their patrons.

MATTHEWS

851.48/104

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] September 20, 1940.

The French Ambassador ¹⁷ called to see me this morning. The Ambassador expatiated at great length on the disastrous political effects which would ensue if the United States did not supply the French civilian population during the coming winter with food supplies.

I told the Ambassador that I was not in a position at this time to discuss this question with him since there were many angles to it, but that I felt it necessary to make it clear to him that this Government would not take any action which in its judgment tended to assist Germany in her present military campaign and make it easier for Germany to feed her own population by being relieved of the obligation to keep from starvation the people of the occupied countries.

¹⁷ Gaston Henry-Haye, who succeeded De Saint-Quentin September 11, 1940.

The Ambassador insisted most vehemently that no demands of any kind had been made upon the Vichy Government for food supplies from unoccupied France.

I asked the Ambassador if he were equally satisfied that no food supplies had been taken by Germany from occupied France or that the Vichy Government had not been obliged by the German Government to send food supplies from unoccupied France to occupied France.

The Ambassador said that he was confident that all information of this character was erroneous.

I said that as a matter of information I would be glad to receive any specific and detailed statement on this point which he might care to make. The Ambassador said that he would do so.

The final argument advanced by the Ambassador as the reason why the United States should send food supplies to France was that if such food supplies were not sent, disturbances on the part of the civilian population in unoccupied France would undoubtedly take place and that the Germans would seize upon this condition as a pretext for undertaking the military occupation of unoccupied France as well as occupied France.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851.5018/45 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, September 27, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 5 p. m.]

650. My telegram No. 596, September 20, 5 p. m., and previous concerning foodstuffs. As of possible interest, I report the following information contained in recent letters from Consulates in unoccupied France.

Lyon: It would seem that German civilians on September 15, 1940, called upon the Mayor of Gannat (Allier) and presented a demand for 10,000 horses. Furthermore some 118,000 quintals of wheat have also been requisitioned at Moulins by the Germans.

Nice: 17,000 sheep from Algeria are reported as having been landed in Nice in early September of which 11,000 were routed to Italy. Final destination unknown. During the first week of September the Italian representatives functioning in the Maritime Alps are reported to have taken 125 cows out of a lot of (Vallée de la Tinée).

Marseille (Fullerton): I have been told by at least a dozen sources in Marseille that there is no question of the fact that large quantities of foodstuffs are being requisitioned and exported across the demarcation line. Potatoes have been bought up wholesale and even in the ground around Aix-en-Provence and elsewhere by German forces in

uniform as well as by members of an Italian commission. Quantities of materials in the port of Marseille have been taken over in a similar manner and now it is reported that large numbers of cattle are being taken. Everything is of course being paid for.

MATTHEWS

851.00/2118

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1940.

The French Ambassador called on me this morning to make a courtesy visit. He complained how difficult he found his task in this country but in the course of his remarks stated there were only 3500 Germans in unoccupied France. These Germans as well as other foreigners were consuming the foodstuffs of the territory within the control of the Vichy Government, but with the exception of these 3500 Germans no demands had been made for food on the Vichy Government nor had any French food been exported from unoccupied France to Germany. I told the Ambassador his statement was so incredible in view of what was commonly believed that I asked him to repeat it which he accordingly did.

RAY ATHERTON

[See memorandum of conversation, by the Under Secretary of State, October 7, 1940, printed on page 384, especially the section on "Blocked French funds in the United States", beginning on page 388.]

851.5018/47 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 9, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received October 10—2:40 a. m.]

727. Department's telegram 484, September 17, 5 p. m. and other correspondence concerning foodstuffs:

Senator Bardoux has returned from Paris for a few days and I saw him yesterday. He stuck to his story that the Germans some weeks ago had demanded delivery of 58 per cent of all cattle, et cetera, but stated that happily the French had been able to resist this demand. He was somewhat vague on the subject and I am inclined to think that his information may have been somewhat inaccurate.

Professor M. Macheboeuf of the Bordeaux Medical Faculty and former fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation is at present technical and scientific adviser of the Supply (*Ravitaillement*) Ministry. He

confirms (my telegrams 596, September 20, 5 p. m., and 687, October 4, 5 p. m.²¹) that the Germans are requiring delivery of 1,000,000 hogs and 500,000 cattle.

The former he says will seriously deplete French breeding stocks and further aggravate the food situation. The Germans have likewise already taken 350,000 cattle, he states. Apparently these demands cover the whole of France, but insufficiency in occupied France means that much will be taken from unoccupied France. He also said that out of recent ship arrivals at Marseille from Algeria some percent of sheep, or between 16 and 18,000 head were taken by the Germans.

Macheboeuf, in a report which he has prepared, expresses anxiety over the future: he believes that malnutrition will be sufficiently serious this winter to result in epidemics, particularly of influenza, around February or March. (A similar view is expressed by Pierret, Director General of the International Health Office, as reported in Embassy's despatch 11, September 27.²²)

The possibility of serious food shortages has been brought home by the recent rationing. There is resentment here that German officials in France are given ration cards considerably in excess of the French. The Government is now, I am told, considering the question of added prisoner ration cards to permit families of French prisoners in Germany and occupied territory to forward them foodstuffs. The French realize that the obligations of feeding war prisoners is German but they seem convinced that unless they send food from here the undernourishment of French prisoners of war will be seriously aggravated.

MATTHEWS

851.5018/48 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 10, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received October 11—5 a. m.]

730. My telegram No. 727, October 9, 10 p. m., and previous concerning foodstuffs. Rougiere of the League of Red Cross Societies at Geneva has arrived in Vichy from Marseille. He tells me that there is "no doubt in his mind" that the Germans are taking considerable food supplies out of unoccupied France. He has personally seen, he said, German officers at Marseille checking food and meat shipments arriving from Algeria. He feels the same is true of other points in unoccupied France. He could unfortunately give me no figures or estimates; in view of his natural interest, however, in seeing food

²¹ Latter not printed.

²² Not printed.

shipments sent to France from overseas, I find his statements of some significance.

He says there is at present no important food shortage in the Marseille area and consequently some resentment at the present severe restrictions exists. There are other regions of unoccupied France however where there is a real dearth of food supplies and he mentioned particularly the Creuse and Lozere. While he is aware of the fact that the present severe rationing is a result of German pressure on the French authorities he believes that in any case it would have been necessary. In this connection the Department may have noted Marshal Pétain's statement in his radio address last night: "The ration problem arose for the Government as a painful necessity. Rationing has been imposed upon us both by the severity of our defeat and by the will of the conqueror."

Rougiere said that there is a French Red Cross ship, the *Mendoza*, loading at Buenos Aires with beef, wheat, coffee, corned beef, et cetera, the cargo of which is destined for French prisoners of war. He understands, however, that authority has not yet been obtained from the British for its passage through the Straits of Gibraltar.

As the Department is aware from the press the French Government is at present engaged in taking a census of livestock in France. This has created such fears among the peasantry lest it be preliminary to a requisition by the German or French authorities that in a number of villages the immediate slaughter of cattle, sheep, pigs, et cetera, has taken place. How extensive this premature slaughter is it is difficult to say but I am inclined to feel it has not been great.

MATTHEWS

840.48/4540 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 21, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received December 21—1:50 p. m.]

4170. Your December 13, 11 p. m.²³ Present position of blockade authorities regarding unoccupied France is that medical supplies under Red Cross supervision will be allowed to go through. Milk for children of unoccupied France is for the moment definitely under the ban. The aggressive spirit in this policy is Mr. Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare. There is no doubt, however, that the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax as well as other members of the Cabinet are fully aware of the position he has adopted and it is in reality a Government position. I think it is also true to say that this policy is rep-

²³ Not printed.

representative of both Parliamentary and public opinion. The cruel loss of civilian life not only in London but in places like Southampton, Bristol, Birmingham, Coventry and Sheffield has greatly hardened both official and public opinion in this country against any sort of concession based even on humanitarian grounds which might even indirectly benefit the enemy.

I know it to be in the minds also of those responsible for the present policy that children in Holland and Belgium are subject to the full rigor of the blockade; these countries are still Britain's allies with exiled governments (although the status of the two is not identical) functioning in London and with soldiers still fighting on Great Britain's side. In the British view it would be, to say the least, embarrassing for the Government to permit milk to go to children in unoccupied France when Dutch and Belgian children are necessarily victims of a more severe rule.

The political situation at Vichy is viewed with very grave anxiety at present in the highest quarters. They have no accurate information of the Vichy Government's intentions and are mentally prepared for any kind of treachery to come from that quarter. Certainly until the Vichy situation has cleared up, and in view of other considerations mentioned above, it would be politically difficult for the Government to make a concession regarding milk for children in unoccupied France. Any increased collaboration between Germany and Vichy, whether with the voluntary or involuntary acquiescence of the latter, is fraught with deadly peril to this country, and both the Government and Parliament, and in an increasing degree public opinion generally, are keenly alive to the potentialities. The rigid policy of Mr. Dalton is therefore, popular and broadly supported. Lord Halifax and, I am sure, other members of the Government, understand and appreciate the humanitarian sentiments which inspire the American people in face of the suffering of innocent children in unoccupied France. If we should make a request for milk for these children to be allowed through the blockade I do not believe the request would give offense, but I think the likelihood of its being granted at the present moment is very small.

JOHNSON

851.48/111

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1940.

The French Ambassador called at his request. I first inquired about the situation of his mother, who is residing near Versailles, and who is some ninety years of age. He replied that she was in consider-

able need of coal, et cetera, which indicated the fuel situation in that area. No further statements were made which threw any light on other conditions there.

I then inquired as to the number of French prisoners held by the Germans and he said there were 1,800,000, of which 1,000,000 were at work in Germany. He added that they were paid in German marks and the sums received did not avail them much in terms of foodstuffs or other necessities. In answer to still further questions, he said that the tens of thousands of people who were ordered out of Lorraine by the Germans were only allowed to take what they could carry with them and that the property they left behind was seized by the German Government. The credit resulting from the appraisal of this property was applied to the expense of maintaining the German Army in France, or to help maintain French prisoners.

In reply to another question, the Ambassador said that there were 3,500,000 refugees from other nations in unoccupied France. I inquired further as to whether the Germans had taken over large quantities of foodstuffs, including milk and other commodities, in occupied France, and he replied that they had taken over immense quantities of food for the German soldiers, and some of which they professed to send into Germany to feed French prisoners.

He very earnestly and almost vociferously set forth the extreme need for appropriate foodstuffs for the children and others of the population in unoccupied France. He said that some wheat and sugar had been sent by the Germans to the free zone of France from the occupied zone. This was the only qualification made to the general situation which he had already described, chiefly in answer to my questions. He went on to say that the President had assured him that he was earnestly in favor of supplying the babies in unoccupied France at least with condensed milk, et cetera. I expressed the deepest sympathy with suffering such as he described and stated that for many weeks this Government has been giving every attention to the matter of getting such foodstuffs to the children in unoccupied France; that the late British Ambassador himself very earnestly urged this upon his Government (this I told him privately); that we, of course, cannot be certain as to the outcome but we are hoping in view of the distressing situation presented that the British may be prevailed upon to relax their blockade; that we shall at all times give the matter every possible attention. He said that, of course, winter was passing rapidly and there would not be time a little later in which to administer such relief.

He then referred to his talk with Mr. Welles about gold exchange, which he said he would not repeat since Mr. Welles and I would be conferring about the matter. He did add that if this arrangement

could be worked out, the food in question could be purchased with gold in the United States, except in cases where such goods were not available in this country and then they would be purchased from South America.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.48/113 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 31, 1940—9 a. m.

[Received 1:30 p. m.]

1201. My telegram 1195, December 30, 4 p. m.²⁴ Flandin²⁵ said that there was one urgent problem which he wished to take up immediately and hoped that I would bring to the serious attention of my Government: namely France's need for wheat supplies. Recent estimates make it quite clear, he said, that there will be a period of at least 7 weeks before the next crop is available in which unoccupied France will be completely without wheat supplies unless imports can be arranged. Present supplies will be completely exhausted by March 31 and a minimum of 6,000,000 quintals of wheat and 2,000,000 quintals of corn for live stock are needed to carry France through. This wheat and corn can be purchased in the Argentine and on the question of funds he understands from Ambassador Henry-Haye's recent conversations with the Department that we are inclined "to take a sympathetic view with regard to unblocking the requisite dollars".²⁶ It is the matter of transportation which presents the real problem. France, he said, has sufficient ships in our ports if she is permitted to use them and there comes the question of the British blockade on which he is asking our help. He said that among the memoranda of his predecessor he found notes indicating British willingness to discuss this matter at Madrid but owing to the fact that they tied the problem to parallel conversations on general political questions this was unfeasible.

Given the present state of Franco-German relations and the German attitude it seems out of the question to have political talks with the British at the present time. He therefore hopes that we will use our good offices with the British to get authorization for the passage through the blockade of a number of shiploads of wheat. He said that the French Government would be willing to give any sort of guarantee that the wheat would be consumed entirely in the unoccupied zone. He emphasized the urgency of the question and the

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Pierre Étienne Flandin, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²⁶ See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, October 7, p. 384.

Government's fear of serious social disturbances if help is not forthcoming.

I said that I should be glad to report the matter immediately to my Government but that in turn I should like to ask him two questions: I said that I had taken an interest in reporting the food situation to Washington last summer and at that time the French Minister of Agriculture had indicated that wheat stocks principally in the occupied territory would be sufficient to carry the whole of France safely through the winter. What was the cause of this complete change of view? He replied that it was due entirely to faulty estimates of the 1940 crop and the poor quality of the wheat harvested. I asked if it was not due in part to heavier German requisitions than anticipated and he flatly denied that this was the case. He could not deny, however, that the Germans had used some stocks for their army of occupation. I asked whether there was sufficient wheat in the occupied zone, in case the Germans would permit its shipment to unoccupied territory, to see the country through and he replied in the negative. He said that the occupied zone has barely enough for its own needs. He went on to say that one thing of which the Germans had plenty was wheat in view of the supplies from the Danube basin, etc., and that if this help were given France now it would in no way assist Germany.

I reiterated that I would promptly transmit his request. (Perhaps I should add that I have shown the foregoing to Allen of the American Red Cross and that in the absence of precise figures he is not yet convinced of a serious deficiency in wheat supplies.)

MATTHEWS

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY INTERESTS IN FRANCE
AFTER CAPITULATION TO GERMANY

351.1143/5a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1940.

44. The Department is receiving numerous inquiries from American citizens in regard to the status and protection of their interests in France. These interests consist of bank deposits, real and personal property including merchandise on consignment and claims for merchandise delivered, and inheritances, insurance policies, accounts receivable, et cetera. Please telegraph any information now available which would be helpful to the Department in replying to these communications and keep the Department currently informed by telegram of important developments in this connection. In particular are there any conditions under which bank deposits or other funds such as cash

values of insurance policies and securities, proceeds of estates, accounts receivable, et cetera, may be realized and (a) expended locally, or (b) transferred to the United States? If so please specify conditions and procedure.

The Department proposes to inform the appropriate consular officer from time to time of specific cases brought to its attention in which American citizens have interests in France, and to request him to investigate and report the status thereof, and should occasion arise to extend such protection to the American interests involved as may be appropriate and feasible. Have you any suggestions or comment to make?

HULL

351.1143/7 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 16, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received July 17—5:10 p. m.]

82. Department's 44, 10th. The situation in France today is so confused and so fluid with various governmental departments and agencies scattered throughout this area of France and resultant division of responsibilities that it is impossible at the present time to give more than the following tentative outline in this changing situation.

1. Bank deposits of American residents in unoccupied France and of American concerns with representatives in unoccupied France are subject to no unusual restrictions. As to means of transferring funds from the United States to unoccupied France you are probably better informed than the Embassy. For transfers of funds to the United States to cover commercial debts and other authorized transactions the Office des Changes is still functioning in unoccupied France and it is understood will grant the necessary applications. In fact Government contracts placed in the United States are, in some cases of which the Embassy has learned, being paid before the due date. An effort is being made by at least one American bank to obtain authority from the Bank of France to transfer dollar accounts of their nonresident clients from France to head office in New York, but it seems doubtful that this will be permitted. There are no restrictions on utilization of franc accounts in unoccupied France by nonresidents. Funds may be transferred from one to another in unoccupied France and even to Bordeaux and La Rochelle at present—though the latter two are uncertain. The National City Bank located at Le Puy, Haute-Loire, Morgan at Chatel Guyon, the Guaranty Trust at Vichy, and presumably the Chase Bank at Jurançon are continuing to conduct business on a small scale and to look after their clients' interests. The ques-

tion of their return to Paris (the first two have left a small organization there to cash depositors' checks) is under consideration. The belief appears to prevail that gradually the distinction between unoccupied and occupied territory will become of less and less practical importance.

2. As to real and personal property in unoccupied France, there are no restrictions other than that of military or Government requisition similar to that to which French properties are subject. Requisitioned property is, in theory at least, subject to reimbursement: Requisition orders may be redeemed locally for payment one-third in cash and two-thirds in treasury bills due one year after the date of requisition. No cases of requisitioned American property have yet been brought to the Embassy's attention. In occupied France, the German authorities appear in general to have respected American property where the latter bore one of the notices of ownership furnished by the Embassy.

3. With respect to merchandise on consignment and claims for merchandise delivered there appear to be no general restrictions on payment but either case will be decided presumably on the basis of circumstances involved. As indicated above, remittances of dollars owed in the United States continue to be permitted. Chief obstacles to payment are, of course, (a) the difficulty of locating the individual debtor or even the company concerned, with millions of the population completely out of touch with their normal relationships, and, (b) the difficulty for even the most solvent debtors to obtain funds for remittance in the present confusion and breakdown of normal means of communication.

4. With respect to inheritance and insurance payments in France there is no moratorium though the question of remittances to the United States therefrom is less clear. Exchange control regulations previously in existence continue to apply and it appears that the tendency will be towards an increased tightening rather than relaxation thereof.

5. The moratorium on payment of debts, counterfoil deposits, et cetera, existing in Paris since June 25 is due to be lifted tomorrow.

6. While access to safe deposit boxes in German-occupied territory has hitherto been forbidden it is now being permitted in the presence of some German officials and subject to the requirement that any foreign currency, foreign securities, or gold must be placed in the custody of the Bank of France or of the bank of deposit on the latter's behalf.

The Embassy will endeavor to report fully and promptly pertinent developments as they occur.

MURPHY

351.115/32

The First Secretary of Embassy in France (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

No. 7075

PARIS, October 8, 1940.

[Received November 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of a law, and a translation thereof, dated September 17, 1940,²⁷ and published in the *Journal Officiel* of September 19, but received only recently in Paris, empowering the French Government to take special action with regard to taking over or liquidating cargoes or lots of merchandise destined for France but not disembarked in France and which merchandise is located within the French colonies or in a foreign country.

The application of this law may have far reaching effects upon merchandise owned by Americans, shipped to France but disrouted to the French colonies or to other foreign countries in so far as the State, by this law, assumes the right either to take over or to liquidate the merchandise in question in the locality where found or, if subsequently brought to France, to place the merchandise at the disposal of the original consignees upon payment by the latter of expenses involved in storage and transportation.

The State may assume automatically the authority to act as the representative of the owners or the consignees at their expense and, despite any intervention or opposition on their part, it may decide to utilize or liquidate the merchandise in question. In the case of such action upon the part of the State, it must give notice of its intention to the holders of the bills of lading and can require them to turn over the pertinent documents in their possession.

The Embassy has already received several oral representations from American and French consignees of American goods to the effect that their merchandise may be affected by the application of this law. Upon receipt of any specific claims with regard to such merchandise, the Department will be informed promptly of the cases in question and, as a matter of record, the Missions in other countries or the Consulates in the colonies concerned will be advised of any such claims which may be presented to the Embassy at Paris.

The Embassy would appreciate receiving any comments or instructions from the Department with regard to its interpretation of a possible conflict of this measure with existing international law with regard to the property rights of American owners, either company or private.

Respectfully yours,

MAYNARD B. BARNES

²⁷ For French text, see *Journal Officiel*, September 19, 1940; translation not printed.

351.115/1a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1940.

1594. Report by cable action now being taken by Embassy where American property is occupied or requisitioned by German authorities and success of such action, together with any comments you may care to make regarding measures which Americans should take to protect their interests in such cases.

HULL

351.115/26½ : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 22, 1940.

[Received October 24—1 : 44 p. m.]

1371. From Paris. Department's 1594, October 17.

1. As of general background interest please see our 992, October 1.²⁸

2. In the early days of the occupation the Embassy received informal official and also private assurances that it was the desire of the German Government that American property should be respected. Many individual Americans also received such assurances in private contact with the German authorities. By informal agreement with the former diplomatic German liaison officer, it was agreed that the Embassy would first seek through local *Kommandanturs* to have American property released in cases where it had been occupied in disregard of the desire of the central authorities. Only cases where these efforts failed were to be brought to the attention of the diplomatic liaison officer. In about one fourth of the cases which have been brought to our attention for action we have obtained redress from the local *Kommandantur*. In about a similar number of cases we have received the reply that the properties could not be evacuated at the moment because of military necessity. These latter cases have been taken up in principle with the present liaison officer who has expressed the view that perhaps the principle of freedom of American property from occupation no longer obtains. He has referred this question to higher authorities. The remaining 50% of the cases we have not yet received replies from the local *Kommandantur*. While we are still awaiting reply from the local liaison officer on the question, we have been assured through other and more informal channels that it continues to be the desire of the German Government to conciliate

²⁸ *Ante*, p. 448.

American opinion by not interfering with American property. This seems to be borne out by several recent instances in which property has been released or announced intention to occupy has been abandoned. On the other hand in one instance at least the German military authorities have informed the local French authorities that no distinction is to be made henceforth in favor of American property; that in fact a circular order to this effect has recently gone from the central authorities.

However it seems likely if such were really the case many of the hundreds of unoccupied American apartments in Paris would have been taken over for use by the German military authorities.

Under the circumstances it seems best for the time being not to press for a statement in principle unless the Department is prepared to make at the same time a strong *démarche* in Berlin in support of the principle of non-interference with neutral property. Otherwise it would be better for the present to leave us to our own devices here.

On the whole the amount of American property occupied by the German authorities is extremely small in relation to the really incredible number of properties owned or rented by Americans in occupied territory. Out of about 13,000 properties recorded in the Embassy through the issuance of protection certificates we have been called upon to intervene actively in not more than 30 cases of actual occupation.

In some instances we have taken preventive action, such, for example, as posting an officer on the property at the time of announced visits of inspection. In a number of instances of actual occupation (perhaps 50 cases that we know about) American owners or their representatives have not seen fit to request the Embassy to take any action.

With respect to the requisition of goods in contradistinction of the requisition of property the Embassy has limited its intervention to rendering assistance where necessary to ensure that requisition is effected legally and that compensation is paid or receipt issued.

Protection certificates for motor cars have proved 100% effective. Such motor cars as have been taken were not covered by certificates of American ownership. In these cases the Embassy has not been able to make any headway looking to the return of the cars. Barnes.

MATTHEWS

862.24/326

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of
State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1940.

Participants: Col. Sosthenes Behn, President of I. T. & T.^{28a}
Mr. Page, of I. T. & T.
Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

Colonel Behn came in to see me today. He asked advice as to whether or not he should instruct his engineers in the plants in Antwerp and also in Paris to try to avoid taking German military orders. He said that if they did attempt to resist undoubtedly the plants would be taken over. Since he himself was convinced we would be in the war in the not distant future, the only question was whether the plants were taken over now, or later. There were some advantages, he said, in having them taken over later; and he could get out certain men, certain information, and certain machinery which he badly wanted. To avoid that he would have to instruct his men that they could take military orders, though naturally they should avoid them where possible. He wound up by asking what I thought—based on an estimate of our entry into the war in three months.

I said:

(1) I did not feel that I could give any indication of a possible date of our entry into the war, since we hoped to avoid going to war; naturally, no one could guarantee it. Nor could I guess as to the time, though it would seem to me that even accepting his own thesis that "war between America and Germany is inevitable", he was rushing things somewhat. But I took occasion to point out that this depended on a great many factors which we could not control—as, for instance, when someone decided to attack us.

(2) As to what instructions he should give his plant, I stated that the Department could not advise. The anomaly of our manufacturing military material for the German army, which conceivably [might?] attack us, at the same time that we were helping the British, was obvious. As to the possible advantages of playing for time, as against the disadvantages occasioned in the continuance of this anomaly, I said I thought that the question was really one for a technician. Colonel Behn was far abler than I was to add up the benefits occasioned by the continued operation of the factories, and setting these against the debits occasioned by the continued supply of military material to Germany, and striking his own balance. I presumed that Colonel Behn in having made such a calculation would undoubtedly be guided by the best interests of the United States.

(3) As to sending the instructions, I said that while the Department did not undertake to advise what instructions he might give,

^{28a} International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.

the transmission of a message by the Department would imply at least tacit acquiescence. By consequence, to transmit an order for Behn to his subordinates which virtually authorized them to manufacture military supplies for Germany did not seem to me desirable, simply by reason of the fact that it was transmitted through the Department itself. The same objection might not apply to a message sent by him privately.

Colonel Behn then launched into a long story of his own relations with the Germans and the British, including the attempt made by Ribbentrop²⁹ to use him to send a peace feeler to the British. He likewise pointed out that Westrick had been the chairman of their German subsidiary; that Westrick was a Catholic and opposed to the Nazi government, but that he had come to the United States on direct orders from Ribbentrop, and over his (Behn's) objection. Behn indicated that he had been telling Westrick and his German connections that the invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium inevitably meant that the United States and Canada enter the war. Behn was given the impression of favoring this. He wound up by saying that he was going to instruct his men to avoid by every possible means the manufacture of military orders for Germany, though he believed this meant the prompt seizure of the plants. I repeated that I thought that in this matter the decision, at this stage, had to be chiefly his.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

351.115/48½ : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 6, 1940.

[Received December 6—11:55 p. m.]

1922. From Paris. My telegram No. 1371, October 22. Local *Kommandanturs* are now replying to our requests for the release of American property occupied by the German forces to the effect that according to orders now in force the properties of citizens of neutral countries may be requisitioned in the same manner as those of French citizens "on condition that the properties are required because of the necessity of the occupying forces". Interest by the occupying authorities in Americans and their activity in occupied France is indicated by evidence that has come to our attention that the French police authorities have for some time been preparing special lists of all Americans for use by the German authorities. [Barnes.]

MATTHEWS

²⁹ Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PERSECUTION OF JEWS BY GERMAN OCCUPATION AND VICHY GOVERNMENTS; REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN JEWS

851.4016/5 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 15, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received August 16—3 : 05 a. m.]

337. Vichy authorities are in the process of expelling undesirable foreigners with the announced purpose of ridding this overcrowded city of persons who serve no useful purpose.

Thus far only two American citizens, both Jewish, have been requested to leave. Authorities declare campaign is not directed against any racial group but there is no question that one of its objectives is to cause the departure of Jews. These, Laval³⁰ told me recently, were congregating in Vichy to an alarming extent. He believed they would foment trouble and give the place a bad name. He said he would get rid of them.

The Doriot Parti Populaire Français³¹ is covering the walls of the town with inscriptions the keynote of which is "down with the Jews and free masons".

The censor has refused permission to American correspondents to send stories to the foregoing effect.

MURPHY

851.4016/9 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 4, 1940.
[Received October 5—7 : 44 p. m.]

1078. From Paris. The Paris press of October 2 carried an ordinance signed by "the Head of the Military Administration in France for the Commander-in-Chief of the (German) Army" dated September 27, which contains the following provisions:

1. Persons with more than two Jewish grandparents are considered to be Jews. Grandparents having professed the Jewish faith are considered Jews.

2. Jews "who have fled from the occupied zone" are forbidden to return.

3. Every Jew must report before October 20 to the sub-prefecture of the district of his usual domicile or residence for registration.

4. Every business owned or operated by a Jew shall display by October 31 a poster in German and French reading "Jewish enterprise".

³⁰ Pierre Laval, French Vice President of the Council of Ministers.

³¹ Jacques Doriot was leader of the Parti Populaire Français, a Fascist party.

As the measure is a military ordinance issued in occupied territory, I am of the opinion that there is only one reply that the Embassy can make to American citizens of Jewish extraction who inquire whether they must comply with these provisions, namely, that as the inquirers have voluntarily placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the laws and regulations applicable to the territory there is no way under existing circumstances that the American authorities may protect them from laws and regulations that are not discriminatory no matter how much we may deplore those measures.

If this does not meet with the Department's views please instruct. Barnes.³²

MATTHEWS

851.4016/11 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, October 18, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received October 19—5:25 a. m.]

773. The long anticipated statute on Jews is published in today's *Journal Officiel*. The measure which presumably has been enacted partly, but only partly, under German pressure stipulates that any person is to be considered as a Jew if he possesses three grandparents of the Jewish race or two Jewish grandparents and is married to a Jew.

The following public offices and positions are forbidden to Jews: Head of State, member of the Government, Council of State, Council of the Legion of Honor, Supreme Court of Appeal, the Audit Office, Office of Mines, Office of Roads and Bridges, Inspectorate-General of Finance, Courts of Appeal, Courts of the First Instance, Justices of the Peace, all elected bodies, consular or diplomatic officials, Secretaries-General of Ministries, Directors-General or Directorate of Central Administrations of Ministries, prefects, sub-prefects, Inspectors-General of administrative services of the Ministry of the Interior, Secretaries-General of Prefectures, all grades of police officials and employees, Residents-General, Governors-General, Governors and Secretaries-General of the colonies, inspectors of the colonies, members of the teaching profession, officers of the armed forces, presidents, directors and secretaries-general in enterprises receiving subsidies from the state, nominees of the Government to posts in enterprises of public interest.

The exercise of all public offices other than those listed above is only open to Jews who (a) are veterans of the Great War, (b) were cited in the Great War, or if they (c) were cited in the orders of the

³² Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy in France.

day in the present war, and (d) have been decorated with the Legion for Military Action or with the military medal.

The exercise of the liberal or "free" professions and the duties devolving upon officials of the Ministries and subordinate judicial officials is open to all Jews unless regulations should be issued limiting the number to a fixed proportion.

Under no conditions may a Jew exercise any of the following professions: editor, manager, or reporter of a newspaper, news agency, magazine, periodical with the exception of publications having a strictly scientific nature; president, director of [or?] manager of enterprises connected with the motion picture industry, motion picture script writers, directors and producers and officials of radio broadcasting companies.

Jews now holding a public office or position no longer open to them are to be retired on pension within 2 months.

By special decree Jews in the literary, scientific and artistic fields who have rendered exceptional service to the state may be exempted from the provisions of the statute on Jews.

The statute is also applicable to Algeria, the colonies, protectorates and mandates.

The *Journal Officiel* likewise publishes a law regarding foreign citizens of the Jewish race. It provides that the prefects are empowered: (a) to intern such Jews in special concentration camps and (b) assign them to a "forced residence" (*résidence forcée*).

I understand that the measure as promulgated represents the maximum that the Foreign Office and other moderating influences were able to obtain in diminishing its severity. The Foreign Office was well aware of the probable effect on public opinion abroad and on various occasions I have endeavored to remove any doubt as to the interpretation which would be given and the unfortunate effect upon public opinion in the United States from any anti-Semitic laws covering unoccupied France.

Charles-Roux³³ this morning and Seguin, Chief of the American Section at the Foreign Office both brought the subject up today.

The former asked me to stress the fact that the measure might have been much more severe: as issued it contains he said no provision for registration of Jews or census of Jews nor does it provide for any confiscation of Jewish property. I said there was little doubt that quite aside from other highly unfortunate aspects it would be in American eyes further evidence that the French Government is dominated as much by Nazi ideas and policies as it is by the German Army. He denied that the law was issued under German pressure and endeavored to explain that the recent large influx of foreign Jews, the dispropor-

³³ François Charles-Roux, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

tionate role played by Jews in French political and financial life, et cetera, had made some measure necessary. It was obvious however that his defense was half-hearted and that he personally deplored the promulgation of the law.

MATTHEWS

851.4016/9 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1940—7 p. m.

2972. Paris reports that the press of October 2 carried an ordinance signed by "The Head of the Military Administration in France for the Commander in Chief of the (German) Army" dated September 27 which requires, among other things, the registration of Jews and the posting on Jewish enterprises of signs indicating the Jewish character of the enterprise.

Unless you perceive compelling reason to the contrary, you are requested to address the following note to the Foreign Office:

"Under instructions of my Government, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government's attention has been called to an ordinance dated September 27, 1940 and signed by the Head of the Military Administration in France for the Commander in Chief of the Army, which, among other things, requires the registration of Jews and the posting on Jewish enterprises of signs indicating the Jewish character of the enterprise. No provision appears to have been made in this ordinance to exempt from its application American citizens who are Jews.

"My Government is confident that steps will be taken promptly to insure that American citizens will be exempted from the application of the ordinance in question as well as for any other ordinances which may be directed against persons in occupied territory on grounds of race, color or creed.

"It is a fundamental American principle, fundamental in the American tradition, fundamental in the Constitution of the United States, that there shall be no discrimination between American citizens on racial or religious grounds. An ordinance which would have the effect of arbitrarily dividing Americans into special classes, subjecting them to differential treatment and exposing one group to indignities, possible injuries and material loss must necessarily be resented by the American people as a whole and by their Government. Uniformly in its relations with foreign nations the American Government has declined emphatically the right of these nations to apply on their part such discrimination as between American citizens. Uniformly, moreover, my Government has avoided discrimination in its treatment of the Nationals of foreign countries residing in the United States, including Germans.

"The American Government believes, therefore, that upon further consideration the German Military Administration in France will not

wish to subject American citizens to provisions of the nature of those embodied in the ordinance in question and that measures to exempt American citizens from the ordinance will be taken urgently, particularly in view of the fact that my Government has received confirmed reports to the effect that persons wearing distinguishing arm bands already have committed acts of vandalism against and destroyed the property of persons singled out in these ordinances in the occupied regions of France.["]

HULL

851.4016/19 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, November 14, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received November 15—2:10 a. m.]

4711. Department's 2972, November 8, 7 p. m. Before taking this matter up with the Foreign Office I should like to invite the Department's attention to the following considerations.

As the Department is aware the German Government does not now look with undivided favor on the maintenance of our Foreign Service establishments in German occupied territories and the position of these establishments as mentioned in my telegrams 4378 [4373?], October 18, 4 p. m., and 4545, October 31, 5 p. m.³⁴ cannot be considered as entirely secure.

There is, I fear, a possibility that the transmission of a note such as that contained in the Department's telegram under reference would not serve to improve the position of our representatives in Paris and might thereby eventually operate to the disadvantage of those same American citizens in whose interests the step is being taken and who would be largely dependent on the effective support of our representatives on the spot in the event that any difficulties should arise for them out of the operation of the ordinances in question. Viewing the problem from the light of the situation here I feel that the Government of the United States would be better served if we were to confine ourselves initially to the transmission of a brief communication to the Foreign Office mentioning the reported tenor of the ordinance and expressing the expectation that it will not be applied in a manner prejudicial to the interests of American citizens. Should any actual cases of application of the provisions of this ordinance to Americans be established we would then be in a position to protest strongly and to back up such protest with the arguments set forth in the Department's draft note.

In accordance with the above I should like to propose the following draft of a note to be submitted to the Foreign Office in preference to that cited in the Department's telegram under reference.

³⁴ Neither printed.

"Under instructions from my Government I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government's attention has been called to a press item concerning an ordinance dated September 27, 1940 and signed by the Head of the Military Administration in France for the Commander in Chief of the Army which among other things is said to require the registration of Jews and the posting on Jewish enterprises of signs indicating the Jewish character of the enterprise.

"My Government is confident that any such ordinance which may have been issued will not be applied in such a way as to damage or prejudice the interests of citizens of the United States who are Jews."

For purposes of clarity it would be desirable to cite the exact press organ in which the ordinance appeared.

MORRIS

851.4016/19 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1940—10 p. m.

3025. Your 4711, November 14, 6 p. m. After full consideration of the observations contained in your telegram under reference the Department desires that you proceed as instructed.³⁵ The question involved is fundamental and we do not propose to temporize.

WELLES

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

740.0011 European War 1939/3966 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Casablanca (Goold)

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1940—6 p. m.

21. Your 30, June 18, 10 p. m.³⁶ Please continue to keep the Department informed of all developments relating to the position of French Morocco toward the war.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/4174c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1940—7 p. m.

20. In view of the fact that the Consulate in Tunis has destroyed its confidential code it would be appreciated if you would telegraph the Department any information that may be obtainable concerning the

³⁵ A note was sent to the German Foreign Office on November 18, 1940, but no reply was received.

³⁶ Not printed.

attitude of Tunisia toward the war. Please keep the Department informed also of similar developments relating to Algeria.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/4198 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, June 26, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

42. Referring to the Department's telegram No. 21, June 24, I see no evidence of the assumption of any initiative by any of the high officials looking to the organization of resistance. They are the purest conventionalists who will probably follow whatever orders they get, even to fighting for Hitler.³⁷ This applies to all services.

Younger men are preparing to join the British. Some aviators will fly their planes, and some naval commanders will take their ships to Gibraltar. Many of the more spirited men in the Government at Rabat mean to go with Great Britain, among them Marchal,³⁸ I am sure the Department will be glad to know.

But these men are much concerned about their families against whom reprisals well may be taken and anxiously inquire as to the possibilities of transit visas for Canada.

The truth of the armistice terms is carefully concealed from the public and the press has assumed an unfriendly attitude to Great Britain. In short, the spectacle is that of human nature at its worst, acting just as Hitler would have it act.

GOOLD

740.0011 European War 1939/4241 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 27, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received June 28—10:08 a. m.]

28. Department's telegram dated June 24, 7 p. m. I believe that the course of events in Tunis will follow those in Algeria where from all indications military and civil authorities will probably obey Bordeaux if General Noguès³⁹ gives the command. All well-to-do white Algerians, civilians and military, urge continuation of resistance but European and native labor and masses inarticulate natives might prefer civil strife. The large Spanish elements of Oran are uncertain. The French Fleet is reported to be unwilling to give the ships to be

³⁷ Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of the German Reich.

³⁸ Léon Marchal, Director of Commerce and Industry, French Residency General, Morocco.

³⁹ Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in French Morocco and Commander in Chief of French troops in North Africa.

used against Great Britain although if convinced of Italian good faith might accept disarmed internment.

Anti-British feeling growing. The situation is tense, depressed, unstable. Acknowledge.

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/5100

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 546

ALGIERS, July 2, 1940.

[Received August 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 27, June 25, 1940,⁴⁰ in which I gave the substance of a proclamation by General Noguès which was published in the Algerian press of June 25, 1940. This proclamation ran as follows:

PROCLAMATION OF THE GENERAL COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO THE
POPULATION OF NORTH AFRICA

"The Armistice⁴¹ is signed. But the Government in answer to urgent appeals representing the wishes of the whole of North Africa informs me officially that:

1. There can be no question of abandoning to a foreign power without a conflict the whole or any part of the territories over which we exercise either sovereign power or a protectorate.

2. The principle of a military occupation of any part of North Africa by a foreign power is rejected.

3. The Government is not disposed to agree to a reduction of the forces stationed in these territories.

For the moment the integrity of North Africa and its means of defense appears to be assured. In consequence I renew my appeal for calm, discipline, unity, and confidence in the future of our country.

Algiers, June 24, 1940"

Signed: Noguès

Since my despatch No. 542 of June 21, 1940⁴⁰ the question of continuing the resistance in North Africa has been actively discussed. According to the most reliable opinion it could have been undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success, but in view of the attitude of the Pétain⁴² ministry, no one could be found who would assume the responsibility. The Governor General of Algiers was definitely opposed to it; the declarations of General Noguès, of which a specimen is given

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ Armistice agreement between France and Germany, June 22, 1940, and between France and Italy, June 24, 1940. For texts, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, July 1939-June 1940, vol. II, pp. 427 and 436, respectively. For text of the Franco-German agreement, see also *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. IX, document No. 523, p. 671.

⁴² Henri Philippe Pétain, French Premier; subsequently Chief of State.

above and those of Mr. Peyrouton, Resident General in Tunisia were non-committal. The final blow to certain hopes seems to have been the request made to the British Military Mission for its departure. It left on June 28th, 1940. On June 30th, the task of dismantling the coast defences was reported as in progress, as it was that ammunition was being rendered useless, and the demobilisation ordered of all men down to the age of 25.

The Algerian Governor General appears therefore to have triumphed over any possible opposition to the armistice terms. He has been helped by widespread propaganda based on the anti-British speeches of Marshal Pétain and on rumors spread by certain army officers as to the deficiencies in military equipment. The reaction to this cold douche is provided by subtle hints of a sudden and beneficial change in relations with Italy with corresponding disadvantages for the now detested England and Germany. It is certain that emissaries (Parliamentary and military) have been sent over from France to cover Algeria and Tunisia. These facts correspond with the desperate and otherwise inexplicable efforts of the Pétain Government to cut loose from England and the recent addition of Mr. Pierre Laval to the Ministry. A large percentage of the public is already imbued with this idea, chiefly, it may be surmised, because it provides ground for hope, though the whole project has the appearance of a "*Combina-zione*" and France has yet to get the better of Italy in a Mediterranean deal.

Great progress has thus been made in getting the Algerians to acquiesce in the armistice conditions; but the idea of resistance is not at this writing completely abandoned nor is England without its indignant supporters. Many hundreds of men have sought ways and means of joining the small remnant of French combatants. In fact, as I stated in my last despatch on this subject, only continued resistance of Africa would have been the certain antidote to civil war. Frenchmen are now thoroughly disunited with the lines of cleavage running athwart the old political parties. The Pétain Government is bound to meet the hostility of the masses and is doomed unless it can rule by despotic measures backed by German authority.

Respectfully yours,

FELIX COLE

740.00119 European War 1939/437 : Telegram

The Consul at Tunis (Heisler) to the Secretary of State

TUNIS, July 3, 1940—noon.

[Received July 4—10:26 p. m.]

20. Tunis is very quiet and I am now informed at the Residence General here that this Government is in entire agreement with the

present Government of France and that this country will comply with armistice conditions.

HEISLER

740.00119 European War 1939/453 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS via Paris, July 7, 1940—noon.

[Received July 12—2:45 p. m.]

4. Italy has temporarily lifted armistice conditions for all French forces for defensive purposes in North Africa to enable them to resist any action by British forces and to prevent any attempt to blockade traffic to and from France. Three regular voyages weekly have been approved as well as up to 20 ships for revictualing France all under French convoy. Strict blackout again enforced.

Governor General is conforming strictly to all orders received from Vichy, but there are prominent political leaders here including, it is reported, Daladier,⁴⁴ Mandel,⁴⁵ and Zay⁴⁶ out of sympathy with Pétain Government and there is a heavy but inarticulate ground swell running against it among the Leftists on one side and the moderate liberals on the other. Deep internal divisions exist within Government circles who are extremely guarded and undecided. Order prevails.

Repeat to Department.

[COLE]

740.0011 European War 1939/4703 : Telegram

The Consul at Tunis (Heisler) to the Secretary of State

TUNIS, July 16, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received July 16—7:45 a. m.]

22. Officially informed a commission consisting of seven Italian naval officers arrived at Bizerte July 7 and is still there owing to suspension armistice terms regarding disarmament French Mediterranean ports.

British Consular Corps left Tunis July 10 but French permission for this Consulate to represent British interests not yet received.

HEISLER

⁴⁴ Edouard Daladier, former French Premier and Minister for National Defense and War.

⁴⁵ Georges Mandel, former French Minister of Colonies.

⁴⁶ Jean Zay, former French Minister of National Education.

681.00/8

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Consul General at Casablanca (Goold)

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1940.

DEAR GOOLD: I have received your letter of June 14, 1940,⁴⁷ enclosing an itemized account of imports into French Morocco for the first eight months of 1939.

Your cooperation in making this information available is much appreciated.

We are anxious to learn, as soon as possible, of the situation in French Morocco consequent upon the French armistice with Germany and Italy and we shall much appreciate any information you may be able to furnish us. Information which we would particularly like to have would include the relationship of the French Protectorate Government to the Pétain Government in France, the attitude of the local French authorities, French private citizens and the native population to the Pétain Government, the possible armistice problems confronting Morocco, the status of French Moroccan trade relations, and any information which may be disclosed by French Protectorate officials and your colleagues regarding the political future of Morocco.

Sincerely yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

740.0011 European War 1939/4875 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 26, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received July 27—10:47 a. m.]

401. There is evidence that Spanish official circles are becoming seriously preoccupied with the possibility that there may be trouble in French Morocco which they fear might result in the necessity of Spanish action there. This is reflected in a recent conversation between the Naval Attaché and the Minister of Foreign Affairs⁴⁸ in which the latter was plainly "jittery" over the possibilities.

In this connection the Naval Attaché in Paris who has just returned from French Morocco states that there is a strong movement among the French forces, civilians and natives there to refuse to abide by the terms of the armistice and if given any opportunity and support French Morocco would be defended against all comers, with the exception of the British. One estimate of the situation is to the effect that if it would be possible for the British to give any support to the leaders of this movement in French Morocco it could be confidently expected that orders from Paris would be disobeyed and that

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ Juan Beigbeder.

any British forces which might be sent there with due advance notice would be joyfully received.

It seems doubtful whether the Spanish for the moment have any intention of attacking French Morocco particularly if they have reason to believe that the French would resist. It also seems doubtful that French forces in French Morocco would attack Spanish Morocco. The reason for Spanish uneasiness as regards the present situation therefore is due to the fear that German pressure would force Spain to attack French Morocco in the event that there was a revolt of the French armed forces in that area in which case Spain would be placed in a serious predicament.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/4964: Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, August 3, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received August 3—3:15 p. m.]

2. Referring to telegram from Madrid ⁴⁹ as to which Department requested comments from Tangier, the following is information available.

Neither Spaniards nor French believed to be likely to start a fight without outside pressure, though French forces and also Moroccan tribes would probably resist Spanish aggression hence remarks of Spanish Foreign Minister possibly intended to create atmosphere favorable to aspirations of Spain.

Sentiment in Morocco might have been galvanized at the time of armistice had there been appropriate British initiative. In its absence and since Oran incident ⁵⁰ activist tendencies, if they have not completely evaporated, have no leadership.

German advisers, also an Italian, are reported to have established themselves inconspicuously in French Zone.

WHITE

881.00/1754

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 336

CASABLANCA, August 12, 1940.
[Received August 27.]

SIR: Adverting to Mr. Wallace Murray's letter of July 18, I have the honor to forward the following comment on the position now existing here.

⁴⁹ No. 401, July 26, 8 p. m., *supra*.

⁵⁰ British naval action against French naval units at Oran, July 3, 1940; see pp. 469-473.

Attitude of the Pétain Government.

The Protectorate Government will follow any commands it may receive from Vichy, in any domain. It might be that the local authorities would invite Vichy's attention to some of the inconveniences resulting from the latter's orders. As for instance, the aggravation of the refugee problem by the order made on Thursday that males between the ages of 17 and 50 belonging to any of France's former allies would not be permitted to leave the country. But the possibility of more serious opposition can be ruled out.

The attitude of the French local authorities is, for all practical purposes, to follow instructions. There are murmurings of regret emitted from functionaries over actions they are forced to take, and more recently an approval of civilian independence of mind that was not to be observed at first. For instance, the new Civil Controller here, M. Contard, called in the leader of the Jewish community and told him that it had been alleged that Jews were putting up pro-British posters on walls all over the city, and that they all desired a British victory. The Jewish leader denied the first allegation, but admitted that the entire Israelite community, including himself, most ardently wanted a British success which was their only hope. Whereupon M. Contard put his hand on the Jewish leader's shoulder in kindly fashion and said he understood. But he asked him to prevent any public manifestation of Jewish feelings, an entirely superfluous request, instantly acceded to.

The Navy is, on the whole, really loyal to the Pétain Government, because the Navy is, on the whole, anti-British. Perhaps between September 1, 1939 and June 17, 1940, there had not been enough German naval opposition to make the French feel that they belonged to the same team as the British. At any rate, old jealousies, rivalries and traditions had evidently not been done away with during that period. And on July 3 they flared up again with surprising vigor. As far as a state of mind is concerned, the Navy (certainly the high command) has been at war with Great Britain ever since that date, and the precautions thereafter taken around this neighborhood were much more thorough than during the war against M. Laval's good old pals.

When I recently took a naval officer to call upon Admiral d'Harcourt, now in command of this district, the zeal he showed concerning the bagging of any British ship or plane that might come near the place was impressive. Perhaps he felt that in the British Navy, he had adversaries nearer his own size than in the case of the Germans whom a returning French officer, with tears in his eyes, had qualified to me last June as the "Seigneurs de la Guerre". One might be able to soak an adversary of more or less equal size. And it would certainly be very satisfactory to soak someone.

This anti-British feeling is by no means confined to the high command but comes down through the staff to other officers. I consider that a fair verdict would be that the French Navy has allowed its *esprit de corps* to get a complete ascendancy over its care for French interests. Perhaps, however, there will be a change. The other day, Admiral Abrial spoke at Oran in honor of the dead. I am told that he said (it was certainly not so reported in the press) that since the British had given the ships at Oran the alternative of going to the Antilles, and the French had asked the Armistice Commission for permission to accept this offer, a permission which the Commission had seen fit to refuse, there was nothing to do but to die.

The Army is different. It is headed here by General François who is a soldier first, last and all the time. So, I suppose that as such, he would literally carry out any conceivable or inconceivable order given him, and I haven't met any member of the local staff who knows what he really thinks. But there are many members of the staff of the Division around Casablanca who consider the admirals quite mad, who hope that the British will hold, and will thereafter increase their strength so as to be able to take the offensive in conjunction with the Army of North Africa, an offensive which might well begin with a British landing in this very area sometime in 1941 or 1942, and thereafter continue on through Morocco, Algeria and Tunis to Sicily, and thence to Italy, and even beyond. They realize that in order to bring about such a consummation, a great deal of work must be done, especially in the supply of the Army of North Africa with munitions, and they pray that these will be furnished not only by British, but by American factories. Indeed, they hope that British troops will not be alone in landing here in 1941 or 1942, and they are watching our Presidential campaign with the greatest interest. And then, there are more extreme Army officers who laughingly tell you that plots against the security of the State are going to become fashionable under the present régime.

The Air Force, for the most part, shares the Army viewpoint. Today, the guns at Rabat began to go off at noon. A British plane was thought to be up in the clouds somewhere letting leaflets fall. French planes began to tear up into the air, and a soldier, perhaps seeing dismay written on my face, came up to me and said, "that's all right, they won't do any harm to it". And a member of the Diplomatic Cabinet afterwards told me that British planes were quite safe as far as French Army flyers are concerned. Navy flyers were more uncertain. Some of them were positive dangers to the British.

When I talk with private citizens here, I have the impression that I am back in Greece with all its Venezelist and anti-Venezelist bitterness.

And this Supreme Court business ⁵¹ reminds me a lot of the case of M. Gounaris and "the Six".⁵² It will be a great mistake if they condemn, and guillotine or shoot anybody. I should think it would come close to bringing on civil war which would be to nobody's advantage except that of Herr Adolf Hitler. And if something of the kind does not occur, it is evident that more and more Frenchmen are going to reach the conclusion that their interests are bound up with a British victory. I know several cases where men who were highly indignant over Oran a few weeks ago now consider their proper place to be in the British forces.

Respectfully yours,

HERBERT S. GOOLD

881.00/1753 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 26, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received 9 : 55 p. m.]

432. Emmanuel Monick, former French Financial Attaché Liverpool, who occupied a similar post at London until recently, called to say goodbye this morning. He has been appointed Secretary General of French Morocco and is leaving for his post tomorrow. He claims that he is being given a free hand in the administration of the territory as well as with respect to questions of policy. He talked at some length of the need for closer economic relations between French Morocco and the United States, particularly as the former close tie-up between the mother country and Morocco and the growing tendency toward French monopolization of Moroccan trade could under present circumstances no longer continue!

Obviously at the present time France is in no position to continue either as a principal supplier of Morocco or as its leading market. He also talked of the strong independent spirit in Morocco; its chagrin at the armistice and subsequent developments; of the excellent morale of the unbeaten colonial forces stationed there (and his statements in this respect have been fully confirmed to me by other observers including one of our own); and he hinted that British policy toward the Protectorate would, if his plans for the future materialize, be "co-operative". How much of his rather ambitious program Monick will be able to carry out I have no means of telling. It seems worth bearing in mind.

MATTHEWS

⁵¹ The trial of former French political leaders by the Supreme Court set up at Riom.

⁵² Trial and execution of Greek political leaders, November 1922; see *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 411-414.

740.0011 European War 1939/5352: Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, August 31, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received August 31—12:28 p. m.]

106. I see no indication that the example of Chad and French Equatorial Africa⁵³ will be followed here, at least for a long time to come. On the whole, there is no fight left in the local French population although this may change if it becomes convinced that France is to be evicted from Morocco.

The revictualling of France is the principal concern of the Government. The traffic proceeds principally via Oran but the port of Nemours will be improved with a view to increasing the movement which a short time ago amounted to about 725 tons per month. I am now advised that it amounts to 1500 tons daily and includes cereals.

Three French merchant vessels have just finished bunkering and I hear that a convoy is being organized to try to reach Marseille, escorted by destroyers and planes. Three French merchant vessels escorted by six destroyers reached Casablanca from Dakar a few days ago bringing frozen meat and demobilized sailors.

The Government is trying to arrange for the importation of sugar from Brazil and has decided to send a certain De Lazover to the United States to buy gasoline. The Director of Public Works blames the Socony-Vacuum and the Shell companies for the shortage of petroleum products here but the Resident General still fails to give any assurance that Allied tankers coming to Casablanca will not be detained after arrival or that the cargoes will be used exclusively here.

A captain of the French Air Force told me that there are 138 American planes in the Casablanca area while there are 100 special Deutz [*Deutz?*] trucks in the assembling plant here as well as 8 complete Sperry projectors. First orders had been to remove magnetos from the planes but now they were being put back. Under General François who has just been retired, much war material had been taken to the Sahara for concealing which might be brought back as a result of the visit of a certain commander Fournier to Vichy. My informant stated that a German delegation composed of four members is soon to arrive to take charge of disarmament operations.

While the Army and the Air Force are strongly pro-British, I find that the extent to which disarming has already proceeded is making them very pessimistic concerning their prospects of effective cooperation with the British when the latter get ready to assume the offensive.

GOOLD

⁵³ Adherence to the Free French movement of General Charles de Gaulle. For further correspondence on this subject, see pp. 636 ff.

740.00112 European War 1939/1772

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to
the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

No. 19

TANGIER, September 6, 1940.

[Received September 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that in the course of my recent rather hurried trip to certain centers of the French and Spanish Zones (notably Rabat, Meknès, Fez, Marrakech, Casablanca, Larache and Tetuan), I made inquiries on various topics. Probably that of the most general and immediate importance concerned the restrictions upon international trade.

SOURCES OF RESTRICTIONS

The restrictions upon international commerce are of various kinds. There is the ban upon trade between the French and Spanish Zones, which dates from the Dahirs of September 8 and 22, 1936. See despatch no. 1227 of December 5, 1936, and the Department's instruction of January 8, 1937, no. 927.⁵⁴ Though offset to a very limited extent by contraband which, despite agreements between France and Franco for trade renewal, are believed to cover Morocco, this restriction is still maintained rigorously by the French. In support of their action, I have heard the plea made of the necessity of preserving their own stocks. I suspect, however, that General Noguès' anti-Spanish Zone policies are a stronger factor. There are also restrictions, prompted by considerations of scarcity, upon exports from the French and Spanish Zones to that of Tangier. Since the French laid down their arms, the British blockade of the French Zone has loomed larger in the public eye than other kinds of restrictions, and it should not be forgotten that this blockade is supplemented by an Italo-German embargo upon the departure of ships from French Moroccan ports; I believe in virtue of the terms of the Wiesbaden armistice which, however, I have not seen.

UNFORTUNATE EFFECTS

While I do not anticipate actual famine, at least in the French Zone, the cumulative effect of these restrictions upon the economy of the country is deplorable. Inquiries as to the state of business made by me in every place where I stopped, elicited practically the same answer, which most succinctly may be rendered by the word "flat"; and the reason given was also the same, namely the stoppage of imports

⁵⁴ Neither printed.

and exports. (Note: A little business is being done in piece goods, I was sometimes told).

FRENCH RESENTMENT AGAINST THE BLOCKADE

It is of course the blockade which is the most keenly resented by the French. It is a restriction not of their own making; it is causing the Europeans in Morocco great inconvenience, besides working hardship to the natives; it raises many problems for the French Zone administration, and it also enables Frenchmen in Morocco to echo the protests of the Government of Vichy in regard to the blockade of France. Thus, when returning my official call, my French colleague in Tangier treated me to a diatribe on the dreadful famine in store for the inhabitants of this country attributable to *Messieurs les Anglais*—though he also did not fail to insinuate that the Department, by its refusal to apply decrees for the control of stocks to American *ressortissants*, will not be wholly exempt from the prospective guilt.

THE BLOCKADE AS A WEAPON OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA

When I presented my credentials to General Noguès as Foreign Minister to the Sultan, I had not been talking with him five minutes before he expressed the fear that as a result of the blockade, the British would acquire the reputation of being anti-Moslem. To a fresh arrival from India, this statement had a strange ring. Later another official, apparently friendly to the British, furnished the explanation by saying that the Germans were making strong anti-British propaganda among the Moors, which the French could do nothing to stop, and that one of its most important features was the attribution of all scarcity to the British.

As to the effectiveness of this propaganda, native opinion, as far as I was able to sense it, was by no means unanimous. I gathered that the propaganda might be making some headway in the towns, where radios are most numerous, bazaar rumors quickest started, and where the people are relatively sophisticated. To the country folk, I am rather disposed to apply the statement of a business man in a small town, to the effect that these people were not disposed to investigate the ulterior causes of scarcity, but rather resigned themselves thereto with the reflexion that such evils were the will of Allah.

POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES BY REASON OF SHORTAGE

In view of complaints of scarcity, I frequently asked whether disturbances on this account, were to be anticipated. On this point I received the impression that the French are more nervous than the Moors and Jews. The former seemed to think that anything is possible,

whereas most of the natives with whom I talked, expressed the opinion that there would be no disturbances of order worth mentioning.

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SUGAR AND GASOLENE, THE PRINCIPAL SHORTAGE. THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE

I append hereto an incomplete list,⁵⁵ given me by a French economic official at Rabat, of the supplies of which there is considered to be the most urgent need, together with import statistics for the year 1938, which apply to the French Zone. The shortage that is most serious is in sugar and gasoline. Of cereals, vegetables and meat, as far as I am aware, there is no marked scarcity in the French Zone. In the Spanish Zone there is a shortage of cereals and vegetables, especially in the country districts, which is partly made up by distributions from Spain.

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IDLE FRENCH SHIPPING

I was informed by a French economic official that there are 70,000 tons of French shipping lying idle in Casablanca and that this should be sufficient, if allowed free circulation, to keep Morocco supplied.

THE BRITISH ATTITUDE IN REGARD TO THE BLOCKADE OF FRENCH MOROCCO

According to my British colleague in Tangier, all French colonies that follow Pétain and not de Gaulle⁵⁶ are subject to blockade. As regards French Morocco, the British are annoyed at the treatment there of refugees from Gibraltar, at the expulsion of the British Consuls, and at the retention in French Moroccan ports of "British allied" ships of which, according to Mr. Goold,⁵⁷ there are now 23 so detained. He stated that the release of these ships and the return of the Consuls is a *sine qua non* for any blockade relaxations.

Mr. Gascoigne⁵⁸ agreed that the blockade of Morocco was of no advantage to Great Britain, indeed there are certain products of this country which could advantageously be consumed there. He said that he had put out feelers through business men to try to get to terms with the French authorities in the "Protectorat", but so far these had brought no response. In Casablanca I was told that General Noguès had put out feelers for relief from the blockade, in London, through

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of Free French forces.

⁵⁷ Herbert S. Goold, American Consul General at Casablanca.

⁵⁸ A. D. F. Gascoigne, British Consul General at Tangier.

business men, also without result. I suppose that German pressure upon France is sufficient to prevent any concessions by the Protectorate authorities to the British.

Mr. Gascoigne expressed optimism as to the Anglo-Spanish negotiations for relaxing the blockade, and if these are successful, they should help the situation in the International and Spanish Zones.

SURMISE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE AXIS POWERS

In this connection one must assume an interest in embroiling the French with the British; but Moroccan territory does not seem necessary for the consummation of this end. The Axis powers, if they relaxed their embargo upon the sailing of French ships, would presumably wish to make sure that no Moroccan products reached England. When in Casablanca, I asked a member of the Italian Commission for the carrying out of the armistice in the French Zone, whether he thought that Italy would interpose great objections to the release of French ships for Moroccan trade, and he replied that he thought not. The member of the Commission whom I asked was not responsible in the matter, and the Commission as a whole is endeavoring to be as conciliatory to the French as possible. Even so, however, it was something that my informant should not have rejected the idea.

THE BLOCKADE OF MOROCCO SUPERFLUOUS AS A WORLD WAR MEASURE

A glance at the map will show that if Morocco could be considered as the dominion of the Sultan, and not as colonies of European powers, there is no reason why trade should not be permitted between this country and neutral nations outside of Europe. Exports from Morocco to Europe by sea should easily be preventable by ships stationed in the Straits of Gibraltar. Exports to Algeria by rail or truck could be controlled at Oudjda; this control might, I should think, be exercised in the name of the powers controlling the government of the Tangier Zone, or their agents, as amongst these powers are both Great Britain and Italy. There is stated to be enough French tonnage available in Casablanca to keep the country supplied, and if desirable this should be transferred to Moroccan register.

If in the next few weeks France does not go to war with her former ally over the blockade, and French Morocco continues to reject the de Gaulle solution, a real service could be rendered by any neutral power that could bring the belligerents to seeing the futility, from all points of view, of the hardships imposed upon this country by the throttling of its trade. As a condition to any restoration of external trade, it should of course be insisted that the French do away with the restrictions on internal trade between their and the Spanish Zones.

Respectfully yours,

J. C. WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/5420 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, September 7, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received September 8—12:40 p. m.]

114. My telegram No. 106, August 30 [31], 5 p. m. The traffic via Oran has been interrupted. Two versions are current as to the causes. One is that it was a German order made because of the fear of developments in the situation here similar to those which occurred in Chad and in French Equatorial Africa. The other is increasing British naval activity, perhaps related to the fact that it is reported that 40 percent of whatever is landed at Marseille is earmarked for Germany and 20 percent for Italy.

The French steamer *Katiola* carrying frozen meat and white beans reached Bordeaux from Casablanca about a week ago, the captain having orders to scuttle if he fell in with the English, the sanction for failure to comply being the occupation of three additional French towns. The French steamer *Lipari* left today for the same destination also loaded with a cargo of frozen meats and escorted by a destroyer.

The crew to take the *Ville d'Oran* on the mission mentioned in my telegram 109⁵⁹ has not arrived. According to the Director General of the French Line, influential people in the French Government are working to bring about war with England and the changes in the Government announced this morning indicate to him that they are making progress.

If French West Africa follows Chad and French Equatorial Africa, there will be more likelihood of Morocco's joining the movement, and an effective blockade keeping out tea and sugar might well create a native pressure that would be hard to resist.

The London radio broadcast recently announced to Moors that they could have the required tea and sugar if they did the right thing. A British agent is here prepared to arrange the exchange of tea for phosphates.

The Protectorate authorities would like to have Moroccan credits in the United States released so that they could buy gasoline and they would like the British to let a French vessel bring it to Casablanca uncovered by navicert. If these desiderata could be tentatively arranged the Resident General would examine the possibility of giving an assurance that the gasoline would not leave Morocco.

GOOLD

⁵⁹ Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/1710 : Telegram

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to
the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, September 9, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received September 9—7:45 a. m.]

14. The representative for Morocco of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, after conference with General Noguès, has asked me to inquire whether Department would (1) informally approach British Embassy for exception to blockade in favor of French tanker to proceed from Casablanca to Aruba and return with Socony gasoline, kerosene and gas oil, (2) secure authorization payment in New York from blocked French Moroccan balances.

As regards first request, Axis Armistice Commission will not tolerate navicerts but Resident General will give guarantee that there will be no re-export from this country. This request is also being made unofficially in London through influential business interests. The British have arranged a tea shipment to the French Zone. Representative asks that Socony-Vacuum in New York be informed.

I have advised the Department by mail that by reason of its geographical position the trade restrictions and consequent scarcity imposed upon Morocco are in my opinion of no value to either side in this war and might be obviated.

WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/5420 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Casablanca (Goold)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1940—2 p. m.

79. The Department has found your telegrams nos. 106, 109⁶⁰ and 114 very helpful and, in expressing its appreciation of them, hopes that you will continue to keep it informed by telegraph of important developments, supplementing your telegrams by such informative despatches as your No. 336 of August 12.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/1710 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General
at Tangier (White)*

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1940—8 p. m.

47. Your 14, September 9, 10 a. m. You should inform the representative of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company that in view of the

⁶⁰ Telegram No. 109 not printed.

well known attitude of the British Government in this matter the Department considers that it would be useless to transmit his request.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/1752 : Telegram

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, September 23, 1940—9 a. m.

[Received 9:53 a. m.]

3. Rear Admiral Landriau commanding the naval forces of French West Africa has confirmed in writing that American vessels will experience no difficulties in French West African ports on the ground that they are carrying cargoes from or to British West Africa. He stated that he will advise me immediately of any change in policy. It is understood that Portuguese and Japanese vessels are the only others enjoying this privilege. The Admiral requested that no publicity be given this matter because the German Armistice Commission might object.

WASSON

740.0011 European War 1939/5634 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, September 23, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received September 23—4:45 p. m.]

136. A German port commission of five members arrived today for a visit of 2 days after which they will proceed to Dakar.

GOOLD

840.51 Frozen Credits/654

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

No. 35

TANGIER, September 23, 1940.

[Received October 3.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith, copy in the French text and in English translation, of a communication dated September 19, 1940, which I have received from the French Resident General at Rabat, concerning the difficulties attending the Protectorate Government's disposal of its credits held in the United States.

General Noguès appeals to me to obtain from the competent authorities in the United States: (a) the quasi-automatic renewal of a monthly license (as granted in the month of June last) for the liberation of

25% of the blocked credits in America of the State Bank of Morocco; (b) the crediting to free account of all remittances and transfers to that Bank, particularly of an amount of \$918,344 paid into its account by the Federal Reserve Bank; (c) liberation of the transfer to the Moroccan State from the Shereefian Phosphate Office of the latter's funds (about \$2,000,000), which are, in effect, on deposit with the Franco-American Banking Corporation of New York; (d) the unblocking in general of the dollar credits in the United States of other Moroccan individuals and institutions.

Not being familiar with the intricacies of the banking connections in the United States of the Moroccan and French Governments' appendages, I hesitate to express an opinion on the details of this request.

In general, for the present, I favor letting this country have as many facilities for supplying itself with needed goods as possible. Should French Morocco become, to quote the Resident General, "enemy occupied territory," it should not be difficult to re-impose the restrictions which such a situation might call for.

I would, however, suggest that, if it is not deemed feasible to accede to the Moroccan Government's various requests, the Department may find it possible to transmit an explanation of the reasons which account for the apparent inconsistencies in the treatment, by the United States Treasury Authorities, of Moroccan transactions, and thus assist in removing from the minds of the Protectorate Authorities the perplexities of which General Noguès complains in this connection.

Respectfully yours,

J. C. WHITE

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco (Noguès) to the American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White)

No. 2581 S.G.P.

RABAT, September 19, 1940.

MR. MINISTER: I take the liberty to draw your attention to a certain number of difficulties connected with the disposal of Moroccan credits in the United States.

Notwithstanding the blocking of French credits and, by extension, of Moroccan credits in the United States, a special measure was taken by the Department of State in favor of the State Bank of Morocco. The latter obtained from the American Authorities in the month of June the liberation of 25% of the amount of its credits in America, namely, 129,295 dollars out of a total of 517,180 dollars. It further obtained the transfer to free account of the credits which would derive from exportations or from free transfers.

This measure has given rise in practice to various difficulties. In the first place, it is valid only for one month. The renewal of the license requires each time the adoption of procedure which attains results only after a somewhat long delay. For example, the license, granted in the first instance in respect of the period June 28–July 28, was not renewed until August 5. At the date of September 11th, we were still unaware whether the licence which expired on September 5 had been renewed for a new period. If the 345,000 dollars in cheques issued by the State Bank of Morocco on August 20 in payment of American credits are presented for payment in New York before such renewal, they cannot be met.

In the second place, the transfers ordered in favor of the bank encounter a variety of treatments, the diversity of which we are at a loss to explain.

The Bank of France assigns to the State Bank of Morocco in the Federal Reserve Bank, for the payment of our importations of agricultural tractors, industrial chassis, fuel oil and gas oil, round irons (*fers ronds*) \$313,600; this amount is credited to the Bank of Morocco in free account.

The Bank of France assigns to the State Bank of Morocco in the same Bank, for the payment of our importations of mineral oils and greases, gasoline, industrial chassis \$218,334; the Bank of Morocco is credited with this amount in a blocked account.

A further transfer of \$700,000 effected by the Federal Reserve Bank upon the order of the Bank of France has likewise been credited to a blocked account.

The Shereefian Phosphate Office remits to the State Bank of Morocco cheques in dollars, the proceeds of its sales; the Bank of Morocco obtains credit for this remittance in a free account.

An American importer of casings makes a deposit for the account of his Moroccan supplier; credit is given for this deposit in a blocked account.

The Shereefian Phosphate Office, an official organization entrusted with the working of mines which are State property, possesses more than 2 million dollars, which it desires to retrocede to the Moroccan State. These dollars are on deposit with the bankers of the Phosphate Office, the "Crédit Foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie," and the latter have been instructed to pay in to the State Bank of Morocco, and to be placed at the disposal of the Shereefian Government, the following sums:

\$515,160.95
\$374,676.36
\$600,000
\$500,000

The "Crédit Foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie" has these sums in account with the French American Banking Corporation of New York, which has been instructed to transfer these amounts to the account of the State Bank of Morocco in order that the latter may dispose of them for the needs of the Protectorate. Transfer licences have not been forthcoming on the pretext that these amounts are blocked.

The reasons commonly given for the blocking of French credits in the United States should not be applicable to Moroccan credits. Morocco is not, and has not at any time, been occupied by enemy powers. Moreover the entire amount of American credits on Morocco, as known and declared up to date, have been settled.

Morocco has a pressing need of sugar and of tea, for the feeding of the natives, who are large consumers of these commodities, and gasoline for the activity of the country. In view of international political conditions an important part of such goods must be paid for in dollars.

In conclusion, I therefore request you, Mr. Minister, to mediate with the American Government to the end that a quasi automatic renewal be assured of the licence granted in the month of June liberating 25% of the blocked credits; that the Bank of Morocco may obtain credit in free account of all remittances and transfers in its favor, and particularly of \$918,334 deposited for its account by the Federal Reserve Bank; that the 2 million dollars may be retroceded by the Shereefian Phosphate Office to the credit of the Moroccan State; and in order that the question of the unblocking of the dollar credits held in the United States for other Moroccan persons and institutions may receive favorable consideration.

Please accept [etc.]

NOGUÈS

751G.94/185

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1940.

[For the first part of this conversation with the French Ambassador, concerning Indochina, see volume IV, page 146.]

The Ambassador then spoke of the Dakar incident.⁶¹ He stated that he regretted deeply that the British had undertaken this attack against Dakar just at the time when a great deal of pro-British sentiment was manifesting itself in France after the events of the past

⁶¹ Dakar, French West Africa, was unsuccessfully attacked by British and Free French forces September 23-25, 1940.

months. He stated that there was no justification whatever for this attack. I replied that, as the Ambassador well knew, in my own belief the only hope for the restoration of that kind of independent France which the American people for so many generations had admired and respected was through a victory of Great Britain and that if such an anomalous situation were presented as the Vichy Government declaring war upon Great Britain and thus becoming the ally of Germany against her own recent ally, Great Britain, the Ambassador could well imagine what the impact upon American public opinion would be. The Ambassador said he fully understood this and that he did not believe the Vichy Government would take any such action. On the other hand, he said, he hoped that the American people would not sympathize with England in the present British attack on Dakar. To this I remarked that the American people certainly did not believe that the control of Dakar by Germany would be in the interest of the United States, nor in the interest of France. The Ambassador then said that it seemed to him that this British attack on Dakar, if it should be successful, would be the best way to bring Germany down into Africa. I expressed my surprise at this statement on the part of the Ambassador and asked if he really had any illusions that if Germany is successful in the war against Great Britain, she would refrain from moving in concert with Italy into Africa and disposing of the French colonies as she saw fit. To this the Ambassador made no reply. I then asked if the Ambassador could tell me whether there had not been both a German military mission and other German emissaries in Dakar within recent weeks. The Ambassador expressed great surprise and said that he did not believe that there were any Germans in Dakar whatever. I said I would be, of course, very much interested to know whether he could confirm this statement. The Ambassador said that he would obtain this information for me and would communicate it to me later.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/5683 : Telegram

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to
the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, September 24, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received September 24—2:20 p. m.]

20. Whatever the reasons for alleged bombardment of Dakar, e. g., report that it was to become German submarine base, from Morocco standpoint the incident appears unfortunate. It should serve to widen breach between British and French administrations (yesterday Goold was urged at Rabat to do his utmost to prevent Anglo-French inci-

dents) and tends to bring the war nearer Morocco—by way of illustration my colleague of Holland tells me he saw 4 Swastika and 7 Italian planes flying south about 1 p. m. and that his gardener saw others early this morning.⁶²

As the newly appointed Spanish Consul General, late Chief of European Division of Spanish Foreign Office, observed, this war will not be decided in Morocco, it is the fate of this country that will be settled by the future peace conference, therefore it is better that the Atlantic coast of Africa be left quiet.

Spanish businessman just returned from Madrid told Doolittle⁶³ Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had assured him that so long as he remained in office Spain would not enter hostilities.

The Consul General of Spain also said that Suñer's⁶⁴ trip had a purely party (Falangist) significance.

WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/5737 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, September 26, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

24. American Consul General Casablanca, has telegraphed me, but I infer not to the Department, to the effect that the Germans have been prevailed upon to agree to cessation of demobilization in French territory in this country because [apparent omission] do not wish Spanish advance there, also that the French naval forces in Morocco will cease convoying merchantmen and that convoys are returning.

While I am informed that Spanish officers in Tangier have recently been assigned the places they are to take in French Zone, the balance of evidence available does not yet point to an early invasion.

