De subiecto theologiae: Gerardus Odonis and the Nature of Theological Knowledge and Theological Authority in the Early Fourteenth-Century

By

Camarin M. Porter

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(History)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2015

Date of final oral examination: 5/14/2015

The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Karl Shoemaker, Associate Professor, History
Lee Wandel, Professor, History
Johann Sommerville, Professor, History
Paula Gottlieb, Professor, Philosophy
Elizabeth Lapina, Assistant Professor, History

Abstract

"*De subiecto theologiae*: Gerardus Odonis and the Nature of Theological Knowledge and Theological Authority in the Early Fourteenth-Century" examines the *Sentences* commentary of Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M. (d. 1349), a theologian at the university of Paris, and later one of the Franciscan Order's most controversial Minister Generals. Looking at questions from Book I of the commentary and its Prologue, this project adopts Odonis as a lens for analyzing contemporary debates over the nature of theology as an activity and a body of knowledge. By the early fourteenth century, theology existed as both a specialized academic activity at the universities and a field of inquiry into the meaning of the Christian faith as revealed in Scripture. However, scholars themselves debated theology's ultimate end and the limits to human reasoning about the mysteries of the faith. Scriptural study and commentary could synthesize and simplify the faith for the majority of the laity, and serve as a pastoral tool to strenghten believers' faith. It could also provide deeper understanding of the faith for those seeking it a level of higher level of study. Tensions arising from those divergent purposes generated questions about the nature of theology, including its audience and the proper object or subject matter of theological inquiry, and the certitude of theological and doctrinal knowledge. Responses to these questions depended on the degree to which scholars upheld theology as reasoned investigation according to the terms of Aristotelian logic, and whether the framework and terminology of Aristotelian reasoning could be accurately applied to the interpretation of revealed Scripture. Debate continued over whether a science of theology would be speculative or practical in purpose, what habit it would engender, and the suitability of characterizing the *articuli fidei* (articles of faith), as self-evident first principles. Odonis' responses reveal a provocative Franciscan thinker negotiating a moderate position of support for theology as a practical science, but simultaneously defending the primacy of the habit of faith and the nature of theology as a tool for strengthening the faith, in a landscape of tension among theologians, canonists, and the papacy over the boundaries of doctrinal authority.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M. was born in 1285 in southern France and died in 1349 in Sicily, as bishop of Catania and nominal Patriarch of Antioch, after a controversial academic, ecclesiastical, and diplomatic career.[1] Odonis is known from medieval and early modern sources as the contentious Minister General of the Franciscan Order, appointed in 1329 as an internal agent of support for his patron, John XXII, and for John's efforts to suppress the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty and its most fervent observers. Prior to his administrative career, Odonis produced a broad body of theological, philosophical, scriptural and liturgical work during his time at the Franciscan houses in Toulouse and Paris. His interest in Aristotle's *Ethics* garnered him the epithet of *Doctor Moralis* among contemporaries, and his exposition and commentary of that text was his lengthiest and most influential work. Interest in Odonis' intellectual products began with his works on logic and ethics, and has expanded into sections of his *Sentences* commentary that reflect his contributions to discussions in physics and natural philosophy during the 1310s and 1320s, including questions on divine foreknowledge, predestination, and topics in natural philosophy.

[1] Variations to Gerard's name abound in the sources, although modern scholars have generally standardized their references to him as Gerardus or Geraldus Odonis, Guiral or Giural Ot, and Gerard or Gerald of Odo. Medieval and modern variants include Gerardus Othonis, Gerhardus, Gerald Odo, Gerald Otho, Gérard Odon, Geraldo Odo, Gerardo de Ódon, Girald Odonis, Giural Odonis, Gérard Odonis, Gerardus Oddo, Geraldum Hodonis, Geraldus Eudes, and Gerardus Eudes. For brief surveys of these name variations, see Chris Schabel, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M.," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 46 (2004): 115n2; and Bonnie D. Kent, Aristotle *and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis' Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1984), 1n1-4. Ambiguity over his name in early sources has at times led to false starts and misattributions, as Anglade notes, "Il est possible d'autre part, voire très probable que l'auteur de l'Obituaire ait été induit en erreur par la similitude des noms et ait confondu Gérard Odon avec le célebre cardinal cistercien Odon ou Eudes de Châteauroux." Marie-Pascal Anglade, O.F.M., "Sur la patrie de Fr. Gérard Odonis, Ministre Général," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* VI (1913): 395.

This dissertation broadens the recent exploration of Odonis' thought to examine his participation in contemporary debates over the nature of theology and theology as a science, after setting those debates in their fullest context. During the early fourteenth century, principial debates, and in written form, Sentential Principia, became venues for individualized responses to broad questions about the nature of theology, and theology as *scientia*. Scholars have previously mined the Principia of Peter Auriol (ca. 1275-1322) and works of other key figures from this period to reconstruct the intellectual contexts and concerns in these debates, and to identify the dominant voices. Until more voices are brought into the discussion, though, our understanding of the debate will remain limited to the opinions of a handful of figures, Auriol, William of Ockham, and Francis of Marchia among them.

Given the attention that many of his contemporaries' Prologues have received, both in terms of analysis and textual editing, recent efforts to open up Odonis' *Sentences* commentary for closer review have been justified and fruitful. Given the surge of interest in both his intellectual products and in the Franciscan poverty crisis as a social and political struggle with roots in contemporary tensions over doctrinal and theological authority, the time is ripe for an exposition of Odonis' Prologue and the Book I questions related to the nature of theology.

Chapter I of the dissertation provides a brief biographical account, an outline of Gerard's works, and a review of the field of Odonis studies. As this overview shows, gaps remain in our understanding of the sequence and timing of Gerard's works. Debates have arisen over how reconstruct his time in Toulouse and Paris. At stake in these disputes over timing is the trajectory not only of Odonis' career, but the development of his thought over time, and evidence for both what issues and contemporaries he chose to respond to, and what positions he adopted in so doing. As with other scholastic writers who produced a large body of works over multiple years or even

decades, half of the issue at hand entails tracking whether his later thought reflects his borrowing and revising of earlier works, and the specific relationships among texts with overlapping subject matter. Identifying these contextual and intellectual connections is especially important in Gerard's case, given the interchange of theology, economics, and ethics in the works he produced. Moreover, research on Gerard requires attention to an inherent historiographic bias. Compared to William of Ockham, Peter Auriol, and other contemporary figures whose works have received continuous focus (and which have been the long-term target of editing projects), Odonis's contributions attracted study much later. His influence on Jean Buridan and other influential writers initially led modern scholars to his work by tracing Odonis' influence on contemporaries backwards towards him.

Debates within the universities over the nature of theology were technically distinct from the political and ecclesiastical constructs of theological and doctrinal authority outside the universities, a point I will revisit. The field as it stands rarely looks for or expects bleed-over from social and personal views into *Sentences* commentary or theological and philosophical work in general. While respecting the immediate academic and intellectual contexts of the Odonis' academic products, we must also acknowledge him as an atypical, outspoken, and provocative figure and one who, like Ockham, has been recognized within the historiographical tradition as a dynamic actor in milieus beyond the pages of his academic works. Moving outward from the specifics of Gerard's life to the larger world he was part of, Chapter II builds on what is known about Gerard from the sources and embeds him in the political, socio-economic, and academic contexts of the early fourteenth century.

The chapter walks through a narrative of tensions within the Franciscan Order, beginning in Francis of Assisi's own lifetime, over how best to interpret and apply Francis' absolute

prohibitions against property ownership. Those tensions, and the contexts they extend into, including millennialism, apocalypticism, and the origins of modern secular political authority, collectively comprise what scholars refer to as the Franciscan poverty crisis. Narratives of the poverty crisis typically assume that fracture lines in the order were drawn according to clear lines of allegiance, including those who professed obedience to the order and, consequently, to the papacy; those who stressed obedience to a more literal interpretation of Francis' Rule; and those who continued to follow the Minister General Michael of Cesena after Pope John XXII intervened in the order's affairs and removed him from office in June 1328. Sources from the period, however, suggest a more complex picture, and even brief overviews of the crisis must take a more nuanced and heterogeneous approach. Franciscan leadership, for example, at times depended on the papacy to help isolate and suppress fervent radicals. Moreover, the tone of discord and of dissendent activity depends heavily on the geographic region; distinct groups of dissidents developed in southern France or Italy. David Burr and others have stressed the diversity of opinions held within the Spiritualist tradition alone.[2] The terms used in later chapters, including Spiritualists, Conventuals, and *fraticelli*, should be understood according to the definitions Burr provides outlines in his Preface.[3]

---

[2] See especially Burr's The Spiritual Franciscans from Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

[3] Burr tracks the earliest textual references to the Spirituals, and urges caution against applying the term to individuals or groups prior to the fourteenth century, although groups of zealots calling for more austere interpretations of the Rule had been active by the late thirteenth century. Burr suggest "…we can speak of the 'spiritual Franciscans' from the early fourteenth century on and enjoy at least some degree of confidence that we are using a category that would have made sense to those in the order at that time, but we should have remarkably less confidence that this would have been the case in the thirteenth century," viii. Likewise, the Conventuals should not be considered homogenous in interests or in opposition to the Spirituals. As Burr notes, "We could…[speak] of the spirituals' opponents as those who preferred to settle for a lower standard of poverty than the spirituals desired, and that would be partly accurate, but, as we will see, not entirely so," ix. Within the context of the poverty crisis as it had developed in Odonis' time, the term *fraticelli* had come to designate a group within the order whose members had dedicated themselves to a

Because Odonis figures so heavily in literature on the Franciscan poverty crisis and the tension over theological authority that it both generated and reflected, this study draws on the recent work of Patrick Nold, Roberto Lambertini, and others who have examined the intersection of the poverty controversy and papal doctrinal polemic.[4] While many scholars, most notably Lambertini, have incorporated Odonis as a pivotal background character in their studies, in an overview of the poverty crisis below, I begin with Odonis, in an attempt reshift a narrative that usually radiates outward from Peter John Olivi, John XXII, and William of Ockham.[5]

---

deeply ascetic lifestyle (the *fraticelli de paupere vita*) as well as those members of the order who stood sympathic with Michael of Cesena after his deposition as Minister General (the *fraticelli de opinione*). See Burr, 281-303.

[4] Patrick Nold, Pope *John XXII and his Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). Roberto Lambertini has written extensively (discussed in Chapter Two) on the political and theological currents running through Franciscan history from the order's origins through the 1320s, as well as political theory that emerged from the crisis. See esp. his *Apologia e crescita dell'identità francescana 1255-1279* (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1990); "*Usus* and *Usura*: Poverty and Usury in the Franciscans' Responses to John XXII's *Quia vir reprobus*," *Franciscan Studies 54* for 1994 (1997): 185-210; Lambertini and Andrea Tabarroni, eds.. *Dopo Francesco: l'eredita difficile* (Torino: Edizioni Gruppo Abele, 1989); "La difesa dell'ordine Francescano di fronte alle critiche dei secolari in Olivi," *Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298). Études de philosophie médiévale* 79 (1999): 193-205; *La povertà pensata: evoluzione storica della definizione dell'identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham* (Modena: Mucchi, 2000); "Francesco d'Ascoli e la polemica francescana contro Giovanni XXII: A proposito dei rapporti tra l' *Improbatio* e l'*Appellatio magna monacensis*," in A. Degrandi *et al*., eds, *Studi in onore di Girolamo Arnaldi offerti dalla Suola nazionale di studi medioevali* (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 2001), 277–308; "Ende oder Vollendung. Interpretazioni eschatologiche del conflitto tra Scolari e Mendicanti alla metà del XIII secolo" *Ende und Vollendung: Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Martin Pickavé (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 250-261; "La povertà e la spada. A proposito dell'interpretazione di Luca 22, 35-38 nella polemica francescana contro Giovanni XXII," in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale: études offert à Zénon Kaluza*, ed. Paul Bakker, et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 617-652; "La *concordia* tra Niccolò III e Giovanni XXII in Fitzralph and Wyclif. Note su alcune reinterpretazioni della povertà francescani," *John Wyclif: Logica, politica, teologia. Atti del Convegno Internazionale Milano, 12-13 Febbraio 1999*, ed. Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri and Stefano Simonietta (2003): 3-22; "La povertà e la spade. A proposito dell'interpretazione di Luca 22, 35-38 nella polemica francescana contro Giovanni XXII," 617-652; "The Franciscan background of early modern rights discussion: rights of property and subsistence," *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity*. ed. Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2005); and "Francis of Marchia and William of Ockham: Fragments from a Dialogue,"in Friedman and Schabel (2006), 184–204.

[5] David Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Nick Havely, "From Assisi to Avignon: Dante, the Franciscans, and the Papal Inquiry of 1309-12" *Journal of the Institute of Romance Studies* 3 for

Chapter III traces the medieval discussions surrounding the nature of theology and theological knowledge, from their patristic origins through the late thirteenth century. Chapters III and IV make frequent reference to the *articuli fidei,* or articles of faith of the Christian tradition. In the medieval scholastic tradition, those articles referred to statements taken from language in the Apostle's Creed.[6] Although ambiguity surrounded early iterations of those statements, as Chapter III notes, by Odonis' time the references he and his contemporaries made to the articles alluded to the specific enumeration standardized by Thomas Aquinas (O.P., d. 1274).[7]

1994-5 (1995): 43-52; IDEM, "The Blood of the Apostles: Dante, the Franciscans and Pope John XXII" *Italian Studies* 52 (1997): 38-50; and IDEM, *Dante and the Franciscans: Poverty and the Papacy in the* Commedia (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004).

As a general historiographic note, it bears mentioning here that scholars have approached Odonis from a number of distinct angles. Duncan Nimmo, for example, discusses him within his broader history of the Capuchin Order's origins within the Franciscan Order, while Nimmo and others take interest in his specific role in the poverty controversy. I take this diversity of approaches as support for my own argument that Odonis was a singular, transitional figure whose complex opinions and loyalties seem even to contradict each other at various points throughout his career (from 1324 to the suppression of Michaelists, to approving hermitage at Brugliano). At a foundational level, Odonis' involvement in the Order's controversies establishes that tensions related to shifting Franciscan identity neither ended in 1324 nor 1329, and that such a complex leader as Odonis could provide a unique window for this transitional period.

[6] The development and dissemination of the earliest Christian creeds are complex narratives, and have generated an extensive body of scholarship. The present study focuses on the references to the creed in the central and late scholastic traditions, which were references to the Apostles' Creed. For discussions and debates that contextualize the emergence of an orthodox creed tradition and the language of late Roman and early medieval credal texts, see among others, J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds,* 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1972); Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss, eds., *Rules of Faith in the Early Church,* vol. 1 of *Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Trevor Hart, "Creeds, Councils, and Doctrinal Development," in *The Early Christian World,* ed. Philip F. Esler (New York: Routledge, 2004), 636-659; and Everett Ferguson, "Creeds, Councils, and Canons," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies,* ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David Hunter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 427-445.

[7] See Chapter III, "The *articuli fidei* as First Principles," below, especially fn264. Aquinas and his contemporaries depended on twelfth and thirteenth-century translations of Aristotle's work from Greek and Arabic into Latin. In addition to the expanse of centuries that separated Aquinas from Aristotle's original thought, it is important to recognize as well the mistranslations and textual alterations that rendered Aquinas' interpretations of Aristotle and Aristotelian vocabulary distinct from their original forms. For a brief overview of the textual tradition of the Latin translations of Aristotle's texts, including those by Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253) and William of Moerbeke, O.P. (d. 1286), see Edward Grant, *The Foundation of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Traditions* (Cambridge:

Chapter IV introduces Odonis' own generation of scholars at Paris, in preparation for a textual study of several questions from Odonis' Prologue. The conclusion distills the arguments Odonis made in opposition to contemporaries, and considers what meaning his responses to questions on the nature of theology had for that debate, and for broader ambiguity during this period over the proper jurisdiction of theological and doctrinal orthodoxy, particularly as tensions arose among theology masters at Paris, canonists, and the papacy during the Franciscan poverty crisis.

Overall, the present study is directed towards two goals. The first is a contextualization of Odonis' life and works and a historiographical survey of Odonis studies, to bring him forward in intellectual, academic, and theological discussions as a key figure of the early fourteenth century, and to situate him more explicitly and dynamically within the relevant social, political, and ecclesiastical backgrounds.

The second is a textual study of twenty-one questions from Odonis' *Sentences* Prologue (Bk. I) and Book I, and establishment of his contributions to contemporary discussions on the nature of theology, specifically within the subtopics of a) the categorization of theology as a science in Aristotelian terms; b) the proper subject and object of theology; and c) the certitude of theological and doctrinal knowledge. Questions within these subtopics also pivoted around Odonis and his contemporaries' treatment of habits and cognition. To provide full context for this study, I include here a brief survey of the narrative and historiography of the debate on theology as a science from through the 1310s and 1320s.

Cambridge University Press, 1996), in particular "The New Beginning: The Age of Translation in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," 18-32.

In addition to the vocabulary medieval scholars adopted from Aristotle's works on logic and metaphysics (defined and discussed in Chapters III and IV), two terms common to all periods of Christian religious history require clarification as to their specific meaning in this project. To a general audience, the terms theology and doctrine may both be understood equivocally as references to a body of knowledge, teaching, revelation, exegesis, or authorative interpretation or dictate about the faith. Even in contemporary use, though, theology should be distinguished from doctrine. Theology is the active inquiry and study of God and the mysteries of the faith through revealed Scripture, Scriptural commentaries from the patristic period, and the ensuing tradition of theological work produced within monastic, cathedral, and academic contexts. Doctrine, by contrast, can be interpreted as a product of theological inquiry. It refers more broadly, though, to the cumulative and authoritative construct of orthodox belief as drawn from Scripture directly, and from the opinions and conclusions drawn by theologians, church councils and popes. Both terms are distinct from religious belief, which refers only to the lived experience, interpretations, and spiritual identity of individual believers.

To a limited extent, those definitions are suitable for the medieval period, although deeper amibiguity surrounded claims to authority over them. To investigate late medieval discussions about the nature and purpose of theology requires equally careful attention to the processes through which both theological and doctrinal conclusions emerge. In Prologue discussions like the one profiled in Chapter IV, we find theologians debating the nature of theology itself in an academic setting, but within a broader context of sharp tension over who controlled the boundaries, definition, and teaching of doctrine. At the level of administration of the university of Paris itself, tension arose over the respective jurisdiction and primacy of the dean of the theology faculty and the rector of the arts faculty. Further tensions emerged with the chancellors of Notre Dame and St.

Geneviève over control of the teaching license (the *licentia docendi*). Compounded with latent hostility and conflict between secular and mendicant communities, the fluid movement of individuals in and out of Paris during strikes and periods of war that made their presence in Paris impractical, and career aspirations and competition among students for the benefices or administrative positions within their order, we find several shifting plates underlying the academic world of theology.

Tensions and conflicts between temporal leaders and the papacy also affected the universities, most prominently in the examples of Philip IV's attacks on Boniface VII and his demand for theologians' support for his condemnation of the pope.[8] The Franciscan poverty crisis embodied all of these tensions and more. As the overview in Chapter II will show, one of the most pivotal events of the crisis was the John XXII's denunciation of the ideal of Apostolic Poverty as heretical. As we will see, John's prohibitions targeted not only the belief and dissemination of this point of doctrine (the idea that Christ and the Apostles used, but did not personally own the goods they are described as having in Scripture), but in doing so also inserted himself into a theological discussion of how to interpret Scripture. Odonis and his contemporary Franciscan theologians at Paris were inherently affected by John's decision, by virtue of its meaning for the future of their order. Within this picture, the boundaries of expertise and authority over theology and doctrine become problematically fluid: even more so when we draw in tension with canonists. The debates over the nature of theology and theology as a science in *Sentences* commentaries of this period are direct products of the academic world of the lectures and debates their authors participated in. But

[8] See among other sources William J. Courtenay's "Between Pope and King: The Parisian Letters of Adhesion of 1303," *Speculum* 71 (1996): 577-605.

as we will see, tension and ambiguity about the nature of theological and doctrinal authority and their relationship to each other manifested themselves distinctly, but just as prominently in other aspects of scholars' lives, including Odonis'.

A Note on Manuscript Sources Used

The textual-study component of this dissertation is based on manuscript evidence of Odonis' *Sentences* Commentary. No early printed editions of the commentary exist, and although work has recently begun on an edited critical edition of the text, it is only accessible through the extant manuscript tradition. All references to the manuscript tradition correspond to the sigla and foliation established by Chris Schabel in his manuscript study, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 46 (2004): 115-161. I have relied most heavily on a microfilmed copy of the Madrid ms. 65 ("M_1" in Schabel), referenced and compared against a digital copy of Valencia ms. 139 ("V"). An excerpt of a recent preliminary transcription of sections of M_2 by Jerry Etzkorn has been invaluable for correcting my own original transcription errors.

Chapter I: Gerardus Odonis (1285-1349): Works and Historiography

Preface: Medieval and Modern Characterizations of Odonis

A biographical account must begin somewhere, and in Odonis' case we begin not with his origins, but with his mendicant and academic careers, where the greatest source material for his life is concentrated. Odonis exists as a significant and relatively well-known figure in the historical record, although more as a controversial Franciscan Minister General than as a theology master. If we apply the modern premise that all press is good press, we recognize that Odonis, like Ockham, gained notoriety as much beyond his academic context as within it. Although we benefit from having litigious, non-academic sources to flesh out our portrait of him Odonis as a scholar comes the expected weight of source biases attached to extraordinary figures. Texts such as Cesena's letter of attack, and contemporary chronicle accounts are problematically polemic, and do not speak to Gerard's own views on voluntary poverty. The full context of the personal and political polemic surrounding the Franciscan poverty crisis will be examined in full in Chapter II. Before examining Odonis as an individual and scholar, though, it would be useful to acknowledge the popular portrait of him that emerges from medieval and modern accounts.

Narratives of Franciscan history often lend themselves to depicting Ministers General as heroes or villains, and in such accounts, Gerard is often demonized, and set apart even from other contemporaries who favored a lenient interpretation of the rule.[9] Comparisons have been made, in

[9] Rosalind Brooke noted that "too strong an emphasis on the personalities of the Ministers General" was often read back into their debates. Although in reference specifically to John and Bonaventure, the point is a valid one generally speaking, in so far as the identities of Ministers General, like Elias have been overly-colored by the disputes in which they were embroiled. Rosalind Brooke, *Early Franciscan Government: Elias to Bonaventure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 34.

both the medieval and modern periods, between Odonis and Elias of Cortona, the controversial companion of Francis who served as vicar general and Minister General. Both took power and held office under controversy, and both had their authority and the legitimacy of their leadership contested by minorities within the order.

We have no evidence for Gerard's own spiritual views to help us temper such harsh bias against him, and we must engage with the characterization that exists. As Odd Langholm has said, "If Gerald was not in fact the living opposite of the meek and ascetic friar, history and his enemies have made him so."[10] In a mid-century description that reflects a common account of Odonis, John Moorman suggested he "was known to be a safe man, a close friend of John XXII, and a supporter of those who desired further relaxations in the daily life of the friars."[11] To be sure, Gerard not only generally supported John XXII on the poverty crisis, but defended his peculiar foray into the theology of the Beatific Vision. John and his successor, Benedict XII, both rewarded Gerard with diplomatic missions on behalf of the papacy, and Gerard was eventually appointed to the wealthy bishopric of Catania, and became patriarch of Antioch. Like John, Odonis was a native of southern France, with diplomatic experience suppressing rebellious Franciscans in that area. Several years before taking administrative control of the order, Odonis had established himself as a critic of strict interpretations of the poverty vow; as a theology master in Paris, he had petitioned the papacy to release the order from strict observance. In the late 1320s, when John needed a loyal insider to

[10] Odd Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 510.
[11] John R.H. Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan order from its Origins to the Year 1517* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 321.

defend his statement on poverty and to quell rebellion within the order, Gerard (like Bertrand de la Tour) was both well-known to him and suited his needs in many ways.

Not surprisingly, contemporaries and modern scholars alike have labeled Gerard as "anti-poverty," as a career opportunist, and as a turncoat Franciscan under whose leadership the order later turned away from Francis' ideals of *humilitas* and *povertas*.[12] As Duncan Nimmo has observed, Odonis "was near the center of the gravest shock to its sense of purpose the order ever experienced."[13] John's interference at a broad level, and *Cum inter nonnullos* more specifically, called into question the abstract definition of poverty itself, but more importantly raised fundamental questions about the nature of Franciscan identity. Was a life of absolute poverty realistically viable? Was a friar's primary obedience to the Rule of 1223 and Francis' *Testament*, to the order's current leadership, or to the papacy? How should the Rule itself be interpreted? Who held authority to amend the Rule or the theological and doctrinal truths believed to underlie it? It is not relevant to our intellectual portrait of Odonis to ask where he positioned himself on these issues, but it is worth acknowledging the special context in which one of the main protagonists of the Franciscan poverty crisis in the fourteenth century developed his perspective on the nature of theology and jurisdiction over doctrinal authority. Odonis represents a unique access point into contemporary attitudes toward doctrinal disputes such as the poverty controversy political, legal, and theological discussions. It is impossible to reconstruct any one individual's

[12] It should be noted that Odonis already faces an "anti-poverty" burden in the sources because he was a theologian studying comfortably at the order's house in Paris. "Theologians were appropriately singled out as those friars who failed most conspicuously to observe poverty. By the second half of the fourteenth century, the pattern of their lives differed markedly from that of ordinary Minorites." Carroly Erickson, "The Fourteenth-Century Franciscans and the Critics: II. Poverty, Jurisdiction, and Internal Change," *Franciscan Studies* (1976), 115.

[13] Nimmo, "Poverty and Politics: The Motivation of Fourteenth-Century Franciscan Reform in Italy," *Studies in Church History* XV (1978): 166-7.

perspective or point of view, but careful use of the extant sources can bring more fourteenth-century voices into the discussion.

As divorced in immediate circumstances as Gerard's academic work is from his involvement in Franciscan politics, we have to ask where in his biography we should fit the miscellanea of characterizations from the poverty dispute, and of what relevance they are to our portrait of him as a scholar. At a minimum, we should hope that increased study of Odonis' theological works, including the present textual study of his *Sentential* Prologue, together with the recent work done on his logic and ethics, will shape the cumulative characterization of him into one of the influential minds of the first quarter of the fourteenth century, in addition to one of its most infamous figures. Unlike Ockham and other of his peers who have received much more attention, there is not as much danger of Gerard having been misunderstood, as having not yet been understood in a dynamic sense that takes in all of his contexts.

Biographical Sources

Biographical information for Odonis' early years and education is limited. Sources are inevitably more vocal about the years after his election to the office of Minister General of the Franciscan Order in 1329. After that point he appears in records and correspondence, some polemical, related to his administration of the order and to his service as a papal diplomat under John XXII and Benedict XII.

In addition to the extant manuscripts of Odonis' works, several medieval sources provide evidence for Gerard's background, career, and travels, as well as his responses to contemporary issues and conflicts both within and outside the order. These resources include fourteenth-century chronicles, notably Giovanni Villani's *Chroniche fiorentine*, Arnald of Sarrant's *Chronica XXIV*

Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, and Bartholomew of Pisa's *De Conformitate Vitae S. Francisci ad Vitam D. Iesu.*[14] Several prospographical and administrative sources specific to Franciscan history, including legislative documents from within the order also include biographical information. The proceedings of the General Chapter held at Perpignan in 1331, for example, are a significant source for our portrait of Odonis in the early years of his tenure as Minister General, a period throughout which he remained a highly divisive figure.[15]

Several texts record Gerard's positions and involvement with regard to contemporary events. He directly addressed the Spiritualist and Michaelist conflicts in *Quid niteris,* his response to Michael of Cesena's letter to the General Chapter at Perpignan in 1331, and to which Cesena replied with the letter *Teste Salomone.*[16] Gerard figures alongside John XXII as an object of William of Ockham's polemic in the *Opus Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris*

[14] For Villani, see Pietro Massai, *Istorie fiorentine di Giovanni Villani, cittadino fiorentino* (Milano: Societá tipografica de' classici italiani, 1802) and *Cronica di Giovanni Villani a miglior lezione ridotta coll' ajuto de' testi a penna*, ed. Ignazio Moutier and Francesco Gherardi Dragomanni (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969). The *Chronica XXIV Generalium* has been reproduced in *the Analecta Franciscana sive chronica allaque varia documenta ad historiam Fratrum Minorum spectantia*, vol. 3 (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1885). For Bartholomew of Pisa, see the "De conformitate vitae beati Francisci ad vitam Domini Iesu," *Analecta Franciscana* 4-5 (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1906).

[15] "Constitutiones Generales Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, a capitulo Perpiniani anno 1331 celebrato editae," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* II (1909): 269-292. A brief reference to Gerard's career also appears in the Register of the Grey Friars of London. See Charles Kingsford, The Grey Friars of London, Their History with the Register of Their Convent and an Appendix of Documents (Aberdeen: The University Press, 1915). See Charles-Victor Langlois, "Guiral Ot (Geraldus Odonis)," in *Histoire Littéraire de la France* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1927), 207.

[16] Latin editions of *Quid niteris* and *Teste Salomone* appear in Albanus Heysse's "Duo Documenta de Polemica inter Gerardum Oddonem et Michaelem de Caesena," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 9 (1916): 134-183, and more recently in Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. and David Flood, O.F.M., eds., *Nicolaus Minorita: Chronica. Documentation on Pope John XXII, Michael of Cesena, and the Poverty of Christ* (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1996), 918-1008. Gál and Flood provide the texts alongside Michael's open letters to the order, and Nicholas the Minorite's response to *Quid niteris.*

compendium errorum Joanis XXII, and as an implied target of Ockham's criticism in the *Epistola ad Fratres Minores,* and the *Opus nonaginta dierum.*[17]

In addition to the extant medieval sources, we also find cursory references to Odonis in several early modern chronicles and histories. Chronicle and archival accounts include Johannes Trithemius's *De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis* and Marianus de Florentia's *Compendium Chronicarum Fratrum Minorum* from the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, Rocco Pirri's *Sicilia Sacra,* and Odorico Rinaldi's seventeenth-century *Annales ecclesiastici.*[18] Many general references works from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also provide evidence for Odonis' life and works, notably Ludwig Hain's *Repertorium bibliographicum*; Casimir Oudin's *Commentarius de scriptoribus ecclesiae antiquis*; Guilielmus Cave's *Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum historia literaria*; Christian Gottlieb Jöcher's *Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon* (1750-1751); Louis Du Pin's *Nouvelle bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques*; Guillaume Lacoste and Louis Combarieu's *Histoire générale de la province de Quercy*; Johannes Fabricius' *Bibliotheca Latina mediae et infimae aetatis*; Maurice Faucon's *La librairie des papes d'Avignon*; and Ulysse Chevalier's *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen age bio-bibliographie*.[19]

---

[17] Ralph Francis Bennett and H. S. Offler, eds., *Guillelmi de Ockham opera politica* (Mancunii: E typis Universitatis, 1956); and Melchior Goldast William and Richard Scholz, eds., *William of Ockham Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris compendium errorum Joanis XXII* (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959).

[18] For editions of these texts, see Johannes Trithemius and Johannes Amerbach, *Liber de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis* (Basel: Johann Amerbach, 1494); Marianus de Florentia's "Compendium Chronicarum Fratrum Minorum Scriptum a Patre Mariano de Florentia" in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* III (1910): 294-309; Rocco Pirri, Antonino Mongitore, and Vito Amico, *Sicilia sacra, disquisitionibus et notiis illustrata. Ubi libris quatuor...a Christiane Religionis exordio ad nostra usque tempora cujusque praesulatus...institutio, archiepiscopi, episcopi, abbates, priores, singulorum jura...explicantur* (Panormi: Apud haeredes P. Coppulae, 1733); and Odorici Rinaldi, Cesare Baronio, and Giovan Domenico Mansi, eds., *Annales ecclesiastici ab anno MCXCVIII ubi desinit Cardinalis Baronius (*Lucae: Typis Leonardi Venturini, 1747).

[19] See Guilielmus Cave, *Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum historia literaria, a Christo nato, usque ad sæculum XIV. facili methodo digesta, et nunc auctior facta ... ; Accedunt scriptores gentiles* (Coloniæ Allobrogum: Gabrielem de Tournes & filios, 1720); Casimir Oudin, *Commentarius de scriptoribus ecclesiae antiquis* (Lipsiae: M.G. Weidmanni, 1722); Guillaume Lacoste and Louis Combarieu, *Histoire générale de la*

Odonis also figures heavily in later histories and compendiums written from within the Franciscan order, notably Luke Wadding's seventeenth-century *Annales Minorem* and *Scriptores ordinis minorum,* and Joannes Sbaralea's early nineteenth-century *Supplementum ad scriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci*.[20] Gerard also appears in the *Obituaire du Couvent des Cordeliers de Châteauroux* (*1213-1782*) and Edmond Albe's biographical works on John XXII.[21]

Historiographical Tradition

The earliest modern biographical surveys of Odonis' life were accounts by Marie-Pascal Anglade in 1913, Michael Bihl in 1913 and 1937, Charles-Victor Langlois in 1927, and Amadeus Teetart's entry in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* in 1932.[22] Brief profiles of Odonis,

---

province de Quercy (Cahors: J. Girma, 1883); Maurice Faucon, *La librairie des papes d'Avignon: sa formation, sa composition, ses catalogues (1316-1420) d'après les registres de comptes et d'inventaires des archives vaticanes* (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1886); Ulysse Chevalier, *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen age bio-bibliographie* (Paris: Picard, 1905); Ludwig Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum, in quo libri omnes ab arte typographica inventa usque ad annum MD. typis expressi, ordine alphabetico vel simpliciter enumerantur vel adcuratius recensentur* (Milano: Görlich, 1948); Christian Gottlieb Jöcher, *Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon darinne die Gelehrten ...welche vom Anfange der Welt bis auf jetzige Zeit gelebt....nach ihrer Geburt, Leben... Schrifften... beschrieben werden* (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1960); Johannes Albertus Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Latina mediae et infimae aetatis* (Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, 1962); and Louis Ellies Du Pin, *Nouvelle bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques.* (orig. pub. Paris, 1690-1736) (Westmead: Gregg International Publishers, 1969).

[20]Sbaralea, J.H. *Supplementum ad scriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci*, 2nd ed., t. I, Rome, 1908, p. 324-325.

[21] The *Obituaire de couvent des Cordeliers de Châteauroux* includes biographical information for Franciscans from 1213 to 1782. The account of Gerard's life was written in 1653, by P. Péan. See Anglade, 393, and 393fn1 See Eugène Hubert, and A. Majesté, eds., *Obituaire du Couvent des Cordeliers de Châteauroux, 1213-1782 publié d'après l'original conservé aux archives du département de l'Indre* (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1885); Edmond Albe *Autour de Jean XXII. Les familes du Quercy.* t. II (Rome, Société des etudes littéraires, 1902-4), 143; IDEM, *Autour de Jean XXII. Hugues Géraud, éveque de Cahors. L'affaire des poisons et des envoûtements en 1317* (Cahors: J. Girma, 1904).

[22] See Anglade, "Sur la patrié de Fr. Gérard Odonis, Ministre Générale," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* VI (1913): 392-396; Michael Bihl, O.F.M., "Gerardus Odonis," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. VI (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1913), 468-69; Langlois (1927); Amadeus Teetaert, "Ot, Guiral, en latin Geraldus Odonis, frère mineur," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* XI (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1932): 1658-1663; and Bihl, *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* XXX (1937): 84-85.

based largely on Wadding and Langlois' works, also appeared in Giralamo Golubovich's biography of Franciscan figures in the Middle East, Anscar Zawart's biographical survey of Franciscan preachers, and in André Wilmart's 1935 study of the literary tradition surrounding Gerard's poem, *De septem verbis Domini in Cruce,* originally attributed to Bonaventure.[23] The first full-length work devoted to Odonis was a 1928 dissertation, *Fray Gerardo de Odón, Ministro General de la Orden Franciscana, 1329-1342,"* by Léon Bartolomé, in Rome.[24] Langlois' profile of Odonis has heavily informed all later accounts, including Teetaert's, and has remained the standard biographical reference until now, even among most recent works.

Updated biographies and textual studies began to appear after mid-century, with several articles and the first editions of Odonis' works. Odonis also began to figure within the scope of broader studies of fourteenth-century thought as a thinker whose works influenced several of his contemporaries, including Jean Buridan.[25] Given Odonis' position as Minister General, and his role in John XXII's struggle to suppress the Spiritualist movement, he has also figured largely in

[23] Golubovich, Giralamo, ed.. *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell' Oriente franciscano*, t. IV (Quaracchi, 1923), 364; André Wilmart, "Le Grand Poème Bonaventurien sur les sept Paroles du Christ en Croix," *Revue Bénédictine* 47 (1935): 248-256; Anscar Zawart, "The History of Franciscan Preaching and of Franciscan Preachers 1209-1927: A Bio-Bibliographical Study," *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1928): 303.

[24] León Bartolomé, O.F.M., *Fray Gerardo de Odón, Ministro General de la Orden Franciscana, 1329-1342* (Diss., Collegio Internacional de San Antonio de Roma, 1928). Although Bartolomé's work was later cited in several studies of Odonis, it is not well known or frequently referenced in the historiographical tradition, and has been overshadowed as a biographical reference by Langlois' account. Bartolomé's dissertation remained the only focused study on Odonis for several decades, and the only dissertation written on Odonis until Bonnie Kent's 1985 study on Odonis' *Ethics* commentary, an exception being Alfons Lellig, S.C.J's article, "Die visiolehre des Gerardus Odonis: Generalminister der Minoriten," an excerpt taken from his dissertation (Diss., Pontificiae universitatis Gregorianae, 1951).

[25] See Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, Albertyzm I tomizm w XV wieku w Krakowie I Kolonii (Wroclaw: Polska Akad. Nauk, 1973): 63-68; and Jerzy B. Korolec, "Les principes de la philosophie morale de Jean Buridan," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 21 (1975): 53-72, esp. 68-71, where Korolec examines Buridan's approach to the *Ethics* broadly taken and his views on virtue and human freedom more specifically by setting his commentary in context with Odonis'.

surveys and reference works for Franciscan history.[26] A handful of additional, isolated studies emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s, representing the first focused explorations of his theological and philosophical texts, and reflecting a growing interest in establishing Odonis' doctrinal positions and his responses to contemporary debates.[27]

Research on Odonis increased significantly during the last quarter of the twentieth century, with studies done by Anneliese Maier, Stephen Brown, James Walsh, Odd Langholm, Bonnie Kent, and others. In her 1965 study, "Die Pariser Disputationen des Geraldus Odonis über die Visio Beatifica," Maier characterized Odonis as one of the most original thinkers of the fourteenth century.[28] Despite her call for further studies of his work, Stephen Brown observed a decade later, in his 1975 addition of Odonis' *Tractatibus de suppositionibus*, that Odonis still remained best known to historians as a divisive figure in Franciscan history, and only secondarily, through new research on his logic and ethics, as the author of highly individualized and personalized texts on

[26] See references in Livario Oliger, "Fr. Bertrandi de Turre processus contra spirituals Aquitaniae (1315)" *Archivum franciscanum historicum* XVI (1923): 323-355; Raphael M. Huber, *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order (1182-1517)* (Milwaukee: Nowiny Publishing Apostolate, Inc., 1944); Clément Schmitt, O.F.M., *Un Pape réformateur et un défenseur de l'unité de l'Eglise: Benoît XII et l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs, 1334-1342* (Quaracchi: College Saint-Bonaventure, 1959); Malcolm Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order, 1210-1323* (London: S.P.C.K., 1961); and John Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origins to the Year 1517* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968).

[27] Vassili P. Zoubov, "Walter Catton, Gérard d'Odon et Nicolas Bonet," *Physis* 1 (1959): 261-278; Antonius M. Mruk, S.I., 'Singularis opinio Gerardi Odinis O.F.M. circa naturam divortii in casu adulterii', *Gregorianum* 41 (1960): 273-283; and James J. Walsh, "Buridan and Seneca." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27 (1966): 23-40.

[28] Although Maier's positive characterization of Odonis' thought drew attention to his work, and encouraged other scholars to take him into account as a prominent figure and contemporary of Ockham and Auriol. See Maier's "Die Pariser Disputationen des Geraldus Odonis über die Visio Beatifica," *Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà* IV (1965): 213-252; and EADEM, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter: gesammelte Aufsätze zur eistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura 1977); as well as Gedeon Gál's comments on her assessment of Odonis in "Geraldus Odonis on the Univocity of the Concept of Being," *Franciscan Studies* 52 (1992), 23.

ethics and physics; he remained otherwise "virtually unstudied and unknown" with regard to his works in logic and theology.[29]

Momentum has significantly increased since that point, however, particularly as scholars recognized Odonis' *Ethics* commentary as a rich source for not only his contributions on the virtues and the will, but economic thought as well. Increased attention to his *Sentences* commentary and works on logic, as well as continued research on the Spiritualist crisis have made Odonis a focus of study within four domains: ethics, economic thought, fourteenth-century theology, philosophy and logic, and Franciscan history. Research in the last two decades by L.M. De Rijk, Chris Schabel, and others, explored below, has supplemented and at times corrected many of the conclusions about Gerard's thought and the sequence of his career, works, and travels proposed in earlier biographies. The 2007 S.I.E.P.M. Congress in Palermo brought together scholars working on all aspects of Odonis' thought for the first conference sessions dedicated to Odonis research.[30]

The wide-ranging body of scholarship on Odonis reflects the breadth and diversity of his works. That said, research in each of the four categories noted above has remained more isolated from the others than might be expected; studies have not frequently overlapped, leaving a

---

[29] See Stephen F. Brown, "Gerard Odon's "De Suppositionibus," *Franciscan Studies* 35 (1975): 5 and 10. Brown here cites James J. Walsh, and Vassili Zoubov, who, along with Maier, were the first scholars to focus on specific questions in Odonis' thought.

