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Foreign Relations of the United States

1951

Volume II

THE UNITED NATIONS; THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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Foreign Relations of the United States 1951

Volume II

The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere

Editors
Fredrick Aandahl, Editor-in-Chief
Ralph R. Goodwin
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Harriet D. Schwar

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PREFACE

Fredrick Aandahl supervised the planning, compilation, and review of this volume. William Z. Slany succeeded him as editor in 1975 and directed the process of declassification and final review. Ralph R. Goodwin assisted in planning and supervision.

Mr. Goodwin prepared the documentation concerning the United Nations; N. Stephen Kane prepared the documentation on the American Republics; and Harriet D. Schwar prepared the documentation relating to Canada. David H. Stauffer arranged for the declassification of the documents, and Ruth M. Worthing and Evans Gerakas provided editorial and technical assistance.

The editors acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided by the staffs of the Harry S. Truman Library and the United States Mission to the United Nations, which helped in locating various documents and facilitated their declassification and publication. Thanks are also due to those foreign governments that kindly granted permission for publication of certain of their documents in this volume.

The technical editing of this volume was the responsibility of the Publishing and Reproduction Division (Paul Washington, Chief). The Index was prepared by Francis C. Prescott.

DAVID F. TRASK
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORDS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all docu-

ments needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletion without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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Department of State

A/MS Files, Lot 54 D 291

Consolidated administrative files of the Department of State for the years 1940–1960, as maintained by the Management Staff of the Bureau of Administration. (180 ft.)

ARA/REA Files, Lot 57 D 597

Files relating to the mutual security program for the period 1951–1956, as retired by the Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs. (Less than 1 ft.)

Caracas Embassy Files, Lot 64 F 14

Top secret central files of the Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, for the period 1948–1956, which are part of Federal Records Center Accession 63 A 5159.

CFM Files, Lot M 88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conference of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancilliary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. (254 ft.)

International Trade Files, Lot 57 D 284

Comprehensive collection of files on commercial trade policy, the question of an international trade organization, and the negotiation, conclusion, and operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, assembled and maintained in various economic offices of the Department of State during the years 1934–1956. (125 ft.)

IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official UN documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the UN Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and *ad hoc* committees for the period from 1946 to date. (More than 100 ft.)

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443

Top secret records relating to the activities of the International Security Affairs Committee for the period February–October 1951, including action summaries, memoranda of meetings, minutes, and other papers, as maintained in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (2 ft.)

L/UNA Files

Files retained by the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.

L/UNA Files, Lot 62 D 205

Working files of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, 1945–1949. (2 ft.)

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953. (6 ft.)

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137

Master file of documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State. (15 ft.)

OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665

Basic collection of records of meetings of the Organization of American States, other major inter-American governmental organizations, and inter-American conferences together with related subject files for the years 1939–1962, as maintained in the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs. (173 ft.)

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Subject files of the Office of Dependent Areas concerning trusteeship and dependent territory matters for the years 1946–1958. (4 ft.)

ODA Files, Lot 62 D 228

Subject files of the Director of the Office of Dependent Areas for the years 1943–1961. (4 ft.)

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff. (32 ft.)

Rio de Janeiro Embassy Files, Lot 61 F 30

Classified and unclassified central files of the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for the period 1950–1955, which are part of Federal Records Center Accession 61 A 473.

Sandifer Files, Lot 55 D 429

Files of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs Durward V. Sandifer for the years 1944–1953. (4 ft.)

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of States' daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. (Less than 1 ft.)

Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444

Comprehensive chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda, memoranda of conversation, and memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (15 ft.)

S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26 and Lot 52–51

Files of the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, containing material for the years 1949–1951. These lot files, and related lots 52–19, 52–24, and 52–40, are part of Federal Records Center Accession 62 A 613. They include documentation on the operations of International Security Affairs (S/ISA) and the interdepartmental International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC) during 1950–1951; material on program development and implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1949–1951; and documentation on planning directed toward the establishment of the Mutual Security Program for 1951. The material includes subject and chronological files, and records of various departmental and interdepartmental committees concerned with military assistance and foreign aid during the 1949–1951 period. (128 ft.)

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial files of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff. (17 ft.)

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250

Master file of records, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 ft.)

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs for the years 1946–1957. (3 ft.)

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to date.

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

A–, airgram
A/MS, Management Staff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
AD, Acción Democrática, a Venezuelan political party
AEC–CCA, Atomic Energy Commission–Commission for Conventional Armaments Committee (United Nations)
AF, Office of African Affairs, Department of State
AFL (AF of L), American Federation of Labor
Agri Att, Agricultural Attaché
AID, Agency (Act) for International Development
AJIL, American Journal of International Law
Amb, Ambassador
AP, Associated Press
APRA, *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, a Peruvian political party
AR, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/E, Economic and Finance Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/I, Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
AREA, *Aerovias Ecuatorianas, S.A.*, an Ecuadoran airline
AV, Aviation Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State
BA, Buenos Aires
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
CA, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
CAA, Civil Aeronautics Administration
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CADE, *Compañía Argentina de Electricidad* (Argentine Electrical Company), in Buenos Aires
Carburo, *Fabrica Nacional de Carburo y Metalurgica, S.A.*, a Chilean ferromanganese plant
CAS, controlled American source
CAVE, *Compañía Aerea Viajes Expresos*, a Venezuelan airline
CAVN, *Compañía Anonima Venezolana de Navegación* (Venezuelan Navigation Company)
CCA, United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments
CCTA, *Commission de Cooperation Technique en Afrique* (Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara), World Health Organization
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
C.F.R., Code of Federal Regulations
CFRS, Committee on Foreign Requirements and Supplies
CGT, *Confederación General del Trabajo* (General Confederation of Labor), in Argentina
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, Caribbean
CIO, Congress of Industrial Organizations
circ agam (circagam), circular airgram

CMA, *Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, S.A.*, a Mexican airline
CMC, Collective Measures Committee, United Nations
CNUS, *Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical* (National Committee for Trade Union Unity), in Guatemala
COAS, Council of the Organization of American States
COAS/OC, Council of the Organization of American States, Office of the Chairman
CON, Office of Consular Affairs, Department of State
COPEC, *Compañía de Petroleos de Chile*, a subsidiary of *Corporación Fomento de la Producción*, a government-owned corporation established in 1939 for Chilean development
CP, Commercial Policy Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State
CPC, Combined Policy Committee
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRI, Committee for Reciprocity Information
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office (British)
CSAV, *Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores* (South American Steamship Company), in Chile
CTAL, *Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina* (Confederation of Latin American Workers)
CTC, *Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia* (Confederation of Workers of Colombia)
CTE, *Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador* (Confederation of Workers of Ecuador
CTG, *Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (Confederation of Workers of Guatemala)
C.U.T., *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (Committee for Togolese Unity)
CZ, Canal Zone
D, member of the Democratic Party in the United States
DE (D–E), destroyer escort
del, delegate; delegation
Depcirgram, Department of State circular airgram
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Depgam, Department of State airgram
Dept, Department (usually the Department of State)
Deptel, Department of State telegram
D.O., Defense Order
DOD, Department of Defense
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
DPA, Defense Production Administration
DRA, Division of Research for American Republics, Department of State
DSDel, Department of State Delegation
E, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EAS, Executive Agreement Series
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ED, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
Emb, Embassy
Embdesp, Embassy despatch
EmbOff, Embassy officer
Embtel (Emtel), Embassy telegram
ENDESA, *Empresa Nacional de Electricidad*, a subsidiary of *Corporación de Fomento de la Producción*, a government-owned corporation established in 1939 for Chilean development
ER, Economic Resources and Security Staff, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State
ERP, European Recovery Program
ESA, Economic Stabilization Agency

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Eximbank, Export-Import Bank of Washington
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization
FASG, Foreign Aid Steering Group
FBPC, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
FCED, Friendship, Commerce, and Economic Development (treaty)
FCN, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (treaty)
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far Eastern
FEA, Foreign Economic Administration
FO, Foreign Office
FOI, Freedom of Information
FonAffs, Foreign Affairs
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
Fon Off Secy, Foreign Office Secretary
FPRY, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
FSG, *Federación Sindical de Guatemala* (Guatemalan Trade Union Federation)
FWG, Final Working Group
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Deputy Under Secretary of State
G–3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the divisional or higher level
G–4, Army general staff section dealing with supply at the divisional or higher level
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
GADel, Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GER, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
GSC, General Staff Corps, United States Army
HICOG, United States High Commissioner for Germany
H.J. Res., House of Representatives Joint Resolution
H.R., designation for legislation introduced in the House of Representatives
HR, human rights
IAD, Division of Acquisition and Distribution, Department of State
IADB, Inter-American Defense Board
IA–ECOSOC (IAECOSOC), Inter-American Economic and Social Council
IAM, Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States
IATA, International Air Transport Association
IBEC, International Basic Economy Corporation
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IC, Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IDAB, International Development Advisory Board
IIAA, Institute of Inter-American Affairs
ILC, International Law Commission of the United Nations General Assembly
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMC, International Materials Conference
IMCO, International Maritime Consultative Organization
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IPM Min, designation for records of the meetings with Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi on his visit to Washington in September 1951

IRCA, International Railways of Central America
IRO, International Refugee Organization
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State
ISAC, International Security Affairs Committee
ITO, International Trade Organization
ITP, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State
IT&T (ITT), International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
JBUSDB (JBUS Def Bd), Joint Brazil–United States Defense Board
JBUSDC, Joint Brazil–United States Defense Commission
JBUSMC, Joint Brazil–United States Military Commission
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/A, Assistant Legal Adviser for Administration and Foreign Service, Department of State
L/ARA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
L/C, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims, Department of State
L/E, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State
L/T, Office of the Assistant for Treaty Affairs in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/UNA, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LADels, Latin American Delegations at the United Nations General Assembly
LAV, *Línea Aeropostal Venezolana*, a government-owned Venezuelan airline
LN, League of Nations
LRPG, Long Range Proving Ground
LST, landing ship, tank
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MCDN, *Movimiento Cívico Democrática Nacional*, an Ecuadoran political party
MFN, most favored nation
MID, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State
MinFin, Minister of Finance
MDAA, Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MINMET, *Minerales y Metales, S.A.*, an Argentine mining company
MNR, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), Bolivian political party
MPAA, Motion Picture Association of America
MPR, Mongolian People's Republic
MSA, Mutual Security Agency; Mutual Security Act (of 1951)
mytel, my telegram
NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
NAC, National Avisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
NARBA, North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NFTC, National Foreign Trade Council
NGO, nongovernmental organization(s)
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NKs, North Koreans
NME, National Military Establishment
NNG, Netherlands-New Guinea
NSA, National Shipping Authority
NSC, National Security Council

NWC, Office of North and West Coast Affairs, Department of State
NZ, New Zealand
OAR, other American Republics
OAS, Organization of American States
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OFD, Office of Financial Development Policy, Department of State
OFMA, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
OIT, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
OMA, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
OOF, Office of Operating Facilities
ORIT, *Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers)
OSA, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization
PAU, Pan American Union
PED, Petroleum Policy Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
Pemex, *Petróleos Mexicanos, S. A.*, a Mexican Government agency responsible for management of the Mexican petroleum industry
PJBD, Permanent Joint Board on Defense
P.L., Public Law
POC, Peace Observation Commission
PRC, People's Republic of China
PriMin, Prime Minister
PRP, *Partido Revolucionario Proletario* (Revolutionary Proletarian Party) Venezuelan political party
R, member of the Republican Party in the United States
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
reDeptel, regarding Department of State telegram
reEmbtel, regarding Embassy telegram
reftel, reference telegram
remytel, regarding my telegram
reurtel, regarding your telegram
RFC, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
ROK, Republic of Korea
R.S., Revised Statutes
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SA, Saudi Arabia
SA, Union of South Africa
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SAMF, *Sindicato de Acción y Mejoramiento de los Ferrocarrileros* (Railwaymen's Action and Improvement Union), Guatemalan labor union
SAPA, South African Press Agency
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCC, Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation
SD, Shipping Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State
Sec Gen, Secretary-General
SG, Steering Group
SHADA, *Société Haitiano-Americaine de Dévelopment Agricole* (Haitian-American Society for Agricultural Development)
S.J. Res., Senate Joint Resolution
SOAFR, Union of South Africa
Sobramil, *Sociedade Brasiliera de Mineração, Ltda.*, a Brazilian mining company
Sominar, *Sociedad Minera, S.A.*, an American-owned mining company in Argentina
S.R., Senate Report
STICA, *Servicio Técnico Interamericano de Cooperación Agrícola* (Inter-American Technical Service for Agricultural Cooperation)

SWA (SWAFR), South West Africa
SY, Division of Security, Department of State
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
TA, technical assistance
TAC, Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements
TC, Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State
Tcdel, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations Trusteeship Council
TF, Task Force
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
TO&E, Table of Organization and Equipment
UFCO, United Fruit Company
UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation
UKUN, United Kingdom Mission at the United Nations
UM, designation for documentation circulated in the Under Secretary of State's meetings; Under Secretary's meeting
UN, United Nations
UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UND, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
UNDel, Delegation to the United Nations
UNE, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNI, Division of International Administration, Department of State
UNKRA, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
UNLC, United Nations Liaison Committee, Department of State
UNO, United Nations Organization
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
UNSCOB, United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UNSYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
UP, United Press
UPU, Universal Postal Union
urinfo, your information
urtel, your telegram
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDel, United States Delegation
USES, United States Employment Service
USGADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USRep, United States Representative
UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*
USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations
UTC, *Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia* (Union of Workers of Colombia)
VD, Visa Division, Department of State
WCF, Working Capital Fund (United Nations)
WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; Western European
Weeka, weekly, inter-agency, summary analysis from United States diplomatic missions
WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions
WHO, World Health Organization
WIDF, Women's International Democratic Federation
WPC, World Peace Conference
XMB, Export-Import Bank of Washington
YPFB, *Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos*, a Bolivian Government petroleum agency

THE UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL UNITED STATES–UNITED NATIONS RELATIONS

I. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SETTING[1]

Editorial Note

The same statute that makes provision for United States participation in the United Nations (Public Law 264, December 20, 1945, 59 Stat. 619, as amended) provides also that the President of the United States report to the Congress of the United States on an annual basis regarding such participation. For the year 1951 this report was published as *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951* (Department of State Publication 4583, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952, 320 pages). This short yet comprehensive historical account is one of two convenient official sources of information for an overview of the entire spectrum of United States–United Nations relations in the year 1951.

The Department of State *Bulletin*, issued on a weekly basis, is the other source. In 1951 the *Bulletin* contained a useful weekly feature, "The United States in the United Nations." The *Bulletin* also printed the texts of statements, speeches, and articles by officials at the highest levels in regard to the conduct of United States foreign policy at the United Nations. Among these to be noted for the year 1951 are:

(1) "The United States Faces Aggression", address by Ernest A. Gross, Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations, Washington, D.C., December 29, 1950 (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 8, 1951, page 57);

(2) "Analysis of Soviet Performance in the United Nations", address also by Gross, New York, N.Y., February 17, 1951 (*ibid.*, March 5, 1951, page 390);

(3) "The Phony 'Peace' Offensive: Soviet Charges Against the United Nations", address by John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, Milwaukee, Wis., April 27, 1951 (*ibid.*, May 7, 1951, page 731);

(4) "Can the U.N. Become a Collective Security Organization?", article by Harding F. Bancroft, Deputy United States Representative

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1 ff.

on the Collective Measures Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 14, 1951, page 771);

(5) "U.N. Action on Collective Security: What it Means to Americans", address by Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1951 (*ibid.*, May 14, 1951, page 775);

(6) "The United Nations and the United States—July 1951", address by Deputy United States Representative Gross, Charlottesville, Va., July 11, 1951 (*ibid.*, July 30, 1951, page 183);

(7) "U.S. Participation in the United Nations", a Message of the President to the Congress (transmitting annual report for 1950), July 26, 1951 (*ibid*, August 13, 1951, page 262);

(8) "International Unity Against Shifting Soviet Tactics: U.N. Actions Against Causes of War", address by Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations, New York, N.Y., August 27, 1951 (*ibid.*, September 10, 1951, page 425);

(9) "Good Faith Among Nations Needed to Achieve U.N. Goals", General Debate Statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Paris, France, November 8, 1951 (*ibid.*, November 19, 1951, page 803).

As set forth in the statements, etc., cited above, the general effort of United States policy at the United Nations in 1951 was to formulate an identity of United States and United Nations principles in the establishment of a peaceful world. The specific thrust of United States policy was to organize a collective security system to resist aggression and to counteract spurious Soviet peace propaganda at the United Nations. More often than not, the war in Korea was the occasion for these official United States pronouncements. President Truman on July 26, 1951 described the United States record at the United Nations as one "of decision and action in the face of danger and, at the same time, a record of increasing efforts to promote human progress."

United States Representation in the United Nations System, 1951 [1]

Missions

Mission at the Headquarters of the United Nations

The United States is represented by a permanent mission at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. Under the direction of the representative of the United States to the United Nations, the mission carries out the instructions of the President, as transmitted by the Secretary of State, in United Nations bodies at the headquarters of the United Nations. It also serves as the channel of communication

[1] Source text is from *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951* (Department of State Publication 4583, Washington, 1952), pp. 316–323.

between the Department of State and the United Nations organs, agencies, and commissions at the headquarters and the delegations of other nations to the United Nations located in New York. It is a base of operations for the United States delegation to the General Assembly when the Assembly meets in New York.

The structure, organization, and functions of the United States mission to the United Nations have been determined in the main by the following factors:

1. The requirements of the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly in particular.
2. The provisions of the United Nations Participation Act as amended by Public Law 341 of the Eighty-first Congress.
3. Executive Order 10108, which superseded Executive Order 9844.
4. Location of the headquarters of the United Nations in the United States and the consequent need for the United States to assume the responsibilities of "host government."
5. The fact that the United States, in consequence of its leadership role in the United Nations, is represented on all organs and virtually all commissions and committees of the United Nations.

The chief of the mission is the United States representative to the United Nations, who, by statute, is the United States representative in the Security Council. He is assisted by a deputy representative of the United States to the United Nations, who, by statute, is deputy United States representative in the Security Council. There is also a second deputy representative in the Security Council. Other principal officers of the mission are the United States representatives on the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council.

During 1951 the chief of the mission served, with the assistance of deputies, as United States representative in the Atomic Energy Commission, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and in the following Committees of the General Assembly: The Interim Committee, the Collective Measures Committee, and the Committee on Additional Measures. The Disarmament Commission, established under a General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, supersedes the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The United States representative and a deputy representative have been designated to serve on this Commission.

The main source of policy guidance and strategical direction for the conduct of the United States participation in the United Nations is necessarily the Department of State. The mission, however, has a staff consisting of a small number of advisers and a secretariat under a secretary-general and a deputy secretary-general. The advisers assist the United States representative in (1) planning the tactical pursuit of United States policy objectives in the light of the political and

parliamentary situations in United Nations organs and bodies; (2) consultation, negotiation, and liaison with other delegations and the United Nations Secretariat. The secretariat of the mission assists the United States representative in (1) the coordination of the above activities; (2) the provision of necessary research, reference, reporting, and communications services; (3) the discharge of the responsibilities of the United States as "host government," in particular those arising from the headquarters agreement between the United States and the United Nations (Public Law 357, 80th Cong.) and the International Organizations Immunities Act (Public Law 291, 79th Cong.), which deal *inter alia* with relations of the United Nations, its officials, and delegation members with Federal, State, and local authorities; and (4) the administration and management of the United States mission.

Other United States Missions

In addition to the United States mission to the United Nations during 1951 the United States maintained several special missions in order to participate effectively in the work of certain bodies of the United Nations which did not have headquarters in the United States.

During 1951 a permanent resident delegation to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe was maintained at Geneva. It worked with the Commission and its committees in efforts to readjust the production and distribution of coal, electric power, lumber, steel, and other commodities for the purpose of assisting the economic reconstruction of Europe. United States representatives were also sent to the meetings of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the Economic Commission for Latin America.

Special missions also were maintained during 1951 to make possible effective participation in the work of certain field missions and specialized agencies of the United Nations. United States representatives served, for example, with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (until April 1951), the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the United Nations Council for Libya. The work of these bodies is described in the text of this report.

During 1951 there was at Geneva a United States representative for specialized agency affairs, charged with maintaining liaison for the United States with the International Refugee Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization, as well as with various other United Nations bodies in Europe. A special United States mission, the office of the United States representative

to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization, was maintained at Montreal. Liaison was also maintained with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) through a counselor on UNESCO affairs stationed at the American Embassy at Paris.

United States Representatives to the United Nations, Its Organs, Subsidiary Bodies, and the Specialized Agencies

United States representative and chief of United States mission to the United Nations
Warren R. Austin
Deputy United States representative
Ernest A. Gross

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Sixth Regular Session, Paris, November 6, 1951

Representatives
Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State, Chairman of Delegation
Warren R. Austin
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Congressman Mike J. Mansfield
Congressman John M. Vorys
Philip C. Jessup*
Alternate representatives
Benjamin V. Cohen
John Sherman Cooper
Ernest A. Gross†
Miss Anna Lord Strauss
Channing H. Tobias

Interim Committee of the General Assembly

Representative
Warren R. Austin
Deputy representatives
Charles P. Noyes (resigned April 8, 1951)
James N. Hyde
William O. Hall (appointed January 11, 1952)

Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories

Representative
Benjamin O. Gerig

*Mr. Jessup served as a representative in the absence of the Secretary of State. [Footnote in the source text.]

† Mr. Gross served as an alternate representative in the absence of the Secretary of State. [Footnote in the source text.]

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Representative
Warren R. Austin
Deputy representatives
Ernest A. Gross
John C. Ross

UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)

Representative
Warren R. Austin
Acting deputy representative
John C. Ross

COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS (CCA)

Representative
Warren R. Austin
Deputy representative
Frank C. Nash

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

(superseded AEC and CCA January 11, 1952)

Representative
Warren R. Austin
Deputy representative
Benjamin V. Cohen

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Representatives
Army: Lt. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger, U.S.A.
Navy: Vice Adm. B. H. Bieri, U.S.N. (resigned May 15, 1951)
Vice Adm. Oscar C. Badger, U.S.N. (resigned May 13, 1952)
Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble, U.S.N. (appointed May 14, 1952)
Air Force: Lt. Gen. H. R. Harmon, U.S.A.F.
Deputy representatives
Army: Col. C. P. Townsley, U.S.A.
Navy: Capt. W. A. Riley, U.S.N.
Air Force: Col. L. H. Rodieck, U.S.A.F.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Representative
Isador Lubin
Deputy representatives
Leroy D. Stinebower (resigned March 14, 1952)
Walter M. Kotschnig

Commissions of the Economic and Social Council and United States Representatives

Social: Arthur J. Altmeyer
Narcotics: Harry J. Anslinger
Transport and Communications (not to convene until 1953): George P. Baker
Fiscal (not to convene until 1953): Edward F. Bartelt
Population (not to convene until 1953): Philip M. Hauser (resigned June 1951)
Status of Women: Mrs. Olive Remington Goldman
Economic, Employment and Development Commission (discontinued until December 31, 1954): Leroy D. Stinebower (resigned March 14, 1952)
Statistical: Stuart A. Rice
Human Rights: Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

Regional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

United States representative (eighth session)
Merrill C. Gay
Alternate United States representative (eighth session)
Walter M. Kotschnig

Economic Commission for Europe

United States representatives
Milton Katz (resigned August 15, 1951)
William H. Draper (seventh session)
Alternate representatives
Paul R. Porter (seventh session)
Robert E. Asher (seventh session)

Economic Commission for Latin America

United States representative
Claude G. Bowers
Acting representative (fourth session)
Merwin L. Bohan

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

United States representative
Francis B. Sayre
Deputy representative
Benjamin Gerig

INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND

United States representative, Executive Board
Katharine F. Lenroot

Alternate
Frances K. Kernohan

SPECIAL COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Assembly: United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (terminated February 5, 1952)

United States representative
Jefferson Patterson

General Assembly: United Nations Collective Measures Committee

United States representative
Warren R. Austin
Deputy representative
Harding F. Bancroft

General Assembly: United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

United States representative
Ely E. Palmer
Acting deputy representative
James W. Barco

General Assembly: United Nations Peace Observation Commission

United States representative
Ernest A. Gross

General Assembly: Balkan Subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission

United States representative
Ernest A. Gross

General Assembly: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

United States representative, Advisory Commission
John B. Blandford, Jr. (resigned June 30, 1951)
Robert B. Macatee, acting (August 31, 1951 to February 20, 1952)
Edwin A. Locke, Jr., representative (appointed February 21, 1952)

General Assembly: United Nations Council for Libya (1951)

United States representative
Lewis Clark

General Assembly: Additional Measures Committee

United States representative
Warren R. Austin
Deputy representative
Ernest A. Gross

General Assembly: Advisory Committee to the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

United States representative
Isador Lubin
Deputy representative
Graham R. Hall

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

United States member, FAO Council
Clarence S. McCormick (June 1951 meeting)
Stanley Andrews (November 1951 meeting)
Alternate United States member
Fred J. Rossiter
Associate United States members
John W. Evans (June 1951 meeting)
Francis Linville (November 1951 meeting)

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

United States Governor, Board of Governors
John W. Snyder
Alternate United States Governor
James E. Webb
United States Executive Director
William McC. Martin, Jr.
Alternate United States Executive Director
John S. Hooker

International Civil Aviation Organization

United States representative to the Council
Paul A. Smith
Alternate United States representative on the Council and United States representative on the Air Transport Committee
Norman P. Seagrave
Alternate United States representative on the Council and United States member on the Air Navigation Commission
Claude H. Smith

International Labor Organization

Representative of the Government of the United States to the Governing Body of the International Labor Office
Philip M. Kaiser
Arnold Zempel, substitute

International Monetary Fund

United States Governor, Board of Governors
John W. Snyder

Alternate United States Governor
James E. Webb
United States Executive Director
Frank A. Southard, Jr.
Alternate United States Executive Director
John S. Hooker

International Telecommunication Union

United States representative, Administrative Council
Francis Colt de Wolf
Alternate United States representative, Administrative Council
Harvey B. Otterman

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

American member in personal capacity on Executive Board (elected by organization itself)
Luther H. Evans

Universal Postal Union

United States member, Executive Liaison Committee
John M. Redding
Alternate United States member, Executive Liaison Committee
John J. Gillen

World Health Organization

United States member, Executive Board
Dr. H. van Zile Hyde

World Meteorological Organization

United States representative, Executive Council, and president
Francis W. Reichelderfer

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Abstract of Office of Intelligence Research Report, "Conflicts Between United States Aims in the UN and Those of Certain Blocs" [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1951.
No. 5524

The Arab States

Despite dynastic and political rifts among themselves, the Arab states are probably the most cohesive non-Soviet bloc in the UN. However, even the Arab states act as a unit only on issues clearly affecting their common regional interests such as Palestine. This and related

[1] As an intelligence report, nothing in this document represented either a statement of United States or Department of State policy or a recommendation of any given policy.

issues constitute the major source of Arab resentment against the US, which is prominently identified with the establishment and encouragement of Israel. Wide gaps between US aims in the UN and those of the Arab bloc may be expected to continue with respect to Arab resistance to any final peace with Israel, the disposition of the Palestinian Arab refugees and freedom of transit of Suez. As part of a larger group of former colonies the Arab states will oppose "colonialism" and "imperialism", often embarrassing the US in its efforts to harmonize the conflicting interests of the major colonial powers and the anti-colonial states. Disagreement between the Arab states and the US is likely to arise over the future of North African territories such as Libya, French Morocco and Tunisia where the Arab states support the nationalist demands of the Islamic populations. As underdeveloped countries, they tend to advance exaggerated claims for economic and developmental aid which may be more visionary than realistic. Partly in retaliation against the US role in Palestine and partly as a result of their weak and exposed position, the Arab states also have to a considerable degree manifested "neutralist" tendencies in the East–West conflict and, after the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean war, they joined with the Asian group in attempting to conciliate between the belligerents. However, such neutralism is largely tactical and opportunistic rather than rooted in principle.

The Asian Group

Unlike the Arab states, there is no formally organized Asian bloc, but rather a group of Asian UN members sharing a broadly common outlook on a number of international issues which permits them to work together on a loose *ad hoc* basis. Of the nine Asian members of the UN, only five (Afghanistan, Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan) seem to fall clearly within the so-called Asian group since the remainder have to a larger degree displayed a pro-Western orientation. Rival ambitions for leadership, differing attitudes vis-à-vis the cold war and the antagonism between India and Pakistan have defeated numerous efforts to establish a formal Asian regional organization. Nevertheless in December 1950, under Indian leadership, a combination of twelve Asian and Arab states interceded vigorously in the UN to seek a Korean cease-fire and peace together with a general settlement of Far Eastern problems including Formosa and Chinese representation in the UN. Although this initiative failed largely on account of Chinese Communist truculence, it afforded the members of the Asian group an opportunity to express their deep rooted neutralism in the East–West conflict. From this neutralist sentiment, shared by all members of the group in varying degrees, and from a closely related distrust of the West, stem sharp disagreement with

the US as to the fundamental role and purpose of the UN. All are extremely cautious in supporting the concept of collective security through the UN, and India, Burma and Indonesia in particular, envisage a conciliating function for the UN in handling international disputes and tend to turn away from a more militant role. Thus none of the group contributed military forces to the Korean war. Each recognizes Peiping and they have consistently supported its seating in the UN. They are also likely to oppose the US position respecting Formosa. Since the group consists of underdeveloped countries until recently under Western hegemony, it, like the Arab states, opposes "colonialism" and "imperialism" and is suspicious of the close association of the US with major colonial powers. On any future UN questions arising out of the nationalist aspirations of French North Africa or Indochina, this group would tend to side against France. Although the members may not regard the US as an important colonial nation in the primary sense, they nevertheless fear the "economic imperialism" which they associate with the US, and, while seeking economic aid for their development, they will want to avoid any major limitation on what they conceive as their political and economic freedom.

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth is merely a loose association of sovereign states which frequently consult on foreign policy matters. At such meetings, although joint policies are rarely adopted, attitudes are explored and the reasons for differences made understandable thereby attenuating centrifugal forces. No formal alliance binds the members, nor is there any obligation to act in concert or even to remain within the Commonwealth. Notwithstanding the flimsy legal ties between the members, a substantial functional unity exists, more pronounced in the case of the older English speaking dominions then in that of the recently admitted Asian dominions. For the first time, important disputes between members have been aired outside the Commonwealth, such as Kashmir case and South Africa's treatment of its Indian minority. On the whole, the historic evolutionary trend in the Empire from British domination to the independence of the major components will continue to favor separate rather than unified action on major international issues. Yet serious as the differences between some of the members may be, it seems likely that the Commonwealth relationship, in some measure, moderates their violence.

In the UN, the Commonwealth is not a voting bloc and follows no agreed line. However, the interaction of the opinions of the members frequently is an important factor in reducing the spread between the different positions. The UK, in its anxiety to maintain the tenuous Commonwealth bonds, often tries as far as possible to avoid taking

positions that would alienate the Asian members, especially India, and at times the older dominions support the UK in this effort. Thus at the January 1951 London Conference of Prime Ministers which considered the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the Commonwealth as a whole agreed that all possibilities of diplomatic negotiation with Stalin [2] and Mao [3] should be exhausted and that any action tending to provoke further intervention by the PRC should be avoided. The Asian Commonwealth components undoubtedly exerted an important restraining influence even on those members which ordinarily are western oriented. This development contributed to a slowing down of the UN's reaction to Peiping's aggression, although the UK and the older dominions ultimately supported the condemnation of the PRC and the GA's recommendation of a selective embargo. The influence of the Asian members will continue to make itself felt in the attitude of the Commonwealth as a whole on issues involving international security, whenever there is general agreement among the members that the US is acting rashly and pressing too hard for UN action. However, this influence will not separate the UK and the older dominions from the US in the event of a showdown with the USSR. At the same time, the older members of the Commonwealth reciprocally exert some moderating influence on the extremism of the anti-Western views of India and Pakistan, and the Commonwealth itself is a potential medium for presenting the US viewpoint to the Asian dominions through those western oriented spokesmen.

The declining military position of the UK has weakened the once powerful unifying force of common defense objectives in the Commonwealth. At the same time, the older dominions have come to look increasingly to the US as the keystone of collective defense. This development lessens the possibility of any difference between the US and the Commonwealth as a whole on basic issues of collective security. In the economic and social fields, Commonwealth ties are stronger than in the political and military spheres since all members except Canada participate in the sterling bloc and imperial preference draws their economies together. For this reason, the US will frequently find itself at odds with the Commonwealth in the economic and social organs of the UN over such issues as trade restrictions, discrimination against the dollar and allocation of scarce raw materials.

The Latin American States

The twenty Latin American (LA) republics constitute the largest UN bloc numerically and are therefore of commanding importance.

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[2] Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[3] Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government Council, People's Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

These states have given strong and frequently unanimous voting support to the US in the UN on issues involving the East–West conflict. However, tangible support has been limited in implementing UN resolutions. Although the LAs frequently caucus on positions to be taken on major issues, they have not operated as a solid bloc on most questions despite general impressions to the contrary. They ordinarily unite in voting for members of their own group to fill important UN posts. However, on substantive matters they more often divide, particularly when special ideological, national or even personality factors enter into the situation.

The LA states have more often voted with than against the US and even when the majority differed with the US position, this was attributable to their desire to uphold some special interest rather than to support the USSR. Like the Arab and Asian groups, their disagreements with US aims in the UN stem from their status as relatively underdeveloped countries and express themselves in anti-colonialism, dissatisfaction with the amount of economic aid received from the US and fear of the inroads of foreign capital on their natural resources. Religious considerations led the majority of the LA states to differ with the US in favoring the internationalization of Jerusalem.

[Here follows the body of the report.]

Editorial Note

In furtherance of a policy formulated in 1950 to conduct broad-gauge discussions and consultations both in scope and extent with other governments on matters coming before the United Nations and particularly the General Assembly, the Department of State despatched several communications (circular airgrams) to the field beginning in June. For the three basic circulars, see *infra* and pages 16 and 24. Many of the subjects are documented in substantive chapters which appear elsewhere in this volume or in the regional volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series. For a fourth circular which was sent out on September 12 and which dealt solely with the question of the amount of the United States contribution to the regular (administrative) budget of the United Nations, see page 162. For a fifth circular, dated October 6, which was concerned with the broad problem of financing economic development within the United Nations system, see page 30.

320/6–2751 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 27, 1951—8:45 a. m.

The Department has begun preparations for the next (sixth) regular session of the United Nations General Assembly to be held in Paris. The date for the convening of the session has been fixed as November 6, with the possibility that it might begin earlier, perhaps October 24.

1. *Advance Diplomatic Consultations*

For your background information we are planning to consult other friendly governments in advance of the Assembly with respect to (*a*) the broad program for the session; and (*b*) our positions on certain significant agenda items. In these consultations, the general program of action in the Assembly will probably be taken up first. In respect of both (*a*) and (*b*), however, consultations will be held on the basis of our tentative views in order that we may be able to take the views of other governments into account, insofar as possible, in the formulation of our final positions.

We will, therefore, over the next four months, send several communications relating to the question of the general program for the session, and setting forth appropriate background information and our tentative positions on a number of issues which you will be asked to discuss with the Foreign Office. We will parallel your approaches with consultations here in Washington with various diplomatic representatives and, through the USUN, with members of the permanent United Nations delegations in New York.

2. *New Agenda Items*

We would, as in previous years, appreciate any information you may receive regarding new agenda items which the government to which you are accredited is likely to raise for inclusion in the Assembly's agenda. In making any appropriate informal inquiries in this connection, however, you should not give any impression that we wish to stimulate the introduction of new items. In fact, in view of the size of the present agenda, the importance and urgency of a number of items, and the lateness of the session, we would be inclined to discourage the introduction of new items not strictly of an important and urgent character.

There is transmitted under separate cover for your background information a list prepared in the Department of items which are

[1] Sent to the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) and to U.S. Embassies and Legations located in 52 of the Member States of the United Nations, for action; sent to the Embassies in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovkia, and Poland for information only.

expected to be included in the agenda of the sixth Assembly.[2] You will note that bracketed items are not certain to be included in the agenda.

3. *Composition of Delegations and Biographic Material*

We would appreciate information with respect to the composition of other Delegations to the Assembly and any available information regarding the assignment of delegates to the Main Committees of the Assembly (Committee 1: Political and Security; *Ad Hoc* Political Committee; Committee 2: Economic and Financial; Committee 3: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural; Committee 4: Trusteeship; Committee 5: Administrative and Budgetary; Committee 6: Legal).

As for previous sessions the Department will prepare biographic sketches of the members of other Delegations for the background information of our Delegation. In this connection it would be appreciated if you would communicate to the Department biographic material on new delegates and any additional information on former delegates which has not previously been reported.

ACHESON

[2] See section entitled "Matters Considered During the Sixth Regular Session" (the General Assembly agenda) in United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951* (United Nations, New York, 1952), pp. 18–22.

320/9–551: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 5, 1951—1:45 p. m.

As already indicated in Circular Airgram of June 27, 8:45 a.m., the Department hopes to consult widely in advance with other UN Members concerning the major issues which will arise at the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly, scheduled to convene in Paris on November 6. The US Mission to the UN has already initiated such discussions in general terms with a number of Delegations in New York. Consultations on questions relating to trusteeship and non-self-governing territories are being held separately, some in Washington, some in the field; for this reason these questions are not dealt with in this message.

As a preliminary step to the discussion of our detailed positions on individual subjects which will be set forth in subsequent circulars, you are now requested to discuss with the Foreign Office at as high a level as practicable, general prospects for the Assembly, making such use of the following material as you consider desirable in setting forth

[1] Sent to USUN and 52 diplomatic missions for action; sent to Moscow, Praha, Warsaw, Saigon, Pusan, and Tokyo for information only.

US views. In your discussions you will, of course, wish to indicate that these views are tentative and subject to change in emphasis and substance in the light of any major developments which occur between now and the opening of the Assembly. For example, the Soviet maneuvers at the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference may cause us to alter our program in certain respects. (For your information, the following material is not intended as a summary of the entire US program; additional elements are under consideration and you will be sent any additional information in this connection as soon as decisions are made.)

1. *Role of the GA in the Present Situation*

This GA session promises to be unusually important. It will be essential to consolidate the gains made by the UN in Korea, and those made by the free world generally in developing its ability to resist aggression. Having inspired and guided the international Cominform policies which led to the present situation, the USSR is now exerting its efforts in a world-wide peace campaign. This campaign, which will presumably come to a climax in the Assembly, is intended to prevent the growing strength and unity of the free world from reaching full realization. With no basic change in objectives, strategy or position, the Soviet method of procedure is to demand adherence by all to a set of slogans or catchwords ostensibly directed toward peace, disarmament, peaceful coexistence, etc., with the implication that those refusing to accept these generalizations at face value are warmongers, reactionaries, imperialists, etc. The purpose of these tactics is to sow disunity among governments and peoples; to the extent that they succeed, the task of building up the defensive strength of the free world is hampered.

The task of moving forward toward the realization of UN and free world objectives does not, at this point, appear to require further major changes or adjustments in UN machinery. The steps already taken by the GA to develop the UN structure and adapt it to current realities are essential and sound. For our part, we will plan to devote our major energies to consolidating and perfecting the existing arrangements.

2. *Major Questions in the GA*

A. *Korea*

In view of the uncertainty as to an armistice it is difficult to foresee precisely what action will be required at the sixth Assembly session on the Korean question. If there is no armistice the GA will undoubtedly be asked to consider further measures against the aggressors. If an armistice is concluded we would expect the sixth GA (if such action has not already been taken by the present Assembly session), as a minimum, to take note of the armistice and to reaffirm UN objectives for Korea. It will be necessary for the sixth session to

review the question of appropriate UN machinery in Korea. In addition, the Assembly will discuss the problem of rehabilitation, reconstruction and relief in Korea. It will be necessary in this connection for delegations to give increased support to the Korean reconstruction fund.

B. *Work of the Collective Measures Committee*

The Uniting for Peace resolution adopted by the last GA was designed to embody in UN practice the lessons learned in the Korean operation and to further the development of an effective collective security system. The report of the CMC will, we believe, embody a genuine advance in this field, and will, of course, be fully discussed. The essential aim at the sixth session with respect to this item should be to consolidate the gains of the Uniting for Peace program by appropriate action, including continuance of the CMC in order that it may complete the formative phase of the work assigned to it by the GA.

C. *Economic and Social Problems*

Adequate emphasis should be given to the varied problems of human welfare, and to the review of the continuing work of the UN on these problems, in the Second (Economic and Financial) and Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committees.

In the economic field the general US objective may be simply described as an expanding world economy; most of the economic problems before the sixth session have a bearing on this objective. One of these problems is that of land reform. The UN is serving as a clearing house for information and a source of encouragement for this movement. The report of the Economic and Social Council on this project should warrant special attention in the Second Committee.

In the social field in the Third Committee our general objective is to further the freedom and well-being of the individual. Our proposed positions on many of the individual items in the economic and social fields will be dealt with in later communications.

D. *Financial and Administrative Questions*

There should in our view be no undue increase in the regular UN budget (i.e., the total budget figure should be in the neighborhood of 40 million dollars), and, within the amount voted, there should be greater concentration on activities of real priority and urgency. Our detailed views on the matter of the budget and other administrative and financial problems which will be considered in the Fifth Committee will be dealt with in subsequent messages.

3. *Possible Soviet Themes*

The main Soviet propaganda lines in the GA may include:

A. Proposals for a Five-Power Pact. A recent variant of this well-worn propaganda proposal would open the pact—once it was concluded among the Five Powers—to all other Members of the UN.

B. Proposals concerning "peaceful coexistence".

C. Intimations that the Soviet Union may permit some cultural and personal interchange with other countries.
D. Soviet "disarmament" proposals.
E. Attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For the most part these are routine themes that have been played repeatedly at previous GA sessions. On those occasions the whole free world joined in exposing them as a fraud, and in declaring its own condemnation of the Soviet offenses against peaceful behavior, in the GA resolutions on "Essentials of Peace" and "Peace Through Deeds". Judged by the standard of these resolutions, Cominform policy is no more peaceful today than it was then, and any sudden protestations of peace should continue to be measured with a skepticism based on the record. For its part the US expects to analyze such proposals strictly on their merits, in the light of well-known and continuing facts of which we shall remind the GA.

We would appreciate the views of other governments as to the nature of probable Soviet proposals and tactics which would be most effective in placing them in proper perspective.

4. *Length of Session*

The recommendations for improving the methods and procedures of the Assembly, approved in 1949, contemplated sessions of 8 to 10 weeks as most desirable, and sessions have usually been completed in about 12 weeks. Because of the international crisis, it has been necessary for the Fifth Assembly to remain formally in session all this year. While the United States has strongly supported the continuance of the Fifth Session, we believe that this situation should be considered as exceptional.

It should, in our opinion, be possible to complete the essential work of the Sixth Session within the normal time. In view of the greatly increased expense of holding the session in Paris and the budget stringency in many countries, including the US, we assume that all delegations will wish to cooperate in holding the session to the minimum practicable length.

WEBB

320/9–1251

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 12, 1951.

DEAR JACK: Since your welcome visit to New York,[1] I have been thinking a great deal about the problems of the forthcoming General

[1] Assistant Secretary Hickerson was at USUN in New York on August 22, consulting with USUN staff on pre-General Assembly matters.

Assembly which we discussed together. I am persuaded by further consideration that the United States will need to project a large and positive theme. The fundamental problem before us has been well stated in the August 24 draft paper prepared in UNP entitled "United States Program in the General Assembly".[2]

All of us, I think, are agreed that we must "formulate a comprehensive United States program for the General Assembly that can meet our expected policy requirements at that time; serve as the main focus of attention in the General Assembly; and be clear and positive enough to enable the United States Delegation to maintain the initiative and to present our position in each Committee as part of a coherent over-all policy".

What I am not yet sure about is whether we have found the answer to this problem. I have considered the draft paper together with the staff here, and set forth our views herein.

I am sure you will agree that the United States theme at the General Assembly should be positive, vital and uplifting. Our greatest asset, it seems to me, is at once our simplest and our grandest concept: the idea of freedom.

Ambassador Sayre[3] has called to my attention a quotation from Abraham Lincoln which expresses beautifully the inter-connection between the free institutions of the United States and the promotion of human freedom everywhere:

"What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence? It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in us. Our defense is in the spirit which prizes the liberty of *all men*, in *all lands*, everywhere."

It is obviously in our national interest to support and uphold that spirit which prizes the liberty of all men. The General Assembly provides a unique forum for the upholding of that spirit. I should therefore like to see our chief activities at the Assembly converge around the central theme of "the foundations of freedom", or "the promotion of freedom", or whatever form of words you like which embodies this thought.

Much of our work in the Assembly can be related to this theme. Thus, if we are able to advance what the draft position paper calls "a positive and realistic program for the reduction and control of armaments", we will be contributing significantly to freedom by limiting the capacity of aggressors to threaten freedom. The same may be said of our program for advancing the work of the Collective Measures Committee, which protects freedom by helping to build a uni-

[2] The specific document has not been identified. It seems to have been a composite of the informational circular airgrams, pp. 15, 16, and 24.

[3] Francis B. Sayre, United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

versal collective security system. The work of the free nations in the economic and social fields can likewise be emphasized as building the economic and social foundations necessary for the establishment and maintenance of human freedom. The United Nations work in the field of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories lends itself obviously to this treatment.

I am sure you will also agree that what the world needs now is deeds more than words. We should therefore not only proclaim the objectives of the free world; we should show what progress the free world is actually making and what forward steps we envisage to make human freedom a worldwide reality.

By seizing the initiative at the outset of the Assembly with such a statement, we can counter the expected Soviet peace offensive through proposing a more realistic and hopeful alternative to the world than the one the Soviets offer. The world situation demands more of us than merely a counterattack against the Russians. Mere negative criticism is not enough. What I am suggesting is that, in addition to showing how and where the Russians are wrong, we should propose a positive and concrete program for the achievement of human freedom throughout the world.

Part of this approach might be historical. We could point to the six years of work of the United Nations in building the foundations of freedom in the political, economic, social and educational fields, and compare with this Soviet achievements during the same period. More important are projects for the future. We should suggest practicable programs for the future building of these same foundations by proposing what the free world should *do*, not just say. The contrast with what the Russians *say* will be so obvious that the world will readily draw the moral.

Something of what I have in mind can be achieved by carefully coordinated speeches and public relations activities. Basically, however, its achievement rests on the positive content of our program. As I said above, the world needs deeds more than words. We must therefore decide what we can *do*, or at least propose doing, that will help build the foundations of freedom. If we feel that we cannot afford the money for any new programs of economic development, for instance, then we should exercise our ingenuity in proposing deeds which will not cost so much money, and in talking about the things we have done and will continue to do in such a way as to carry conviction that we are not merely paying lip service to these great ideas.

Our specific comments on the Department's draft paper are as follows:

On Korea, we think that even if we should decide to "keep the problem of the political settlement of the Korean situation out of the

Assembly", we will want to have the Assembly reaffirm the United Nations political objectives in Korea. We feel there might be advantages in the General Assembly appointing after armistice a United Nations representative to assist the General Assembly in effecting a political settlement in Korea. In addition, we imagine that we would want the Assembly to take some action initiating, authorizing or approving whatever steps are taken outside the United Nations towards a political settlement in Korea. On Korean relief, we are considering some proposals designed "to encourage wide participation in relief programs by non-official groups throughout the world". We hope to be able to send something specific on these points to the Department soon.

On the Collective Measures Committee, we think that it would probably be advantageous to have the Assembly adopt a substantive resolution embodying various recommendations to members on steps which they might take to further the development of an effective universal collective security system. We also agree that we should press for continuance of the Collective Measures Committee for another year so that it can finish the formative aspect of the Uniting for Peace Program. We agree that consideration should be given to making the POC more useful and effective, and we hope to send you some specific proposals on that question in the near future.

On the control and reduction of armaments, we agree in the formulation of what is necessary. We would only underscore what the Department has no doubt already thought of: that we will need something more than a reiteration of our previous positions in this field if we are to fill the bill of "a positive and realistic program . . . designed to convince other delegations that we intend to reduce armaments when the necessary conditions have been met."

On the problem of meeting Soviet propaganda suggestions for East–West negotiations and the Five Power Pact, it seems to us that basically this is a question of how the United States establishes an initiative in the General Assembly and retains the momentum of prior resolutions (Essentials of Peace, Peace through Deeds, etc.) The adoption of a broad theme of freedom would be part of our initiative. Relating specific proposals and agenda items to this theme would be another part. In addition, the importance of deeds rather than words can be shown by an outline by the Secretary in his opening statement of the real causes of tension.

On the general economic and social themes, we feel that the United States will not be able to make much progress politically or propagandawise unless proposals of more substance can be made. General advocacy of increased productivity and an expanding economy is not enough. In fact, it may even boomerang if we leave to the rest of the world the task of reconciling our advocacy of expansion with (*a*) our earlier opposition to the International Development Authority, which many of the underdeveloped countries rightly or wrongly regard as a major method of achieving the recommended expansion, (*b*) our attitude on East–West trade. It seems clear, therefore, that the expanding economy theme, to be effective, should be accompanied by substantive proposals for making fuller use of the United Nations as an instrumentality for economic and social advance.

We are not in a position here to put forward detailed proposals, but suggest that the following topics, in addition to those mentioned in the Department's draft paper of August 24, might be investigated:

(*a*) The conditions under which more technical assistance might be channeled through the United Nations, and more nations might be brought to participate more fully in the program;

(*b*) The presentation of a more affirmative attitude toward the creation of an International Development Authority. If there is need for international development, as we assume there is, and if the United States is meeting that need at least in part, we do not think that many other countries will be profoundly impressed by the United States argument against such an authority on the ground that the United States would be almost the only contributor;

(*c*) If we cannot indicate in an affirmative way the conditions under which the establishment of an International Development Authority could come about with United States support, we might be able to offer some hopeful suggestions concerning implementation of the ECOSOC recommendation for exploring the establishment of "an International Finance Corporation to promote the financing of productive private enterprise either through loans without government guarantee, through equity investments or by other methods intended for the same purpose";

(*d*) The Community Development Employment scheme worked out in Greece by a United Nations Technical Assistance expert, and now being tried out also in Ecuador, appears to offer substantial possibilities for capitalizing on local initiative and expediting economic development at minimum cost. Perhaps the United States could encourage Greece or Ecuador to emphasize the potentialities of this scheme in a manner which would underscore the importance of national and local efforts in the development field and correspondingly reduce the pressure for large-scale international action;

(*e*) The feasibility of international action to stabilize commodity prices should be investigated. The receipts of underdeveloped countries from their exports of copper, rubber, jute, tin, wool, hemp, tobacco, etc. now vary so much from year to year that it is hard for them to make practical long-range plans for economic development. At the same time, the expenditures of the more developed countries in Western Europe for the raw materials they have to import are subject to variations that jeopardize their rearmament and recovery programs. For contrary reasons, therefore, proposals looking toward greater stabilization might evoke wide-scale support. We have no recommendations as to what the United States might propose by way of international action (more International Wheat Agreements, other types of long-term commitments, creation of international buffer stocks, etc.) but we suggest that the problem merits imaginative consideration. If an overall approach is impractical, action with respect to one or two commodities might be suggested.

The foregoing would be in addition to the suggestions in the August 24 paper regarding increased productivity and land reform, which we agree are useful items. In this connection we have also thought about the possibility of Assembly action along the lines of

the recent OEEC statement on increased productivity and the prospect of a better life after the needs of rearmament have been met. We were much struck by the exchange of telegrams on this subject and the related subject of a possible NATO initiative in this field between London, The Hague and the Department—more struck by the telegrams, in fact, than by the OEEC product. It seems to us that this sort of thing would be useful and heartening, particularly with the Assembly in Paris; and it occurred to us that the United Nations members of OEEC might conceivably wish to co-sponsor in the Assembly a resolution setting forth these views.

We assume that the sections of the draft paper on human rights will be amended along the lines of the Department's present thinking on Soviet violations of human rights. Our specific comments on this subject are being sent separately to the Department.

In the field of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, we are attempting to develop a specific proposal which we hope to be able to send to the Department soon.

On all other substantive parts of the Department's paper, we have no comments at present.

Sincerely yours, WARREN R. AUSTIN

320/9–2751 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 27, 1951—1 : 45 p. m.

Reference is made to the Department's circular airgrams of June 27, 8 : 45 a. m. and September 5, 1 : 45 p. m. There are indicated below the Department's tentative positions on a number of items which will be considered at the sixth session of the General Assembly. You are requested, in your discretion, to outline these views to the Foreign Office and report its reactions as soon as possible. In your discussions you should, of course, indicate that these positions are tentative and that we will wish to take into account the views of other friendly Governments in formulating our final positions. Any significant information you obtain which in the form of an airgram would not reach the Department by October 12 should be cabled.

There is attached for your background information a copy of the provisional agenda of the sixth session of the GA which was communicated by the Secretary General of the UN to Member Governments on September 7.[2] Detailed background information on most of the issues involved may be found in the President's Annual Reports

[1] Sent to USUN and 52 diplomatic missions for action; to Moscow, Praha, and Warsaw for information only.

[2] U.N. doc. A/1870.

to Congress on US Participation in the UN for 1950 and previous years.

1. *Libya*

The UN Commissioner, with the assistance of the UN Advisory Council, has, we believe, painstakingly and constructively carried out the responsibilities assigned to him by the GA. The progress of Libya toward independence has, of course, been made possible chiefly by the efforts of the Libyans themselves, with the advice and guidance of the Commissioner and the cooperation of the Administering Authorities (UK and France).

The Department hopes and expects that all powers previously exercised by the Administering Authorities will, by the date fixed by the GA (i.e., by January 1, 1952) "have been transferred to the duly constituted Libyan Government". Proclamation of independence is expected to follow thereafter, together with the assumption by Emir (Idris Al Senusi) of his position as constitutional monarch of United Libya.

It is likely that certain states in the GA (Egypt, possibly Pakistan and other Arab states) will challenge the legality of the Libyan constitutional development and may even suggest that the General Assembly repudiate all that has been done and adopt some new course providing for temporary UN supervision, such as direct trusteeship. Specifically, these states may make such allegations as the following: (*a*) the National Assembly (which prepared the constitution) should have been an elected rather than an *appointed* body (Egypt has contended previously that only an elected National Assembly in which the three parts of Libya (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and The Fezzan) were represented in proportion to their population could properly represent the people of Libya in the constitution-making process; Tripolitania has by far the largest population and such a scheme would put Tripolitania in a position to dominate the other two parts of Libya.); (*b*) the form of government should be unitary rather than federal; and (*c*) the present federation plan is merely a disguised method of maintaining old imperialist control over Libya by the interested great powers.

The Department considers it essential that allegations of this character be decisively repudiated by a large majority. The pertinent background facts are as follows:

(*a*) The Libyan National Assembly is "duly representative" of the inhabitants of Libya. That it is not an elected body does not alter this fact. The indigenous political leadership of Cyrenaica and The Fezzan would agree to enter a National Assembly with representatives of Tripolitania only on the basis of equal representation for all parts of Libya. Furthermore, the procedure followed in the selection of representatives to the National Assembly was decided upon by the UN Commissioner with the concurrence of the UN Advisory Council

and after full consultation with the responsible Libyan political figures and the local French and British administrators.