WHITE

740.00112 Navicert/207

The Consul at Tunis (Heisler) to the Secretary of State

No. 523

TUNIS, September 26, 1940.

[Received November 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for such disposition as the Department may deem expedient, copy of a letter dated Sep-

⁶² In telegram No. 36, October 27, 10 a. m., the Consul at Dakar reported that no German airplanes had arrived at Dakar. No mention was made of any Italian planes.

⁶³ Hooker A. Doolittle, First Secretary and Consul of the Diplomatic Agency and Consulate General at Tangier.

⁶⁴ Ramón Serrano Suñer, Spanish Minister of Interior and executive head of the Falangist Party; he became Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1940.

tember 23, 1940, from the Société Tunisienne des Pétroles, Tunis,⁶⁵ in which a request is made for assistance in the granting of "navi-certs" by the British authorities to permit Tunisia to obtain additional petroleum products. The Tunis firm handles the products of the Standard Oil Company in this country, and the firm has been quite insistent in regard to reference to the Department of the request contained in the enclosure.

As pointed out in the enclosure, supplies of petroleum products now in this country are running very low and the local authorities are making every effort to conserve the supplies now on hand. Notwithstanding the efforts of the local authorities, it is not believed that supplies presently available will last more than three or four months.

It is interesting to note that the enclosure points out certain difficulties which may arise in Tunisia when the supplies of gasoline and coal oil are no longer available, such as the inability to continue certain activities in the phosphate and lead mines, farming activities by mechanical means, heating and lighting in various sections, and cooking in a large number of homes, especially in the homes of Arabs where coal oil is used to a very great extent. The local firm fears the outbreak of Arab disturbances when coal oil is no longer available for cooking purposes.

Relative to the assurance of the Tunis firm that no part of any possible supplies received from the United States would be permitted to fall into the hands of the Italians, it is the opinion of the Consulate that complete assurance in this regard is difficult to give at this time, since no one here now seems to be in a position to determine the future policy of the Tunisian Government, which will doubtless be dictated by the Vichy Government. Moreover, there are rumors now circulating in Tunis to the effect that supplies of wheat, barley, and olive oil are being shipped to Gabès, Tunisia, and from there to Libya. If these rumors are true, it is not at all impossible that supplies of petroleum products from the United States might eventually be sent across the border to Libya.

Respectfully yours,

CHARLES H. HEISLER

740.0011 European War 1939/5773 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, September 27, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received September 28—4 p. m.]

143. The navy is greatly elated by its victory at Dakar; the convoy of vessels to Bordeaux and to Marseille is to be resumed; the *Richelieu* now capable of making 18 knots, two cruisers and some destroyers left

⁶⁵ Not printed.

Dakar soon after the British retired and have not yet returned; the third cruiser is here; there has never been such feverish air activity here as now; 24 British subjects taken at random have been interned; more German port commissioners have arrived, and the Japanese Consul has assured a French staff officer that if the British should ever act in Indo-China as they did at Dakar, the French could count on Japanese support.

GOOLD

611.8131/72

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1940.

Mr. Helm ⁶⁶ came in to see me this afternoon on his own initiative and gave me the following oral message:

"His Majesty's Government propose to try to reach an informal agreement with Morocco, by which the United Kingdom would obtain Moroccan phosphate in return for the supply to Morocco of green tea and sugar. Their reasons for making this endeavour are their compelling need of phosphates which otherwise they could only obtain for hard currency or on a much longer ship haul and the political desirability of letting the Arab population of Morocco have essential supplies of tea and sugar.

"The United Kingdom Government proposes, therefore, to arrange through trade channels a deal whereby they would buy phosphate against payment into a blocked account, which would be used only for the purchase of tea and sugar through the United Kingdom. This would prevent the proceeds of phosphate sales from passing to metropolitan France in the form either of foreign exchange or of goods. The United Kingdom Government intend to confine the transactions, so far as possible, to tea and sugar, on the one hand, and to phosphates on the other, though it might be necessary for them to include small quantities of other goods.

"For political reasons the United Kingdom Government propose to let Spain and Portugal obtain supplies of phosphate by payment of sterling into the blocked account referred to above.

"We are asked to inform the State Department in confidence of the above, and to explain that His Majesty's Government feel that some slight elasticity in their blockade of French Morocco is justified, so long as the continent of Europe does not gain in goods or foreign exchange thereby—in this case tea and sugar are particularly safe commodities from the British point of view.

"His Majesty's Government do not, however, wish to exercise such relaxation of their control only in the interests of British trade. This is shown by their willingness to include Spain and Portugal. Moreover, they would be prepared, if the United States Government should so wish, to examine sympathetically any proposals which the United

⁶⁶ A. K. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

States Government might wish to put forward for a limited exchange of goods with Morocco, the legal essential conditions being that no payments should be made to Morocco or France, and that exports to Morocco should be goods which would be consumed there and not passed on to the continent of Europe.

"His Majesty's Government do not at present contemplate any relaxation of the blockade of Algeria and Tunis, which they regard as in a different category from French Morocco, as they are more closely united with metropolitan France and have no Atlantic seaboard."

Mr. Helm then stated that in the event the American Government was interested in arranging some kind of exchange of goods with Morocco he had been instructed to urge upon us the consideration of acquiring olive oil from that country. I commented that we were large purchasers of olive oil, but that most of our purchases came normally from Spain and Italy, and at the present time nearly all of our purchases were coming from Spain. He said that he was aware of the fact that Morocco produced very little olive oil, but that last year they exported 7,337 tons, mostly to continental France, Algeria and Italy. He said that it would be very helpful from their standpoint if the United States could pre-empt as much of this olive oil as possible.

Mr. Helm stated further that he had in the last day or so received an inquiry from Mr. Jesse Smith, Washington representative of the Armstrong Cork Company, who had expressed an interest in purchasing Moroccan cork. Mr. Helm added that Mr. Smith's company would doubtless be interested in any arrangements which we might consider with Morocco.

I received Mr. Helm's oral message and his explanatory comments, and told him that I would bring them to the attention of those officers of the Department dealing with the subject.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

123 W28/266

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1

DAKAR, October 1, 1940.

[Received December 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram number 193 of August 6, 6 p. m., addressed to the American Ambassador at Madrid,⁶⁷ assigning me Consul at Dakar, Senegal, and to report that I arrived at my post on September 15, 1940. The Governor of the Circumscription of Dakar sent his Chef de Cabinet to the ship to welcome me. Representatives of the oil companies and trading firms and several honorary consuls came on board for the same purpose.

⁶⁷ Not printed.

Within a few days of my arrival calls were made on the Governor General, High Commissioner of French Africa, the Governor of the Circumscription of Dakar, the General Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l'Afrique Occidentale Française et de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française, the Rear Admiral, the Secrétaire General, the Directeur de la Sûreté, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the Director of the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale, other officials, and consular colleagues. The Governor General, High Commissioner of French Africa, expressed particular pleasure that the Department had decided to reestablish a consulate at Dakar. He stated that he had not received confirmation of my appointment but that he would accord me provisional recognition and that I might enter upon my duties at any time.

The Governor General expressed the hope that commercial relations between French Africa and the United States would increase. At present France is unable to supply the minimum vital requirements of this Dependency, and it must turn to the United States for petroleum products, coal, foodstuffs, and pharmaceutical preparations. He stated that his Economic Adviser would submit suggestions to the Consulate regarding the manner in which payment can be made for imports.

There is enclosed a clipping from the *Paris-Dakar* of September 21, 1940,⁶⁸ concerning the opening of the Consulate.

Respectfully yours,

THOMAS C. WASSON

740.0011 European War 1939/5773 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1940—2 p. m.

57. Referring to Goold's telegrams Nos. 136, 143, 145 and 147⁶⁹ concerning an increasing control and influence exercised by Germany and Italy in French Morocco the Department will appreciate receiving by telegraph some more detailed examination of the extent and form which that reported control and influence are taking. Such an analysis, which should be prepared by you in collaboration with Casablanca, should include, in addition to any facts in support of Goold's conclusions, any opinions which may be available on those conclusions from responsible sources in Morocco.

HULL

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ Nos. 145 and 147 not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/5960 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 10, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

124. General Weygand⁷⁰ arrived yesterday afternoon to establish headquarters here with a small staff and the title "Delegate General of the (Vichy) Government in French Africa" for the briefly announced purpose of assuring the protection of the French African bloc and furthering its economic prosperity by coordinating the administrative and political action of the Residents and Governors General.

The habitually un-city [*sic*] population received him with unusual apathy and the atmosphere at the official reception was strained.

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/5999 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, October 12, 1940—noon.

[Received October 12—9:08 a. m.]

30. Source of information believed to be reliable and close to Government at Rabat from member of which he [*it?*] is reported that Axis requested Spanish Minister of the Interior not to make trouble in Morocco at the present juncture as Italo-Germans desired to concentrate on Eastern Mediterranean.

WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/6601

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 648

ALGIERS, October 18, 1940.

[Received November 9.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 124, of October 10, 3 PM and to report that General Weygand arrived by air at Algiers on October 9, 1940, to assume the post of "Delegate General of the French Government in French Africa."

[Here follows a description of the official reception given to General Weygand.]

⁷⁰ Gen. Maxime Weygand, formerly Minister of National Defense in Marshal Pétain's Cabinet.

A good deal of curiosity has been evinced as to the motives which led to the General's new appointment and as to the course of action which he will take.

All that is definitely known for the present is that he is making his headquarters at Algiers and is accompanied by a small personal staff. His title suggests that his authority is to be supreme throughout French Africa and that he is likely to combine the functions of inspector and executive. All the rumors that preceded his arrival agreed that he was coming "to organize resistance".

Resistance to what? The question has received no answer. Probably his directives are to base himself on opportunity and the future course of events.

The French Government at Vichy is under control of the enemy but, it is possible that, in spite of the declaration of "loyalty to the conqueror" made by Mr. Baudoin [*Baudouin*],¹ there may be an understanding that an attempt at German or Italian military occupation of French possessions in Africa should be opposed, if there were reasonable chances of success. Or it may be that the General is simply to attempt to moderate the encroaching attitude of the conquerors in Africa and especially of the Italians, who are reported as being much less correct and much more arrogant than the Germans. The fact that his first journey has been to Tunis lends support to this supposition.

Another point of view is that the General has come to smother the fairly silent pro-British attitude of great numbers in Algeria and to restrain those who although inactive and completely silent are nevertheless partisans of de Gaulle. There are a great many of these among all sections of the population, including the armed forces. His task would thus be "to oppose force with force," which seems to have become the fighting slogan of the French Army, Navy, and Air Force, anywhere within reach in French Africa. It is reported as a "known" fact that the Vichy Government has no confidence now in General Noguès, Resident General of Morocco, and that his continuance in office, even though no longer in command of the troops there, is contrary to its official and manifested desires. A role of this sort would accord with General Weygand's missions to Syria to reason with recalcitrant commanders after the Armistice.

Finally, there are whispers, alleged to emanate from Vichy, that in certain favorable circumstances the General himself would assume supreme command in French Africa and once more rally the Empire to a successful campaign, thereby enhancing French military prestige and ousting de Gaulle at the same time. Here it may be noted paren-

¹ Paul Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the French (Vichy) Government.

thetically that Algerians are thoroughly familiar with these whispering campaigns, excellently fitted in any case to lull to sleep any possible more vigorous reactions of patriotism.

Some indication supporting the possible authenticity of this view may be found in a statement recently made to me somewhat unexpectedly and at the speaker's own initiative, by a highly placed official who came to Algeria definitely at the appointment of the Vichy Government as one of the new Governor General's (Abrial's) men. This was to the effect that "France is not finished yet. More will be heard from it later."

In conclusion, after carefully grading my information, I am inclined to believe that the General's policy in French Africa will be at first to oppose both the pro-British and the de Gaulle movements and thereafter will be based on opportunity.

Respectfully yours,

FELIX COLE

611.8131/64

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1940.

Mr. Helm telephoned me and referred to the informal discussion we had had some days previously at a casual meeting concerning the question of trade with Morocco, a question which he had originally raised on September 27 with Mr. Hickerson of Eu.⁷² Mr. Helm stated that the Embassy had telegraphed the British Foreign Office on October 2 stating the question of trade with Morocco under a clearing arrangement was under consideration by the Department. Mr. Helm added that the telegram had stated that the well-known opposition of the American Government to barter or clearing arrangements was an obstacle which would naturally have to be taken into account. He asked me if there was anything more that might be added.

I informed him that there had been a meeting in the Department on October 15 of certain officers interested in the question and that I did not know that there was anything to be added at this time to what he had telegraphed previously. I added that the question was still under consideration.

Mr. Helm stated that in our previous informal discussion of the subject I had suggested that there might be some helpful information which he could furnish us by way of background. I suggested that it would be interesting for us to know what arrangements the British might be making with regard to their own clearing arrangement with

⁷² For memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, see p. 594.

regard to Moroccan trade. Mr. Helm stated that any information he might be able to attain on the subject would be made available when received.

611.8131/63

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1940.

Mr. Helm telephoned and stated the Embassy had had a reply to its telegram of October 2d. He read it to me over the telephone and it was substantially as follows:

"We have no special suggestions to make to the United States Department of State concerning Moroccan trade. We would prefer that agreed quantities of goods for consumption in Morocco be such as would not readily lend themselves to being commandeered for reexport to Europe, such as sugar, tea, soap and cotton goods. Moreover it would be preferable if the principal enemy deficiencies should be avoided, especially mineral oils."

I informed Mr. Helm that the information would no doubt be found useful and would be conveyed to those interested.

Mr. Helm stated he was still awaiting a reply to the further inquiry he had made of London concerning Moroccan trade and he would communicate with me further.

811.79680/3 : Telegram

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, October 20, 1940—11 a. m.
[Received October 21—2:20 a. m.]

28. The Governor General has requested the Consulate to invite American aviation companies interested in transatlantic air services to send representatives to Dakar with a view to making this city the terminus of an air line from the United States. He pointed out that Dakar has all of the facilities required, such as gasoline storage tanks, machine shops, good hotel accommodations, an excellent stretch of water for take-offs. The Governor General stated that he was glad that the Department had decided to re-establish the Consulate and he would welcome an American air service particularly so since it would put an end to all of the British-inspired rumors about Germans and German influence in French Africa. He, a *grand blessé* of the World War, had not driven off the British in order that the Germans might occupy Dakar and he stated that no German or Italian missions would come here.

I do not know whether the Governor General is in a position to make this offer without the approval of Vichy but I do not question his sincerity.

WASSON

740.0011 European War 1939/6208 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, October 22, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received October 23—7:10 a. m.]

171. There is nothing to report here beyond General Weygand's visit on his tour of inspection, the probable early departure of a vessel for England to bring back 6,000 French seamen, and the action of the authorities in ordering refugees into the interior which has caused a new rush of these unhappy people on this office.

But during the last few days I have had talks with Henri Croze, president of the Chamber of Commerce, Pierre Maas, owner of the principal newspapers of the country and Admiral Sable, formerly in command of this naval district. The first two have just returned from Vichy where they saw Marshals, Ministers, Generals and Admirals; Admiral Sable has just returned from a trip to various places in the unoccupied area.

All agree that the French have been astounded by the British resistance; that while right after the formation of the Pétain Government, Britain was expected to last one month, she is now expected to hold out at least long enough to permit American industrial aid to make its weight decisively felt and Admiral Sable, as almost an American (he was formerly Naval Attaché at Washington), expresses the fervent hope that American laws will soon be amended to provide for credits to Great Britain, the use of American ships to carry munitions, and permission for American pilots to join the British Army. Nothing more will be needed, he thinks. Nor will any other possible factor (not even Russia in active opposition) balance the effect produced by these measures.

All three concur in reporting French belief that the morale of the German Army in France is low, by no means ready for the cross channel venture, and all report the vast majority of Frenchmen as praying for a British victory although unable to show any signs of their feeling.

Croze stated that General Weygand has characterized the British performance as "épatant" and Maas assured him that the General fully shares the views expressed in the third paragraph hereof.

Admiral Sable deplored the incredible lack of comprehension on both sides which had brought on the Anglo-French misunderstanding,

the tragedy of the war. He had left Morocco at the middle of June to head a naval mission to London. He had never reached the British capital.

Repeated to Legation and Vichy.

GOOLD

611.8131/74

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 25, 1940.

Mr. Reed,⁷³ whom I have known for some years in the Near East, called and stated that he had just arrived by Clipper from Lisbon, to which he had flown from Tangier, Morocco, on a confidential mission on behalf of the French Protectorate authorities and in the interests of his company.

Mr. Reed stated that he had been asked by M. Monick, Secretary General of the French Residency at Rabat, French Morocco, to proceed to the United States to investigate the possibility of obtaining permission for small quantities of petroleum products to be transported from Aruba in the Dutch West Indies to French Morocco, in return for the export to the United States for American and British consumers of certain minerals such as manganese, cobalt and so forth. Mr. Reed stated that the French Protectorate authorities would be unable, under the terms of the armistice with Germany, to agree to obtain navicerts for any shipments to Morocco but that General Noguès, French Resident General, had given assurances that none of the petroleum products introduced into French Morocco under the arrangement envisaged would be transhipped from that country.

Mr. Reed observed that in his opinion the problem had a political importance transcending the relatively small amount of trade which might be involved. He expressed the view that such an exchange of goods would have the highly desirable end of tending to withdraw French Morocco from its economic tie with metropolitan France and, indirectly, the Axis.

I asked Mr. Reed if the views he had expressed represented in his opinion the views of General Noguès and M. Monick. He answered that, of course, the French Protectorate authorities could not be expected to express themselves so freely but that he had gained the impression that they were sincerely desirous of preventing French Morocco from falling into the hands of the Axis and that, in his opinion, he had been requested by M. Monick to come to the United States with that consideration in mind. In that connection, he men-

⁷³ A. G. Reed, manager of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company in Morocco.

tioned that M. Monick had stated that French Morocco was in a position to sever the link which bound the French Moroccan franc with the French franc and to establish an independent currency.

Mr. Reed added that the French officials in Morocco were in an exceedingly delicate situation. They were obliged to maintain their solidarity with the Vichy Government and to do nothing openly which would invite the intervention in French Moroccan affairs of the Germans.

I asked Mr. Reed what significance he attached to the appointment of General Weygand as Delegate General of the (Vichy) Government in French Africa. Mr. Reed stated he thought it was a reasonable hypothesis that General Weygand had been sent to Africa as a form of insurance by those at Vichy not unalterably opposed to the British with a view to using him as a rallying point for protecting French Africa against German absorption in the event the German demands against France proved too onerous to accept.

I observed that, as Mr. Reed had no doubt read in the newspapers during the past few days, there appeared to be considerable discussion of the imposition by Germany of very onerous conditions on France and that it had even been reported that one of the German demands included the control of French Mediterranean ports by Germany. Mr. Reed agreed that in case such demands were successfully imposed there could, of course, be no question of the British lifting the blockade to permit trade with Morocco.

I suggested to Mr. Reed that the question of obtaining permission for one of the tankers of his company to transport petroleum products from Aruba to Morocco through the British blockade was a matter for discussion by him with the British. Mr. Reed stated that he was already in touch with Mr. Marris, First Secretary of the British Embassy, on the subject with whom he had been put in touch by an intermediary to whom he had been referred by M. Monick.

Mr. Reed stated that, unfortunately, all of his papers, including a statement, given him by M. Monick, of the minerals which might be available in French Morocco for export had been taken from him by the British Censor at Bermuda. The British Embassy had telegraphed the Censor to forward the papers but, as there might be some delay, Mr. Reed asked if the Department would be willing to send a telegram at his expense to our Consulate in Casablanca in order that a duplicate might be obtained from the office of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company there and telegraphed by the Consulate to the Department for communication to him. I stated that we would be glad to do so.

I informed Mr. Reed that there were others in the Department who would be interested in talking with him, including EA,⁷⁴ who had

⁷⁴ Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

under examination the question of Moroccan trade and he was subsequently introduced to Mr. Livesey.⁷⁵

Mr. Reed stated that he had an engagement with Mr. Marris at the British Embassy tomorrow and that thereafter he would call again at the Department to report the results of his mission. I suggested that he inform Mr. Marris that it might be worthwhile for him to see also Mr. Helm.

Mr. Reed stated in conclusion that he thought that the risk the British might run of permitting small quantities of petroleum products to pass into French Morocco for the benefit of Moroccan economy in exchange for Moroccan minerals which might otherwise pass into the hands of Germany would be a small one and was on balance well worth undertaking.

740.00119 European War 1939/534a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1940—1 p. m.

82. The Department has received from the British Foreign Office the following message:

"The following comes from an absolutely sure source.

German peace terms for France:

For Italy: Department of Alpes Maritimes, half Algeria and Tunis.

For Spain: Morocco.

For Japan: Indochina.

For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an internationalized zone from Switzerland to the sea. Naval and air bases in north France for the duration of hostilities. French fleet at the service of the Axis.

A tripartite France-German-Italian mandate over all French colonies and at the moment of the cessation of hostilities the relaxation of colonial conditions imposed on France.

Pétain has refused but his ministers are equally divided."

You are instructed to make every effort to communicate this message personally and confidentially to General Weygand for his information.⁷⁶

HULL

⁷⁵ Frederick Livesey, Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

⁷⁶ The Consul General reported that General Weygand was absent at Dakar but that the message was delivered to him on the night of October 29.

851.01/164 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*ALGIERS, October 28, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received October 29—4:50 a. m.]

137. For the confidential information of Department. Information received from various sources indicates that De Gaulle movement here is not strong enough to declare by itself for Free France but if support in the form of British battleships, varied according to importance of locality, was to present itself before all North African ports including Morocco *coup d'état* supported by eventually local air, army and doubtfully naval forces might be possible if leaders previously informed when ships would appear.

Recent information from the southern territories reports considerable passive disaffection.

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/6285 : Telegram

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State*TANGIER, October 28, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received October 28—3:45 p. m.]

39. Referring to your [*my*] cablegram 38, October 27, 10 a. m. [*p. m.*],⁷⁷ the British Ambassador in Spain has requested my British colleague here to transmit to Marshal [*General*] Weygand at Algiers a message from Winston Churchill, not for the scrutiny of the Government of Vichy. This expressed determination to continue the war and a desire to reach an understanding with France whose [apparent omission] Great Britain had no disposition to sacrifice.

As the representatives of British Foreign Office have been expelled from French North Africa and the post is not to be trusted, the British Minister asked me whether I could help to establish contact with the Marshal [*General*]. I replied that (first) I should have to consult the Department; (second) I cannot communicate with the American Consul at Algiers in cipher.

The Minister had a secret agent to carry this particular missive, but he now anticipates other messages for which he has no other suitable emissaries, he has therefore asked me to get permission to assist him.

Should the Department not object thereto I suppose that desired assistance might take the form of finding a suitable emissary in the French Zone or I might seek out Weygand myself. Again if Weygand

⁷⁷ Not printed.

proved either highly receptive or absolutely cold to Churchill's first advances my aid might not be needed. Possibly restrictions on our code telegrams with Algiers may be now relaxed, which should facilitate matters.

In the event of your being willing to leave the decision to me, I might respectfully suggest that for the sake of the record you merely authorize me to proceed to Algeria and Tunis to investigate desirability of establishing a North African courier service as indicated in the Department's August [*October*] 10, 6 p. m.⁷⁸ No answer to my written inquiries in that respect has so far been received from the Consulates in the above-mentioned countries.

WHITE

851.30/94 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 29, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received October 30—2 a. m.]

139. Reliable source states, "Local high command of naval forces has received a telegram from Admiral Darlan,⁷⁹ 'I need French Fleet kept in complete readiness day and night to save our Empire.' "

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/6286 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1940—4 p. m.

64. Your 39, October 28, 7 p. m. Consul at Dakar reported October 27 that General Weygand had arrived there October 26. Accordingly, there would appear to be no further question of your acting as intermediary.

HULL

611.8131/60

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1940.

Mr. Helm of the British Embassy telephoned and stated he had a further telegram from London on the subject of Moroccan trade. The telegram expressed the hope that, inasmuch as the United Kingdom clearing agreement involved the exchange of green tea and sugar

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ Jean François Darlan, Minister of Marine in the French (Vichy) Government.

for Moroccan phosphates, any clearing agreement we might conclude would not envisage the export of green tea and sugar. Mr. Helm explained that these were "politically important" commodities which would be exported by the United Kingdom to French Morocco in order to keep the native population quiet and that arrangements were being made for exports of these same commodities to Spanish Morocco. I told Mr. Helm that the subject of a clearing arrangement for trade between this country and French Morocco was still under discussion in the Department. I added that Mr. Reed, Manager of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company in Morocco, had called at the Department last week concerning the possibility of such trade involving the importation into French Morocco of small quantities of gasoline and that I understood he had been in communication with Mr. Marris of the Embassy on the subject. Mr. Helm stated he had seen Mr. Marris' minute of his conversation with Mr. Reed but he felt that London would not consent to permitting any imports into Morocco of gasoline which was an "enemy deficiency".

I informed Mr. Helm that I would pass on to the interested officers of the Department the information he had conveyed and that I would let him know as soon as anything had been definitely determined on the subject of the clearing agreement he had proposed.

611.8131/61

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 30, 1940.

Mr. Helm telephoned and read to me a telegram which he had just received from London, reading substantially as follows:

"The United States Government were informed in the first instance of the Moroccan deal in order that they might be given the opportunity, if they chose, of participating in the proposed arrangement.

"The United Kingdom scheme is not progressing as we would have liked, possibly owing to enemy influence with the Moroccan authorities.

"Under these circumstances the United States Government may wish to suspend the taking of any measures looking to the consummation of the proposed arrangement.

"The question is however still being pursued on our part, and if it should appear that there may be any prospect for the consummation of the United Kingdom arrangement we shall not fail to inform the United States Government."

I informed Mr. Helm that in view of the latest international developments we had rather anticipated receiving a communication of this character from him and that the information he had given me would be conveyed to those interested.

740.00119 European War 1939/582

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1940.

The French Ambassador ⁸⁰ called upon me at his request. The Ambassador commenced the conversation by reading to me a communication he had received from his Government in which he was instructed to "protest energetically" to the Government of the United States against instructions sent by the Secretary of State to the American Consul in Algiers ⁸¹ instructing the latter to inform General Weygand of a report which had reached the Government of the United States covering peace proposals made by Hitler to the French Government.

When the Ambassador had finished reading this communication, I asked him to be kind enough to explain upon what ground this protest was based—was I to understand that the French Government protested against the American Consul in Algiers having communicated with a high French authority. I desired to know whether the protest was based upon the objection of the French Government to American officials in French colonies communicating to the French authorities for their information such reports as we might desire to bring to their attention. If that was the case, I said, it appeared to me that the protest was based upon grounds that were absolutely untenable.

The Ambassador quickly interjected to say that he understood the protest was based upon the fact that the information which had been communicated to General Weygand was entirely inaccurate.

I replied to the Ambassador that this Government and its agent, the American Consul in Algiers, had not attempted to vouch for the authenticity of the report and it had been made very clear that the report had been brought to General Weygand's attention solely for his information. The Ambassador then dropped the subject.

I then requested the Ambassador to read to me again the concluding paragraph of the communication he had read to me since I had not been able to understand it clearly at the first reading. This last paragraph contained the categorical and specific declaration on the part of the French Government for communication to this Government that no peace proposals of any kind had been made by Hitler to the French Government.

I asked the Ambassador whether I was to construe this as notification to the Government of the United States that the French Government not only had not agreed to any peace terms with Germany, but also had not received any suggested peace terms from Germany.

⁸⁰ Gaston Henry-Haye.

⁸¹ See telegram No. 82, October 26, 1 p. m., p. 604.

The Ambassador said that this was entirely accurate but that this message which he had read to me was the first word that he had received from his Government in this sense.

I asked the Ambassador whether he did not think it exceedingly strange, when the press of the entire world during the past week had been filled with reports as to the nature of the discussions between Hitler and Marshal Pétain and Mr. Laval,⁸² and when it had time and again asserted that the terms of peace between the two countries were under discussion and had been dealt with in those conversations, and when the French Government was well aware of the tremendous importance which American public opinion attributed to this matter, that his Government should have waited a full week before informing the Government of the United States through him that not only had France not agreed to any peace terms, but that France had never received any suggested peace terms from the German Government.

The Ambassador admitted that it was strange.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/6349 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, October 31, 1940—noon.

[Received 4 : 20 p. m.]

183. I am reliably informed of a conversation between General Weygand and Monsieur Mareaux of the Intelligence Service at Rabat. The General stated that the activities of the said Monsieur must be carried on with the greatest discretion and secretiveness; that the Germans were most anxious to destroy it altogether, and that any manifestation of its activities here would bring on a German occupation. It was the business of Frenchmen to grit their teeth, prepare very quietly and await the opportunity that might come.

I understand that Monick, the new Secretary General will proceed to Vichy in a few days for information and instructions.

Repeated by telegraph to the Legation and Vichy.

GOOLD

740.0011 European War 1939/6359 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, October 31, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received October 31—11 a. m.]

43. Rabat published the following telegram from Weygand to Noguès:

⁸² Pierre Laval, Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 28–December 13, 1940.

"General Weygand warns the populations of French Africa against cunning, ill considerations, and tendentious informations of which the attitude and instructions of the Government are the object in the actual circumstances.

I call upon the Governors and the Residents General to intervene instantly in this sense.

Nothing contrary to the honor and the interests of France and the peoples confided to her has been or can be consented to by a Government of which Marshal Pétain is the chief."

WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/6394 : Telegram

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, October 31, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received October 31 (*November 1*)—10:13 a. m.]

42. General Weygand left this morning by airplane for Conakry. He planned to visit the French West African colonies before proceeding to Algiers next week. He requested me to do everything that I could in order that French Africa may obtain its vital requirements of petroleum products, coal, foodstuffs, and pharmaceutical preparations from the United States.

WASSON

740.0011 European War 1939/6393 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, November 1, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 7:10 p. m.]

47. The following statements emanate from French official source [regarding?] the instructions covering Weygand's mission to Africa: Defence of French colonial possessions particularly Tunisia, Morocco, and Senegal from any aggressor; consolidation (presumably psychological) of those regions; and the maintenance of their loyalty to Vichy. The General is unable to entertain any proposals of an aggressive nature at the present time. (Note this confirms all my previous impressions, namely, that the French authorities in this part of the world are not taking any risks until it is perfectly safe to do so.)

The French Consulate General is so far not disposed to protest against the most [apparent omission] expansion of Spanish protection here.⁸³

⁸³ Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier; see vol. III, section under Morocco entitled "Spanish occupation and control of the Tangier Zone . . ."

Negotiations between France and Spain were initiated several weeks ago in regard to insignificant boundary rectifications of the two zones, maintaining the international status of Tangier, the Sultan's local agent or Mendub to be appointed by Caliph at Tetuan instead of by His Majesty at Rabat, see Article 29 of Statute of Tangier.⁸⁴ I cannot believe that the Spaniards will now be satisfied with such slight territorial acquisitions.

From various sources I hear that rumors of widespread dissatisfaction among Spanish officers in Morocco at the thought of Suñer dragging their country into the war.

WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/6408 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 2, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 4:10 p. m.]

871. From a reliable source I learn that a few days ago a delegation of eight French naval officers from Toulon called on Admiral Darlan. They told him that the navy was fully prepared to defend France and French colonies against all comers but that they could not answer either for themselves or for their men if any attempt were made either directly or indirectly to force officers to "collaboration" with Germany.

From the same source I learn that on Thursday morning Pierre Lyautey, nephew of the famous Marshal and Candace, Deputy from La Guadeloupe, called upon Admiral Platon, the Minister of Colonies, and expressed their anxiety with respect to reports of possible changes in the status of France's African possessions in view of the newly proclaimed policy of Franco-German collaboration. Admiral Platon, said my informant, assured them that as long as he remains as Minister of Colonies there will be no change in the colonial status involving German or Italian participation in their administration. Similarly I understand that General Weygand declined to return to France to participate in the current negotiations; that he reiterated assurances he had formerly given that he would maintain the unity of France's African territories, but not if any German or Italian control or "collaboration" were involved.

The foregoing encouraging reports should serve somewhat to help restrict the limits to which Laval may be able to go. They are a further indication that the "peace negotiations" on the large scale which Hitler and Laval apparently both wished have for time being been blocked.

MATTHEWS

⁸⁴ Convention signed at Paris, December 18, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, p. 541.

862.20281/7 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, November 3, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 7:10 p. m.]

185. There is now here a permanent German delegate controlling the port and shipping movements. He has taken a house very near to this office, and (jokingly, I of course presume) expressed his pleasure to the Commissioner of the administrative police over his fortunate location which would help him and his secretary to keep an eye on the comings and goings here. But, joke or no joke, the Commissioner wants this kept strictly confidential.

Repeated to Tangier.

GOOLD

862.20281/7 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Casablanca (Goold)

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1940—noon.

118. Your 185, November 3, 11 a. m. The Department would be interested in receiving any information you are able to obtain concerning the extent of the control which may be exercised by the German delegate over the port and its traffic and the manner and form of such control.

HULL

611.8131/50 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 6, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

904. My telegram No. 432, August 26, 8 p. m. Monick, Secretary General of Morocco, and his Chef de Cabinet, Marjolin (who was Jean Monnet's assistant in London), arrived in Vichy yesterday and came to see me this morning.

Monick again talked of the importance of closer economic relations between French Morocco and the United States, that Morocco had to look to the Atlantic, et cetera. He then turned to specific questions. He states that in spite of the new policy of Franco-German collaboration he has up to the present complete liberty of action. Negotiations have been practically concluded for the sale of 2,500 tons of cobalt ore to the Japanese. He has he says prevented the shipment of this ore on one excuse or another notably difficulties of receiving payment but says that he cannot continue to block the transaction indefinitely. He states that this cobalt ore is now at Casablanca ready for shipment

and urges emphatically that if possible we purchase it. He would prefer that the transaction be arranged through private interests in order to avoid possible "political difficulties", German objections, et cetera. Negotiations could be conducted through L'Omnium Nord Africaine of which M. Epinat is the principal owner. The ore contains an average of 10 to 12% pure metal. The price offered by the Japanese is \$2.12 per kilo of pure metal or a total of some \$800,000. He suggests that payment could be made by opening a free account for the Banque d'Etat du Maroc with the Franco-American Banking Corporation and definite assurances would be given by him to employ the proceeds for the purchase of products principally sugar and gasoline to be consumed solely in Morocco. As for transportation, which is a difficult problem, he said that there is a French ship—the *Montagel*, he believes—which is sailing for Martinique in 2 or 3 weeks' time on which it could be transported.

While this deal, he said, is one of considerable urgency as his hand may be forced at any moment he considers the whole question of increasing Moroccan-American trade of the greatest importance as a means of maintaining Moroccan "independence". In answer to my questions as to what Laval might have in mind in the way of Franco-German "colonial" collaboration (my telegram 865, November 1, 4 p.m.⁸⁵) he said that as yet he had no information whatsoever. It would however, greatly strengthen his hand and his policy of maintaining a "free" Morocco if he could show that whereas neither Germany nor France could furnish the imports so vital to the country's existence these could be obtained from the United States. He said that he had urged on Reed of the Vacuum Oil Company to go to the United States and endeavor to obtain from his principals some authorization to ship gasoline which is so badly needed in Morocco; he had given the most complete assurances with the authority of the French Government that it would be consumed solely in Morocco. Reed, he said, has been gone a month, and while it was understood that he would telegraph Monick "feasible" or "not feasible", he has as yet received no word.

He said the following products are now available in Morocco some or all of which he hoped could be purchased by American interests: manganese 58,000 tons, of which 30,000 at port; iron ore 90,000 of which 45,000 at port; lead 25,000, of which 17,000 at port; cobalt, including the above 2,860, of which 2,500 at port; zinc 3,310 at port; antimony 180 at port; graphite 50 at port; vanadium 27 at port (he has no figures on stocks at the mines of the last four products).

⁸⁵ Not printed; in this telegram the Chargé reported a press statement by Laval with the following quotation: "In every domain and especially in the economic sphere and the colonial sphere we have envisaged and will continue to examine in what practical forms our collaboration may serve the interests of France, of Germany, and of Europe." (740.00119 European War 1939/560)

I asked as to the probable English attitude with regard to Moroccan-American trade and he said that he did not think that it had been taken up and that it was politically impracticable to have direct Moroccan-British conversations. He felt, however, that with the assurances—and he spoke of control by some American observer—that the products would be consumed solely in Morocco, it was to the British advantage of keeping Morocco free and satisfied; that in case of any unrest or modification in the status of Morocco, the English would presumably not be the beneficiaries. If Morocco could not trade with us, he said, she would probably be compelled to sell her products to Germany; he did not know what plans might be in the wind for such trade but at least for the time being he had not been stopped from trading with us and any hopes in that direction might be helpful in trying to block a deal with Germany.

With reference to my telegram 766, October 17, 9 p.m.⁸⁶ Monick said he knew nothing of the Pellenc project and that Pellenc was not a person to be taken seriously.

As to the political situation he said that sentiment in Morocco was overwhelmingly anglophile; that this included civil officials, the army, the air corps and the natives; the sole exception was the navy which he said remained decidedly hostile to the British. He states that General Weygand and General Noguès (who is due here for a conference Thursday or Friday; Admiral Esteva⁸⁷ has already arrived from Tunis) have made it clear that they cannot accept any German "foot-hold" in Morocco. Although the Spanish have some nine divisions in Spanish Morocco he does not anticipate difficulties in the immediate future on that score.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6595 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 8, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received November 9—12: 52 p. m.]

920. There is no question but that the Government is worried about the position of the African colonies. First of all Laval, echoing the feelings of his German friends, is much annoyed at General Weygand's attitude. The General in an article published in a Moroccan paper the reproduction of which was prohibited in France is reported to have stated that French national honor would permit no abandonment of colonial territory. Weygand has apparently been much impressed upon breathing the free air of North Africa in the probability of a British victory and the spirit of resistance seems to have revived in

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ Jean Pierre Esteva, Resident General of Tunisia.

him—stimulated no doubt by his bitter animosity to Laval (and to a lesser extent to the Marshal who sent him to North Africa at Laval's instance). In fact he remarked that to Monick, the Secretary General of Morocco, as well as to several other people on different occasions that "Laval is like a dog, rolling in the dung of defeat". In spite of the General's personal prestige and fear of his influence in the colonies his position is precarious and I have just learned that he is about to be recalled. Even less secure is the position of General Noguès who has now arrived in Vichy for "consultation". Apparently Laval henchmen are not entirely sure that he will fall in with their plans—whatever they may be—for the colonies or that he would under all circumstances be loyal to Vichy. (The best opinion here is that Noguès is a "political" general and that he will keep his eye pretty well glued to the weather vane.) He will in any event be put on the carpet and his future status seems somewhat doubtful. Admiral Esteva of Tunis as I have reported is likewise here and General Bergeret, the Minister of Air, has been sent to Dakar and North Africa for a personal exploration of the situation.

There is little tangible in the foregoing; it does show, however, that the colonial problem is definitely in the forefront at the moment and much may depend on Laval's current talks with the Germans and the limits of "collaboration" to which the Marshal will agree.

MATTHEWS

611.8131/50 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1940—10 p. m.

706. Your 904, November 6, 5 p. m. You may inform Monick that the Department has received and read with interest the account of his conversation with you and that consideration is being given to the possibility of arriving at some arrangement along the lines suggested by him.

HULL

611.8131/54 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, November 11, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received November 12—9: 08 a. m.]

934. Department's 706, November 9, 10 p. m. I have informed Monick. He is leaving to return to Morocco on Wednesday. He reiterated the need for haste as it seems questionable how long a time he may have the requisite authority and independence of action.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/6699a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Cole)*⁸⁸

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1940—9 p. m.

91. I desire you to see General Weygand at the earliest opportunity and to present to him orally the following.

Refer to the conversation which the General had with the American Consul at Dakar late in October,⁸⁹ at which time he expressed the hope that arrangements could be made for the United States to supply French African territories with certain needed products such as petroleum and drugs. Explain to the General that we have been giving consideration to what steps might be taken to meet that situation, particularly in Morocco and French West Africa. It is our preliminary view that an exchange through trade channels of goods such as mineral ores and olive oil from Morocco and tropical products from French West Africa for such American commodities as may be needed in those territories might be mutually advantageous. Point out that, as the General is aware, it is the policy of the United States Government to afford Great Britain all possible assistance, short of war, in the effort of the British to resist totalitarian aggression and that we would not participate in any plan which would deflect us from that main objective. At the same time we are convinced that only through a British victory can France regain its rightful position both in metropolitan France and in the colonies.

State that we are well aware of General Weygand's patriotism, of his friendly disposition toward this country, as manifested during his two tours of duty in Syria, and of his determination to preserve the French colonial territories in Africa against aggression. Add that we should like to render him such assistance, in an economic way, through an exchange of products, as would result in the improvement of the economic situation in the African territories and their preservation to France. Explain that we have been unable to proceed along these lines because of our lack of definite information in regard to the policies of the French Government concerning the status of the French territories in Africa.

Tell the General that we understand the difficult position in which he is placed, that we should like to assist him, at least from the economic point of view, if that can be done without injury to Great

⁸⁸ Summary of this telegram sent to the Chargé in France as telegram No. 731, November 18, 7 p. m.

⁸⁹ See telegram No. 42, October 31, 6 p. m., from the Consul at Dakar, p. 610.

Britain, and that we would welcome an expression of his views which naturally would be held in strictest confidence if he so desires. Upon the receipt of those views we shall be glad to explore what action may be open to us.

WELLES

611.8131/62

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1940.

I telephoned Mr. Reed in New York prior to his departure by Clipper for Morocco on November 13 and stated that the Department had considered his request that the Consulate at Casablanca be authorized to accept telegrams on the subject of his negotiations with the French Protectorate authorities concerning trade matters, to be transmitted through the Department for the British Embassy in Washington.

Mr. Reed was informed that the questions he had raised in his discussions with the Department on the subject of Moroccan trade were now being considered on a broader basis and that it was not believed that it would be necessary, in view of those circumstances, for the narrower basis of the negotiations to be considered as a practical possibility. It was stated that there was a possibility that the trade arrangements he had envisaged would be considerably broadened and in that case the negotiations would be undertaken directly.

Mr. Reed said that he was very heartened by this news and that he quite understood it in the light of the developments reported in the morning press concerning North Africa.

I suggested that when he returned to French Morocco he see our Diplomatic Agent in Tangier and our Consul General in Casablanca and that of course he would undoubtedly call on M. Monick, Secretary General of the French Residency at Rabat, at whose instance he had come to the United States. I expressed the belief that perhaps by the time he reached Morocco something concrete might have developed and that in such an event he would no doubt learn of it upon his return to French Morocco.

Mr. Reed thanked me for the information, which I stated was given him, of course, in strict confidence, and he added that he felt that if something materialized he would feel that his visit to the United States had been very well worth while.

740.0011 European War 1939/6697 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, November 15, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received November 15—2:15 p. m.]

61. Referring to my 39, October 28, 7 p. m., I hear that Weygand's reception of the Churchill messages was non-committal but not hostile. He evinced particular interest in the question of what armed assistance Great Britain could supply in case he turned activist (as a premature Tangier rumor, presumably based on radio broadcast, claims that he may).

I heard also that Weygand has agreed to collaborate with the Count de Paris⁹⁰ but am ignorant as to whether this signifies a definite royalist orientation on his part. My informant questioned whether De Gaulle and Weygand could work together cordially.

WHITE

123 M 956/282

The Secretary of State to Mr. Robert D. Murphy

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1940.

SIR: Referring to the Department's instruction of this date⁹¹ by which you were directed to return to your post at Vichy, you are now instructed, after your return to your post, to proceed to North Africa and to such other areas as may be necessary to carry out instructions which have been given you verbally.

[Here follows transportation authorization, etc.]

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

740.0011 European War 1939/6724 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, November 18, 1940—noon.

[Received November 18—9:19 a. m.]

63. To my 61, November 15, 4 p. m., should be added that Weygand still insists against doing anything that might embarrass the Pétain Government.

De Gaulle is to return shortly from Africa to London. One of the matters to be discussed with him there is the delicate problem of defining his future position in case General Weygand joined the British.

WHITE

⁹⁰ Bourbon-Orléans Royalist Pretender.

⁹¹ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/6752 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 18, 1940—3 p. m.
[Received November 19—8:09 a. m.]

167. Department's rush 91.^{91a} My 166.⁹² Message was delivered at noon this day. The only comment by the General immediately followed the words concerning the preservation of French African colonies against aggressions when he interposed "and against British aggressions too".

At the conclusion of the short interview he requested that I should convey to the American Government his appreciation of its interest in the matter and indicated he would make an early reply.

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/6790 : Telegram

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, November 19, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received November 20—6:45 a. m.]

65. This morning I called on the Governor General. He opened the conversation by referring laughingly to the many rumors that part of the American Fleet flying the British flag is off Dakar and preparing to attack the city. He stated that he would take steps to have a group of these [war-?]mongers arrested and imprisoned. In reply to a question the Governor General stated that the forces under his command would not attempt to recover the Cameroons or French Equatorial Africa but that every disposition has been taken to defend French West Africa. His military advisers have drawn up plans to meet any eventuality some of which include retaliatory measures against the British colonies. The Governor General requested me to inform the Department that he will do all in his power to keep French West Africa intact, that there is no question of permitting Germans to come here. The Governor General asked me to come to see him frequently because he does not wish the Department to be misinformed by British propaganda.

WASSON

^{91a} November 13, 9 p. m., p. 616.

⁹² Not printed.

862.20281/8 : Telegram

The Consul General at Casablanca (Goold) to the Secretary of State

CASABLANCA, November 20, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received November 21—8:10 a. m.]

207. Your 118, November 6, noon. All movements of vessels from Casablanca are reported by the Admiralty to the German delegate who represents the Wiesbaden Commission here. This was stated to me today by the Chief of Staff who evaded a reply to my question whether Herr Klaube had ever interfered with any departure.

The German delegate lives and works at a hotel, seldom if ever visits the port, and is unknown to the Director of Customs or the agent of the French Line. Herr Klaube told Mayer⁹⁸ the other day that he had little to do and hoped to move south in the near future. He has given up the project of taking a house. He stated that he might be an advance agent for German consular representatives here. He himself had formerly been Consul and Lufthansa representative at Bathurst.

Repeated to Tangier and Vichy.

GOOLD

740.00112 Navicert/276

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1940.

The sugar which entered French Morocco from the French West Indies either entered without British knowledge or it may have been tacitly permitted as a part of a deal in exchange for French permission for phosphates to pass from French Morocco to Great Britain.

We know that the British expressed themselves to us as desiring that we not ship sugar or tea to Morocco when there was under consideration a clearing agreement between Britain and French Morocco. The reason given was that the British wished to reserve these products for their own trade with French Morocco.

It is believed, therefore, that we should keep an attentive eye on any possible efforts to misuse the navicert system to curb arbitrarily American exports to Morocco.

WALLACE MURRAY

⁹⁸ Ernest de Wael Mayer, Vice Consul at Casablanca.

740.00112 Navicert/207

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tunis (Heisler)

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1940.

SIR: The Department has received your despatch no. 523 of September 26, 1940, transmitting the request of the Société Tunisienne des Petroles, Tunis, distributors for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, that the Department intervene with the British authorities with a view to permitting the entry into Tunisia of petroleum products from the United States.

You should inform the Société Tunisienne des Petroles that the British navicert system operates only by the direct and voluntary application of American exporters to the British authorities. This Government is not connected with or responsible for the operation of the system and imposes no obligation upon any exporter to apply for or to refrain from applying for a navicert.

In view of the statement of the Société Tunisienne des Petroles that it has no means in Tunis of getting in touch with the British authorities on this subject, it should be pointed out that the exporter in the United States has facilities for making application for navicerts. Furthermore, you may perform any appropriate notarial services in connection with any applications which the Société Tunisienne des Petroles may wish to forward to the nearest British Consul outside Tunisia, but such transmission should be left entirely to the applicants and no responsibility should be accepted by any American officer for the correctness of statements made in applications or for their transmission.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
HENRY F. GRADY

611.8131/64a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1940—9 p. m.

74. You should seek an interview at once with M. Monick, Secretary General of the French Residency at Rabat, and, in referring to his conversation on November 6, 1940, with the American Chargé d'Affaires at Vichy,⁹⁴ inform him orally that this Government has been concerned for some time with the difficult economic situation of French Morocco arising from the present international situation.

⁹⁴ See telegram No. 904, November 6, 5 p. m., from the Chargé in France, p. 612.

You should add that this Government is prepared to examine sympathetically any concrete proposals of the French Protectorate authorities looking to the amelioration of that situation by an exchange of goods between the United States and French Morocco under suitable guarantees that any goods which might be imported by French Morocco under such an arrangement would be used exclusively in French Morocco.

In your conversation you should make it clear that this Government sympathizes with the efforts which the French Protectorate authorities have been and are making in the face of the difficult situation with which they are confronted and that your Government is ready to endeavor to assist in any practical way in easing that situation so far as may be possible.

With reference to the specific products mentioned by M. Monick as available for export to the United States, it appears possible that manganese, graphite and zinc may be of interest to us. Before reaching any definite decision, however, it is necessary that we be informed of the ore content and price of the manganese, as well as the grade, source and price of the graphite, and whether the zinc is concentrates or slab.

Please endeavor to expedite your reply.

HULL

611.8131/65a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1940—10 p. m.

789. Upon the arrival of Murphy, please bring to his particular attention your telegrams nos. 904 and 934 of November 6, 5 p. m. and November 11, 8 p. m., and the Department's nos. 706 and 731 of November 9, 10 p. m. and November 18, 7 p. m.⁹⁵ Please communicate also to him the following:

"The Department has forwarded by air mail to the Legation at Lisbon an instruction to you enclosing a memorandum⁹⁶ with which it is desired that you acquaint yourself before proceeding to North Africa. As it is understood that you are proceeding to North Africa by way of Lisbon, you may obtain the instruction from the Legation at that time.

⁹⁵ Telegram No. 731, November 18, 7 p. m., not printed, but see telegram No. 91, November 13, 9 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 616, and footnote 88.

⁹⁶ There is no indication in the Department files of such an instruction to Lisbon. However, an unnumbered instruction was sent to Tangier for Murphy, November 27, 1940, enclosing a memorandum dated November 12, 1940, entitled "The Political Implications of American-Moroccan Trade"; merely a detailed summary of political and economic developments in French North Africa, June-November, 1940. (740.0011 European War 1939/7043a.)

At Tangier, you should request the Diplomatic Agent to acquaint you with the Department's telegram ⁹⁷ concerning the interview he was instructed to have with Monick, Secretary General of the French Residency at Rabat, regarding American-Moroccan trade, as well as with the results of that interview.

Before calling on General Weygand in Algiers, you should consult the Department's telegram no. 91 of November 13, 9 p. m. to Algiers. In your interview with Weygand, when, of course, you will refer to the communication Cole was instructed to make to him, you should acquaint him with the general purport of the communication made to Monick by White."

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/6980 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, December 3, 1940—3 p. m.
[Received December 3—10:55 a. m.]

76. My 70, November 28, 1 p. m.⁹⁸ Pétain's personal representative expressed the opinion here that there is no hope of either his principal the Marshal, or Weygand, joining the British, as they are both too old and have not the required initiative.

WHITE

740.00119 European War 1939/483 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White)

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1940—10 p. m.

78. Casablanca's nos. 96 of August 15, 5 a. m.⁹⁸ and 207 of November 20, 7 p. m. The Department would appreciate receiving from you or Casablanca an air mail despatch containing such explicit information as may be available concerning the activities of the Italian Armistice Commission of Control at Rabat and the German Port Delegate at Casablanca. It is the Department's understanding from Casablanca's telegrams that these are the only official Italian or German representatives in French Morocco.

In addition to the air mail despatch mentioned, the Department would appreciate it if Casablanca would continue to report promptly by telegraph the activities of the Italian Commission and the German Port Delegate so far as information concerning those activities may be obtainable discreetly.

HULL

⁹⁷ *Supra.*

⁹⁸ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/7039 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 7, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received December 8—9: 25 p. m.]

182. 1. Reliable reports received that aviators mentioned in my telegram 180¹ were formerly civilian aviators residents of Liberia and were being repatriated by Dakar.

2. Reliable reports received confirming mobilization of aviators for eventual use at Dakar.

3. Rumors from unknown sources that France may eventually attack Italy with the approval of Germany which would undoubtedly meet with approval of majority of persons here including all military, naval and air circles.

4. All sales of military equipment of all types have been suspended and report links this to paragraph 3.

5. Report received of constant friction between French, German and Italian officials over orders of latter which are frequently if not always countermanded upon application to Wiesbaden.

6. Italian passport and customs control now being exercised at Algerian Moroccan and Moroccan Spanish Zone borders.

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/7035 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 7, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received December 8—9: 29 p. m.]

183. My confidential telegram No. 167, November 18; the Department's confidential telegram of November 13, 91. A Secretary of Embassy attached as an aide to General Weygand has just delivered a *note verbale* in reply to my communication of November 18 which, carefully paraphrased to protect the code, reads as follows:

The substance of my message of November 18 was communicated to the French Government.

The French Government having approved in principle the re-establishment of economic exchanges between the United States and French Africa, the General will continue to study the needs of the region and the methods by which such exchanges may be re-established.

The French Government will make a communication direct to the American Government concerning the explanations requested by the latter (end of paraphrase).

¹ December 4, 11 a. m., not printed; it reported that nine German aviators had passed through Algiers returning from Dakar (740.0011 European War 1939/6997).

The Secretary gave me to understand that the last paragraph above was in reference to the American Government's desire for more complete information concerning the position of French African colonies.

COLE

740.00118 European War 1939/22 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 7, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received December 8—6 p. m.]

1103. Your 779, November 30, 5 p. m.² Rochat ³ suggests informally that the Department might wish to send the naval officer in question to Dakar as a Vice Consul detailed to that office. Rochat believes such action would avoid any possibility of embarrassment and would probably better suit the Department's purpose.

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/6997 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Wasson)

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1940—6 p. m.

34. Please comment on report from Algiers that nine German aviators, reported to be members of an armistice commission, have just passed through that city returning from Dakar.

HULL

881.01/93

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1940.

Participants: M. Paul Guerin, Assistant Director of the Moroccan Railways
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling ⁴
Mr. Villard
Mr. Childs

M. Truelle of the French Embassy telephoned Mr. Murray to make an appointment for M. Guerin who was stated to be in this country on a mission for the French Protectorate authorities in Morocco.

² Not printed; it instructed the Chargé to endeavor to obtain permission to send a naval officer as an observer.

³ Charles Antoine Rochat, Acting Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Paul H. Alling, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Guerin upon calling at the Department stated that the situation in Morocco had become quite acute from the point of view of the Moroccan Railways, as well as, of course, from the point of view of Moroccan economy generally. The Railways were without an adequate supply of coal, while there were no work shops in the country or in North Africa which might supply the Railways with equipment which had previously been imported from France or abroad. He had been commissioned to come to this country in order to arrange for a supply of coal, if possible, and he had been asked by M. Monick, Secretary General of the French Residency at Rabat, to look into other possibilities of exchanges of goods between Morocco and the United States.

M. Guerin was asked about the political situation in Morocco and as it related also to France. As a result of a series of questions put to him, he stated that Spain had gone into Tangier on June 12, 1940 to forestall an Italian occupation. Britain and France, of course, preferred Spain in Tangier for the time being at any rate to Italy or Germany, while Germany no doubt preferred to see Spain there rather than Italy. He thought that Spain would endeavor to bite off as much of Morocco as possible, profiting by developing circumstances. There were three lines of advance: (1) the obtainment of the old boundaries of the Spanish Zone which had been promised Spain at one time (1902) (we have had information that Laval is in negotiation with the Spanish looking to their satisfaction along these lines, which would mean but little more than a readjustment of existing boundaries); (2) the extension of the Spanish Zone by a considerably greater extent; and (3) the absorption of all of Morocco and the Department of Oran in Algeria by Spain.

M. Guerin thought that Germany would not permit Morocco to be absorbed under present circumstances by Spain, in as much as Germany itself had its eyes on Morocco.

It was mentioned to M. Guerin that there had been talk that Germany desired to return to the 1909-1911 period in Morocco when it endeavored to bring about a joint Franco-German economic condominium for Morocco. M. Guerin thought this was correct but he thought also that Germany had its eyes on air and naval bases in Morocco which would enable Germany (after the war if the war was won by Germany) to dominate that part of Africa and the Atlantic.

M. Guerin stated that the present situation made it extremely difficult for Morocco. The Railways were running out of coal, stocks of petroleum were running low, as also sugar and tea of which a great quantity was consumed by the natives, and the Moroccan tanning industry was threatened with collapse as a result of an absence of essential chemicals. He did not know what would be the outcome

but he hoped that it might be possible to arrange for certain essential raw materials to be made available to Morocco. The possibility of social disorders could not be excluded if the situation grew worse.

He had succeeded in inducing the British to permit Morocco to obtain about 10,000 tons of coal at the present time from the United States, which would be shipped to Lisbon, there transshipped to Tangier, and exported into French Morocco from that port. This deal had been facilitated because the railways ran in part through Spanish Zone territory and because they had obligated themselves to make part of the coal available to the railways in that territory.

The question of shipping was difficult. There were no regular sailings between Casablanca and Lisbon nor between Tangier and Lisbon. There were occasional sailings of French vessels between Casablanca and Dakar and Casablanca and French metropolitan ports. He did not think that the transport of freight between the United States and Morocco in French vessels was practical as there was the question of navicerts and there was also the possibility that if French vessels attempted to make the run without navicerts incidents would be created with the British which would be unfortunate.

Questioned with regard to Weygand and the position in which he stood with respect to Pétain, M. Guerin stated that it must not be forgotten that Weygand's loyalty as a soldier to Pétain was a matter of honor with him. It was unthinkable that Weygand would go against Pétain unless the former were released by the latter from his obligations.

740.0011 European War 1939/7070 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

VICHY, December 10, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received 1 p. m.]

1110.

I explained to the Minister ⁵ the interest in North Africa which has been awakened in the United States and he eagerly said it was a most hopeful sign and just what France desired.

I remarked that the Department desired me to inspect our Consulates in that area which I planned to do shortly and such a trip would afford an opportunity to view conditions at first hand. Much to my surprise he expressed enthusiasm over the idea and said "We will be glad to put a plane at your disposal to take you where you wish includ-

⁵ Paul Baudouin, Secretary of State at the Presidency of the Council with the prerogatives of a Minister; formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ing Dakar if you desire and we will arrange an interview with Weygand."

If you see no objection I may take advantage of this offer which I believe is made in good faith.

MURPHY

611.8131/66 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 10, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 4: 22 p. m.]

1112. Your 789, December 2, 10 p. m. It now appears that I shall be able to proceed by air from Vichy directly to North Africa. This will afford a considerable saving of time. I will notify the Department of the date of departure.

I am requesting Lisbon to endeavor to convey the memorandum in question to me here or at Casablanca, but as this might not prove practicable I should be grateful if the Department would telegraph the gist of the memorandum to me here.

MURPHY

611.8131/65 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (White) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, December 10, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received December 11—2: 08 p. m.]

79-81.⁶ On the 6th I apprised the Secretary General of the contents of the Department's telegraphic instruction 74, November [December] 2, 9 p. m., and on the 7th he handed me two unsigned memoranda, one general and the other technical, at the same time expressing his lively gratitude to the Department.

M. Monick devoted considerable eloquence to the side of restoring United States-French Moroccan trade, the principle of which has received the approval of the French Chief of State, and which he hopes may develop eventually prewar dimensions. He felt that were French Morocco to resume its transatlantic trade this would be most effective anti-German propaganda for France. He desires trade to be started as soon as possible. The following are the essential provisions of both memoranda as elucidated by verbal explanations:

1. *Moroccan exports to the United States.*

(a) Ores. The North African Omnium has a representative (Henschel, if I am not mistaken) in Lisbon whom the Government of the Protectorate has instructed to represent it on all questions concerning ores. Being under the impression that American exports are also

⁶ Three sections sent as separate telegrams: section I as No. 79; section II as No. 80, December 11, 9 a. m.; and section III as No. 81, December 11, 5 p. m.

going to Lisbon (I gather in connection with Canadian cobalt deals) he suggests that deals be arranged at Lisbon. Meantime the following data has been supplied in reply to the Department's specific question of manganese ores:

(1) 30 to 35 percent poor calcareous: 280 francs f. o. b. Nemours, 33,947 tons available.

(2) 35 percent to 40 percent roasted: 700 tons at 400 francs f. o. b. Nemours.

(3) 52 percent lead 1 percent powdery: 35,795 tons at \$25 c. i. f. United States of America.

(4) Dioxide 72 to 92 percent: 3,063 tonnage, 1,100 francs f. o. b.

(5) 46 percent silicon 15 percent lead .8 percent rock: 14,020 tons selling at \$20 c. i. f. the United States or \$16 f. o. b. Spanish ports.

(6) 49 percent rich rocky ores: 1,070 tons, \$25 c. i. f.

(7) 50 percent rich but much Si: 1,497 tons available, no prices stated.

Zinc ores, concentrates only no slabs and all unroasted—52 to 54 percent: 3,060 tons, 1,500 francs free on board; 48 percent: 500 tons, 1,300 francs free on board; 55 percent with some sulphur: 1,348 tons, 1,500 francs free on board. Graphite is a poor grade of amorphous: 190 tons, 1,600 francs free on board.

(b) Other products. Specially mentioned are vegetable fiber, hides, cork, worked leather, seeds (grains). For these and all other products other than ores, Paul Guerin, agent of the Moroccan Railroad Company, for which he is now in the United States to purchase coal, is suggested as the intermediary. The Protectorate Government would like to have a 6 months' program of American purchases.

2. *American exports to Morocco.*

(a) The Protectorate Government requests that American licenses to export be issued permitting early exportation of the shipments already arranged for as follows: "\$50,000 worth of tin ordered from the United States Steel Export Company, New York; sugar from North American Sugar Corporation \$120,000; ditto from Golodetz and Company 152,000; spare parts for agricultural implements from Ford Motor Company and Champion spark 16,250; total 338,250.["]

[b] Authorization is requested forthwith for a shipment of 13,800 tons of gasoline and gas oil by Socony-Vacuum which has been brought to the attention of the Department already.

(c) The Government of the Protectorate will shortly complete program of American purchases for the first 6 months of 1941.

(d) The undertaking not to re-export is given for all of the foregoing.

(e) All orders for the United States given by businessmen in French Morocco must have import licenses from the local authorities, a copy of which could be given Consulate at Casablanca (as this proviso raises the question of treaty rights I have translated the following from the general memorandum: "It is essential to maintain as far as possible the principles upon which the traditional policy of the United States as well as the juridical statute of Morocco are based", see Department's instruction No. 1066, March 20, 1940⁷).

⁷ Vol. III, section under Morocco entitled "Spanish occupation and control of the Tangier Zone . . ."

3. *Financing.*

(a) For all questions arising under this head, Jean de Sieres, President of the French American Banking Corporation which is the agent of Moroccan State Bank, is suggested as the representative.

(b) At present French Morocco has an unblocked balance in the United States of \$300,000 which about equals purchases already authorized. The release of \$200,000 more is requested to cover cost gasoline above mentioned.

(c) Pending American purchases in Morocco, the payment for which would provide funds, the Government of the Protectorate requests liberation of 500,000 dollars solely for purchases in the United States.

4. *Transportation.*

For oil supplies the Government of the Protectorate is willing to send a French merchant tanker. For other products a neutral ship would be necessary (I gather to prevent the Germans claiming that the British might seize French vessels), the latter would carry nothing but American and Moroccan merchandise and would not touch at intermediary ports. The Department is requested to arrange with the British authorities for some kind of a general authorization granted for its voyages since navy certificates are forbidden by Wiesbaden and insistence upon them would in the opinion of Monick, wreck the whole project.

If any guarantees against non-reexportation additional to what has been noted above and in my despatches 19, September 6, pages 8 and 9^s and 31, September 16,⁹ pages 3 and 4 are required the Department should specify the same.

Reed of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company considers that he and Thayer, Shell manager, could easily and effectively check on petroleum products.

It is suggested that message in regard to the foregoing pass through the Consulate at Casablanca and that there should be no cables *en clair*, Monick does not even trust all of his own clerical staff.

WHITE

740.0011 European War 1939/7074: Telegram

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, December 10, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received December 11—3 a. m.]

95. Reference is made to the Department's telegram No. 34, December 7, 6 p. m. No Germans have been in this city. The report may refer to a group of 19 German nationals from Liberia who left Abidjan by airplane November 28 and November 29 for Germany via Algiers. The Governor General stated that he had every reason to believe that no Germans would come to Dakar, but that he would

^s Portion entitled "The Blockade of Morocco Superfluous as a World War Measure", *ante*, p. 584.

⁹ Not printed.

inform me immediately should there be any change in policy. He expressed himself as optimistic regarding the situation in French Africa. There had not been any interference with French shipping for some time and it appeared that frozen credits in the United States would be unblocked for the payment of gasoline, coal and paper imports. The Governor General read me excerpts from a letter written by Marshal Pétain to General Weygand in which he stated that there was no question of giving Germany air bases or naval bases in Africa.

The Governor General said that he wished to repeat that the French forces in French West Africa would remain on the defensive as long as they were not attacked. I gathered the impression that the British colonies may be invaded should De Gaulle make any further moves in these parts.

WASSON

740.0011 European War 1939/7094: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 11, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

1114. For the Under Secretary. I have had several conversations with Devinat, Director of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Colonies. He is flying to Dakar this morning, enthusiastic over a scheme which he tells me is personal as yet but which is favored by several men in the Government including Baudouin, to develop an autonomous economic setup in the African colonies. He said that the Marshal himself is, he believes, inclined in that direction.

He envisages a plan which generally would create in the French North African areas a coordinated civilian and economic autonomy, even possibly to the extent of issuing their own currency and dealing with all economic affairs directly without reference to Vichy.

He plans to begin by discussing the matter with the Governor of Dakar. Devinat has also discussed with Alan Arragon of Morgan and Company the question of financing exports to Dakar without reference to Vichy and on the responsibility of the Senegalese authorities locally. He points out that this territory is rich in assets including an annual gold production of \$5,000,000.

I believe that with some encouragement Devinat's idea can be developed. Maybe we have struck oil in that connection.

Devinat said he had no confidence in Weygand as an eventual leader of an autonomous or dissident movement in North Africa. He said Weygand has a military mind which moves in a comparatively narrow groove and in any event he is convinced that Weygand will not continue in North Africa much longer.

MURPHY

740.0011 European War 1939/7070 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1940—4 p. m.

831. For Murphy from the Under Secretary. Your 1110, December 10, 10 a. m., and 1112, December 10, 3 p. m. Both the Secretary and I feel that it would be preferable for you not to accept the plane offered to you by Minister Baudouin. We feel it would be more expedient for you to carry out your original plan and proceed to North Africa by commercial transportation. It would seem possible for you to base your refusal of the facilities offered on the ground that your plans and schedule are uncertain and that for that reason you would not wish to make use of a French Government plane for so indefinite a period. [Welles.]

HULL

123 M 956/293 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 18, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received 1:25 p. m.]

1153. For the Under Secretary. I am departing from Vichy on December 18 by commercial plane for Dakar via Algiers. General Weygand now in Dakar will leave there for Casablanca on December 22 and will receive me on December 21. I shall then return to Algiers, thereafter visiting Tunis, Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangier in the order named, planning to spend 2 or 3 days or longer in each place depending on the circumstances.

Matthews in charge.

MURPHY

611.8131/80

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1940.

Participants: Mr. A. K. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy
 Mr. A. D. Marris, First Secretary of the British Embassy
 Mr. Berle
 Mr. Murray
 Mr. Alling
 Mr. Villard

Mr. Berle opened the discussion by stating that we had been endeavoring to study the economic needs of French Morocco and the

question of our trade with that territory, but that our consideration of the question was hampered by the lack of any definite knowledge as to the British policy on letting products leave Morocco and supplies enter from the outside. The time had come, therefore, when it appeared necessary to inquire of the British Government what its attitude was in respect to these matters in order that we might fully understand what action was going to be possible and proper in the circumstances.

As an example of the uncertainty and ambiguity as to the British policy, Mr. Berle cited the reports which we had received to the effect that a triangular agreement had been reached between Great Britain, Spain and Morocco for an exchange of products between the two latter countries. Under this arrangement Morocco was to supply Spain with a quantity of phosphates, 40 percent of the payment for which would be effected by Spain in Spanish products and the remainder in sugar and tea, apparently supplied by Great Britain. It was pointed out that while it thus appeared that Great Britain was undertaking to supply sugar to French Morocco, navicerts were being refused for the shipment of American sugar to the same territory. We considered that this matter required explanation, particularly in view of the importance of our sugar industry and our responsibility toward Cuba in this respect.

Mr. Berle went on to say that the supplying of commodities to French Morocco by British interests appeared to be wholly inconsistent with the British blockade of that country. One could not have a barter agreement and a blockade at the same time, and we would, therefore, like to know exactly what the British position was on the subject of trade with Morocco. Mr. Murray inquired whether it was not desirable from the British point of view to prevent Moroccan economy from collapsing with inevitable repercussions in the Moslem world as well as resulting in an invitation to German occupation, and if so how the blockade could be reconciled with this presumably worthwhile objective.

The reply of Mr. Helm and Mr. Marris to the foregoing observations was, in effect, that they had no information on the subject. The British Embassy had not been informed as to the sugar and phosphate deal and no outline of policy had been received from London as regards French Morocco, except that the blockade was considered to exist. Mr. Marris said that while he personally believed it to be highly desirable to preserve the Moroccan economy and to keep trade alive with appropriate safeguards, he wished he could say that it was the settled policy of his Government. Mr. Helm admitted that the authorities

in London had refused to permit a shipment of coal from the United States for the French Morocco Railways which had been sought here by Mr. Paul Guerin. The question was raised of olive oil shipments from Morocco which importers in this country desperately needed, and Mr. Helm was asked how this could harm British interests. Mr. Helm replied that the British feared a building up of exchange balances by French interests through such exports to the United States. In reply it was pointed out that the interests concerned had volunteered to leave all such exchange blocked in the United States for as long a period as was necessary or desired. In the same way it was mentioned that adequate safeguards had been offered for importations into Morocco from the United States, with a view to assuring that they did not reach the Axis powers. Mr. Helm had no special comment to make on this except to say that his Government was endeavoring by every means within its power to prevent any advantage accruing to the Axis through French Moroccan trade.

Mr. Marris said that representatives of British interests were now meeting in Lisbon with French Moroccan representatives to discuss such matters as shipments of cobalt to Canada. It was possible these discussions might be extended to other commodities. Mr. Berle said that inasmuch as we have tentatively and informally broached to the French Moroccan authorities the question of a limited two way trade with the United States, we would like to know the precise intent of British policy. Both Mr. Helm and Mr. Marris said that the British Embassy would be glad to cable to London at once with a view to obtaining a clarification of this policy, and that the Embassy would inform the Department as soon as it had obtained the desired information.

The subject of the British blockade of Syria and the Persian Gulf area was also brought up, our information being that the British intended to "asphyxiate" Syrian trade and incidentally Syrian trade with the United States. Mr. Helm said he would be glad to endeavor to obtain information on this subject also. Mr. Berle said that we would like to have as much clarification as possible, since it might be necessary for us to consider taking an independent line if British policy remained obscure, and we desired to cooperate.

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Inquiry was made of Mr. Helm whether the British authorities would permit passage of quinine to Dakar in view of the essential need for this product. Mr. Helm said that in his opinion there would be no difficulty whatever about obtaining permission for quinine to pass through the blockade.

123 M 956/294 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 19, 1940—6 p. m.
 [Received December 20—5: 45 a. m.]

1158. Both the French press and the American correspondents here have been told to "play down" Murphy's trip to Africa and to make no reference to any "meeting with Weygand". Fears of German reaction if much publicity is given his movements and mission were likewise expressed to Murphy by the Minister of Colonies and his assistants, who were most cooperative on the evening before his departure.

MATTHEWS

611.8131/78

The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Helm) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1940.

DEAR MR. BERLE: You will recall that at our talk on December 18th¹⁰ with regard to the question of trade with Morocco, I expressed some surprise when I thought you indicated that under your existing regulations the proceeds of exports from Morocco to the United States would have to be paid into a blocked account. I wasn't too certain, as that point is not my immediate concern, so I made enquiries and find that our information as to the present position is that a monthly license was granted about June 28th to the French American Banking Corporation in New York, under which 25% of the amount standing to the account of the Bank of Morocco with the French American Banking Corporation and all sums paid into that account after the 28th June were released from the operation of the Executive Order No. 8389 (as amended).¹¹ It seems therefore that it is only necessary for the proceeds of any exports from Morocco to this country to be paid into this account for them to be at the disposal of the French authorities in Morocco. I understand that similar facilities have been given to all the accounts with New York banks of the Bank of Syria and the Bank of Indo-China.

In London all Moroccan funds are blocked under the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Ministry of Economic Warfare there and our people here who deal with such questions have never been very happy over the difference in the treatment accorded by our two countries to these funds.

I realise of course that in the particular case which we were discussing with you the treatment of the proceeds would be part of the

¹⁰ See memorandum of conversation, p. 632.¹¹ See *Federal Register*, April 12, 1940, p. 1400.

whole question to be examined when we have had the statement of policy from London. This we immediately asked for and we shall naturally let you know as soon as we receive London's reply.

All best wishes for Christmas and the New Year.

Yours sincerely,

A. K. HELM

123 M 956/296 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 27, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received December 27—5:55 p. m.]

197. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. I have concluded a number of interesting conversations at Algiers and Dakar. I shall be in Tunis December 28th to 30th arriving in Casablanca on January 2. Thereafter I shall proceed to Rabat and Tangier. If you approve I shall defer reporting these conversations until after my arrival at Tangier or Lisbon. [Murphy.]

COLE

123 M 956/298 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1940—5 p. m.

108. For Murphy from the Under Secretary. Your 197, December 27, 6 p. m. I agree that your report of the conversations you mention may be deferred until after your arrival at Lisbon unless there is some safe way before then of transmitting your report to the Department. [Welles.]

HULL

**ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL OVER FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA BY
THE FREE FRENCH; NON-COMMITTAL ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED
STATES**

740.0011 European War 1939/4174a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Lagos (Jester)*¹²

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1940—6 p. m.

Department would appreciate receiving by telegraph any information you may be able to obtain in regard to the attitude of the armed forces in French colonial territories toward carrying on the war.

HULL

¹² The same telegram was sent on the same date to the Consul at Leopoldville.