[30] The S.I.E.P.M. sessions reflected the most recent approaches to Odonis' philosophical and theological thought: Russ Friedman, "Gerard Odo on the Soul"; Chris Schabel, "Gerard Odonis and the Plurality of Worlds"; Bill Duba, "The Beatific Vision in the *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis"; Christian Trottman, "Pluralité philosophique dans le traité de Guiral Ot sur la vision de Dieu"; Roberto Lambertini, "Letters and Politics: Odonis vs. Michael of Cesena and Francis of Marchia"; Joke Spruyt, "Gerardus Odonis' Logic of Being"; Giovanni Ceccarelli and Sylvain Piron, "Guiral Odonis' Economics Treatise"; and Camarin Porter, "Identifying Theological Authority in Book I of Gerardus Odonis' Sentences Commentary." Papers from the sessions appeared collectively in a *Vivarium* issue (47:2, 2009) dedicated to Odonis studies, along with additional articles by Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Sander de Boer ("*Locus est spatium.* On Gerald Odonis' *Quaestio de loco*"); Stephen Brown ("Gerald Odonis' *Tractatus de suppositionibus:* What is *supposition communicabilis*?"); and Camarin Porter ("Gerardus Odonis' Commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*: a Discussion of the Manuscripts and General Survey"). Duba and Schabel also provided an introductory biographical portrait of Odonis and his works.

fragmented portrait of Odonis' thoughts and concerns. Tracking Gerard's origins and life before his academic career began has proved difficult, as shown by Anglade, who first surveyed the medieval and early modern sources for Gerard's life. According to Hubert's *Obituaire du Couvent des Cordeliers de Châteauroux, 1213-1782,* and several other sources, Gerard was from the province of Tourraine. In his own survey of the evidence, though, Anglade established that this was not the case, and established Gerard as a native of Aquitaine.[31] Anglade surveyed the medieval and early modern sources for Odonis' life, and by comparing accounts was able to discredit earlier claims made about Gerard's early life and career.

Works

Odonis has been largely overshadowed in an academic context by his contemporaries at both Oxford and Paris, notably William of Ockham, Peter Auriol, and Jean Buridan, and by Ockham, Michael of Cesena and John XXII in the context of the Franciscan poverty crisis. Large and small-scale efforts to edit his works, however, have increasingly brought his voice forward within the historiographical tradition; his works on logic have been edited, as well as several questions from his *Sentences* commentary and his *quodlibeta,* and most recently his economic treatises, *De contractibus* and *De excommunicationibus et de casibus reservatis*.[32] In addition to these textual studies, discussed in-depth below, revised biographical accounts have appeared in response to increased interest in establishing the sequence of his career and works and distilling his fundamental contributions.[33] Several partial bibliographies of Odonis' works and known

[31] Anglade, 393.
[32] See an anlysis of Odonis' treatise on contracts in Giovanni Ceccarelli and Sylvain Piron's "Gerald Odonis' Economic Treatise," *Vivarium* 47 (2009): 164-204.
[33] A. Emmen, "Geraldus Odonis," *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* 4 (1960): 708; Clément Schmitt, "Ot (Guiral; Geraldus Odonis)," *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 11 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1982), 1057-1058; Roberto

manuscript witnesses, *olim* and extant.[34] Information on manuscripts attributed to Odonis also appears in several archival catalogs.[35]

In addition to the considerable body of work confirmed to be Odonis', Charles Lohr cites two doubtful works, the *Quaestiones in logicam* (Wadding, Sbaralea: 'asservantur in Complutensi bibliotheca Collegii Majoris' (cf. item 3), and the *Quaestiones in naturali philosophia*, cited in manuscripts and later by Wadding.[36] Of the first, Lohr notes, "Vaticana Vat. Lat. 3066 (XIV) f.

Lambertini and Andrea Tabarroni, *Dopo Francesco: l'eredità difficile* (Torino: Edizioni Gruppo Abele), 1989, 158-159; Bonnie Kent, "Gerard of Odo," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 4 (London: Routledge, 1998): 38b-40a; "Gerard of Odo," in *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, ed. Norman Kretzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 861; Olga Weijers, "Giraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot), [*ca.* 1285-1349]," *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: texts et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500*) 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 79-83; Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Olga Weijers, "Un type de commentaire particulier à la Faculté des arts: la *sententia cum questionibus," La tradition vive: mélanges d'histoire des textes en l'honneur de Louis Holtz*, ed. Pierre Lardet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), v. II, 211-213; Steven J. Livesey, "Gerardus Odonis, Minister Generalis, O.F.M., Patiarch of Antioch ca. 1285-1349," in International Encylopaedia for the Middle Ages-Online Supplement to LexMA-Online. Turnhout: Brepols, 2007, in Brepolis Medieval Encyclopaedias http://www.brepolis.net/bme [Accessed 10 May 2007]; and Schabel, "Gerald Odonis," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Henrik Lagerlun (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 903.

[34] Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum* (1940) v. II, n. 2466-2472., 339-40; Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentarium in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (1947) v. I, 113-14; P. V. Doucet, "Codicographia: Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au repertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüeller," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 47 (1954): 117; Lohr, "Gerardus Odonis O.F.M., in "Medieval Latin Commentaries, Authors G-I," *Traditio* XXIV (1968): 149-246; Johannes Schneyer, ed. *Reportorium der Lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters 1150-1350*. Band 43 (1969): 178-179; Lohr, *Commentateurs d'Aristote au Moyen-Age Latin: Bibliographie de la literature secondaire récente* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1988): 67; Weijers (1998) ; and Langlois, 203-225.

[35] A partial list of catalogs includes : *Catalogue general des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques*, Tome IV (Arras-Avranches-Boulogne). Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1872, p. 641; D. José Villa-amil y Castro, *Catalogo de los manuscritos existents en la Biblioteca del noviciado de la Universidad central (procedentes de la antigua de Alcalá)* (Madrid, 1878); Franze Ehrle, *Historia bibliothecae Romanorum pontificum* (Rome, 1890), G. Mazzatinti, *Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia* (Forlì: L. Bernardini, 1890); R. Beer, *Handschriften schätze speniens* (Wien, 1894); *Le Catalogue des manuscrits de Chartres. Notices et extraits des manuscrits* XXXV (1895); Giuseppe Avarucci, "L'antica biblioteca francescana ora comunale di Sarnano" *Collectanea Franciscana* 60 (1990): 201-254; Catalogue general des Départements, XI, 1890, 163; Girard J. Etzkorn, *Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum: A Description of Some One Hundred Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus Collection* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996); and Cesare Cenci, *Bibliotheca manuscripta ad Sacrum conventum Assisiensem* (Perugia: Regione dell'Umbria, 1981).

[36] Lohr, 1968, 164.

14 contains two questions ascribed to Gerardus Odonis which possibly come from his *In naturali philosophia*: Quaeritur: Utrum lumen augeatur per adventum novae partis ad novae partis ad priorem, utraque remanente...'; 'Quaeritur: Utrum continuum componatur ex indivisibilibus ...' Alcala BU 105 (XV) f. 14ss. Contains Gerardus Odonis, De principiis scientiarum; De suppositionibus; De syllogismis." L.M. de Rijk suggests, however, that the reference in Sbaralea and Wadding is to a manuscript of the *Logica.* [37]

Theology, Philosophy, and Logic

<u>*Sentences* Commentary</u>

Gerard lectured on the four books of the *Sentences* twice, first in Toulouse and again at the Franciscan house in Paris. Ten manuscripts of Odonis' commentary survive, although none are full witnesses of all four books.[38] Although the commentary remains unedited, interest in the work as a whole, and in Gerard's participation in contemporary theological debates, has grown quickly and now complements the research and editing projects done on his logic texts. In his 2004 survey of the *Sentences* manuscript tradition, Chris Schabel outlined the questions Odonis addressed and the authorities he cited in the commentary, and also amended aspects of earlier biographical sketches, particularly with regard to dating both Sentences lectures.[39] As Schabel noted,

[37] See de Rijk, *Guiraldus Odonis O.F.M., Opera philosophica. Volume One: Logica. Critical Edition from the Manuscripts* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 4.
[38] See Schabel's survey of the manuscript tradition in "The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M." 128-132.
[39] Schabel's *Theology at Paris, 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) also includes a brief biographical survey and a possible chronology for Odonis' career.

manuscript evidence situates Odonis in Toulouse in early 1316.[40] There is no explicit evidence for the dates for his Paris lectures, though, beyond the assumption that all of his theological and philosophical works were completed by the time of his election as Minister General in 1329, the end point of his academic career. Teetaert placed Odonis reading the *Sentences* at Paris in 1326, based on an explicit in a Madrid witness (Biblioteca nacional ms. 65) that referenced Odonis as "bacallarii in theologia, legentis *Sententias* Parisius anno Domini CCCXXVI," which reference Langlois cited as well.[41] Drawing on these earlier biographical accounts, Friedrich Stegmüller also dated the Paris lectures to 1326.[42] Mruk, writing in 1960, argued Odonis could not have lectured before 1328, because until then he was still called a bachelor, and for the reasons just mentioned, not after 1329.[43] In a 1997 article De Rijk placed the Paris lectures between 1326 and 1328.[44] In the introduction to his critical edition of the first volume of the *Opera Philosophica*, however, he cited the Valencia witness of the second book of the *Sentences*, which describes Odonis lecturing in 1328, and argued for reading that date as 1318 instead, thus moving the Paris lectures back ten years.[45] In his introduction to the second volume, De Rijk Vol. placed them sometime between 1316 and 1322.[46] Schabel looked deeper into internal evidence within the *Sentences* manuscripts

---

[40] See Schabel, 2004, 119n10, where he cites R. Dreiling, *Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre des Franziskanererbischofs Petrus Aureoli* (*Pierre d'Auriole*). *Nebst biographisch-bibliographischer Einleitung* (Münster i.W., 1913), 218.
[41] Teetaert, 1658 and Langlois, 213.
[42] Stegmüller (1947), 113.
[43] See Antonius M. Mruk, S.I., "Singularis opinio Gerardi Odonis O.F.M. circa naturam divortii in casu adulterii," *Gregorianum* 41 (1960), 273n3: "Codex parisiensis Bibliothecae Nationalis, lat. 3068, non indicat nobis annum lecturae libri quarti, dicendum est tamen non ante a. 1328, quia hoc adhuc anno Gerardus vocatur bacallarius, dumvero Explicit Ordinationis libri quarti dicit eum iam esse magistrum in theologia. Non potest insuper eius lectura poni post a. 1329, quia mense iunii huius anni in Magistrum Generalem sui ordinis eligitur."
[44] de Rijk, "Guiral Ott (Giraldus Odonis) O.F.M. (1273-1349): His View of Statemental Being in His Commentary on the Sentences," in *Vestigia, imagines, verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIIth-XIVth century)*, ed. Constantino Marmo, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 355.
[45] de Rijk (1997b), 1n3.
[46] de Rijk (2005), 8-9.

and argued that Odonis' references to *Cum inter nonnullos* and to Francis of Marchia and Francis of Meyronnes as theology masters by 1323 supported incipit and explicit references he found that dated Odonis' Paris lectures to 1326-1328.[47] Schabel thus narrowed the window for Odonis' Paris lectures to the academic years 1326-1328, and further to 1327-1328, based on William Courtenay's work on the lecturing sequence at Paris, which would have Odonis lecturing all four books that year.[48]

The exact relationship between the Toulouse and Paris lectures, and the degree to which the Paris lectures represent redactions of his thought in Toulouse, remains to be seen, although consensus now holds that since the Paris lectures took place just before Odonis' election as Minister General, they reflect his theological opinions before he began his controversial tenure as Minister General. They are likely to be a synthesis of his earlier lectures in Toulouse and separate works on economics, philosophy and ethics written possibly written between Toulouse and Paris.[49] Research on Odonis' thought in the *Sentences* has been piecemeal to this point; a handful of questions have been edited for their relevance to broader debates. The first scholar to give article-length scrutiny to an aspect of the text was Antonius M. Mruk, who looked at Book IV, d. 39, in

[47] Schabel (2004), 119, 124, and 199n12. 8 As he notes, the Madrid manuscript has Odonis lecturing on Book I in 1326, and Naples and Sarnarno in 1327. Per Klosterneuberg he lectured on Book II in 1327, and in 1328 according to Sarnano and Valencia.

[48] Schabel, 2004, 124. See also Schabel's earlier outline for Odonis' lecturing sequence, in "'Non aliter novit facienda quam facto.' Gerard Odonis' Questions on Divine Foreknowledge," in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale: Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza,* ed. Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Emmanuel Faye, and Christophe Grellard (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 352: "According to the incipits and explicits of the manuscripts, Gerard was a bachelor of theology lecturing on the Sentences in the Franciscan "studium´ in Paris in the academic years 1326/1327and 1327/1328, on books one and probably four in the first year, and on books two and probably three during the second year."

[49] For evidence on dating the *Ethics* to this window, see Porter, 247-248.

which Odonis argued that a man has the right to marry again in the case of his wife's adultery.[50] Mruk examined Odonis' opinion as a background for a similar position taken by Cajetan.

In several cases, Odonis' individual tracts and treatises on logic and metaphysics were later adaptations of opinions originally developed in the *Sentences*, particularly Book I. Odonis' tract on being, for example, the *De esse,* was based on a question in Book I of the *Sentences* (Bk.I, d.7, q. 2, "utrum esse tertio adiacens [vel tertium adiacens] sit fictio anime)."[51] The treatise *De intentionibus* was likewise a later reproduction of Book I, distinction 23.[52] Gedeon Gal's study of I *Sentences* Book I, d. 3, q. 1, outlines Odonis' defense of Scotus on common being, and includes an edition of the text.[53]

All told, these texts establish Odonis' strong realist views on being and universals, which have garnered significant interest.[54] The *De esse,* the *Sentences* commentary, the tract on universals, the *De natura universalis,* establish Odonis' dependence on John Duns Scotus' metaphysical framework and his own defense of "extreme realism."[55]

---

[50] Cf. Mruk (1960).

[51] de Rijk, 1997b, 356; IDEM, "Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M. on the Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Proper Nature of Demonstration," *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1994-97): 67.

[52] For the relationship between the two versions of the text, see de Rijk (2005), 8-10.

[53] Cf. Gál (1992).

[54] Cf. de Rijk, "Works by Gerald Ot (*Gerardus Odonis*) on logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 60 (1993): 173-193; IDEM, 1997a; Joke Spruyt, "Gerardus Odonis on the Universals," in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen* Age 63 (1996): 171-208; and EADEM, "The extreme realism of Gerardus Odonis", in *Vestigia, imagines, verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (xiith-xivth century)*, ed. Constantino Marmo (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997).

[55] De Rijk, 1997a, 362-64. De Rijk notes, "Odonis' thesis of priority of statemental being over real being as well as conceptual (or intentional) being is of paramount importance. It seems to be closely related to the Scotistic doctrine of being. Cf. Spruyt, "Gerardus Odonis on the Universals"; and EADEM, "The extreme realism of Gerardus Odonis." See also Gál (1992).
De Rijk confirms this (1994-97, 67): "[The] role of the Scotistic common nature may be recognized in Odonis' view of statemental being. Statemental being's priority over both real and conceptual being clearly shows that to Odonis, the status of statemental being goes far beyond the domain of logic proper; rather it concerns the ultimate structures (*rationes*) of all that is."

Gerard's *Sentences* commentary has also been mined for contributions to the late medieval debates over future contingents, divine foreknowledge, and predestination. Chris Schabel edited three questions from Book I, d. 38 and d. 39 on divine foreknowledge, in which Odonis partially supports Peter Auriol's goal of avoiding positing that God knows futures as "futures" to avoid the necessity incumbent on them being future events, but emphasizes instead God's eternality to posit that God can know futures, which have not occurred yet in time, as past events.[56] Schabel also edited a question from Book I, d. 41, (q. 21) on predestination, further setting Odonis' contributions in the full context of the debate from Scotus onward.[57] Odonis's work thus figures as a significant source in surveys of these broader debates.[58]

Additionally, Paul Bakker has identified and edited a previously anonymous question, *De motu*, which bears heavy resemblance to Gerard's treatment of motion in Book II of his *Sentences.*[59] Research has also established Odonis' influential contributions to atomist thought,

---

[56] Schabel notes, "Gerard's lectures took place about five years after a lively debate among the Paris Franciscans concerning Peter Auriol's radical position had initially subsided. In a sense, then, Gerard was left free to explore the problem without any pressing need to refute anyone in particular," (352). "It seems that Gerard Odonis agrees with Auriol that futures cannot be known as futures. For Auriol, however, the most important reason for holding to this point was to avoid the necessity of the future. Gerard, on the other hand, appears to use God's immensity in eternity to explain that He can know futures in their pastness, though they are not yet past in time. This position defeats Auriol's purpose, but accepts some of his reasoning, especially in that for both Gerard and Auriol God abstracts from all differences of time." (354).

[57] Schabel, 'Landulph Caracciolo and Gerard Odonis on Predestination: Opposite Attitudes toward Scotus and Auriol', *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 65 (2002): 62-81.

[58] See in this regard especially Schabel's *Theology at Paris,* which framed the debate and identified the significant contributors to the field and positions taken. For Odonis, see pp. 158-162; and Schabel's "Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the problem of predestination," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard. Current Research*, ed. G.R. Evans, 2 vols., (Leiden: Brill, 2002) I, 221-265.

[59] Bakker, "Guiral Ot et le movement autour de la question *De motu* conservé dans le manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca nacional, 4229," *Early Science and Medicine* 8 (2003): 298-319. Bakker tracked the anonymous question on motion against Odonis' Book II, d. 14, questions four, seven, and eight, and noted that several passages match word for word.

from his *De continuo* and select questions on indivisbilism from his *Sentences* commentary.[60] Most recently, S.W. de Boer produced an edition of the *De continuo* and a profile of atomist positions in Odonis' work.[61]

The *Logica* and other Philosophical Texts

As noted, several questions in Gerard's *Sentences* commentary overlap with discussions in the *Logica,* and the work is thus an important source for his metaphysics, cognition, logic, physics, and natural philosophy. Taken together with his other treatises, Odonis' considerable body of philosophical works includes the *De suppositionibus*, *De intentionibus, De principiis scientiarum, De sillogismis* and miscellaneous questions and tracts on logic.[62] As the editor of Odonis' *Logica, De intentionibus,* and several individual questions on logic and metaphysics, L.M. de Rijk has worked most extensively on Odonis' philosophical texts, and like Brown and Kent, has also characterized Odonis as a dynamic thinker.[63] Writing in 2005, De Rijk reflected back on Stephen

[60] See Schabel, 2004, 122: Book I, d. 37 and Bk. II, d. 44 correspond to *De continuo.* Also see Vassili P. Zoubov, "Walter Catton, Gérard d'Odon et Nicolas Bonet," in *Physis* 1 (1959): 261-278; de Rijk,. "Works by Gerard Ot (Gerardus Odonis) on Logic, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy Rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl. Nac., 4229,"*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 68 (1993): 173-93; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, "The response to Thomas Aquinas in the early fourteenth century: eternity and infinity in the works of Henry of Harclay, Thomas of Wilton and William of Alnwick," in *The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries*, ed. Jozef Wissink, (Leiden: Brill, 1990); and Langlois, 218-219.

[61] Sander de Boer, *Gerardus Odonis O.F.M. over het continuum. Een filosofisch-historische studie met een editie van '*De continuo', (MA thesis, University of Nijmegen, 2005) and IDEM, "The Importance of Atomism in the Philosophy of Gerard of Odo (O.F.M.), in *Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 85-106.

[62] See de Rijk (1993); IDEM, 1997b; Zoubov (1959); Langlois (1927); and Thijssen.

[63] See De Rijk (1997b) and (2005). De Rijk noted in his Introduction to the edition of the *Logica*: "It may be useful to say something about the general nature of Girald's *Logica*, Libri I-III**,** which now appear in print for the first time as a whole. Generally speaking, the work is well-composed and written in a lucid style. The *Addenda* even contain rather passionate passages, when Girald is rejecting opponent views, especially in those cases where Walter Burley is (anonymously) under attack. The characteristic given by Brown (1) of *De suppositionibus* seems to be well to the point for the entire *Logica*: Girald's treatise is

Brown's assessment of the field in 1975, and acknowledged that research on Odonis' doctrinal positions remained largely in the same state, with more focus needed on Odonis' theological and philosophical works.[64] Like Kent, de Rijk has also asked how Odonis accommodated Aristotelian thought as a Franciscans, and in several articles he has explored idiosyncrasies in Odonis' works. [65]

The *De suppositionibus* has received the most attention to date of Odonis' works on logic and, as noted, was the first excerpt of his thought to be edited. In his 1975 edition of the text, Stephen Brown suggested Gerard had written the *De Suppositionibus* between 1320 and 1324, and he set Odonis' definition of supposition in context with its similarities and differences with views of his contemporaries, including Burley, and Ockham.[66] Brown commented constructively that the work "shows us an instance of how early fourteenth-century logicians were personal in the way they thought through their treatises. Gerard's treatise is structured in his own individual way and the divisions he provides for formal supposition in particular show this. Gerard's *De suppositionibus,* for all its personal stamp, seems to have had little influence."[67] In his own 1997 edition, De Rijk also stressed the text's significance for contemporary thought, and characterized the *De Suppositionibus* as the" most original part of his *Logica*."[68]

---

structured in his own individual way, but all with its personal stamp, especially emerging in *De Suppositionibus*," de Rijk, 1997b, 25

[64] de Rijk, 2005, 2.

[65] de Rijk (1993); IDEM (1994-97); IDEM "Being as truth' in Aristotle and Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. (d. 1349)," In *Thirty years of Logica Modernorum. Acts of the Academy Colloquium held in Amsterdam, 5-7 November 1997*; "Girald Odonis on the Real Status of Some Second Intentions," *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione philosophica medievale* 16 (2005): 515-551; IDEM, 1997a.

[66] Brown, 6-10, cf. n28..

[67] Brown, 10.

[68] "As we have remarked before, Girald's tract on "the two most common and well-founded principles of knowledge" is the most original part of his *Logica*. To assess its place in Girald's thought requires an investigation into the proper nature of the two principles and what the medieval commentators used to call

De Rijk took advantage of the complexity of thought in Odonis' *De intentionibus* to frame a survey of the debate over intentionality around an edition of the text.[69] The text originally comes from *Sentences*, Book I, d. 32, which was later worked into a separate treatise that De Rijk assigns the work to a period between 1328 and 1334, which bridges Odonis' academic and administrative careers.[70] The *De principiis scientiarum* "one of the most original works" by Odonis.[71] General contributions to late medieval logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy.[72] De Rijk (2-3) points out that although Gerardus "became known for his unorthodox views on the existence of a void and the composition of continua," on this topic and others, his views were nevertheless shared by contemporaries, including Autrecourt.[73] Nicholas Bonet and Nicholas Autrecourt drew on Odonis'

---

the `conditiones' ('specific properties') of these principles, as well as what to Girald's mind plays the key role in such an inquiry, the proper subject of logic." de Rijk, 1997b, 37.

[69] de Rijk, 2005.

[70] de Rijk, 9-10. As noted, the relationship between positions Gerard expounded in the *Sentences* commentary and in independent treatises and tracts remains difficult to determine in all cases. For the *De Intentionibus*, though, De Rijk notes that between Odonis' first opinion, in his first lectures on the *Sentences* in Toulouse and the separate treatise, no reference was added about Ockham's *Summa logicae*, which emerged in the intervening period (ca. 1324). De Rijk thus suggests "it is unlikely that Girald had the opportunity of reworking both his logical works and *De intentionibus* before he was assigned the tasks of Minister General, let alone that as Minister General he could himself undertake or continue such a vast labour. It seems obvious that the Minister General commissioned one (or more) of the brethren to do the job, under his supervision." Cf. 10n.19 for De Rijk's explanation of Odonis' possible involvement in adapting the treatise from his *Sentences* commentary.

[71]de Rijk, 1994-97, 51: "This treatise is not just a commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, nor is it a specialized treatment of its subject matter...Rather, Odonis took his treatise to be a supplement to the Aristotelian work, where the demonstrative principles proper to the different "sciences" (*principia propria*) as well as those they all have in common (*principia communia*) are extensively discussed by Aristotle, but less attention is paid to the most common principles of the intellect (*principa communissima intellectus*), such as the twofold principle of non-contradiction. What Odonis means to do, then, is to discuss the well-known seven requirements concerning the proper and the common principles insofar as they apply to the principle of non-contradiction."

[72] John E. Murdoch, "From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning," *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, ed. IDEM and Edith Sylla (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975), 271-348 and Alfonso Maierù, ed.. *English Logic in Italy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982).

[73] De Rijk, 1997b, 3.

work on natural philosophy; Autrecourt dedicated a treatise to him.[74] Odonis also heavily shaped several contemporaries' thought on the *continuum*, including Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham, and elicited references to his work and responses to his reasoning from others, including, Jean le Chanoine, Pierre Tartaret, Gaëtan de Tiène, and Thomas Bradwardine.[75] Although after editing the *De suppositionibus*, Stephen Brown attested to the individuality it showed in Gerard's thought, he also noted that no contemporaries cited the work. Based on Walsh, though, Brown argues that Odonis was very influential in terms of logic, and lists Nicholas Bonet and Nicholas Autrecourt as Odonis' "disciples" on ethics, and that Nicholas of Autrecourt especially followed him on the question of the *continuum.*[76] Aspects of *De intentionibus* were directed against Hervaeus Natalis' views on intentions, although De Rijk observes Odonis' own text did not generate comparable contemporary response.[77]

---

[74] Autrecourt's dedication in the *Exigit ordo* read: "Domino Odonis ceterisque veritatem inquirere volentibus et ipsam agnoscere..." Zoubov, 265.

[75] Zoubov, 264-76.

[76] Brown (1975), 5 and 10. Cf Schabel's overview of Odonis' range of influence: "Nicholas Bonet called Gerard a 'Platonist' with regard to his brand of atomism, and Platonism does run through Gerard's works. On the subject of a possible plurality of worlds, treated in distinction 44 of his commentary on II *Sentences*, Gerard went beyond his scholastic predecessors and contemporaries, explicitly arguing in favor of Plato over Aristotle in defending God's power to make more than one world. Rather than just state this as fact, as required after the Condemnation of 1277, Gerard gave analogies to show by example how different worlds of the same type would each have different centers to which and from which heavy and light objects would fall or rise, without the different worlds interfering with each other, as Aristotle had maintained. Gerard reasoned that the circulation of the blood in different humans works this way, and he surmised that similar phenomena are observed in the northern and southern hemispheres with respect to opposite poles. In his discussion, Gerard hints that there is a mutual attraction between heavy bodies and the center of the world. To Aristotle's claim that beyond the heavens of this world there is neither place nor body, Odonis asserts not only that the contrary is possible, but 'I would not even consider it very untoward if in reality, right now, *de facto*, one said that beyond the heavens there is a place and an infinite space, although an empty vacuum.' If in expressing similar views later Nicole Oresme drew inspiration from any scholastic, the best candidate is Gerard Odonis." *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500,* ed. Henrik Lagerlund (London: Springer, 2010), 903.

[77] As De Rijk comments in his "Introduction" to the *De Intentionibus*, "All things considered, the present is markedly polemical, which particularly comes to the fore in the (at times venomous) criticism of Hervaeus Natalis. It might be suggested, therefore, that the elaborated version too originated in the context of academic disputation, which is highlighted by the prologue of *De intentionibus*, in which the *quaestiones*

Quodlibetic Questions

Of the quodlibetic questions that exist for Odonis, the most consequential for recent research has been his question on the beatific vision. Odonis addressed the controversial issue during Advent, 1333, and his response became a significant theological—and apologetic—source for the crisis that arose over John XXII's statement that the blessed do not immediately enjoy the presence of God after death. Odonis' role in the controversy and his support for John's position have received attention for several decades, culminating most recently in Christian Trottmann's comprehensive study of the debate and its full social and political context.[78]

Economic

disputate on transcendent intentions are presented as the proper theme of the treatise. Unlike Hervaeus's treatise, Girald's work seems to have met disappointingly little response," De Rijk (2005), 13.

[78] See Trottman's extensive body of work on this debate: "Vision béatifique et science théologique. Inférences scotistes dan le Quodlibet parisien de Guiral Ot (décembre 1333)," *Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti,* ed. Leonardo Sileo, 2 vols, *Medioevo* (Rome, 1995), II, 739-748; *La vision béatifique: des disputes scolastiques à sa definition par Benoît XII* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1995); "Sulla funzione dell'anima e del corpo nella beatitudine. Elementi de riflessione nella scolastica," *Anima e corpo nella cultura medievale: atti del V convegno di studi della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale, Venezia, 25-28 settembre 1995,* ed. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio (Firenze: SISMEL edizioni del Galluzzo, 1999), 139-156; "Guiral Ot: de l'éternité au temps et retour. Conjectures à partir du De multiformi visione Dei," *The Medieval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Pasquale Porro, (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 287-317; *La vision de Dieu aux multiples formes. Quodlibet tenu à Paris en decembre 1333* (Paris: Vrin, 2001); and "Apports à la réflexion sur les fin dernières lors de la controverse de la vision béatifique déclenchée par Jean XXII," *Ende und Vollendung: Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Martin Pickavé (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 687-704. For elements of the Beatific Vision debate outside Odonis' quodlibeta, see Duba, "The Beatific Vision in the *Sentences* Commentary of Gerald Odonis," *Vivarium* 47 (2009): 202-217. For the key texts of the controversy, see *Pour et contre Jean XXII en 1333: deux traits avignonnais sur la vision béatifique*, ed. Marc Kykman and Annibal de Ceccano (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1975).

For Odonis and early fourteenth-century quodlibetic literature more broadly, see Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus," *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century,* ed. Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 569-650.

Odonis' economic thought comes from his *Ethics* commentary and his economic treatises, *De contractibus* and *de excommnicationibus et de casibus reservatis*, key sources for tracing the development of economic thought from the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries. Given its significance for the transmission of early fourteenth century to later writers, the *Ethics* commentary has been most actively discussed in the principal surveys of scholastic economics. Odd Langholm has mined Odonis' economic works extensively, and established him as a provocative thinker in close dialogue with contemporaries on social and economic concerns such as just price, usury, the nature of money, and the ethics of a profit economy.[79] Langholm has also supported Maier's view of Odonis was a courageous thinker, especially given the challenges he made to Aquinas and Peter John Olivi's economic thought.[80]

Odonis figures heavily in all of Langholm's works, and *Economics in the Medieval Schools*, includes an exhaustive outline of Odonis' economic contributions, and the links between his and contemporary's thoughts.[81] Joel Kaye has also surveyed Odonis' economic thought in detail, situating it within the context of late medieval natural philosophy and establishing his contributions on the equality of exchange.[82] Most recently, as a reflection of increased interest in textual studies of Odonis' works, Giovanini Ceccarelli and Sylvain Piron published the treatise on

---

[79] See Langholm's *Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979); "Economic Freedom in Scholastic Thought," *History of Political Economy* 14 (1982): 260-283; *Wealth and Money in the Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983); *The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1984); *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350* (Leiden: Brill, 1992); *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and *The Merchant in the Confessional Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation Penitential Handbooks* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

[80] Langholm (1992) 509.

[81] See especially Langholm (1992), Chapter 20, "Franciscan Economics 7: Gerald Odonis, William of Rubio," 508-535.

[82] See Kaye's *Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth-Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought*, esp.: "Evolving Models of Money and Market Exchange," 116-162.

contracts in a critical edition, the *Tractatus Giraldi Oddonis de contractibus secundum Io. Schotum*.[83] Odonis' tract on contracts was written in response to a request for him to produce a tract outlining the subject in an ethical context for use in confessionals; he focused therein on contracts, and how confessors handle them with regard to penance and absolution.[84] Some language in this tract also reflects economic thought in both his *Sentences* and *Ethics* commentaries.[85]

Odonis has been acknowledged in his own right as one of the most significant economic thinkers of the fourteenth century, as well as for his influence on John Buridan, particularly on Buridan's *Ethics* commentary. In turn, Odonis' own dependence on earlier writers, particularly John Duns Scotus and Peter John Olivi two generations earlier in the Franciscan tradition, has been well examined.[86] Olivi's influence on thought for this period is difficult to assess, in light of the Council of Vienne's posthumous condemnation of several of his propositions in 1312, after which time no other figures could explicitly cite or credit him as a source for their thought. However, Joel Kaye and Langholm and others stress that it is clear Odonis largely relied on Olivi's work.[87] Olivi's treatise on economic contracts appears paraphrased in Odonis' *Ethics* and his own tract on

---

[83] See Langholm (1982), 264n17: "Odonis' treatise (still unprinted) is in U.V.8 of the same collection [Siena BCom] (corresponding question on f. 81^{r-v}). See also Ceccarelli and Piron's edition of the *Tractatus Giraldi Oddonis de contractibus secundum Io. Schotum*, 2009.

[84] Langholm (1992), 513. See also Langholm's *The Merchant in the Confessional: Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation Penitential Handbooks* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

[85] Langholm notes, "all of the relevant material of the two commentaries can be related in some fashion to points in the treatise on contracts." Langholm (1992), 515.

[86] Langholm has identified the main sources for Odonis' thought in his treatise on contracts as first Olivi and then Scotus. (1992), 515.

[87] Kaye notes, "No succeeding economic thinker, including San Bernardino, could admit to reading or being influenced by Olivi's writings, nevertheless, one can find evidence of Olivi's thought 'peeping out' in the work of later theorists, particularly that of his fellow Franciscans." See Kaye, 125, especially n. 33, where he notes, "Both Langholm and Spicciani see Odonis' treatise on economic contracts (Siena, U.V. 8) as leaning heavily on Olivi's work."

contracts.[88] Odonis seemingly plagiarizes Olivi, but in fact disagrees with him in places; Langholm noted that "Odonis is sometimes openly critical of Olivi and elsewhere quotes him selectively or alters the emphasis in favor of personal views and preferences, such as those which stand out in the two commentaries on the *Ethics* and the *Sentences.*[89]

Langholm argues Odonis may have written his treatise on economic contracts before the other two works, and that he may likely have done so while still in southern France, where he would have been most likely to encounter Olivi's work on economics.[90]

Odonis also participated in two of the most controversial economic discussions of his time, on the ideas of just price and usury. Langholm has argued his writing closely reflected the thinking in the marketplace around him."[91] Odonis shifted the discussion from scholastic understanding that "the purchasing power of money as a function of the scarcity or abundance of the money metal itself" to put more emphasis on Aristotle's theory of value.[92] Odonis' theory of usury, however, appears fragmented and "contradictory" in places and unfinished.[93] Odonis justified a kind of usury (*lucrum cessans*) as recompense for the use of loaned capital. Langholm argues Odonis may have been influenced in his theory of value by Grosseteste's translations of Greek commentaries on the *Ethics*.[94] Langholm also cited Odonis' question on usury (*Sent.* Book IV, q. 15) as strong

[88] Langholm notes that Olivi's innovative text "was read by Geraldus Odonis (d. 1349), another Franciscan, who took Olivi's ideas into the commentary tradition concerning Aristotle's *Ethics*, an important vehicle for part of the argument on economic freedom. An earlier tradition on the *Ethics*, that of the Paris Averroists, helped, along with Odonis, to influence the great Aristotelian Johannes Buridanus." (1982), 264.
[89] Langholm (1992), 514.
[90] Langholm (1992), 512-13.
[91] Kaye, 141.
[92] Langholm (1992), 523.
[93] Langholm (1992), 523.
[94] Langholm (1992), 523n65. "It is not surprising to find that the scholastic economist who brought the theory of value to the highest degree of perfection attained by any medieval author was Gerald Odonis, a

evidence of not only a close correlation between the *Sentences* and Book IV of the *Ethics* commentary, but also of the fact that Odonis significantly reworked his thought between the two texts. On the similarity of Book IV of the *Ethics,* on usury, Langholm argues, "this is not a common case of an author copying verbatim or nearly verbatim from an earlier work into a new one, for the actual wording is different in the two cases."[95]

Ethics

As noted, Odonis was the first Franciscan to produce a full commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics,* and his interest in the *Ethics* was remarkable enough among his contemporaries to earn him the nickname of *Doctor moralis.*[96] His commentary, identified alternatively in the manuscripts as the *Scriptum super libros Ethicorum* or the *Sententia et Discussio cum quaestionibus super libros Ethicorum Aristotelis,* exists in at least thirteen extant full witnesses, four fragments and abbreviations, one gloss, and two early printed editions.[97] Despite the wealth of manuscripts,

---

Franciscan who commented on the *Ethics* and the *Sentences* and composed a treatise on economic contracts *secundum Scotum*" Langholm (1992), 412-413.

[95] Langholm (1992), 512.

[96] For a description of his commentary's style and format, as well as a survey of its manuscript tradition and modern scholarship on his ethical thought, see Porter (2009). Portions of that article appear here.

[97] The full list of witnesses includes: Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, 285; Boulogne-sur-Mer, Bibliothèque municipale, BV 111; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1027; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2168; Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, S. Croce XIII Sin. 3; Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. sopp. I.3.25; Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, XVIII 389; Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3496; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16127; Salamanca, Colegio de S. Bartolomé, 1869; Sevilla, Biblioteca Colombina, 7.5.14; Tarazona, Archivo Catedral Capitular, 15; Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Palatinus 2383. Additionally, two mss. contain fragments of the text: Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. Lat. 1369; and Madrid, Biblioteca nacional, 6546. Two further mss. contain abbreviations of the text: and Subiaco, Biblioteca statale monumento nazionale di Santa Scolastica, 26; and Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc. 378.Of the other known editions of the work, an additional ms. from Tarazona (Archivo de la Catedral, Codex 71) contains abbreviations of the *lectiones* of Odonis' commentary inserted as a marginal gloss in a fourteenth-century copy of the *Ethics.* The early printed editions are Brescia (Brixie), 1482 (Hain 11968); and Venice, 1500 (Hain 11969). Both incunabula are held in several manuscript copies and Venice is available online through the Bibliothèque Nationale's Gallica catalog. In addition to these extant texts, Lohr

nearly all of the research done on the text to date, including Kent's in-depth study has been based on the printed editions, primarily the Venice edition of 1500. We do not know with certainty when, where, and in what context the commentary was written, but evidence based on incipit references to Odonis has suggested a timeframe.

Throughout the general biographical accounts written of Gerard's career, his commentary on the *Ethics* was noted for its length and its novelty as the first full and complete such effort by a Franciscan. Langlois pointed to the abundance of copies, although his list did not include the other manuscripts listed by Lohr.[98] He described the commentary as Gerard's principal work, and cited its influence on later authors, notably Guillaume de Vaurouillon's *Sentences* commentary, and Petrus Pompanacius's *Defensorium de animae immortalite*.[99] With regard to authorities cited, Langlois lists Cicero, Boethius, Augustine, Algazel, and Hugh of St. Victor. Despite its length, and its value as one of Gerard's most significant work, Langlois took a relatively pessimistic, or at least conservative, view of what it can offer modern scholars.[100]

Although the work had previously received broad, preliminary attention and been recognized as a significant source for fourteenth-century interpretations of Aristotle's text, work done by James Walsh, Bonnie Kent, and others in the mid-1970s and 1980s represented the first major expansion of his thought.[101] Walsh included Odonis' work in his study of late-medieval

---

identifies two manuscripts as olim: Rimini, Bibl. San Francesco. The Salamanca text is also listed as *olim* in Lohr's survey, although the manuscript is extant. Lohr, 164; Langlois, 216-17; and de Rijk, 1993.

[98] Cf. Langlois, 216-217.

[99] Langlois, 217.

[100] Langlois, 217. Langlois lamented that "L'auteur a trouvé moyen de ne rien dire, en tant de phrases, qui soit de nature à instruire la postérité des choses de son temps."

[101] René Antoine Gauthier, "Trois commentaries 'avverroistes' sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *Archives d'histoire doctrinal et littéraire du moyen age* 22/23 (1947-49): 187-336; Walsh, *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1963); IDEM, 'Buridan and Seneca', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27 (1966), 23-40; Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, *L'Ethique à Nicomaque*, 2nd ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaire de Louvain, 1970); Walsh, 'Some Relationships between Gerald Odo's and John

Ethics commentaries, and established it as a significant source for Jean Buridan's own commentary.[102] As noted earlier, the text received early attention in Bonnie Kent's 1984 dissertation, *Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis' Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics*, in which she argued that Odonis' decision to comment on the *Ethics* neither contracted traditionally Augustinian voluntarism in Franciscan thought, nor signaled a defense of Thomistic views of the will and intellect. Kent sought to situate the text both "in its proper historical context" and within contemporary ethical debates.[103] After outlining Gerard's arguments on the location of the virtues, and free will, she argued that, in fact, his positions closely reflected currents among his Franciscan contemporaries. Although scholars have since moved away from positing schools of cohesive "Franciscan" or "Dominican" thought, Kent's defensive approach to the *Ethics* commentary reflects the fact that Gerard's commentary stands out as unusual at first glance, perhaps more so because of Odonis' ties to John XXII, and John's own dependence on Aquinas' theology for his interpretations of Apostolic Poverty.

Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics', *Franciscan Studies* 35 (1975), 237-75; IDEM, '"Teleology in the Ethics of Buridan', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 18 (1980), 265-86; Langholm (1982); George Wieland, 'The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle's *Ethics*', in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), 657-672; Kent (1984); Langholm (1984); and Kent, 'The Good Will According to Gerardus Odonis, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham', *Franciscan Studies* 46 (1986), 119-39.