(*b*) The idea of federation has not in any way been imposed upon the Libyans. The Libyan National Assembly itself recognized a federal system as the only feasible basis on which unity and independence could be established. Last fall the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the GA in its report to the Assembly stated that . . . "The form of State to be created, and whether it would be a unitary or a federal State, must be left entirely to the representatives of the Libyan people, meeting and consulting in a National Assembly". The federal plan has been freely chosen by the representatives of Libya and any attempt by the GA to impose or demand a tighter unitary form of government would destroy the only basis on which Libyan unity can possibly be achieved.

(*c*) Each of the three parts of Libya insists upon having a wide measure of control over its own local affairs under the new Libyan Government. Cyrenaica, in particular, has made it clear that it would not voluntarily participate in any government other than one based on a federal system which ensured that Tripolitania would not interfere in purely local Cyrenaican affairs. The Emir of Cyrenaica, who has been invited by the National Assembly to become King of Libya, will obviously not assume that role if under the constitution Tripolitania is placed in a position to dominate the other two parts of Libya and control the National Parliament, as would result from the Egyptian unitary thesis.

All Members of the free world have a vital interest in the rational and stable development of an independent and unified Libya. We are convinced that disruption of the federal plan now agreed upon would plunge Libya into political chaos, destroy all chance of unity, open the way to political agitation and violence, generally prevent the maintenance of stability in the entire area and assist Soviet efforts to penetrate the Middle East.

Accordingly, it is essential that the GA (*a*) give decisive support to the way in which Libya's independence has evolved, recognizing that independence and unity can be achieved only if the difficult elements in the complex Libyan political picture are reconciled and given due recognition in the constitution; and (*b*) reject any charges along the lines indicated above.

2. *The Greek Question*

In its annual report, which was signed on August 15, UNSCOB recommended to the GA that it:

(*a*) re-assert the importance of maintaining peace in the Balkans, continue its efforts to eliminate the threat to Greece by considering ways and means to achieve peaceful cooperation between Greece and her neighbors from which the threat stems, and to this end re-affirm its recommendations to the appropriate states regarding (1) cessation of assistance and support to the Greek guerrillas; (2) renewal of diplomatic and good-neighborly relations; (3) renewal, revision or establishment of frontier conventions; (4) disarming and disposition of

Greek guerrillas; (5) prohibition of sending arms and war materials to Albania and Bulgaria until their unlawful assistance to the guerrillas has ceased; (6) repatriation of Greek military personnel, children and other Greek nationals; and (7) cooperation of the states concerned with the appropriate UN body, particularly as regards the prompt and impartial investigation of their complaints and allegations;

(*b*) take note of the evidence concerning the existence in Eastern and Central Europe of a network for the training and sending into Greece of guerrilla agents for subversive purposes;

(*c*) take into account the changed but continuing threat to Greece within the context of the hostile attitude towards Greece of a number of Eastern and Central European states, particularly Bulgaria, and consequent tension in the Balkans; and

(*d*) consider the advisability of maintaining UN vigilance over the Balkans in the light of the present nature of the threat to peace in that area.

In the GA the United States will support the UNSCOB report and will place major emphasis on the Special Committee's recommendations given in (*c*) and (*d*) immediately above; these two points are, in our view, the central issues to which the General Assembly should address itself. The Department does not believe that any mention of further conciliation efforts should be included in this year's GA resolution since there has been no evidence of willingness on the part of Albania and Bulgaria to enter in good faith upon genuine conciliation talks. However, we are confident that, if and when there is some genuine basis for conciliation, adequate resources and instrumentalities already exist within the UN to discharge the conciliation function. The Department believes that the present UN machinery may require some re-organization and reduction in size with a view to efficiency and economy and in the interest of better adapting the machinery to the present and foreseeable needs of the Balkan situation. At the last GA some delegations recognized that some such re-organization might well be needed if observation machinery were to continue in 1952. Our tentative view is that a smaller body, of perhaps 3–5 members, functioning under the Peace Observation Commission, might supervise the work of the observer corps, review their reports and submit reports as necessary to a higher UN authority. This matter will be discussed in detail with Greece and the Governments represented on UNSCOB and our final position must necessarily await the outcome of these consultations.

We assume that the Soviet states in the GA will indulge in their usual diversionist maneuvers when the Greek question is considered, i.e., these states can be expected to renew their charges against the Greek Government regarding mass executions of "patriots", etc. The Department assumes that this Soviet tactic is now so shop-worn that all Delegations will cooperate in disposing rapidly of such charges.

3. *Report of the Committee of Twelve*

In his speech before the GA on October 24, 1950, President Truman suggested that it might be useful to explore ways in which the work of the UN Atomic Energy Commission and Commission for Conventional Armaments could be more closely brought together, and to consider whether there should be a new and consolidated disarmament commission. The GA subsequently (on December 13, 1950) established a Committee of Twelve (SC Members and Canada) and instructed it to report to the forthcoming GA session "on ways and means whereby the work of the AEC and CCA may be coordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission". On August 23, 1951 the Committee of Twelve adopted a resolution recommending to the GA that it establish a new commission (which would be under and report to the SC) to carry forward the tasks presently assigned to the AEC and CCA. The Committee also recommended that the AEC and CCA be dissolved by appropriate action upon the establishment of the new commission.

The United States will support the adoption of a resolution in the GA establishing a new commission and setting forth in detail its organization and functions. In general such a resolution would provide that (*a*) the new Commission should be composed of Members of the SC plus Canada; (*b*) it should have as its primary task the preparation of comprehensive and coordinated plans for effective international control of all armaments and armed forces, including atomic energy, these plans to provide for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces; (*c*) it should devote its efforts toward effective international control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, using as the basis the UN plan unless and until a better and no less effective system can be devised.

4. *Presidency of the GA*

We do not know of any candidates for this post except from the Latin American area. From this area there are four announced candidates: Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Henriquez-Urena (Dominican Republic), Costa du Rels (Bolivia), and Belaunde (Peru), and Santa Cruz (Chile) may also be a candidate. On the basis of present indications it is our impression that support for Padilla Nervo is increasing, and FYI the Department believes that he is the most able of the candidates. In connection with the formulation of our position, the Department would appreciate any information you obtain regarding the views of other governments on this matter, particularly information as to commitments made to any of the candidates.

5. *Council Slates*

Security Council

The United States will support Pakistan to replace India (although we are not yet making a public announcement to this effect), and a Latin American state to replace Ecuador. The announced candidates for the Latin American post are Chile and El Salvador. The Department is interested in ascertaining the views of Latin American and other governments regarding these candidates (but FYI only we favor Chile and may take steps to advance its candidacy). The term of Yugoslavia also expires. We most strongly oppose the election of a Soviet state to this post. Although we have as yet taken no decision as to which state we will support for the post, we would be prepared to support Greece, which is a candidate, if it obtains sufficient support, or some other non-Soviet state (Ethiopia, Thailand, Lebanon or the Philippines might be considered in this connection).

Economic and Social Council

The terms of the following states expire: Belgium, India, China, France, Chile and Peru. The United States will support (*a*) the re-election of China and France and (*b*) the election of two Latin American states to replace Chile and Peru, for which there are the following announced candidates: Colombia, Cuba, Argentina and Haiti, and it is probable that Bolivia will also be a candidate. Our decision on this matter will be influenced by the views of the Latin American governments.

The Department has not yet taken any decision as to which states we will support for the other two ECOSOC posts. Belgium and India are seeking re-election and other announced candidates are Egypt, Australia and Burma. We would appreciate any information as to which candidates other governments intend to support for these two posts.

6. *Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind*

Pursuant to previous GA resolutions, the International Law Commission completed in July and forwarded to the GA a code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. In the Sixth Committee the United States will take the position that no final action should be taken on this matter at the sixth Assembly session since governments have not had adequate opportunity to study in detail a matter of such importance and seriousness. Specifically, the United States would support a resolution which would (*a*) thank the ILC for its work; (*b*) request the Secretary General to transmit the draft code to governments for their comments and to forward the comments of governments to the ILC; and (*c*) request the ILC to give further study to the draft code with a view to its possible revision in the light of the

comments submitted by governments and the debates in the Sixth Committee.

ACHESON

320/10–651 : Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 6, 1951—8 : 20 a. m.

Reference is made to the Department's circular airgrams of June 27, September 5, and September 27 regarding the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. There are set forth below essential background material and views of the Department concerning the problem of *financing economic development*, which will be the most important item on the agenda of the Assembly's second (Economic and Financial) committee. You are requested in your discretion to outline our views to the appropriate officials of the foreign office and report reactions as soon as possible. For your information, it has been apparent in previous UN meetings (particularly ECOSOC) that some delegates speak and vote according to their personal views and *not* on the basis of a governmental position. In fact delegates have on occasion supported positions that appear to have been contrary to those of the responsible home government. It is, therefore, important in discussing our views with the foreign office that you express the hope that its delegation will be instructed on this issue—preferably in support of the U.S. position.

Financing economic development has been a perennial agenda item of ECOSOC and more recently of the General Assembly. The position of many underdeveloped countries is that international financing facilities, i.e. private foreign investment, International Bank loans, and Eximbank loans, are inadequate to their needs for external capital; since, they say, many essential development projects are of a non-self-liquidating nature and cannot be financed by loan capital or by private investment. Therefore they seek "grant" aid for such projects as roads, irrigation systems and the like. Pressure for international grant aid has been given impetus by recommendations in two recent publications, the Rockefeller Report "Partners in Progress" and the report by a Group of Experts appointed by the SYG of the UN on "Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries". Both of these reports recommend the establishment of an International Development Authority to provide substantial grant aid to governments of underdeveloped countries as a supplement to

[1] Sent to USUN and 38 diplomatic missions for action and to 19 for information only. The former generally comprised posts in Latin American, Near Eastern, African, South Asian, and Far Eastern countries.

international loan financing. All governments would be invited to participate in the IDA but in fact the funds that the IDA would make available would have to come largely from the U.S.

The most recent action on the issue of an international agency to provide grant funds for economic development was taken at the 13th session of ECOSOC in a resolution which called for further study of and report on the subject. The U.S. Government agreed to the ECOSOC resolution to continue study of the subject but made clear that it is unprepared at this time to support the establishment of an IDA. The U.S. believes that the resources of existing international financing institutions are adequate to the need, especially when supplemented by the grant aid programs of developed countries. (For fuller exposition of U.S. position on IDA see below.) Notwithstanding known U.S. opposition to the idea, a strong concerted effort to force the issue is likely to be made at the General Assembly. It is, therefore, desirable that you explain the U.S. position to the government to which you are accredited and where politic seek to secure support for that position.

Outlined below are the main elements of the U.S. position on the subject of financing economic development.

U.S. Position on Financing Economic Development

Economic development can be accelerated through a wider application of improved technology and an increasing rate of capital formation, particularly in selected areas of the economy. The primary responsibility for economic development, the planning, the organizing, the executing, and *the financing* rests with the local government concerned. The international community can help but it can at most do only a fraction of the job. The extraordinary progress that some underdeveloped countries have made in recent years is attributable to domestic effort and energy for which there is no international substitute. In those countries where development has lagged, the problem in largest part has been the failure of the governments concerned to plan development programs, to translate these programs into concrete projects, to mobilize domestic resources for their execution, and to utilize effectively the international capital and technical assistance that is available from existing institutions. At the present time, when the financial position of many underdeveloped countries has improved, it is particularly important that domestic efforts to promote development be intensified.

A. *The role of underdeveloped areas.*

(1) Realistic planning of their investment programs and the establishment of a system of priorities for the investment of available capital: domestic effort can be supplemented by the technical assist-

ance available through the UN, its regional commissions and specialized agencies, and through bilateral programs.

(2) Improved mobilization of domestic savings: technical assistance is available in this field.

(3) Optimum use of foreign exchange resources for economic development: this must apply not only to such resources obtained through foreign grants and loans but also and primarily to the foreign exchange proceeds from exports. In this regard, it is important to realize that, since 1949, the external financial position of many underdeveloped areas has improved significantly:

(*a*) Increase in prices and volume of raw material sales has enlarged export receipts of underdeveloped countries.

(*b*) Terms of trade have moved in favor of underdeveloped countries, i.e. the prices of goods they import have, in general, risen less than the prices of goods they export.

(*c*) As a result, the reserve position (gold and foreign exchange) of most underdeveloped countries has improved and the volume of their imports, including imports of capital goods from Europe and the U.S., has greatly increased.

(4) Full utilization of existing international financing facilities, both public and private, in order to secure additional resources which the economy can use effectively.

B. *U.S. action to promote economic development of underdeveloped areas.*

For its part, the U.S. Government, notwithstanding the need to divert resources to the defense effort, has given and will continue to give strong support to the export of both capital and technology to promote economic development. Specifically:

(1) U.S. Government has made and will continue to make loan capital available for economic development through the U.S. Eximbank. (In the period July 1945–June 1951 Eximbank authorized loans to underdeveloped countries in excess of $1 billion.) The present Congress has just authorized an increase in Eximbank lending authority of $1 billion.

(2) U.S. Government has supported and will continue to support economic development activities of IBRD. U.S. Government has made its subscription freely available; has facilitated flotation of Bank bonds in U.S. capital market; has encouraged the Bank to give increased attention to economic development, to enlarge its technical assistance activities, to adopt flexible policies.

(3) U.S. Government has tried to stimulate private capital outflow by such measures as investment treaties, tax treaties, tax credits, and government guaranties against such risks as inconvertibility and expropriation. (At present time, guaranties against extraordinary risks of private foreign investment are made only by ECA. U.S. Executive asked 81st Congress to authorize guaranties by Eximbank to cover new private investments anywhere in free world but Congress did not act on proposal.) The net outflow of U.S. private long-term

capital to the underdeveloped countries in the period 1947–1950 has been approximately $2 billion.

(4) U.S. Government has supported ECOSOC proposal that IBRD explore desirability and feasibility of establishing an International Finance Corporation to promote the financing of productive private enterprise through loans without government guarantee, through equity investments, or by other appropriate means.

(5) U.S. Government has supported and will continue support technical assistance program of UN and OAS and will itself provide technical assistance on a bilateral basis where requested.

(6) U.S. Government recognizes that some underdeveloped countries whose internal resources and external borrowing capacity is limited require extraordinary aid to achieve momentum in the development process. Consequently President has requested and U.S. Congress will probably authorize grant aid funds for economic development, including technical assistance, of between $400–$500 million for this fiscal year. (Note that bulk of proposed grant aid is for Asia and Near East. Aid to Latin America will continue in form technical assistance and loans.)

(7) While first priority in the allocation of scarce goods must necessarily go to support the military effort, U.S. Government recognizes that economic development is an essential element in the total concept of "defense" of free world. Therefore the U.S. Government is assisting underdeveloped countries in obtaining priorities for equipment for economic development. One of the important functions of certain U.S. Government departments is to present the requirements of foreign countries to U.S. allocating and production authorities so that the needs of foreign countries both for maintaining essential civilian activities and for economic development can be met.

(8) U.S. mobilization policy is not restrictive but expansionist. We are expanding capacity at home and helping to expand it abroad so that the productive base can be established to support both an adequate defense establishment and the economic development requirements of the free world.

C. *U.S. position on non-self-liquidating projects and International Development Authority.*

(1) *Non-self-liquidating projects.* Many projects basic to economic development, such as irrigation and drainage systems, roads, etc., are not in themselves self-liquidating, i.e., they do not yield revenues directly either in domestic or foreign exchange to repay the costs of the investment although they do make an important indirect contribution to national income, productivity, export potential, etc. Underdeveloped countries claim that projects of this character cannot be financed by loans and require grant aid. In fact, both the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank have indicated their interest in and willingness to finance non-self-liquidating projects which contribute indirectly to increased productivity, and both institutions have in fact extended loans on many occasions to finance projects of this character, e.g., IBRD loans for road and telecommunications development in Ethiopia, power development in India, Export-

Import Bank loans for road development in Bolivia, irrigation works in Afghanistan, etc. Moreover, the improved balance of payments position and prospects of most underdeveloped countries has enhanced their ability to finance non-self-liquidating projects with their own resources as well as to assume larger debt obligations in order to accelerate investment in this field.

(2) *International Development Authority.* The U.S. Government is not prepared at this time to support the establishment of an international agency for the purpose of distributing grants. No organization can be truly international in character unless a sufficient number of countries are able to make effective and significant contributions to it. At the present time it would be unrealistic to assume that substantial contributions would be forthcoming from members of the United Nations generally to an international development authority such as has been proposed. Developed countries which were formerly substantial exporters of capital are not in a position now to provide additional funds for grant aid over and above their present commitments. In fact, many members of the International Bank have found it difficult to permit the Bank to use the funds they subscribed initially to the Bank's capital. Similarly, members of the United Nations have found it difficult to make substantial contributions to other international undertakings, such as the relief and reconstruction of Korea and the settlement of Palestine refugees. But, to be genuinely international should obviously be a prerequisite for any such development authority.

This does not mean that grant assistance will not be made available where needed. Many governments, including that of the U.S., have made available grant assistance for economic development over recent years and will doubtless continue to do so. Metropolitan powers have provided grant assistance for the economic development of their dependent territories. Members of the British Commonwealth have recently announced their intention to make grants-in-aid in support of the Colombo Plan, for the more rapid economic development of countries in the area of South and Southeast Asia. The President of the U.S. has requested and the Congress will shortly authorize the provision of grant funds for investment in such basic fields as agriculture, health, education and transport in underdeveloped countries that need extraordinary assistance.

This does mean that such grant aid as is likely to be made available in the foreseeable future can effectively be made available without creating new international agencies and without establishing grant aid as a normal feature of international cooperation.

Department would appreciate early response from you regarding 1) local government's views on U.S. position, and 2) instructions local government plans to give its delegation to G.A.

It may be helpful in your discussions with officials of the government to have data available which indicate that the country is, in fact, making economic progress and is receiving substantial international aid under established institutions. Department will airgram within next few days data where available and relevant on the specific country to which you are accredited relating to its improved financial and trade position, to the volume of external assistance country has received in postwar period, and other like information.

WEBB

320/9-1251

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 8, 1951.

DEAR SENATOR AUSTIN: Thank you for your most thoughtful and helpful letter on the problems of the forthcoming General Assembly. I agree entirely with the thought, which you express so well, that a really positive central theme for all of our chief activities at the Assembly is needed, and it seems clear to me also that the idea of freedom is necessarily a main element in that theme.

As you know, we have given a good deal of thought to a central theme for our work in the Assembly—in fact, we began our consideration of the General Assembly program in that way. We recognize that, although it is possible to relate all our major objectives to a single idea or formula, a fully effective presentation will require considerable stress on at least several major ideas. One of these is certainly freedom; and as you say, our general program is certainly to enlarge freedom everywhere. However, we believe it is evident that much stress needs to be given also to the ideas of national security, of peace and of human welfare, particularly economic welfare. For example, we must not permit the Russians to appear to be the exponents and defenders of peace. In my mind, therefore, each of these ideas needs to receive great stress, according to circumstances, in our major activities in the Assembly.

Of course, a question arises concerning the most effective method of presentation. I agree with you that there is much that we can do in the Secretary's speech and in all our major pronouncements to relate our activities to central themes. Moreover, these central themes can and should be used in the preparation of our statements in the non-political committees so as to relate our positions on individual points to our large objectives. Of course, I agree with you that our emphasis must be on acts, not on mere words, and I take it that the record of the United States has been and is such that we can make this kind of presenta-

tion without difficulty. As to the specific comments contained in your letter, I believe members of your staff are now receiving or will receive our position papers which reflect the Department's thinking in some detail.

With respect to the economic and social themes, while we agree that we should, if possible, advance proposals of more substance than those which you have seen, it is nevertheless extremely difficult to do so in the light of the present temper of Congress.

We have, however, found your particular suggestions very useful and, in fact, it is at present contemplated that several of them will be incorporated into the instructions to the delegation.

As to the first suggestion, we are planning to make a strong speech in support of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies' Technical Assistance program and to make several proposals to liberalize and strengthen it. We will call for general support and contributions by all countries.

It is impossible to give United States support to the proposal for the International Development Authority, owing to the present attitude of Congress. We agree that this will be a particularly difficult issue in the Second Committee. We will, however, show our interest in the development of more concrete plans for an International Finance Corporation.

We plan, in connection with our technical assistance speech, to give particular support to schemes such as the Community Development Employment plan to which you refer. We believe that such schemes: (*a*) are effective as techniques to channel assistance into a country; (*b*) reach down to the popular level and bring the organizations effectively to the attention of the "Man in the street"; and (*c*) throw desirable emphasis upon self help.

The Department recognizes the desirability of reconsidering its position on price stabilization. It is possible that a new line may be taken at this Assembly, if the necessary interdepartmental clearances can be obtained in time to do so.

After discussing the ECA productivity proposal briefly with the officers of ECA most familiar with the matter, it appears that the plan is so closely tied up with the industrial countries and with Europe that it would not make a particularly suitable theme of the Assembly.

The Department has noted Mr. Lubin's [1] recent cable from Geneva in which he suggested the undesirability of the United States placing too much emphasis on anti-Soviet propaganda themes and in which he suggested the desirability of examining the subject of food and famine as a possible issue on which the United States might take a positive

[1] Isador Lubin, United States Representative on the Economic and Social Council.

position. We are giving this matter active consideration and discussing it with other interested agencies.

I am pleased to see the free and active collaboration between your staff and the staff of UNA in the interchange of ideas and in the other preparations for the Assembly. We shall be glad to receive any further papers or ideas on the individual subjects which you or your staff may have in mind.

During these final weeks of preparation, much depends upon the pre-Assembly consultations on the agenda items which your staff has started with other Delegations, particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.[2] I am most anxious that this program of consultations move ahead rapidly and that the consultations broaden out to include a large number of representative delegations. As you know, progress on many of the subjects depends upon securing agreement of other friendly delegations. In this way, your staff is performing a most essential function in our Assembly preparations.

I am looking forward to discussing these matters with you in more detail in person soon.

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

[2] The Department of State central indexed file 320 has a complete file of the many and multisubject telegrams from USUN to the Department on these consultations, as well as with representatives of other countries.

320/10–1551

The United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Paris, November 6, 1951 [1]

*Representatives:**

The Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
The Honorable Warren R. Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations and United States Representative in the Security Council
The Honorable Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The Honorable Michael J. Mansfield, House of Representatives
The Honorable John M. Vorys, House of Representatives
The Honorable Philip C. Jessup, United States Ambassador-at-Large

Alternate Representatives:

The Honorable John Sherman Cooper
The Honorable Ernest A. Gross
The Honorable Benjamin V. Cohen
The Honorable Anna Lord Strauss
The Honorable Channing H. Tobias

[1] Source text was Tab A of memorandum from Assistant Secretary Hickerson to the Secretary of State, October 15, 1951, not printed (320/10–1551).

*In the absence of the Secretary, Ambassador Austin serves as Chairman. [Footnote in the source text.]

320/10–2451

Committee Assignments for Members of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 6, 1951 [1]

REPRESENTATIVES

The Secretary
- Chairman of Delegation
- General Debate
- Chinese Representation
- Atomic energy and armaments

Ambassador Austin
- Chairman of Delegation in absence of Secretary
- General Committee
- Korea (Political)
- *Soviet Item (including World Peace Council)
- *Formosa

Mrs. Roosevelt
- Committee 3

Ambassador Jessup
- Assist the Secretary on atomic energy and armaments
- CMC
- Palestine

Representative Vorys
- Committee 5
- Korean relief and rehabilitation
- *Revision of Italian Peace Treaty
- *Burma

Representative Mansfield
- Committee 2
- Membership
- *Austrian Peace Treaty

ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES

Senator Cooper
- Yugoslav Item
- German Elections
- China (Political Independence and Territorial Integrity)
- *International regime for Jerusalem

Ambasador Gross
- Libya
- Morocco
- Report of SC
- Assistance to Secretary on Chinese Representation
- *Anglo-Egyptian question

Dr. Tobias
- Lie Peace Plan
- Information from non-self-governing territories (Committee 4)
- Land Reform (Committee 2)
- Famine and Food Shortages (Committee 2)
- Freedom of Information (Oatis) (Committee 3)

Miss Strauss
- Public Relations (including non-governmental organizations)
- Joint Committee 2 and 3 (except Korean relief)
- Indians in South Africa
- *Eritrea

Mr. Cohen
- Committee 6
- Greece
- *Kashmir

Ambassador Sayre
- Committee 4

[1] Source text was an attachment to a memorandum of October 24, 1951 from Assistant Secretary Hickerson to the Secretary of State, not printed (320/10–2451).

*Items not listed on Provisional Agenda. [Footnote in the source text.]

320/10–1551

The Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 6, 1951 [1]

Advisers:

1. Allen, Ward P.
   Acting United Nations Adviser, Office of European Affairs.
2. Arneson, R. Gordon
   Special Assistant to the Secretary.
3. Badger, Vice Admiral O. C.
   U.S. Navy Representative, Military Staff Committee.
4. Bancroft, Harding F.
   Deputy U.S. Representative on the UN Collective Measures Committee.
5. Barco, James W.
   Acting Deputy Representative of the U.S. on the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
6. Bolté, Charles G.
   USUN.
7. Clark, Lewis
   U.S. Representative on the UN Advisory Council for Libya.
8. Cory, Thomas J.
   Foreign Service Officer, USUN.
9. Crittenberger, Lt. General Willis D.
   U.S. Army Representative and Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee.
10. Dreier, John C.
    U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States.
11. Fisher, Adrian S.
    Legal Adviser.
12. Gerig, Benjamin O.
    Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs.
13. Green, James F.
    Deputy Director, Office of UN Economic and Social Affairs.
14. Hall, William O.
    Director, Office of International Administration and Conferences.
15. Harmon, Lt. General Hubert R.
    U.S. Air Force Representative, Military Staff Committee.
16. Hyde, James N.
    Deputy U.S. Representative on the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, USUN.

[1] Source text was Tab D of memorandum of October 15 from Assistant Secretary Hickerson to the Secretary of State, not printed (320/10–1551).

17. Kellogg, Edmund H.
    Officer in Charge, United Nations Economic Affairs, Office of UN Economic and Social Affairs.
18. Kirk, Alan G.
    American Ambassador, Moscow.
19. Laise, Carol C.
    Division of International Administration.
20. Lubin, Isador
    U.S. Representative on the UN Economic and Social Council.
21. Maffitt, Edward P.
    Foreign Service Officer, USUN.
22. Maktos, John
    Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.
23. Mangano, Philip A.
    Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
24. McKay, Vernon D.
    Office of Dependent Area Affairs.
25. Meeker, Leonard C.
    Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.
26. Meyers, Howard
    Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
27. Nash, Frank C.
    Assistant to Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.
28. Nolting, Frederick E.
    Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary.
29. Palmer, Ely E.
    U.S. Representative on the UN Conciliation Committee for Palestine.
30. Palmer, Joseph II
    First Secretary of Embassy, London.
31. Patterson, Jefferson
    Foreign Service Officer, UN Special Committee on the Balkans.
32. Phillips, Richard
    Second Secretary of Embassy, Caracas.
33. Plitt, Edwin A.
    Senior UN Adviser to Assistant Secretary of State for NEA.
34. Ross, John C.
    U.S. Deputy Representative in the Security Council and Acting U.S. Deputy Representative in the Atomic Energy Commission.
35. Sandifer, Durward V.
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs.

36. Sayre, Francis B.
    U.S. Representative on the UN Trusteeship Council.
37. Simsarian, James
    Assistant Officer in Charge, UN Cultural and Human Rights Affairs, Office of UN Economic and Social Affairs.
38. Stein, Eric
    Acting Officer in Charge, Pacific Settlement Affairs, Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.
39. Stibravy, William J.
    Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy.
40. Utter, John
    Second Secretary of Embassy, Paris.
41. Wainhouse, David W.
    Director, Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.

Congressional Staff Advisers:

42. Crawford, Boyd
    Staff Administrator and Clerk, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives.
43. Wilcox, Francis O.
    Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate.

Principal Executive Officer:

44. Taylor, Paul B.
    Acting Officer in Charge, General Assembly Affairs, Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.

Assistant:

45. Gough, Betty
    Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.

Assistants to Representatives:

46. Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary.
47. Shulman, Marshall, Special Assistant to the Secretary.
48. Evans, Barbara, Secretary to Secretary Acheson.
49. Mills, William, Assistant to Ambassador Austin.
50. Thompson, Malvina, Assistant to Mrs. Roosevelt.
51. Thompson, Josephine, Secretary to Ambassador Austin.
52. Pollak, Louis H., Assistant to Ambassador Jessup.

Secretariat:

53. Winslow, Richard S.
    Secretary General, USUN.
54. Brown, Benjamin H.
    Deputy Secretary General, USUN.

Information Officers:

55. McKeever, Porter
Director, Office of Public Information, USUN.

Assistants:

56. Clucas, Lowell, USIE.
57. Haney, Robert, USIE.
58. Hansen, Lt. Col. K. K., Defense.
59. MacVane, John, USUN.
60. Norberg, Charles or Hansen, Lt. Col. Chester K., CIA.
61. Roberts, Edward V., USIE.
62. Singer, Jeanne, USUN.
63. Williams, Chester, USUN.
64. Wood, Lt. Col. Glenn Harland, Defense.

320/10–1551

Operational and Topical Assignments for the Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 6, 1951 [1]

Delegates:

11 Representatives and Alternate Representatives*

Senior Advisers:

John C. Ross
Durward V. Sandifer

Economic Adviser:

Isador Lubin

Legal Adviser:

Adrian S. Fisher

Trusteeship Adviser:

Francis B. Sayre

Principal Executive Officer:

Paul B. Taylor
Betty C. Gough, Special Assistant

Committee I (Political and Security):

David W. Wainhouse, Executive Officer

Ad Hoc Political and Security Committee:

Eric Stein, Executive Officer

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[1] Source text was Tab C of memorandum of October 15 from Assistant Secretary Hickerson to the Secretary of State, not printed (320/10–1551).

*When the Secretary is present, one Representative will serve as Alternate and one Alternate as Adviser. [Footnote in the source text.]

Advisers:

Charles G. Bolté
James N. Hyde
Ambassador Alan G. Kirk
Philip A. Mangano
Leonard C. Meeker
Howard Meyers

Ad Hoc Advisers:

Harding F. Bancroft (Collective Measures)
Jefferson Patterson (Balkan Commission)
James W. Barco (Palestine Commission)
Ely E. Palmer (Palestine Commission)
Lewis Clark (Libyan Commission)
Frank C. Nash (Armaments)
R. Gordon Arneson (Armaments)

Committee II (Economic and Financial):

Edmund H. Kellogg, Executive Officer
William J. Stibravy

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural):

James F. Green, Executive Officer
James Simsarian

Committee IV (Trusteeship):

Benjamin O. Gerig, Executive Officer
Vernon D. McKay

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary):

William O. Hall, Executive Officer
Carol C. Laise

Committee VI (Legal):

John Maktos

Area Advisers:

Europe:

Frederick E. Nolting
Ward P. Allen
John E. Utter
Thomas J. Cory

Far East:

Amb. David M. Key
Ruth E. Bacon

Near East:

Edwin A. Plitt
Joseph Palmer II

Latin America:
John C. Dreier
Edward P. Maffitt
Richard I. Phillips

Military Advisers:
Vice Admiral O. C. Badger
Lt. General Willis D. Crittenberger
Lt. General Hubert R. Harmon

Congressional Staff Advisers:
Francis O. Wilcox (subject to possible change)
Boyd Crawford

Information Officers:
Porter McKeever
Assistants:
John MacVane
Chester Williams
Jeanne Singer
Charles Norberg or Lt. Col. Chester Hansen
Lt. Col. Glenn Harland Wood
Lt. Col. K. K. Hansen
Edward V. Roberts
Lowell Clucas
Robert Haney

Assistants:
to the Secretary of State
Lucius D. Battle
Marshall S. Shulman
Barbara Evans
to Mrs. Roosevelt
Malvina Thompson
to Ambassador Jessup
Louis H. Pollak
to Ambassador Austin
William Mills
Josephine Thompson
to Representative Mansfield
_____ (if named)
to Representative Vorys
_____ (if named)

Supporting Staff:
To be presented at a later date when nominations are complete.

320/11–2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council and Senior Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Ross)

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 21, 1951.

Subject: Secretary's Conversation with Mr. Trygve Lie

Participants: Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations
The Secretary of State
Mr. John Ross
Mr. Lucius Battle

Mr. Lie called on the Secretary by appointment at the Embassy at 9:30 this morning and stayed for about twenty minutes.

Mr. Lie said that the two major obstacles he encountered in his work were (*a*) Soviet Communism and (*b*) American isolationism.

He felt that the United Nations must go at "convoy speed", that is, that the convoy (The United Nations) should not go faster than the slowest ship (the United States).

He said that the Russians had suffered a series of defeats, namely, in Korea, at San Francisco, at Ottawa and at the beginning of this Assembly in Paris. He said he had an idea that the Russians wanted to make "contact" but in a face-saving manner.

Considering his responsibilities as Secretary General, Mr. Lie said he was trying to think of areas where "contact" might be established. In this connection he mentioned the German question and membership.

With regard to the German question the Secretary observed that he did not foresee any possibility of the Russians willingly sacrificing their position in East Germany; on the contrary, their effort was to establish a foothold in West Germany.

On the membership question Mr. Lie, stating his belief in the principle of universality of membership, wondered whether American public opinion would stand for the admission of the Soviet satellites at this time in return for the admission of such countries as Italy, Ireland and Finland. Mr. Lie felt there would be strong public opinion in the United States in favor of admitting the latter three states.

Mr. Ross indicated his belief that American public opinion was very strongly opposed to the admission of the Soviet satellites at this time. He felt that the only key to the membership question at this time was the admission of Italy. Mr. Lie doubted that the Italians would yield on the admission of Italy alone.

Mr. Lie felt that there was no harm in his continuing to try to find possible areas of "contact".

The principal purpose of Mr. Lie's call, as he himself quite frankly indicated, was to be in the position of having seen the Secretary, not having seen him for approximately a year past.

JOHN ROSS

II. PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER THE UNITED STATES–UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT OF 1947, AND RELATED MATTERS[1]

L/UNA Files,[2] Lot 62 D 205, "Passports; Procedures & Standards"

The Comptroller General of the United States (Warren) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to letter of October 27, 1950[3] (L/A) from the Deputy Under Secretary, requesting a decision as to whether there exists any fiscal impediment to the issuance of a passport visa without charge to a non-immigrant temporary visitor who comes within category 3, (4), or (5) of section 11 of the Headquarters Site Agreement between the United States and the United Nations, and who is not restricted to the Headquarters District and immediate vicinity in accordance with section 13 (*e*) of that Agreement.

Section 11 of the agreement referred to, as set forth in Joint Resolution of the Congress, Public Law 357, approved August 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 756, entitled "Agreement Between the United Nations and United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations" provides in pertinent part as follows:

"The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of . . . (3) representations of the press, or of radio, film or other information agencies, who have been accredited by the United Nations (or by such a specialized agency) in its discretion after consultation with the United States, (4) representatives of nongovernmental organizations recognized by the United Nations for the purpose of consultation under Article 71 of the Charter, or (5) other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations or by such specialized agency on official business. . . ."[4]

Section 13 (*a*) and 13 (*e*) provide that:

"(*a*) Laws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the entry of aliens shall not be applied in such manner as to interfere

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 46 ff.

[2] The L/UNA files are the working files of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, and are organized on an alphabetical subject basis. Documents in this compilation which carry the sole caption "L/UNA Files" are located in a folder entitled "Hdqtrs Agreement: Immigration (McCarran Act; Int. Sec. Act; Visas), Sec. 11 (secept 11 (4))—Sec. 14."

[3] Not printed.

[4] Omission indicated in the source text.

with the privileges referred to in Section 11. When visas are required for persons referred to in that Section, they shall be granted without charge and as promptly as possible.[5]

. . . . . .

"(*e*) The Secretary-General shall, at the request of the appropriate American authorities, enter into discussions with such authorities, with a view to making arrangements for registering the arrival and departure of persons who have been granted visas valid only for transit to and from the headquarters district and sojourn therein and in its immediate vicinity."

As to the instant matter it is stated that it is the opinion of your Department that, under the terms of the Headquarters Agreement, the United States is committed to issue visas without charge to persons coming within the categories listed in section 11, *supra*, thus enabling such persons to apply to the American Immigration and Naturalization authorities for admission into the United States for the duration of their status with the United Nations.

Section 11 of the Headquarters Site Agreement, quoted above, by its terms is for application to transit from and to the United Nations Headquarters District. Section 13(*a*) of the Agreement, also quoted above, specifically refers to "the privileges referred to in section 11." This Office concurs in the views expressed in the next to the last paragraph of your letter to the effect that collection of visa fees is not to be made from the persons in categories listed in section 11 who are to be limited in transit to the United Nations Headquarters District and to its immediate vicinity. Likewise, it reasonably may be concluded—from the fact that restrictive visas may, but need not, be issued—that a visa issued for the purpose of transit to the United Nations Headquarters Site, but not restricted as contemplated in section 13(*e*), would be for the purpose of exercising a privilege referred to in section 11 and would fall within the provision of section 13(*a*). If the visa is bona fide for the purpose of transit to the United Nations Headquarters District, the question as to whether in a given case a restriction should be incorporated therein is a matter for the decision of your Department.

Accordingly, it may be said that this Office would not be required to object to the issuance without charge of passport visas for transit to the United Nations Headquarters Site to persons in the categories referred to in your letter merely because said visas were not restricted as they might be pursuant to section 13(*e*) of the Headquarters Site Agreement.

Sincerely yours, LINDSAY C. WARREN

[5] The following omission indicated in the source text.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of International Administration and Conferences (Hall) to the Legal Adviser (Fisher)

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1951.

Subject: McCarran Act[1]—Possible Conflict with Headquarters Agreement

In conversation with Abe Feller[2] in New York recently he expressed the view that the regulations which have been issued under the McCarran Act make it fairly clear to him that there is likely to be some conflict between that Act and the way in which it is being interpreted and the Headquarters Agreement. He expressed the view that in the event of such conflict the UN secretariat would be forced to resort to the arbitration procedure under the Agreement. He stated he thought this would be very unfortunate and wondered whether any consideration was being given to a general amendment to the McCarran Act which would waive its provisions so far as it conflicted with international obligations or international agreements. I told him I did not know whether any amendments were under consideration but that I would bring his view to your attention.[3]

Mr. George Ingram[4] informs me that this is an unrealistic proposal and that in his view there is no possibility of conflict because of the national security provision in the Headquarters Agreement.[5] I believe it would be useful at some point for you or Mr. Jack Tate[6] or Mr. Leonard Meeker[7] to have a discussion with Mr. Feller on the subject of the McCarran Act and the Headquarters Agreement in order to avoid future misunderstanding.

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[1] The Internal Security Act of 1950, enacted September 23, 1950 (64 Stat. 987). For documentation regarding the impact of this statute upon the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 896 ff.

[2] Abraham H. Feller, General Counsel and Principal Director, Legal Department, United Nations Secretariat.

[3] The need for revision of the act was under study in fact by the Department of State's Policy Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (PIN). The problem became merged subsequently in that of the proposed McCarran–Walter legislation to provide a completely new immigration and naturalization law (S. 716).

[4] Chief of the Division of International Administration.

[5] There were two annexes to the Headquarters Agreement, and the national security reservation (Section 6) occurs in Annex 2 which reads in part: "Nothing in the agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity." The reservation further provided that nothing in the agreement "shall be construed to amend or suspend in any way the immigration laws of the United States or to commit the United States in any way to effect any amendment or suspension of such laws." (61 Stat. 767, 768)

[6] Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser.

[7] Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.

L/UNA Files

Draft Principal Witness Statement For Use Before a Congressional Committee

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

Assistant Secretary McFall [1] has submitted by letter the request of the Department of State for certain changes in S. 716. The majority of those requests are of a technical nature and the representatives of the Visa and Passport Divisions are prepared to testify in detail on them if the Committee wishes to hear them. I am here to present in greater detail, if the Committee wishes to have them, the Department's comments on the first change proposed by Mr. McFall's letter, a change dealing with the law governing the admission of three groups of individuals associated with the United Nations:

representatives of the press, radio and similar information agencies;
representatives of non-governmental organizations associated with the UN;
persons invited by the UN or organs of the UN to appear.

The admission of these three groups of people as promptly as possible after their application for visas is important for the following reasons:

1. Failure to so admit them embarrasses the voicing of United States views on the freedom of the press and public information, and also embarrasses the voicing of U.S. views on freedom of movement with individuals in all nations.
2. To carry out the obligations of the U.S. under the Headquarters Site Agreement with the United Nations.
3. To counteract certain Russian policies and propaganda aimed at undermining the efforts of the United States to contribute to making the UN an effective international organization for security.

As the Bill is drafted these three groups of people may be admitted provided the Consul to whom they apply for visas recommends their admission and the Attorney General approves the recommendation. This procedure takes the place of the present Ninth Proviso procedure under which the Secretary of State recommends the admission to the Attorney General.[2] As the procedure envisaged by S. 716 would be more time-consuming than the present Ninth Proviso procedure and

[1] Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

[2] The "Ninth Proviso" occurs in the Act of February 5, 1917, captioned "An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States." (39 Stat. 874) There were 10 "provisos" to Section 3 of the Act (39 Stat. 877, 878). The ninth of these provided "That the Commissioner General of Immigration with the approval of the Secretary of Labor shall issue rules and prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission". For documentation regarding Ninth Proviso practice in 1950, within the concern of the Department of State, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 46 ff.

as the Department considers that the present Ninth Proviso procedure involves more delays than the Headquarters Agreement contemplated, it is considered desirable from a practical point of view as well as necessary under the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement to exempt these three groups of people from the exclusion and deportation provisions of the Bill to the same extent that representatives of foreign governments to the UN and officials of the UN are exempted from the exclusion and deportation provisions of the Bill.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum of Two Conversations, by Mr. Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney, Division of International Administration

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1951.

Subject: Elimination of any requirement of Ninth Proviso action in any case covered by Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement with the UN

Participants: Mr. Ingram—UNI
Mr. Kerry—UNI
(1) April 3, 1951: Congressman Francis E. Walter (D., Pa.), Chairman, Subcommittee, Immigration and Naturalization;
(2) April 4, 1951: Congressman Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), Senior Minority Member.

(1) Mr. Ingram gave Mr. Walter a copy of Secretary General Lie's note protesting delays in the admission of the Polish newspaper correspondent Brodski. Mr. Ingram explained that the note in the Brodski case was not strictly responsive to the Committee's request for the views of the SYG on the effect of the *Internal Security Act of 1950* on U.S. obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, as the General Assembly had never addressed itself to that question by formal resolution. The U.S. was very anxious to avoid, and heretofore had been successful in avoiding, any such formal action by the UN. Mr. Ingram summarized the adverse effects which delays in admission of persons coming under the Headquarters Agreement had had. Mr. Walter said that certain Committee members and Senator Ferguson, in particular, were disturbed over political activities which some correspondents admitted to attend sessions of the UN had carried on outside the Headquarters District. He assured Mr. Ingram that the Committee was very much concerned with the problem of United States obligations under the Headquarters Agreement and said that the State Department's proposed change to eliminate the necessity of Ninth Proviso action by the Attorney General was at the head of

the list of items which the Committee would consider in Executive Session.

(2) Mr. Ingram handed Mr. Case copies of the papers he had given to Mr. Walter the previous day and again explained the nature of the SYG's note in the Brodski case. Mr. Ingram then summarized the difficulties involved when Ninth Proviso action is required. Mr. Case inquired as to what security measures, other than those taken by the Attorney General, were taken in connection with the accreditation and admission of correspondents generally.

Mr. Ingram explained the accreditation procedure as follows: when a correspondent applies to the UN for accreditation the UN requests the comments of the Department before acting on the application, and the Department then makes a review of any security information available in the Government before indicating whether or not it has any objection to the accreditation of the applicant. Upon being accredited by the UN, the correspondent applies for a visa and if the Consul has no information which indicates that the applicant is excludable, the visa is then issued. If, however, either as a result of investigations by the Department or by the Consul, the applicant is found to be inadmissible (by reason only of Section 2 of Section 22 of the *Internal Security Act*), Ninth Proviso action is then requested of the Attorney General. The Attorney General may then either admit the alien in reliance solely upon the Secretary of State's certification that admission of the alien is in the national interest or may conduct his own security investigation and then determine whether or not to admit the alien.

Mr. Ingram pointed out that this procedure was excessively time consuming in all cases and that the elimination of Ninth Proviso action was only one aspect of the problem of eliminating delay in the accreditation and admission of correspondents. He said that under the consultation agreement pursuant to which the UN requests the comment of the U.S. on applications before accrediting correspondents, the U.S. has two weeks in which to make its comments, but that, because of the great workload now imposed on agencies involved in making security checks, the accreditation procedure now took from six weeks to three months. Despite this delay the UN, to date, has not accredited any correspondents before receiving the comments of the U.S. In view of the delays which were involved it was, however, now giving consideration to accrediting correspondents at the end of two weeks consultation period whether or not U.S. comment had been made. He said that the Department was studying various possible means of eliminating these delays without reducing security standards and that revision of the entire accreditation procedure was under consideration. Mr. Case inquired under what circumstances correspondents were admitted subject to their being restricted to the

Headquarters District. Mr. Ingram replied that all of the correspondents who had been admitted by Ninth Proviso action had been restricted. Mr. Case then inquired whether it would be feasible to admit all correspondents promptly on a restricted basis and then to deal with the security question by post-audit. He pointed out that it would be necessary to have something like a restriction to provide the same incentive for prompt action in the case of a post-audit as is inherently present in the case of a pre-audit. Mr. Ingram said that the idea of admitting correspondents promptly, if the Consul to whom they applied for a visa did not have any information which would exclude them, was under consideration, but that it would be undesirable to restrict all correspondents even for a short time. Mr. Kerry pointed out that the incentive to promptly complete post-audits would be adequately provided if correspondents were initially accredited only for a period sufficient to complete a security check (about three months) and that under such a procedure it would probably be sufficient to restrict only certain correspondents. Mr. Case inquired as to what restrictions were imposed by Soviet and Iron Curtain countries on the movement of U.S. representatives resident there. Mr. Ingram pointed out the differences in the status of persons accredited to the UN in New York and persons accredited to the U.S. Government in Washington, D.C., and said that Curtain country representatives accredited to the U.S. were being restricted on a basis of reciprocity. Mr. Case concluded the interview by saying that he was very hopeful that the Committee could recommend some provisions which would satisfy the Department and be acceptable to the whole House and to the public.

340.1–AGB/5–751

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Legal Adviser (Fisher)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1951.

Subject: Attorney General's Proposal with Respect to Admission of Otherwise Excludable Aliens Covered by Section 11(3), (4) and (5) of the Headquarters Agreement with the UN

I understand that you have under consideration a proposal by the Attorney General to establish a procedure for the admission of certain otherwise inadmissable aliens covered by Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement which would relieve us of the necessity of making a separate application to the Attorney General in each case. It seems to me that it would be highly desirable if some agreement could be reached with the Attorney General for this purpose.

You are, of course, familiar with the Ninth Proviso cases which arose last fall after the enactment of the McCarran Act. The most recent Ninth Proviso case is that of Laura Diaz.

Laura Diaz applied in Rome on or before April 17 for a visa in order to attend meetings of the Social Commission in New York, as a representative of the WIDF, an NGO within the meaning of Section 11(4) of the Headquarters Agreement. The Social Commission convened on Monday, April 30, and is expected to adjourn on Friday, May 11. The Department was advised by the Attorney General shortly after noon, Wednesday, May 9, that the Attorney General had authorized the admission of Miss Diaz. Attached hereto, for your information, is a copy of a New York telegram which may already have come to your attention.[1]

JOHN D. HICKERSON

[1] New York telegram 1495, May 7, not printed.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by Mr. Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney, Division of International Administration, to Mr. Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1951.

Subject: Representatives of UN Non-Members Participating in the General Assembly: Privileges and Immunities, Visas

Privileges and Immunities

Representatives of various non-member governments acting as observers and in similar capacities at the UN have been considered entitled to the privileges and immunities which P. L. 291, 80th Congress,[1] makes available to "persons designated by foreign governments as their representatives in or to international organizations." It may therefore be considered settled that representatives of non-member governments invited by the General Assembly to participate in its proceedings in any manner contemplated in your draft position paper,[2] dated May 14, 1951, would be similarly entitled, provided they represent a government recognized by the U.S. It must be noted, however, that a difference of opinion exists within the Department as to whether representatives of a government not recognized by the U.S. would be thus entitled.

Sec. 7(*a*) of P. L. 291 provides:

"Persons designated by foreign governments to serve as their representatives in or to international organizations and the officers and

[1] The International Organizations Immunities Act, enacted December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 669).

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

employees of such organizations, and members of the immediate families of such representatives, officers, and employees residing with them, other than nationals of the United States, shall, insofar as concerns laws regulating entry into and departure from the United States, alien registration and fingerprinting, and the registration of foreign agents, be entitled to the same privileges, exemptions, and immunities as are accorded under similar circumstances to officers and employees, respectively, of foreign governments, and members of their families."

This provision has been construed to give to representatives of foreign governments, with respect to the subjects covered by Sec. 7(*a*), the same privileges and immunities as representatives of foreign governments accredited to the U.S.

It should be noted, however, that the subjects covered by Sec. 7(*a*) are only: entry, departure, alien registration, finger-printing and registration of foreign agents.

In addition to the foregoing privileges: Sec. 7(*b*) grants immunity from suits and legal process with respect to acts performed by representatives in their official capacities and Sec. 4 exempts salaries of representatives of foreign governments from U.S. income tax.

Diplomatic privileges and immunities are granted pursuant to Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement and can be extended only to resident representatives of Members and certain resident members of their staffs. Among privileges and immunities of representatives of Members which would not be available to representatives of non-members would be general immunity from legal process and immunity from arrest, exemption from personal property taxes, exemption from fees for driver licenses and automobile license plates, exemption from federal excise taxes and exemption from the New York city sales tax and the New York state fuel tax.

The representatives of non-members would be exempt from custom duties only on things brought with them at the time of original entry. They would therefore not have a continuing right to receive liquor and other items free of U.S. taxes.

I am informed that the exemption from the New York city hotel tax applies to all officials of all governments.

The foregoing does not attempt to deal in any respect with questions of rank and precedence and similar matters of Protocol.

Visas 3(7)

Sec. 7(*c*) of P.L. 291 amends Section 3 of the Immigration Act, approved May 26, 1924,[3] by providing for the entry into the U.S. of representatives of foreign governments in or to international organi-

[3] 43 Stat. 153.

zations covered by P.L. 291.[4] Representatives of non-member governments, which the U.S. recognizes, would be entitled to entry under that provision and, consequently, would not be excludable by Section 2(2) of the Immigration Act of Oct. 16, 1918,[5] as amended. In the opinion of VD representatives of governments not recognized by the U.S. would not be entitled to 3(7) visas. If this opinion were to prevail, the obligation to admit such representatives would have to be found in Sec. 11(5) of the Headquarters Agreement and they would have to make their entry under Sec. 3(3) of the 1924 Act. As such, they could, if excludable under Sec. 2(2) of the 1918 Act, be admitted only under the Ninth Proviso. As a practical matter, it would therefore follow that the representative of any non-member, which the U.S. does not recognize as a government, would not be admitted as promptly as other representatives of non-members.

[4] Section 3 of the 1924 Act undertook to define the term "immigrant". It also listed six categories of exceptions, that is, aliens who because of a certain status, occupation, etc., would not be defined as an immigrant within the meaning of the Act. The Act of 1945, in Section 7, as noted here, provided for another excepted category, representatives of foreign governments concerned with the activities of international organizations; persons in this group were issued what came to be known as 3(7) visas.

[5] 40 Stat. 1012. This statute was captioned "An Act to exclude and expel from the United States aliens who are members of the anarchistic and similar classes."

A/MS Files, Lot 53 D 291 (V), "Ninth Proviso"

Memorandum by Mr. William K. Ailshie of the Office of Consular Affairs [1]

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1951.

1. VD is not interested in accreditation cases unless a visa question is involved.

2. UNA may, so far as VD is concerned, inform USUN in all consultation–accreditation cases that if the applicant for accreditation is lawfully in the United States VD is not concerned with accreditation. INS (New York) can inform USUN if alien is in United States in lawful status.

[1] This memorandum was drafted to provide the views of the Office of Consular Affairs on a memorandum of May 17 written by Joseph S. Henderson of the Division of International Administration and which dealt with recommendations that were being formulated for the revision of procedure for the accreditation by the United Nations of newspaper correspondents (May 17 memorandum, 314.1/5–1751). On May 25 the two memoranda were forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) by the Director of the Office of International Administration and Conferences (Hall), with the comment that the Office of Consular Affairs had approved the Henderson memorandum "provided there is nothing therein inconsistent with a memorandum dated May 24, 1951 [instant] which he [Ailshie] has made a part of the file." (A/MS Files, Lot 53 D 291 (V), "Ninth Proviso")

3. If applicant for accreditation must apply for visa the case will be referred Department by consular officer for advisory opinion, as provided in outstanding instructions.

4. When advisory opinion requested by consular officer SY will make usual security check with FBI and CIA and Department's files.

5. SY will inform VD of results of security check.

6. VD will consult appropriate officers of Department and formulate advisory opinion, which will be routed through SY, CON and UNA.

7. UNA may then advise USUN regarding prospects visa issuance and whether there is any objection to accreditation.

8. USUN may then inform UN regarding prospects visa issuance, and whether there is any objection to accreditation.

9. When consular officer receives advisory opinion from Department he may act.

10. If advisory opinion favorable consular officer, in issuing visa, will charge usual visa fee, if any, unless evidence of accreditation by UN is presented by applicant.

11. If advisory opinion unfavorable visa will be withheld regardless of any accreditation action by UN.

12. If ninth proviso necessary before advisory opinion can be rendered VD will draft letter to Attorney General for ninth proviso authorization, provided responsible officers of Department agree to recommend ninth proviso action by Attorney General, routing through UNA.

13. UNA may inform USUN when ninth proviso request is made and USUN may then appropriately inform UN.

14. If responsible officers of Department decide that ninth proviso action will not be recommended UNA will be informed and may so inform USUN, which will register US objection to accreditation with UN.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by Mr. Albert F. Bender, Jr., of the United States Mission to the United Nations to Mr. Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney, Division of International Administration

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] May 28, 1951.

Subject: Recommended Revision of Procedure on Accreditation by UN of Correspondents

I wish to refer to my telephone conversations with you and Bill Hall of May 25 concerning the above-mentioned proposed revision of the accreditation procedure.

In my conversation with you I advised that the Mission was prepared to concur in the recommendations contained in your memorandum of May 17 entitled as above, subject to the comments contained in my memorandum to you of May 24 (which you said could be handled without difficulty),[1] and subject further to a clarification of certain items contained in Mr. Ailshie's memorandum of May 24. With reference to Ailshie's memorandum, I was particularly concerned about paragraph 4 which provided "When advisory opinion requested by consular officer SY will make usual security check with FBI, CIA and Department files." I stated that I believed it essential that we be informed concerning:

a. The number of cases in which it could be anticipated that advisory opinions might be requested by consular officers, in the light of past experience, and in view of the language contained in paragraph 13 of the Department's Circular Airgram of October 11, 1950 dealing with the Internal Security Act.

b. Whether it was anticipated that a complete security check would be made in the case of all requests for advisory opinions.

c. Why complete security checks should be made with respect to correspondents in cases in which consuls requested advisory opinions when such checks were not made when advisory opinions were asked concerning representatives of foreign Governments coming from the Soviet Union.