740.0011 European War 1939/4175 : Telegram

The Consul at Lagos (Jester) to the Secretary of State

LAGOS, June 25, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

Your June 24, 6 p. m. Situation in West Africa still obscure even to British officials in Nigeria. Communications difficult through lack of full liaison facilities. While the Governor General at Dakar is reported to have announced 2 days ago the disassociation of the colonies under his jurisdiction from any decisions or control of the Bordeaux Government the Governors of the several colonies have as yet taken no decisive stand with the exception of the Governor of the French Cameroons who follows the lead of the Governor General. Considerations of positions, salaries, source of authority and a tendency to await clarification of position in France are given as reasons for their hesitation. French colonial military forces are reported (Chief Secretary, Government of Nigeria) to be more firmly resolved to carry on the war and it is generally believed that native troops and population are in full agreement.¹³ Political liaison officers were suddenly despatched from Lagos by plane last Friday to the French Cameroons and two military liaison officers were sent there this morning. I believe other nearby colonies are being visited. British officials state they are trying to persuade the French colonies to carry on and in general the will to do so is taking shape probably in association with the French National Committee in London.

No news here of whereabouts of French naval units. As a precautionary measure no Allied vessels allowed to leave for French ports. Air mail to Europe suspended.

I find some concern in official circles over the possibility that Italian pressure on Franco and promise of Gibraltar may bring Spain in which will affect West African situation. Will report later.

JESTER

740.0011 European War 1939/4176 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, June 25, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received June 26—6:26 a. m.]

In reply to the Department's telegram of June 24¹⁴ French military and civil authorities of French Equatorial Africa nearly unanimous in

¹³ The Consul at Lagos reported in telegram of July 1, 3 p. m., that a political officer just returned from tour by air of nearby French territory reported that French military forces were definitely in favor of carrying on the war. (740.0011 European War 1939/4333)

¹⁴ See footnote 12, p. 636.

desire to continue war. The Governor General has informed the British Consul General at Leopoldville in strict confidence that he has telegraphed today all other French Governors in Africa that he is prepared to join in a solid bloc of African colonies to carry on the war regardless of any action taken by the French Government. Many French officers and civilians have expressed a desire of joining the British armed forces should the Colonial Government capitulate.

The Governor General of the Belgian Congo announced today that the Belgian Government has conferred on him full powers formerly vested in the King and Colonial Council and that he will give full support to the British in continuing the fight.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/4861 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, July 26, 1940—8 a. m.

[Received 9:05 a. m.]

With reference to my telegrams June 25 and 29¹⁵ and despatch No. 112, June 29,¹⁶ Pierre Boisson received notice of his appointment as High Commissioner for French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa and left for Dakar July 19 to take up his duties. General Husson named Governor General of French Equatorial Africa and contrary to expectations he has told British Consul General he will support the French Government in carrying out the terms of the armistice and will take orders from Dakar. He has bitterly criticized the British for action at Oran. The attitude of the civil authorities appears to have changed also. All this has greatly disappointed British liaison officers now at Leopoldville who had hoped that the French would cooperate in establishing a line of defense from Dakar to Malakal, Sudan.

The Governor General of the Belgian Congo is maintaining a strong pro-British attitude.

In reply to the Department's telegram of July 23¹⁶ the Portuguese Consul General has been requested to take over Italian interests. He telegraphed his Government in June for authorization but has had no reply.

MALLON

¹⁵ Telegram of June 29 not printed.

¹⁶ Not printed.

848L.00/28 : Telegram

The Consul at Lagos (Jester) to the Secretary of State

LAGOS via LONDON, August 1, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received August 4—9:40 a. m.]

Following from the Governor of Nigeria. While en route recently from Brazzaville to Dakar to assume position of High Commissioner for all colonies in Western Africa Boisson gave a clear indication of intention to avoid antagonizing the British as well as those of his own people who favor opposition to Pétain Government but at the same time rendering lip service to the latter Government and carrying out its official instructions. Together with General Husson now Governor General of French Equatorial Africa and commander of the armed forces therein he believes that the British will win and has objective of keeping French colonies intact. While ordering Governor Eboue (a Martinique colored man friendly to the British and rated high in ability) of Chad territories to sever direct relations by means of liaison officials with Nigeria and to deal henceforth through Husson his instructions to the former were to maintain the best relations possible with the British colonies but to sign nothing and enter into no engagements. He approved Eboue's action in permitting British airways use of field and refueling facilities at Fort Lamy. The loyal Governor of Ivory Coast on meeting Boisson demanded the arrest of the administrator of Upper Volta Province with whom former had quarreled. Boisson refused and gave support to the administrator who immediately issued a proclamation, apparently with the tacit consent of the High Commissioner, declaring the adherence of his territory to De Gaulle.¹⁷

Husson will officially receive the British Consul General only to discuss economic matters but is not privately antagonistic.

Following the recent visit of Admiral Platou (by plane direct from Vichy Government) to the French Cameroons Brunot¹⁸ formerly most staunch ally of British colonies has gone disappointingly sour Governor states and is frightened. He requested withdrawal of His Majesty's Ship *Dragon* (now here) from Duala and refuses to receive military liaison officers.

The Governor confirms my information that older officers of French colonial army hold with Vichy but the majority of younger officers are for cooperation with the British. Without [*While?*] recognizing the danger of repercussion from France to new measures of blockade Governor does not believe there is any immediate danger of overt French action against British colonial possessions, however the situation re-

¹⁷ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French movement.

¹⁸ General Brunot, High Commissioner of the French Cameroons.

mains kaleidoscopic. The French are demobilizing part of armed forces in nearby colonies. Nevertheless plans for compulsory evacuation of European women and children to South Africa in case of need are now before the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Americans would be included unless alternative arrangements were made.

While badly needing markets the French think the British need their produce. British will now reduce purchases in French colonial possessions for a time hoping to develop a more cooperative attitude politically.

The remainder will follow.¹⁹

JESTER

740.0011 European War 1939/5258 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, August 24, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 2:35 p. m.]

Colonel de Larminat, former Chief of Staff under Mittelhauser and now representative of De Gaulle for Africa arrived at Leopoldville August 20, issued a manifesto today to French Equatorial Africa denouncing Vichy Government and urged Frenchmen to join the British. His stand bitterly repudiated by the Governor General of French Equatorial Africa who is becoming increasingly anti-British.

Military mission 27 members, 3 automobiles, 9 trucks, 3 motorcycles en route from England via Capetown, 4 officers arriving August 25. Civil liaison officer from Lagos already here. The British organizing local volunteer corps.

Economic mission consisting of Lord Hailey²⁰ and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade due to arrive in 2 weeks.

Viewed as an effort to fortify the position of the Belgian Congo and to win French Equatorial Africa to Allied cause. The latter definitely unsuccessful so far.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/5291 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, August 28, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received August 28—9:15 a. m.]

Referring to my telegram of August 24, the Governor of Tchad territory has declared for De Gaulle; the British Consul General officially informed that Cameroon took similar action today. Move-

¹⁹ Second and third sections, dated August 2, 11 a. m., not printed.

²⁰ Head of British economic mission to the Belgian Congo.

ment gathering momentum in Brazzaville despite strong opposition of Governor General Husson who has closed traffic between Brazzaville and Leopoldville. Colonel de Larminat still at Leopoldville endeavoring to effect capitulation of Governor General Husson and acquisition of all French Equatorial Africa for De Gaulle. Important developments are expected in the near future. Belgian Congo gaining confidence in British-De Gaulle movement in Africa.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/5299 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, August 28, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received August 28—3:05 p. m.]

Referring to my telegram of this morning, Husson, Governor General of French Equatorial Africa, physically attacked by pro-De Gaulle faction escaped to Leopoldville and has sought refuge with the Governor General of the Belgian Congo. The whole of French Equatorial Africa has now declared for De Gaulle. De Larminat has gone to Brazzaville.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/5334 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, August 30, 1940—noon.

[Received August 30—10:40 a. m.]

Referring to my telegram of August 28 De Larminat appointed High Commissioner of France Libre for French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon. *Coup d'état* effected without bloodshed. Husson roughly handled but unhurt, expects to leave Leopoldville for Dakar as soon as possible. Should I call officially on De Larminat?

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/5334 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon)

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1940—2 p. m.

Last sentence your August 30 noon. The Department desires to avoid as far as possible raising any question of principle in the matter of relations between this Government and the De Gaulle Committee. However, since it is your primary duty to protect American nationals and American interests in French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroon Mandate, you should maintain whatever personal con-

tact may be necessary with local officials for that purpose. You may call informally on the High Commissioner and state orally that you are personally prepared to cooperate with the French administrative authorities for the protection of American nationals and property in the territories under his jurisdiction. You will of course be careful in this connection to refrain from any action or statement which would commit this Government in any way.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/6251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon)

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1940—11 a. m.

The Consulate at Dakar reports that fighting has taken place in Gabon and that airplanes and infantry officers have been sent there as reinforcements. Please comment briefly by telegraph.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/6348 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, October 31, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received October 31—2:35 p. m.]

In reply to the Department's telegram of October 30 all of Gabon except Libreville, Port Gentil, Njole and Lambaréné have joined De Gaulle movement, please see my despatch of September 25.²²

De Gaulle forces surrounded and bombed the 2 inland posts probably about a week ago in attempting to take the 2 seaports which are defended by 2 submarines and a sloop. Attack by sea may be made if naval forces are available. Very little fighting, few casualties and no British troops involved.

Little information available but failure of the expedition would be a severe blow to prestige of De Gaulle.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/6581 : Telegram

The Consul at Dakar (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, November 10, 1940—9 a. m.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

53. In official circles it is stated that the military forces under the command of De Gaulle have completed the occupation of Gabon.

WASSON

²² Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/6612 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, November 11, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received November 12—10:55 a. m.]

Referring to my telegram dated October 31. Libreville taken by De Gaulle forces November 10 by air and sea attack. General Tetu taken prisoner. De Gaulle reports very little bloodshed, insists that no British forces took part, sees possibility of retaliatory measures against Pointe-Noire and Fort Lamy by Dakar troops.

The Governor General of the Belgian Congo gave a very strong pro-British pro-De Gaulle Armistice Day address.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/6712 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, November 16, 1940—noon.

[Received 12:15 p. m.]

The Governor General of French Equatorial Africa reports that Free French forces entered Port Gentil November 15 completing the occupation of Gabon.

Businessmen, lawyers and minor Belgian Congo Government officials have formed "Congo League of Patriotic Action" with a view to exerting pressure on the Government to increase war effort.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/6704 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, November 17, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received 4:15 p. m.]

I have been asked to accompany High Commissioner de Larminat on a visit by plane to Libreville and Port Gentil to witness the effects of the recent bombs. Departure set for early in the morning November 20. Respectfully request Department's advice in time to accept or decline.

De Gaulle left for London today.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/6704 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon)

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1940—6 p. m.

Your November 17, 2 p. m. Department has no objection to your accompanying High Commissioner on proposed trip in a purely personal capacity. Naturally you will be guided in this and in any similar situation in the future by the Department's telegraphic instructions of September 7, in which you were cautioned to avoid any statement or action which might in any way commit this Government.

Please report results of your trip by telegraph.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/6878 : Telegram

The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State

LEOPOLDVILLE, November 26, 1940—noon.

[Received November 26—noon.]

Referring to Department's telegram of November 18. I returned yesterday from visit to Gabon and observed that aerial bombardment Libreville caused slight damage to the hospital which is within 100 yards of wireless station and military headquarters. One 10-kilo bomb which was dropped by plane about to crash struck Catholic Mission causing little damage. Otherwise practically no visible signs of hostilities.

2. At Lambaréné official residency slightly damaged by aerial bombardment. Catholic priest said to have been acting as army chaplain killed by shell while with defending troops.

3. At Port Gentil no shots fired and no bombardment from the air.

4. Except for the Catholic priest no civilians killed or hurt anywhere in Gabon. Former Governor Masson committed suicide after surrender.

5. About 2,000 were engaged in military and naval operations on each side. Free French forces had 16 dead including 4 Europeans and total of 40 wounded. Vichy forces had 25 killed of which 5 were white, total wounded 60. The wounded and the prisoners receiving excellent treatment.

6. The Government of French Equatorial Africa claim that Vichy radio has accused them of bombing civilian population, destruction of property and inhuman treatment of prisoners of war. They want me to refute the charges. I have made it clear that my visit was strictly personal and my observations would be communicated only to my Government.

MALLON

740.0011 European War 1939/6957 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Lagos (Jester)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1940—6 p. m.

Dakar reports French belief that British are planning a thrust against the Ivory Coast from their Gold Coast headquarters at Kumasi to railway at Bouaké. Please telegraph such information as you may be able to obtain discreetly as to size of British forces which might be available for such an attempt.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/7091 : Telegram

The Consul at Lagos (Jester) to the Secretary of State

LAGOS, December 11, 1940—noon.

[Received 7:25 p. m.]

Referring to the Department's telegram dated December 4, 6 p. m., from the standpoint of my interest in the safety and welfare of American citizens in this area, I have discussed with the Governor here the possibility of military operations occurring in West Africa and stated that I have been informed that an expedition into Ivory Coast might soon be undertaken from the Gold Coast. He emphatically denied the existence of any such plans and outlined the policy of the colonial governments and the military commander for West Africa to be: (1) the prevention of any form of German activities in this region, (2) preventing supplies of any kind reaching Germany from French territory, (3) to avoid hostilities if at all possible with the neighboring French colonies, but as regards the latter he observed that one never knew when "the Prime Minister might take the bit in his teeth as he did in the Dakar affair".

However, unusually large stocks of motor gasoline are being accumulated at Takoradi, much of it in small drums and considerable shipments of same are being sent there from Lagos. Missionaries report native troops are being concentrated on the northern border Nigeria in the direction of Zinder and believe British preparing for an offensive on scale to avert another Dakar fiasco. Informed some De Gaulle forces in Cameroon moving to Chad, also some by sea to Port Sudan. Pratt and Whitney representative at Takoradi reports from authoritative French sources which is confirmed by opinion in Duala that Weygand will not return to France and is believed likely to support Free France movement in near future for which contingency British and French appear to be marking time.

Am making discreet inquiries through Americans only regarding size of military forces in the Gold Coast. Will report later.²³

JESTER

²³ Telegram of December 23, 3 p. m., not printed.

**EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE RELEASE BY FRANCE
OF CERTAIN STRATEGIC MATERIALS HELD IN INDOCHINA**

811.20 Defense (M)/47 ½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, June 22, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received June 22—10:20 a. m.]

284. Mr. A. J. Bell, Agent General of the Pekin Syndicate whose company has a marketing agreement for wolfram with the Chinese Government, called on me on the afternoon of June 21 saying that he had been sent by Dr. H. H. Kung²⁴ and Dr. Wong Wen Hoo²⁵ to ascertain whether I could intercede with the Governor General of Indochina to obtain the release by the Indochina Government of an accumulation there of 5,000 tons of wolfram and the same quantity of antimony, which has been held as contraband since last November, and to assist in getting an American vessel to call at Haiphong to ship the ore.

Mr. Bell stated that the French Government had been in negotiation with the Chinese Government since last fall to buy its entire output of wolfram, but had been haggling over the price, trying to buy at the London figure of 60 shillings per ton rather than the New York price of 90 shillings. Recently a cash sale was concluded between the Chinese Government and a former French arms salesman, Jean Audinet, who agreed to purchase the 5,000 tons of wolfram at 85 shillings per ton and left the following day by plane for Hanoi where he was to deposit the cash.

This having occurred over a week ago and the deposit not yet having been made, Chinese officials fear that recent events in France have blocked the deal.

Mr. Bell stated that the Counselor of the British Embassy here had been in communication with London and Hong Kong concerning the question of obtaining the release of the metals but as yet no reply has been received. He said that London had not heretofore indicated a desire to buy them. The Secretary in charge of the French Embassy here had likewise communicated with the Indochina Government but had received no answer as to the position taken by that Government with regard to releasing the metals.

Mr. Bell expected to leave today for Hanoi by plane with letters of introduction to the Governor General to endeavor to secure his agreement to permit the export of the metals to some other country other than Italy, Germany, Soviet Russia or Japan. The metals at present are still the property of the Chinese Government and the antimony is

²⁴ Chinese Minister of Finance and Vice President of Executive Council.

²⁵ Wong Wen-hao, Chinese Minister of Economic Affairs.

said to be unpledged as will be the wolfram if the cash payment therefor is not produced. The Chinese fear the seizure of the metals by the Japanese and desire to get them shipped out as soon as possible, negotiating details of sale afterwards. I undertook only to report the above to Washington and suggested to Mr. Bell that he inform our Consul in Hanoi of further developments after his arrival there.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping. By mail to Hanoi.

JOHNSON

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, June 24, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received June 24—2:34 a. m.]

291. My 284, June 22, 11 a. m. Minister of Economic Affairs informs me that at present Chinese Government has approximately 5,940 tons of wolfram ore, 5,670 tons of antimony, 428 tons of tin and 48 tons of quicksilver in Indochina which Chinese are anxious to move out to Manila or to Singapore. Says they need permit of Governor General at Hanoi and asked me to instruct American Consul at Hanoi to assist in obtaining such a permit. He adds that at Kwangchow-wan the Government possesses 958 tons of antimony. I am informing Minister of Economics that I have no authority to instruct American Consul as he requests but that I have transmitted information to Washington.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping. Hanoi informed.

JOHNSON

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1940—6 p. m.

108. Your 284, June 22, and 291, June 24. Same matter was urgently brought before the Department by K. C. Li, Head of the Wah Chang Trading Corporation, stating that by cable of June 23 he has credentials and authority to sell for the "National Resources Commission" of the Republic of China.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation today agreed to buy for national defense emergency stocks, from the Wah Chang Trading Corporation the 5,940 tons of wolframite (tungsten ore) and the 5,670 tons of antimony regulus (metal) represented by K. C. Li to be stored in, or in transit to, Haiphong.

You may so inform the Chinese authorities.

Department is advising the American Consul at Hanoi of this purchase and making it clear that it is a highly important transaction for national defense and asking him to try to obtain immediately permission from the Governor General for export.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to the Secretary of State

HANOI, June 27, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received June 27—3:40 p. m.]

The Department's telegram dated June 25, 6 p. m.²⁶ I have been informed verbally that the Governor General will release at once the wolfram at Haiphong, about 4,200 tons. Written confirmation promised tonight or tomorrow.

Governor of Hong Kong previously requested release of all ores for shipment to Singapore and the Governor General agreed to release all antimony but no wolfram except that at Saigon, approximately 1,500 tons. A telegram is being sent to Governor of Hong Kong requesting approval to release all antimony (about 5,500 tons at Haiphong and about 400 tons at Saigon) and the wolfram at Saigon for shipment to the United States.

A favorable reply from Hong Kong is expected within a day or so by the Indochina Government.

No Isthmian Line [ships?] are expected to arrive at Haiphong in the near future, and it is suggested that Hong Kong or Manila may be better informed as to ship movements.

REED

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to the Secretary of State

HANOI, June 28, 1940—10 a. m.
[Received June 28—4:28 a. m.]

My telegram dated June 27, 7 p. m. The Chief of the Bureau of Mines has just informed me that last evening just prior to signing a letter confirming the information contained in my telegram to the Department referred to above the Governor General received a telegram from the French Government at Bordeaux instructing him to take no steps in regard to wolfram prior to the receipt of further instructions. Antimony is still released for shipment to Singapore but the telegram to Hong Kong requesting approval of shipment to the United States has not been sent.

²⁶ Not printed; for essence, see Department's telegram No. 108, June 25, 6 p. m., *supra*.

Governor General flew to Saigon early this morning and will return tomorrow. The Department's instructions are requested whether I should represent that the title to ore has passed to the American Government.

REED

811.20 Defense (M)/47⁴₃ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Hanoi (Reed)

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1940—noon.

Your June 28, 10 a. m., and June 27, 7 p. m. The American Government definitely purchased this wolfram and antimony and shipments are to be consigned to an agency of the American Government.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/47⁴₃a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hong Kong (Southard)

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1940—6 p. m.

103. This Government has purchased the entire quantity of Wolframite (Tungsten ore) and antimony owned by Chinese Government now stored in Indochina. The Governor General of Indochina has been requested to release these materials for shipment to the United States consigned to a government agency here. He has informed American Consul at Hanoi that 1500 tons Wolfram at Saigon, 5500 tons antimony at Haiphong, and 400 tons antimony at Saigon had already been released for shipment to Singapore at request of Governor of Hong Kong. The Department was informed that the Governor General is prepared to authorize releases to the United States if the Governor of Hong Kong would approve.

Since the purchase has actually been made by this Government, and a cargo vessel is nearby ready to take these materials off, please request the Governor of Hong Kong to cable his approval directly to the Governor General of Indochina. You may stress the strong desire of this Government to expedite the shipment of these materials.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/47⁴₃a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Bordeaux (Waterman)

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1940—8 p. m.

380. On June 25, the American Government through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation signed contracts for the purchase of all of the wolframite (tungsten ore) and antimony, owned by the Chinese Government, in storage in Indo China. Through American Consul,

Hanoi, Governor General of Indo China was requested to release these ores for shipment to the United States on consignment to a Government Agency to be specified. Governor General informed the Consul verbally on June 27 that all of these ores not already released would be released and the necessary written confirmation would be signed later in the day. Department is now informed by the Consul, however, that on the evening of June 27, and just before the necessary papers were signed, the Governor General received instructions from Bordeaux that no steps were to be taken in regard to wolframite prior to the receipt of further instructions.

These ores have been purchased by this Government to be held indefinitely as national reserves, and this Government would, of course, make any necessary commitment against their reexportation. We feel sure that the French Government will take immediate steps to authorize the release of these ores when they realize they have been purchased by the American Government. Please take this matter up at once with the appropriate authorities, seeking assurance that the necessary instructions to the Governor General will be sent immediately.

This matter is deemed urgent and important by National Defense Commission.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Southard) to the Secretary of State

HONG KONG, June 30, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received June 30—7:05 a. m.]

220. Reference Department's 103, June 28, 7 p. m. [6 p. m.]. Governor of Hong Kong has today telegraphed through British Consul General at Saigon to Governor General of Indochina his approval of shipment of stocks of wolfram and antimony to the United States.

I am telegraphing Reed at Hanoi to get in touch with Bell of the Pekin Syndicate who is handling shipping arrangements at Haiphong as the Governor here has requested me to do so.

Sent to Department.

SOUTHARD

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

LA BOURBOULE, July 1, 1940—noon.

[Received July 2—9:15 a. m.]

4. Telegram No. 380, June 28, 8 p. m. to Consul Bordeaux, repeated here. I took this question of our wolframite and antimony up with

Charveriat ²⁷ this morning. He is sending instructions immediately to authorize release of these ores.

BULLITT

811.20 Defense (M)/47 $\frac{1}{2}$: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

LA BOURBOULE, July 5, 1940—8 a. m.

[Received July 7—9:33 p. m.]

18. My number 12 of July 3, noon.²⁸ The Ministry of Colonies has been discovered²⁹ and Chauvel³⁰ stated yesterday that a telegram ordering the immediate release of our wolfram ore and antimony in Indochina had gone forward.

BULLITT

811.20 Defense (M)/106a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1940—8 p. m.

1746. This Government has purchased approximately 6300 tons of tungsten and 6700 tons of antimony from the Chinese Government, for shipment from Haiphong and Saigon, Indochina, where it has been in storage. The United States vessels, *Puerto Rican* and *Birmingham City*, of the Isthmian Line, will carry these cargoes to the United States; the *Puerto Rican* is now loading and the *Birmingham City* will load during the latter part of the month. Please place this information informally before the appropriate British officials and request that British naval officers be instructed to permit the free movement of these vessels.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/105: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1940—6 p. m.

108. The following telegram dated July 18, 7 p. m. received from Hanoi:

²⁷ Emile Charveriat, Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Foreign Office.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ The Ministry of Colonies was in the process of moving from Bordeaux to Vichy.

³⁰ Jean Chauvel, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the French Foreign Office.

"I have just been informed by the Governor General that a telegram has been received from the French naval headquarters at Saigon to the effect that the French Admiralty in France has telegraphed forbidding the exportation of the wolfram (1200 tons) and antimony (400 tons) seized on the Soviet vessel *Selenga*. The *Birmingham City* sailed from Haiphong today for Saigon to load the above described ores."

In as much as this Government has purchased all of the wolfram and antimony owned by the Chinese Government in storage in French Indochina it is presumed that these purchases include the lots mentioned above. In view of the assurances given you by the French Government (reported in your 18, July 5, 8 a. m.) it is assumed that the reported action of the French Admiralty is due to a lack of knowledge of the situation or some misunderstanding which can be readily clarified by the French Government. Please request that the French Government take the necessary action to free these shipments from any restriction, and that appropriate instructions be sent to the Governor General and the naval authorities in Indochina. Please report by telegraph.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M)/119: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1940—2 p. m.

119. Department's 108, July 18, 6 p. m. The following from American Consul, Saigon, dated July 19:

"Reference is made to Reed's telegram July 18, 7 p. m. relating to ore. French naval authorities at Saigon have just informed me that they have received instructions from French Admiralty to release to the Soviet authorities the wolfram and antimony unloaded from *Selenga* upon evidence of purchase by Soviet Government; Admiralty merely takes the position that cargo discharged from Soviet ship on advice of contraband committee could not be object of sales transaction."

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/119: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to the Secretary of State

HANOI, July 20, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received July 20—3 p. m.]

Reference to my telegram dated July 18, 7 p. m.

1. I am reliably but unofficially informed that the Governor General yesterday received a second telegram from the naval authorities

at Saigon transmitting the substance of a second instruction from the French Admiralty to the effect the Admiralty does not consider the ores discharged from the *Selenga* and *Vladimir Mayakoski* to be the subject of a valid commercial contract and accordingly these ores are to be released to the Soviets.

2. I have been informed but it is not confirmed that a telegram has been drafted for transmission to the French Government at Vichy questioning the advisability of failing to recognize the validity of the purchase by the United States Government, particularly in view of the economic and financial dependence of Indo China upon the United States. The telegram is also said to refer to the fact that as long ago as June 6 (the date of a telegram from the French Minister of Colonies) the ores were specifically mentioned as being included in a valid commercial contract, that of the French merchant Audinet (Chungking's telegram 284, June 22, 11 a. m.). Reference will also be made to a telegram of July 5 from the same source releasing the ores included in Audinet's contract for exportation to the United States.

3. The fact that the new Governor General, my telegram dated today, 8 a. m.,^{30a} is a naval officer may complicate this matter.

4. The Department's instructions are requested.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

REED

811.20 Defense (M)/105 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1940—8 p. m.

127. Department's 108, July 18, 1940, 6 p. m. K. C. Li representing the National Resources Commission of the Chinese Government in the sale of wolframite and antimony to this Government, has received the following telegram from the Chinese Government:

"Cargo in French Indochina absolutely free. *Selenga* cargo already replaced by cargo from Hongkong. She sailed for Vladivostok June 29. Therefore, 1,200 tons wolfram, 400 tons antimony respectively, absolutely no ground for detention. Please advise State Department accordingly."

Mr. Li has now requested the Chinese Government to send to its agents at Saigon the necessary documents supporting its claims, especially the surrender of title by the Soviet Government, with reference to both the *Selenga* and the *Vladimir Mayakoski*.

^{30a} Not printed.

The Department is informed confidentially by the American Consul at Hanoi that the French Admiralty does not consider the ores discharged from the *Selenga* and *Vladimir Mayakoski* to be the subject of a valid commercial contract and accordingly these ores are to be released to the Soviets.

Apparently the present Indochina Government authorities see the force of this Government's position especially in view of the action of the French Government on July 5 in releasing the ores in question as well as others for exportation to the United States and the previous action of the French Government early in June in recognizing these ores as being included in a valid commercial contract with the French merchant Audinet.

This Government expects the French Government to clear up the misunderstanding arising out of the French Admiralty's action and to take the necessary steps to provide for the prompt release of these ores for loading on the American vessel *Birmingham City* which has been sent to Saigon for this purpose and is now due there.

The Department will appreciate at least an interim report immediately.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/131 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 23, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received July 24—7:46 a. m.]

136. Your duplicate 108, July 18, 6 p. m., received today. Foreign Office states that since our 18 of July 5 their investigation of the *Selenga* reveals that this vessel of Soviet registry sailed from China for Manila with cargo on consignment. The eventual destination apparently was the United States. A change in sailing directions, for reasons unknown, resulted in the vessel proceeding to Hanoi. En route, presumably at Hong Kong, it was detained by the British blockade because of suspicion that these ores in its cargo were intended for Germany but it was allowed to proceed. At Hanoi the French blockade detained ship for investigation. Soviet authorities protested and ship was allowed to depart but the cargo consisting of 1200 tons of wolfram, 400 tons antimony and an unknown quantity of tin was detained.

According to the Foreign Office in addition to the claim of our Government another government, whose identity the Foreign Office would not disclose, has also claimed the cargo.

Foreign Office said that they are not at all convinced that the wolfram and antimony in question were purchased by the United States

Government and if there was such a transaction it would not be technically valid under French law because it occurred after sequestration and prior to the release of the merchandise by the French blockade authorities.

The Foreign Office said that the French Government has no interest in these ores but it is merely in the position of an arbitrator wishing to protect itself against claims on the part of other claimants. Also that as the ores were taken from a Soviet ship they should be returned to a vessel of Soviet registry.

I urged that the investigation be terminated at the earliest possible moment making reference to the sailing from Haiphong of the *Birmingham City* and that a decision be taken to release the ores in favor of the American claimant.

The Foreign Office said that it would expedite the investigation and inform us as soon as practicable of the decision taken.

MURPHY

811.20 Defense (M)/105 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1940—7 p. m.

144. The information transmitted in Department's No. 127 should answer all queries in the mind of the French Foreign Office.

Their statement "that they are not at all convinced that the wolfram and antimony in question were purchased by the United States Government" has no foundation whatsoever. It was purchased as reported.

We greatly hope Foreign Office will reach a favorable decision in this matter promptly.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/131 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1940—6 p. m.

147. With further reference to your 136, July 23, 7 p. m. The Department is now informed that the Sino-Soviet agreement covering goods shipped by China provided that the title to such goods remained with China until they reached the Soviet frontier. This would check with information given you by the foreign office that the *Selenga* cargo was "on consignment". The Department understands that both the French and British Governments have been informed of this fact by the Chinese Government.

In view of this fact and of the action of the French Government in releasing these ores in connection with a contract signed between the

Chinese Government and a French citizen on June 10, later cancelled, it is assumed that the French Government does not challenge the Chinese title. This Government is at a loss therefore to understand how the French Government can contemplate releasing these ores to anyone other than the United States since this Government has purchased them from the Chinese Government and the Chinese Government has dealt with no one else.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/135 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1940—7 p. m.

149. Department's 127, July 22, 8 p. m. For your information, the American Consul at Saigon informs the Department³¹ that in his opinion French naval authorities at Saigon will not release the ores discharged from the *Selenga* until specific instructions are received from the French Admiralty. He states that the Chinese Consul at Saigon has been informed by the Chungking Government that this question was taken up with the Government in France by the Chinese Embassy and that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs has authorized the release of the wolfram and antimony purchased by this Government.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/150 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, July 27, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received July 28—2:26 p. m.]

194. Your 127, July 22, 8 p. m. I believe that I have discovered the reason for the French reluctance to release the wolfram and antimony which formed part of the *Selenga* cargo.

Our telegrams 12, July 3, noon,^{31a} and 18, July 5, 8 a. m., were based on statements made by Charveriat and Chauvel of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. According to the officer in the Economic Department who is handling the matter Charveriat and Chauvel spoke without the book and were not in possession of all the facts. This contact told me under stricture that no official use be made of the information that the Soviets insist on delivery of the wolfram and antimony to a vessel of Soviet registry on the ground that: (1) the ores were removed by the French from a Soviet bottom, and (2) all

³¹ In telegram of July 24, 3 p. m., not printed.

^{31a} Not printed.

transactions regarding the cargo concluded during the blockade investigation are null and void under French law.

In strictest confidence my informant went on to say that the French Government is tying up this question with a proposition to the Soviets for the delivery to nonoccupied France of gasoline and rubber. The Soviets apparently have promised an initial delivery of 5,000 tons of gasoline. The French believe that the British blockade authorities will not care to stop such a shipment under the Soviet flag. My contact concluded by saying that as this particular cargo comprised only a small part of the total quantity of these ores in Indo-China the United States would probably not wish to insist on its release.

I made it quite clear that my Government did insist and that our position is unassailable, based as it is on the unreasonable [*unquestionable?*] title of the Chinese vendor. The fact that under French law title may not change during the blockade investigation confers no title on the Soviet claimant.

The Embassy will continue to press for an early adjustment.

MURPHY

811.20 Defense (M)/150 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1940—8 p. m.

173. Your 194, July 27, 4 p. m. It is essential that these ores be released for shipment on the *Puerto Rican* now loading at Haiphong, then proceeding directly to Saigon. If there is any further hesitation to release the ores in question, please state that this Government expects prompt action to clear this matter up since it has been given a clear statement of the Chinese Government's title to the ores and has never received from the French Government any factual statement as to the basis of the contention that the title rests with the Soviet Government.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/163 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1940—6 p. m.

131. The Department has understood that Minister Wong Wen-How [-hao] has informed Mr. K. C. Li repeatedly that the 1200 tons of wolfram ore and 400 tons of antimony removed from the Soviet vessel *Selenga* were included in the Chinese Government's sale of wolfram and antimony to this Government, the title resting clearly with the Chinese Government, and that the Chinese Government would make this position clear to the French Government and to the

authorities in Indochina so that these ores might be released for shipment to the United States.

The Department has received the following telegram from the American Embassy at (Paris) Vichy dated July 30 which seems inconsistent with the above. It will be appreciated if you will clear this matter up with the Chinese Government and advise the Department promptly:

"Wellington Koo ³² who has arrived in Vichy tells me that he never advised the Chungking Government that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had authorized the release of the wolfram and antimony included in the *Selenga* cargo. He states that his advice to the Chungking Government was that all the wolfram and antimony in Indo-China 'with the exception of the *Selenga* cargo' had been released.

Koo confirms that the Soviets insist on the retention of the *Selenga* cargo. He said that his own position in the matter is anomalous because in the beginning he was obliged to insist with the French that the cargo be returned to its Chinese owner and not given to the Soviets. Now his Government wished to favor the Soviets and he was obliged to support the Soviet claim."

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/190 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1940—8 p. m.

235. The text of your 210, July 30 ³³ was communicated to the American Embassy at Chungking with instructions to take the matter up with the Chinese Government. Chungking now replies, dated August 6, as follows:

"In a letter dated August 5 Wong Wen confirms without qualifications that portions of the *Selenga* cargo in amounts given the Department's first paragraph are part of cargo of 5940 tons of wolfram ore and 5670 tons of antimony sold to the American Government. He also states that article 8 of [the Sino-Soviet agreement]³⁴ stipulates that all ores and metals supplied by the Chinese Government shall be delivered at the Soviet frontier; that although the ores were shipped on the *Selenga* for delivery at Vladivostok the Government [has] prevented this and since [they] did not reach the frontier title indubitably remains vested [in] the Chinese Government. Wong states that the Soviet trade representative [at] Chungking Bakou[lin] entirely agrees with the Chinese Government that the latter possesses [title to] the ores in question. The Chinese Government is trying through Ambassador Koo to clear up [the] misunderstanding of the Vichy Government and hopes for early release."

WELLES

³² Chinese Ambassador in France.

³³ See telegram quoted in telegram No. 131 of July 31, 6 p. m., *supra*.

³⁴ Brackets throughout this telegram appear in the original.

811.20 Defense (M)/195 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1940—4 p. m.

140. The American Embassy at Vichy (Paris) has been informed by Wellington Koo that "according to Chungking the Soviet Union has waived claim to the *Selenga* cargo" and reports further that Koo "understood that Moscow would instruct the Soviet Chargé at Vichy accordingly". French officials have advised the American Embassy that if this is the situation, the French Government will give orders for the immediate release of the ores in question.

The Department has not yet been informed however that the Soviet Government has taken any action on the matter and believes it possible that Wellington Koo was misinformed or misunderstood his instructions. Your 382, August 6, 5 p. m.,³⁵ does not indicate that the matter has been cleared with the Moscow Government by the Chungking Government. Please check with the Chinese authorities, report to the Department, and secure if desirable clarifying instructions to Wellington Koo.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/216 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 12, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 3:46 p. m.]

322. Department's 266, August 9, 4 p. m.³⁶ Russian Chargé d'Affaires has now returned from Paris and advises me that he has not received any instructions from his Government to indicate that the Soviet Government has changed its attitude in respect to the wolfram and antimony forming part of the *Selenga* cargo. He understands that the Soviet Government purchased these ores from the Chinese Government fully 4 months ago and that the Soviet Union has never relinquished its title thereto. He said that he would telegraph his Government immediately to ascertain whether any change in this situation had occurred.

Arnal, economic director at the Foreign Office, states that the French attitude remains unchanged, namely, in the absence of an indication from the Soviet Union to the effect that it relinquishes claim the French Government feels obliged to restore the ores to a Soviet bottom.

³⁵ Quoted in telegram No. 235, August 6, 8 p. m., *supra*.

³⁶ Not printed.

Please telegraph whether Oumansky³⁷ has given any indication in this respect.

MURPHY

811.20 Defense (M)/230 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, August 14, 1940—9 a. m.

[Received August 14—9 a. m.]

399. Department's 138, August 10, 2 p. m.,³⁸ and 140, August 10, 4 p. m. I have received two replies from Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs, summarized as follows:

The situation as described in his letter of August 5 has changed. The local Soviet trade representative a few days after agreeing that China still owned the *Selenga* cargo and might sell it to the United States, said he had received notification from Moscow that it must be shipped to the Soviet Union. Wellington Koo has been informed. Wong expressed the view that the Vichy Government would not release this cargo unless the Soviet Government consented.

Instructions have been telegraphed to K. C. Li to ask for the consent of the American Government to reduce the original amounts contracted for sale or to allow the Chinese to make up the shortage later. He greatly regrets the inability of the Chinese Government to carry out the agreement as made. With respect to the tin he confirms that an option to purchase the 318 tons remaining after 100 tons included in the *Selenga* cargo are deducted will be offered to the American Government, which option will be open for 2 months after the arrival of the tin in the United States. Wong asks that the American Government take immediate steps to effect release of this cargo.

JOHNSON

811.20 Defense (M)/236 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 15, 1940—noon.

[Received August 16—3:25 a. m.]

336. Ivanoff, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, called on me today with the advice that his Government has now replied to the inquiry he promised to make (see my 322, August 12, 1 p. m.) regarding the *Selenga* cargo. He said that the reply confirms the interest of the Soviet Union in the wolfram and antimony in question. These, said

³⁷ Konstantin A. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

³⁸ Not printed.

Ivanoff, are urgently needed by the Soviet Union "which is engaged in an intensive effort to strengthen its military defenses for reasons we could divine". He volunteered the assurance that the ores would be used in the Soviet Union and would not be reshipped to Germany. Ivanoff said that the Soviet commercial delegation at Chungking has had recent discussions of the matter with the Chinese Government which approves delivery to the Soviets. (I cannot check this through Wellington Koo who is confined to his bed with grippe.)

MURPHY

811.20 Defense (M)/236 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1940—noon.

341. Your 336, August 15 noon. The Chinese Government has requested that its contract for the sale of wolfram and antimony to this Government be modified so as to release it from responsibility of delivering the wolfram and antimony included in the *Selenga* cargo. This Government feels that under the circumstances it has no choice but to grant this request.

The Chinese Government expects to supply this Government with 1200 tons of wolfram shipped from China as a replacement for the wolfram included in the *Selenga* cargo. In closing the *Selenga* case with the French authorities you are requested, within your discretion, to refer to the intention of the Chinese Government to make this replacement and to request that assurances be given by the Government at Vichy as well as by the Government of Indochina that such replacements may be shipped over the Yunnan Railroad to Haiphong and may be exported from Haiphong to the United States without interference or restriction on the part of the Indochinese Government.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/230 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1940—noon.

148. Your 399, August 14, 9 a. m. Instructions are being sent to American Embassy at Vichy to inform French Government that this Government has consented to a modification of the contract covering the sale to this Government of Chinese wolfram and antimony so that the Chinese Government will have no further responsibility for delivery of the wolfram and antimony included in the *Selenga* cargo. You may so inform Chinese Government.

It is regretted that Chinese Government was not able to carry out the original contract and it is hoped that it will be able to replace the 1200 tons of wolfram involved by shipments from China as promptly as possible. A contract covering such replacements and perhaps further quantities of wolfram is being worked out with Mr. K. C. Li.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M)/265 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, August 23, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 8 : 25 p. m.]

417. Department's telegram No. 341, August 21, noon. The Foreign Office showed obvious relief at the relinquishment of our interest in the *Selenga* cargo. They gave me verbal assurance that neither the Government here nor the Government of Indo-China would place any restrictions on shipment of the 1,200 tons of wolfram in replacement. They stated, however, that they understood that the railroad has been severely damaged and that transport difficulties might make such shipment impossible.

MATTHEWS

811.20 Defense (M)/271 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, August 27, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received August 27—5 a. m.]

427. Department's 148, August 21, noon. The substance of the Department's message was communicated by letter to Wong Wen-hao August 23 and he has replied under date of August 26 that the Chinese Government appreciates consent to modify purchase agreement to exclude *Selenga* cargo and will do its best to replace it. Title to this cargo has been transferred to the Soviet Government and the latter is now sending a chartered ship to Saigon to remove it.

French Embassy states the Soviet assistant commercial representative has been making earnest efforts for several days to obtain visa for journey to Indochina urging important business there. The visa has not yet been granted but the delay has been occasioned by unavoidable official procedure (see my despatch 497, April 2³⁹).

JOHNSON

³⁹ Not printed.

811.20 Defense (M)/318: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, September 12, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received September 12—9:40 a. m.]

461. My 427, August 27, 11 a. m. In a letter dated September 11 the Minister of Economic Affairs asks that I convey to the American Government the grateful and cordial thanks of the Chinese Government for the helpful spirit shown and the practical assistance rendered in the shipment of the Government's stock of minerals in Indochina which has been sent to the United States in four lots.

JOHNSON

**RESERVATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS TREATY RIGHTS
WITH RESPECT TO EXPORT-IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IN FRENCH
MANDATED TERRITORY**

(See under Syria and Lebanon, volume III.)

GERMANY

REPRESENTATIONS BY GERMANY AGAINST THE SURVEILLANCE OF MAIL ARRIVING IN THE UNITED STATES FOR GERMAN CON- SULATES

702.6211/1210

The German Chargé (Thomsen) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

II W XI No. 2

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1940.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to communicate the following to Your Excellency:

According to reports from various German Consulates in the United States of America, American officials have recently tampered several times with the official mail of the German Consulates. In the cases reported to me, the point involved is that post offices, customs officials or their agents have subjected mail for the German Consulates arriving from abroad to surveillance, that is, they have demanded that such mail be opened in their presence and shown for investigation of its contents.

1. The German Consulate General in New York has reported to me that pieces of mail arriving from abroad, addressed to the Consulate General, have been held up by the American postal authorities since about the middle of June of this year. The postal authorities in such cases have sent the Consulate General a notification of the arrival of the pieces of mail, and at the same time a request to send a representative to the building of the Federal Reserve Bank. The letters received were submitted to such representative in the presence of an official of the Post Office Department or the Federal Reserve Bank with the request that they be opened. If the representative of the Consulate General agreed to this request, the letters were turned over to him, after the official of the Post Office Department or the Federal Reserve Bank had examined the contents of the various pieces of mail.

In the case of almost all of these letters, communications of official tenor to the Consulate General from officials of the German Reich were involved; in one case even a diplomatic dispatch from the Foreign Office to the German Consulate General in New York, closed with the official seal, which, if it too was not finally opened, was at least held up.

2. A similar occurrence took place recently in Los Angeles. There too the German Consulate was called upon, and this time, to be sure, by the customs authorities, to send a representative to open letters

received. In the presence of a German official there then took place, at the demand of the American official, the opening of the letters and inspection of the contents of the pieces of mail.

3. The German Consulate in Cleveland received on July 6th a postal card with the request to send a representative to the central post office of that city, in order to receive a registered letter, the contents of which were to be inspected after opening, "in accordance with the known regulations". The opening of the letter was done at the window by the postal clerk on duty, who examined the contents of the piece of mail.

4. In the middle of June, there arrived in Cleveland a registered letter addressed to the German Consul at that place, with a diplomatic dispatch from the German Foreign Office, which had been sent via the German Embassy in Buenos Aires on account of the unsafe and uncertain direct postal route. The German Consul in Cleveland was requested by a postal card to send a representative to the main post office for receiving the mail or to authorize the postal authorities in writing to open the mail. It was stated to the Chancellor of the Consulate, who thereupon went to the post office, that the letter would have to be opened at the Customs Division of the Post Office, under American regulations. The letter was then opened by the customs officers at the main post office in Cleveland and the contents examined by him.

5. In the middle of June a diplomatic dispatch of the German Foreign Office to the Consulate at St. Louis, which bore a seal of the German Government, was held up by the American customs authorities in St. Louis. The customs office stated that it had the right to hold up this piece of mail for the purpose of determining whether its contents had any commercial value. When the Consulate called attention to the contrary provisions of Article XXVII of the German-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights,¹ the official stated that he could first require the Consulate to make application for release to the Department of State, through the Embassy. Not until after long delay did the customs officer give up his arguments and turn over the piece of mail to the German Consulate.

The German consular officers concerned have refrained from refusing to accept the mail that has been held up, merely in order to avoid a considerable disturbance of the work of their offices.

By direction of my Government, I submit the most emphatic protests against these interferences with the official postal communication of the German Consulates in the United States. It is a generally recognized principle resulting from the mutual acceptance of consular officials (that is, official representatives of a foreign government in one's own national territory), that the consulates cannot be subjected, in their official communication with the authorities of their own state, as well as with private persons inside and outside the country, to any surveillance in the form of a search of their mail. That is a

¹ Signed at Washington December 8, 1923, *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 29, 43.

natural prerequisite for the performance of the duties entrusted to them, which they perform with the consent of the country to which they are admitted. That this principle is valid also according to the American view is shown by the statement in the work by Julius J. Puente: *The Foreign Consul—His Juridical Status in the United States*, in which it is stated under the heading of "Inviolability of official mail":

"As the organ of a foreign power in commercial and administrative matters a consul has the undoubted right to communicate with the governmental agencies of his state. So long as the communications are of an 'official' character, this right is held to be inviolable.["]

"The official mailbags and pouches of a consular officer are inviolable; also the communications exchanged between the diplomatic and the consular officers of the appointing state."

"One of the objects of the institution of consuls being to watch over the rights and interests of his citizens or subjects wherever the pursuits of commerce may draw them, or the vicissitudes of human affairs may force them, it is but natural that the consul should have the right to communicate freely and inviolably with his nationals within the consular district over which he presides. The denial of this right would hamper the consul considerably in any effort to determine whether the common or conventional, personal and proprietary rights or interests of those nationals have been violated. To take from this class of correspondence the stamp of inviolability, would, moreover, offer the local authorities the opportunity, whenever the exigency of the situation required it, to intercept any communication tending to disclose abuse and injustice on their part."

Without the recognition of the inviolability of the official mail of a foreign consulate, the exercise of its official functions would be prejudiced most decidedly.

I have been instructed by my Government to declare that pieces of mail intended for the American Consuls in Germany are not subjected to any examination or search and that the American Consuls receive all mail without inspection. In this connection I have pointed out that the consular privileges under Article XVII, paragraph 2, of the German-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of October 14, 1925,² are granted reciprocally, that is, on the assumption of reciprocity. The action of the American authorities against mail arriving from abroad and intended for the German Consulates in the United States would therefore justify corresponding action of the German authorities with regard to the foreign mail of the American Consulates in Germany. Further, in the above-mentioned paragraph 2 of Article XVII, all rights, favors, exemptions and immunities are granted to the consular officers of

² This was the date of exchange of ratifications of the treaty signed December 8, 1923.

the two contracting parties that are enjoyed by the officers of the same grade of the most favored nation. In this connection it is to be remarked that the Order of the Secretary of the Treasury of June 6, 1940, which the American postal and customs authorities have invoked in the cases discussed above, in holding up and searching official mail of the German Consulates, was expressly declared by the Secretary of the Treasury not to be applicable to France, Great Britain, Canada, Bermuda and Newfoundland. The most-favored-nation treatment of the German Consulates in the United States provided by paragraph 2 of Article XVII is therefore violated, as the postal communication of the consulates of the above nations existing in the United States with their home country remains without surveillance. It is further violated so far as any foreign consulates receive the mail addressed to them from abroad without inspection.

The fact that among the pieces of mail held up by the American postal and customs authorities and in some cases even opened by them there are also diplomatic dispatches of the Foreign Office to German Consulates, which were plainly indicated as such by the official seal of the Foreign Office, also makes the interference of the American postal and customs authorities a violation of diplomatic immunity.

By direction of my Government I therefore take the liberty of expressing the hope that the American Government will take the necessary steps to stop the tampering of the American postal and customs authorities with mail addressed to the German Consulates in the United States. I should be grateful to Your Excellency if I were promptly favored with a communication regarding this, which I can transmit to my Government.

Accept [etc.]

THOMSEN

702.6211/1210

The Acting Secretary of State to the German Chargé (Thomsen)

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1940.

SIR: I refer to your note of July 12, 1940, in which you state that there has been interference by American postal and customs officials with mail addressed to German consular officers in the United States. Reference is also made to my preliminary reply of July 31, 1940.³

I am informed that instructions have been issued providing that under General Ruling No. 5 of the Treasury Department, dated June 6, 1940, there shall be no examination of the following: (1) Sealed letters addressed to a consular officer by his Government or by a diplomatic officer or another consular officer of his Government and bearing

³ Not printed; it stated that the German note was being transmitted to the appropriate authorities for consideration.

the official seal of his Government; (2) official consular pouches; and (3) packages addressed to a consular officer bearing the official seal of his Government and accompanied by certificates under such seal to the effect that they contain only official communications or documents. These exceptions apply alike to the consular officers of all nations. In no event are officials of this Government authorized to read mail in connection with the administration of General Ruling No. 5.

Accept [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT
TO ITS TREATMENT OF AMERICAN MOTION-PICTURE INTERESTS
IN GERMANY AND IN GERMAN OCCUPIED AREAS

840.4061 Motion Pictures/33

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary
of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1940.

Mr. Hays⁴ called from California to say that he had received a letter we sent him several days ago containing Kirk's report⁵ of the barring of American films from Germany and occupied areas. He said that it now applied to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and the 20th Century-Fox. It was not now applicable to Paramount but he thought it probably would be. Prior to the receipt of our communication he had asked Burt New to discuss with the Department the possibility of the American Government taking steps in retaliation. Germany, he said, was still sending films to the United States and they were exhibited in certain theaters in New York and Milwaukee. He said they were not in very great volume but they are enough to keep up the distribution of the German picture industry and were worthwhile from the point of view of Germany and were somewhat remunerative. He saw no reason why something should not be done in retaliation and asked whether we would consider it. He did not want to make a request that it be done until the matter had been informally explored and the Department had come to its own conclusions. He said that he would answer the letter and would accept the invitation in it to communicate his views on the subject matter but that he would not do it immediately and would deliberately consult the presidents of all the moving picture industries in order that he might have a careful and comprehensive report to make of their opinions.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

⁴ Will Hays, president of Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc.

⁵ Telegram No. 3654, August 20, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in Germany (Kirk) was enclosed, in paraphrase, in letter to Mr. Hays of August 22; neither printed.

840.4061 Motion Pictures/33

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1940.

Colonel Herron, representative of Mr. Will Hays and the motion picture industry came in at his request. I told him that I thought we had better wait until Mr. Hays returned to New York and until after he had had all of his conferences with the presidents of the companies; then he could talk with us. I told him we would be glad to cooperate to any legitimate and reasonable extent in making representations to sustain the rights of American interests in Germany and German-occupied territory. Colonel Herron doubted that they would ask retaliation. He thought retaliation would not affect a large German interest in this country. He said he personally hated to see the propaganda films which the Germans were exhibiting here, particularly on the east side of New York. However, they had little circulation. Even though he disliked to see films of that kind imported and shown in the United States, he was of the opinion that to exclude them would be insignificant in importance as compared with the damage that had been caused by German action against the American moving picture interests in German-occupied territory.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

840.4061 Motion Pictures/35a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1940—7 p. m.

2732. The motion picture interests have requested the Department's assistance and support in the protection of their interests in the occupied areas. We have endeavored to obtain reports from those areas with regard to the actual situation, but the information so far received is not at all complete. However, we do know in broad outline what is happening to the industry and have available certain specific details. Essentially the situation is that the companies are not permitted to operate in these areas and are denied possession of their properties including positive and negative prints and access to their books, and over and above this there has been confiscation of certain prints. Our information indicates that the activities of the Germans in this respect is directed principally against American interests. The American industry feels that it should be permitted to continue operation in the occupied areas if such privilege is permitted any other motion picture interests, including the German. They maintain that their property should be returned to the actual possession of their

representatives with the privilege to export or dispose of this property in such manner as they deem appropriate. On the basis of the information available to the Department, it would appear that the Germans have been acting in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner with respect to American-owned film property in the occupied areas, and in view of the outstanding importance of the industry here we do not feel that we can allow this treatment to continue without presentation to the German Government of vigorous representations in the matter.

You are requested to take up this whole question informally with the appropriate authorities, and endeavor to work out with them some feasible and effective means of obtaining appropriate protection of the interests involved. If response which you deem satisfactory is not made within a reasonable time, report by telegram to the Department.

While we of course anticipate difficulty in getting any agreement on the part of the German authorities to permit our interests to continue functioning unmolested in the occupied areas, we should be alert to reserve our position and not admit any right on the part of the German authorities to confiscate without compensation property belonging to American nationals. If the German authorities are not prepared to let our motion picture interests continue to carry on business, we shall at least expect them to return all film prints improperly seized to the companies. If such protection is denied by the German authorities the sooner we know it here the better so that steps may be taken to file official representations against such treatment with the German authorities and prepare sufficient evidence of loss sustained to substantiate future claims.

HULL

840.4061 Motion Pictures/41: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, October 30, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received October 31—12:15 a. m.]

4515. Department's 2732, October 15, 7 p. m. The complaints of the American motion picture interests were taken up informally on October 25 with the competent official in the Propaganda Ministry. The official alleged that there was no ban against the American film industry but only against the individual American motion picture companies which produce "anti-Nazi" pictures which are defined in the pertinent German decree as films having "a tendency of effect injurious to German prestige". He added that Universal Picture Company was being allowed to continue operations in the Netherlands. It was quite apparent from the conversations that his Ministry

has no intention of allowing established American distributors for producers who are classified as making so-called anti-Nazi films to resume operations in any of the countries under German military occupation and it was intimated that the property attached and the prints seized by the German authorities would not be returned unless the interested American companies agreed to cease producing anti-German films and came to some arrangement whereby German films would be shown in the United States. The official stated that the Embassy would be given a written decision in the matter.

In the opinion of the Embassy political motives are prominent in this attitude, that is subtraction of American influence from the occupied countries, substitution of direct and indirect German film propaganda and the hardly concealed desire to exert censorship as regards reference to Germany over American motion picture production but there are decided business reasons as well. The Propaganda Ministry is increasingly subsidizing [*subsidizing?*] German films and welcomes the opportunity offered by military occupation to stop American competition and establish the Reich's film industry in Europe.

Since it is altogether likely that the Propaganda Ministry's final decision will be both negative and delayed I am of the opinion that there should be promptly delivered a formal note of protest along the following lines:

The Embassy has the honor to bring to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the fact that the showing of American films in countries under German military occupation has been discontinued reportedly under instructions from the German authorities while German films continue to be allowed to be shown; that in compliance with similar instructions the property of some of the distributing agencies has been attached and motion pictures prints belonging to American companies have been seized; that applications to local officials for the release of such property and for permission to continue showing of the films have been met with the answer that such action was taken in accordance with instructions of the central film authorities in Berlin.

The Embassy is persuaded that the situation above set forth can quickly be confirmed by the Ministry and that the Ministry will appreciate the serious prejudice to trade resulting from any arbitrary discontinuance in countries at present under German occupation of a legitimate American business built up after years of work and investment of capital especially in view of the continuance by German companies of a similar business in those areas and is confident that the Ministry will promptly cause to be issued the necessary permits for American film distributing agencies in the occupied areas to resume their operations and cause to have released to them their property which has been attached as well as to have returned to them the motion picture films which have been seized.

840.4061 Motion Pictures/41 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1940—3 p. m.

2998. Your 4515, October 30, 7 p. m. You are instructed to present a note to the German Government in the form recommended in your telegram.

WELLES

840.4061 Motion Pictures/82 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, November 28, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 11:46 p. m.]

4864. Embassy's despatch 2070, March 12, 1940.⁶ The Embassy has learned that the Reich film authorities of the Propaganda Ministry since the receipt of the Embassy's note sent in compliance with the Department's telegram No. 2998 of November 13, 3 p. m., has notified Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer film agency to turn over to them all Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer negative and positive prints in spite of the fact that the Foreign Office has previously been informed that such prints are the property of Loew's Incorporated. I suggest that the Embassy be instructed to forward a note to the Foreign Office referring to the instructions to the Reich Film Chamber contained in its note transmitted with the Embassy's despatch under reference which would appear to be disregarded by the threatened seizure of the films and concluding as follows.

"The Embassy is confident that the Ministry will cause immediate steps to be taken to have its instructions to the competent German authorities to take careful note of the property rights in question given due effect with a view to having the negative and positive prints in question remain unmolested in the control of their American owner or its agent."

Early instructions are requested since it is unlikely that the German manager will be in any position effectively to deter the film authorities of the Propaganda Ministry from their proposed action in entire disregard of American property rights.

MORRIS

⁶Not printed.

840.4061 Motion Pictures/82 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1940—3 p. m.

3179. Your 4864, November 28, 4 p. m. Proposed action approved.
HULL

840.4061 Motion Pictures/88 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, December 5, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received December 5—5:43 p. m.]

4929. Department's 3179, December 2, 3 p. m. In spite of the Embassy's note delivered in compliance with the Department's instruction under reference, representatives of the Reich's Film Chamber of the Propaganda Ministry yesterday against the protest of an employee of the local agency took seven prints, the property of Loew's Incorporated. A member of the Embassy called at the Foreign Office and protested this flagrant disregard of property rights without compensation and without excuse of military or national necessity.

MORRIS

GREECE
(See volume III.)

ICELAND

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT OFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

859A.01/42

The Danish Minister (Kauffmann) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1940.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the Icelandic Parliament last night passed the following two resolutions:

First: Due to the present situation in Denmark it is impossible for His Majesty the King of Iceland and Denmark to exercise the executive power vested in him under the Constitutional Act of Iceland. It has, therefore, been necessary for the Icelandic Parliament to declare that the Icelandic Cabinet for the time being is entrusted with the conduct of the said power.

Second: Due to the present situation Denmark for the time being is not in a position to safeguard the foreign affairs of Iceland with which Denmark is entrusted in accordance with Art. VII of the Danish-Icelandic Union Act.¹ Furthermore Denmark is not in a position to carry out the Fishery Inspection within Icelandic territorial waters in accordance with Art. VIII of the said Union Act. It has, therefore, been necessary for the Icelandic Parliament to declare that the Government of Iceland for the time being has taken over the entire charge of the said affairs.

I avail myself [etc.]

HENRIK KAUFFMANN

701.59A11/1: Telegram

The Icelandic Prime Minister (Jonasson) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, April 15, 1940.

[Received April 15—8:30 a. m.]

In view of the status of Iceland created by parliamentary resolutions of April 10th, already notified to you, the Icelandic Government propose to establish a Legation in Washington and at the same time to appoint consular representative in New York. With this object in view they intend to appoint Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Icelandic Gov-

¹ For text of Danish law of November 30, 1918, providing for union of Denmark and Iceland, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 703.

ernment Trade Commissioner in New York and temporary Consul General for Iceland in New York; to entrust him to be in charge of the Legation in Washington. Icelandic Government would be glad to learn by telegram whether this proposed appointment of Mr. Vilhjalmur [Thor] as Consul General for Iceland in New York and in charge of Legation in Washington would be acceptable to the United States Government.

HERMANN JONASSON

701.59A11/1 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Icelandic Prime Minister (Jonasson)

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1940.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of April 15 informing me that the Icelandic Government proposes to establish a Legation in Washington and a Consulate General in New York, and that it is intended to appoint Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor as Consul General for Iceland in New York as well as to entrust him with the charge of the Legation in Washington.

The establishment of direct diplomatic and consular relations between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the United States in the existing circumstances will be welcomed by my Government. My Government considers, however, that if an Icelandic Legation is established in Washington it should be placed in charge of a diplomatic officer who would be resident in Washington and would confine himself to the performance of diplomatic duties.

As a first step in reciprocating direct relations between our two Governments my Government is anxious to open a Consular Office in Reykjavik and desires to appoint Mr. Bertel E. Kuniholm, a career Foreign Service officer of the United States, as Consul in charge of such office. I trust that this will be agreeable to Your Excellency.

CORDELL HULL

701.59A11/6

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1940.

This morning Mr. Thor telephoned me from New York and inquired as to the nature of the reply which the Secretary of State had made to the Icelandic Prime Minister's telegram proposing direct Icelandic consular and diplomatic representation in the United States. I gave Mr. Thor the substance of Mr. Hull's telegram to the Prime Minister, dated April 16, particularly that portion which indicated that should an Icelandic Legation be opened in Washington this

Government would prefer that it be in charge of a diplomatic officer who would confine himself to the performance of diplomatic duties.

This afternoon Mr. Thor telephoned and said that after his conversation with me this morning he had telegraphed his Government that there appeared two alternatives, first, to open a Legation in Washington in charge of a Chargé d'Affaires, together with a Consulate General in New York in charge of a Consul General, and second, to forego for the moment the establishment of a Legation in Washington, (particularly since the United States at this time was only establishing a Consulate in Reykjavik) and open a Consulate General in New York. He said that he had informed his Government that he was sure that as Consul General he would be permitted to transact necessary business with the State Department, but that it would not of course give the Icelandic Government the direct relationship with the American Government which could be maintained only through a Legation.

Mr. Thor then said that he had just received a telegram from his Government which had evidently crossed his of this morning, asking him to inquire whether in his opinion it would be satisfactory to the American Government if Iceland at this time confined itself to the establishment of a Consulate General. He said that his Government, in view of their limited funds and the comparatively small amount of official business between the two Governments, would prefer their first suggestion, namely, the establishment of a Legation in Washington to be in charge of their Consul General in New York.

I told Mr. Thor that I would consult my superiors and try to give him an answer informally in the morning.²

701.59A11/2

The Danish Minister (Kauffmann) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1940.

SIR: Continuing my note dated April 10th 1940 pertaining to the temporary measures taken by the Icelandic Government in regard to the conduct of the Foreign Affairs of Iceland I have the honor to inform you that I have been apprised of the radiogram sent to the Department of State by the said Government notifying you of the Government's proposal to appoint Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, the present Icelandic Government Trade Commissioner to the United States, acting Consul General for Iceland in New York and to entrust Mr. Thor with the charge of the Legation in Washington.

² Marginal note by Mr. Cumming states that he telephoned Mr. Thor on April 18th that it would be perfectly satisfactory if an Icelandic Consulate General only were opened.

In conformity with the above I have already handed over to Mr. Thor the diplomatic and consular matters hitherto handled by this Legation and the Danish Consuls General, Consuls and Vice Consuls in the United States.

I avail myself [etc.]

HENRIK KAUFFMANN

701.59A11/4 : Telegram

*The Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stefansson) to the
Secretary of State*

REYKJAVIK [undated].

[Received April 22, 1940—9:24 p. m.]

I have the honour to refer to the Prime Minister's telegram April 15 and to Your Excellency's reply April 16 and to express profound appreciation of the Government of Iceland of your attitude towards their proposal in the existing circumstances to establish direct relations between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the United States of America and to assure you that Mr. Bertel E. Kuniholm will be heartily welcomed in Iceland as Consul for the United States. Further I may mention that Mr. Kuniholm as a career consul will enjoy in this country all such rights, privileges and immunities as generally afforded diplomatic agents as a first step in reciprocating direct relations between our two Governments. My Government is anxious to open immediately a Consulate General in New York to deal with commercial and financial matters, etc., and desire to appoint Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor as Consul General in charge of such office with all the rights, privileges and immunities thereto appertaining, trusting that this will be agreeable to Your Excellency. I propose that Mr. Thor from the receipt of your reply may be considered as having taken charge as Consul General for Iceland in New York.³

STEFAN JOH. STEFANSSON

³ Mr. Thor was commissioned by his Government on April 23, 1940, to serve as Icelandic Consul General to the United States and was officially recognized as such by this Government by an exequatur dated August 16, 1940.

The following year Iceland requested that it be represented in the United States by a Minister rather than a Chargé d'Affaires. The request was approved, and Mr. Thor Thors, the newly appointed Minister of Iceland, who in September 1940 had replaced Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor as Consul General, presented his letters of credence to President Roosevelt on November 19, 1941. Some weeks earlier, on October 1, Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh had presented his credentials as United States Minister to Iceland.

DISINCLINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE ICELAND UNDER ITS PROTECTION FOLLOWING GERMAN INVASION OF DENMARK AND BRITISH OCCUPATION OF ICELAND

859A.01/45

The British Ambassador (Lothian) to the Secretary of State

No. 201

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1940.

SIR: On instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I have the honour to inform you that since the German seizure of Denmark it had become necessary for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to reckon with the possibility of a sudden German descent upon Iceland. It was clear that in the face of an attack on Iceland, even on a very small scale, the Icelandic Government would be unable to prevent their country falling completely into German hands.

His Majesty's Government accordingly decided to preclude this possibility, which would deprive Iceland of her independence, by themselves landing a force in Iceland; and that was done this morning.

They have explicitly assured the Icelandic Government that they are acting solely to ensure the security of Iceland against a German invasion, that the force will be withdrawn at the end of the war and that they will not interfere with the administration of the Island. They are also prepared to negotiate an agreement on trade matters which should bring material advantages to the inhabitants of Iceland.

I have the honour [etc.]

LOTHIAN

859A.01/46 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 11, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 7:35 p. m.]

1302. My 1176, May 1, 1 p. m.⁴ Yesterday's and this morning's press published reports of the British occupation of Iceland which is pictured as an unprovoked aggression against a small and utterly defenseless people and thus as demonstrating the hypocrisy of England's righteous indignation against Germany for its action to protect the neutrality of other small nations from British encroachment. The DAZ⁵ this afternoon publishes a brief editorial which argues that Iceland is closer to Greenland in which the United States has manifested interest than to Scotland and therefore is to be regarded as in the Western Hemisphere and as falling within the scope of the Monroe

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Doctrine. The British action which is described as a side show to divert public attention from British failures on the Continent is said accordingly to be of primary interest to the United States and not to Germany.

KIRK

859A.01/45

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lothian)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 10, 1940 stating that in order to preclude the possibility of a German seizure of Iceland, the British Government landed a force in Iceland on the morning of May 10.

I am pleased to note that assurances have been given to the Icelandic Government that the British Government is acting solely to insure the security of Iceland against a German invasion and that the British forces will be withdrawn at the end of the war and that they will not interfere with the administration of the island.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

SUMNER WELLES

859A.01/49 : Telegram

The Consul at Reykjavik (Kuniholm) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, May 29, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received May 31—3 : 34 p. m.]

British occupation of Iceland proceeding without resistance. Prime Minister⁶ estimates troops at 4,000. Other officials put figure as high as 7,000. Heaviest concentration at Reykjavik where German air raid is expected. Radio station, harbor entrance, bridges, piers, and principal public buildings occupied. Warships in hiding Alfjördur [Hvalfjördur] Bay mouth of which has been mined.

Iceland Government feels that capital is now a defended city and a legitimate object for total bombing. Feeling generally is that military occupation is necessary evil not only to prevent Germans from establishing air base but more particularly submarine base which could be used with Norway to break blockade of North Atlantic.

Officials disturbed over meager British defensive measures. They state only two airplanes on island and that heavy machine guns but very little anti-aircraft setup as yet.

All telegrams and mail abroad must pass via England through censor. Our consular correspondence and radiograms may be sent directly to New York without censoring.

⁶ H. Jonasson.

British Legation established with Minister to Copenhagen in charge.

KUNIHMOLM

710.11/2551

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 12, 1940.

The Consul General for Iceland, Mr. Thor, came in to see me today, at his request. Mr. Cumming⁷ was present.

Mr. Thor asked two questions. The first was whether the United States would not include Iceland in the Western Hemisphere and put it under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine.

I said that this question could not be answered casually, since it involved very grave considerations. The political Western Hemisphere did not turn altogether on the theoretical meridian of division; historically, the Monroe Doctrine had been fairly close to the American continent; I could not give assurance, though I should be glad to study it.

He then asked whether perhaps Iceland could not be included in a customs union, pointing out that now their trade with the United States constituted the bulk of the means by which they could live.

I said that that also raised some very grave questions. I pointed out that we had had every friendship for Iceland, as was evidenced by the fact that the Export-Import Bank had made them a loan of a million dollars. At present, however, Iceland was occupied by foreign troops and I was not clear what policy our government would adopt towards it.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

859A.20/2: Telegram

The Consul at Reykjavik (Kuniholm) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, July 22, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received July 24—6:50 p. m.]

Department's July 19, 6 p. m., received today.⁸ Full report was sent to the Department some time ago. Please confirm receipt.

Total complement of troops in Iceland over 20,000. Forces consist of one division plus coast defense troops and small naval units. One brigade covers north from northwestern peninsula to Hofn with major concentration at Akureyri and smaller one at Seydisfjordur. Main

⁷ Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of the Division of European Affairs.

⁸ Not printed; it instructed the Consul to submit to the Department reports on the developments of the military situation in Iceland (859A.20/1a).

divisional strength is around Reykjavik in west and south. Several fighter planes are at airfield north of Eyrarbakki. Motor transport, tanks and anti-aircraft recently augmented.

No naval vessels here now except armed trawlers. Attack feared daily. German forces in Norway believed to number 10 divisions and ready to move at any time.

German bomber sank fishing boat off east coast of Island on July 12.

KUNIHOLM

859A.014/9

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1940.

Participants: The Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull,
Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Retiring Consul General of Iceland,
Mr. Thor Thors, Newly Appointed Icelandic Consul General,
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Division of European Affairs.

The Consul General called on the Secretary of State by appointment to take his leave before returning to Iceland to become Managing Director of the National Bank of Iceland, and to present his successor, Mr. Thor Thors.

After an exchange of amenities, during which Mr. Hull wished Mr. Thor success in his new position, the newly appointed Consul General, Mr. Thors, presented his Commission to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Thor explained at some length the desire of his Government for a more intimate relationship, both economic and political, between Iceland and the United States. From time to time Mr. Thors acquiesced in Mr. Thor's remarks and supplemented them with observations of his own.

The substance of Mr. Thor's remarks was that all Icelanders were concerned over the position of Iceland in a war-torn world, and over the difficulties which would face his country in the event of a German victory. He said that he had already discussed with officers of the Department the question of facilitating the sale of Icelandic goods to the United States. He understood the difficulties in the way of obtaining any tariff concessions through trade agreement or otherwise, but he still hoped that a solution would be found.

Mr. Thor then said that speaking informally and unofficially, but with the knowledge and consent of his Government, he wished to repeat the inquiry which he had previously made of Assistant Secretary

Berle that the United [States] take Iceland under its protection through some sort of a declaration which would recognize that Iceland was in the Western Hemisphere, and which would extend the Monroe Doctrine so as to include that island. . . .

Mr. Hull told Mr. Thor that the United States continued to have a very deep and friendly interest in the welfare of Iceland, and of course sympathized with the desire of the Icelandic people to do everything possible to insure the maintenance of their independent status during the present disturbed world conditions. Mr. Hull said that he was sure that the interested officers of the Department would continue to study possibilities of supplementing the help already given Iceland through the million dollar credit extended by the Export-Import Bank.

With respect to the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to include Iceland, Mr. Hull said that we would of course bear Mr. Thor's suggestion in mind, but that he was sure that Mr. Thor would understand that dealing as this Government constantly was with the many complicated phases of problems arising out of the European situation and the situation in the Far East, we could make no definite answer at this time.

During subsequent conversations with Mr. Atherton, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State Berle, Mr. Thor and Mr. Thors covered the same ground as in their conversation with the Secretary of State, and were given substantially the same replies as those given by Mr. Hull.

711.59A/9 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Reykjavik (Kuniholm)

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1941—3 p. m.

1. Your despatch no. 56, December 24.⁹ Please orally inform the Foreign Minister that you have reported the substance of your conversation to your Government and have been instructed to say that we readily appreciate and sympathize with the apprehension which his Government feels with respect to the future of the Icelandic people in the rapidly changing world situation, and he may be assured that we will continue to give the most serious attention to the effect upon the relationship between the United States and Iceland of the now unpredictable course of events. We feel sure, however, that upon

⁹ Not printed. In this despatch the Consul at Reykjavik reported a conversation with the Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stefansson) in which the latter discussed informally the possible protection of Iceland by the United States along the lines already presented at Washington as recorded in the memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, September 5, printed *supra*.

reflection he will understand that, owing to the existing international situation, it seems necessary that we retain a freedom of action that will enable us the more effectively to meet any situation affecting our interests that may arise.

For your guidance: It will be clear to you from the foregoing that while we can not close our eyes to the fact that the war may touch Iceland in such a way as to require a definite decision with respect to what action this Government might feel it advisable to take relative to Iceland, we wish to be in a position to face that decision, if it should be forced on us, free from prior commitments. Accordingly, you are requested neither to encourage nor discourage an approach by the Icelandic Government with respect to this question but to continue to report fully any expressions of public or private opinion that may come to your attention.

HULL

ITALY

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP ITALY FROM ENTERING THE WAR AGAINST THE ALLIES

740.00119 European War 1939/242 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, January 29, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received January 29—2:35 p. m.]

71. For Welles.¹ I learn from Kirk² that Attolico, Italian Ambassador Berlin, has called upon him to tell him of a recent conversation which the President had with Colonna³ during which the President, among other things, emphasized in particular the change of attitude in the United States towards Italy and the part which neutral countries might play in the interests of peace. Attolico added that he assumed Ciano⁴ had discussed it with me. It seems clear, therefore, that the Italian Government regards this conversation as of sufficient importance to circularize it among its representatives in third countries.

You will appreciate, I know, that it would have been helpful if I had been advised of this conversation but perhaps it is not too late even now to authorize me to refer to it sympathetically when I see Ciano.