[102] See Walsh, *Some Relationships*, IDEM, *Teleology* (cit. above), Kent (1984) 124, and Kaye, 151. Scholars have also drawn parallels between Odonis's and Walter Burley's ethical thought for a number of reasons. Both wrote commentaries on the *Ethics*, and both addressed the questions of how to interpret moral weakness (*akrasia*) and the location of the virtues. Names Nicholas Bonet and Nicholas Autrecourt as Odonis' "disciples" on ethics. Brown, *De Supp.* 10; Korolec (1975); M. Markowski, "L'influence de Jean Buridan sur les universities d'Europe Centrale," Zénon Kaluza and Paul Vignaux, eds., *Preuve et raisons à l'université de Paris: Logiique, ontologie, et théologie au XIVe siècle.* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1984), 149-163 (p. 154).

[103] Cf. Kent, 1984.

Following trends in medieval ethics studies at large, recent work on Odonis has focused on his contributions to broader debates on the virtues and moral *akrasia*.[104] His commentary has also received increased attention for its influence on fifteenth-century thinkers, and the teaching and transmission of the *Ethics* during the Renaissance.[105] As noted, contemporaries, especially Buridan, took interest in Book V of the commentary, since the *Ethics* was one of the main sources, along with the *Politics,* for economic theory in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

In terms of influence, Odonis' commentary, along with that of Walter Burley's, was a conduit from earlier commentators, including Grosseteste, to Nicole Oresme and John Buridan in

---

[104] Odon Lottin, "A propos de la date de certains commentairs sur l'Ethique," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et medieval* 17 (1950): 127-33; "La connexion des vertus chez Saint Thomas d'Quin et ses prédécesseurs," in Lottin, *Pyschologie et morale aux XIIe et XIII siècles,* vol. III (Gemblous: J. Duculot, 1957), 197-252; Walsh (1963); Kent (1986); IDEM, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1995); Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought from Augustine to Buridan*, Leiden 1994; Olaf Pluta, "Albert der Grosse und Johannes Buridan, *Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters*, ed. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen and Alain de Libera (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 91-105; Lambertini, "Individuelle und politische Klugheit in den mittelalterlichen Ethikkommentaren (von Albertus bis Buridan)," *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, ed, Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 1996), 464-478; David A. Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300-1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education* (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Risto Saarinen, "The Parts of Prudence: Buridan, Odonis, Aquinas," *Dialogue* 42 (2003), 749-765; Bénédicte Sère, "De la vérité en amitié. Une phenomenologie médiévale du sentiment dans les commentaries de *l'Éthique à Nicomaque* (XII[e]-XV siècle)," *Revue historique* 636 (2004-05), 793-820; IDEM, *Penser l'amitié au moyen âge: Étude historique des commentaires sur les livres VIII et IX de* l'Éthique à Nicomaque *(XIIIe-XVe siècle)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007); István Bejczy, "The Cardinal Virtues in Medieval Commentaries on the *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1250-1350," *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, 1200-1500*, ed. IDEM (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 199-221; Pavel Blažek, "The Virtue of Virginity: The Aristotelian Challenge," IBID., 247-273; Saarinen, *Die heroische Tugend als Grundlage der individualistischen Ethik im 14. Jahrhundert, Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, 450-463.

[105] Walsh, "Some Relationships Between Gerald Odo's and John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics," *Franciscan Studies* 35 (1975): 237-75; Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance;* IDEM, "The Commentary Literature on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in Early Renaissance Italy: Preliminary Considerations" *Traditio* 54 (1999): 245-282; Lines, "Sources and Authorities for Moral Philosophy in the Italian Renaissance: Aquinas and Jean Buridan on Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity*, ed. Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2005), 7-29;
And Christoph Flüeler, "Teaching Ethics at the University of Vienna: The Making of a Commentary at the Faculty of Arts (A Case Study)," *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, 1200-1500*, ed. István Pieter Bejczy (Leiden; Brill, 2008), 277-346.

late fourteenth-century economic thought.[106] With regard to the *Ethics* commentary's relationship to Odonis' other work, Schabel identified forty questions in Gerard's *Sentences* commentary that share either precise wording or similar content with questions in the *Ethics* commentary.[107] The close relationship between those two texts alone merits further study of the *Sentences.*

Scriptural and Doctrinal Works and Sermons

Although they have received little attention, Odonis left a considerable body of work on scriptural and doctrinal themes, as well as several sermons. He wrote at least six commentaries on books of the Bible, comprised of works on the books of the *Psalms*, *Wisdom*, *Romans*, I and II *Corinthians,* and *Galatians,* all of which remain unedited and largely unexplored.[108]

The longest of his Biblical studies was the *Figurae Bibliae*, which exists in three manuscripts.[109] The text itself is convoluted, and comprised of commentaries Gerard wrote on thirty subjects and narratives from scripture, including the Incarnation and the Nativity. One of the Paris editions received preliminary attention when attempts were made to study the work.[110]

Gerard also produced three doctrinal and liturgical works: the *Cathecismus scolarium novellorum*, the *Officium de stigmatibus sancti Francisci*, and the poem *De septem verbis Domini Iesu Christi in cruce....*[111] Gerard wrote the *Cathecismus* in 1338, and in the only focused study to

---

[106] See Langholm, 1983.
[107] See Schabel's manuscript survey of the *Sentences* commentary, above.
[108] Paris, nat. lat. 590 f. 1-73 and nat. lat. 4523; Vaticana, Palat. Lat. 142 f. 1-25. See Stegmüller, 1940, 338-40; and de Rijk, 1993. Langlois cited the *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, which describes Gerard as "necnon minister [sic] quondam generalis eorum," 215.
[109] See Stegmüller (1940), 339; and Langlois, 215-216.
[110] In his description of the Paris BN nat. lat. 590 ms., Langlois recounted that Hauréau's notes on the text describe it as difficult to work through. Langlois himself transcribed a brief excerpt, and noted "Mais nous n'avons pas, en vérité, le courage de continuer," Langlois, 215-16.
[111] Cf. Wilmart, and Langlois, 219-224.

date on the first two works, André Wilmart suggests the *Officium de stigmatibus* was written slightly earlier, in 1337.[112] Wilmart also suggests that Odonis drew heavily on a thirteenth-century office written by Julien de Spire for his *Cathecismus*.[113] The *Officium de stigmatibus sancti Francisci*, was approved by Benedict XXII and instituted among the provinces at the General Chapter held in Assisi in 1340.[114]

The *De septem verbis Domini Iesu Christi in cruce...* poem has received much more attention by virtue of a long-standing historiographical tradition from the late medieval period through the nineteenth century that attributed the poem to Bonaventure.[115] Writing in 1935, Wilmart instead ascribed the text to Odonis, based on a previously unknown fifteenth-century manuscript that cited the work as Odonis'.[116] Wilmart traces the textual history of the two other works to show the common use of verse, and evidence that the earlier liturgical texts were precedents of Odonis' style and further evidence.[117]

As is the case with Gerard's works on scripture, little research has been done on Gerard's sermons. Based on extant manuscripts, we can attribute at least five sermons to him, comprised of

---

[112] Wilmart, 250.

[113] "L'ouvrage de Guiral se présente évidement comme une sort d'appendice, par rapport à cette vaste architecture. A cet égard, aucue illusion n'est possible. Les deux offices ne sont pas exactement comparables; mais le second s'appuie modestement sur le premier," Wilmart, 252.

[114] Langlois, 224 and Wilmart, 250.

[115] Wilmart attributed the popularity of the poem to it being a characteristically Franciscan spiritual text—and thus it's inherently anonymous appeal. The fact that the only dated manuscripts were written after Bonaventure's canonization, the longstanding tradition ascribing it to Bonaventure (sealed by Bonaventure's canonization in 1482), and the inclusion of the text among the first collection of his works in the sixteenth century, precluded early modern and modern compilers of Bonaventure's works from questioning the text's authenticity. The manuscript Wilmart cites as evidence of Gerard's authorship was not used in earlier studies of the poem.

[116] Wilmart, 248-249.

[117] Of the *Cathecismus*' verse structure and foreshadowing of the *De septem verbis*, Wilmart notes: "en regard du poème sur les sept douleurs, cette analyse sommaire dispense d'autres details; car elle permet d'entrevoir assez bien le train de pensée qui a pu conduire Guiral à traiter par des moyens analogues un theme qui, somme toute, était voisin." Wilmart, 254-255.

Christus assistens pontifex (Hebr. 9:11); *Exivit vincens, ut vinceret* (Apoc. 6:2); *Sermo in Parasceve; Sermones super Epistolas Pauli*; and *De Discussio justorum,* or *Conciones quadragesimales.*[118] We also have Odonis' *De signis et aliis diei Judicii,* dated to his years in Toulouse.[119]

[118] See Schneyer (1969), B. 43, 178. Schneyer's survey lists two manuscripts of sermons, held at Cambridge (Pembroke Coll. 98 f. 58rb) and Wien (Nat. 4195 f. 8v). The catalogue of Madrid's Biblioteca Nacional, however, also includes a sermon manuscript. See D. José Villa-amil y Castro, *Catalogo de los manuscritos existents en la Biblioteca del noviciado de la Universidad central (procedentes de la antigua de Alcalá)* (Madrid, 1878); See also Langlois, 223-224.
[119] Langlois, 213-14.

Chapter II: Broad Fourteenth-Century Contexts of Odonis' Career

Early Fourteenth-Century Political, Social, and Academic Contexts

The career and works just described reflect a life lived within the communities of first the Franciscans, and later mendicant and secular contemporaries in the university community in Paris. However, neither the city nor the university were insulated from the social and political upheavals of the period. Continuing trends from the mid-thirteenth century, the early fourteenth century witnessed a growing market economy, urbanization, strengthening national churches, and related tension between ecclesiastical and temporal authority ranging from the level of parish to papacy.

On the other hand, threats to papal authority from secular leaders, notably the confrontations between Philip IV and Boniface VIII, and later between John XXII and Louis of Bavaria, together with the upheaval of the Great Schism, and deepening agricultural crises reshaped individual and collective identity and perspectives during these years. The social, political, and military tensions of the period, as well as natural disasters, have each given rise to their own secondary literature. However, any discussion of theological tensions during the period, especially at Paris, necessitates a brief survey of those circumstances that would have most immediately influenced and affected thought during this years. The continued tension between the papacy, emperor, and French and Italian political leadership in particular framed the political background and context for not only the poverty controversy, but Odonis and his contemporary's careers. Questions of doctrinal authority that arose within these disputes, though distinct from the specific theological debates over the nature of theology, thus fit into a broader context of increased discussion of ecclesiastical and political authority. Several of these debates concerned tension over ecclesiastical wealth and poverty, an issue that drew in nearly all of the above flash-points.

Social and Economic Tensions: Wealth, Usury, and Merchant Ethics

The general economic expansion of the central middle ages was followed in the fourteenth century by periods of economic depression associated with climate change, crop failure, famine, plague, and warfare until a general recovery in the mid-fifteenth century.[120] Increased urbanization, technological and economic growth, expanded trade routes and merchant networks marked the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth-centuries. By Odonis' time, these expansions had sparked complex social, ethical, and even doctrinal tensions that directly influenced he and his contemporaries' thoughts on money and exchange specifically, and on economic theory and ethics more broadly. Odonis thus witnessed a period of sharp social and economic transformation before falling victim himself to the plague at mid-century.

The commercialization and monetization of Western Europe, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries especially, shaped not only market structures and daily life, but also economic thought. The convergence of contemporary interests in establishing standardized measurements, the arrival of the *Ethics* and other Aristotelian texts that offered models of equalization and discussions of justice, and the increased complexity of merchants' ethical concerns about

[120] For general studies of the commercial revolution and economic development during the transitional thirteenth and fourteenth-centuries, see Jacques Le Goff, "Au Moyen Age: Temps de l'Eglise et temps du marchand," *Annales ESC* (1960): 417-433; IDEM, "Le temps du travail dans la 'crise' du XIVième siècle," *Le Moyen Age* LXIX (1963): 597-613; Georges Duby, *Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West*, trans. Cynthia Postan (Columbia, S.C., 1968); Robert Lopez, *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Le Goff, "The Town as an Agent of Civilization, 1200-1500," *Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Middle Ages*, ed. Carlo Cipolla, (London: Collins, 1972), 71-95; Michael M. Postan, *The Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain*, 1100-1500 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Peter Spufford, "Le role de la monnaie dans la revolution commercial du XIIIe siècle," *Etudes d'histoire monétaire*, John Day (Lille, 1984), 355-95; IDEM, *The Medieval Market Economy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Christopher Dyer, "The Consumer and the Market in the Later Middle Ages," *Economic History Review* 42 (1989): 305-327; R.H. Britnell, *The Commercialization of English Society 1000-1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Newton Press, 1993); Peter Spufford, *Power and Profit: The Merchant in Medieval Europe* (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2003); IDEM, *Money and its Use*; and Diana Wood, *Medieval Money Matters (*Oxford: Oxbow, 2004).

contracts, loans, pricing, and the accumulation of wealth bridged scholastic thought with the commercial world beyond the university.

The medieval money economy arose out of the need for a measurable medium of exchange in order to replace direct exchange.[121] The concept of currency as a unit of common measure comprised only part of a broader contemporary phenomenon of quantifying abstracts such as time, labor, and value into standardized measurements. This trend itself corresponded with technological developments and the social changes necessitated by urban life in growing medieval cities, such as the appearance of public, mechanical clocks to measure time—and consequently the urban work day—according to fixed hours rather than daylight.[122] Jacques LeGoff and others have specifically tied the division of time into measurable units to the growth of the money economy and the structure of daily urban life.[123] Closer to the scholastic discussion of monetization, Joel Kaye and

[121] Money is a medium of exchange: "Because direct exchange one object for another is difficult, objects are exchanged for money which was invented to serve as a medium." Langholm, Economics *in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 522. Peter Spufford, "Le role de la monnaie dans la revolution commercial du XIII siècle," *Etudes d'histoire monétaire, XIIe-XIXe siècles* ed. John Day, 355-396 (Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1984); IDEM, *Money and its Use in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[122] See Gerhard Dohrn-Van Rossum, *L'histoire de l'heure: l'horlogerie et l'organisation moderne du temps* (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1997); David Goodman, "Medieval Cities," *Pre-Industrial Cities and Technology,* ed. Colin Chant and David Goodman (London: Routledge, 1999); and Chris Humphrey, "Time and Urban Culture in Late Medieval England," *Time in the Medieval World,* ed. idem and Mark Ormrod, (Rochester, NY: York Medieval Press, 2001), 105-17.

[123] See LeGoff, "Au Moyen Âge: temps de l'Église et temps du marchand," *Annales ESC* (1960): 417-433; David S. Landes, *Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Helmut Flachenecker, "Mechanische Uhren," *Europäische Technik im Mittelalter, 800 bis 1400: Tradition und Innovation,* ed. Uta Lindgren (Berlin: Mann, 1996); and Alexander Callander, "Time and Money," in *The Work of Jacques Le Goff and the Challenges of Medieval History,* ed. Miri Rubin (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1997), 1-27.

others have suggested a correlation between the development of proportional units of time and currency, and shifts in fourteenth-century scholastic discussions of natural philosophy.[124]

Medieval economic thought, including Odonis', thus arguably grew as much out the reception of Aristotelian works in the twelfth century as out of practical questions and concerns from the same period about profit and wealth, determining value and price, and the ethics of commercial growth and development.[125] Aristotle's economic concepts were known in part in the west before the mid-thirteenth-century translations of the *Ethics* and *Politics*, but were only fully vetted in thirteenth and fourteenth-century commentaries on the *Ethics*.[126] Much as was the case with aspects of Aristotle's natural philosophy, though, sources show fourteenth-century thought on markets and exchange moving well beyond their Aristotelian foundations.[127]

Most significantly, Odonis and others rooted their interpretations of equality with regard to price and value in Aristotle's discussions of justice in Book V of the *Ethics*.[128] As noted, of

---

[124] On this connection, see especially Kaye (1998) and IDEM, "The Impact of Money on the Development of Fourteenth-Century Scientific Thought," *Journal of Medieval History* 14 (1988): 251-270. Also significant: Miskimin, *Money, Prices, and Foreign Exchange in Fourteenth-Century France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); IDEM, *The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe, 1300-1460* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); and Brian Stock, "Science, Technology, and Economic Progress in the Early Middle Ages," *Science in the Middle Ages,* ed. David Linberg, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 1-51.

[125] Raymond A. De Roover, *La pensée économique des scolastiques: doctrines et methods* (Montreal: Institute d'études médiévales, 1971); Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992); Kaye (1998); and Diana Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[126] Langholm, 1992, 27.

[127] Kaye cites not only Olivi's independence of thought ["Peter John Olivi showed both knowledge of and characteristic independence from Aristotelian doctrine in his analysis of relativity in exchange." Kaye (1998), 147] but also the complexity of thought in later figures, including Odonis: "Odonis, and even more, Buridan, were beginning to formulate a conception of a market system so self-ordering that equality could result as a *product of willed inequalities*. None of this is found in Aristotle or the thirteenth-century commentaries." Kaye, 132.

[128] Joseph Soudek, "Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: An Inquiry into the Origin of Economic Analysis," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 96 (1952): 45-75; Barry J. Gordon, "Aristotle and the

foremost interest in this regard was Book V, Chapter Five on the nature of justice and injustice, and more specifically reciprocity and money as a means of preserving equality and justice in exchange. Aristotle argued that money allows for goods to be made proportionally equal to each other, and thus makes possible the fair exchange of otherwise dissimilar and disproportional goods.[129] In the Roman tradition, the emphasis on equality shifted in favor of profit; the "just" price signified the highest price for which goods could possibly be sold.

By the central medieval period, however, theologians who took up the question of just price sought to mediate tension between measuring the value of goods and determining the highest possible price for them, and Christian concerns over whether it was fair to earning excessive profit beyond one's needs.[130] Theoretical discussions of just price within a Christian theological tradition

---

Development of Value Theory," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 78 (1964), 115-128; Hans Kelsen, "Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice," *Aristotle's Ethics: Issues and Interpretations,* ed. James J. Walsh and Henry L. Shapiro (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1967), 102-119; Todd S. Lowry, "Aristotle's Mathematical Analysis of Exchange," *History of Political Economy* I (1969), 44-66; Mark D. Jordan, "Aquinas Reading Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers,* ed. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

[129] Most relevant here is Bk. V: Ch. 5 1133^{b} 16-23: "This is why all goods must have a price set on them; for then there will always be exchange, and if so, association of man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in truth it is impossible that things differeing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured by money."

[130] "The heightened sensitivity of fourteenth-century theorists to the central role of money as equalizer, not only in exchange but also in the life of the community, can be clearly seen a decade later [after Henry of Freimar's treatment of money as a medium in his *Ethics* commentary] in Odonis' deductive proof of its necessity: without exchange there would be not intercourse between men; without the equalization of goods there is no exchange; without commensuration of value according to money price, there is no equality." Kaye, 133. Kaye here cites Odonis' Book V, lectio 9, 31b, 106ra in the 1500 Venice printed edition. See 133n64. Langholm has also noted Odonis' contribution to the "scholastic Aristotelian analysis of value." Langholm, 1992, 512. On the just price debate, see Armando Sapori, "Il giusto prezzo nella dottrina di San Tommaso e nella pratica del suo tempo," *Archivo storico italiano* 18 (1932): 3-56; De Roover, "The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Practice," *Journal of Economic History* 18 (1958): 418-434; John W. Baldwin, *The Medieval Theories of the Just Price: Romanists, Canonists, and Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: the American Philosophical Society, 1959); Kenneth S. Cahn, "The

entailed weighing merchants' desire to price goods as expensively as they could be sold for, and the moral imperative to price them instead for what they ought to be sold for, according to the buyer and seller's needs and the circumstances of the sale.[131] This recognition of context and motive as extenuating circumstances that shaped market transactions itself reflected the marked shift that had occurred in the twelfth century toward legitimizing personal intent as a factor in ethical and doctrinal questions. Questions of equality within the larger context of merchant transactions embedded the scholastic discussions of just price in larger ethical debates, especially when focused on the context of the buyer's decision to pay for goods.

Questions specifically arose over unjust transactions, and the degree to which a buyer's need coerced them to pay higher prices than they otherwise would. Odonis and others weighed whether or not sales represented "equality preserved" in situations in which buyers' hardships, such as the need for food when hungry, coerced them into paying whatever price charged for goods.[132] Odd Langholm has cited Odonis' own discussion of need and compulsion as an important contribution to the just price debate, particularly his response to the *Ethics* with regard to scenarios in which a buyer may not be consenting absolutely to the seller's price when his motive for buying is determined by his need, whatever the price.[133]

Roman and Frankish Roots of the Just Price of Medieval Canon Law," *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 6 (1969), 3-52; and Harold Johnson, "Just Price, Aquinas, and the Labor Theory of Value," in *The Medieval Tradition of Natural Law* (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1987), 75-86. For the medieval roots of the early modern discussion of just price, see Andrea Finkelstein, *The Grammar of Profit: The Price Revolution in Intellectual Context* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

[131] See extensive discussions in Langholm (1998).

[132] Langholm (1998), 79.

[133] "If this is how Odonis understood him, the statement that "need compels him" means that the borrower is forced, in order to fend off starvation or utter discomfort, to accept terms he would not otherwise have consented to. Need is not compulsion as such; need is a particular kind of *economic* compulsion, different from but on a par with physical or moral compulsion. If we now turn from usury back to value in commodity exchange, it is quite clear that this is how Odonis and the tradition to which he belonged understood

Langholm also established the significance of Odonis' contribution to the discussion of borrowers' conditional or absolute consent, and its subsequent influence on Jean Buridan's thought on usury. [134] The same concern over buyers' free consent to sales figured in discussions of usury, specifically with regard to borrowers' agreements to loans. The comparably large body of contemporary commentaries and tracts written on the subject reflect the broader social and theological apprehensions surrounding usury.[135] Merchants and theologians alike shared an interest in defining Christian economic ethics, and questions about usury, prices and profits, and contracts and credit reflected broader concerns over fraud and deceit in trade, including usury, contracts, and the use of credit.[136] Beyond scholastic discussions, anxiety, uncertainty, and guilt

---

economic compulsion as modifying the liberalistic maxim. Odonis was a disciple also of Olivi and through him of Henry of Ghent. Explaining the value maxim, Henry rules out contracts based on ignorance, as we saw, and then adds those based on the buyer's need ("*necessitas ementis*"). Later authors who knew Ghent read this in substantive terms. Henry of Hassis speaks of "a poor man coerced by need," Henry of Oyta of someone "restricted by penury." Oyta and Olivi both use the word *egestas* (want, poverty). Justice in exchange is violated, says the latter, if on party "is compelled by such poverty or other need" ("*ex tanta egestate vel alia necessitate compulsus*") that the terms cannot be said to have issued freely. This was copied by Odonis in his treatise on contracts and by Bernardino of Siena and through him by Caepolla." Langholm (1982), 273-274.

[134] "In the Aristotelian sources there is also an early tradition which invokes the concept of conditional consent to counter an objection to the prohibition of usury. It was taken from the context of the *Politics* into the *Ethics*, where it appears in Book IV (on the virtue of liberality) as well as in Book V. In both places Buridanus copies the Franciscan commentator Geraldus Odonis, who was not an Averroist but transmitted a number of other influences and was very well informed," Langholm (1982), 272.

[135] T. P. McLaughlin, "The Teachings of he Canonists on Usury," *Medieval Studies* I (1939), 81-147; John Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Ovidio Capitani, "Sulla questione dell'usura nel Medio Evo," *L'etica economica medievale: testi à cura di Ovidio* Capitani, ed. IDEM (Bologna: Il mulino, 1974), 23-46; Giorgio Marcuzzi, "Una soluzione teologico-giuridica al problema dell'usura in una questione *De quolibet* inedita de Guido Terreni (1260-1342)," *Salesianum* 41 (1979): 647-684; and Langholm, *The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury* (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1984).

[136] Jean Ibasnès, *La doctrine de l'église et les réalités économiques au XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967); John T. Gilchrist, *The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); Amleto Spicciani, *La mercatura e la formazione del prezzo nella riflessione teologica mediovale* (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1977); Jacques Le Goff, *Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages* (New York: Zone Books, 1988); and Michael A. Hicks, *Profit, Piety, and the Professions in Later Medieval England* (Gloucester: A. Sutton, 1990).

over merchant transactions appears in contemporary literature and drama.[137] Moreover, as this ethical ambiguity spilled over into confessionals, penitential handbooks reflected theological responses to the concerns faced by merchants.[138]

These social and economic tensions represented one layer of context underlying the economic issues Odonis and his contemporaries addressed, particularly in their commentaries on the *Ethics* and select *quodlibeta*.[139] Joel Kaye has made the important qualification, however, that, as in most other academic works, no one responded directly to specific social situations or questions, but only discussed socio-economic practices and theories in broad, theoretical terms.[140]

---

[137] Not limited to confessional booth or scholastic treatises. Roger Ladd, "My condition is mannes soul to kill" -- Everyman's mercantile salvation," *Comparative Drama* 41 (2007): 57-78. "Suggests that the play is aimed at a mercantile audience, and that the Everyman of the text represents Every Merchant rather than Every Man."

[138] Langholm has most recently explored the intersection of economic thought and concerns over personal piety in *The Merchant in the Confessional* (2003), cited earlier. A recent related study is James Davis' *Medieval Market Morality: Life, Law, and Ethics in the English Marketplace, 1200-1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[139] Discussion at Paris on usury and trade, e.g. Langholm notes Henry of Ghent's quodlibet in 1276 on profit and price (Langholm, 1982, 267). "Most of what there is about money on an Aristotelian basis in earlier work outside the textual commentaries is couched in the scholastic form of disputed questions. A standard *quodlibet* (freely chosen) question deals with money-changing (*campsoria*); it offers an opportunity for paraphrasing Aristotle and explaining his teaching also in some of his more analytical passages. This is, for instance, how Henry of Ghent came to discuss money," Langholm (1983), 27-28.

[140] "Despite ample evidence for the involvement of fourteenth-century natural philosophers in the economic life of their time, not one directly acknowledges the impact of social and economic experience on his philosophical speculation. While in their economic writings they continually state that 'money measures all things' (*inventum est nummisma ut sit medium et mensura omnium commutabilium*), and while they investigate in great depth how money performs its function of measuring, relating, and equalizing, they never directly acknowledge its influence on their philosophical preoccupation with these same questions of measurement, relation, and equalization. Although they often remark on money's extraordinary success as an instrument of gradation and commensuration, they never acknowledge it as a model for the conceptual instruments they themselves devised to perform similar functions within philosophical discourse." Kaye, 8. In this regard, as noted, the confessional literature examined by Langholm, and possibly the tracts on usury and contracts written by Olivi and Odonis come closest to citing specific contemporary concerns.
Kaye's own argument supports this exception of the ethical and doctrinal tensions: "In discussing the complex relationship between economic and proto-scientific thought in the fourteenth century, a question arises concerning the direction in which the insights flowed. Were they insights originally derived to make sense of pressing new economic and social realities that were then applied to the understanding of the natural world, or were they insights developed within the philosophical and intellectual tradition of

As theology masters and university faculty, however, they remained participants in the contemporary economic sphere.[141] Kaye also notes those scholars making the strongest contributions to natural philosophy did so, although without explicit reference in their works, while firmly embedded in the trade, commercialization, and market practices of the world beyond the university, as well as the financial bureaucracy of the university itself.[142] Their rotations as rector or procurer involved them in record-keeping and administrative financial matters.[143] In terms of their own personal involvement with the market economy, masters themselves were dependent on financial support from their religious order, their own personal wealth, or that of a benefactor in order to complete their degree programs, and in need of benefices and income after that.

Research on scholastic economic thought has traditionally focused on the contributions of key figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Peter John Olivi, Jean Buridan, and Nicole Oresme, although work has increasingly been done on Odonis and other lesser known figures.[144] Of all of these writers, Olivi has been characterized as the economic thinker whose writing most closely reflected

problems...The very act of creating conceptual models rested on the existence of a sophisticated university culture, proficient in the exercise of logic and criticism, and confident in its powers of creative speculation. But, while allowing for the strength of scholastic culture, my study of particular intersections between economic and proto-scientific thought has led me to conclude that the creative impulse behind the fertile new models of measurement, relation, and equalization emerging with thin the schools Came largely from the experience and comprehension of unsettling social and economic developments that were transforming the society beyond the schools." Kaye, 12.

[141] Murdoch (1975); and J.I. Catto, "Citizens, Scholars, and Masters," *Early Oxford Schools* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 151-92.

[142] Kaye, 6.

[143] Kaye, 29. For the administrative and economic structure of the programs, the Nations, and the university at large, see Astrik L. Gabriel, and Aleksander Gieysztor, eds., *The Economic and Material Frame of the Mediaeval University* (Notre Dame: International Commission for the History of Universities, 1977); Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), and *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century A Social Portrait* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), particularly "*Collectae* and University Finance," 28-45.

[144] Also important commentary on the *Ethics* by Henry of Freimar, significant for economic thought, Augustinian friar early fourteenth century.

the thinking in the marketplace around him, as well as the one who most directly influenced Odonis' own economic thought.[145] Olivi's primary economic text, the *Tractatus de emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuries, de restitutionibus,* appeared in paraphrases in Odonis' own treatise on contracts.[146] Odonis also borrowed from Olivi in his *Ethics* commentary.[147]

As noted, Odonis' *Ethics* commentary remains the most significant source for his economic thought, and is likewise a source of that distinctiveness and individuality of thought that frequently reveals him favoring pragmatic, if not also surprising or unconventional positions. Langholm has flagged several of Odonis' opinions in this regard, particularly stressing that "One sometimes gets the impression from reading Odonis of certain impatience with the tiresome line of theoretical objections to commercial practices, since the critics must be perfectly aware of the fact that there is nothing to be done about them."[148] Odonis saw merchants as useful and necessary to society, and accordingly judged occasional dishonesty in their transactions an acceptable consequence.[149]

Olivi, Scotus, and Odonis's considerable contributions to discussions of money and exchange have raised the question of whether or not they and others represented a particularly

---

[145] Kaye, 141. For Olivi's economic thought, see D. Pacetti, "Un trattato sulle usure e le restituzioni di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi falsamente attribuito a fr. Gerardo da siena," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 46 (1953): 448-457; Giocomo Todeschini, "Oeconomica Franciscana II: Pietro di Giovanni Olivi come fonte per la storia dell'etica-economica medievale," *Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa* 13 (1977): 461-494; and Julius Kirschner and Kimberly Lo Prete, "Peter John Olivi's Treatises on Contracts of Sale, Usury, and Restitution: Minorite Economics or Minor Works?" *Quaderni fiorenti* 13 (1984): 233-286.

[146] Langholm (1982), 264. For Olivi's text, see Amleto Spicciani, *La mercatura e la formazione del prezzo nella riflessione teologica medioevale*. Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1977; and Giocamo Todeschini, ed. *Un trattato di economia politica francescana: il 'De emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuries, de restitutionisbus' di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi* (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, 1980).

[147] Langholm (1998), 131.

[148] Langholm (1992), 515.

[149] Langholm (1992), 515-16. Langholm further notes, "Odonis counters the objections raised by simply referring to the fact that all this [merchants' scamming] is common practice among merchants. Merchants have their ways which must to some extent be tolerated, for there is no realistic alternative." IBID., 516.

"Franciscan" school of economic thought.[150] This deference to practical economic concerns corresponds with Odonis' general Aristotelian defense of money as necessary for the exchange of goods in society. Even some Franciscans recognized the value of money as a medium. Kaye notes, "While this distrust remained pervasive in society, by the late thirteenth century, writers, including Franciscans, began to articulate a counter position based on the growing intellectual appreciation of money as an instrument of order and equalization in exchange."[151] Although we cannot know, it may have also informed Odonis' understanding of the Franciscans' poverty vow, and the viability of voluntary poverty in a merchant society. His petition for release from the vow has frequently been framed retrospectively in light of his later enforcement of *Cum inter nonnullos*, but it also bears consideration that for Odonis and others critical of literal interpretations of the vow, there was no realistic economic alternative than to seek dispensation from it.

Franciscan authors joined many of their contemporaries in commenting on the use and abuse of money in exchange; A group of Franciscan thinkers who, like many of their contemporaries, commented on the use and abuse of money in exchange relationships. Recent scholarship has generally followed the broader preference in medieval philosophy to avoid categorizing groups of individual thinkers as schools of thought, and thus the label of a Franciscan economic school denotes a body of writers contributing to economic thought, not a body of

[150] In a broader sense, though, as part of his argument that the tenth through thirteenth-centuries represented a transition to a profit economic, Lester Little has posited the friars in general as the dominant force in the development of a late medieval urban spirituality with a Christian ethic suited to the reality of merchant life and the pursuit of profit. See Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978). See also De Roover, *San Bernardino of Siena and Sant' Antonino of Florence: The Two Great Economic Thinkers of the Middle Ages* (Boston: Kress Library of Business and Economics, 1967).
[151] Kaye, 132.

economic thought rigidly shaped by Franciscan theology. A cohesive Franciscan "school" did not exist generally, or within this context.[152]

We should, however, recognize that the key Franciscan figures from the 1310s and 1320s, the tense years of the Spiritualist crisis, commented on the same economic issues and influenced each other's thought. Moreover, many of these figures participated in the political arguments for and against evangelical poverty which, although a debate over doctrinal and papal authority, arose most immediately over concerns with money and commerce. John XXII's efforts to dismantle the legal framework of use and ownership by which the Franciscans nominally preserved their poverty vow necessarily touched on tensions between wealth and poverty.[153] Given the dynamic context in which Olivi, Odonis, Peter Auriol, and others wrote, scholars have approached their economic thought with full view of these author's Franciscan theological heritage, especially with regard to questions of free will. Odd Langholm identified five traditions among the *Ethics* commentary and economic literature of the thirteenth and fourteenth-centuries, and characterized one of the five as "Franciscan," comprised of the contributions made by Olivi, Odonis, and Bernardino of Siena.[154]

That said, seeming contradictions arise that seem out of character for Odonis, according to Kaye, who has argued for the possibility of Franciscan (Augustinian) theology closely shaping

---

[152] Kaye, 130. Courtenay has made this point about allusions to an "Augustinian school" in earlier historiography, and as a corrective measure pointed out that currents of thought within each order varied among individual writers, and among university communities. England to the continent: the difference in trends and influences at Oxford and Paris at any point not only impede, but make somewhat irrelevant any attempt to assign a homogenous intellectual identity to the mendicant orders. Courtenay points out, however, that even the Austin Friars in Paris and Oxford, shared a "core teaching", although their respective connections to "Augustinianism" are very different. See *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England*, 311, where Courtenay adopts the term "Augustinianism" to refer to Augustine's doctrine and thought, and designates the Austin Friars as the "Augustinian school."

[153] See, for example, Lambertini (1997).

[154] Cf. Langholm (1979).

economic thought, for Odonis and others.[155] No direct, or at least intuitive connection exists between the Franciscan poverty crisis and these debates over economic theory. That said, at least two influential personalities in the order, Peter John Olivi and Odonis, inserted themselves into both matters. Kaye noted that Odonis cited specific, practical examples of daily life and daily merchant reality in his discussions of money and exchange in the *Ethics* Book V. While bearing in mind the qualifications that have generally prohibited historians from evaluating medieval theological or philosophical positions based on their social contexts, we could posit that Odonis' rational approach to evaluating exchanges mimics the pragmatic approach some have interpreted he (and his patron John XXII) as having taken in the poverty controversy.

[155] "As if to demonstrate by philosophical argument that free agreement between exchanging parties was more to be trusted as a guide to equality than the decision of a judge, Odonis interjected a discussion into his commentary on Book V found neither in Aristotle nor in earlier commentaries at this point. He asked a question of particular concern to Franciscan writers: whether a well-regulated society rested more on the virtuous activity of men or on the strength and enforcement of positive law. As one might have guessed from Odonis' earlier valorization of free agreement in exchange, he concluded that the good man was more rational, just, divine, and to be prized than the good law. In this as in so many of his economic decisions, Odonis was in substantial agreement with his fellow Franciscans Olivi and Duns Scotus. This unanimity raises two related questions: (I) what role did Franciscan theology play, particularly its emphasis on the freedom and primacy of the will, on the evolution of "economic" insights such as the validation of estimation and mutual agreement in the determination of just equality? (2) Was there a position on economic exchange, generally sympathetic to the give and take of the marketplace and so favorable to capitalistic acquisition that can be labeled specifically "Franciscan?" Clearly Franciscans are found among the most sensitive and understanding of economic observers, particularly in their willingness to recognize agreement as a dynamic process of equalization. However, the long existence of parallel arguments in Roman and canon law and their acceptance and development by non-Franciscan thinekers, including Domincans and secular masters such as Godfrey of Fontaines, Jean Buridan, and Nicole Oresme, argue against the existence of a specifically 'Franciscan economics.'
Certainly in a tradition as intentionally synthetic as scholastic thought, Franciscan theological positions influenced Franciscan definitions of economic liceity. Scholastics sought to integrate economic insights with theological requirements as intently as they integrated models of economic activity with models of nature. Thus the Franciscan emphasis on the primacy of the will would have facilitated the acceptance of free agreement as the sufficient guarantee of equality in exchange, and would have worked, in a general sense, toward the acceptance of the Roman law position allowing free bargaining in the determination of price and value. We can see this in the thought of Odonis, who often surpassed Duns Scotus in the acuity of his economic observations." Kaye, 130-132.

Kaye, Langholm, and others have noted that Olivi was extraordinarily tuned in to contemporary economic practice and was intensely sensitive to economic and market realities surrounding him. We may not have the strongest ground on which to link socio-economic thought and theological positions (and vice versa), but Kaye and Langholm's points about Odonis should be counted with those of Duncan Nimmo's portrayal of him as a thinker and administrator quick to observe practical circumstances and respond pragmatically, whether in his evaluations of the contemporary market economy or his attempts to preserve the Franciscan order as a cohesive unit after John XXII's summary judgment of the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty (to be discussed in depth below).

Academic Contexts and Tensions

The spirit and structure of academic work in the fourteenth century, including the significant shifts and distinctions between this later period and earlier scholastic writing of the thirteenth century, stand well covered in secondary scholarship of the past three decades.[156] Within

[156] The fourteenth-century universities were also marked by changes in genres of academic production. See "Background A: The Textual Tradition of Early Fourteenth-Century Principial Debates and Prologues" in Chapter III below for an overview of these shifts.

For an overview of medieval education, university curricula, secular and mendicant career structures, and the theological degree program, at Paris during this period, see among others Stephen C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the Universities: The Schools of Paris and Their Cities* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Courtenay, "Teaching Careers at the Univ. of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," *Texts and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education* XVIII, ed. Astrik L. Gabriel, et al. (1988); and Jacques Verger, "The First French Universities and the Institutionalization of Learning: Faculties, Curricula, Degrees," in *Learning Institutionalized*: *Teaching in the Medieval University,* ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 5-19.

For late medieval university education more broadly, including university careers at Oxford, see Reuven Avi-Yonah, "Career Trends of Parisian Masters of Theology, 1200-1320," *History of Universities* VI (1986-1987): 47-64; Courtenay, "The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1303," *FS* 53 (1993): 156-173; Jacqueline Hamesse, ed., *Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales: actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 septembre 1993*) (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institute d'Études Médiévales de l'Université Catholique de Louvain, 1994), particularly

the Paris university community itself, several conflicts emerged, a number of which remained latent tensions well into Odonis' time there.[157]

One conflict comprised tensions that had coalesced around the separate communities of mendicant and secular students at Paris.[158] Concern arose in 1290 when Boniface VIII allowed priests within the mendicant orders to preach, hear confession, and bury laymen in their own cemeteries. Secular clerics protested; this expansion of the pastoral ministry to the mendicants usurped their own spiritual jurisdiction and, more immediately, the fees they collected for penance, last rites, and burial legacies.[159] Their complaints mirrored struggles within the mendicant orders themselves over the nature of their calling. Among the Franciscans, for example, decades earlier

---

Courtenay's, "Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century," 325-250; Friedman and Schabel, "The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in the 1320's: MS Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Palatinus 1439" *AHDLMA* 63 (1996): 357-372; Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth-Century," in *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life. Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff*, ed. P. Biller and R.B. Dobson (Rochester, NY: Boydell, 1999), 77-92; Courtenay (1999); *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University,* ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2000), in particular Courtenay, "The Institutionalization of Theology," 245-256; Thomas Sullivan, O.S.B., "Merit Ranking and Career Patterns: The Parisian Faculty of Theology in the Late Middle Ages," *Universities and Schooling in Medieval Society,* ed. Courtenay and Jürgen Miethke (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 127-147; *Medieval Education,* ed. Ronald B. Begley and Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); and Courtenay, "Franciscan Learning: University Education and Biblical Exegesis," *Defenders and Critics of Franciscan Life. Essays in Honour of John V. Fleming,* ed. Michael Cusato and Guy Gelner (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 55-64.

[157] See Takashi Shogiman, "Academic Controversies," and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).

[158] On the mendicant-secular conflict broadly, see Decima Douie, *The Conflict Between the Seculars and the Mendicants at the University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Blackfriars, 1954); Yves Congar, "Aspcts ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et séculiers dans la seconde moitié du xiiie siècle et le début du xive," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 28 (1962): 35-151; Shōgimen, "Academic Controversies" *The Medieval Theologians,* ed. G.R. Evans (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 233-249.

[159] On the mendicant orders in urban culture generally, see Jacques LeGoff, "Ordres mendicants et urbanization dans la Oeuvres médiévale," *Annales* 25 (1970): 924-965 and Jean-Claude Schmitt, "Oú en est l'enquête Ordres mendicants et urbanization dans la Oeuvres médiévale," in *Stellung und Wirksamkeit der Bettelorden in der städtischen Gesellschaft,* ed. Kaspar Elm (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1981), 13-18.