I was further concerned with the question of visa fees raised by paragraph 10 of Ailshie's memorandum, and believe that we should have a clarification as to whether or not visa fees would be demanded of correspondents coming to the U.S. for UN accreditation who had received visas prior to accreditation. In this connection I suggested that we ought ascertain whether or not it was possible to obtain a waiver of the visa fee if it were indicated that a correspondent was seeking UN accreditation or, if not, a refund of the fee after the correspondent had become accredited.

As I understood it, it was your opinion that USUN should not concern itself with Ailshie's memorandum, and should limit itself to concurrence or non-concurrence with your memorandum. I was unable to agree with this position.

In my subsequent conversation with Bill Hall he stated, I believe with your concurrence, that in the past advisory opinions had been requested by consuls in only about 10 percent of the cases of correspondents applying for visas and for accreditation by UN, and that about half of these cases had been handled without the necessity of a full security check. This would mean that in only about 5 percent of all correspondent cases had a full security check been necessary. Hall said

[1] The Bender memorandum of May 24 is filed under decimal number 314.1/5–2451.

that he had received assurance from Ailshie that present practices would remain unchanged, but pointed out of course that the percentage of cases requiring security checks might rise should there be an increase in the number of correspondents of dubious reputation who might seek UN accreditation. I advised Hall that this was the clarification which I had sought concerning paragraph 4 of Ailshie's memorandum.

I mentioned to Hall the matter of visa fees. He said he believed that there was a procedure for refunding visa fees, and that an inquiry would be made to establish whether or not this procedure could be applied to correspondents who received their UN accreditation after they had paid a fee to obtain a visa.

I also discussed with Hall the difference between the procedure with respect to a full security check adopted by the Department with reference to correspondents and that applied to alien governmental representatives to UN and Secretariat personnel. I pointed out that it had been my understanding that, in seeking to amend the new codification of the immigration laws to place the admission of persons covered by Sections 11(3), (4) and (5) of the Headquarters Agreement upon the same basis as persons covered by Sections 11(1) and (2), it had been the Department's position that there was no basis for discrimination among these categories of persons since all were covered by Section 11. Hall said that he felt that alien correspondents presented a greater source of danger to the U.S. than governmental representatives and Secretariat personnel and that, even if the proposed amendments to the immigration laws were adopted, the Department would be warranted in applying more stringent procedures with reference to the issuance of visas to correspondents than were applied to governmental representatives and Secretariat personnel. I said that I was somewhat dubious about this position.

I advised Hall, however, that in view of the foregoing clarification, USUN concurred in the recommendations contained in their memorandum of May 17. I pointed out nevertheless that, in order to secure UN's acquiescence in the revised accreditation procedure, we must be in a position to assure the UN that the percentage of cases in which the U.S. failed to give a final comment within 21 days would be kept to the barest minimum. I said I believed that, if UN were advised that the percentage would amount to as much as 10 percent of the cases, we would have great difficulty in selling the revised procedure.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by Mr. Albert F. Bender, Jr., of the United States Mission to the United Nations to Mr. Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney, Division of International Administration

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] May 29, 1951.

Subject: Recommended Revision of Procedure on Accreditation by UN of Correspondents

I would like to suggest the following with reference to the proposed revision of the accreditation procedure.

Assuming that the Department will require a full security check before commenting concerning certain accreditation applications, I believe that every effort should be made to have such security checks made on the highest priority basis. I believe that this should be done in view of the obligation assumed by the U.S. in entering into the Headquarters Agreement. A further reason is the fact that the accreditation procedure involves a most sensitive area, and experience has demonstrated that delays with respect to even a few correspondents creates ill will among practically all members of the UN Correspondents Association, even though the vast majority are not directly affected. (In this connection you are of course familiar with action taken by the UN Correspondents Association in the past.) Such a situation seriously embarrasses the best interest of the U.S. by antagonizing those on whom we must rely for a sympathetic presentation of our case in a critical period.

With respect to action by the Department of Justice in cases requiring use of the 9th Proviso, I understand that the Department is continuing its efforts to reinstate the "blanket 9th Proviso" procedure which existed formerly. Unless and until this is accomplished, I believe that representations should be made to the Department of Justice requesting that the highest priority should be given to handling 9th Proviso cases for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

I assume of course that every effort will be made to streamline the handling of correspondent cases within the Department.

I would suggest further that, in any instructions the Department may send to USUN concerning the negotiation of a revised accreditation procedure with UN, there might be included for our use with UN officials a statement of the Department's position concerning the responsibility that UN is expected to assume with respect to establishing the *bona fides* of applicants for accreditation. We have discussed this responsibility with UN from time to time, but I feel that it would be helpful for the Department to restate the criteria with which it expects UN to comply in the light of the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement. I have a feeling that the exertion of some pressure

on UN in this respect may result in our being faced with fewer problem cases in the future.

310.361/8–751

Memorandum by Mr. Albert F. Bender, Jr., of the United States Mission to the United Nations to Mr. Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney, Division of International Administration

[NEW YORK,] August 9, 1951.

Subject: Picketing in Front of Offices of Soviet Delegation to UN on August 2, 1951.

Enclosed herewith is a copy [1] of the official report of the New York City Police Authorities concerning an incident which occurred on August 2, 1951 in the course of picketing by the American-Hungarian Federation in front of the offices of the Delegation of USSR to UN at 680 Park Avenue. This is the incident referred to in the communication of August 6 from Nikolai Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to President Truman. I understand that the Department has also received from the Soviet Embassy a note protesting this incident.[2]

The enclosed report was furnished by the New York City Police Department in response to a request by the Mission for an investigation and a report concerning the incident. You will note that the report states that members of the police force present at the time of the incident failed to observe any evidence of assault or breach of the peace. With specific reference to a woman, Vilma P. Soos who was held temporarily by the police after the occurrence of the incident, the report states that "She had not, however, been observed by any witnesses or members of the department committing any violation of law." This portion of the report is in conflict with the account carried in the New York *Herald Tribune* of August 3 which states that "one of the Russians was hit on the back by an unidentified woman who apparently swung at him with a closed fist."

I have been advised by a UN Protocol Officer (Rodzianko) that, on August 7, Mr. Abram S. Shakhnazarov, Counselor of the USSR Delegation, described the incident to him. According to Shakhnazarov, the Soviet First Secretary, Polianski, was hit on the head with a "board", and was bleeding when he re-entered the Delegation building after the occurrence of the incident. Further, according to Shakhnazarov, in the course of the picketing, the persons acting as pickets directed obscene epithets in the Russian language at members of the Soviet

[1] Not printed.
[2] The Soviet Embassy note was dated August 7 (310.361/8–751).

Delegation who appeared outside the Delegation building. According to Shakhnazarov, the Delegation was extremely upset at the picketing and he stated that nothing similar ever occurred in the vicinity of Embassies and Legations in Moscow. He conceded that the members of the Soviet Delegation used strong language with respect to Americans in the course of UN meetings, but said that that was all part of the game and bore no relationship to the treatment to which Soviet Delegation members were subjected in the course of the picketing.

L/UNA Files, "Headquarters Agreement, General, Privileges and Immunities, 1948–1951"

Memorandum by Mr. H. Linde of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs [1]

MEMORANDUM ON PICKETING OF FOREIGN DELEGATIONS

1. The specific issue which gives rise to this memorandum is the extent of the obligation, if any, of the United States to protect the New York Headquarters of foreign delegations to the United Nations against disturbance by group demonstrations, specifically against picketing.

2. The problem has arisen out of complaints by the USSR Mission to the United Nations concerning incidents in front of the Mission's building at 680 Park Avenue, New York, on June 30, July 7, July 14, July 28, August 2 and August 4, 1951. The facts of these incidents appear as follows:

Undisputed facts: (Sources: Exchange of notes and *New York Times*)

Picketing of the USSR Mission at the above address was organized by the American-Hungarian Federation to protest against deportation of Hungarians to Russia. The New York police had been informed of the plans to picket the Mission and had apparently indicated no objection thereto but had sent additional personnel to the scene. The first few demonstrations involved no personal violence, although the Mission complained of noise, hostile shouts and damage to Mission limousines. The number of individuals participating in the demonstrations on the different dates seems to have varied from about 20 to 100. On the earlier occasions the Mission directed its objections to Amb. Austin. The present exchange of notes between the Embassy of the USSR and the State Department concerns the incident of August 2.[2]

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[1] Apparently this memorandum was drafted in three sections, on November 9, 14, and 15, respectively. An attached "Note on Possible Constitutional Limitations on Control of Picketing", not printed, was drafted on November 14. The memorandum was sent to USUN (Bender) under cover of an L/UNA memorandum of December 6, not printed.

[2] The notes hereunder reference are not printed.

Disputed facts:

As to this incident the two Soviet notes allege that two employees leaving the Mission were subjected to insults and threats from the pickets; that Mr. Polyanski, a First Secretary of the Mission, who followed them, was surrounded, insulted and threatened by about 10 demonstrators, three of whom hit him on the head with sticks, injuring him "in the region of his parietal bone"; that the police did nothing to protect Mr. Polyanski; that immediately after the incident a plainclothes officer, who came to the Mission, asked for—and was given—the name of the injured Russian and stated that the attacker was known to the police.

The Department's answer, based upon a report of the New York police, states that access to the building was adequately maintained by the police; that "the delay experienced by Mr. Polyanski in reaching his automobile" was due to his effort to force himself through the picket line; that no claim of injury to anyone was made when the plainclothes officer visited the Mission; and that the instructions given the New York police to keep a clear path from the building entrance to the curb constituted adequate measures for the protection of the Delegation.

There was also some disagreement by the Soviet and US notes on proximity of the pickets to the building entrance and whether, and from what date, the police undertook to keep the sidewalk clear.

The *New York Times* reported the incident of August 2 as follows:

"A Russian was thumped on the back last night by a woman marcher in an American-Hungarian Federation picket line in front of the office of the Soviet Union's United Nations delegation at 680 Park Avenue. Among the slogans on signs carried by the pickets was 'Rather hooligans than Communists'.

"The incident occurred during a two-hour demonstration when three Russians came out of the building at 7:15 p. m. and attempted to enter a car parked at the curb. Seven of the 150 pickets crowded the trio, booing, hissing and shouting: 'Stop the deportations', 'Stalin, you dirty dog', 'Gangsters' and 'Hooey'.

"Policemen rescued the Russians, two of whom departed in the car while the one who was hit turned back into the building.

"It was the first violence in six demonstrations by the group . . ."

3. The obligations of the United States towards delegations to the UN Headquarters in New York are governed by the Headquarters Agreement rather than by the customary international law concerning foreign representatives accredited to the United States Government. However, the applicable provision of the Headquarters Agreement, Section 15, entitles delegations to the United Nations ". . . in the territory of the United States to the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it." By that Agreement United States

practice as to ordinary diplomatic privileges and immunities has thus been made the measure of United States obligations towards UN delegations.* With reference to the present problem, then, it is necessary to establish the prior US position on picketing of buildings occupied by "diplomatic envoys accredited to it".

4. In general expositions of international law, picketing, which in the form familiar in the United States is a fairly recent phenomenon, has received little attention. It is mentioned, if at all, in connection with the security of the person and effects of envoys, or sometimes with the question of the privilege of foreign sovereigns and national ambassadors to be protected from insult and defamation. With the abandonment of common law rules of criminal libel and an increasing respect for freedom of speech, press and other expressions of popular opinion, the latter privilege retains only doubtful validity (but see E. D. Dickinson in 22 AJIL 840); but the former principle is unquestionably recognized. (A representative selection of discussions, with edition citations includes: Oppenheim, 7th Edit., Vol. I, p. 707; Hyde, 2d Edit., Vol. II, pp. 1249, 1252; Hackworth, Vol. IV, p. 511; Harvard Research in International Law, 26 AJIL Supp., p. 90; 31 AJIL 705.)

The Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of the Harvard Research, Art. 3(2), provides "A receiving state shall protect the premises occupied or used by a mission, or occupied by a member of a mission, against any invasion or other act tending to disturb the peace or dignity of the mission or of the member of a mission; provided that notification of such occupation or use has been previously given to the receiving state." (26 AJIL Supp. P. 50) On the specific application of this rule to picketing, the Comment states: "The special duty of protection of premises would include protection against crowds or mobs collected in the vicinity of the premises for the purpose of expressing abuse, contempt or even disapprobation of the sending state or of its mission, or of the members of the mission. A similar duty would seem to exist to protect such premises against so-called 'picketing,' this being an act tending to disturb the peace and dignity of the mission." (P. 56)

5. While this work, published in 1932 gives no authority for its propositions, the other sources quoted above cite as evidence of adoption of this view of picketing a 1937 United States statute which specifically prohibits the picketing of foreign missions in the District of Columbia: "It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government, party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into public disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government, party,

*Examination of the U.N. "legislative history" of the agreement sheds no further light on this problem. [Footnote in the source text.]

or organization, or to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into public disrepute any officer or officers or diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government, or to interfere with the free and safe pursuit of the duties of any diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government, within five hundred feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign government or its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation, consulate, or for other official purposes, except by, and in accordance with, a permit issued by the superintendent of police of the said District; or to congregate within five hundred feet of any such building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities of the said District. (Feb. 15, 1938, 52 Stat. 30, Ch. 29, Title 1.)

"The police court of the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction of offenses committed in violation of sections 22–1115, 22–1116; and any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of said section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment not exceeding sixty days, or both: *Provided, however*, that nothing contained in said section shall be construed to prohibit picketing, as a result of bona fide labor disputes regarding the alteration, repair or construction of either buildings or premises occupied for business purposes, wholly or in part, by representatives of foreign governments." (Feb. 15, 1938, 52 Stat. 30, Ch. 29, Title 2.) These sections are now in Title 22–1115 and Title 22–1116 of the District of Columbia Code.

It may be argued that this statute, of itself, makes protection from picketing one of the "privileges and immunities which the United States accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it" and to which the Missions in New York are, therefore, also entitled. On the other hand, the Statute is on its face only a local regulation of the District of Columbia. Consideration of collateral materials is relevant to determine whether and to what extent the Statute represents a recognition in United States practice of international privileges and immunities of foreign envoys.

6. The legislative history and judicial application of the Statute are sparse. There were no hearings before its adoption by Congress, and favorable committee reports in both Houses (S.R. No. 1072, H.R. 1516, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.) consist solely of reprints of a letter by Secretary of State Hull, urging passage for the following reasons:

"If we are to obtain for our representatives in foreign countries that degree of protection to which they are entitled, we should be in a position to show a like consideration for representatives of other governments in this country. Unless we extend such reasonable protection to representatives of other governments, we cannot hope to receive protection for our representatives abroad.

"It is extremely embarrassing to the Department to be reminded by representatives of foreign governments in the United States that their missions are being interfered with by individuals or groups, particularly when existing domestic law does not seem to cover the situations of which complaint is made. By the comity of nations, representatives of foreign governments in countries where law and order are supposed to prevail are entitled to freedom from any attempted intimidation or coercion."

During debate on the floor of the Senate, the Statute (then S.J. Res. 191) was in the hands of Senator Pittman. His statements elaborate the objectives stated in Secretary Hull's letter and indicate that the law was thought to be appropriate in execution of an international obligation toward foreign diplomats; but that the motive for its adoption at that time was the desire, not to live up to international law, but to assure the security from mob demonstrations of Americans abroad (Congress. Record Vol. 81, Pt. 8, pp. 8586 to 8593).

The purposes of the Statute were also considered in sustaining its constitutionality in the only case to bring it to an appellate court, *Frend* v. *United States*, 100 F. 2d 691 (CA D.C. 1938), cert. den. 306 US 640. (See separate note on First Amendment protection of the right to picket.) The Court found Congressional power both in the Constitutional provision for the Government of the District of Columbia, Art. 1, Sect. 8, Cl. 17, and in Cl. 10, which authorizes Congress to "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations." In Judge Groner's opinion, the Statute is squarely founded in the Law of Nations.

7. There is other evidence that the ban on picketing represents an American view of the rights of foreign representatives in the United States. When the British Embassy was picketed by Irish sympathizers April 2, 1920, an opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of State (by J. R. Baker, 1920 Vol. I, p. 395) concluded that the British Chargé had been insulted "in violation of the Law of Nations" and recommended prosecution under Sect. 4062 R.S., which applied only to assaults in violation of that law. (Now 18 U.S.C. 112)

In 1937 the Secretary of State, in answer to an inquiry from a group proposing to picket the Japanese Embassy, asked them to refrain from doing so; he did not refer to international law (Press Release of August 26, 1937). When in the same year Congress, in response to the increasing practice of picketing Axis Missions here, passed the Statute discussed above, a commentator in the American Journal of International Law welcomed the law as a fulfilment of American obligations under international law. E. C. Stowell: "It is to be regretted that the application of this remedial legislation is limited to the District of Columbia. The responsibility of the Federal Government is as broad as our national jurisdiction. . . . In an effort to escape

responsibility, it will not avail to plead lack of legislative sanction, since Congress might well have enlarged the scope of the anti-picketing resolution."—Art. I, Sect. 8, Cl. 10, of the Constitution. (32 AJIL 344.)

8. It has been pointed out that, in view of the recent development of picketing, it is doubtful that there has developed a rule which obligates a receiving government to prevent picketing as such (Preuss, "Protection of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Premises against Picketing", 31 AJIL 705). But, in the absence of such a general rule it may still be concluded that in United States law and practice protection from picketing has been recognized as a privilege to be accorded envoys accredited to this Government. If so, it remains to establish the extent of the privilege for the purpose of its application, under the Headquarters Agreement, to foreign United Nations missions in New York.

9. *Suggested Conclusions:* On the basis of the foregoing facts and the additional note on constitutionality,[3] the following conclusions are suggested:

The Headquarters Agreement does not entitle U. N. Missions in New York to the exact equivalent of the District of Columbia's anti-picketing statute. As Sec. 15 of the Agreement guarantees missions certain rights, not in New York City, but "in the territory of the United States", it is reasonable to assume that the section means "the same privileges and immunities . . . as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it" *in the territory of the United States.* The anti-picketing statute, of course, only applies in the District of Columbia.

The specific provisions of that statute go beyond the extent of an established United States recognition of an international diplomatic "privilege against picketing". The evidence examined above, including the statute, nevertheless indicate some such recognition in United States practice. Application of this practice in the present situation requires the development of more particular standards based on considerations of law and policy.

On the one hand, in this country the "right to picket" has won both legal and ideological recognition. The Department should naturally be slow to seek restrictions on a privilege so closely related to our basic democratic premises. In view of the constitutional question, recourse to formal legislation should certainly be avoided.

On the other hand, the privileged position of picketing is a consequence of its function as an agency of public information. The right should be thought of as one of demonstrating the viewpoint of a seg-

[3] The "Note on Possible Constitutional Limitations . . ." is not printed. The final paragraph of the memorandum reads: "It must be concluded from the above that it is impossible to state flatly any definite rules concerning the constitutionality of steps which might be taken to restrict the New York pickets."

ment of American public opinion rather than of badgering an "adversary". Neither law nor policy extends its favors to picketing by unreasonably large numbers or attended by shouting or other noise and the physical annoyance of mission personnel. The constitutionality of narrowly formulated police standards governing the number of pickets permitted in a given area, the required distance from the building, and orderly conduct is virtually certain. Ideologically, the right of Americans to express to representatives of foreign governments their opinions of the policies of those governments must be balanced by recognition of the fact that the missions in New York are there to represent their nations, not in the United States, but in the United Nations; that the position of the American people in this instance is that of a privileged host, not of a party to normal international intercourse.

The standards to be applied in New York should probably be stricter than those appearing from the police and press reports, though not as stringent as those in the D.C. Code. Specifically, the group picketing at any time should, with due regard to the size of the premises, be limited to a reasonable number—certainly considerably less than the maximum of over 100 reported from New York. Shouting or noise of any kind should be avoided in consideration of working conditions in the mission buildings. Finally, there should be no "name-calling" posters which communicate nothing but abusive epithets. Enforcement of such standards would demonstrate our determination to extend appropriate protection to our U.N. guests without infringing any of our popular liberties.

L/UNA Files, Lot 62 D 205, "Passports: Procedures and Standards"

Memorandum by Mr. Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney, Division of International Administration

[WASHINGTON, October 12, 1951.]

PASSPORT LAWS AND THE POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE TRAVEL ABROAD OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS

1. AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DENY PASSPORTS

The authority of the President, with respect to the granting, denial or restriction of passports implicit in his power to conduct foreign relations, has been delegated to the Secretary of State by Executive Order 7856, March 31, 1938 (F.R. Doc. 38–953; F.R. Apr. 2, 1938). The right of the Secretary of State, to grant or withhold a passport as the public interest requires, has been recognized by the Attorney General

(23 Op. Atty. Gen. 509) and by the Supreme Court (see *Perkins* v. *Elg*, 307 U.S. 325 at 349).

2. AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DENY DEPARTURE

The Act of May 22, 1918 (40 Stat. 559) provided that when, in time of war, the President found the restrictions of departure and entry (provided for otherwise by the Act itself) were inadequate, the President could impose additional restrictions by proclamation. Criminal penalties for the violation of restrictions thus proclaimed were provided.

The Act of June 21, 1941 (55 Stat. 252) amended the 1918 Act by broadening the authority of the President to proclaim the restrictions authorized by the 1918 Act, and specifically gave the President authority to issue such a proclamation during the national emergency proclaimed by him on May 27, 1941.

3. LAWS AND REGULATIONS PRESENTLY IN FORCE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEPARTURE OF U.S. CITIZENS

The President, on November 14, 1941 issued the proclamation authorized by the above cited statutory provisions (Proclamation 2523, 55 Stat. 1696).

The 1918 Act provides:

"That after such proclamation as is provided for by the preceding section has been made and published and while said proclamation is in force, it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States unless he bears a valid passport. (May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559.)"

The Presidential proclamation delegated to the Secretary of State authority to make regulations concerning entry and departure of citizens and aliens in accordance with the rules, regulations and orders prescribed in the proclamation. Subsequently, on November 25, 1941, by Department Order 1103 (F.R. 6069) the Secretary of State published such regulations. These regulations reiterated the general rule that no citizen of the United States shall depart from the United States unless he bears a valid passport, and provided the exceptions authorized by the statute. The only exception relevant to the case of United States citizens employed by the UN, who have been denied passports, is that which provides: "No valid passport shall be required of a citizen of the United States . . . when specifically authorized by the Secretary of State, through appropriate official channels to depart from or enter into the continental United States. . . ." (22 C.F.R. 53.2).

4. THE OBLIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO PERMIT DEPARTURE OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS EMPLOYED BY THE UN

In a memorandum, dated August 17, 1948, L gave an opinion, in response to a request from Mr. Sandifer,[1] concerning the obligation of the United States:

(1) to issue passports to U.S. citizens, employed by the UN, proposing to travel abroad on official UN business;
(2) to issue passports to U.S. citizens accredited by the UN as correspondents when proposing to proceed abroad to cover the General Assembly in Paris;
(3) to permit the departure, without passports, of U.S. citizens employed by the UN;
(4) to permit the departure, without passports, of U.S. citizens accredited by the UN as journalists.

With respect to U.S. citizens employed by the UN, it was the opinion of L that the U.S. was obliged to permit them to depart by virtue of the provisions of Art. 105 of the UN Charter, and that "the United States is obligated to issue a passport to such an official for travel unless the United States amends the laws and regulations, referred to above, so as to permit the official's departure without a passport."

L took the view that, although Sec. 11 of the Headquarters Agreement was drafted primarily with reference to aliens, that it in fact covered U.S. nationals as well. With respect to the departure of U.S. citizens employed by the UN, the question, however, was treated as moot since L had previously, in the same opinion, found an obligation, to permit the departure of U.S. nationals, in Article 105 of the UN Charter. Section 11 was the only basis upon which, in the case of journalists, an affirmative answer could have been based on legal grounds. The opinion of L recommended that, with respect to journalists, the legal issues involved be avoided by permitting the journalists to depart as a matter of policy.

The provisions of Art. 105 of the UN Charter clearly apply to aliens as well as to U.S. nationals. Neither the Charter nor Article 105 of the Charter is subject to any express right of the U.S. to safeguard its security. Mr. Meeker, L/UNA, has indicated, however that he considers it clear that Art. 105 of the UN Charter is subject to an implied right of the U.S. to safeguard its security. If this view is accepted, it may be possible to consider the Headquarters Agreement, despite reservation 6, as a partial implementation, in the manner contemplated

[1] Durward V. Sandifer, in 1948 Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, and in 1951 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. The 1948 memorandum is not printed.

by Art. 105, of the privileges and immunities therein provided for.[2] The only effect then in relying exclusively on Art. 105, in the case of UN employees, and in not invoking Sec. 11 of the Headquarters Agreement, is that the case of UN employees is not a precedent in the case of journalists, and the case of journalists and others not covered by Art. 105 remains undecided for the time being.

5. THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950 ON PASSPORT POLICIES OF THE DEPARTMENT

Sec. 6(b) of the *Internal Security Act of 1950* provides:

"When an organization has registered, or there is in effect final order of the Board requiring an organization to register as a Communist action organization, it shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to issue a passport to, or renew the passport of, any individual knowing or having reason to believe that such individual is a member of such organization."

The foregoing provision was apparently drafted with reference to the premise stated in Section 2 of the Act under the heading: "Necessity for Legislation" that "travel of Communist members, representatives and agents from country to country facilitates communication and is a prerequisite for the carrying on of activities to further the purposes of the Communist movement." The registration procedure contemplated by the Act has not yet come into existence. Mrs. Shipley,[3] however, inquired through Mr. McFall as to the desirability of giving these provisions interim effect through an exercise of the discretion of the Secretary of State to deny passports. Upon being advised of the desirability of such action, Mrs. Shipley inquired of L, by memorandum dated November 16, 1950,[4] concerning the denial of passports to certain United States citizens who were journalists. In an opinion, dated February 5, 1951,[5] L noted that it had been the policy of the Department, for some time, to refuse passports to Communists, but that an exception had been made in the case of journalists

[2] In implementation of Articles 104 and 105 of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly of the United Nations on February 13, 1946, adopted a resolution (Resolution 22 (I), Part A) which incorporated the text of a General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and which was recommended to Member States for adoption. The United States had never acceded to the convention, a matter for constant discussion both within the U.S. Government itself and between the United States and the United Nations (documentation regarding this is found in volume I of *Foreign Relations*, 1946–1948 and volume II for 1949–1950). Because the United States had not ratified the General Convention (as it was known, in contrast to the 1947 convention regarding the locating of the Seat of the United Nations in the United States, which was spoken of as the Headquarters Agreement), the privileges and immunities of the United Nations as recognized by the United States derived from two other sources: the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 and the Headquarters Agreement of 1947.

[3] Mrs. Ruth B. Shipley, Chief of the Passport Division.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

[5] Not printed (L/UNA Files).

in order to avoid criticism. L pointed out that this exception existed as a matter of policy only and was not a legal requirement.

After stating: "Obviously if the Secretary of State had authority in the exercise of his discretion to refuse passports to Communist newspaper correspondents before the enactment of the Internal Security Act, that authority has not been diminished by the enactment of the Act." L concluded that the policy underlying the McCarran Act would justify a reversal in the Department's policy with respect to journalists.

6. EFFECT OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950 ON PRACTICES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPARTURE OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS EMPLOYED BY THE UN TO WHOM PASSPORTS HAVE BEEN DENIED

Early in July, 1951, Dimitri Varley, a UN employee, was denied a passport for which he had applied in order to proceed abroad on UN business. The question was then raised as to whether Varley would be permitted to proceed abroad without a passport. The Act of May 22, 1918 (40 Stat. 559), as amended by the Act of June 22, 1941 (55 Stat. 252), provides that it shall be unlawful "for any person to transport or to attempt to transport from or into the United States another person with the knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the departure or entry of such other person is forbidden by this section . . .", establishes criminal penalties for the violation of any of its provisions, and provides for the forfeiture of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft used in such unlawful transportation. Under the provisions of law and regulations now in force, the absence of a passport, in the case of any person destined outside the Western Hemisphere, seems to be reasonable cause to believe that departure is forbidden. Transportation companies will therefore not give passage to a United States citizen seeking to depart from the United States for such a destination without a passport unless Mrs. Shipley has expressly indicated to them that the departure is authorized. In view of the fact that the intent of the McCarran Act is to restrict movement rather than merely to cause the denial of passports, Mrs. Shipley was most reluctant to indicate to any transportation company that they could give passage to Varley. She was advised by L, however, that she was obliged, in view of the obligations of Article 105 of the UN Charter, to indicate to the transportation company that the travel was authorized. She declined, however, to give any such indication to Varley himself or to permit the Department to communicate anything more to the UN than the fact that such a message would be transmitted to the transportation company. The UN took but did not maintain the position that, in view of the fact that an individual who departs from the United States at the present time without a passport or other au-

thorization is subject to the criminal penalties of the Act of May 22, 1918, as amended, Varley should be given such authorization as would make his departure lawful within the provisions of that Act. It is difficult to see how any authorization which is sufficient to bar criminal prosecution of a transportation company is not also sufficient to bar criminal prosecution of the individual. It is therefore questionable whether any real distinction between communicating such authorization to a transportation company and to the individual really exists.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Contrary to the view expressed by L in the opinion of Aug. 17, 1948, no change in the current regulations appears to be necessary in order to enable the U.S. to comply with its obligation to permit the departure of U.S. citizens employed by the UN.

2. Under the present regulations, it would appear that the U.S. is obligated to specifically authorize the departure of any U.S. citizen, employed by the UN, to whom it denies a passport, unless there are overriding security considerations.

3. It is doubtful whether any distinction between the giving of such authorization to a transportation company and to the individual is tenable.

4. It remains to be determined what security standards apply in the case of persons desiring to depart on UN business without passports, and whether security considerations sufficient to warrant the denial of a passport are also sufficient to warrant denial of departure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That no action be taken on the issue of whether or not we are obligated to give any authorization to the individual unless the UN forces the issue.

2. That the security question involved in the departure without passports of U.S. citizens employed by the UN be treated on a case by case basis.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Administration (Ingram) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1951.

Subject: Abuse of Privilege of Residence and Deportation

The contention of VD is that any activity by any person covered by the Headquarters Agreement other than activity in their official

[1] Drafted by Richard J. Kerry, Administrative Attorney.

capacity and for the purpose for which they were admitted to the United States deprives them of status under the Headquarters Agreement at our option. Under this view, deportation would not depend upon whether or not the activity which we consider the abuse of privilege of residence was grounds for deportation, but simply upon whether or not they were deportable under the immigration laws when deprived of the protection of the Headquarters Agreement.

It is our view that it was the intention of the Headquarters Agreement to provide that, in any case in which a person abused his privilege of residence, he could be deported *for that reason.* The history of the negotiations involved in the drafting of the Headquarters Agreement supports this view, i.e., it was the intention of the parties who entered into the Agreement that this should be so. The intention of the parties has significance similar to the intention of Congress in determining the meaning and obligations of the Agreement.

The history of the negotiations also seems to show that the principal reason why it was not specifically spelled out in the Agreement that only "unlawful activities" would amount to abuse of privilege of residence was that it was desired to preserve the discretion of the *Secretary of State* where it might be desirable to subject a person to deportation because of his lack of *bona fides* or for subversive activities where no provable crime was involved.

The view advanced by VD does not even make all communist correspondents deportable. It would affect only those admitted by the 9th Proviso. Activity which would render Hitschmannova [2] deportable would not render a Tass [3] correspondent deportable.

[2] Miss Marcelle C.V.B. Hitschmannova, an alien journalist accredited by the United Nations Secretariat for residence in New York for one year, ending in March 1951; see letter from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General, November 8, p. 75. This was a recurring case.

[3] Notation here in the source text: "3(4) visa".

L/UNA Files

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1951.

1. It has not been in the past the position of the Department and is not a reasonable construction of the Headquarters Agreement that a person who has qualified under section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement can lose such privileged status on the sole ground that he is engaged in an activity which is not performed strictly in his official capacity.

[1] Probably in the Division of International Administration, possibly in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.

(*a*) Telegram of April 6, 1950 to Prague discussed possibilities of retaliating against Czech correspondents in US. Referring to Srych, who it appears had an accredited status under section 11(3), it was pointed out that he could be restricted to the Headquarters Area but that such action would not interfere with his freedom to report on developments in UN *or New York.*

(*b*) The *Rapporteur* of the subcommittee of the Sixth Committee of the Second General Assembly summarized the view of the subcommittee on section (*b*) as follows:

> "The provisions of section 13(*b*) and (*c*) fall, however, into a different category. They deal with a matter which had not been dealt with in detail either in the draft agreement or in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Organization. These provisions give the right to the Government of the United States to require an official of the United Nations Organization or the representative of a Member Government or a member of a representative's staff to leave the territory of the United States *in the case of abuses or of serious infractions committed in the United States in matters outside his official duties.* This right of the United States Government is surrounded by a number of safeguards and, in particular, where the individual concerned possesses diplomatic immunity, it is specified that he shall not be required to leave the United States 'otherwise than in accordance with the customary procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the United States.' "

The Sixth Committee unanimously approved this report. (UN Doc. A/C.6/172,2d Gen Ass., 1947, underscoring supplied.[2])

It will be noted that the assumption is made that a correspondent will be involved "in matters outside his official duties" and that to revoke protection there must be "abuses" or "serious infractions" in such matters.

(*c*) The Congress apparently shared in the view that one must look for an abuse of privileges *in* activities outside official capacity and does not find an abuse of privileges *by* activities outside official capacity:

> ". . . Two important protections are, however, provided in section 13: (1) the United States may require such persons to have visas and may limit the visas which it issues so as to be valid only for transit to the headquarters district and sojourn in its immediate vicinity; (2) in case any such persons abuse their privileges in activities outside their official capacity, they become subject to deportation." (Senate Report 559, Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Congress, 1st session, July 15, 1947, p. 6)

2. As used in 13(*b*), abuse of privilege in activities outside an accredited correspondent's official capacity must at least involve an activity which would of itself constitute sufficient grounds for deportation, such as violiation of the espionage laws.

(*a*) Judge Charles Fahy, then Legal Adviser of the Department and an official who was most active in negotiation of the Headquar-

[2] Printed here as italics.

ters Agreement,[3] was asked in his appearance, Wednesday, July 9, 1947 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which was considering US adherence to the Headquarters Agreement, about the meaning of section 13.

Mr. Fahy said:

> "... The deportation laws take hold, *if he abuses his privilege.* It is a question of the way in which you administer statutes.
>
> "There is a provision here that the proceedings shall not be instituted without the approval of the Secretary of State, which has to do with the administration of the laws in connection with the United Nations.
>
> "However, the law regarding the right of aliens to remain takes hold of anyone who comes in under section 11 *if he runs in conflict with our statutes.*" (Underscoring supplied.[4] Quoted from Mr. Stokes' corrected copy of transcript of July 19, 1947, Subcommittee 6, Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 67).

[3] For documentation regarding the negotiating history of the Headquarters Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 60 ff., and *ibid.*, 1947, vol. I, pp. 22 ff.

[4] Printed here as italics.

L/UNA Files

The Secretary of State to the Attorney General of the United States (McGrath)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Reference is made to a letter, dated August 3, 1951, from the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, regarding Marcelle C. V. B. Hitschmannova.[1]

In that letter it was stated that Marcelle Hitschmannova has been in an illegal status so far as the immigration laws are concerned since January, 1950.

At the time of receipt of the letter, Miss Hitschmannova had not been formally and regularly reaccredited by the United Nations, since this Government had not yet forwarded its comments to the United Nations concerning her reaccreditation. The United Nations Secretariat has considered that Miss Hitschmannova continued in an accredited status after March 17, 1951 pending action on her application for renewal of accreditation. Upon being informed, by letter dated October 2, 1951, that the United Nations would find it necessary to proceed with the regular reaccrediting of Miss Hitschmannova in the absence of comment from this Government, the Department notified the United Nations on October 8, 1951 that, if she were reaccredited, it might be necessary to deport her. On October 9, 1951, the United Nations reaccredited Miss Hitschmannova for a period of one year.

[1] Not printed (314.1/8–351).

The letter of August 3, 1951 also stated:

"The files of this Service indicate that the continued presence in the United States of this alien may be a threat to the national security. In this connection you are referred to reports received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which I assume were also received by your Department. Inasmuch as subject's reaccreditation by the United Nations expired on March 17, 1951, it will be appreciated if you will promptly inform me as to whether the Department of State has any objection to this Service requiring subject alien to depart from the United States."

It is not apparent from the letter whether, in view of the fact that Miss Hitschmannova has been continuously accredited by the United Nations as a correspondent within the meaning of Sec. 11(3) of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations, Public Law 357, 80th Congress, you would propose to deport her exclusively on security grounds.

In this connection, your attention is invited to Section 13 of the Agreement which provides, in part:

"(*b*) Laws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the residence of aliens shall not be applied in such manner as to interfere with the privileges referred to in Section 11 and, specifically, shall not be applied in such manner as to require any such person to leave the United States on account of any activities performed by him in his official capacity. In case of abuse of such privileges of residence by any such person in activities in the United States outside his official capacity, it is understood that the privileges referred to in Section 11 shall not be construed to grant his exemption from the laws and regulations of the United States regarding the continued residence of aliens, provided that:

"(1) No proceedings shall be instituted under such laws or regulations to require any such person to leave the United States except with the prior approval of the Secretary of State of the United States. Such approval shall be given only after consultation with the appropriate Member in the case of a representative of a Member (or a member of his family) or with the Secretary-General or the principal executive officer of the appropriate specialized agency in the case of any other person referred to in Section 11;"

In the light of the foregoing, and since you have not stated that the continued presence of Miss Hitschmannova is a threat to the national security or that she has violated the conditions under which she was granted her present status, the Department is not in a position to determine whether it should or should not object to the institution of deportation proceedings until it receives from your Department the evidence, material allegations and the legal basis upon which you would require Miss Hitschmannova to depart from the United States.

Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State:

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE [2]

[2] Humelsine was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by Mr. B. Fensterwald of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs to the Chief of the Division of International Administration (Ingram)

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1951.

Subject: Definition of "Immediate Vicinity", UN Headquarters

Reference: Your Memorandum of November 26, 1951 [1]

This Office concurs in your opinion that a further approach to the UN should be made at this time to negotiate an agreed definition of "immediate vicinity".

In regard to the specific questions posed, nothing has been found to alter the plain meaning of Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement whereby the U.S. can restrict visas for persons covered by that section to the Headquarters district and its immediate vicinity.

The second question (e.g., "as to what rights of the U.S. to so restrict persons covered by Sections 11(1) and (2) would be if the U.S. had acceded to the General Convention without pertinent reservation") is more difficult. Sections 11(*d*) and 18(*d*) of the General Convention certainly would put definite limitations upon the U.S. in regard to issuing visas restricted to certain areas. However, we feel that the obligations in the Convention would not necessarily prevent the U.S. from issuing such visas in all cases.

This conclusion is based in part on the necessity of interpreting the exact meaning of the words "immigration restrictions" in Sections 11(*d*) and 18(*d*). There was probably no intent to prevent states parties to the Convention from applying any or all immigration restrictions. For example, States parties would probably not be prohibited from applying immigration restrictions, of a health or sanitary nature. The purpose of the Sections was to guarantee free access to and egress from areas in which UN functions were being performed. It would seem doubtful if this would necessarily imply in all cases that visas be issued for travel throughout the entirety of a country.

This idea is strengthened by the Preamble to the Convention:

> Whereas Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations provides . . . that representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall . . . enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of the functions in connection with the Organization.

It is our view that the U.S. could restrict visas in necessary cases even if the U.S. adhered to the General Convention *as long as such restriction in each particular case did not interfere with the reasonably independent functioning of the person in question.*

[1] Not printed (314.1/11–2651).

GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES [1]

I. THE ELECTION TO FILL THE SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT BEING VACATED BY YUGOSLAVIA

330/4–1651

Memorandum by Mr. Harry N. Howard, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, to the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1951.

Subject: Possible Greek Candidacy for the Security Council

At the NEA staff meeting on Thursday, April 12, I made note of Mr. Kyrou's [2] recent statement that Greece might be a candidate to succeed Yugoslavia as a member of the Security Council, indicating that Mr. Kyrou had referred to the possible Greek candidacy in discussing the matter with me last November. I also indicated in the staff meeting the Greek view that Greece could hardly be expected to be a successful candidate in 1952 to succeed Turkey since the Arab States would have a strong case in 1952 for that seat, in view of the successful Turkish candidacy in 1950.

Mr. McGhee,[3] Mr. Rountree,[4] and I felt that Greece was entitled to support from the United States in this matter, although there has been no formal request as yet for such support, in view of the strong Greek stand in the Korean situation, the support which Greece has always given to the United States in the United Nations, and the position which Greece occupies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

We were all aware that such a candidacy would also raise some problems since Greece is a neighbor of Turkey, already on the Security Council, and since the Soviet Union and its satellites will, no doubt, put up a strong case for the election of another Soviet satellite.

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[1] For previous documentation on this general subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 87 ff.

[2] Alexis Kyrou, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations.

[3] George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[4] William M. Rountree, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

330/7–2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 20, 1951—8 p. m.

47. Re election to SC seat now held by Yugo. To Dept's knowledge, Greece is thus far only announced candidate Yugo seat, although USSR will undoubtedly put forward satellite and possibility other candidacies still exist.

Dept does not favor election satellite to Eastern Eur seat. Provided Greece can obtain sufficient support other UN Members, Dept presently favors its election for fol reasons:

1. Greece among strong supporters UN programs, including Korea. First qualification stipulated in Charter re contribution UN Members maintenance Internatl peace and security and other purposes Organization cld be emphasized in support its election.
2. It might be easier for Greece win Eastern Eur seat this year than Near East and African seat next since larger number states compete for latter and in view bargaining power Arab League and its influence over choice Near East candidates.
3. Greece borders on area from which Eastern Eur seat hitherto filled and has deep interests that area. Further, unduly rigid adherence past geographical categories wld exclude Greece from consideration SC seat.

Dept realizes there may be opposition Grk candidacy on grounds since Greece not normally considered Eastern Eur country, her election to succeed Yugo inconsistent with understanding reached informally in 1946 [2] and followed succeeding years that one SC seat reserved for Eastern Eur area, and also in view proximity Greece and Turkey, latter of which now serving 1951–52 SC term.

Without indicating any firm US position, ascertain views UK, Fr, Canada, Braz and Phil re Grk candidacy. Also ascertain Braz estimate possible attitude other LA countries.

ACHESON

[1] Repeated for information to Athens as 353.

[2] For documentation regarding U.S. policy at London in 1946 with respect to elections to United Nations organs, etc., see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 117 ff.

330/8–751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1951.

Subject: Replacement for Yugoslavia on Security Council

Participants: Mr. John Boyd, First Secretary British Embassy
Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary British Embassy
Mr. David Popper—UNP [1]
Mr. Ward P. Allen—EUR

In response to a previous request as to an indication to [*of*] UK views on this matter, Mr. Boyd reported that UK position as approved by Mr. Morrison [2] is that this SC seat should be reserved for a State acceptable to the USSR (*a*) in order to "preserve the UN as a world forum" and (*b*) to maintain the 1946 "Gentlemen's Agreement" on the distribution of SC seats so as not to endanger the Commonwealth representation. Moreover the UK is not disposed to support Greece for this seat because of the inbalance that would be created by having both Greece and Turkey (both by then admitted to NATO) on the Council at the same time. However, Mr. Morrison suggests that Greece be supported for the seat which the Netherlands will vacate in 1952, although the UK realizes that this would depend upon the willingness of the Benelux and Scandinavian Governments to give up that seat.

Mr. Boyd referred to information from the UK Embassy in Athens that the Greek press had published reports of US intentions to support Greece's candidacy, and asked where our thinking now stood on this matter. We replied that, although the Department had not reached a final decision on supporting Greece, we are at present strongly inclined to do so and in any event would be unable to vote for a satellite. However, so far as we knew no indication of our thinking had been conveyed to the Greek Government and the only reply that we had given to their request for our support was that the matter would be seriously considered. The press reports were therefore not correct.

As to the UK reasoning we expressed some doubt that failure to elect a satellite would be any more offensive to the USSR and thus endanger the UN as a world forum, than the original election of Yugoslavia in 1948 [*1949*].[3] As to the 1946 "Gentlemen's Agreement" we stated that as the UK knew the US interpreted that as binding only for the elections of that year and not necessarily a commitment for the indefinite future. It might also be argued that the general

[1] David H. Popper, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
[2] Herbert S. Morrison, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[3] For documentation regarding this matter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 291 ff.

geographic balance might be as much upset by Mr. Morrison's suggestion of replacing the Netherlands with Greece in 1952. While it is true that both Greece and Turkey would be on the Council concurrently, the terms would overlap for only one year.

Mr. Boyd indicated that if the US held very strongly a point of view contrary to that of the British they would of course reexamine their position although the above represents their fairly well considered views at the present time. We stated that we would of course consider the UK views within the Department and discuss the matter further at a future date.

330/9–1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1951—7 p. m.

134. Re election to fill Yugo SC seat: As reported Deptel 47, July 20, Dept opposes the election of a Soviet satellite to fill SC seat being vacated by Yugo and wld be prepared support Greece if latter cld obtain sufficient support. Since your discussions with several other Dels have shown that Greece may not receive strong support, we are willing consider possibility other non-Sov candidate. Lebanon, Thailand, or Ethiopia might be possible compromise candidate.

It is important that agreement, if possible, among the US, UK, and others re election to fill Yugo seat be reached soonest. Pls inquire urgently of UKDel whether its FonOff has yet responded to its inquiry re compromise candidate. Further, in discussions pursuant Deptel 47, pls ascertain views other key Dels re possible alternative non-Sov candidate.

ACHESON

[1] Repeated for information to Athens as 1213.

330/9–1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, September 12, 1951—5:29 p. m.

334. Re GA matters. As interim report, re Deptel 134, September 10, Laskey (UK)[1] states FonOff is communicating with Embassy Washington on question of election to fill Yugoslav SC seat. Laskey had reported US suggestion of compromise candidate and has seen

[1] Denis S. Laskey, Member, Permanent British Delegation to the United Nations.

no decision by FonOff, but hears this issue is being discussed between Embassy and Dept. He stated that USUN seemed more strongly opposed to election of Soviet satellite to fill SC seat than Dept view as expressed to Embassy reps. However, we gave Laskey substance of Deptel 134. Jebb[2] subsequently stated that he personally inclines toward Byelorussia but he seemed interested in possibility of Ethiopia.

Re GA presidency, FonOff has telegraphed Embassy decision to give up idea of Western European candidate and support Padilla Nervo. This also, according to Laskey, is being handled between Embassy and Dept.[3]

AUSTIN

[2] Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent British Representative to the United Nations.
[3] Documentation regarding the election of a president for the Sixth (Regular) General Assembly is located in Department of State indexed file 320. The United States initially supported the view that there should be a European president, who, however, failed to emerge. By mid-September the U.S. Government was formulating a position in support of Luis Padilla Nervo, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, believing that it was important to secure a strong president. Padilla Nervo was elected on November 6, 1951.

330/9–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET ATHENS, September 13, 1951—11 a. m.

1239. Re Deptel 1213, Sept 10, we have discussed matter with FonOff which is cabling Kyrou to make strong attempt rally other UN delegates to Greece's support. FonOff is aware that we wld be prepared to support Grk candidacy but cld hardly do so usefully unless other backing developed.

PEURIFOY

330/9–1251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 17, 1951—6 p. m.

143. Brit Emb has confirmed it has clearly understood from discussions with Dept that US opposes election Sov. satellite to Yugo seat. Laskey statement this matter reported urtel 334[1] therefore incorrect.

[1] Dated September 12, p. 81.

In view Protitch [2] statement (urtel 330) [3] that Greece is saying US has agreed support its candidacy, it is particularly important that in your discussions pursuant Deptels 47 and 134 you make clear that Dept has not made a final decision to support Greece.

WEBB

[2] Dragoslav Protitch, Principal Director, Department of Security Council Affairs, United Nations Secretariat.
[3] Not printed.

330/10–851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1951.

Subject: Election to Fill Yugoslavia's seat on the Security Council and Secretary Generalship of the Caribbean Commission.

Participants: Mr. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Michael Wenner, British Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, UND
Mr. Paul W. Jones, UNP

Mr. Meade called on me to explain the UK views on the election to fill Yugoslavia's seat on the Security Council and to discuss the Secretary Generalship of the Caribbean Commission.

Mr. Meade stated that the Foreign Office had communicated to the Embassy its strong belief that the Yugoslav seat should be given to a Slav state, which, it was assumed, would be Czechoslovakia. In support of this view, the Foreign Office maintained that it was generally accepted that a Slav state should have one of the non-permanent seats, and expressed apprehension that the denial of a seat to the Slavs might be considered by the Soviet Union as a highly provocative act which, on top of other past actions, might conceivably lead to a Soviet walk-out.

I told Mr. Meade that the United States was absolutely opposed to a Soviet satellite and would do all it could to elect a non-Soviet candidate. I explained that the 1946 "gentleman's agreement" applied to 1946 only. We did not believe that the denial of one of the non-permanent seats to a Slav would jeopardize the safety of the Commonwealth seat. The degree of representation of the Commonwealth

[1] Drafted by Messrs. Paul W. Jones of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and J. Jefferson Jones, Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

group, or of the Latin American states, as agreed upon in 1946, could still be justified on the basis of numbers, contributions, or support for UN activities, but the election of a Soviet satellite could not be justified on any grounds. While we would not wish to take any action deliberately to force a Soviet walk-out, we also would not want to make any unusual concessions. I said that it was, of course, impossible to predict how the Soviet Union would react to the defeat of a Soviet satellite, but I expressed personal doubts that this in itself would produce a Soviet walk-out. Many past acts, including the election of Yugoslavia rather than Czechoslovakia in 1949, were probably considered much more serious in the eyes of the Soviet Union. I also pointed out that our voting margin could be jeopardized by giving the satellites one of the non-permanent seats. Finally, I stated that public opinion in this country would tolerate no other position than opposition to the election of a Soviet satellite.

Mr. Meade said that if the American people would be any more amenable to the election of a member of the Soviet bloc other than Czechoslovakia, a hint might be thrown out for the candidacy of another satellite. I assured him that while the American public would be unmanageable if Czechoslovakia was elected, it would positively oppose the election of any satellite.

I told Mr. Meade that we had not taken any position on which of the non-Soviet candidates to support. We would favor Greece if it had sufficient support, but realized the difficulties in connection with its election and were considering other possibilities such as Thailand, the Philippines, Lebanon and Ethiopia. I stated frankly that our final position would be determined on the basis of which country would most likely win.

Mr. Meade personally thought that Greece was not supportable in view of its proximity to Turkey and the invitations to these countries to participate in NATO. He feared that Ethiopian representatives would be unsatisfactory and believed that the Philippines would be considered a mouthpiece for United States views. He also thought Lebanon should not be elected, although he later acknowledged that the election of Lebanon this year would facilitate the election of Greece next year to succeed Turkey. He personally believed that Thailand would be the most satisfactory of the non-Soviet possibilities. I told Mr. Meade that we would be glad to support Thailand if the UK could agree.

Mr. Meade asked Mr. Allen to explain our position to the UK Foreign Office when he was in London and to point out particularly the point I had made on our voting margin and our belief that the Commonwealth seat is not in jeopardy. He also asked whether he could inform the Foreign Office that the position which I had presented represented the view of the Secretary of State. I replied that

I felt certain the Secretary agreed with this position but would be happy to clear it with him and inform Mr. Meade later.

[Here follows discussion of the Caribbean Commission.]

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

330/10–1051

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1951.

Subject: Election to Fill Yugoslav Security Council Seat

Discussion:

The General Assembly, at its Sixth Session, will elect a Member to the Security Council to fill the seat being vacated by Yugoslavia. Greece has announced its candidacy for this seat, and Ethiopia, Lebanon, Thailand and the Philippines have been mentioned as other non-Soviet possibilities. The Soviet Union will undoubtedly put forward a satellite candidate, probably Czechoslovakia, on the theory that the Yugoslav seat belongs to a Slav state.

The United Kingdom Foreign Office strongly believes that a Slav state should be elected to succeed Yugoslavia. They have explained this position on the grounds that under a 1946 "gentleman's agreement", followed in succeeding years, one of the non-permanent seats was allotted to the Slavs; that the election of a Slav would help to preserve the United Nations as a world forum; and that to deny the Soviets this seat might be considered an unduly provocative act which, on top of other actions, might conceivably lead to a Soviet walk-out.

We have taken the position, and so informed the United Kingdom and others, that the United States would oppose strongly the election of a Soviet satellite and support the non-Soviet candidate which is most likely to win. We believe that the election of a Soviet satellite is unwarranted on any grounds, and maintain that the 1946 "gentleman's agreement" was meant to apply for one year only. Further, with the USSR permanently on the Council, the seating of a Soviet satellite could jeopardize our voting margin. While it is impossible to predict what might induce a Soviet walk-out, the election of a non-Soviet candidate would not appear to be as serious an action in the eyes of the Soviet Union as past acts, such as the election of Yugoslavia rather than Czechoslovakia in 1949. We are convinced that public opinion demands a strong position against a Soviet satellite.

British Embassy officials have asked whether they may inform the Foreign Office that the above views represent your position on this matter.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you authorize us to inform the British Embassy that the above views do represent your position.[1]

[1] On October 18 Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, sent in to the Secretary a duplicate of this memorandum, under a "chit" which read: "Mr. Secretary: The original copy of the attached memorandum seems to be lost. I feel certain that this went in to you and that you approved it, but, lest my memory be faulty, did you approve the memo? LDB". The Secretary did not indicate "Yes" or "No" in either of the spaces provided.

330/10–1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1951.

Subject: Security Council Slates

Participants: Mr. C. T. Moodie, Counselor, Australian Embassy
UNP—Mr. David W. Wainhouse [1]
Mr. Paul B. Taylor

Mr. Moodie called at his request to present the views of the Department of External Affairs on the Yugoslav seat on the Security Council. He read extensively from a carefully written document expressing the Australian concern lest the Soviets be led to withdraw from the United Nations and making the point that the non-Soviet members should be careful not to take any action which would lead to Soviet withdrawal except in a matter of real importance to themselves. The Australians believe, therefore, that we should not oppose the election of some satellite to Yugoslavia's seat in the Security Council. They realize that we could not support Czechoslovakia and Mr. Moodie asked whether a "compromise" could be reached on Byelorussia or Poland. He further pointed out that even if we are committed to opposition to a satellite there were still various degrees of intensity of such opposition. He asked how strong our opposition would be.

We said that in our view the U.S. would have to oppose very actively the election of any Soviet satellite to Yugoslavia's seat. We mentioned the attitude of American public opinion on that point and mentioned also the possibility that the working majority of the free nations in the Security Council would be cut down to a dangerous point. Mr. Wainhouse suggested that the mere defeat of a satellite for this SC seat would not in itself lead the Soviets to withdraw from the

[1] Wainhouse was Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

United Nations—that such a decision would probably be taken only if they considered that United Nations membership was no longer helpful to them and that they probably had not reached that conclusion.

Mr. Moodie said that if we were to push actively our opposition to a satellite this would alter to that extent the geographic pattern heretofore followed on the Security Council and that this would have very interesting possibilities for Australia. Australia, he said, does not agree to the existing geographic distribution under which only one member of the Commonwealth may be on the Security Council at one time and he rather jokingly said that if Australia were to run for the Security Council next year he would make it embarrassing for us if we opposed him on the basis of geographic allocation. Mr. Wainhouse said that obviously to cut down the Eastern European representation would not mean abandonment of the whole geographic principle.