PHILLIPS

740.00119 European War 1939/242 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1940—7 p. m.

24. For the Ambassador from the Under Secretary. Your 71, January 29, 6 p. m. The President asked me to let you know that in his conference with the Italian Ambassador the President emphasized his satisfaction that public opinion in this country had become markedly more friendly towards Italy because of the fact that Italy had maintained her neutrality during the present European conflict. The President further expressed his hope to the Ambassador that the Italian Government would continue to remain neutral.

¹ Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State.

² Alexander C. Kirk, Chargé in Germany.

³ Ascanio dei principi Colonna, Italian Ambassador in the United States.

⁴ Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I think it would be entirely appropriate and desirable for you to refer to this friendly conversation in any conference you may have with the Foreign Minister as suggested in the last paragraph of your telegram under reference. [Welles.]

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, April 19, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received April 19—3:45 p. m.]

278. My 277, April 19, 6 p.m.⁵ Vatican circles are evidently greatly alarmed by the possibility of Mussolini making an aggressive move in the immediate future and Mr. Taylor⁶ has been asked to remain in Rome another day or so in order to receive another communication from the Vatican for the President which probably will renew the request that the President send some secret and appropriate message to Mussolini.

Taylor and I have discussed the subject which seems to us worth careful consideration. Through the medium of the press Mussolini has built up such a "smoke screen" as might well justify the President in coming to the conclusion that Italy was in fact contemplating early aggression. An appeal to Mussolini to do his utmost to prevent the spread of the conflict to this area might indeed have a moderating effect but on the other hand if Mussolini has no immediate aggressive designs such an appeal might be resented. There is no one who really knows the Duce's plans.

I am leaving for Milan to attend the annual banquet of the American Chamber of Commerce Saturday⁷ evening and shall return to Rome Sunday evening.

PHILLIPS

740.00119 European War 1939/312 : Telegram

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt⁸

ROME, April 19, 1940—midnight.

[Received April 20—4:03 p. m.]

13. I was called to Rome from Florence on Thursday and have since conferred with the Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione, the

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Personal representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

⁷ April 20.

⁸ Transmitted to the Department by the Embassy in Italy as telegram No. 279, April 20, 11 a. m., referring to the Ambassador's No. 278, April 19, 7 p. m.; it carries this introductory sentence: "The following was not seen by the Ambassador before he left but its contents were discussed with him."

British, French, Belgian, Rumanian, Polish and Spanish Ambassadors to the Holy See and of course with Ambassador Phillips. In all quarters the situation of Italy vis-à-vis Germany was represented as uncertain and critical. Ambassador Phillips today seems slightly less troubled than yesterday based, he said, on the reported unpreparedness of Italy to go to war. He is sending a telegram in this regard.

The others were severally of the opinion that there exists at this moment a real danger of Mussolini joining Hitler or engaging separately in aggression in new fields. I had a long and very earnest visit with Cardinal Maglione who sensed the general feeling of uncertainty and again expressed the belief that you should address Mussolini urging him to refrain from action. I raised the point that two other influences were very potent, namely, the King of Italy and the Pope, and asked if in line with "parallel action" for peace the Pope would simultaneously address himself to Mussolini and the King. He promptly asked me to remain here so that he might have time to consult with the Pope and give me a direct answer for your guidance.

Cardinal Maglione expressed the Vatican reaction to your address before the Pan American Conference⁹ as courageous, timely and excellent. All the Ambassadors to the Vatican whom I have seen expressed enthusiastic approval. It seems to me that the background of the general situation has now been laid down by you so that an immediate communication to Mussolini would be most desirable, timely and is perhaps the best effort you can make with him before the next large phase in the war is undertaken.

I lunched with the British and French Ambassadors to the Holy See and raised the point when [*whether?*] their Governments could do anything further to persuade Mussolini to refrain from action.

The British replied by referring the question to Lord Halifax¹⁰ and gave me in writing the following message from the latter. "Please tell Mr. Taylor that it is undoubtedly a critical moment and I should be very grateful for anything he could advise the President to do with a view to restraining Mussolini from any rash act. It is desirable to disabuse Mussolini of the feeling he is believed to entertain that the Allies aim at destroying the Fascist regime in Italy as well as the Nazi regime in Germany. It would therefore be helpful if Mr. Taylor would suggest to the President that he might impress on high circles in Italy the fact to which I referred in a speech on April 10 namely, that we are in friendly relations with many countries which are governed by an authoritarian regime and that the kind of regime prevailing in other countries is no business of ours."

⁹ Apparently the reference is to the address the President made before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in Washington on April 15, 1940; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 20, 1940, p. 403.

¹⁰ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am to see the British and French again Saturday. Meanwhile they have put their files in order preparatory to possible sudden departure from Rome.

In my first message on arrival here I quoted the Pope as saying that he was not in direct contact with Mussolini.

I am advised, however, that he has channels of communication with both Mussolini and the King which are adequate.

It appears that the remaining action that you can take to make the record complete is to combine your influence which is admitted in all quarters as very great with that of the King and the Pope in order to prevail on Mussolini to remain nonbelligerent.

It is suggested that Mussolini can rise to his greatest height by playing such a role as fits him to work with the Pope and yourself for ultimate peace. I am definitely convinced that such a communication would be timely and helpful and can be so worded as to contain no possibility of harmful results either to our own country, our neutral position considered, nor to yourself. In any event it seems to me to be the only remaining effort you can make at this moment to try to circumscribe the theater of war. It is the general opinion among those with whom I confer that Hitler will make his next move in surprise form before the end of this month and that he will demand of Mussolini, if he has not already done so, definite assurance of his participation or his refusal. It is not impossible that if you follow the course indicated it might lead ultimately to that larger service in the cause of peace which you and nearly every one over here so earnestly desire.

As I was leaving the Vatican Cardinal Maglione most earnestly repeated the need for speed of your action and that at the utmost it should be taken within 2 or 3 days preferably immediately.

[TAYLOR]

740.00119 European War 1939/313 : Telegram

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt*¹²

ROME, April 20, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 5 p. m.]

14. My 13. I am now able to give you the final and definite answers from His Holiness on the questions.

First: Should a message from you to Mussolini be sent at this time? The answer was that such a message should be sent immediately.

Second: On the question whether a "parallel" endeavor would be made by His Holiness at this time, the answer is yes. Coupled with

¹² Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 281.

this message was the request that nothing be made known of the parallel or contemporaneous character of the action and that such action by each should be considered separate and unconnected.

I will leave for Florence this evening, returning here Monday evening unless requested to return in the meantime. I have agreed to be here Tuesday.

[TAYLOR]

740.00119 European War 1939/315 : Telegram

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt*¹³

ROME, April 25, 1940—noon.

[Received April 25—8:50 a. m.]

15. While awaiting your response to my telegrams numbers 13 and 14 Vatican authorities desire to see me Friday¹⁴ and I consider it important at that time to advise the Pope of your views.

[TAYLOR]

740.00119 European War 1939/315 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1940—1 p. m.

4. I have been in consultation with the President, who is at Warm Springs, regarding your telegrams nos. 13 and 14, and notably your suggestion that the President send a further communication to Mussolini urging him to refrain from any belligerent activity. He has asked me to telegraph you as follows:

On two occasions the President has sent messages to Mussolini expressing satisfaction that Italy has remained out of the war and has thereby prevented its spread to other areas with its inevitable repercussions on many nations and peoples now living in peace. The first of these messages was given during the course of a conversation between the President and Prince Colonna before the trip to Europe of Mr. Welles; the second message, which was even more explicit, was given directly to Mussolini by Mr. Welles speaking under instructions from the President.¹⁵ In spite of the uncertainties of Italian policy to which you refer, there has been no change sufficiently concrete to make us feel that a useful purpose would be served at this particular moment by repeating again a message from the President that has in effect been twice delivered to Mussolini.

¹³ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 287.

¹⁴ April 26.

¹⁵ See Mr. Welles' report of February 26, 1940, vol. I, section entitled "Special Mission to Europe of Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State".

Although the President feels it inadvisable to take the action you suggested at this moment, we hope that the Vatican authorities will not thereby be influenced in relation to any independent move on their part which in their judgment they feel would be useful in preventing a spread of hostilities.

You should make it clear that this Government is following the situation from day to day and that the reluctance of your Government to take the action suggested at this moment does not imply that the possibility of taking such action is not still under careful consideration. Please keep the Department advised of all developments.

The President was most encouraged at the Vatican approval of his address before the Pan American Conference.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/316 : Telegram

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt*¹⁶

ROME, April 26, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received April 26—1 : 48 p. m.]

16. Your telegram number 4, April 25, 1 p. m. I was of course unaware that messages of the character referred to had been sent. The suggestion that you send a communication to him at this time has been urged upon me from many quarters and still continues.

Efforts towards peace through circumscribing the spread of war have been supported and suggested quite generally by such civilians as I have been in contact with here and elsewhere and of course by others as already reported. In suggesting that these efforts be made now it is considered that the situation changes so rapidly that a surprise move is quite likely especially as it is said that Mussolini would need to move suddenly in order to overcome such opposition as exists.

I have just learned that Mussolini's private and unpublished speech to the Hierarchy of Syndical Directors on Sunday¹⁷ contained the following points.

1. Fierce resentment of interference with Italian shipping and mails at Gibraltar, Malta, and Marseilles, confiscation and delay involving loss of perishable foodstuffs and materials.

2. Italy is a prisoner in the Mediterranean.

3. It is useless for Italians to blind themselves to the fact that for the past 8 months they have been deprived of raw materials.

4. A free Gibraltar and Suez Canal are essential to Italian commercial life.

¹⁶ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 293.

¹⁷ April 21.

5. The enemies of Italy are under the illusion that Rome could be bombed from the sea. He would like to see a hostile warship near Ostia for instance.

6. His meditations on history make him certain that a nation is free only if it has windows on the great seas and that it is not independent if only on an inland sea.

7. The growing population of Italy requires a long view into the future which makes colonization of new lands essential.

8. To accomplish these objectives it is now of vital importance that an increasing volume of weapons be produced and that this is the first duty of Italian industry.

I had separate audiences with the Pope and Cardinal Secretary of State today the result of which confirms and does not change but on the contrary emphasizes the statements and suggestions made in my telegrams Nos. 13 and 14.

I am leaving for Florence this afternoon and Tittmann¹⁸ is returning to Geneva.

[TAYLOR]

740.0011 European War 1939/2691a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1940—6 p. m.

98. By direction of the President the following personal message from the President is transmitted herewith:

"Dear Bill: Because of the delay in the transmission of communications by mail, I am sending to you by telegram a personal message to Signor Mussolini which under more normal conditions I would have sent him in a personal letter to be handed to him by yourself. Please explain the circumstances to the Duce and convey to him in my name the following message:

'MY DEAR SIGNOR MUSSOLINI: I am requesting my Ambassador in Rome to deliver this message to Your Excellency. Because of the long delays in the transmission of mail, I am conveying to you in this manner a message which under more normal conditions I would have transmitted by means of a personal letter.

'During the past days the scope of the conflict in Europe has further widened and two more neutral nations which had done their utmost to avoid involvement in war have been drawn by force into the scene of hostilities.

'The people of the United States, as I have already sent you word, have seen with the deepest satisfaction the policy of the Italian Government in exerting every effort to prevent war from spreading to southern and to southeastern Europe. I fully recognize the profound truth of the statement you made recently to my representative, Mr. Welles, that because of Italy's determination to limit, so far as might be possible, the spread of the conflict, more than 200,000,000 of people in the region of the Mediterranean are still at peace.¹⁹

'A further extension of the area of hostilities, which would bring into the war still other nations which have been seeking to maintain their neutrality, would necessarily have far-reaching and unforeseeable consequences, not only in Europe,

¹⁸ Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Consul General at Geneva, acted as secretary to Mr. Taylor's mission.

¹⁹ See report by the Under Secretary of State on his special mission to Europe, vol. 1, in the section entitled "Special Mission to Europe of Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State."

but also in the Near and the Far East, in Africa, and in the three Americas. No man can today predict with assurance, should such a further extension take place, what the ultimate result might be—or foretell what nations, however determined they may today be to remain at peace, might yet eventually find it imperative in their own defense to enter the war.

'I am, as you know, a realist. As occurs inevitably in every contest, the participants themselves are far less able to predict the eventual outcome of the struggle than the onlookers who are near at hand, and these latter perhaps are not in as good a position to determine which may be the winning side as those onlookers who may be still farther away. By reason of its geographical position, this country has a panoramic view of the existing hostilities in Europe. Because of the many imponderables involved, I see no reason to anticipate that any one nation, or any one combination of nations, can successfully undertake to dominate either the continent of Europe or much less a greater part of the world.

'I earnestly hope that the powerful influence of Italy and of the United States—an influence which is very strong so long as they remain at peace—may yet be exercised, when the appropriate opportunity is presented in behalf of the negotiation of a just and stable peace which will permit of the reconstruction of a gravely stricken world.

'With the assurance of my highest regard, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'

"Please request the Chief of Government to receive you as soon as may be possible so that you may deliver this message to him and assure him that I shall be most glad to remain in close and friendly communication with him in the consideration of any matters which may in his judgment be related to the objectives indicated in the last paragraph of my message.

Yours very sincerely, Franklin D. Roosevelt"

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/318 : Telegram

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt*²⁰

GENEVA, April 30, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 4:36 p. m.]

Continuing my telegrams sent from Rome. The Pope, pledging us to secrecy, advised me on Friday last²¹ that he had fulfilled his duty of parallel action by direct handwritten message to Mussolini aimed at non-belligerency for Italy. My communications to you were latterly aimed at this feature and not at the question of general peace negotiations first explored. The greatest present service to humanity seems to be to circumscribe the area of the war. The fact that for the first time and as late as Friday last the Pope has addressed Mussolini indicates how uncertain the situation continues to be and this, in part at least, because the value of surprise action has been amply demonstrated through the activities of the dictators.

Summarizing information from many sources it does not appear at all certain that Mussolini has not already made his decision to take

²⁰ Transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Geneva as telegram No. 47.

²¹ April 26.

independent action in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the near future, while Hitler occupies himself further east in the Balkans and elsewhere. Yugoslav copper and bauxite are essential to both Germany and Italy. It may appear that both will await the progress of the crops. In these parts there has until the past week been no rain and consequent deterioration of crops. According to one authority Mussolini and Hitler had agreed upon the above plan and its timing at the Brenner meeting ²² but which has been at least temporarily postponed by the opposition Mussolini encountered from the King, Grandi,²³ Balbo, Badoglio, Graziani,²⁴ and Papal influences representing the church and the prevailing popular opinion in Italy. However regarding the public as well as the army it is believed that they will move with the Duce if orders are given to march.

Lord Halifax through the British Minister to the Vatican suggested that if we thought it advisable the King would address a similar non-belligerency message to the King of Italy. My reply after consideration was that it might be best to postpone it because in the present state of tension over blockade activities and Mussolini's hatred of England such a message might only serve to irritate him further. Both the British and the French including François-Poncet ²⁵ whom I met at luncheon have mentioned to me possible terms of compromise with Italy, but they were quite vague.

I was told that at the crisis of a fortnight ago Ciano had resigned; that Balbo had been ordered back to Libya; that Graziani heretofore supporting Mussolini had discouraged the venture; and that messages between Hitler and Mussolini had led to some misinterpretation necessitating a visit to Berlin by the German Ambassador.

As I was cautioned not to telegraph this particular message from Italy I have asked Tittmann who is returning to Switzerland to have it sent from Geneva.

[TAYLOR]

740.0011 European War 1939/2691† : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 1, 1940—noon.

[Received May 1—9 a. m.]

301. Your telegram No. 98, April 29, 6 p. m. Mussolini received me this morning at 9:30 at the Ministry of the Interior. Ciano came in late and was therefore present only part of the time. The inter-

²² Meeting of Hitler and Mussolini on March 18, 1940.

²³ Count Grandi di Mordano of the Italian Council of Ministers.

²⁴ Italian military officials.

²⁵ André François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Italy.

view lasted just over half an hour. I read the President's message slowly and Mussolini translated it into Italian as we proceeded. It was clear to me that he understood every point. At the conclusion of the message he took the paper and read it a second time and during the rereading made the following observations: he was puzzled at the possibility of the three Americas being drawn into the war and did not understand why they should be. Neither Italy, Germany nor Russia desired to extend the war. There is no menace to Germany from the Balkans unless the Allies through some act in the Danubian region or at Salonika create a new situation which would in fact become a menace. In his opinion it would be possible to defeat Russia and he said that it was also his opinion that Germany could not be beaten.

With the news this morning of the important German successes in Norway he regards the Scandinavian situation as already "liquidated" in favor of Germany. Germany can now call upon 15 countries for supplies of every description and he enumerated them to me. Moreover, the Allied blockade was accordingly wholly ineffective. He took note with apparent satisfaction of the President's statement that he, the President, was a realist. Being also a realist he feels that it is impossible to consider a European peace without recognizing the conditions which had arisen as a result of the war. Germany had defeated Poland and was willing to permit the creation of a new independent Polish state without the former frontiers which were wholly unjustifiable. Germany would also be willing that a new state of Czechoslovakia should be re-established. He hoped that the President would foresee the necessity of a "new geography" as he called it and the necessity of first liquidating all political questions and the poisons which are now making impossible a peaceful Europe. When the political problems are disposed of then we can approach the economic problems. But it would be putting the cart before the horse to tackle the economic problems first. He repeated there must be a new map of Europe. Italy also had her new position in the reconstituted Europe.

Formerly Italy had been an agricultural country and her foreign trade was of no particular importance to her own welfare. Now she was a heavily industrialized nation. Her large mercantile fleet was dependent on international trade. And yet Italy was today a "prisoner within the Mediterranean". This was an intolerable situation and with the rapid increase in her population she would insist upon obtaining freedom of access to the Atlantic which she did not now have "under the guns of Gibraltar". He mentioned also the necessity for a change with respect to the Suez Canal in Italy's favor. In reply to my inquiry as to whether these were the principal requirements of a new Italy he merely mentioned that there were some other problems to be settled with France but he did not indicate them. In

conclusion he said he would be very much interested to know what the President's attitude was with regard to his observations and with regard to the new map of Europe. He asked me to thank the President cordially for his message which indeed he seemed to appreciate very much. He looked in good health and expressed himself with calmness and yet decision. It seemed to me that he went out of his way to be friendly.

Ciano evidently expected that I would leave with him a copy of the message and appeared to be disappointed when I told him that my instructions made it impossible for me to do so.

Later he telephoned me that Mussolini would send an answer to the President through Ambassador Colonna.

PHILLIPS

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles) ^{25a}*

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1940.

Participants: The President;
The Italian Ambassador, Don Ascanio dei principi
Colonna;
The Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

The President received at noon today the Italian Ambassador, whom I accompanied to the White House.

The Ambassador stated that he had requested to be received by the President by instruction of his Government in order to communicate to the President textually a message addressed to the President by Mussolini. This message, the Ambassador said, was a clarification of some of the statements which the Duce had made on the preceding day in his conversation with Ambassador Phillips in Rome. The Ambassador did not leave a written copy of the message, but read it to the President. The following are the essential points in the message.

[Here follows summary of message from the Chief of the Italian Government (Mussolini) to President Roosevelt, printed *infra*.]

The President then stated that he desired the Ambassador to tell Mussolini that he was gratified by the receipt of this message, and that he regarded the last paragraph as particularly encouraging. He said he felt that the influence of both Italy and the United States was very great so long as they remained out of the hostilities, and that he was particularly happy to know that Italy, like the Government of the United States, was desirous of exercising its influence in behalf of the establishment of a better and a more stable world order.

^{25a} Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The original of this memorandum was transmitted by Mr. Welles to President Roosevelt under covering memorandum of May 2, 1940.

The President then said that, with regard to the first paragraph of Mussolini's message relative to the invasion of Denmark and Norway, he did not believe that there was anything to be gained by a discussion of what had taken place prior to the actual invasion of those two countries. The fact remained, he said, that the invasion had been undertaken by Germany, and that for the commission of the act itself only Germany could be held responsible.

The President said he fully recognized that interference with the commerce of neutral powers such as Italy on the high seas by the Allied nations was exasperating and created natural irritation. He called attention to the fact, however, that nations engaged in the war resorted to such measures as a part of their belligerent activities. He reminded the Ambassador that the United States itself was of course not free from such interference, and added as an illustration that American airplanes traveling from the United States to Europe and stopping at Bermuda had had American mail from the United States seized by the British authorities at that place and searched.^{25b} As an indication of why the British authorities felt this procedure warranted, the President stated that in one lot of mail so searched the British found \$234,000 in American currency destined for Germany included in correspondence dispatched in that way.

The President then went on to clarify the reasons for the belief which he had expressed to Mussolini that an extension of hostilities into the Mediterranean might result eventually in such a situation as to cause the three Americas to defend themselves. He said that if, as a result of such an extension of the scene of warfare, any one power or group of powers succeeded in extending their domination over the whole of Europe, that would inevitably result in the extension of such domination over the whole of Africa as well. As an inevitable result, every republic in the Western Hemisphere would find itself compelled to arm to the utmost extent, and such an armament race would, after a very short time, result in complete ruin for all but one of the participants in such an armament race. The exception, the President said, was the United States which, because of its population, its almost inexhaustible material resources and its preponderant financial resources, could withstand the strain longer than any power in the world. To these remarks the Ambassador nodded his emphatic agreement.

The President then went on to say that an extension of hostilities into the Mediterranean would immediately result in very grave prejudice to American trade and commerce and to the freedom of navigation of American ships in the Mediterranean area. The Presi-

^{25b} For correspondence on representations to the British Government with regard to censorship of American mail, see vol. III, under United Kingdom.

dent said that he wished here to cite certain historical precedents which would be illustrative to the Ambassador of what the President had in mind. He said that in 1803, as a result of constant harassing and interference with American shipping in the Mediterranean, including even the capture of American citizens on American ships by the Barbary corsairs sent out by the Bey of Algiers, the Bey of Tunis and the Sultan of Morocco, the Government of the United States finally dispatched American naval vessels to the Mediterranean, which eventually forced the various rulers of North Africa to refrain from further interference with American shipping. When in 1815 there was a further seizure of American merchant vessels in that same region, a further naval force was sent by the United States and, as a result of these forceful measures, there had been no further interference with legitimate American trade in the Mediterranean area. The Government of the United States, the President said, necessarily had an obligation to assure full and due protection to peaceful trade interests of the United States in that area.

With regard to the efforts of the two Governments, Italy and the United States, to work for a better and a more stable world order, the President said he had already informed Mussolini, as the latter would remember, that the United States would be glad to participate in international efforts to achieve the reduction of armaments and the creation of a liberal international economic system. He could not, however, agree with the belief expressed to me in my conversations with Mussolini in Rome ^{25c} that the finding of a political agreement in Europe must precede agreements upon disarmament and a sound economic system. As the President envisaged it, the three efforts must be made simultaneously and, while the United States could not participate in the negotiations leading up to a political settlement and would limit itself to participating in the disarmament and economic negotiations, the President nevertheless thought it essential that the three negotiations be conducted simultaneously. The President here referred to the phrase used in the Far East—"face saving". He said that very often it might be impossible for a power negotiating a political settlement to make certain concessions of a political character unless it had some *quid pro quo* to show to its people as a justification for such a concession and that if some economic concession or some concession in the disarmament discussions could be obtained simultaneously in the favor of such power, in return for a political concession which it might make, a solution could be obtained which could not be found otherwise.

In concluding the conversation with the Ambassador the President asked that Mussolini be assured that the President was gratified with

^{25c} See vol. I, under section entitled "Special Mission to Europe of Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State."

the message sent to him, and that he hoped that Mussolini and himself could continue to communicate in the same manner from now on, any message the President desired to send to be transmitted through Ambassador Phillips in Rome and any message Mussolini desired to send to be communicated to the President through the Italian Ambassador in Washington.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/2691‡

*The Chief of the Italian Government (Mussolini) to President Roosevelt*²⁸

[Translation]

[ROME, May 2, 1940.]

1. If two nations, Denmark and Norway, have been involved in the war, the responsibility does not fall upon Germany, but upon the initiatives of the Allies.

2. Italy's non-belligerency has effectively insured peace for two hundred millions of men, but notwithstanding, Italian merchant traffic is subjected to a constant surveillance that is vexatious and harmful.

3. As far as I know, Germany is opposed to a further extension of the conflict, and Italy likewise. We must learn whether this is also the Franco-British aim.

4. The only European nation that dominates a large part of the world and possesses a monopoly on many basic raw materials is Great Britain. Italy has no programs of that kind, but declares that no peace is possible without the fundamental problems of Italian liberty being settled.

5. As to the repercussions which an extension of the war fronts might have on the three Americas, I call attention to the fact that Italy has never concerned itself with the relations of the American Republics with each other and with the United States (thereby respecting the Monroe Doctrine), and might therefore ask for "reciprocity" with regard to European affairs.

6. Whenever conditions permit, and always starting with the recognition of the actual and accomplished facts, Italy is ready to make her contribution to a better order of the world.

MUSSOLINI

²⁸ This is the message the substance of which was given orally by the Italian Ambassador to President Roosevelt. See memorandum of conversation, *supra*. This is apparently translation of copy of message presented by the Italian Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy. This message in Italian and English translation is filed with the memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy of May 2, printed on p. 699.

740.0011 European War 1939/26924: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 2, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received May 2—12:45 p. m.]

307. My telegram No. 301, May 1, noon. Ciano sent for me this morning and handed me a copy of the Duce's reply to the President's message which he said had already been cabled to Colonna for presentation to the President. After I had read it I referred to the Duce's statement to me yesterday with regard to the problems to be settled with France. Ciano observed that it was impossible to define precisely these problems beyond those already stated, namely, Tunis, Djibouti and Suez. He added that it was "not quite the moment to include Corsica" a statement which certainly is not without significance. He went on to say that the point which the Duce had made regarding Gibraltar was of supreme importance. Italy's need of a "window on the Atlantic" was something to be borne in mind as vital to this country.

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/26917

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

Ciano sent for me this morning at eleven o'clock in order to give me Mussolini's answer to the message which I presented yesterday and which has already been telegraphed to Colonna for presentation to the President. After I had read the message, I thanked the Minister for his courtesy in letting me have a copy of it.

I referred to the British move of yesterday in connection with the British merchant marine in the Mediterranean, and asked him whether he had any further explanation. He told me that he had seen Sir Noel Charles and had expressed surprise at the step the British had taken. It was a step similar to one which they had taken last September a few days before the outbreak of the war. At that anxious moment it had been natural for the British to order their merchant marine out of the Mediterranean, but why should they do so now? The situations were wholly different. Italy had no intention of going to war unless the allies attacked Italy.

According to Ciano, Charles had replied that he presumed that his Government had become aroused as a result of the anti-British campaign in the press and in public speeches. Ciano had assured him that the only spokesmen of the Government upon whom he could rely were the Duce and himself; that the remarks of individuals should

not be taken as expressing the voice of Italy but merely independent views of their own. (I made no comment but looked the Minister straight in the eye, and I think he got me.)

I said that the intensity of the pro-German attitude of the press was nevertheless causing a great deal of uneasiness in the United States. There they did not understand the reasons for it, which living here I could understand, and it was only natural that the American public should come to feel that Italy was preparing to enter the war on the side of Germany. Ciano replied that at the outbreak of the war in September, Italy had two choices: either to enter the war on the side of Germany or to assume a position of non-belligerency with a sympathetic attitude towards Germany. The Government had chosen the latter, for obvious reasons (which he did not enumerate), but that the least they could do in the circumstances was to give to Germany a pro-German Italian press.

I then referred to my conversation with the Duce yesterday and to his statement with regard to Gibraltar. He had mentioned, I said, that there were certain problems to be settled with France, and I had regretted that I had not asked him for clarification on these points. Ciano said that it was impossible to formulate, with any definiteness, their problems with the French beyond those which had already been stated: Tunis, Djibouti, and the Canal. It was really not quite the moment to include Corsica. The point which the Duce had mentioned with regard to Gibraltar, however, was of supreme importance. Italy's need to have a "window on the Atlantic" was to be borne in mind as of vital importance to this country.

In conclusion, he said that it was his job to keep people calm and he was endeavoring to do so. With his rather unusual friendliness, and with a certain engaging naivety he hoped that I realized that he had never told me a lie and that he never intended to do so. He would prefer to resign his position than do anything of the sort. I assured him that I had the utmost confidence in him, that it was a growing confidence, and I would always trust him. Moreover, I said, lies were stupid things because they were of no ultimate value whatsoever and were so easily discovered.

ROME, May 2, 1940.

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/2692½ : Telegram

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt ²⁷

ROME, May 3, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received May 3—9 a. m.]

17. My impression is that you have now been given an opportunity to reply cautiously to Mussolini so as to keep the current of discussion moving now once started. This might further draw him out. My information is that time and absolute secrecy are very important elements. Naturally any approach to preservation of non-belligerency for Italy involves secret statement of terms by Allies regarding Mediterranean question. My contacts with British and French representatives encounter apparent insurmountable obstacles of Gibraltar in one case and Tunis in the other. The French Ambassador, however, vaguely outlined to me an idea of creating some sort of international control of the Mediterranean, but that the French would never surrender an inch of Tunisia. Among other contacts I spent an hour with Cardinal Maglione at the Vatican last night. Leaving for Florence.

[TAYLOR]

740.0011 European War 1939/2881 : Telegram

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt ²⁸

ROME, May 11, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

19. In audience with the Pope this a. m. lasting nearly an hour, I left with and read to him portions of your speech as reported in radio bulletin of the 10th.²⁹ His Holiness was very much impressed. I emphasized the condemnation of aggression and also last paragraph in which you assembled the sentiment of the countries represented in such a way as to convey impression that under some circumstances something more than mere words would be employed to defend what might prove to be the last stronghold of civilization.

I urged upon His Holiness at the urgent insistence of the British, French and Belgian Governments, whose representatives visited me yesterday that he condemn aggression in no uncertain terms and he read to me telegrams which he has now sent to the King of Belgium,

²⁷ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 310.

²⁸ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 334.

²⁹ For text of the President's address delivered to the Eighth American Scientific Congress, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1940, p. 494.

Queen of Holland, and Grand Duchess of Luxemburg. The various Ambassadors who called on me here have emphasized need of keeping prominently before the world, the idea of condemnation of aggression and I am confident you have that thought in your own mind. They, representing many governments, as in the case of the Pope himself, emphasized also the importance of America and public opinion in America upon events of the present and presently to develop.

My information is that the Pope advised Prince and Princess of Piedmont³⁰ at their visit on Tuesday³¹ that the invasion of Holland and Belgium would take place on the 10th though the Germans denied any such intention. Some preparation to meet the invasion was made. Whether it proves adequate will be demonstrated by developments. The accuracy of this information, however, is worthy of note and it is unnecessary for me further to convey the source from which it originated although I am aware of it. It was disbelieved by diplomatic representatives. It is believed the invasion of Yugoslavia is not far away. I was advised of this more than a fortnight ago when the importance of the copper and bauxite deposits to Germany was indicated as one of the material reasons for the invasion. It has been said to me that the part of Yugoslavia that Italy covets is the Dalmatian coast. I am able to give you in utmost secrecy a vital part of the substance of the reply from Mussolini to the Pope's letter which I paraphrase as follows: "Your wish to keep our country out of war is also my own. Up to the moment, I have done so but in this matter I have also to take note of the action of third parties." This may be interpreted to mean the conduct of the Allies or the conduct of Germany. "I cannot, however, give absolute assurance that it will be possible for Italy to remain non-belligerent until the end, but I can assure you that it will not take part unless the necessities imposed by its honor, interests are demanded by evidence which makes it as clear to all as the sunshine itself."

The only further suggestion that is made for your consideration is that the United States should make it clear through all means at its command that it will give real help. This may be done by statement from other sources than yourself if you feel disinclined to go further than you already have done.

Referring to your last message, it was quite unnecessary to assume any lack of caution in dealing with these delicate matters, for a lifetime of experience and accomplishment has not yet developed any lack of caution or discretion in matters confidential; in fact my previous messages have requested secrecy.

Leaving for Florence tonight. Have agreed to return here Tuesday.

[TAYLOR]

³⁰ Prince Humbert and Princess Marie-José.

³¹ May 7.

740.0011 European War 1939/2955 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 14, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received 8:05 p. m.]

657. For the President. The Germans have launched the greatest attack of modern times on the French Army from the point where the Maginot Line ends at Montmedy northwestward to the line Sedan Givet Dinant Namur. They have put in four armored divisions and many other troops and an overwhelming number of tanks and airplanes. This is as you know, the shortest road to Paris.

The Belgians have been obliged to fall back to the line of Namur Louvain Malines Antwerp. Dutch resistance has been almost crushed.

At this moment news has reached the French General Staff that certain dispositions of airplanes and troops indicate that Mussolini is contemplating making a direct attack on France and that he has adjourned his attack on Yugoslavia.

There are literally no French planes available to face an Italian attack and the Italian aviation would be able to bomb southern and southwestern France at will.

I have talked with eyewitnesses of the German bombings in Belgium and Luxemburg, including the Archduke Otto and Bech, Foreign Minister of Luxemburg. Neither men, women, nor children are being spared and the tales of horror pass belief.

No one in Paris doubts that Mussolini is contemplating pleasurably the infliction of similar atrocities. Information reaching the French Foreign Office today which Léger³² has just given me indicates moreover that the Italians are trying to provoke incidents which will give them an excuse for attacking France. The Italian colony in Tunis has become most provocative and insults to French and English in Italy continue.

Nearly every member of the French Government and many French Senators have appealed to me today to ask you to make a final effort to keep Italy from entering the war as Germany's ally. Telegrams from the French Ambassador in Rome today report that the Italian press is filled with praise of the American Government and its friendly gesture in eliminating certain duties on Italian goods.³³ Poncet reports that this is being interpreted to mean that the Government of the United States approves of Mussolini's present policies. Since you have handed Mussolini a carrot of this variety I trust that you have not forgotten the club.

³² Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

³³ A Treasury decision dated April 26, 1940, discontinued the countervailing duties on certain silk products.

The suggestions that have been made to me are the following:

(1) That the most powerful weapon to employ against Mussolini would be a statement by the Pope based on purely spiritual grounds denouncing the barbarities which Germany has inflicted on the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.

I have been requested by numerous members of the French Government to ask you to use all the influence you have to persuade the Pope to make such a declaration. It is pointed out that his telegrams to the sovereigns of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg were in the nature of political acts whereas what is needed is a declaration on the ecclesiastical and spiritual plane which centuries ago would have taken the form of excommunication of Hitler and Germany.

(2) Several members of the French Government and the Argentine Ambassador have suggested to me that if all the countries of Latin America should join in denouncing the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg, and if this denunciation should be fully supported by you the effect in Italy would be important.³⁴

(3) It has been suggested to me by many persons that you might let Mussolini know privately that in case he should go to war at this time as Hitler's ally you would do everything in your power to cut off from Italy all immigrant remittances and other funds which Italy ordinarily receives from the United States.

(4) All the members of the Government including Reynaud,³⁵ the Senators, and others with whom I have talked today have implored me to obtain more planes immediately and have become exceedingly depressed when I explained that so far as I knew no planes were available.

You will have thought of other possible methods of influencing Mussolini and I do not wish to make this telegram any longer but I must end it by saying that unless action is immediate it will come too late and that no one in France, general or statesman, believes that France can resist an attack by Italy at this time when every available man in the French Army is needed to stem the German advance through Belgium.

BULLITT

740.0011 European War 1939/3004a : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Chief of the Italian Government
(Mussolini)*³⁶

[WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1940—midnight.

I do not know what Your Excellency plans or proposes but reports reaching me from many sources, to the effect that you may be contemplating early entry into the war, have given me great concern.

³⁴ For correspondence regarding the collective protest by the American Republics against this invasion, see vol. I, section entitled "Cooperation among the American Republics, in their reaction to the European War," subsection III.

³⁵ Paul Reynaud, President of the French Council of Ministers.

³⁶ Transmitted in telegram No. 116, May 15, 1940, from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy.

I send you this appeal as the head of a peaceful nation and as a close friend of twenty other American Republics. All of us in the Americas feel in our hearts that tonight the whole world faces a threat which opposes every teaching of Christ, every philosophy of all the great teachers of mankind over thousands of years.

Forces of slaughter, forces which deny God, forces which seek to dominate mankind by fear rather than by reason seem at this moment to be extending their conquest against a hundred million human beings who have no desire but peace.

You whom the great Italian people call their leader have it in your own hands to stay the spread of this war to another group of 200,000,000 human souls in the Mediterranean Area.

I have sent word to Your Excellency before that I am a realist. As a realist you also will, I know, recognize that if this war should extend throughout the world it would pass beyond the control of heads of States, would encompass the destruction of millions of lives and the best of what we call the liberty and culture of civilization. And no man, no matter how omniscient, how powerful, can foretell the result either to himself or his own people.

Therefore, I make the simple plea that you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack. So only can you help mankind tonight and tomorrow and in the pages of history.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/326 : Telegram

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, to President Roosevelt*³⁷

ROME, May 17, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received May 17—3 : 30 p. m.]

20. In the last several days various members of the Diplomatic Corps to the Vatican have come to see me. The only suggestion that emanates from their conversations is that led by yourself the Americas support the Pope in his efforts for peace and that a further strong protest against aggression be collectively made. On the first part of the suggestion the Pope is really under fire from the political forces in Italy. The *Osservatore Romano*³⁸ is assailed openly and even the Pope since his three messages to the heads of the Governments of Luxemburg, Belgium, and Holland has been openly attacked. It is true that he needs all the support that can be given him but whether

³⁷ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Italy as telegram No. 369.

³⁸ Semi-official daily newspaper of the Vatican.

you see fit to express this point openly is of course for your own determination. Cardinal Maglione was of the opinion in respect to the second part that your contribution to the preservation of peace directed personally to Mussolini was outstanding and important. Learned last night from the English Ambassador Loraine who dined with Osborne³⁹ and myself that Ciano had told him of your last message in an effort to explain that Mussolini would not see any Ambassador. My own feeling is that Mussolini will wait on the outcome of the action on the western front before planning to plunge himself into the conflict and my further thought based on much conversation with widely diversified interests is that Mussolini's particular action will be an independent one aimed at Yugoslavia and ultimately towards Greece while the German activity in the Balkan field would start concurrently in the eastern section of Yugoslavia as a passageway through that country and Bulgaria in which case Hungary and Rumania would be quite completely surrounded. The slowing down of action on the western front as Ambassador Phillips has probably already advised you, appears to have calmed the feelings of many for the moment in Italy, but a renewal of German success would quickly rekindle the anti-Allied activities here.

It is considered that the next effort of the Germans will be against Switzerland in order to turn the flank of the French Army much as they are trying to do in the case of Holland and Belgium at the northern end of the line.

[TAYLOR]

740.0011 European War 1939/3124 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 18, 1940.

[Received May 18—10:04 a. m.]

379. The following "personal message from the Duce for the President of the United States of America" was handed me at 1 p. m. today :

"I reply to the message which you sent me at noon on the 14th instant. I understand perfectly the motives by which it was inspired and I consider it worthy of much respect and of the greatest consideration but there are two fundamental motives which cannot escape your spirit of political realism and those are that Italy is and intends to remain allied with Germany and that Italy cannot remain absent at a moment in which the fate of Europe is at stake. I cannot therefore but reconfirm the substance of my first message. May 18."

PHILLIPS

³⁹ Francis Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See.

811.24 Raw Materials/990

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He read from a memorandum a statement by his Government to the effect that Italy is stocked up on a considerable amount of important commodities, such as toluy, molybdenum, a number of other alloys, and still other important commodities needed for war purposes; that the British Government is of the opinion that this has been done for the benefit of the Axis, especially for Italy, if and when she enters the war; that today different cargoes of these and other commodities are going forward from the United States to Italy. The plea of the British Government is that, in view of the virtual certainty of Italy going to war unless diverted in some way, this country should by embargo or its equivalent let Rome understand that we could not undertake to ship further to her the foregoing commodities, but that we were reserving all of them for emergency purposes. I replied to the Ambassador that I could not comment either pro or con with respect to the matter, but would, along with my associates, give it consideration.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.00119 European War 1939/328

The French Ambassador (De Saint-Quentin) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Translation *]

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1940.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I informed you the other day that the French Government had suggested to eleven American Republics (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela) that they transmit officially to the Holy See the text of their collective protest against the last three German acts of aggression. M. Daladier instructed me today to ask you if President Roosevelt did not think it opportune to invite the American heads of States to associate themselves with the appeal addressed by him to M. Mussolini.

It is possible that the Duce is still undecided as to the time and manner of his intervention. Considering the importance of the material and cultural interests that Italy possesses in Latin America, notably in Brazil and Argentina, a collective *démarche* by the several Governments of that part of the continent might have as great an influence upon the mind of M. Mussolini as American opinion.

* Supplied by the editors.

Because of the urgency, I believe I should present this matter to you without waiting until my visit with you tomorrow at noon. I should appreciate it greatly if you could indicate to me by telephone what reception you feel this proposition will receive.

Accept [etc.]

DE SAINT-QUENTIN

740.00119 European War 1939/328

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1940.

The French Ambassador called to see me this morning. I told the Ambassador that I had received his letter of yesterday's date, suggesting in the name of his Government that the United States request the other American Republics to support the President's peace plea to Mussolini, too late to discuss the subject with the President or the Secretary of State. I said that otherwise I would have been glad to telephone the Ambassador the reply of this Government as he had requested. I said, however, that I had now been afforded the opportunity of talking both with the President and the Secretary of State and that we all felt that the step proposed by the French Foreign Minister would produce an effect counter to that desired by the French Government. To use the President's phrase, it would give Mussolini the impression that the United States and the other American Republics were "ganging up" on him, and that under present conditions this would undoubtedly create an undesirable resentment on his part. Furthermore, I said, if an appeal of this character were made by the United States to the other American Republics, the President would have to make known to them the text of his messages to Mussolini and this the President did not consider it expedient to do. I said, however, that I believed that if one or two of the largest South American republics where there was a considerable element of Italian population were willing spontaneously and of their own initiative to appeal to Mussolini to prevent the extension of the war, such steps might be beneficial rather than prejudicial. I said that I would be glad to see whether this was feasible.

The Ambassador said that he understood fully the views of this Government and thoroughly approved them.

The Ambassador inquired again with regard to the contents of the President's interchange with Mussolini and I told him, as I had told him before, that the President believed it desirable that these communications be kept confidential and that I could, therefore, merely say that the reports published in the press alleging that Mussolini had

outlined to the President Italian claims for compensation were entirely untrue.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/3303½

The British Ambassador (Lothian) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1940.

DEAR MR. HULL: I have received an urgent telegram from my Government which instructs me to make an appeal to the President on behalf of the British and French Governments to make a final approach to Signor Mussolini in the hope of preventing him entering the war in the next few days, which would in the view of the French Government be an appalling blow for France. The suggestion is that the President should ask Mussolini what his reasons are for being on the brink of entering the war against the Allies; I say that the President would be prepared to communicate the Italian claims to the Allied Governments with a view to seeing whether a last minute agreement could not be reached. In view of the urgency of the matter, I am arranging to see the President this evening and shall be at your disposal any time tonight or tomorrow should you desire to see me.

Yours sincerely,

LOTHIAN

740.0011 European War 1939/3303½

The British Ambassador (Lothian) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1940.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose two copies of the proposal for a communication by yourself to Mussolini which I discussed with you last night. I am also sending one to Mr. Hull, though I am not certain it will reach him before he sees you. The text has been agreed with the French Ambassador.

Believe me [etc.]

LOTHIAN

P. S. I presume that the U. S. A. would participate in this discussion to the extent that its own interests were engaged.

L

[Enclosure]

The Allied Governments suggest that the President on his own initiative should ask Signor Mussolini for the reasons which apparently induce him to contemplate an immediate entry into the war against the Allies and that he should further state that if Signor Mussolini will inform him of his grievances or claims against the Allies he will

immediately communicate them to the Allied Governments in order to leave nothing undone to prevent an extension of the war.

They suggest that the President should inform Signor Mussolini that he had reason to believe that the attitude of the Allies towards the Italian Government can be defined as follows:

(a) The Allied Governments are aware that the Italian Government entertains certain grievances in regard to Italian position in the Mediterranean

(b) That the Allied Governments are prepared to take into consideration all reasonable Italian claims and to attempt to reach an agreement with Italy at once for a settlement which would come into force as soon as the war was ended.

(c) The Allied Governments would welcome Italian participation at the peace conference with a status equal to that of the belligerents.

Signor Mussolini would thus be invited by the President to notify him for transmission to the Allies of the claims of Italy the fulfilment of which would in his view ensure the establishment in the Mediterranean of a new order guaranteeing to Italy the satisfaction of her legitimate aspirations in that sea. If the negotiations succeeded the President would then formally record:

(a) The agreement thus arrived at

(b) The undertaking of the Allies to execute the agreement at the end of the war

(c) The assurance of Signor Mussolini that the claims of Italy would be satisfied by the execution of this agreement. The agreement thus arrived at to be dependent of course on Italy not entering the war against the Allies.

740.0011 European War 1939/2691#a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1940—3 p. m.

140. Personal for the Ambassador. Please communicate immediately and orally to the Chief of Government the following message from the President:

"I want to thank you for your courteous reply to my last verbal message to Your Excellency.

Events have been marching swiftly but I still believe that political long range vision favors the limitation of the war to its present areas.

I hope it will be helpful to Your Excellency in keeping war out of the Mediterranean and out of even much wider areas and populations if I make the following suggestions to you:

The people of the United States are greatly concerned by the indications of the past few days which would seem to show that there was an increasing possibility of the extension of the European War to the Mediterranean area.

I realize fully from your recent messages and from public statements which you have made that the Italian Government desires to obtain readjustments with regard to Italy's position.

If you are willing to inform me of the specific desires of Italy in this regard in order to insure the satisfaction of Italy's legitimate aspirations in that area, I will communicate them to the Governments of Great Britain and of France.

I would take this action in the belief that I am thereby rendering a constructive service at this critical moment with the hope that the cause of peace might thereby be furthered.

Likewise, I would communicate such a message from you with the understanding that if an agreement were arrived at, it would involve an assurance to me by the French and British Governments that such agreement would be faithfully executed by them at the end of the war and that those Governments would welcome Italian participation at any eventual peace conference with a status equal to that of the belligerents; and, finally, that you would in similar fashion assure me that the claims of Italy would be satisfied by the execution of this agreement and that the agreement so reached would avoid the possibility of Italy entering the war.

With the terms which you might be willing to propose or with the counter terms which the French and British Governments might desire to propose I am of course not concerned; nor can I undertake any responsibility other than that indicated. My sole desire in making this suggestion is to make a practical effort towards avoiding the extension of the war. Roosevelt."

Please telegraph immediately the nature of the reply that may be made.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/3303g

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1940.

I called the British Ambassador over the telephone. I first made it clear that I was referring to the British memorandum requesting the President to lay before Mussolini a request to preserve peace and at the same time to make known his demands for recognition in the Mediterranean, etc., etc., in order that the President might transmit the same to the British and French Governments. I stated to the Ambassador that the President, rather than act at the instance of the British and the French, preferred to pursue the next logical step in his previous correspondence with Mussolini on the same general subject, which he had conducted on his own initiative and without any request from any other government; that, accordingly, the President had communicated with Mussolini; that in doing so he had really taken action on the matters referred to in the British memorandum, as a part of his communication to Mussolini. I enjoined absolute secrecy on the part of the Ambassador and his government on the ground that

it would be hurtful rather than helpful if the matter should be made public at this time. The Ambassador accordingly pledged secrecy.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/2691‡ : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 27, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received May 27—10:25 a. m.]

420. Department's 140, May 26, 3 p.m. Ciano received me this morning at 11:30. I told him that I had a very important message from the President which I had been instructed to deliver orally to the Duce but I would be glad to have him read it for his information. Ciano replied that Mussolini would be unable to receive me but that he himself would receive the message and with my permission would take a few notes of its contents. This he proceeded to do with attentive care and I did not feel that I could press further my request for an interview with Mussolini. When he had concluded I asked him if he could give me any idea of the nature of the reply. He said with conviction "it would be a no" and he went on to explain that Mussolini's position was not merely a question of securing Italy's legitimate aspirations but that the Duce was determined to carry out his obligations under his alliance with Germany. He added that Mussolini was out at the moment but would return later in the day and the Minister promised to send for me at once as soon as he was in a position to communicate the reply.

I asked the Minister whether he fully realized the importance and the seriousness of the President's message. He admitted that he did so but that nothing now could alter the situation. He added that he could not tell me precisely when Italy would enter the war; it will not be possible for a few days and it might not be for a few weeks but he said that "it will happen soon". In conclusion he asked me with regard to the attitude of the United States. I reminded him of the President's program for an immense defensive armament. Ciano merely replied that he assumed the United States was in sympathy with the Allies just as Italy was in sympathy with Germany.

At 1 o'clock Ciano sent for me and told me that Mussolini had confirmed the statements which he, Ciano, had made to me earlier in the day. The Minister stated that Mussolini desired to preserve his "freedom of action" and was not disposed to enter into any negotiations which in fact, however, would not be in the spirit of Fascism. He emphasized the point that Mussolini had the responsibility of the "fulfillment of an engagement—of words given" and he added that "any

attempt to prevent Italy from fulfilling her engagements is not well regarded."

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/2691† : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1940—6 p. m.

154. By direction of the President you are requested to call on Count Ciano and deliver to him orally the following message for the Chief of Government:

The President has received and has of course given the most thoughtful consideration to the reply conveyed by the Chief of Government to the President's last message.⁴¹

The President feels compelled in the most friendly manner, but at the same time with the utmost frankness, to lay certain very important considerations before Signor Mussolini.

If the war in Europe is now extended through the entrance of Italy into the war, direct interests of the Government of the United States will be immediately and prejudicially affected. The President has already reminded the Chief of Government of the historic and traditional interests of the United States in the Mediterranean. These interests have been upheld over a period of almost 150 years. This Government has never asserted any political interest in Europe, but it has asserted its clearly defined interests of an economic and property character. Through the extension of the war to the Mediterranean region and the inevitable destruction of life and property resulting therefrom, the legitimate interests of the American people will be gravely curtailed and such a possibility cannot be viewed with equanimity by their Government.

An extension of the war into the Mediterranean region will almost unquestionably likewise involve a further extension of the war area in the Near East and in other regions of the world. The President has already stated his belief that such further extension of the war might well bring with it the involvement of countries at present remote from the scene of the hostilities. The President feels it necessary to emphasize that possibility. The social and economic relations between the Americas and the whole of Europe are greater than with any other part of the world. These relations are already gravely disturbed as a result of the present hostilities. In the event that there were any further extension of the war, they would obviously be even more seriously disturbed.

In conclusion, the further extension of the war as a result of Italian participation would at once result in an increase in the rearmament program of the United States itself and in a redoubling of the efforts of the Government of the United States to facilitate in every practical

⁴¹ Presumably reference is to oral reply reported in telegram No. 420, May 27, 1 p. m., *supra*. No other reply from Mussolini has been found in the Department files.

way the securing within the United States by the Allied Powers of all of the supplies and matériel which they may require.

Signor Mussolini will recognize that arming on an unprecedented scale in the Americas will make difficult the reduction of armaments in Italy, Europe, and the rest of the world at the conclusion of the present wars. The establishment of normal internal economic and social programs will, therefore, be made infinitely more difficult.

As the Chief of Government well knows, the relations between the Italian and American peoples have always been particularly close and friendly and the President feels sure that the Chief of Government will also recognize that the President has desired and now desires to promote profitable commercial relations between the two countries, as well as a friendly understanding and comprehension of their respective policies and interests between the two Governments. It is for these and the other reasons mentioned that the President believes that entire frankness on his part in these grave moments will be construed by the Chief of Government as an indication of the President's earnest desire to maintain and promote good relations between the two countries.

Please telegraph immediately the reply which may be made to you.
HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/2855 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 31, 1940—10 a. m.
[Received May 31—8:55 a. m.]

964. For the President and the Secretary. Last night Daladier ⁴² informed me that he was about to sign and send a note to the Italian Government stating that the Italian Government had informed the British Government that it intended to make war on France. The Italian Government had made no similar communication to the French Government. The French Government desired to know for what reasons the Italian Government intended to commit an unprovoked aggression against a people who had always lived in peace with the people of Italy and desired nothing but to live in peace with the people of Italy. The French Government was fully prepared at this moment to examine at once any claims which the Italian Government might have against France with a view to satisfying them.

Daladier went on to say that he felt this move was wise because either Mussolini would make such outrageous claims that the whole of the French Empire would be swept by a flame of patriotism or Mussolini would refuse to reply, in which case the people of the French Empire would know that the French Government had done everything possible to avoid an unprovoked attack by Italy.

BULLITT

⁴² Edouard Daladier, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/26914 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, June 1, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received June 1—10 a. m.]

445. My telegram No. 437, May 31, 2 p. m.⁴³ Ciano sent for me at 12:15 p. m. and conveyed to me orally Mussolini's reply to the President's message contained in your 154, May 30, 6 p. m. Mussolini confirmed the statements which Ciano made to me yesterday and mentioned in particular that the decision had already been taken to enter the war. He does not agree with the point taken by the President with regard to the interests of the United States in the Mediterranean and maintains that the United States has the same interest in that area as Italy has, for example, in the Caribbean Sea.

With regard to the President's statement that Italian participation in the war would result in the redoubling of our efforts to help the Allies, Mussolini says that he has no objection and that that is our business. This proves to him, however, that America is actually giving help to the Allies and has already "chosen the Allied side". He on his part has his own engagements under the alliance with Germany which he desires to fulfill. He does not believe, however, that Italian intervention in the war will necessitate an enlargement of the conflict in the Mediterranean. At any rate that is not the Italian aim and Italy will do her best to prevent it.

Ciano concluded his statement by saying that Mussolini prefers not to receive "any further pressure" which I was advised "would only stiffen his attitude". Ciano added that Mussolini knows already the President's mind and the President undoubtedly is now aware of Mussolini's mind.

PHILLIPS

740.0011 European War 1939/3441 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 1, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received June 1—11:40 a. m.]

240. President Vargas says that if the Department of State is willing at this juncture to use good offices with the Italian Government in another effort to keep Italy out of the war he will instruct his Ambassador at Rome to take steps along similar lines. If the Department is in accord, what form will good offices take?

CAFFERY

⁴³ Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/3441 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1940—4 p. m.

150. Your 240, June 1, 1 p. m. The President has exchanged several communications with Mussolini during the past few weeks. The last message sent by the President was on May 30. Mussolini's reply was received this morning.

It states specifically that Italy has made her decision to enter the war and to carry out her engagements under the German alliance.

While this Government deeply appreciates the suggestion made by President Vargas, it would seem, for the reasons above mentioned, that it is now too late for any effective results to be obtained.

I am keeping the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington closely informed of all developments.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/2855 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 3, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received June 3—5:52 p. m.]

1018. With reference to the French offer to discuss immediately any and all Italian claims against France (see my telegram No. 964, May 31, 10 a. m.), François-Poncet informed the French Government that Ciano had said to him that Mussolini would not be interested in receiving any French territories by peaceful negotiations. He had decided to make war on France. There would, therefore, be no reply to the French note.

Is it impossible for the President now to speak the truth in public about Mussolini?

BULLITT

740.0011 European War 1939/3710

The Italian Ambassador (Colonna) to the Secretary of State

N. 4901

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1940.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Under instructions from my Government I have the honor to bring what follows to your knowledge.

On the 10th of June 1940 at 4:30 P. M. the Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Galeazzo Ciano received at the Chigi Palace the French Ambassador and made to him the following communication:

“His Majesty the King and Emperor declares that Italy considers herself in a state of war with France beginning tomorrow, June 11th, at 4:45 P. M.”.

Count Ciano asked the British Ambassador to call and made to him in identical terms the communication that Italy considers herself in a state of war with Great Britain.

Accept [etc.]

COLONNA

[For a review by President Roosevelt of his efforts to keep Italy out of the war, see text of his address given at Charlottesville, Virginia, June 10, 1940, in *Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1940, page 635.]

PROTEST BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING ATTACK BY ITALIAN AIRPLANES ON THE SUDAN INTERIOR MISSION AT DORO, KILLING TWO AMERICAN CITIZENS AND WOUNDING TWO OTHERS

348Z.1123 Grieve, Robert/40

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Italy (Reed)

No. 662

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1940.

SIR: You are requested, upon the receipt of this instruction, to address the following communication to the Italian Foreign Office:

"On August 23, 1940, shortly after nine o'clock in the morning, two Italian aircraft attacked the compound of the Sudan Interior Mission at Doro in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, resulting in the killing of Dr. and Mrs. Robert C. Grieve and the wounding of the Reverend and Mrs. C. K. Oglesby, all American citizens.

"As soon as my Government learned of the occurrence, the American Legation at Cairo was instructed to make a most thorough investigation of all the facts and circumstances concerning the incident so far as might be possible, based in particular on eye-witness sources. That investigation has now been completed and, under instructions of my Government, I have been directed to acquaint the Royal Italian Government with what follows.

"An American branch of the Sudan Interior Mission, an international missionary organization with American, British and Canadian branches, has been established for some time at Doro, with a mission station also at Chali. For some six months prior to August 23, 1940, the mission at Doro consisted of the Reverend and Mrs. C. K. Oglesby, Dr. and Mrs. R. C. Grieve, all American citizens, and Miss Zullah Walsh, a British subject, ordinarily resident of Australia.

"Doro, like Chali, is a small open undefended village and, apart from the mission compound, is exclusively native. There are no military or police posts at Doro mission station or in the village of Doro or any military works of any character. The village itself consists of some 15 native tukls.

"Mr. Malcolm I. Forsberg, an American citizen, of the Sudan Interior Mission at Chali has declared in a sworn affidavit that 'having learned from three Greek traders from Kurmuk passing through Chali on their way to Melut of disorders in the Kurmuk area and bearing in mind the nearness of Chali and Doro to Kurmuk', he ad-

dressed on July 27, 1940, a letter to the Commander, Italian Army at Dul, Ethiopia, reading as follows:

'Sir: This is to inform you that there are two men one woman and a child at Chali all of whom are Americans. There are two men and three women at Doro one young lady of whom is Australian. The rest are Americans. We are engaged solely in missionary work among the Uduk and Maban tribes. We have placed an American flag on one of the houses at Chali.

'Sincerely yours, M. I. Forsberg, Sudan Interior Mission'

"According to Mr. Forsberg's affidavit, he received on August 5, 1940 the following communication dated August 2, 1940 from the Commander Italian Army, Kurmuk (signature illegible):

'Mr. M. I. Forsberg, Sudan Interior Mission, Chali.

'I have received your letter of which I understand the presence of your mission in my territory. I shall be glad to see you all, men and women, here at Kurmuk every one with his own passport. I hope that the travel by Chali and Doro to Kurmuk may afford like to you. Please accept my best wishes to ladies and my salutations to gentlemen.

Commander Italian army Kurmuk'

"On August 5, date of receipt of the foregoing, Mr. Forsberg, according to his sworn statement, sent the following reply to the Italian Commander at Kurmuk:

'The Commander Italian Army at Kurmuk.

'Dear Sir: I received your letter of August 2, 1940, today. I will send word concerning your wishes to our missionaries in Doro. It will be a number of days before we can get an answer from them. We have no means to take us to Kurmuk. It would be dangerous for the child and for the ladies to travel in the wet now when there is malaria. One of the ladies at Doro (near Boin) is going to have a baby and is very ill from that. She also is just recovering from malaria. It would be very hard for her to travel now. We will appreciate it if you will let us stay in our houses at Chali and Doro until you occupy this territory.

'Sincerely yours, M. I. Forsberg, Sudan Interior Mission'

"Mr. Forsberg further avers that following the despatch of the letter quoted above 'he received no communication from the Italian military authorities'. According to other information, it appears that the mission at Doro had had at no time any communication with the Italian military authorities.

"At about 9:15 a. m. on August 23, 1940 members of the mission station at Doro were attracted by the sound of aircraft engines. Upon an observation of the sky, two aircraft were to be seen about a mile distant flying apparently in a westerly direction along and over the approximate course of the Yabus River, whose nearest point is about a mile from the southern boundary of the mission compound.

"As a result of the noise made by the aircraft engines, Dr. and Mrs. Grieve and the Reverend and Mrs. Oglesby left their houses and stood together on the open ground to observe the airplanes. Miss Walsh was standing on the porch along the south side of her house.

"Suddenly the two airplanes changed their course toward the compound. As they did so, Dr. Grieve and Mr. Oglesby held extended a United States flag, measuring some six by four feet, while their wives stood a little distance south of them.

"The two aircraft, flying one after the other, crossed the southern boundary of the compound at a height of not more than one thousand feet, possibly less, in as much as the details of the planes were plainly

distinguishable from the ground. In an affidavit of Mr. Oglesby the aircraft are described as Italian single-engined bi-planes. It is added that the vertical tricolor national markings were painted upon the tail fins of the aircraft.

"When the aircraft were only a short distance from the four Americans standing in the open, the second airplane, flying slightly to the west of the airplane in the lead, dived toward the group discharging its bombs. There were three almost simultaneous explosions.

"The airplanes flew over the eastern corner of Miss Walsh's house in a northeasterly direction, passing over the native village where at least two more bombs were dropped which fell in the fields.

"Dr. and Mrs. Grieve were struck by the first bombs, Dr. Grieve having fallen partly covered by the United States flag, which was perforated by shrapnel or bomb splinters in no less than twenty-four places. Mr. and Mrs. Oglesby were wounded, Mr. Oglesby only slightly in the shoulders, but Mrs. Oglesby had sustained about thirty small shrapnel wounds on the arms and in the back with three major wounds in the legs and was still reported suffering from mental shock as late as October 21, 1940.

"The airplanes almost immediately afterward returned and dropped a considerable additional number of bombs. They then departed in an easterly direction.

"When the airplanes had finally departed Mr. and Mrs. Oglesby were assisted into their house, while Dr. and Mrs. Grieve were carried into the clinic. Dr. Grieve died at about 10:30 a. m. and Mrs. Grieve that same day about 5:30 p. m.

"Altogether a considerable number of bombs, some high explosive and some incendiary, were dropped in or around the mission compound. The first salvo of three bombs were high explosive or shrapnel bombs while an incendiary bomb destroyed a house belonging to the Reverend and Mrs. Oglesby.

"From the above facts it is clear that:

"The airplanes making the attack were Italian, in accordance with the sworn statements of two eye-witnesses.

"The Italian military authorities at Kurmuk had knowledge prior to the attack on Doro of the presence there of American missionaries and of their non-combatant character.

"Doro is an open undefended village with no military or police posts or any military works of any character.

"The attack on Doro by Italian airplanes was consequently a deliberate and wanton assault on a non-military objective and on non-combatant civilians, including four American citizens.

"My Government is confident that the Royal Italian Government will promptly condemn the acts of those responsible for the brutal unprovoked attack against the four American citizens concerned and that prompt steps will be taken to punish those guilty of an outrage shocking to all those who continue to preserve any respect for the principles of civilized behavior. My Government must of course make full reservations concerning the subsequent entering of claims for compensation for the killing of Dr. and Mrs. Grieve, the wounding of the Reverend and Mrs. Oglesby and for any property damage suffered by American interests."

Very truly yours,

CORDELL HULL

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./22 : Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Reed) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 8, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received November 8—11 : 35 a. m.]

1076. My telegram No. 1054, November 2.⁴⁴ Acknowledgment dated November 6 of my note to Ciano of November 1 concerning bombing of Sudan Interior Mission is signed by Prunas, Director General of Transoceanic Affairs, and reads in translation as follows:

"Detailed information in the premises has been requested of the competent military authorities.

However, as it relates to facts supposed to have occurred more than 2 months ago in a distant locality it is very probable that a report on the matter cannot be received for some time.

Much more expeditious procedure on the part of North America [*sic*] would have been to have requested information concerning the bombardments in question simultaneously from Cairo and from Rome.

That among other things would probably have resulted in a composition different from your note of November 1 which in its concluding portion contains criticisms of the Italian armed forces which cannot but be rejected in toto."

REED

348Z.1123 Grieve, Robert/54 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

ROME, February 3, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received February 3—3 p. m.]

157. Embassy's 1076, November 8, 2 p. m. The following is a translation of a *note verbale* together with enclosure dated January 31st, 1941 (but not received by the Embassy until February 3d) from the Foreign Office with regard to the bombing of the Sudan Interior Mission at Doro:

"With reference to the Embassy's letter of November 1, 1940, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the report from the competent Italian military authorities regarding the alleged bombardment of Doro. The said authorities after careful investigation state that it is to be excluded that the air action in question was carried out by Italian airplanes and emphasize the point that the Government of the Province concerned had in fact given orders that the two missions whose presence at Doro and Chali was perfectly well known should be left undisturbed where they were."

Translation of enclosure follows : ⁴⁵

"The careful investigation immediately ordered by the high command in Italian East Africa has given the following results:

⁴⁴ *Post*, p. 725.

⁴⁵ Released to the press, February 10, 1941. See Department of State *Bulletin*, February 15, 1941, p. 184.

'At Chali (Kurmuk) there is a group of American missionaries composed of two men one woman and one boy; another group of American missionaries composed of two men and three women carries on its work at Doro.

These missionaries in due time informed the commander of the Kurmuk garrison that they belonged to the Sudan Interior Mission and that they were engaged in religious work exclusively.

The Galla Sidama Government gave instructions that these missions be left undisturbed where they are.

The report of the bombardment of the said mission as broadcast by the British is in so far as we are concerned unfounded.

The Galla Sidama Government has caused an investigation to be made and states that it is to be excluded. We have twice bombarded the locality of Daga River Post and there is corroborating proof that this was the locality and not another. Furthermore the dates on which the bombardments took place do not coincide.

The crews of the planes which carried out this action likewise confirm that the locality bombarded was beyond possibility of mistake Daga River Post (which is easily identifiable because of its location on the Daga River), and not Doro.

The only matter which is known to us is that during our first bombardment of Kurmuk (then British) on July 13th last a missionary who was in that locality was wounded in the shoulder but not seriously.'"

PHILLIPS

[The notes here printed were released to the press by the Department of State on January 31 and February 10, 1941. No record of further representations to the Italian Government regarding this incident has been found in Department files.]

ORAL PROTEST BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING ITALIAN BOMBING OF AMERICAN-OWNED OIL PROPERTIES IN SAUDI ARABIA

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./21

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1940.

Mr. James A. Moffett, of the Standard Oil Company California, called on Mr. Welles ⁴⁶ this morning to discuss the situation resulting from the attack by Italian bombing planes on October 18 on properties of the Standard Oil Company of California both in Bahrein as well as in El Hasa, on the mainland of Arabia.

Mr. Moffett had with him the attached telegrams ⁴⁷ received from the company's representative in Arabia stating definitely that both Arabia and Bahrein were attacked, but that damage was done only on the Arabian side.

Mr. Moffett said he realized that, owing to the status of Bahrein as a British-protected state, this Government could not make any protest as a result of the attack at that place. The situation was, how-

⁴⁶ Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

ever, entirely different in regard to the attack on the company's properties in Arabia proper and he very much hoped that we would find it possible to make vigorous protest to the Italian Government in order that there should be no repetition of this attack.

Mr. Welles stated that if the information received from the company's representative in Arabia could be definitely depended upon the Department would of course be prepared to take action. It would be desirable, however, for Mr. Moffett to endeavor to obtain further details regarding the attack, and he requested Mr. Moffett to take the necessary steps in that direction. Mr. Welles promised, however, that the Department would in any case act this afternoon in the event that further information had not been received by the company from Arabia.

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./18

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray)* ⁴⁸

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1940.

With reference to the oral protest made by Mr. Berle this morning to the Italian Ambassador in connection with the attack last Friday by Italian bombing planes on the properties in Arabia of the Standard Oil Company of California, the Ambassador called me by telephone upon his return to his Embassy to say that he would very much prefer to have the Department also take this matter up with the Italian Government through our Embassy in Rome where the matter could be handled more expeditiously and where accurate information was available.

I told the Ambassador that we had discussed this phase of the matter and that in the light of all the circumstances it had seemed preferable to handle the matter in Washington through discussions with him. The Ambassador seemed to imply, however, that it might be somewhat difficult for him to handle the matter entirely alone and expressed the desire that I bring his suggestion to the further attention of Mr. Berle. This I promised to do.

In my opinion it is somewhat difficult for us to avoid meeting the Italian Ambassador's wishes in this matter in view of the fact that, strictly speaking, if representations are to be made by this Government they should pass through our Embassy in Rome. Under the circumstances, if you so desire we can prepare a telegram in that sense, but it would be my suggestion that before acting we should make a further endeavor to obtain more precise information and details re-

⁴⁸ Addressed to Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

garding the bombing in Arabia from the Standard Oil Company of California. I propose in any case to telephone to their office in New York this morning, making an urgent request that they set their machinery in motion and try to obtain an absolute confirmation of the bombing in Arabia as well as further details regarding it.

I would appreciate receiving at your earliest convenience an indication of your wishes as to the reply I should give to the Italian Ambassador in this matter.

WALLACE MURRAY

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./19

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1940.

I telephoned Mr. Moffett and asked him whether he had any further information with regard to the bombing of the property of the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Moffett said that he had just received a further telegram which stated that some 28 bomb craters had been caused and that one plane had been sighted but it was thought that the attack was made by at least two or three planes. Mr. Moffett stated that if we desired he would send us the text of the telegram, and I stated that we would appreciate receiving it.

I stated that we would appreciate receiving any additional information that might be received on the bombing and Mr. Moffett said that he would be glad to send us any additional telegrams as he had requested telegraphically further details both of the bombing of the Company's property in Saudi Arabia as well as at Bahrein.

I informed Mr. Moffett that a protest had been made this morning to the Italian Ambassador with regard to the bombing of property of the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company but that the Department desired that no publicity be given this for the time being. Mr. Moffett assured me that he would carefully respect the information which was given him in confidence.

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./16

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs (Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1940.

I informed the Italian Ambassador this morning that the Department contemplated acting in accordance with his request that the oral protest which had been made to him yesterday by Mr. Berle, regard-

ing the bombing of American oil properties in Saudi Arabia by Italian planes, be brought simultaneously to the attention of the Italian Government through our Embassy at Rome.

The Ambassador thanked me for this assurance and reiterated his feeling that after all, since this was an American interest involved, the proper channel for communicating with the Italian Government with respect thereto was through our Embassy in Rome.

The Ambassador said he very much regretted to note the publicity which had been given in the morning papers to the conversation which he had yesterday with Mr. Berle. He added that he had not mentioned the matter to anyone and therefore assumed that the report had emanated from the Department. He added that publicity of this kind was in his opinion always unfortunate.⁴⁹

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./10 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Fish)

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1940—7 p. m.

127. Please inform the Saudi Arabian Government through the appropriate channel that your Government today protested to the Italian Government through the Italian Ambassador in Washington the bombings by Italian aircraft in the night of October 18, 1940, of the property of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company at Al Khobar in Saudi Arabia.

You should add in your communication to the Saudi Arabian Government that your Government would appreciate being informed of the attitude which the Saudi Arabian Government may take or has taken concerning this violation of its neutral rights.

Repeat to Baghdad for its information.

HULL

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./11 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Italy (Reed)

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1940—4 p. m.

512. The Department has forwarded to you by air mail an instruction no. 662 of October 23, 1940,⁵⁰ containing the text of a note which you have been requested to communicate to the Italian Foreign Office concerning an attack by Italian aircraft at Doro in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan on August 23, 1940, which resulted in the killing of two American missionaries and the wounding of two others.

⁴⁹ Attached to this document is a note by Mr. Berle as follows: "I see no reason why we should have kept our protest to the Italians secret. They did not bother to keep their bombings secret."

⁵⁰ *Ante*, p. 717.

The Department desires that upon the delivery of the above-mentioned note you take occasion at the same time to protest orally the illegal and unwarranted action of the Italian military authorities in the bombing, in the night of October 18, 1940 by three Italian aircraft of the Pioggia type, of the property of the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company near Al Khobar in Saudi Arabia. You should add that the company is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and that its shares are owned equally by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Corporation, both organized under the laws of Delaware. According to information received by the Department, which you may convey to the appropriate Italian authorities, damage was done to the water line and oil line of the American company near Al Khobar and some 28 craters were caused by the bombing.

The Italian Ambassador in Washington was, on October 23, acquainted with the text of the formal note which you are being instructed to present to the Italian Government concerning the Italian attack on American missionaries and a protest was made to him orally at the same time regarding the attack by Italian aircraft on the property of the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company in Saudi Arabia.

Please inform the Department by telegraph upon the delivery of the note and upon the making of your oral protest.

HULL

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./15 : Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Reed) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 2, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received November 2—9:35 a. m.]

1054. Department's telegram No. 512, October 26, 4 p. m. Note and oral protest delivered this morning to Anfuso, Chief of Cabinet at the Foreign Office. He did not comment other than to say that while the incidents were regrettable they occurred in the course of military operations. He said he would refer both protests immediately to the Ministry of Italian Africa.

REED

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./23 : Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Reed) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 10, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received November 10—9:08 a. m.]

1082. Department's telegram No. 512, October 26, 4 p. m. Prunas⁵¹ called me to the Foreign Office this morning and in response to my oral protest regarding the bombing of American property near Al Khobar

⁵¹ N. R. Prunas, Director General of Transoceanic Affairs.

stated that the bombing was due to a mistake on the part of the Italian pilot who thought he was over territory under British control; that appropriate expression of regret had been conveyed by the Italian Government to the Government of Saudi Arabia and that the latter Government considered the matter a closed incident. Prunas added that his Government was glad that no more serious damage had been sustained by the American-owned property in question.

REED

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./28: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Fish)

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1940—1 p. m.

145. Department's 127, October 24, 7 p. m. A reply has been received from the Italian Government in answer to this Government's oral protest against the bombing of the property of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company in Saudi Arabia by Italian aircraft.

The American Chargé d'Affaires in Rome has been informed by the Italian Foreign Office that the bombing was the result of a misapprehension on the part of an Italian pilot, who was of the opinion that he was flying over territory under British control. The Italian Foreign Office is stated to have added that an appropriate expression of regret had been transmitted by the Italian Government to the Government of Saudi Arabia, and that the latter Government considered the incident as closed. The official of the Italian Foreign Office making the oral communication is stated to have expressed gratification on the part of his Government that no more serious damage was sustained by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company.

In communicating the foregoing to the Saudi Arabian Government, you should refer to the inquiry you were instructed to make concerning the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government towards this violation of its neutral rights, and state that your Government would appreciate being informed thereof.

HULL

346B.115 Standard Oil Co./38

The Minister in Egypt (Fish) to the Secretary of State

Saudi Arabian Series No. 8

CAIRO, January 24, 1941.