Minister General Elias had opposed the clericalization of the order. Elias favored the lay friars over the clerics and remained conservative about the friars' roles at the universities.[160]

This broad animosity towards the mendicants sharpened into cynicism, criticism, and polemical attacks on the Franciscans' relationship to material goods and wealth relative to their poverty vow. The lived reality of mendicant privilege at the universities overtly contradicted their claims to follow a model of Apostolic Poverty modelled on scripture. Fourteenth-century statutes at Paris reflect the order responding to anti-mendicant criticism among both the clergy and laity.[161] Tension surrounded the granting of pastoral responsibilities and privileges to the mendicant orders, as well as the contested jurisdiction over orthodox doctrine and theology, coalesced into conflict among individual students in the secular and mendicant university populations at Paris. Those tensions were sharpened by the mendicant orders' decision to remain teaching in Paris when the secular community left on strike in 1229.[162]

On August 14, 1279, Nicholas III issued *Exiit qui seminat,* reconfirming the Franciscan Rule and clarifying *usus pauper.*[163] The bull made a further distinction between use and property with regard to the difference between use in right (*usus iuris*), which was not allowed, and use in actuality (*usus facti*). In response to heightened rhetoric from the seculars that an order so well-

---

[160] See Erickson, 136-137. Others, like Haymo of Faversham, who opposed Elias, wanted "to see the Order more fully integrated into the clerical ministries of the Church, much like their Dominican counterparts;" in other words, to be able to preach, offer confession, and bury the dead. Michael F. Cusato, "Talking About Ourselves: The Shift in Franciscan Writing from Hagiography to History (1235-1247)" *Franciscan Studies* 58 (2000): 55.

[161] Erickson, 135.

[162] Of interest here: Courtenay, "The Institutionalization of Theology" in *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University,* ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 245-256. See as well the literature on the conflict between the secular master Henry of Ghent and Boniface the VIII over the contested authority over teaching and exegesis of scripture.

[163] See "Apostolic Poverty" discussion below.

provisioned with houses and material goods could claim to live in poverty, Nicholas argued that the Church held literal ownership of the goods and property donated to the order and used by the brothers on a daily basis. In this regard, *Exiit qui seminat* represented a kind of end to seculars' attack on mendicants, at least with regard to claims that the latter were not in fact poor. It accordingly stands as further evidence of the importance of setting the poverty controversy within the background and context of the attacks on the mendicants in the mid-thirteenth century. It is impossible to separate the Franciscan poverty crisis from the mendicant-secular crisis, particularly in its university context, because the latter prompted the Franciscans to defend, and in the process define and refine, their profession of poverty. The doctrine of Apostolic Poverty that John XXII later attacked in the 1320s had arisen as much from the order's defenses of its ideal in the 1250s and the 1260s as much, if not more directly than from any of the early versions of the Rule itself.[164]

Crisis in the Franciscan Order

As suggested, any attempt to contextualize Odonis' thought should situate him within the crisis over Franciscan poverty, which took root during the order's early years and came to a head during his term as Minister General. Politically and socially, the period stretching from the late thirteenth to the early fourteenth century was one of spiritual rebellion and upheaval in southern France and north-central Italy, areas where both the beguine and Spiritualist movements grew strongest.[165] Given Odonis' roots in Quercy, neighboring Languedoc, he was exposed to these

[164] See David Flood and especially Erickson. The General Constitutions of Cahors mandated that Exiit and Exivi be read twice a year, "and the sections on the observance of poverty four times," Erickson, 112.

[165] The Franciscan crisis and corollary debates over Apostolic Poverty have been well-surveyed, particularly in recent years. Several accounts appear in broader histories of the Franciscan order, and others focus more closely on the Spiritual debate; of these, the narrative most sensitive to the spirit of the voices and protests, is David Flood, O.F.M.'s introduction to the individual documents that comprise Nicholas the Minorite's fourteenth-century *Chronica*. As the collected texts within the *Chronica* bear witness, the crisis generated

conflicts during his early years in the order, and was familiar with the religious fervor and heterodoxy that had characterized the region since the eleventh-century.[166] Odonis himself figured centrally in the Spiritualist controversy, and appears frequently in medieval and modern accounts of the conflict. A brief overview of the events and texts that shaped the crisis will establish Odonis' specific role.

During the span of Odonis' academic and administrative careers, the debates over Apostolic Poverty became a touchstone for the preceding centuries of calls for the reform of the church's wealth. One such call had been Francis' own initative to gather together a community of

---

not only personal polemics among John XXII, Michael of Cesena, and their respective supporters, but opened new fronts in the attack on papal authority.

Roberto Lambertini has written extensively on the social and political context surrounding John XXII's suppression of the Spiritualists, and Duncan Nimmo has profiled Odonis as Minister General and surveyed the significance of decisions he made as the order's leader within the long view of Franciscan history from the medieval through the early modern period.

For the scholarship on this chapter in Franciscan history, see the following works, as well as those cited in the "Apostolic Poverty" sub-section below: Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order, 1210-1323* (St. Bonaventure, NY: Church Historical Society, 1961); Duncan Nimmo, "Poverty and Politics: The Motivation of Fourteenth Century Franciscan Reform in Italy," *Studies in Church History* XI (1978): 161-178; Gál and Flood (1996); David Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Prosecution in the Century after Saint Francis* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2001); Michael Robson, *The Franciscans in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2006); and Giacomo Todeschini, *Franciscan Wealth: From Voluntary Poverty to Market Society* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2009).

[166]See for this area and period, Raoul Manselli, *Spirituali e beghini in Provenza* (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1959); Jean-Louis Biget, "Autour de Bernard Déliceiux. Franciscanisme et société en Languedoc entre 1295 et 1330" in André Vauchez, ed., *Mouvements franciscains et société française, Xiie-Xxe siècles* (Paris, Beauchesne: 1984), 75-93; Raoul Manselli, *Spirituels et béguins du Midi* (Toulouse: Bibliothèque historique Privat, 1989); Marie-Humbert, Vicaire, ed., *La Papauté d'Avignon et le Languedoc, 1316-1342* (Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1991); Takashi Shogimen, "Academic Controversies," in *The Medieval Theologians*, ed. G.R. Evans (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 233-249; IDEM, *Ockham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Louisa Burnham, *So Great a Light, so Great a Smoke: The Beguin Heretics of Languedoc* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); EADEM, *Medieval Heresy: The Church's Struggle for Orthodoxy and Survival* (London, I.B. Tauris & Co., 2008); and *The Cambridge Companion to Francis of Assisi*, ed. Michael J. Robson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), particulary Patrick Nold's "Pope John XXII, the Franciscan Order, and its *Rule*," 258-272.

brothers in service to the church, who would renounce their material wealth and pursue lives of service, modeled on descriptions of Christ in the Gospels. Innocent III approved Francis' order in 1209. That sanction and all later legislation concerning the Franciscan order during the thirteenth century, including Francis' canonization in 1228, reflected the church's support for the order and its comfort with the lifestyle of mendicant poverty.

With regard to material wealth and goods, the Rule Francis wrote to bind the order restricted the brothers from handling money, storing provisions, and owning property, individually or as a community. These proscriptions were meant to codify the spiritual and material humility that Francis had envisioned; as such, they reflected a level of practical poverty already assumed by Francis' and the brothers' having taken on the dress and demeanor of penitent pilgrims. Neither Francis nor his early Rule explicitly codified poverty or discussed it in legal terms, beyond the context of humility and rejection of material goods in favor of an ascetic life. That Francis wished foremost to recreate Christ's humility, not pursue an ideal of poverty divorced from that model, is crucial to understanding that absolute, Apostolic Poverty—as a doctrine and spiritual ideal—was constructed and defined in later thirteenth and fourteenth-century rhetoric.

Francis had not left instructions specific enough to guide his followers through the discord that arose over how strictly to interpret the vow of mendicancy, nor was it entirely clear who had the authority to interpret the rule definitively. Ambiguity and discord began within Francis' own lifetime. In 1219, while Francis was on a mission to Egypt and Palestine, the friars in Bologna accepted the gift of a house, which Francis later rejected and forced them the brothers to leave. Cardinal Hugolino (later Gregory IX), who had been appointed as Cardinal Protector of the order in 1217, intervened and claimed ownership of the house himself. The church preserved the

Franciscans' legal, if not practical, poverty by claiming ownership of the property and goods used by the brothers. The precedent for the legal fiction that developed more fully in later decades thus came only a decade after Francis appeared at the papal court. By Francis' death in October of 1226, the order had greatly benefitted from donations of property from the laity. Although he had removed himself from the day-to-day governance and administration of the order before that, Francis censured the increased laxity of observance in a letter to the order at the end of his life. He ordered that this *Testament* be appended to all copies of the Rule as a reminder and clarification of the the humility and sacrifice called for in the poverty vow.[167] A spectrum of convictions about how best to interpret the rule had developed by that point, though, ranging from those who favored lenient interpretation and those who clung more tightly to the spirit of Francis' intention.

In 1230, Gregory IX issued *Quo elongati* in response to growing confusion over property use and ownership, especially for the friars who had need of books and fixed residences for study. Gregory ruled in favor of the friars using donated houses, furniture, books, and other study materials; all such donations would remain in the legal ownership of the donors. Gregory thus legislated away from a literal reading of Francis' Rule; he also ruled that the *Testament* was not a binding amendment to the Rule. He further violated Francis' own directive that the *Testament* not be glossed, and glossed it himself. In so doing, Gregory provided a rhetorical defense for those friars who desired a relaxed interpretation of Francis' guidelines: he characterized the *Testament*

[167] The nature of revisions made to the Rule itself during the order's early years reflected the movement's rapid growth and shifts in the friars' activities and foci. Francis' early Rule was a spiritual statement of faith, with guidelines relevant to a group of lay pilgrims and preachers. Revisions in 1221 (the *Regula non bullata*) clarified the friars' liturgical roles. Pressed for a more pragmatic and administratively-natured Rule, though, Francis presented the *Regula secunda* (the *Regula bullata*) in 1223, which was approved by Honorius III.

as a statement representative only of Francis' personal wishes, and not a document binding on the rest of the order.

Tension and disagreement over Franciscan identity increased during the 1240s. The *Commentary of the Four Masters on the Rule* presented at the General Chapter in 1242 reflected the perceived need for clarification about the economic life of the order. By that point the divisions in the order had sharpened, from the lowest levels to the order's leadership. Those members who had sought the freedom to interpret the Rule ascetically were countered by those interested in reforming the order to reflect the reality of the friars' daily use of material goods. In 1245, Innocent IV issued *Ordinem vestrum*, in which he decreed that the papacy would own the houses and supplies used by the Franciscans, and that agents of the order could handle monetary transactions for them. Innocent acted in response to an appeal from the then Minister General, Crescentiuis of Jesi, for a relaxation of the rule. Crescentius was also a strong voice in the calls to suppress the community of ascetic friars in the Marches of Ancona, the *Zelanti*. These factions grew stronger in opposition to each other.

Terms of debate are often carved out and shaped during the course of conflict, and by the third decade of the poverty crisis, the manner in which either side defined themselves was one front of the conflict itself. Contemporaries not only self-identified as either lenient or literal interpreters of the rule, but were also persecuted or tolerated according to how they defined poverty.[168] By mid-century, the ascetic side of the order had polarized its rhetoric, now that it had been forced into a defensive position as a minority movement. Bonaventure's tenure as Minister

[168] See Lambert and Burr for definitions of and chronological distinctions between the terms fraticelli and Spiritualists.

General (1257 to 1274) marked a turning point in the order leadership's relationship with Francis' legend and legacy.

Bonaventure took a moderate approach to the Spiritualist debate and reform within the order.[169] More to the point, Bonaventure and others recognized what heavy use the radicals had made of the ascetic fervor and poverty ascribed to Francis, not only in sources from the order's early history, but in the body of works written and circulated after his death, in which his piety and asceticism were celebrated and frequently distorted into legend. The popularity of the oral and written stories of Francis' life must be viewed in the broader context of the spiritual outpouring that that also prompted pilgrimages to Assisi, and the support for Francis' rapid canonization. As pressure on the ascetic members of the order grew, they drew upon these sources for material in defense of more literal and austere interpretation and embodiment of the Rule. To counter the continued influence of earlier biographic accounts that were sympathetic to Francis' ideal, and to circulate an image of Francis that moderates could draw from in their attacks on the radicals, Bonaventure produced his own biography of Francis. He distributed this *Legenda maior* at the Chapter General meeting at Narbonne, from which point the text was carried back to the provinces. In 1266 the order's leadership adopted the *Legenda maior* as the order's official biography of Francis.

To imply that divisions in the order aligned neatly between spiritualists and their opponents is to imply first that theirs were the only voices in the thirteenth and fourteenth-century debates,

[169] For Bonaventure's reforms and their institutionalization in the Constiutions of Narbonne (1260), see the edition of the latter in Ferdinand Delorme's "'Diffinitiones' Capituli Generalis O.F.M. Narbonensis (1260)," *AFH* 3 (1910): 491-504 and "Explanationes constitutionum generalium Narbonensium," *AFH* 18 (1925): 511-524.

and that these groups were coherent and homogenous themselves, or even that they were readily distinguishable from one another. In 1279, Nicholas III called together a commission of Franciscans to write a new interpretation of the Rule itself, to reflect the spirit of Bonaventure's moderate approach to the poverty dispute and to reforming the order. *Exiit qui seminat,* issued the same year, not only reconfirmed the Rule but distilled the spirit of poverty into a clarified understanding of *usus pauper.*[170] Also as noted, in this regard *Exiit* provided a legal end to the seculars' attacks on the mendicants, or at least muted their cries of hypocrisy with regard to the friars' poverty vow.

The orders' defenses were further strengthened in 1288, with the accession of the first Franciscan pope, Nicholas IV. Nicholas came to office as a vehement opponent of the Spiritualists, and as pope moved determinedly to suppress them, especially in the Marches of Ancona. 1299 and 1300 marked reversals in two regards. The Chapter General at Lyons degreed that Peter John Olivi's works, which had previously been tolerated under a blanket of suspicion, were to be burned.[171] By this period, however, one of Olivi's closest followers, Ubertino of Casale, was actively preaching in northern Italy. The following year, Boniface VIII issued *Super cathedram,* which he intended to quell the continued tensions between the friars and the secular clergy, and was intended to be a compromise. The friars did not receive it as such, and distanced themselves from their earlier relationship with the papacy, as the orders' leadership were moving more

[170] For Peter John Olivi's influence on the commission and the tone of *Exiit* itself, see Burr, 51-58.
[171] For Olivi's economic thought and context for his role in the Spiritualist crisis, see the Introduction (fn3) and earlier discussions in Chapters I and II.

forcefully to contain the Spiritualists, who by this time had gained significant defense and protection from political patrons.

In 1310, Clement V, having received requests from several of these patrons on behalf of the Spiritualist, established a commission in Avignon that year to investigate the dispute. The Minister General, Gonsalvo of Valboa, spoke for the Conventuals, while Ubertino of Casale represented the Spirituals. Clement supported the Spirituals in their criticism of corruption in the order; they were released from their vows of obedience to the order and were instead placed under the direct care and authority of the papal commission. The Conventuals immediately opposed the idea of dividing the order, however, because it legitimized the Spiritualist position, which they maintained was heretical. Two years later, in May of 1312, Clement issued a final settlement to the dispute, *Exivi de Paradiso*. The bull recognized the Spirituals' criticism of the order's lax observance of the rule, and reflected Clement's own gloss of the rule. Clement urged a reconciliation of the two sides to end the ideological and administrative divisions in the order, but died shortly thereafter, before any concord was effected.

The situation within the Franciscan Order by 1316 was thus one of recognized division and antagonism with no foreseeable resolution. That year marked two transitions during this period of stalemate. Michael of Cesena was elected Minister General, and took a moderate stand to the conflict, modeled on Bonaventure's earlier approach, in persecuting of the Spirituals and urging broad reform throughout the order. As the incoming leader of the order, Michael intended to heal its divisions.[172] Like Clement V, though, he proposed weak reforms on rents, types of habit, shoes, meat, and other aspects of daily practice that failed to satisfy the most ascetic brothers. Cesena

[172] Moorman, 309

issued revised statutes for all the members of the order, meaning to enforce a modicum of asceticism that Conventuals would find palatable but that would still satisfy "the small group of dissidents who were now more and more determined to cut adrift from the Order altogether."[173] Once again though, the strict adherents of Francis' original intentions for the order considered reforms on the collection of rents and possession of luxury items as topical treatments that ignored much deeper wounds. The approach taken to the Franciscans by the new pope, John XXII, must be seen in the same light; needing to resolve a fracture, not arbitrarily attacking a minority group within the order.[174] As Moorman notes, though, "No one wanted to see the Order split into two; but the problem of holding the two groups together in a system which would satisfy both was proving increasingly difficult."[175]

That same year, John XXII ascended to the papacy and inherited the growing papal bureaucracy in Avignon, attacks on the church's wealth and discussion, and crises that included the Franciscan dispute. John XXII came to the papal office trained in canon law, not theology. This background explains the legalist approach he took to the papacy's affairs, and his desire to limit the degree to which the papacy was adminiatratively responsible and legally liable for affairs concerning the order's property.[176] With such a heavy agenda, John viewed the poverty crisis as

---

[173] IBID., 310.
[174] Cf. Malcolm Lambert, "The Franciscan Crisis under John XXII," *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972): 123-143
[175] Moorman, 308.
[176] For John and his papacy generally and with regard to the Franciscan crisis, see Guillaume Mollat, *Popes of Avignon, 1305-1378,* trans. Janet Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); John E. Weakland, "John XXII before his Pontficate, 1244-1316: Jacques Duèse and his Family," *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 10 (1972): 161-185; Stephen C. Rowell, Rasa J. Mazeika, "Zelatores maximi: Pope John XXII, archbishop Frederick of Riga and the Baltic mission 1305-1340," *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 31 (1993), 33-68; Felice Accrocca, "Concerning the Case of the Heretical Pope: John XXII and the Question of Poverty: ms. XXI of the Capestrano Convent" *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1994): 167-184; Courtenay, "John XXII and the University of Paris," in *La Vie culturelle, intellectuelle, et scientifique à la Cour des Papes d'Avignon* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 237-254; Jean Favier, *Les Papes d'Avignon* (Paris: Fayard, 2006); Ulrich Horst,

threat on several fronts. The Spiritualist dissidents both fed off of and fueled the anti-ecclesiastical rhetoric building agaist the papacy. John was aware of the degree to which the Spiritualists' rhetoric of absolute poverty, fueled by Olivi's writing, had by this point amounted to an attack on the church's hesitancy on Apostolic Poverty, and had manifested itself as a a more legitimate expression of piety than either the mainstream Franciscans or the church itself.

By the late 1310s, John XXII thus needed to quell a noxious dispute that had spilled far outside the borders of the Franciscan order, and which had provoked nothing short of a political crisis with critical social, theological, and legal ramifications. John himself took issue with the amount of wealth and property the Franciscans had accumulated by the early fourteenth century. From an administrative and financial viewpoint, the legal fallacy through which the church had come to own the property given to the friars, the papacy had become responsible for all legal disputes that arose concerning those donations. Given the extensive geographic breadth of the order's provinces, John wished to divest himself of legal and financial liability in land disputes hundreds of miles from Avignon.

John saw a common root and a common solution to the discord caused by both the Spiritualists' complaints and the encumbrances that had arisen after Nicholas III had placed the order's property in the church's holdings. As before, the polemical dissonance reflected conflicting views of poverty. The ambiguity over the specific definitions of ownership and poverty in the Rule

---

O.P. *The Dominicans and the Pope: Papal Teaching Authority in the Medieval and Early Modern Thomist Tradition*, Trans. James D. Mixson. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006); *Jean XXII et le midi,* ed. Guy Lobrichon et al. (Toulouse: Editions Privat, 2012), in particular "Anne-Marie Hayez, "Jean XXII et Avignon : Une cité épiscopale régie par un pape," Clément Lenoble, "Jean XXII et les franciscains d'après un inventaire du couvent d'Avignon," Patrick Nold, "Jean XXII et le franciscain Bertrand de la Tour: anatomie d'une relation," and Sylvain Piron, "Avignon sous Jean XXII, l'Eldorado des théologiens;" and Sebastian Zanke, *Johannes XXII, Avignon und Europa: Das politische Papsttum im Spiegel der kurialen Register (1316-1334)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

had, over the course of the preceding century, led to the incongruent definitions of these terms in sources ranging from biographies of Francis, to tracts on poverty, to the papal legislation of the mid to late thirteenth century.

In October 1317, John summoned Ubertino of Casale and Angelo Clareno to Avignon to hear the Spiritualist position, and afterwards issued *Quorundam exigit* in response. In it he established new guidelines on proper practice for members of the order, with directives specific enough to concern the type of habit to be worn and methods used to store wheat and wine. John reminded dissenters that proper practice amounted to whatever practices their superiors, the order's leaders, decided upon. John's goal in *Quorundam* was widespread suppression of the Spirituals. As a test of obedience and orthodoxy, the dissenting Spirituals were asked to accept or reject it as a final, authoritative ruling on Franciscan poverty. In late December 1317, John issued *Sancta Romana*, explicitly denouncing the remaining Spirituals. On December 30, 1317, John condemnded the Fraticelli. Those brothers who had refused to recognize the authority of the order's leadership, and John's earlier prouncement on orthodox practice were condemned; of those, John called five rebellious friars to Avignon for investigation. Four were executed by burning six months later in Marseille.[177] John also issued *Gloriosam ecclesiam* to suppress the remaining Spirituals in Tuscany.

Sources show that the Spiritualist movement continued while John pursued his revision of the order's relationship to poverty in general.[178] In 1322, he asked theologians in Avignon to submit opinions on whether or not it was reasonable to uphold the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty.

[177] On the executions of 1318, see Burr (2001) and more recently, Louisa A. Burnham, *So Great a Light, so Great a Smoke: The Beguin Heretics of Languedoc* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
[178] Cf. Lambert (1972).

From this point on in his dealings with the order, I would argue John's rulings are best examined as discussion about the very nature of theological and doctrinal authority. *Exiit* and the body of thirteenth-century legislation related to the order had planted two seeds of debate for fourteenth-century polemicists. First, the legal construct established to protect the order's property had sharpened debate over the legal distinction between right of ownership and right of use. Second, Nicholas' prohibition on future discussion of the nature of the Rule and the Rule's legitimacy sparked tension over papal authority and jurisdiction over doctrine. As we will see, the poverty crisis reached its climax when John XXII later rescinded the legal and doctrinal protections that *Exiit* and earlier bulls had provided the order, when he ruled the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty to be heretical.

John sought an opportunity to repeal a tenet of doctrine and promulgate a doctrinal position to be used as a tool to quell resistance. When he attempted to settle the dispute, contemporaries both within and beyond the order questioned whether he had either the legal, or theological authority, to amend a rule that an earlier pope had approved. I include an expanded overview of this theological context below.[179]

John put the question to the theologians in Avignon, asking them to determine the scriptural and doctrinal accuracy of the claim that Christ and the Apostles had no property or right of ownership over the things they are described as using in the Scriptures.[180] In 1323 he issued *Cum inter nonnullos,* meant to subdue several decades of conflict. As a theological interpretation of a

[179] See the subsection "Apostolic Poverty" below.
[180] Louis Duval Arnould, "Les conseils remis à Jean XXII sur le problem de la pauvreté du Christ et des apôtres (MS. Vat. Lat. 3740)," *Miscellanea Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae,* III, ed. Marco Buonocore (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1989), 121-201.

doctrinal precept, it shows evidence of John making use of primarily Thomistic interpretations of Scripture and doctrinal questions related to Apostolic Poverty.[181] It functioned primarily as a vehicle for John's declaration that it would be heretical to hold or teach that Christ and the Apostles had lived in complete poverty, without owning property individually or in common, and without having had the right of ownership or dominion over any of the goods they were described as having or using in the Scriptures. Even many Franciscans who favored a lenient interpretation of their poverty vow, as well as Michael of Cesena and others who had long worked to suppress the Spirituals and strike down rigidly ascetic interpretations of the rule, felt alienated by the pope's condemnation. John's pronouncement left Cesena acting cautiously. It also coincided with growing tension between the papacy and Louis of Bavaria.[182]

---

[181] *Cum inter* has generated its own body of literature. See Louis Duval-Arnould "La Constitution "Cum inter nonnullos" de Jean XXII sur la pauvreté du Christ et des Apôtres: rédaction préparatoire et rédaction definitive,"*Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 77 (1984): 406-420; IDEM, "Elaboration d'un document pontifical: les travaux préparatoires à la constitution apostolique Cum inter nonnullos (12 novembre 1323)," *Le Fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d'Avignon: actes de la table ronde organisée par l'Ecole française de Rome avec le concours du CNRS, du Conseil général de Vaucluse et de l'Université d'Avignon (Avignon, 23-24 janvier 1988)* (Roma: Ecole française de Rome (1990): 385-409.
For discussion of John's dependence on Dominican advisors on the question of Apostolic Poverty and aspects of economic thought, and his own personal reading and glossing of Thomistic texts, see Angelus Walz, Papst Johannes XXII und Thomas von Aquin: zur Geschichte der Heiligsprechung des Aquinaten," in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), I: 29-47 and Antoine Dondaine, "La collection des œuvres de saint Thomas dite de Jean XXII et Jaquet Maci," *Scriptorium* 29 (1975) : 127-152. Franze Ehrle has established that Dominican advisors had special influence with John; their and John's response to the question of absolute poverty reflected anger over the hypocrisy of Franciscans' actual lifestyle as opposed to the idealism the Rule committed them to. This same tension explains why John ordered there to be a debate held between a Dominican and a Franciscan in 1322, over the nature of poverty. For a reconstruction of the dialogue and texts surrounding John's inquiriry into papal perogative in another theological discussion, see Patrick Nold's *Marriage Advice for a Pope: John XXII and the Power to Dissolve* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
[182] For the conflict, see Hilary S. Offler, "Empire and Papacy: The Last Struggle," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6 (1956): 21-47 and more recently Anthony Cassell, *The "Monarchia" Controversy: A Historical Study with Accompanying Translations of Dante Alighieri's "Monarchia", Guido Vernani's "Refutation of the "Monarchia" Composed by Dante", and Pope John XXII's Bull "Si Fratrum* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004).

Neither of these tensions subsided over time; by 1329, the order needed a new Minister General to oversee its recovery from schism, and John XXII needed a loyal insider to defend his statement on poverty and to quell rebellion within the order. Odonis suited the pope's needs in many ways.[183] Like John, he was a native of southern France, with diplomatic experience suppressing rebellious Franciscans in that area. More significantly, there is evidence that Gerard had also once petitioned the papacy for a waiver from the order's vow of poverty. Despite Cesena's plea for a boycott, several members appeared at the General Chapter in Paris, and deposed Cesena. With interim Vicar General Bertrand de la Tour presiding, and at John XXII's behest, Gerardus Odonis was elected Minister General; his tenure continued until 1342.

Corespondence between the deposed Michael of Cesena and Odonis, the latter speaking as Minister General on behalf of the order and as proxy for John XXII, illuminates the continued open conflict over the John's intervention in the order's affairs, as well as public challenges to Odonis' right to hold the office of Minister General. The *Allegationes religiosorum virorum* of Francis of Marchia, Henry of Theilheim, Bonagratio von Bergamo, and William of Ockham, shortly thereafter argued that Odonis' election was invalid because the deposition of the former officeholder was itself invalid. Because Michael of Cesena was not, in truth, deposed, he had not been removed from the office of Minister General, therefore an election held to fill an office rightfully held by someone else was invalid.[184]

---

[183] See Lambertini (1997) and *La povertà pensata: evoluzione storica della definizione dell' identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham* (Modena: Mucchi, 2000). For the period immediately before Gerard's involvement in the poverty controversy, see Lambertini (1999).

[184] Gál and Flood (1996), 474. The text of the *Allegationes* follows on pages 524-551. Other documents relevant to the debate include Michael of Cesena's March 26, 1330 his *Appellatio Michaelis de Caesena contra libellum papae 'Quia vir reprobus,'*" known as "the short appeal;" his subsequent letter (January 24 1331) to the order citing the pope's errors (*Littera Michaelis de Haeresibus papae*); another letter shortly thereafter, (March 15, 1331), the [*Litterae excusatoriae Michaelis*] in response to *Quia vir reprobus*, written

As noted in Chapter I, Odonis figures in the scholarship of the Franciscan poverty crisis primarily as an enforcer of John's policies; the literature has retrofitted him as the incarnation of an anti-Franciscan Franciscan, due to his seemingly lone support for the pope's reforms. Perhaps more to the point, Odonis' own role in the crisis has been narrated on the assumption that his actions reflected deep idealistic support of John's reform program, rather than ideologically-detached decisions made in the course of advancing his own administrative career. Patrick Nold recently reevaluated the complex personal motivation and career-trajectory of another prominent Franciscan and contemporary of Odonis, Bertrand de la Tour. La Tour also supported the John's position, in unexpected contradiction to traditionally Franciscan values.[185]

Courtenay and others have urged scholars to avoid blanketing fourteenth-century Franciscans under a homogenous "Franciscan" intellectual tradition. I would argue that comparable caution must be raised against attributed homogenous attitudes towards not only the friars' vow of poverty, but the theological basis for voluntary poverty in the image of Christ, not

---

in Munich, delivered to Odonis by John of Lorraine, and then sent to John XXII. Odonis and the brothers at the chapter ignored the letter, so Cesena had it sent out more broadly [*Relatio Michaelis facta de praefata littera*]. Odonis' letter of April 25, 1331 responded to Cesena (*Sententia excommunicationis in capitulo Parisiensi lata et in capitulo Perpinianensi confirmata contra Michaelem de Caesena eiusque sequaces*); later in 1331 Odonis addressed a separate response to Cesena, the *Responsio Geraldi Odonis ad litteram excusatoriam Michaelis de Caesena*, in response to Cesena's *Litterae excusatoriae Michaelis*. In 1332, Cesena responded to Odonis' *Responsio Geraldi Odonis ad litteram excusatoriam Michaelis de Caesena* (Odonis' personal response to Cesena after the chapter at Perpignan), accusing Odonis of heresy: *Replicatio Michaelis ad litteram Geraldi* (the *Teste Salomone*). See Albanus Heysse's edition of Odonis' letter in "Duo Documenta de Polemica inter Gerardum Oddonem et Michaelem de Caesena," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 9 (1916): 140-153, and Cesena's response in 1332, pp. 153-183.[184]

[185] See Nold's *Pope John XXII and his Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), especially 23-24: "As a Franciscan, he should have subscribed to the official position of his Order set out by the Chapter General of Perugia in its letter; the bull *Exiit qui seminat* had determined that Christ and the apostles had nothing either individually or in common by way of *proprietas*, of *dominium*, or of any property rights at all, and this definitive papal determination must always be held by the Church. Thus, it would seem that Bertrand as a Franciscan opposed John XXII on Apostolic Poverty."

only among the Spirituals, the Michaelists, and the Conventuals, but among the Conventuals themselves. Figures like de la Tour and Odonis appear more "anti-Franciscan" in secondary literature the more historians posit a common Franciscan attitude for the other Conventuals. This affinity for positing conformity distracts historians from examining these men as individuals with personal concerns, since they otherwise fit well into particular roles created to explain the poverty debate.

As mentioned earlier ("Social and Economic Tensions") Duncan Nimmo has interpreted Gerard's decisions and actions as those of someone defending the order's stability in a practical and pragmatic manner. David Burr has also acknowledged that Gerard emerges from the sources as a complex, and somewhat contradictory, figure.[186] Nimmo primarily roots his defense of Odonis as a conservator, rather than betrayer of the order on two points. First, Odonis, like John XXII, recognized both the short and long-term impracticalities of the order remaining bound, in practice and ideal, to absolute poverty, especially at the universities. Second, Nimmo looks beyond the events and polemic of 1329-1331 to 1334, when Odonis sanctioned John of Valle's establishment of a hermitage at Brugliano, for a community of brothers to live according a strict and austere interpretation of the Rule.[187] Gerard allowed the brothers at Brugliano to form a community of hermits and practice the Rule with nearly the same spirit of asceticism as the Spirituals had argued

[186] See Burr, 302-303, for his description of Gerard's Minister Generalship.

[187] Nimmo's primary interest in Odonis has been this decision as Minsiter General to approve the hermitage of Brugliano, not coincidentally located in an area favorable to the *Fraticelli* and what they considered to be their purer adherence to Francis' original plan for the order. The sanction Odonis gave this group has been taken as the symbolic foundation of the Observant tradition that developed within the order during the mid-fourteenth century. Thus Nimmo has been more concerned with Odonis's role in the broader history of the Observant movment. Since the Observants interpreted the Rule to nearly the same literal extent the Spirituals had called for, in his work Nimmo has especially characterized Odonis's overall relationship with Franciscan poverty, during and after the Spiritualist controversy, as one of contrast and paradox.

for. In this longer view, earlier scholars' dismissal of Odonis as an anti-poverty saboteur does not hold up. Gerard does not emerge from the sources as completely faithful to the papacy, nor does his sanctioning of five persisitent hermits to pursue a live of asceticism at Brogliano demonstrate an *ideological* opposition to mendicant poverty.

Theological and Doctrinal Contexts

Apostolic Poverty

The Franciscan poverty crisis became a political and social conflict as well as a doctrinal dispute. But the doctrinal aspect merits deeper scrutiny as context for a project tracking the debates over the nature of theology and doctrinal authority. As noted, John XXII attempted to clarify and define a doctrinal position in *Cum inter nonnullos*. The doctrinal question at hand was whether or not Christ and the apostles had owned, or had had the right of ownership over the property they are described as using in scripture. His actions capped a longer debate over understanding the poverty of Christ in its broader Christian inheritance.[188] In response, members of the Franciscan Order faced the challenges of how to think about their identity and historical narratives as both related to the constructed ideal of poverty. More pragmatically, administrators and members were faced with recasting their short and long-term interpretations of living under a vow of Christ-like poverty.[189]

Given the conflict it was meant to resolve, *Cum inter nonnullos* functioned as a dictate about theological and legal authority, since it was an explication of Apostolic Poverty based on

[188] See Peter Garnsey, *Thinking About Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[189] As Bonnie Kent has suggested, "Against the Franciscan vow of poverty, John posed the vow of obedience," (26).

the pope and his advisor's own studies of the matter. John meant not only to bring the Spiritual Franciscans back into the control of the institutional church, but to refute the basis of their spiritual claims through Scripture. The language of the short decree read (emphasis in bold text my own):[190]

> Since among not a few scholarly men it often happens that there is called into doubt, whether to affirm pertinaciously, that Our Redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ and His Apostles did not have anything individually, nor even in common, is to be censured as heretical, diverse and opposite things being opined concerning it, desiring to put an end to this contest…do declare that a pertinacious assertion of this kind, when sacred scriptures, which assert in very many places that they had **not a few things**, expressing contradict it, and when it supposes openly that the same sacred scripture, through which certainly the articles of orthodox faith are proven in regards to the aforesaid things, contains the ferment of falsehood, and consequently, as much as regards these things, emptying all faith in them, it renders the Catholic faith

[190] "Cum inter nonnullos viros scholasticos saepe contingat in dubium revocari, utrum pertinaciter affirmare, Redemptorem nostrum ac Dominum Iesum Christum eiusque Apostolos in speciali non habuisse aliqua, nec in communi etiam, haereticum sit censendum, diversa et adversa etiam sentientibus circa illud: nos, huic concertationi finem imponere cupientes, assertionem huiusmodi pertinacem, quum scripturae sacrae, quae in plerisque locis ipsos *nonnulla habuisse asserit*, contradicat expresse, ipsamque scripturam sacram, per quam utique fidei orthodoxae probantur articuli quoad praemissa fermentum aperte supponat continere mendacii, ac per consequens, quantum in ea est, eius in totum fidem evacuans, fidem catholicam reddat, eius probationem adimens, dubiam et incertam, deinceps erroneam fore censendam et haereticam, de fratrum nostrorum consilio hoc perpetuo declaramus edicto. Rursus in posterum pertinaciter affirmare, quod Redemptori nostro praedicto eius Apostolis iis, quae ipsos habuisse scriptura sacra testatur, nequaquam ius ipsis utendi competierit, nec illa vendendi seu donandi ius habuerint, aut ex ipsis alia acquirendi, quae tamen ipsos de praemissis fecisse scriptura sacra testatur, seu ipsos potuisse facere supponit expresse, quum talis assertio ipsorum usum et gesta evidenter includat, in praemissis non iusta, quod utique de usu, gestis seu factis Redemptoris nostri Dei Filii sentire nefas est, sacrae scripturae contrarium et doctrinae catholicae inimicum, assertionem ipsam pertinacem de fratrum nostrorum consilio deinceps erroneam fore censendam merito ac haereticam declaramus. Nulli ergo omnino hominum liceat hanc paginam nostrarum declarationum infringere, vel ausu ei temerario contraire. Si quis autem etc.."

> doubtful and uncertain, taking away its demonstration, is respectively to be censured erroneous and heretical.

When faced with the tone and conclusion of John's edict, contemporaries within the order and beyond it immediately argued that the he had single-handedly legislated *new* doctrine, and questioned whether or not his authority as pope allowed him to do. His Franciscan opponents thus attacked the bull on two counts: first, they argued John had broken canon law by annulling a previous pope's bull: Nicholas III's aforementioned *Exiit* of 1279, which had affirmed the Franciscan's pursuit of lives of poverty as moderate but virtuous. Moreover, John had effectively introduced a new tenet of doctrine: that according to Scripture, Christ and the apostles had owned material goods and had held the right of ownership over them. In other words, John pronounced it a theological truth that Christ and the apostles did not *not* own the things they used, based on Scripture. The nature of his decision on Apostolic Poverty in *Cum inter* not only encouraged but *required* him to be vague about the origins of the articles of faith, and exactly what aspects of doctrine they include.

As a rendered papal judgement, and not an explicitly hermeneutical study, *Cum inter* did not track and collate the potential Scriptural, patristic, or other theological references that could have lead to an orthodox interpretation. John, the canon lawyer, albeit it one flanked by theological advisors, did not specificy the cumulative Scriptural and theological basis for his decision. Rather John, in his capacity as pope, simply declared the doctrinal question of Apostolic Poverty answered, and the ideological root of the Spiritual's defiance destroyed. [191] To preview a

[191] On the ambiguous relationship between theology and canon law in this period, significant for the immediate context of the poverty dispute, see Takashi Shōgimen, "The Relationship between Theology and

significant point that will emerge in Chapter IV about the the construct of doctrinal authority itself: *Cum inter's* dependence on the articles of faith as a *category* and vehicle for doctrinal authority gives convincing evidence of John XXII writing doctrine into the body of canon law.[192]

John promulgated a position that, regardless of its explanation, entered into the amalgamated body of orthodox doctrine. John's papal authority could not be questioned in the context in which he exerted it. As we will see below, Odonis' own reference to *Cum inter* in his *Sentences* Prologue mirrors the ambiguity surrounding papal judgements as sources of doctrinal authority. As an attempt to suppress the Spirituals, whom he considered heretics, *Cum inter nonnullos* pronounced the church's orthodox position on Apostolic Poverty. As an attempt to mediate the internal affairs of a religious order, though, the bull was primarily a polemical document through which John meant to test *all* of the Franciscans' obedience to the papacy the crisis was over interpreting the strictness or laxity of the poverty vow, not whether or not to live in some kind of poverty. Although John intended to end the crisis by resolving the complicated doctrinal issue behind Apostolic Poverty, his bull has not traditionally been viewed as a work of theology, but rather legal and administrative crisis-management. As a reminder, John had a legitimate interest in taking measures to end the papacy's legal responsabilities for the Franciscans' property (dating to *Ordinem vestrum*), including legal suits arising out of land disputes throughout all of the order's provinces.

I would argue that the fact that John's intervention stands of interest in examination of the broader ambuity over the proper jurisdiction over orthodox doctrine. Although John nominally

---

Canon Law: Another Context of Political Thought in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1990): 417-431.

[192] Bk. I, Prologue, part II, q. 2: "Utrum habitus articulorum fidei sit intellectus."

sought the opinion of Dominican Thomist theologians, he ignored the masters within the Franciscan order, and the order's own leadership when executing his reform. The polemic attacks launched against him in response, including Ockham's, focused on John's casual and expedient, not theological or academic, manipulation of previously ruled-on doctrine in Nicholas III's *Exiit qui seminat*.

The question of how best to interpret John's motives and interests in intervening in the order's business, and how to explain the roots of the controversy have elicited considerable historiographical debate over the last century. According to several narratives, Franz Ehrle's among them, John was left with no choice but to undermine the Spirituals' claims on poverty. His seemingly deliberate attack on what had come to be the order's own imagined ideology of Apostolic Poverty was a means to an end; he took preventative action to mitigate attacks on papal property and possessions.[193]

Brian Tierney, by contrast, broadened the context of John's decision to account for fourteenth-century tensions between lay and church authority. By this view, John had to attack and overturn the Franciscan's fundamental claims about Apostolic Poverty, or else eventually face inherent criticism of the hierarchical church's heavily vested wealth.[194] Following Tierney, Hillary Offler argued that John had sensed "administrative disorder" arising from the order's legal fallacy of using but not owning their considerable property. John was interested in reforming not only the

[193] See J.G. Sikes, *Herveus Natalis: De paupertate Christi et Apostolorum* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938); Leon Baudry, *L'ordre franciscain au temps de Guillaume d'Occam* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1965); and Brian Tierney, *The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150-1625* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1997).
[194] See in particular Tierney's discussion of the poverty crisis in Ch. V ("Languages of Rights"), 104-130 and Ch. VI ("Property, Natural Right, and the State of Nature"), 131-169.

way the Franciscans' wealth was administered, but more fundamentally, the specious "theological grounds" of their nominative poverty.[195]

Opinion has also differed over whether John acted solely in the guise of a canon lawyer determined to streamline the papacy's administration and legal responsibilities, or if his decision was informed in whole or part by other concerns about the order. Raoul Manselli argued most strongly that John's legislation on the poverty crisis, especially *Quorumdam exigit* and *Cum inter,* reflected his training as a canon lawyer, and his complete "insensitivity to the religious values he was touching."[196]

By contrast, one of Manselli's students, Edith Pásztor, was concerned more with John's view of millenialist Joachism and attacks on the church's authority in the rhetoric of Olivi and his followers.[197] She thus argued counter to Josef Koch, that the poverty dispute was a separate matter and concern.[198] John's attack on the order was tied to his investigation of Olivi's *Lectura super Apocalipsim* and his effort to condemn the Spirituals. In order to condemn all of the articles of that text fully, he needed to attack *Exiit*, the notable connection being that one of Olivi's articles had claimed Francis' rule was the same evangelical rule Christ had observed.