Mr. Moodie said that elimination of a satellite from the Security Council would look worse if it were merely one of a series of anti-Soviet measures such as (1) increasing the Soviet financial contribution, (2) opposing the Soviet nominee for the ICJ and (3) freezing the USSR out of the General Committee. We said that, while we are not familiar with the details of the budget problem, we understand that the increase in Soviet contribution is a perfectly sound thing on its merits and is not anti-Soviet. As to the ICJ, while our position has not yet been determined, tentative working level opinion is that we will probably support Golunsky. As to the General Committee our tentative position is to support a Soviet bloc chairman for one of the committees, and we see a possibility of a Soviet chairman doing harm in every committee but the Sixth. Mr. Moodie agreed that this total position did not involve the complete freezing out of the Soviet bloc which the Department of External Affairs seemed to feel.

Mr. Moodie ended by indicating that on the Security Council seat his Government might have to differ with us.

[Here follows brief discussion of another matter.]

330/10–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1951.

Subject: Elections to SC—Yugoslav Case

Participants: Mr. Gerald Meade, British Embassy
Mr. Ward P. Allen—EUR

I advised Mr. Meade that we had practically decided to announce our support of Greece for the Yugo SC seat, and would undoubtedly

do so shortly. Mr. Meade felt certain that even if the UK should change its decision to support a Soviet satellite, they would not feel able to support Greece. I suggested that therefore the only way in which we might avoid a US–UK split on this issue would be for the UK to come up in the next two or three days with the name of another non-satellite candidate whom they would agree to support and whom we could seriously consider as a compromise.

We discussed the proposed Yugo case at some length [1] and I indicated that the French as well as ourselves had taken an affirmative attitude toward it in response to Yugoslavia's request for our views and that only the UK had sought to discourage them. I asked Mr. Meade to urge his government, now that Yugoslavia has decided to go forward with its case, to take a more affirmative attitude, to lend its support, and participate wholeheartedly in the debate. Mr. Meade indicated his personal agreement and stated he would strongly urge this course upon the UK Foreign Office.

[1] For documentation on U.S. relations with Yugoslavia, see volume IV.

330/10–2351

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1951.

Subject: Election to fill Yugoslavia's Security Council Seat.

There seems to be agreement in the Department that we should oppose the election of a Soviet-sponsored candidate, which will probably be Czechoslovakia. There is some difference of view on (*a*) what non-Communist country we should support; and (*b*) the degree of political pressure we should apply.

It is my personal recommendation that we should state clearly and consistently our opposition to the election of a Soviet-sponsored country; that we should clearly and consistently support the election of the non-Communist country which has the best chance of election (at the present time this seems to be Greece); that we do not engage in political arm-twisting in order to bring about the election of any particular candidate.[1]

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[1] Notation by the Secretary of State: "I agree. D[ean] A[cheson]." The Secretary underlined his inscription.

320/10–2551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 25, 1951—8 : 50 p. m.

Gadel 8. Re election to fill Yugoslav seat: Dept has clearly and consistently stated that it opposes election of a Sov-sponsored country to fill Yugo seat, and that it will support election of non-Sov country which has best chance of election. Secy has personally approved this policy. We have stated US wld be prepared support Greece, provided it obtained sufficient support other UN members, or some other non-Sov state. FYI, in order not to jeopardize our overall objective of defeating a Sov candidate we do not wish to engage in special polit pressure to bring about election of any particular non-Sov candidate.

On basis available info, Greece appears have best chance of election. Accordingly, in conversations other Dels, you shld continue stress our opposition to election Sov candidate and state that US disposed to support Greece as long as it is candidate on which there is reasonable prospect of securing widest agreement in UN. You shld not, of course, inflexibly commit US to Greece so as to make it impossible for us ultimately to vote for another non-Sov candidate which might receive greater support in the end.

It is particularly important that Greece, and also countries which appear undecided this matter, including Benelux countries, know our views soonest. Dept is informing Phil which has requested US support its candidacy.[2] Posts to which this rptd for info pls inform FonOffs.

WEBB

[1] An advance party of the advisory staff of experts of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly was functioning in Paris at this time, prior to the opening of the session on November 6. This telegram was repeated for information to Athens as 2023, Manila as 1297, London as 2199, The Hague as 556, Brussels as 577, and Luxembourg as 49.

Substantially the same cable was sent on October 29 to Copenhagen (369) and repeated to Oslo (358) and Stockholm (521). Additionally, the telegram to the Scandinavian capitals stated: "Greece has been one of strong supporters UN programs, including Korea. Article 23 of Charter provides that in Security Council elections, due regard should be specially paid in first instance to contribution of UN members to maintenance of international peace and security and other UN purposes." (330/10–2951)

[2] Documentation on this matter is located in file 320.

320/10–3151 : Telegram

The Chargé in Belgium (Millard) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BRUSSELS, October 31, 1951—7 p. m.

611. Fol info obtained from FonOff re certain UNGA issues. FonOff has up to now been reluctant to discuss Belgian position on various agenda items, preferring to await results of mtg Brussels pact

powers at London Oct 25–26. Apparent now that this meeting had been influential in establishing Belgian policies, and FonOff has promised provide Emb with Belgian views additional issues not covered here.

1. Vice President GA. London mtg unanimously favored Yugoslavia.

2. SC seat being vacated by Yugoslavia. At London mtg Belgium alone favored our position of keeping seat in hands of country outside Commie orbit. Strongest stand taken by Dutch who favor Czechs getting seat. In discussion this subject, Dutch claimed Yugoslavia got seat while still within Soviet orbit (*sic*) and Belgian proof to contrary did nothing to shake Dutch stand that Yugoslavia seat must be returned to Soviet orbit. This principle supported by French, who favored Poles for seat, and by British, who made reservation that UK FonOff attitude might be altered if govt changed by election. Luxembourg rep said little and sided with majority on this and most other questions. Result of discussion this question was that Dutch, French and Luxembourg expressed desire to see seat returned to Soviet orbit. British held same view subject to decision new govt, and Belgians wld decide their attitude after consideration within FonOff. Not yet clear whether Belgium will change original position, but Delhayes, Belgium FonOff head of UN section, who was Belgian rep at London mtg, said that he had argued there that it must be anticipated that eventually Red China will obtain UN seat, and that for Commies to control two permanent and one other seat in UN SC was too much. Attitude of British, French and Dutch was that returning to Soviets the SC seat which had been taken from orbit in 1949 was cheap method promoting better relations and might stimulate Commies to adopt more reasonable attitudes on controversial matters. (*Note:* Info on strong Dutch stand was obtained from Delhayes assistance in FonOff; Delhayes carefully avoided identifying Dutch as leading advocate for return of seats to Soviet orbit.)

3. London meeting unanimously favored Lange[1] of Norway for chairman first comite.

4. While London meeting favored Padilla Nervo for GA presidency, it was noted that there was as yet no decision by Latin American states as to which candidate wld receive united support, and London mtg decided to wait and see if there are further developments among Latin Americans themselves. Santa Cruz[2] also considered well qualified for job.

5. Belgian FonOff anticipates long GA session.

Sent Dept 611, rptd info Paris 131 (for USUN).

MILLARD

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[1] Halvard M. Lange, Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[2] Hernan Santa Cruz, Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations.

320/11–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, November 1, 1951—5 p. m.

432. Re Deptel 556, October 25, 9 p. m. In election fill Yugo SC seat Neth del instructed by cab decision vote for Sov satellite or Greece depending how situation develops in UNGA. Neth inclined support Sov satellite for fol reasons:

1. Gentlemen's agrmnt with USSR made at Yalta and San Francisco 1945 assuring Sovs additional seat SC.
2. To support Greece, Philippines or other noncandidate regarded as provocative to USSR.
3. Election this state regarded as not sufficiently important to argue about.

Prelim mtg West Eur reps held London October 26 to discuss UN agenda in accord Neth position this point. Only Belg inclined support Greece.

CHAPIN

320/11–151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 2, 1951—8 : 09 p. m.

601. Fol are comments on reasons advanced by FonOff to justify present Neth inclination support Sov satel for election SC (urtel 432 Nov 1).

Gentlemen's agreement with USSR re SC seats was not made at Yalta or Frisco 1945 but in London and it was in our view clearly limited to allocation SC seats in first 1946 election.

While same representation other areas as that which applied for 1946 can still be justified on basis support UN activities, numbers, or contributions, allocation of one non-permanent seat to Sov bloc of five, already represented by USSR, cannot now be justified on any these grounds.

We do not believe support for non-Cominform candidate to succeed Yugo wld be as provocative as election Yugo 1949. In last two yrs Cominform states have done nothing justify increase their representation.

Pls stress to FonOff that we regard maintenance satis majority SC highly important for free world in troubled yrs which lie ahead.

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris as Gadel 54.

Pls suggest that Neth Del consult USDel Paris re above points since we wld like Neth be aware solid reasons for our view and wld appreciate full consideration those reasons.

WEBB

310.2/11–551

Briefing Memorandum for Talks by the Secretary of State With the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), at Paris [1]

SECRET [PARIS,] November 3, 1951.

YUGOSLAV SEAT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

London's 907, October 31,[2] states that the Foreign Office believes it probable that Eden will take up with the Secretary the question of the succession to Yugoslavia's seat on the Security Council.

1. *U.K. Attitude.*

The United Kingdom is taking a strong position in favor of the election of a satellite to the seat being vacated by Yugoslavia. It takes this position chiefly on the ground that failure to give this seat to the Soviets would irritate the U.S.S.R. and give the impression that we wish to drive them out of the United Nations. Moreover, the United Kingdom is interested in a strict application of the geographic quotas followed in the past in which the Soviet group had one seat in addition to the U.S.S.R.

2. *U.S. Position.*

As set forth in the attached telegram,[3] the Department's position is that it is opposed to the election of a Soviet satellite and will support the election of that non-Soviet country which has the best chance of election. We consider this necessary in order to maintain public support for the United Nations in the United States. Moreover, under present international conditions the maintenance of a working majority in the Security Council is essential to the free world. On the basis of the information now available, Greece appears to have the best chance of election. We are informing other delegations of the United States position.

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[1] The Secretary of State had arrived in Paris on November 1, to head the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly which was to convene in Paris on November 6. A series of bipartite (Acheson–Eden) and tripartite (Acheson–Eden–Schuman) meetings was held at Paris between November 4 and November 9. This briefing paper was probably drafted for the use of the Secretary of State at a November 4 meeting with Eden.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not attached to source text. Probably Department of State telegram Gadel 8, October 25, 8:50 p.m., p. 89.

320/11–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, November 6, 1951—6 p. m.

449. I made informal representations along line Deptel 601, Nov 3 (rptd Paris Gadel 54) to SecGen Boon at FonOff this morn. While admitting force US arguments he expresed grave doubts whether they wld be sufficient secure reversal Cabinet decision that Neth del shld support Sov satellite for election SC. Decision he stated based on fol considerations:

(*a*) Irrespective whether or not commitments been made in matter precedent undoubtedly been estab in practice whereby non permanent seat is allocated to Commie state. Fact that Yugo not member of Sov bloc candidate wld further greatly increase East West tension development which Neth as country in geographic proximity to Russia most anxious to avoid. This connection Boon said he understood UK intends support Sov bloc candidate.

Boon expressed personal hope if US after canvass dels in UNGA found majority wld not back its position—and he considered this likely—US wld not persist in opposition. To do so he felt might really precipitate showdown which wld not only create bitterness among non Commie friends of US but also might be construed as lending force Sov charges US encirclement.

At conclusion conversation Boon said Neth del wld naturally wish exchange views on subject with USDel. He assured me if US cld obtain majority, instructions Neth del wld be changed since Dutch wld not want be associated with minority in such question. Also Neth position wld be altered in unlikely event the Commie Chi were admitted SC.

Sent Dept 449; rptd info Paris 71 (for UNDel).

CHAPIN

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 13, 1951.

US/A/3382

ELECTIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL

Permanent Members

China
France
USSR
UK
US

Non Permanent Members
Term Expires December 31, 1952
Brazil
Netherlands
Turkey
Term Expires December 31, 1951

	Candidates	*U.S. Slate*
Ecuador	Chile, El Salvador [1]	Depends upon which candidate receives the support of the majority of the Latin American States
India	Pakistan	Pakistan
Yugoslavia	Greece, Philippines	Greece*

[1] In a revision of November 21, Doc. US/A/3382/Rev 1, El Salvador was deleted, leaving Chile. A footnote read: "Choice of Latin American caucus."
*US disposed to support Greece as long as it is the candidate on which there is reasonable prospect of securing widest agreement in UN. [Footnote in the source text.]

320/11–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PARIS, November 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 237. Subject: SC elections. Greek del now counts 35 votes sure and 7 votes possible in support of Greek candidacy to succeed Yugo on SC (Gadel 160, Nov 15).[1] Our own info at present tends to confirm accuracy this Greek report; we will, of course, take more precise reading as time of election approaches which shld be in about week or ten days. Hamilton story seems to be purely speculative. We have been telling other dels that (A) we strongly oppose Slav candidate; (B) we will support candidate that seems to have rallied greatest strength to defeat a Slav; and (C) Greece seems to be far in the lead.

For several days Romulo[2] worked very hard on behalf of Philippine candidacy. In conversation with Ross[3] yesterday he seemed,

[1] Not printed. The Department of State requested information concerning an article in the *New York Times* (Thomas Hamilton) which stated that there were indications that the United States might reconsider its earlier position in favor of Greece and support the Philippines (320/11–1551).
[2] Carlos P. Romulo, Chairman of the Delegation of the Philippines to the General Assembly (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Philippine Government).
[3] John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, was one of two Senior Advisers to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

however, to have all but given up hope. Kyrou informed us today that Philippines wld withdraw in favor of Greece. Romulo refused to confirm or deny this but asked whether US wld support Philippines for election to Council next year. Romulo, who returns to Philippines tomorrow, feels it is necessary for him to give Quirino [4] some satisfaction. If he has to tell Quirino that Philippines withdrew this year because it did not have US support he wld like to be able to add that he recd assurances of US support for next year. Ross gave him an evasive answer, saying we cld undertake for moment no such commitment but that we wld, of course, study matter very carefully. Romulo will expect to receive from us through his people here early next week some indication of our attitude. Any suggestions Dept may have wld be welcome.

ACHESON

[4] Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines Republic.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL
US/A/3390

[PARIS,] November 22, 1951.

Subject: Security Council Slate

Participants: Ambassador Jacob A. Malik,[1] USSR Delegation
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, United States Delegation

Mr. Malik, USSR, approached me before Committee I began this morning and said he wished to talk to me about the seats on the Security Council. He said that he hoped we could now return to the provisions of the Charter in selecting states for the SC. He said that the agreement reached in 1946 had worked very well until we broke it by putting in Yugoslavia. I told him that we had not broken any agreement and asked him what provision of the Charter he referred to. He said the Charter requires geographical distribution. I said we recognized the principle of geographic distribution but he seemed to be referring rather to political distribution. He insisted that you could not follow the principle of geographic distribution without the agreement of the states in the geographic area. He repeated his reference to the agreement of 1946. I told him that we did not share his view but that this was a question which I was not handling personally.

[1] Ambassador Malik was Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations.

I asked him if he would like to talk to Ambassador Austin or Ambassador Gross. He replied that he wished to talk to me about it and would wait two or three days for my reply. He said he wished me to consider this as an official approach. He then added laughingly that he understood that Mr. Romulo was now holding himself out as a new Slavonic state which should succeed to this seat and said that while they would be glad to include the Philippines, he did not think that the qualifications had yet been demonstrated. I told him I would talk with him again later about this.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS, November 22, 1951.]

US/A/3391

Subject: Security Council Slate

Participants: Minister of State Lloyd [1]—U.K. Delegation
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup—U.S. Delegation

At the meeting of Committee I this afternoon, I told Lloyd that Malik had approached me this morning on the question of filling the Yugoslav seat in the Security Council. I said that I noticed he was talking to Lloyd later and wondered if he had raised the same point. Lloyd said that he had. I did not get from him a clear impression of just what reply he made to Malik except that it was probably somewhat evasive. Lloyd said to me that, if we were going to do business with the Soviets, we had to consider agreeing on something. He said the trouble is to determine whether any other particular opening represents a change in attitude or whether it was merely horse trading on a particular issue. He agreed with me that it was quite probable that the Soviets were merely trying in this instance to get back their seat on the Security Council. I told him that we had told a good many people that we were supporting Greece for the Yugoslav seat and that this was among the reasons why any change would probably be impossible. He said they had also told people they were supporting Greece. I also pointed out the difficulty we had all experienced in maintaining even a 7-vote majority in the SC. Although Lloyd said nothing definite to this effect, I got the impression that this was a matter which he would take up with Mr. Eden, and which he was by no means dismissing out of hand.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[1] Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

IO Files

Minutes of Seventeenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 23, 1951

SECRET
US/A/M(Chr)/204

[Here follow list of persons (47) present [1] and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. *Security Council Slate.* Mr. Taylor explained that of the three seats to be vacated, that of Ecuador had only one possible candidate, Chile, which was the choice of the LA caucus. For the seat of India, only Pakistan was a candidate. The Yugoslav seat offered the only difficulty. The candidacy of the Philippines had in effect been withdrawn, leaving only Greece and Byelo-Russia. The US position had been and continued to be to oppose any satellite for this seat. The so-called "gentleman's agreement" of 1946 was only applicable for that session and for the elections of that time. There was no justification for a second Soviet bloc seat on the Council on the basis of proportional representation within the UN or from the point of view of contribution to the work of the UN or support for its actions on behalf of international peace and security. Furthermore, the functioning of the SC would be disrupted considerably if an additional Soviet bloc member were sitting thereon. Another extremely important reason was, of course, that American public opinion would never understand how the US could allow such a development. In view of these considerations, the US position had been to support in the final analysis the candidate which had the best chance of defeating the Soviet candidate.

With this in mind, the US had been faced with the candidacies of Thailand, the Philippines (as latecomers) and Greece. The first two had withdrawn, and the Greeks had been out garnering considerable support. The last estimate available indicated that Greece had about 20 certain votes and some 16 possible votes already. The chief opponents of Greece for this seat had been the UK, the Commonwealth following the UK lead, and certain Western European countries. Now, however, the UK had come around, bringing most of the Commonwealth with her, as well as some of the Western European countries. The Scandinavians were not yet certain, but it appeared from all impressions available that Greece would fall just short of the necessary 2/3rds vote on the first ballot. In view of this considerable support for Greece, the staff recommended that the Delegation decide to support and vote for Greece.

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[1] For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

Mr. Ross added that the Byelo-Russians were certain to obtain six votes, i.e., the five of the Soviet bloc plus Sweden. Miss Gough stated that she had no information on the voting intentions of India or Pakistan; she added that perhaps the Norwegians and Danes would vote for Byelo-Russia on the first ballot, but there were indications that they might switch to Greece on the second ballot.

Ambassador Austin asked the Delegation which Soviet member had approached the US Delegation. Ambassador Jessup answered that Malik had approached him officially, to seek US support for the Byelo-Russian. He noted that Lloyd of the UK had had a similar approach. The appeal to both had been made on the basis of returning to what Malik called the 1946 agreement. Mr. Hyde mentioned that France had been approached in a like manner. (See Daily Secret Summary of 23 Nov., Delga 312, page 3.)[2] In this connection, Ambassador Austin said he had heard that the Russians were calling for a return to "principles" if peace was the real objective. Ambassador Jessup said that his conversation with Malik was undoubtedly the source of this idea, and that in addition, he had the impression from his talk with Lloyd regarding the Soviet approach, that the UK was far from "solid" in their support of Greece, as had been reported earlier.

Ambassador Gross also recalled his talk with Tsarapkin[3] in a similar vein, but in connection with Committee chairmen rather than Council slates. Ambassador Austin remarked that of course at some time in the future, however distant that might be, the US would have to consult with the USSR on such matters, but he added that there was no use of dignifying such talks now with the hope of agreement, since that did not exist. He did think, however, that we ought to consider the possibility of disarming the Soviets of a weapon which would be their ability to say that the US did not even wish to talk with them. Ambassador Jessup reminded the Delegation that an answer to Malik's official approach was called for. Mr. Sandifer said that it would be the Department's view that readiness to talk should not mean that we would relax our position. Such a course would be a serious mistake. To return a satellite to the SC would go a long way to establishing a precedent for the future. The US was certainly not convinced of the validity of any claims for such a seat or for such a precedent. The proportional representation in the GA and the weight of their contributions to the organization were certainly not such as to entitle them to a seat in addition to the USSR's.

Ambassador Austin felt that it was highly important that Mr. Sandifer had made those remarks. There were, in his opinion, two

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[2] Not printed.

[3] S. K. Tsarapkin, Deputy Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations and Member of the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly.

questions for the Delegation to consider. The first one concerned whether the Delegation would adhere to the position taken by the Department. The second had to do with whether we would attempt to disarm the Soviets so that they could not say that the US refused even to consult with them.

Senator Cooper asked what the status of the so-called "gentleman's agreement" was. Mr. Sandifer replied that the Soviet contention was that in London in 1945 and 1946 during the work of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, an agreement had been reached by which one Eastern European seat would be reserved on the Security Council in addition to that of the USSR. He [re]called, however, that when the Yugoslavs had broken with the Soviets and had campaigned for the seat they were now vacating on the Security Council, this same argument had been raised. At that time the record had been gone into very carefully. The US representative on the Preparatory Commission, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, now Governor of the State of Illinois, had also been consulted. Mr. Stevenson had been certain that no binding agreement had been made. The purpose of the arrangement was to determine the composition of the Council for its first term. No agreement in perpetuity could have been contemplated by the makers of that agreement.

In view of this explanation, Senator Cooper said that he liked very much the ideas expressed by Ambassador Austin. Ambassador Austin said that he wondered about having Ambassador Jessup go back to Malik, saying that the Delegation had consulted among itself and found no reason which would allow it to give support to the Soviet candidate. At this point Ambassador Dreier expressed concern lest the Latin Americans hear that the US was telling the Russians that we would not adhere to the patterns established for the Security Council. They would, without doubt, imagine that the US felt the same about their representation. Ambassador Austin asked whether there was supposed to be a pattern or agreement on composition which included the Latin Americans also. Mr. Sandifer said the understanding had been that there would be two seats on the Security Council for the Latin American countries. Although this was not a binding contractual agreement, it nevertheless represented a long-time understanding, based on geographical distribution considerations.

Ambassador Jessup suggested that the key to the situation lay in the fact that the extent of contribution to the organization and geographical distribution were the criteria which made it possible for the US to continue to support two Latin American seats on the Security Council. No factor of political domination was involved. It was the latter factor for which the USSR was arguing, and on that basis they were clearly in the wrong. Mr. Maffitt cautioned that if the US were to adhere rigidly even to this formula, it would run

the danger of inadequate representation of the countries in the Far East. New members in the future from that area would thus be excluded from representation on the SC. Mr. Ross agreed with both Ambassador Jessup and Mr. Maffitt. As for Ambassador Jessup's point, the important factor was that the Russians could not claim another Council seat on the basis of political domination, or sympathy. As far as Mr. Maffitt's point was concerned, Mr. Ross urged that a fair degree, at least, of flexibility ought to be reserved in view of the necessity to treat future members of the UN with due respect in seeing that their interests were represented on the Council.

Ambassador Austin apologized for having perhaps misled Ambassador Dreier by the way he had formulated his question. In reformulating it, he asked whether the Delegation agreed that Ambassador Jessup should go to Malik and state that the US position was to favor the candidacy of Greece and consequently against the opponents of Greece, giving our reasons therefor. On the general problem of talking with the USSR, Ambassador Gross said that it might be desirable to consult with the UK and France so that the three powers in responding to Malik's inquiry would not express divergent viewpoints. He recalled in this connection that the UK, which now was "unsolidly" supporting the Greeks, had, in New York earlier, followed a different interpretation of the "gentlemen's agreement". It would be quite unfortunate for two or three western interpretations of this agreement to be made by the west to the USSR. For this reason, he urged advance consultations with the UK and France on exactly what we would say to the Russians.

Mrs. Roosevelt cautioned the delegation on a possible change of attitude by Prime Minister Churchill since the elections were over. She felt it very important that we find out where he now stood, since he was always capable of changing, and quite suddenly. Ambassador Jessup felt that Churchill would maintain a flexible position at least until he went to America to see President Truman at the end of the year. All this matter would be settled before then. Ambassador Jessup did refer, however, to a position that Trygve Lie might be taking. Lie apparently wanted to avoid exacerbating the Russians further for the duration of his extended term of office, and although not known to be campaigning for Byelo-Russia was nevertheless known to favor electing a satellite to the Yugoslav seat.

Mr. Mansfield commented that it was quite apparent from the discussion that there were two sides to this question. He also felt that an eventual coming together of the US and USSR would be necessary. However, it was not urgent that Ambassador Jessup see Malik and it would be best to await Vyshinsky's [4] speech on Saturday in response to

[4] A. Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly.

the Secretary's speech on disarmament.[5] If Vyshinsky were adamant, we could then tell him we were planning on supporting Greece. If something more than a ray of hope came from the speech, we could change our answer to the extent of telling him we were sorry they came out so late with their candidacy for Byelo-Russia, and that we had already made a commitment to Greece. In the interests of peace, he said, the US must not fail to explore any avenue leading in that direction. This, however, did not mean we would be any less firm. Ambassador Austin thanked Mr. Mansfield for his remarks and said that it seemed to be a very logical application of the original US position.

Mr. Cory warned that the US was pretty thoroughly committed to opposing a satellite. As Mr. Sandifer added, our statement to other delegations in New York and in Paris had all been to the effect that we would support that candidate which stood the best chance of defeating a satellite. Mr. Sandifer also referred to the seven-vote majority necessary for passing resolutions in the Security Council, and added that it was oftentimes difficult enough with the present composition (without a satellite) to obtain a majority. There were no prospects of any change in Soviet policy which indicated that the work of the Security Council would be any easier, or on which we could rely with any degree of certainty. There would be nothing to gain, and much to lose, by waiting before taking the next proposed step in favoring the Greek candidacy, while talking to the UK and France and then going to Malik. He did not think the Department would be able to agree to a change in its commitment against a satellite.

Mr. Mansfield said in explanation of his suggestion that the thing which had impressed him most so far at this session of the UN General Assembly was the Secretary's speech in Committee One on disarmament, and the reaction it had evoked. It had been a presentation of cold facts on a vital topic, essential to ultimate peace. It had been a statement of what the US was prepared to do. We must now wait to hear what the important Russian reply would be. He said there would be no harm in waiting to see what they said before Ambassador Jessup gave Malik an appropriate answer.

Ambassador Austin suggested that since Delegation meetings were frequent, this matter could easily be handled within the Delegation, and it would not do any harm to follow the suggestion of Mr. Mansfield to hold off on talking to Malik for a few days. Since there was no objection to this course of action, and since the elections were not immediate, any decision on Security Council slates would be postponed. Mr. Mansfield added to this that the suggestion made by him did not change the Department position and that all that was needed

[5] For documentation on this matter, see vol. I, pp. 443 ff.

before giving a reply to Malik would be to await the Vyshinsky reply to the Secretary. Mrs. Roosevelt related her problems in her Committee to the conversation with Malik and the possible character of the reply of Vyshinsky. From what she gathered, there would be little cause for hope in the Vyshinsky statement. With this, the meeting adjourned, after Mr. Taylor had cautioned that Secretariat action might conceivably put Council elections ahead a few days, necessitating an early Delegation meeting on this subject again.[6]

CHARLES D. COOK

[6] The following is recorded at the end of the minutes of the 20th meeting of the Delegation on November 27: "Mr. Taylor noted, with respect to the SC slate, that in view of the nature of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement last Saturday [November 24], Ambassador Jessup would now inform Mr. Malik that the US intended fully to support Greece for this seat. Other members of the Delegation would take the same position with other Delegations." (Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/207)
For the Vyshinsky statement to the First Committee on November 24, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, First Committee*, pp. 23 ff.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET PARIS, November 27, 1951.

US/A/3395

Subject: Slate in Security Council—Disarmament

Participants: Ambassador Y. Malik—USSR Delegation
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup—US Delegation

In accordance with the decision of the Delegation, I arranged with Mr. Vishinsky at the close of the Committee I session this morning to meet Mr. Malik at the Palais at 5:45 before the meeting of the General Committee.

Mr. Malik was accompanied by the young interpreter. I told him that I wished to answer his question and to ask a question. I said I would give him our answer and give him the reasons for our answer, but that I did not expect that we would reach agreement today on our position.

I then told him that we had considered the question of seats in the Security Council and had decided to vote for Greece, and that we had announced that decision. Malik started to interrupt, but I told him that I wished to state our reasons. I said that we did not admit the existence of an agreement made in 1946 along the lines which the Soviets claimed. I said there had been a discussion in regard to the original composition of the Council but no permanent arrangements. I said that, in regard to the Charter, there were both the provision about geographical distribution and the principle of contribution to the UN. I said we thought that Greece could make a

better contribution. I reminded him that Vishinsky in his speech in the First Committee on Saturday had said that the views of a regional group should be followed except when there were special ethical or political reasons. Perhaps our view about Byelorussia in the Security Council was due to what Vishinsky called ethical or political reasons.

Malik then started to repeat the usual arguments. We had turned geography all around with our formation of the Atlantic bloc. We were trying to fill up the SC with seven members of the Atlantic bloc. We were unwilling to follow the provisions of the Charter. We were violating the agreement of 1946. They had checked this agreement, and there was nothing about limiting it to one year and it was in fact applied until we put Yugoslavia in. These arguments were advanced without any particular vigor and more or less as if he were reciting his lesson. I said that, as I had told him at the outset, I did not expect him to agree with me but I had stated the situation and our reasons. He said he was sorry we had made such a decision.

[Here follows brief discussion of the other matter.]

320/11–3051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, November 30, 1951— 9 p. m.

Delga 448. Re ICJ elections.[1] LA caucus last night decided unanimously to press vigorously for retention four seats on ICJ. Comite appointed to work on tactics and solicit support other dels. Gonzalez,

[1] Elections to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as to the Security Council were pending at this time. The specific problem posed for the U.S. Delegation was how to harmonize the U.S. position as between the two elections, in view of a decision made in the Department of State in October to support an Asian instead of a Latin American for one of five regular vacancies then occurring on the Court. Considerable documentation exists in file 320 on the question of the ICJ elections in 1951. The basic Department of State instruction to the U.S. Delegation is in telegram Gadel 100 to Paris, November 7 (320/11–751) ; the principal U.S. Delegation working paper on the matter, Doc. US/A/3389, November 25, 1951, in turn was based on Gadel 100.

The basis of the U.S. position was that three general principles should apply to the election of judges: (*a*) the Big Five should be represented; (*b*) incumbents who had served well and wished to be reelected should generally be supported; and (*c*) depending upon (*b*), posts occupied by nationals of small states should be rotated. In effect, in terms of the specific ICJ situation at this time, U.S. policymakers formulated a fourth principle, namely that geographic representation on the Court should be more balanced. This was reflected in the October decision in the Department of State to support Sir Benegal Rau of India for a vacancy being created by the retirement of a Latin American incumbent, that is, to increase the representation of Asia on the ICJ.

The U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly considered the ICJ question at meetings on November 13, November 28, December 3, and December 6. The November 28 meeting was devoted entirely to this problem (Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/280, IO Files).

chairman caucus, told US Del that caucus wished to inform us that we shld not now count on Latin American support Greece's candidacy for SC. Gonzalez and others indicated that caucus tended towards position that it wld accept US stand on principle with reference US vote for judges but in return LA's wld take stand on principle of particular importance to them, namely retention London understanding on geographic distribution of seats and right of each region to select their own candidates. This wld lead them to vote for Byelorussia. Final decision on Latin American votes for Greece or Byelorussia has not been reached however.

AUSTIN

320/12–151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 1, 1951—2 p. m.

Delga 459. Subject: SC elections. Re developments Latin Amer caucus as result our ICJ position reported Delga 448, USGADel staff recommends circular instruction to Latin Amer capitals reiterating importance we attach to rejection of Sov satellite Byelorussian candidacy for SC. This shld be stated in affirmative form of reaffirmation of reasons for this position and of our support for Greece as principal candidate for this seat. Circular shld express hope dels will be instructed to take similar position in SC elections next week.

Strong conviction of USGADel staff that we must maintain our position re SC election and this will be recommended USGADel in reporting present sitn on Mon morning.

Holmes[1] at our request has talked to officer in charge of FonOff today, Dixon,[2] and indicated our serious concern over this sitn. These views will be communicated to Eden who is away from London for weekend. Dixon thought Jebb might have instructions by tomorrow night.

At our suggestion Bonsal[3] talked this morning with De La Tournelle[4] and found Fr surprisingly categorical on supporting Byelorussia. He admitted they thought they had probably "corrupted" Brit on this score. Bonsal reiterated importance we attach to supporting Greece and rejecting Sov satellite Byelorussia.

AUSTIN

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[1] Julius C. Holmes, Minister of Embassy in the United Kingdom.
[2] Sir Pierson Dixon, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[3] Philip W. Bonsal, Counselor of Embassy in France.
[4] Guy de La Tournelle, Director-General of Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

320/12–251 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, December 2, 1951—1:45 p. m.

500. UNGA will hold elections this week, probably Dec 5, to fill seats on Security Council being vacated by India, Ecuador and Yugo. Elections fill first two seats (US supporting Pakistan and Chile respectively) present no particular difficulties but election fill seat now held by Yugo and formerly by members Sov bloc is special problem. USSR has put forward candidacy of Byelorussia, claiming Sov bloc entitled to one nonpermanent seat on basis a 1946 gentleman's agreement that Eastern Eur, Western Eur, British Commonwealth, and Near East and Africa shld each have one seat and LAs two seats.

Dept strongly opposes election of Sov sponsored country fill Yugo seat for fol reasons:

1. Apart from consideration that gentleman's agreement, although followed in succeeding years, was in our view meant to apply for 1946 only, allocation one non-permanent seat to Sov bloc of 5, already represented on SC by USSR, cannot now be justified on any grounds. On other hand, same representation other areas as that which applied for 1946 (such as two seats for LAs) can still be justified on basis numbers, support for UN activities or contributions.
2. Election of Sov candidate wld make functioning of SC, already obstructed by USSR tactics, all the more difficult. Further, maintenance safe voting margin in SC is highly important for free world in difficult years which lie ahead.
3. GA already decided in 1949 against election Sov candidate when it elected Yugo over Czech and events past two years make it even more inappropriate that Sov candidate shld be elected. We do not believe election non-Sov candidate to succeed Yugo wld be as provocative as election Yugo in 1949.

Greece is principal non-Sov candidate for Yugo seat and US strongly supports its election. Greece has been one of main supporters UN programs, including Korea. Art 23 of Charter provides that in SC elections due regard shld be specially paid in first instance to contribution UN Members maintenance intl peace and security and other purposes of Organization. Further, Greece borders on area from which Eastern Eur seat hitherto filled and has deep interest that area.

Unless you perceive strong objection, pls stress soonest above US position to FonOff and express hope its GADel will be instructed take or continue take this position. FYI only, USDel has been informed by LADels that US shld not now count on LA support for Greece and that LA countries are inclined support Byelorussia as result US posi-

[1] Sent for action to all Embassies except in Guatemala. Sent for information to Guatemala and the U.S. Delegation in Paris. At request of U.S. Delegation, sent on December 4 in telegram 4324 to London for information (320/12–251).

tion not support LA candidate for regular term on Intl Court of Justice. Dept greatly concerned this matter and desires strong presentation US position re SC election to FonOff.

To justify tendency support Byelorussia, LADels have expressed concern re possibility decrease their own SC representation if existing pattern upset. Consequently, in ur conversations with FonOff, you shld carefully refrain from any inference US wishes alter existing practice maintaining two LA seats on SC.[2]

WEBB

[2] Of answers received before the voting began on December 6, somewhat less than half assured that categoric instructions were being sent to Paris to vote for Greece. The remainder were noncommittal but strongly pointed in the direction of voting with the "Latin American bloc." Only one government specifically linked the Security Council and ICJ elections, suggesting a settlement of issues on a *quid pro quo* basis. Ecuador was the object of particular interest to the U.S. Delegation as the incumbent Security Council president was an Ecuadoran (Antonio Quevedo), but the Delegation seems not to have known the direction of the Ecuadoran vote. The reaction in Montevideo to the U.S. *démarche* was, that "Uruguay would not consider voting against Greece unless obliged to do so to maintain faith and confidence of Latin block which [Foreign Minister] insisted Uruguay can not let down." (Montevideo telegram 234, December 4, 1 p. m., file 320/12–451; the Latin American bloc candidate for the ICJ position was Enrique C. Armand Ugon)

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)

TOP SECRET [PARIS,] December 3, 1951.

US/A/3399

Subject: Security Council Successor to Yugoslavia

Participants: Sir Gladwyn Jebb, U.K. Delegation
(Separately) Mr. Maurice Schumann, French Delegation [1]
Mr. Julius Holmes, American Embassy, London [2]
Mr. Philip Bonsal, American Embassy, Paris
Mr. Durward Sandifer, U.S. Delegation [3]
Ambassador Ernest Gross, U.S. Delegation

At lunch with Sir Gladwyn Jebb today, he informed me that although he had not yet received instructions from London to vote for Byelorussia for the Yugoslav vacancy in the Security Council, he believed the decision would be made shortly. . . . Accordingly, after talking with Mr. Sandifer, I gave this message to Mr. Julius

[1] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
[2] By telephone.
[3] Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and in Paris with the U.S. Delegation as one of the two Senior Advisers to the Delegation.

Holmes, in the London Embassy, and told him of Circular Telegram No. 500 (Control 214, Dec 2) and which I thereafter asked our Code Room to repeat to him.

Mr. Holmes said that Ambassador Gifford had an appointment to talk with Mr. Eden on Wednesday and doubted whether he could see him before then. I therefore suggested to Holmes that he communicate at once with the Foreign Office to endeavor to have the decision put off until Ambassador Gifford has had a chance to talk with Mr. Eden on Wednesday. Mr. Holmes said he would do what he can.

During the afternoon I went with Mr. Bonsal to discuss the subject with Mr. Maurice Schumann and explained our position at length along the general lines of Circular 500. Schumann professed to be greatly surprised when I told him that the Charter provided that in the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council due regard should be paid to the contribution of members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security. He also said that he had been unaware of the intense importance which we attached to the election of a non-Cominform State to the Security Council.

In response to his inquiry concerning the British position, I said that although I could not of course speak for the British, it was my understanding that the British Government had not yet made a final decision and I hoped that they would carry out their commitment which they had made some time ago to support Greece. Mr. Schumann appeared to be sufficiently impressed by the exposition of our point of view to indicate that if the decision were up to him, he would vote for Greece, but that although he would undoubtedly be in the French seat and would therefore have to cast the vote in the Assembly, it was a matter of sufficient importance for him to discuss fully with "the other Schuman".[4]

In order to derive optimum benefit from the approach which Mr. Bonsal and I made to the Quai d'Orsay, Mr. Bonsal suggested that he would inform Mr. de la Tournelle during the afternoon of the substance of our conversation with Maurice Schumann.

[4] Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

320/12–451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 4, 1951—8 p. m.

502. Subject: SC elections—further developments since Delga 459, Dec 1. On Dec 3, Gross and Bonsal explained to Maurice Schumann US position along general lines of circular 500, and latter agreed to take question up FonMin.

Holmes now advises us that UK decision has been made and instructions have been sent to UK del to vote for Byelo. Holmes advises Gifford will raise question with Eden Dec 5.

Reaction of Congressional members USGA del when informed of UK position was very strong, Cong Vorys [1] indicating his serious concern over effect on UK assistance program. Dept may wish to explain to Brit Amb serious view we take.

Jebb advises us that he late this afternoon recd info . . . from French that latter had made firm decision to vote for Byelo. In addition, Jebb has learned from Norwegian sources that the 4 Scandinavian countries will vote for Byelo as well as Neth, while Belg is still undecided. Luxembourg will vote for Greece. Jebb also has info that Afghan, Pak, Iran, Burma and Indo will vote for Byelo.

UK del instructions are not to lobby for Byelo and to notify their decision only to French, US, Dominions, Greece and Soviet Union.

AUSTIN

[1] Representative John M. Vorys, member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)

TOP SECRET [PARIS,] December 5, 1951.

US/A/3402

Subject: Elections to the Security Council

Participants: Mr. Maurice Schumann, French Delegation [1]
(Separately) Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, U.K. Delegation
Amb. Jean Chauvel, French Delegation
Mr. Julius Holmes, Amer Embassy, London [1]
Amb. Ernest A. Gross, U.S. Delegation

Last evening Maurice Schumann phoned to inform me of developments on this subject. He said that following his meeting with Mr. Bonsal and myself, he had talked to Robert Schuman and he indicated to me that a decision had been taken to support Greece, subject to further word regarding the British position. Speaking very frankly, Maurice Schumann told me they had subsequently received word of the British decision to vote for Byelorussia and thereupon reverted to the previous French position, which was to support Byelorussia.

I expressed grave disappointment and told him that we also had been informed to our regret of the British decision, but that Ambassa-

[1] By telephone.

dor Gifford was to raise the question with Mr. Eden today, and I therefore hoped the French would keep their position as flexible as possible pending further developments. Mr. Schumann made no commitment, but expressed interest in the information that we were still pursuing the matter with the British.

Later in the evening Amb. Chauvel told me that the French decision had been based not so much on "principle" as on their fear lest the election of Greece this year might create a very confused situation next year when the term of Turkey expires.

During the course of the evening I had an opportunity for a long talk with Selwyn Lloyd at dinner. He opened the conversation on this subject in a somewhat defensive manner, saying half-jokingly that he supposed they were "very unpopular with us now." I outlined our views as persuasively as I was able. I said that one of the most puzzling aspects of the matter was the fact that the United Kingdom had made a commitment to Greece. Lloyd admitted this was so. I also expressed disappointment that the Foreign Office had not acceded to the request of our Embassy to delay the decision until Ambassador Gifford had had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Eden. I told Mr. Lloyd I had this information from Julius Holmes. Lloyd, who did not know of the discussions between our Embassy and the Foreign Office on this matter, said, "That is most regrettable."

Lloyd tried earnestly to justify Mr. Eden's decision. He said that latter had been swayed by consideration of the fact that in 1949 the British Government had publicly affirmed its intention to adhere to the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement of 1946" regarding the distribution of seats in the Security Council. Lloyd said Mr. Eden felt it could not now take the position there was no such agreement. I repeated to Lloyd, as I had done on previous occasions, our view that there was no agreement going beyond a composition of the first Council.

Lloyd, speaking very frankly, made the significant comment that another factor in Mr. Eden's mind was a desire to indicate that the present British Government "could move toward the Soviet Union." Lloyd said it was easier for the new Government to do so because they would not so readily incur our suspicion since the unshakeable and solid ties between us were beyond doubting. On the other hand, the Labor Government, he said, was always under the pressure of "forty or fifty Bevanites" [2] and any moves which the Labor Government might make toward the Soviet Union were always likely to be played up in such a way as to cause deep distrust and resentment in American public opinion.

[2] A reference to the Labor Party group in the House of Commons led by Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Labor and National Service in the Attlee Cabinet. They constituted a radical wing of the Labor Party.

Reverting to the subject of the elections to the Security Council, I said that under the circumstances the question was what the British would do after the first ballot, assuming that neither Greece nor Byelorussia were elected. I expressed the earnest hope that the British would feel that they had honored their so-called obligation after the first ballot and would then vote for Greece. Lloyd said he would discuss this matter further with his Government.

I made this same point to Chauvel and told him I wished to follow it up with him as well as the British.

I phoned Julius Holmes this morning to advise him of my discussion with Mr. Lloyd and suggested that Ambassador Gifford urge upon Mr. Eden the importance of the British (assuming they do not reverse their present instructions to the UK Delegation) switching to Greece after the first ballot in the event that neither Greece nor Byelorussia wins on the first ballot. Mr. Holmes said he would advise Amb. Gifford and have a go at it with Mr. Eden.

310.381/12–551 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Yost) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, December 5, 1951—5 p. m.

2605. Brit Emb has just recd personal note from Eden for transmission PriMin Plastiras stating that while Grk qualification UN SC seat recognized Brit feels compelled vote for Slav State on first ballot in respect for tradition and in order not to discourage Slav cooperation in UN. If Slav State did not secure necessary vote on first ballot Brit wld then cast vote for Greece. Note couched in friendly terms stressed desire explain beforehand reasons which compelled Brit position probably disappointing to Grks.

Sent Dept 2605; rptd Paris 64 (for USDel).

YOST

IO Files

Minutes of Twenty-seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 6, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/214

[Here follows list of persons (43) present.]

Mr. Taylor outlined the agenda for the plenary meetings scheduled for December 6 and 7 and the positions which would be taken by the US on the various items. The first item was the formal installation of the Assistant Secretary-General for Social Affairs. The second item

was the election of the three non-permament members of the Security Council. The Delegation, in accordance with its previous decisions, would vote for Chile, Pakistan and Greece. Our present tally indicated that Greece ought to come fairly close to the necessary two-thirds vote on the first ballot. There should be switches to Greece on the second ballot. The Scandinavians, for example, had indicated they would switch to Greece after the first ballot. Developments with respect to the British position on this matter were important. Mr. Taylor asked Ambassador Gross to indicate the results of his conversations with the British. Ambassador Gross stated that the UK position still remained to vote for Byelorussia. The French, influenced by the UK position, had decided to vote for Byelorussia, too. The important question was, how soon after the first ballot would the UK and France switch to Greece. Every effort had been made to try to persuade them to change their position, but without success. Ambassador Gifford had seen Mr. Eden in London about this, but also in vain. Ambassador Sunde of Norway had stated that the Scandinavians would be under pressure to change after the first ballot. Since indications were that the tide would change, it was important to avoid giving an impression of US acquiescence in States voting for Byelorussia on the first ballot, since this might tend to freeze the situation. In talking with Ambassador Gifford, in the presence of Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Harriman, Ambassador Gross had said that the present British attitude was not a good prelude to the forthcoming talks between Mr. Churchill and President Truman in Washington.[1]

Ambassador Gross thought that there were indications that other western Europeans would also vote for Byelorussia. Luxembourg and Belgium would, however, vote for Greece. A conversation with Mr. Pearson had shown that the Canadians were waivering but would probably vote for Greece without saying much about it. A primary factor in the British position appeared to stem from the UK interpretation of the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1946. The US was certain that this arrangement was not intended to apply beyond the first SC elections in London in 1946. Governor Stevenson of Illinois had represented the US on those early meetings and had specifically confirmed this. The USSR, of course, was claiming that the US had broken this agreement. Ambassador Gross felt that the UK attitude was important not only for the present but for its effect upon the future institutional development of the UN. It had appeared that the present UK Government wanted to make some kind of overture to the Soviet Union and thought that this was a good way to do it. They

[1] Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was Acting Head of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly at this time. W. Averell Harriman was Director, Mutual Security Agency. For documentation regarding the Truman–Churchill conversations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume VI.

also were slightly concerned lest a vote against the Soviet candidate might precipitate a Soviet walkout. The principal reason, however, remained the British interpretation of the 1946 agreement. The British stated that in 1949, on the occasion of the election of Yugoslavia to the Council, they had publicly reaffirmed their interpretation of the 1946 agreement.

Mrs. Roosevelt said she would reverse the explanation by Ambassador Gross of the UK reasoning to read that their interpretation of the 1946 agreement was motivated by their desires. Ambassador Gross said he could not disagree. He added that he also could see no possibility of a Soviet walkout. Mr. Sandifer noted that the Russians were not even threatening so to act.

Mr. Cohen commented on the effect on public relations of this situation. He felt that so long as the hostilities continued in Korea there could be no question of supporting a state which had indicated its opposition to UN action there. Ambassador Jessup agreed with this statement, adding, however, that we should make every effort to avoid having the present situation characterized as a "big split" among the Western Powers.

Ambassador Gross commented that the British instructions were to inform only the US, France, Greece, the Dominions and the Russians of their position. Otherwise it was to be kept a "dark secret".

Mr. Taylor stated that the third item on the plenary agenda was the ECOSOC election. Mr. Taylor recalled that the Delegation had decided to vote for China, France, Argentina, Cuba, Belgium and Australia. The situation was much less acute in these elections. The dynamic factor involved in them came from their relationship to the ICJ elections. He pointed out that whatever our tally showed as to relative voting strength, it would be subject to variation depending upon the degree of Latin American activity. He recalled that our instructions would allow us to vote for Burma only in case it was certain that Egypt would not be elected and Australia showed no prospects of winning. Mr. Lubin asked whether the US would not be in a better position vis-à-vis the Latin Americans if the ICJ elections were held first. Mr. Taylor stated that the agenda was set and it would be very difficult to change it.

The fourth item would be the ICJ elections. The Security Council would meet in Conference Room 4, with Ambassador Gross sitting for the US. In the special election to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Azevedo (Brazil), the US would vote for Carneiro, also a Brazilian. It seemed certain that Carneiro would be elected by a large majority.

In the regular elections for the five expired terms, the US would vote for Rau, Klaestad, Hackworth, Golunsky and DeVisscher. Our

tally showed that Ugon of Uruguay would obtain 9 or 10 votes in the Security Council. Mr. Taylor was not certain whether Klaestad or DeVisscher would be defeated by Ugon's apparent success. The result would depend on which of those two the Latin Americans decided to oppose to assure Ugon's election. The US vote, in accordance with instructions and the decision of the Delegation, would remain as presently determined unless it appeared that Klaestad or DeVisscher had no chance of being elected. In this case the Delegation would reconsider and probably vote with the majority for Ugon.[2]

[Here follows a discussion of the remaining items on the agenda of the forthcoming plenary meetings, which consisted of reports from the Credentials Committee, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Committees.]

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[2] For the record of voting on December 6 for the three nonpermanent seats of the Security Council, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 203 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Plenary*). Chile and Pakistan were elected on the first ballot. None of the others received the necessary two-thirds majority, but Greece and Byelorussia were at the head of the list. There followed three "restricted" ballots as between Greece and Byelorussia, with inconclusive results. In three "unrestricted" ballots (any eligible Member qualifying), the deadlock continued, with two other states reappearing. In further pursuance of the rules of the General Assembly governing such procedure (Rule 94), the president ordered one more restricted ballot (Greece and Byelorussia alone), which was inconclusive. The president then declared the election postponed "in order to give us all time for reflection." (*ibid.*, p. 205)

The elections for the seats on the International Court of Justice proceeded on the same day, and concurrently in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. Messrs. Golunsky (Soviet Union), Hackworth (United States), Klaestad (Norway), Ugon (Uruguay), and Sir Benegal Rau (India) were elected. For the proceedings in the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, pp. 208 ff.; and in the Security Council, where an interesting constitutional situation developed, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixth Year*, 567th Meeting (hereafter cited as SC, *6th yr., 567th mtg.*, or number as appropriate).

320/12–751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 7, 1951—10 p. m.

559. Re SC elections. GADel staff has attempted analyse voting situation and herewith presents recommendations concerning preparation for election now scheduled for Thursday Dec 13. It is clear that only through major effort can necessary 40 votes for Greece be secured. Accordingly, we strongly recommend action be taken immediately by Dept along lines suggested numbered paras below. We noted today some tendency turn toward dark horse as substitute for Greece. We have resisted this in strongest terms and believe issue must be presented sharply as simply Greece vs. Byelo. Importance of earliest possible switch to Greece shld be emphasized, since first two ballots

restricted to Greece and Byelo, after which in fol three ballots votes may be cast for any state. Moreover, since switch by some dels will probably be possible only when Greece develops clear lead crux of problem in securing substantial gain first ballot.

Fol is our analysis last ballot yesterday (restricted to Byelo and Greece alone) in which 32 voted for Byelo, 27 for Greece and one abstention. According best calculations we can make fol probably among those who voted for Byelo: 5 Soviets, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, UK, Fr, Neth, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Israel, Iran, and 8 or 9 LA states (see immediately fol tel).[1] Number dels such as Scandinavian and Neth had informed us they wld switch from Byelo to Greece, on assumption that Greece wld show clear lead. When this lead failed materialize they continued vote for Byelo.

1. UK and Europe.

Key problem is UK. UK position must have been taken by Churchill[2] himself and involved failure to follow through on commitment given Greece. UK del here said wld switch to Greece after strong lead obtained; we note however, from Athens 2605, Dec 5, rptd info Paris 64, Eden's personal note stating that if Slav state did not secure necessary vote on first ballot British wld then switch to Greece. In view previous efforts London and here, we recommend strongest representations at highest level including possibility of personal note from Secy to Eden, making clear the genuine seriousness this issue to them. Recommend same steps be taken re France. Re other states Eur area, recommend representations to three Scandinavian Govts and Neth either at Washn or their capitals, urging instructions that their dels switch to Greece on first or second ballot next Thursday. Background is that Scandinavian dels agreed vote on first ballot for Byelo, each member being free to switch vote for Greece thereafter. We were informed by Nor that they intended to switch but Sweden and Danes appeared to prefer continued support for Byelo. Dutch informed us their instructions were vote Byelo first ballot with discretion switch to Greece thereafter. Thors[3] (Iceland) informed us in greatest confidence that he had consistently voted for Greece and would continue to do so but asked that this not be disclosed to anyone especially Scandinavian countries.

2. NE states if not inconsistent with Dept's overall objectives in area, we suggest circular tel be sent Jidda, Baghdad, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Kabul, instructing chiefs mission raise matter those govts. Suggest no approach be made Leb (which appears firm in any event)

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[1] *Infra.*

[2] Winston L. S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

[3] Thor Thors, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the United Nations, Chairman of the Delegation of Iceland to the General Assembly.

since FonMin here [4] might resent action. Also suggest no action Damascus as del here apparently acting own initiative in view unsettled conditions and has apparently been firm for Greece. Also we think it wld be best leave Egypt alone, as approach in Cairo might be resented by Salah-el-Din [5] and result his putting pressures on Arab States to vote for Byelo.

3. FE States.

Recommend representations to Indian and Indonesian Govts their capitals.

4. LA States.

Different approach to LA States recommended in immediately fol Delga.

AUSTIN

[4] Charles Helou, Chairman of the Delegation of Lebanon to the General Assembly.

[5] Egyptian Foreign Minister.

320/12–751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 7, 1951—10 p. m.

Delga 560. See immediately preceding Delga [559]. Re: Latin American voting on successor to Yugo in SC. Last restricted vote yesterday, 32 for Byelo (Byelorussia), 27 for Greece and one abstention, according to best calculations we can make, wld seem to have included 8 or 9 LA's for Byelo and 11 for Greece. We have reason believe Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay were among Byelo supporters. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru have told us they voted for Greece. Venezuela before vote told us wld not support Byelo but did not indicate how it wld vote. Perhaps it was the abstention.

During successive ballots it became obvious some LA's were voting for Byelo as tactic to deadlock and adjourn vote until after ICJ elections, as method of pressure for Ugon.

Conversations subsequent to ICJ election indicate Mexico and Paraguay may switch to Greece. On pure speculation we expect El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela also to switch. Election of Ugon might be determining factor in these cases. Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Guatemala are, in their several ways, special cases.