[Received March 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 127 of October 24, 7 p. m., 1940, and subsequent correspondence regarding an attack by Italian aircraft on American oil installations in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein and to enclose a copy of the English trans-

lation of a note dated January 13, 1941, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in reply to the Legation's note no. 15 of November 30, 1940,⁵² in which the Legation renewed its request to be advised of the attitude of the Government of Saudi Arabia in respect of the violation of its neutral rights as a result of the bombing of the property of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company at Al Khobar.

It will be noted that the Saudi Arabian Government expresses its appreciation of the interest shown by the United States Government in this matter and the steps taken by it in that regard. The note adds that the Saudi Arabian Government presented an official protest to the Italian Government regarding the attack and that the latter expressed its regret for the incident giving as an explanation that the bombing was the result of an error by an Italian pilot.

Respectfully yours,

BERT FISH

⁵² Legation's note of November 30, 1940, and Saudi Arabian note of January 13, 1941, not printed.

LITHUANIA

NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING A CONSULAR CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LITHUANIA

[On August 3, 1936, the Lithuanian Chargé acknowledged receipt from the Department of State of a draft consular convention and stated he was forwarding the draft to his Government for suggestions. In a note of October 9, 1937, the Department inquired of the Lithuanian Minister whether the Legation was prepared to proceed further with negotiations for a consular convention (711.60M21/25). The Minister replied on October 19 that the matter was still being given consideration, but had been delayed because of negotiations regarding the Naturalization and Military Service Treaty which was signed on October 18, 1937 (Department of State Treaty Series No. 936), and which had been given preference (711.60M21/34). The Lithuanian Minister next informed the Department on September 6, 1939, that his Government was now anxious to speed up the conclusion of this convention (711.60M21/38). The suggestions that the Lithuanian Government desired to make in connection with the draft convention were submitted on November 1, 1939 (711.60M21/40). A consular convention with Lithuania was signed on May 10, 1940. It was sent to the Senate May 20 but on September 26 the Senate without objection agreed to return the convention to the Secretary of State, without the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, in view of the political changes effected through military operations in Europe since the convention was signed (*Congressional Record*, volume 86, part 11, page 12670). No further action on the convention was taken by the Department.]

NETHERLANDS

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE FATE OF THE NETHERLAND POSSESSIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFTER THE NETHERLANDS WAS OVERRUN BY GERMANY

856B.01/2

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1940.

The Ambassador of Venezuela ¹ called to see me this afternoon. Dr. Escalante told me that he was leaving Washington on April 24 and would sail the following day from New York for Venezuela in order to attend the session of the Venezuelan Senate of which he is a member.

I told the Ambassador that I would be grateful if he would talk over with his Foreign Minister, Dr. Gil Borges, the problems which might be suddenly raised with regard to the Dutch West Indies and Dutch Guiana in the event of an invasion of Holland by Germany. I stated that rumors had come to my attention which I had already transmitted to Dr. Gil Borges to the effect that attempts might be made by groups of Germans or other individuals operating from Venezuelan territory to create acts of sabotage in the Dutch West Indies. I added that if any further rumors of this character came to me I would, of course, transmit them in the same way for the confidential information of the Venezuelan Government. I said that it seemed to me that in the event of an invasion of the Netherlands by Germany an immediate consultation on the part of all of the American Republics would be desirable so as to consider the steps of prevention which might be taken in the interest of continental solidarity should the local authorities in the Dutch West Indies and in Dutch Guiana find themselves confronted with any concerted effort at sabotage or insurrection and should the situation arising from such possibilities create a condition where non-American activities would endanger the peace of the western world.

The Ambassador replied that he was in very hearty accord with these ideas and that he felt sure that his own Government would be in accord. He said that the rumors which had arisen alleging that

¹ Don Diógenes Escalante.

the Government of Venezuela itself might attempt to seize the islands were utterly ludicrous and had originated from an article which had been published in a newspaper in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The article had later been circulated in certain Venezuelan cities in the form of hand bills. He said that these hand bills undoubtedly had been circulated by propagandists for the purpose of creating trouble and he had no doubt that non-American money was behind this circulation.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

856B.01/20

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1940.

The British Ambassador² came in at my request. Having definitely in mind the real possibility of Holland proper being overrun and occupied militarily by the Germans, as in the case of a number of other small countries heretofore, with the result that there arises questions concerning the colonies of the Netherlands located throughout the world, including those in this hemisphere, as was the case of Greenland after the occupation of Copenhagen,³ and in the light of the report that the British were proceeding to occupy Curaçao, off Venezuela, I said that countries throughout this hemisphere would be liable to construe that action as assumption of more or less jurisdiction by the British over the island of Curaçao, regardless of the real intention of the British to the contrary. In these circumstances, I felt that the possible arousing of adverse comment among the American nations in this hemisphere would do the British needless harm, assuming that they had no intention of violating the Monroe Doctrine.

The Ambassador at first seemed to resent the raising of this question by bluntly and with some feeling inquiring of me whether we would guarantee the oil resources from being sabotaged on the island of Curaçao. I replied that that was not the question I was undertaking to raise; that the only question I was endeavoring to raise was that whatever might be the motive of the British in occupying Curaçao militarily, they could very easily develop misunderstanding and criticism throughout the American continent and thereby do themselves more harm than good; whereas the point I had first in mind was to suggest that there was undoubtedly a different method of approaching the whole problem in lieu of British military occupation under circumstances calculated to arouse criticism. This method was one of conference in advance between the British and interested countries in this hemisphere in order to find a way to solve the matter to the

² Marquess of Lothian.

³ See pp. 343 ff.

satisfaction of the British, while avoiding suspicion and criticism on the theory that the British had some secret intention to occupy Curaçao more or less permanently. The Ambassador seemed finally to understand and appreciate what I was undertaking to say to him, and he said he would take it up with his Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/2928

The Netherland Minister (London) to the Secretary of State

No. 2422

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1940.

SIR: Acting upon telegraphic instructions received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at The Hague, through the intermediacy of the Netherlands Minister in London, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that a state of war exists between the Netherlands and Germany.

I am further instructed to inform you that whatever the fate of the Netherlands in Europe might become, the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies as well as the Governors of Surinam and Curaçao are entirely competent and in a position to continue their administration as well as to maintain order within these territories and defend them against aggression from without and that therefore any foreign intervention will be rejected by the Netherlands Government.

The Netherlands Government would highly appreciate it if the United States Government would not take any measures by which commercial and financial intercourse would be cut off between the United States and those parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands not occupied by Germany, and especially with the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao, which territories, like the Netherlands territory situated in Europe according to the Netherlands constitutional law, constitute separate units of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The occupation of a smaller or larger area of these units can therefore entail no legal consequences so far as the unoccupied parts of the Kingdom are concerned.

Measures have already been taken in the Overseas Territories of the Netherlands to insure that commercial and financial intercourse between these units and parts of the Netherlands in Europe which are occupied by Germany will be prohibited.

I am further requested to draw your attention to the Netherlands law concerning the transfer of the seat of companies with limited liability which law has already become operative and which is expected to be observed by all authorities, also the judicial authorities.

Finally I am requested to notify you that the Netherlands diplomatic and consular agencies will continue to function normally in all countries except in Germany and in parts of foreign countries occupied by Germany even in case the whole territory of the Netherlands in Europe should be occupied. The Governments of the Netherlands Indies, of Surinam and of Curaçao are from now on authorized independently to issue instructions to Netherlands Ministers and consuls about matters concerning territories under their respective jurisdictions.

Please accept [etc.]

A. LOUDON

856B.00/23 : Telegram

The Consul at Curaçao (Huddleston) to the Secretary of State

CURAÇAO, May 10, 1940—9 a. m.

[Received 1 : 35 p. m.]

I have been informed by the Colonial Secretary that martial law was declared in Curaçao this morning and that the German crews of the 7 German merchant vessels in port numbering about 350 persons are being held in the Emma school here. German Austrian residents approximating 50 people have also been arrested, all of these individuals will be interned at Bonaire Island. Sand bags are being placed over local recently constructed steel air raid shelters. Banks are not quoting foreign exchange rates today.

HUDDLESTON

856B.01/4 : Telegram

The Chargé in Venezuela (Scott) to the Secretary of State

CURAÇAO, May 10, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 8 : 50 p. m.]

60. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has read me a note which has just been handed him by the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires ad interim and which in close paraphrase is as follows :

[Here follow two paragraphs similar to the second and third paragraphs of the note of May 10 from the Netherland Minister, printed on page 731.]

The Minister then stated that he had just received a telegram from Washington that Curaçao was being reinforced by British troops from Jamaica. He expressed great concern over this development stating that once the British were in it would be difficult to get them to leave after the liquidation of the war. He stated that his Government was very desirous (to fix ?) define [*sic*] some line of action immediately and in accord with the United States. For this purpose he was sending a

telegram to the Venezuelan Chargé d'Affaires in Washington to discuss this at once with the Department. He added that the status of Curaçao and Aruba was to be discussed in Cabinet meeting with the President this afternoon.

SCOTT

856B.01/11

The British Ambassador (Lothian) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1940.

SIR: I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands Government are most concerned about the security of Aruba and Curaçao and of the oil refineries which are vital to their war effort. There is reason to fear attempts at sabotage by Germans or German agents, and that local authorities may have insufficient forces at their command to deal with these attempts. It has therefore been agreed that a small additional force from neighbouring British territory should be placed at the disposal of the local Dutch authorities for security purposes. In case the United States Government would feel inclined to cooperate with His Majesty's Government and the Netherlands Government in this matter, such cooperation would be most welcome to both Governments.

I have [etc.]

LOTHIAN

856B.01/18

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at Woodley ⁴ last night, about 10:30 p. m., at his request.

He presented a note addressed to Secretary Hull, dated May 10th,^{4a} relating to the concern of the United Kingdom and of the Netherlands Government about the safety of Aruba and Curaçao, and the oil refineries there, and to the decision that a small additional British force should be landed in Curaçao.

Prior to the visit of the Ambassador, McDermott ⁵ had telephoned to me press reports that a French force had landed on Aruba from the cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc*. Surmising that this might be the subject of Lord Lothian's visit, I telephoned the White House.

⁴ Residence of Assistant Secretary Berle.

^{4a} *Supra*.

⁵ Michael J. McDermott, Chief of the Division of Current Information.

The President said that in his view the position immediately to be taken should be that we must insist that any forces landed must be so landed at the request of the Dutch authorities, subject to the command of the Dutch authorities, acting under the Dutch flag, and merely by way of temporary assistance. He suggested that I communicate with McDermott, so that the morning papers should not convey the impression that these landings amounted to a "taking over" of the islands.

When Lord Lothian handed me the British note, I stated that I had talked informally to the President on the subject, and that indeed Lord Lothian was familiar with the views of this Government, from his conversations held earlier in the day with Secretary Hull. We had undertaken an obligation to "consult" in the matter of the Dutch West Indies, should there be a "threatened change of sovereignty", as the Ambassador was aware from the proceedings of the Panama consultation. On the other hand, I understood his communication to relate to a temporary landing of forces solely for the assistance of the Dutch authorities, carried out under Dutch command and under the Dutch flag, and not threatening in any sense the Dutch control of the island. Lord Lothian observed that this was his understanding, also.

I likewise pointed out (as the President had suggested) that our reports seemed to indicate that the Dutch authorities had the situation entirely in control. They had interned some ninety-three Germans or German sympathizers working in or near the oil refineries. They had likewise interned all Germans over the age of sixteen. They had taken over the German ships in their harbors; although one had resisted, and one German was killed, and the boat set on fire, the fire had been put out and the resistance promptly put down. According to all reports, the situation was well in hand.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

856B.01/23

The Netherland Minister (Loudon) to the Secretary of State

No. 2474

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1940.

SIR: I have been instructed by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform Your Excellency that the Netherlands Government and the Government of Its Allies are seriously concerned about the security of the oil refineries in the islands of Aruba and Curaçao which are of vital importance to their war effort. There is reason to fear attempt at sabotage by Germans or German agents, and that local authorities may have insufficient forces at their command to deal with these attempts. It has therefore been agreed that small additional

forces from neighbouring allied territories should be placed at the disposal of the local Netherlands authorities for security purposes.

In case the United States Government would feel inclined to co-operate with the Netherlands Government and the Governments of the Allies of The Netherlands in this matter, such cooperation would be most welcome to the Governments concerned.

I avail myself [etc.]

A. LOUDON

856B.01/27

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1940.

Count van Rechteren Limpurg, Counselor of The Netherlands Legation, came in this morning under instructions from his Minister to state that The Netherlands Minister regretted very much to see the American press and to hear American radio commentators make reference to an alleged "occupation" of Curaçao and Aruba by French and British military forces. Count van Rechteren said that the Minister felt that it would be regrettable if Japan were to use the expression "occupation", as carried in the American press, as an excuse to take some preventive action against the Allies in The Netherlands East Indies. The Counselor of the Legation pointed out that any action taken by the French or British armed forces in The Netherlands possessions in the West Indies was along the lines of supporting and assisting the local authorities in the preservation of order and in the prevention of sabotage and other possible subversive movements in those territories. He said his Minister hoped that some correction might be made in the use of the words describing the French and British action in The Netherlands West Indies.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

856B.01/4 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Venezuela (Scott)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1940—5 p. m.

44. Your 60, May 10, 5 p. m. For Scott from the Under Secretary. I saw the Venezuelan Chargé d'Affaires this morning and received from him the message to which you refer in your telegram.

I asked the Chargé d'Affaires to inform Dr. Gil Borges for the latter's confidential information that this Government had already brought to the attention of the British and French Governments certain aspects of the situation which would arise from the landing of

British or French military forces in the Dutch West Indies and to which this Government attached very great importance.

The Department is now awaiting a reply from the British and French Governments and as soon as such reply is received, Dr. Gil Borges will at once be informed. Please inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that we will keep in close touch with him and that we will desire to consult with the Venezuelan Government confidentially with regard to all developments concerning this matter. You may add that the Department has been officially informed by the Dutch Government that the action taken by the British and French authorities was taken at the request of the Netherlands Government and that such forces as have been landed have been placed at the disposal of the local Netherland authorities solely for security purposes. [Welles.]

HULL

856B.01/5 : Telegram

The Consul at Curaçao (Huddleston) to the Secretary of State

CURAÇAO, May 12, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received 4:38 p. m.]

Reference is made to the Department's telegram May 10, midnight [noon?] and to my telegram of May 10, 3 p. m.⁸ The British cruiser *Despatch* arrived at Willemstad at 5 p. m., May 11. A proclamation of the Governor of Curaçao, states that as part of The Netherlands this territory is also at war with the German Reich but that its international political status will remain as before; that the Government established here has resolved to continue to remain in and to take care of this part of the Netherlands territory on land and at sea and any help from outside from whomever it may come will be refused and considered as unwelcome.

HUDDLESTON

756.94/108

The British Ambassador (Lothian) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1940.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Confirming my telephone conversation this morning I enclose a brief summary of the information I obtained by telephone from London in response to the representations you made to me yesterday.

Believe me [etc.]

LOTHIAN

⁸ Neither printed.

[Enclosure]

I got through to London early this morning as a result of representations made by the Secretary of State and the President yesterday. Lord Halifax told me that the following action would be taken to-day:

1) His Majesty's Government was making a public statement to the effect that it had no intention whatever of intervening in the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch Government has been asked to make a public statement that it has no desire for any assistance from outside in order to deal with the internal situation. Lord Halifax is seeing the Japanese Ambassador to-day and communicating this statement to him. It will also be published in the press.

2) The following statement is being published to-day in London and is being given to the American and Japanese press:

"As soon as the Dutch and the Allied Governments are satisfied that the internal position in Curaçao and Aruba have been fully established or as additional Dutch forces are available in sufficient numbers arrangements will at once be made for the immediate withdrawal of the British and French forces on the islands. There has never of course at any time been any intention to alter the status of the islands."

(As this statement was only obtained by telephone I cannot guarantee its verbal accuracy.)

3) This action has been reported to the British Ambassador in Tokyo.

856B.01/34

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
European Affairs (Moffat)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1940.

During the course of a conversation with the British Ambassador at lunch he said that he was as anxious as anybody else to get the British and French military forces off the Islands of Curaçao and Aruba. As he understood it, the chief danger still came from the fact that the interned Germans had not as yet all been removed from the Islands. Once this had been done, then any danger that might arise would come from the outside and could be met by naval patrolling. He said that he hoped the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Governor was satisfied, and he said that he understood the Governor had already issued a proclamation that he did not need outside protection.

I told the Ambassador that this was correct, but that the proclamation had been issued before the landing of the British troops.

He said that he would keep after the matter, but that obviously he could not speak with authority on the purely military phases. He

said that he knew the Secretary had his mind fixed on the Dutch East Indies, and that he fully shared his preoccupations in that direction.

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

856B.01/9 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, May 13, 1940—noon.

[Received 12:04 p. m.]

1321. My No. 1316, May 12, 2 p. m.⁹ Dealing further with British and French occupation of Dutch possessions in the Western Hemisphere, a DNB¹⁰ report issued yesterday evening likens this measure to earlier British additions whereby the British using similar excuses acquired valuable bases throughout the world. Germany it is stated has no interest in Dutch possessions in this part of the world and on the contrary has solemnly declared that it has no territorial aspirations in the Western Hemisphere and has no thought of establishing itself on the American continent. According to DNB Germany is, however, interested in observing what the American Republics which took such pains to maintain their neutrality by the establishment of the 300-mile zone will do as regards this act of aggression which gives Great Britain and France bases in neighborhood of the Panama Canal.

KIRK

856B.01/21

The Chargé in Venezuela (Scott) to the Secretary of State

No. 311

CARACAS, May 13, 1940.

[Received May 17.]

SIR: Amplifying this Embassy's telegram No. 61 of May 13, 10 a. m.,⁹ I have the honor to submit the following information.

Upon receipt of the Department's telegram No. 33 [44?] of May 11, 5 p. m., I called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and gave him the Department's message. He was very pleased at the reassurances which this contained and particularly at the fact that the Department plans to keep in close touch with him concerning developments touching the Netherlands West Indies islands. He set forth in some detail the reasons for his apprehensions concerning the islands. He pointed out that if Holland were completely occupied by Germany the Dutch Government would presumably take refuge in London and under such conditions it would inevitably be dominated by the British. England already had possession of Trinidad and might feel de-

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Deutsches Nachrichten Büro.

sirous of increasing the chain of its island possessions along the northern coast of Venezuela by including not only Curaçao and Aruba but possibly other islands as well. This would have the effect of blocking off the northern coast of South America, a situation which he thought unfavorable not only to Venezuela but to the United States. He stressed the fact that the islands of Curaçao and Aruba formed an integral part of the economy of Venezuela and that his country would not be complacent to any change in sovereignty or status which would jeopardize this relationship. He expressed certain scepticism as to whether the Dutch Government itself had been very anxious for England and France to land troops. Dr. Gil Borges made it clear that his explanation of the reasons for his concern did not imply any lack of complete confidence in the attitude of the American Government.

In commenting on public opinion in Venezuela the Minister said that there had been very little excitement with respect to the occupation of the islands except that a student organization known as UNE¹¹ had issued an inflammatory manifesto the day following the occupation, inciting Venezuela to attempt in some manner to obtain the islands. (A copy of this document with translation is enclosed.¹²) The Minister added that the Dutch Chargé had protested concerning this manifesto and had requested that the Venezuelan Government take appropriate steps to stop such a hostile incitation against a friendly power. The Minister said that he had given every assurance to the Dutch Chargé that this did not represent any responsible opinion in Venezuela and that he would call in the head of the student group and inform him that the students would have to desist from publishing further inflammatory material of this sort. In commenting to me further he added that while this did not represent any important opinion in Venezuela the matter was of some concern to the Government since he was afraid that the Nazi organization might exploit this student group to make trouble with regard to Curaçao. The Minister said that the Nazis in Venezuela had been under quite close surveillance and had not been as far as he knew very active during the last few months, but that the entrance of Holland into the war, coupled with the recent German victories in Europe, might encourage activities of the local Nazi party.

Mr. M. J. van Schreven, Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, in a conversation with me this morning, confirmed the information given by the Foreign Minister and stated that he had overlooked previous newspaper articles virtually advocating taking over the Dutch islands but that he felt he should now put a stop to the growth of any movement of this sort.

¹¹ Unión Nacional Estudiante.

¹² Not printed.

With respect to the landing of the French and British marines Mr. van Schreven said that this move had been at the request of his Government and was merely for the purpose of temporary assistance on the part of allied nations. The landing of troops to help did not fall in any sense within the term of "intervention". The Dutch Chargé expressed himself as satisfied with the attitude of the Venezuelan Government which he said was cooperating in every way. As measures toward preventing a surprise attack by Germans he said that the Venezuelan Government had sent a small gunboat with a detachment of men to occupy the islands known as "Islas Aves", which are a few miles east of Curaçao. These islands belong to Venezuela but are uninhabited, and the purpose of the detachment will be to prevent their being made a base by Germans for an attack on Curaçao.

As of further possible interest to the Department it should be reported that Colonel A. H. Gilkesom, who was making a navigation training flight from the Canal Zone (See Department's telegram No. 28 of April 13),¹⁴ was at Aruba at the time the French marines were landed. The Colonel informed me that he had had an interview with the Governor of the island, who stated that the landing of the marines was not at his request. Colonel Gilkesom said that he had the impression that the Governor was not pleased that the marines were landed. He also informed the Embassy that high officials of the Standard Oil Company at Aruba had told him that upon declaration of martial law by the French marines the civilian American guards that had been employed by the company had been made to turn over their arms to the French authorities. He added that this step was resented by the Standard Oil Company and the American colony in Aruba.

Respectfully yours,

WINTHROP R. SCOTT

856B.01/12 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Curaçao (Huddleston)

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1940—5 p. m.

In reporting developments at Curaçao please give us pertinent details, such as whether the British infantry are operating under the Dutch flag, whether any statements have been made locally about the temporary nature of the occupation, whether the interned Germans have been removed elsewhere, whether in the opinion of the Dutch authorities the danger is now from internal or external sources, and what plans, if any, are being made for ultimately assuring the safety of the Islands by Dutch strength alone.

HULL

¹⁴ Not printed.

856D.01/38

The Netherland Minister (Loudon) to the Secretary of State

No. 2693

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1940.

SIR: I have the honor to confirm the message which I have communicated by telephone to Mr. Berle, the Assistant Secretary of State, that I am in receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, worded:

"We have absolute conviction that no alteration in political or legal status Netherlands East or West Indies is contemplated by Allies and we also feel confident about Japan."

Please accept [etc.]

A. LOUDON

856B.01/15 : Telegram

The Consul at Curaçao (Huddleston) to the Secretary of State

CURAÇAO, May 15, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 7:50 p. m.]

Answering the Department's telegram dated May 13, 5 p.m., I have the honor to report that I have been reliably informed that: (1) the British infantry while commanded by their own officers are under the Dutch flag the Governor of Curaçao having supreme command of all land forces; (2) no statements have been made locally about the temporary nature of the occupation, the British Consul having informed me that it may continue for an indefinite period and that British military opinion here is that the force of approximately 500 officers and men already landed here is inadequate and should be increased; (3) all of the interned Germans have been removed to Bonaire; (4) the danger is reported to be principally from internal sources particularly sabotage by German sympathizers of the oil refinery in which both Dutch and English are interested; external danger is rumored here as from German citizens in Colombia and Venezuela and from possible air attack on oil company interests at Willemstad; (5) the Dutch authorities in Willemstad have some 200 trained marines and police and have mobilized 2,000 raw soldiers. The cruiser *Kinsbergen* and two small submarines are on patrol duty outside Willemstad. They have no military planes nor anti-aircraft guns except a few light machine guns and no artillery. About 15 steel air raid shelters each to accommodate 65 persons have been set up in Willemstad and I understand that 6 have been erected at Aruba.

HUDDLESTON

856B.01/22 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1940—1 p. m.

157. On May 16 the Japanese Ambassador called at his request and questioned me in detail in regard to developments in the Netherlands West Indies.¹⁵ I said that as soon as this Government learned that the British and French vessels patrolling the waters near Curaçao and Aruba were offering potential aid to the Netherlands Government in preventing possible sabotage and possible armed expeditions from the mainland intended to seize the governments of one or both of these possessions, this Government proceeded forthwith to assemble the facts in regard to the ability of the Netherlands forces in those islands to afford protection from such dangers. I said also that it was my understanding that the British and French patrols were not interfering with the Netherlands Governments in those islands but were recognizing the authority of those governments during the brief, temporary time deemed necessary to aid in safeguarding against the dangers mentioned, that the Netherlands Government would be expected to send from abroad additional guards that might later be found to be needed and that therefore there cannot arise in connection with these developments any question of conflict with the traditional American policy relating to our own protection. When the Ambassador proceeded to cross-question me further I inquired whether his inquiries were at the instance of his government, and if so, what the purpose of his government was. I called his attention to press reports of discussions in Japanese Government circles of one aspect or another of the Netherlands East Indies situation and Japan's supposed special rights therein. I pointed out that the tenor of these reports from Tokyo was as though no commitment to respect and preserve the *status quo* had been made and I said that although I was slow to give credit to the contents of news reports, the reports were of a tenor which interfered with efforts of the Ambassador and myself and others to maintain understanding between our two countries.

The Ambassador disclaimed any purpose on the part of his government to cross-question me on the Netherlands West Indies. He stated that his government was entirely satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the *status quo* in respect to the Netherlands East Indies by each of the four governments interested and that it had no purpose to raise any further question in that connection unless the British or French should land troops to protect the islands. I observed that since my Government was interested I had inquired of the British and French and had obtained the unequivocal understanding

¹⁵ For memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p. 285.

that they had no idea of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies. The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the West Indies situation, whereupon I offered comments of the same general nature as in a previous interview, an account of which was contained in the Department's telegram No. 123 of April 22, 6 p. m.¹⁶ I said it was surprising to observe that after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out in China there was an intimation in the news reports that Japan, because of supposed special interest, would not be content unless it extended itself 3,000 miles further to take in the Netherlands East Indies. In conclusion I emphasized that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that there would appear to be no need of further elaboration beyond my recent statement on this subject.¹⁷

HULL

856B.01/43

The Canadian Legation to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United Kingdom authorities have advised the Canadian Government that they are apprehensive of damage, particularly from sabotage, to oilfields in Aruba, a Dutch island near Curaçao, from which the oil is derived, to which is largely due the superior performance of British aircraft. The island is at present garrisoned by French troops. If they should not be willing to continue to co-operate, the United Kingdom wish Canada to undertake to send the Canadian battalion which is now in Jamaica. The consent of The Netherlands Government would of course be obtained.

Canada has no desire to increase its commitments in the West Indies, particularly in view of the urgency of needs more within Canada's ordinary sphere of interest. In view of the emergency the Canadian Government proposes, however, to inform the United Kingdom that Canada is prepared to make a battalion available if necessary.

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1940.

856B.01/43a

The Department of State to the French Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has learned that some time ago French troops were landed in the Netherlands West Indies, specifically on the

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ See statements of April 17 and May 11, Department of State *Bulletin*, April 20, 1940, p. 411, and *ibid.*, May 11, 1940, p. 493.

Island of Aruba. It is understood that the purpose of these military dispositions is to assist the local authorities of the Netherlands Government in protecting these possessions.

The Government of the United States reserves until a later date its comments on the bearing which the foregoing military dispositions have upon certain long-standing and well-known views and policies of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1940.

856B.01/43

The Department of State to the Canadian Legation

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In an *aide-mémoire* dated June 28, 1940 the Canadian Legation informed the Department of State that in response to the expressed wishes of the authorities of the United Kingdom the Canadian Government proposed to inform the United Kingdom that, subject to the consent of the Netherlands Government, Canada was prepared to make troops available, if necessary, for the purpose of insuring the safety of oil properties in Aruba.

Note has been taken of the proposed military dispositions, but for the time being the Government of the United States reserves its comments on the bearing which such dispositions have upon certain long-standing and well-known views and policies of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1940.

856B.01/11

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In a note dated May 10, 1940 the British Ambassador, acting under instructions from his Government, informed Mr. Hull that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands Government had agreed that a small British force should be placed at the disposal of the Netherlands authorities in Aruba and Curaçao for the purpose of insuring the security of those islands and of the oil refineries located there.

Note has been taken of the military dispositions as communicated by Lord Lothian, and the Government of the United States reserves until a later date its comments on the bearing which such dispositions have upon certain long-standing and well-known views and policies of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1940.

856B.01/44

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1940.

The British Ambassador called at his own request. I said to him that it was reported that the French guards had left the island of Aruba. The Ambassador had first remarked that the British would need to send guards there even though French troops were there and a clash might be possible. After advising him that the French had departed, according to our reports, I said that of course this Government cannot agree and does not agree for any British troops to be sent to Aruba. I then said that the French only had 75 to 100 guards there before they departed. He suggested that they might send Canadian guards. I said the same objection of this Government applies, although the situation would not be so acute in these circumstances. Finally, he indicated that his Government might send the same number of guards from Curaçao to Aruba that the French had there. I said of course this Government cannot agree to any British guards going there. I then said that all these questions would probably come up at the Habana conference¹⁸ and ample plans worked out for dealing with them.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹⁸ See vol. v, section entitled "Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held at Habana, July 21-30, 1940."

NORWAY

CLAIMS CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORWAY, SIGNED MARCH 28, 1940

[For text of convention between the United States and Norway, signed at Washington March 28, 1940, and effective November 9, 1948, providing for the disposition of a claim of the Government of Norway against the Government of the United States on behalf of Christoffer Hannevig, a Norwegian subject, and a claim of the Government of the United States against the Government of Norway on behalf of George R. Jones, an American citizen, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1865, or 62 Stat. 1798.]

POLAND

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GERMAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS OF AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS TO SEND RELIEF SUPPLIES TO POLAND

840.48/3201a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1940—6 p. m.

176. In your discretion please discuss with the appropriate German authorities the difficulties now being encountered by the American Red Cross in the matter of relief in Poland. For details see Department's 167, January 23, 11 p. m.¹ You may point out that the requests of the American Red Cross in nowise involve any lack of confidence in the German Red Cross, but represent a normal procedure where responsibility is assumed toward executive committee, donors, et cetera. Norman Davis² has had a long talk with Thomsen³ who volunteered to send a telegram to his Government urging it to accept the American Red Cross viewpoint; Thomsen suggested that at the same time we authorize you to make an official approach.

HULL

840.48/3202 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, January 25, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 4:23 p. m.]

195. Department's 176, January 24, 6 p. m. In the course of a visit at the Foreign Office this morning the occasion arose to discuss the difficulties being experienced by American relief organizations in the matter of relief in Poland and although I had not at the time received the Department's telegram under reference I was able, owing to frequent conferences with Nicholson the American Red Cross representative in Berlin to present the observations regarding the Red

¹ Not printed. The American Red Cross sought assurances that its delegate would be permitted to cooperate with the German Red Cross in receiving and allocating supplies for impartial distribution through Polish agencies. It requested that it be given adequate receipts for the supplies that had already been delivered. (840.48/3199)

² Chairman of the American Red Cross.

³ Hans Thomsen, German Chargé.

Cross outlined by the Department as well as additional views which had developed in the course of those conferences. I was told that it was expected that these difficulties would be settled satisfactorily.

In the event that further obstruction is experienced I shall again approach the Foreign Office but I feel confident that the able efforts of Nicholson will effect whatever satisfactory results it may be possible to attain.

KIRK

840.48/3208 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 27, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received January 27—10 : 53 a. m.]

253. The Chairman of the Contraband Committee of the Ministry of Economic Warfare has just called me to say that he is greatly concerned about messages which are coming in considerable number from the British Embassy in Washington regarding the facilitation of passage for Red Cross supplies for Poland. Lord Drogheda said that none of the information the British authorities require is being furnished in connection with these shipments which are accompanied only by a declaration from German authorities which he says the British consider of "absolutely no value whatever". He said that the contraband authorities are not only willing but glad to facilitate the passage of any supplies which it can be known will go only to destitute Poles and will not fall into the hands of the Germans. They must therefore be assured that the supplies will in fact be delivered and distributed by the American Red Cross Committee. He referred in this connection to his letter to me of December 27 quoted in my telegram 2746, December 29, 7 p. m.,⁴ in which he said the British views for procedure in clearing Red Cross supplies were laid down. He pointed out that no reply had been received to that letter and urged that consideration be given to the matter as soon as possible.

I told Lord Drogheda that I would of course telegraph what he had said but that I had no information in regard to the Red Cross shipments he referred to.

May I suggest that Mr. Norman Davis be advised of the foregoing.

JOHNSON

⁴ Not printed.

840.48/3213 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1940.

203. Following for Nicholson from American Red Cross:

"Our primary consideration in proceeding with proposed arrangement Polish relief without more definite understanding about observing actual distribution was agreement that supplies would be consigned to Amcross whose delegate would collaborate closely with Deutschrotkreuz in receiving, allocating and observing on basis our 119 as stated in Embassy's 2151, November 28.⁵ Having publicly stated such was agreement, we shall be greatly embarrassed if understanding is not fulfilled. Furthermore we have had considerable difficulty over blockade. British finally released supplies thus far delivered on above understanding and may release two shipments being held at Genoa but inform us hereafter they will not pass further supplies without assurance that our representative will receive them at Cracow and see that they are turned over to Polish agencies for distribution. Davis 249"

HULL

840.48/3228

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1940.

The Polish Ambassador ⁶ came in this morning and stated that he had talked with Mr. Herbert Hoover in New York yesterday. Mr. Hoover had told him that he was now planning to renew the drive for funds for civilian relief in Poland, and that a large meeting for this purpose was to be held in Chicago on February 10th. Mr. Hoover had told the Ambassador that if no acceptance had been received from the German Government by that date of the proposals Mr. Hoover had made with regard to American supervision of the distribution of relief in German occupied Poland, or if the German Government had, before that date, refused to accept these proposals, Mr. Hoover planned to make a public statement explaining the arrangements he had suggested, thereby putting the German Government in the position of having refused to cooperate in the carrying on of this humanitarian work.

The Ambassador further stated that Mr. Hoover had told him confidentially that he was contemplating making an effort to obtain a Governmental loan from the United States, Great Britain, and France, and perhaps other countries, with a view to obtaining funds for enlarged plans for extending civilian relief to the Poles in occu-

⁵ Not printed.⁶ Count Jerzy Potocki.

pied Poland, thus permitting the carrying on of the private efforts for civilian relief of Polish refugees who had succeeded in leaving Poland but were in need of relief in the countries to which they had gone.

The Ambassador said that he thought the recent revelations of atrocities in Poland on the civilian population as given out by the Vatican were being given far greater publicity and were much more impressive than any similar reports that might have been given out by strictly Polish sources.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

840.48/3232 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1940—7 p. m.

249. For Nicholson from Norman Davis:

"Situation here, due to tense feeling engendered by publication alleged persecutions in Poland, misappropriation funds sent to Poles for relatives and Vatican's broadcast charging execution of priests and systematic exterminations, necessitates earliest possible clarification our position in order determine future course in relief activities in Poland. We must either be able give positive assurance to public that arrangement is working satisfactorily, explaining in detail how it functions, and secure definite assurances of necessary facilities to oversee completion program, or give public notice of withdrawal and reasons. Am hoping your visit to Poland will result in satisfactory understanding, but for your information and guidance, situation has reached stage where uncertain periodic visitation will no longer suffice. Unable secure release of shipments at Genoa and complete contemplated program unless our representative can be in Cracow to receive shipments and visit other centers when necessary observe distribution. Understand Hoover will shortly issue blast and publish correspondence if Germany continues refuse Polish Commission permission conduct Polish relief operations. Important clarify our position before this. Have Toz Society for Protection of Health Jewish Population and Warsaw Jewish Hospital been used in distribution medical aid and hospital supplies. Advised these agencies excellent. Naval appointment assured. Davis—Amcross 261"

For Kirk: Department desires this message to reach Nicholson as soon as possible. We understand he is to return to Berlin shortly. Not waiting for his return and having in mind the foregoing message intended for him and recent communications between him and Davis and having also in mind Department's recent communications to you, we suggest that you present the situation again informally to the appropriate officer of the German Government and suggest a review of the entire situation and a speedy favorable decision. The publications referred to in the above message and various other charges that the Germans have taken drastic actions in occupied re-

gions will find substantiation in the thought of the people of this country if the German Government takes the position that it will not allow any visitors to those regions and particularly representatives of relief organizations. Furthermore it will be impossible for the Red Cross to continue to request funds from the American people for the alleviation of suffering in those regions. We use the case of the Red Cross particularly because of the fact that it is founded in treaty with Germany and that under the treaty its agents have certain specified rights.

Unless some definite arrangement is conceded by the German Government to the American Red Cross and possibly to other organizations offering relief in the occupied regions it may be expected that the representatives of private agencies in the United States will make some explanation to the American people which may not react favorably upon German-American relations.

HULL

840.48/3254 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, February 7, 1940.

[Received February 7—1:35 p. m.]

323. For Norman Davis from Nicholson.

71. Regarding Amcross 268 plan being reviewed probably favorably by Berlin officials provides for Amcross and Quaker representation with headquarters at Cracow, Radom, Lublin and Warsaw for duration of operations. Deutschrotkreuz would be responsible for internal administrative details of warehousing transportation, et cetera, and to general government for assisting in organization and coordination of Polish welfare agencies through the representative community committees. Amcross and Quakers would receive, allocate and observe distribution. Commodities would be restricted to civilians and free from requisition and would appear to provide all desired assurance. Should all Berlin officials concur I recommend acceptance and also joint representation with Quakers. Amcross accordingly should be prepared to provide four capable American men who speak German and who would be acceptable to German Government. Present delay here due probably to report Quakers might also represent contributions from Allied countries. Have advised Foreign Office we represent only American people, Rhoads' sayeth nothing regarding financing of their program. [Nicholson.]

KIRK

¹ Charles J. Rhoads, U. S. representative in Europe for Commission for Polish Relief.

840.48/3256 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, February 7, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 8:05 p. m.]

336. Department's 295, February 6, 6 p. m.⁸ The plan regarding relief in Poland which is now being considered by the German authorities is described in my 323, February 7, and is being endorsed both by Nicholson and Rhoads on the basis of developments following Nicholson's and Gamble's trip to Krakow. I am informed that this plan has been reported on favorably by officials in the Foreign Office and is being submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for final decision whereupon other Government agencies involved will be called upon to pass on it. This procedure will require several days and both Nicholson and Gamble who are in close and constant touch with the various German officials involved advise that I withhold any representations on the matter at least for the moment.

As regards the contemplated statement to which the Department refers in its 295, February 6, 6 p. m., I am strongly of the opinion that in view of the apparently favorable course which the negotiations are now taking any such utterance at this time might jeopardize the entire plan of relief and in this opinion Nicholson, Rhoads and Gamble all concur.

KIRK

840.48/3275 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, February 13, 1940—3 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

385. My 336, February 7, 5 p. m. In view of the continued delay in the decision of the German authorities regarding relief in Poland I informed the representatives here of the Red Cross Polish Relief Commission and Mennonite organization that I did not feel that I could withhold longer the representations to the Foreign Office outlined in the Department's 249, February 1, 7 p. m. The foregoing representatives agreed to my taking such a step and accordingly I presented to an Under State Secretary in the Foreign Office today the observations as set forth by the Department in regard to this general question. I was assured that these observations would receive the most serious consideration and although no statement was forth-

⁸ Not printed. Secretary Hull asked to be advised with respect to a report that "a representative of an organization not the Red Cross" outside the control of the Department was preparing to make a statement which might be critical of the German Government's policy on Polish relief. (840.48/3238)

coming as to the nature of the ultimate decision of the German authorities I was assured that a definite answer would be given to the representatives of the American relief organizations in Berlin within a very few days. I am urging upon those representatives not to leave Berlin until a decision has been rendered.

KIRK

840.48/3283 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1940—6 p. m.

284. The Department of State has read with regret your No. 386, February 14, 6 p. m.⁹ conveying a message from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the American Red Cross which informs that the Committee on Economic Warfare declines to relent in the execution of its policies which intercept, delay and may prevent the supplies of American relief organizations from reaching the stricken areas in Europe and particularly of Poland.

You are requested to present the matter to the Foreign Office of the British Government and to invite their attention to the objective which has inspired the American people to make generous donations in the form of supplies to aid the sufferers from the war which so unhappily rages in Europe, which supplies are tendered the victims of that war irrespective of race, nationality or religion but the effectuation of which will in large measure be frustrated in the first instance if the policy of the Economic Warfare Committee of the British Government is persisted in.

The American Government feels that the right of its citizens to send medical and other related supplies to victims of war should not be interfered with by the British Government or such interference predicated by that Government on policy which the German Government may adopt in the premises.

The American Government has instructed its Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to make representations to the German Government to permit certain supervision of distribution of the supplies on the ground that the American people are entitled to have definite knowledge that the supplies which they send will be distributed to the persons for whom they are intended, but it is also a prerequisite to the effectuation of these desires of the American people that the supplies which they send shall in the first instance reach the stricken areas.

You will please present this matter to the Foreign Office in the light that this representation is made by the American Government on be-

⁹ Not printed.

half not only of the Red Cross but also of the Polish Relief Commission and the Joint Distribution Committee of the Jewish Charities and other legitimate charitable organizations which have been registered as provided by the laws of the American Government and authorized by the Department of State to solicit funds to be used for the purchase and distribution of relief supplies and is based upon the generous impulse of the American people and on the humanitarian sympathies of the American Government.

Repeat to Berlin for its confidential information.

HULL

840.48/3306 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, February 19, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 6:32 p. m.]

455. My 385, February 13, 3 p. m. I was informed at the Foreign Office today that a communication had been sent to the German Embassy at Washington outlining the decision on the part of the German authorities in regard to the administration of relief in Poland originating in the United States.¹⁰ The Foreign Office official stated to me that it was impossible for the authorities to grant permission for a permanent American relief committee in the Government General particularly at a time when the authorities found it necessary to withdraw foreign representation in Warsaw. The authorities, however, I was told would consent to a system whereby each shipment of relief supplies, of which it was said up to the present there have been only two, would be accompanied by a representative of a relief organization and that the representative would remain at the place of destination in order to supervise the allocation and distribution of those supplies. Upon the conclusion of that distribution or series of overlapping distributions the representative would withdraw. It was added that the Health Offices of the relief organization could be established in Berlin and that the representatives accompanying the shipments and supervising the distribution thereof would be accorded without delay necessary permits to proceed to the destination of the supplies.

I am acquainting the representatives of the American Red Cross, Commission for Polish Relief, Inc., and the Mennonite organization with the foregoing.

KIRK

¹⁰ See telegram No. 339, February 22, 8 p. m., to the Chargé in the United Kingdom, *infra*.

840.48/3326a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1940—8 p. m.

339. On behalf of the American Red Cross please transmit the following statement to the Ministry of Economic Warfare

"The Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in Washington has transmitted to the American Red Cross under instruction from his government definite proposals for relief work in the Government General for the occupied Polish territories, the terms of which are quoted as follows:

"The German Government agrees to the relief work among the civil population in the Government General which the American Red Cross is carrying out or intends to carry out. The German Government is prepared to grant transportation facilities and exemption from customs duty for the shipments imported by the American Red Cross for relief purposes. The German Government will grant, upon special application, permission for a qualified representative of the American Red Cross to enter the territory of the Government General in order to receive the American shipments for Polish relief, to regulate their distribution in agreement with the German Red Cross and to observe this distribution. It is understood that these American shipments are being forwarded to the civil population of the Government General exclusively and that they will at no time be at the disposal of or claimed by the German authorities."

The American Red Cross has accepted the statement of the German Government and will proceed immediately with the distribution of relief supplies received at Cracow or in transit. We trust that the written guarantees above referred to, which have been accepted by the American Red Cross as the assurance required for its continued effort to provide a measure of relief of the distress in Poland, likewise will be accepted by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare as meeting its requirements.

The American Red Cross on its part undertakes full responsibility for the regulation and observation by its representatives of the receipt and distribution of supplies in Poland, and will immediately discontinue the shipment of supplies whenever it appears that the agreement of the German Government has not been observed.

I trust that the assurances which are herein given will be acceptable to the Ministry of Economic Warfare and that favorable consideration will be given to our request for the further passage through the blockade of American Red Cross supplies consigned for relief in Poland.

The full text of the letter from the German Chargé d'Affaires has been transmitted today to the British Ambassador for his information. Norman Davis 312."¹¹

Mr. Davis will greatly appreciate any assistance which you can appropriately render in obtaining favorable action on the request of the Red Cross.

HULL

¹¹ In a letter of February 24, 1940, addressed directly to the German Chargé, Mr. Davis accepted the proposals of the German Government.

840.48/3362

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of European Affairs (Henderson)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 29, 1940.

Dr. Rajchman came in to see me this afternoon. He said that the purpose of his visit was to acquaint me with the situation in so far as he knew it with respect to Polish relief. He had already had a talk earlier in the day with Mr. Long.¹² The Polish Government had sent him to this country in order to assist in coordinating various Polish relief activities and to speed up the despatch of aid to Poland.

The following is a summary of the statements made by Dr. Rajchman during the course of his conversation :

The Polish Government feels that if relief is not extended without delay to the population of Poland, great numbers of persons will perish during the next few months from malnutrition. It is obviously impossible to feed the whole population of Poland. The Polish Government has decided, therefore, that relief activities should be concentrated upon that section of the Polish population which will be most in need. That section comprises the women and children of the citizen towns with a population of 10,000 or over in what may be termed as Government Poland, that is, that part of Poland not annexed by Germany, the Soviet Union, or Lithuania. It is estimated that this will mean the feeding of about 1,500,000 people. Experts have estimated that to feed this number of persons about 1,200 tons of foodstuffs daily will be needed, at a cost of approximately \$2,000,000 a month.

The Polish Government has already decided to apportion \$1,000,000 for feeding purposes out of funds lent it by its Allies. It has suggested to the British Government that the latter contribute approximately 1,000,000 pounds, and to the French Government that it donate about \$3,000,000. It is believed that the French and British Governments will contribute provided arrangements satisfactory to them for food distribution can be made between the feeding organization, which all agree should be American, and the German Government.

The relief program as envisaged cannot be successful unless: (1) the American Government also makes a large contribution to the fund by Act of Congress; and (2) an arrangement which will guarantee that the foodstuffs will not be misused can be effected between the feeding organization and the German Government.

Voluntary subscriptions in the United States have not been large. Only about \$200,000 have been raised by the Commission for Polish Relief, of which amount approximately \$137,000 have been contrib-

¹² Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

uted by Polish-American organizations. The American Red Cross thus far has been able to collect for its program, which has to do with medical supplies and clothing, only about \$397,000.

When the Polish Government discussed the project with the British Government and suggested that the Commission for Polish Relief, which seemed to be the clearing house in the United States for various relief organizations, should be the agency in charge of the feeding work, some of the British authorities raised the question as to whether the fact that Mr. Hoover was associated with the Commission for Polish Relief might not cause some embarrassment to the American administration since he was one of the leaders of an opposition political party. Before proceeding, the Polish Government, therefore, made informal inquiries in this connection, and was assured by responsible American officials that Mr. Hoover would be most acceptable to the American Administration as the leader of Polish relief. When the British Government was informed of this fact, it agreed that the Commission for Polish Relief should be the organization in charge of the program.

The British Government has insisted that not only will it have nothing to do with the program but that it will not permit foodstuffs to pass from the United States to Poland unless Germany will permit a supervision of food distribution which will assure that no foodstuffs will be diverted to purposes other than that for which they are intended. The British authorities state that they have complete confidence in Mr. Hoover and that any arrangement with the German authorities which may satisfy him will be satisfactory to the British Government.

Neither the British nor the Polish Governments are satisfied with the offers which the German Government has thus far made. Since the feeding operations may continue over indefinite periods, and will cover considerable territory, it will be necessary for more personnel to be permitted to go to Germany than the German Government has as yet been willing to approve. There is no criticism of the American Red Cross for having accepted the German terms, since relatively few persons are required to supervise the distribution of medical supplies and clothing, which, for the most part, are given as an emergency measure through institutions and in lump amounts. Nevertheless, it is felt that the acceptance by the Red Cross of the German terms has to an extent weakened the negotiating position of the Commission for Polish Relief.

Dr. Rajchman has had several talks with Mr. Hoover, who will plead for large appropriations in Congress, and with various members of Congress. Mr. Bloom¹³ has assured him that he is prepared to

¹³ Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

introduce a bill authorizing the President to set aside sums up to \$15,000,000 for European relief.

It will, of course, be impracticable to bring all the food that will be necessary for relief from the United States. Potatoes, cabbages, and other bulky foods will probably be purchased in Europe. It is possible that some of these supplies will be obtained from Rumania, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and so forth. One advantage of this procedure, from the Allied point of view, would be that the exports of foodstuffs from Eastern Europe to Germany may be correspondingly curtailed.

I thanked Dr. Rajchman for his courtesy in furnishing me the information.

840.48/3439

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1940.

After the Secretary called me to his office to discuss with the British Ambassador¹⁴ the matter of our communications to England with regard to Polish relief, the Ambassador accompanied me to my office. There he read the communication from his Government which paraphrased the phraseology of our no. 284, February 16, [15] 6 p. m. to London as regards the fourth paragraph thereof but presented it in a curt and inadequate paragraph. I obtained our telegram in question and read it to the Ambassador and explained to him that we had acted independently of any of those organizations but had taken a position as a Government simply because of our humanitarian interest in having an arrangement made whereby relief could be distributed to the needy people in Poland. We had viewed it in two different lights. First, as regards the control of distribution, which was the question with Germany, and second, as regards transportation to the affected areas, which was the question with England. We had communicated with the British Government through our London Embassy before we had had the answer from the German Government.

The Ambassador commented that we had not advised the British Government of our reply from the German Government. I reminded him that the Red Cross had communicated to the Committee on Economic Warfare the answer which they had received from the German Government. It was appropriate for them to communicate through the Committee on Economic Warfare because it was that branch of the British Government with which they had had their dealings. I observed that whereas the Committee on Economic War-

¹⁴ Lord Lothian.

fare was an agency of the British Government, we must presume that the British Government had knowledge of the situation.

We discussed the matter at some length. In the course of his remarks the Ambassador expressed a great concern on the part of his Government that food supplies should reach Germany. On my part I told him that the American Government, as such, was not sending relief and that the organizations which were doing so were groups of private citizens. However, they were licensed by the American Government and somewhat subject to its control. They were not sending supplies to the military forces of Germany, nor would the American people give monies for supplies which were to go to the military forces of Germany or of any other country. Our point was that the American people had every reason to feel that supplies for the relief of distressed people should be allowed to proceed to the areas where the distressed people lived. Furthermore, our people felt that there should be proper supervision of the distribution of the supplies so that the American people, themselves, would be satisfied. It followed that this was a question between the American donors and the societies which represented them and the German Government in order that the American people might be satisfied. The Ambassador said he disagreed. He said that if the American Government would give a guarantee the British Government would respect it but that it would be very difficult for his Government to agree that American societies should carry relief to Poland because he did not know what societies might be organized and what might happen to the supplies that were permitted to reach Poland. However, if the American Government would give its guarantee the British Government would accept that guarantee.

The Ambassador also related that the Polish Government had stated they would give a million dollars for relief purposes. He said the French Government would give a considerable sum and that the British Government had agreed to make available certain funds. He thought these monies could be expended by an American committee.

I pointed out to Lord Lothian that the American societies were organized under the laws of the United States and licensed by the Department of State; that the American Government had a certain control over those societies and their activities; however, the American Government would have no control over funds which were contributed by other governments or other peoples; consequently, any funds which were distributed by an American organization must be American funds.

The Ambassador said that he had not considered the matter in that light and wondered what agency the British Government could use for the distribution of supplies if it could not use an American

agency. I told him that that was a matter primarily for the British Government but it seemed to me that they might use an agency like the International Red Cross, or the League of Red Cross Societies, or even the Swiss Red Cross, and that his Government might make some arrangement with them in connection with the Polish and French Governments. I said it did not seem feasible for the American Government to permit an organization which it licensed to engage in an activity which the American Government would have no control over. (I particularly did not mention the feature which to my mind is especially objectionable, and that is that American funds would be mingled with funds of the three governments which are at war with Germany and which would place the American organization—an agency licensed by the American Government—in the anomalous position of carrying relief into Poland largely contributed by the governments at war with Germany.)

The Ambassador left with a better understanding of the whole relief situation and America's attitude toward it, and said he thought he could put it in a new light to his Government. He said that his Government did not want to say "no" again to the American Government. I told him we hoped they would not say "no" in this instance and that we hoped very much they would not find it necessary to say "no" in regard to the very reasonable positions the American Government took. He said he would send a despatch to his Government.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

840.48/3378 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 16, 1940.

[Received March 16—11:15 a. m.]

661. Department's 284, February 15, 6 p. m., Embassy's 447, February 23, 8 p. m., 480, February 27, 7 p. m., first paragraph and 491, February 28, 9 p. m., first paragraph.¹⁵

Following letter dated March 15 received this morning from the Foreign Office:

"I must apologise for not answering your letter of February 22nd before this. You will appreciate that the question which you raised on that occasion in regard to the passage of American Red Cross supplies for Poland is a matter of high policy on which Lord Halifax¹⁶ has been in communication with the British Ambassador in Washington.

¹⁵ Telegrams Nos. 447, 480 and 491 not printed.

¹⁶ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am glad to be able to inform you that His Majesty's Government have agreed to allow passage through the Contraband Control of medical and other related supplies from the American Red Cross to the total value of \$250,000 (including the value of the shipments already made) for the relief of victims of the war in Poland, without insisting on compliance with the conditions laid down in Lord Drogheda's letter to you of the 27th December.

It was a great pleasure to me to listen to what you were good enough to tell me at the Foreign Office and you may be sure that His Majesty's Government are deeply sympathetic towards the relief of distress in Poland, provided that it can be organized in such a way as to ensure that the benefits accrue to the Poles rather than to the Germans."

Please inform Red Cross.

KENNEDY

840.48/3448a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1940.

632. For Wayne Taylor¹⁷ from American Red Cross:

"As we urgently require permission to continue our shipments of medical supplies and clothing to meet the desperate needs in Poland suggest you endeavor secure extension present arrangement with blockade authorities without awaiting decision as to foodstuffs. Quantities our supplies, including innumerable articles of clothing produced by volunteers throughout country, are now awaiting shipment and further delays would result in great embarrassment. Gratified to know that Johnson and you are proceeding through foreign office. Davis 393"

HULL

840.48/3553 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to Poland (Biddle), Temporarily in France, to the
Secretary of State*

ANGERS, May 10, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 7:40 p. m.]

For Hoover¹⁸ from Gibson.¹⁹ In the present situation I feel you should have conclusions drawn from my discussions so far.

1. British clearly determined to prevent if possible any general relief for Poland because (a) in the light of growing pressure for tightening blockade unwilling to make any avoidable exceptions, (b) reluctance to create precedent which might be invoked for feeding of other countries overrun by Germany, (c) reluctance to grants which

¹⁷ Wayne Chatfield Taylor, American Red Cross Delegate in Paris.

¹⁸ Herbert Hoover, Vice President of American National Red Cross.

¹⁹ Hugh Gibson, Director General for Europe of Commission for Polish Relief.

might create similar precedents, (*d*) idea that political developments may prevent shipments through Mediterranean ports and leave nothing beyond shipments from Balkans which create no precedent and served only to absorb supplies which might otherwise fall into German hands.

2. Attitude toward blockade and distressed populations characterized by toughness unknown in last war. Antagonism to relief even in unofficial circles on ground (*a*) hard-boiled belief that suffering populations will exert definite pressure on Germany, (*b*) belief that current German behavior in Poland such they cannot permit foreigners freedom of movement.

3. Both British and French Governments weak and in no mood to take courageous action on relief. This may, of course, be subject to rapid change.

4. Polish Government badly divided and lacking in firm decision. President and Foreign Minister doing their best to secure vital action.

5. British have communicated impossible conditions alleging they are imposed by French. Latter deny this. Present plan Polish Foreign Minister secure firm denial from French and then proceed London if possible with French support for show-down. First step planned for today may be held up by military developments. [Gibson.]

BIDDLE

840.48/3995

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have recently been examining the question of relief for territories under German control, and feel it important that the results of this examination should immediately be known to the United States Government.

His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion that they must treat Germany and the territories under her occupation on the same footing, since supplies admitted to the occupied territories must inevitably either fall into German hands or release other supplies for the enemy.

There is no doubt that Germany has it in her power to see that the inhabitants of her occupied territories are adequately fed: there may be scarcity, but Germany has or can obtain from sources immediately accessible sufficient supplies to avert famine. The Germans indeed boast of their ability to feed the conquered territories and as recently as June 27th a German broadcast went so far as to say that, while Mr. Hoover's plans for relief in France, Belgium and Holland deserved

commendation, the German authorities had already taken all the necessary steps for the feeding of the populations.

While, therefore, His Majesty's Government appreciate to the full the humanitarian ideals which inspire the desire now becoming apparent to supply relief to the stricken territories, they are convinced that it would be entirely mistaken policy to lengthen the war by allowing Germany to be assisted in the difficulties which confront her and which are of her own creation. Painful as the decision is, they have, therefore, decided that no exemption from contraband control can be accorded for relief goods.

For the reasons given in the second paragraph above, His Majesty's Government feel obliged to treat unoccupied France for all contraband control purposes in the same way as occupied France. France is well known to be self-supporting in essential foodstuffs and any willingness to allow relief supplies to enter would simply be an encouragement to Germany to remove supplies from France for her own use. His Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, contemplate any general scheme for facilitating the passage of foodstuffs to the former, although in view of the special problems caused by the influx of refugees into unoccupied France and the dislocation of communications, they have agreed to give safe conducts to Marseilles for certain ships already en route for France with cargoes of food.

His Majesty's Government realise that their decision may lay them open to criticism, the sincerity of which is beyond question. But their intention is to win the war in the shortest possible time and so to liberate the peoples from Nazi oppression. They believe that this decision will help them to achieve this. They therefore hope that the United States Government will be able to see the question in this light, not as a measure which will inflict avoidable hardships on the helpless, but as one which will shorten the struggle and hasten the day when Germany's victims can regain their liberty and the world enjoy a prospect of lasting peace.

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1940.

RUMANIA
PERSECUTION OF JEWS IN RUMANIA¹

740.0011 European War 1939/4388 : Telegram

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, July 2, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received July 3—9: 55 p. m.]

327. With the cession of territory to Russia the Jewish problem in Rumania has become more acute. Prior to the Russian ultimatum the new political party formed along Nazi lines had excluded Jews from membership and consequently had politically and economically disemployed them. This had caused grave alarm among Jews and even the rasher Rumanian leaders felt sure that such an action was premature and endangered the economic structure of the country at a critical time. Upon Russian occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina Jewish groups relying upon the protection of the Russians have taken the opportunity to repay old scores and there have been many incidents reported some of which have been most sanguinary. Jews in the rest of Rumania have openly expressed their pleasure at the Russian occupation and many are moving into the ceded area while those resident there are mostly remaining. This would seem to offer an excellent opportunity for settling this old question from the Rumanian point of view by migration of Jews into Bessarabia (as of possible interest see my letter of January 11, 1938,² page 5 last paragraph to Under Secretary Welles) but feelings have been much inflamed by the more radical Rightist elements until the situation has become alarming and may result in serious difficulties. Certain members of the Government and more serious leaders are counseling calm and caution realising that any excesses will be a direct provocation to Russia which she will not be slow to accept as well as a signal for the possible outbreak of disturbance from other disaffected minority groups. There is reason to believe that other Government officials are pursuing the traditional policy in southeastern Europe of using anti-Semitic agitation to cloak from the people at large Government inefficiency and ineptitude. Very strict instructions are being issued by the Government however, to avoid provocative acts.

¹ For previous correspondence regarding anti-Semitism in Rumania, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 672 ff.

² Not found in Department files.

The supposedly loyal Jewry in Rumania has not as yet made any statement disclaiming or renouncing the action of its coreligionists. I discussed this matter with a leading Jew this morning and he alleged that no publicity would be given such a statement. I am inclined to the view, however, that he and his associates hesitate to align themselves one way or the other until the eventual potentialities of Russian aggression become more apparent.

The situation however, is entirely different from that which prevailed after the entrance of the Goga government in power when prior to any instruction from you I made the representations to the new Prime Minister and other authorities set forth in my telegram No. 3 of January 7, 3 p. m., 1938.³ In view of the natural national resentment that a Rumanian minority should so disloyally welcome the invaders it would be difficult to find grounds for general representations pending specific instances other than to intimate that any violence against the Jews here would only be playing the Russian game as the Russians would probably like nothing better than that excuse for further encroachment. No American interests or citizens in non-occupied Rumania have as yet been threatened.

GUNTHER

871.4016/232

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

No. 1496

BUCHAREST, July 12, 1940.

[Received August 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the new Minister of Propaganda, Mr. Nichiror Crainic, received the directors of Bucharest newspapers on June 8th last, at which time he read to them a prepared statement which included the following passages:

"In the new regime inaugurated by His Majesty the King the right of daily addressing the Rumanian nation belongs to Rumanians of pure blood. Nationality is a fatality of the blood, and a stranger tends only to express his own self when he utilizes our language. A long and grievous experience has taught us that the press written by Jews never succeeds in integrating itself into the ideals of Rumanianism, but under the mask of the borrowed language only expressed the natural ideas of the respective race, unfortunately dissolvent for our nation. The defunct regime of democracy was dominated by a Jewish press and we are today experiencing its last consequences with profound disillusionment. The regime of integral or totalitarian nationalism of the Party of the Nation and of the Government which I represent can be served only by a national press, the other co-habiting peoples continuing to have newspapers in their languages, harmonized with the superior principles and interests of the State, a thing which, to their

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, p. 674.

credit, the Christian minorities of the country have done for a long time.

"Consequently, the Government makes it known that Rumanian newspapers can not be directed by Jews, and Jews are not in their place on newspapers directed by Rumanians. . . .⁴

"We know perfectly well that after the great Rumanian misfortune which the old democratic policy won for us, the psychology of the time imposes the bellowing of grief and the red-hot iron of accusation. But, nevertheless, external circumstances, known to everyone, forbid the settlement of internal accounts in the superior interests of the State."

The foregoing is noteworthy mainly for its plain speaking. The result has been the elimination of the Jews from the Rumanian press. The French-language newspaper *Le Moment*, whose Jewish founder-editor has resigned, has been suspended for an indefinite period for reasons of public order and two other democratically inclined newspapers, *Semnalul* and *Jurnalul* (Jewish controlled) have been suppressed. Of interest in this same connection is the publication in the *Monitorul Oficial* of July 10th of the Law for the Organization of the College of Doctors, which provides that in order legally to practice medicine one must be a member of the College and membership is restricted to Rumanian citizens enjoying full civil rights. Since Jews do not enjoy full civil rights, not being eligible to membership in the Party of the Nation, it is obvious that the intention is to exclude them also from the practice of medicine.

The Government appears to be making every effort on the one hand to appease the Jews by restraining molestation of all kinds, while on the other hand proceeding with such discriminatory regulations as those just mentioned. Some are suspected of clandestinely encouraging attacks on the Jews because of their conviction that (a) this is the solution of the entire Rumanian problem and (b) it will curry favor with Germany. Rumanians in general seem to wish to wreak their wrath either actively or passively on the Jews for the events which have taken place in Bessarabia, particularly the many instances which are gradually becoming known in which the Jews, either aided or encouraged by communists and other members of the local populations, rose against the departing Rumanian officials at the time of the Russian entry.

Continual reports of persecutions and killings of Jews in the provinces, particularly in Moldavian villages and towns along the new frontier, are drifting into Bucharest daily, but it is difficult to ascertain just what proportion of them may be true.

As of possible interest in this general connection I am enclosing herewith a copy of a covertly circulated statement ^{4a} issued by the self-styled "Central Committee of the organization for the protection of

⁴ Omission indicated in the original despatch.

^{4a} Not printed.

the victims of imperialistic terrorism in Rumania" which describes the "joy and enthusiasm" reigning in Bessarabia and Bucovina today.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

FREDERICK P. HIBBARD
Secretary of Legation

871.4016/238

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

No. 1502

BUCHAREST, July 20, 1940.

[Received September 9.]

SIR: Adverting to my telegram No. 327 of July 2, 5 p. m., I have the honor to report that Ambassador Stoica, formerly Ambassador at Ankara and now Under Secretary of Propaganda, told me the other evening at dinner at my house in honor of himself and the representatives of the American newspapers, that his Government was going to do everything within its power to prevent anti-Jewish outbreaks, but that it greatly feared such outbreaks on the part of the Army as the latter was so incensed at the treatment meted out to it by the Jews in Bessarabia when it was withdrawing. I observed that for once Rumania had a good press in the outside world, where there was great sympathy because it had been set upon by a powerful nation of 180,000,000 people, and that I thought it would be a great pity to sacrifice this for the sake of a Pogrom or two.

On another recent occasion I had an opportunity informally to emphasize to Prime Minister Gigurtu that any internal disturbance, especially Jewish persecution, might easily be seized upon by Russia as an excuse for further action. Prime Minister Gigurtu, I feel, is fully alive to this possibility, and represents the more moderate element in the present Government's consideration of the Jewish question.

A communiqué issued this morning reads as follows:

"A Council of Ministers met today (July 19) at seven p. m. under the Presidency of Engineer Ion Gigurtu, President of the Council of Ministers, and examined the principles relative to the laws proposed for the incorporation of the Jewish element into the new order of the Rumanian State in accordance with the provisions contained in the law for the organization of the Party of the Nation."

It would appear that the discussions in this meeting hinged on the character of the laws to be passed regarding Jews, the extreme Iron Guard and Rightist element in the Cabinet strongly urging the promulgation of a set of laws similar to the Nürnberg Laws of Germany, while the more moderate element headed by Premier Gigurtu favors laws along the lines of the more restrained anti-Semitic legislation of Italy and Hungary. The Gigurtu group maintains that to pass rigid

laws against Jews at the present critical moment would seriously affect the economic structure of the State, as well as create a most unfortunate impression among nations abroad, particularly the United States. Some observers take the view that should there be no further pressure from Hungary and Bulgaria for territorial cession at present the moderate group will win its point and there will be no strong anti-Semitic reaction in Rumania; if, however, the Government is forced to cede more territory immediately, a cession for which public opinion has not yet been adequately prepared, the Iron Guard thesis will be more likely to win because the Government will find it necessary to resort to anti-Semitic agitation as a cloak and counter-irritant.

In recent days a few mild anti-Jewish measures have been announced but nothing to suggest a really vicious program. One of the first steps was, as already reported, the elimination of Jews from the local press and the suppression of a few Jewish newspapers. It may be mentioned, in addition, that several of the Ministers have announced the dismissal of Jews from public office in their respective departments, the Minister of Cults and Arts has issued a regulation withdrawing the subvention allocated to the Jewish cult, the Christian clergy are forbidden to baptize Jews, kosher slaughter has been prohibited and measures have been taken to prevent Jews from acting as representatives of foreign commercial firms. There are other minor indications, of course, but so far the various measures can in no way compare with those taken during the Goga regime of early 1938. I accordingly feel that no really strong Jewish persecutions are apt to eventuate in the near future except as they may arise out of new circumstances created by the evolution of international events or further dissatisfaction in the Army.

There are no sure indications as yet of German official pressure for widespread elimination of the Jewish element, possibly in view of the attitude of Bolshevik Russia. But it is recalled that at the time of the German occupation of this country in 1917-18 the Jews were used on a large scale by the invaders for all sorts of minor services, and even now it is questionable whether the Germans could dispense with the many Jews being employed by them as middle-men for their agricultural purchases. . . .

Respectfully yours,

FRANKLIN MOTT GUNTHER

871.4016/241

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

No. 1535

BUCHAREST, August 23, 1940.

[Received September 17.]

SIR: Pursuant to the observations regarding the present treatment of Jews in Rumania contained in my despatch No. 1502 of July 20,

1940, I now have the honor to report that in the course of a conversation with Prime Minister Gigurtu last Sunday I referred to the new Decree Law regulating the status of Jews in Rumania, the text of which is being sent to the Department separately. I observed that the Jews in Rumania did not seem to be deeply disturbed to date by this legislation, which M. Gigurtu said was the case, since Jews living in cities did not particularly mind the expropriation of land held by rural Jews. He continued by remarking that Rumania this time was positively going to get rid of the surplus of Jews who had proved themselves undesirable. Having heard it said that Hitler had held out hope in some recent conversations with Rumanian officials in Germany that Madagascar would soon be available for the settlement of all surplus European Jews, I mentioned this report. The Prime Minister immediately corrected me by saying that it was Rhodesia and not Madagascar which was in the Fuehrer's mind as there was some gold there which would give them a welcome occupation. M. Gigurtu observed that even if they were eventually settled there it would probably not be long before a large part found ways and means to leave for other destinations. I asked him what he proposed to do meanwhile with the Jews dispossessed here or otherwise unemployed as a sequence to this new Decree Law and whether Russia would not take them into Bessarabia. He said that on the contrary the Russian authorities were refusing now to accept any more Jews and that as a matter of fact many rich Jews of Bessarabia had succeeded in getting out and into Rumania proper. It is maintained by others that the Russians want a leaven of Jews left here for the propagation of Russian propaganda; it can hardly any longer be called "Bolshevism".

At this point I thought it opportune to recall to the Prime Minister Rumania's age-old reputation for tolerance and refuge and observed that it was a pity that Rumania should lose this by following in Germany's footsteps. I reminded him that in 1919, when after the Rumanians had withdrawn from Budapest and Hungarian anti-Semitic outbreaks had occurred, the Jews of Budapest sent a petition to the Peace Conference at Paris begging that the Rumanians should be permitted to reoccupy Budapest. M. Gigurtu recalled this circumstance—but seemed surprised and pleased that I had—and remarked that this was all very well but that Rumania had been too lenient and complacent and could not risk drifting into the situation in which Germany found itself soon after the war and during the Weimar Republic when no less than 80% of public offices, professional jobs, newspaper posts, etc., were in the hands of the Jews. If they had contented themselves, he remarks, with 20% the question would probably never have been raised. He maintained that Hitler was not voicing anything new in anti-Semitism which had not already been

expounded by Kant, Nietzsche and the later writers since the World War such as Carl Rosenberg. I could not argue with him about the 80% as I have not the facts, but I cited in support of my contention that the present wave of anti-Semitism is Hitler's doing and that Germans have only recently become anti-Semitic, the following clause contained in the Peace of Bucharest of April 24, 1918 imposed upon Rumania by Germany:

"VII. All worships shall be recognized; Roman-Catholic, Uniate, Protestant, Mohammedan and Jewish; they shall have the same freedom and protection as the Orthodox.

"All residents of Roumania shall become citizens without special measures, including the Jews."

The Prime Minister replied that during all the campaign against Rumania the Jews in Rumania had flocked to the Germans and rendered all sorts of services and that it was in recognition of this attitude of cooperation that the Germans had insisted upon this clause.

The Jews of Rumania have weathered many storms and may survive this one. It will presumably depend largely on the success of German arms and the continued affiliation of Rumanian policy with the Axis. Additional data on this general subject are being submitted in a separate despatch.

Respectfully yours,

FRANKLIN MOTT GUNTHER

871.4016/240

The Minister in Rumania (Gunter) to the Secretary of State

No. 1536

BUCHAREST, August 23, 1940.

[Received September 17.]

SIR: Pursuant to my various past despatches regarding the situation of Jews in Rumania I now have the honor to enclose herewith translations of two Decree Laws,⁵ one dated August 8, 1940, forbidding marriage between persons of Rumanian blood and Jews, and the other dated August 9, 1940, establishing a juridical statute governing the status of Jews in this country.

The nature of the first of these decree laws is evident from the title. The second is much more far-reaching, being designed to define the status of Jews generally and set forth the restrictions placed on their participation in the public and private life of the country. After establishing who are to be considered Jews and dividing them into three categories, the law then proceeds to stipulate that, with certain exceptions, they shall not be allowed to hold public office, practice law, serve in the military forces, have membership in boards of directors, be

⁵ Not printed.

country merchants or wineshop keepers or engage in other specified activities in which the Jews of Rumania have in the past been prominent (Article 7).

Although the provisions of the new law, while somewhat ambiguous, are fairly sweeping and the present Government avowedly purposes to follow an anti-Semitic program, the Jews of the country give an appearance of remaining strangely unperturbed. They undoubtedly realize that the full possible force of the new law could bring them real disaster, but they know from long experience that repressive laws usually are not nearly as bad as they sound, that application and interpretation are of far more importance than the letter, that Governments and programs change fast and that anti-Semitic fever is like the malarial and flares up only to subside again. Although the Prime Minister has, as reported elsewhere (despatch No. 1535 of August 23, 1940), indicated his full intention to proceed energetically with the Jewish question, the foregoing considerations will suggest that the actual effect of this new statute can not be gauged with even an approach to accuracy before an opportunity is had to observe the mode and vigor of its application.

The Jews have, as previously reported, already been eliminated from the press. Since the promulgation of the new statute it has been noted that various Government departments have announced the dismissal of their Jewish employees and many Jewish lawyers are liquidating their affairs. On the other hand I learn that in many cases Jewish members of boards of directors are retiring behind the scenes but retaining their interests while being ostensibly replaced by dummy directors and wineshop keepers and merchants place their businesses under the name of a Rumanian who is paid a salary for his services! As Premier Gigurtu remarked to me: "Jews here are not like those in the United States. If there is a new law, they look for some way to get around it; they have no patriotism or loyalty."

As of possible further interest in connection with this general subject I am enclosing herewith, in single copy, a copy of a statement on "The Jewish Problem in Rumania"⁶ prepared by a Mr. Grindea, Rumanian representative of the Jewish Telegraph Agency. Since preparing this statement Mr. Grindea has been arrested and placed in forced domicile for "spreading false or alarmist news".

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:
FREDERICK P. HIBBARD
Secretary of Legation

⁶ Not printed.

871.404/148 : Telegram

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, September 17, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

544. A decision of the Minister of Cults and Arts dated September 9th lists 8 cults which the State recognizes and protects and then adds that the existence of the Mosaic faith is recognized under new regulations which stipulate that a synagogue is available only if it serves at least 400 Jewish families in urban and 200 families in rural districts. Organizations in districts where no synagogue is authorized must cease all activities. In view of these drastic limitations the president of the Jewish Community has seen Premier Antonescu who agreed to delay application of the new laws pending investigation in the light of information and data accompanying the protest. General Antonescu gave assurance at the same time that he does not propose to adopt a program of Jewish persecution and a statement issued on his instructions on September 14 declared that "no one is permitted to use violence against foreign cults, persons, or property distribution.["]

In my first official interview with General Antonescu yesterday I observed that I had noted with relief and satisfaction the above-mentioned statement. The General assured me that he would brook no persecution and that such action as might ensue would be taken through the courts.