Malcolm Lambert contributed a more objective portrait of John's role in the poverty crisis, emphasizing that John's training was admittedly not theological, but legal and administrative, and that his legislation, including *Cum inter nonnullos,* and the creation of the immense Avignon

---

[195] Offler'.
[196] See Lambert, 124. Manselli, "Un papa in un'eta di contradizione, Giovanni XXII," *Studi Romani* 22 (1974): 444-456.
[197] Pásztor, "Giovanni XXII e il giochimismo di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi," *Bullettino dell'istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo* 82 (1970), 81-11. See also Marco Bartoli, "Jean XXII et les Joachimites du Midi," *La Papauté d'Avignon et le Languedoc 1316-1342*, ed. Marie-Humbert Vicaire (Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1991), 237-256.
[198] See Koch, "Der Prozess gegen die Postille Olivis zur Apokalypse" *Recherches de théologie ancienne et medieval* 5 (1933): 302-15.

beaurocracy reflected this fact.[199] Lambert also argued that John's involvement in the crisis had no lasting impact on the way Franciscans thought about poverty, and that "John's Bulls were in practice largely ignored and the brothers went on thinking about their poverty in traditional juridical ways."[200] Thus Lambert did not characterize John's intervention as any attempt at reform out of interest in the order's welfare; John's main focus was rather the suppression of heresy associated with Olivi, the Beguines, and the Spirituals.[201]

In David Burr's work, we find support for the argument that John made a calculated and legalistic study of Apostolic Poverty as an effort to eliminate it, root and branch, as a present and future threat to his authority. Burr points out that John XXII's own seemingly anti-poverty views were based on support he found in Aquinas. This is significant, because it limits the extent to which his contemporaries, or modern scholars, could justifiably demonize him as personally opposed to the notion of ascetic poverty.[202] Turley also believed John came to see the poverty dispute as a separate, weightier issue than John's investigation of Olivi. Moreover, through his study, John

---

[199] "But I would suggest that the whole body of his major Bulls for the order, settling the Spiritual crsis and later attacking the Franciscan position on the poverty of Christ, *Quorumdam exigit, Ad Conditorem, Cum inter nonnullos,* deserve to be taken as a whole and regarded as the fragments of a possible reform in the early fourteenth century doctrine of poverty of the Franciscan order. It is as if the Pope's thinking here takes place at two levels, the one petulant, sardonic, personal, much influenced by his quarrel over the encyclical of Perugia, the other shrewd and realistic, understanding within his limitations the true state of the friars in the 1320s. Few would deny that by this time the Franciscan leadership had reached an impasse…John offered realism. *Quorumdam exigit,* for example, is the first in the long series of Papal clarifications of the Rule that faced the friars bluntly with the necessity of some kind of dispensation from the literal provisions of the Rule." Lambert, 137.

[200] Lambert (1972), 139.

[201] "The Franciscan difficulties were not capable of being resolved lightly; more important, John never intervened for the sake of the order itself…The friars could never feel in their dealings with John that he had fully understood the basis of their feelings over poverty….John did not have the interests of the order chiefly at heart. The removal of superiors was undertaken for a plain negative end: to ensure that there was no rebellion against his Bulls." Lambert (1972), 141.

[202] "Pope John did become interested in the poverty question as a result of his suspiscion of Olivi, but soon saw the issue as important in its own right." Burr, 204.

realized that Francis' rhetoric on poverty had led to Olivi's apocalypticism. Francis had tied Apostolic Poverty to a spiritual ideal: for him, the Gospels' teaching on spiritual perfection became *were* both he and Christ's ideals. At heart, this singular, shared ideal was inherently in opposition to the church's right to possess property. In the early fourteenth century, rebellion about the beguines and Spirituals could easily have spread farther on this front, so John took note. He neded to prevent wider-spread heresy, which explains why he turned his focus away from Olivi, and to promulgating *Exiit.*[203]

Most recently, Sean Kinsella, Roberto Lambertini, and Patrick Nold have offered new perspectives. Kinsella has taken up the question of John's motives and developed a clearer picture of his desire to streamline the Church as an administrative and corporate body.[204] Lambertini has profiled the personalities and debates critical to the context of the poverty crisis, greatly expanding modern coverage of each of them individually and their relationships cumulatively.[205] Nold has forefronted the documents produced as a result of John's call for a theological commission to investigate the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty, and defended John's knowledge of, and sensitivity to the theological issues at stake. Like Lambert and others, Nold thus defends John, but with more

[203] Thomas Turley, "John XXII and the Franciscans: A Reappraisal," *Popes, Teachers and Canon Law in the Middle Ages,* ed. James R. Sweeney and Stanley Chodorow (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 84.
[204] Sean Kinsella, "The Poverty of Christ in the Medieval Debates between the Papacy and the Franciscans" *Laurentianum* 36 (1995): 477-509.
[205] Of Lambertini's considerable body of work, see in particular "La *concordia* tra Niccolò III e Giovanni XXII in Fitzralph and Wyclif. Note su alcune reinterpretazioni della povertà francescana," *John Wyclif: Logica, politica, teologia. Atti del Convegno Internazionale Milano, 12-13 Febbraio 1999,* ed. Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri and Stefano Simonietta (millennio Medievale 37) (2003): 3-22.

of a focus than others have aimed for on John's theological capability and authority, not only his strength and authority in canon law.[206]

Beatific Vision

The poverty debate is not the only instance in which scholars found Odonis supporting John XXII on a doctrinal position, nor is it the only one which both reflected and deepened tension over his theological authority. Given the nature of the doctrinal claims made, and the heated responses they generated from critics, the controversy over interpretations of the Beatific Vision is often cited as the foremost outgrowth of the ambuiguity of jurisdiction between the Parisian theology masters and the papacy.[207]

John gave several sermons on the Beatific Vision in the 1330s, beginning in 1331, in which he argued that Christians do not enjoy perfect, intuitive knowedge of God until after the final judgment and resurrection, not immediately after their deaths. John's first sermon on the subject surprised those who heard it.[208] Although John only publicized this position informally, his foray

---

[206] Additional voices in this literature include John Oakley, "John XXII and Franciscan Innocence." *FS* 46 (1986): 217-226; Andrea Tabarroni, *Paupertas Christi et apostolorum: L'ideale francescno in discussion 1322-1324* (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1990); Gabrielle Gonzales, "The king of locusts who destroyed the poverty of Christ": Pope John XXII, Marsilius of Padua and the Franciscan question," in *The World of Marsilius of Padua*, ed. Gerson Moreno-Riaño (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 65-88; Pietro Zerbi, "Ancora sul problem storico della povertà francescana." *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* (1996): 158-161.

Scholars have yet to render a comprehensive characterization of Odonis' own interpretation of poverty, although he figures in several of the studies profiled above. Like several of his contemporaries, including Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia, Odonis directly addressed the poverty issue and John XXII's position. An expansion revision of this chapter would look closely at those sources.

[207] In addition to the sources cited in the historiographical overview in Chapter I, see also Isabel Iribarren, "Theological Authority at the Papal Court in Avignon: The Beatific Vision Controversy," in *La Vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientifique à la cour des papes d'Avignon*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 277-301.

[208] Marc Dykmans, *Les sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique* (Rome: Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1973), 42.

into doctrine and theology quickly caught the attention of the theology faculty at Paris. John was accused of contradicting the orthodox doctrinal position that the *beati* enjoy the Beatific Vision immediatedly after death.The broader underlying concern, disquieting to members of the laity and theologians alike, was the implication that the souls of the saints, though separated from their bodies, were not yet with God.

After heated calls for John to retract his statements, and a consistory held in 1334, John recanted his position. Of direct significance for the present discussion of papal jurisdiction and doctrinal authority, John acknowled theologians' criticism that he had stepped out of his field of expertise, and had not been qualified to speak on such a delicate doctrinal concern. John's defense was effectively a concession that he was not an authority on theology and that, moreover, although he was pope, he had stepped beyond his training and competence, and thus out of his realm of authority. Even members of the laity, most notably the secular authorities who called for a formal investigation, were aware that having dabbled in doctrine, John had gotten it wrong.[209] He had not done so without help, however. Source evidence in the form of of extant glosses in his hand suggest John sought counsel in contemporaries' work on the subject, including Gérard d'Abbeville, and also turned to patristic sources, looking especially at St. Bernard and Augustine.[210]

Throughout this growing controversy, Gerard had failed not only to join other theologians in condemning the pope's position, but had adopted it and propounded it himself, in sermons and academic exchanges, in particular a quodlibetal dispute at Paris, in December 1333. Like John, Odonis was attacked, investigated, and forced to recant his view. Biographical sources show that

[209] Benedict XII later clarified and confirmed the orthodox doctrinal position (and the swiftness of the blesseds' arrival in the presence of the divine) in *Benedictus Deus* (1336).
[210] Dykmans, 39.

that this investigation kept him from a papal diplomatic mission to bring peace between England and Scotland.[211] Odonis' connection to the Beatific Vision controversy, both direct and peripheral, is not the most crucial episode to investigate in order to understand Gerard's argument about doctrine and intellect. It does, however, offer another opportunity to meditate on the relationship of legal and theological authority with regard to doctrine at the time.

Political and Papal Tensions

From the conflict between Philip IV and Boniface VIII onward, political and ecclesiastical posturing in Avignon shortened the geographical distance between the papacy and Paris. It is not by coincidence that Odonis and many of his contemporaries, particularly fellow mendicants, appear as actors in the affairs of the university and the royal and papal courts during the 1310s and 1320s. By this period two traditional bridges had come to link the theology community to the two latter instutions. First, the heavy economic burden of the lengthy theology program itself had led to scholars serving as royal tutors or advisors in return for patronage and financial support while in the program, a relationship not unknown to arts masters, either. Second, the papacy had streamlined and sharpened its position as gatekeeper to the ecclesiastical appointments and benefices sought after the completion of studies at Paris.[212] But beyond these contexts, two disputes tested and shifted the respective boundaries of papal and temporal authority and drew in active participation as well as written polemic from members of the theology community.

---

[211] For broad background, see Karsten Ploger, *England and the Avignon Popes: The Practice of Diplomacy in Late Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Legenda, 2005).

[212] For the tradition of submitting the rolls of benefice seekers to the papacy, the fourteenth-century records thereof, and the efforts to identify individuals within academic cohorts beyond their contemporary notoriety and publication records, see William J. Courtenay's *Rotuli Parisienses* series (Volume I: 1316-1349; Volume II: 1352-1378; and Volume III: 1378-1394), published by Brill, 2002-2012.

The first, the conflict between Philip IV and Boniface VIII predated Odonis' time at Paris, but remained a latent memory there. The voices that had spoken or acted in defense of Boniface and the general notion of papal authority had included Giles of Rome, James of Viterbo, both Augustinian Hermits, and John Duns Scotus (O.F.M.). The latter's career at Paris ended with his refusal to sign the letter of adhesion circulated among the theologians as part of Philip's efforts to create the appearance of homogenous support for his attacks on Boniface.[213] Giles's *De potestate ecclesia* and *De regimine principum* supported ecclesiastical authority based on the theory of dominion. In his *De regimine Christiano,* James of Viterbo argued similarly, but drew references from Aristotle's political thought to argue that a state such as the one formed by the church and the faithful has only one legal authority, effectively giving the papacy a stronger claim to royal power (*regnum*) than any temporal figure, including the king of France.

Writing most strongly in defense of Philip's monarchical authority was John of Paris, O.P.. In his *De potestate regia et papali*, he argued an early iteration of social contract theory: power lies within the body of the people, who give to the king a kind of political authority that he argued (influenced as James of Viterbo was by recently introduced Aristotelian political thought) was

[213] Giles of Rome, O.S.A., produced two tracts in response to the conflict, *De potestate ecclesiastica* and *De regimine principum,* writing with a particular eye to dominion theory. James of Viterbo, O.S.A., wrote *De regimine Christiano,* which rested on a more explicitly Aristotelian argument for the institutional church's claims to sole regnum than had Giles' works. On these works and the conflict in general, see among others Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, particularly "The Struggle for Independence," 233-253; Charles Wood, ed., *Phillip the Fair and Boniface VIII: State vs. Papacy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967); Joseph Strayer, *The Reign of Philip the Fair* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Jeffrey Howard Denton, *Philip the Fair and the Ecclesiastical Assemblies of 1294-1295* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991); Brian Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); R. W. Dyson, ed., *Giles of Rome's On Ecclesiastical Power: A Medieval Theory of World Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Joseph Canning, *Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

endemic to society naturally rather than annexed from ecclesiastical power.[214] Of contemporary influence as well was Dante's *De Monarchia,* which argued strongly for distinct secular and spiritual powers.[215]

Political theory emerged just as vigorously from the conflict between John XXII and Louis of Bavaria two decades later, but because of the individuals drawn into the poverty controvery, the political polemic drew much closer to the academic world of the universities, particularly on the side of those writing in support of secular authority above and against that of the church. An anonymous tract, *De potestate ecclesiastica,* attributed to Augustinus Triumphus, drew heavily on Giles of Rome's earlier tract. The author argued in defense of the papacy that the secular state is good (and functions as a good), but lacks the same grace and dominion as the papacy, and is therefore subject to its greater authority.

Two figures, however, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham, put forth arguments in defense of secular authority from which early modern discussions took root in England and on the continent. Marsilius' *Defensor Pacis* posited a biological model of statehood in which secular leadership functioned as the sole head. In so doing he argued for the separation of church and state; the leadership of the former, the papacy, had only developed as an institution of the early church, and was not inherently necessary for maintaining peace, which was the main purpose of

---

[214] Arthur P. Monahan, ed., *On Royal and Papal Power: A Translation, with Introduction, of the De Potestate Regia et Papali of John of Paris* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974).

[215] See most recently Anthony Cassell, *The "Monarchia" Controversy: A Historical Study with Accompanying Translations of Dante Alighieri's "Monarchia", Guido Vernani's "Refutation of the "Monarchia" Composed by Dante", and Pope John XXII's Bull "Si Fratrum* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004).

government. Marsilius' *legislator humanus*, or concept of the people operating as a body that can reclaim its power at will, was heavily influenced by John of Paris' earlier model.[216]

Distinct from Marsilius' secular supremacy, Ockham argued for a model of authority that recognized distinct functions between the ecclesiastical and secular realms. Ockham also drew heavily on the rhetoric of *dominion*, or moral right to rule. As applied to a secular leader like a monarch, it would limit the right to govern only to those individuals whose rule benefitted the people. When applying that same qualification to the pope, Ockham considered his own position, having been called to Avignon to response to perceived unorthodox positions in his academic work at Oxford. The poverty crisis had not extended to the Franciscan community in England with the same vigor as in France. Ockham had become more familiar with the personalities and stakes of the debate during his time in Avignon. In Ockham's view as a Franciscan, John XXII had directly contradicted orthodox doctrine in *Cum inter nonnullos* and thereby rendered himself heretical. Not only could his papal court not hold itself as an arbiter of orthodox theology; the pope had lost dominion and his right to rule when he ruled against the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty.[217]

It was through these controversities that the universities became venues for theoretical discussions of authority and the legitimacy of power. These opinions and models of authority were

---

[216] For background on Marsilius' thought, see James M. Blythe, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1992); Vasileios Syros, *Marsilius of Padua at the Intersection of Ancient and Medieval Traditions of Political Thought* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); and the essays collected in Gerson Moreno-Riaño and Cary J. Nederman's *A Companion to Marsilius of Padua* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

[217] Ockham's political thought. On political texts that come out of the debate, see Felice Accrocca, "Concerning the Case of the Heretical Pope: John XXII and the Question of Poverty: ms. XXI of the Capestrano Convent" *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1994): 167-184; Roberto Lambertini, "Francesco d'Ascoli e la polemica francescana contro Giovanni XXII: A proposito dei rapporti tra l'*Improbatio* e l'*Appellatio magna monacensis*," in A. Degrandi et al., eds, *Studi in onore di Girolamo Arnaldi offerti dalla Suola nazionale di studi medioevali* (Rome, Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo: 2001), 277–308.

not properly products of either theology or canon law, but rather the "integrating effect" political theory had on otherwise distinct disciplines.[218] The genesis of these discussions can be partially attributed to the influence of Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* by the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, particularly evidenced by the number of commentaries written on the former.[219] Two additional factors merit mention here as well, though, the first being John XXII's perspective on doctrinal authority as a canon lawyer, not theologian. John had ruled against the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty, but had done so through the authority of his office; no ranking existed to mete out the comparative authority of a papal decision on a question of doctrine as opposed to earlier rulings and interpretations of Scripture itself. The second factor concerns the inherent ambiguity of late medieval theological authority itself. I will explore the latter point more fully in Chapter IV and the Conclusion.

---

[218] See Jürgen Miethke, "Political Theory and the Fourteenth-Century University," in *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University*, ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame, 2000), 270; Courtenay, "Practical Intentions of Scholasticism: The Example of Political Theory" in *Universities and Schooling in Medieval Society*, ed. IDEM and Miethke (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 211-228; Takashi Shōgimen, "Academic Controversies" in *The Medieval Theologians*, ed. G.R. Evans, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 233-249; Anthony Cassell, *Dante and the Monarchia Controversy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), esp. the Prolegomena and Chapter I; and Takashi Shōgimen, *Ockham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[219] "An important line of Aristotelian political theory broke away early from the rigid form of the textual commentary to issue in important independent works like those of Dante, Ockham and Marsiglio of Padua. They quote the *Politics*, frequently supported by the *Ethics*." Langholm (1983), 27.

Chapter III: Thirteenth-Century Debates on the Nature of Theology and Theological Knowledge (Contexts and Key Figures)

By the 1310s and 1320s, when Odonis was first lecturing on the *Sentences* in Toulouse and later revisiting his thoughts in a second round of lectures in Paris, one of the questions taken up during principial debate was an inquiry into the nature of theology, a question inherited from the thirteenth century, but one that generated increasingly individualized responses as the fourteenth century progressed.[220] Odonis, his contemporary Peter Auriol (*Sentences* 1316-1318; d. 1322), and other figures active during these years contributed to discussions and debates on *theologia* as both a subject matter and an activity. They opened their oral and written responses to the *Sentences* with an overview of their own positions, placed in context with past and present opinions. Mining Odonis' Prologue to the *Sentences* brings forth not only his own voice in this debate, but an opportunity to measure his thought against that of Auriol, whom Odonis cited frequently in his commentary. It also offers insight into what sources for doctrinal and theological authority he drew upon and manipulated in support of his arguments. A textual analysis of Odonis' Prologue and related questions from Books I first requires a brief review of approaches to, and definitions of, theology as it had developed since the thirteenth century in order to set Odonis' own responses in context.

Given the breadth of material that falls within the full scope of the debate, even limited to the period between Aquinas' death and Odonis' *Sentences*, an exhaustive chronological or topical survey would be challenging, if not counterproductive to the task of recreating the immediate

[220] See Lauge Nielsen, "The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue," *Vivarium* 38 (2000), 52n71 on evidence for the subjects debated during the fall of 1316.

background to Gerard's thought.[221] If we begin instead with what the conversation about theology as a discipline and a body of knowledge looked like by the time Odonis entered it, we can focus on the specific questions of the debate during the 1310s, and work both backward and forward from that point. Auriol's *Prologue* suggests itself as an entrée point into this conversation for two reasons. First, as noted Auriol was a close contemporary of Odonis, and a figure with whom Odonis was in direct dialogue on this subject.[222] Second, Auriol's strenuous objections to the arguments for theology as a science considerably reshaped the broader discussion during his generation. Evidence of the authority that Auriol's position held is abundant, even in an anonymous (but likely Franciscan) commentary, tentatively dated to 1323-1324, where we see the discussion shaped around responses primarily to Auriol, and then to the earlier opinions of Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Scotus, and Giles of Rome.[223] Auriol's attention to this discussion arguably transformed it into a vibrant issue that pulled in the most influential figures active during the 1310s and 1320s.

---

[221] Each subtopic is its own specialized field of study, made even more idiosyncratic by individual authors. And insofar as all are related to broader epistemological question on the nature of knowledge and wisdom, the act of cognition, and certitude and truth, the subtopics draw and depend on research and expertise in the fundamentals of the distinct discussions. I will note in the subtopics below the relevant specialized secondary sources. My own summaries will be brief and generalized.

[222] Peter Auriol is believed to have become a "master in the second half of 1318 and left Paris in 1320." (See Nielsen and Teetaert). He and Auriol's time at Greyfriars overlapped by years. Auriol also garnered favor with John XXII. Peter's first work was, in fact, a tract on poverty meant to inform those on both sides of the crisis. Auriol dedicated the text to John XXII.

[223] For Russ Friedman and Chris Schabel's survey of the anonymous ms., see IDEM (1996), 364. The questions of interest to the present study include q. 1: Utrum viatori in quantum viatori posit communicari notitia abstractive de subiecto theologie, scilicet de Deo sub ratione deitati; q. 2 Utrum sacra theologia vere posit dici scientia; q. 3: Utrum theologia sit scientia una vel habitus unus; q. 4: Utrum Deus sub propria ratione deitatis sit subiectum theologie; q. 5: Utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessaria aliqua specialis doctrina de veritatibus sceibilibus de Deo sub propria ratione deitatis super naturaliter infusa ad quam non posit attingere limine naturali intellectus; q. 6: Adhuc circa prologum queritur utrum habitus dicatur practicus a fine vel obiecto vel a quo*;* q. 7: Utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa. For the date of the anonymous commentary, see IBID, 361-362.

Anyone writing after Aquinas--who himself had classified theology as a speculative science according to Aristotle's characterization of its puposee, and a deductive science with regard to its function as a tool for the study of the faith--heavily rooted their discussion in the framework and definitions Aquinas had introduced to the debate. To begin with Auriol is, then, in a strong sense to begin with Auriol responding to Thomistic thought. That the debate in question had grown extensively beyond Aquinas' original treatment a half-century earlier reflects both the challenges and defenses raised by subsequent figures while engaging with his arguments. Both medieval and modern writers have struggled with the broad and comprehensive nature of theology as a spiritual and intellectual pursuit; as evidence, we find Auriol and his contemporaries addressing a specific and established set of questions as access points into broader discussions. By the early fourteenth century, several specific areas of investigation came into close focus, all of which revealed a shift in characterizing *theologia* as a body of knowledge to an activity.[224]

Narrowing my own survey in this chapter to the debate as it looked during this later period, I will subdivide it according to three distinct yet mutually-informed topics: 1) the possibility and suitability of categorizing theology as a science according to the strict Aristotelian definition; 2) questions about the proper subject matter and object of theology; and 3) fundamental concerns these first two topics raised concerning the certitude of theological and doctrinal knowledge.

[224] B.P. Gaybba posits three distinct activities: "the assent given to Scripture…transmitting, defending, and explaining [Scripture's] contents…[and] drawing conclusions from them." *Aspects of the Medieval History of Theology: Twelfth to Fourteenth Centuries* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1988), 2.

As challenging as it is to introduce these topics in the abstract without simultaneously introducing specific authors' positions and contributions, I will lay out a topical map first, and then place key figures on it. After introducing the questions Auriol and his contemporaries focused on and identifying their roots in Aquinas' discussion, I will move back to track the definitions defended by Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus, all figures whose contributions to theology as a science remained valued currency in the early fourteenth-century debates. In the first half of Chapter IV, I will then return to Auriol and Odonis' own generation and review the positions adopted by contemporaries Thomas Wylton, Dionysius de Borgo, Gerard of Siena, and Francis of Marchia. By drawing the survey in closely around these two groups--those earlier figures whom Odonis and his contemporaries cited and those contemporaries who themselves commented most heavily on the nature of theology--we will be in a position to evaluate Odonis' own responses to them in the second half of the chapter.

As noted, discussions of theology as a body of knowledge and area of specialized study played out in principial debates and Prologues; those are the primary media through which we can track changes in the debate and shifts among individual thinkers and from generation to generation. A review of the debates themselves compels a brief introduction to the genre in which we encounter them; in the case of sentential Prologues and principial debates on the nature of theology, the academic and literary genres are inseparable from their subject matter.

Background A: The Textual Tradition of Early Fourteenth-Century Principial Debates and Prologues

The significance of sentential Prologues (for both their medieval authors and modern scholars) as personalized intellectual signatures and windows into contemporary debates has been well established.[225] As a literary genre, they were a medium for broad, introductory reflection on the nature of theological study, including the intended nature of the *Sentences* commentaries themselves. As such, prologues have been approached in a manner distinct from research on *Sentences* questions that introduce innovative turns in physics and natural philosophy. In so far as the latter categories of study, particularly for the fourteenth century, are of interest in the broader scope of the history of science, prologue treatments of the nature of theology risk appearing rote and procedural rather than innovative unless one understands the significant shifts in thought developing from one figure to another.[226]

In terms of a required academic exercise, addressing questions on the nature and subject matter of theology allowed bachelors to set a tone for their lectures on the *Sentences*, and to establish their intellectual and polemical dexterity by attacking and dismantling arguments made

[225] See, among other studies, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, "Medieval Philosophical Literature," in *CHLMP*, 11-42; B.C. Bazán et al., eds., *Les questions disputes et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de medicine* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985); *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médievales: Définition, critique, et exploitation* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1982).

[226] Elizabeth Lowe has commented, in reference to the debates between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus, "this scholarly disregard for the debates over theology may have been prompted by want of direct evidence from the antagonists, themselves, as to their significance." Lowe, *The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 99. In fact, however, particularly in light of the level of attention given to refuting or responding to Auriol's position on the nature of theology, contemporaries held this topic of debate to be of considerable significance. These debates engaged figures on as provocative a level of thought as other topics addressed in *Sentences* commentaries; we should not regard them as requisite and apologetic precursors to more sophisticated debate, because they were questions of interest and questions that attracted prompted intricate consideration and response in their own right.

by other members of their cohort. As noted, during the thirteenth century the practice had arisen of adding introductory questions to *Sentences* commentaries. These questions preceded Book I as a prologue to the topics Lombard had originally raised, which included questions on the Trinity, the metaphysical relationships among the persons of the Godhead, the nature of those persons themselves and their individual spiritual distinctions, and God's omnipotence and the nature of divine knowledge and being.

The prologial questions, by contrast, supplemented those that Lombard had categorized as common contemporary discussions, and inquired more acutely after the nature of theology as *scientia* in Aristotelian terms, and of the nature of faith and wisdom. The physical location at which we find these questions in the written texts reflects their primacy within the contemporary discussions and debates that underlaid the academic works. Prologue questions presented a medium for defining not only the terms of debate but the *modus operandi* through which they were examined. As theology had developed into a professional academic specialization, a body of knowledge, and a genre of writing over the thirteenth and fourteenth-centuries, *theologia* came to be defined across these categories. As the role human reason had in expounding on scripture came under scrutiny, the question arose of how *theological study and commentary* differed, in theory and practice, from Scriptural exegesis. As these and related inquiries were undertaken in academic theological texts, explanations appeared on what purpose and limits the *Sentences* commentary themselves, as works of human reason, held in relationship to revealed doctrine, found only in Scripture. Questions about the meaning and utility of the *Sentences* thus appeared in Prologue discussions as investigations of what end the commentaries themselves should advance towards.

Moreover, as theology--*qua* a body of questions and analyses--came exclusively under the ambit of bachelors and masters of theology, the intellectual products of theological study were shaped by the academic context in which they were produced. As noted, by the generation prior to Odonis' lectorate at Toulouse, the stage of principial debate had been introduced as an overture to the *Sentences* lectures, and itself became an inaugural preview of each cohort's agility and stamina for open debate. For subject matter, the same general issues were taken up, as well as many individual questions identical to those that had been found in prologues since the thirteenth century. As Courtenay describes, the individual questions expounded upon were chosen by each respondent, with the assumption that lectors would distinguish themselves by integrating attacks on the weaknesses of their peers' arguments into their own responses.[227] In the written records of the debates, the *principium* was added before the prologue questions and included the kernels of personalized interpretation to be further developed throughout the commentary itself. In terms of comparing and contrasting sophistication of argument and reasoning, sentential *principia* and prologues remain the most valuable ore to mine for both individuality of theological and philosophical innovation and as a means of tracking where contemporaries were pushing discussions relative to earlier iterations of those questions.

Intellectual emphasis increasingly shifted towards provocative and personalized commentary on prologue questions and on those topics in Books I through IV that most interested each scholar. The shift was organic, and we can understand it intuitively in terms of the competition for advancement built into the structure of the degree programs, as described earlier. In terms of academic genres, Odonis' *Sentences* commentary thus reflects the movement by his time towards

[227] See Courtenay, *Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 2007), 28-34 on the development of Principial questions.

shortened works that no longer addressed all of Lombard's questions, with a prologue that developed a coherent position on theology as a discipline, reflective of arguments made during principial debates and of corollary and related positions to be explored in Book I.

Background B: Augustine's Theological Tradition

In discussions of the nature of theology broadly speaking, Augustine's influence figured prominently within the subtopics that Aquinas, Auriol, and all later writers developed throughout their commentaries on all four books of the *Sentences*. For Augustine, the question of theological authority and the limits of theological thought had clear answers, although they were shaped by his views on the more complex subjects of divine illumination and the role of the will over the intellect. Focusing here on his interpretation of the role reserved for human reason with regard to questions of faith and religious belief, we find throughout his works a cumulative circumscription of what he saw as strict limits to human understanding. Although he argued, in opposition to fideism, that God had provided individuals with strong sense faculties, and with a kind of reason to help make quotidian decisions and render judgments, Augustine more strongly emphasized the degree to which human intellect was unable to understand truths fully in this life, as a result of the fall. The *viator* can know some things through reason, even some things about God, just as he or she can also know a great deal of things through sense experience. The authority of human reason is ultimately subordinated, however, to the truth of matters that are not now in individual's power to grasp, and which must therefore be taken on faith.

This faith is a prerequisite for understanding, but it is the multivalent nature of human understanding as characterized by Augustine that gave rise to later medieval distinctions and debates over the proper object of theological inquiry, and the means by which theological

knowledge is known. According to Augustine, individuals must disassociate themselves from the concept of knowledge as the exclusive product of reason and intellect, and accept that there are bodies of knowledge *known* through faith. Augustine's concern here was the disjuncture caused by trying to "know" matters of faith by means of reason, because they are more properly the objects of faith.

In his own work, distinct from later interpretations of his thought, Augustine did not posit a strict tension or polarization between faith and reason, but focused instead on the varying definitions of knowing and understanding the *viator* can achieve in this life, in humanity's corrupt condition after the fall. Augustine qualified these definitions according to the context of what is being understood (e.g., personal feelings and opinions, as opposed to the mysteries of the faith). Individuals must not confuse the means of understanding given to them (faith and reason) with their proper objects (matters that can be understood in a limited sense through human reason and sense perception, and those that cannot, such as the Trinity). For Augustine, then, the *object* of understanding determines the *means through which it is known* and the degree to which individuals can understand it in this life. The objects of theological thought are known to each *viator* through faith and their full truth is hidden, but faith can prepare individuals to understand them better using the tool of reason (the basis of Augustine's *credo ut intelligam*). Theology, therefore, is the study of God. Scripture, with wisdom and interpretations borrowed from patristic writers, is sufficient for understanding the faith.

We cannot, of course, read Augustine anachronistically for comments on the nature of theology as an academic or intellectual pursuit, because he did not speak or conceive of it as such. For himself and the other patristic writers, Scripture contained adequate evidence of the Christian

faith with no need to investigate or prove the truth behind it, and certainly no need to investigate beyond it. It is accordingly unfruitful to look for introspective critiques of theology as a discipline prior to the twelfth century and, for the immediate context of Odonis' thought, not before the thirteenth century.[228]

Point of Entrée: Peter Auriol's Defense of an Augustinian View of *theologia*

Auriol addressed several questions on the nature of theology in his first *Sentences* commentary (*Scriptum super primum sententiarum*): in his Prologue to Book I and his conclusion [d. 48, article 3]; in the Prologue to his second commentary on Book I (the *Commentarius brevior in primum sententiarum*); and as Nielsen shows, in the question *De distinctio habitus speculativi et practici* (Balliol no. 63), in which Auriol defends his thought against a contemporary, Thomas Wylton.[229] By way of general characterization, Auriol espoused a strong, conservative Augustinian perspective on theology as an act meant to defend the truths of the faith as garnered from Scripture and the Creed, and a means of strengthening the faith of individual believers. Auriol's sharpened designation of theology as a means by which the faithful (having already chosen to believe on faith) deepened their understanding of Scripture, rather than expanded it to include new

[228] Jacques-Guy Bougerol, "The Church Fathers and *auctoritates* in scholastic Theology to Bonaventure," *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West from the Carolingians to the Maurists,* ed. Irene Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1997), vol. I, 289-336.

[229] For the sequence of Auriol's Toulouse, then Paris lectures on the *Sentences,* and the resultant textual tradition of his *Sentences* commentary, see especially Nielsen, (2000), 40n.23. See also Eligius Buytaert, ed., *Peter Aureoli Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum,* 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1952-1956; Nielsen, (2001), 40, 40n.22-23, and 44. Nielson's edition of Wylton's question "Utrum habitus theologicus sit practicus vel speculativus" appear here with Auriol's questions "Utrum virtus in quantum virtus sit ens per accidens" and "De distinctio habitus speculativi et practici." Nielson notes that on this topic, Auriol's thought in the later commentary corresponds very closely to the first (41). For other Auriol studies, see Lauge Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way with Words: the Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the Sentences," in G.R. Evans, ed., Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 149-210.

conclusions, generated his strong rhetoric in opposition to theology as a deductive science.[230] His defense of theology as simply declarative reinvigorated the discussion and generated comment and opinion from most seminal figures of the 1310s and 1320s. As we will see, he overwhelmingly channeled his opposition to deductive theology into examining the implications surrounding the habit engendered by the pursuit of *theologia* when interpreted as a science in strict Aristotelian terms.

At their most fundamental level, the debates over the nature of theology by Auriol and Odonis' time concerned what body of knowledge or learning *theologia* encompassed, and consequently *whose* knowledge and learning it was, either human or divine. As direct inquiries into those broader themes, positions taken on what should be considered the proper subject and object of theology emerged as distinct questions, but derived from the same ambiguity. Was theology as a discipline equivalent to the reading and exegesis of Scripture? Was its purpose limited to the pastoral functions of explaining Scripture and teaching doctrine to the laity, bringing believers closer to God, and defending against heresy? Was it a means of defending and proselytizing the faith to nonbelievers? As a body of knowledge, did it include human speculation about Scripture and efforts to answer questions raised by evidence found in Scripture, but not clearly answered therein? Was it the foundational evidence for the faith and Christian history

[230] By way of introduction to working definitions for these terms, Stephen Brown has said, "Deductive theology differs from declarative theology in so far as the latter focuses on the principles themselves and how they are supported and defended, whereas deductive theology looks to the conclusions that can be drawn from the principles," "Declarative Theology after Durandus: Its Re-Presentation and Defense by Peter Aureoli," in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. IDEM et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 406. See also IDEM, 1998, 648-649 and Nielson (2000), 42 n32.

distilled directly from Scripture, or was it the understanding of that material held in the mind? Was it equivalent to wisdom?

Underlying this array of questions was tension over whether theology, if in fact limited to the body of revealed knowledge in Scripture, could be supplemented with the fruits of human inquiry and interpretation. If *theologia* so defined was divine knowledge, how could human reasoning possibly improve upon it or increase it? One general response given in several cases, including to a degree by Aquinas, held that theology helped believers and those already in the habit of grace to understand better the preliminary truths about the faith, such as statements found in the creed. The correlative difficulty was frequently raised of understanding Scripture itself; for the learned and unlearned alike, Scripture was equivocal, ambiguous, and at times contradictory. Examples proliferated of even the patristic authors struggling to interpret inconsistencies among the Gospel's narratives of events, as well as between Hebrew prophecies and their Christian fulfillments. In response to arguments that their explanations and commentaries should be placed within the bounds of *theologia* beside the revealed texts themselves, the question arose why human intellect and instruction should be required in order to understand truths known through revelation. We see, then, in spirit and in frequent textual reference, the distinction made by Augustine between the human capacity to know through acts of reason, relative to the ability to know things to be true through the act of faith.

Theology as a Science

The debates over theology as a science, a subcategory to the broader debate just introduced, were similarly shaped by objections raised in defense of the self-sufficiency of Scripture as the body of knowledge, or *doctrina*, required for the faith. These discussions appeared in Prologue

material, and materialized not only within the general question of whether *theologia* could be properly classified as a science in the Aristotelian sense (*utrum theologia sit scientia*), but also in questions about what capacity humans had to understand theological truths, and what part of the intellect is responsible for comprehending them. These questions are most closely associated with Aquinas and his premise that theology does meet the criteria of a science, and functions as one. As a field of inquiry, theology operates deductively by distilling broad, Christian truths from the articles of faith, or statements found in the Creed, which serve as first principles of which the *viator* has *a priori,* certain knowledge.

The philosophical foundation for this argument was Aristotle's definition of *scientia* in the *Ethics* (Book VI.3), his discussions in the *Posterior Analytics* of scientific knowledge and the four causes (Book I.2), and his account of the cognition and understanding of first principles (Book I.19). Aristotle categorized scientific knowledge as demonstrable, or as that kind of knowledge of which we can reach the highest level of certainty, based on self-evident knowledge of first principles and causes.[231] Its premises must be self-evident, its causes must be clearly understood, and its propositions must be necessary and universally true.

The classification of Christian theology as a science or as scientific knowledge in these terms gave rise to several difficulties related as much to the philosophy of mind as to objections about the relevance of circumscribing Scripture according to human philosophical definitions.[232]

---

[231] On scientific knowledge generally, see Eileen Serene, "Demonstrative Science" in *CHLMP*, 496-517; and R.J. Hankinson, "Philosophy of Science," *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, 109-139.

[232] An extensive body of secondary work explores these debates. A comprehensive bibliography is impossible here, but key works include Jean Leclercq, "La théologie comme science dans la literature quodlibétique," *RTAM* 11 (1939): 351-374; Chenu, *La théologie comme science XIIIe siècle*, 3rd ed., (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957); *La théologie est-elle une science?* (Paris: Fayard, 1957); Chenu, *La théologie au XII siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958); Camillo Dumont S.J., *La théologie comme science chez les Scolastiques du Treizième Siècle: Histoire de la question* "Utrum theologia sit *scientia*" *de 1230 à 1320* (Louvain: Pontificia

Can the understanding of theological truths be characterized as science? If so, can it be understand as a science in the proper Aristotelian sense of self-evident premises, or in the more general sense that theology leads to truths, albeit truths known through faith, not human reason? If science for Aristotle implied a chain of deductions in which all premises and the conclusions drawn from them are necessary truths, what room existed for the will to choose (free of determinism) either to assent to or to reject the precepts of Christian belief?[233] Moreover, if theologians' work extended the body of theological knowledge beyond the truths revealed in Scripture, who else among the body of Christian believers would be capable of comprehending it? More fundamentally, what role did the articles of faith, which were nowhere explicitly defined or enumerated in Scripture, play as premises from which to draw new conclusions about the faith, or as the proper objects of truths?

The primary objection raised against classification as a science derived from disagreement over the proper subject and object of theology. Was it God, the doctrinal knowledge found in Scripture respectively, or the knowledge accrued by theologians' interpretation and hermeneutical study of Scripture? More technical objections arose out of the Aristotelian definition of science itself and appeared in discussions of this question from at least the time of Alexander of Hales forward, coalescing around four distinct concerns: objections to theology defined specifically in Aristotle's terms; and relatedly, theology as a practical or speculative science; the proper subject matter and object of theology; and the certitude of theological and doctrinal knowledge.

Universitas Gregoriana: 1962); Henry Donneaud, "M.-D. Chenu et la théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle," *Mémoire dominicaine* 4 (1994): 139-175; Stephen Marrone, *The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); and Henry Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi au XIIIème siècle* (Paris: Parole et silence, 2006).

[233] Hankinson, 109-110.

Objections to Theology Defined as an Aristotelian Science

First, objections arose over whether or not theology had *a priori* first principles upon which to build propositions and from which to draw broader conclusions about doctrine and faith. Ambiguity surrounded the exact number of the articles of faith and how each should be identified, until they became standardized within debates to those Aquinas identified as the fundamental premises of Christian belief expressed in faith-statements within the creed.[234] Based on broader tension, less along strict Thomist-Franciscan lines by Auriol and Odonis' time, regarding perceptions of the authority of the faculty of the will versus the faculty of the intellect, the question arose whether cognitive assent to the articles of faith as first principles left room for accession to faith, calling back into question the relationship between beliefs known cognitively as opposed to faith. A related objection called into question whether individuals have certitude of their knowledge of theological principles.