We have it from one LA colleague that Argentina and Ecuador, greatly influenced by possibility that SC, in Iranian or some other case, may in future again be confronted by question of right of a

govt take over commercial claims of a national. Ecuador's position in recent Iranian case will be recalled. It may be that these two countries will figure that Byelo can be relied upon more than Greece to sustain thesis that a state may not take on claim of one of its nationals.

Chile wld seem to have no logical reason for supporting Byelo, but in gen seems to be thought by its colleagues inclined do so. Perhaps resentment at US ICJ position influences it. Guatemala during this assembly has rather consistently been on Sov side, as was forecast by some at outset.

Some resentment has been noted over our recent *démarches* in LA capitals, which in one case was interpreted as protest and in others were made, or at least reported to their delegations here by FonOffs involved, so soon before vote as to appear to LA's to represent open pressure. It occurs to us that without in any way seeming acknowledge efficacy of LA action or eat crow, Dept might usefully send another circular asking chiefs of missions to inform govts to which accredited that momentary incident in Paris arising over ICJ is in our opinion closed, that outcome was happy for LA candidate whom circumstances permitted US to support in Security Council showdown vote (US helping break deadlock by voting for Ugon) and that we give no credit to rumors that our failure to support Ugon at outset has created lasting differences between US and LA brethren. It is recommended that no further pressure be put on any LA govt including those believe are likely to vote for Byelo.

Such a friendly gesture as this *démarche* when learned of by LA's here might well have favorable effect on dels which for final vote next week have been given discretion. Atmosphere has eased considerably in recent days, especially since Ugon's election, but there is evidence that resentment still exists in some quarters and cld unfavorably influence voting.

AUSTIN

320/12–851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 8, 1951—3 p. m.

Delga 567. Re: SC elections. Discussions with UK del subsequent to events reported Delga 559, December 7, emphasize importance of representations to highest levels London. UK del has frankly disclosed to Gross doubt whether UK del wld switch to Greece even if on first ballot on Thurs, December 13, Greece shows lead over Byelo.

Maximum commitment obtainable from UK del here is that they wld "feel free to switch" in event Greece took lead. This obviously not commitment at all.

We are keeping Harriman closely advised and he feels just as strongly as does GADel that continuance of present UK position wld not only create friction and misunderstanding between US and UK people but wld make more difficult MSA program. Harriman feels and we agree that election Byelo to SC wld weaken free world posit vis-à-vis USSR and, therefore, it wld be against highest interests UK as well as ourselves to permit this to happen if it can be avoided. We believe Brit analysis of sitn is wrong and that course which they have been following on this matter does not constitute a constructive "approach" toward Sov Union, despite apparent Brit feeling that their support Byelo somehow brings UK and Sov Govt closer together.

We suggest US approach to London shld avoid "whip-cracking" and shld stress our sincere belief that we are right in principle and that higher common interests of both of us wld be served by supporting Greece.

Sent Dept niact Delga 567, rptd info London 905.

AUSTIN

320/12–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 8, 1951—2:30 p. m.

2844. For Gifford. Pls advise whether you raised with Eden Dec 5 problem election Greece vs Byelorussia to SC and if so results. (Delga 567 rptd info London 905.) If not done, sugg approach be made if you believe might be helpful.

To assist Dept in deciding on approach other Eur cos pls advise by Mon p m [1] if possible.

WEBB

[1] December 10.

320/12–1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT LONDON, December 10, 1951—1 p. m.

2669. Deptel 2844 Dec 8. I did raise question of election of Greece vs Byelorussia to SC with Eden on Dec 5. Eden said he could

not agree to support Greece as Brit felt bound by agreement of 1946 to include a "Slav state" in SC under the concept of geographic distribution. This was telephoned US del GA Paris. I urged that Brit support Greece on second ballot. He said same principle applied to second ballot as first but I urged he give further consideration to second ballot. To this he commented that understood Greece would in all probability win without Brit vote. He also turned down my suggestion that UK might abstain. Harriman telephoned me evening of December 5 while I was dining with Eden. I raised matter again with him then. His reaction was identical with that of the morning and Morrison [1] who was present agreed with him. This result without mention of Morrison communicated Harriman when he telephoned Holmes morning Dec 6. Holmes not present at conversation with Eden and Morrison; although he knew Eden's attitude was unaware that Morrison participated.

I have appointment to see Eden morning Dec 11 and will try again to get him to change UK position.

Sent Dept 2669; rptd info Paris 1225.

GIFFORD

[1] Possibly Herbert S. Morrison, Foreign Secretary in the previous Labor Government.

320/12–1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 10, 1951—4 p.m.

Delga 581. Re SC elections. At his request, Politis (Greece) [1] called on Gross at evening in considerable state of agitation concerning the developments of the past week on the Grk candidacy for the SC. He affirmed in strongest terms the understanding of the Grk Govt that both UK and Fr had made firm commitments to support Greece and repeatedly characterized their default as "treason". With respect to Fr commitment, he described circumstantially discussion he had held with Maurice Schumann about ten days ago in which latter had raised with him question of Grk attitude toward placing the Moroccan item on GA agenda.[2] Politis said he had explained to Schumann the predicament of the Grk del, which desired to bring up the Cyprus question and which, therefore, cld not vote against putting the Moroccan item on the agenda since in certain respects there was a parallel between the two questions.

However, according to Politis, this discussion with Maurice Schumann concluded on the basis that the Fr wld support the Grk candi-

[1] Jean Politis, Chairman of the Greek Delegation to the General Assembly.
[2] For documentation on this matter, see pp. 135 ff.

dacy for the SC in return for which the Grk del wld abstain on the Moroccan question. Politis said he had also discussed the matter with Robert Schuman and indicated that the same understanding has been reached. The Grk Govt was, therefore, at a complete loss to understand why the Fr had reneged. Politis said he had reason to believe the Fr had sought to persuade Belgium and Luxembourg to vote for Byelo.

With regard to Brit position, not only had Greece recd a commitment of support from the Brit Govt, which commitment in addition to our own had induced the Grk Govt to enter the race, but the Grk Govt had later recd a note from Mr. Eden advising them that although the Brit wld vote for Byelo on the first ballot, it wld switch to Greece thereafter. Despite this note, it was clear that the Brit had continued to vote for Byelo up to and including the last ballot taken before the voting was adjourned.

Moreover, said Politis, a Grk correspondent had raised the question with a press officer of the Brit del, who had made the comment that if the Greeks recd 35 or so votes on a subsequent ballot, they shld "feel that their prestige and honor had been maintained" and shld then withdraw from the race.

Politis requested our views. Gross replied that there shld be no question in the mind of the Grk Govt concerning our firm intention to see this matter through. Without characterizing the Brit and Fr action, Gross said we were in strong disagreement with them and intended to maintain the strongest effort at the necessary high levels to persuade both the Brit and Fr Govts that the election of Greece to the SC wld serve the highest interests of the free world.

Gross expressed emphatic disagreement with the reported comment to the Brit press officer and added that there had been some talk of a substitute candidate in the event that subsequent balloting remained indecisive, but that we had taken a firm position against this and that we were actively discouraging to the best of our ability any thoughts along this line.

Gross told Politis he cld take what he had said as the official point of view of the US Govt and make his report accordingly.

Sent Dept Delga 581; rptd info London 912, Athens 67.

AUSTIN

320/12–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1951—6 p. m.

2683. Re Embtel 2669 Paris 1225 Dec 10. I again raised SC election with Eden this morning. He said he had instructed Selwyn

Lloyd to hold discussions with Fr and Dominions in Paris, looking toward Brit voting for Greece if it appeared that enough Latin Americans and others cld be won over to make it obvious that Greece wld be elected. He seemed anxious to settle the matter and hoped that either on next ballot or following ballot, a decision cld be reached.

He made it clear he was not definitely promising Brit wld vote for Greece because they cld not make final decision until discussions revealed what practical results of doing so wld be.

Sent Dept 2683; rptd info Paris 1236.

GIFFORD

320/12–751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 11, 1951—7:35 p. m.

Gadel 417. 1. We have been seriously concerned re developments Greece–Byelorussia contest SC seat, especially since LA defection became apparent because of unfortunate ICJ slates problem. Since last week's deadlock we have been considering how far we cld usefully go to assist Greeks and what tactics wld be most appropriate, bearing in mind Delgas 559 and 560.

2. We appreciate fact Greece has been innocent victim circumstances. We trust Del's estimate that Greeks will gain five votes from LA states when voting resumed Dec 13 correct, but we realize LA shift alone cannot at best bring about Greece's election.

3. Key to situation, in our opinion, therefore remains UK together with WE states which are strongly influenced by UK position. Like Greeks, we were misled into belief UK wld shift support to Greece after first ballot. We have approved strong and repeated representations made by Gifford to Eden, but recognize there is only very slight chance these or any others will be effective.

4. Given these unexpected difficulties, problem is whether to engage US prestige beyond point already reached in effort secure election Greece. Our thinking on this point is colored by several factors:

(*a*) We have made honest effort bring about defeat Sov satellite and, as Greece emerged as principal anti-satellite candidate, to bring about its election. USDel cannot be reproached for failing in any way meet its commitments.

(*b*) We foresee little prospect that extraordinary measures which might be undertaken by Dept—i.e., representations to Ambs or circulars to field suggested Delga 559—will have decisive impact on recipients. All of them already know what our position is and why we

[1] Repeated for information to London as 2873 and Athens as 2803.

hold it. We have considered various further approaches to LAs including suggestion Delga 560 and have concluded there is nothing further that cld usefully be done.

(*c*) Pressure tactics undertaken on large scale may generate reverse effect. They may be resented as attempt restrict freedom of action small states at one of their most sensitive points, right to cast secret ballot in accordance with their own views on bloc representation. (While not agreeing, we believe many states sincere in their protestations that attempt cut down representation any bloc will ultimately endanger position their own.)

(*d*) Moreover, other states will be unable understand why we make extraordinary efforts gain their support on an issue which does not seem to them of first rank substantive importance. In their view, presence or absence of Sov satellite to echo its master's voice will not markedly affect functioning of SC. As we have observed, it is difficult convince others that presence of a satellite may on occasion rob us of crucial seventh vote on closely contested issues.

(*e*) Failing to understand basis our anxiety, other states may regard our efforts as indication we do not feel secure in our leadership. This may affect their confidence in our judgment and, in some cases, may lead to attempts trade off support for Greece in exchange concessions from us on unrelated subjects. This we cld not permit.

5. Our conclusion is that we shld not make further extraordinary efforts pressure other states into support of Greece. We do not mean by this to imply you shld not follow line set forth in Delga 581, Dec 10, maintaining Dels strong support for Greece. However, if impasse continues through next balloting, we doubt desirability completely foreclosing possibility compromise candidate. We continue strongly to desire defeat of satellite and election of Greece, but are convinced that undue pressure tactics will at this stage push us past point of diminishing returns, considering our position in the largest sense.

WEBB

330/12–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY ATHENS, December 11, 1951—11 a. m.

2700. This morning Plastiras sent Moatsis, chief of PriMin's polit bureau, to tell me that if Greece's candidacy for SC is proving at all embarrassing for us in our relations with UK or others PriMin wld immed issue orders withdrawing Greece from race.

Moatsis emphasized Plastiras' intense desire for complete cooperation with us particularly in foreign affairs. He added that PriMin had been intensely irritated by Politis' activities in early GA meetings, and wished us to know that he disapproved of any maneuvering by Grk rep which wld not be wholly in accord with Amer wishes.

Wld appreciate immed telegraphic advice so that I may answer Plastiras.[1]

Sent priority Dept 2700; rptd info Paris 72 for USDel.

PEURIFOY

[1] In telegram 2804, December 11, 7: 36 p. m. (repeated for information to Paris as Gadel 419) the Department responded: "Inform Plastiras that Greek candidacy not proving embarrassing to U.S. from standpoint our relations with U.K. and that U.S. intends vote for Greece during balloting scheduled December 13." (330/12–1151)

320/12–1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 11, 1951—2 p. m.

Delga 605. Re: SC elections. In conversation Gross with Jebb and Chauvel on other matters Dec 10, Jebb raised question of SC elections. From ensuing discussion it became clear UK del still without instrs to switch to Gr on subsequent ballots. Gross took opportunity to set forth in strongest terms US position along lines Delga 567, Dec 8. On basis Chauvel's comments, it is clear, as we had suspected, that Fr position entirely dependent upon Brit and if UK switches to Gr, Fr will unquestionably do likewise. Jebb told Gross UK del wld seek firm instrs re position future ballots.

We have seen London's 2669, Dec 10. We are struck by omission of ref on part of Eden to UK commitments to Gr and in particular Eden's letter to Plastiras, text of which we have not seen but which is obviously interpreted by Gr Govt in Athens (Athens No. 2650 and No. 2668, Dec 8) as well as by Gr del here (Delga 581, Dec 10) as a UK commitment to switch to Gr after first ballot. Both Lloyd and Jebb have confirmed to Gross fact of earlier UK commitment to support Gr but neither has sought to explain repudiation of commitment. Re Eden's comment to Gifford that Gr wld in all probability win without Brit vote, our canvass here shows that Gr may have difficulty even with Brit vote and it shld accordingly be brought home to Eden that votes of UK and those which like Fr are fol the UK lead will probably be decisive factor in outcome of election.

We also have reason to believe from discussions with Fr del that Maurice Schumann did in fact commit Fr to support of Gr as Politis had previously informed us (Delga 581, Dec 10). Altho absence of both Schumanns from Paris makes impossible requisite high-level discussions here, we still regard UK position as key (Delga 559, Dec 7).

We urge renewed efforts London stressing factors outlined Delga 567, Dec 8 and sharp focusing on UK commitments to Gr, facts of

which are widely known here and violation of which is causing intense confusion and bitterness.

Sent Dept Delga 605; rptd info London 923.

AUSTIN

320/12–1151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 11, 1951—7 p. m.

611. Re SC elections. Jebb has just informed Gross UK will shift to Greece on second ballot if Greece obtains majority on first ballot at forthcoming plenaries. Gross without success pressed for UK shifting to Greece on first ballot or in any event UK shifting to Greece on second ballot irrespective of outcome of first ballot.

In subsequent conversation Chauvel informed Gross France wld also shift on second ballot along with UK provided Greece obtained more votes than Byelo on first ballot. Chauvel also revealed that Fr FonOff recd info from Massigli [1] to effect Brit FonOff had authorized Jebb to concert with Chauvel. It seems probable from this that Jebb has broader authority to shift than he disclosed to us altho this is inference only.

In light of foregoing, it wld be most useful to us if we cld obtain firmer info concerning nature of UK instruction to Jebb this matter. Altho we are hopeful that Greece will have majority on first ballot because of possible LA shift, there is still too much doubt concerning actual LA voting position to warrant relaxation of efforts to obtain UK commitment to vote for Greece.

Sent Dept Delga 611; rptd info London 926.

[AUSTIN]

[1] René Massigli, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

330/12–1351: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET ATHENS, December 13 [*12?*], 1951—noon.

2724. Acting FonMin Averoff confides that after consultation yesterday afternoon with Rendis and Varvoutis he instructed Politis provisionally to withdraw from contest for SC seat if Greece did not obtain ⅔ majority next ballot. Averoff said this instruction sent with some reluctance as Politis had telegraphed that USDel anxious Greeks remain in race. However Averoff said, govt concerned by rising tide

of anti-Brit sentiment here which it feared might result in Britain's refusal to purchase this year's currant crop now ready for market.

In view of much greater irritation to Brit through Greek Govt's increasing agitation Cyprus question and current indications that Greek FonOff may recognize Farouk as King of Sudan, alleged fears of split with Brit over SC seat seem rather far-fetched. More likely reasons wld appear criticism of govt's bungling in opposition press and Parl, native timidity, and Averoff's long-time personal opposition to putting Greece in SC where it might be forced to take open stand against Egypt.

Obviously aforesaid three Greek Mins acted without consultation with PriMin and without knowledge of fact that PriMin had requested US views before making decision re withdrawal. Consequently now attempting coordinate situation.

Sent Dept 2724; rptd info Paris 76 (for USDel).

PEURIFOY

330/12–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT ATHENS, December 12, 1951—4 p. m.

2728. Moatsis representing PriMin, and acting FonMin Averoff called to say that if USDel Paris so desired Greece wld remain in race for SC seat for three more ballots but wld thereafter, if unsuccessful, withdraw its candidacy. Remytel 2724, Dec 12 (instructions to this effect are being sent Politis). Averoff and other Mins feel strongly that govt which is being subjected to telling ridicule in Parl and press cannot withstand embarrassment of more prolonged struggle in contest with "nonexistent" state of Byelorussia and without support many Western states.

Grk Govt and Emb extremely anxious for USDel views on current SC seat situation. Govt understands vote will take place tomorrow.

Sent Dept 2728; rptd niact Paris for USDel 77.

PEURIFOY

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 12, 1951—7 : 12 p. m.

2827. Re urtel 2728. While we appreciate Greeks' discomfiture over SC election developments, we hope you will make it clear to them

[1] Repeated for information to Paris priority as Gadel 430.

that decision whether continue in race is matter for their own determination. There shld be no misunderstanding re fact they decided on their own to make race and US support was given only after Greece seemed leading non-Soviet candidate.

We expect GADel will inform Emb re prospects in Dec 13 balloting. Seems to us Greeks shld pick up number of LA votes, and perhaps UK and Fr votes on second ballot as well. If GADel concurs, you may inform Greeks our own view wld therefore be that they wld be wise reserve decision re withdrawal until several more ballots cast. We repeat, however, Greeks must make this decision themselves.

WEBB

IO Files

Minutes of Thirty-second Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 13, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/219

[Here follows list of persons (41) present.]

1. Mr. Taylor called attention to Gadel 417, received the night before, in the last paragraph of which the Department's views were set forth on the question of the election to the Yugoslav seat in the Security Council. The Department indicated that the Delegation should not drop all consideration of the possibility of a compromise candidate in the event that Greece's chances seemed to be waning. Pointing out that this telegram would have been more helpful had it been received a week earlier, Mr. Taylor referred to a new complication in the situation as a result of new instructions being sent Dr. Politis from Athens (see niact 2728 Athens to Washington, repeated info to Paris niact 77). Although not completely clear, it seemed that Politis might withdraw the Greek candidacy for this seat if after the third ballot Greece no longer stood chance of getting the necessary two-thirds vote. If the word were to get around that Politis had instructions to this effect Greece's chances would be completely scuttled. Ambassador Gross had not been able to contact Politis the night before when we received word of this development. Mrs. Roosevelt thought the Delegation could not now shift its vote to a compromise candidate since there would be no time to reach agreement with enough delegations to assure success. She felt that the Department should have decided some time ago if it wished the Delegation to pursue the indicated course. Now the Delegation would have to vote

for Greece and let the latter decide what it wished to do in the light of the new instructions.

Mr. Sandifer said that we should at least keep Greece in the running for three ballots. Much would depend on how Politis interpreted his instructions. Ambassador Gross thought there was too much defeatism since Greece stood excellent chances of winning. The voting situation had incidated a sizeable majority of votes were going to go to Greece. He noted that when the news arrived at the South African reception the night before that the South African Delegation was being instructed to withdraw from the General Assembly, he had tried to persuade Messrs. Donges [1] and Jooste to stay in the plenary until they could cast their vote for Greece.

Mr. Cory reported that Kyrou had called him this morning saying that there was a rumor that the Philippines was a strong darkhorse candidate, and asking that the US talk to the Philippines and dissuade them from entering the race. Mr. Cohen suggested that we could contact Elizalde, since he had always been amenable to sound suggestions. Mr. Lubin agreed that this would be feasible. Miss Bacon asked why we wanted to persuade the Philippines to stay out of the race. Mr. Cohen suggested that we should avoid a snap judgment on this matter but that keeping the Philippines out would be avoiding the inevitable victory that Byelorussia would obtain if another candidate entered the race, and Greece were to drop out in favor of them.

Ambassador Gross was very disturbed about talk of withdrawal of the Greek candidacy. The prestige of the US was very deeply engaged in Greece's candidacy. To give up without a strenuous effort to obtain the three or four extra votes necessary to assure a victory for Greece would be very undesirable.

Mrs. Roosevelt interpreted the final paragraph of Gadel 417 as meaning that the US would not begin looking around for compromise candidates until Greece withdrew. Mr. Sandifer did not think this telegram gave the Delegation an absolute instruction to that effect. He agreed with Ambassador Gross that we must stick with Greece, and should avoid any indications from us or from the Greeks that we were considering a compromise candidate. There would be no time to develop a strong alternative candidate. The UK position, furthermore, would not allow it to switch to a compromise candidate, and they would probably return to supporting Byelorussia, if they did switch to Greece, in preference to any compromise candidate. This corresponded to their position with regard to the so-called gentlemen's agreement.

Ambassador Key reported a rumor he had picked up from the Chinese that the US was planning to withdraw its support for Greece.

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[1] T. E. Donges, Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of South Africa to the General Assembly.

Having "stepped on" that rumor, he had attempted to have it killed in other quarters as well.

Mr. Cohen thought a considerable amount would depend on how the balloting stood when Greece withdrew, if it did, as to whether a compromise candidate would be possible.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that the consensus of opinion seemed to be that the US Delegation would stand firmly for Greece. If they did not come close to the necessary two-thirds majority, we would try to obtain a postponement in order to consider further the possibility of a compromise candidate, or whether to continue to support Greece and try to obtain the few more votes needed to ensure its election.

Ambassador Gross summarized the voting strength as follows: on the first ballot Greece should get about 32 votes. On the second, if the UK and others switched as they had indicated they would, Greece would get 37 votes. What happened on the third ballot would be extremely important. If the result were the same as on the second, the fourth would be even more important. He added that the instruction to Politis, as reported by Peurifoy from Athens, was not entirely clear as to what Politis would or could do.

Mr. Plitt suggested that all the political officers attempt to "knock in the head" all rumors to the effect that the US might withdraw its support from Greece. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. McKeever agreed with this. Similar rumors had been circulating among the press people, too, and every effort had been made to squelch them.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

320/12–1351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 13, 1951.

[Received December 13—12 : 01 p. m.]

Delga 645. Subject: SC election. Seven ballots taken this a. m., last ballot resulting 36 votes for Greece and 23 for Byelorussia. Pres GA then proposed that further balloting be postponed until next week, presumably Thursday. US del not in position object.[1]

During balloting today Greek strength steadily increased, from initial vote of Greece 28, Byelorussia 27. It is probable that if balloting had continued, Greece wld have picked up neces four votes. We think Greece may be elected in next few ballots and hope that Greece will not in next critical days show any tendency withdraw from race. For Dept's info, we see this as contest strictly between Byelorussia and

[1] For the proceedings in the General Assembly, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pp. 235 ff.

Greece and believe that there is no possibility at this stage, of any successful dark-horse candidate.

After conversations today, USDel will wire Dept our analysis last ballot today. For preliminary info, UKDel is coy about how it voted and we are not sure whether they in fact switched as we had understood they wld. Kyrou said UK informed him they voted for Greece. We understand Nor and Den have not yet switched, but were informed they intended do so next ballot when voting was adjourned.[2]

Sent Dept Delga 465, niact Athens 72, rptd info London 947.

AUSTIN

[2] In telegram Gadel 484, December 17, 6: 32 p. m. (repeated information Athens 2929), the Department responded that it concurred in the Delegation's hope that Greece would not show any tendency to withdraw "at this time." (320/12–1351)

320/12–1351: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 13, 1951—noon.

Delga 659. Ref Delga 645.

1. Re last ballot SC election today, we estimate that 23 states voting for Byelorussia included fol: 5 Soviets, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Afghanistan, Israel, Burma, Indonesia, India, Iran, Syria or Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Uruguay, Guatemala, Mexico, Chile and possibly Iraq. Kyrou's list checks with this.

2. As indicated Delga 645 UK is being very coy. UK has told Kyrou, however, they voted for Greece on 4th ballot.

3. Greece wld have been only 3 votes short if South Africa had been present. Kyrou intends ask Donges attend next plenary for SC election and we plan see South Africa and second this idea. We have been informed that Norway and Denmark were about to switch to Greece when further balloting was postponed. Kyrou believes there is some possibility that he may be able to persuade one or two Asian states to cast blank ballots and thus cut down required majority. We will assist Kyrou's efforts. We believe, barring some unusual development, that Greece can be elected with modest efforts on our part in 3 or 4 more ballots.

Sent Dept Delga 659, rptd info Athens 73.

AUSTIN

320/12–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:26 p. m.

Gadel 469. In discussion other matters between Dept and Israel Emb rep Dec 14 subj elections SC came up. (Delga 659 Dec 13) Dept stated understood reasons for Israel vote for Byelorussia these elections but stalemate reached which urgently necessary resolve. US wld contiue support Greece for SC and hoped that as many states as possible wld also support. If Israel felt as matter principle it unable support Greece we urged as next best course Israel shld submit blank ballot and in effect abstain from voting. Israel Emb rep promised teleg Depts views Israel Del Paris.

ACHESON

[1] Repeated for information to Tel Aviv as 442.

330/12–1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:26 p.m.

197. US GADel reports belief SA voting Byelorussia over Greece SC elections. Next elections to resolve deadlock scheduled for next week. Dept requests that unless you perceive objection your approach SAG along fol lines: US aware interest SA in this important issue and hopes SA now in position give support Grk candidacy SC. US believes SAG shares view that Greece election will bring to SC nation which has demonstrated deep interest in maintenance peace and security in Europe, ME and Far East through its actions during past several years in opposition Soviet inspired aggression directed at Free World.

ACHESON

[1] Repeated for information to Paris as Gadel 470.

320/12–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:26 p. m.

Gadel 471. Re Delga 659 Dec 13 Dept suggests light possibility Iraq voting for Byelorussia, USDel might if it thinks useful approach

[1] Repeated for information to Baghdad as 321.

Jamali [2] along fol lines: US keenly aware deep interest Iraq in this issue and strongly hopes Jamali in position urge his Govt's unqualified support for Grk candidacy. Del shld play on theme that US recognizes importance Iraqi Govt attaches Jamali's recommendations; [3] US therefore approaching him Paris in hope he will recommend to his Govt that it support Greece. Del cld also refer instances his valuable support in past which we greatly appreciate.

ACHESON

[2] Mohamed Padhil Al-Jamali, Chairman of the Delegation of Iraq to the General Assembly.

[3] Dr. Jamali was also President of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies.

320/12–1751 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 17, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 710. In conv after SC balloting Dec 13 Jamali told member USDel Arab States possible exception Egypt had supported Greece after initial ballot. Altho we have had some difficulty in reconciling statement without voting analysis, we have no reason to assume it did not reflect the Arab position which was corroborated today by unofficial source close to Arab dels. In circumstances, we question advisability approach along lines suggested Gadel 471 but will remind Al-Jamali our mutual interest in supporting Greek candidacy. Divergent opinion allegedly developed Egyptian del today on vote for Greece. Their position this respect undecided as of this moment.

Sent Department Delga 710, repeated Baghdad 20.

ROOSEVELT

320/12–1851 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 18, 1951—8 p.m.

Delga 724. Subj: SC elections. Gross just raised with Gundersen (Norway) problem of breaking deadlock on SC voting so Council cld function as of Jan 1. Gundersen's reply indicated he does not have authority to switch to Greece if deadlock continues. He also said they wld have to take Denmark with them on any switch, indicating Denmark likewise does not have such authority. Gundersen said he appreciated force of this new argument and wld communicate it urgently to his capital. He said if deadlock does continue he will

request authority to switch but indicated difficulty of problem for them. Suggest Dept take up matter urgently with Ambs and capitals.

Sent Dept Delga 724, rptd info Oslo 50, Copenhagen 37.

ROOSEVELT

330/12–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Norway [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 19, 1951—12:26 a.m.

505. Re SC Election: Dept concerned re USDel's report (Delga 724 from Paris rptd info Oslo 50 and Copenhagen 37, Dec 18) Dels of Norway and Denmark do not have authority switch from Byelorussia to Greece if election deadlock continues. Dept strongly desires election of Greece during next balloting and requests you approach FonOff soonest and express hope its Del will be given authority vote for Greece during next balloting which we understand will take place Dec 20. Suggest you point out as appropriate arguments mentioned Deptel 369 to Copenhagen rptd Oslo 358, Oct 29,[2] and necessity resolving deadlock to permit SC to function as of Jan 1.

ACHESON

[1] Sent also to Copenhagen niact as 510 and repeated for information to Paris as Gadel 504.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 89.

330/12–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Denmark (Anderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT COPENHAGEN, December 19, 1951—7 p.m.

459. ReDeptel sent Oslo 505, Copenhagen 510, rptd Paris Gadel 504, Dec 19.

I called on FonMin today to discuss Security Council balloting schedule Dec 20. After I outlined our position which had originally been presented to FonOff Oct 30, FonMin answered that Dan position supporting Byelorussia is based on belief that membership on Sec Council of one or two Sov votes and vetoes make little difference since "everyone knows is only one country". FonMin also stated that Dan motive was to show Sov, if possible, Scand good will. However FonMin added that, in case deadlock, situation might appear differently, and he agreed to get in touch Dan del Paris. He seemed interested when I mentioned Nor also being approached by US. He then added Den standing with Nor this question.

FonMin emphasized that, in question where principle and serious issues involved such as Swed res on Ger, Den had no hesitation sup-

porting our position but that Den believes Security Council membership is different kind of question.

My impression is that if deadlock develops or Nor changes its position then Den might alter its views.

Sent Dept 459, rptd info Oslo 11, Paris for GADel 57.

ANDERSON

320/12–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY DJAKARTA, December 19, 1951—5 p.m.

884. FonMin Subardjo called me this noon to his home where confined since Saturday result automobile accident. FonMin said Palar [1] telegraphed him under considerable pressure from other delegations for Indo vote on membership Security Council. Palar sought approval vote for Byelorussia over Greece feeling Soviets wld support Indo claim NNG.

Subardjo sought my advice and quickly agreed that for Indo del now to favor Soviets wld tend confirm Austral argument that Indo wld constitute Commie menace in NNG. Vote for Byelorussia wld also be keen disappointment to Western friends who have supported Indo's cause in SC and elsewhere. Subardjo said he wld telegraph Palar to vote for Greece.[2]

Dept pass Paris for USDel UNGA.[3]

COCHRAN

[1] L. N. Palar, Acting Chairman of the Delegation of Indonesia. Dr. Ahmed Subardjo, the Indonesian Foreign Minister was initially in Paris as the Chairman.

[2] As of 3 p. m., December 20, Mr. Palar had not received new instructions (Paris telegram Delga 753, December 20, 3 p. m., 320/12–2051).

[3] Notation by Code Room: "Relayed to Paris 12–19–51, 10 a. m."

330/12–2051 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT OSLO, December 20, 1951—2 p. m.

582. Saw SecGen Skylstad this morning re Deptel 505, December 19 and reiterated US position re election of Greece to SC as outlined Deptel 358, October 29, stressing need for breaking deadlock and enabling SC to function as of January 1.

Skylstad said Nor del being given discretionary authority to shift vote to Greece if absolutely necessary in order break deadlock. Am informing GADel by telephone.

Sent Dept 582, niact Paris for GADel; rptd info Copenhagen 25.

SNOW

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Slates for UN Organs Beg. 1951 (1951–1953)"

Memorandum of Conversations, by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] December 19, 1951.

Subject: Security Council Election

Participants: Sir Gladwyn Jebb (UK)
Mr. Osten Unden [1] (Sweden) (Separately)
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup (US)

Sir Gladwyn Jebb told me last night that "everybody" was going to vote for Greece on the next ballot. He specifically mentioned Norway and Denmark. I told him that Sunde had seemed a little uncertain because he did not know definitely what the UK would do. Jebb said that the Norwegians now had been fully informed about the British attitude and that they were all right.

I spoke to Unden and asked if it was going to be possible for Sweden to abstain. Unden, who is leaving for home today, said that they had not yet definitely decided. He thought there should be a change in the rules so that the election would be decided by a simple plurality. He agreed that the continuation of the balloting was very unsatisfactory and that the matter ought to be wound up.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[1] Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Delegation of Sweden to the General Assembly.

IO Files

Minutes of Thirty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 20, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M (Chr)/222

[Here follow list of persons present (48) and discussion of a prior agenda item. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair.]

2. *Review of the Security Council Elections Situation.*

Mr. Taylor recalled that on the last ballot, the fifteenth,[1] Greece had had 36 votes to Byelorussia's 23. There would be one more restricted ballot and then if a two-thirds' majority were not obtained, the balloting would again become unrestricted. He estimated that the situation from the US point of view was somewhat better than it had been at the end of the balloting the week before. A "precision campaign" had been undertaken with a view to obtaining the necessary extra votes or abstentions to secure the election of Greece.

[1] This occurred on December 13; see Delga 645 and Delga 659, December 13, pp. 127 and 128.

Mr. Taylor mentioned that Mrs. Roosevelt had talked with Mr. Sharett of Israel about this matter. The Israeli Foreign Minister indicated that he might ask the Greek delegation what its attitude was with regard to the Palestine problem, in order to determine whether it might be possible to switch to Greece.

From Djakarta had come word that the Indonesian delegate would receive instructions to vote for Greece. Ambassador Jessup had approached the Swedish Foreign Minister with a view to securing an abstention on the part of Sweden but Mr. Unden had not made any commitment on the matter. Mr. Cohen had talked with the Uruguayans, who agreed to switch to Greece.

Approaches in Oslo and Copenhagen indicated that at least in Denmark the preference was still for Byelorussia, but that if a stalemate continued, they might switch to Greece. In conversations with the South Africans nothing had been heard which indicated they would return to the Plenary to cast their vote for Greece. If they did return it would be for that purpose, however.

Ambassador Gross felt that the deadlock must be resolved at the plenary meeting of that day, inasmuch as it would be the last time an election could be held before the Christmas recess and before the year's end. It would be highly undesirable to allow the year to end without a legally constituted Security Council to take up its duties in January. He offered to indicate to both Padilla Nervo and Lie the US concern over such a situation, and its willingness to remain all night if need be to solve this problem on the sole basis that the Council could not do business with only ten elected members.

Mr. Maffitt reported that on the last ballot Mexico, Guatemala and Uruguay had voted for Byelorussia. Now Uruguay had switched to Greece. In view of the change in attitude of Guatemala in Committee One, perhaps they would switch to Greece. Chile would definitely vote for Greece.

Mr. Utter reported that the Danes and Norwegians were waiting on each other to switch to Greece before themselves changing. Iceland was trying to persuade both of them to change. The result ought to be known before long.

Ambassador Gross reiterated his belief that the deadlock must be broken. Small states, it could be pointed out, had the greatest stake in a properly constituted and functioning Security Council. The clock and the calendar were pressing for a solution. Mrs. Roosevelt noted that this was the only effective argument that she had been able to use with Mr. Sharett. Mr. Cohen wondered whether Israel knew the Greeks were not indebted to the Arabs for any measure of support. Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out that the basis of the Israeli position was that there were many Greeks in Egypt with whom Greece carried on

trade. This, they felt, would make it necessary for Greece to be amenable to the Arabs. Then when a successor to Turkey from the Arab bloc would be elected next year, the Council would be stacked against Israel.

Mr. Plitt had just talked with Kyrou, who had found out only recently that three Arabs had voted for Greece. Apparently the Arabs were now trying to forge a common front for Greece.

Ambassador Key was surprised at the Indonesian instructions reported in the telegram from Djakarta. He proposed to approach India and Burma with this news and try to persuade them to reconsider their positions.

[Here follows brief discussion of matters not on the agenda.]

CHARLES D. COOK

320/12–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY PARIS, December 20, 1951.

Delga 755. GA elected Greece to SC today. Results: Greece 39, Byelorussia 16, absentions 4.[1]

Sent Dept priority Delga 755, rptd priority London 990, Athens 78.

ROOSEVELT

[1] This result occurred after the General Assembly voted in one restricted ballot (that is, Greece and Byelorussia alone) and three unrestricted ballots. For the proceedings, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, p. 282.

II. THE QUESTION OF PLACING THE EGYPTIAN ITEM REGARDING MOROCCO ON THE FINAL AGENDA OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

320/10–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL. WASHINGTON, October 12, 1951—6 p. m.

2177. Bonnet [2] called on Secy Oct 9 and after referring strong feel-

[1] Repeated to London for Sanders as 1994 and to New York for USUN as 199. William Sanders was Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (John D. Hickerson). Sanders was in London at this time as head of a U.S. party engaged in talks with the British Government on colonial questions at the United Nations. The U.S. group was scheduled to proceed to Paris on the same mission, after the London talks. For documentation regarding the colonial policy discussions in London and Paris, see pp. 623 ff.

[2] Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the United States.

ings in France incited by Egypt placing Morocco before UN [3] stated Fr Govt has decided fight placing item on agenda in General Comite and plenary sessions on grounds it was internal matter under Charter. Bonnet said he was instructed emphasize great importance Fr Govt attaches attaining our full support.[4]

Secy replied we concur UN shld not pass condemnatory res or estab comm investigation, etc., and we wld want work with Fr discussing means reach desired end. Re tactics, however, Secy pointed difficulty keeping question off agenda and inquired whether, unless favorable vote assured, it wld be wise fight on this issue. If we lost result wld be two debates instead one, first on procedure then substance. Secy requested Fr Govt consider this point and see whether from their own point of view it wld not be best take attitude they were proud of Moroccan record and glad opportunity tell it to world. If Fr wld give us some material we wld be glad occasionally "chime in". Sec added our mind not fully made up re tactics but thought idea was worth Fr consideration.

Sec then suggested if negots with Egypts on def matters [5] went well it might be possible persuade them withdraw request Moroccan debate. Bonnet replied Egypt withdrawal wld of course be satis. Doubted they wld do so however and added altho Egypts took lead some other Arab states intended take identical action. Re suggestions on tactics he was sure his Govt had already considered possibility proceeding along those lines. Bonnet agreed two debates undesirable but Fr Govt doubted Fr pub opinion wld stand for failure meet issue squarely. Moreover, light Iran situation [6] and Egypt abrogation treaty, Fr felt line must be drawn halting deterioration Western position. He felt his Govt wished draw line Morocco and adopt stiff attitude toward it.

Bonnet also referred to exchange of notes on No Africa [7] and Sec replied he had just returned office and had not had opportunity go

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[3] On October 4 the Government of Egypt asked that an item be inscribed on the agenda of the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, under the heading of "Violation by France in Morocco of the principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights" (Doc. A/1894). Subsequently several other Arab governments had made an identical request. There was thus effected a *démarche* by Arab governments that the United States had sought to avoid and concerning which this Government had had communication with Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, as recently as October 3 (circular telegram 303 to Cairo, October 3, 7 p. m., 771.00/10–351). The General Assembly was due to convene in Paris on November 6.

[4] A memorandum of this conversation of October 9 with attached French Embassy Note No. 565, dated October 9, is located under file no. 771.00/10–951. Related background and briefing material is located in UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Morocco–General Correspondence."

[5] For documentation regarding Middle East defense matters and the question of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, see volume v.

[6] For documentation regarding Iran, see *ibid.*

[7] For documentation regarding this matter, see *ibid.*

into question deeply. Sec inquired what Schuman [8] desired with exchange. Bonnet said he had no info but assumed Fr Govt probably wished pub or certainly show them to Cabinet. Bonnet also surmised Schuman wanted them to show US approves Fr policy Morocco.

In subsequent conversation with Hickerson [9] Bonnet developed Fr thesis further stating Fr resolved fight along procedural lines and France wld not tolerate UN considering Moroccan question.

(FYI only) We have reason to believe Bonnet does not personally share our views re placing on agenda and is so informing Paris (FYI only).

ACHESON

[8] Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[9] This conversation occurred on October 11. A memorandum of this conversation is located in UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Morocco–General Correspondence."

320/10–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 13, 1951—1 : 36 p. m.

PRIORITY

2198. In line with Secy's statement to Amb Bonnet (Deptel 2177 sent to USUN as 199), request you reaffirm to FonOff Dept's strong belief Fr shld not fight placing Morocco question on GA Agenda, but shld in first place attempt induce Egyptians withdraw or agree to postponement of item. If not successful they shld support insertion on ground that it presents useful opportunity for Fr to present their record in Morocco and tell world about it. We gratified note from Paris Embtel 2102 Oct 9 Fr Del will make complete statement before GA showing Fr carrying out provisions Art 73 UN Charter.[2] Above view re tactics in GA supported by fol reasons:

1. In light of past practice of GA under which no item proposed for insertion in Agenda has ever been rejected by vote of GA it is most unlikely that General Comite or GA wld vote to reject item even

[1] Sent also to New York for USUN as 202 and repeated for information to Paris for Sanders as 2010.

[2] Not printed. The Embassy reported the French news organs *Figaro* and *Monde* had published officially inspired articles to the effect that the United Nations was not competent to examine questions relating to Morocco. When questioned by the Embassy, a French Foreign Office spokesman had stated that this essentially was the line the French Government contemplated taking regarding the Moroccan case submitted to the General Assembly by Egypt. The Embassy was told that "French would not only declare UN incompetent this question but refuse carry out any UN resolution thereon. French delegation would make complete statement before General Assembly showing France was carrying out provisions Article 23 [73] UN charter. [Official] stated Embassy Washington had been asked convey Department French attitude as above." (320/10–951)

if US shld fully support Fr. In our view Fr case wld suffer by defeat on agenda issue and our own capabilities of helping Fr out in later stages might be adversely affected. Moreover, in such event result wld be adding debate in General Comite to debate in main Comite.

2. Under established GA practice placing item on GA agenda does not prejudice question of jurisdiction of GA to deal with it. US has taken this position consistently in GA and in SC, most recently in SC proceeding on Iran. Discussion fol placing matter on agenda wld clarify jurisdictional issue.

3. US itself has never opposed placing of any consequential matter on agenda. This is essential part of our philosophy that GA is "town meeting of world", in sense that all matters which appear of serious concern to any Member of UN can at least be raised for discussion in GA. We are most anxious avoid abandoning this firmly established US position.

4. Explanatory memo forwarded by Egypt to SYG alleges (*a*) conflict between Fr and Morocco reaching "highly critical phase" with incidents; (*b*) violation of Treaty of 1911 [*1912*]; (*c*) violation of principles and provisions of Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. It will be argued in GA that protectorate relationship rests upon Treaty of Fez concluded between sovereign states of Morocco and France; that issues involving treaty relationships are of international concern and no single party to treaty may claim exclusive control of its effect by invoking Art 2 para 7 of its Charter. It will be pointed out claim made by Fr in 1921 that dispute with Great Britain arising out of nationality decrees in Morocco was by international law solely within its domestic jurisdiction was held invalid by Permanent Court of Justice; Court based its opinion on fact that resolution of dispute wld have involved interpretation of treaties. Moreover, it will be argued that even if Art 2 para 7 shld be applicable in this matter, GA under Arts 10 and 14 has competence consider the matter under these Arts because such consideration does not constitute intervention within meaning of Art 2 para 7. Precedents will be cited of GA action in cases of Indians in South Africa, observance of human rights in satellite states, Chilean wives, etc., where GA passed condemnatory resolutions. We anticipate force of these arguments will be such as to rally substantial majority for inclusion of item on agenda and possibly for proposition that GA has jurisdiction to consider matter. By attempting to fight these arguments particularly prior to the inclusion on agenda Fr will weaken their case.

It has been consistent US position avoid wherever possible jurisdictional issue.

Regardless of jurisdictional problem we believe GA may place matter on agenda. Again regardless of jurisdictional problem, we strongly believe it wld be most inadvisable and inappropriate for

GA to pass condemnatory res in Moroccan matter or establish commission of investigation. In line with Secy's assurances to Bonnet we intend strongly oppose such action stressing that it wld not be warranted in light of statement Fr Del will make in GA.

We also believe every effort shld be made by Fr to induce Egyptians withdraw or agree to postponement of their item. You shld follow up with FonOff Secy's suggestion to Bonnet that if negotiations with Egyptians on defense matters went well it might be possible to persuade them withdraw their request for debate on Morocco.

If withdrawal of item shld appear impossible Fr shld make every effort obtain postponement of consideration of question in GA. We shall support appropriate Fr proposal that question be placed at bottom of agenda in Comite with view to ensuring adequate time for negotiations for possible agreement on withdrawal of item or indefinite postponement.

USUN pass above to Lacoste [3] in response to his approach reported in urtel 434 Oct 8.[4]

FYI Oct 11 Bonnet asked Asst Secy Hickerson specifically whether US will support Fr Del in Gen Comite to keep Moroccan item off agenda and whether US will oppose any res other than one which wld drop item from agenda on ground GA lacks jurisdiction. Hickerson explained our traditional attitude toward placing matters on agenda along lines of para nr 3 above. He told Bonnet his two specific questions will be taken up with Secy.

ACHESON

[3] Francis Lacoste, Minister in the Permanent French Delegation to the United Nations.

[4] Telegram 434 not printed; it informed the United States Mission at the United Nations that Egypt had requested the inscription of the Moroccan item on the agenda of the General Assembly. (771.00/10–851)

320/10–1551 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, October 15, 1951—9 p. m.

2200. Deptel 2198, October 13, rptd London 2010 USUN 202.

I have just made detailed exposition to La Tournelle [1] of Department's position on Moroccan question and GA agenda. La Tournelle took careful notes and stated he understands that position thoroughly. He said it would be immediately conveyed to Schuman and matter

[1] Guy de La Tournelle, Director General, Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

would presumably be discussed by cabinet since decision as to ultimate Fr position could only be taken at cabinet level. La Tournelle also commented that possibility of successful approach by Fr to Egyptians to secure either withdrawal or adjournment seemed slim.

My personal opinion is that Fr Govt is in most delicate pol position in this matter and that it will be difficult for it to reach a conclusion in line with the eminently reasonable position set forth in reftel. I plan to incorporate this position in *aide-mémoire* and assume it will be furnished in writing also to Fr Emb Wash and to Lacoste as reply to Fr *aide-mémoire* [2] which La Tournelle understands was delivered by Bonnet. I venture suggestion that if we could offer to make some statement of solidarity with substance of Fr position at time of possible Fr acceptance of inclusion of item on agenda this might facilitate Fr acceptance our position. I have not raised this possibility with La Tournelle.

Sent Dept 2200; rptd info London 546. Please pass USUN New York.

BONSAL

[2] Refers to French Embassy Note No. 565 of October 9; see footnote 4, p. 136.

320/10–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Member, United States Party on Colonial Policy Talks With the French [1]

SECRET [PARIS,] October 15, 1951.

Subject: Moroccan Case in the GA

Participants: M. Maurice Schumann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
M. Pignon, French Delegate to Trusteeship Council;
M. Broustra, Director of Conference Section (UN);
M. Naudy, Conference Section (UN);
M. Wolfrom, Assistant Director, Conference Section (UN);
Mr. William Sanders, Department of State;
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, Department of State;
Mr. John Utter, U.S. Embassy, Paris;
Mr. Ward P. Allen, Department of State.

M. Schumann took the occasion of an informal conversation with the above group to raise the question and reiterated the French position as follows:

1. As soon as the question of admitting the item to the agenda arises in the General Committee, the French will make a major stand on the

[1] This and the Allen memorandum of conversation, October 17, *infra*, were carried back to Washington on October 18 by the head of the U.S. party, William Sanders.

question of jurisdiction under Article 2, paragraph 7, claiming that the Assembly is completely incompetent to deal with the matter. They will, however (and M. Schumann gave us to understand this would be in the General Committee) take advantage of the opportunity to explain in some detail the French record in Morocco. However, they will force the question to a vote on the jurisdictional issue.

2. M. Schumann seemed quite optimistic that the matter can be kept off the agenda, provided the US, UK and French present "a solid front". He stated that several of the Arab States themselves (specifically Iraq and Saudi-Arabia) had previously informed the French that they were opposed to submitting the item, and were highly unenthusiastic about any GA consideration, realizing that there is really no constructive action the GA could take. They did, however, state that if the matter did arise, they would, of course, have to go along. As to the Latin Americans, M. Schumann referred to Brazil's recent refusal of Egypt's request to mediate in the matter as indicative of Latin indifference and he therefore felt confident that there would be general support among the Latin American Delegations for opposing admission of the item.

We sought to temper somewhat this optimism on the question of admission to the agenda, pointing out the traditional attitude of the Latin Americans both towards freedom of discussion in the GA and towards colonial problems generally, as well as the fact that the reaction of Brazil is not always an accurate barometer of that of the other 19. Making clear we were not prepared to comment on the U.S. position, we nevertheless gave no ground for belief that the U.S. would be able to join the French in opposing admission of the item.

3. If, nevertheless, the item should be admitted, M. Schumann initially stated that the French would probably not participate in any discussion in Committee I. In response to a direct question on this point, however, he replied that at that time, the French Government (which had not yet reached a decision) would "have to consider the question of their participation in the discussion".

There was general agreement among those present that, if admitted, it would be desirable to place the item as low on the Committee agenda as possible.

4. In the course of the discussion it was noted that Egypt in its complaint placed great emphasis on the violation of Human Rights in Morocco. On this aspect the French freely admitted the right of Committee IV to consider the matter, in view of the fact that under Chapter 11 of the Charter France has accepted the responsibility for promoting human rights in Morocco as a non-self-governing-territory and reports upon this problem regularly to the UN. M. Schumann nevertheless maintained that Committee I has no right to discuss even this aspect of the Moroccan question since it would then be placed in

a political context. The U.S. representatives mentioned that, legal position aside, from a practical point of view, Committee I or the *Ad Hoc* Committee[2] might be a more favorable forum than Committee IV for this type of discussion since the Heads of Delegations who sit in Committee I are apt to be more responsive to over-all political factors and less likely to take positions without instructions from or consultations with their governments. It was generally agreed that the raising of the specific case of violation of human rights in Morocco in Committee IV might introduce a new precent [*precedent*] which might create future difficulties.

5. Throughout the discussion the French representative sought to place the problem of Morocco in the context of its importance as part of the problem of defense of the NATO area. He pointed out the vulnerability of U.S. to attack in the course of any discussion because of the existence of U.S. bases there, and thus emphasized the desirability of a completely united front on this whole question between the U.S. and France.

[2] The General Assembly's *Ad Hoc* Committee on Political and Security Affairs.

320/10–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Member, United States Party on Colonial Policy Talks With the French

SECRET [PARIS,] October 17, 1951.

Subject: Moroccan Case in GA.

Participants: M. Jean Chauvel, French Representative to UN.[1]
Mr. Ward P. Allen, Department of State.

In the course of a conversation on other problems arising in the GA, M. Chauvel brought up the question of Morocco and elaborated the French position in more detail and with slightly different emphasis than had M. Maurice Schumann in a conversation separately reported.

M. Chauvel explained the strong initial reaction of many persons in the French Foreign Office that France should walk out of the GA if the matter were considered. He stated that he had disagreed with this view and had helped discourage it, but that it had nevertheless been seriously considered and might well have prevailed, considering the depth of feeling on the problem both in the French Government and the French people. I agreed with M. Chauvel that it would be wiser to leave the practice of "walk-outs" to the Soviets.

According to Chauvel, the present planned line in the GA is as follows: The French will, of course, make a strong point of the GA's

[1] Chauvel was Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.

lack of competence in the General Committee. What is not yet decided is whether at that time the French Delegate will go further and "draw the consequences" of that conclusion by stating flatly that France will not accept or recognize *any* resolution the GA may pass on the matter. Those who argue for stating this view initially (which I gathered Chauvel was somewhat inclined to share) point out that any resolution which does emerge will probably be unacceptable and it would be easier for France to say that they do not accept it because the GA has no competence than because on its merits it is a bad resolution. I suggested that if the French Delegate did not "draw the consequences" in the initial statement, it might put them in a better tactical position and leave them more freedom and flexibility of maneuver.

In response to my question Chauvel said that the French would probably not make their explanation of their Moroccan policy in the General Committee. He is quite aware of the fact that whatever the French do, the item will be admitted, and therefore says the French would make their substantive statement either in the Plenary session or in Committee I (or the *Ad Hoc*) when the item is reached. Following that detailed explanation, the French would not participate actively, but merely listen, to any discussion. At the close they might, if circumstances warrant, speak again to correct with calm, objective proof, any misstatements of fact or wrong impressions the Egyptians or others may have made.

When he asked me what the U.S. position would be on the matter in the GA, I stated that I could not say because the subject was being discussed both with the French Embassy in Washington and our Embassy here directly. He also expressed some of M. Schumann's optimism as to Latin support, stating that while he was meeting with the Foreign Minister this morning, the latter had been called out to receive the Chilean Ambassador who had assured him officially of the support of the Chilean Government in opposing the admission of the item.

320/10–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, October 19, 1951—8 p.m.

1943. In conv with Allen[1] today we enquired re UK attitude Moroccan question. Allen replied FonOff feels it must support French in their efforts keep item off GA agenda and has assured Fr of UK support in this effort.

[1] Roger Allen, Head of African Department, British Foreign Office.

We outlined US views as contained Deptel 2010 Oct 13,[2] stressing our doubts re desirability and likelihood success preventing inclusion item on agenda. Allen indicated that UK was not as gloomy as we are re prospects preventing consideration of question. He thought in all probability Fr cld obtain considerable support from LA states and that this together with western European votes cld carry day. He recognized, however, that this was type of question on which it was very hard anticipate how LA states wld vote. He then went on to say that he felt the question of whether or not item included on agenda was of secondary importance to that of assuring that US, UK and Fr spoke with one voice on this question. UK hoped very much sitn wld not develop which wld result in any split among us. He felt sure that if US cld persuade Fr to inclusion item on agenda UK wld have no objection and wld be glad follow suit.

Allen said foregoing was as far as UK thinking has gone at present and that it has not made up its mind as to what its position will be on substantive problems in event item is placed on agenda.

Sent Dept 1943; rptd info Paris 775.

GIFFORD

[2] Same as telegram 2198 to Paris, October 13, p. 137.

771.00/10–2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1951.

Subject: Egyptian Complaint in UN on Moroccan Question

Participants: Secretary of State;
M. Bonnet, French Ambassador;
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
EUR—Mr. Bonbright
Mr. van Laethem, French Embassy

Mr. Bonnet stated that he appreciated how busy the Secretary was preparatory to his departure for the GA tomorrow but he had been instructed by Mr. Schuman to see the Secretary once again on the Moroccan question. He said that in Paris they had looked at this

[1] Initialed by John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, with whom Bonbright cleared the text of the memorandum. In a chit to Mr. Hickerson, Bonbright explained that he had not made the memorandum of conversation in the first person (that is, by the Secretary of State himself), due to the Secretary's departure for Paris (on October 25) (771.00/10–2451). The Secretary of State headed the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly.

problem from every angle and had reached certain conclusions as to their line of action whether or not they lost their fight to prevent the Moroccan question from being placed on the agenda. He said that in the first place the French Government was determined to fight against the placing of this question on the agenda even if they became convinced that they would lose the fight. However, they had recently received encouraging news on this score. Under the leadership of Mr. Maurice Schumann, all French Chiefs of Mission in Latin America have been meeting in Rio and it is the consensus of opinion of this group that there is a reasonable hope of having many of the Latin American countries support the French thesis provided they do not feel that the United States will be on the other side. The Ambassador felt that the Latin countries were deeply disturbed by recent events in the Near East. They fear a further split between the West and the Arab countries; they appreciate the strategic importance of North Africa; and they are worried over any tendency of the UN to intervene in matters of domestic concern to member states. The French hope is that if there is a chance of winning this fight on procedural grounds, the United States will side with France. On the other hand, if it should become clear that they could not win this fight, the French would understand if some of their friends abstained on this procedural point.