As in the past the Baptist faith is not included in the list of cults recognized by the new decision. However the leaders of the Baptist Church have been received by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Cults and have left a full memorandum with the latter on their situation. They have been promised that careful consideration will be given their requests.

GUNTHER

871.404/150

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

No. 1592

BUCHAREST, October 1, 1940.

[Received November 7.]

SIR: Reference is made to my telegram No. 544, of September 17, 6 p. m., regarding the decision issued by the Ministry of Cults and Arts on September 9th, governing the various religious organizations in Rumania. It was then particularly noted that, although the "existence" of the Mosaic faith was recognized, it was not included in the list of cults authorized and protected by the State, and separate regulations were issued to govern the exercise of the faith and all

other Jewish activities. I now have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of the decision, as well as of a new set of regulations governing confessions in general, the special regulations pertaining to the Jewish faith and a decision regarding the suppression of religious associations.⁷

The foregoing decisions and regulations have since been suspended. The drastic limitations which they placed upon the exercise of the Mosaic faith naturally produced consternation in Jewish circles and, as indicated in the telegram already cited, the President of the Jewish Community (Dr. W. Fildermann) immediately made representations to Premier Antonescu on the subject. According to Dr. Fildermann, General Antonescu received these representations in a sympathetic, reassuring manner and directed his Minister of Cults and Arts to accord them careful consideration. But on September 14th the New Iron Guard Government converted the Ministry of Cults and Arts into an Under Secretariat of the Ministry of National Education; and Dr. Fildermann found in his first interview with the new Iron Guardist Under Secretary that he was disposed to treat the Jews and the Jewish problem with all severity. Becoming thereupon genuinely apprehensive, Dr. Fildermann busied himself with new representations to the Premier which apparently bore fruit. On September 18th he received a letter from the Secretary General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers quoting a communication from General Antonescu which said in part:

“Assure Dr. Fildermann . . . ⁸ that if his coreligionists do not openly or secretly sabotage the regime, either politically or economically, the Jewish population will not suffer.

“General Antonescu keeps his word.”

A copy of the full text of the Premier's letter, as furnished the Legation by Dr. Fildermann, is enclosed herewith.⁹

Then on the following day, September 19th, came the announcement of fresh decisions suspending those of September 9th “until such time as the regime governing religious associations and communities shall have been definitely regulated by legislation”. Translations of the suspending decisions form an enclosure hereto.⁹

On September 19th, before he had been apprised of the suspensions, Dr. Fildermann called on Mr. Benton ^{9a} by appointment for the express purpose of acquainting the Legation with the circumstances and, undoubtedly, of enlisting its sympathy and possible support. I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Benton's memorandum ⁹ of the conversation,

⁷ None printed.

⁸ Omission indicated in the original despatch.

⁹ Not printed.

^{9a} James Webb Benton, First Secretary of Legation.

since it contains some very useful data and background information regarding the Jewish position in this country at the present time.

The position now is, then, that Premier Antonescu, desirous of consolidating governmental authority and restoring order rather than provoking new complications or taking over-hasty action pointing to persecution, is making every endeavor to moderate the enthusiasm of the youthful, impatient, essentially anti-Semitic element newly come to power. Suspension of the former decisions is an indication that he has in this instance been successful, at least to a degree, and that the problem is to be reviewed in favor of a less hurried solution. It can not be expected that such new regulations as may be issued will be in any way favorable to the Jews, but I believe that General Antonescu was sincere in his recent assurances to me that there would be no real persecution or anything in the nature of a pogrom.

A few minor anti-Semitic measures have in the meantime been taken, such as: The elimination of certain Jews from activities in State and private theaters; the prohibition for Jewish bookshops to sell school books and equipment, exclusion of Jewish lawyers from various bars, dismissal of numbers of Jews from the different Ministries and official institutions, elimination of Jews from the stock exchange, proposed exclusion of Jews from medical practice and other similar measures.

When a few days ago I called on Professor Horia Sima, who not only has fallen heir to the leadership of the Iron Guard but is Vice President of the Council of Ministers, our conversation turned briefly on the subject of the Jews. After asserting, to my surprise, that the Legionaries had swung to the support of the Axis because it is anti-Jewish, he went on to say that he personally was anti-Jewish because the Jews had succeeded in obtaining a strangle-hold upon every branch of Rumanian life. He warned me that they were probably trying to do the same thing in America and would not be convinced that a serious Jewish problem does not exist in the United States. But the point of chief interest was his assertion that he purposed to carry out his program by pacific means rather than persecution, gradually training young Rumanians to take over the work now done by Jews. As this was in harmony with remarks made to me the other day by Premier Antonescu, who said that he planned to place young Rumanians in Jewish offices to learn their methods, I felt considerably reassured as to the intention to exercise restraint and to avoid bloodshed or any other of the more violent forms of oppression.

Furthermore, since the drafting of the above despatch it has reached me from a usually reliable source that the German authorities in Bucharest in the last day or two have warned the Rumanian Government to make less haste in the matter of ousting the Jews from their various occupations. The Germans have no desire to see the impending eco-

conomic crisis hurried along. It would take three or four years, at least, for the gradual training of Rumanians to take the places now occupied by Jews, and before that the Germans hope to be able to demobilize and to have plenty of young men to take those places themselves. I shall not fail to point this out to the Rumanian authorities as opportunities present themselves. The Germans employ a large number of Jews here as middlemen for most of their agricultural purchases. Furthermore, the German Legation's local lawyer is a Jew. I understand that he has recently tried to resign in the light of the general attitude towards his race but was deterred by the Minister, personally, who pleaded with him not to do so.

Respectfully yours,

FRANKLIN MOTT GUNTHER

871.4016/248

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

No. 1607

BUCHAREST, October 7, 1940.

[Received October 31.]

SIR: In continuation of my despatch No. 1592, of October 1, 1940, which dealt with certain aspects of the situation of Jews in Rumania under the new Antonescu régime, I have the honor to list below the more recent measures, official and otherwise, that have been taken in this regard:

1. All rural property in the hands of Jews has been taken over by the State and paid for in bonds at an interest rate of 3%, the bonds at the same time being blocked.
2. Jews are forbidden to use the phrase "Furnishers to the Royal Court".
3. Jewish children are permitted to attend Jewish schools only.
4. Jews who have entered Rumania clandestinely during the past five years are required to leave the country within two months, failing which they are to be placed in concentration camps at their own expense, or at the expense of the Jewish Community.
5. Pharmacy shops may not be leased to Jews; Jews may not be employed in pharmacies other than those owned by Jews; pharmacies now leased by Jews must be liquidated within one month.
6. Jewish lawyers who remain members of the bar can plead the cases of their coreligionists only.
7. Christian lawyers will replace Jewish lawyers in the legal departments of commercial firms.
8. All lawyers and all persons practicing a liberal profession who come from the evacuated territories will be given places as new vacancies arise through the elimination of Jewish professionals.
9. Jewish lawyers have been eliminated from the bar at Braşov.
10. Twenty-eight Jewish professors have been dismissed from teaching faculties in different parts of the country.
11. Jews have been excluded from the Syndicate of Journalists of Bucharest.

12. The Society of Rumanian Writers has eliminated from its membership all writers of Jewish origin.

13. Jews of Rumanian origin may not be correspondents for foreign newspapers.

14. "Rumanianizing" commissars have been placed in the larger Jewish enterprises.

15. The Association of Rumanian dentists has decided to exclude all Jewish dentists from its ranks.

Respectfully yours,

FRANKLIN MOTT GUNTHER

871.4016/254

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

No. 1690

BUCHAREST, December 4, 1940.

[Received January 30, 1941.]

Subject: The Situation of Jews in Rumania.

SIR: Referring to the Legation's despatch No. 1607, of October 7, 1940, and previous despatches on the above subject, I now have the honor to note some of the more recent developments affecting the situation of the Jewish population in Rumania.

The Department is well aware of the perennial character of the Jewish problem in this country, particularly as it has presented itself since the conclusion of the World War. In 1922 a student movement was founded having anti-Semitism as its basic tenet. A few years later, Codreanu and his Iron Guard took up the cry. Throughout the twenties and late into the thirties Mr. A. C. Cuza, a veteran politician and nationalist, has led a constant and bitter campaign against the Jews. A particularly critical period came with the ill-starred and short-lived Goga Government of early 1938, when official anti-Semitism became rampant for the first time. Then followed the uncertain period of King Carol II's dictatorial regime, which retained Goga's plan for citizenship revision and otherwise indicated its clear intention to deal seriously with the Jewish problem. Those who could not establish their title to Rumanian citizenship under drastic and severely applied regulations became "foreigners", or unwanted residents of the country without nationality, and it was hoped that their emigration would eventually become possible through some as yet nebulous international arrangement. Throughout all this the Jews were watchful and fearful; there was even a mild exodus and some flight of capital. But, in general, they were relatively untouched; they were humiliated and jostled, but they kept their homes and jobs, they continued to sell their wares and practice their professions, hoping that this storm would pass as had so many others.

But, as earlier despatches have already suggested, the lot of the Jews in Rumania has definitely worsened since the inauguration of

the present regime three months ago. In the first place, the green-shirted Iron Guard is in power, and the Iron Guard is notoriously and avowedly an essentially anti-Semitic organization. In the second place, Rumania not only has come under the direct "influence" of Nazi Germany but is now actually a member of the Axis and an adherent to the Tripartite Pact.¹⁰ And, thirdly, the country requires scape-goats for all the evils and misfortunes of the day, and finds that the Jews, along with former King Carol and the old politicians, serve admirably in this unhappy rôle. These considerations, plus an underlying sentiment of genuine anti-Semitism generally, provide sufficient reason and background for Jewish fears and sufferings in Rumania today.

Dr. W. Fildermann, President of the Jewish Community in Rumania, has made a special point of keeping the Legation informed of the changing situation of the Jews in Rumania, particularly through the Bucharest correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, a Mr. Adolph Grindea, who is among those who recently succeeded in effecting a clandestine departure for Palestine. These sources have supplied the Legation with a sheaf of copies of written representations to the Rumanian Government, dealing sometimes with individual cases and at other times with general decrees and measures, as well as providing information of the temper and fears of the Jewish population and retailing innumerable stories of persecution and violence. Translations of two typical representations to the authorities form enclosures hereto.¹¹ Among the verbal but uncorroborated accounts received, the following may be mentioned as representative cases:

1. Following minor disorders at a market on the outskirts of Bucharest, attempts were made to implicate the Jews as communists, and two young Jewish boys were shot by the Legionaries.

2. At one village the Jewish families were sent into the forest to cut down trees and when they returned found that their household belongings had been confiscated.

3. At Tecuci, estimated to have possibly one hundred and fifty Jewish families, the Jewish colony was notified one day that it should produce one million lei by seven o'clock in the evening, which it finally succeeded in doing in spite of extreme poverty.

4. Jewish stores all over the country are being placarded as such and Legionaries are either forbidding entry or at least warning persons who come to such stores. In other cases entrance is encouraged but a Legionary collects the cash at the end of the day.

5. A Jewish merchant on Strada Lips cani was forced under duress to sign a statement transferring the rights of his store to the Legionaries.

¹⁰ German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact, signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940; adhered to by Rumania November 23, 1940; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p. 165.

¹¹ Not printed.

6. Three men were taken from their offices, charged with being Communists, stripped to the waist, beaten and then released with a warning.

7. Jews leaving Constanza at the time of the last sailing of the *Basarabia* had all of their personal effects confiscated, including even the shoes they were wearing, being left with only the other clothes they happened to have on.

8. A group of some fifty or sixty young Jewish girls who were gathered together at some sort of meeting were made the object of various forms of violence, including the shaving of their heads.

Most of the foregoing alleged happenings, which could be multiplied indefinitely from hearsay, took place early in November, and leading Jewish quarters became increasingly alarmed at that time. In the hope that I might exert some leavening influence in the proper quarters, Dr. Fildermann made known to me his fears that a pogrom of serious proportions was being planned to take place while Premier Antonescu was away on his official visit to Italy. As Mr. Mihai Antonescu, Minister of Justice and a cousin of the Premier, laughingly reminded me some days later, these extreme fears were not realized and the Premier's absence was not marked by any notable anti-Semitic activities. Nevertheless, the day-by-day persecutions, restrictions, humiliations, hardships and instances of violence have been sufficient to strike terror in the Jewish heart.

In recent weeks the Jewish plaint has not been one of lost positions, special taxes or discriminatory restrictions—that is an old story. Rather it has been one of deaths, torture, beatings, abductions, confiscation, robbery and violence in all forms. It is not an exaggeration to say that here today one sees the Jews with tears, hollow eyes and wringing hands. Many of them never go out; they keep to their homes for fear of meeting violence in the street. A few, who have reasons to fear they may be sought out, creep from friend to friend or house to house afraid to go to their own homes to sleep. Those of means endeavor frantically to dispose of their property, secure funds abroad and find a way to leave the country. Officers of this Legation are daily besieged, in the street, in public places, at social functions and even in their homes, by seekers of American visas or their friends. They all feel that Rumania's identification with the Axis and the advent of the Green Shirts spell an end to that tolerance for the Jews which has to some degree heretofore existed in this country.

The wiser heads amongst the Rumanians, official and otherwise, look askance at these young, undisciplined, irresponsible Green Shirted boys who, drunk with their new power, their uniforms, their songs and their untried revolvers, rush headlong for a quick revenge against the Jews, the "enemies of the country". General Antonescu is making every effort to hold them in leash. Even the Germans here, military

and official, consider that the anti-Jewish movement is going at an unreasoning speed, and that the Legionaries are trying to accomplish in a few short months what Germany required several years to achieve. And observers have noted that as Nazi interests acquire business establishments and other enterprises in Rumania they take care to retain the experienced Jewish administrators and managers to ensure continued efficiency of operations.

It may be pertinent to the foregoing to note here a few of the official measures taken with regard to Jews in Rumania during the past few weeks.

1. It has been decreed that all enterprises and companies are obliged to eliminate all Jewish employees by December 31, 1941.

2. Following the announcement that all rural property owned by Jews was liable to confiscation by the State, it was decreed that Jewish owners of land properties (forests, forestry enterprises, mills and the like) are compelled to continue the exploitation of such properties until they are taken over by the State.

3. Jewish doctors are not allowed to have other than Jewish clients, nor are they allowed to practice outside of their prescribed district.

4. Jews are not permitted to benefit from the arrangements made for exchanges of students with other countries.

5. Jews engaged in the moving picture business or connected with moving picture theaters, as well as those engaged in tourist trade, must withdraw from such enterprises or employment.

6. Jews have been excluded from military service; but they must pay special military taxes and are to be employed in public works instead. Qualified specialists (doctors, chemists, engineers, architects and the like) will be utilized according to their specialty.

7. Rumanian civil servants are forbidden to marry persons who are not of Rumanian ethnical origin.

8. All boats and vessels which belong, or which belonged on September 6, 1940, to Jews or Jewish-owned companies are confiscated by the State. (A few days after this decree was issued it was announced that eight tug-boats confiscated from Jews had been turned over to the German Company for Danubian Navigation).

Some uncertainty always exists as to the precise number of Jews in Rumania. The official census of 1930 indicated that in Greater Rumania there were 728,115. In 1938, official estimates placed the number at roughly one and a half million; Jews gave a considerably smaller figure and anti-Semites a much larger. A few weeks ago, Dr. Fildermann said that he had established with the Rumanian Government that the number of Jews in present-day Rumania, following the losses of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Southern Dobruja and a large part of Transylvania, was approximately 340,000, or roughly 21½% of the total population. Officially supplied figures now appearing in the press show a Jewish population of only 283,094. For general purposes, however, it may be assumed that there are now approximately 300,000 Jews in Rumania.

Respectfully yours,

FRANKLIN MOTT GUNTHER

APPLICATION OF CONTROLS ON RUMANIAN ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES

840.51 Frozen Credits/648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Gunther)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1940—8 p. m.

333. Executive Order 8565, October 10, 1940¹² extended all provisions of Executive Order 8389 of April 10, 1940,¹³ as amended, to include Rumania. For reference see last paragraph of Radio Bulletin No. 85, April 10, 1940.

HULL

840.51 Frozen Credits/708 : Telegram

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, October 15, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received October 16—6 : 50 a. m.]

605. Department's No. 333, October 11, 8 p. m. Foreign Minister Sturdza asked me to come to see him late yesterday when he complained banteringly of our having sequestrated Rumania's "gold". The Finance Minister¹⁴ joined us in a few minutes and stated specifically that he would be needing immediately some 10,000,000 dollars for payments to Greece for tanning fluid and to Turkey and Iran for cotton and wool without which money Rumania would be ill equipped for the winter. He referred also to payments of salaries of Rumanian diplomats such as Gafencu¹⁵ which had to be paid in dollars. He made reference to seeming "discrimination" in our decision and both stated that Rumania was neither invaded nor occupied. I could, however, get no precise figures of number of troops but was assured that General Antonescu¹⁶ who desired to see me on this matter would himself give them to me today. It was of course alleged that the German officers and men were here by invitation and arrangement.

I replied that I have not been consulted and really knew very little about the matter, showed them a paraphrase of the only telegram from you on the subject No. 333, October 11, 8 p. m., and left with them a copy of Executive Order 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended by Executive Order 8405 of May 10, 1940,¹⁷ with both of which I

¹² *Federal Register*, October 12, 1940, p. 4062.¹³ *Ibid.*, April 12, 1940, pp. 1400-1401. This order froze all the assets of Denmark and Norway in the United States.¹⁴ Georges Cretzianu.¹⁵ Grigore Gafencu, Rumanian Minister to the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Ion Antonescu, Rumanian Chief of State, Prime Minister, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.¹⁷ *Federal Register*, May 10, 1940, p. 1677.

had armed myself in anticipation. I pointed out that licenses for specific payments might presumably be obtained in much the same manner as with the licensing system prevailing here.

When they asked me to present the true facts to you I replied that I had already done so in so far as I was able to ascertain them due to the seeming mystery which shrouded the presence of German forces but would not fail to report this conversation and recommended that they take the matter up with their representative in Washington. I added upon leaving that quite possibly this had been an independent decision of the Treasury Department without prior consultation with you.

The Finance Minister estimated that the total amount of Government funds blocked was something under 30,000,000 dollars although he did not know how much private individuals had in America over and above this amount and also referred further to Jewish black bourse operations here to that end.

For my own information has this decision been actuated more especially by reported instances of growing domination of German party's Economic Central in Rumania's internal and foreign economic policy?

GUNTHER

840.51 Frozen Credits/709 : Telegram

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, October 15, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received October 16—8:44 a. m.]

608. My 605, October 15, 1 p. m. I have just come from seeing General Antonescu at his request. He spoke with considerable emphasis of the blocking of Rumania's funds. He said that he assumed that it was due to British pressure, adding that this attitude should no longer hold as he had now reached a satisfactory solution of British difficulties in Rumania that the Minister¹⁸ and his diplomatic staff were remaining and that in turn he, the General, was releasing for deportation a number of the British civil prisoners charged with sabotage.

I am transmitting to you separately by telegraph a translation of a memorandum¹⁹ which the General handed me taking it from the hands of the Finance Minister who was present at the interview. He urged immediate release of the required funds. As he added that contrary to the insistence of his Finance Minister he was not taking the retaliatory measures urged upon him respecting the American tele-

¹⁸ Rex W. A. Leeper.

¹⁹ Transmitted in telegram No. 609, October 15, 9 p. m., not printed; the substance of the memorandum is contained in a note from the Rumanian Chargé, October 17, *infra*.

phone and oil interests in Rumania. I replied that I was very glad to hear this and that certainly I at least never anticipated for a moment that he would do such a thing. I added that, as explained yesterday to the Foreign Minister and the Finance Minister, I was personally completely in the dark as to the reasons actuating this decision, which I casually observed might not have been taken solely for military reasons but possibly also because of the seemingly increasing pressure upon Rumania's internal economy of the German Legation's economic centres.

GUNTHER

840.51 Frozen Credits/755

The Rumanian Chargé (Coste) to the Secretary of State

No. 3631/P-3-II-3a

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1940.

SIR: With reference to Your Excellency's note of October 12, 1940,²⁰ transmitting copies of Executive Order No. 8565 of October 10, 1940, I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by my Government to protest in its behalf against the issuance of the above Executive Order, by which the provisions of Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended, are extended to Romania and Romanian nationals.

Considering that Executive Order No. 8565 does not contain any reasons for the measures ordered thereby, the Romanian Government is obliged to interpret it, in view of established precedents and of statements, apparently semi-official, which appeared in the American press on October 11, 1940, as a measure based on the assumption that Romania is an occupied country.

The Romanian Government is unable to admit such an assumption and declares most categorically that Romania is a free and independent country.

The sending of a German military mission accompanied by military units, for the purpose of instructing the Romanian army, had already been negotiated by the previous Romanian Government.

This action on the part of the then Government being found agreeable, the present Government continued these negotiations and is now carrying out the agreement reached. Therefore, and since numerous precedents are in existence, the Romanian Government can in no way concur with the view that the presence in Romania of this mission could be interpreted as a military occupation.

In behalf of my Government, therefore, I have the honor to ask for a reconsideration of the entire matter, leading to the rescinding of Executive Order No. 8565.

²⁰ Not printed.

Pending the favorable decision of the United States Government on this request, I have the honor to inform you of the urgent character of certain obligations, which my Government has to fulfill out of funds deposited with the Chase National Bank by the National Bank of Romania, and for which I request, on behalf of my Government, that the Treasury be good enough to free immediately the following necessary funds:

(a) Two Million Seven Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars for the payment of cotton imports from Iran, in fulfillment of an existing contract;

(b) Seven Million Dollars for the import of raw materials from Turkey, in accordance with an agreement signed by the Romanian and Turkish Governments in September 1940.

(c) Four Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars for the import of raw materials from Greece, in accordance with contracts now being executed.

(d) Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars for salaries and expenses of Romanian Legations in different countries during the current month.

Accept [etc.]

BRUTUS COSTE

840.51 Frozen Credits/710: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Gunther)

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1940—7 p. m.

351. Your 609, October 15, 9 p. m.²¹ and 614, October 17, 7 p. m.²² The Rumanian Chargé on October 16 [17] left a note with the Department which was similar to that contained in your no. 609, October 15, 9 p. m. (This note has been referred to the Treasury Department). Coste was informed that this was a matter lying within the competence of the Treasury Department.

For your guidance the customary procedure in the presentation of applications for unblocking funds is for either the American bank or foreign mission in Washington to apply to the Treasury Department which has full responsibility for the administration of the blocking order. This practice should be followed in the case of Rumanian blocked funds. You may inform Jordan²³ in the above sense stating that it is regretted that documentation in connection with applications cannot be handled through the American Legation.

HULL

²¹ See footnote 19, p. 781.

²² Not printed.

²³ Inspector General of the National Bank of Rumania.

840.51 Frozen Credits/730 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1940—7 p. m.

78. The Rumanian Government has requested this Government to release sufficient Rumanian funds in this country to enable Rumania to pay for Turkish cotton in accordance with the Turkish-Rumanian Agreement of September 26. The Department desires to follow a benevolent policy regarding Turkey in view of the political situation in the Levant and is considering recommending that \$1,410,000 of Rumanian funds be released to enable Rumania to pay for 3,100 tons of Turkish cotton now understood to be ready for shipment from Turkey. The Turkish Commercial Attaché in Bucharest has stated to our Legation there that Turkey is convinced that the cotton is for Rumanian ultimate destination and that Turkey will stop shipments if this proves to be incorrect.

Before reaching a final decision, the Department would be glad to receive any observations the Turkish Government might desire to make regarding the matter. An urgent reply is requested.

HULL

840.51 Frozen Credits/860

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1940.

The Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires called on me today, at his request.

The subject was the blocking of Rumanian funds. He did not seem to be too well informed. He raised an objection to the blocking, on principle. He said he understood that it turned partly on the belief that Rumania was occupied by the Germans, partly on our own theory of national defense, and partly on an endeavor to prevent any goods reaching Germany. He thought that the amount involved—some thirteen million dollars of Rumanian Government funds—was not an item sufficient to affect our defense; he stated that Rumania was not effectively occupied by Germany; he said that all of the materials for which they used this American exchange as a revolving fund were for strictly Rumanian consumption. Therefore he pressed an objection of principle against our blocking exchange.

I said that I found it difficult to accept any such principle. We happened to be the last great country in the world that preserved the principle of free exchange. But we could hardly recognize that we were bound by a principle against exchange blocking orders when every other country in the world, including Rumania, felt entirely free to put blocking orders into effect as they saw fit.

Further, I said, the blocking orders were really motivated primarily by two desires. One was to safeguard American interests: we had seen Austria and Czechoslovakia occupied and every obligation to the United States repudiated at the same time that all of the assets of these countries were promptly withdrawn or utilized.

The second was a desire to assure that the assets in question reached their rightful owners, instead of somebody else.

We had, I said, every sympathy for independent Rumania. We desired nothing more than that she should be able to preserve herself. We recognized fully the cruel situation in which a country menaced by two forces, both of which were quite ready to occupy territory, necessarily found itself. This underlined our own policy of being unable to recognize seizures by armed force.

Coste thereupon explained at some length that there was not a true force of occupation, but merely a "military mission"; that it did not exceed ten thousand men; that it was not regimental formation, but company formation; and then added, somewhat illogically, that Americans would find difficulty in realizing that the Rumanians on the whole were favorably disposed towards the Germans. They had vivid and terrible recollections of the Russian army which had marched through during the World War and the fighting they had had to do to get them out. The troops in Rumania, on the other hand, had been Austrian; and they had behaved themselves well. Many of these Austrians had subsequently been in Rumania as technicians and had created a favorable impression. In any event, if they were forced to choose between Russians and Germans, they would naturally choose Germans.

I said that we did not feel called upon to pass judgment on what a country in that unhappy predicament might do; that we could not very well retire from the blocking order; but that we would of course examine sympathetically any application for licenses which they might make.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

840.51 Frozen Credits/730: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Gunther)

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1940—7 p. m.

353. Your 617, October 17, 9 p. m.²⁴ and other telegrams on Rumanian blocked funds. The Department is considering recommending the release of dollars to cover preliminary Rumanian obligations to Turkey for cotton importations. Before reaching final decision Department would appreciate your further recommendations after you

²⁴ Not printed.

have consulted the Turkish Ambassador. This subject will also be discussed with the Turkish Ambassador in Washington ²⁵ and by Mac-Murray in Ankara. For your guidance, the Department desires to follow a benevolent course in its dealings with Turkey because of the political situation in the Levant. HULL

840.51 Frozen Credits/772 : Telegram

The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, October 24, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received October 24—7:35 a. m.]

655. This morning I had a conference with the Turkish Ambassador,²⁶ his Commercial Attaché and Mr. Edson²⁷ being present.

The statements of the Turkish Commercial Attaché on the technical aspects of the problem may be summarized as follows:

The urgency of Rumania's need for cotton is genuine; local stocks have been almost exhausted and certain Rumanian mills may be forced to shut down in a few days if fresh imports are not made. Turkish cotton has proved usable in Rumanian textile factories without important changes in the machinery although the textile produced was naturally inferior to the product obtained from Egyptian long staple. "The Iranian Minister last night confirmed to me both of the above points concerning which I had been anxious. He has a number of Armenian nationals who operate textile factories in Rumania." Recently Rumania has been importing ersatz cellulose thread from Germany in order to keep weaving mills busy.

The Commercial Attaché confirmed the other statements conveyed in my 617, October 17, 9 p. m.²⁸ but added the following modifications:

1. The sum of eleven million Turkish pounds fixed for the value of cotton to be bought by Rumania and also of oil to be bought by Turkey was not a fixed contractual figure to buy the quantity which each party promised to make available to the other. It now appears probable that Turkish purchases of oil will not be as large as Rumanian purchases of cotton.

2. At present it seems possible that Rumania will attempt to insist that Turkey pay for oil in Swiss francs instead of dollars.

The Turkish Ambassador stated that the proposed transaction was an entirely legitimate one which had been envisaged since some time. He assured me that the granting of licenses for this cotton would be esteemed a real favor by his Government.

If only as a matter of tactics the granting of some licenses now would appear warranted, i. e., unless perchance we would lief see

²⁵ Mehmet Münir Erteğin.

²⁶ Bay Suphi Tanrıöer.

²⁷ Andrew W. Edson, Second Secretary of Legation in Rumania.

²⁸ Not printed.

American companies here completely nationalized. So far I have been able to juggle the deferment of definite decision on this but I could not guarantee being able to do so indefinitely in view of the strength and persistence of the radical wing of the Iron Guard Party. Further, now that we are at last using some of our power our action in this matter, with skillful handling, might even be turned to inure somewhat to the advantage of American interests in Rumania.

GUNTHER

840.51 Frozen Credits/781 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 25, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 6:25 p. m.]

177. Department's 78, October 21, 7 p. m. Foreign Office states that under the Turkish-Rumanian agreement of September 26, last, Turkey is to deliver to Rumania cotton to a maximum amount of 12,000 tons against petroleum products of an equivalent value to be furnished by Rumania. Rumania is obliged to pay for the cotton in dollars which will be deposited in a special account in the Turkish Central Bank and used for the payment of the petroleum products delivered by Rumania. Upon inquiry being made why provision was not made for an exchange of specified amounts of these products without payment in free exchange, the Embassy was informed that such an arrangement had been tried before and had not worked.

Foreign Office states frankly that it realizes that some of the cotton exported to Rumania may find its way to Germany. It is convinced, however, in view of the great need of cotton in Rumania that any such amount would be small. (Turks estimate minimum needs of Rumanian cotton mills at approximately 20,000 tons annually and usual sources of supply—Egypt and the United States—are not available.) While there is a provision in the agreement requiring clearance of the cotton through the customs, there is no stipulation prohibiting re-exportation. The cotton will be delivered in a series of shipments and a second shipment will not be made until Rumania has furnished petroleum products. Foreign Office emphasizes that Turkey was obliged to agree to deliver cotton to Rumania in order to obtain petroleum products which Turkey greatly needs and cannot at present readily obtain elsewhere. Rumania was willing to deliver such products only if Turkey furnished cotton.

The Foreign Office states that 3,100 tons of cotton are now being prepared for shipment to Rumania of a value of between \$1,400,000 and \$1,500,000.

MACMURRAY

840.51 Frozen Credits/727 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Gunther)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1940—8 p. m.

374. Your 609, October 15, 9 p. m., 614, October 17, 7 p. m.²⁹ and 655, October 24, 6 p. m. Following a careful examination of the points involved in the Rumanian Government's request for the release of \$1,410,000 to pay for Turkish cotton importations, it has been decided that the request is justified. Accordingly, the Treasury Department has released the aforementioned sum for the purpose indicated.

You should immediately inform the Prime Minister of this fact, stating that the release has been made strictly on the merits of this specific request. You should in no sense, however, give any indication that the action of this Government has been in any way concerned with a *quid pro quo* involving the difficulties of American companies in Rumania. The Department believes that this Government and the companies themselves would be in a far stronger position by keeping the question of blocked funds entirely separate from American interests in Rumania.

HULL

840.51 Frozen Credits/1033

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1940.

The Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires came in to see me today at his request. His purpose was to ask the renewal of the license³⁰ formerly granted by the Treasury for fifteen days authorizing payment of \$1,400,000 from the account of the National Bank of Rumania with the Chase National Bank of New York to the Agricultural Bank of the Republic of Turkey in payment for 3,100 tons of Turkish cotton purchased by the Rumanian Textile Industry.

I said that I knew about the matter; that I had previously recommended the granting of the license. In frankness, however, I felt it necessary to observe that the situation of Rumania had changed materially since the last license had been granted. She had adhered to the Axis; she had recognized Manchukuo despite the fact that our Legation there had made representations to General Antonescu.

The German "Military Instruction Mission" had now become quite openly an army of occupation. She had signed a commercial treaty which on first analysis would seem to indicate that the results of

²⁹ Neither printed.³⁰ See *Federal Register*, October 29, 1940, p. 4273.

Rumanian manufacture would go first to Germany, and that only after their needs were satisfied would the Rumanian people get anything out of it. This did not necessarily indicate what action would be taken on the license; but these considerations necessarily entered into the matter.

The Rumanian Chargé was obviously very moved and very unhappy. He said that Rumania's misfortunes were due to the action of one man—King Carol; that Antonescu was doing his best to save what he could from the wreck; that if the Rumanian population could not be taken care of to some extent the present group which were moderate would probably be replaced by extremists; etc. He did not conceal from me the fact that he felt Rumania was well on the way to becoming virtually a conquered province. He hoped that we might be of some assistance to them.

He left with me the attached *aide-mémoire*.³¹ I said I would consider the matter with the Treasury.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

840.51 Frozen Credits/1012 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1940—noon.

97. Department's no. 78, October 21, 7 p. m., your no. 177, October 25, 5 p. m., and Department's no. 82, October 31, 7 p. m.³² Transfer of the \$1,410,000 of Rumanian funds to pay for Turkish cotton has been delayed due to the Rumanian Government's failure to utilize the permit within the 15 days for which it was valid. The Department's recommendations have now been asked by the Treasury Department on a new application by Rumania for release of the funds. In view of recent developments in Rumania, the Department has decided to recommend that the funds be not released, and has informed the Turkish Ambassador here of this decision today.

The Department understands that the Rumanian Government is very anxious to obtain the cotton and that our refusal to release the funds may force Rumania to supply oil to Turkey promptly, in accordance with the original barter plan. For this reason, we believe the Turkish Government will be in accord with our decision to withhold the funds.

This information is being sent to you for such use as may be appropriate.

HULL

³¹ Not printed.

³² Telegram No. 82, October 31, 7 p. m., not printed.

840.51 Frozen Credits/1020

The Rumanian Chargé (Coste) to the Secretary of State

No. 4069/P-3-II-3a

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1940.

SIR: Pursuant to my note No. 4062 of December 9, 1940,³³ concerning the application filed by the Chase National Bank of New York with the Treasury Department for a license to pay the sum of \$2,730,000 from the account of the National Bank of Romania with the said Institution, to Maison Pirous, Teheran, Iran, I have the honor to reiterate to your Excellency the following points, which I stressed, on behalf of my Government, during my conversation today with Mr. Ray Atherton, Chief of the European Division:

1. The freezing of Romanian funds by Executive Order No. 8505 of October 10, 1940, has been regarded by the Romanian Government as a departure from the Most-Favored-Nation Clause stipulated in Article I of the Provisional Commercial Agreement concluded between the United States and Romania on August 20, 1930,³⁴ inasmuch as the measure taken in regard to Romanian funds was not general but specific, thus discriminatory.

2. If the license referred to in the aforesaid note were not granted, it would mean that Romania is subjected to a further discriminatory treatment, which is not applied to any of the belligerent countries.

The funds of the belligerent countries in the United States are not frozen.

Thus, the belligerent countries have the possibility of using these funds for buying needed goods from all those countries with which they are able to maintain commercial communications. Turkey and Iran are, without doubt, in the category of those countries with which each one of the belligerents has extensive trade relations.

In addition to the funds deposited in the United States, the belligerents, in virtue of special payment agreements, dispose of direct means of payment for the importation of Turkish and Iranian goods. In contrast, Romania, particularly with regard to Iran, has no means of payment available other than the blocked funds in the United States.

3. The cotton imported by Romania from Turkey and Iran is destined exclusively for internal consumption. Romania has never exported and has no intention of exporting or re-exporting raw cotton, finished or semifinished cotton goods. Because of exceptional conditions prevailing during the current year and in spite of increased needs, due to extended mobilization of its army, Romania has imported only insignificant amounts of raw cotton in comparison with an average annual importation of 17,000 tons for each of the three preceding years.

4. Having in view on one hand that the needs of the domestic market are so urgent that several textile factories in Romania have been forced to slow down production because of lack of cotton, and on the other the fact that the foreign countries supposedly able to obtain for their needs the cotton imported by Romania are in position to import it

³³ Not printed.

³⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. III, p. 799.

direct from Iran and Turkey, the suggestion that goods imported by Rumania and paid for from accounts frozen in the United States could reach certain foreign countries cannot be substantiated by indications, let alone by facts.

5. The discrimination against Rumania, mentioned under point 2, appears evident not only by comparison with the treatment accorded the belligerents, but also with that granted to all the countries bordering on Rumania, no matter what attitude these countries have taken with regard to the present war.

I beg your Excellency to be good enough to take the foregoing arguments into account when considering the request for the license mentioned above.

The said arguments (particularly those under Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5) apply with equal force to the specific requests for which I had the honor to ask your Excellency's intercession with the Treasury Department in my notes of November 18 and 19, Nos. 3896 and 3819,³⁵ respectively.

Accept [etc.]

BRUTUS COSTE

840.51 Frozen Credits/985‡

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1940.

The Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires called and protested against the failure thus far of this Government to release a certain amount of Rumanian assets which have been blocked in this country, in order that the Rumanian Government might pay for cotton, et cetera, which it is desirous of purchasing in Turkey and Iran. I said to him that the entire problem of exchange was under consideration from day to day by the experts in the Treasury and the State Departments and that every attention was being given to all phases of the matter; that it was necessary to consider the entire picture for the purpose of formulating policy. He stated that we were allowing Germany and Italy to purchase cotton in Turkey and Iran with dollars and that this was a discrimination against Rumania. I replied that that might be an argument in favor of dealing with this situation rather than in favor of complying with the Rumanian request. I made it clear to the Chargé d'Affaires that this Government and the American people have a most friendly and sympathetic interest in the people of Rumania and in any circumstances deemed at all permissible, we would go far out of our way to do a service to the Government and the people of Rumania; that we were well aware of what Hitler has done to many countries in Europe, including Rumania, and we were taking no

³⁵ Neither printed.

chances in aiding or encouraging him, even indirectly, to continue his ruthless advance across the earth, and ultimately to reach South America and this hemisphere. I said that I felt sure his Government understood the situation.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

840.51 Frozen Credits/1007

The Secretary of State to the Rumanian Chargé (Coste)

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1941.

SIR: Reference is made to your notes no. 4069/P-3-II-3a of December 10, 1940 and no. 4095/P-3-II-3a of December 13, 1940 ³⁶ expressing the view of your Government that the freezing of Rumanian funds by Executive Order no. 8505 of October 10, 1940 is discriminatory and a departure from the most-favored-nation treatment stipulated in Article I of the Provisional Commercial Agreement concluded between the United States and Rumania on August 20, 1930. Particular reference is made to two applications to the United States Treasury Department for licenses to pay from the account of the National Bank of Rumania with the Chase National Bank of New York, sums totalling \$3,419,200 to residents of Turkey and Iran in payment for cotton and rubber imported into Rumania from those countries.

Without concurring in the assumptions implicit in your note no. 4069 as to the purposes for which the freezing of certain foreign funds in the United States was adopted and is administered, it is to be noted that the cases under reference raise no question of commercial transactions between the United States and Rumania, but relate to the release of funds for payment of transactions between Rumania and third countries. It would not appear therefore that the provisions of the Provisional Commercial Agreement of August 20, 1930 are pertinent to these cases.

It would not appear necessary, therefore, in the instant cases to examine whether the provisions of the Agreement extend to regulations affecting the means of payment for transactions between Rumania and the United States or whether the administration of Rumanian exchange control regulations has been such as to accord most-favored-nation treatment to nationals of the United States.

Careful examination has, nevertheless, been given to the request of the Rumanian Government that the Department of State intercede with the Treasury Department in order that the sums of \$2,730,000 and \$689,200 be paid to Maison Pirous, Teheran, Iran and to Mr. John

³⁶ Latter not printed; it requested the Department of State to intercede with the Treasury Department in support of an application for a license to release \$689,200 for payment of imported rubber in Istanbul (840.51 Frozen Credits/1031).

Toyhe, Istanbul, respectively. The Department regrets, however, that it does not feel that it can recommend the granting of licenses for the release of the amounts in question.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

SPAIN

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF
NEUTRALITY BY SPAIN

740.0011 European War 1939/2667 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 5, 1940—1 a. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

106. I called on the Foreign Minister¹ yesterday afternoon to say goodbye. In the course of our conversation I asked him directly what was Spain's attitude in the present war.

The Minister replied that Spain was neutral and that it was determined to maintain this neutrality if necessary by force of arms against anyone who acted against the sovereignty of the country. When I inquired whether Spain's position would not be a difficult and delicate one should Italy become a belligerent, he remarked that I was discussing a matter which was extremely theoretical. (In a previous conversation, the Minister had mentioned that he felt convinced that Italy would not enter the war for economic and other reasons.)

I then inquired whether Spain would continue to recognize the Polish diplomatic representative here. By way of reply, he handed me a copy of the diplomatic list and of the budget of the Foreign Office: in the former, the Polish Minister appears and in the latter provision is made for a Spanish Minister to the Polish Government. He remarked that Spain would "dishonor itself" if it withdrew its recognition of Poland, although this attitude was highly offensive to Germany, and that the same attitude was and would be maintained toward Norway and Denmark. He remarked, however, that Spain was not sending a Minister to the Polish Government now in France since the latter-named country was a belligerent.

In support of the Foreign Minister's statement that Spain was determined to defend her neutrality against anyone who might attempt to violate her sovereignty, are the recurring rumors of substantial reinforcements being sent to the Balearic Islands and to the neighborhood of Malaga in anticipation of the possibility that an Italian entry into the war might be followed by an Italian attempt to occupy these areas.

¹ Juan Beigbeder y Atienza.

In conflict with the foregoing, however, is a statement made yesterday to the Naval Attaché² by a prominent Spanish military figure to the effect that in the event Italians should attempt to seize the Balearics, Spain would find it very difficult to resist such an attempt by force of arms. While it is impossible under present circumstances to make definite predictions as to future events or future policies of the Spanish Government the entry of Italy into the war would raise question of Spanish participation or continued neutrality to a point where it would be very difficult to foresee the outcome. It is my own feeling, however, that the more reasonable elements in the Spanish Government will make every effort to preserve Spanish neutrality and that the final outcome may well depend upon the internal situation existing at the time of a possible Italian entry into the war or any direct attempt against the neutrality of this country. In this connection it might be remembered that the internal situation in Spain is increasingly more difficult as a result of lack of foodstuffs and other vital supplies. In the event that the Government's attempts to meet the food and industrial needs of the country are unsuccessful, the very existence of the present Government would be at stake.

Repeated to the Embassy at Rome.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/2961 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 15, 1940—4 a. m.

[Received May 15—2:20 a. m.]

124. My telegram No. 122, May 14, 7 p. m.³ Suñer⁴ told Behn⁵ to-night that he was fearful that Italy would enter the war on the side of Germany "at any moment". He insisted that Spain would maintain her neutrality in this event and that he was certain that Italy would not attack the Balearics or other Spanish territory and stated that Spain would defend her integrity against any attack "by other powers". He would make no reply to a direct question as to whether Spain would defend the Balearics against an Italian attack beyond stating that he was certain that Italy would not launch such an attack. He displayed a considerable anti-British attitude and appeared extremely interested in the possibility of the United States' eventual entry into the war indicating however that he believed that such entry was highly improbable.

² Commander Ben H. Wyatt.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Serrano Suñer, Spanish Minister of Interior.

⁵ Sosthenes Behn, president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

I am confidentially informed by the Minister of Marine that four classes have been called up in the Balearics tonight.

The French Naval Attaché informed me tonight that the Allies were denying a report that they contemplated an attack on the Balearics or other Spanish territory. He displayed considerable anxiety as to the possibility that Italy might consider the present time favorable for some hostile action particularly toward Yugoslavia.

BUCKNELL

740.0011 European War 1939/3649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 10, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received June 10—7:08 p. m.]

178. I called upon the Foreign Minister this afternoon in an effort to obtain first reactions to the Italian entry into the war. The Minister appeared quite tense and stated that the Italian action was "madness" and that he had not foreseen it.

In response to my direct query if I might assure my Government that the neutral attitude of Spain of which he had previously given me categorical statements was unchanged he seemed to hedge declaring textually "that is to be presumed". He added that if for example Italy should attack the Balearics or England Ceuta Spain would resist.

I pressed him for a more definite statement on Spain's neutrality to which he repeated his remark above and added that neutrality was what Spain aspired to and that the whole question would be discussed by the Cabinet. Our conversation was intercepted [*interrupted?*] by a telephone call to Tetuan his representative there declaring that "all was quiet".

I am expecting to see Franco⁶ within the next day or so and will not fail to emphasize the fact that any assistance from the United States would be conditional upon the maintenance by Spain of its neutrality.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/3723 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 12, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 5:28 p. m.]

182. My 178, June 10, 11 p. m. Up to the present there has been no apparent change in Spain's official neutrality policy but the whole situation remains extremely fluid.

⁶ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

It is perhaps significant to note that Franco has refrained from any official pronouncement regarding the new situation in contrast to his other prompt and categorical declarations of neutrality on the occasion of previous new extensions of the European conflict. It is possible that should Spanish sympathies and Italian-German pressure result in a change of policy on the part of the Government, this might in the first phase at least, be manifest in an attitude of "non-belligerency" in place of the present "neutrality". Should this come about it would still remain to be seen whether this would necessarily mean an eventual Spanish entry into the war.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/3751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 13, 1940—10 a. m.

[Received 11 a. m.]

186. My No. 182, June 12, 5 p. m. All of the local press today carry the following:

"The following decree will appear today in the *Boletín Oficial*:

Article 1. The following agreement of the Council of Ministers is made public: The hostilities having extended to the Mediterranean by the entrance of Italy into war against France and England the Government has decided upon the non-belligerency of Spain in the conflict.

Done in the Pardo the 12th of June, 1940. Signed Francisco Franco and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Beigbeder Atienza."

WEDDELL

852.51/501 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 13, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received June 13—8:04 a. m.]

187. My 186. Since my instructions regarding possible aid to Spain emphasize that such assistance would be predicated upon the maintenance of Spanish neutrality,⁷ and since the declaration of non-belligerence by the Spanish Government has, in the strict sense, terminated Spain's neutral status, urgently request new instructions regarding my interview with Franco.

Will appreciate these instructions by tonight at latest since the interview may take place tomorrow.

WEDDELL

⁷ See instruction dated May 28, p. 803.

852.51/501 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1940—5 p. m.

87. Your 187, June 13, 11 a. m. You should set forth our position in interview with Franco in accordance with your existing instructions. Thereafter you should refer to the decree mentioned in your no. 186, and state that in view of this apparent change in the previous position of the Spanish Government with respect to the maintenance of a status of neutrality in the present European conflict you have transmitted the text thereof to your Government. You may add that there has not yet been time for you to receive further instructions from your Government but that in the meantime you would appreciate any clarification of the Spanish position that the Chief of the Spanish State might care to give.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/3796 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 14, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received June 14—3:08 p. m.]

193. My 186, June 13, 10 p. m. [*a. m.*] An amusing following up of yesterday's declaration of Spain's non-belligerency is an order in today's *Official Bulletin* signed by Serrano Suñer declaring that in view of Spain's position with regard to the European conflict the "paper war" of propaganda now being carried on by the representatives of the belligerent powers in Spain must be brought to an end. Also "reading rooms, libraries, and similarly named premises" used for the dissemination of belligerent propaganda are therefore ordered closed and publication of "information bulletins" is prohibited. Embassy press sections may continue to prepare such information bulletins but may not distribute them to other than Spanish Government authorities or the national headquarters of the party.

WEDDELL

852.51/503 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 17, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received June 18—1:26 a. m.]

199. My 182 [189?] June 13, 8 p. m.^s and Department's 87, June 13, 5 p. m. Spanish reaction to the news of the French collapse has been

^sNot printed.

immediate and jubilant. This ignominious destruction to the previously prevailing pro-Axis non-belligerency of the country together with the hope of reward at the peace table or otherwise may easily be strong enough to overbear the relatively conservative Government elements (these are believed to include Franco) thought to be opposed to Spain's entry into war.

However even should this final step be avoided the possible arrival of German troops at the Spanish frontier would probably result in an even more dominant German influence in Spain's foreign policy, on the other hand should Spain enter the war under such circumstances I incline to think that the possibility of internal uprisings mentioned in previous telegrams would be diminished.

With regard to our position vis-à-vis the Spanish Government as clarified by the Department's telegram number 87, I would invite attention to the seemingly indifferent attitude of Franco toward receiving me, an attitude which has been reflected by the Foreign Minister to whom I strongly hinted the nature of my errand when I saw him on June 6th. For the Department's information I asked the Foreign Office on the morning of June 14 (in view of the non-receipt of instructions from the Department up to that time) to hold in abeyance my request for the interview which had been originally promised between the 6th and the 10th. Upon receipt late that afternoon of the Department's new instructions I renewed my request for an early interview and was informed that a meeting had been arranged for the 15th but in view of my request this had been postponed (this statement may or may not be correct). The Foreign Minister now tells me that the Caudillo^{sa} "has been very busy" but that he will be able to see me on June 22.

The foregoing strengthens my apprehension that the Spanish belief in a quick German victory is allied to the hope and perhaps Axis assurances that this success will bring with it needed supplies without any necessity for recourse to the United States.

The Department is of course aware that the situation is changing from hour to hour and this is particularly true in this country. Furthermore a period of 5 days must yet elapse before I am to see Franco.

In these circumstances I venture to suggest a reconsideration of the instructions contained in the Department's number 87 to the extent that I be given a free hand to decide at the time of the interview whether or not all the questions contained in the Department's existing instructions shall be laid before Franco. At this time and under the present circumstances I would prefer, with the Department's approval, to limit my preliminary remarks to the Caudillo to general statement of our sympathetic attitude toward Spain's needs, an

^{sa} Gen. Francisco Franco.

attitude conditioned on Spanish neutrality, and then to ask for a clarification of the Spanish position as a result of the declaration of non-belligerency and of recent events in France. Should I receive an indication of an attitude which would signify the possibility of a cooperative policy and a worth-while assurance with regard to Spain's future attitude toward the European conflict, I might then discuss in more detail the various possibilities contained in the Department's instructions under reference. In any case a free hand is to be desired since it is impossible to foresee what the situation will be at the time of my interview on June 22.

WEDDELL

740.00111 European War 1939/484 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 19, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received June 20—2:28 a. m.]

209. For a long time past and in accordance with what I believe to be the spirit of the Department's instructions I have endeavored to urge in appropriate quarters that in her own best interests Spain should remain neutral.

However, today a highly responsible Spanish officer countered this with the observation that while Spain may have been uneasy as to attacks on its neutrality, that in his opinion and in the light of recent events it is our own neutrality which is now in danger.

I interpret this remark to mean that in the opinion of my informant Germany may seize an early opportunity to react sharply to its present attitude.

Although the foregoing is but the observation of one man it may easily be that in the view of increasingly close relations between Spain and Germany especially as manifest in Germany's acceptance of Franco as intermediary in bringing Germany and France together to discuss peace that the feelings may be a reflection of opinion prevailing in high German circles.

WEDDELL

852.51/503 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1940—6 p. m.

94. Your 199, June 17, 8 p. m., last paragraph. You are authorized to proceed in your discretion in the manner indicated.⁹

HULL

⁹ For account of Ambassador Weddell's conference with Franco, see telegram No. 232, June 22, 9 p. m., from the Ambassador in Spain, p. 887.

740.0011 European War 1939/4229 : Telegram

The Minister in Ecuador (Long) to the Secretary of State

QUITTO, June 27, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received June 28—12: 33 a. m.]

134. The British Minister asked me yesterday if I had received word from Washington indicating that the American Republics might make representations urging Spain to remain out of the war. I gave a negative reply. Later in the day while talking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs I learned that he thought Ecuador would have no objection, even though representations might not be joint owing to severed relations with Mexico.

The British Minister again inquired today if word has been received from the Department and I said no. He requested me to ask whether my Government thought there was likelihood of such representations being made.

LONG

740.0011 European War 1939/4229 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ecuador (Long)

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1940—8 p. m.

88. Your 134, June 27, 9 p. m. The Department has had no indication that the American Republics intend to make collective representations urging Spain to remain out of the war. This idea was broached to the Under Secretary by the British Ambassador, however, in approximately the manner it was mentioned to you.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/4628 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 12, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received July 13—9: 40 a. m.]

358. In conversation with the Foreign Minister this morning he re-emphasized Spain's desire to keep out of war and said that he felt that his country was called on to play a definite and helpful role at the appropriate time in the achievement of a permanent peace.

Referring to the numberless rumors concerning Spain's attitude and hostile intentions toward Portugal he described these as tendentious. He was equally critical of what he called false and misleading constructions placed on certain local happenings. For example German troops in Pamplona had entered the country on tourist visas; manifestations in the streets of the capital with cries for Gibraltar

were merely characteristic of the Spanish mentality; the hostility of the press towards Great Britain and to a voluble extent toward France were expressions of a press which might be duplicated elsewhere; he added here that while his Government could limit what should not be published it was less concerned with material appearing to which it did not have specific objection for reasons of domestic order or otherwise.

I asked the Foreign Minister whether he envisaged an attempt by Italy to occupy French Morocco. He assured me that he did not but that if it occurred it would create a most grave situation, comparable to a British landing at Casablanca or a German occupation of some port or frontier point.

The Minister was most pessimistic with regard to the outlook for Europe, declaring that in a few months stark famine would prevail and that the United States must help. He added that his representatives in France reported general conditions there as very bad.

As the Department is aware, the political forecasts of the Foreign Minister have not always proved reliable and I see no reason to alter my views on future possibilities already telegraphed to the Department.

WEDDELL

740.0011 European War 1939/6565 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 8, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 9:58 p. m.]

626. My 619, November 6, 7 p. m.¹⁰ The British Ambassador informs me that he had an interview with Franco yesterday and asked him the flat questions: whether there had been any change in Spain's international policy and whether German troops would be allowed to enter the country.

The Caudillo replied categorically that there had been no change in the policy of his Government and that if German troops crossed the frontier force would be met with force.

WEDDELL

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 828.

**EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN TO OBTAIN NEEDED
FOODSTUFFS FROM THE UNITED STATES**

852.51/499a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to Spain (Weddell),
Temporarily in Washington*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1940.

SIR: Reference is had to the informal approaches which were made to you recently by representatives of the Spanish Government in Madrid, and which have also been made to this Department and other agencies of this Government in this country, regarding the possibility of obtaining credits in the United States, particularly with a view to the purchase by Spain of American agricultural products such as cotton and corn.

You are authorized upon your return to Madrid to indicate to the appropriate officials of the Spanish Government that it may be possible to give consideration to the extension of credits to make possible the exportation to Spain of American agricultural products, particularly those of which there are surpluses under control of governmental agencies in this country.

With respect to cotton, it is believed that the best procedure would be for the Spanish Government to approach the Export-Import Bank of Washington with a view to renewing the credit arrangements which were made with that institution in July 1939 covering the purchase by Spain of 250,000 bales of American cotton. With respect to corn or other products you may state that this Government would be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any proposals that the Spanish Government may care to make. Such proposals should be submitted to the Department of State through the Spanish Ambassador in Washington.

You should make clear to the Spanish authorities that the possibility of the extension of credits by agencies of this Government to enable the Government of Spain to acquire certain products in this country will naturally be dependent upon a number of factors. In the first place, it will be dependent upon the existence of available surpluses for export in the United States and upon the credit facilities available at the time in question from the Export-Import Bank or other agencies of this Government. You should make it particularly clear that the extension of credit facilities in any form by any agency of this Government will be contingent upon the definite maintenance by Spain of its neutral status in the present European war.

In discussing the foregoing matter with the Spanish authorities you should of course point out that any extension of credits by this Government would naturally be predicated in the first instance upon the

assumption that the Government of Spain is desirous of maintaining and developing friendly commercial as well as political relations with this country.

Reference is had in the foregoing connection to your despatch no. 370 of April 4, 1940¹¹ on the subject of blocked funds owing to private American creditors in Spain. You are authorized to address a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs calling his attention to the existence of a large amount of blocked funds owing to private American creditors in Spain. In so doing you should express the interest of your Government in the steps that may be taken for the liquidation of these blocked accounts, which date back to before the beginning of the civil conflict in Spain in 1936. You should request a formal expression of the attitude of the Spanish Government with respect to these debts and should inquire whether the Spanish Government is prepared to discuss the matter with the American creditors. In the event that the Spanish Government is prepared to do so, you may inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this Government will endeavor to notify the interested American creditors accordingly.

Very truly yours,

SUMNER WELLES

611.5231/1212 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1940—6 p. m.

78. Your 144, May 24, 10 p. m.¹¹ and Department's instruction of May 28, 1940. With reference to the possibility suggested by the Minister of Finance that exploratory conversations might be undertaken to ascertain whether a basis exists for the initiation of negotiations for an agreement between Spain and the United States for the purpose of improving existing commercial relations between the two countries, you may in your discretion inform General Franco on the occasion of your forthcoming interview with him that this Government would be glad to undertake such informal and confidential conversations if the Spanish Government so desires. It is observed in this connection that the Minister of Finance recognized that Spain must envisage trade with the United States on a triangular rather than on a bilateral basis and indicated the belief that a mutually beneficial agreement along these lines might be negotiated in spite of the fact that Spain has already concluded a number of bilateral trade balancing agreements with other countries.

You should point out that it is the purpose of the trade agreements negotiated by the United States under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act to reduce barriers to trade through mutual tariff con-

¹¹ Not printed.

cessions on important products entering into the commerce between the two countries and that any trade agreement negotiated by the United States must be based upon the most-favored-nation principle as applied to all forms of trade and payments control, including tariffs. In this connection you may mention the note which you have been authorized to address to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with reference to blocked funds owing to private American creditors in Spain.

For your own confidential information and guidance:

The Department fully appreciates the desirability of improving our commercial relations with Spain and to this end of negotiating a trade agreement if a basis therefor can be found. For this reason the Department would be willing to enter into informal discussions along the lines suggested by the Minister of Finance if the Spanish Government so desires and feels able to present a satisfactory solution of the problems confronting us, even though the Department is itself unable to visualize a satisfactory basis for a trade agreement in view of existing conditions and the commercial policy heretofore followed by the Spanish Government. The Department has in mind that a satisfactory solution of existing problems in our commercial relations with Spain must be comprehensive in nature. In your conversations with General Franco and other appropriate officials of the Spanish Government you should bear in mind the foregoing considerations with respect to a possible trade agreement and the improvement of our commercial relations with Spain in general, which it is apparent are closely related to the questions of credits and sale of surplus commodities mentioned in the Department's instruction under reference.

HULL

652.1115/90 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 7, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

490. My No. 459, August 19, 1 p. m.,¹² last paragraph. An official of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce who stated that he was speaking in the name of the Minister has called on me at his request. He stated that Spain was rapidly approaching a crisis particularly as regards supplies of wheat, gasoline, cotton and certain other foodstuffs and raw materials. It had been hoped that the current wheat crop would be sufficient to relieve one of the most pressing problems but recent reports had revealed a desperate situation in this regard and the deficit would be at least 1,300,000 tons and perhaps considerably more. Spain had been able to obtain supplies of Australian wheat amounting to roughly 200,000 tons but this amount was only a

¹² *Post*, p. 896.

drop in the bucket and the time element involved in the arrival of this grain in Spain would be disastrous. He said that the Minister of Industry and Commerce had asked him to place before us the following concrete proposition with a view to ascertaining our reaction thereto:

Spain needs a credit of \$100,000,000 of which approximately \$70,000,000 would be expended in the first year principally for the following commodities: \$22,000,000 for wheat; \$20,000,000 for gasoline; \$20,000,000 for cotton with the remainder spread over machinery and equipment such as tractors, certain amounts of corn and possibly scrap iron, rubber, et cetera. It was proposed that this credit be liquidated over a period of 20 years through annual shipments to the United States of between ten and fifteen thousand tons of olive oil. He estimated that this would have a total annual value of approximately \$5,000,000.

I took occasion to explain to the representative that I had discussed in some detail several months ago with the Caudillo ¹⁵ the possibility of supplying to Spain certain surplus commodities from the United States provided certain conditions were met.

He asked what these conditions had been and I replied that one of the principal conditions was the continued neutrality [of] Spain in the present war. It would also have to be clear that the Spanish Government is interested in maintaining and developing friendly commercial and political relations with the United States. Furthermore there should be evident a willingness on the part of Spain to consider such problems as the United States Government might desire to be solved in the same friendly spirit as they would expect us to regard their own problems and desires.

I went on to say that we had no indications of how the United States Government would view the proposal made by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce but that we would refer it by telegraph for such instructions as the Department may consider appropriate.

In considering the whole matter it is becoming more evident that internal conditions in Spain are rapidly approaching a most dangerous stage and that the only points from which relief can be expected are either from the sterling area or from the United States. It is also becoming more evident that the present Government of Spain is endeavoring to resist pressure to enter the war and that they will probably continue to do so unless and until Axis pressure becomes so strong as to force them in without regard to their own desires. It is also believed that the time element is of great importance and that every month that Spain remains out of the war strengthens the possibility that with a change in the current of events the present

¹⁵ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

Spanish resolution to maintain the country's attitude of at least "non-belligerency" may be progressively fortified. However, unless some relief particularly in the way of foodstuffs is forthcoming from some quarter, conditions may be expected to become so chaotic that internal uprisings in Spain will become a distinct possibility with the result that the present regime which appears to be steadily more inclined against entering the war may either be forced to accept complete Axis domination or be supplanted by other elements who might seize any opportunity to relieve themselves of internal dissatisfaction by a foreign adventure however hazardous to the future of Spain.

These considerations are respectfully submitted to the Department with the thought that in considering any credits particularly with regard to surplus commodities it might be well under present circumstances to take into account the possible intangible benefits to be gained by the extension of such credits as well as and alongside the problem of the eventual repayment of these credits. For these reasons I am strongly inclined to recommend a more benevolent attitude toward Spanish necessities at this particular time than might be desirable or reasonable under ordinary conditions. While it is of course realized that a credit of \$100,000,000 is of considerable financial importance and the security offered in exchange may be of much further value or interest to the United States its influence upon the future course of Spain's foreign policy might be well worth the investment even if repayment were delayed over a considerable period of years.

In this general connection I may add that recent conversations with the British Ambassador ¹⁶ and members of the British Embassy have made it quite clear that the British Government are inclined to help Spain to a substantial degree "on the gamble" that the present regime thus fortified may be able to maintain its present position of non-belligerency at least for "a few more months". In such conversations the possibility of "second peninsula war" was not raised and the hope was expressed that even if Spain is eventually forced into the war by Germany whether by invasion or otherwise the people at least will be on the side of Great Britain when the "time comes".

The Department will recall in this connection the considered opinions set forth in my telegram 304, July 5, 1 a. m.¹⁷ together with statements made to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in my No. 406, July 29, 9 p. m.¹⁸

¹⁶ Sir M. D. Peterson.

¹⁷ Not printed; it reported that an invasion of Portugal by Spanish forces or Spanish forces in cooperation with the Germans was unlikely due to an anticipated German attack on England (740.0011 European War 1939/4415).

¹⁸ Not printed; the Ambassador reported that the Spanish Foreign Minister, Juan Beigbeder, denounced as baseless the idea that Spain intended to commit any hostile act against Portugal. In support of his statement the Foreign Minister announced that a treaty of amity would shortly be signed between the two countries (740.0011 European War 1939/4913).

I will appreciate the Department's telegraphic instructions as to the nature of the reply I should make to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

WEDDELL

652.1115/90 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1940—7 p. m.

229. Your 490, September 7, 11 a. m. It is suggested that you discuss this matter with the Spanish Government along the following lines; this Government is cognizant of the economic difficulties facing Spain and desirous of sustaining all possible economic relationships between the two countries which may be mutually beneficial and would be in general disposed to consider plans for cooperation looking towards the economic rehabilitation of Spain. However, the Spanish Government must realize we could only justify action if there is sufficient assurance that it would be in accordance with those general principles of international relationship for which this Government stands, and if it was reasonably certain to produce a genuine and lasting economic result—which would be the best assurance of repayment.

The political principles to which reference is made have often been stated and for a summary of them you are referred to a communication which was addressed by this Government to all nations in July 1937¹⁹ and the address delivered by me at Havana on July 22, 1940.²⁰

You should have in mind that the recent reports arising out of conversations held in Berlin and of possible Spanish entry into the war of course give rise to fears, and point out that financial assistance on our part at this time would have to take into account questions concerning prospective Spanish policy. In addition, of course, if Spain is again called upon to expend economic effort in war the major or financial risk would be increased.

We are willing to continue discussion with the Spanish Government of this whole question in the light of the preceding observations.

Naturally the specific nature and extent of the credits that might be made available would depend on what credit facilities were available here, the existence of surplus commodities for export and possible repayment arrangements. Furthermore, there would have to be reassurances regarding possible reexport from Spain of commodities acquired by means of any credit.

For your information, apart from the foregoing, the general subject of relief in Spain has been discussed informally with Mr. Norman

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. I, p. 699.

²⁰ Department of State *Bulletin*, July 27, 1940, p. 42.

Davis²¹ who has indicated the interest of the American Red Cross in possible extension of assistance by it to meet such urgent relief requirements. Mr. Davis has informed the Department that he believes it possible for the Red Cross to make available substantial sums for shipment of wheat or other foodstuffs to Spain, subject to appropriate assurances from the Spanish Government that such shipments would not be diverted to any other use and satisfactory arrangements can be made for distribution to the needy population in Spain.

HULL

652.1115/91 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1940—4 p. m.

235. Your 510, September 20, 9 p. m.²² We appreciate the reasons you advance in support of giving some concrete indication to the Spanish authorities of the amount of credits or commodities that may be available at this time. We have not undertaken at this stage to discuss the extent of credit facilities and available surplus commodities with the Export-Import Bank and other interested agencies, in view of the many still imponderable factors which are bound to enter into any detailed consideration of this subject. In any event it would probably not be possible to consider extension of credits in any such amount as that mentioned to you by the representative of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and we are inclined to feel, therefore, that any specific amount that might be mentioned would not lead to any satisfactory results.

What we have in mind is to make it clear to the Spanish Government that we are in fact disposed to give detailed consideration to the extension of credits to Spain to make possible the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materials in this country, such as wheat, cotton, and gasoline, which we understand the Spanish Government is anxious to acquire to meet the domestic requirements and to promote the economic rehabilitation of Spain. Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary that we be assured of the future direction of Spanish policy, as indicated in our no. 229. It would obviously not be possible to give consideration to the extension of credits to Spain if it appeared that that country did not intend to remain outside of the present war, since aside from any other consideration such a development would create a prohibitive credit risk.

It is suggested that you take the opportunity to bring the foregoing basic considerations directly to the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, referring to the recent approach made to you by

²¹ Chairman, American Red Cross.

²² Not printed.

the representative of the Minister of Industry and Commerce. In so doing you may assure him that in the event that satisfactory assurances are received this Government will be prepared to give immediate detailed consideration to the extension of credits to Spain for the purpose indicated.

HULL

652.1115/93 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 30, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received October 3—11 : 35 p. m.]

528. Department's 229, September 19, 7 p. m., and 235, September 26, 4 p. m. I today called by appointment on the Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by Messrs. Bucknell²³ and Ackerman.²⁴ With him were the Ministers of Finance and of Industry and Commerce, and the Counselor of the Foreign Office. I discussed in some detail the considerations set forth in the Department's telegrams referred to placing special emphasis on the fact that any aid from the United States must of necessity be conditioned upon Spain remaining outside of the present world conflict. I also pointed out that the extension of such aid must likewise be conditioned upon the existence of a cooperative attitude as regards such problems as we might care to lay before the Spanish Government.

The Foreign Minister speaking for his colleagues stated that while it was impossible for political reasons for his Government to make a public declaration or to sign a protocol to define in advance the attitude of the Spanish Government, he could assure me officially in the name of his Government that Spain would remain out of the European conflict unless and until she was attacked. He pointed out that the situation had been extremely difficult; that Spain previously had Italy on one side and now Germany on her frontier. As an indication of the future direction of Spanish policy for 13 months Spain had been able to preserve her position of non-belligerency which he described as a peculiarity of Spanish attitude in international relations. He stated that he must admit that one particularly dangerous spot existed for Spain and that this was French Morocco, attempts against which by the De Gaulle Government²⁵ or Great Britain or Germany or Italy would be treated as a hostile act.

In speaking of the recent visit to Berlin of Suñer²⁶ the Minister stated that the visit had been one of courtesy and stressed that Spain

²³ Howard Bucknell Jr., Counselor of Embassy.

²⁴ Ralph H. Ackerman, Commercial Attaché.

²⁵ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, head of the Free French Forces.

²⁶ Ramon Serrano Suñer, President of the Spanish Junta Política.

was not a signatory of the Tripartite Pact²⁷ which created a "new order" in the world the implication being that Spain had remained out of this in accordance with its policy of "Spanish prudence".

In speaking of the minimum and the most urgent needs of Spain the Minister of Industry stated that 800,000 tons of cereals were required before the next crop next June. Of this amount approximately 600,000 tons of wheat would be necessary and 200,000 tons of corn. He stressed the urgency of beginning shipments from the United States at the earliest possible moment in view of present difficulties in transporting wheat from Spanish wheat producing centers to consuming centers. He said that there was sufficient Spanish tonnage to transport approximately 100,000 tons of wheat per month. The Foreign Minister here interrupted him to point out what he declared would be of great political importance of namely to have a large American ship bring the first load. The Minister for Industry then added that the present situation in Spain was such that the bread ration would have to be reduced to at least one-third by next week.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as the other Ministers emphasized the belief that aid to Spain at this time on the part of the United States would serve to strengthen the Government in its present intention of remaining apart from the European conflict also that a renewed interchange of goods with the United States could only have a most calming and beneficial effect.

I desire to present the following comments concerning the foregoing for the Department's consideration :

1. There can be no doubt of the gravity with which these Ministers view the present food and general economic situation in Spain;

2. I consider that the assurances given me today represent the utmost that can be expected from the Spanish Government under existing circumstances;

3. Any aid from the United States effectively to strengthen Spanish determination to remain apart from the conflict must be prompt;

4. I am more and more convinced that it is the intense desire of these three Ministers and of the majority of the Cabinet as well as the overwhelming majority of the Spanish people to maintain their present position of at least non-belligerency.

5. I believe that aid at this time from the United States in the way of foodstuffs, at least at the beginning, which could be limited as to quantity and which could be limited [apparent omission], might well serve the purpose of so strengthening the present Spanish Government that they will continue to resist German or Italian pressure.

I therefore urgently recommend that the Department give immediate consideration to the possibility of supplying up to 600,000 tons of wheat and 200,000 tons of corn upon as generous credits terms as may

²⁷ German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact, signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p. 165.

be possible. The opportunity to put forward our own problems at this time should also be taken advantage of.

I agree with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his observation that the first shipments arriving in a Spanish port on an American vessel would have a beneficial effect on Spanish public opinion.

If, as I earnestly hope may be the case, the Department adopts the foregoing recommendations Spain's further needs in the way of cotton, other raw materials and equipment could be subsequently considered.

The Department's urgent telegraphic instructions are requested.

WEDDELL

652.1115/97 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 3, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received 11:08 p. m.]

531. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My 528, September 30, 11 p. m. On calling on the Foreign Minister tonight at his request in the matter of Mr. Paderewski,²⁸ he drew me aside and with the utmost gravity of manner said textually:

"Your President can change the policy of Spain and of Europe by a telegram announcing that wheat will be supplied to Spain." He repeated this solemnly and slowly, adding that a first cargo in an American bottom "would have a profound effect" and that "I wish to tell you that the psychological moment has arrived."

I repeat my previously expressed conviction that any aid from the United States effectively to strengthen Spanish determination to remain apart from the conflict must be prompt.

WEDDELL

852.48/745a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1940—6 p. m.

243. Your 528, September 30, 11 p. m., and 531, October 3, 9 p. m. The President is ready to request the American Red Cross, acting on behalf of the Government of the United States, to undertake at once the shipment of a quantity of wheat to Spain to meet the immediate urgent needs of civilian population.

²⁸ Ignace J. Paderewski, member of the National Council of the Polish Government-in-exile at London. Mr. Paderewski had been arrested by the police in September while in Spain. The Spanish Foreign Minister claimed that German influence on police officials was responsible for the incident.

The Spanish Government will understand the necessity from our point of view of having assurances on the following points before initiating this program:

1. No wheat from any source is being or will be exported from Spain;
2. The American Red Cross will be permitted, in cooperation with the Spanish Red Cross or such other Spanish organization as the American Red Cross may designate, to supervise and handle the arrangements for distribution of this wheat to the needy population of Spain;
3. The Spanish press will be informed and permitted to give full publicity to these shipments of wheat from the United States, including details regarding the arrangements that may be made for distribution in Spain.

It is suggested that you request the Minister of Foreign Affairs to arrange an immediate interview with General Franco at which the Minister will also be present. The purpose of this interview would be to obtain the concurrence of the chief of the Spanish State in this action which the President of the United States is prepared to take to assist in meeting the urgent food requirements of Spain, as well as his personal assurance that the Government of Spain is prepared to cooperate in the manner set forth in the foregoing three points.

A separate telegram will be sent to you later with regard to the question of extension of credits to Spain by agencies of this Government. It would seem advisable and more expeditious not to treat together the question of credits and the attendant problem of our commercial relations with Spain, and the present proposal for urgent humanitarian relief in that country.

HULL

852.48/771

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 7, 1940.

The British Ambassador,²⁹ accompanied by Mr. N. M. Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, called at his request. The Ambassador spoke about our proposal to supply some foodstuffs to Spain under given conditions. He said that his Government was in harmony with this view and that this was the psychological time for such action. He seemed to have in mind olive oil as one commodity that might be considered as part payment for any loan we might make for foodstuffs, adding that this would be in addition to cork and quicksilver.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

²⁹ Lord Lothian.

852.48/746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 8, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received October 9—2:45 a. m.]

542. Department's instructions 243, October 4, 6 p. m. Upon receipt of the Department's instruction I called upon the Foreign Minister; outlined the contents of the Department's telegram; requested an early interview with the Caudillo; and suggested that the Minister be present at the interview.

I was today received by the Caudillo alone and laid before him the considerations contained in the Department's instruction. The Caudillo requested me to transmit his thanks to the President and stated that he agreed with the proposal and gave his personal assurances in regard to the three conditions laid down in the instruction.

In speaking of the matter Franco expressed the thought that aid through the Red Cross would probably not amount to anything very large in the way of quantity. I replied that I did not know just what the quantity would be but that I did not believe it would be negligible. The Caudillo then went on to speak of Spain's desperate economic condition, the disappointing cereal crops, Spain's inability to sell in many markets previously open to the country and finally referred to the deficiencies of the Spanish transportation system which made it difficult to get from one point to another within the country. He added that he supposed that if wheat came to Spain under this plan it would arrive in Vigo which was remote from the central, southern and eastern portions of Spain. I replied that the port of arrival of the wheat was a matter of detail to be worked out but that I thought it possible at least that shipment could also be arranged to Mediterranean and other ports.