Second, for Aristotle sciences concerned only the knowledge of universals. A fundamental dilemma arose when characterizing universals within Christian doctrine. Aristotle had referred to the knowledge of universal concepts, but Christian theology drew upon the revealed knowledge of specific, individual truths and lessons found in Scripture. A third objection arose targeting the kind of habit that theology, if a science, engendered. For Aristotle all sciences gave rise to a related *habitus*, which in the context of Christian theology posed a problem in that a habit is an inclination or proclivity developed discretely within the individual. To characterize theology as a science

[234] See further discussion below.

implied the presence of an additional habit of knowing, or of intellect, that served as the medium through which individuals understood the truths revealed by Scripture. However, such a habit would, at a fundamental level, not only be superfluous in light of the habit of faith through which the faithful believe those revelations, but challenge the role played by the habit of faith in the process of comprehending Scriptural truths.[235] Each of these concerns merits a brief overview below.

Theology as a Science in the Condemnations of 1277

One of the most accessible touchstones for reconstructing the landscape of theological debate at Paris by the last quarter of the thirteenth century is the list of propositions to be condemned and prohibited from teaching, issued in 1277. The list was hastily compiled and enumerated 219 general statements and concepts that were not to be taught in public or private. As a historical source for establishing the circumscribed boundaries of orthodox theology and doctrine at the time, the list remains problematic and misleading.[236] It contained prohibitions

[235] As Gaybba more succinctly notes, "all sciences involve a *habitus*, a habitual state or predisposition (in this case, of knowing) that is acquired through the use of human reasoning. But theology's *doctrina* is a pure gift from God." Gaybba, 100.

[236] For the text of the 1277 articles themselves itself, see Denifle, H. and E. Châtelain (eds.), *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, pp. 543-558, Paris 1889; Kurt Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277*. Frankfurt, 1989, and Piché, D. (ed.), *La condemnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, Paris 1999. For interpretation, commentary, and discussion of the condemned propositions in relation to the Thomistic corpus, see foremost John F. Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1997): 169-201 and more recently his overview, "The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277" in the *Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Wippel and Timothy Noone (London: Blackwell, 2003).

See as well Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1977); Edward Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages," *Viator* 10 (1979), 211-44; Wippel. "Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277," *The Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), 233-72; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome," *Vivarium* 34 (1997), 1-29; Luca Bianchi, "1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?" in: Jan A. Aertsen and

against teaching what would have amounted to the most fundamental contradictions of Christian faith, including the Aristotelian understanding of the world as eternal rather than created by God, and effects not being possible without their causes, which if true would impose limitations on God's absolute power. That said, the list did not accurately reflect classroom discussions, nor did it recognize the nuance and sophistication with which contemporaries engaged with Aristotle's texts. Rather, contemporaries themselves used the list as a means of condemning their opponents' arguments or attempting to raise suspicion about them, particularly with regard to implications that the will was bound to the dictates of reason, which would weaken the possibility of the will's capacity for choice according to or against the dictates of reason. The condemned propositions have taken on greater, albeit widely varying, significance only for modern scholars. However, the list does affirm the polemical heft of the debate over theology as a science, since several of them focus on key elements of the discussion including the nature of and possibility of knowing self-evident principles and causes with certitude, as well as the nature of theology as a body of teachings and source of authority.

Theology as a Speculative or Practical Science

From his discussion in the *Metaphysics,* we find Aristotle distinguishing in particular those kinds of sciences the-knowledge-of-which is acquired through practical application of their relevant body of knowledge; in other words, those sciences in which one attains proficiency by

---

Andreas Speer (eds.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* Berlin, New York, 1998, pp. 90-110; Alain de Libera, "*Philosophie et censure. Remarques sur la crise universitaire parisienne de 1270-1277*," in IBID., 71-89; Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); and Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer, eds., *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzen Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts.* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001).

doing, or practicing them, rather than theorizing about them. For Aristotle, these sciences include ethics and politics: activities in which individuals become trained and skilled only by actively engaging in them. Their practical pursuits stand in contrast to the theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, which are pursued only through human reasoning. Late medieval questions arising over whether to classify theology as a *scientia practiva* or *speculativa* thus followed secondarily from those over whether or not theology was a science.

To return for a moment to Auriol's perspective on this issue, we find him characterizing practical science as the higher pursuit because it implied a kind of authority, knowledge, or excellence to be applied actively in life, not merely as an object or product of speculation. By contrast, we find others, including Thomas Wylton, arguing speculative science to be of greater merit.[237] As we will see, the distinction between the two designations was neither arbitrary nor isolated; it related directly to the question of whether theology was an active tool for the dissemination and strengthening of the faith in daily life, or a theoretical discussion reserved for those members of the learned elite interested in clarifying or expanding what was known about the faith through revealed Scripture.

The Proper Subject Matter and Object of Theology

By Auriol's time debates on the nature of theology thus rested heavily upon the fundamental question of what subject matter and purpose theological study should be directed towards. In that broader context, as well as in his refutation of theology as a *deductive* science--meaning one in which broad conclusions are drawn from known premises--Auriol reshaped the debate by characterizing theology as a *declarative* science, a distinction which served as the

[237] See Nielsen, (2001).

framework for his defense of an Augustinian understanding of theology as a means of strengthening the faith, not proving it.

Questions on the nature of theology were also inherently questions of authority. Was theological knowledge to be equated unequivocally with, or subordinated to, the body of spiritual learning found in Scripture? Or could it properly include the distinctive and discrete explanations and inquiry on Scripture itself as pursued by theologians? As a product of human reason, the latter body of knowledge potentially reached *beyond* the learning revealed in Scripture, and included both questions and conclusions asked out of human interest and answered through the authority of human reason, thus building upon and expanding what is known about theology beyond the theological knowledge found in Scripture alone. More narrowly, then, these debates reflected contemporary tensions and concerns among the theology faculty over which activities should be characterized or included in theology.

Certitude of Theological and Doctrinal Knowledge

In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle ascribed to scientific knowledge the yielding of the most certain form of understanding; more certain than human opinion or speculation. Therein lay a further conflict for defining theology as a science within a Christian context: the teachings of Scripture are already known to believers with certainty, or a kind of certainty, through faith, bringing into question the role of the intellect in comprehending theological truths.

Although questions on the certitude of theology took several forms, they drew upon one of the same doubts underlying the preceding topics: given that individuals in this life are sure of what appears in Scripture because it is known to them through divine revelation, how can the same

certitude be had about theological knowledge acquired through human reason?[238] What kind of knowledge did *theologia* lead to? A familiar tension reappeared in this context between the authority of revealed knowledge (which is certain, and cannot be rejected out of doubt or skepticism if believed to be true through faith) and the authority of the human analyses of revealed knowledge (which yields only opinion, which is less certain). This careful distinction between reasoned knowledge and what is known by faith highlighted the differences between theology as a discipline and faith, and paralleled the debates over the differences between the two as activities and the differences in the habits each engenders. We see the nature of faith often addressed in separate, yet directly related questions from this period.[239]

One of several correlative discussions was that of how the mind understands God, and the question of whether the *viator* is inherently, naturally capable of it. Theologians generally agreed that humans required more than the Aristotelian agent intellect to comprehend supernatural knowledge of God. Although they agreed on this point of epistemology, they disagreed on the precise nature of the human capacity to understand God. Some believed the *viator* to be naturally incapable, while others upheld a kind of natural capacity. There also existed debate over whether

[238] See Kevin White, "Saint Thomas et Durand de Saint Pourçain: la question de la certitude de la foi," in *Jean Capreolus en son temps (1380-1444)*, ed. Guy Beduoelle, etc al., (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1997), 165-176.

[239] Overview of these tensions with regard to the nature of faith as discussed by Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) during the fifteenth century, see Heiko Oberman, "Faith: Acquired and Infused" in *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, 3rd ed. (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press, 1983), 68-89.

the light of faith and the light of the agent intellect themselves sufficed, or if another (e.g., Henry of Ghent's *lumen medium*) were required.[240]

At its broadest, this discussion owed its terminology and intellectual framework to the paradigmatic discussions on divine illumination and cognition, and the sufficiency or insufficiency of the agent intellect to understand God.[241] In the sense that Aquinas and those who adopted his interpretation argued the negative positions, that individuals do have need of an additional supernatural light to make up for the limits of natural intellect, the question concerned the functional capacity of the human agent intellect to perceive supra-human, or divine, knowledge. In the broader sense, though, the question devolved to the role played by reason as opposed to faith in the act of thinking about God and Christian truths; oppositions to Aquinas on this point thus took the form of defenses of faith as an innate, natural mechanism for contemplating God. Concensus emerged that individuals required something beyond the agent intellect to understand God, but disagreed on whether individuals were naturally capacitated or incapacitated to do so; if incapacitated, they had need of divine illumination in some manner. If the *viator* is already capable of doing so, though, it is through the inborn faculty of faith. In this sense, the role of theology is

[240] Cf. Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1995): 49-75, and more broadly, IDEM, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[241] On divine illumination theories in this period, see Marrone, 2001. For more on their relation to the debates at hand, see Stephen F. Brown, "*Duo candelabra parisiensia*: Prosper of Reggio in Emilia's Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study" in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte*, ed. Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 320-329.

to make God knowable through faith, and to nourish the desire and capacity for knowing God further.[242]

Late Thirteenth-Century Shifts in Defining *theologia*

In the roughly eight intervening centuries between Augustine and Aquinas, seminal figures including John Scotus Erugenia, Lanfranc, Anselm of Bec, and others had continued Augustine's examination of the respective natures and relationships of reason and faith, and debated related questions on specific points of doctrine and belief.[243] Appearing in the mid-twelfth century, Peter Abelard's *Sic et non* and Peter Lombard's *Libri Quatuor Sententiarum* were themselves compilations of patristic writing, heavily laden with Augustine' thought, and their own responses to questions about Christian faith. Both Abelard (author of the *Sic et non*) and Lombard recognized the pedagogical and interpretative challenge that existed by their time of competing theological authorities, and the need to use human reason to clarify and accomodate Scriptural and patristic sources when not easily reconciled with each other.

By the thirteenth century, theology thus existed as a discipline focused on the nature of theology as it had by that time come to be practiced; that is to say at Paris, embedded within the university curricula and structure of the degree programs for secular and mendicant masters, and a product of oral and written discussion both within and beyond the classrooms.[244] In that context,

---

[242] Brown (2001), 323.

[243] For general background, see Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978) and Guilio d'Onofrio, "Theological Ideas and the Idea of Theology in the Early Middle Ages," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 38 (1991): 273-297.

[244] See Louis Bataillon, "Early Scholastic and Mendicant Preaching as Exegesis of Scripture," *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, ed. Mark Jordan and Kent Emery (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 172-175; G. R. Evans, "Exegesis and Authority in the Thirteenth Century," *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers*, ed. Jordan and Emery (1992), 93-112; Ian P. Wei, "The Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth Century: An Authority Beyond

it supplanted the prior tradition of "monastic theology" as described by Jean Leclercq and M.-D. Chenu, and embodied by figures including Hugh of St. Victor and others who approached theology as a spiritually strengthening activity.[245] As such its end was spiritual, not intellectual, and it manifested itself not in dialectical inquiries on doctrine but in mysticism and veneration of creation, divine love, and the recognizably human figures of Christ and Mary. Monastic theology could be viewed in part as a conscious response to the increased application of logic and dialectic to Scripture, as in the spirit of Bernard of Clairvaux's criticisms of Abelard.[246] Prior to that, no need existed to define theology beyond the reading and study of Scriptures as a means of strengthening one's faith and individual piety.

As such theology "centered on the practical issue of the soul's ascent to contemplative union with God. It was concerned not with imparting abstract information, but with enabling

---

the Schools," *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 75 (1993): 37-63; Wei, "The Self-Image of the Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 46 (1995): 398-431, and most recently Wei, *Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, c. 1100-1330* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[245] See Leclercq (1964), 54; and Gaybba, 7-9. For broad comparisons of the respective relationships of monastic and scholastic theology to scripture, see Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science,'" in *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 270-309.

[246] On twelfth-century philosophy and theology in general, see especially the foundational study by Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), particularly "The Masters of the Theological 'Science'," 270-309; and more recently, Peter Dronke, *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Studies around mid-century and after by Chenu and Yves Congar, O.P. established the broad bounds of the discussions over theology, and tracked the form and specific questions the debate took within each generation. See Congar, "Théologie" in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris, 1938-39), [adapted as *A History of Theology*, trans. Hunter Guthrie, S.J, (New York: Doubleday, 1968)]; and Marrone, 2001). See also Jaroslave Pelikan's *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

As with other subjects within medieval philosophy, more recent studies have examined specific authors' questions on theology as part of a larger focused study of their work, or tracked the debate between two or more individual writers. See Lowe, 2003.

someone to come closer to God."[247] Practical theology was an activity focused on mining Scripture for practical information of benefit to the faithful and their quotidian concerns about ethical mores and, ultimately, their salvation. Theology required no more specific definition or sharpened spiritual purpose; it comprised the reading, study, and—when occasioned—the vigorous defense of Scripture against heresy, as an act of piety and an expression of faith.

A significant shift in the definition of theology as a discipline and in its perceived relationship to sacred Scripture took place over the course of the thirteenth century, most markedly in the divergent approaches taken by Aquinas and Bonaventure.[248] The earliest stages of that shift were tied to the arrival in the west of previously unseen Aristotelian texts. Aquinas's own active immersion in them can be viewed as the culmination of thirteenth century interest in accommodating and undergirding the body of Christian doctrine--essentially Scripture combined with the patristic inheritance--to and with Aristotelian understandings of reasoning and scientific argument. This philosophical infrastructure facilitated both theological study and argumentation, but also provided a means of more explicitly defining and delineating the elements of Christian belief when defended against those of Judaism, and more significantly, Islam.

Theology came into focus as a discipline, more than an abstract body of knowledge as a consequence of becoming part of the university's structure and degree program, for both secular and mendicant students. That shift coincided with fecund interest in the new Aristotelian texts, and

[247] Gaybba, 53.

[248] From the thirteenth century forward, "theology was invested irrevocably within an academic structure, one that relied on scholastic methods. Hence, its different approach doomed monastic theology to extinction, or rather to surviving as mysticism divorced from, and taking a dim view of theology." Despite the pessimism of Gaybba's interpretation (57), he correctly pegs this divergence of mysticism from the academic context that theology was exclusively limited to after the rise of the universities.

inquiries they sparked into the processes by which individuals reach truths, both of the worldly and secular nature and higher truths rooted in, and perhaps exceeding, Scripture. These developments fundamentally recast the question of what relationship existed between human reason and revealed knowledge from God, and prompted responses unique to this period, distinct from earlier iterations of these discussions prior to the twelfth century. By the close of the thirteenth century, then an interpretation of theology as human endeavor and as a direct product of human reasoning had been advanced.

The Early Franciscan and Dominican Traditions

Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) became the first individual to hold a teaching chair at Paris as a Franciscan, having joined the order after his earlier career as a secular scholar, and was a regent master by 1220 or 1221.[249] His students, who included Bonaventure, Richard Rufus, Odo of Rigauld, and Jean de la Rochelle, later comprised an intellectually vibrant Franciscan community at Paris, just as a shift occurred towards a greater profusion of publications by mendicant scholars rather than secular theologians.[250] As a source for the early thirteenth-century discussion of the nature of theology, Alexander's *Summa theologica*, the *Summa Halensis* contains

[249] For references entries and brief overviews of Alexander's works and thought, see "Prolegomena" in the edited edition of the Glossa, *Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica* vol. 1 (1951), 7-75; Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilgeschichte: eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis* (Munich: M. Heuber, 1964); Kenan B. Osborne, "Alexander of Hales," in *A History of Franciscan Theology,* ed. IDEM (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1994), 1-38; Gideon Gál, "Alexander of Hales," in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* vol. 1, ed. Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 1998), 176-178; and Christopher M. Cullen's biographical and intellectual profile in *A Companion to Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

[250] Odo of Rigauld, O.F.M. (d. 1274) produced two works on the nature of theology: his prologue to the *Sentences* and his *Quaestiones theologiae.*

questions on theology as a science. Of his other works, his formative early commentary on the *Sentences, Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum* and early disputed questions, the *Quaestiones disputatae* also set him within the contemporary debate, particularly since his work provides a window into the process of early engagement with, and response to, newly introduced elements of Aristotelian thought.[251]

More so than Alexander, Bonaventure (d. 1274) delineated a distinct role for philosophical demonstration within the area of theological inquiry, which reflected the increased authority of Aristotle's texts by this later period.[252] Of Bonaventure's prolific theological and pastoral corpus, his *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis, Commentarii in quatuor libros Sententiarum,* and *Collationes in Hexaemeron* speak most directly to the nature of theology. Elements of his thought show explicit attention to the question of a distinction between theological truths and philosophical truths. Within the *Mys. Trin.,* he provides an explication of the role of philosophy within natural reason and how philosophical tools can be accommodated to theological inquiry.[253] Bonaventure himself drew on Aristotelian terminology and epistemological constructs, but also affirmed a limit of certitude to be reached through philosophical inquiry alone; perfect certitude required the aid of divine illumination.[254]

---

[251] Christopher Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), 105-106.
[252] For brief recent introductions to Bonaventure's thought, see Andreas Speer, "Bonaventure and the question of a medieval philosophy," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997): 25-46; IDEM, "Bonaventure," in *A Companion to Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 233-240; and Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006).
[253] Speer (2002), 234.
[254] Speer (2002), 234-235.

The professionalization of theology at Paris likewise included a strong Dominican tradition, which took root with Albert the Great.[255] Albert's body of work includes re-translations of Aristotelian works produced in an effort to uncover Aristotle's original meaning, devoid of Averroist interpretation. Albert's *Sentences* commentary included explicit questions on theology as a science, and addressed the definition of theology, and the question of theology's proper body of knowledge. [256]

Thomas Aquinas, O.P.

As Chenu noted, by the time Aquinas took up the question of theology as an Aristotelian science, he joined a discussion already in progress for several decades.[257] With regard to the present discussion, before Aquinas we find the idea of faith identified as first principles by William of Auxerre (d. 1231). The *Summa aurea* includes a discussion that equates the articles of faith

[255] On Albert's thought generally, see Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg, *Albert the Great* (Leipzig: Benno, 1980/2005).
[256] Gaybba, 90-93.
[257] See Chenu (1957), 67-70 for his overview of the discussion and its contributors. See also Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Peter Wawrykow, eds., *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). A select bibliography for Aquinas' theological thought includes Brian Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993); Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993); John Jenkins, *Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997); John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2000). For purposes of this overview, I have not commented here on debates about how representative of his thought the *Summa*'s discussion of theology as a science has been judged to be. Joseph Owens, "Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 453-54.

(defined more ambiguously than Thomas' later categorization) with the first principles of a *scientia.* We thus find earlier kernals of the Thomistic framework for theology as a science: the expansion of theology's body of learning to comprise not only Scripture, but also the lessons and truths imparted by the creed; the characterization of theology as a speculative science, with God as its subject; and the deepening of the recognized distinction of knowledge from faith, with the related effort to distinguish the meaning of scripture intellectually from understanding it in an affective way concerned with salvation.

The seminal sources for the nature of theology among Aquinas' broader body of work include his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics,* the *Summa theologica,* and, to a lesser extent, *De veritate* and the *Summa contra Gentiles.*[258] His interpretation of theology as a scientific discipline took deep root in his philosophy of mind and understanding of cognition, with a unique recasting of the traditional limits placed on the latter. For Aquinas, the *viator* could have some knowledge of God in this life by observing the created order of nature. In Aristotelian terms, the natural world, including humanity, collectively represented an effect brought about by God, meaning humans could reason back through their observations of creation to understand God as creation's cause.[259] The kind of knowledge engendered by comprehending causes teleologically through their effects was sharply limited, however, both by the human senses and the fact that no evidence appeared in this world to prove most aspects of the mysteries of Christian faith. For Aquinas it did not strictly demonstrate scientific knowledge of God in the Aristotelian tradition.

---

[258] Within the *Summa* itself, the questions comprising Thomas' expositions on theological knowledge, virtues, habits, wisdom, the intellection and certitude of faith, and the articles of faith include but are not limited to: I, 1; I, 12; II: I, 49-67; II:II, 1-16.
[259] *Summa,* I, 1, 1.

Individuals could be more certain of principles known from God than those known through the natural light of human reason. Here Aquinas' characterization of theology as an Aristotelian science (built on *a priori* first principles) allowed him to approach theology as a speculative discussion whose object is God.[260] Thus, sacred doctrine itself becomes a speculative science, because it concerns God's acts and speculative knowledge of God and the Beatific Vision. For Aquinas, the *habitus principiorum,* which allows the *viator* to comprehend first principles, and the *habitus scientiae,* which comprises the knowledge deduced from those principles, become the vehicles through which individuals expanded the body of information available about the faith beyond revealed Scripture itself.

It is now well-established in the scholarship that later criticism of Aquinas' argument for theology as a science cannot be uniformly labeled as simple rejection of theology as a science based on first principles. Rather, several fault lines of criticism emerged, stemming from doubt that such a theological construct could, in fact, match Aristotle's exact meaning. Those who attacked Aquinas based on the spirit of his program were commonly Franciscans, including Auriol. Several others, though, including Dominicans and secular scholars, including Godfrey of Fontaine, took issue instead with how true Thomas himself had remained to the discrete Aristotelian definition of science.

It bears remembering here that the professionalization of theology occurred not only simultaneous to these discussions, but through them. Opinions against characterizing theology as a science, and against distinguishing between it and Scripture, came in the Prologues to commentaries on the *Sentences,* which were themselves products of human engagement with

[260] *Summa,* I. 1, 4.

Scripture and reasoned responses to questions about doctrine and practice.[261] Lectures on the *Sentences* and written accounts produced for circulation, particularly the later, highly personalized Prologue tradition, came to represent a liminal space as varyingly the products, and the mediums of theological inquiry itself.

The articuli fidei as First Principles

A sub-inquiry of theological debate at Paris during this period was what kind of knowledge the articles of faith represented, how they were comprehended, how they could be known to be true, and whether they functioned as kernals of finite knowledge or access points for deeper inquiry. Several objections emerged to Aquinas' designation of the articles of faith as *a priori* first principles. They all hinged in part on the requirement that deductive logic have self-evident first principles for conclusions to be drawn from. Nothing in either Scripture or early patristic works explicitly characterized any set of facts or body of knowledge in that discretely a manner. The articles of faith were principles of dogma *distilled* from Scripture, but as such remained theological constructs. Thus it remained arguably unclear what the first principles of *theologia,* defined as an Aristotelian science, would be, or on what basis they should be understood as self-evident, or who by.[262]

---

[261] Of Albert in particular, Gaybba has noted "In [this] contrast between theory and practice one can see the tensions and contradictions present in trying to limit theology's body of knowledge to a transcendent datum, and yet see it as incarnate in theological texts other than its acknowledged normative expression in scripture." Gaybba, 93.

[262] The standing authoritative survey of the articles through the thirteenth century is Joseph Goering's "Christ in Domincan Catechesis: The Articles of Faith," in *Christ Among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers,* ed. Kent Emery, Jr. and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 127-138. The field has need of a continued study into the fourteenth century. Goering rightfully noted their key significance for the debates on theology as a science, outlined the definitions at play not only from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (in England and France), but the various listings of Aquinas and after. As he states, "in spite of the absence

A primary objection arose out of ambiguity over the articles of faith themselves. Neither the Gospel authors, nor Paul, nor any other Scriptural authorities explicitly labeled or identified specific statements or beliefs in these terms. By the twelfth century, though, the articles of faith as a doctrinal construct had come to be comprised of statements in the Apostles' Creed and elsewhere that collectively defined the tenets of orthodox belief and enumerated the mysteries of the faith.[263] Separate traditions had cited either twelve articles, drawing on parallel symbolism with the twelve apostles, or fourteen, with two sets of seven articles related to divine precepts concerning God and Christ's nature respectively. The *Summa,* II:II, q. 1, articles four through nine comprise part of Aquinas' discussion of the nature of faith. He there took up questions on the object of faith, how things of faith are known, their division into articles, whether the number of articles has increased over time, and how the articles are formulated. All throughout, Thomas characterized them as self-evident principles, and necessary presuppositions to matters of the faith. In II:II, q. 1, a. 8, Aquinas numbered the articles at fourteen, effectively codifying them (and freezing their content and structure) for late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century debate.[264]

---

of clarity and distinction concerning the number and definition of these articles, they are the foundation fo the theological enterprise; that as such they distinguish it clearly from philosophy, and that these revealed articles are central to the medieval claim for a scientific status, indeed the highest scientific status, for theology" (133). See also Bertrand-Georges Guyot, "L'attribution des articles de foi aux apôtres dans la literature pastorale latine des XIIIe-XIVe siècles," in *Pensée, image, et communication en Europe medieval,* ed. Pierre LaCroix et al. (Besançon: Asprodic, 1993, 179-184) and Harvey Hames, "Approaches to Conversion in the Late 13th-Century Church," *Studia Lulliana* 35 (1995): 75-84; Jarislov Pelikan and Valerie R. Hotchkiss, eds., *Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition* Vol I (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2003); and Andrew Reeves, "Teaching the Creed and Articles of Faith in England: 1215-1281," in *A Companion to Pastoral Care in the Late Middle Ages,* ed. Ronald Stansbury (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 41-72. A foundational study by Ludwig Hödl remains useful, as well: "Articulus fidei. Eine begriffsgeschitliche Arbeit," in *Einsicht und Glaube: Gottlieb Söhngen zum 70. Geburtstag am 21. Mai 1962,* ed. Gottlieb Söhngen, Joseph Ratzinger, and Heinrich Fries (Freiburg: Herder, 1963), 358-376.

[263] See Goering's overview, above.

[264] "Duo autem nobis ibi videnda proponuntur, scilicet occultum divinitatis, cuius visio nos beatos facit; et mysterium humanitatis Christi, per quem in gloriam filiorum Dei accessum habemus, ut dicitur ad Rom. V. Unde dicitur Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Et ideo prima distinctio credibilium est quod quaedam pertinent ad maiestatem divinitatis;

Aquinas also stressed the inherent utility of using the articles broadly, not only in defense of the faith, but as irrefutable, reasoned truths to draw on when proselytizing non-Christians and repudiating their errors.[265]

A related problem stemmed from Aristotle's requirement that self-evident first principles be universally comprehended (or comprehensible), a fact that presupposed such principles were not secretive, such as revealed doctrine might be considered to be. Along with knowledge taken on faith, in Aristotelian methodology, first principles were also to be distinguished from those kinds of knowledge that needed to be proved or demonstrated in order to be comprehended or believed. Yet Scripture was both revealed and unproven, according to the orthodox tradition. In this manner ambiguity over the articles of faith, as interpreted from Scripture, also implied ambiguity over who could determine the validity of a conclusion drawn on them as premises. If no one was sure which specific premises were known *per se* (even through subalternation, which we will see below as Aquinas' own defense against these objections), how could anyone treat their

---

quaedam vero pertinent ad mysterium humanitatis Christi, quod est pietatis sacramentum, ut dicitur I ad Tim. III. Circa maiestatem autem divinitatis tria nobis credenda proponuntur. Primo quidem, unitas divinitatis, et ad hoc pertinet primus articulus. Secundo, Trinitas personarum, et de hoc sunt tres articuli secundum tres personas. Tertio vero proponuntur nobis opera divinitatis propria. Quorum primum pertinet ad esse naturae, et sic proponitur nobis articulus creationis. Secundum vero pertinet ad esse gratiae, et sic proponuntur nobis sub uno articulo omnia pertinentia ad sanctificationem humanam. Tertium vero pertinet ad esse gloriae, et sic ponitur alius articulus de resurrectione carnis et de vita aeterna. Et ita sunt septem articuli ad divinitatem pertinentes. Similiter etiam circa humanitatem Christi ponuntur septem articuli. Quorum primus est de incarnatione sive de conceptione Christi; secundus de nativitate eius ex virgine; tertius de passione eius et morte et sepultura; quartus est de descensu ad Inferos; quintus est de resurrectione; sextus de ascensione; septimus de adventu ad iudicium. Et sic in universo sunt quatuordecim. Quidam tamen distinguunt duodecim articulos fidei, sex pertinentes ad divinitatem et sex pertinentes ad humanitatem. Tres enim articulos trium personarum comprehendunt sub uno, quia eadem est cognitio trium personarum. Articulum vero de opere glorificationis distinguunt in duos, scilicet in resurrectionem carnis et gloriam animae. Similiter articulum conceptionis et nativitatis coniungunt in unum." *Summa* II:II, 1, 8.

[265] "Unde sacra Scriptura, cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum negante sua principia, argumentando quidem, si adversarius aliquid concedat eorum quae per divinam revelationem habentur; sicut per auctoritates sacrae doctrinae disputamus contra haereticos, et per unum articulum contra negantes alium*." Summa* I, 1, 8.

conclusions as authoritative, or depend on them as the basis of knowledge of causal relations within theology? They would only be true to those who believed them to be the articles of faith, although subalteration implied that once the *viator* determined what the precepts of the faith were, they would be irresistibly true because comprehension of them was based on God's own intuitive knowledge of those principles.[266]

Henry of Ghent (d. 1293)

Henry of Ghent was a secular master in Paris (regent master, 1276-1293), and at times a vocal critic of the mendicant community around him.[267] Henry's influence in the discussion over theology, rooted in his *Quodlibeta* and *Summa* (*Quaestiones ordinariae*), remained vivid into the fourteenth century. As Stephen Brown has shown in his study of the Augustinian Prosper of Reggio's work on the knowledge of God, much of the debate over nature of theology as a science still revolved around responses to—and critiques of—Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines'

[266] See the Summa I,2,2 on the possibility of demonstrating God's existence by reading the effects of his actions (i.e., the created world and all in it) as evidence of existence.

[267] Not counting the large-scale efforts that have produced critical editions of his words, key overviews of Henry's thought relevant to the debate on theology include Raymond Macken, "La théorie de l'illumination divine dans la philosophie d'Henri de Gand," *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 39 (1972): 82-112; Steven Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent* (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1985); V. Sorge, *Gnoseologia e teologia nel pensiero di Enrico di Gand* (Naples: Loffredo, 1988); W. Vanhamel, ed., *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996); and R. Wielockx, "Henry of Ghent," in *A Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). See as well Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, eds., *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte* (Leuven: Leuven Univ. Press, 2003), and Brown's aforementioned "*Duo Candelabra Parisiensia*." See also fn240 above.

positions on the capacity of individuals (and theologians in a distinct category, as unique and specialized scholars of doctrine) to understand truths about the faith in this life.[268]

With a mind towards Augustine's strict circumscription of Scriptural study as a means of strengthening and illuminating the faith, Henry held that theology was a science, not in the sense that it comprised certain knowledge from which higher truths could be reached, but because it brought forth evidence for the truths of Christian faith. He felt the attempts to create rational theology, apart from revelation, had gone too far; he re-adopted Augustine's idea of divine illumination, arguing that the latter was necessary even for rational understanding of sense experiences. The supernatural truths of faith could not be grasped by the natural light of the agent intellect, thus there must be a light distinct from faith that makes the truth of the faith comprehensible.

Henry here applied Augustine's different types of understanding, and distinguished between the understanding theologians can reach compared to that of other believers to argue that the former have benefit of a distinctive "middle light" by means of which they understand the faith more clearly. This act of understanding is distinct from, and supplements the understanding that comes through faith: "middle" because it falls between the limited light of the agent intellect in this life and the full light of intuition that only comes later.[269] This level of comprehension

[268] For a study of Prosper of Reggio's Prologue to Bk. I, and in his own focus of inquiry into the nature of theology, see Brown (2001), 320-329. Brown argues that Prosper's own position differed from both of the earlier writers he took up a close dialogue with, Henry and Godrey of Fontaines, and that he generally followed the "scholastic mode" associated with Godfrey but defended possibility of Henry's special middle light for doctors in their comprehension of the faith.

[269] For Henry on cognition and divine illumination more generally, see in particular Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997).

remained limited to theological truths already revealed through Scripture, as opposed to new or correlative truths built upon what has been revealed through Scripture.

For those critics who rejected and countered Henry's attempt to mediate between the acts of intellect and the acts of faith, such an intermediate position was unnecessary and irrelevant; individuals have access to theological knowledge by intellect, faith, or depending on the author, a combination of both, with emphasis shifted not from the faculty by which they understand revealed truth, but the authority on which we assent to its truth. Truths taken on faith, through the kind of understanding the act of faith provides are true based on the authority of Scripture. The premise that Scriptural authority is inherently self-evident when taken on faith does not so much respond to or counter the inquiries into the explicit manner in which the agent intellect comprehends Scriptural truth, but rather circumvents them as irrelevant to the fact that faith is a sufficient medium through which to read an understanding of revealed Scripture.

John Duns Scotus, O.F.M. (d. 1308)

John Duns Scotus's work represented a turning point in thirteenth and fourteenth-century thought in several contexts, including scientific theology in Thomist terms, an idea Scotus pulled away from even more than Henry of Ghent.[270] As with Henry's work, it is possible to track shifts

[270] The most recent and comprehensive resource for Scotus on this subject is Steve Marrone's analyses of Scotus' positions in individual works and changes to his thought over time: "Scotus at Paris on the Criteria for Scientific Knowledge," in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Brill, 2009), 383-400, particularly 385-387. In addition, see Stephen Dumont, "Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," *Speculum* 64 (1989): 579-599; Allan B. Wolter and Marilyn McCord Adams, ed., *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990); W.A. Frank and A.B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus, Metaphysician* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Univ. Press, 1995); Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); IDEM, *Duns Scotus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Dumont, "John Duns Scotus," in *A Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), and Thomas Williams, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).

in both the content and tone of contemporary debates on the basis of what he chose to respond to, and which sets of questions to privilege over others. Based on his level of contribution to the questions over theology, it seems clear that the discussion had already shifted in his period; his work reveals a more complex investigation and recognition of what the practice of theology, as he and others were themselves engaged in it, had already come to entail in his generation. Compared to the structure of Aquinas' treatment of theological knowledge, Scotus' interest was no longer in categorically rejecting or accepting a human role in theology and its intellectual products, but in breaking down theology's parts and determining how best to accommodate it to the academic and pastoral purposes to which it had come to be applied.[271]

Chapter IV: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Odonis' Voice in the Debate (Contexts, Key Figures, and Textual Analysis)

Having outlined the key figures and lines of inquiry that comprised the thirteenth-century academic and intellectual background of Odonis' *Sentences* commentary, we turn then to Odonis' Prologue as understudied evidence for the state of the debates on theology in the 1310s and 1320s. Our purpose in analyzing it is first and foremost to establish where Odonis fit into the broader contemporary conversation on the nature of theology. Based on his arguments, we can reconstruct who Odonis was most directly in dialogue and conflict with on this subject. Beyond that, we can determine whether his thoughts corresponded to those of someone participating within the proscribed bounds of the contemporary debates, or someone who operated outside of them.

Fourteenth-Century Voices: Auriol's Declarative Theology

[271] An expanded version of the discussion in this chapter will include a deeper profile of Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, particularly with regard to Scotus' thought on the habit of theology, and restructure Chapters III and IV to more closely integrate their thought into my coverage of Auriol's specific positions.

Gerard's academic and administrative careers nearly aligned with the second quarter of the fourteenth century.[272] It is well-established that a number of diverse and talented figures, primarily mendicant, thrived at Paris and Oxford during the 1310s and 1320s.[273] At Paris they included Durand de St. Pourçain (O.P.), Peter Auriol (O.F.M.), Thomas Wylton, Dionys de Borgo (O.E.S.A.), Gerard of Siena (O.E.S.A.), Francis of Marchia (O.F.M.), Francis of Meyronnes (O.F.M.), Landulph Caracciolo (O.F.M.), and Nicolas Bonet (O.F.M.).[274] As noted, this cohort flourished at least two generations after Aquinas, and at least one after Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. We have seen that Aquinas and Bonaventure had reshaped the spirit and direction of the discussion about the nature of theology; they and seminal figures after them continued to redefine the terms of debate, literally, and to scope out the bounds of human agency within

[272] For a broad overview of the "pregnant plurality of fourteenth-century thought" and comments on it reception and interpretation in the modern period, Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile," *Speculum* 53 (1978): 80-93.

[273] For recent profiles of this period and snapshots of key debates, see Friedman and Schabel (1996): 357-372; Schabel, *Theology at Paris 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology Among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

[274] Other figures from Friedman and Schabel's '96 list include Antonius Andreas, Landulphus Carraciolo, Peter of navarre, Peter Thomae, Gaufredus Brito, William of Brienne (From Friedman and Schabel, '96, list of Auriol's contemporaries and others at Paris in the 1320s (359). At Oxford, Odonis' rough contemporaries included Walter Chatton, O.F.M. (1285-1344), Walter Burley (1274/1275-c. 1344), and William of Ockham, O.F.M. (c. 1285-1347). Chatton commented on the *Sentences* in 1322-23 (his *Reportatio*), and a second time after that (*Lectura*). Odonis is known to have been in Assisi at the same time in 1332 and at the papal court in 1333, where, as one of the Pope's advisors, Chatton was involved in various theological controversies and proceedings. See "Walter Chatton," *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, ed. Norman Kretzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 887 and 889. Scholars have connected Gerard's work with Burley's for a number of reasons, most stemming from their *Ethics* commentaries and comparable discussions found in their studies on the virtues. (See Ch. I).

I have not included a profile of Ockham's rejection of theology because it was not directly relevant to Odonis' views; for a recent and concise overview of his position, see Jenny E. Pelletier, *William Ockham on Metaphysics: The Science of Being and God* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

theology as an activity. As a further reminder, this period saw an increased proclivity among the figures at Paris to base their debates primarily on responses and criticisms to contemporaries, rather than on direct engagement with classical or early medieval sources.

Tension carried over into the fourteenth century about what theology encompassed: only revealed data, or also human reasoning on it, including patristic sources. We find increased pressue, though on the definition of not only theology as a subject of study, but an activity, and on the definition of "faith," particularly as defined against, and in distinction to theology. A general concensus emerged by the 1310s and 1320s that theology was not an Aristotelian science along the lines that Aquinas had outlined. Objections centered on outright rejection of the articles of faith as first principles, or calls for revising the way the terms were used. The ubiquity of questions related to theology as a science in Prologue discussions meant the topic was broached by contemporaries other than those surveyed below, but I have limited the discussion here to those figures Auriol and Odonis cited, a group which predictably comprises those figures whose thought most directly drove and reshaped the debate.[275]

The Habit of Theology

We come at this point to the focus of Auriol's Prologue: a collective inquiry into what habit the study of theology engendered, whether it was practical or speculative, and how it related to the habit of faith. As with the discussion of whether or not to characterize the articles of faith as first principles underlying scientific knowledge, the discussion of habits from Aquinas forward entangled Aristotle's own semi-ambiguous references to habits and their metaphysical meaning

[275] An expanded study would draw in Prosper of Reggio Emilia, (O.S.A.) and Godfrey of Fontaines, and others as background.

and function, with late medieval theological connotations that varied according to individual writer.[276] Like the definition of scientia itself, Aristotle's definition of habits was at best a compilation of references, in this case from De Anima, the Ethics, Physics, and Metaphysics.

For present purposes, we look not to those texts but to the definitions gleaned from them in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Commentaries on the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics* had produced discussions of habits, with common medieval usage interpreting the *habitus* as a virtue or, as the *Metaphysics* supported, a disposition. In so far as a habit could be considered a recurring act that shapes an individual's behaviour, or inclines them toward certain patterns of belief or action, Aristotle's definition of habits as active dispositions that developed within individuals appealed to Christian theologians as a strong metaphysical undergirding for the spiritual act of faith.

We find Aquinas' own lengthy discussion of habits in the *Summa*, II:I, questions 49-54, and his related discussion of virtues as habits immediately following, part II:I, questions 55-67. In q. 49, he proceeds first through a discussion of habits as *media* through which a relation is formed among things, as in the case of a relation formed between an individual and a thing done by the individual (q. 49, a. 1).[277] He then characterizes habits and dispositions as collectively a species,

[276] Cf. on habits: Cary J. Nederman, "Nature, Ethics, and the Doctrine of 'Habitus': Aristotelian Moral Psychology in the Twelfth Century," *Traditio* 45 (1989/90), 87-110.

[277] Q. 49, a. 1 ("Utrum habitus sit qualitas"): "Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus duplicter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.

Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel

or kind of quality in the Aristotelian sense (q. 49, a. 2).[278] He then takes up the question of whether habits are acts and responds affirmatively, that a habit is technically an act, in a state of potentiality in respect to its operation. (q. 49, a. 3).[279] Q. 50, a. 4 asks about the presence of a habit in the intellect, to which Aquinas responds affirmatively, based on Aristotle's discussion of science in the *Ethics* (*Sed contra est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animae*).[280] Aquinas' discussion here will be key to analyzing one of Odonis' Prologue questions, on whether or not the articles of faith function as a habit of the intellect. Q. 50, a. 5 also affirms the presence of a habit of the will.

As previewed earlier, in response to Aquinas' explanation of habits, criticism had emerged about the possibility of a habit arising in the *viator* in addition to the habit of faith. This line of criticism ran parallel to concerns that theology *qua scientia* posited a necessary vehicle beyond faith and the natural, albeit, limited understanding within each *viator* to comprehend scriptural

---

passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V *Metaphys.*, quod habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus.

Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V *Metaphys*., quod inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V *Metaphys*., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est." *Textus Leoninus* ex, ed. Marietti, 1948.

[278] "Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod una species qualitatis est habitus et dispositio. Respondeo dicendum quod philosophus, in *Praedicamentis*, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum."

[279] "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in ii *De Anima*. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam respicit potentia; ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia."