If the French lose the procedural battle, they attach the greatest importance to obtaining active U.S. support at the Committee stage and in the Assembly. The French will say that they will not accept any resolution which the Assembly may pass and they would like us also to oppose any resolution no matter how mildly worded. They feel that unless the question is defeated on jurisdictional grounds, the Arab States will be encouraged to raise the question again next year and in succeeding years. Mr. Bonnet stated, however, that the French will make a positive statement on their work in Morocco which they will maintain as in full conformity with Chapter XI. Following the statement of the French case, the French delegation will abstain from further discussion reserving the right at the end of the proceedings to answer any attacks which may develop in the course of the debate. The French want the U.S. delegation to support the French statement regarding their achievements in Morocco.

The Secretary interrupted at this point to say that he unfortunately had another engagement, but before terminating the interview, he wished to state briefly the U.S. position: He said that on the procedural question the U.S. will abstain, a course which we have never taken before in such a situation. If the matter is placed on the agenda, the Secretary stated that we will support the French on the merits of the case. He said that he personally could not conceive of any resolution to which the United States would give its support. In any event,

the U.S. would vote against any condemnatory resolution or a resolution setting up a committee of investigation.

The Ambassador returned to the charge and pointed out that while the Secretary's statement about abstaining would meet the French point in the event that the procedural question was lost, it would not meet the French hopes in the event that there was a chance of winning the procedural fight. He urged the Secretary to reconsider our position in that event. The Secretary said that he would think the matter over but that it would not do any good, since we could not go any further on this point.

We then left the Secretary's office and continued the discussion briefly in EUR where we were joined by Mr. Wainhouse of UNA.[2] Nothing new of importance developed except that the Ambassador returned to the question of the Latin American vote and urged us to send a circular to our people in the area giving them our position. Mr. Hickerson and I said that we saw no reason why this could not be done.

Copies in translation of the note left by the Ambassador are attached.[3]

J[AMES] C. H. B[ONBRIGHT]

[2] David W. Wainhouse, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

[3] The lengthy note formulated a French position in light of certain contingencies that might arise at Paris; not printed (771.00/10–2451).

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

SECRET [PARIS,] November 3, 1951.

US/A/3370

THE MOROCCAN QUESTION

THE PROBLEM

To determine the United States position in the General Assembly on the question entitled "Violation of the Principles of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights by France in Morocco" submitted by the Arab States.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Delegation should support, at any stage of the discussion, postponement of the question, preferably for an indefinite period of time, if such a move appears to have adequate support and is at least tacitly acquiesced in by the Arab States.

2. If postponement cannot be achieved, the Delegation should continue to make every effort to persuade the French not to oppose the inclusion of the matter on the agenda.

3. The Delegation should abstain in the vote on the inclusion of the matter in the agenda in the General Committee.

4. The Delegation should continue its efforts to impress upon the French the necessity of undertaking discussions with Arab delegates and leaders in order to avoid, if at all possible, a situation in which a majority of the United Nations Members would vote against the French. The Delegation should also continue to urge the French to state in the General Assembly their policy and objectives in Morocco as thoroughly and effectively as possible. The Delegation should consult closely with the French on every aspect of this matter.

5. The Delegation should endeavor to moderate the Arab-Asian action in the Assembly.

6. The Delegation should oppose any condemnatory resolution or the setting up of a commission of investigation and should consult the Department on any proposals offered by other Delegations.

IO Files

Minutes of Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 5, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M (Chr)/191

[Here follow list of persons (49) present [1] and discussion of prior agenda items. Discussion of the Moroccan item was then initiated with a background survey of the Moroccan question since World War II and a résumé of the development of the United States position with respect to the United Nations aspect of the problem.]

The Secretary added a note explaining the explosive nature of this whole question for the French, describing it as the biggest thorn in the side of Franco-American relations. France was seriously worried about our attitude and thought we might be attempting to undermine France's position in Morocco. We had made great efforts to point out the erroneous nature of this conception, stating that none of the rights granted to the US by France in Morocco would be used against France.[2] Nevertheless, France still remained uneasy. The Secretary referred to the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to their feel-

[1] For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

[2] Refers presumably to U.S. bases in Morocco.

ing that this was a matter of supreme importance. Their advice might well be to support France fully on this matter. The Secretary reported that last night Eden [3] had sought to obtain full US support for the joint UK-French stand.[4] The Secretary had said we could not give such support. He did not want to split jurisdictional hairs with Eden, but we would depart in principle from our traditional position to the extent of abstaining procedurally, and going 80% of the way in support of the French substantively. Why, therefore, he had asked Eden, was the latter quibbling with the US over the last 20%? Eden had answered that the Iran and Egypt precedents made this a point of disunity vis-à-vis the Arabs. The Secretary had offered to show the world the French were not so bad in Morocco, and Eden came around somewhat. It was further pointed out to Eden that there would be a big battle over the agenda issue which might well be lost. This would be particularly unfortunate in that there would then be two battles, the first one of which the French would already have lost. The Secretary therefore recommended to the Delegation that the US take the position of trying to keep this matter off the agenda by an abstention or postponement; i.e., to do as much to help France as we can, consistent with our own interests, without ourselves voting against the item. The extremely vital nature of this matter is such that it requires the US to back up slightly.

[Here follows further discussion of the Moroccan question, at which the individual point of view of other United States representatives was expressed. The Delegation then took up another agenda item.]

[3] For documentation regarding the bipartite and tripartite conversations held in Paris at this time between the Secretary of State and the British and French Foreign Ministers (Anthony Eden, Robert Schuman), see volume III.

[4] The record of this Acheson–Eden meeting of November 4 is located in Doc. NOVB–1, dated November 19. It is not as full as regards Morocco as this oral report by Acheson to the U.S. Delegation (CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159).

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Minutes of Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, Paris, French Foreign Office, November 6, 1951, 10:30 a. m.

TOP SECRET

NOVT M–1

[Here follows list of persons present: France (10), United Kingdom (8), United States (9). The Foreign Ministers headed each group. The Secretary of State was supported at the top level by David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to France; Walter S. Gifford, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Philip C. Jessup, U.S. Ambassador at Large and member of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly; and George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for

European Affairs. Assistant Secretary Perkins was accompanied by G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs and formerly United Nations Adviser for the Bureau of European Affairs.[1]

It was agreed at the outset that the meeting "was not a conference, but an informal meeting for a frank exchange of views." Morocco was the fourth item on the agenda.[2]]

Morocco

M. Schuman indicated his concern about this matter being raised in the Assembly not because the French felt they would be embarrassed but because of the emotional way it would be handled in the Assembly and because of the deteriorating effect this might have on the situation in Morocco. He said he thought we were all in agreement that the Assembly was not competent to act on this matter in the sense of taking a decision or making recommendations. Hence, he felt it was too bad to have a debate which was bound to be fruitless and which could only be harmful in Morocco. He said he thought it was of great importance for the three great Powers to take a common stand, as in Morocco all of our actions are very closely watched and any difference between us would be quickly spotted and exploited.

M. Schuman added that he knew this was the first time we had attempted to keep an important item off the agenda and that we had been extremely liberal in this respect in the past. He questioned, however, whether this had been a wise policy, inquiring as to whether the South African case had really had any beneficial effect on anyone. He felt that discussing questions of this type merely leads to an increase of tension rather than the reverse. He urged that we all take a stronger stand and refuse to place the item on the agenda.

Mr. Acheson said that he would speak first in reply inasmuch as it was our position which was obviously worrying M. Schuman. He said that as he had explained to Ambassador Bonnet in Washington we are anxious to support the French on this question. We agreed as to the importance of Morocco to France and to the West because of the need for stability in the area in view of its military importance. He said that in every substantive way we will support the French on this in the Assembly, but that we could not vote against placing the question on the agenda. We will abstain on this action. We will, however, work with other Delegations in an effort to obtain abstentions or negative votes.

Mr. Acheson added that in the General Assembly when the report of the General Committee comes up for action we will abstain if the

[1] Perkins and Raynor were not attached to the U.S. Delegation and seem to have been in Paris only for the ministerial talks.

[2] A short and inconclusive discussion of Morocco occurred in a bipartite meeting between Acheson and Eden on November 5 (Doc. NOVB M–2, November 19, CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159).

report includes the item, but that we would support the report if the General Committee recommends rejecting the item.

Mr. Acheson said that he thought we should also explore possible new procedures which might be applied to this case. He said that the general practice in the past had been to refer all questions to the substantive Committees of the Assembly and to have resolutions passed on all matters. He inquired if this is really necessary. He repeated that we will support the French in the debate. He also said that we will do all we can to persuade the Arabs not to press the matter. He suggested to M. Schuman that perhaps he could say something in his opening speech which would assist with the Arabs. Mr. Acheson also said that even if he were himself personally convinced on the agenda question that he would have a serious problem on this with his own Delegation. He pointed out that several members of the Delegation had attended most of the meetings of the General Assembly and were fully committed to the policy of regarding the Assembly as the Town Meeting of the World and they would be most reluctant to support rejecting the items for the agenda.

M. Schuman, responding to the Secretary's suggestion about reference to a Committee, said that if we wanted to avoid Committee reference we would have to decide this today as the matter might come up in the General Committee tomorrow. He then said that in considering between necessary evils he thought he would prefer a reference to Committee rather than directly to Plenary.

Mr. Eden intervened at this point to say that although the UK would vote with France on the agenda question, he was finding that a number of Delegations shared some of the US difficulties on the point, not so much on the merits of the question but because of the angle of precedents. He expressed the view that he felt it would be difficult for the French to obtain support on the agenda question and inquired how M. Schuman evaluated this situation.

M. Schuman observed that we were faced with a situation resembling a showdown, and that there was a campaign to divide us. He felt the situation was extremely serious.

Mr. Acheson then said that we might explore the possibility of getting the General Committee to decide to postpone action on putting the question on the agenda.

Mr. Eden said he thought this procedure would have a chance of getting more support than the proposed French course of action. Mr. Acheson said he had two additional suggestions to make: (*a*) That the French consider carefully in connection with selecting the Chairmen of the Committees what their attitude would be on this Moroccan issue; (*b*) When we are shortly talking with the Arabs on the Middle

East Command that we point out to them how disruptive their action on Morocco is.

M. Schuman picked up the thought with respect to postponement and said that if this were to be tried we would have to reach a decision on this now. He thought if this were done, the postponement would have to be on a provisional basis without a date being specified as otherwise the action would amount to rejection.

Mr. Eden commented that an argument for postponement is that none of the various steps outlined in the Charter which should take place before action is taken in the UN itself had occurred.

It was agreed that as soon as the Arab request was submitted an effort will be made in the General Committee to arrange to postpone "the inscription" of the item on the agenda. Each Delegation was asked to designate one man to make this job his top priority activity. The Secretary designated Ambassador Gross for the US.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Morocco–Memoranda of Conversation"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)[1]

SECRET [PARIS,] November 6, 1951.

Subject: Morocco.

Participants: Amb. Jean Chauvel, French Delegation
Sir Gladwyn Jebb, UK Delegation[2]
Mr. Francis Lacoste, French Delegation[3]
Amb. Ernest Gross, US Delegation

Pursuant to general agreement reached by the three Secretaries during the morning, we discussed details of the procedure for handling the Moroccan Case in the General Committee. We agreed that after presentation of the item by the Egyptian Delegate, a friendly member (to be determined after the General Committee has been established) will move under Rule 78 to adjourn the debate on the item. The French Representative will support the motion, followed by the U.S. Delegate. Chauvel is to discuss with Schuman whether the latter wishes to make a brief policy speech in the General Committee, generally maintaining that the French policy in Morocco has been in conformity with Article 73 of the Charter and indicating in general

[1] Gross was also a member of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly.

[2] Sir Gladwyn Jebb was Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations and a member of the British Delegation to the General Assembly.

[3] Lacoste was a consultative adviser to the French Delegation to the General Assembly.

terms French plans with respect to the political, economic and social evolution of Morocco.

Although it was recognized that the General Committee is technically not an appropriate forum for a substantive debate, it was considered inevitable that the Egyptian in presenting the item and the Russian in opposing a motion to postpone will both make policy arguments and it would be wrong to leave the record of the General Committee free of even a brief policy rebuttal.

Chauvel agreed that if Schuman decides that the French Representative will make a policy speech in the General Committee, Chauvel will give me a draft before the Committee meeting. Chauvel is to advise me of the decision as soon as it is possible for him to talk with Schuman, which he hopes will be sometime before Wednesday morning, November 7.

I referred to information received that Maurice Schumann was supposed to have indicated recently that the French would be prepared to answer questions in the Fourth Committee on the observance of human rights in Morocco. (This information had been given to me by Wallner and Stein).[4] I expressed the hope that the information was correct and that we attached great importance to the French being able to handle the anticipated attacks in the Fourth Committee by the nonadministering powers. However, Chauvel and Lacoste vehemently denied the accuracy of the information and said that if it were true, "Maurice Schumann would be afraid to admit to them that he had said anything like this." The French considered this completely outside the competence of the United Nations.

Jebb climbed aboard, strongly supporting the French position.

[4] Woodruff Wallner, First Secretary of Embassy in France, and Eric Stein of the U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff. Stein was Executive Officer on the advisory staff for matters relating to the General Assembly's *Ad Hoc* Political and Security Committee.

IO Files

Minutes of Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 8, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/194

[Here follows list of persons (46) present.]

1. Mr. Stein continued his presentation on the Moroccan question. The Sec'y had been in consultation with Schumann [*sic*] [1] about this matter and had told him that the US would abstain, itself, on a vote

[1] The references here are to Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, and not to Maurice Schumann.

on putting the matter on the agenda, in line with our previous commitment to the French. In addition he had told Schumann that the US would work as much as was consistent with our not taking the lead to convince other delegations of the wisdom of not putting the matter on the agenda at the present time, either by seeking to obtain abstentions or negative votes on the Arab proposal. The US would support a negative report of the General Committee on this matter, and abstain on a positive one. We would work to get the General Committee to postpone inscribing this matter on the GA's agenda.

In talks with Chauvel and Jebb, Ambassador Gross had rehearsed the agreed strategy of having a friendly member of the General Committee move postponement after the Egyptians had made their charges. Under Rule 75 this would allow only two speakers in favor and two against the proposition. France and the US would speak against inscribing the item on the agenda. Chauvel was to consult with Schumann as to whether he (Chauvel) would make any reference in his speech to the effect that France was living up to her obligations under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter and carrying out plans for the social, economic, and political evolution of Morocco. Although the French were not likely to agree to make such a statement, the US should point out to them that political statements would be made by the Arabs and the Russians, and it would be unwise for the record to remain silent on the French side.

Ambassador Gross found the draft of the French statement, which they had not discussed with the US, to be unsatisfactory in that it did not address itself to the issue of postponement and was not in conformity with the agreement we had worked out with the French. In regard to the argument that the French were providing for the proper evolution of Morocco, the draft statement quoted all of Article 73, vehemently denied the applicability of the Charter to this matter, and in a very offhand manner mentioned French compliance with this part of the Charter. It ended with a statement that the General Assembly could not investigate the status of human rights in Morocco.

Ambassador Gross would contact Chauvel and try to get him to adhere to the agreed procedure for postponement and discuss with him the statement. He recommended that the US not make any statement if the French give one equally as bad as the draft he had seen.

Mr. Cohen said that unless a French policy statement showed a bona fide desire to reach a settlement with the Arabs, the accusation would undoubtedly be made that the US had imposed a trick upon the General Assembly by opposing its consideration of the Moroccan matter. Mrs. Roosevelt referred to a considerable undercurrent against the French on this reversal in the US position. The Secretary agreed to speak again to Schumann to get him to be sensible, adding, in response

to a request for a clarification of the US position by Ambassador Austin, that the US wanted itself, the UK and France in the same corner on this matter, the only feasible one being that of a postponement. He would try to obtain Schumann's agreement to be reasonable on this and admit of the necessity of postponing. Only thus would the US be able to go along easily with France and oppose the Arabs.

Mr. Cohen questioned whether the motion in the General Committee to postpone referred to postponement of General Committee consideration or postponement of General Assembly consideration. The Secretary said that even if Mr. Cohen was right in thinking it referred to postponement in the General Committee, the matter would be questioned when the report of the Committee came up for discussion in the Plenary. Ambassador Gross said that he had previously assumed that there would be discussion in the GA on the question of postponement. A working group of Messrs. Cohen, Gross and Fisher would discuss this matter further. Mr. Taylor had been given information to the effect that when the question of Tibet had come up in the General Committee during the last GA, and the General Committee had agreed on postponement, and the General Assembly did not consider this action by the General Committee.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

IO Files

Minutes of Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, November 9, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M (Chr)/195

[Here follow list of persons (47) present and brief remarks about the course of the General Debate in the General Assembly.]

2. Ambassador Gross reviewed the General Committee developments on Morocco.[1] He said that confusion had reigned since the Canadian had not presented the motion he was supposed to have made. Instead of moving that the General Committee recommend to the General Assembly that the General Assembly postpone consideration of the question whether the Moroccan item should be placed on the agenda he had moved that the General Committee itself adjourn debate on the matter in order that he could have time to study the matter further. This precipitated considerable discussion. Ambassa-

[1] The General Committee began consideration of the Moroccan item on November 8. For the proceedings, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, General Committee*, pp. 3 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *General Committee*). The tangled parliamentary situation that arose is explained herein by Ambassador Gross.

dor Austin had explained why the US favored postponement.[2] Jebb had tried to bring the matter around to where it was supposed to have been.[3] Tsiang [4] moved adjournment of the meeting without coming to a vote on the matter—a wise move in Ambassador Gross' view.[5] Today the matter would arise on the basis of a written proposal, but the most important question was what exactly that proposal would say.

Ambassador Gross pointed out that by agreement with Mr. Schuman France had been left the diplomatic initiative on the matter which prevented the US from doing its usual liaison work as it was accustomed to do in the Security Council. France seemed to be doing a particularly inept job of carrying the initiative and would not stand too good a chance of persuading the General Committee members to adopt its view. Padilla Nervo,[6] for instance, would vote against any move calculated to keep this matter from being discussed.

Ambassador Gross speculated on what the situation would be following a *sine die* postponement; the very next day, he thought, someone might rise in the Assembly and propose that the General Assembly on its own decision take up the matter of Morocco. This would precipitate the large debate we sought to avoid. There would be no assurance that the debate would not ensue if our formula of having the General Committee recommend to the General Assembly that the latter not put the matter on the agenda were followed. It would, however, give a little more weight to the French side. Ambassador Gross wondered whether we ought not approach the French and ask them to release us from our commitment to them. We would honor the commitment if not released, but if we were freed, we might conceivably accomplish more on our own initiative.

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[2] Senator Austin covered considerable ground in his relatively brief statement to the General Committee: (1) The United States favored a General Committee recommendation to the General Assembly (for postponement) regarding the Moroccan item: The item dealt with a complicated situation that warranted careful study and there was insufficient time for such study as the item had been submitted by Egypt only one month previously; (2) The United States had confidence in the French administration of Morocco; (3) The United States felt that a detailed discussion of the Moroccan question "would not be in the interests of the Moroccan people"; (4) The United States considered that "Efforts should be made, in the spirit of the Charter, outside the United Nations to settle such matters before submitting them to the Organization." (GA (VI), *General Committee*, pp. 4 and 5)

[3] That is, to effect an interpretation of the Canadian resolution that would have the General Committee actually recommend to the General Assembly that discussion of the Moroccan question be postponed (*ibid.*, p. 5).

[4] Tsingfu F. Tsiang, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation to the General Assembly.

[5] Tsiang's proposal was that the Canadian motion should be submitted in writing "so that members could fully appreciate the implication of their vote." (GA (VI), *General Committee*, p. 7)

[6] Luis Padilla Nervo, President of the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Austin gave his understanding of the situation to be that we advocated putting the matter on the agenda, but with a notation, in effect, that the discussion of the matter would be postponed. Mr. Sandifer [7] did not understand this to be what the US had agreed to. First, we had said that we would abstain on the question of putting the matter on the agenda. Secondly, on the substance of the matter, if it came up for discussion in the Assembly, we would support the French to the extent of not voting for any investigation or other action by the General Assembly against France in Morocco. The wording of a motion in the General Committee would be to the effect that the General Committee decides to recommend to the General Assembly that it (the GA) postpone the question of whether to include the matter on the agenda.

Ambassador Jessup said that what the General Committee did in a case like this was to send to the General Assembly a proposal either to include or not to include a certain matter on the agenda. Mr. Bonsal read from a letter from the French to the US Delegation the language they thought had been agreed upon, namely, that the General Committee should recommend to the Assembly that it postpone the question of whether to retain the item for inclusion on the agenda.[8]

Ambassador Gross summarized the situation by saying that the Arabs wanted the item on the agenda even if it did not come up for debate. The French objected even to putting it on, even if there should be no debate on the matter. The US compromise was to have the General Committee itself recommend postponement of the consideration of the item. In response to this, Ambassador Austin wondered what the status of our preferred resolution would be if the General Committee took no action and its report contained no reference to the Moroccan item. Ambassador Gross said that in such a case the General Committee report would have to show what the General Committee had recommended and the General Assembly would have, by its approval, implicitly accepted the *sine die* postponement of the question of whether to put the Moroccan item on the agenda. The trouble, of course, with such a result, would be that the *sine die* postponement meant that the matter could be brought up at any time thereafter. This, at least, was the understanding of Padilla Nervo, who felt that the General Assembly had the inherent power to add items on its own motion. Mr. Fisher cautioned that Padilla Nervo might state his interpretation that the effect of our resolution was to reject the Moroccan item. Ambassador Austin said the Delegation

[7] Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, was one of two Senior Advisers to the U.S. Delegation.

[8] Bonsal was from the U.S. Embassy, Paris. The letter cited here has not been found in the Department of State files.

should suspend its consideration of this matter and get the advice on it of the 3 Foreign Ministers who were to meet that morning. It was so decided.

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Minutes of Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, Paris, French Foreign Office, November 9, 1951, 11:30 a. m.

SECRET

NOVT M–2

[Here follows list of persons present: France (11), the United Kingdom (8), the United States (11). The Foreign Ministers headed each group. The Secretary of State was assisted by the same senior-level officials as in the November 6 meeting, except Ambassador Jessup.

There followed first a short discussion of projected dates for the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Council.]

Morocco

M. Maurice Schumann opened this discussion expressing thanks to both the UK and the US for their warm and firm support yesterday. He reviewed the difficulty caused by the Canadian Delegate's unfamiliarity with UN procedures. He said that today a revised and clarified Resolution would be submitted by the Canadian Delegation and that it was important to have this approved. He said the importance in his view was increased by the alacrity with which the Soviets were exploiting this situation. He said he thought the three Western Powers had been able yesterday to avoid statements which would worsen their relations with the Arab States. He said that he thought our objective should be to affirm and retain the solidarity of the Western Powers on this question.

Foreign Minister Schuman then said that we should now agree on tactics for this afternoon. If we can obtain the required majority for the passage of the Resolution, we are in satisfactory shape, although we might have to debate and vote on it again in Plenary.

Mr. Eden questioned the desirability, should the Canadian Resolution fail, of voting on a second Resolution as Western solidarity would then be lost, and because the chances of prevailing on the second Resolution would be less than on the first.

Mr. Acheson indicated that our canvass of the situation indicated a very close Parliamentary situation. We estimated at the moment five votes for, six against, 1 abstention and 2 doubtful (Dominican Republic and Thailand). Our information, contrary to that of the French, is that Chile will vote against the Canadian Resolution. The Secretary suggested that our efforts should be concentrated on the two doubtful

members of the Committee and that perhaps efforts should be made to persuade Yugoslavia to abstain rather than to vote against.

Foreign Minister Schuman inquired as to the position of China and Ambassador Gross replied that we understand it to be abstention. In reply to a further inquiry, he indicated that the Mexican Delegate had received instructions which he interpreted to mean that he must vote against any Resolution tending in the direction of keeping the item off the agenda. M. Maurice Schumann indicated that our information changed somewhat the calculations which the French had made.

Foreign Minister Schuman then said that we must consider what to do in the event that the Canadian Resolution fails to pass.

Mr. Acheson said that he felt we should all follow Mr. Eden's suggestion and abstain. He said if we lose out on the Canadian Resolution, we could clearly do no better on the second and that it was therefore pointless to attempt to block the second. On the other hand, if the three Western Powers abstain, they would maintain solidarity on this question.

Foreign Minister Schuman replied that if a vote on the second Resolution was called for, the French Delegation would be compelled to vote against it. He said the domestic Parliamentary situation gave them no possible alternative. He then questioned whether it would be feasible to avoid voting on a second Resolution by means of an interpretation by the President that the first negative vote automatically placed the item on the agenda. This, he explained, would permit us to maintain our solid front. It was agreed that this matter should be taken up with the Chairman of the Committee, but that he should not be approached unless and until the first Resolution failed because such an approach might have an adverse effect on the chances of passing the first Resolution. It was thought that this could be done by arranging a short recess after the vote on the first Resolution, if that Resolution failed.

Mr. Eden commented that he was pleased by this suggested procedure because he could visualize a situation under which only France and the UK would be voting against the second Resolution placing the item on the agenda, and he thought this would be unfortunate.[1]

[Here follows the Ministers consideration of other matters on the agenda.]

[1] When the General Committee convened at 5:45 p. m. that evening, it addressed itself to the following Canadian draft resolution:

"'*The General Committee Recommends* to the General Assembly that consideration of the question of placing provisional item 62 [the Moroccan item] (A/BUR/126) on the final agenda of the General Assembly be postponed for the time being'."

After a parliamentary wrangle over the scope of the authority of the General Committee to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding agenda items, the Committee adopted the Canadian resolution 6–4–4. For the proceedings of the General Committee at this meeting, see GA (VI), *General Committee*, pp. 9 ff.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly considered the recommendation of the General Committee regarding the Moroccan item, which was incorporated into the Report of the General Committee to the General Assembly (A/1950), in two phases.

The first phase occurred on November 13, and was marked initially by general discussion of the powers of the General Committee to act in this case as it did (in terms of the Canadian resolution). The character of the statements then assumed a substantive content, that is discussion of French policy in Morocco, first on the part of the Soviet Representative (Arutiunian), and then by the French Representative (Robert Schuman). Immediately following the Schuman statement, the Egyptian Representative (Salah-el-din-Pasha) rose and requested a postponement of further debate so that all could study "thoroughly" the French statement which was of "particular importance". As described by Ambassador Gross to the United States Delegation at its meeting on November 14, "Schuman had been faced with a quick decision as to whether to acquiesce in or oppose this request, and apparently decided on the former course." (IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/198) The debate on item 62 was then temporarily suspended. For the proceedings of the General Assembly on this matter on November 13, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 96 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Plenary*).

The second phase of General Assembly consideration of the Moroccan item occurred in two meetings on December 13. (For documentation on an interlude that supervened in the Fourth Committee in late November, in which France walked out of the Fourth Committee, see pages 655 ff.) Following lengthy debate on both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Moroccan question, the General Assembly adopted the recommendation of the General Committee that consideration of the Moroccan item be postponed "for the time being" (28–23–7). For the proceedings of the General Assembly on this matter on December 13, see *ibid.*, pages 236 ff.

The telegraphic text of a statement made to the General Assembly by Ambassador Gross at its second meeting on December 13 (official text in *ibid.*, pages 258 and 259) is printed *infra*.

547–842—79——12

320/12–1551 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 15, 1951.

Delga 679. For release on delivery. Fol is text Gross statement on Moroccan case in plenary December 13th.

Statement by Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, United States represenative, in plenary session of the General Assembly on the question of placing the Moroccan item on the final agenda of the General Assembly.

The General Committee has recommended that consideration of the question of placing the Moroccan item on the final agenda of the General Assembly should be postponed for the time being. This is a recommendation which the United States delegation supported in the General Committee and supports here.

I think that the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, if he was translated correctly, referred to the recommendation of the general committee as a postponement for some time. I think the precise recommendation was in fact, postponement for the time being of the question of placing the Moroccan item on the agenda.

The foreign minister and representative of France has stated that France has accepted as a sacred trust under Article 73 of Chapter XI, the obligation to promote, within the system of international peace and security established by the charter, the well being of the peoples of Morocco, to ensure their advancement and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions. The representative of France has told the General Assembly that these freely undertaken obligations have been and continue to be performed by France. We feel that France should not be hindered in its opportunity to put reforms into effect under conditions favorable to their successful execution.

The United States has given careful attention to the views expressed by the representatives of the six states which have proposed this item. We are aware of their common bonds with the peoples of Morocco and the position they, as members of the United Nations, have taken on their duties and responsibilities under the charter. We share their concern for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States has approached the question before us today from the point of view of its considered estimation of the highest interests of the peoples of Morocco.

The powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly shld be discharged with regard to the principle of the charter that persons concerned with problems and controversies shld in good faith exhaust

efforts for their solution by less formal means than debate in the General Assembly. The representative of Brazil in opening the general debate was, I think, developing this principle. He put this thought in felicitous language when he said:

"At the present time it is urgent that peoples which aspire to total liberation and emancipation should act with prudence and serenity necessary to safeguard the structure of security that has been built up so slowly and painfully, and which represents the best guarantee of their own aspirations. It is, therefore, indispensable to seek compensatory agreements through friendly negotiations. To bring any dispute to the United Nations without having previously exhausted all other methods of peaceful settlement would be to run counter to the spirit of the Charter of San Francisco. It would, furthermore, be causing considerable harm to that spirit."

The question, then, is whether the best interest of the peoples of Morocco will be promoted by debates now in the General Assembly on the complaint made by the six states. We do not believe their interests would best be served by this course. Indeed, the Government of France has recently renewed the expression of its desire and intention to follow the course of finding a solution of mutual problems by less formal means. The distinguished foreign minister of France in the General Assembly on November 15 referred to conversations under way which are designed to hasten the democratic reforms proposed by France in Morocco. He has with great statesmanship expressed his desire for rapid action upon reforms, the study of which would be the responsibility of a joint France-Moroccan commission.

So also, His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco has reaffirmed his desire for negotiations with a view to reaching agreement with the Government of France.

Under these circumstances, is it not entirely in accordance with the highest objective of the charter to leave to those intimately concerned to pursue their own avenues of settlement?

The tradition and policies of the United States demonstrate our friendship for the peoples of Morocco and our interest in their aspirations. All members here know this, except for that small minority whose views are based upon dogma and autocratic decree.

The representative of Syria proved his awareness of this great tradition by his eloquent references to the first President of the United States. The distinguished foreign minister of Egypt spoke of President Roosevelt [1] and Senator Vandenberg.[2]

[1] Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, 1933–1945.

[2] Arthur H. Vandenberg, ranking Senator of the Republican Party on the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate and foremost Republican exponent of "bipartisanship" in United States foreign policy.

It is in the light of this proud history that we believe, upon careful consideration, that our position on this matter is sound, logical and forward-looking.

My government feels that the general committee correctly concluded that this is an item in which debate at this time within the United Nations would not serve the best interests of the peoples directly concerned. It would in no way detract from the dignity and prestige of the Assembly to recognize that it is highly expedient to postpone this item as recommended by the general committee.

ROOSEVELT

III. THE QUESTION OF THE SCALE OF NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE REGULAR (ADMINISTRATIVE) BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS[1]

320/9–1251 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[2]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 12, 1951—8:45 a. m.

Reference paragraph 2D of Circular airgram 1:45 pm, September 5, 1951.[3]

Recent action of House of Representatives reduced appropriation for U.S. contributions to international organizations approximately $3,000,000 below U.S. commitments for this year. In addition it added an amendment stating that the U.S. could not pay more than 33⅓% of the expenses of these organizations, although the U.S. is at present assessed more than 33⅓% in 7 organizations. Senate has approved full appropriation asked by President, but has added provision that

"No representative of the United States Government in any international organization hereafter shall make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33⅓ per centum of the budget of any international organization for which the appropriation for the United States contribution

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 87 ff.

[2] Sent to 58 diplomatic and consular offices.

Additional paragraph sent to Paris, London, The Hague, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Pretoria, Canberra, New Delhi, Brussels, Rio de Janeiro, Rangoon, Ottawa, Taipei, Belgrade, Tel Aviv, Manila, Damascus, Bangkok, Djakarta, Ankara as follows:

> "Governments to which you are accredited have in the past sent representatives well qualified in these matters to the United Nations, and while not always supporting the U.S. have generally voted for economy and sound administrative practice. However, almost all of these governments have upon occasion sent delegations to the specialized agency meetings which were not adequately briefed on administrative and budgetary implications of their actions in these agencies."

For information only to: Moscow, Praha, Warsaw.

[3] *Ante*, p. 16.

is contained in this act: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances necessitating a contribution by the United States in excess of 33⅓ per centum of the budget, a commitment requiring a United States appropriation of a larger proportion may be made after consultation by United States representatives in the organization or other appropriate officials of the Department of State with the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to the United States representatives to the Inter-American organizations."

Action indicates the general trend of temper of Congress in this connection. U.K. and Australian representatives have also indicated apprehension of their Governments re increasing budgets and Member costs for international organizations.

Past efforts of the U.S. to eliminate unnecessary expenditures, and insure defensible administrative and program policies among UN and the specialized agencies have oftentimes been handicapped by absence of representatives of other countries who were both familiar with and instructed on their government's budgetary and financial policies.

For example and for your information, the Department is quite concerned over the fact that the Fourth Health Assembly recently voted a 1952 WHO budget which is more than 20% larger than its 1951 budget. This precipitate increase, which USDel strongly opposed, was voted primarily as a result of the efforts of uninstructed delegations, among which were representatives of countries who have urged economy when discussing specialized agency budgets in the United Nations.

Focal opportunity for intensified effort to control budgetary costs is the forthcoming sixth session of the General Assembly. In conversations with the Foreign Office, the Department requests you express U.S. concern along above lines, (1) indicating our hope that its Delegation will be instructed generally to support efforts to keep the total budget figure within reasonable proportions and to ensure that all expenditures make maximum contribution to the achievement of UN objectives; and (2) if appropriate, urging representation on the Fifth Committee along the lines indicated above. As related these discussions, note should also be made of the continuing need for similar representation at governing body meetings of specialized agencies. Department recognizes difficulty making specific suggestions re delegation representation on any one Committee and suggests it be done only if informal, personal relationships make it possible. Stress on problems of international organization's expense and possibility of budget control through action of General Assembly delegations without specific mention of character of delegation membership may in some cases accomplish ends. Department intends

to forward additional information on positions on administrative and financial questions as soon as documents are available.

In conversations about this matter, you should make clear that the Department's concern over undesirable and unnecessary budget increases does not imply any diminution of its support of the principles, purposes, and activities of the many international organizations to which the U.S. belongs. Participation in these organizations is, and will continue to be, an essential and important aspect of American foreign policy. Our participation may be easily jeopardized, however, if the budgets of these organizations increase at too rapid a rate.

ACHESON

315.2/10–1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Administration (Henderson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1951.

Subject: Contributions to the United Nations

Participants: Mr. Christelow, British Embassy [1]
Miss Salt, British Embassy [2]
Mr. Ketain, BNA [3]
Mr. Ingram, UNI [4]
Mr. Henderson, UNI

At the request of the British Embassy, Mr. Hamilton,[5] BNA, arranged a meeting of the above listed participants on October 17, at 10:30 A. M. in Mr. Ingram's office.

Mr. Christelow opened the discussion by stating that his government was generally sympathetic to the desire of the United States to reach the one-third "ceiling", set by the UN on contributions to regular expenses by any one member.[6] He hoped, however, that this might be done gradually, and stated that the UK was disposed to support the recommendations of the UN Committee on Contributions on the scale of assessments for calendar year 1952.[7] He wondered what the position of the U.S. would be in this respect.

[1] A. Christelow, British Counselor of Embassy.
[2] B. Salt, British First Secretary of Embassy.
[3] Mr. Ketain of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
[4] George M. Ingram, Chief of the Division of International Administration.
[5] William L. Hamilton, Jr., of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
[6] Information as to Foreign Office agreement with the U.S. position outlined in the circular airgram of September 12, *supra*, had been cabled to the Department of State by the Embassy in its telegram 1430, September 19, 6 p. m. (320/9–1951).
[7] The Report of the Committee on Contributions (UN Doc. A/1859) is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10.*

Mr. Ingram replied by explaining the necessity for consultation with the Appropriation Committees of the Congress, prior to the adoption of a firm U.S. position. He stated that it was possible that the U.S. would also be in a position to support the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions, and assured Mr. Christelow that when the consultation had been completed, he would be pleased to discuss the U.S. position further.

Mr. Christelow then stated his hope that General Assembly debate on this question could be confined to the scale of assessments for 1952. Mr. Ingram responded that it would be necessary for the U.S. spokesman to express the determination of his government to press for early achievement of the 33⅓% goal, if it did not insist upon such achievement this year. Mr. Christelow commented that he could understand the reason for this.

Mr. Christelow expressed, as a matter of secondary concern, his hope that we would not press for immediate increase in USSR and satellite contributions in any dimensions which would prompt arrearages on their part. He hoped that the U.S. would go along with the recommendations of the Contributions Committee re these governments for the coming year. Mr. Ingram replied that, if we could accept the Contribution Committee Report, this would be no problem.

Mr. Christelow then added that although the UK was reluctant to do so, except as a matter of last resort, he had been instructed to inform the Department that his government was prepared to forego something of the reduction recommended for the UK, for next year if such action would be of assistance to the U.S. in supporting the report of the Committee. Mr. Ingram said that while this was welcome news, he could not comment further until the previously referred to consultation with the Congress had been completed.

The scale of assessments situation in the UN specialized agencies was generally discussed, with Mr. Christelow making specific inquiry as to U.S. attitude re an increase in its percentage of assessment in the case of FAO. Mr. Ingram replied that since the U.S. assessment in WHO and UNESCO had now been reduced to one-third, and since a significant reduction was anticipated in the UN, he believed that the U.S. would be prepared to see its assessment in FAO moderately increased. He stressed that it was the hope of the U.S. that a satisfactory overall scale of assessments could be negotiated at the November Conference of the FAO, which would not be subject to any modification until the following Conference two years thereafter. Mr. Christelow agreed to the desirability of this.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of the status of the U.S. contribution to UNKRA. Miss Salt wondered about the significance of the recent limited appropriation action by the Congress, and was assured by Mr. Henderson that apparently such action only

reflected Congressional doubt as to the ability of UNKRA to effectively use the entire amount of the U.S. pledge at this time. It was emphasized that no serious question as to the amount of the pledge, as such, had been raised. Miss Salt went on to inquire whether the U.S. considered its contribution to cover a period of one year from the time that full payment was made, or whether it was for the U.S. fiscal year 1952. Mr. Henderson replied that the contribution was intended to provide for the period required to carry out the initial UNKRA program, as approved by the GA, and that it was presumed that approximately one year from the time that UNKRA began full operations would be required to do this.

IO Files[1]

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations[2]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1951.
SD/A/C.5/170

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE UN
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS

THE PROBLEM

The United Nations Committee on Contributions has recommended a reduction for the United States of 2.02 percentage points (from 38.92% for 1951 to 36.90% for 1952). The Committee recommends adjustments, upward or downward, for 33 countries including an increase of 2.87 percentage points for the USSR (from 6.98% to 9.85%). The Soviet member voted against the proposed scale in the Committee and has publicly attacked the reduction proposed for the United States.

Under the terms of the Congressional appropriation act for fiscal year 1952 the Department is directed to consult with the two appropriations committees before committing the United States to a contribution to an international organization in excess of 33⅓ percent. The Department is proceeding with such consultations in regard to the United States contribution to the United Nations. What position

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[1] Short title for the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

[2] The General Assembly was scheduled to convene in Paris on November 6. For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

should the United States Delegation take on the United Nations contribution scale for 1952?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Contingent upon Congressional consultations, the Delegation should support adoption of the Committee Report. In doing so it should:

1. State that the US is seriously disappointed that the Report does not recommend a much more substantial reduction in the US contribution.

2. Note that its acceptance of the Report is motivated by a desire to avoid an insistence upon changes in the scale which might appear to the smaller and more populous states to require more rapid upward adjustments in their contributions than they may be prepared for, and in recognition of the fact that Soviet obstruction to the accession of new members has denied to the membership an opportunity to soften the impact on other members of U.S. reductions.

3. State that its acceptance of a Committee report which does not recommend a reduction of the U.S. assessment to 33⅓% at this time is based on the assumption that a continuation along the course now firmly set by the Committee will achieve the goal of a 33⅓% assessment for the U.S. in not more than two further annual steps.

COMMENT

The scale of contributions for 1952 recommended by the United Nations Committee on Contributions embodies the most extensive adjustments of any scale to date, both in the number of Members affected (33 against 23 last year), and in the extent of the changes for some members (for the United States, a reduction of 2.02 percentage points against 0.87 last year, and for the U.S.S.R., an increase of 2.87 percentage points against 0.64 last year). However, the Committee again emphasizes its policy of moving "step by step in making adjustments, satisfying itself that the changes recommended are fully supported . . . [etc.]". The Committee reports that available statistical information continues to improve but that it is by no means adequate for all countries and that there is room for differences of opinion as to the appropriate method of converting estimates of national income into a common currency.

As to the largest (U.S.) share, the Committee considers that the General Assembly intended a further step to be taken at this time toward the goal of a ceiling of 33⅓%. In recommending a reduction for 1952 for the United States of approximately one-third of the remaining distance to 33⅓%, the Committee states it had in mind its policy of moving gradually and systematically toward the removal of maladjustments in the scale of whatever sort, with adjustment of the United States share taking place at the same pace as adjustments

elsewhere in the scale. Although the Committee is not explicit on the point, it is known to have had in mind particularly the progressive withdrawal of the adjustment for war damage that has kept assessments low, particularly for the Iron Curtain countries. The Committee notes in its report that its recommendation for limiting the changes in assessments in 1952 to one-third of the indicated amounts was arrived at after careful consideration during which some members favored a faster rate, and some favored a slower adjustment. Mr. Stuart Rice (U.S.) is recorded as proposing a full adjustment at once. Mr. Soldatov (USSR) objected both to the increases for the Iron Curtain countries, and to decreases for the U.S., the U.K., and France.

In its recommendations, the Contributions Committee has come a very long way from the position previously taken which produced such small results in terms of the U.S. objective. Previously, the Contributions Committee had limited itself to annual changes of not more than 10% in the assessment of any one country. In contrast, the scale recommended for 1952 results in an increase of over 41% in the assessments of the three Soviet states, and of about 30% in the case of Poland. On the basis of the present level of expenditure, the reduction of 2.02% in the case of the U.S. will mean a saving to the U.S. of some $800,000 and a credit from the Working Capital Fund account of some $400,000 additional. In observing that it has taken account of about one-third of the maladjustments in the previously existing scale, the Committee has established a strong presumption that the U.S. objective of 33⅓% will be achievable in not more than two additional annual steps.

The Soviet member of the Contributions Committee has made strong public objection to the recommended scale, and has made his vote against it a matter of record. He has specifically stated that there should be no reduction in the U.S. assessment—that in fact the U.S. should contribute approximately 50% of the budget. It is expected that the U.S.S.R. will make a strong and bitter attack on the recommendations of the Committee when the General Assembly convenes.

The position of the U.S. in the General Assembly would be greatly weakened if it should join the Soviet Union in opposition to the recommendations of the Contributions Committee. It is anticipated that the Soviet Union's attack on the recommendations will be in the nature of an assault upon the expertness and objectiveness of the Committee, the integrity of its members and its freedom from U.S. domination. An attack of this character should of itself redound to the benefit of the U.S. through the resentment which it will arouse in other delegations.

Since the recommendations of the Contributions Committee which produce this 2.02% reduction in the U.S. assessment are based on general considerations of improvement in the economic conditions of

all member states showing improvement, the reductions accorded the U.S. and certain other members are equated by increases in the assessments not only of states in the Soviet group, but in other states as well. The new scale results in increases for ten states other than the five Soviet states, namely: Afghanistan, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

If the U.S. should reject the Contributions Committee report and insist that a further reduction be accorded, it might attempt to make this claim without upsetting the non-political basis for the Committee's recommendations by urging that Committee Five go further in correcting acknowledged maladjustments than the Contributions Committee felt inclined to recommend. However, this would mean that the ten states listed would all have reason to feel that the U.S. was pressing for very sudden and sizeable increases in their contributions in a completely unreasonable manner—to the detriment of U.S. attempts to secure support from these same states on matters of great political importance. Further, it would be difficult to avoid the U.S. attack on the Contributions Committee Report being misrepresented as a political attack of the same character as that expected from the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, a U.S. challenge to the Contributions Committee Report which openly brushed aside the objectivity which has been the historical foundation of the General Assembly deliberations on the contribution scale would have a serious unsettling effect on all non-Soviet or satellite states. It is this presumption of objectivity which has permitted all delegations to convince their governments of the integrity of Committee Five recommendations on the sharing of the cost burden. Any attack from the U.S. which seriously damages this presumption would throw into turmoil the entire contribution scale proceedings and would both place in question the early achievement of the U.S. goal of 33⅓% and seriously endanger general support for U.S. political objectives.

320/10–3151

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Humelsine) to the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the United States Senate (McKellar)[1]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1951.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCKELLAR: I am writing for the purpose of consulting with the Senate Committee on Appropriations with re-

[1] The same letter *mutatis mutandis* was sent to the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives. Deputy Under Secretary Humelsine delivered both in person on October 31.

spect to the position to be taken by the United States delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the subject of the scale of assessments for the calendar year 1952. A similar letter is being sent to the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

At this fortcoming session of the General Assembly which convenes in Paris on November 4 [*6*], 1951, a prominent item in the agenda, as in past years, will be the question of the scale of assessments for the ensuing financial year. Originally, it had been hoped that a permanent scale of assessments might be adopted by this time, and the rules of procedure of the General Assembly in fact stipulate that general revisions in the scale of assessments not be made more frequently than once in every three years. However, this rule has been set aside each year, a procedure strongly supported by United States delegations in order that there might be annual progress toward the goal of a 33⅓ percent assessment for the United States.

The goal of an assessment of 33⅓ percent for the United States was set by the General Assembly at its Third Session, held in New York in the fall of 1948, when the organization had under consideration its scale of assessments for the calendar year 1949. This accomplishment was due in large measure to the unremitting efforts of United States representatives, in the Committee on Administration and Finance of the General Assembly, and in particular of the late Senator Vandenberg in 1946. It represented a substantial concession to the United States, which was thereby to be exempted from the full application of the "capacity to pay" standard upon which the scale is based. This same goal of a 33⅓ percent contribution for the United States was later adopted by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the two specialized agencies whose scales of assessment are directly modeled after that of the United Nations.

In the case of WHO and UNESCO, the United States assessment has been gradually reduced until it now stands at the target figure of 33⅓ percent of assessments against all members in support of their budgets for the calendar year 1952. For WHO, this represents progress downward from an assessment of 38.77 percent in 1948, and for UNESCO from an assessment of 44.03 percent in 1947. In both instances, the successive reductions in the United States assessment percentage were made easier by the accession, each year, of new members who took up their share of the burden of contributions. At the same time, these reductions have represented the determination of the other members, most of whom are also members of the United Nations, to relieve the United States of some of the weight of its contribution responsibility.

Following up the decision in 1948 to reduce the United States assessment to 33⅓ percent, the Fourth Session of the General Assembly reduced the United States assessment from 39.89 percent to 39.79 percent. Last year, the Fifth Session of the General Assembly voted a further reduction to 38.92 percent. The smallness of these reductions to date in the United Nations, as compared with WHO and UNESCO, is largely attributable to the fact that the accession of new members in any significant number has been blocked by the Soviet veto. Under the terms of the resolution of the Third Session, one of the principal means through which changes were to be brought about was an increase in membership.

Nevertheless, the United States has pressed strongly for substantial reductions which, it believed, could be achieved through a fuller recognition of the increased capacity to pay of certain other members. This position was advanced in 1949 by Mr. John Sherman Cooper, United States representative in the Committee on Administration and Finance and, last year, by Senator John Sparkman while serving in the same capacity.

This year, for the first time, the General Assembly will have before it a report of its Committee on Contributions which recommends a substantial reduction for the United States. This Committee, consisting of ten experts drawn from Member countries and serving in a private capacity, is one of the principal standing committees advisory to the General Assembly. The confidence placed in its expertness and judgment by Member governments has been such that its recommendations have been accepted each year without exception. Mr. James E. Webb, now Under Secretary of State and Mr. Frank Pace, now Secretary of the Army, have previously served as United States members of the Committee at a time when each was Director of the Budget. Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, was the United States member of the Committee this year with Mr. Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, acting as his alternate.

In its current report the Committee on Contributions has recommended, for calendar 1952, a reduction in the United States contribution of 2.02 percentage points (from 38.92% to 36.90%). This is approximately one-third of the remaining distance downwards to 33⅓%, and the Committee indicates that it has in mind a three-year progression both for the United States reduction and for certain upward revisions elsewhere in the scale of contributions.

The proposed reduction of 2.02 percentage points for 1952 would be the largest the United States has yet received, and compares with a reduction for 1951 of 0.87%. Based upon the 1951 level of expenditure, a reduction of 2.02 percentage points would amount to a saving

of some $800,000, and in addition there would be a credit to the United States in respect of its Working Capital Fund account of $400,000.

At the same time that it recommends this reduction for the United States, the Committee on Contributions also proposes adjustments, upwards or downwards, of the quotas of thirty-two other Member states. Among these states for whom increases are proposed is the Soviet Union with an increase of 2.87 percentage points, from 6.98% to 9.85%. Proposed increases for Byelorussia and the Ukraine are in the same proportion; the increase for Poland is slightly smaller, and there is a minor increase for Czechoslovakia. The United States has been a strong advocate of increased assessments for the Iron Curtain countries since their original quotas were heavily adjusted for war damage which has now been overcome. Although members of the Committee on Contributions sit in their individual capacity as experts, the Soviet member in the Committee discussions made a vigorous attack on the Committee's conclusions and voted against the proposed scale.

It is the Department's proposal that the United States support the adoption of the report of the Contributions Committee as the best available basis for the 1952 scale, and as the course most consistent with our national interest. The Delegation would make clear the continuing determination of the United States to realize at the earliest possible date the objective that no one member of the United Nations Organization should pay more than 33⅓% of its regular expenses. The Delegation would further indicate that it supports the quota assigned the United States in the 1952 scale only because the report of the Contributions Committee gives promise of a systematic reduction to 33⅓% in not more than two annual steps after 1952.

The Department stands ready to provide any further information which the Appropriations Committee may require in this matter and to meet with the Committee if it so desires.

Sincerely yours, CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE

320/11–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State[1] *to the Acting Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, November 19, 1951—midnight.

Delga 260. For Hickerson[2] (UNA) and Ingram (UNI) from Hall.[3] Re contributions. Essential contributions position be presented delegation week Nov 19. In absence Congressional consultations and

[1] The Secretary of State was in Paris at this time serving as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly. The session convened in Paris on November 6.

[2] John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

[3] William O. Hall, Director of the Office of International Administration and Conferences and member of the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation.

based upon discussions Congressmen Vorys and Mansfield [4] USGADel advisers believe positions stated in SD/A/C.5/170 must be modified as fols:

US shld propose contributions comite report be referred to a subcomite with instructions so to revise report as to reduce US contribution to 33⅓ percent and to increase contributions of countries presently under-assessed sufficiently to offset decrease in US contribution.

If this position is not accepted US shld vote against comite report to comply with appropriation statute and state that del has no authority to commit in any way US Govt to payment of any contribution in excess of one third of total cost of UN during fiscal year 1952.

This position is subj to approval of USGADel but represents maximum which Congressmen Vorys and Mansfield feel can be presented to Congress in absence of Congressional consultation required by Appropriation Act. Need reply by 9 a.m. Wed Paris time.[5] [Hall.]

ACHESON

[4] John M. Vorys and Michael J. Mansfield, of the House of Representatives, members of the U.S. Delegation.

[5] Notation at the end of the telegram: "No legal obstacle to voting for report. Disastrous to vote against it. Least should be abstain. Recognize essentially problem of Congress[ional] relat[ion]s."

320/11–1951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 20, 1951—5:26 p. m.

NIACT

Gadel 201. For Hall from Hickerson. Re Delga 260. Wish you discuss following with Congressmen Vorys and Mansfield and hope matter may be subject further frank discussion delegation, prior to final decision. It is my strong personal feeling that course of action outlined urtel undesirable in that might result in failure obtain first sizeable reduction U.S. percentage as recommended Contribs Comite. As matter my own judgment believe U.S. interests better served by supporting Comite report and thus assuring two point two reduction next year plus promise subsequent two year reduction to thirty three and one third percent, than by running risks of "all or nothing" action contemplated urtel. My judgment this connection supported by Dept legal opinion that on facts this case letters to Chairmen Approps Comites, copies of which I assume Reps. Vorys and Mansfield have seen, constitute reasonable endeavor under consultation provision of approp. act. Realize however that more than legal matter involved and of course wish to avoid any action prejudicial to continued good

relations Congressional Comites. With this in mind, and if point of view outlined above not acceptable suggest as maximum Del consider abstention on acceptance Contrib Comite report if proposal to refer report to subcomite fails. [Hickerson.]

WEBB

IO Files

Memorandum by Representative John M. Vorys of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

US/A/C.5/166 [PARIS,] November 21, 1951.

[Subject:] Memorandum on niact (Gadel 201, 11/20/51)

This requires consideration of (*a*) the present legal situation, (*b*) the Congressional situation next year.

(*a*) Note that the law prohibits any representative of the U.S. from committing the U.S. to any contribution in excess of 33⅓ percent of the budget of any international organization, provided that in "exceptional circumstances" such commitment can be made after "consultation with the" Appropriation Committees of the House and Senate. Every one in Congress knows that it is practically impossible to have a consultation with a Congressional Committee while both houses are in adjournment. No one in Congress would consider that a letter to Committee Chairmen constituted consultation, and "consultation" is required, not "reasonable endeavor", as stated in Webb's niact.

The law provides for commitment above 33⅓ percent only under "exceptional circumstances". Routine contribution to the regular budget of the UN is certainly not an exceptional circumstance, particularly when the Congress knew of the 1948 UN resolution making 33⅓ percent the normal, knew of the gradual reduction, knew that more than 33⅓ percent, however, would probably be recommended by the Contribution Committee for next year.

Since there has been no consultation and the circumstances are not exceptional, representatives of the Government are prohibited by law from committing the U.S. to a contribution over 33⅓ percent.

(*b*) Regardless of legal technicalities, it is perfectly clear that Congress is not going to appropriate more than 33⅓ percent for the regular budget of the UN in 1952. The U.S. Delegation should bear this in mind in determining its position.

Note that Webb's niact is strictly personal—"my strong *personal feeling . . . my own judgment. My judgment . . .*"

J. M. VORYS

320/11–2851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 28, 1951—6:11 p. m.

Gadel 277. For Fisher [1] from Tate.[2] Following are views Legal Adviser's office here re Article 17 UN Charter: [3]

Language Paragraph 2 that "expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly" clearly mandatory and imposes treaty obligation upon US to pay contribution as apportioned by GA. (In this connection note that if US is in arrears in its financial contribution it loses vote in GA under Article 19 UN Charter. Under Article 19 Member in arrears may vote only if GA satisfied failure pay due conditions beyond Members' control.)