I have taken occasion immediately to make known to the Foreign Minister in writing the substance of the above conversation. I desire respectfully to submit the following comments:

1. It is suggested that I be informed immediately of the date and quantity of the first wheat shipment from the United States, the quantity of wheat that will be supplied under the plan and to what ports the Red Cross contemplates shipping this grain and whether or not the wheat will be transported in American bottoms at the expense of the Red Cross.

2. I think it essential that negotiations for the desired credit to Spain should be begun at the earliest possible moment. Every effort should be made to avoid offending Spanish pride by unwittingly giving the appearance that Spain is being "bought off" by charity.

3. As regards the general question of Spanish pride and susceptibilities which made the situation here unique there is considerable doubt in my mind as to the advisability of the American Red Cross undertaking to supervise the handling and distribution of wheat

within Spain, although it would probably be advisable promptly to send a Red Cross representative to Madrid who would be in a position to make detailed representations to the Red Cross in the United States as to such quantities as may be necessary from time to time, the Spanish ports to which shipments should be despatched and otherwise remain in contact with the Spanish authorities.

4. Another matter which will require very careful handling is the question of publicity. This should in my opinion be directed deliberately toward strengthening the moderate elements of the present regime in Spain by sharing any resulting credit with these elements and to avoid giving any basis for Axis propaganda which might allege that Spain had been bought or influenced by humanitarian aid. It might be well in this connection to consider the possibility of laying the greatest emphasis on a gesture between the two heads of states and to play down correspondingly any suggestion of charity to a country which after all desires to believe that it is in a position to take care of its needs if normal credits were available.

5. I reiterate my previous observations that aid to Spain to be effective must be prompt and would urge that arrangements for the first shipment of grain to this country should be undertaken at once.

WEDDELL

852.48/746 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1940—3 p. m.

250. Your 542, October 8, 7 p. m. In view of the statements of General Franco mentioned in the second paragraph of your telegram under reference, the President has requested the American Red Cross to make arrangements at once for a shipment of wheat, or flour if preferred, to help meet immediate needs of the civilian population in Spain.

Various problems and questions of procedure involved in this undertaking are receiving serious consideration by the Red Cross in consultation with the Department, and are set forth herewith for your information and comment:

1. It may be preferable to ship flour rather than wheat since the flour can be distributed directly to the needy population for immediate consumption. Moreover, it may be possible to ship the flour in small sacks appropriately marked and thereby better control distribution, as well as obtain some assurance that publicity will be given to its origin. If wheat were shipped there might be reason to fear possible diversion, as well as lack of publicity.

2. The Red Cross will send one or more representatives to Madrid as soon as shipment is determined upon to cooperate with the Spanish Red Cross and governmental agencies in arrangements for distribution. The Red Cross does not contemplate handling distribution in Spain directly but does feel it essential that it be in a position to assure itself through its own representatives and in cooperation with local

representatives that whatever foodstuffs may be sent are given impartial distribution to persons in need in all parts of Spain. The Red Cross will be guided in its decision as to future shipments by the reports of its representatives in Spain, as well as by general political developments.

3. Shipment will be made by an American vessel to some port not in the combat area. If Vigo is unsatisfactory, it is suggested that consideration be given to Bilbao or Santander since American flag service is available to those ports.

4. A shipment of six to ten thousand tons of wheat or its equivalent in flour is contemplated at this time, depending upon tonnage of vessel available.

5. All costs of transportation to the port of discharge in Spain will be borne by the American Red Cross. The Spanish Government will extend necessary facilities and will bear all further costs in Spain.

6. The Department has been informed by the British Ambassador that his Government interposes no objection to this proposed shipment of foodstuffs to Spain by the American Red Cross and will not interfere with the ship en route to Spain.

It is proposed that the following statement shall be released simultaneously by the American Red Cross in Washington and by you in Madrid as soon as possible:

"The President of the United States, in view of the reports which have reached him of a serious shortage of food among the civilian population of Spain, and with the approval of the Spanish Government, has requested the American Red Cross to make arrangements for a shipment of flour (or wheat, as the case may be) to Spain to assist in meeting immediate needs. The President has approved the necessary expenditure for this purpose by the Red Cross from the funds made available under the Act of Congress approved June 26, 1940⁵⁰ for assistance to civilians rendered destitute by hostilities abroad. The flour will be shipped by an American flag vessel to a Spanish port outside of the combat zone in Europe, and will be distributed on an impartial basis to the needy civilian population in various parts of Spain. Representatives of the American Red Cross will proceed to Spain immediately to maintain direct contact with the interested Spanish organizations and to report upon the arrangements that may be made in the foregoing connection."

You are requested to inform General Franco of the foregoing, including the statement which it is proposed to make public, and to report the result by cable as soon as possible, together with any further recommendations that you may care to make.

At the same time you may inform General Franco that this Government is prepared to discuss the bases for extension of credits to Spain with the accredited representatives of the Spanish Government, having in mind the essential conditions to which we have already re-

⁵⁰ 54 Stat. 611.

ferred in our nos. 229 and 235. Reference is had in this connection to the possible developments in the Spanish situation described in your 543 of October 8, 8 p. m.³¹

HULL

852.48/749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 14, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received 11 : 25 p. m.]

550. Department's 250, October 12, 3 p. m. I today communicated to the Foreign Minister the appropriate portions of the telegram under acknowledgment and handed him a copy of the proposed statement to be released in Washington and Madrid. He said he would like to study this with the Caudillo and would promptly inform me. He indicated his desire that "the Chief of State" be substituted for "Spanish Government" in the first paragraph to rather emphasize that the arrangement resulted from initiatives of the two chief executives; and further that he would like a paragraph to be added indicating that credit negotiations between the two Governments were pending in order to forestall criticism of a seeming acceptance of charity by his Government, adding that the satisfaction of the Spanish people would nullify adverse comment when it was known that credit arrangements were in process of being concluded.

The Minister further indicated that Cadiz would be a better discharge port since need exists especially in Andalusia. He desires to consult with his ministerial colleagues before deciding whether wheat or flour is desired. He emphasized the necessity of quick action remarking that the next 30 days would be particularly difficult.

With regard to credits the Minister asked if information could not be promptly given concerning terms. I inquired if it was the intention of his Government to put their needs in a more exact and definite form. He said no and that the figure of 800,000 tons of cereal before the next crop in June (see my telegram No. 528, September 30, 11 p. m.) was the essential and pressing need. He added that there were other needs such as cotton, raw material and equipment and that he would be grateful to have something definite as to our ideas with regard to credits to cover these. I expect to see the Caudillo Wednesday.

WEDDELL

³¹ Not printed.

852.48/750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 16, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received October 17—5:10 a. m.]

553. Department's No. 250, October 12, 3 p. m. At his request I today called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Minister said he had examined the proposed statement to the press setting forth the arrangement for sending wheat or flour by the Red Cross and suggested the following as a substitute:

In accordance with the suggestion of the President of the United States the American Red Cross has offered to the Chief of the Spanish State the shipment to Spain of a cargo of wheat or flour to meet the most immediate needs of the civil population. President Roosevelt, aware of the foodstuffs difficulties of the Spanish people has authorized the Red Cross to make the necessary shipments from funds available for aiding foreign civilian populations. Representatives of the American Red Cross will visit Spain to maintain direct contact with the charitable interested Spanish organizations for its distribution.

The Minister said that the announcement of this gift of wheat would constitute "a political bombshell" in Spain and that the substitute form of press statement which he hoped would be agreeable to my Government had been approved by the Caudillo himself and was adapted to Spanish psychology. He said further that it would be given full publicity in the Spanish press. I promised to lay it immediately before the Department.

In my opinion the proposed substitute is unobjectionable and I recommend its acceptance. Following the arrival and in the course of distribution of the shipment I would make every effort to insure continuous and favorable publicity.

The Minister then added that as soon as the text of statement had been settled the Caudillo would be pleased immediately to receive me to discuss any further details that might arise. This, however, may be unnecessary.

With regard to Minister's previous suggestion concerning an announcement of pending negotiations for credits at this time he now feels that the appropriate time to make such an announcement would be when these have actually been begun. The Foreign Minister referred to the possibility that some credit could be arranged for gasoline and said that it would be most helpful if such gasoline as might become available to Spain through a credit arrangement could be transported in American tankers because of a shortage of available Spanish tanker tonnage. He concluded by again referring to the necessity for prompt action both as regards the initial wheat or flour shipment and the proposed credit negotiations.

I have also taken occasion today to see the Minister of Industry and Commerce who stated that the first shipment from the Red Cross might be either wheat or flour in the discretion of the American organization. If as was hoped there were subsequent shipments the Spanish Government would prefer to receive these in wheat since the milling by-product would be available for animal consumption, the wheat could be mixed with other cereals to increase the quantity of bread thus made available and employment would be given to Spanish mill labor. The Minister would greatly prefer that the first Red Cross shipment be made to the ports of either Echo or Huelva instead of to a northern Spanish port in view of the great existing need for flour in Andalusia.

The Minister of Industry and Commerce then referred to the question of initiating negotiations for a credit in the United States and said that he is very desirous of being informed of the total sum of credits which our Government can make available. He continued that only when the global sum is known can he intelligently allot its division covering the commodities, quantities and values to be encompassed within such credit. He further considered it essential that he be informed of the possible movement of the credit terms, form, interest and method of repayment which we would be prepared to consider as a basis for negotiation.

With regard to the foregoing I am inclined to recommend (1) that flour should be sent in the first shipment instead of wheat for the reasons set forth in the Department's telegram under reference; (2) that the Department inform me immediately of the basis upon which it would be prepared to begin negotiations for credits for a minimum of 600,000 tons of wheat and 200,000 tons of corn, that I be informed at the same time of the problems which we desire to place before the Spanish Government which should be discussed from the time that the negotiations begin.

As to further credits it is suggested that the Department now consider at least in a preliminary way the possibility of extending credits for other foodstuffs and necessary raw materials and equipment to aid the economic rehabilitation of Spain. These would of course be dependent upon the success of the arrangements for the first credits, the degree of reciprocity encountered with regard to our own problems and finally upon the evolution of the international political situation. An indication of the Department's views on this latter recommendation would be most valuable in the event the Minister of Industry and Commerce should press his request.

WEDDELL

852.00/9502 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 17, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received October 18—4: 45 a. m.]

561. My 557, October 17, 11 a. m.³² The first reaction in Spanish military and naval circles to the Cabinet changes which were reported in my telegram under [reference?] appears to be one of accepting the situation without undue excitement. These circles maintain that the change had been expected for some time; that the recent visit of Suñer to Rome and Berlin had placed the then Foreign Minister in an impossible position which he could not accept with any dignity. They hope that Franco will actually take into his own hands the Ministry of Gobernación with the result that Spanish foreign policy will continue unchanged and that Franco will become an even greater stabilizing influence in the situation.

In a conversation with a member of the Junta Política today my informant mentioned the fact that there had of course been bad blood between Suñer³³ and Beigbeder for some time and that the present change serves to clear up an unfortunate internal situation. He insisted that the new appointments represent no changes in Spanish foreign policy but that some change of personalities was indicated after Suñer's recent visits to the Axis capitals. With regard to Himmler's³⁴ visit which coincides with the sudden change in the Spanish Cabinet he insisted that the visit was in return for Mayalde's³⁵ to Berlin and that in any case Himmler was now on the down grade in Germany. He continued that the Caudillo could be depended upon to permit no variation in Spanish foreign policy and so far as the suddenness of the move was concerned simply shrugged his shoulders saying that this was a "casa de España". He spoke of the appointment of Carceller³⁶ to the Commerce Ministry as being of great value since this would give an added and sorely needed confidence in financial and business circles in Spain. He described Carceller as a realist and as one who knows the United States.

As regards opinion generally the man in the street has received the news with some apprehension and disgust since Suñer has not recently improved his highly unpopular position among the people generally. One hears the fear expressed that the move means Germany will take

³² Not printed.

³³ Serrano Suñer succeeded Beigbeder as Spanish Foreign Minister on October 16, 1940.

³⁴ Heinrich Himmler, head of the Nazi SS (Schutzstaffel) and Chief of the German Police.

³⁵ José Finat Escrivá de Romani (Conde de Mayalde), Spanish Director General of Security.

³⁶ Demetria Carceller Segura.

advantage of the new situation rapidly to increase its pressure upon Spain.

In a conversation with the British Ambassador this morning and in subsequent conversations with other members of the British Embassy recently engaged in commercial negotiations with the Spanish authorities I received the following impressions: (1) that the change in government had come as a complete surprise and a great shock to the British; (2) that they were fearful that the reaction in London would be severe and very unfavorable; (3) that the Ambassador while insisting that he did not believe that there was any imminent possibility of German military action in Spain, confessed the fear that the Cabinet reorganization might be the prelude to an increasing infiltration of German agents throughout all of the Spanish Ministries with the result that Spain might become "a second Rumania", and should this be accomplished, he added, "Germany could then wait until the apple was ripe and it would fall off into their mouths"; (4) as to British action in the face of this situation he felt that negotiations which had been taking place with a view to supplying certain Spanish requirements should not be broken off but should be suspended until such time as satisfactory assurances were received from the new Ministers with regard to the future direction of Spanish foreign policy. I learned this afternoon that the Spanish negotiators have in fact now been informed that the representative of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare who has been conducting the negotiations in Madrid will leave for Portugal probably tomorrow or the next day and remain there until the Embassy receives satisfactory assurances from the two new Ministers with regard to their intentions and plans in connection with Spanish foreign policy; (5) the British appeared to feel that there was at least an even chance that there would be no perceptible immediate change in Spanish foreign policy but that for the moment they would prefer to have the situation develop more clearly before deciding just what attitude they should adopt.

In a conversation with the Portuguese Ambassador he expressed to me the opinion that there was no immediate cause for alarm as regards any change in Spanish foreign policy. He put forward the personal opinion that the change might have some advantages since diplomatists could now deal with a Foreign Minister with authority and whose promises would not be sabotaged in the future by more powerful Ministers behind the scenes.

For my own part, I incline to favorable consideration that it is much wiser not to arrive at any hard and fast conclusions concerning the situation which will result from these Cabinet changes until the various elements are much clearer.

I am also inclined to believe for the time being at least that the reorganization may not be the forerunner of any immediate change in

the situation and that there is the possibility that, faced with the tremendous economic and food problems which now confront the Spanish Government, the new Ministers now responsible for meeting this situation may prove to be much more realistic than might have been expected under other circumstances.

It would appear that Suñer now has complete control of both Gobernación and Foreign Affairs in spite of Franco being ostensibly at the head of the Ministry of Gobernación. It is now reported that both the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture will be dismissed within the near future and replaced by supporters of Suñer.

As regards any military reaction to Suñer's sudden rise to power it may be that they will accept the situation for fear that open opposition might precipitate a crisis which might result in an immediate German invasion to keep the pro-Axis regime in power although the possibility of some sudden move by the generals [*Germans?*] cannot yet be entirely dismissed.

The new [Minister of?] Navigation and Commerce is well known as an able and astute . . . financier and businessman. It is possible that he may meet Spain's financial and economic difficulties in a much more realistic and sensible way than has been possible heretofore. It should be borne in mind however that Carceller accompanied Suñer on his recent visit to Rome and Berlin as "Economic Adviser".

With regard to my own recent conversations with the Spanish authorities concerning wheat and other Spanish necessities, I would recommend that preparations continue as heretofore to make available Red Cross flour for early shipment to Spain and that the Department continue to study the question of extending credits. For the next few days however I think it desirable that I do not discuss these matters further with the Spanish authorities until such time as they themselves raise the question. I could then talk over these matters as a whole with the Ministers concerned and if it seems desirable with the Caudillo himself. If events should develop in this way I would then be in a position to give the Department a more studied estimate of the probabilities in the Spanish situation which for the moment remain clouded.

WEDDELL

852.48/750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1940—3 p. m.

257. Your 553, October 16, 7 p. m. In view of the change in Foreign Ministers, please request an interview with the Caudillo and state

that in view of the wording of the legislation authorizing the President to distribute supplies for foreign civilian relief, this Government suggests the following statement in place of the statement submitted to you by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"In accordance with the suggestion of the President of the United States, the American Red Cross has offered to the chief of the Spanish State the shipment to Spain of a cargo of wheat or flour to meet the most immediate needs of the civilian population. President Roosevelt, aware of the foodstuffs difficulties of the Spanish people, has authorized the Red Cross to make the necessary shipment of supplies to be purchased with funds made available to him for foreign civilian relief. Representatives of the American Red Cross will visit Spain to cooperate with the Spanish Red Cross and other charitable interested Spanish organizations in the allocation and distribution of supplies."

You should make it very clear that this statement is predicated upon the assurances already given to you by General Franco and in no way supersedes or modifies the agreement which you originally reached orally with General Franco. The legislation adopted by the Congress authorizing the President to utilize funds from the appropriation of fifty million dollars for the purchase of supplies for foreign civilian relief makes obligatory supervision as to allocation and distribution by the President's agent, namely, the American Red Cross. The American Red Cross will make every effort to ship the supplies to such port as may be desired by the Spanish authorities, further information on this point to be telegraphed to you later.

HULL

852.48/750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1940—noon.

259. Department's 257, October 18, 3 p. m. In your anticipated conference with General Franco please make certain that it is understood that any agreement on the matters to be taken up will only be regarded as final after the Department has been afforded the opportunity of passing upon the information you will send it by telegram as to the nature of your conversation with General Franco.

Please also telegraph the Department your best judgment as to whether the commitments orally given to you will be carried out in view of the recent changes in the Spanish Government.

HULL

852.48/766 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 31, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received November 2—5:30 a. m.]

606. Department's 257, October 18, 3 p. m. I was only able to see the Foreign Minister today. He received me with marked cordiality and began a long statement by way of apology for not having received me before, that he had been surprised at my failure to call on him but that he had since learned that the mistake was entirely in his own Ministry on [one?] which he greatly regretted. I then told him chronologically of my efforts to enter into contact with him which gave the Government of the United States the opportunity to attack the conduct of affairs under his predecessor.

I said that while my visit was one of courtesy and I naturally wished to felicitate him on his appointment of which I had, of course, informed my Government at the same time I would be gratified if he could tell me whether his entry into his high office indicated any change in Spanish foreign policy.

He replied that in substance the change was slight but in method it was plausible that prior to his taking office the Spanish Government was practically speaking no more informed concerning the ideals and intentions of Germany and Italy than I was, that this was a situation that should not continue and for this reason he had even, prior to becoming Foreign Minister, initiated visits to Berlin and Rome where he had talked extensively with the Chiefs of State and their Foreign Ministers. Without defining it he said that he had made clear to two Governments concerned the exact situation in Spain and had equally received from them a full statement of their program and aims that as a result of this he could assure me of the political solidarity of it with Germany and Italy. He said also and I made him repeat it three times that there had been no pressure not even an insinuation on the part of either Hitler or Mussolini that Spain should enter the war! To this he added "and as you see we are completely tranquil". The Minister reiterated his intention so long as he was Foreign Minister to establish personal contacts with other governments and said that this applied not alone to the two countries mentioned above. He then spoke at length of the natural sympathy of his country for Germany and Italy and a corresponding lack of cordiality toward England and France in view of the aid which the two latter countries had given to the Republic in the civil war. He said that Spain for a long time had occupied a subordinate position in the family of nations in spite of the fact that it was a great country and that it was determined henceforward to have a voice in European affairs. He again referred to the

cordiality of relations with the Axis powers and I remarked that his friendship toward those powers and his personal dislike of Russia bore a certain resemblance of our attitude of sympathy toward Spain without special cordiality toward Germany, which he said he entirely understood.

I then told the Minister of the friendly atmosphere which prevailed in Washington toward Spain and reminded him that probably contrary to his preconceived notions our Government throughout the Spanish conflict had maintained a position of the most complete impartiality.

He said dryly that he was of course glad to learn that there was a friendly atmosphere and remarked that the Caudillo had expressed to him extreme surprise that certain shipments of wheat about which I had spoken had never come. I said that there was evidently a complete misunderstanding of the situation; that when I saw his predecessor I left with the understanding that I would submit to my Government a formula for publicity and intended immediately to advise him when a reply was received from Washington; that the day after, his predecessor was out of office; that since then, as he himself admitted, time had been lost through defects in his own office machinery since only today had I been able to see him. He [I?] said further that his personality was well known in the United States, as was his commanding voice in Spanish foreign affairs and that it was the natural desire of my Government to be fully informed of the existing situation and policy of this Government before it [apparent omission] also more deeply into Spanish needs; that the sending of wheat by the Red Cross had been suggested because that could be done at once without the necessity of conversations which would necessarily arise where credits were concerned.

I said that as a matter of fact I had brought with me a memorandum which I placed in his hands and in which I had set forth my Government's position and that he would perhaps like to consider it and then discuss the matter further with me. He said that he would immediately study this and would invite me to come for a further discussion.

I equally told him that, following this, my Government wished me again to see the Caudillo to receive his personal confirmation concerning the entire situation, to which he seemed to give assent.

While Suñer's rather general statements may be as much as can be expected from him under present circumstances, I will of course press for an early interview with the Caudillo so as to obtain as complete assurances as possible with regard to the future direction of Spanish foreign policy.

After a comprehensive study of the existing situation in Spain I am daily more convinced that aid to Spain on the part of the United States should be largely based on political rather than upon humanitarian or commercial considerations.

Provided that sufficient publicity can be obtained, aid from the United States at this time may well serve to strengthen Spain to resist German pressure either to enter war or to permit the passage of German troops to the extent that would be impossible in any other way.

I feel further that every month that Spain remains apart from the conflict is of genuine value and may have results unfavorable to the Axis which cannot now be foreseen.

Under these circumstances I would urge that preparations for the shipment of Red Cross wheat or flour to Spain be begun immediately so that its departure from the United States can be announced in the Spanish and American press immediately after my forthcoming conversation with Franco. As regards the question of further supplies, particularly of foodstuffs, we can point out that the actual realization of a program so important to the Spanish mind, particularly to the public, as the beautiful picture that a large program presents [apparent omission] maximum [apparent omission] I would recommend that we be prepared to discuss future supplies to Spain with more abandon than would be possible under normal circumstances with the realization that the greater part of such supplies may never reach this country.

The actual shipments to Spain should be limited to a point where such stocks can be built up leaving the hope always before them however of greater supplies in the future in the event that they remain outside the conflict. All aid could be canceled immediately should a drastic change in the situation occur. The British can be depended on to grant navicerts for only such supplies as are absolutely essential for current Spanish needs.

WEDDELL

852.48/766 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1940—5 p. m.

290. Your 606, October 31, 9 p. m. In view of the statements made to you by the new Foreign Minister with regard to the "political solidarity" of Spain with Germany and Italy, the Department considers it undesirable for you to make any renewed efforts for an interview with General Franco.

In view of the request which you have already made for an interview, however, should General Franco give you an audience, the Department desires you to make the following points clear:

1. Any food supplies which might be distributed for civilian relief in Spain by the American Red Cross would be purchased with funds pertaining to the United States Government and not to the Red Cross itself.

2. As the Spanish Government is aware, it is the policy of the Government of the United States to furnish all possible assistance to the British Government in its present struggle against aggression.

3. If the "political solidarity" with Germany and Italy referred to by the Foreign Minister in his conversation with you is to be interpreted as assistance to be given by Spain to Germany and Italy in their war against Great Britain such as naval bases, facilities, or any other kind of help, direct or indirect, it would manifestly be impossible for the Government of the United States to lend assistance to Spain through the expenditure of governmental funds, however meritorious under normal conditions the object for which such funds would be spent might be.

4. The suggestion for relief which was under consideration by this Government was premised upon the maintenance by Spain of an absolutely neutral attitude and this Government regrets to be drawn to the conclusion that the statements made to you by the Spanish Foreign Minister indicate very clearly that the Spanish Government under the new conditions which have arisen seems to have no intention of maintaining such an attitude.

For your confidential information, while the Department has given the fullest measure of consideration to the arguments which you advance in support of the taking of steps for the furnishing of relief to Spain, the points above mentioned would seem to furnish conclusive reason why this Government can no longer give favorable consideration to this proposal. Public opinion in the United States is almost unanimously opposed to the undertaking by the American Red Cross of such activities in Spain and likewise to the furnishing by the Government of the United States of the funds necessary for such purpose.

HULL

852.48/774 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 5, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

614. My 606, October 31, 8 [9] p. m. The Foreign Minister told me today that the matter of the gift of Red Cross wheat and flour to Spain had been discussed in the Council of Ministers and that the stipulations laid down in the Department's 250, October 12, 3 p. m. had been accepted; also that the text of the press release proposed by the Department in your 257, October 18, 3 p. m., was equally acceptable. He added that a written reply to the above would be sent to me shortly and further that the Caudillo would receive me within the

next day or so to repeat to me his previous personal assurances on this subject.

In these circumstances I repeat that recommendation made in my 606, October 31, is not impractical and urge that preparations for immediate shipment of Red Cross wheat or flour to Spain be expedited in order that public announcement may be made through the American and Spanish press immediately following my interview with the Caudillo in the event the Department considered his assurances acceptable.

WEDDELL

852.48/775 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 6, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received November 7—3: 15 a. m.]

619. Department's 290, November 5, 5 p. m. I regret exceedingly that I evidently did not make my meaning clear to the Department with regard to my recent interview with Serrano Suñer as reported in my 606, October 31, 9 p. m. I felt then and feel now that there has been no change in Spain's status of non-belligerency and that I received as satisfactory assurances as could be expected under the circumstances that no change in this status was to be anticipated.

I emphatically do not interpret Suñer's statements to mean that assistance such as naval bases or other direct assistance will be given by Spain to Germany and Italy against Great Britain.

I have been in constant but discreet contact with Sir Samuel Hoare³⁸ and he has repeatedly assured me that he feels that the British position in Spain can be most strengthened by assistance particularly in the way of foodstuffs from the United States. Furthermore the British Government has resumed negotiations designed to assist Spain in the hope that such help will prevent any radical change in Spain's present status, and this was decided upon after several conversations between the British Ambassador and Suñer.

In making my previous recommendations that foodstuffs be sent to Spain I have constantly kept in mind the fact that the policy of the United States Government is to furnish all possible assistance to Great Britain short of war. As far as regards the British position in Spain I believe that a supply of foodstuffs from us attended with sufficient publicity might well be the only factor which would prevent Spain from accepting Axis demands or promises and entering the war against Great Britain through sheer desperation. After being led to believe that such aid was forthcoming a blunt refusal at this

³⁸ British Ambassador in Spain.

time to consider Spanish needs might have the effect of forcing an immediate decision to act against Great Britain.

In view of all of the foregoing I respectfully request that the Department reconsider the matter and I reaffirm the recommendations submitted in my 606, October 31, 9 p. m.

I have an appointment to see Franco tomorrow but intend to be "ill" until such time as I receive the Department's instructions.

WEDDELL

852.48/775 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1940—6 p. m.

295. Your 619, November 6, 7 p. m. Your recommendations contained in your 606 and in your telegram under reference have been given the most careful and sympathetic consideration. After full reflection, the Department desires you to see General Franco at an early opportunity and to lay before him the following considerations:

1. The Government of the United States was preparing, with the assistance of the American Red Cross, to make available for impartial distribution to the civilian population in Spain certain quantities of food supplies and was also prepared to give further consideration to the question of credits for the Spanish Government for the purchase of raw materials in the United States. Recent developments apparently involving a change of policy on the part of the Spanish Government have made it necessary in the opinion of the Government of the United States to delay a final decision in this question.

2. As General Franco, the Department is confident, clearly understands, the sums to be expended in the purchase of food supplies to be sent to Spain for distribution by the American Red Cross in cooperation with the appropriate Spanish relief organizations are sums pertaining to the Government of the United States itself and appropriated by the Congress of the United States. They would not be funds of the American Red Cross itself. Under these conditions, public opinion in the United States would most positively disapprove the expenditure of these funds in the manner proposed unless it were assured that it is not the policy of the Spanish Government to facilitate the axis powers in their belligerent activities against Great Britain.

3. The policy of the United States, as it has been clearly and officially stated, is to furnish all possible assistance short of war to Great Britain in her defense against aggression. It would, consequently, be illogical and counter to the policy of the United States Government as well as to the desires of the overwhelming majority of the American people for the United States to render any assistance, even of a strictly humanitarian character, to Spain were Spain to assist Germany and Italy in their present hostilities against the British Empire.

4. The statements made to you by the Spanish Foreign Minister in your recent interview with him referred to "political solidarity" between Spain and the German and Italian Governments. Unless Gen-

eral Franco were to find it possible to make it publicly known that the policy of the Spanish Government not only does not envisage any change in the present neutral position of Spain, but also does not envisage any assistance to Germany and Italy in the war upon Great Britain, the Government of the United States could not justify the assistance which it had proposed to render to the Spanish people and to the Spanish Government.

5. Should your conversation with General Franco take such a course as to make it in your opinion desirable and expedient, you may also point out that if the Government of the United States undertakes to render assistance of the nature proposed and undertake an act of mercy to the Spanish people in their distress, it would, of course, be hoped and expected that the Spanish Government itself would undertake a policy of mercy in its attitude towards Spanish political prisoners and those Spanish political refugees who may have been returned to Spanish jurisdiction.

6. It would be desirable for you to make clear during the course of your interview with Franco that this Government is deeply interested in the renaissance and rehabilitation of Spain. It is confident that this objective cannot be attained if Spain now takes part in the present war since such participation would inevitably have a disastrous effect upon Spain both political and economic, and this effect likewise would result from any acquiescence by Spain in a breach of her neutrality by the axis powers. This Government believes that the policy pursued by the United States after the achievement of its own independence of strict non-involvement in the wars then raging in Europe and of being prepared even to defend its neutrality by armed force, was the only policy which made it possible for the United States to achieve its present world situation. It believes the similarity between the position of the United States at that time and the situation of Spain, now emerging from a prolonged and cruel civil war, is very great.

For your personal and confidential information, public opinion in the United States is very much exercised with regard to assistance by the American Red Cross so long as it would appear probable that Spain would undertake active assistance to Germany and Italy and so long as the Spanish Government was undertaking political executions of a character which profoundly shock American public opinion. While the Department fully recognizes the need of the Spanish people, it could not justify alleviating such need were Spain to give practical assistance, direct or indirect, to the axis powers. The only remedy for this situation would be a clear cut and public declaration of policy on the part of the present Spanish Government that it not only intends to remain neutral, but that it would not undertake any kind of assistance to Germany and Italy which would aid them in their war against the British Empire.

In the face of Serrano Suñer's positive assertion to you of the Spanish "political solidarity" with the axis powers and of the hostile attitude of Spain toward Great Britain, there must be some act of good

faith on the part of the Spanish Government to justify this Government in acting on the assumption that Spain will keep out of war and not directly or indirectly assist the axis powers. This Government would be severely censured and with full reason, if after, or at the time of, extending aid to Spain, German or other foreign troops or forces should cross, use or occupy Spanish territory, or if political executions should continue.

HULL

852.48/808

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government are in general agreement with a policy vis-à-vis Spain, recommended by His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, the principal features of which are that food should be sent now, as famine is imminent this month and might cause General Franco's Government to throw in its lot more entirely with the Axis; and that control should be fully retained over the programme of supply by the United States and British Governments. Specific recommendations are that the United States should at once send a wheat ship to Spain, and that His Majesty's Government should open discussions for the further supply of wheat and credits to Spain. His Majesty's Government believe that the delay in the execution of these proposals which would be involved by attempts to obtain further assurances of Spanish non-belligerency over and above those which have already been obtained from General Franco, Senor Suñer and the new Minister of Commerce would not be worth the extra value of any such further assurances. His Majesty's Government would however state in detail the assumptions upon which they are prepared to help. These assumptions are

- (a) The continued non-belligerency of Spain.
- (b) The removal of obstacles which now impede Anglo-Spanish trade.
- (c) A fairer attitude in the press and
- (d) A just treatment of British subjects in Spain.

As stated His Majesty's Government agree generally with this policy. They propose therefore to continue negotiations for facilitating supplies to Spain from the sterling area and from other countries on the basis of a definite programme. This will involve an increase of credits and His Majesty's Government are at present prepared to grant additional credits up to a limit of £2 millions by the end of March 1941. The rhythm of supply will be controlled in accordance

with the rationing policy which is already in force and which will effectively prevent the accumulation of stocks or an increase in Spain's war potential. This rhythm can be interrupted through the export licensing machinery and by the refusal of navicerts if there is evidence of any change in Spanish policy.

His Majesty's Government therefore venture to hope that the United States Government will decide upon the immediate despatch of a wheat ship and continue negotiations for an American loan to Spain for wheat and possibly for other commodities. If these loan proposals mature, one commodity in which it is to be presumed that the United States Government will be interested is cotton. His Majesty's Government would not be averse to seeing cotton excluded from those commodities which United States might supply under loan, for they would then allow Spain to buy cotton with sterling in Brazil which is extremely short of sterling. The Spanish Government have in fact asked urgently to be allowed to buy Brazilian cotton with sterling up to £100,000. His Majesty's Government propose to allow this: but they will not allow similar operations on a large scale if the United States Government wish to include cotton in any loan negotiations with Spain. His Majesty's Government would in any case like to keep closely in step with the United States Government in all questions of supply and credits to Spain.

The policy on which His Majesty's Government propose to embark with the hope of the collaboration of the United States Government may seem to the latter open to the objection that Spain sympathizes politically with the Totalitarian powers. This has of course always been the case, but His Majesty's Government cannot disregard the fact that General Franco has given assurances that there will be no change in Spain's policy of non-belligerency. His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid is convinced, and His Majesty's Government as stated above share his view, that if the United States were now to withdraw their offer of economic help there is a very serious risk that Spain will be driven into the arms of Germany and the British cause would greatly suffer. His Majesty's Government would regard it therefore as being entirely in accordance with the United States Government's policy of co-operating with Great Britain if the United States Government were, for their part, to take the action recommended above.

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1940.

852.48/808

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 11, 1940.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me on Saturday, November 9, and again on Monday, November 11.

Mr. Butler first took up the question of the attitude of the Government of the United States towards the Spanish Government, particularly with respect to the shipment of food supplies for civilian relief, and with regard to the granting of credits to the Spanish Government for the purchase of raw materials in the United States. The views of the British Government are set forth in detail in the *aide-mémoire* attached herewith.³⁹

I informed Mr. Butler that this Government had been in close touch with the American Ambassador in Madrid during the past few days in connection with this general subject and that after very full and careful consideration, final instructions in this regard had been sent to Ambassador Weddell. I told Mr. Butler that, as I believed he would realize, the funds which would be expended by this Government for the purchase of food supplies for civilian relief in Spain were funds of the United States Government itself and were not funds of the American Red Cross. I said that neither the Congress, which had appropriated these funds, nor American public opinion would countenance the utilization of these funds for grants to the Spanish Government unless positive assurance were had that the Spanish Government would not facilitate the war of the axis powers against Great Britain, nor acquiesce in the passage through Spain of German or Italian troops. I stated that if the Spanish Government were willing to give positive assurances in this sense, and let it be publicly known that such was the policy of the Spanish Government, this Government would be prepared to proceed with the plans which were already under consideration when Señor Serrano Suñer undertook his visits to Berlin and Rome and the apparent change in the policy of Spain came about. Mr. Butler seemed to comprehend the reasons for this attitude on the part of this Government.

852.48/779 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 12, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

636. Department's 295, November 9 [8], 1 [6] p. m. I called last night on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked him to arrange

³⁹ *Supra.*

an interview for me with the Chief of State which he said he would do.

I told the Minister that the object of my visit was to lay before the Caudillo certain statements and observations of my Government with further reference to the question of supplying foodstuffs and making credits available to Spain. I also informed him of the essential portions of the Department's telegram under reference and left with him a memorandum closely paraphrasing in Spanish the various points laid down therein.

In the subsequent conversation I referred to his previous remark concerning the "political solidarity" of Spain with the Axis stating that I did not quite understand what it meant. He replied that he could best illustrate by pointing to the attitude of the United States with relation to Great Britain, that Spain's situation vis-à-vis the Axis was almost identical with this but with the difference that Spain had nothing to give to the Axis while the United States could do everything for Great Britain. He added that the Axis had helped Spain at a critical time in the time [*sic*] of the country and that it would be disloyal not to recognize this.

I interrupted the Minister here to ask the bold question whether if German or Italian troops crossed the frontier or otherwise violated Spanish neutrality this would be resisted by force. He answered that Spain would fight to the last man. I then stated that my Government laid great stress on this point and that it felt in fact that it could not justify the extension of aid to Spain before American public opinion unless it were in a position to reassure this opinion through some public utterance of the Generalissimo that it was definitely not the intention of Spain to facilitate the belligerent activities of the Axis Powers against Great Britain. Although however startling, I did not find strong opposition in the mind of the Foreign Minister to this suggestion and am inclined to think that the Spanish political and economic situation has reached a degree of gravity such that this proposal which might normally be expected at least to evoke some expression of surprise and opposition is now apparently taken calmly and deemed worthy of deliberation.

I said in conclusion that the Minister would doubtless wish to study the memorandum in detail and repeated my request that as soon as convenient an interview with the Chief of State be arranged.

The impression left on me by the Minister's remarks was that "political solidarity" with the Axis under present circumstances is a matter of sentiment and ideologies and hardly translatable into actual aid.

WEDDELL

852.48/781 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 17, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received November 18—2:05 a. m.]

652. My 636, November 12, 4 p. m. Just before leaving for France with the Foreign Minister (and without disclosing that proposed visit) the Chief of Protocol volunteered the information that my request of November 11 for an interview with the Chief of State was being handled exclusively by the Minister himself. It accordingly appears likely that the proposed interview must await the return of the latter, and I shall not, therefore, attempt meanwhile to press the matter with the Foreign Office.

However, I learn indirectly that the subject matter of my contemplated conference with Franco is being discussed in ministerial circles but that the requirement of a public declaration of Spain's intention not to give aid to the Axis Powers is regarded as an almost insuperable stumbling block since such a declaration would in all likelihood provoke a situation with Germany which the Spanish Government would have infinite difficulty in meeting.

WEDDELL

852.48/782 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 17, 1940—11 p. m.

[Received November 18—7:50 a. m.]

654. The Naval Attaché⁴⁰ informs me that he has just been told by the chief of the Spanish Merchant Marine Shipping Board that he has been ordered by the Minister of Industry and Commerce to hold in readiness one-half of his tramp tonnage or approximately 350,000 tons of shipping to be sent to a destination to be indicated later for the purpose of bringing wheat to Spain of a total tonnage of 450 tons which will be supplied by Germany.

The British Chargé d'Affaires tells me that he has been informed that such an offer has been made. However, I share the Naval Attaché's entire skepticism as to the feasibility of effective deliveries.

The subject appears to be of interest as indicating the efforts which Germany is now making to offset any offers of foodstuffs which might be made to Spain by any other Governments.

WEDDELL

⁴⁰ Commander Ben H. Wyatt.

852.48/809

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1940.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me this morning.

Mr. Butler first referred again to the situation in Spain. He read to me two telegrams which had been sent by the British Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid to the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, now in Lisbon, stating, first, that there was a strong movement in the Spanish Army against Señor Serrano Suñer and the policies which he is advocating which threaten the involvement of Spain in the war, and, second, that the Minister of Commerce had stated that the Spanish Government could not make a public statement of neutrality in opposition to the Axis powers as compensation for food supplies from the United States. The British Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid further stated that the Germans had offered to send to Spain 450 tons of wheat and insisted that the Spanish Government might be forced into the arms of Germany unless food supplies were speedily sent from the United States.

Mr. Butler then read to me an instruction from his own Foreign Office urging that this question again be brought to the attention of the Government of the United States and emphasizing the belief of the British Government that the possible control by Germany of Iberian ports and of the Iberian Islands in the Atlantic would be so prejudicial to the interests of the United States as to make it desirable for the United States to give favorable consideration to the reiterated request of the British Government that the United States withdraw from the position it had taken by demanding some public statement of policy from the Spanish Government prior to the dispatch of food supplies for the civilian population in Spain and to the consideration of credits for food and other raw materials.

I told Mr. Butler that I would lay his representations before the President. I said, however, that the policy adopted by this Government, as he already knew, has been taken after very full consideration and that I doubted if there would be any action taken here until Ambassador Weddell had been afforded the opportunity, already requested, of discussing the whole issue personally with General Franco.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

852.48/783 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 19, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received November 20—5 a. m.]

661. Department's 295, November 8, 6 p. m. This morning and at their request I had an interview with the Minister of Industry and Commerce and Gamero del Castillo, Minister without Portfolio.

The former Minister who was the principal speaker seemed to be informed of the essentials of my remarks to Suñer as reported in my No. 636 of November 12, 4 p. m., and our conversation followed its general lines. The Minister said that it was an error to suppose that Spain saw eye to eye with the Axis Powers in all respects, that some of its ambitions were contrary to theirs, pointing out that his own appointment was a proof of Spain's independence of action since his economic views were generally known not to be rigidly totalitarian. Moreover in the case of Gibraltar Spain would not under any circumstances permit it to fall into the hands of either Italy or Germany. He also cited the recent occupation of Tangier as further illustrative of this attitude.

With regard to Spain's food and credit needs both Ministers were explicit in their declarations that with Germany at the frontier crouched ready to spring the requirement of a public declaration of Spain's intention not to render aid to the Axis Powers could not possibly be accepted.

After briefly restating our point of view I reemphasized that unlike Spain the American Government had a public opinion to consider, that under my instructions I must limit my statements to a petition, the stipulations of which they were aware and that in the circumstances I could only await my anticipated interview with the Chief of State and receive from his lips a declaration of his Government's views and policies. In reply to a query Castillo said the Caudillo was informed of my Government's views as set forth to Suñer and was not "contento".

Neither Minister could be drawn concerning Suñer's present visit to France and Germany.

Reviewing this whole question in the light of the foregoing and of previous facts made known to the Department my consideration of the subject of relief to Spain boils down to the following:

1. Spain's interior condition from every standpoint, grows daily worse, and a crisis cannot long be postponed unless relief is promptly promised and at least partly realized.

2. Should the anticipated crisis arise the present Government would be hard put to it to maintain itself and in event of failure or danger of collapse German troops could be expected to come to "rescue" the country.

3. Spain on the other hand dares not make a public declaration of policy along the lines demanded by us for to do so would be equivalent to inviting German intervention. I believe that it might still be possible to secure personal and private assurances by the Caudillo along the lines of the public declaration demanded plus an official undertaking by the Spanish Government to fulfill the three conditions laid down in the Department's 243, October 4, 6 p. m.

5. [*sic*] Might not American public opinion be satisfied if publicity were given this latter undertaking supplemented by a statement from the Department indicating that British attitude and the steps to be taken to prevent supplies from reaching the Axis Powers? Emphasis could be laid on the humanitarian aspect of the matter and the fact that the shipments could be terminated at any time.

6. Failing relief along the lines suggested I anticipate a situation approaching chaos; a situation which Britain is bending every effort to prevent. Withholding relief therefore might easily defeat our Government's avowed purpose of extending all possible aid to Great Britain.

7. I venture again to emphasize the necessity of prompt action in the matter. Suñer is expected here at the end of this week and my interview with the Caudillo can scarcely be delayed much thereafter.

WEDDELL

852.48/783 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1940—7 p. m.

313. Your 661, November 19, 8 p. m. By the personal direction of the President you are authorized in your conference with General Franco to modify the position previously taken by this Government to the extent indicated in your recommendation number 3. In view of existing conditions the President believes that specific and formal assurances to you must be obtained from General Franco but that because of the position in Spain, a public statement need not be insisted upon. You may, however, make it clear that any public indication by the Spanish Government of a continuation of its present policy of neutrality would have the most beneficial effect upon public opinion in the United States and would make it much easier for this Government to undertake the relief measures which have been under consideration.

WELLES

852.48/785 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 20, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received November 20—9:37 a. m.]

3803. I saw Lord Halifax⁴¹ for a few minutes yesterday afternoon and he mentioned the condition of starvation in Spain which he regards with great anxiety due to its direct bearing on Spanish relations with the Axis Powers. He referred to a telegram which he had just sent to Washington instructing the British Chargé d'Affaires to express the hope to the Department that we would not insist on General Franco's making a public declaration of non-belligerency as a condition for receiving food supplies from the United States. Lord Halifax said that it was quite impossible for General Franco to make such a declaration and that the situation in Spain was so critical that he hoped our point of view might be modified. When I called to see Mr. Strang⁴² at the Foreign Office this afternoon he showed me this telegram as well as previous telegrams from the British Ambassador at Madrid and one from Lord Lothian to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Washington all of which I understand have been repeated to Mr. Butler for communication to the Department.

While I am aware of no facts in this connection not known to the Department I feel that I should report the foregoing in view of the very great importance which Lord Halifax attaches to an immediate alleviation of the Spanish food situation.⁴³

JOHNSON

852.48/793 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 29, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received November 30—5:15 a. m.]

687. I had this noon a 2-hour audience with the Chief of State in an atmosphere on Franco's part of great cordiality, almost approaching warmth. In the course of the conversation I informed him that the Government of the United States was profoundly interested in the economic rehabilitation of Spain and fully recognized its pres-

⁴¹ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴² William Strang, British Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴³ In a message of November 23, 1940, to President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill wrote: "Our accounts show that the situation in Spain is deteriorating and that the Peninsula is not far from starvation point. An offer by you to dole out food month by month so long as they keep out of the war might be decisive." (852.48/11-2340. Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.)

ent difficulties. However, in view of recent events *inter alia* the exchange of visits between Spanish and German statesmen my Government felt that it was necessary for Spain to clarify its attitude concerning aid to the Axis Powers in order that the American Government might be in a position to justify itself to American public opinion before proceeding with its original intention of placing at the disposition of Spain through the American Red Cross certain quantities of wheat or undertaking to consider the possibility of the extension of credits for the purchase of raw materials in the United States.

To this Franco replied that Serrano Suñer's first visit to Germany was made with a view to exchanging opinions and impressions along many lines including Africa; however he gave no indication of the content of the discussions. He stated that he had been invited by Hitler as a result of Suñer's visit to meet Hitler at the frontier where discussion was continued between the two Chiefs of State.

Inquiry as to the reason for Suñer's second visit the Caudillo said that conversations had been along general lines and with a special view to clearing up statements made to the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin by Ribbentrop⁴⁴ which conflicted with those made to their Ambassador in Paris by Laval.⁴⁵ I asked the flat question whether Spain had signed the Three Power Pact.⁴⁶ He said it had not; that it was not a pact which affected Spain. He also remarked that he looked on the Three Power Pact as a pact of peace.

I then gave him the background of our Government's present attitude and especially of our [aim?] and intention to aid Great Britain in the present war, which made it essential that we justify to our public, which was something to be reckoned with in a democracy, any help which we might give to Spain.

Franco remarked that America's foreign policy seemed to be based on the belief that Great Britain would win the war, while in Spain they thought otherwise; he later modified this viewpoint by suggesting that it would probably be a drawn battle.

With regard to relations between Spain and the Axis Powers Franco emphasized the gratitude and loyalty which Spain naturally felt to the two countries which had helped it overthrow the Red regime. He then went on to point out the fact that Germany had some 250 idle divisions a considerable number of which he said were on the Spanish frontier "through no fault of Spain" and concluded by saying "no one can foretell the future".

⁴⁴ Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁵ Pierre Laval, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers.

⁴⁶ German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact, signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, p. 165.

He then turned to the general question of help from the United States emphasizing its complexities. I remarked that admitting its complexities I felt that between the two Chiefs of State a formula might be worked out to meet the situation especially when a personal and private guarantee was an essential point. To this he remarked textually "it would be quite impossible for me to attempt to deceive such a man as President Roosevelt".

I then asked Franco whether I might inform my Government that:

(1) Spain does not envisage (which latter word I translated slowly and repeated conspicuously as "contemplar" and "preverse") any departure from its present international attitude.

(2) Nor does it contemplate any aid to the Axis Powers.

To the foregoing he assented but immediately thereafter he repeated an observation made on a previous occasion that Spain could not help the Axis Powers if it wished and that no one could foresee what the future might bring forth.

I then told him that his statement would be faithfully submitted to my Government for its information and important interest.

The impression left on me by Franco's remarks is that he is keenly alive to the difficulties now facing his Government and that this view is shared by Suñer. Equally I feel that while he has weakened in his original belief in German victory as has Suñer that he has a real fear of what might happen to Spain through German action. I further feel that nothing more specific than the foregoing can be obtained from Franco; that it meets the Department's conditions; and I therefore urge that the Department accept it as adequate.

I now propose to call on the Foreign Minister to inform him of the substance of my conversation with the Caudillo. I shall inquire whether the Minister will undertake to give the formal assurances of exports distribution as set forth in the Department's 243, October 4, 6 p. m., and if possible I shall also ask him to approve the text of the proposed announcement as contained in the Department's telegram of October 18, 3 p. m., number 257. I shall make it clear that nothing is yet definite but must await word from Washington.

WEDDELL

852.48/795 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 2, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received December 3—2 a. m.]

693. I called on the Foreign Minister this morning and informed him of my interview with the Chief of State, details of which I said had been communicated to my Government. I also handed him a note

setting forth the conditions under which my Government was disposed to send a shipment or shipments of wheat through the Red Cross together with the text of the proposed press statement.

The Minister, who seemed a changed man from my last interview, spoke with deep gravity of the desperate situation in which Spain finds itself and the necessity for prompt aid in the form of wheat in substantial quantities. He seemed to feel that any Red Cross wheat that might be made available would hardly touch Spain's vital needs until the next harvest which needs, he said, approximated a million tons.

I pointed out that wheat through the Red Cross represented a gift and that a shipment or shipments in this form could be made through executive action while credits for wheat and raw materials necessarily required negotiation. The Minister remarked that negotiations consumed time. To which I could only reply that that depended on the negotiators, at the same time assuring him with the statements made to me by the Caudillo which were now before my Government plus his response accepting the several conditions laid down in the matter of wheat through the Red Cross. The question would be promptly studied in Washington and I felt that no undue delay need be anticipated. I asked if he did not think that the mere fact of beginning negotiations would be a helpful thing to which he said very emphatically—"Only provided relief comes".

The Minister who said that I would have a formal reply to my communication tonight indicated that our conditions would be met and again emphasized the necessity of prompt action.

It is confirmed to me that this morning certainly one bakery in Madrid and probably another were held up by armed men. The British Ambassador informs me that he has reports of bread riots in Zamora. I therefore venture to emphasize the humanitarian aspect of this general question.

The British Ambassador whom I have informed of the general progress of the above negotiations said that there was a certain quantity of wheat in Canada amounting to over 100,000 tons which might be made promptly available to the Spanish Government if this were desired. I asked him if this might be paid for out of the sterling agreement formally signed this morning (see my 694, December 2, 2 p. m.⁴⁷). He replied in the negative adding that Spain was practically already overdrawn under that agreement. My interpretation of this is that it is British policy to continue to subsidize the Spanish Government so long as it can hold it neutral, something which the Ambassador remarked the British General Staff considers of highest importance.

WEDDELL

⁴⁷ Not printed.

852.48/796 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 3, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received 1:06 p. m.]

697. My telegram No. 693, December 2, 1 p. m. I have just received the following communication dated yesterday from the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"My Dear Ambassador: I have received your kind letter of today's date concerning shipments of wheat or flour for the civil population of our country and, in accord with the same, I have great pleasure in indicating to Your Excellency that the Spanish Government is in agreement with the three points contained in it, as well as with the draft of the press release which accompanies it.

I reiterate to Your Excellency my gratitude for the cordial good will of your intervention in this matter and request you to transmit that of the Chief of State and Government of Spain to the President of the United States of America.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the expression of my high consideration and my personal friendship."

WEDDELL

852.48/797 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 3, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

698. My 697, December 3, 11 a. m. In the hope and on the assumption that the private and personal assurances of the Chief of State and the formal declarations of the Minister for Foreign Affairs are satisfactory, I venture to submit the following observations and suggestions for the Department's consideration:

(1) As has been emphasized, the general economic and especially the food situation in Spain is critical, with a worsening tendency. Therefore the necessity for prompt action becomes more and more pressing.

(2) For the distribution of wheat or flour here it will probably become necessary to have office space for the Red Cross representatives. It is physically impossible to provide this space in the Embassy, but it is thought that space can be easily obtained at a moderate price in the immediate neighborhood, perhaps across the street. Will the Department please instruct.

(3) Confidentially, while the Spanish Red Cross is of high standing it is believed that the Spanish Government will favor and prefer collaboration between our representatives and its Auxilio Social which latter is represented in practically every village and town in the country.

(4) Early publication of the press release concerning the Red Cross wheat of which the text was proposed by the Department and agreed to by the Spanish Government should help to curb growing discontent springing from hunger. Telegraphic instructions indicating the Department's desires as to the date and hour of release are therefore requested.

(5) Equally helpful in the above sense would be the announcement that negotiations between the two Governments for credits were soon to begin.

(6) The present Spanish Government has conducted all commercial agreements negotiations in Madrid. To avoid misunderstandings and delays I should be grateful to receive the Department's views as to where these negotiations are to take place so that I can inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs and in the event the Department desires that they be conducted in Washington to urge the immediate nomination of the Spanish negotiators. On the other hand if they are to be conducted in Madrid it is suggested that I be informed whether it is the intention of the Department to send experts and additional clerical staff to collaborate with the Embassy.

WEDDELL

852.48/799 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 3, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received December 4—6:05 a. m.]

700. My No. 697, December 3, 11 a. m. The British Ambassador tells me that in an agreeable conversation today with the Foreign Minister the latter advised him of the acceptance by his Government of our various conditions relating to wheat and credit negotiations and then emphasized to him the gravity of the situation as regards wheat needs.

The Ambassador says he told the Minister that it was the desire of his Government to make its policy with Spain harmonize with that of the United States even if it did not follow identical lines and that in this desire they were prepared to negotiate a further loan which for the present the Ambassador added to me would probably not exceed 2,000,000 pounds, to be spread over the next few months. He also informed the Foreign Minister that there was approximately 100,000 tons of Canadian wheat available but that Spanish vessels must be provided for its transportation. Help in the above ways was to be conditioned on adequate publicity and a cessation in press attacks on Great Britain.

The Ambassador tells me he was struck with the complete change in attitude of the Foreign Minister from his previous interview a few days ago.

The Ambassador has already placed the foregoing before his Government and anticipates instructions permitting him to begin negotiations at once.

WEDDELL

711.52/152a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1940—7 p. m.

339. The Department has observed in recent weeks increasing manifestations of hostility on the part of Spain toward the United States, which have been coupled with the apparent development of a propaganda campaign against this country operating principally through the Spanish Falange organizations in Spanish-speaking countries of America.⁴⁸

Among the indications of such a development there may be cited:

1. The increasingly hostile attitude of the Spanish press toward the United States in recent months, manifested notably on the occasion of the Pan American conference at Habana last July, in connection with the observance of the "Día de la Raza" last October, and within the past few weeks in connection with the alleged cession of land for a naval base by Uruguay to the United States. This attitude is indicated by such statements as that appearing in the Madrid newspaper *El Alcazar* of November 19 that "the problems and interests of South America can in no sense be foreign to us . . .⁴⁹ we must place opposite the Monroe Doctrine, which was proclaimed in a moral climate far removed from the present, the doctrine of the unity of that Hispanic world." Since the Spanish press is completely controlled by the Government this attitude suggests official approval if not actual inspiration.

2. The statement of Serrano Suñer in a press interview given before his departure for Berlin in September, in which he is quoted by the German and Spanish press as asserting that "there must not be ignored our will to project into Spanish-America a moral influence and to restore the prestige of Spanish culture in the face of the usurpation which another culture has perpetrated . . .⁴⁹ In this sense our claims are also for America, to defend the rights of those sister nations."

3. The message broadcast on November 20 by Eugenio Montes, National Councilor of the Falange, addressed to the intellectuals of Spanish-America, sharply attacking the alleged imperialist designs of the United States in South America and referring to the certain danger to Spanish America from the "Monroeist continent."

4. The creation on November 7 of the "Consejo de Hispanicismo" in Madrid, under the exclusive control of Serrano Suñer, which is apparently intended to centralize direction of Spanish propaganda activities in Spanish-speaking nations of this hemisphere. It is noted that the introduction to the Decree published in the *Boletín Oficial* states that the purpose of this Council is to carry on "the glorious work of the Council of the Indies."

5. The recent action of the Spanish Government, through certain of its diplomatic representatives in the other American Republics, of congratulating other American Governments on their refusal to acquiesce in the imperialist designs of the United States.

⁴⁸ On December 2, Under Secretary of State Welles in a conversation with the Spanish Ambassador had called his attention to these activities which made it difficult for the United States to extend aid to Spain (852.48/798½).

⁴⁹ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

Aside from the foregoing indications of an attitude of official hostility toward the United States on the part of the Spanish Government, we have recently noted a number of instances in which Falangist agents have been appointed to important posts in the other American Republics and the Philippines in diplomatic and consular capacities. It is recalled in this connection that upon taking office as Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 17 Serrano Suñer stated, according to the Spanish press, that "the Falange abroad, whose defects I know and undertake to correct, from now on will be an element to consider in the diplomatic life of Spain." The subsequent appointment of José del Castaño to be Consul General of Spain at Manila and other similar appointments elsewhere seems to indicate the initiation of a definite policy in this respect. A recent press despatch from Madrid reported that the Spanish Government was preparing to require all diplomatic and consular representatives abroad to submit detailed personal biographical reports, with a view to the assignment of new representatives who are active members of the Falange.

You are directed to bring to the attention of the Foreign Office the fact that this Government is deeply concerned over the foregoing developments which appear to indicate an increasing attitude of hostility toward the United States on the part of the Government of Spain. At the same time you may point out that our own attitude has always been one of understanding and approval of the efforts of other nations to promote closer ties of friendship and peaceful relations with all countries. It may be observed, for example, that in its relations with the other nations of this hemisphere, this Government has acted upon the policy that friendly cooperation in all spheres of mutual interest between nations in all parts of the world redounds to the benefit of all. The same attitude has been clearly manifested by all the American Republics, as shown in the acts and resolutions adopted by all of the recent Pan American Conferences.

For your confidential information, we are particularly concerned by the indications we have received of German interest and collaboration in a campaign of propaganda directed against the United States in Spanish-speaking countries of America operating through the Spanish Falange and its organizations in those countries. One indication of such a development has been received recently from an authoritative and reliable source in Berlin to the effect that a definite agreement was reached during German-Spanish negotiations in November that Spain will conduct an intensive propaganda campaign against the influence of the United States in Spanish-speaking America and will endeavor to promote Spanish influence and sympathy for the Axis. Recent comments in the German press have tended to support the foregoing information. At the same time, our

Embassy at Rome reports that the Italian press is giving increased space to alleged anti-American developments in Spanish America, that American correspondents are not permitted to cable comments on the Italian attitude toward Spanish America, and that at a recent press conference an official statement was made to correspondents that "Fascism is now an article for export."

HULL

852.48/814 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 12, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

718. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. The Department's telegrams 338, December 10, 1 p. m.⁵⁰ and 339, December 10, 7 p. m., are causing me deep concern.

If am correct in interpreting these as a growing reluctance or a present unwillingness to give relief to Spain, relief which would at once achieve a humanitarian work and be in harmony with our avowed intention to assist Great Britain and thus aid the general cause, it becomes clear that the efforts of this Mission over past months to bring about an arrangement which it had believed was desired by the Department have gone for naught.

Furthermore, the Department's telegram 243, October 4, 6 p. m., penultimate paragraph, and 313 of November 20, 7 p. m., made this a personal matter between Franco and the President himself. It was so presented to the Foreign Office and to the Caudillo and the latter's assurances were given to me on this direct personal basis. See my 542, October 8, 7 p. m., second paragraph, and my 550, October 14, 9 p. m., first paragraph.

The personality of our President is thus seen to be involved.

WEDDELL

852.48/814 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1940—5 p. m.

346. Your 718, December 12, 1 p. m. This matter is being given every attention. The emergency arrangements for shipments by the Red Cross are awaiting a public announcement on the part of the British Government as to their action on British food shipments to Spain. It is contemplated that canned milk for children will be included in first Red Cross shipments. We would like your comment on this plan.

⁵⁰ Telegram No. 338 not printed.

We are cabling further regarding developments on credit question upon the President's return to Washington.

HULL

852.48/821 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 19, 1940—noon.

[Received 5:27 p. m.]

734. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Department's 346, December 14, 5 p. m. My concern over the situation here increases daily and I venture again to urge prompt action in the matter of emergency shipments by the Red Cross to meet urgent needs of the civilian population.

As I have endeavored to emphasize before, I consider that the personality of the President is now involved. Since the Spanish Chief of State and his Government have met our conditions, I am further of the opinion that for us to hold up our own promised humanitarian aid until Great Britain makes public announcement of its intention to grant commercial credits, et cetera, injects an entirely new element and condition into the subject.

WEDDELL

852.48/814 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1940—7 p. m.

350. Department's 346, December 14, 5 p. m., and your 723, December 13, 5 p. m.⁵¹ As soon as public announcement is made by the British Government of its arrangements for shipment of wheat to Spain from Canada and Argentina, we are ready to go ahead with the first of two or three shipments of foodstuffs to Spain through the American Red Cross, to be paid for out of the fifty million dollar appropriation for foreign civilian relief.

This action will be taken on the basis of the following three points, with which the Spanish Government has officially stated that it is in agreement (Your telegram 697, December 3, 11 a. m.):

1. No wheat from any source is being or will be exported from Spain;

2. The American Red Cross will be permitted, in cooperation with the Spanish Red Cross or such other Spanish organization as the American Red Cross may designate, to supervise and handle the arrangements for distribution of this wheat to the needy population of Spain;

⁵¹ Latter not printed.

3. The Spanish press will be informed and permitted to give full publicity to these shipments of wheat from the United States, including details regarding the arrangements that may be made for distribution in Spain.

On the basis of these assurances the American Red Cross will make public the following statement:

"In accordance with the suggestion of the President of the United States, the American Red Cross has agreed to undertake, on certain conditions, the shipment to Spain of a cargo of wheat or flour to meet the most immediate needs of the civilian population. President Roosevelt, aware of the foodstuffs difficulties of the Spanish people, has authorized the Red Cross to make the necessary shipment of supplies to be purchased with funds made available to him for foreign civilian relief. Representatives of the American Red Cross will visit Spain to cooperate with the Spanish Red Cross and other charitable interested Spanish organizations in the allocation and distribution of supplies."

It will be observed that a slight change has been made in the first sentence of the foregoing statement in order to conform with the general practice of the Red Cross in undertaking foreign relief shipments. Please ascertain and report at once whether this statement as now drafted is agreeable to the Spanish Government.

In addition to the foregoing statement by the Red Cross, the President has approved the following message which you are authorized to convey to the Chief of the Spanish State as soon as the statement is released by the Red Cross:

"The President of the United States has authorized, in view of the statements of policy made by the Chief of State of Spain to the American Ambassador at Madrid on November 29, 1940, that United States Government funds be made available to permit immediate shipments of wheat or flour to Spain through the American Red Cross."

You will be informed in advance of the date and time of release of the statement by the Red Cross at Washington, in order that you may arrange for its simultaneous release in Madrid. The message from the President to General Franco should be transmitted at the same time.

The Red Cross plans to ship either whole wheat flour or white flour and also, as indicated in our no. 346, powdered and condensed milk for children and possibly some medical supplies. Please ascertain and report as soon as possible whether whole wheat or white flour is preferred, and whether Spanish authorities have any objection to proposed shipment of powdered and condensed milk or medical supplies.

The possibility of initiating negotiations for the extension of credits by agencies of this Government to Spain in order to make possible the purchase of surplus commodities in the United States has been discussed with the President. It is believed that such negotiations may

be initiated upon the basis that they would cover the attitude and intentions of the Spanish Government on the following points in which we have a vital interest:

(1) That Spain intends to remain outside of the present war and does not contemplate extension of aid to the Axis powers.

(2) Formal recognition by the Spanish Government of the validity of the claims of private American creditors for payment of blocked accounts owing to them in Spain.

(3) Fair and non-discriminatory treatment of private American citizens in Spain and of American firms doing business with Spain, in accordance with the most-favored-nation principle.

(4) Cessation of the press attacks and other manifestations of hostility toward this country in Spain and through Spanish sources in the Spanish-speaking countries of this Hemisphere.

It would also be made entirely clear throughout the negotiations that the continuance of any credits would be dependent not only upon the continued non-participation by Spain in the present conflict but also upon a faithful compliance with the other conditions agreed upon. The delivery of commodities would be allocated on a basis of monthly minimum shipments in accordance with demonstrated Spanish needs.

For your confidential information, it is proposed to make the following announcement in the event that credit negotiations are initiated on the basis already outlined, in order that the American public may be accurately informed of the facts upon which such action is based:

"The Spanish Government is very desirous of purchasing American surplus commodities for her economic rebuilding and has asked for time in which to make payments. This would probably include some Spanish commodities which we would desire. The Government of the United States is naturally interested in the mutually desirable improvement and development of commercial relations between the United States and Spain, and in the peaceful economic reconstruction of Spain. This Government feels that these objectives can only be achieved if Spain remains outside of the European conflict. Accordingly, the Government of the United States, in a spirit of cooperation with Spanish efforts for the furtherance of such peaceful economic reconstruction, has indicated that the appropriate governmental agencies are prepared to explore the possibility of an early initiation of discussions with representatives of the Spanish Government with a view to the extension of conditional, limited credits for the purchase of such surplus commodities as wheat, corn and cotton."

HULL

852.48/822 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 20, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received December 21—10:10 p. m.]

737. Department's No. 350, December 19, 7 p. m. The present delay in the announcement by the British Government of its arrangements

for shipment of wheat to Spain is believed to arise from the fact that London is now apparently making an issue of the Spanish action in Tangier ⁵² as set forth in my 727, December 16, 7 p. m. and 733, December 18, 10 p. m.⁵³ If I inform the Spanish Government that we are deferring action on our own arrangements pending action by the British, we not only inject a new condition as pointed out in my 734, December 19, noon, but in these circumstances also place ourselves in the position of bringing pressure merely in support of British interests in Tangier which are unrelated to our fundamental aim of keeping Spain out of the war. Moreover, too close linking of our relief efforts with those of the British may also have the effect of lessening emphasis on our independent contribution to the economic rehabilitation of Spain and this may be important from the point of view of subsequent credit negotiations.

I again urge therefore that our own announcement should not be contingent upon the announcement of the British Government.

With regard to the proposed press statement, Department's numbered paragraph 3, I feel strongly that the text set forth in the Department's No. 257, October 18, 3 p. m., should be adhered to inasmuch as the inclusion of the name of the Chief of Staff [*State?*] was especially urged upon me by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequently agreed to by the Department. Its suppression now would be unfortunate. If this suggestion cannot be accepted might not the Department authorize the publication in Spain of the text already agreed to and the simultaneous release to the American press, if this is agreeable to the Spanish Government, of the text given in telegram No. 350, December 19, 7 p. m.?

I should appreciate a reply to the foregoing at the Department's earliest convenience in order that I may present the whole matter to the Foreign Minister whom I hope to see on Monday.

WEDDELL

852.48/822 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1940—7 p. m.

363. Your 737, December 20, 8 p. m. If you will look back over and construe the record in its logical development you will see that the whole question of assistance to Spain is based on our policy of furnishing all possible assistance short of war to Great Britain in her defense against aggression. Any assistance that we may give to Spain

⁵² For correspondence regarding the Spanish occupation and control of the Tangier Zone, see vol. III, section under Morocco entitled "Spanish occupation and control of the Tangier Zone . . ."

⁵³ Neither printed.

therefore, must be governed primarily by the attitude and actions of the Spanish Government in the present war. In line with our traditional policy of extending relief to help meet urgent human needs in other countries we are interested in any practical way of relieving distress in Spain and of promoting the peaceful reconstruction of that country. However, unless it is clearly evident that the Spanish Government wishes to pursue such a course of peaceful reconstruction it would be difficult to justify here the expenditure of Government funds for assistance to Spain.

The foregoing basic considerations were, as you will recall, set forth in our confidential telegram no. 295 of November 8, 6 p. m. At that time the attitude and actions of the Spanish Government indicated the adoption of a policy of increasing collaboration with the Axis, which the Spanish Foreign Minister himself characterized as a policy of political solidarity with Germany and Italy. At the same time we had observed increasing indications of an unfriendly attitude on the part of the Spanish Government toward the United States, with particular reference to our relations with the other American Republics, to which reference was had in our no. 339, December 10, 7 p. m. In the face of these developments we were not prepared to continue with our plans for the shipment of foodstuffs to Spain.

The matter was thus continuing in complete abeyance until a little later when the British Government revived the question by bringing to our attention its plans to make available to Spain a quantity of wheat from Argentina and Canada, and urging that we proceed at the same time with the plan for shipment of foodstuffs to Spain through the American Red Cross. It seemed evident from the British plans that the British Government considered itself justified in extending credits to Spain under the safeguards provided.

At the same time, however, we had pressed upon us for consideration the whole question of food shipments to European countries not involved in the war, and especially of shipments of milk for children in unoccupied France. Although the British Government has been quite clear in agreeing to shipments of foodstuffs to Spain, it apparently has not entirely or finally clarified its attitude toward American food shipments to other unoccupied countries. We have been striving to find a solution to both the Spanish and French relief problems.

You have no idea of the difficulties we are facing in connection with the whole food relief problem by reason of the terrific criticism of our preparing to send relief to Spain without at the same time sending milk to children and babies, especially in unoccupied France.

For all the foregoing reasons, and while we are continuing discussions with the British about French relief, we have felt that announcement of the British intention to make shipments of foodstuffs avail-

able to Spain should be made before we announce our own action. Unless announcement were first made by the British the whole prospect of food shipments as well as of further discussions of possible purchases by Spain of foodstuffs and other materials in the United States would be jeopardized.

In the light of the foregoing consideration, if the British Government is no longer prepared to make foodstuffs available to Spain because of acts of the Spanish Government which it considers to be of an unfriendly nature or intended to assist the Axis Powers, we certainly cannot justify such assistance to Spain on our part. We have all along considered these shipments as an initial step in the whole program of peaceful reconstruction of Spain, an emergency measure to help meet the critical food situation in Spain until a satisfactory basis for more concrete economic collaboration and assistance could be worked out. Our attitude in this regard, it should be observed, is not based on support of Britain in any particular political controversy with Spain, but upon the broad considerations which we have set forth in the foregoing paragraphs.

We wish to make it perfectly clear to you, in thus setting forth the details of our position, that we are not seeking to create further obstacles to delay the shipment of food to Spain. The delay which has thus far occurred would have been obviated if the Spanish Government in recent weeks had followed a policy clearly indicating a desire to develop closer and more friendly relations with us, rather than a policy of increasing collaboration with the Axis. We hope that this statement of our position will clarify the points raised in your no. 737 and will serve to explain the reason for our proceeding in the manner set forth in our no. 350 of December 19, 7 p. m.

With reference to the language of the statement to be made public by the American Red Cross, Mr. Norman Davis has approved retention of the statement as set forth in our no. 257 of October 18, 3 p. m., with the insertion of the words "on certain conditions" after the words "Chief of the Spanish State" in the first sentence. The first sentence would then read as follows:

"In accordance with the suggestion of the President of the United States, the American Red Cross has offered to the Chief of the Spanish State on certain conditions the shipment to Spain of a cargo of wheat or flour to meet the most immediate needs of the civilian population."

We feel that it would not be desirable for the statement to be released by the American Red Cross in Washington and that to be released simultaneously in Madrid to differ in any way.

You will recall that as previously arranged this statement, after it has been mutually agreed upon, is not to be released until authorization is received from the Department.

HULL

852.48/828 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 30, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received December 31—8:15 a. m.]

750. The Department's No. 363 December 27, 7 p. m., has been carefully noted for my governance. The matters discussed in the Department's numbers 369 [339?], 343⁵⁴ and 350 have equally received my careful consideration. However, I have not felt that it would be opportune and effective to take up these matters with the Foreign Minister until such time as I am in a position to inform him of the Department's definite decision to make Red Cross shipments. On that occasion I shall of course again make clear to the Minister our policy and stress that any further assistance will be dependent upon the maintenance of a loyal attitude by Spain.

In this general connection I learned from the British Ambassador yesterday that negotiations with regard to Tangier are progressing and that just now he is feeling rather optimistic as to their result.

WEDDELL

852.48/828 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1941—6 p. m.

12. Refer Department's 363, December 27, 7 p. m., and your 750, December 30, 5 p. m. After consultation with the President, and agreement having been reached with the British Government, the American Red Cross is prepared to proceed with shipment of flour and milk products to Spain, in conjunction with shipment of foods and medicines for relief of children in unoccupied France. The Red Cross is preparing to announce the foregoing arrangements very shortly. It will, therefore, be appreciated if you will ascertain and report by telegraph immediately whether the statement to be made public by the American Red Cross regarding shipments to Spain, with the slight modification indicated in our No. 363, is agreeable to the Spanish Government.⁵⁵

HULL

⁵⁴ Telegram No. 343 not printed.

⁵⁵ The press release was issued without waiting for Spanish agreement. The Spanish Government disapproved the words "under certain conditions" and the Embassy was informed that there was no objection to the Spanish Government publishing the text of the announcement as originally agreed upon. (852.48/844)

852.48/828 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1941—noon.

13. Refer Department's 12, January 7, 6 p.m. The plan for shipment of supplies for relief of children in unoccupied France has been made public by the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London. Accordingly, the American Red Cross will today make public announcement of its plans for shipment of flour and milk products to Spain in conjunction with the relief project in unoccupied France.

HULL

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE SPANISH NATIONAL TELEPHONE
COMPANY ⁵⁶**

852.75 National Telephone Co./309 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 8, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

3. I presented the note proposed in my 259, December 22,⁵⁷ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs⁵⁸ on December 30 and this morning received from him a reply the text of which follows:

"Excellency: With respect to our last interview in which you presented to me the note dated December 29 which expresses the desire of your Government that American interests in Spain and especially those affecting the National Telephone Company shall enjoy the former *status quo* I take pleasure in informing you that there exists no danger to the legitimate enjoyment of the situation.

As regards the situation of the American personnel in Spain this depends upon the general purging of the Company's personnel who were active under Red regime.

If any measure of this kind affects the said personnel this does not constitute any departure from the position and functions which foreigners have had and may continue to have within the law.

Of the measures of the Company of other kinds which do not involve Government, action should be taken up directly with the Company, any conflict or disagreement which American enterprise may have with the National Telephone Company or with other companies because of nonfulfillment of contracts or injury to legitimate interests should be settled between them, and, if necessary, before the courts of justice.