[280] See the *Ethics*, Book VI, Ch. 5.

truths. Whatever process or proclivity theology as a science would thereby posit to exist, be it intellective or scientific in nature, would as such engender its own discrete habit, distinct from that of the habit faith. The objections here were both moral and technical. All sciences were understood to involve the development of a habit. To characterize theology as a science would posit the individual *viator* drawing on a *human* habit of theological reasoning. By contrast, theological precepts, specifically the articles of faith taken as self-evident first principles, were subaltered from the divine.

Subalternation

Auriol and others' objections to the designation of the articles of faith as *a priori* first principles all hinged in part on the requirement that deductive logic has self-evident first principles for conclusions to be drawn from. As noted, neither the Gospel authors, nor Paul, nor any other Scriptural authorities had explicitly labeled or identified specific statements or beliefs in so discretely a manner. It remained arguably unclear what the first principles of theology *qua* Aristotelian science would be, or on what basis they should be understood as self-evident, or who by. "Who" posed a particular problem. Aristotle required that self-evident first principles be universally comprehended and comprehensible, a fact that presupposed such principles were not secretive or needed to be divinely revealed**,** such as the theological truths would be considered to be. Writing in a secular context, Aristotle's requirement that first principles be universally comprehensible would imply that anyone would immediately understand the precepts of Christian doctrine and accede to their truth. In the context of late medieval Christian theology, only

Christians and non-believers who had been moved to assent to the propositions could be said to understand them, and even then to a limited degree.

To approach this tension from a different direction, in Aristotelian methodology, first principles were to be distinguished from principles taken on faith, and distinguished from the kind of knowledge that needed to be proved or demonstrated in order to be comprehended or believed. By contrast, Scripture was divinely revealed and unproven. Ambiguity over the articles also implied ambiguity over who would determine the validity of any conclusion drawn on them as premises. If no one was sure which specific premises were known *per se*, how could anyone treat their conclusions as authoritative, whether a Christian or non-Christian? They would only be true to those who believed them to be the articles of faith.

Aquinas' own solution to this incongruity between the secular and religious contexts for thinking about first principles rested on subalternation. He reinforced the idea that a separation or distance did exist between the articles of faith and divine truth itself. Subalteration implied that once an individual was exposed to the precepts of the faith, those precepts would appear to be irresistibly true because the individual's comprehension of them was based on God's own intuitive knowledge of those principles. Only God and the *beati* fully understood the mysteries of the faith, but God had provided basic premesis about those mysteries in Scripture, which was accessible to believers. An additional, acquired habit would only develop when an individual reasoned *beyond* the first principles of the faith provided in Scripture. Aquinas thus defended the idea that first principles were subalternated, since the *viator* did not experience the direct understanding of the divine truths available only to the *beati*. Theology categorized as a science did not imply the

development of a *separate* habit of theology, only a habit of conclusions [drawn from them].[281] Moreover, no opponent could argue that Aquinas had implied faith to be science, because sciences depended on reasoning, not faith infused with divinely revealed truths.[282]

As a reminder, the traditions of deductive and declarative theology differed most fundamentally about the end purpose towards which the articles of faith should be applied. Deductive logic based on the articles could expand what was known, and what could possibly be known, about the faith. By contrast, the declarative tradition sought only the clarification of known elements of the faith. It sanctioned the use of accepted beliefs in philosophical arguments that confirmed but did not expand the body of knowledge implied to be true within the articles of faith. In other words, in the declarative tradition the articles of faith would not generate new knowledge, or a new intellective habit. They would only strengthen the faith by generating clearer understanding of its basic principles, which were themselves already known through faith.

Auriol singularly expanded and fortified the argument against theology as a deductive investigation.[283] In his view, theology did not begin with *a priori* articles leading to further conclusions. The fundamental principles revealed in Scripture instead defended and nurtured the truth inherent in the articles of faith. This kind of theological meditation and study did not bring about acceptance of the articles of faith in the *viator,* or bring about adherence to Scriptural truths. For Auriol, those actions were engendered only through the habits of faith and grace. Questions

[281] Gaybba, 101.
[282] After 1277, a plurality of interpretations emerged, beyond diametrically opposed positions of either accepting or rejecting theology as a subalternated science. Camillo Dumont, S.J. noted three groups key thinkers can be organized into in this context. See Dumont (1962), 44: "ceux qui refusent pour la théologie le statut de subalternation à la science de Dieu et des bienheureux, ceux qui l'admettent tout en amenuisant son sens, ceux qui la défendent en dépassant la perspective aristotélicienne."
[283] In Brown's study of the *Scriptum,* he characterized Auriol's discussion as the "most elaborate treatment of declarative theology written in the Middle Ages." Brown (2009), 413.

on the nature of theology comprise the singular focus of Auriol's Prologue: Q. I: *Utrum ex studio theologiae et solo naturali ingenio aliquis habitus acquiritur, alius a fide*; Q. II: *Utrum dari posit a Deo lumen aliquod viatori, virtute cuius theologicae veritates scientific cognoscantur*; Q. III: *Utrum theologicus habitus sit practicus vel speculativus*; Q. IV: *Utrum habitus ex theologico studio acquisitus sit unus vel plures*; and Q. V: *Utrum habitus theologicus habeat pro subiecto Deum sub ratione deitatis*.[284]

Thomas Wylton

Thomas Wylton's career bridged Merton College and Oxford with Paris, where he completed his theological studies as a contemporary of Auriol.[285] One of the most revealing

[284] These questions are available in a critical edition of Auriol's Scriptum, *Peter Aureoli Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum* Vol. I, ed. Eligius Buytaert, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1952). Q. II, on the possibility of demonstrative knowledge of theological truth with the aid of divine light, was translated by Robert Pasnau and Charles Bolyard and included in the *Cambridge Translation of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. III: Mind and Knowledge*, ed. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 178-218.

It is important to note the work done in the 1990s and the early 2000s by Stephen Brown and Lauge Nielson, among others, to establish the significance of Auriole's *Sentences* commentary (the *Scriptum* and later *Reportatio*). Seminal articles include Nielsen, "Dictates of Faith versus Dictates of Reason: Peter Auriole on Divine Power, Creation, and Human Rationality," *Documentie Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale: Rivista della Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino* 7 (1996): 213-241; Brown, "Declarative and Deductive Theology in the Early Fourteenth Century," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), 648-655; Nielson, "The Intelligibility of Faith and the Nature of Theology: Peter Auriole's Theological Programme," *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999), 26-39; IDEM, (2000); and Brown (2009).

[285] For brief biographic accounts, see "Thomas Wilton," by Cicilia Trifogli in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 666-667. Within the past two decades, Wylton's name has appeared with increased frequency as a key background voice in studies of more significant figures, including Ockham. Most dedicated studies of Wylton's work to date focus on aspects of his work on natural philosophy and metaphysics unrelated or only tangential to questions of interest here, although relevant titles include Mark Henninger, "Thomas Wylton's Theory of Relations," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 1 (1990): 457-490; Gerard Etzkorn and Robert Andrews, "Tortosa Cathedral 88: Thomas Wylton's Manuscript and the Question on the Compatibility of Multiple Accidents in the Same Subject," *Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum* 32 (1994): 57-99; Stephen Dumont, "New questions by Thomas Wylton," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 9 (1998): 341-381; Elżbieta Jung-Palczewska, "Delimitation between Theology and Natural Philosophy: the Case of God's Infinite Power in Thomas Wylton," *Studia mediewistyczne* 33

sources for Wylton's perspective on the nature of theology were his debates with Auriol on questions focused largely on the distinction between speculative and practical sciences. As Neilson shows, Wylton and Auriol's debate cut across two distinct but parallel theological lines of inquiry: the varying semantic definition and purpose of habits characterized as practical rather than speculative (Auriol's Q. III, above); and whether or not theology comprises deductive reasoning (Auriol's Q. V); as well as comments on the nature of relations.[286] Nielson has edited Wylton's thorough response to Auriol's position, on the question "Utrum habitus theologicus sit practicus vel speculativus."[287] Wylton begins by outling Auriol's argument that the habit of theology is practical, not speculative.[288] Wylton himself upheld a defense of theology as ultimately a deductive science, within which the articles of faith can function as first principles. This possibility distinguishes theology from faith, which stands on truths taken to be true based on their authority (Scripture), and not deductive reasoning.[289]

Gerard of Siena, O.E.S.A.

(1998): 65-71; Nielson, (2000); Sergio Landucci, "La doppia verità, a Parigi, attorno al 1315," in *Humanistica: Per Cesare Vasoli*, ed. Fabrizio Meroi and Elisabetta Scapparone (Firenze: Olschki, 2004), 19-39; Jean-Baptiste Brenet, "Jean de Jandun et la *Questio de anima intellective* de Thomas Wylton," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 56 (2009): 309-340; and *Thomas Wylton, On the Intellectual Soul*, ed. Lauge Nielsen, Trifogli, and Gail Trimble (Oxford, Oxford Unversity Press, 2010).

[286] Nielson, 2000, 45-46 and 54ff.. Nielson dates to the debate to late 1316, IBID., 50. For whether or not Wylton reconstructed Auriol's arguments most directly from written sources, see Nielson (2000), 43.

[287] Neilson, 2000, 76-89, Appendix II ("Determinatio Thomae Wylton contra Petrum Aureolum").

[288] In Nielson's words, "This particular debate moved from focusing on the nature of practical sciences or habits, in contradistinction to what is speculative, to dealing with the nature of relations or relational entities. What prompted this transition was the objection that Auriol's distinction between the practical and the speculative would make these characteristics into essential differences in the first species of quality. This would, however, contradict the position of John Duns Scotus, who had demonstrated that what belongs to the category of relation cannot be constitutive of what belongs to the category of quality. Whether this objection originated with Wylton is not indicated in either Wylton's or Auriol's question. It is clear, however, that Wylton continued this line of reasoning when arguing against Auriol's view of that relationship between what is absolute and what is relative in an entity that, by its nature, is linked to something else." Nielson (2000), 44.

[289] Nielson (2000), 56-57.

Like Wylton, Gerard of Siena's work has attracted more focused interest recently, as scholars have been drawn beyond the orbit of more prolific contemporary figures in the 1310s and 1320s.[290] In Gerard's case, his responses to Auriol on the nature of theology in his *Sentences* commentary provide not only evidence of his own position, but reflect the status of that and other discussions at Paris around 1320. His Prologial questions on the nature of theological knowledge include the certitude of theological truth, the proper end of theological inquiry, subalternation, and the characterization of theology as either a speculative or practical science. Some of these appear distinct from the direct line of questioning Odonis takes, while others in his commentary on Book I run directly parallel.[291]

As Courtenay's question list shows, Gerard of Siena did take up a question on the articles of faith, in which he addressed Auriol's position and presented his opinion against it.[292] Textual

---

[290] *Chartularium Universitatis parisiensis* vol. II, 339, #904. For the most recent overview of Gerard's academic career, see Courtenay, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerard of Siena, O.E.S.A.: Manuscripts and Questions," *Augustiniana* 59 (2009): 247-300. Courtenay updates the profile of Gerard included by Damasus Trapp in his article, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore," *Augustiniana* 6 (1956): 146-274. See also Russ Friedman, "How 'Aegidian' Were Later Augustinian Hermits Regarding the Intellectual Cognition? Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa and the Object of the Intellect," *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at the Papal and Royal Courts: Acts of the XVth Annual Colloquium of the Société International pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, University of Ntore Dame, 8-10 October 2008,* ed. Kent Emery, Jr., William Courtenay, and Stephen Metzger (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 427-478.

Along with an expanded analysis of Gerard of Siena's questions on theology, a fuller revision of this chapter would also look at related sources for another contemporary Augustinian, Dionysius de Burgo, O.E.S.A., who lectured on Book I of the *Sentences* at Paris, October 1317 to January 1318. See Damasus Trapp, "The Quaestiones of Dionysius de Burgo, O.S.A.," *Augustinianum* 3 (1963): 63-78 and Courtenay, "Balliol 63 and Parisian Theology around 1320," *Vivarium* 47 (2009): 375-406, particularly the dating profile on 404.

[291] Most notably overlap in structure and content in Gerard's (Balliol 63) *Sent.* I, Prologue, q. 2, a. 3 "Utrum Deus sub absoluta ratione deitatis sit subiectum in theologia." and Odonis' *Sent.* I, Dist. 1, pars. I, q. 5 "Utrum Deus sit subiectum primum theologiae sub ratione deitatis"; Gerard's q. 3, a. 1 "Utrum articuli fidei sint principia in theologia" and Odonis' Prol. Pars II, q. 2 "Utrum habitus articulorum fidei sit intellectus;" Gerard's q. 3, a. 4 "Utrum theologia possit dici scientia," and Odonis' Prol., Pars II, q. 5 "Utrum doctrina theologica in aliqua sui parte sit scientia proprie."

[292] Prol., Q. 3, article 1: See Courtenay (2009a), especially the codicological study of two variants of this question (pp. 391-396), the full texts of which are included as appendices (pp. 397-406).

variations notwithstanding, from Courtenay's critical study (Appendix II), we find Gerard arguing against Auriol that the articles of faith should not be characterized as *a priori* theological principles to be used in the service of theology as a science in any other vein than a declarative one, meant to strengthen the faith. The articles are, by contrast principles of theological science in Gerard's view, for several reasons. First, the articles of faith are not conclusions reached through other principles, nor can they be proven thorough other *a priori* statements; therefore they *can* be characterized, by contrast as the fundamental principles of the science of theology.[293] Second, the *articuli* contain all truths of the science of theology, and they concurrently circumscribe the boundaries of theological truth, which makes them the principles of theology.[294] Third, principles are the means by which all considerations of any science are regulated and measured to be true or false; the *articuli* are the means by which statements about theology are measured to be in accord with the truth.[295] Fourth, the articles of faith are principles that stand as the ultimate resolutions of theological thought.[296] The arguments Siena offers here can not be characterized as particularly complex or nuanced; they are functional arguments against some of the technical merits of Auriol's position. Siena then offers more idiosyncratic and nuanced means by which the articles can be considered principles, which are true as axioms or premesis, but not opinions.[297]

---

[293] "Non potest autem dici quod articuli sint tales propositiones quod pertineant ad istam scientiam sicut conclusions, quia suppositum est quod non possunt deduci per aliquas alias a priori; nec valet si dicatur quod sufficit eas deduci eet probari a posteriori, quia si hoc sufficeret, tunc principia cuislibet scientie possent dici conclusions, et concusiones etiam principia," IBID., 401.

[294] "sed articuli fidei includunt omnes veritates pertinentes ad theologiam etexcludunt omnes impertinentes; ergo sunt principia ipsius," IBID., 401.

[295] "Illa per que regulator et mensuratur tota consideration alicuius scientie sunt principia in illa scientia; sed tota consideration theologie mensuratur per articulos fidei…Hec autem Omnia veritatem non haberent nisi prefati articuli principia essent in ista scientia." IBID., 401.

[296] "Illa ad que stat ultima resolution totius considerationis theologice sunt principia theologie; artuculi fidei sunt huiusmodo…Relinquitur quod articuli fidei sint principia isstius scientie*."* IBID., 401.

[297] "Concludo ergo quod articuli fidei sint principa theologie et sicut dignitates et sicut suppositions, nullo tamen modo sicut petitiones, nullo tamen modo sicut petitiones." IBID., 404.

Francis of Marchia, O.F.M.

As noted, Francis of Marchia and Odonis held opposing sympathies towards John XXII's interference in the Franciscan poverty crisis, and toward John's exploitation of his authority as pope. [298] With regard to Marchia's participation in the debates on the nature of theology, though, we focus our attention a decade prior to his flight from Avignon with Michael of Cesena, to Marchia's lectures on the *Sentences.* As a Franciscan reading the *Sentences* at Paris in 1319-1320, Marchia entered the conversation on theology slightly after Auriol and between Odonis' first and second set of *Sentences* lectures.[299] Although attention has nearly exclusively been paid to Marchia's work on natural philosophy, his participation in the debate on theology as a science is evident from the responses he garnered from, among others, Gregory of Rimini in the early 1340s.[300]

---

[298] For Odonis and Marchia's interaction with each other in the polemic emerging from John's suppression of the poverty controversy, see Lambertini (2000) and IDEM, "Letters and Politics: Gerald Odonis vs. Francis of Marchia," *Vivarium.* 47 (2009): 364-373. For Marchia's career and works, see especially Russel Friedman and Chris Schabel, eds., *Francis of Marchia, Theologian and Philosopher: A Franciscan at the University of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), as well as their earlier study, "Francis of Marchia's Commentary on the *Sentences*: Question List and State of Research," *Mediaeval Studies* 63 (2001): 31-106. For biographical profiles see also Russell Friedman, "Francis of Marchia," and Schabel (2000). For the recent critical edition of Book II of *Sentences* Commentary, see *Francisci de Marchia: Opera philosophica et theologica, Reportatio IIA (Questiones in secundum librum Sententiarum),* 2 vols., ed. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, William Duba, Emmanuel Babey, and Girard Etzkorn (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008 and 2010). See also *Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius in IV Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Questiones praeambulae et prologus*, ed. Nazareno Mariani (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2003). The body of secondary literature on Francis overwhelmingly focuses on his contributions to natural philosophy. For the secondary literature on the poverty crisis, which includes Marchia's own statement against John XXII, see Ch. II.

[299] Friedman and Schabel (2006), 2. As Friedman and Schabel note, Marchia's knowledge of and frequent attention to Auriol's thought is a factor of Auriol having been regent master (1318-1320) while Marchia was lecturing on the *Sentences*, IBID., 3.

[300] Although not included in my current study, future revisions would give an opportunity to place him in the broader chronology and breadth of the debate. For Gregory's thought in general, see Schabel (2000), 264-274; Francesco Fiorentino, *Gregorio da Rimini: Contingenza, futuro, scienza nel pensiero tardo-medievale* (Roma, Antonianum, 2004); and less recently Damasus Trapp, "Gregory of Rimini: Manuscripts, Editions, and Additions," *Augustiniana* VIII (1958): 425-443; Gordon Leff, *Gregory of Rimini: Tradition*

Francis' *Sentences* Prologue exists in two versions: the extant *Scriptum super primum librum sententiarum* and *Reportatio*.[301] His questions on theology vary in format between the two works; references here are to positions outlined in the *Scriptum.* There he takes up six questions, largely in response to Auriol, focused on the nature of theology as a practical science and its proper object and subject.[302] His mediated position countered Auriol with the argument that faith-obtained knowledge is known *per se*, thus proposing that faith-based knowledge functioned in argument parallel to scientific knowledge in the Thomistic argument. He does not, however, outline as comprehensive of an explanation of how faith *qua* knowledge is apprehended as conversations on propositions' functions. Theological principles are known *per se*, but as elements of faith, not

---

and Innovation in Fourteenth-Century Thought (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1961); Trapp, "New Approaches to Gregory of Rimini," *Augustinianum* 2 (1962): 115-130; *Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, ed. Heiko Oberman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981); and IDEM, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Book-Lore," *Augustiniana* VI (1956): esp. pp. 182-190.

For a survey of Gregory's responses to Francis' interpretation of the articles of faith as self-evident principles and his general rejection of Francis' argument for *theologia* as a science, see Ronald L. Ferguson's study of the Prologue to Gregory's *Sentences* commentary, q. 1,"The Debate over 'Scientific' Theology in the Fourteenth Century: Francis of Marchia and Gregory of Rimini," M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1971, 86-110).

[301] For the manuscript tradition of the *Scriptum*, see Friedman and Schabel, 2001, 40-59; for the list of questions comprising the prologue and commentary, see IBID., 62-73. For the manuscript witnesses of the *Reportatio,* see IBID., 73-106.

[302] Scriptum, Prologue, "q. 1: Quaeritur utrum theologia sit de Deo tamquam de primo subiecto; q. 2: Quaeritur utrum aliqua alia scientia ab ista sit de Deo tamquam de primo subiecto. Et videtur quod non...; q. 3: Quaeritur utrum theologian obis revelata a Deo sit scientia proprie dicta; q. 4: Quaeritur utrum scientia dicatur practica ab operatione elicita intellectus vela b operatione imperata; q. 5: Secundo quaeritur utrum scientia practica et speculative distinguantur per se et primo ex obiecto vel ex fine; q. 6: Quaeritur utrum theologian obis revelata sit practica vel speculative. Et quod practica videtur...qualiter servire Deo debeamus sit sit practica. (IBID., 62-63). In the Reportatio Prologue: q. 1: Utrum ends simpliciter simplex posit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae viatoris; q. 2: Utrum theologia quam habemus de Deo simpliciter simplici nobis hic in via revelata procedat ex principiis per se notis vel tantum creditis; q. 3: Utrum scientia practica dicatur practica ab operatione elicita vel imperata; q. 4: Utrum speculative et practica distinguantur principaliter ex obiecto vel ex fine; q. 5: Utrum practicum et speculativum sint differentiae immediatae; q. 6: Utrum istae sint differentiae essentials vel accidentales; q. 7: Utrum theologia viae sit practica vel speculative. Videtur quod practica...obiecti praxim aliquam sicut illa; q. 8: Utrum theologia sit de De out de primo eius objecto vel subiecto; q. 9: Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae sub ratione absoluta vel relativa; q. 10: Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae sub ratione absoluta essentiali vel attributali; q. 11: Utrum aliqua alia scientia a theologia sit de De out de primo subiecto." IBID., 73-74.

scientific propositions. Rather than offering a rigorous discussion of demonstrative reasoning, he takes rhetorical advantage of the orthodox position that faith is more certain by its nature than knowledge.[303]

Durand de St. Pourçain, O.P.

Like Auriol's rejection of many Scotistic positions, Durandus in his theological works represents an example of nonconformity within his order. His dissent from Thomistic thought in his *Sentences* commentary led to him being forced to edit and rewrite them (his third redaction dates to 1327).[304] Sources describe him having a close relationship with John XXII, which also draws him into comparison with Auriol, as does the strong pull of Augustinean theology that led him to reconsider some of Aquinas' interpretations of theology and what kind of theological knowledge is accessible through human reason.[305]

Durand rejected the view of theology as a science, reflecting his broader inclination to view theology as an instrument of faith rather than intellection. As Stephen Brown has shown, Durand recognized two types of theology posited at that time by his contemporaries: a kind of persuasive theology, inspired by Augustine that defended and clarified the faith, as Auriol supported. The

---

[303] A later, expanded discussion will more deeply outline Marchia's opposition to Auriol on the question of theology as a science.

[304] Odonis was among the theologians present for the investigation and condemnation of Pourçain's work in Avignon in 1333. Langlois, 208.

[305] For Durandus' career and works, see Joseph Koch, "Die Jahre 1312-1317 im Leben des Durandus de Sancto Porciano O. Pr.," *Per la storia della Teologia e della Filosofia* (Rome: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1924); idem, *Durandus of S. Porciano, O.P.: Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14 Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1927); Edward A. Synan, "Sensibility and Science in Medieval Theology: The Witness of Durandus of St. Pourçain and Denis the Carthusian," *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy* (1990), 531-539; and more recently, Russell Friedman, "Durand of St. Pourçain," in *Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge Gracia et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 249-253; Lowe (2003), especially 99-105; Brown (2009); David Piché, "Intuition, Abstration and the Possibility of a Science of God: Durand of St. Pourçain, Gerard of Bologna and William of Ockham," *Philosophical Debates in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. Brown et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 423-431.

second and more popular theology deduced conclusions about the mysteries of the faith from the articles of faith and Scripture.[306] Durandus himself rejected the articles of faith as deductive sources, on the basis that the *viator* cannot simultaneously have both faith in their truths and scientific knowledge of them. Individuals come to believe the articles' truth solely through faith. The articles cannot be proven, demonstrated, or known through reason; in fact, any observable evidence available from nature that would otherwise help to prove them often seems rather to counter their validity or to disprove them.[307]

Odonis' Prologue: Overview

As outlined in Schabel's manuscript survey, Odonis' prologue to Book I follows the *collatio* and is divided into two sections of first ten, and then six questions.[308] His commentary on Book I is comprised of forty-eight distinctions of varying length. Given that the questions he addressed had become standardized by earlier precedent, we must look for evidence of innovation of thought not in his choice of topics, but in his responses and his choice of authorities to cite.

Odonis's commentary shows the same trend of his contemporaries in the early fourteenth century to shift from the structure and content of late thirteenth-century commentaries. It begins immediately with questions on the nature of theology itself. It does not include questions on God, the Trinity, or metaphysical characteristics of either. The nature of theology as an act, discipline,

[306] Brown (2009), 405-406.
[307] "According to Durandus, then, it is clear that when we consider faith concretely in terms of the special material that is spoken of in the articles of the Creed, faith and scientific knowledge cannot exist at the same time in the same person in regard to the same thing, since it cannot be demonstrated to a wayfarer that things are as the article of faith says they are. Neither can it be shown that an article of faith is possible. Finally, arguments brought forth against an article of the faith cannot be refuted demonstratively." Brown (2009), 411. As Brown notes, Durandus went so far in defense of this point as to argue the Apostles, as witnesses to Christ's miracles, themselves accepted the truth of what they experienced through their senses on faith, not the miracles as evidence (412).
[308] Schabel (2004), 132-142. The Madrid ms. contains the Prologue on ff. 1ra-14va.

and a sacred science had themselves become the foci of questions written in fulfilment of theological study.

In the Book I *Prooemium,* Odonis begins with a passage from Augustine explicitly circumscribing the nature and purpose of higher inquiry into matters of faith: Christ is human knowledge and wisdom, and the means through which we are guided through both.[309] From there Odonis delimits three *theologiae* extant by his own time: *magistralis*, *prophetalis*, and *principalis*. Theology *principalis*, the broadest categorization of knowledge among the three, is here defined metaphorically as that which is written into the book of life (*theologia principalis est simpliciter increata scripta in libro vitae*). *Theologia prophetalis* is found written in Scripture, the *libro Bibliae* (*talis autem invisibiliter inspirata scripta in libro Bibliae*). Odonis notes that *theologia magistralis* is written in the book of the Church, "libro ecclesiae," namely his own present work, the *libri Sententiarum* (*…magistralis vero fideliter determinate scripta in libro ecclesiae, scilicet in isto qui dicitur liber sententiarum*).

The knowledge taken from these three books is ordered, according to Odonis, from the masters' dependency on the prophets and theirs in turn on *theologia principalis;* one and the same are disposed eternally *per principalem*, proposed temporally through the prophets, and ultimately explained by the master, or teacher.[310] For this reason, the *Sentences*, as a collection of opinions and teachings, can be interpreted as fulfilling the highest purpose of explanation and clarification

[309] "Scientia nostra Christus est, sapientia quoque nostra idem Christus est. Ipse enim de rebus temporalibus fidem inserit de Scripturis exhibet veritatem per ipsum pergimus ad ipsum, tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam ab uno eodemque Christo non recedimus in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi," a reference to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book XIII, Ch. 19.

[310] "…quia magistralis depdendet essentialiter a prophetali et phrophetalis a principali, quoniam una et eadem disponitur aeternaliter per principalem, proponitur temporaliter per prophetalem, exponitur art ificialiter per magistralem."

(*expositiva et declarativa*).[311] I isolate below four groups of questions within both parts of the Prologue, based on the distinct sub-topics of the debate Odonis is responding to. Of all of these questions, I will focus on four in particular. The preliminary analyses below are part of a larger project to to produce a in-depth synthesis of Odonis' positions, and one that will require expansion of all of the questions in the Prologue and Book I that frame a picture of Odonis and the conversations about theology in the 1310s and 1320s.[312]

Odonis' Prologue Part I: On the Nature of Theology and its Ultimate Purpose

Odonis enters the debate by addressing a set of questions (Prologus, Part I) on the ultimate purpose and object of theology. In the first of these (Prol. I, q. 1) he takes up the question of whether or not God is the ultimate subject, or end of theology.[313] In so doing he confirms that God is the *finis theologiae ultimus simpliciter*, both because his grace is the greatest desireable good (*cuius gratia appetitur ut bonum amabile*) and because God is also the purpose of theology and all of human life (*sciendum quod idem est finis theologiae et totius humane vitae*).

Odonis moves then to the question (Prol., I, q. 2) of whether the ultimate purpose of theology is an activity.[314] Here he defends the position that it can be considered such, on the basis of Lombard's first distinction in Book I of the *Sentences,* that enjoyment, which is a kind of activity, is the highest reward and by consequence an end.[315]

---

[311] "Hius rei gratia liber Sententiarum, in quo sentential aeternaliter disposita et temporaliter proposita, est artificialiter declarata; verissime dici potest quod est interpretation sententiae altissimi, id est expositiva et declarativa."

[312] See Chapter I for discussion of Odonis' general disinclination to cite fourteenth-century contemporaries frequently or explicitly.

[313] Prol. q. 1, "Utrum Deus sit finis theologiae ultimus."

[314] "Utrum finis ultimus theologiae sit operatio."

[315] Lombard, Distinction I, chapters two ("De rebus quibus fruendum est, vel utendum, et de his quae fruuntur et utuntur"*)* and three (*"*Quod sit frui et uti") on the distinction between the activities of enjoying

This leads to Odonis' position in a more specific question (Prol., I, q. 3), whether theological speculation is the ultimate purpose of theology.[316] Here he distinguishes a position closer to that of Auriol's, that theology should lead not to speculation, but to the fear of God and observance of his commandments.[317]

Odonis deepens his support of declarative theology in his next question (Prol., I, q. 4) whether charitable practice is the goal of theology.[318] He affirms that it is, citing I Timothy 1:5, *Caritas de corde puro conscientia bona et fide non ficta.*[319]

Odonis' Prologue Part I: On Whether Theology is a Practical or Speculative Science

Odonis' interest in the Prologue next turns to a set of questions responding to the debate over whether theology could be defined as a practical or speculative science, in which he focuses at length in the first two questions on the suitability of categorizing theology as speculative, practical, logical, or metaphysical. He asks first whether doctrine is fittingly divided between theoretical and practical (Prol. I, q. 5) and argues that not all doctrine is either practical or

---

and using. Here Lombard heavily cites Augustine on this same distinction throughout *De doctrina christiana*, Book I.

316 "Utrum speculatio theologica sit finis theologiae ultimus."

317 "In oppositum arguitur, quia finis sacri eloquii videtur esse timor Dei et observantia mandatorum eius, dicente Salomone, 'Finem loquendi omnes partier audiamus Deum time et mandata eius observa'." Eccl. 12:13, finem loquendi omnes pariter audiamus Deum time et mandata eius observa hoc est enim omnis homo et cuncta quae fiunt adducet Deus in iudicium pro omni errato sive bonum sive malum sit."

318 "Utrum finis theologiae sit praxis caritativa."

319 Timothy 1:3-7, Sicut rogavi te ut remaneres Ephesi cum irem in Macedoniam ut denuntiares quibusdam ne aliter docerent neque intenderent fabulis et genealogiis interminatis quae quaestiones praestant magis quam aedificationem Dei quae est in fide finis autem praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta a quibus quidam aberrantes conversi sunt in vaniloquium volentes esse legis doctores non intellegentes neque quae loquuntur neque de quibus adfirmant."

speculative.[320] He expands on this argument in the following question (Prol. I, q. 6), whether theology is to be adequately divided between speculative and practical.[321]

He next addresses the question (Prol. I, q. 7), whether theology is explicitly speculative.[322] Supporting his defense of practical theology, he argues no. A science which is ordered simply to love (an act of the will) is practical; theology is this kind of science, because the purpose of its law is clearly to love God.[323]

Odonis further targets the speculative nature of theology, addressing the question (Prol. I., q. 8), of whether or not theology can be both a practical and speculative science simultaneously.[324] Odonis argues no, because although it can be argued that speculative sciences are more perfect (to borrow Aristotle's comparison of the two in the *Metaphysics*) and that practical sciences tend towards the greatest good, they remain opposites in purpose and thus cannot *both* be predicated of theology.

His corollary response to the hypothetical question of whether theology is neither a practical nor speculative science follows (Prol. I., q. 9).[325] Against the argument that theology is neither, he argues it must be one of two kinds of knowledge: either speculative theology, on account of the good of the intellect alone, or else knowledge functioning on account of the good of the intellect and the appetite, which would thus be practical, as is clear from the prior question.[326] He sets forth his opinion and addresses his contemporaries' arguments, consolidating them into

---

[320] "Utrum doctrina sit convenienter divisa in theoreticam et practicam."
[321] "Utrum theologia sit sufficienter divisa in speculativam et practicam."
[322] "Utrum theologia sit simpliciter speculative."
[323] "Contra, quia illa scientia est practica quae ordinatur simpliciter ad dilectionem; theologia est huiusmodi, patet quia finis legis dilectio."
[324] "Utrum theologia sit simul practica et speculativa."
[325] "Utrum theologia nec sit practica nec speculativa."
[326] "Oppositum arguitur quia vel theologia est propter bonum solius intellectus et sic practic, ut patet ex praehabitis."

three opinions. First are those who say theology is neither speculative nor practical, but affective, since all *doctrina* ultimately affects and stirs the will to good conduct.[327] Second, he cites the opinion of those who characterize theology as a *scientia amativa*, given that it is exclusively directed towards charity, as taught in Scripture, which no other science is.[328] Third, he recognizes the argument for theology being a *scientia contemplativa,* for those who interpret theology to be directed toward the goal of contemplative spirituality.[329]

Pausing here, we find further evidence of the ambiguity surrounding theology's purpose, rooted in varying interpretations that prioritize theology as an act directed at the self (with the goal of bringing about a change in the will), or at God and neighbor (through *amor* and *caritas*), or at the self as a vessel for intropsective spirituality (distinct from active spirituality meant to shape one's feelings and actions towards others).

Odonis moves back to the question itself and clarifies that he rejects the idea of theology being neither practical nor speculative.[330] All sciences could be considered to exist either for the sake of the consideration of truth, which makes them theoretical in nature (*scientia theorica*), or for the sake of the practice of virtue, which renders them practical (*scientia practica*).[331] They may alternately function for the sake of addressing basic needs, which makes them mechanical in nature (*scientia mechanica*), or be ordered towards knowledge of the truth in the context of logic (*scientia*

---

[327] "Quidam dixerunt quod theologia nec est speculative nec practica, sed affective, quia omnis doctrina voluntatem afficientem et excitans ad bonum exemplis et berbis, est affective, non practica nec speculative, cum haec ad nullam illarum participat."

[328] "Alio modo tenetur quod est scientia amative praecise totaliter pertinens ad amorem, quia omnis scientia cuius finis est caritas et finitor ets amative, non speculative nec practica. Ista patet, quia nulla illarum habet caritatem pro fine ; sed finis theologiae est caritas, ut dicit Apostulus."

[329] "Alio modo tenetur quod theologia est scientia contemplativa quia omnis scientia cuius finis est meditari cum complacentia spirituali est contemplativa."

[330] "Dico quod theologia non est neutra."

[331] "…quoniam omnis scientia vel est propter solam notitiam veritatis et sic est theorica vel amplius propter operationem virtutis appetitus et sic est practica."

logica).[332] Odonis rejects the possible distinctions between *scientia mechanica* and *logica,* and insists instead on a dichotomy of *speculativa* or *practica.*[333]

His response takes the form of a continued clarification of his definition of the key terms and their relationships to each other, with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that theology is a practical science. He holds all *scientia practica* to be affective in nature, since it provokes and moves individuals toward the pursuit of the good and the avoidance of evil.[334] Likewise, *amativa,* since friendship refers to behaviour, and to the work of virtue or excellence of character, and for faithfully loving those who must be loved, all of which characteristics render *scientia amativa* practical in nature."[335] Odonis continues, noting that *scientia contemplativa,* if understood in Augustine's terms in *De civitate Dei* (Book VIII, ch. 4), would still not imply neither a speculative or practical nature, but instead a speculative science. But if we take the contemplative life, which is devoted to governing the interior actions of the will and ceasing external action, the practice elicited is purely a practice, and as Odonis continues to argue as evidence for his interpretation, practical. [336]

Odonis then addresses two potential doubts to his argument. The first asked whether *theologia* of God and of the blessed would be neither speculative nor practical by nature, or whether it would fall under a different classification; it would not be seen to be speculative, since

---

[332] "…vel amplius propter adeptionem humane necessitates et sic est mechanica…vel propter efficacem traditionem scientiarum ordinatarum ad summam veritatem."
[333] "Constat autem quod non est mchanica nec logica quare est speculative vel practica."
[334] "Dico quoud omnis scientia practica est affective, hoc est affectum et appetitum provocans et excitans ad bonum prosequendum et ad malum fugiendum."
[335] "Item est amative, quoniam amicitia ad mores pertinent et ad opus virtutis est bene et fideliter amare ea quae Amanda sunt maxime propter honestum et hoc pertinent maxime ad practicam."
[336] "Si vero sit contemplative modo quo Augustinus sumit contemplativam VIII *De civitate Dei* cap. 4 non erit neutra immo determinate speculativa. Si vero sumatur contemplativa quae vacat actionibus interioribus voluntatis et cessat ab exterioribus non minus erit practica non minus erit practica quia ut ostensum est supra praxis elicita est pure praxis…"

it would pertain not to seeking knowledge, but to the more self-defined condition of being the blessed.[337] Likewise, it would not be seen to be a *scientia practica*, through which the appetites could be lead astray, which the divine appetites are not capable of doing.[338] The second potential objection depends on whether *theologia contingentium* would be neither speculative nor practical in nature.[339] All practical or speculative concepts are of either principles or conclusions, but *theologia contengentium* is neither of principles or conclusions.[340]

Odonis dismisses both objections, pointing out that *theologia* is of God himself. Through this course of argument he argues it must now be clear that only human sciences (sciences related to human activity) differ according to the categorizations raised earlier, but even in reference to the divine world.[341]

Odonis completes his argument for theology as a practical science with a final question (Prol. I., q. 10), asking whether theology is explicitly and absolutely practical.[342] He first poses the negative argument that no purely practical science deals with unchanging, separated substances such as divine persons and angels.[343] Against this position he restates his argument that theology,

---

[337] "An theologia Dei et beatorum sit neutra an cadat sub aliqua differentia, quia non videtur esse speculativa quia non est propter solum scire sed maxime propter beatum esse."
[338] "Item non videtur practica quia practica dirigit appetitum potentem errare sed divinus appetitus non potest errare."
[339] "…an theologia contingentium sit neutrum."
[340] "…videtur pro eo quod omnis notita practica vel speculative est principiorum vel conclusionum, set theologia contingentium nec principiorum nec conclusionum."
[341] "…nonsolum humana scientia differ per practicum speculativum metaphysicum et logicum sed etiam in tota sui communitate accepta."
[342] "Utrum theologia sit simpliciter practica."
[343] "…nulla doctrina simpliciter practica tractat de substantiis separatis et immobilibus VI Metaphysicae sed theologia tractat de talibus puta de personis divinis et angelis…"

taken generally, has the practice of charity for its end, as proved in the fourth question above (*Utrum finis theologiae sit praxis caritativa*).[344]

Odonis' Prologue Part II: On What Form Doctrine Takes

In the second part of the Prologue, Odonis turns to a discussion of what metaphysical form sacred doctrine takes, throughout six questions.[345] He first asks, fundamentally, (Prol. II, q. 1) whether theology in any of its parts is a function of the intellective faculty.[346] He raises one potential negative argument, rooted first in language from the *Posterior Analytics*, Book II, and the *Ethics*, Book VI, that the intellect is that faculty through which we know our selves and things that can be known *per se* (self-evidently). He then cites Augustine (*De civ.* Bk. XI, ch. 3) on the belief that the intellect comprehends only those matters of which the human mind is capable of knowing, such as self-evident propositions.[347] To counter both of these authorities in this context, he cites a statement of Moses in Deuteronomy 4:6, that the statutes and judgments given to Israel should be followed and observed carefully, to show other nations the people of Israel's wisdom (*sapientia*) and understanding (*intellectus*).[348]

---

[344] "Oppositum arguitur quod theologia tota universaliter habiet praxim caritatvam pro fine ut supra visum est quaestione quarta."

[345] "Quaesito de fine quaerendum est de forma doctrinae divinitus inspirate misericorditer spiritu veritatis. De forma igitur inquirenda sunt sex. Primum utrum doctrina theologica in aliqua sui parte sit intellectus. Secundum utrum habitus articulorum fidei sit intellectus. Tertium utrum fides possit esse in eodem et de eodem cum scientia. Quartum utrum opinio cum scientia. Quintum utrum doctrina theologica in aliqua suit parte sit proprie scientie. Sextum utrum sit sapientia."

[346] "Utrum theologia in aliqua sui parte sit intellectus."

[347] "De primo arguitur quod doctrina theological in nulla parte sui sit intellectus quia intellectus est de rebus quas per nos nosse idonei sumus cum intellectus sit de rebus per se notis II Posteriorum et VI Ethicorum. Sed doctrina theolgoica non est de talibus secundum Augustinum XI *De civitate Dei* cap. 3 quare doctrina theologica nullo modo est intellectus."

[348] Deuteronomy 4:5-8, Scitis quod docuerim vos praecepta atque iustitias sicut mandavit mihi Dominus Deus meus sic facietis ea in terra quam possessuri estis et observabitis et implebitis opere haec est enim vestra sapientia et intellectus coram populis ut audientes universa praecepta haec dicant en populus sapiens et intellegens gens magna nec est alia natio tam grandis quae habeat deos adpropinquantes sibi sicut Dominus Deus noster adest cunctis obsecrationibus nostris quae est enim alia gens sic inclita ut habeat

Key here is Odonis' manipulation of the term *intellectus* (*haec est nostra sapientia et intellectus coram populis*) as evidence that Scripture gives explicit evidence of doctrinal truths (in this case the commandments to the Hebrews) being characterized as *knowledge* to be understood through the faculty of the intellect. His broader purpose here and throughout the rest of his response to this question is to provide a means of arguing the possibility of some self-evident theological knowledge in this life.