Check of history US ratification UN Charter shows no controversy or discussion Article 17 in Senate hearings or debate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending ratification UN Charter noted GA will have function to approve budgets and concluded on page 15:

"The question of our membership in an international organization to preserve peace has been debated throughout our country and in this Congress as fully as any public issue in our history has ever been discussed. The committee feels that the people and the members of the Senate understand clearly the consequences and the requirements of our membership in the United Nations and that they are prepared to undertake the responsibilities of membership in order to enjoy the privileges which that membership may ultimately bring in the form of world security. The committee is convinced that participation in the United Nations is in accordance with our national interests, and that our contributions to the United Nations will be repaid many times."

Clear support found in legislative history Charter that Article 17(2) imposes obligation. Committee One of Commission Two of UNCIO [4] in recommending sanction appearing Article 19 stated pur-

[1] Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, member of the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

[2] Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

[3] Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations reads:

"1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

"2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

"3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned."

[4] The United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945. For text of the Charter of the United Nations, formulated by the Conference, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, or Department of State Treaty Series 993.

pose was "to impose a penalty of loss of voting rights in the General Assembly in the event that member states fail to fulfill their financial obligation (underscore added) to the International Organization." (Eight UNCIO Doc. 364.)

We feel therefore that UN Charter imposes clear treaty obligation upon US to pay its contribution to UN as fixed by GA. Failure to do so would not only subject US to loss of vote under Article 19 but would be contrary to American tradition of respect for treaties since earliest days of republic. In 1796 Supreme Court in case of *Ware* v. *Hylton* enforcing Treaty of Peace with Great Britain enunciated principle respect for treaties. In 1931 Chief Justice Hughes in opinion enforcing Consular Convention with Italy reaffirmed principle. *Santovincenzo* v. *Egan*, 284 U.S. 30. Hughes said in that case "As treaties are contracts between independent nations their words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning 'as understood in the public law of nations'."

Internationally in North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration between Great Britain and US in 1910 arbitral tribunal said "every State has to execute the obligations incurred by treaty."

Distinguished American authorities have consistently upheld principle of respect for treaties, including international legal obligation of US to pay money if so required by treaty.

In 1833 Secretary of State Livingston observed "The Government of the United States presumes that whenever a treaty has been duly concluded and ratified by the acknowledged authorities competent for that purpose, an obligation is thereby imposed upon each and every department of the government to carry it into complete effect, according to its terms, and that on the performance of this obligation consists the due observance of good faith among nations. (2 Wharton, *International Law Digest*, 1887, p. 67.)"

Professor Hyde also comments "It is not unreasonable to assert that when, for example, the United States concludes a treaty contemplating payment by it for the cession to itself of territory, the nation incurs a legal obligation to make payment, and incidentally agrees that the Congress will not fail to make the requisite appropriation." [Tate.]

WEBB

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Minutes of Twenty-second Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 29, 1951 [1]

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/209

[Here follow list of persons (45) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. *Scale of Assessments*

Mr. Hall called atention to the documents that had been placed before the Delegation. Among them were the following: the Report of the Committee on Contributions of the UN which had set forth the assessment recommendations for the coming calendar year. There was an excerpt from Public Law 188 enacted near the end of the last Session of Congress and which stated the conditions under which the US contributions to international organizations were to be made. Only in exceptional circumstances, in which case consultation with the Appropriations Committees of both House and Senate was required, could the US contribution to an international organization be in excess of 33⅓% of the total contributions. Also included among the document was a letter to Congressman Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, similar to a letter which had been sent to Senator McKellar of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Department's position paper, SD/A/C.5/170, together with recommendations from the Delegation staff to amend it, Delga 260, and the Department's comments thereon, Gadel 201, were also included. A memorandum prepared by Congressman Vorys regarding Gadel 201 was also appended. Finally, there was enclosed Section A of General Assembly resolution 238(III), in which the aim had been expressed of limiting the maximum assessment of any one contributor to the UN during normal times to one third of the total.

Mr. Hall briefly reviewed the history of the scale of assessments problem. He pointed out that the high level at which the US contribution had originally been set was based primarily on the principle of ability to pay. After strenuous efforts, the US in 1948 had secured adoption by the Assembly of resolution 238(III) in which the principle was enunciated that in normal times the contribution of the highest contributor should be kept at a ceiling of 33⅓%.

The 1949 reduction in the US assessment for 1950 had been 0.10%, 0.89% for 1951, and 2.02% reduction was being proposed for 1952. At the same time the Committee on Contributions had increased the

[1] The Secretary of State was no longer with the Delegation, having left Paris on November 21. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair at this meeting and the following one on November 30.

Soviet percentage by 2.87 points. The Committee had agreed that this large decrease in the US contribution over previous years was in line with the principle stated in the GA resolution of 1948, and that in two more years, the US contribution would be down to one third of the total contributions.

Mr. Hall next took up the position of the Delegation in relation to the legislation applicable to the situation. He pointed out that it had been impossible for the Department, and would now be for the Delegation as well, to consult with the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, since Congress had adjourned. He also referred to the opinion of the Department that the letters written to Congressman Cannon and Senator McKellar constituted a reasonable attempt to consult in view of the situation. He referred to the telegram to Mr. Hickerson (Delga 260), in which it had been stated that the US Delegation staff felt that a 33⅓% position would probably lose out in the GA voting, in that the Contributions Committee Report would probably be supported. In listing the factors unfavorable to achievement of a 33⅓% goal in 1952, Mr. Hall pointed out that other delegations felt that the US profited from having the Headquarters in US, and that the US had not yet acted in the matter of tax exemption for US Nationals in the Secretariat. Should the US go into the Assembly prepared to insist that its contribution assessment be reduced to one third, other delegations might tack onto such a resolution a condition that the US reciprocally provide some form of tax relief for US Nationals so as to eliminate the necessity for reimbursing to the US Treasury the taxes of US Nationals. On the side of achieving 33⅓%, the US could go into the Assembly and argue that on the basis of sovereign equality, its contributions to the Korean fighting, and the possibility of diminished support for the UN within the US, it would have to insist on the reduction.

But as he had pointed out earlier, the USSR and others would certainly take advantage of this position. In addition, the USSR might well attack the objectivity of the Contributions Committee, and seek to have the full Fifth Committee determine contributions. The US had previously backed the objectivity and "expertness" of this Committee and in terms of US interests this concept should be preserved. Mr. Hall pointed out that on the Contributions Committee the developed countries outweighed the underdeveloped ones. If the assessments matter were to be opened in the Fifth Committee the balance would be completely reversed.

On the question of whether the US was legally or morally obligated to make its contribution, in accordance with the amount fixed by the GA, Mr. Hall said that both the Department and Ambassador Austin had felt that there was a treaty obligation by which the US would be legally bound. A moral obligation was also present. What Mr. Hall

was asking the Delegation to consider was the recommendations for a change in position to the extent indicated in Delga 260.

Mr. Cohen commented that he was not connected with either the Legislative or Executive branches of government in between the sessions of the GA and therefore approached this matter as a private US citizen. He wondered how serious it would be for the US to upset the Report of the Committee on Contributions. He felt that there was a great need for the United Nations to succeed, and that the "exceptional circumstances" referred to in the legislation applicable to the present situation needed something other than a fine legal interpretation. He said that if Congress had intended to make an exception in any particular case, it could not have intended the executive branch to be bereft of the authority to take such an exception on its own when it was impossible to consult with the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. Fair compliance with the Act, in view of its passage late in the session and the reasonable efforts made to consult with the Committees, had been achieved. He suggested that rather than voting against the Report of the Committee on Contributions, the US could at least abstain and remain consistent with its legal obligations. He felt that voting for it might be contravening the terms of the Appropriation Act, but abstaining would not constitute such a contravention.

Senator Cooper said that he followed in part the line of reasoning put forward by Mr. Cohen. He thought that there were exceptional circumstances involved, and that the US contribution was very small in comparison with the value received, and in view of the amounts the US was spending on other things. However, he could not vote for the Report of the Committee on Contributions since it was absolutely essential to have consultation with the Congressional Committees if exceptional circumstances presented themselves. That was the crucial point and those consultations had not been held. In his interpretation of the situation the US should vote against the Report, although he hoped a way could be found for the US to pay its full assessment.

Miss Strauss said that she felt this matter was of such great importance that it would be unwise to seek a Delegation decision that day.

Mr. Vorys said that there were three questions involved. First in importance was the meaning of the law itself. Secondly, he thought, the meaning of "consultation" should be defined. And thirdly, he felt that it should be decided whether the US would be committed to a course of action because it voted for a particular report. He did not think there had been consultation within the meaning of the law. He was not personally convinced that the US would be committed to a course of action simply because an international body passed a

resolution. Nothing could supplant the Congress' authority over money bills. He had taken up the question of Congressional intent with the Senators and Representatives who had been at Strassbourg. They had all agreed that the Congress would not appropriate more than ⅓ of the total of UN contributions for the next year. Mr. Mansfield referred to the opinions of Senators McMahon and Benton on this matter, and said he understood them to have felt that while it was not proper for the Congress so to limit the US contribution, they agreed that the temper of Congress was such that it would probably not appropriate more than 33⅓%. Mr. Mansfield agreed with Mr. Vorys that the US should vote against the report.

Mr. Hall re-explained his views in regard to the Contributions Committee. His only point had been intended to be that the ratio of underdeveloped countries to developed ones was much safer from the US point of view in the smaller Contributions Committee than in the full Assembly. Other states would vote against the Report of this Committee since their own assessments were being increased. They were behaving on the basis of their own immediate short-range interest, and ignoring what would be to their better interests in the long run. Mr. Sandifer added that of course the Contributions Committee had no ability to bind the Assembly, but could only make recommendations. The Assembly had full power to decide whether or not to accept these recommendations.

Mr. McKeever addressed himself to the political-propaganda aspects of this matter. He felt that the UN was the best ideological weapon in the US arsenal. It would be a great mistake for the US, by voting against the Assessment Scale, to help the Russians, who were at this very moment building up a substitute for the UN in their World Peace Council.

No decision was taken at the meeting on the US position on this matter, and it was understood that the matter would be brought up again.

CHARLES D. COOK

IO Files

Minutes of Twenty-third Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 30, 1951

SECRET
US/A/M(Chr)/210

[Here follows list of persons (47) present.]

The Delegation continued the discussion, begun the day before, on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of expenses of the United Nations. Mr. Hall stated that he had nothing to add to what

he had said previously in his presentation. Mr. Vorys recommended that the position of the Delegation be that it seek an adjustment in the assessments scale in order to achieve the 33⅓% ceiling for the U.S. contribution. He took this position not so much on the basis of domestic U.S. law as from a feeling that a time of relatively full adjustment in terms of ability to contribute was at hand (a position he knew would be attacked by other Delegations) and that the U.S. should seek to have its contribution confined to what the General Assembly has previously agreed was just; namely, a maximum contribution of one third of the total. He felt that when General Eisenhower [1] and Foreign Minister Schumann [2] [*sic*] had said that the present situation was likely to continue for ten years, the world had come as near to a condition of "normalcy" as was possible. Therefore, it would be wise to seek, on the basis of principle, a reduction in the U.S. assessment. The U.S. should not say that it would not pay the difference between one third and the present assessment, for in fact one third of the forthcoming budget might be larger than we had paid in the past. The sole basis should be that the General Assembly itself had agreed that one third was a normal maximum contribution.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked Mr. Vorys if he felt that the U.S. could achieve acceptance of that position in the Committee. He answered that he had been reluctant to talk too much with other delegations about the matter in the absence of a clear decision by the U.S. Delegation. He added that he and Mr. Hall had however talked with a few Committee 5 delegates about the matter. Stone of Canada [3] had seemed sympathetic to the U.S. view. In a talk with the Mexicans and Brazilians, during which they brought the matter up, the Brazilian had said that he saw merit in the U.S. position and would be willing to forego the proposed decrease in his country's contribution in order to offset in part a reduction in that of the U.S. Byron Price [4] of the Secretariat had mentioned that Secretary-General Lie had heard of the U.S. desire to reduce its contribution to the one third ceiling and had said he was thinking about the matter. Price himself had stated that he did not think the time propitious for advancing such an idea.

Dr. Tobias indicated that he had been present at the Non-Governmental Organization luncheon at which Mr. Vorys had discussed this matter, and had noted in particular their reactions. He said there had been disappointment that the U.S. might have to contemplate such a step at this time. The Non-Governmental Organization representa-

[1] General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
[2] Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[3] T. A. Stone, member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly; he was Chairman of the Fifth Committee.
[4] Byron Price, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services.

tives recognized that the Act of Congress was on the books and that the normal United Nations expectancy of a one third maximum was logical. The general feeling had been, however, that some way should be found to indicate to the Non-Governmental Organizations and others what would result from a decision of this sort in terms of cutting important services rendered by the United Nations, especially since the actual difference in money was relatively small. They indicated they would be willing to work toward asking Congress to appropriate the difference. They realized also that taking a position of this kind might tend to damage the strength of domestic U.S. law if they were to argue against the mandate of Congress. The seriousness of the situation, nevertheless, seemed to be an overriding consideration, and made it very desirable for the U.S. Delegation to try to give every indication of its awareness of the dilemma in which it found itself. For example, they had suggested an abstaining vote, or an indication that partial payment of the total assessment would be followed by attempts to have Congress appropriate the remainder at its next session. Dr. Tobias felt we were faced with a situation where we could not adhere only to the letter of the law. Quoting the Scriptures, he said "The letter killeth", and especially here the letter of the law might well kill. The best way of summing up the situation seemed to be that the U.S. would be "penny wise and pound foolish" in view of the great amounts of financial aid it was giving to individual countries, when it decided to reduce its United Nations contribution by such a small amount. For the reasons he had expressed, he hoped the Delegation would decide to abstain in the voting and then explain its position to the public at home.

Mrs. Roosevelt thought that there were two possibilities from which the Delegation could choose. It could authorize an abstention, or a negative vote with an explanation of the reasons therefor. She called the Delegation's attention to the legal position the Department had taken as expressed in Gadel 277, and suggested that it should also be considered by the Delegation in determining its position. In this connection, Mr. Fisher remarked that he felt there were two decisions the Delegation had to make. The first was what the Delegation should try for, and how much effort it ought to make on behalf of whatever it decided to pursue. The second decision should be what the Delegation would do in case its efforts under the first decision did not succeed. He thought a sincere and honest effort was called for, in seeking to obtain a reduction in the U.S. assessment. If the Delegation members who would be making this effort felt, however, that pushing this position to the extreme would cost infinitely more in other areas, then the existence of "exceptional circumstances" might be indicated. The attempt should be made, in other words, but if it were found to prejudice the overall national interest, we should consult to the fullest

degree with Congress. Our constitutional duty required us to use every legal method to protect the overall national interest. It would be very unfortunate if the U.S. were to be voted down on its demand to reduce its contribution to one third and then hinted that perhaps it would not pay. The implications in this for other states would be extremely dangerous. It was up to the Delegation to make a "college try", to obtain a reduction.

Ambassador Gross [5] said he had been on Committee 5 in 1948 when the General Assembly resolution had been adopted which recognized that the maximum contribution should be one third. He was troubled by several problems in addition to those mentioned by Dr. Tobias and Mr. Fisher. The law itself, he felt, was a "good cog" but it was fashioned for a "slightly different kind of machine". He thought it was fairly well understood that the "commitments" in the United Nations only arose out of the Charter. So said the lawyers. He asked Mr. Vorys whether, if the 33⅓% contribution position were adhered to, this would mean taking matters out of the hands of the Contributions Committee and putting it into the full Fifth Committee.

He referred to paragraph 17 of the Contributions Committee Report in which it was apparent that a decision on the matter of the U.S. contribution could not be made in a vacuum. Other states would be affected by whatever action we insisted upon. Whose contribution would rise if ours went down? Where would the re-adjustment be made, and would there be time for whatever group was to do this to accomplish their task? Ambassador Gross expressed the view that it would be dangerous to open the question of the assessments scale in the Fifth Committee where we might be swamped by the "have not" states; it might be better to adhere to the recommendations of the Contributions Committee where there was a fair balance between the "have" and "have not" states. Ambassador Gross also pointed out that in paragraph 12 of its Report, the "policy of the Contributions Committee", as stated there, was one most accurately reflecting that of the General Assembly as a whole and as favorable as possible to the U.S.

Lastly, Ambassador Gross thoroughly agreed with Mr. Fisher that a "commitment" as foreseen in the legislation did not generate an "obligation". It was the apportionment as agreed upon by the General Assembly which generated the obligation. He felt for the reasons stated that there was room for arguing that the US ought to vote against the Contributions Committee Report. The members of the United States Delegation might be criticized for not voting against it. In analyzing the "apparent spirit" of Public Law 188, he said that when Congress had considered enacting it, someone must have known

[5] Ernest A. Gross, Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations, member of the United States Delegation.

that a United States vote by itself did not commit the United States, but that only the apportionment by the General Assembly could do that. The law, then, might have been an effort on the part of Congress to offset any additional moral obligation on its part. If the Delegation were to decide and vote against the Report of the Contribution Committee, this would leave the question in Congress' hands as to whether to comply with the decision of the Assembly. For these reasons he felt the United States Delegation should vote against the Report and not go any further by way of explanation which could rivet the situation so that Congress could not comply even if it wished to do so.

Senator Cooper said that his position was that legally the individual members of the Delegation were directed by law not to vote for anything over a one-third contribution for the US. This did not mean, however, that the United States Delegation should stop working to make it possible for the Congress to give more. He hoped that it might be possible to postpone General Assembly action for a while in order to work along those lines.

Mr. Vorys thought that the Delegation should make every effort to persuade the United Nations members to apply the 33⅓% principle this year. The Delegation should try this out on other Delegations now. He said in answer to Ambassador Gross' previous remarks that of course he realized this would mean an upward adjustment in the Contributions of other countries. He felt that foremost among these upward adjustments should be those of the Soviet bloc countries.

Mr. Vorys said that if the law prohibited the United States Delegation from committing the United States to anything more than a one-third contribution, that bound the members of the Delegation. In regard to the question of Charter obligations, he said that some people had pressed the view that a levy by the General Assembly acting under the Charter constituted a legal obligation. He had taken an opposite view. He felt that any such doctrine would be extremely unfortunate. He also expressed the view that the Delegation should not be so concerned with trying to get the Congress to change its views. What the legislation required was that the United States Delegation should try to get the UN views changed. If not successful in that undertaking, then the Delegation would have to decide how to cast its vote in such a situation.

Ambassador Sayre[6] was much impressed by the need for trying to get the United States contribution down to one-third. But he felt it should also be considered that the Delegation was under a duty to try to effectuate the will of Congress in the best way possible. The United States could adopt a "take it or leave it" attitude, or it could

[6] Francis B. Sayre, United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council, member of the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation.

try to work for the reduction to one-third in a year or two. The latter would seem to him to be the better way if the law could be construed to permit such an endeavor. He thought that with the general world situation and the disillusionment with the United Nations in many quarters it might endanger matters considerably if the United States refused to pay more than the one-third this year. Similar attempts to restrict contributions might well begin all around the world.

Looking at the law, he felt that a "commitment" could not come from the casting of a United States vote in one way or another. The law provided for exceptional circumstances, and should the Delegation take the view that there was some degree of flexibility provided for in the law, it could abstain on the present report of the Contributions Committee and seek to obtain a promise from the United Nations that in the next two years the United States contribution would be reduced to the one-third maximum. He hoped that the Delegation would agree that "exceptional circumstances" did exist and that the Delegation should not be held too rigidly by the law before them.

Mr. Mansfield joined with Mr. Vorys in complimenting the advisers of the Delegation for their talents in ironing out differences in viewpoints. He felt those talents should be applied to the present situation. He pointed out that he and Mr. Vorys were in the position of having to go back and explain their actions before Congress. In regard to a suggestion by Mrs. Roosevelt that the Delegation meet with a group of Congressmen arriving for the weekend, he thought it a very good idea. He felt it necessary to point out however that they were all Democrats and might not reflect the views that Congress as a whole would take. He added that Senators Benton and McMahon had expressed the view at Strassbourg that the Congress would not appropriate more than the one third. Since time was not too pressing on this matter he suggested meeting with the Congressmen of the group referred to by Mrs. Roosevelt, and also with the members of the Appropriations Committee who would be in Paris shortly.

Mr. Sandifer [7] said that in regard to the question of whether or not there had been "consultation" in connection with the "exceptional circumstances" proviso of the law, those who felt that every reasonable effort had been made to consult were acting from a very conscientious viewpoint. They too would have to face Congress, and the Appropriations Committees. He felt that the leeway provided for in the law through the existence of "exceptional circumstances" indicated that Congress did not intend to tie the hands of the Executive branch. When every reasonable attempt had been made to achieve consultation, the law had been satisfied. This was not an isolated problem. It related to the overall complex of United States obligations

[7] Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, one of two Senior Advisers on the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation.

in the world. He felt that it would be very difficult to convince other delegations that these were normal times in the sense of the 1948 General Assembly resolution. He referred to the fact that within the Specialized Agencies a one-third contribution by the US had been achieved only because the membership of those agencies had been increased. The USSR had successfully blocked the expansion of the United Nations membership and so the problem was not one of normal times. In view of these considerations, Mr. Sandifer suggested that the Delegation approach the problem on the basis of what was politically feasible in the General Assembly without undermining the basic position of the United States. This, he felt, was what the Congress must have meant. He thought that it would be feasible to seek to achieve the reduction to one-third in one more year after the present. He mentioned the tremendous effort by Mr. Stuart Rice for the United States in the Contributions Committee to obtain the full reduction. As it was, he had only been able to obtain that of 2.02%. Even this was much more than in previous years. Mr. Sandifer was convinced that regardless of the talents of the political officers, this was a case where no amount of "arm twisting" could get the full reduction this year. It did seem possible to achieve the 33⅓% goal in one more year, however. He therefore suggested as a possible compromise position, which he would be willing to recommend to the Department, that the US agree to accept the scale recommended by the Contributions Committee if the General Assembly would adopt a clear-cut mandate to the Contributions Committee to reduce the United States contribution to 33⅓% next year. This was, of course, on the assumption that the Congressional Committees did not state that the Delegation must insist upon the reduction to 33⅓% this year.

On the question of the existence of "exceptional circumstances", Miss Strauss felt that the repercussions of a negative vote from the US would be so dangerous to the UN itself that this matter should be made the basis of an appeal to the people of the United States. She felt sure that if the public were fully presented with the situation, they would indicate to Congress their desire that the United States should pay this year what the Contributions Committee had recommended. The hands of Congress were tied, too, and only through a groundswell of public opinion could the position be changed.

Ambassador Jessup [8] asked if, in view of the time element, the Delegation ought not to authorize Mr. Vorys to make the effort he had suggested. He understood that Mr. Fisher and Ambassador Gross agreed with this approach.

Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that the United States should go "all out" to ascertain the chances of success for a United States move of this sort.

[8] Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, member of the U.S. Delegation.

Mr. Vorys said he thought the matter so vital that the full weekend should be used to ascertain the views of the other delegations.

Mr. Sandifer wondered whether the decision of the Delegation would be to announce that the United States position was to work for the reduction, or simply to seek information as to whether a possible move by the United States would be successful. Mr. Hall felt that a United States effort to change the recommendations of the Contributions Committee would be a matter of such importance that the Department should take it up on the highest governmental level. Mr. Vorys said that the answer to Mr. Sandifer's question would be that the decision was only to explore. He could, of course, refer to the existence of Public Law 188, but not state that the Delegation had decided to vote against the report and seek the reduction to one third.

Mr. Ross [9] said that the Delegation must be sure that the United States was working as a team on this matter. He wanted the political officers to be sure that the approach to be taken was one of "reconnaissance in depth" in a first *démarche*. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the approach would be to clarify the dilemma with which the Delegation was faced. Mr. Ross felt that it would be bad politics in the United Nations to expose our internal difficulties. We should argue on the merits for a one-third reduction, a policy the United States Delegation had followed since the beginning of the United Nations. He added that the political officers could get from Mr. Hall the appropriate points to make in such an argument.

Mr. Cohen was disturbed at the way this matter was being approached. All would agree with Mr. Vorys, he said, in making the "college try" for obtaining a reduction. But at the same time the United States should be careful not to prejudice its other positions by trying to obtain information as to what the situation would be if the United States sought to open up the Report of the Contributions Committee. He only wanted to be sure what kind of action the Delegation was authorizing, and was not certain how far the exploration could go without prejudicing our other interests. As it was a matter of great importance to all countries, we might be opening a Pandora's Box.

Mr. McKeever cautioned that regardless of what the exploration consisted, the Delegation should be extremely careful not to let this develop into a public debate. The damage that could be done to the interests of the United States would far outweigh the differences in amounts of the assessments.

Ambassador Dreier [10] suggested that in view of the present state of mind of the Latin Americans over the ICJ slate, it would be unwise to approach them at all. Mrs. Roosevelt thoroughly agreed with him

[9] John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, and one of two Senior Advisers on the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation.

[10] John C. Dreier, United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States and member of the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation.

on this point. When Mr. Nolting asked whether the United States would also explain that reducing the United States contribution would constitute a raising of the contributions of other countries, Mrs. Roosevelt said that this was understood to be the case, but since this matter had to be handled with the utmost delicacy, it would not be wise to bring that point up.

Mr. Vorys said that he had mentioned confidentially to the members of some delegations the problems facing the United States Delegation. Mr. Hall added that this had been only to our best friends. To India and Pakistan and countries similarly situated we would have to argue on principle. So far, he admitted, there had been no bad reactions. He advocated adoption to Mr. Ross' suggestion.

Ambassador Gross said he was very impressed with the suggestion of Mr. Sandifer, and of course agreed with Ambassador Jessup that he favored giving the matter a try. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed too, saying that Messrs. Mansfield and Vorys would continue as in the past to express themselves as Congressional members of the Delegation. The staff would seek what it could get on the basis of its regular consultations. Mr. Ross could not agree that this was a "try". We would only be "raising the question" with other delegations and getting them to come out of the Committee Five atmosphere into the broader plane of political considerations, and would ask them whether we could not get on with the previous intentions of the General Assembly to limit the maximum contributions to one-third. We would let only just enough be known to provoke their reactions to this idea.

Mr. Sandifer suggested that any liaison be done only after consultation with Messrs. Ross and Hall.

Mrs. Roosevelt remarked that Mr. McKeever was right in stating that this should not be made a matter of public debate, and that it would do great damage to our political efforts. However, she said, this had not been taken into consideration when Congress had enacted the law.

[Here follows a short statement about a matter not on the agenda.]

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United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 30, 1951.

US/A/C.5/167

Subject: Contributions to the UN

Some of the points which might be useful in the exploratory conversations requested in this morning's Delegation meeting are as follows:

1. The United States has consistently held, since the first General Assembly, that the sovereign equality principle which underlies the Charter of the United Nations requires the more equal sharing of the expenses of the Organization than is reflected in the present contributions scale. The Delegation stated at the first General Assembly that in its view a contribution ceiling of one-third would not violate that principle. There is a relationship between the one-third ceiling and the two-thirds voting principle in the Assembly, and also in most corporations and business enterprises one-third is not considered as constituting a majority control of the enterprise.

2. This principle was recognized in 1948 by the General Assembly in the resolution of principle. The implementation of this resolution has been delayed from year to year in spite of the protests of the United States. The people of the United States have been unable to understand this long delay and are becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of the UN to reduce the United States contribution to 33⅓%.

3. This impatience has been greatly increased over the past year during which the United States has spent many hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of lives in defending the interest of the United Nations in Korea. The United States people are even more perplexed when they examine the Report of the Committee of Contributions which continues in effect the preferential treatment of Eastern European countries as a result of war damages of the second World War, a principle which was established in 1946 and which it was assumed would have been put aside by 1951. This is particularly apparent when one considers the statements of Eastern European states at this session of the Assembly and at the last session of ECOSOC which claim complete recovery from war damages and even boast that the pre-war levels of production in the Soviet Union and its satellite states are being far exceeded.

As a result of all these factors the United States Delegation holds strongly the opinion that this General Assembly should consider very seriously the revision of the Report of the Contributions Committee with a view to the immediate application of the ceiling principle, the upward adjustment of contributions of states presently under-assessed and in cognizance of increased national production.

4. The United States recognizes the economic difficulties faced by many countries of the world, but it should be clear that the question of contributions to the UN is a political and not an economic matter and that the question of economic assistance is one which can best be handled through bilateral relationships between nations. The recognition of this principle by the people of the United States is reflected in the very large economic assistance program contained in the Mutual Security Act. In addition the United States has shown its under-

standing of the humanitarian problems and economic needs of underdeveloped countries by its large contribution to the Palestine Refugee Program and the Korean Program and its leadership in making contributions to the Technical Assistance Program.

You should generally avoid the question of the law unless it is brought up to you, but if you are questioned about the Congressional action which limits the ability of the United States Representatives to commit the United States Government to any contribution beyond 33⅓%, it would be desirable to state that this action in itself, while important, is primarily reflective of the attitude of the United States people indicated in the first paragraphs above. The Act does not indicate definitively what the attitude of the Congress would be in handling any requests for appropriations which may come from the United Nations in excess of 33⅓%.

If the person to whom you are talking desires a more definitive opinion, you might suggest that you will be glad to arrange for them to talk with Congressmen Mansfield or Vorys who should be able to speak more defintively since they are Members of Congress.

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper

US/A/C.5/169 [PARIS,] December 1, 1951.

Subject: UN Contributions—1952 Budget

In continuing the next steps in Delegation action concerning the problem of contributions to the regular UN budget, the Representatives and staff will probably wish to make use of the following essential information containing excerpts from paragraphs 18 and 19 of the "Report of the Committee on Contributions" (A/1859):

"18. Taking all the above into account, the Committee recommends changes in the rates of contribution of the countries shown in the following table:

Country	*1951 rate of contribution Per cent*	*Recommended rate of contribution for 1952 Per cent*	*Change*
Afghanistan	0. 06	0. 08	+0. 02
Argentina	1. 85	1. 62	−0. 23
Australia	1. 92	1. 77	−0. 15
Bolivia	0. 08	0. 06	−0. 02
Brazil	1. 85	1. 62	−0. 23
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	0. 24	0. 34	+0. 10
Canada	3. 30	3. 35	+0. 05
Chile	0. 41	0. 35	−0. 06
China	6. 00	5. 75	−0. 25
Cuba	0. 31	0. 33	+0. 02
Czechoslovakia	0. 99	1. 05	+0. 06
Egypt	0. 71	0. 60	−0. 11
Ethiopia	0. 08	0. 10	+0. 02

Country	1951 rate of contribution Per cent	Recommended rate of contribution for 1952 Per cent	Change
France	6.00	5.75	−0.25
India	3.41	3.53	+0.12
Iran	0.45	0.40	−0.05
Iraq	0.17	0.14	−0.03
Israel	0.12	0.17	+0.05
Mexico	0.63	0.65	+0.02
Netherlands	1.35	1.27	−0.08
Pakistan	0.74	0.79	+0.05
Poland	1.05	1.36	+0.31
Sweden	1.85	1.73	−0.12
Syria	0.11	0.09	−0.02
Thailand	0.24	0.21	−0.03
Turkey	0.91	0.75	−0.16
Union of South Africa	1.04	0.90	−0.14
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	0.92	1.30	+0.38
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	6.98	9.85	+2.87
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	11.37	10.56	−0.81
United States of America	38.92	36.90	−2.02
Venezuela	0.30	0.32	+0.02
Yugoslavia	0.36	0.43	+0.07

19. The Committee therefore recommends the following scale of assessments, to be applied for one year only:

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR 1952

Member State	Per cent
Afghanistan	0.08
Argentina	1.62
Australia	1.77
Belgium	1.35
Bolivia	0.06
Brazil	1.62
Burma	0.15
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	0.34
Canada	3.35
Chile	0.35
China	5.75
Colombia	0.37
Costa Rica	0.04
Cuba	0.33
Czechoslovakia	1.05
Denmark	0.79
Dominican Republic	0.05
Ecuador	0.05
Egypt	0.60
El Salvador	0.05
Ethiopia	0.10
France	5.75
Greece	0.18
Guatemala	0.06
Haiti	0.04
Honduras	0.04
Iceland	0.04
India	3.53
Indonesia	0.60
Iran	0.40
Iraq	0.14
Israel	0.17
Lebanon	0.06
Liberia	0.04
Luxembourg	0.05
Mexico	0.65

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR 1952—Continued

Member State	*Per cent*
Netherlands	1.27
New Zealand	0.50
Nicaragua	0.04
Norway	0.50
Pakistan	0.79
Panama	0.05
Paraguay	0.04
Peru	0.20
Philippines	0.29
Poland	1.36
Saudi Arabia	0.08
Sweden	1.73
Syria	0.09
Thailand	0.21
Turkey	0.75
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	1.30
Union of South Africa	0.90
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	9.85
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10.56
United States of America	36.90
Uruguay	0.18
Venezuela	0.32
Yemen	0.04
Yugoslavia	0.43
Total	100.00

IO Files

Memorandum of a Staff Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 1, 1951

SECRET

US/A/C.5/171

[Here follows list of persons (25) present. Congressmen Mansfield and Vorys were present for the representatives of the Delegation. The two Senior Advisers of the Advisory Staff, Messrs. Ross and Sandifer, were present. The sole agenda item was the question of the scale of assessments for national contributions to the United Nations.]

Mr. Ross indicated that the purpose of the meeting would be to examine the soundings made thus far in regard to the contributions matter, and thereafter to consider the memorandum (doc. US/A/C.5/167)[1] prepared by Mr. Hall as a basis for continuing these soundings. In view of the revolt of the Latin Americans over the ICJ and SC slates in the past 24 hours,[2] it had been practicable to approach any of the Latin American delegations on the contributions matter. Mr. Hall reported that the Soviets seemed to be making the rounds to gain support against the increase in their assessment as recommended by the Contributions Committee.

[1] Dated November 30, p. 188.

[2] For documentation regarding these matters, see pp. 78 ff.

Mr. Taylor [3] read Mr. Hall's memorandum. The discussion resulted in deleting the second half of the last sentence in paragraph one, to omit reference to the practices of business enterprises and corporations. There was some discussion as to the appropriateness of relating the matter of voting to that of contribution percentages. Mr. Vorys felt that there was more than a coincidental relationship between the one-third maximum contribution and the two-thirds majority required in the voting.

Mr. Ross suggested that the tone of the second paragraph should be changed to indicate the emphasis on principle which the United States was stressing. If the United Nations expressed itself on principle, the implementation thereof ought to follow without undue delay. This had not been true in the contributions case. Mr. Hall noted the reference to "normal times" in the 1948 General Assembly resolution recommending one-third as the maximum contribution. Many states would argue these were not normal times. He felt the United States should define normal times as a period of stability; such a period existed at the present time.

Mr. Ross suggested broadening the scope of the first sentence in paragraph three to include all international contributions to relief and aid funds, among which that of the United States to Korea, both in lives and money, was by far the greatest. Mr. Lubin also suggested adding an annex containing a few short excerpts from Soviet bloc speeches in ECOSOC on their economic recovery as evidence that preferential treatment of these states in matters of assessment should end.[4] Mr. Vorys added that recitals of adherence to United Nations principles in all United States appropriations for foreign aid, together with a willingness to end these programs whenever the United Nations felt them no longer necessary, were indications of United States good faith on this matter. Mr. Hall agreed with Mr. Nolting's observation that this matter was being cast in terms of the East–West struggle, and that such a development was not strictly desirable. However, he pointed out that in talking with states like India and Pakistan, the argument could be used that their assessments need not be so high if the inequities resulting from preferential treatment to the Soviet bloc for war damages were eliminated as a result of the admitted economic recovery of those states.

Commenting on the second paragraph under number 3, Mr. Ross warned that the United States Delegation had not yet decided to advocate a revision of the Contributions Committee Report and call for immediate application of the 33-⅓ per cent ceiling principle.

[3] Paul B. Taylor, Principal Executive Officer of the Delegation.
[4] This information was incorporated into a Delegation Working Paper, Doc. US/A/C.5/170, December 4, 1951, not printed.

In regard to paragraph 4, Mr. Fisher challenged the naked use of a power-political argument. After some discussion it was agreed to add qualifying words which would clothe the argument in more diplomatic phraseology. The important point contained in the paragraph was that this question should be brought out from the atmosphere of finance-ministries and onto the political plane.

The parliamentary situation applicable to this item was discussed. An element which entered into the formulation of the United States Delegation's decision would be the reactions of other delegations to the soundings taken by the United States over the weekend. For this purpose it would be important that the political officers be thoroughly briefed on the technicalities involved. Since it would be leading from weakness for the Delegation to indicate the indecision of the United States on this matter, Mr. Sandifer suggested a slightly different approach. We would stress the importance the United States attached to the one-third principle, and the disappointment that the United Nations had been so slow in implementing the 1948 Resolution. In view of the increasing domestic pressure to obtain a reduction to the one-third maximum, especially since United States expenditures on a world-wide basis for foreign aid were so high, the United States was beginning to feel it was nearing the point of diminishing returns. For these reasons, the Delegation wondered how far the time schedule for reducing the United States contribution to one-third could be advanced. Mr. Sandifer felt that it would be impossible to evade the fact that behind this pressure stood the United States Congress. What the Delegation would be seeking was an answer to how an approach could be made toward obtaining the necessary reduction. From the point of view of United States participation in the United Nations, what approach would ensure the best arrangement to achieve this end?

It was agreed that the Delegation would be going too far if it asked other delegations to go back to their governments with questions as to their willingness to increase their or other's contributions to offset an American decrease. Mr. Hall estimated that a reduction of the United States contribution to one-third of the total would mean an increase of about 4.77% in the contributions of each of the other members. At the same time he felt on the basis of past experience that it would be unfortunate to indicate what a small amount this would be to each country. A thousand dollar increase for example in the contribution of a small country like Guatemala or Paraguay would be much harder to realize than an increase of several hundred thousand in that of the United Kingdom.

After it had been brought out that a reduction of the United States contribution to one-third of the total would only involve about $2 million, various suggestions were offered on how the United States

amount in the Working Capital Fund could be charged to the United States contribution to the United Nations itself.

It was generally agreed that only a fair sampling of the opinions and reactions of other delegations was necessary. For this purpose it would be better to spend more time with fewer delegations in order to assure that the United States position was understood. Mr. Ross wanted the political officers to understand that the making of this approach, was just like that for any other matter. Above all, they should not be apologetic and give the impression that talking about money was unpleasant business and that wealthy countries should not be talking to poor ones about cutting down their contributions.

320/12–151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 1, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 468. For Hickerson UNA, and Ingram, UNI, from Hall. Re contributions scale. Ref telecon. Package deal for consideration follows:

1. US propose adoption Contributions Committee report with reduction US contribution to 33-⅓ percent and secretariat distribution amount of reduction across all other members on basis assessments recommended by Contributions Committee.
2. Resolve to distribute surplus of $1,230,000 for 1950 to membership rather than transferring it to WCF.
3. Call upon all members to endeavor pay ½ their annual contributions on January 1 and balance by July 1 of each year.
4. US propose that reduction to 33-⅓ percent of advance to WCF of member having highest contribution rate should take place only after members contributing at least ⅓ of cost of budget, i.e., US or a group equalling ⅓ have indicated ability contribute ½ of their contribution early in fiscal years.

Vorys suggests in addition US should offer to prove this question matter of principle of offering $1,500,000, conditional to TA if contribution percentage reduced.

This would involve following Congressional action:

1. Approval 18 months appropriation for next fiscal year for UN.
2. Authorization of additional $1,500,000 from TA program for multilateral programs. This could be done by amendment authorization provision and administrative transfer from bilateral to multilateral channels.

Arithmetical calculations cannot be completed here and may require variations in proposal. Could you, after mathematical analysis

on basis $40,000,000 dollar assessment budget, send comments and any suggestion for modifications.

Early preliminary reactions Staats [1] or Rice [2] for Budget Bureau and TCA on acceptability Vorys proposal would be helpful.

Possible variation above would be to get secretariat to introduce all above points except TA contribution and delegation could then support. [Hall.]

AUSTIN

[1] Elmer B. Staats, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget.
[2] Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget. Rice was U.S. member on the United Nations Committee on Contributions.

320/12–351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 3, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 485. For Hickerson. Hall outlined proposals contained Delga 468 to USGADel this morning emphasizing successful execution would depend not only our ability obtain favorable Executive and Congressional action with respect an 18 month appropriation and transfer TA funds from bilateral to UN program, but also ability to convince other dels US Congress will back up action of USGADel.

USGADel's reaction as follows: [1]

Gross questioned whether such complex scheme preferable to clear cut proposal to accept contributions comite report this year and instruct it to reduce US contribution to 33⅓ percent next year.

Mrs. Roosevelt indicated her understanding financial effect of both substantially same, but proposal outlined Delga 468 would enable USGADel to follow letter PL 188.

Vorys agreed this most important advantage. He and Mansfield expressed conviction this scheme could be sold Congress as only feasible way of achieving 33⅓ percent goal this year. Both recognized and accepted responsibility this imposed on them and pledged themselves to do everything possible secure necessary Congressional action.

Cooper, recalling US failure to deliver on tax exemption, pointed to risk of making promises based on predictions of Congressional attitudes. He stressed importance of making clear to other dels exact nature of plan.

Lubin wondered whether proposal to increase US TA contribution would discourage contributions other countries to $20 million goal.

[1] The lengthy minutes of this meeting are not printed (IO Files: Doc. US/A/M (Chr)/211, December 3, 1951).

Hall replied such additional contribution would be on same matched basis.

Cohen considered it desirable follow course of action for which Executive and legislative support assured. He queried whether it might be more acceptable US provide additional $1,500,000 in form advance to increase US share WCF instead TA fund. Hall felt such unilateral action undesirable from both US and UN standpoint. Vorys concurred.

Ross stated scheme offered concrete and constructive means obtaining political support.

Sandifer, while calling attention necessity for not underestimating hurdles which commitments contained these proposals involved, thought assurances Vorys and Mansfield offered sufficient basis for trying gain acceptance this proposal in GA. He endorsed making recommendation to Dept.

Strauss felt proposed scheme difficult explain but thought it offered best solution.

Jessup agreed with Cohen desirability following course supported by both executive and legislative members of USGADel.

USGADel concluded US position along lines para 1–4, Delga 468 shld be strongly recommended to Dept. Question of strategy for introduction this proposal not considered. Instructions authorizing USGADel proceed on this basis urgently requested.

If this position agreed by Dept, Vorys and Hall believe most desirable submit request for six month appropriation as supplementary estimate for US fiscal 1952. With Vorys, Mansfield and Hall available to push such legislation in January, might be possible pay one-half US contribution for 1952 before GA adjourns.[2]

AUSTIN

[2] The following typewritten notation appears on the source text: "Mr. Hickerson's office (UNA) informed 5 : 40 p. m. 12/3/51."

320/12–351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 3, 1951—midnight.

Delga 489. For Hickerson (UNA) from Hall. Need Dept's views Delga 478 [*468*] recommendation contributions as item scheduled for discussion Thursday Comite 5 and affirmative political and technical work other dels necessary. Preliminary soundings today indicate no enthusiasm but probable reluctant acceptance package deal.

UK given full plan and has informed FO and Treasury London and Wash and possible may join US in waiver WCF reduction. UK

primary concern seems avoidance any legitimate excuse Soviet withdrawal UN and may be prepared sacrifice major portion contributions comite reduction this end. [Hall.]

AUSTIN

320/12–651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 6, 1951—6 p. m.

Delga 531. For Hickerson and Ingram from Hall. No further distribution. Re contributions: In discussion with Roosevelt, Vorys and Mansfield, Rooney and Harvey [1] indicated 36.90% position of Dept satisfactory. Committee proposed floor fight next session repeal compromise Williams Amendment. Considered no further action necessary for US vote for contributions committee report. Rooney opposed proposal for 18 months appropriation and urged straight-forward acceptance contributions committee report. In Vorys' view Rooney opposition ends possibility 18 months proposal. Vorys uncertain whether he can support contributions committee proposal.[2] [Hall.]

AUSTIN

[1] Congressman John J. Rooney, member of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives and George Y. Harvey, Clerk of the Appropriations Committee.

[2] The following typewritten notation appears on the source text: "Advance copy to Mr. Hickerson's office (UNA) 12/6."

IO Files

Minutes of Twenty-eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 7, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/215

[Here follows list of persons (49) present.]

1. *Scale of Assessments of Apportionment of UN Expenses.*

Mr. Vorys began a discussion of the latest developments on the contributions problem. He recalled the proposal that had been made at a previous Delegation meeting as a solution to this problem. He, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Mansfield had discussed that proposal with the Congressmen who had been in Paris during the past week. The great majority had felt that this proposal was not possible from a Congressional point of view, especially that aspect of it which would have required the Congress to appropriate for 18 months in advance. Mr. Vorys had been inclined to agree with their estimate of the general

temper of Congress. He therefore suggested to the Delegation that its position should be to speak to the members of Committee Five and indicate we wanted to proceed with the plan to reduce the US contribution to one-third of the total budget, in line with the previously expressed intention of the GA. For this purpose the US would indicate that it would probably have to oppose the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions. He and Mr. Hall felt that if this position were made known early enough in the general debate on this subject, other delegations might well come up with some compromise proposal on which the US could abstain rather than cast a negative vote. He did not believe that the US should vote for anything which would cause the US contribution to exceed the one-third, or in any other way commit the US in violation of the present law. On the legal point of what would "commit" the US to a particular course of action, he felt that approval of the Charter originally was what had made this commitment. While the US should not initiate discussion on the matter of its domestic legislative requirements, if the point were raised, the US should say that it would abide by what the UN had said it should pay, under the GA resolution of 1948, limiting the US to the one-third.

In other words, Mr. Vorys advocated the tentative position that the US could not support the report of the Contributions Committee and would try to obtain, by an indication of its opposition, certain compromises which would or might allow it to abstain. If no changes or compromises were forthcoming, we might still wish to abstain, but would have to reconsider our position in the light of future developments. The Committee Five Schedule called for a vote on this matter by the following Monday or Tuesday.

Mr. Sandifer asked whether Mr. Vorys' ideas included the possibility that the US could give indications, in the course of corridor discussions, of encouragement to proposals somewhat along the lines of the plan he had suggested at a previous meeting. This plan had been to approve the report if a proviso were obtained from the GA that the US contribution would be reduced to 33⅓ percent next year. He felt that the US would have to give some encouragement along these lines to obtain, more favorable reception to its proposal. Mr. Vorys said that he and Mr. Hall had agreed to take the position of sticking to the one-third, and that otherwise the US would want to oppose the Report of the Contributions Committee. This should be indicated at an early stage so that compromises would be possible. He had preferred the 18 months' appropriation proposal since it would solve the additional problem of the Working Capital Fund. He did not want to have to accept a compromise proposal which would require the US to give a favorable vote commiting it in excess of one-third. He felt the US should avoid having to debate in Congress whether its affirmative vote on any particular proposal "committed" the US to anything.

Mr. Sandifer wondered what kind of line Mr. Vorys would take both before and after he had made the US statement in Committee 5 as to the kind of compromise proposals the US would accept, as modifications of the report of the Contributions Committee. Mr. Vorys said that he would indicate that the US reduction to one-third would require some four per cent of the budget being spread around among the other countries. Mr. Hall said that the UK had indicated that it would be willing to consider raising its own contribution to take over part of a US reduction, in order to avoid a rupture in the Committee. Mr. Hall felt that other delegations would come up with similar offers. Somewhere along the line we would have to give encouragement to such compromise proposals.

Mr. Vorys was torn between what the UN ought to do and what it was possible to obtain. He disliked having the US forced to pick up the largest portion, of all checks by the blithe action of many small countries in voting for certain programs or recommendations which cost them next to nothing. He therefore advised the delegation to await the reactions of others as indicated by their speeches in Committee. This would give the delegation something concrete to show Congress when and if we were forced to explain the US Delegation position on this subject, and why it had not been possible to obtain exactly what Congress wanted.

Mrs. Roosevelt summarized the discussion as follows: the position of the US Delegation would be to seek reduction of the US Contribution to 33⅓%, to obtain the reactions of other delegations to this position, and to consider the possibilities of abstaining if some compromise formula could be worked out.[1]

[Here follows discussion of another agenda item.]

[1] A close reading of this summarization was cabled to the Department of State as a Delegation decision in telegram Delga 565, December 8, 1 p.m., not printed (320/12–851).

320/12–851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 8, 1951—6 p. m.

Delga 571. Re contributions, Delga 565.[1] Auth to modify positions stated SD/A/C.5/170 [2] in line decisions last USGADel meeting requested. Modifications requested follow:

1. US shld state opening session reasons for reduction US contribution to 33⅓ percent, request favorable consideration without tabling specific proposal.

[1] See footnote 1, *supra*.

[2] Dated October 18, 1951, p. 166.

2. If compromise offered by other delegations either as to percentage US contribution or firm application of ceiling next year. USGA Del shld give favorable consideration to vote abstention with statement indicating abstention in no way increases or changes existing charter obligation to make payment.

3. If no compromise forthcoming, USGADel shld determine whether negative vote or abstention shld be recorded. Discussions Roosevelt, Vorys and Mansfield with Rooney Comite indicate package deal unacceptable to Appropriations Comite.

Necessary speak Monday on contributions and authorization urgently requested.

AUSTIN

320/12–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 8, 1951—11 : 27 p. m.

Gadel 396. Re Delga 565,[1] 571. Authorization requested Delga 571 granted. In any exercise para 3 discretion Del will wish consider together with other elements whether reaction to negative vote will endanger 36.90 this year or make subsequent reduction to 33⅓ more difficult as well as possible consequences US intransigence this issue for overall political objectives this and following GA's.

WEBB

[1] Regarding Delga 565, see the first footnote 1, p. 200.

320/12–1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 10, 1951—10 a. m.

Delga 596. Re contributions. For Dept info following proposed USGADel staff tactical position comite 5 Tuesday, based on Monday's developments reported unclassified summary.[1]

[1] Not printed. India and the Soviet Union had each submitted draft resolutions which had the effect of sending the Report of the Committee on Contributions back to the Committee for reconsideration. This was undesirable from the U.S. point of view, because the scale of assessments recommended by the Committee, although it did not put into effect the one-third ceiling for the U.S. contribution, did effect a reduction of 2.02% in the U.S. contribution as against fiscal 1951.

At one of the two meetings of the Fifth Committee on this matter on December 10, the U.S. Representative (Vorys) made a strong statement of some length calling for a reduction of the U.S. contribution to 33⅓%.

For the proceedings of the Fifth Committee on December 10, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Fifth Committee*, pp. 125–136 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Fifth Committee*).

1. Obtain withdrawal or defeat expected Indian proposal as priority number one.
2. Introduce proposal US reduction coupled with automatic over-all budget reduction in amount equivalent burden assumed by other governments.
3. If this proposal defeated, as now seems likely, US indicate support Canadian proposal to apply 33 and ⅓ percent next year and offer abstention contributions comite report if Canadian proposal adopted.
4. If Canadian proposal not adopted, vote against contributions comite report. Political officers will bring above position to attention dels, urge defeat or withdrawal Indian proposal and adoption Canadian proposal to make it possible US abtain on contributions committee report.

Hopeful Indians can be persuaded withdraw proposal which view USGADel staff wld endanger not only working basis UN contributions support but also congressional public support continuing aid India, many other underdeveloped countries.

AUSTIN

IO Files

Minutes of Thirtieth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 11, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/217

[Here follows list of persons (49) present.]

1. *Scale of Contributions to the United Nations*

Mr. Hall began the meeting with a discussion of the situation in Committee Five following the excellent speech given by Mr. Vorys the previous day. He reported that the speech had been very well received. The Soviets had paid their usual compliment at this time to the great productive power of the United States which would enable the United States to contribute heavily to the United Nations budget. They indicated they would not support the report of the Contributions Committee because it recommended a reduction in the United States contribution and an increase in the Soviet contribution. They suggested that the report be referred back to the Contributions Committee. The small states said they appreciated the motives which impelled the United States to seek a reduction to one-third, but unfortunately were not in a position to make up the resulting difference. The Indian representative had apparently been carried away with the sound of his own voice and had spoken at great length about why the United States contribution should not be lowered. In fact, he had said, since the United States obtained such great benefits from having the headquarters on its territory, since the United States had not granted United Nations personnel tax immunity and was receiving

taxes from the United States Nationals in the Secretariat, and since the Soviets had suffered such great damage during the last war a subcommittee should be appointed to reconsider the scale and this could only result in the United States contribution being raised. He had cast his argument in terms of the under-developed countries as opposed to the developed ones. The former, being unable to contribute very much should therefore be accorded the right to take more out of the United Nations.

The Canadians had suggested that this year the recommendations of the Contributions Committee be accepted with the understanding that next year the scale would be so adjusted that the United States contribution would be reduced to 33⅓%. After the meeting, Canada, South Africa and Australia had reiterated this suggestion, and had indicated their view that acceptance of this proposal and defeat of the Indian proposal would require a great deal of effort. For this reason they felt we should abandon our position of obtaining the reduction to one-third this year and support the Canadian suggestion.

Referring to Delga 596, Mr. Hall said that this telegram contained proposals by the staff on how to approach the problem in Committee 5. The matter of first priority was to obtain a withdrawal of or defeat for the Indian idea that the whole matter be reconsidered with a view to increasing the United States contribution. He planned to talk with B. K. Nehru and see if the Indians could be persuaded to withdraw their proposal. He was not confident, however, that even if Nehru saw the wisdom of such a course, Adarkar, the alternate Indian representative in Committee Five, would follow Nehru's instructions. The second point in the proposed approach was to introduce a proposal for reduction of the United States contribution to one-third and couple this with an automatic reduction in the overall budget in an amount equivalent to the burden to be assumed by the other governments. Mr. Hall was dubious as to the chances of success of such a proposal but felt it had to be tried as one of the possible alternatives.

If, as he expected, this proposal were defeated, Mr. Hall and the staff recommended that the United States: (*a*) support the Canadian amendment (which would achieve the reduction to one-third next year); (*b*) if the Canadian amendment were adopted, abstain on the resolution as a whole which included approval of the report of the Contributions Committee; and (*c*) if the Canadian amendment were not adopted, vote against the report of the Contributions Committee.

In this connection, Mr. Hall recommended that all the political officers be sure to bring out these points when speaking with other delegations.

Mr. Vorys felt that the second point of this proposal was an improvement over the report of the Committee on Contributions. In addition, he considered that it might be possible, as he had previously

suggested, to ask Congress to transfer to the United Nations Technical Assistance program from the bilateral aid program an amount equal to the reduction of the United States contribution. The other delegations all seemed to regard Technical Assistance as a "plum", and if this added attraction would make acceptance of our proposal more certain, it should be undertaken. He thought that the feelings of other delegations would not be hurt by such a proposal, and at the same time our bargaining position between abstention and a negative vote would be somewhat improved.

Ambassador Gross asked whether the second point of the proposed approach, i.e., cutting the budget, would not have a crippling effect upon the United Nations. It was bound to reduce United Nations activities somewhat, and if its crippling effect would be too severe, the United States ought not to propose it. He cautioned that a practice of attacking the United Nations budget itself could thus be developed by overassessing the United States in the Contributions Committee and then cutting the budget by bringing the United States contribution down to one-third and reducing the over-all budget amount. Mr. Vorys said that he disliked the method whereby the budget was considered not in terms of amounts of money but rather by percentages. Many small countries, he feared, would always, under such a system, favor high budgets in which their proportional contribution would be very small.

Ambassador Gross suggested that it would not be inconsistent to combine points two and three. This would have the effect of establishing a policy for the future, which it would be in our interest to do, while accomplishing those results only in this year's budget by the over-all cut. Mr. Hall agreed that Ambassador Gross had put his finger on the "bug" in the whole scheme. However, he could not see any other way that other states could be brought around to accepting a United States contribution reduction to one-third.