Only in the abnormal case of a denial of justice or nonfulfillment of a judicial sentence should the matter be taken up through diplo-

⁵⁶ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 820-856.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 853.

⁵⁸ Juan Beigbeder.

matic channels with the Spanish Government which is always ready to guarantee legitimate American interests as has been openly declared.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration."

The Minister's remarks upon handing me this note were vague and irrelevant to the subject at issue and added nothing to contents of the note itself.

In the absence of Behn ⁵⁹ I have shown this note to Caldwell ⁶⁰ but have not furnished him with a copy. I venture to suggest the Department give Frank Page ⁶¹ a copy for communication to Colonel Behn as the latter may consider that the first paragraph will give the company opportunity to take direct action through the board without further representations on any part for the moment. Such action on the part of the company can alone determine the sincerity of the Government's expressions as contained in the first paragraph.

I do not feel we have any technical basis for objecting to paragraphs 2 or 3, irritating as they may be to the telephone company.

The meaning of paragraph 4 is not clear and in any case it appears to be beyond the point.

Paragraph[s] 5 and 6 appear to be irrelevant as both in my opinion and that of Caldwell no conflict or disagreement exists between the International Telephone and Telegraph Company and the local company.

The note as a whole is unsatisfactory in that it ignores the opposition which Behn has experienced in his efforts to settle this question directly with the Minister of the Interior and other Spanish officials. This casts some doubt upon the sincerity of the expressions in the first paragraph.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./326

*The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)*

[MADRID,] January 8, 1940.

DEAR MR. WELLES: Ere this you will have received my telegram giving the text of the note from the Spanish Government concerning their attitude and policy toward the Telephone Company.

I delivered my note on December 30 and had a lengthy talk with the Minister. In the course of this conversation I had occasion to rub

⁵⁹ Sosthenes Behn, president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

⁶⁰ Fred Caldwell, Madrid manager of the National Telephone Company.

⁶¹ Vice president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

in the fact of our surprise that while one hand was being extended to solicit a credit, the other was holding a big stick over important American interests.

During this visit the Minister called up the Secretary of the Presidency and had a longish talk with him and it was arranged that the Minister should either discuss the subject at the Cabinet meeting fixed for the same afternoon or else talk it over with the Caudillo⁶³ following the meeting. The Secretary referred to is a Colonel in the Army and it is he who was instructed to prepare a report on the subject of the Telephone Company for the information of the Caudillo and the Cabinet.

There were great goings on at Zaragoza following the first of January and there also took place on the 6th the popular Festival of the Kings. For these reasons, as Beigbeder explained to me, he was unable to see me before today. After handing me the note the Minister went over it paragraph by paragraph but succeeded only in still further blurring the impression which I had received from my reading of it. He began by remarking that the note was intended to be *vaga y simbólica*, to establish a principle, and to clear away clouds—(*hacer desvanecer nubes*.)

The first paragraph he said represented the attitude of his Government, viz., that all American interests in Spain would be safeguarded.

With regard to the second paragraph, relating to the *depuración* of the personnel of the Telephone Company, he said that this meant that if Señor X had to leave, that Señor Y would be permitted to carry on exactly the same functions. He constantly returned to this, and finally I remarked that I could not see that it made much difference since the Telephone Company was not master in its own house.

With regard to the fifth paragraph he said that the Company had not exhausted its legal remedy, and therefore was premature in seeking governmental intervention. I said that this rather surprised me because there is no conflict whatever between the American Company and the Spanish Company; that the difficulty arose from the Government's attitude; further that discussions had been going on for months, more recently between Behn, as Director of the Spanish Company, and the Minister of Gobernación, until the latter had practically refused to see him for further discussions, and this coupled with a complete lack of courtesy. Here the Minister evaded comment.

He then remarked that the Company should have made a petition to the Government for relief. I pointed out that Behn, as Director, had made a petition. He said he meant a formal petition—one in writing.

⁶³ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

He seemed later, however, to somewhat shift from this position, and to return to the idea that the Company should seek its legal remedy.

He laid great emphasis on the fact that in the fifth paragraph the seeking of a legal remedy would apply not only to a non-fulfillment of contract but even to hurt or damage to legitimate interests—(*lesión*).

I then remarked that it was evident that all of Behn's interviews, and the 4 to 5 months which he had spent in trying to settle the matter went for naught, to which the Minister replied with a torrent of words concerning the stockholders of the Company and their power to elect directors and expressed surprise that they had not been called together to take action.

The interview consisted almost wholly of a monologue on Beigbeder's part, with references to apparently irrelevant things. He is a Spanish edition of Saavedra Lamas.⁶⁴

In conclusion the Minister repeated his statement that the Company should exhaust its legal remedy and further that if there was anything in his note which was not clear he would be glad to see me daily for further discussions.

During the afternoon Scotten⁶⁵ and I have gone over the whole subject with Caldwell of the Telephone Company and the latter is suggesting to Behn, now in London, to have Frank Page go down to Washington and visit the Department. It would seem, as suggested in my telegram of tonight, that there are no steps to be taken at the moment by the Embassy; the next move would seem to be one for the Telephone Company.

Meanwhile, as you are aware, we are being pressed by the Minister of Finance⁶⁶ in the matter of subsidiary coinage for his Government. The Commercial Attaché⁶⁷ is today making known to him the data communicated through the Department. Behn gained the idea before his departure that the Finance Minister would eventually ask for a credit from us to cover this mint operation. The Commercial Attaché will, in his discussion with the Minister of Finance, keep the matter on a purely purchase and sale plane; should the Minister hint at a credit, he will be told to initiate that with me directly or through the Finance Minister.

I really feel that after 5 months of backing and filling with Behn, coupled with their requests for credits, that we should now clamp down hard. I venture to think you are of the same opinion.

Very sincerely yours,

ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL

⁶⁴ Former Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁵ Robert M. Scotten, Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

⁶⁶ J. Larraz López.

⁶⁷ Ralph H. Ackerman.

852.75 National Telephone Co./314 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 16, 1940—midnight.

[Received January 16—6:55 p. m.]

10. Referring to my telegram No. 3, January 8, 8 p. m. After a discussion with Caldwell of the messages from Colonel Behn embodied in the telegram of January 13, 9 p. m., from the Embassy at London ⁶⁸ both Caldwell and myself are in entire agreement with the procedure suggested by Colonel Behn. I therefore venture to suggest that the Department authorize me to transmit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following note: ⁶⁹

“Excellency: Referring to Your Excellency’s esteemed communication of January 8, my Government has noted with satisfaction that the Spanish Government has reiterated its declaration that American interests in Spain and especially those affecting the National Telephone Company will enjoy their former *status quo* and there exists no danger to the legitimate enjoyment by them of that situation.

It is accordingly the understanding of my Government that there is no prohibition on the part of the Spanish Government to the reinstatement of American officers and employees and that American officers and employees may be elected and appointed in the National Telephone Company and those against whom there are no charges or who have been cleared of charges may take over their respective positions. My Government assumes that Americans may also be temporarily appointed or reinstated and occupy their positions pending the clearing of any charges against them as in the case of a very large number of the Spanish employees in the National Telephone Company.

It will be appreciated if you will confirm to me at your early convenience my Government’s understanding of the attitude of your Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.”

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./321 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 14, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 6:17 p. m.]

23. Department’s 12, January 17, 5 p. m. There follows hereunder a translation of a note which has now been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to my note quoted in the Embassy’s No. 10, January 16, noon [*midnight*]:

⁶⁸ Also sent by the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Department as his No. 118, January 13, midnight, not printed.

⁶⁹ The Department in telegram No. 12, January 17, 5 p. m., granted the authorization requested (852.75 National Telephone Co./315).

"46. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States and in reply to the latter's *note verbale* No. 241 of January 19th⁷⁰ last in which is set forth the interpretation of the Government of the United States of America of the attitude of the Spanish state towards the officials and employees of the National Telephone Company, has the honor to state that in fact in the application of the legal measures which are at present in force in Spain respecting the employment of foreign personnel and the purifying of the same in relation to their activity during the period of Red domination will not exercise any discrimination to the prejudice of the foreign personnel in question which was in the service of the company in question."

I have replied to this note as follows:

"263. Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's *note verbale* dated February 7 in reply to my communication to you, No. 241 of January 19 regarding the status of the American officials and employees of the National Telephone Company.

In this connection I would greatly appreciate receiving from you a confirmation of my Government's understanding of the attitude of your Government as set forth on page 2 of my communication, above referred to, which reads as follows: 'My Government assumes that Americans may also be temporarily appointed or reinstated and occupy their positions pending the clearing of any charges against them as in the case of a very large number of the Spanish employees in the National Telephone Company.' It is my Government's desire that this long pending matter of the telephone company may be speedily settled and since you have already, in your esteemed communication of January 8 expressed the intention of your Government to permit the reestablishment of American interests in their former *status quo* in the National Telephone Company I shall greatly value your aid in bringing this about.

I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration."

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./323 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 14, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 8:35 p. m.]

48. The situation of the telephone company which during the past 2 weeks had appeared to me to be making considerable progress toward a settlement favorable to the company has unfortunately now suffered a severe setback.

On March 5th the Minister for Foreign Affairs called me to the Ministry and read to me a rough draft of a note which he proposed to send me in reply to my note No. 263 of February 12. The draft ap-

⁷⁰ See *supra*.

peared on the whole satisfactory, especially since it states that the legislation governing the relation of the American personnel to the company would be that existing prior to the Spanish Civil War. This would free the telephone company from the onerous provisions of legislation enacted during the past year which makes the employment of foreign personnel very difficult. The Minister also informed me verbally that the orders given to the company several months ago to the effect that no Americans could be reinstated in the company had been annulled. There was, however, a misstatement of fact in the note and I suggested to the Minister that this be clarified and that he redraft the note accordingly. Accordingly the same evening I sent him an informal *aide-mémoire* embodying certain facts which clarified the error existing in the note.

From the conversation reported above and several informal conversations at the Foreign Office since that time it appeared that the most serious fuels of friction now existing between the International Telephone and Telegraph and the Government had been eliminated and that it only remained to clear up the purification (*depuración*) of two or three of this American personnel. Yesterday, however, Caldwell showed me a copy of an official letter addressed to the President of the Board of the National Telephone Company by the Government delegate stating that the Minister of the Interior had ordered that eight Americans including himself who constitute one-half of the American personnel should be separated from all connection with the National Telephone Company as a result of *depuración* proceedings (Behn is not included in this list).

I learn that this action was decided upon at a Cabinet meeting on March 9th. Furthermore Caldwell informed me that the National Company had also received instructions from the Ministry of the Interior to postpone the stockholders meeting which was scheduled for March 30 pending the drawing up of a balance sheet. Caldwell explained that the drawing up of a balance sheet would be a lengthy matter on account of the inefficient accounting system of the Spanish officials who managed the company during the Civil War. Its non-preparation it should be pointed out was due to the exclusion from their posts of American accounting officers. Both he and his lawyer are convinced that this action on the part of the Minister of the Interior is illegal and that the reasons given by Pren constitute a subterfuge as many stockholders' meetings are held here prior to the balance sheet having been prepared.

At Caldwell's request I have addressed a personal letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing my surprise and disappointment at the action taken against the eight American employees of the company and requesting the Minister to inform me of the charges which have been proved against these officials. Colonel Behn is expected

to arrive in Madrid on March 18 and I will take no further action pending his arrival and further consultation with the Department. In the meantime, however, in view of what I frankly consider to be the bad faith of the Government and its decidedly hostile attitude to American interests as evidenced by the above I feel I should repeat my previous recommendations to the effect that our Government abstain from granting any credits, loans, or in fact any favor whatsoever to the Spanish Government for the time being. I also feel that the firm of J. P. Morgan should be persuaded if possible to refrain from extending any loan to the Spanish Government (which I learn they are contemplating) until this matter is cleared up.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./323 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1940—7 p. m.

31. Your 48, March 14, 4 p. m. We are at a loss to understand this change in attitude on the part of the Spanish Government. We feel that it is high time that the Spanish Government acquiesce in a fair and reasonable settlement of this matter and we are confident that you will continue your efforts to that end.

HULL

852.75 National Telephone Co./327

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] March 18, 1940.

The Spanish Ambassador ⁷¹ came in this morning. After taking up with me another matter which related to the Bellanca planes now in Mexico, I told the Ambassador of the telegram we had received from our Ambassador in Madrid under date of March 14th, to the effect that the Spanish Government had, within the last few weeks, just about come to the point of making an arrangement with Colonel Behn with respect to the operation of the National Spanish Telephone System, but that last week, according to Mr. Weddell, the Spanish Cabinet had revised its position and was now presenting new difficulties with respect to the settlement of this question.

I told the Ambassador that I knew he was conversant with the difficulties Colonel Behn and the American management of the telephone company in Spain had met in trying to arrive at an arrangement which would permit them to resume the operation of the telephones

⁷¹ Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.

in Spain in accordance with their contract, and that although I understood all of these matters had been handled directly in Madrid, I did want him to know the tone of the telegram which the Secretary had sent to Mr. Weddell upon hearing of the new obstacles brought up by the Spanish Government. I told the Ambassador that we were completely at a loss to account for this reported change of attitude taken by the Spanish Government and there was a distinct feeling on the part of this Government that it was high time now after all of these delays that the Spanish Government come to an understanding with the American Telephone officials which would permit of a reasonable and fair settlement of this matter.

The Ambassador stated that he knew of the difficulties which had been encountered by the American Telephone officials in this regard, that he had, for his part, urged that a settlement of the question be reached as soon as possible, and that he would again so advise his Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

852.75 National Telephone Co./329 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 28, 1940—noon.

[Received 1 p. m.]

54. My number 48, March 14, 4 p. m.; Department's number 31, March 15, 7 p. m. After careful consideration and review of all the developments in the telephone company case to date I am of the opinion that the whole problem may be now boiled down to a simple question of the good or bad faith of the Spanish Government. . . . This question of good or bad faith, to my mind, can under existing circumstances in Spain only be resolved by an authoritative assurance from the head of the Spanish State as to whether the statements contained in the Foreign Minister's notes reported in my telegram No. 3, January 8, 8 p. m., and 23, February 14, 1 p. m., actually mean that the company shall forthwith enjoy its former *status quo* and that Americans who have had no connection with the Spanish Civil War or who have been cleared of any suspicion of "Red" tendencies or who may be awaiting a decision concerning pending charges against them may now be freely appointed and may immediately enter upon their functions without further delay or obstruction on the part of the Spanish authorities.

It would appear abundantly clear from the entirely unsatisfactory results obtained after nearly a year of constant pressure that any assurances received from the Foreign Minister alone may not only be valueless but at times definitely misleading since the forces in the Government opposed to the company appear to be in a sufficiently strong position to nullify any promises given by him.

Under these circumstances I request the Department's telegraphic approval of the following procedure: That I inform the Foreign Minister that upon instructions from my Government I desire an interview with General Franco whom I am directed to ask for assurances as head of the Spanish State that the statements contained in the notes from the Foreign Minister referred to above mean that not only will the company be immediately permitted to enjoy the rights and privileges of the *status quo* of 1936 but also that no further delay or obstruction will be placed in the way of the appointment and functioning of such Americans chosen by the company as have had no connection with the Spanish Civil War or who have been cleared of any charges of having been implicated with the Republican regime or who may still be awaiting examination of such charges. (I would remark here to the Department that I am not losing sight of the seemingly arbitrary treatment accorded the eight Americans which I propose to discuss further with the Foreign Minister at the first opportunity.)

At my interview with Franco I should like to state that I have tried by every possible means to arrive at a fair and mutually satisfactory solution of the telephone case but that after nearly a year of fruitless efforts have come to the conclusion, as has my Government, that only he himself can give the word which would finally dispose of a case which has been and would otherwise continue to be a serious obstacle to those improved relations between our two countries which are so much desired by all concerned.

In the event that Franco gives me the desired assurances I might request him to instruct the Minister for Foreign Affairs to embody them in a formal note. Should he refuse to give them or attempt to evade the issue our growing suspicion of the good faith of the Spanish Government would be abundantly proved and our own attitude toward any further Spanish request for assistance of any kind would become extremely simple.

As regards the question of a fair investigation and a fair decision concerning charges against the eight American employees of the company I am frankly of the opinion that in this the Spanish authorities will inevitably have the last word and while I recommend that this be energetically pursued in an effort to insure just treatment of all those involved I would urge that this question be kept separate from the more vital matter of whether or not the Spanish Government intend to carry out in good faith their contractual obligations to the American company and whether Americans may or may not be appointed and may function without further prejudice, discrimination or obstruction on the part of this Government.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./329 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1940—7 p. m.

36. Your 54, March 28, noon. Department concurs in your views and suggested procedure. You are authorized to request an interview with General Franco and to present to him the following statement in the form of an *aide-mémoire* which you should explain was cabled to you textually by me:

1. Repeated assurances have been given by the Spanish Government during the past year that it intended to accord to American rights and interests in Spain just and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law. Assurances to this effect were given by the Spanish Ambassador in Washington on July 28, 1939, acting upon specific instructions from his Government. Similar assurances were given in notes addressed to the American Ambassador in Madrid by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Government in January and February of this year, in which particular reference was had to the American interests in the National Telephone Company of Spain.

2. Relying upon the foregoing assurances and upon the good faith of the Spanish Government the Government of the United States has expected that the management and control of its properties would be restored to the Telephone Company in accordance with the terms of the existing contract with the Spanish State. Up to the present, however, no action has been taken for the restoration of these properties to the management of the Company, despite continuous efforts over a period of several months on the part of the management to reach an amicable understanding with the appropriate Spanish authorities.

3. Under these circumstances the Government of the United States feels that the time has come to request the Chief of the Spanish State to make effective the assurances which have been given in the past and to issue the necessary instructions to restore the management and control of its properties to the National Telephone Company of Spain without further delay.

In your discretion you may make it perfectly clear that until the Spanish Government makes evident its intention to respect American rights and interests in Spain by concrete acts, the relations between our two Governments can hardly be considered by this Government to be on a satisfactory basis with respect to our mutual interests and desires.

HULL

852.75 National Telephone Co./330 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 4, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received April 4—9: 13 a. m.]

62. I have requested interview with the Caudillo as directed by the Department's 36, April 2, 7 p. m.

In order that statements made in *aide-mémoire* may be more exactly in accordance with the facts I request authority to amend section 2 thereof to read as follows:

"Relying upon the foregoing assurances and upon the good faith of the Spanish Government, the Government of the United States has expected that the management and control of its properties would be restored to the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, as the majority shareholders and in accordance with the terms of the existing contract with the Spanish State. Up to the present, however, no action has been taken for the restoration of these properties to the representatives of the majority shareholders despite continuous efforts over a period of several months on their part to reach an amicable understanding with the appropriate Spanish authorities."

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./337 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 9, 1940—6 p. m.

[Received 9: 32 p. m.]

66. Referring to Department's telegram No. 36, April 2, 7 p. m. In accordance with the foregoing instruction I requested on April 3 an interview with the Chief of State. Since the last paragraph of the memorandum to be submitted contemplated a request that instructions issued to restore the management and control of its properties to the International Telephone and Telegraph Company without further delay, I deemed it appropriate to informally apprise the Foreign Minister of what I wished to discuss with his Chief.

On April 6 the Foreign Office telephoned to say that I would be informed on Monday ⁷² on what date Franco would receive me. However, on Monday a further telephonic communication was received inviting me to call on the Foreign Minister today.

This interview lasted an hour and a half. On entering, the Foreign Minister handed me a memorandum, a translation of which follows.

"The Chief of State would be very pleased to receive the American Ambassador, and an interview will be granted whenever requested, it being understood, however, that in such interview there cannot be taken up or discussed administrative questions of the company, as in-

⁷² April 8.

ferred by the memorandum which in fact expresses an idea which does not conform with reality.

The American economic interests in Spain are guaranteed by Spanish law and in accordance with international procedure.

The following case is proof of the interest with which American matters are considered: The International Telephone and Telegraph Company attempted to collect dividends in arrears from the Telephone Company. The representatives of the state alleged the possible prescription of the right to collect and consulted with the Minister of Finance concerning the matter. The latter will reply recognizing the right of the International Telephone and Telegraph and stating that prescription does not exist as regards the right of collection of dividends in arrears.

The state cannot consider the nationality of shareholders of corporations who have a juridicial personality in conjunction with such Spanish corporation; the personality of a shareholder of another nationality not constituting a factor to be given consideration.

Therefore it is a question of interior relations within a company and notwithstanding contracts between companies not subject to state intervention such intervention being limited only to questions of the morality and conduct of the members of the board of directors and to the fulfillment by the company of the laws and decrees of the nation."

I read this hastily and said to the Minister that the first paragraph filled me with astonishment, that the succeeding paragraphs I would wish to study more at leisure. I said further that I could not but feel that in the face of such an attitude on the part of the Chief of State that my mission had been a failure and that a year of labor in attempting to improve relations between our two countries had gone for naught, that I equally felt that the effect of the note on my Government would be most painful.

The Minister interrupted me here to say I was misunderstanding the Caudillo's viewpoint; that to receive me on such a mission would indicate that relations between the two countries were not good and that Franco did not wish to admit that this was the case! I returned to the charge remarking that from all I could gather there were elements in the Government that did not wish to see a betterment of relations between the two countries; that these elements were found in the Ministry of Gobernación and went directly back to the head of that Ministry.

Again the Minister interrupted to say that I misapprehended the situation, that the Government was grateful for the credits extended in the matter of cotton and were not unmindful that for oil and other products his Government was dependent on us.

The Minister said further that the difficulty existing between the Company and the Government was pre-eminently one of personalities, that there were violent political passions at work which could only calm through certain removals, and that he expected to hand me in a

few minutes a note from the Minister of Gobernación treating the case of each official whose services the Government felt should be terminated. To this I remarked that to him as a soldier it should be apparent that these men who had never been informed of the accusations made against them or given the opportunity to refute them, were being unjustly treated. He replied that the note which he would hand me was naturally for my comment and anything I would submit would be carefully considered.

I then said that the situation was apparently exactly where it was months ago, that the representatives of the majority stockholders were not permitted to take over the property, that the Minister of Gobernación had prevented the holding of the stockholders meeting to renovate and complete a new board of directors and that even those employees not mentioned as undesirable were still prevented from discharging their duties.

The Minister remarked here that the stockholders meeting could be held in 3 weeks but added textually (I wrote it down at the moment) that a stockholders meeting could not be held until the balance sheet was ready to be submitted, for reasons of public order, and that at the end of 3 weeks within which time the balance sheet could be ready was not a long time to wait. I asked him who had told him the foregoing and he named Serrano Suñer.

I pointed out here that from all I could gather the balance sheet could not be ready in 3 weeks and, furthermore, that the reason it had not been prepared before was due, so far as I could ascertain, to the refusal of the Government to allow the American officers of the Company to carry out their auditing duties. I added further that under the law the Company was required to hold its stockholders meeting within a certain time limit which was now exceeded and this by order of the Minister of Gobernación and that there was no reason why a meeting should not be held even without a balance sheet, he returned to his old argument that breaches of public order would be provoked if the balance sheet was not ready at the meeting of stockholders and that he added textually "is a matter of Spanish interior order."

I returned to what I told him was the unsatisfactory situation in which Franco's unwillingness to receive me left this whole subject, that my wish in seeking this interview was to post Caudillo concerning certain facts which apparently were not within his knowledge, I felt sure, and to illustrate this assertion pointed out that although the Caudillo himself had promised me the release of all American prisoners in July 1939⁷³ it was only within the past few weeks and through the intervention of the Minister of War that the last one had

⁷³ See telegram No. 136, July 25, 1939, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in Spain, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, p. 841.

been sent home; I added that equally nearly a year ago the Caudillo at my request had authorized the entry into Spain of Behn,⁷⁴ that I felt sure he did not mean a mere physical entry but that he should enter and be permitted to carry out his duties; that in both cases the will of the Chief of State appeared to have been defeated. The Minister heard me in silence on these points and finally said that he would faithfully report my words to Franco.

In concluding the interview I repeated to the Minister my sense of disappointment and discouragement, and my fears for the reaction of my own Government to his memorandum and that I could not see that any progress whatever had been made in settling this matter.

The interview took place in an atmosphere of entire courtesy but of some heat on my own side.

Contents of the foregoing communicated to Behn via Embassy at Paris.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./338 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 10, 1940—4 p. m.

[Received 4:19 p. m.]

69. Referring to my telegram No. 66, April 9, 6 p. m., paragraph 15, I have since conferred with the officials of the telephone company who reaffirm to me their previous statements that it would be physically impossible to prepare an audited balance sheet of the company within a period of 3 weeks, that it is in fact a question of months and that the failure of the company to have the balance sheet now ready arises from the refusal of the Government to give the American auditing officers liberty of action in its affairs.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./341 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1940—7 p. m.

41. Your 66, April 9, 6 p. m. You should immediately renew request for interview with General Franco for the purpose of delivering to him in person the communication in the form of an *aide-mémoire* from this Government set forth in our no. 36 of April 2, 7 p. m. with the textual changes suggested in your no. 62 of April 4, 11 a. m.

⁷⁴ See *ibid.*

As pointed out in our *aide-mémoire*, assurances were given by the Spanish Ambassador in Washington on July 28, 1939, acting upon specific instructions from his Government, that the Spanish Government intended to accord to American rights and interests in Spain just and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law. In requesting this interview, you should make clear to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that this Government expects that the Chief of the Spanish State, as the source of final authority, will exercise that authority to make effective without further delay the assurances previously given with respect to American rights and interests in Spain, which in the present instance requires the restoration of its properties to the control and management of the telephone company. You may add that your Government cannot believe that the statements reported in your telegram under reference represent the considered judgment of the Spanish Government.

For your guidance we wish to stress the fact that the primary consideration here involved is the restoration of the telephone properties and operating rights to the American owners in accordance with the terms of the contract with the Spanish State, and not the status of particular American employees of the Spanish Telephone Company. We fully agree with the opinion you express in this regard in the final paragraph of your no. 54 of March 28, noon.

HULL

852.75 National Telephone Co./339 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 11, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received April 11—7:20 p. m.]

73. My 65 [66], April 9, 6 p. m. After sufficient time for calm consideration of the situation created by the refusal of the Chief of the Spanish State to receive me upon your instructions, I believe that the following points require special consideration:

1. I should emphasize that prior to discussing with the Foreign Minister the question of an interview with Franco I had handed to him a memorandum which embodied completely the *aide-mémoire* contained in the Department's 36, April 2, 6 [7] p. m., including the last discretionary paragraph in this telegram. Therefore, the decision of Franco not to receive me was arrived at in full knowledge of your view that the telephone company case constituted a pivotal point in our relations with Spain and was far from being limited to a question of "interior relations within a company and of contracts between companies not subject to state intervention". Furthermore, I am reliably informed that my memorandum was considered by the Council of Ministers before the decision not to receive me was arrived at.

2. These circumstances amply confirm my growing suspicion that at least the stronger elements in the Spanish Government have desired to retain the telephone company case as a bargaining point for obtaining future credits or concessions from us when these are urgently required, and that to this end every possible means would be employed to delay a final and favorable decision in the matter.

3. I feel even more strongly that it is useless and might logically have an adverse effect for me to take any further steps with the members of the Spanish Government unless and until that Government fully realizes that the telephone company cannot be used as a club to extort concessions but that a satisfactory solution of the case is actually a matter of principle and the pivotal and cardinal point in the establishment of a satisfactory basis upon which can be built a mutually desirable relationship between the two countries.

Under these circumstances I respectfully submit the following recommendations:

(a) That the Department advise the Spanish Ambassador in Washington in no uncertain terms that it considers the telephone company case as it has now developed as being not an internal matter of a domestic corporation not subject to state [apparent omission] as the Foreign Office has maintained but rather that it represents a test case in the relations between our two countries and that for this reason you have instructed me to present the matter to the Chief of the Spanish State himself.

(b) That the controversy has now resolved itself into the question of whether the Spanish Government intends in good faith to carry out its contractual obligations to an American company as set forth in its repeated assurances to this Government a decision which cannot fail to influence directly our views as to the reliability of any further assurances of the Spanish Government on other matters.

(c) That under these circumstances we are forced to state quite definitely to the Spanish Government that we cannot accept that Government's assurances "that American economic interests in Spain are guaranteed by Spanish law and in accordance with international procedure" until the good faith of that Government has been demonstrated by action rather than words, namely the actual return of the management of the company to its American majority stockholders.

With reference to my personal letter to Welles of April 1st:⁷⁵ in the event the Department agrees with my suggestion that I visit briefly the United States you may also consider it desirable in the absence of some immediate and concrete action on the part of the Spanish Government to place the present unsatisfactory relations on an improved basis and as a means of emphasizing the seriousness of the matter for me to inform the Foreign Minister that in view of this situation I am instructed to return to the United States in order to report personally.

WEDDELL

⁷⁵ Missing from Department files.

852.75 National Telephone Co./343 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1940—2 p. m.

46. Your 73, April 11, 9 p. m. and 74, April 12, 11 a. m.⁷⁶ The Spanish Ambassador will be asked to call at the Department Monday or Tuesday and will be given a copy of the memorandum which you left with the Foreign Minister in Madrid on April 9. The Ambassador will be informed that we consider that a satisfactory solution of the Telephone Company problem is of fundamental importance to all future relations between our two countries; that it furnishes a basic test of the willingness of the Spanish Government to accord to American rights and interests in Spain the just and equitable treatment to which they are entitled and which that Government has repeatedly promised; that we consider this whole problem to be primarily a matter of principle and not a subject for bargaining; that consequently we are convinced that the time has come for the Spanish Government to give evidence of its good faith in making effective its past assurances by concrete acts, in the present case through restoring the Telephone properties to their rightful owners; that we find it difficult to believe that the Chief of the Spanish State will, as stated in your no. 73, refuse to receive the Ambassador of the United States or to give his personal attention to the settlement of a problem of such importance affecting the relations of our two countries; that in as much as we consider it essential that our Ambassador shall be able at all times to be received and to discuss with the head of the State to whom he is accredited any subject in which this Government is interested, we have again instructed you to request an immediate interview with General Franco. The Ambassador will be requested to inform his Government of the foregoing and to emphasize the seriousness with which we view this matter.

You should immediately request an early interview with General Franco in accordance with previous instructions, bearing in mind particularly the considerations set forth in the Department's no. 41, April 11, 7 p. m. You may inform General Franco and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the contemplated interview with the Spanish Ambassador in Washington.

Reference last paragraph your no. 73, April 11, 9 p. m. You are being granted leave requested but should make no announcement thereof for the time being. In the event that no progress is made toward a solution of this problem in the near future it may then prove desirable to give the impression that you are returning to the United States to consult with your Government, but no action should be taken in this direction pending further instructions.

⁷⁶ Latter not printed.

852.75 National Telephone Co./352

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1940.

The Spanish Ambassador called to see me this morning at my request. I told the Ambassador of the recent developments in the telephone case and emphasized my great surprise that when Ambassador Weddell had requested an interview with General Franco to discuss this exceedingly important matter, he had been told by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that other officials of the Spanish Government would discuss the matter with the Ambassador.

I told the Ambassador that Mr. Weddell had again been instructed to seek an audience with General Franco and to leave with him an *aide-mémoire*, of which I gave the Ambassador a copy.

I told the Ambassador that this Government considered that a fair and equitable solution of the telephone controversy was of fundamental importance in the relations between the two countries inasmuch as it involved the basic question of whether American rights and interests in Spain were to be accorded the just and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law which the Spanish Government had repeatedly assured the Government of the United States these interests would be accorded.

I said that I believed the question was one of fundamental principle and in no sense subject to any bargaining, and that this Government must insist that the telephone properties be restored at once through some equitable arrangement to their rightful owners.

In conclusion I stated that one of the generally accepted rules of conduct in international relations was that an Ambassador had the right to request and receive an audience with the chief of the state to which he was accredited; that, as the Ambassador knew, the President was always willing to receive a foreign ambassador upon matters of official business if the latter so desired, and that I could not believe for a moment that such procedure would not be followed in Spain. I emphasized repeatedly to the Ambassador the very great seriousness with which the Government of the United States viewed the present problem.

The Ambassador, as he had so often done previously, told me that he had communicated with his Government on this subject upon innumerable occasions, that he had written and that he had cabled, and that he had expressed it as being his own personal conviction that the matter could and should be settled in an equitable manner inasmuch as the relations between the two governments could never be restored to normal until the telephone properties through some equitable arrangement were restored to the owners of the properties. The

Ambassador said that he would again cable his Government in this same sense. He expressed, however, the utmost measure of discouragement and gave me to understand that, since the transfer of the former Under Secretary of State, Señor Barcenas, he personally had no contacts of a personal character with his own Foreign Office.

The Ambassador said it was all the more imperative that this situation be promptly settled in view of the increasingly disquieting situation in the world at large. He said that in his own judgment there were innumerable ways in which cooperation between the United States and Spain in these critical times could be of advantage to the latter country.

With regard to the European situation, the Ambassador expressed it as being his own conviction that any Spanish government that attempted to get the Spanish people into the war would find itself with a revolution on its hands within the ensuing 10 days. He said that what the Spanish people needed was food and not military adventures, and that the internal situation was so critical that any attempt on the part of Italy or Germany to force General Franco into the war would unquestionably result in revolutionary outbreaks throughout Spain.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

852.75 National Telephone Co./354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1940—6 p. m.

51. Your 87, April 18, 8 p. m."⁷ For your information the Spanish Ambassador called at the Department yesterday to discuss "the details" of the Telephone Company case. He said that as the matter had been handled entirely in Spain he was unfamiliar with the substance of our complaints. His Government had sent him a telegram stating that the only subject at issue between the Company and the Spanish Government was a question of the removal of six or eight American employees because of activities deemed hostile to the present régime during the Spanish civil conflict.

The Ambassador was informed that while there has in fact been considerable discussion on this point, it was definitely a subsidiary issue and one believed capable of easy settlement. The Ambassador was told that the cardinal point at issue between our two Governments was the failure of the Spanish Government to return the management of its properties to the Telephone Company under the terms of the contract with the Spanish State, and he was urged to emphasize this point to his Government.

HULL

⁷ Not printed.

852.75 National Telephone Co./348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 22, 1940—midnight.

[Received April 22—1 a. m.]

90. My telegram No. 89, April 20, noon.⁷⁸ During the last 3 days I have had a number of unsolicited interviews with a Spanish lawyer favorably known to the Embassy who at first asserted that he was acting on behalf of Gamero del Castillo, Ministry [*Minister*] without Portfolio, who he later stated was in turn representing Serrano Suñer absent in Valencia since Saturday.⁷⁹ On each visit he insistently urged me to postpone on some plausible pretext my interview with General Franco fixed for tomorrow. On each occasion I stated that I was acting in accordance with definite instructions of my Government and these I intended to carry out. On a final visit today my informant stated that Serrano Suñer had had a complete change of heart with regard to the telephone company case but that in view of his absence Suñer had as yet been unable to communicate these revised views to General Franco and that under these circumstances and until he could reorient the Caudillo with regard to this changed viewpoint he feared my interview could only result in a failure which might further prejudice good relations between our two countries.

In view of the fact that these overtures came indirectly; that Serrano Suñer had had more than sufficient time to communicate his changed views to the Caudillo; that any proposals that Serrano might have for a postponement of the interview could easily have been made known to the Caudillo and finally in view of the fact that the record of the case is not conducive to excessive faith or confidence in the Minister of Gobernación I again insisted that I would avail myself of the opportunity to present to General Franco in person my Government's views as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* which I had been instructed to hand him.

This afternoon I called on the Foreign Minister at his request. He told me that his object in inviting me to visit him was to remove a misinterpretation; that of course my right to see the Caudillo was unquestioned but that Franco was reluctant to grant an interview when it could be interpreted as an indication that relations between our two countries were unsatisfactory. He assured me that the telephone company case could now be considered settled in principle and that as proof of this the annual stockholders' meeting of the telephone company (which it will be recalled was postponed at the instigation of Suñer) would be authorized for a date which would be communicated to me following the next meeting of the Cabinet Council set for

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ April 20.

Thursday or Friday next. In view of this the Minister added that I of course would be able to have a separate friendly conversation with General Franco (indicating quite plainly that he hoped that the matter of the telephone company would be left strictly alone during this conversation). I pointed out in reply that I had definite instructions to hand to Franco the memorandum with which he was already familiar, and that this I proposed to do; further I hoped the conversation would present an opportunity to settle once for all the basic question of principle which had created such a difficult phase in the relations between the two countries. I also took occasion to mention the matter of the personnel of the telephone company as subsidiary but of considerable importance and stated that I expected that as a soldier he would agree that the accused persons in the company should be given a fair trial and that opportunity should be granted to present their defense. In the meantime following his suggestion (see my 66, April 9, 6 p. m.) I expected shortly to send a note commenting on the charges which I have now received. He assured me that these comments would be carefully considered, at the same time hinting at Spain's sovereign rights concerning the evidence of aliens.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 23, 1940—noon.

[Received April 23—11:03 a. m.]

92. My 90, April 22, midnight. Spanish lawyer mentioned in my 90, April 22, midnight, called again at 10:45 this morning stating that he had been instructed by Gamero del Castillo to inform me that Serrano Suñer had last night telephoned to the Caudillo advising him that he wished to confer with him on the matter of the telephone company before the Caudillo's interview with the Ambassador scheduled at 12:30 today and suggesting that the interview be postponed therefore until Friday next.⁸⁰ The Caudillo was alleged to have replied that it would be entirely agreeable to him to postpone the interview as desired by Serrano Suñer. I at once pointed out to Del Castillo's representative that while his information was interesting I had a written invitation from the Caudillo to see him today at 12:30 and intended to keep the appointment. The emissary then endeavored to draw from me a statement as to whether I would consider it an offense to myself or to my Government if the Caudillo were to postpone the interview. To this I replied that the question of the postponement of the interview would appear to be a matter entirely for the decision of

⁸⁰ April 26.

the Spanish authorities themselves but that I should very greatly regret the postponement of an interview which had once been refused and had finally been obtained only after a renewed request made upon the direct instruction of my Government. Throughout the interview the lawyer emphasized that a postponement was desired only in order to reorient the Caudillo in a sense favorable to the telephone company.

At 11:20 Castillo's representative telephoned that within half an hour I should receive a note from the Caudillo's Secretariat postponing the interview.⁸¹

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 25, 1940—noon.

[Received April 25—9:50 a. m.]

95. My 94, April 23, 9 p. m.⁸² In a conversation with Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs last night he stated that the Spanish Ambassador in Washington had already begun negotiations to obtain 100,000 tons of wheat. He continued that "now that the telephone company case was satisfactorily settled", since we have made it clear that the question of the personnel of the telephone company was not at issue, that he would appreciate my sending a telegram to the Department to "facilitate" the Spanish Ambassador's representations.

I remarked in reply that as regards the telephone case there had been many words but very little action. He replied that he could assure me that the telephone case was now satisfactorily settled and that any new personnel which the company [apparent omission] might immediately go to work. I remarked that I hoped soon to take up an important subsidiary matter, the question of a fair trial and opportunity to present a full defense for the members of the telephone company who had been ordered expelled by the Spanish authorities. He replied that the Minister would be glad to discuss this with me later but remarked that the right of expulsion on the part of any Government was well recognized "with or without trial". Apparently as an afterthought he asked that I include in my telegram to the Department the request that the supply of nickel for minting Spanish coins (see my telegram 19, January 25, 8 p. m.⁸²) also be expedited. In this connection he added that it was his opinion that this matter had not made any progress because the American Government feared that nickel supplied to Spain might be sent to Germany. This he said incorrect since the nickel was desired only for Spanish coins.

⁸¹ Ambassador Weddell's interview with Franco was postponed until April 27.

⁸² Not printed.

Since I feel that the question of any further credits to the Spanish Government should be included in the larger question of the eventual settlement of a number of pending problems between the two countries, I venture to suggest that any decision regarding the matters referred to by the Under Secretary be deferred pending my arrival in the United States. Am planning to sail on *Roma* May 7th from Lisbon.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./355 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 26, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received April 26—3: 25 p. m.]

96. My telegram No. 94, April 23, 9 p. m.⁸⁴ At the request of Serano Suñer I called upon him this morning. The conversation was friendly throughout and I was given the following specific assurances: (a) that the annual meeting of the company's stockholders may now be held and (b) "that the Spanish Government will abide by the terms of July contract with the company".

Although no allusion was made to it I believe that this conversation was preparatory to my interview with the Caudillo on Monday.⁸⁵

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./356 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 29, 1940—6 p. m.
[Received April 29—4: 22 p. m.]

99. My telegram No. 94, April 23, 9 p. m.⁸⁴ During my interview with General Franco today at which I handed him the *aide-mémoire* set forth in the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 36, April 2, 7 p. m., and 38, April 4, 7 p. m.⁸⁶ I received the following repeated and categorical assurances:

That the International Telephone and Telegraph Company would without delay be restored to the possession and control of its properties thus returning to the status of 1936 and that any new American employees which it might be necessary to substitute would be permitted immediately to go to work and would receive the necessary work permits without further restrictions or objections. To clinch the matter I asked the Caudillo whether I might transmit to my Gov-

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ April 29.

⁸⁶ Latter not printed.

ernment his personal assurances on these points and he unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative.

During my interview I brought up as a secondary matter, but one which I considered of considerable importance, the question of the exclusion by the Spanish Government of certain of the present American personnel of the telephone company. I stated that while I had no intention of questioning Spain's sovereign right in the matter of the residence or expulsion of foreigners I must maintain the point that it was not equitable that these men should be expelled without having been informed of the accusations against them or having been given a fair opportunity to defend themselves against these charges. Franco insisted that I was misinformed and that the accused had been informed of the charges against them and had been given an opportunity to defend themselves. I replied that this was contrary to my information but that in any case I would take an early opportunity to present to his Foreign Minister in accordance with the latter's suggestion my comments upon the informal list of charges which has been transmitted to me and that I felt sure that the Spanish Government would study and consider these comments. To this he agreed.

With regard to the previous postponement of the annual meeting of the stockholders of the company the Caudillo remarked that this meeting was to be held to consider the balance sheet, which could now be prepared in a few weeks. I replied that according to my information some months must elapse before a balance sheet could be prepared and that the reason for the delay in the preparation of these accounts was due to the refusal of the Spanish Government to permit the American employees of the company access to the company's books and an opportunity to prepare the balance sheet. To this he made no reply.

The Caudillo went to some length to explain his previous refusal to see me along the lines set forth in the memorandum from the Foreign Minister which has already been telegraphed to the Department in my 66, April 9, 6 p. m.

While these assurances would appear to make it difficult if not impossible for the Spanish Government to fail to return the control of the telephone company to the American majority stockholders forthwith I cannot escape the conviction that although it may be possible to secure at least a *pro forma* rehearing of the charges against the present American personnel, the expulsion of these employees represents the pound of flesh upon which the Spanish Government will insist on one pretext or another. I will of course continue my efforts to obtain a fair and ample hearing of the charges against this personnel but as already indicated in previous telegrams I am frankly doubtful that these efforts will do more than delay the final exclusion

from employment of these American employees of the telephone company who are unacceptable to the Spanish Government.

Behn has been informed of the substance of the foregoing.

In order that there may be no possibility of future equivocation I am today transmitting to the Foreign Minister the following note:

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, as you have doubtless already learned, that during an interview with the Chief of State today he was good enough to give me his assurances that the International Telephone and Telegraph Company would without delay be put in possession and control of its properties in Spain and that any new American employees whom it might be necessary to substitute would be permitted immediately to go to work and to receive the necessary work permits without further restrictions or objections. These assurances I have taken the greatest pleasure in telegraphing to my Government.

With regard to the secondary though important matter of the present American personnel now employed by the company in Spain, I took occasion to inform the Chief of State that I would seek an early opportunity to comment upon the list of charges which you were good enough informally to transmit in communication of April 9, 1940, and that I trusted that these comments would receive your study and consideration.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration."

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./362

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
European Affairs (Moffat)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1940.

Mr. Frank Page called this morning. I gave him the substance of the first two sections of Mr. Weddell's telegram no. 99 in which General Franco gave assurances that the I. T. and T. Company would without delay be restored to the possession and control of its properties. I then told Mr. Page that we all of us felt here that it would be a mistake for the I. T. and T. Company to press further on trying to retain the eight company officials. Irrespective of whether or not their cases had been properly adjudicated, nonetheless the Spanish Government did have the right to receive or expel any foreigner. Furthermore now that the log jam seemed to be broken we felt that it was very important to speed up the momentum and if giving the Spaniards their pound of flesh would help this momentum, we believed that it should be done. Mr. Page said that he believed Colonel Behn would agree with this point of view and that as a matter of fact the Company had already been giving a good deal of thought to replacements. He would telegraph Colonel Behn our point of view on this question and would add that he personally entirely agreed.

We then discussed how the property would be returned to the Company. There were various ways in which this could be done but in essence it amounted to recognizing Colonel Behn's right to function again as Chairman in charge of Operations, to appoint his own divisional assistants, et cetera. Colonel Behn is now in Madrid and for a while at least Frank Page said that he could fulfill the functions of all the eight employees who were being ousted.

I then took up the question of the stockholders' meeting. It appears that this has nothing whatsoever to do with the return of the properties. Nevertheless it is important for the following reasons: During the war no interest or dividends were paid to the preferred stockholders or to the bond holders. Furthermore, according to the contract, during such time as the Government had control of the properties, it was obligated to pay the Company eight per cent. Obviously the Company has no illusions that it will obtain this eight per cent. However there will have to be some negotiations between the Company and the Government regarding these and related matters and such negotiations cannot begin until the accounts are in order and properly audited. The reason the stockholders' meeting became so important was that Colonel Behn wanted to use this as a means of putting pressure on the Government for the return of the property. The Spaniards countered by pointing to the by-laws of the Company which provided that the year-end balance sheet should be submitted to the stockholders before the annual meeting took place. The problem is an important one but it is not tied up with the return of the properties.

Mr. Page was extremely grateful for everything that the Department and the Embassy in Madrid had done and wished to extend his sincere thanks.

PIERREFONT MOFFAT

852.75 National Telephone Co./361

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
European Affairs (Moffat)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1940.

The Spanish Ambassador called this morning. I read him the first main paragraph of Mr. Weddell's telegram No. 99 of April 29th giving General Franco's personal assurances with regard to the return to the International Telephone and Telegraph Company of the possession and control of its properties.

I told the Ambassador that it was a great pleasure to be able to give him good news, and that I felt certain that this was due in part to his efforts.

The Ambassador replied that he felt that the point of view he had taken in Madrid last summer had at last borne fruit. At that time he

had told General Franco and others that whereas public opinion in the United States had been exceedingly hostile to the Franco régime, the attitude of the Government had been, if not friendly, at least correct, and that he believed that it would be possible to build up satisfactory commercial and other relations if the Telephone Company's case were disposed of. He had reiterated over and over again that without this nothing satisfactory could be accomplished.

The Ambassador then went on to say that this did not mean that he approved the Telephone Company's contract, which he felt was a very onerous one and not consistent with Spanish dignity. Nevertheless he recognized that it should be modified by mutual agreement rather than by unilateral action, and that this mutual agreement could hardly be reached until the Telephone properties had been returned.

The Ambassador then went on to say that he appreciated our having made so clear to him that the return of the properties was the central and vital issue. He had telegraphed in this sense to his Government, which he felt had become confused by a number of subsidiary issues.

As he left the Ambassador said that he hoped I would telephone him as soon as the properties had been actually returned.

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

852.75 National Telephone Co./357 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 5, 1940—2 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

107. My No. 99, April 29, 6 a. m. [*p. m.*] Since my interview with Franco there have been a series of conversations and negotiations between myself and various members of the Spanish Government, and others between Behn, members of the Government and members of the Telephone Company, with a view to giving practical effect to the promises made to me by the Caudillo and the Minister of Gobernación.

The greatest difficulty has centered around fixing a date within the immediate future for the general stockholders' meeting. Serrano Suñer has insisted that before this meeting could be held a balance sheet must be prepared for submission to it. Based on statements made to me by the telephone authorities I have repeatedly maintained that it was physically impossible to prepare a balance sheet with [*within?*] a period of months and have insisted that in the event that the Caudillo's promises meant what they purported to mean the meeting must be held forthwith in order to give practical effect to his assurances that the "control and possession" of the company would be immediately returned to the American majority stockholders.

It now appears that Suñer has finally taken the line that he was misinformed about the possibility of a balance sheet being prepared within the near future and I have direct assurances from Gamero del Castillo, Minister without Portfolio, who talked with Suñer last night, that he will not insist upon a balance sheet being prepared before the meeting is held; that he will meet Colonel Behn next Wednesday ⁸⁷ to agree to this and to discuss the new nominations to the Company's Board of Directors; and the entry into their functions of the new American personnel of the Company.

I have also received the same assurances from a person close to both Suñer and Gamero who is also in the confidence of the Embassy and am now inclined to believe that the matter will be satisfactorily resolved after Behn's conversation with Suñer. The Embassy will however continue closely to follow the situation and will report any developments to the Department by telegraph. In accordance with plans previously reported to the Department I took occasion yesterday to present to the Foreign Minister my comments upon the informal charges which have been made against the American employees of the Telephone Company. These were based upon written statements submitted to me by the Telephone Company. I requested the Foreign Minister to reopen the cases and to ensure that all the Americans involved be given ample opportunity to present their defence against these charges. The Foreign Minister assured me that my comments would be given careful consideration and I am hopeful the Americans involved will at least be given the opportunity to reply to the charges. However, as previously indicated, I am not hopeful as to the final result of my intervention but the Embassy will continue to press for a fair hearing of the American individuals concerned.

In all the circumstances and believing that further steps at the moment with the Caudillo might be interpreted as a lack of confidence in his assurances concerning the Company I have, after carefully weighing the matter, decided to pursue my plans to sail from Lisbon on the 7th.

I believe that I have been successful thus far in my efforts to induce the Spanish Government to realize that merely being just and equitable in its attitude toward the Telephone Company cannot be used to wrench favors from the United States. However, in my conversations both with the Minister of the Interior and the Caudillo, strong hints were given which I ignored that the time was ripe for the United States to come to the assistance of Spain in this its time of need and I was told yesterday that the Minister of Finance would seek an interview before my departure. In any case I believe that the Department may expect an early campaign on the part of the Spanish

⁸⁷ May 8.

Government either in Madrid or Washington or both directed toward obtaining credits and/or a loan which would now appear difficult to obtain from other sources under present circumstances.

Should this campaign develop I would urge that the Department await my arrival in the United States before giving any decision in order that I may discuss personally its possible evaluation.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./359 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 8, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received May 8—6:20 p. m.]

113. Embassy's 107, May 5, 2 p. m. Behn today had a long and spirited conversation with Suñer. From Suñer's attitude throughout the conversation it seems quite evident that he intends to do everything to retain the largest possible measure of control of the company in his own hands while giving the appearance of returning the "control and possession" of the company to the American majority stockholders. Behn, on each occasion that an effort in this direction developed, firmly refused to be drawn [apparent omission] or to accept any proposals which would have weakened the controlling position of the American majority stockholders.

The conversation must as yet be considered inconclusive but at Suñer's suggestion it will be resumed next Saturday⁸⁸ at noon at which time it may be possible for Behn to discuss details such as the date for the general meeting; new nominations to the Company's Board of Directors; and the entry into their functions of new American personnel. None of these were touched upon during today's conference in other than a general way.

Since the final outcome of the matter still remains in doubt, I would renew previous recommendations that any question of credits to the Spanish Government be held in complete abeyance pending further developments.

BUCKNELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./360 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 9, 1940—noon.

[Received May 9—8:50 a. m.]

114. My telegram No. 113, May 8, 9 p. m. I am informed by members of the Telephone Company that a representative of the Minister

⁸⁸ May 11.

of Finance is now proceeding to Paris to resume discussions with Morgans in an effort to obtain a loan ⁸⁹ from that bank for the Spanish Government. Under the circumstances the Department may consider it advisable to notify the Embassy in Paris of the inconclusive results so far obtained with regard to the final settlement of the Telephone Company case.

BUCKNELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./365 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 15, 1940—2 a. m.

[Received 2:24 a. m.]

123. My 121, May 13, 8 p. m.⁹⁰ As a result of a conversation between Behn and Suñer tonight the Telephone Company case has been settled to the satisfaction of Behn. The settlement is embodied in an *aide-mémoire* which Behn presented to Suñer and which the latter approved subject to the final approval of the Caudillo which Suñer expects to obtain by tomorrow afternoon. The full text of the *aide-mémoire* will be telegraphed tomorrow as soon as it can be translated and after it is finally approved by Franco. In the meantime the following are the main points:

1. The International Telephone and Telegraph Company will be reinstated in the management and control of the National Telephone Company of Spain thus re-establishing the *status quo ante* of July 18, 1936.

2. The management of the company will be placed in the hands of an executive vice president named by the majority of American stockholders. He will be in control of all matters of the company as regards its general management subject only to the approval of the board of directors of the company.

3. No question will be raised with regard to the contract with the State or the contracts between the National Telephone Company of Spain and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

4. The Americans who have been separated from their posts in the company and the revision of whose cases has been solicited by the United States Government or who may be separated from the company in the future for whatever cause may be substituted by other Americans to whom the Spanish authorities will grant the necessary work permits without any obstacle as will be the case in regard to any other American personnel which will be named by the company.

Furthermore Suñer agreed to the list of American personnel to be named by Behn who are to take immediate charge of their respective

⁸⁹ The Department in telegram No. 60, May 13, 7 p. m., informed the Embassy in Spain as follows: "There is every reason to believe that Morgans will not consider under present circumstances the transaction discussed."

⁹⁰ Not printed.

departments; to a list of new directors; and to the calling of a general meeting without the necessity of awaiting the preparation of an actual balance sheet although some explanatory statistical data may be presented for the consideration of this meeting.

Behn is hopeful that of the eight Americans separated at least Caldwell will be reinstated in an executive position in the company. This latter point is still subject to some doubt.

BUCKNELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./366 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 18, 1940—11 p. m.
[Received May 18—10:24 p. m.]

128. My 123, May 15, 1 [2] a. m. The following is a close translation of the text of the *aide-mémoire* presented to Suñer by Behn and agreed to by the former and today approved by Franco:

"1. The International Telephone and Telegraph Company is re-instituted in the management and control of the *Compania Telefonica Nacional de Espana* thereby reestablishing the *status quo ante* of July 18, 1936.

2. The management of the company shall be composed of: an executive vice president (*administrador delegado*) with all the effective powers of a general administrative nature of the company subject only to the general approval of the board of directors of the company; a general manager who shall exercise the management of the services of the districts both peninsular as well as outside the peninsula; a general secretary; a comptroller; a general treasurer; a chief engineer; a superintendent of construction and maintenance; a commercial superintendent; a superintendent of traffic and a superintendent of the technical school, these departments functioning under the control of the executive vice president.

The president, executive vice president, and general manager shall be appointed for periods of 1 year subject to reappointment in their positions if the board of directors so resolves.

3. It is the present intention of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to appoint Americans for the position of heads of departments as follows: executive vice president, comptroller, chief engineer, superintendent of construction and maintenance, commercial superintendent, and the necessary assistants. This clause, in view of the provisions of the contract with the state, does not constitute a limitation upon the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation's rights.

The executive vice president can carry out such changes in the organization of the services and make such appointments of heads of services and assistants as he may deem necessary for the proper progress of the company.

4. The Americans who have been separated from their positions as a result of proceedings whose revision has been requested of the

government, or who leave the company for any other reason, can be substituted by other Americans to whom the authorities shall grant the necessary permits without any obstacle whatever, as well as to the remainder of the American personnel which is appointed.

5. There is no question whatever with respect to the contract with the state and the contracts between the Compania Telefonica Nacional de Espana and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

6. Without this paragraph constituting a limitation in view of the provisions of the contract with the state the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation proposes for the present to appoint 6 Americans of the 18 directors elected by the stockholders, the 3 Government delegates completing the total number of 21 directors provided by the company's statutes.[""]

The delay since my last telegram has been caused by Suñer's illness and not by any last minute differences of opinion.

Behn expresses himself as entirely satisfied and is leaving tonight for Paris for urgent business connected with problems presented to the company by the German invasion of Belgium. He expects to return in a few days and has agreed with Suñer that any further details of the settlement of the telephone company case will be discussed and settled at that time.

BUCKNELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./369: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 22, 1940—9 p. m.

[Received June 23—12: 35 p. m.]

232. A recent slowly formed opinion that current events in Europe, more especially German successes, have altered Spain's attitude toward help from the United States receives confirmation from the somewhat detached and indifferent attitude displayed by the Minister of Gobernación and the Chief of State with both of whom I talked today.

The Minister whom I saw first following his indirectly but strongly conveyed intimation that he was desirous that I talk with him before seeing the Caudillo appears to have yielded to interior elements in the telephone company and stated on the one hand that the document embodying the arrangement he reached with Behn and which was telegraphed to the Department, was a private arrangement between himself and Behn and later in the conversation remembered that the document "did not exist". When I pointed out this inconsistency and the painful impression which would be created in Washington on reporting his attitude he countered with a harangue concerning Spain's sovereignty, the unsatisfactory situation for Spain through

the control by foreign interests of so vital a thing as its communication system and said the company must trust to his good faith! I could only prevail on him to promise to send for the company's president and the Ministry delegate on the board and impress on them his declaration that the Government loyally maintain the company in the *status quo* of 1936.

Although I am discouraged by the present phase of this situation there remains the possibility that the Minister may for time being at least obviate the company's present difficulties although the Minister's remark that this corporation was a political Gibraltar in Spain is significant.

In my hour's talk with the Caudillo in which I set forth the Department's attitude as outlined in instructions of May 28, 1940,⁹¹ and telegram No. 78, June 5, 6 p. m.,⁹² I made it abundantly clear that any potential assistance to be expected under these instructions were contemplated prior to recent events and prior to Spain's declaration of "non-belligerency" and stated that a completely different situation now confronted us and that a prime motive in seeing him was to ask for a clarification of his Government's attitude.

In reply the Caudillo, referring to previous declarations of neutrality, said that the war in Scandinavia, as in Poland, had been remote. Now the war clouds have come much nearer. Italian dead lie in Spanish fields and Spain's sympathy toward Italy was very great—in a word, the phrase of non-belligerency might be interpreted as descriptive of a state of more definite sympathy toward Italy and a wide awake attitude. I asked bluntly whether Spain would enter the war. He parried this, remarking "The United States is nearer to war than we are."

Franco declared that England is in for a very bad time. He said the enormous colonies held by that country and France were governed with unenlightened selfishness and that he felt that by dividing them among Germany and other countries (probably thinking of Spain) the general good would be promoted. He believes that Hitler whom he described as "a very human man" would be reasonable in his demands.

Referring to Europe's food needs I suggested that these would become critical in a few months; with this he expressed entire disagreement. In concluding my visit I said that I would, of course, communicate his declarations concerning his interpretation of non-belligerency to my Government; that it was possible that I would receive further instructions but that meanwhile and since potential action appeared to have been contemplated to take place at Washington he

⁹¹ *Ante*, p. 803.

⁹² *Ante*, p. 804.

might in all the circumstances and if still interested have his Ambassador sound out the Department. I added that since his Minister of Finance had made a suggestion of exploratory conversations to determine whether there were any bases for a trade agreement it was possible and keeping in mind the limitations arising from our trade agreement principles that my Government would still be interested and that if he desired to pursue the matter further approximate [apparent omission] might be given to his Finance Minister.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./371 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 17, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received July 18—9 : 42 a. m.]

379. My 232, June 22, 9 p. m., paragraphs 2 and 3. I have continued to press Suñer to carry out his promise to send for the telephone company's president and the Ministry's delegate on the board and to impress upon them Suñer's declaration that the Government would loyally maintain the company in the *status quo* of 1936. This up to the present he has failed to do. Furthermore, elements within the telephone company with the open support of the Government delegates on the board are continuing to create a most difficult situation and have attempted in effect to nullify the promises of the Caudillo and of Suñer regarding the return of the telephone company to the direction and control of the American strategic [*majority?*] stockholders. With regard to this latter phase I have also communicated the facts to the people [*Minister?*] of Gobernación and have insisted that his promises and those of the Caudillo be carried out. Up to the present all of my efforts to persuade the responsible members of the Spanish Government to give effect to their promises concerning the telephone company have remained without effect. Furthermore, Colonel Behn has unsuccessfully used every device and stratagem to attempt to overcome the opposition to the company existing within the Government as well as within the telephone company itself.

It now seems quite evident that the telephone company case is perilously close to again becoming a political football and there are numerous indications that the Spanish Government intends to use the company as a bargaining point in obtaining various items from the United States, principally gasoline at the moment.

In view of this situation I have requested another interview with Franco at which time I will, unless otherwise instructed by the Department, again insist that his promises with respect to the company be loyally carried out in good faith.

In the meantime a serious situation has arisen with regard to the supply of American gasoline for Spain. Further, a director of the oil monopoly confirms the report that the United States was considering the establishment of a quota for the supply of American gasoline to Spain and that no gasoline would be supplied until such quota was decided upon. The director added that the amount now being discussed was 500,000 tons semi-annually which amount he declared was "satisfactory". However the former representative of the Atlantic Refining Company in Madrid states that this is just double annual Spanish requirements prior to 1936. It would appear that a million tons of gasoline is considerably in excess of actual Spanish requirements even though it is recognized that consumption has increased over that obtaining in 1926 [1936?].

In spite of the fact that I have endeavored, as has the Department, to keep the telephone company case upon a basis of good faith and equity it is being borne upon me that the Spanish Government insists on using the case as a *quid pro quo* and as a bargaining point for advantages desired by it.

I therefore am reluctantly forced to suggest to the Department the advisability of delaying any decision with regard to supplying gasoline or any other commodity to the Spanish Government on any terms until the promises made to me by Franco and by Suñer are backed up by effective action. With this in mind the Department may desire to consider the advisability of informing Cárdenas at such time as the Department may consider appropriate that the telephone company case is still in a most unsatisfactory state in spite of the categorical assurances given by the Spanish Government and that until effective and satisfactory action in the matter is taken by the Spanish Government that we for our part would be unwilling to make any arrangement to supply Spain with gasoline or any other commodity. It is believed that an intimation of this kind would have an immediate and salutary effect upon the attitude of the Spanish Government.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./371 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1940—4 p. m.

168. Your 379, July 17, 8 p. m. The failure of the Spanish Government to carry out its promises to restore the management and control of the telephone company to the American majority stockholders, as provided in the memorandum agreed upon by Behn and Suñer and approved by Franco on May 18 (your no. 128 of that date), certainly does not place that Government in a position to raise for consideration

other questions in which it may be interested. As that Government must be aware, we have been prepared to cooperate and to assist in arriving at satisfactory arrangements of a number of matters on which it has approached us during the past year. We have expected, of course, that the Government of Spain would in fact accord to American rights and interests in Spain just and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law. As mentioned in our no. 41 of April 11, 7 p. m., formal assurances to this effect were given by the Spanish Ambassador in Washington on July 28, 1939, acting upon specific instructions from his Government. As we have made clear on a number of occasions we will not bargain on this point, and you should again emphasize this fact if the occasion arises.

WELLES

852.75 National Telephone Co./375 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 3, 1940—8 p. m.

[Received August 4—3 : 30 a. m.]

432. My 406, July 29, 9 p. m., Department's 187,⁹³ and 168, July 20, 4 p. m. I to-day called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On entering I said to him that what I was going to say would be with a frankness which was dictated by a real friendship for Spain and a desire to promote good relations between our two countries. I told him that I had reported my recent conversation with him and was instructed to say that his observations had been duly noted by my Government; further, that equally under instructions I wished to tell him of my Government's surprise that the Spanish Government should bring up such a question⁹⁴ in view of its failure to put into effect the solemn promises from its Chief Executive and the Minister of the Interior regarding the telephone matter. I added that as he was aware my Government had been prepared to cooperate and assist in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement concerning a number of matters on which we had been approached during the past year but that naturally we had expected Spain would accord American rights and interests just and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law.

I returned [*referred*] to the promises made to me by the Caudillo and by the Minister of the Interior that the direction and control of the company would be immediately returned to the American majority stockholders which had been duly reported to Washington and equally

⁹³ Neither printed.

⁹⁴ The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had raised the question of a supply of American gasoline for Spain. The Department informed the Ambassador that sending gasoline to Spain was contrary to the policy of the American Government.

recalled the formal assurances given in this respect by his Ambassador in Washington more than a year ago. I said further that the failure of the Spanish Government to carry out its promises certainly put it in no position to raise with the United States any questions in which they thought their interests and welfare were being affected. I closed this part of my remarks by telling the Minister that under no circumstances would my Government bargain with regard to this matter.

The Minister heard me in an obviously embarrassed silence but finally remarked that he was not familiar with all the details of the case but had supposed that what we desired was the re-establishment of the *status quo ante*. I assured him that he was correct and that at least four steps were necessary to bring this about: first, to permit the annual meeting of the stockholders to be held, something which the Minister of Gobernación had successfully blocked up to the present; second, to allow that body to name a board of directors; third, for the various directors to be promptly approved by the Government in order to permit the final step of the entry into the direction and control of the company's properties; and, fourth, that the Government delegates be instructed to limit their activities to the rights and duties set forth in the contract between the company and the Government.

The Minister then referred to the agreement arrived at between Behn and the Minister of the Interior. To this I remarked that I had felt that this would give effect to the solemn promises made to me but that now Suñer denied its physical existence and therefore certain concessions made by Behn in the agreement naturally fell with it and I urged again the re-establishment of the *status quo ante* which would put into effect the four steps described above.

I told the Minister that all these things were matters that I wished to lay before the Caudillo since it was from him that I had first received the solemn assurances of essentially equitable treatment for the company. I reminded him of my several requests that this interview be arranged. He replied that he would immediately push the matter with the Caudillo who was not accessible today and hoped to fix the meeting for Tuesday the 6th.

The Minister then made the astonishing statement that of course the Caudillo's promises were "symbolic" and that naturally matters of "administrative detail" would have to be worked out by subordinates. I declared by remarking that I knew of no details that were not fully covered by the promises referred to which involved the restoration to the true owners of the direction and control of the Telephone Company in accordance with the contract between the Company and the Government. I further made the observation that the failure of the Spanish Government to settle this matter was poisoning every relation between the two countries concerned and that it was

for his Government to decide whether a group of wilful men now in the Telephone Company and operating through the Minister of the Interior should be allowed to jeopardize matters of even greater importance.

Shortly before leaving I mentioned in referring to what I thought had been the obstructive attitude shown by the Minister of the Interior that a cartoon (my 406, July 29, 9 p. m.) published here and printed and distributed, so I had been assured on reliable authority, by the Minister of the Interior, should be permitted to display an offensive caricature of the President of the United States; all this in addition to a generally hostile press attitude.

Apparently sensing an opportunity to shift the conversation into a more bearable channel the Minister literally screamed to an assistant to bring him a copy of the broadside in question; none could be found in the Ministry. I volunteered to send him a duplicate copy I had. He said that he would be grateful, declaring that it was "monstrous" that a Chief of State should be so attacked. I remarked that I had written to the Minister of the Interior to ask if the seemingly preposterous story that his Ministry was printing and distributing this sheet was true but that I was as yet without reply.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./376 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 6, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received 9:50 p. m.]

437. My 432, August 3, 8 p. m. I called on the Foreign Minister this morning with the intention of asking him when the Caudillo would receive me. He met me at the door saying he was delighted to see me as he wished to inform me that within 6 days the annual meeting of the telephone company stockholders would be held and further that his Government would loyally carry out its pledges to place the affairs of the telephone company in the *status quo* of 1936.

I said that holding this meeting would be but the first step in bringing about a satisfactory solution. The Minister asked what were the others. I replied that the other necessary steps were, (1) for the majority stockholders to elect a new board of directors, (2) to secure their warranted approval by the Government and permission for them at once to enter upon their duties, (3) to ensure that the Government delegates would henceforth abide by the contract between the Government and the company and, (4) generally to let the owners control and direct the affairs of the company.

The Minister said he was not familiar with all of the details of the matter but repeated his former assurances and emphasized that if there was any hitch or delay he and I could promptly work out an adjustment. I said that no arrangement could be worked out lacking good will on the part of the Minister of Gobernación whose promises of a righteous solution I had received before the last crop of difficulties had sprung up. The Minister assured me that everything was now set for a satisfactory adjustment and what with his insistent requests that I come immediately to discuss with him any further delays or difficulties he may have I took occasion here to remark that it seemed not to be recognized by certain members of the Spanish Government that the good faith of the Caudillo himself was in question and that I thought that this had not been fully grasped in considering the entire telephone company case.

He assured me that I was in error in believing that there was any real problem with regard to the company saying that Suñer did not think of things in their international political aspects.

I referred here to my request for an interview with the Caudillo and the Minister remarked that Franco had been loath to see me while the telephone matter was hanging fire. I observed that my object in requesting the interview was to clear up that very difficulty but that if, as he said, the matter was on the way to settlement I had no wish to take up the Caudillo's or my own time in discussion.

I added that I did wish to emphasize one point which was that in Washington an Ambassador who wished to see the President could obtain an interview through the Secretary of State without the intervention or blocking of his request by another member of the Government. He asked me to explain myself. I said that I regretted to have to say it but that Serrano Suñer did not wish me to see the Caudillo. The Minister assured me that I was mistaken and reiterated his remarks about Suñer's interior viewpoint.

The Minister then showed me a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in London the substance of which was that an American press association was sending out a story concerning cotton necessary for Catalan mills and which in certain circles it was feared might go to Italy.

The Ambassador commented that this seemed to be a similar muddying of the waters as occurred in the case of gasoline needed by Spain.

The Minister then gave a monologue on the subject of Spain's miserable international position pointing out that Spain was in no position to enter a war, that the recent protocol with Portugal made a unit of the Iberian peninsula and that his Government's concern today was that no one—French, English, Japanese, German or Italian—should touch French Morocco.

Past experiences since the declaration by the Spanish Government concerning the Telephone Company case would lead me to expect some further obstacles or difficulties but unless otherwise instructed by the Department I feel that the Embassy should delay further action in the matter pending the fulfilment or otherwise of the assurances given me today.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./379 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 12, 1940—5 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

448. My 437, August 6, 7 p. m. Behn has returned to Madrid and states after consultation with his attorneys that the annual meeting of the Telephone Company cannot be legally held before 30 days' notice has been given to stockholders. In the meantime he has made several unsuccessful efforts to see Suñer in order to obtain the latter's approval of the new directors which should have been elected at a directors' meeting scheduled for today and which is also to set the date for the annual meeting. He has also submitted a full list of new directors to be elected at the annual meeting but in view of Suñer's delaying tactics has been unable to receive any assurances that either of these lists would be acceptable to the Spanish Government. Behn also had an interview with the Foreign Minister with whom he discussed recent developments in detail and who assured him that he would "talk" to Suñer about the matter. Behn, however, received the impression that the Foreign Minister would prove of doubtful assistance in view of his lack of influence.

In spite of the assurances given me by the Foreign Minister and in view of a complete lack of any worthwhile indication of a change of heart on the part of the Minister of Gobernación, I am the more convinced that the Telephone Company case will only be settled by continued and unrelenting pressure on our part combined with an absolute refusal to discuss any needs of the Spanish Government particularly including gasoline until a satisfactory solution is reached. I will, therefore, in the absence of favorable developments in the meantime renew my request tomorrow for an immediate interview with Franco and in the meantime will again recommend to the Department that there be no departure from our present attitude of refusing to consider or discuss any Spanish desires until such time as a final and satisfactory solution of the Telephone Company case is arrived at.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./380 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 19, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 10:52 p. m.]

459. The growing conviction on the part of the Spanish authorities that we are in earnest in our refusal to permit the telephone company case to be used as a bargaining point coupled with our determination not to consider or discuss any Spanish needs until American rights and interests are recognized has had its expected result. Following a series of conversations with Suñer Colonel Behn has now reached an agreement which he is satisfied will return the American majority stockholders to the effective direction and control of the telephone company. The annual meeting has been set for September 14th. The Minister of Gobernación also approved a list of directors to fill existing vacancies, who have since been duly elected at a directors meeting held today. Furthermore Suñer has approved a complete new list of directors which will be elected at the annual meeting. Behn has also obtained the consent of the Spanish authorities for the appointment of Caldwell as executive vice president of the company who has now taken office and is in effective charge of the company's operations and in addition Behn has obtained the complete [consent?] of Suñer to his proposed reorganization of the company.

Finally it was agreed that the Government delegates will in the future confine themselves to the rights and duties set forth in the contract.

Under these circumstances I desire to make the following recommendation which if adopted would in my opinion be of material assistance in any future dealings with the Spanish Government: I propose that I now be authorized to call upon the Foreign Minister and recall to him his request that I endeavor to obtain supplies of ordinary gasoline for Spain and state that I am now informed by my Government that there would be no objection from our point of view to the Spanish Government's obtaining such quantities of ordinary gasoline for which British navicerts can be obtained and which can be transported in tankers of other than American flag.

It is doubtful [*sic*] the British now have in Spain an official of the Ministry of Economic Warfare who is studying Spanish requirements in the way of gasoline and it is therefore believed certain that it would be impossible for the Spanish authorities to obtain navicerts for any petroleum products shipped from the United States in excess of their own bona fide requirements. Thus the proposed action would be completely in line with the Department's general policy explained in its telegrams 187, August 1, 6 p. m., and 191, August 5, 5 p. m.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Neither printed.

I suggest that no reference be made on this occasion to the satisfactory solution of the telephone company case for the reason that this would inevitably be construed as an admitted return on our part for Spanish concessions in connection with this American property. The fact that gasoline suddenly became available without explanation will perhaps be sufficient to convince the Spanish authorities that we are only prepared to deal generously with them when American rights and interests are respected.

As regards any further Spanish needs for surplus commodities including cotton, wheat, et cetera, I would suggest that these problems be held in abeyance pending some concrete request or proposal from the Spanish Government, at which time the Department would be promptly and fully informed.

WEDDELL

852.75 National Telephone Co./380 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1940—7 p. m.

214. Your 459, August 19, 1 p. m. We are gratified at the successful outcome of the telephone case. The Company's New York office has requested that their appreciation be expressed to you and your staff.

The recommendations and suggestions contained in your telegram have been considered and are approved. Licenses are being freely issued for the exportation of ordinary motor gasoline to Spain. You are authorized to follow the course proposed in paragraphs 3 and 5 of your telegram.

The Department is in accord with the suggestion contained in the last paragraph of your message.

HULL

SWITZERLAND

**SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND SWITZERLAND, SIGNED JANUARY 31, 1940**

(For text of treaty, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 969, or
55 Stat. 1140.)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(See volume III.)

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