Odonis outlines his approach to the question, and notes that he will begin with a discrete discussion of his understanding of the intellect, which he defines in the following terms: the habit of immediately truthful propositions (*est habitus annunciativus propositionis immediate veridicus*). The intellect's purpose is to make propositions and concepts clear, and as noted in Book I of the *Perihermeneas* that all habits that function as either affirming or negating are by their nature making something known clearly (*annunciativus*).[349] The intellect is thus seen to function in this way, since it is the means by which (and the power through which) the *anima* is capable of confirming and denying truths.[350] Odonis then draws further on Aristotle's descriptions of the process and limits of demonstration, in the I and II *Posteriorum* and the *Ethics,* Book VI, but most strongly from I *Posteriorum.*

What follows throughout the rest of the question is a discussion delimiting what kind of things can be *per se nota* and the ways in which they are known, in reference to the limits of human

caerimonias iustaque iudicia et universam legem quam ego proponam hodie ante oculos vestroset observabitis et implebitis opere.

[349] "Quod enim sit annunciativus patet, quia omnis habitus affirmativus vel nagativus est annunciativus, I *Perihermeneas,* sed intellectus."

[350] "…sed intellectus est huiusmodi quoniam anima eo affirmat et negat, ut VI *Ethicorum* cap. 4." Book VI, chapters 3-6 include Aristotle's discussion of the means through which the soul can posses truths, through the powers of affirmation and denial available through art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive reason.

cognition generally and in specific reference to theological knowledge. Pulling back from his response to this question (and looking ahead to his later response to the question of whether or not theology should properly be called a science, in the second part of his Prologue, q. five), we can see Odonis here building his personalized response to the broader debate, although without particularly idiosyncratic intellectual steps. He navigates through a conservative position that contrasts knowledge of theological truths and principles that can be known by the *viator* through reasoning and intellection of propositions to reach true conclusions, or through divine aid, with those that can be immediately recognized as true. Near the conclusion to the question, he distills a main tenet of this argument: not all common mental concepts are of the intellect, because some mental concepts are known from principles. But some things are common conceptions of the mind known from the conclusions of principles, known by all as common habit or known syllogistically.[351]

By the time he concludes the question, Odonis has established that theology, in some parts, is most properly understood to be a function of the intellect. All teaching or doctrine having propositions *per se notas et immediatas* is intellected, either in full or in part, and he has shown theological doctrine to be of this kind.[352] He makes reference to two statements from Scripture, both *per se nota*: *Ego sum qui sum* (*Exodus* 3:14) and *Deus est* (*Hebraeos.* 11:6).[353] The Scriptural

[351] "Ad ultimum dico quod non omnis communis animi conceptio est intellectus, quia sunt quaedam communes animi conceptiones de principiis. Sic sunt quaedam communes animi conceptiones de conclusionibus sicut enim quaedam principa sunt communiter nota sic etiam quedam conclusiones sunt notae communiter apud amones. Et hoc potest fieri vel ex consuetine ve ex quodam syllgismo imperceptibili."

[352] "…dico quod theologia in aliqua sui parte est propriissime intellectus. Quod probo quia omnis doctrina habens propositiones per se notas et immediatas est intellectus vel in toto vel in parte ut patet ex praemissis, sed theologica doctrina est huiusmodi." Aliae enim sunt immediatae et immediatione causali communiter, ista « spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas » id est cogitatus domini super res fabricandas. Item ista '*declinandus est a malo*' et ista ' *faciendus est bonum*' et multae consimiles."

[353] "…assumptum patet quia ista esset per se nota, *Ego sum qui sum* Exod. 3 :14 et ista *Deus est* Hebr 11 :6."

statement that God exists, the most fundamental statement of faith, is accepted by the *viator* and known to be true immediately, without need of demonstration. Other truths are known *immediatae et immediatione causali communiter,* that is to say inferred from truths known immediately, such as the statement from Genesis 1:2, *spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas.*[354] Aristotle's definition of scientific knowledge specifies that causes can be understood, and thus known, through their effects. In this example Odonis similarly shows that God's state-of-hoveringness is known by reflecting back from the truth of his having created the world, and the *per se nota* truth of his existence itself. The faculty of the intellect allows the *viator* a means of reasoning towards a tangential truth.

Odonis then further summarizes his position on what theological knowledge can be known and that by which the *viator* is by no means capable of knowing in the same way. Theological knowledge is of the kind known to individuals on their own account with respect to some things, but not all. Odonis here cites the examples of past and future contingents, which cannot be known.[355] Likewise, some things are true immediately, that is true *de voluntate divina,* which we cannot otherwise know ourselves.

Having just argued for the possibility of some self-evidently known precepts of theological doctrine, Odonis then asks whether the habit of the articles of faith (*articuli fidei*) is intellective (whether the habit develops within the faculty of the intellect) (Prol. II, q. 2).[356] This question,

[354] "Aliae enim sunt immediatae et immediatione causali communiter: ista *spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas* id eest cogitates domini super res fabricandas."
[355] "Per hoc ad principalem obiectionem dicendum quod doctrina theologica est de talibus rebus quas nosse per nos ipsos nequaquam idonei sumus, quantum ad aliqua, non quantum ad omnia quia historica vel future contingentia per nos ipsos nosse non possumus."
[356] "Utrum habitus articulorum fidei sit intellectus*."*

and its ramifications for Odonis' understanding and categorization of the articles of faith, the habit of faith, and how best to characterize thelogical knowledge, bears a fuller exposition.[357]

Developing out of the previous question, he begins considering the position that the habit of the articles of faith, meaning the habit developed within each *viator* through which the articles were considered and known, would arise within the intellect, since the habit of principles is intellective. *Secundum aliquos,* as Odonis notes, the *articuli* are metaphysical first principles.[358] This clear reference to the Thomistic position identifies this question as one of the most significant within the Prologue, and within Odonis' broader opposition to an interpretation of the articles as principles in service to theological study when viewed as a deductive process. In succinct opposition to this position, Odonis points out the habit of conclusions is not, by contrast, intellective, citing the *Posteriorum,* Book II. The *articuli,* which he characterizes here as conclusions of doctrine, are proven through the Scriptures, other holy books, and the reasoning of scholars. His purpose is clear: to defend the articles as conclusions drawn from Scripture, not first principles from which other theological truths are drawn. In response to the question then, the articles of faith are necessarily *not* governed by a habit of the intellect.[359] In other words, the intellect does not bring the *viator* to immediate understanding of the articles as it would first principles in other subjects of thought. The articles of faith are recognized as true statements, but through an act of faith, not reasoning. Odonis' general desire here to defend the freedom of the

[357] A future expansion of this chapter will include deeper exposition of the sub-arguments in q. 2 to supplement those brought forth here.
[358] "…arguitur quod habitus articulorum fidei sit intellectus quoniam habitus principiorum est intellectus sed articuli secundum aliquos sunt principia metaphysica.″
[359] "Sed oppositum arguitur quia habitus conclusionum non est intellectus, II *Posteriorum* sed articuli sunt conclusiones huius doctrinae, quod apparet quia probantur per scripturas et per libros sanctorum et per rationes doctorum, quare eorum habitus non est intellectus."

faculty of the will, but more specifically the habit of faith, sets his argument in line with Auriol and others in the tradition of declarative theology.

Odonis proceeds by elaborating on the position defended by others. According to some, the articles of faith are, as noted, *principia theologiae,* which are said to be seven principles relating to the divine nature and seven pertaining to Christ's humanity.[360] He recites here Aquinas' enumeration of fourteen articles (*Summa* II:II, q. 1, a. 8), concerning the unity of the Godhead, the three natures of the Trinity, the grace and glory of God, and the events of the life of Christ, namely the Incarnation, Nativity, Passion, descent into hell, the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the advent of a day of judgment.

What others posit to be true of the articles based on this enumeration is this: the articles are necessary and evident principles (*primo et principaliter necessaria et evidentia sunt principia*), tied to the habit of theology (*sic in habitu theologico primo et principaliter credita sunt*). No science can have its principles and conclusions understood (*cognoscuntur*) through the same habit; according to Aristotle's distinction between the habit of the intellect and the habit of *scientia* in the *Posteriorum,* Book II, the first is the habit of principles and the second of conclusions.

Odonis next begins to lay forth the opinion he believes to be truer, that the articles thus described are not theological principles, the reason (hinging on the most basic tenet of Aristotle's

[360] "Est ergo sciendum de primo quod aliqui voluerunt dicere articulos esse principia theologia quos dicunt ita esse distinctos ut septem participant ad divinitatem et septem ad Christi humanitatem. Dicunt etiam quod primus ad diviniatatem pertinens est de unitate dei, et alii tres de trinitate dei et alii tres de tribus effectibus dicitur de creatione naturae, alius de collatione gratiae et tertius de collatione gloriae et secundum hoc formant septem propositiones tamquam septem articulos fidei quae sunt illae, Deus est unus, Deus est pater, Deus est filius, Deus est Spiritus Sanctus, Deus est creator naturae, Deus est collator gratiae, Deus est donator gloriae. Primus articulus ad humanitatem pertinens est de incarnatione, secundus est de nativitate, tertius de passione et morte, quartus de descensu ad inferos, quintus de resurrectione ex mortuis, sextus de ascensione in caelum, septimus de adventu ad iudicium."

understanding of deductive reasoning) being that no science can *prove* its own first principles.[361] Odonis cites evidence of the fact that the *articuli fidei* are in fact *proven,* which renders them conclusions, not principles. The authority by whom he choses to establish this fact is as, if not more significant than the specific textual evidence he leans on here.

> The articles of faith are *proven* through Sacred Scripture (*per scripturam sacram probantur articuli*), as stated by John XXII in a decretal that begins *Cum inter nonnullos,* for the articles are not principles of doctrine contained in divine Scripture.[362]

Odonis emphasizes here the articles' distinction from any kind of knowledge that can be accepted as first principles, and recasts them instead as knowledge synthesized from Scripture. It is interesting that he structures this argument around an ecclesiastical text, the bull *Cum inter nonnullos* (1323), but more to the point suprising that he rests his argument on a doctrinal promulgation from John XXII: in fact, the same papal directive by which John declared the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty to be unproven by Scripture, and thus heretical.

As noted in Chapter Two above, *Cum inter* was the most decisive blow John XXII dealt against the Franciscans in his efforts to quell the poverty controversy. Given, as also noted, that John XXII later elevated Odonis to the position of Minister General as the immediate successor to Michael of Cesena, the choice to cite a text that so heavily established John's authority over the order and equally over a disputed tenet of doctrine, we should see his choice as unsurprising, but

---

[361] "Nunc secundo sciendum quod est alia opinio, quam reputo veriorem dicens quod articuli supra dicti non sunt principa theologiae cuius ratio est quia per nullam doctrinam potest scientia aliqua probare sua principia."

[362] "...sed per scripturam sacram probantur articuli, ut dicit dominus ioannes papa XXII in quadam decreteali quae incipit Cum inter nonnullos, quia articuli non sunt principia doctrinae in scripturis divinis contentae."

certainly atypical and potentially contentious. The section of *Cum inter nonnullos* that makes brief reference to the articles of faith does not define them, clarify them, or acknowledge them to have been the subject of great debate among theologians. Thus we cannot understand Odonis' use of it to be have been exclusively necessary for building his argument. Like any of his contemporaries, Odonis had access to the full corpus of doctrinal discussions dating to the early church fathers. His frequent dependence on Augustine's works elsewhere in the Prologue indicates Odonis deliberately selected John's bull because of the brief reference John made to the articles of faith. That reference itself requires further examination.

Chapter Two introduced *Cum inter* and set it within the broader context of the Franciscans' tension with John XXII, including the crisis that his condemnation of the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty created. Whatever personal response Odonis may have had toward John's decision in the bull, and however closely dependent he was on John later for administrative advancement within the order, we cannot say he chose to manipulate *Cum inter* in his Prologue for either arbitrary or purely personal reasons.[363] We know this because the use he makes of it in Question 2 two fits seamlessly within his broader argument.

Odonis writes, *dicendum quod articuli fidei probantur non per philosophiam, sed per sacram scripturam, ut probatum est supra auctoritate domini papae*. The specific statement he refers to from the bull is this (in bold):

> *Cum inter nonnullos viros scholasticos saepe contingat in dubium revocari, utrum pertinaciter affirmare, Redemptorem nostrum ac Dominum Iesum Christum eiusque Apostolos in speciali non habuisse aliqua, nec in communi etiam,*

[363] If we assume Odonis' Paris lectures to have taken place 1327-1328 (see above), they were among his last academic excercises before becoming Minister General in 1329.

> *haereticum sit censendum, diversa et adversa etiam sentientibus circa illud: nos, huic concertationi finem imponere cupientes, assertionem huiusmodi pertinacem, quum scripturae sacrae, quae in plerisque locis ipsos nonnulla habuisse asserit, contradicat expresse,* ***ipsamque scripturam sacram, per quam utique fidei orthodoxae probantur articuli*** *quoad praemissa fermentum aperte supponat continere mendacii, ac per consequens, quantum in ea est, eius in totum fidem evacuans, fidem catholicam reddat, eius probationem adimens, dubiam et incertam, deinceps erroneam fore censendam et haereticam, de fratrum nostrorum consilio hoc perpetuo declaramus edicto.*[364]

Distinct from Chapter Two, our interest here is not in John's interpretation of Scriptural references to Christ and the Apostles' use or ownership of physical goods, but rather John's emphasis on Scripture as the authority *by which* individuals can have certitude of theological truths. Christ and the Apostles are shown to have owned items that they wore and carried with them. The faithful know this from sacred Scripture, the same authoritative source through which they have *per se* knowledge and understanding of the *articuli fidei* themselves. John's foremost motive in the bull was to elevate the interpretation of Apostolic Poverty from the human level to the divine. By his reading of Scripture, both the legal and doctrinal matters should be considered settled, in light of the incontrovertible and immutable truth of Scripture, in which John argues Christ and the Apostles are described as owning goods. In the context of theology as either a deductive or declarative pursuit, though, John simultaneously sets up the articles of faith as an example of intuitively known *a priori* truths. Christ and the Apostles' ownership of goods is known

[364] See Chapter Two ("Apostolic Poverty") for an English translation of *Cum inter.*

with certainty because of the descriptions found in Scripture, the same Scripture through which the articles of orthodox faith are known to be true with certainty and without need of complex analysis or explanation. Although the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty is not mentioned in the creed, and was not implied by any of the articles, because Scripture is that authority *though which* the articles of faith, the fundamental premises and tenets of orthodox belief, are taken and legitimized, any other references in Scripture should be understood to be stated with the same authority as the articles of faith.

The *articuli fidei* function here as statements that *legitimize the doctrinal authority of Scripture itself.* Although principles drawn from Scripture, in John's use here, they lend their own authority to Scripture. John and his advisors would have known how the articles of faith had come to be used in discussions over the nature of theology since the late thirteenth century; their status as authorative statements of the faith did not vary from one side of the debate over Thomistic interpretations of theology to the other. Scholars in the theological communities at both Oxford and Paris, including Franciscan students and masters, would not have had reason to question or criticize his allusion to the articles as evidence of Scriptural authority, regardless of their criticism of his lack of theological training and the polemical nature of *Cum inter* itself.

As a reflection of the influence of John's Dominican advisors in Avignon, the bull does draw attention to the precedent set by Aquinas and others of *deriving doctrinal truth from Scripture.* John XXII *derives* the doctrinal truth that Christ and the Apostles cannot really be described as *not* owning the things they carry and use; just as the faithful know the articles of faith to be true from Scripture, they likewise also know Christ and the apostles did not *not* own things. An element of irony, or at least incongruity on Odonis' part bears mention here. In the process of denying that the *articles of faith* are *a priori* first principles that can, along Aristotelian lines, be

studied to lead to new truths, he cites a statement in which a pope seems to be establishing a new doctrinal truth from Scripture, based on evidence (or principles) found elsewhere in Scripture. We can at a minimum take Odonis' choice to use and manipulate *Cum inter* in this question as a reminder of the ambiguous way in which the articles of faith and their status as doctrinal truths were used by the 1320s, both within the universities and beyond.

To return to Odonis' Prologial argument about the articles of faith, his defense of a position consistent with Auriol's characterization of declarative theology continues. The *articuli fidei* are conclusions set forth by the Church for the simple, in other words for the common *viator,* as distinguished from scholars of theology, who cannot sufficiently comprehend the points and principles of theology. It suffices them instead to hear and confess those propositions contained in summaries. Just as the Decalogue was a product (or by-product) of broader doctrine, and just as precepts or commandments are considered moral conclusions of natural law, the simple articles of preaching can be called conclusions in the doctrine of faith.[365]

Here Odonis views the articles as lessons of complex doctrine presented in Scripture that have been condensed for believers to take in and digest on a simpler level. They were conclusions already reached, not first principles of theology to be grappled with to see what further knowledge could be wrung from them. His commentary here supports the position throughout his Prologue that theology was affective in function, and meant to strengthen faith, not set it up as an intellectual pursuit.

---

[365] "…dicendum quod articuli sunt conclusiones per ecclesiam elicitae coram simplicibus proponendae qui non possent apices et principia theologiae sufficienter intelligere, et sufficit eis istas propositiones audire et confiteri in quibus summarie continetur effectus doctrinae reditorum, sicut in decem mandatis continetur effectus doctrinae agendorum et sicut praecepta seu mandata sunt conclusiones morales iuris naturalis non prima, sic articului simplicibus praedicandi possunt dici conclusiones in doctrina fidei."

Odonis next addresses the question of whether faith can be one and the same as knowledge (Prol. II., q. 3).[366] This response is key to Odonis' simultaneous defense of the act of faith and his refutation of theology as a science. It is also key to understanding an otherwise seeming inconsistency in his work that some theological truths can be known intellectively (above) but theology is restricted solely to a declarative function, not an inductive path to further truths. Odonis first cites the negative position that they cannot be, as we know that the faith held as a *viator* will be displaced by clear vision. Odonis counters with the argument that they can be the same, leaning on Augustine's discussion of the distinct Scriptural definitions of wisdom and knowledge in *De Trinitate* Book XIV, Chapter One.[367] Augustine therein notes that knowledge in this sense refers to "those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, stregthened." Odonis follows with a similar argument (Prol. II., q. 4), that opinion and knowledge can likewise be the same.[368]

His next question (Prol. II., q. 5) leads him into a critical discussion of the question at the heart of the broader debate over the nature of theology: whether theological doctrine should properly be called *scientia*.[369] He addresses the possible argument that it cannot be, since all scientific knowledge is of things known by natural illumination, meaning the ability of the *viator* to understand through the intellective faculties available in this life. Theological knowledge, by contrast, requiries divine illumination to understand the mysteries of the faith fully.

---

[366] "Utrum fides posit esse in eodem et de eodem cum scientia."
[367] "Sed oppositum arguitur quia gignens et genitum, nutriens et nutritum, defendens et defensatum, roberans et roboratum stant simul sed fides et scientia sic se habent quod ex theologia fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defeditur et roboratur, secundum Augustinum XIV *De Trinitate* cap. 1."
[368] "Utrum opinion et scientia stent simul."
[369] "Utrum theologia sit scientia proprie dicta."

Odonis rejects this assumption, in a lengthy response that brings him into discussion of illuminated knowledge and ultimately the definition of *scientia.* His deepest interest is in arguing that some theological knowledge can be known by natural illumination (*aliqua vero theologica possunt esse nota lumine naturali*), although certain of it solely by the light of faith (*quaedam autem solo lumine fidei*), and some simultaneously both ways. But those things that are known *scientifice* are, properly speaking, known by that ability which is itself *scientia.*

Odonis follows this discussion with the question of whether theology is wisdom (Prol. II., q. 6).[370] His response here affirming that it is so complements his foregoing effort to contrast his view of theological knowledge against the declarative tradition. We find a brief survey defining *sapientia,* followed by a lengthy synthesization of wisdom in the *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* with Scriptural references.

Odonis' Prologue Part II: On the Proper Object and Subject of Theology

We turn then to the first part of the first Distinction of Book I. Odonis here addresses questions that cumulatively investigate the nature of theology's proper object and subject matter. The first question (Bk. I, Dist. 1, q. 1) addresses whether or not the substance, object, and subject of theology are one and the same.[371] His preliminary response is negative. In support of his argument he outlines brief definitions and descriptions of these terms, drawing on their distinct meanings in Aristotle's original definitions in the context of scientific knowledge in the *Physica* and *Metaphysicae,* ultimately citing the authority of Augustine, Cassiodorus, and Hugh of St. Victor on the distinctions existing among material, subject, and object.[372] Odonis next takes up the

[370] "Utrum theologia sapientia sit."
[371] "Utrum materia obiectum et subiectum theologiae sint idem."
[372] "…dicendum cum doctoribus antiquis, scilicet Augustinus, Cassiodorus *Super Psalmos,* et Hugone de Sancto Victore qui omnes differentiam assignant inter materiam, subiectum et obiectum."

lengthy question of whether the conception of an object (*ratio obiecti*) is a cause of knowledge (Bk. I, Dist. 1, q. 2).[373] He argues the negative position, and offers the preliminary example that God has knowledge (*scientia*) but independently, not by or from objects (meaning God has no need of the presence of an object to bring about the intellect's knowledge of it, or to induce the habit of knowledge). This question tangentially connects to contemporary discussions of the possibility or impossibility of intuitive cognition of non-present objects. Limiting intuitive cognition to physical, present objects of reference inherently precluded intuitive knowledge of God before the Beatific Vision, before individuals came into the direct presence of the divine.[374]

In Bk. I Dist. 1 q. 4, Odonis addresses whether God is the first subject of theology.[375] He responds in the affirmative; since God is the subject of the articles of faith, he is the proper subject of theology as well.[376] At its outset he clarifies this fact would be true for those who conceived of the articles as first principles, since God would be their subject, as well as those who viewed them instead as theological conclusions, for which God would also be the subject.[377] Odonis then examines whether or not God is the subject of theology by reason of his divinity (Bk. I, Dist. 1, q. 5), to which he responds affirmatively.[378]

A final question of strong relevance to the broader debate in the Prologue material comes in the first question of the second distinction (Dist. 2, a. 1), asking whether all theological truths

---

[373] "Utrum ratio objecti sit causa scientia."
[374] For Durandus and others on this issue, see Piché (2009).
[375] "Utrum Deus sit subiectum primum theologiae."
[376] "Quia Deus est subiectum articulorum fidei, ut patet considideranti, ergo et theologiae."
[377] "Quia Deus eest subiectum articulorum fidei ut patet consideranti ergo et theologiae. Consequentia tenet quia idem est subiectum utriusque sive articuli sint principia theologiae, secundum quod aliqui dicunt quia idem est subiectum scientiae et principiorum eius sive conclusiones theologiae quia idem est subiectum scientiae et conclusionum eius."
[378] "Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae sub ratione deitatis;" "…quia Deus videtur esse subiectum ini theologia secundum illam rationem per quam denominantur, omnia theologica ut considerantur in theologia sed ratio deitatis est huiusmodi."

can be known by man through natural reason.[379] Odonis rejects the underlying premise, which necessarily sets up a lengthy discourse on the distinction between knowledge gained with or without benefit of divine aid.

[379] "Utrum omnens theologicae veritates per hominem possint naturali ratione cognosci."

Conclusion: Odonis's Contributions to the Debate on the Nature of Theology

The turn towards introspective discussions about the nature and purpose of theology in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth-centuries pulled in a plurality of voices, many known to contemporaries and modern scholars alike for their positions on other topics, unrelated to the formula of theological questions that appeared in their Prologues to *Sentences* commentaries. Those topics included questions on logic and natural philosophy, some of which attracted more study than the Prologial material has. This bias in the modern scholarship should by no means be interepreted to suggest the Prologue and Book I questions on *theologia* were less sophisticated or relevant material than debates found in Books II, III, and IV. The intellectual dynamism associated with the central and late medieval periods has perhaps nowhere been more succinctly described than this statement of Marie-Dominique Chenu:

> "The place of the masters in the church became increasingly difficult to determine as they organized theology into a science with its own rules, constructed within the faith and its premises to be sure, but according to criteria stemming from the intelligible nature of the subjects they were examining, and not according to the needs and opportunities of pastoral responsibility or of subjective, pious intentions. There would now necessarily be "theological" errors, whereas hitherto the term heresy simply denoted any lapses from orthodox faith."[380]

The task of defining *theologia*, both as a body of knowledge and a pursuit, elicited complex arguments built around delicate manipulations of key terms, both from Aristotle's original

[380] M.D. Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science,'" in *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968), 276.

vocabulary for the discussions of science and knowledge, and from the body of Scriptural and patristic sources. Odonis' interest in these Prologial questions is not itself extraordinary, but rather a reminder that *Sentences* Prologues by the 1310s and 1320s had come to be focused around questions on the nature of theology. Exposition of Odonis' text does, however, reveal his Odonis participation in the debate, and doing so also reflects the state of the discussion at the time. We find the fourteenth-century debate shaped by, and responding to, the legacies of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines, among others.

Significance for the Fourteenth-Century Discussions of Theology's Nature and Purpose

It has been my current purpose to shed more light on Odonis' treatment of what form doctrine takes, specifically in the first two questions he addressed in the second part of his Prologue to Book I. We benefit in particular from determining how and where in these responses Odonis aligned himself with Auriol and other contemporaries associated with the tradition of declarative theology. These questions likewise reveal Odonis' response to the concerns Peter Auriol and others had raised about the potential habit engendered by theology as a science in Aristotelian and Thomistic terms.

Odonis's Prologue reveals him defending what I characterize here as an idiosyncratically conservative understanding of theology's purpose. Theology is a science for Odonis, but practical, not speculative. Questions 5 through 10 in the first part of the Prologue show him siding strongly with Auriol on theology being purely practical in purpose, which gives us ground to argue for Odonis upholding the spirit of the declarative tradition, if through unique sub-argumentation. Odonis supported a view of the articles of faith as lessons of complex doctrine presented in Scripture that had been condensed for believers to take in and digest on a simpler level. They were conclusions set forth by the Church for the simple, namely those in the laity who could not

sufficiently comprehend complex theological arguments. It sufficed for them to hear doctrinal propositions as quips and summaries They were conclusions already reached, not first principles of theology to be acting as access points to further knowledge of the mysteries of the faith. Throughout the Prologue, theology is characterized as affective: a body of knowledge and an activity meant to strengthen the faith of the *viator*, not prepare it for intellectual pursuit.

The Prologue and select questions from Book One reveal what I would further characterize as a moderate Franciscan position in the broader debate. Odonis upholds an Augustinian understanding of the limits of human understanding and analysis of revealed truths, again with idiosyncrasies. We find him more akin in these texts to those who took distinctive positions on the issue, including Durandus and Auriol, rather than those early fourteenth-century figures we associate with a stricter polarity of positions taken in response to Aquinas' characterization of theology as a sicence. Odonis did not explicitly reject theology as a science, but did maneuver within Thomistic framework to clarify the limits of theological knowledge available without divine aid, and to defend the autonomy of the habit of faith.

Significance for the Nature of Doctrinal Authority

Research on Odonis within the last decade has established him as not only a highly individualized and provocative thinker, but also one for whom the academic and social contexts of his work were perhaps less strictly differentiated than for his contemporaries. Odonis' support for John XXII in the Franciscan poverty crisis and in the Beatific Vision debate, and his own controversial tenure as Minister General mired him concomitantly in ecclesiastical, administrative, and theological conflict. His contribution to the Beatific Vision debate perhaps most explicitly

showed an unconventional overlap between theological argument, social context, and personal viewpoint.

If we can say with certainty that these academic discussions of theology give evidence of any broader phenomenon that bridged them to the world outside of the university, it would arguably be ambiguity over theological and doctrinal authority. Theological disputes over Apostolic Poverty, for example, were both symptomatic of ambiguity over doctrinal authority; the conflict both contributed to this ambiguity and took advantage of it. As we saw, *Cum inter nonnullos,* issued by John XXII in his capacity as pope, not a theologian, condemned the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty as heretical. Several voices in the historiography of the Franciscan poverty crisis have suggested that John saw himself as merely clarifying a point of doctrine and remedying a legal liability. Given the reality, however, that John effectively commissioned this doctrinal position and issued it as pope, it now attained legitimacy and authority in a canonical sense. Trained as a canonist, John arguably realized the advantage of his position, which is why he resolved to clarify the collective socio-economic, legal, and spiritual aspects of the Franciscans' ideal of poverty by simply declaring the ideal heretical. John was not a theologian, but in this context he acted with an institutional authority theologians lacked. Work remains to be done in framing the poverty controversy itself as the most overt point of crisis in late medieval tension and ambiguity over claims to doctrinal authority among the papacy, canonists, bishops, non-university theologians, and secular and mendicant theologians at the universities.

It is clear, however, that further studies should adopt Odonis as a filter for sifting evidence for these tensions. Although we should not draw a direct connection between his support for John XXII's position against the Franciscans and theological opinions produced in an academic context, I would argue that certain late-thirteenth and early fourteenth-century touch points suggest

analogues between theoretical discussion of theology and in practical application. I would include foremost among them the Franciscan poverty crisis and the corollary debate over the doctrine of Apostolic Poverty and debates about usury and just prices.

To recall Odonis' work in his Prologial question (Prol. I, q. 9) on whether theology should be considered neither a practical nor speculative science, we find direct access to the contested claims about theology's purpose. To reemphasize an earlier point, we must approach abstract *Sentential* discussions of theology as simultaneously active and formative moments, in which figures like Odonis practiced theology through the very act of debating it. That broader context of equivocal purpose better prepares modern readers for investigating the ambuigity surrounding the articles of faith specifically. I would argue that Odonis' Prologue shows evidence of the *articuli* functioning not only as an explicitly enumerated body of faith statements, but as a category of theological certainty that could be applied to other statements of faith to determine their verity.

If the poverty controversy not only revealed but shaped ambiguity over who could define or redefine points of doctrine, an expanded study of the nature of doctrinal authority should look more closely at the relationship between canonists and theologians, points of contention and friction, and dialogue between them in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. This expansion would focus especially on the canonists' discussions of the nature of theology (including theology as a science). Bringing to light divides among canonists themselves over how best to understand papal pronouncements and whether to categorize them as law would complement a deeper study of doctrinal authority as understood by theologians.[381]

[381] Takashi Shogimen has examined tensions between the academic discplines of theology and canon law within this period, with a broader view to claims of greater doctrinal authority and expertise between the two in the context of emerging arguments for and against papal and monarchical authority after the conflicts between Philip IV and Boniface VIII, Louis of Bavaria and John XXII, and the poverty crisis. See "The Relationship between Theology and Canon Law: Another Context of Political Thought in the Early

Significance for Future Work On The Articles Of Faith

What began as an interest in Odonis as a charismatic figure within Franciscan history, and a contemporary of Auriol, led to a textual analysis of several questions in his Prologue. That study itself has led to a desire to look more closely at the tradition of the articles of faith and how they functioned as doctrinal constructs, from their origins in Jewish doctrine through to the late fifteenth-century shift that marks a distinction between the late medieval and early modern discussions on theology at the unversity of Paris. The field has not seen a dedicated study of the *articles* since Joseph Goering's survey, and not yet one that extended into the early fourteenth century. A distinct gap in the scholarship exists from the Thomistic and Scotistic period until Jean Calvin's revision of the concept and content of the articles from the medieval Church's tradition. That interruption is problematic. As we have seen, references to the articles of faith, and to the doctrinal authority derived from them, appear frequently within broader discussions in Paris on

---

Fourteenth Century," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999): 417-431; and IDEM, *Ockham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Cf. Tierney, "Ockham and the Franciscans," in his work *The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150-1625* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 93-103.

Within a study of the legal and theological views of sex within marriage, James Gordley provides a general comparison of the canonists and theologians with regard to their methods of investigation, and paints the relationship between the two authorities as more symbiotic than competing: "…the important difference was not in their methods themselves. When they asked the same questions, they usually encountered similar difficulties and found similar ways of resolving them, so much so that one can scarely distinguish canon law from theology. When differences arose, the reason, most often, was that they asked different questions. The canonists were more interested in finding rules, the theologians in explaining them. The canonists asked which actions were sinful. The theologians were concerned with why they were sinful. When there was little dispute as to the appropriate rule, the theologians simply asked more questions than the canonists. When the rule itself was in doubt, the canonists' effort to determine the appropriate rule helped the the theologians by suggesting conclusions that the thoelogians could borrow and use." See Gordley's "*Ardor querens intellectum: Sex Within Marriage According to the Canon Lawyers and Theologians of the 12th and 13th Centuries*," *Zeitshrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschicte (kanonistische Abteilung)* 114 (1997): 307.

the nature and subject of theology. Although we have gained clarity through recent textual studies, we have yet to establish certainty of contemporaries' understanding and use of them. Aquinas' interests in them were as the first principles he needed to apply a framework of Aristotelian deductive reasoning to doctrine. The list he presented in the *Summa* was distilled from vague generalizations from the Patristic period through the age of monastic theology, nearly up to his own generation. We can observe a shift over this period from initial ambiguity over what the content of the articles of faith should be to ambiguity in fourteenth-century theological, doctrinal, ecclesiastical, papal, and canonical contexts for their authority.

We may ask in closing whether by the late medieval period the articles of faith had completed a cycle of ambiguity distilled into clarity, but then emerging again as a generalized reference. To answer, yes and no. By my interpretation, John XXII and Odonis manipulated them to function as categories of Scriptural, and thus doctrinal, and for John, even papal authority. I hope to have shed light on the complexity surrounding what otherwise may appear passing references in questions on the nature of theology as a science. I also hope to have shown that as authorative doctrinal statements, the articles had come to function in medieval theological debates distinct from the content they codified.

Bibliography

Manuscripts

Odonis, Gerardus, *In I Senteniarum* Valencia, Biblioteca de la Catedral, Ms 139.

In Primum Librum Sententiarum, Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 65.

Secondary Sources

Anglade, Marie-Pascal, O.F.M., "Sur la patrie de Fr. Gérard Odonis, Ministre Général," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* VI (1913): 392-396.

Bakker, Paul J.J.M., "Guiral Ot et le movement autour de la question *De motu* conserve dans le manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca nacional, 4229," *Early Science and Medicine* 8 (2003): 298-319.

Brooke, Rosalind. *Early Franciscan Government: Elias to Bonaventure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

Brown, Stephen F.. "Gerard Odon's "De Suppositionibus," *Franciscan Studies* 35 (1975): 5-44.

Steven Brown. "Declarative Theology after Durandus: Its Re-presentation and Defense by Peter Aureoli." *Philosophical Debates in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. Brown et al. Leiden: Brill, 2009, 401-422.

-- "*Duo candelabra parisiensia*: Prosper of Reggio in Emilia's Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study." *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte*, ed. Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001.

David Burr. *The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.

Courtenay, William. "Balliol 63 and Parisian Theology around 1320," *Vivarium* 47 (2009a): 375-406.

Courtenay, "The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerard of Siena, O.E.S.A.: Manuscripts and Questions," *Augustiniana* 59 (2009b): 247-300

Michael F. Cusato, "Talking About Ourselves: The Shift in Franciscan Writing from Hagiography to History (1235-1247)" *Franciscan Studies* 58 (2000): 37-75.

de Rijk, L.M.. "Works by Gerald Ot (*Gerardus Odonis*) on Logic, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy Rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 68. 1993: 173-193.

de Rijk, L.M.. "Guiral Ott (Giraldus Odonis) O.F.M. (1273-1349): His View of Statemental Being in his Commentary on the *Sentences*," in *Vestigia, imagines, verba, semiotics, and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIIth-XIVth Century),* ed. Constantino Marmo. Turnhout: Brepols, 1997a, 355-369.

de Rijk, L.M. ed.. Guiraldus *Odonis O.F.M., Opera philosophica. Volume One: Logica. Critical Edition from the Manuscripts.* Leiden: Brill, 1997b.

de Rijk, L.M.. "Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M. on the Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Proper Nature of Demonstration." *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1994-97): 51-67.

de Rijk, L.M., ed.. *Opera philosophica. Volume Two: De Intentionibus. Critical Edition with a Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350.* Leiden: Brill, 2005.

Dumont, S.J.. *La Téologie comme Science chez les Scolastiques du Treizième Siècle*. Louvain: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1962.

Dykmans, Marc. *Les sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique*. Rome: Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1973.

Erickson, Carroly. "The Fourteenth-Century Franciscans and Their Critics: II. Poverty, Jurisdiction, and Internal Change." Franciscan *Studies* (1976): 108-147.

Friedman, Russell and Chris Schabel. "The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in the 1320s: Ms. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Palatinus 1439." *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 63 (1996): 357-372.

Friedman, Russell and Chris Schabel. *Francis of Marchia, Theologian and Philosopher: A Franciscan at the University of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century.* Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Gaybba, B.P.. *Aspects of the Medieval History of Theology: Twelfth to Fourteenth Centuries.* Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1988.

Gál, Gedeon, O.F.M.. "Geraldus Odonis on the Univocity of the Concept of Being." *Franciscan Studies* 52 (1992): 23-51.

Gál, Gedeon, O.F.M., and David Flood, O.F.M., eds.. *Nicolaus Minorita: Chronica. Documentation on Pope John XXII, Michael of Cesena and the Poverty of Christ with Summaries in English.* St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1996.

Golubovich, Girolamo, ed.. *Biblioteca biobibliografica della Terra Santa e dell' Oriente franciscano,* vol. IV. Quaracchi, 1923.

Hankinson, R.J.. "Philosophy of Science" *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 109-139.

Huber, Raphael M.. *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order (1182-1517).* Milwaukee Nowiny Publishing Apostolate, Inc., 1944.

Kaye, Joel. *Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kent, Bonnie. *Aristotle and the Fransiscans: Gerard Odonis' Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics.* PhD. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1984.

Kretzman, Norman, ed.. *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Lambert, Malcolm. "The Franciscan Crisis under John XXII." *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972): 123-143.

Lambert, Malcolm. *Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order, 1210-1323.* London: S.P.C.K., 1961.

Langholm, Odd. *Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979.

--"Economic Freedom in Scholastic Thought." *History of Political Economy* 14 (1982): 260-283.

-- *Wealth and Money in the Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983.

-- *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350.* Leiden: Brill, 1992.

--*The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Langlois, Charles-Victor. "Guiral Ot (Geraldus Odonis)." *Histoire littéraire de la France.* Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1927, 203-225.

Livesey, Steven J.. "Gerardus Odonis, Minister Generalis, O.F.M., Patriarch of Antioch ca. 1285-1349." *International Encyclopaedia for the Middle Ages—Online Supplement to LexMA-Online* (2007).

Lohr, Charles. “Gerardus Odonis O.F.M., in “Medieval Latin Commentaries, Authors G-I.” *Traditio* XXIV (1968): 149-246.

Lowe, Elizabeth. *The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain.* New York: Routledge, 2003.

Miethke, Jürgen. “Political Theory and the Fourteenth-Century University.” in *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University*, ed. John Van Engen. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000, 257-277.

Moorman, John R. H.. *A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origins to the Year 1517.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Mruk, Antonius M., S.I.. “Singularis opinio Gerardi Odonis O.F.M. circa naturam divortii in casu adulterii.” *Gregorianum* 41 (1960): 273-283.

Lauge O. Nielsen, “The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue,” *Vivarium* 38 (2001): 35-98.

Nimmo, Duncan. “Poverty and Politics: The Motivation of Fourteenth-Century Franciscan Reform in Italy.” *Studies in Church History* XV (1978): 61-178.

Joseph Owens, “Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience,” in *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy.* Ed. Norman Kretzman, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 440-459.

Patrick Nold. *Pope John XXII and his Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.

Porter, Camarin M.. “Gerardus Odonis' Commentary on Aristotle’s *Ethics*: a Discussion of the Manuscripts and General Survey.” *Vivarium* 47:2-3 (2009): 241-294.

Schabel, Chris. “The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M.” *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 46 (2004): 115-161.

Schabel, Chris. “Landulph Caracciolo and Gerard Odonis on Predestination: Opposite Attitudes toward Scotus and Auriol.” *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 65 (2002a): 62-81.

--“’Non aliter novit facienda quam facto.’ Gerard Odonis’ Questions on Divine Foreknowledge.” *Chemins de la pensée médiévale: Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza,* ed. Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Emmanuel Faye, and Christophe Grellard. Turnhout: Brepols, 2002b. __

Schneyer, Johannes, ed.. *Reportorium der Lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters 1150-1350* 43. Münster: Aschendorff, 1969: 178-179.

Speer, Andreas. “Bonaventure.” *A Companion to Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, 233-240.

Stegmüller, Friedrich. *Repertorium Biblicum* II, n. 2466-2472. 1940, 339-40.

Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentarium in Sententias Petri Lombardi* I. Würzburg: Schöning, 1947.

Teetaert, Amadeus. “Guiral Ot.” *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*. Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1932, 1658-1663.

Todeschini, Giacomo. "Franciscan Economics and Jews in the Middle Ages: From a Theological to an Economic Lexicon." *Friars and Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, ed. Susan E. Myers and Steven J. McMichael. Leiden: Brill, 2004, 99-117.

Turley, Thomas. “John XXII and the Franciscans: A Reappraisal.” *Popes, Teachers and Canon Law in the Middle Ages,* ed. James R. Sweeney and Stanley Chodorow. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1989, 74-88.

Olga Weijers. “Giraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot), [*ca.* 1285-1349],” *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: texts et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500*) Volume 3. Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, 79-83.

Wilmart, André. “Le Grand Poème Bonaventurien sur les sept Paroles du Christ en Croix.” *Revue Bénédictine* 47 (1935): 250-55.

Zoubov, Vassili P.. “Walter Catton, Gérard d’Odon et Nicolas Bonet.” *Physis* I (1959): 261-278.