[Here follows continued and lengthy discussion of the proposal in numbered paragraph 2 of Delga 596, December 10, that the United States propose a cut in the overall United Nations budget in conjunction with the United States request for immediate application of the ceiling principle. At the end of the discussion it was agreed by the Delegation that it was inexpedient from several points of view for the United States to propose such a reduction in United Nations activities.

After this discussion on contributions, the Delegation proceeded to take up another agenda item.]

320/12–1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 11, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 620. Re: UN contributions. After Committee 5 mtg today (reported unclassified summary),[1] agreement reached UK and Canada under which UK resolution approving Contributions Committee report and in effect reaffirming contribution principles now outstanding should be basis for following amendments:

1. US amendment reducing US to ⅓ current year.[2]
2. Canadian amendment declaring intention to reduce US to 33⅓ 1953 financial year.

Order of voting will be US amendment, Canadian amendment and British resolution. US will vote affirmatively on US and Canadian amendments and abstain on UK resolution if amendments not adopted. Two Indian resolutions still pending as is USSR proposal to impose 10 percent rule. US vigorously opposing all three resolutions.

Adarkar[3] (India) continued attacks US today. B. K. Nehru[4] confirms impression Adarkar operation contrary to instructions with respect to avoiding any criticism US. Nehru hinted Delhi wld probably discipline Adarkar.

AUSTIN

[1] Not printed. New draft resolutions had been submitted by Syria and the United Kingdom, accepting the scale of assessments submitted by the Committee on Contributions and calling for a review of that scale the following year; and by Cuba, India, Israel, Mexico, and Pakistan in a joint draft, proposing the appointment of a subcommittee to review (and probably revise) the principles and directive underlying the work of the Committee on Contributions.

The U.S. Representative (Vorys) made another statement to the Fifth Committee on December 11, principally against the Soviet draft resolution and the joint 5-power draft resolution. He reaffirmed the U.S. request that the U.S. contribution be reduced "immediately to 33⅓ per cent." "The United States was seeking not to save money, but solely to defend a principle."

For the proceedings of the Fifth Committee on December 11, see GA (VI), *Fifth Committee*, pp. 137–147.

[2] The United States amendment was submitted for the Fifth Committee meeting on December 12 (UN Doc. A/C.5/L.127).

[3] D. P. Adarkar was a Commercial Counselor in the Indian Diplomatic Service (posted to Bonn), member of the Delegation of India to the General Assembly, and Indian representative on the Fifth Committee.

[4] Probably R. K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Delegation of India.

Editorial Note

Proceeding through a complicated parliamentary situation in one meeting on December 12 (on the assessments question), the Fifth Committee successively rejected the Soviet draft resolution, the Indian draft resolution, the joint draft resolution of Cuba–India–Israel–

Mexico–Pakistan, and the United States and Canadian draft amendments to the draft Syria–United Kingdom resolution. The Committee then, in a series of votes, adopted the latter resolution, which *inter alia* accepted the scale of assessments adopted by the Committee on Contributions together with a recommendation that the Contributions Committee review this scale of contributions in 1952, taking into account views expressed by Members during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

The United States voted against the Soviet draft resolution, the Indian draft resolution, and the joint 5-power draft resolution. For its own draft amendment, the United States was joined by one other Member. The United States was one of nine to vote for the Canadian draft amendment. The United States was one of three Members to vote against the joint Syria–United Kingdom resolution.

The United States Representative (Vorys) made two statements during the December 12 meeting. The first was to speak against the Soviet draft resolution. The second, briefly, was in support of the United States position that the ceiling principle should be established "immediately as the best means of strengthening support for all United Nations activities." Representative Vorys described the question as "a vital political matter."

For the proceedings of the Fifth Committee on the contributions question on December 12, see GA (VI), *Fifth Committee*, pages 149–153.

For an overview of the proceedings of the Fifth Committee on the assessments question, see "Report of the Fifth Committee" (UN Doc. A/2019), in GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for Agenda Item 44, "Scale of Assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions".

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 12, 1951—midnight.

Delga 637. For Hickerson from Hall. Re contributions. Strong reaction in USGADel to defeat Comte Five likely reduce support UN and foreign aid programs. My view major reason defeat was untenable position believed to be required by statute. Serious consideration should be given proposal separate message reintroduce Canadian proposal in order improve position next session of Congress. I believe Canadian proposal can be pushed through if strong representations made in various capitals. [garble] Dept also may wish to view vote with alarm in next contact with press. [Hall.]

AUSTIN

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 12, 1951—midnight.

Delga 638. Re contributions. In light action Comte Five does Dept wish USGADel staff urge Canada reintroduce proposal plenary next week. If proposal to have any chance success it wld in judgment USGADel staff require direct approach foreign mins or heads of govts Commonwealth, Western Europe and Latin America to change abstentions to affirmative votes. USGADel staff opinion is such action valuable assure US reduction 1953 financial year to 33⅓ percent, to improve presentation to Congress and stop present trend so-called underdeveloped states voting irresponsibly on budget and financial proposals UN.

AUSTIN

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:18 p.m.

Gadel 468. Re Delga 638. Serious consideration given by Dept to question advisability reintroduction Canadian proposal in plenary leads Dept to doubt success of effort and to fear possible consequences on US effectiveness major polit issues. US unlike Sovs has never taken Comite Five defeat to plenary. Adoption Canad proposal in plenary wld be judged to require ⅔ vote. This wld mean broadly speaking that 15 abstentions Comite 5 wld have to be corrected to affirmative votes and major portion of 26 Comite 5 negative votes wld need to be converted to affirmatives or abstentions. This wld require most weighty and urgent pressure many embassies. Despite all out effort issue wld still be in doubt. In view this and in light developments Internatl Court and Security Council election issues,[1] and having in mind major polit objectives still to be achieved this GA such as Korea, Ger elections, Sov charges re MSA,[2] etc., Dept wld conclude that reserve of US influence shld not be dissipated. Dept also concerned that failure in plenary after all out effort might seriously undermine US position subsequent GA's and make reduction 33⅓ more difficult. Dept therefore wld recommend no attempt in plenary unless Del feels Dept's appraisal over-all considerations unduly pessimistic.

[1] For documentation on the International Court and Security Council election issues, see pp. 78 ff.

[2] For documentation regarding Soviet charges with respect to the newly-enacted Mutual Security Program, see pp. 477 ff. Documentation on Korea is in volume VII.

Although full objective not achieved by UK, Syrian res, first substantial reduction of 2.02% has been secured. Dept recognizes this in itself difficult achievement in view great proportionate increases required other states and commends Del on success.

ACHESON

320/12–1551 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 15, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 695. For Hickerson, UNA from Hall. Re contributions: Vorys and I have checked sentiment here and are of opinion we should rest on present contributions position and should not ask Canadians to reintroduce resolution. Advantages this course seem to be:

1. Any action by Canada would result other proposals which might worsen our position.
2. As a result of Stone's speech Friday, December 14, and general reaction, some sentiment exists that US has been unfairly treated in Comite 5 and Comite 2 decisions. Expected growth this view which we are fostering should result in Contributions Comite being able to proceed with recommendation on reduction next year US contribution most of way toward 33⅓ percent.
3. Present resolution very unclear and conflicting which permits Contributions Comite to interpret resolution at its discretion. Present composition Contributions Comite favorable to US and we will review candidacies for election next week with this in mind.
4. Outcome on Canadian res at best uncertain and we are doubtful if the necessary pressure to assure outcome would be justified.[1]

[Hall]
ROOSEVELT

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[1] On December 21 the General Assembly in plenary session adopted the draft resolution of the Fifth Committee regarding the assessments scale. The United States abstained from voting. Immediately after the vote the United States Delegate on the Fifth Committee, Representative Vorys, explained the United States abstention in remarks of some length which amounted to a major statement of United States policy regarding United States–United Nations relations: "For the first time in the history of the United Nations my country has abstained from approving the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the Organization." For the proceedings of the General Assembly on December 21 on this matter, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pp. 289 and 290.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS [1]

Editorial Note

The document that follows is the text of a resolution adopted by the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950 regarding the problem of the representation of China in the United Nations. It is printed for reference purposes in view of the fact that mention is made of it frequently in this chapter.

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 186 ff.

399.10 UPU/1–1551

General Assembly Resolution 490 (V), Adopted September 19, 1950, Entitled "Question of the Representation of China in the General Assembly" [1]

The General Assembly,

Taking note of differences of view concerning the representation of China in the United Nations,

Establishes a Special Committee consisting of seven Members nominated by the President and confirmed by the General Assembly to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back, with recommendations, to the present session of the General Assembly, after the Assembly shall have considered item 62 of the provisional agenda (item proposed by Cuba);

Resolves that, pending a decision by the General Assembly on the report of this Special Committee, the representatives of the National Government of China shall be seated in the General Assembly with the same rights as other representatives.

[1] Source text was Annex A to a Department of State position paper, dated January 15, 1951, not printed, which, in turn was attached to the Department's telegram 384, January 15, 1951, 5 p. m., *infra*. The substance of the position paper appears in the telegram.

399.10 UPU/1–1551 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 15, 1951—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

384. Conference UPU mtg Cairo Jan 22 with NGO group, Intl Air Transport Assn, to study airmail postal questions. Although technical title group is "Mixed Comisn for Study Airmail Postal Questions", we understand UPU and IATA will initially meet separately.

Question Chi representation will arise UPU Conference. Fol is position USRep [2] will take. You are requested outline our views FonOff and indicate our hope its del will be instructed support. Report reactions soonest.

At outset Conference USRep will make motion to effect that UPU (*a*) postpone consideration Chi representation question until GA has taken action on matter; and (*b*) pending such consideration, seat reps Chi Natl Govt with same rights other Members. This position based on GA resolutions Sept 19 and Dec 14, 1950. Under Sept 19 res, GA (*a*) apptd Special Comite to study question Chi representation and report with recommendations fifth GA after GA completed action on agenda item re recognition by UN of representation Member State; and (*b*) pending GA decision on report Special Comite, seated reps Chi Natl Govt with same rights other GA reps. Under Dec 14 res on recognition by UN of rep Member State GA recommended (*a*) whenever more than one authority claims to be govt entitled represent Member State UN, question shld be considered by GA (or IC if GA not in session) in light Purposes and Principles Charter and circumstances each case; and (*b*) attitude adopted by GA (or IC) shd be "taken into account" in other UN organs and specialized agencies. Although GA Special Comite on Chi representation has held one mtg, it has taken no decision and matter therefore still pending fifth GA.[3] In view above resolutions and present status Chi representation matter GA, USRep UPU Conference will take above position.

ACHESON

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[1] Sent to the diplomatic missions at Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, Paris, London, The Hague, Stockholm, and Bern.

[2] The United States Representative was John M. Redding, Assistant Postmaster General of the United States.

[3] The Fifth General Assembly was still in session, addressing itself to problems relating to China and Korea: for documentation on these matters, see volume VII.

399.10/1–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, January 16, 1951—5 p. m.

3940. January 16 Embassy Officer informed Parrott [1] UN Department Foreign Office Department's position re Chinese representation at forthcoming meeting UPU Cairo (London circular 384, January 15) and asked for British support US position.

Parrott's preliminary reaction was that probably UK will adhere to present position of voting to seat CPC representative, adding that "he could not see UK reversing its position on that question at this time." When Embassy queried him as to effect GA resolution September 19 and December 14, 1950 on UK position, he said that on first thought those resolutions did not appear to be sufficiently weighty to change UK point of view. He will inform other Departments Foreign Office of US position and give Embassy British Government's considered view soonest.

GIFFORD

[1] C. C. Parrott, Head of the United Nations (Political) Department, British Foreign Office.

399.10 UPU/1–1851

Memorandum by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1951.

Subject: Chinese Communist Representation at UPU Meeting in Cairo.

The Mixed Commission for Study of Air Mail Postal Questions, meeting in Cairo on January 22, will include representatives of the US, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, France, UK, India, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Yugoslavia and the USSR, of whom the last eight countries named recognize the Chinese Communists.

We have circularized (Department's Circular telegram 384, January 15) the above-mentioned countries, with the exception of India, Czechoslovakia, USSR and Yugoslavia, informing them that our Delegate has been instructed to move to postpone consideration of the question of Chinese Communist representation pending UN General Assembly action on the matter, and to seat, in the meantime, representatives of the Chinese National Government with the same rights

as other members. We indicated our hope that the Delegates of these countries would be instructed to support our position.

Embassy London (in telegram 3940, January 16, 1951) reports that Parrott of the UK Foreign Office "could not see the UK reversing its position on that question at this time", and on first thought felt the General Assembly resolutions were not sufficiently weighty to change his Government's point of view. It is possible that this position represents Mr. Parrott's personal opinion and may be reversed after Foreign Office consideration. However, if a more satisfactory response is not forthcoming, UNP plans to send another telegram to London more strongly stating our position. There would seem to be no reasonable basis for the UK to insist upon voting for the seating of the Chinese Communists at this time, in view of the GA action.[1]

[1] Marginal notation by Clubb, beside the last two sentences: "Agree EC".

399.10–UPU/1–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 19, 1951—6 p. m.

4180. Depcirtel 384, January 15. Foreign Office informs us instructions sent to French representative UPU meeting Cairo as follows: French representative to take position that both Chinese National Government and Chinese Communist regime should have one delegate each with observer status present at meeting. Foreign Office explains French position based on geographical position IC and necessity postal communications, thus making it difficult refuse completely presence of Chinese Communists' observer. Foreign Office adds that in effect it supports part (*a*) of US position but is unwilling support part (*b*) to seat representative Chinese National Government with same rights as other members.

Sent Department 4180, repeated info Cairo for Redding 33.

BRUCE

399.10–UPU/1–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 19, 1951—3 p. m.

2338. For Redding. Fol is summary further replies Depcirgram re Chi representation UPU. Cairo promises careful consideration our position; Rio agrees and will instruct delegate support; Mission Buenos Aires reports official reply not likely before Jan 22 but will probably be favorable.

ACHESON

399.10–UPU/1–2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Sweden (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM, January 22, 1951—4 p. m.

864. For USDel. Further study by Swedish Foreign Office (Embtel 866, January 22)[1] has resulted in decision that Swedish delegate will be instructed to take same position with respect to seating of Chinese representatives as was taken at UPU Executive Committee meeting at Montreux last May. At that time, Swedes supported Swiss motion to seat Chinese Communist representatives because they represented authorities controlling territory and communications. Foreign Office commented that decision was based on purely technical considerations and was not political and same is true this time. Commented further that decision last May was taken for that meeting alone even though Soviet delegate objected and wanted to establish principle of Chinese Communist representative at meetings of specialized and technical agencies.

Sent Department 864; repeated info Cairo unnumbered, Copenhagen 33, Oslo 30.

BUTTERWORTH

[1] Not printed.

399.10–UPU/1–2351 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERN, January 23, 1951—1 p. m.

1041. ReDepcirtel 384, January 15. Following third request Foreign Office has just replied stating it has instructed Swiss delegation to UPU now meeting Cairo to "go as far as possible to support US position" but that he can go no further than abstaining from voting.

Foreign Office explained that to be consistent with recognition Peiping Government and with Swiss attitude at Montreux Conference last year when Communists were admitted on temporary basis, Swiss should really consent to seating Chinese Communist delegation. However, in view our request, delegation instructed to remain neutral and abstain if necessary.

Sent Department 1041, repeated info Cairo 1.

VINCENT

399.10–UPU/1–2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, January 23, 1951—3 p. m.

766. Department also inform Postmaster General. Situation re question Chinese representative UPU–IATA conference briefly: vote put over until Thursday morning session to allow Swiss, Dutch and British delegations clarify positions with their governments. Today's meeting US position placed before conference. Russia countered with a proposal to maintain *status quo* established Montreux last May. We in anomalous position because no one seconded our proposition. This lapse unnoticed by Russia and vote on proposition to go forward Thursday unless parliamentary question raised. Line-up at this time for US position: Argentine, Brazil, possibly France, making total of four votes. Possible abstainers: Switzerland, Sweden, Egypt, Holland; doubtful, Yugoslavia. Against US position: UK, Russia, Czechoslovakia. This seems to indicate victory for US position but France is very doubtful and final position of Yugoslavia very doubtful. For information delegate Brazil and Argentine instructed to support us in votes but not to speak on subject. They construe this to prevent them from seconding our position. French delegate refuses to second position and will not finally commit himself. Urge action by State Department in two parts: (1) obtain permission from Argentine and Brazil for delegates to speak and second; (2) press Switzerland, Holland, possibly UK and Yugoslavia on importance supporting US position, possibly on Yugoslavia obtain abstainer if not affirmative support. Request information soonest your decision.

Sent Department 766; repeated information Stockholm 3, Oslo 2, Geneva 3, Paris 36, Rio 1, Buenos Aires 1, The Hague 2, Belgrade 1, London 147.

CAFFERY

399.10–UPU/1–2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 24, 1951—3 p. m.

PRIORITY NIACT

707. For Caffery and Redding. Dept has taken fol action re urtel 766. Mission Rio requested ask FonOff instruct its delegate second and speak in favor US motion. Mission Hague asked endeavor obtain Dutch affirmative vote. In view Bern's tel Jan 23 rptd Cairo Dept doubts second approach Swiss wld be fruitful. Dept also doubts desirability second approach London or approach Belgrade. Suggest Caffery continue endeavor obtain affirmative vote Egypt.

ACHESON

399.10–UPU/1–2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT CAIRO, January 24, 1951—noon.

769. From Redding. France, supporting US position re Chinese Communists but still looks like defeat. France proposes compromise to seat no one and allow Nationalists and Communists participate as observers. Argues this consistent with Security Council action. Request US oppose nominally, asks secret vote. Abstaining governments will support compromise. Argentine now authorized to speak. Please instruct soonest niact. [Redding.]

CAFFERY

399.10–UPU/1–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 24, 1951—3 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

507. Ref Depcirtel 384 Jan 15 and urtel 929 Jan 18.[1] USRep UPU Conference Cairo informs Dept vote on US proposal re Chi representation as well as Sov motion seat Chi Commie will be taken at morning session Jan 25. No Del has been willing second US proposal, although Arg Rep will speak in favor. Braz Rep has indicated USDel he instructed vote for US proposal but not speak on subj and construes this mean he cannot second US motion. Since situation precarious, request you in your discretion ask FonOff urgently instruct Braz Rep second and speak in favor US motion.

ACHESON

[1] Telegram 929 not printed.

399.10–UPU/1–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 24, 1951—3 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

861. Dept has not received reply Depcirtel 384 Jan 15 re Chi representation UPU. USRep Cairo informs Dept that vote on US motion described Depcirtel and on Sov motion seat Chi Commie put over until morning session Jan 25 to permit certain delegates including Dutch Rep consult their govts. USDel indicates it possible Dutch Rep will abstain on US motion. Dept understands Cabinet has resigned.

However, since voting situation re US motion precarious, Dept suggests you urgently approach FonOff and ask them if at all possible instruct Dutch Rep cast affirmative vote.

ACHESON

399.10–UPU/1–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 24, 1951—7 p. m.
NIACT

711. For Redding. Reurtel 769 Jan 24. In event US motion defeated and Fr compromise comes to vote agree you shld vote against but not lobby or speak against. You shld of course strongly oppose Soviet motion. Dept considers use secret ballot question this kind undesirable precedent and in any event seriously doubts beneficial effect its use. Therefore, you shld not make motion use secret ballot; if such motion made by other Del you shld abstain. Dept suggests you urge Brit Rep telephone FonOff and attempt get authorization abstain or support US motion in light of recent highest level talks between two govts on China problems.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Refers presumably to a meeting on the evening of January 23 of British Ambassador Franks "with Secretary and other Dept officers for discussion Korean-UN problem." (Telegram Deptel 3512 to London, January 24, 7 p. m., 795.00/1–2451). For documentation on the Korean War, see volume VII.

399.10–UPU/1–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, January 25, 1951—1 p. m.
NIACT

1088. Depcirtel 384, January 15. Foreign Office states its opinion is questions of political nature cannot be resolved in technical conferences and for this reason it must abstain on vote US motion re Chinese representation UPU. Added that it has followed this same procedure previous technical meetings.

Sent Department 1088; repeated niact Cairo 8.

CHAPIN

399.10/1–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, January 25, 1951—1 p. m.

4104. ReEmbtel 3940, Chinese Communist representation Universal Postal Union.

British decision reached late January 24 and will be formally communicated to Department January 25 by British Embassy Washington in view Rusk's conversation with Franks.[1] FonOff has decided UK cannot support either (1) US resolution or (2) resolution proposed by "middle way" states to effect that UPU should wait for Assembly action and in meantime both Chinese Governments should send observers only. UK delegation being instructed to vote for resolution along lines USSR resolution provided that it is made clear that UPU is not being bound in perpetuity to seat Chinese Communists and that Cairo conference developments are not logical sequence of Montreux conference last year. If it is made certain that Chinese Communists being admitted for Cairo conference only UK will vote for Chinese Communist representation.

FonOff states bases UK decision are: (1) Assembly resolution concerning representation of member state does not in any way oblige other UN organs to hold up decisions which such organs have to take for immediate purposes of their work. (2) Since only Peking Government is actually in position to implement any decisions Cairo conference Peking Government would appear entitled to representation.

Sent Department 4104; repeated Cairo 118.

GIFFORD

[1] No Rusk–Franks conversation has been identified in this context.

399.10–UPU/1–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, January 25, 1951—3 p. m.

779. Embassy approached FonOff as requested Deptel 707 January 24. Egyptian position will be that as hosts they will abstain unless their vote constitutes deciding vote which case will request adjournment to study situation.

British Embassy has just informed Embassy (after telephoning London seeking modified instructions) that they have received positive instructions from London to vote against US resolution against compromise and for Russian resolution.

CAFFERY

399.10–UPU/1–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, January 25, 1951—5 p. m.

776. From Redding. Deptel 711, January 24. Situation complicated last night by position Chinese Communists who arrived and stated president committee they would take seat and would refuse to leave until forced out by physical violence. We view this as insult to committee. This morning we arranged Nationalists be present in meeting room too. Then arranged delay of meeting while try to work out settlement. Meeting to continue this afternoon. On advice Embassy here if Communists continue their present position and flout decision of committee will move to adjourn meeting as having become impotent to enforce its decisions; will be supported in this by Brazil and Argentine possibly others but do not know yet. Yugoslavia wavering in Communist group and may abstain. UK telephoning London for new instructions. [Redding.]

CAFFERY

399.10 UPU/1–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, January 26, 1951—5 p. m.

789. Department pass to Postmaster General. From Redding. At UPU meeting yesterday (Embtel 782, January 25)[1] UK demanded secret ballot on US resolution seconded by USSR. Under UPU procedural rules this necessitated secret ballot despite US objection. Best estimate voting as follows: For: US, Argentine, Brazil. Against: UK, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Sweden. Abstentions: Dutch, Swiss, Egypt. Unmarked ballot: France.

Argentine then moved resolution applying action of UPU congress of Paris in regard to Spain which would have barred both delegations. US seconded to obtain discussion and open vote on question. Vote over Russian resolution was: For: US, Brazil, Argentine. Against: UK, USSR, Czechoslovakia. Other abstained. Argentine resolution then tabled. Under agreed rules tie vote meant defeat.

Voting on USSR resolution followed and after repeated hints from chairman in presence of US motion for open ballot Czechs finally

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[1] Not printed. A full résumé of the January 25 proceedings at Cairo regarding the Chinese representation issue was transmitted by the Embassy in despatch 1785, January 29, not printed (399.10 UPU/1–2951).

moved for secret ballot seconded by USSR. Count and estimated line up were same as in ballot on US resolution.[2] [Redding.]

CAFFERY

[2] In telegram 814, January 31, 1 p. m., the Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) informed the Department of State, regarding the Cairo meetings: "I would like to emphasize the extraordinary attitude of the other non-Communist delegations to our delegation during this meeting. It has reached such a point, according to Mr. Redding, that they act as if they are afraid to be seen talking to our delegation. 'This includes', said Mr. Redding, 'our so-called Allies, namely, such nations as UK, France, Switzerland, Sweden and Netherlands.'" (399.10–UPU/1–3151).

The Embassy in Sweden subsequently cabled to Cairo that "Embassy may wish to explain to Mr. Redding that so far as Sweden is concerned . . . he has been receiving treatment as from a neutral." (Stockholm telegram 917, February 1, 2 p. m., 399.10–UPU/2–151)

Editorial Note

On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution finding the Chinese Communists to be aggressors in Korea (for documentation on this subject, see volume VII, pages 1 ff.). On February 2 the American Universal Postal Union delegation at Cairo queried the Department of State as to whether the Chinese representation question should be reopened when the full meeting of the Universal Postal Union convened on February 5, in light of this action of the General Assembly on February 1. The Department responded as follows on February 2: "Dept believes that it is up to each Govt to take GA res into account, as it sees fit, in determining its position on Chi representation in UN and specialized agencies. You . . . might, as appropriate, state that so far as US concerned we do not think Commies shd participate UN or specialized agencies while they engaged aggression and will cast our votes accordingly. Suggest you make no further efforts re-open representation matter in circumstances." (Telegram 749 to Cairo, February 2, 7 p. m., 399.10–UPU/2–151)

On the basis of procedural motions, in the course of which no United States motion was brought up, the Universal Postal Union decided on February 5 to proceed with its substantive agenda and not to take up the China issue (Telegram 843 from Cairo, February 5, 6 p. m., 399.10 UPU/2–551).

310.2/1–2551: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 25, 1951—8:25 a. m.

Within the next few months, the question of Chinese representation will undoubtedly arise in various UN and Specialized Agency bodies. In preparations for pending meetings, United States Representatives will be instructed to take the position described below. You are requested in your discretion to outline our views to the Foreign Office at an appropriate time indicating our hope that its delegates to the various UN and specialized agency bodies will be instructed along the same lines.

Except for (*a*) the GA itself (where the United States will strongly oppose the seating of the Chinese Communists) and (*b*) certain expert or quasi-expert bodies (where United States Members will take the position that a question of representation is beyond the competence of the body to decide), United States Representatives will be instructed to initiate or support proposals to the following effect: in view of the GA resolution of December 14, 1950 (described below), consideration of and action on any proposals to unseat representatives of the Chinese National Government or seat representatives of the Chinese Communist regime should be postponed until the General Assembly has taken action on the question of Chinese representation. (When the GA has taken further action, this position will be appropriately modified and you will be so informed.)

This position is based on the following considerations:

(1) The General Assembly, on September 19, adopted a Canadian resolution which (*a*) established a Special Committee of seven Members to consider the question of Chinese representation and report with recommendations to the fifth Assembly session after the Assembly considered a Cuban agenda item regarding recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State; and (*b*) provided that, pending a decision by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee, representatives of the Chinese National Government should be seated with the same rights as other representatives.

2. The agenda item on recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State was exhaustively considered and on December 14, 1950 the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that (*a*) whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the UN, it should be considered by the General Assembly (or by the Interim Committee if the GA is not in session) in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each

[1] Sent to 52 posts and the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN) for action; and to the Embassies at Moscow, Praha, Warsaw, and Taipei for information.

case; and (*b*) the attitude adopted by the General Assembly (or the Interim Committee) concerning such questions should be "taken into account" in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies.

3. The controversy as to the representation of China in the United Nations is still before the Fifth session of the General Assembly; (Although the GA's Special Committee on Chinese representation has held one meeting (on December 15), it has taken no decision.)

4. Pending the Assembly's decision, it would be unwise for other UN Organs or bodies of the specialized agencies to take any decision on the question of Chinese representation; and

5. Consideration of and action on any proposal to unseat representatives of the Chinese National Government or seat representatives of the Chinese Communist regime should therefore be postponed until the General Assembly has taken action.

You should stress in addition our view that representatives of the Chinese Communist regime should not be seated in any UN or specialized agency body while that regime is engaged in hostilities in Korea against the United Nations.

In the event that the procedural position outlined above is not adopted and the substance of the Chinese representation question is voted upon, United States Representatives will, of course, be instructed to oppose actively and vote against any proposal to unseat the representatives of the Chinese National Government or seat representatives of the Chinese Communist regime.

[Note to Missions in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, Paris, London, The Hague, Stockholm: Action under this airgram would, of course, take into account discussions already held pursuant to Depcirgram of January 15 re Chinese representation in the UPU.] [2]

ACHESON

[2] Brackets appear in the source text.

350/2–151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 1, 1951—5 p. m.

677. When TC considers SYG's report on credentials, it is possible that USSR may again raise Chi representation issue in form challenge validity credentials Chi Natl reps and request for separate vote on that part of report which deals with Chi credentials. You shd, of course, vote to approve report on credentials Chi Natl reps. You shd state we had thought Chi representation matter had been disposed of for time being since clear intent of TC decision of Jan 30 was to continue seating Chi Nationalists pending further consideration matter

after GA decision.[1] Since USSR has again raised matter US will, of course, vote in favor section report on Chi credentials and assumes other states who voted in favor Jan 30 decision will do likewise.

We assume, in view clear intent Jan 30 decision, that SYG's report will include statement re credentials Chi Natl reps only. Pls check this matter with Secretariat before report submitted TC.

ACHESON

[1] For the proceedings of the Trusteeship Council on January 30, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Eighth Session*, pp. 1–6. The Council adopted a United States motion (10–2) to postpone consideration of a Soviet motion to unseat the Nationalist China delegate. The two negative votes were cast by the delegates of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the latter describing the United States motion as "inappropriate" and the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1950, cited in the motion as "not mandatory". The United States spokesman was Francis B. Sayre, United States Representative to the Trusteeship Council.

340.290/2–2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1951.

Subject: ECAFE [1] Meetings in Pakistan

Participants: Dr. Tan Shao-hwa, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Clubb, CA

Dr. Tan Shao-hwa took up today the question of Chinese representation in the ECAFE meetings sheduled to be held shortly in Pakistan. He pointed out that the Seventh Session of ECAFE is scheduled for February 28 with the following members (divided into two columns according to their probable orientation respecting the question of Chinese representation):

Burma	Australia
India	China
Indonesia	France
Netherlands	New Zealand
Pakistan	Philippines
UK	Thailand
USSR	USA

The associate members, divided in the same way, are as follows:

Ceylon	Cambodia
Malay States	Laos Kingdom
British Borneo	Nepal
Hong Kong	Republic of Korea
	Vietnam

[1] United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

The situation was, however, complicated by the circumstance that the third meeting of the Subcommittee on Iron and Steel is scheduled to meet on February 14 and the third meeting of the Subcommittee on Industry and Trade on February 15, that is, before the Seventh Session might have had the opportunity to determine the question of representation. He pointed out that the Chinese Communists have already appointed Dr. Chi Ch'ao-ting to represent the Peiping regime. It was the hope of the National Government that the United States would do everything possible to support the Nationalist representation. He pointed out the narrowness of the margin enjoyed in terms of support for the Nationalist position, and said that it would be very much appreciated if the United States Government prior to the meeting could instruct its missions in the several concerned countries to approach the Governments to which they were accredited and exercise American influence to the end that the Nationalist representation should be maintained in ECAFE.

I confirmed to Dr. Tan that our position had consistently been in support of the Nationalist position as he knew, said that I would bring the matter promptly to the attention of FE and UNP, and assured him that we would do our best in this connection.

340.290/2–551 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 5, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

457. ECAFE and ECAFE Comite on Industry and Trade meet Lhore, Comite Feb 15 and Comm Feb 28. Chi representation issue will probably arise both bodies and situation precarious in view number states which recognize Chi Commie regime. ECAFE composed as follows: *Members*—Austral, Burma, China, France, India, Neth, NZ, Pak, Phil, Indo, Thailand, USSR, UK, US; *Associate Members*—Cambodia, Ceylon, Hong Kong, ROK, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, Viet Nam. In ECAFE only Members vote; in Industry and Trade Comite, which is Comite of Whole, both Members and Ass Members vote. US Rep will support continued seating reps Chi Natl Govt. Fol are details US position which you are requested in ur discretion outline FonOff, expressing our hope its delegates will be instructed support.

ECAFE Comite on Industry and Trade. If proposal unseat rep Chi Natl Govt and seat Chi Commie is made, USRep will move or

[1] Sent to Canberra, Wellington, Manila, Karachi, Djakarta, Bangkok, Paris, and London for action; and USUN and the Embassies at Taipei, New Delhi, and The Hague for information.

support motion by which Comite wld note that ECAFE will convene Feb 28 and decide forward such proposal ECAFE. This position in our view appropriate since (*a*) ECAFE meets only few days after Comite; (*b*) Comite was estab by ECAFE to perform technical tasks and was never contemplated it deal with political question of character Chi representation; and (*c*) voting composition Comite not same as ECAFE (see above). This wld mean, of course, that rep Chi Natl Govt wld accordingly be seated Comite for this session.

ECAFE. If similar proposal to unseat Chi Natl rep and seat Commie is made, USRep will move or support motion that ECAFE postpone consideration of any action on any proposal unseat rep Chi Natl Govt or seat rep Chi Commie regime until GA has taken action which ECAFE can take into account in making its decision same issue. This position based on fol considerations: (*a*) ECAFE's decision of May 16, 1950 that was wish and desire Comisn that Chi rep issue be decided by higher body; (*b*) fact this issue still before fifth GA; (*c*) GA res Dec 14, 1950 recommending that (1) controversies re representation in UN shld be considered by GA (or IC if GA not in session) in light Purposes and Principles Charter and circumstances each case; and (2) GA attitude shld be "taken into account" in other UN organs and specialized agencies. This wld, of course, mean that rep Chi Natl Govt wld be seated pending further consideration Chi rep issue after GA has taken action this matter.

It is possible that Chi representation issue may also arise in ECAFE Sub-Comite on Iron and Steel which meets Lahore Feb 14 although matter did not arise there last year. All Members ECAFE entitled send governmental experts this Sub-Comite and both Members and Ass Members have right vote. If Chi matter arises in Sub-Comite US will take same position as in Industry and Trade Comite.

You shld stress US view that in any case Chi Commies shld not be seated any UN or specialized agency body while Commie regime engaged in aggression in Korea.

ACHESON

340.290/2–651: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Penfield) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, February 6, 1951—5 p. m.

4300. Embassy Officer discussed with Parrott, Head UN Department Foreign Office, London circular February 5 on Chinese representation at ECAFE meetings. Parrott said in all likelihood UK would be unable to support US position this matter in view British

recognition Peking Government. He recalled that at tripartite meetings last May, US–UK in view of divergent policies on China had "more or less agreed that each would go its own way".[1] He added that branding Chinese Communists as aggressor [2] had not altered fact that they were in control of China, that British policy was based on reality and it followed that it was consistent to support Chinese Communist representation so long as UK recognized Peking.

Parrott was drafting UK position paper on question at time of Embassy Officer's call and impression was gained that British position on Chinese Communist representation will remain firm so long as there is no reversal present British China policy.

Department pass USUN; sent Department 4300, repeated information USUN New York 71.

PENFIELD

[1] For documentation on the Chinese representation aspect of the Ministerial Tripartite Meeting in London in May 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 828 ff.

[2] A reference to the General Assembly's Resolution of February 1, 1951; for documentation on the Korean question at the United Nations, see volume VII.

340.290/2–751 : Telegram

The Chargé in Paris (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 7, 1951—5 p. m.

4665. Depcirtel 457, February 5. Foreign Office informs us French Government position re Chinese representation ECAFE and ECAFE Committee on Industry and Trade expected to be same as that outlined in reftel and on basis of same reasons, but that final decision will not be made for another two or three days. Foreign Office promises inform us when decision reached and Embassy will report immediately.

In connection with general question Chinese representation in various UN and specialized agency bodies, Foreign Office states it is generally in agreement with position outlined in Department's circular airgram January 25, 8:25 a. m., with reservation that in case of technical bodies, such as Universal Postal Union, where question of actual control of territory is pertinent, a Chinese Communist representative should be present as observer. Foreign Office further states that in some cases, which would be similar to Universal Postal Union, French Government would like to look at each case separately and decide its position on merits each case.

Foreign Office points out that there appeared to have been insufficient prior consultation between delegates to UPU meeting at Cairo and that, following rejection US resolution, Soviet proposal seat Chinese

Communist representative was presented and approved before French delegate ever had opportunity to present French resolution calling for each Chinese side to be represented by observer. Foreign Office expresses hope that this general question will be matter frequent discussion between French and US delegates at UN.[1]

BONSAL

[1] In telegram 4767, February 12, 8 p. m., the Paris Embassy cabled the Department of State that "Foreign Office today informs us instructions have been issued French delegation ECAFE and ECAFE Committee on Industry and Trade along same lines as those described Depcirtel 457, February 5." (340.290/2–1251)

340.290/2–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Lahore

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 12, 1951—7 p. m.

PRIORITY NIACT

55. For Gay and Wainhouse.[1] Neth Emb has informed Dept that Dutch Rep ECAFE will take position that any motion on question Chi representation is out of order. Assume this means Dutch will support our position in Comisn, Sub-Comite and Comite. According Dutch Emb UK rep will support any motion which wld keep Chi representation issue on procedural grounds and avoid vote on substance. Dept checking this with Brit Emb and will send further info soonest. Suggest you urgently check with Brit and Dutch reps and report niact if their understanding is not in accord with above. If recognizing states prefer motion to effect that Sub-Comite and Comite not competent, you are authorized support on ground voting composition these bodies is not same as ECAFE, namely that FE non-UN Members, including non-self-governing territories, have right vote.

ACHESON

[1] Respectively, Merrill C. Gay, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), United States Representative to ECAFE, and David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (UNP), Adviser to the U.S. Representative. For information regarding the Seventh Session of the Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East, due to meet at Lahore, Pakistan, February 28–March 7, 1951, and the United States delegation thereto, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 26, 1951, p. 357.

340.290/2–1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1951.

Subject: British Position on Chinese Representation in ECAFE.

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, British Embassy [1]
Mr. Merchant [2]
Miss Bacon

Mr. Graves called to leave the attached message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks giving the British position on the question of Chinese representation in ECAFE.[3] Mr. Graves explained that the message was in response to inquiries made by Mr. Rusk several days ago and by our Embassy in London.

It was agreed that the message clearly implied that the UK Delegation would be instructed to vote against our proposed resolution in ECAFE to postpone consideration of the Chinese representation question until the GA had acted.

Mr. Merchant said that the position taken was disappointingly rigid in view of Chinese Communist aggression in Korea and of the Chinese Communist defiant attitude toward the UN. Referring to the UK vote this morning in the AEC–CCA Committee in support of the American resolution on Chinese representation and to a similar British vote in the Children's Fund, he said that the British Delegation in New York had been able to find a way of working out with our Delegation a solution on a procedural basis which both Delegations could support and he added that it would be helpful if the British Delegation in Lahore could be authorized to take a similar approach. The contrast between the British positions on this question in London and in New York was difficult to understand. Miss Bacon added that the British vote in ECAFE may well be crucial. It was not clear to us why the UK felt unable to go along with a procedure which avoided the substantive issue and was in accord not only with the GA resolution of December 14 but also with ECAFE's desire, expressed at its last meeting, to

[1] H. A. Graves, British Counselor of Embassy.

[2] Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

[3] Message not attached to source text, but see the Bevin message, *infra*. Ernest Bevin was British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. For an informal expression of the views of the British Embassy in Washington regarding the generalities of the Chinese representation question made at this same time, and reaction of Department of State officials thereto, see memorandum of conversation by Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant for United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, February 13, printed in volume VII.

leave the Chinese representation question for decision by a higher body.[4]

After explaining that he was not fully familiar with the subject, Mr. Graves said that in his view the statement of British position in the message was categorical and that no purpose would be served by the Embassy's going back to London about it. He advised that our best course would be to have our Embassy in London make another and urgent approach to the Foreign Office directed specifically to the ECAFE situation to see if some arrangement could not be worked out on a procedural basis which both Governments could support.

[4] This occurred at the Sixth Session of ECAFE, meeting at Bangkok, Thailand, May 16–20, 1950. The specific action took place on May 16, 1950, on the motion of the Thai delegate, and was incorporated into resolution E/CN.11/247. The question of Chinese representation was referred by the Commission "for decision by a higher body of the United Nations", without reference to the competence of ECAFE to settle the matter itself. For the ECAFE proceedings on this matter, see United Nations document E/CN.11/SR.73 (Department of State Lot File 60 D 463, Box 170). The episode is described in United Nations, *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 8, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report for the period 6 April 1949–20 May 1950*, pp. 27 and 28. (Hereafter cited as ECOSOC (XI), or other sessional number as appropriate; ECAFE public documentation will be cited in the same way.)

340.290/2–2051

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 14TH FEBRUARY 1951

Your telegram.

Chinese Representation.

There has been no change in our policy and we propose to vote for the representation of the Peoples Government if the question is raised in Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

2. The United States Embassy here had already approached us on this subject. It seems clear from the American attitude in this case and in that of the Universal Postal Union Meeting in Cairo that there is a considerable gulf between our respective views on the effects upon our policy on Chinese representation arising from:

[1] Delivered to the Department of State by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) on February 14. The Department of State transmitted the text of this message to the London Embassy in airgram A–1449, February 17 (340.290/2–1751).

(*a*) The Assembly Resolution of 14th December (on the Cuban item):[2]

(*b*) The Assembly Resolution of 1st February condemning the Peoples Government for aggression:[3] and

(*c*) The discussion of Chinese representation during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.[4]

3. As regards 2 (*a*) above, we do not consider that there is anything in this resolution (which incidentally we voted *against*) which should cause us to change our policy. It does no more than recommend that the Assembly's attitude in any particular case "should be taken into account in other organs". The Assembly's decision cannot bind other organs, nor do we see why its indecision should delay indefinitely consideration of this question by other competent bodies.

4. We do not regard 2 (*b*) as relevant to the question of representation, which should be based on recognition of facts alone and should not be connected with moral approval or condemnation.

5. As regards 2 (*c*) above my interpretation of the outcome of the discussion on Chinese representation during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington is that we agreed to differ and not that we should go back on our policy on this question. We were agreed moreover in our determination to prevent this difference of view (in the words of the joint communiqué of December 8th) from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives".

6. It is my fear that recent manifestations of the American interpretation of 2 (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) above can only lead to an unnecessary exaggeration of our difference on this point which may, if unchecked, tend to "interfere with our united effort". I should like you to take an early opportunity to explain fully to the State Department my fears on this score, and the reasons for the attitude which we feel bound to maintain on this question.

WASHINGTON.

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[2] Reference is to Resolution 384(V), "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China", printed in U.N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records, *Resolutions adopted during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*, p. 15.

[3] Resolution 498(V), "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea", printed in U.N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records, *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 16 December 1950 to 5 November 1951*, p. 1.

[4] For documentation on the Washington meetings in December 1950 between President Truman and British Prime Minister Attlee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1698 ff.

340.290/2–651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 21, 1951—6 p. m.

3873. Ref Depcirtel 457 Feb 5, urtel 4300 Feb 6, Depcirgram Jan 25 and other recent exchanges on Chi representation.

1. Brit vote on Chi representation will be crucial in ECAFE. Dept has discussed situation with Brit Emb which delivered Feb 14 FonOff msg rejecting our postponement position. (For text msg see Depcirgram 1449 Feb 17.)[1] Emb has suggested we make additional approach FonOff. You are requested deliver Bevin msg in tel immed fol.

2. In connection possible conversation FonOff this matter you might wish use fol points in explaining our position.

(*a*) Objective GA Res Dec 14, as set forth preamble that Res, is that in the interest of proper functioning of UN there shld be uniformity in procedure applicable when controversies as to representation arise in UN. Res then states that because of its composition GA is organ in which consideration can best be given views all Members re questions affecting functioning Org as a whole. Pursuant these considerations GA then recommends that when controversies as to representation arise they shld be considered by the GA and that its attitude shld be taken into acct in other UN organs and in the Specialized Agencies. We agree that this Res does not bind other competent UN organs or Specialized Agency bodies either to await GA action or to abide by its decision. We do believe, however, that in view objective uniformity expressed in Res, it is wise and appropriate for other UN organs and Specialized Agency bodies to postpone action on Chi representation until the GA has declared its attitude. Moreover, this position seems to us to be a sound procedural basis on which to avoid direct discussion of the substance of the Chi representation question and thus prevent unnecessary highlighting of the differences between UK and ourselves on this issue.

(*b*) Each Govt must, of course, decide what bearing the GA condemnation of Chi Commie aggression shld have on its position on Chi representation. In our opinion, it wld be highly undesirable, in view GA finding, for other UN organs or bodies affiliated with UN to seat Commies and we will vote accordingly.

(*c*) As indicated above, our postponement position, grounded on an Assembly recommendation, is designed precisely to avoid exaggeration of our differences on the substance of this issue and we hoped it wld be recd in that spirit.

3. For background info Emb in recent mtgs UNICEF Exec Board and Comite to coordinate work AEC–CCA, UK Del voted with US Del in support postponement Res. In latter Comite UK Del explained support was based on UK view organ not competent deal with representation issue. At ECAFE mtg last year Res expressed desire ECAFE

[1] See footnote 1, *supra*.

question Chi representation be decided higher body approved 8 (US, Neth)–1 (Burma) 3 (UK).

4. USDel Lahore informs Dept Brit Del unwilling consider question procedural basis and pushing vigorously settlement substantive basis.[2] Neth has been instructed abstain even on substance if UK will do same. Unless UK changes position, US Del estimates Commies will be seated.

ACHESON

[2] Lahore telegram 56, February 15, 11 a. m., not printed.

310.393/2–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 21, 1951—6 p. m.

3874. Pls deliver fol msg from Sec to FonMin. "I have been informed of your views in the ques of Chi representation in the UN as explained to the Dept by the Brit Emb here. I had hoped that you might share our position concerning the weight to be given in this connection to the GA Res of Dec 14 on recognition by the UN of representation of a Memb state and to the Res of Feb 1 on Chi Commie aggression in Korea. In my opinion for the Chi Commies to be seated in UN organs while their forces are engaged against UN forces wld tend to vitiate the good effects which it is hoped that the Feb 1 Res may accomplish and to confuse public opinion in this country and thru out the FE.

I am hopeful, however, that whatever differences we may have on the substance of the issues involved we may be able to find means of avoiding a further and needless public evidence of disunity between the US and UK on this ques.

I am bringing this matter to ur attn personally at this time because ECAFE is about to meet at Lahore. The voting situation in this organ on the Chi representation ques is close and the Brit vote will be crucial. We had intended to support or initiate proposals which wld avoid a confiict on the substantive issue by postponing action on any motion on Chi representation until the GA has acted. If, as it appears, such a procedural proposal wld cause difficulty for ur Del, I am confident that the US and UK Dels can work out some other approach which wld be mutually acceptable. It is my understanding that on two occasions recently the US and UK Dels in NY have been able to find solutions to the Chi representation ques in UN bodies there which both Dels were able to support. Last year, the problem was solved in ECAFE when it expressed its wish and desire that the ques of Chi representation be resolved by a higher body. The UK

Del abstained on this Res at the time. Wld it not be possible for the UK Del to abstain on if not support a similar proposal this year?

I do not wish to suggest the precise nature which the solution might take because details can be more easily worked out by the Dels themselves. It is my hope, however, that you may see ur way clear to give latitude to the UK Del in Lahore to work out some procedural solution to the US Del. With good will on both sides I am sure that our two Dels can find means of preventing our differences on this ques from becoming unfortunately, and I believe unnecessarily, exaggerated at this time.

The problem here presented is, of course, not limited to ECAFE but will arise repeatedly in other bodies in the near future. For this reason, I am venturing to ask your help in laying a basis for a *rapprochement* between UK and US Dels on this issue and can assure you that I also will work toward this end."

ACHESON

340.290/2–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Lahore

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 21, 1951—7 p. m.

64. For Gay. Dept is making highest level approach Brit FonOff re Chi representation ECAFE. We are requesting that UKDel be given latitude work out with USDel some procedural arrangement to avoid vote on substance issue which both Dels cld support or on which UK cld at least abstain. Will inform you soonest results this approach.

If UKDel given discretion most feasible arrangement may be for you get UKRep agree abstain on resolution similar to Thai res last year. UK cld explain vote on ground it consistent with UK abstention same res last year.

Forurinfo UKDel NY voted in favor US postponement motion in Jt Comite to coordinate work AEC–CCA and explained vote on ground that irrespective of effect GA res Dec 14 Comite was not competent decide representation question. Prior to Comite meeting Laskey[1] told USUN that his instructions wld permit him support move postpone Chi representation issue but UK was not to identify itself with position that GA res Dec 14 was proper basis for postponement.

ACHESON

[1] Denis S. Laskey, First Secretary, Permanent Delegation of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

340.290/2-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, February 23, 1951—6 p. m.

4591. Reference Deptels 3873 and 3874 on Chinese representation at ECAFE. Your message to Bevin (who at present convalescing in Eastbourne) was delivered to his Foreign Office February 22 and today I called on Younger,[1] Minister State, to discuss matter. Along lines of Department's instructions I emphasized to Younger: (1) Importance of avoiding at this time any action which would indicate to USSR and Chinese Commies US–UK divergence, particularly in Far East matters, and (2) Desirability of giving latitude to US–UK delegates in Lahore to work for procedural formula which might prevent UK and US voting against each other.

Younger made following points, after repeating arguments of British Embassy note to Department:

1. ECAFE situation is different from that of recent AEC–CCA meeting since UK is committed to view ECAFE is in fact competent to decide representation question.
2. UK believes that it must continue to vote for Chinese Commie representation on these UN bodies in order to be consistent both with its policy and realities of situation.
3. British view is that December 14 resolution is not sufficiently weighty to prevent British from voting in favor seating Chinese Commie representative.
4. Latest British information is that vote, even with British voting against US, will probably be 8 to 6 in favor US position, possibly 8 to 5 if Pakistan abstains.
5. Younger had consulted Attlee before seeing me and Prime Minister was firm that principle of Chinese Commies right to representation should not be compromised. Also Younger feels that public opinion in UK particularly in Labor Party, strongly behind government on this basic principle.

After considerable discussion, Younger agreed to consider possibility of having US and UK delegates try to work out some procedural maneuver providing it would not compromise British basic position on: (1) Chinese Commie representation and (2) ECAFE's right to decide the question. He added *caveat* that UK delegate in Lahore was not skilled parliamentarian and that prospect of hitting upon some such maneuver did not appear promising. He did not however, close door completely to idea and Foreign Office will explore to see what sort of procedure might be devised. In sum, Younger gave an impression that if such procedural maneuver could be worked out

[1] Kenneth G. Younger, Minister of State, British Foreign Office.

British might abstain from voting provided that it is clear that on principle British position has not been changed.

In absence specific information as to sort of parliamentary tactics which Department has in mind I do not believe a more satisfactory answer could be obtained at this time. British position has to certain extent become firm on question Chinese Commie representation and without changes in British thinking there is slight chance of their altering their position as this problem recurs in various UN bodies.

GIFFORD

340.290/2–2351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 25, 1951—8 p. m.

3921. Urtel 4591 Feb 23. As stated Deptel 3874 Feb 21 ECAFE last year approved res stating that ECAFE without raising matter its competence decide question Chinese representation expressed its wish and desire that question Chinese representation be resolved by higher body. UK delegate abstained this Res last year. Dept understands Thai delegate considering offering similar proposal this year. You shld ask Fon Office whether UK will abstain such proposal and if it will so instruct UK delegate Lahore urgently. You shld point out that such proposal meets UK criteria reftel as it would not compromise UK position Chi Commies representation nor ECAFE's right decide question competence. Emphasize for UK oppose would be inconsistent previous UK position. Urgent instructions UK delegate necessary if UK is to abstain such proposal in light attitude activities UK delegate as described Lahore's tel ECAFE 5[1] rpt to London. Report niact.

WEBB

[1] Lahore telegram 64, February 22, not printed.

310.2/2–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT LONDON, February 26, 1951—6 p. m.

4623. Deptel 3921 discussed this morning with Parrott, head UN Department Foreign Office, who promised to raise question with his superiors but doubted whether UK would acquiesce since British look at questions as follows:

1. UK abstention last year was in line with then British policy of abstaining on Chinese representation question as protest against

Soviet walkout and similar action this year would not be justified in British view.

2. As technical point, if ECAFE, without raising question of its competence to decide issue, expressed desire that higher body should resolve question, is ECAFE not in effect questioning its own competence? On ECAFE's competence UK is firm.

3. Main British concern is whether, if UK should go along with US in this instance, US would regard this as precedent and urge UK to take similar action in case of various other UN bodies. British do not wish to put themselves in position whereby yielding procedural manoeuvre on ECAFE would result in continued "whittling away" at their basic position on Chinese representation which they believe must be maintained in cases where UN body is competent to decide on this question. In view of continued US insistence UK does not see how it could give way without being repeatedly asked to yield in similar cases.

4. While recognizing special US interest in ECAFE as result of FE situation, UK believes it has stake in keeping its own position clear to FE countries and that any wavering on UK's part would be interpreted by FE countries as alteration of UK's basic position.

Embassy interprets Depcircgram of January 25 to mean that US will in fact continue to press Chinese representation issue at various UN bodies, although those "certain expert or quasi-expert bodies" which are excepted (paragraph 2 reference Circgram) are not defined. However, in case of other UN bodies where situation less crucial than at ECAFE, will US in fact take equally serious view of UK action on Chinese representation question? In conversation with Younger and Parrott we have emphasized special position of ECAFE and attempted to avoid question of future US action in respect to *other UN* bodies, but British look at problem as a whole of which ECAFE is only a part.

GIFFORD

340.290/2–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 26, 1951—6 p. m.

4624. Re Embtel 4623. In later conversation with Dixon [1] Embassy officer pressed point 2 in Embtel under reference, questioning whether British position on ECAFE's competence as distinguished from its position on Chinese Communist representation had changed since last year. Dixon promised to review matter again but without holding out much hope of meeting US view. In conversation with British, British have indicated that they can not understand great

[1] Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

importance which we attach this question as they regard it as technical issue on which we could agree to disagree without serious repercussions.

GIFFORD

340.290/2–2751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Lahore

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, February 27, 1951—2 p. m.

73. For Gay. Re Chi representation, London reports indicate little prospect any procedural formula can be worked out for which UK cld cast affirmative vote or even abstention. Re nature Chi representation proposal ECAFE, Dept leaves ur discretion in light current negotiating situation whether propose postponement motion or support reaffirmation last year's decision.

WEBB

340.290/2–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1951.

Subject: UK Position on Chinese Representation in ECAFE and Other Bodies

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Dennis Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy
Miss Bacon—FE
Ward P. Allen—EUR

The UK representatives called this morning at their request to deliver the attached message from Mr. Bevin[1] in response to the message sent from Mr. Acheson to Mr. Bevin on this subject contained in Deptel 3874, Feb. 21.

We agreed that the basic point of difference between ourselves and the British on this general question arises in large part from their firm conviction that moral considerations are completely irrelevant in determining whether the Peiping regime should be accorded either diplomatic recognition or China's seat in the UN. In our view, on the other hand, regardless of the considerations which might normally determine recognition, Peiping's aggression in Korea and UN con-

[1] Not attached; see Bevin message, *infra*.

demnation of it requires that such measures as non-recognition and denial of China's seat in the UN be considered at present more in the nature of diplomatic sanctions, which the Charter clearly envisages, and in that light moral considerations necessarily play a more important role. We expressed regret that it had not proved possible to work out with the UK some procedural device in ECAFE whereby public manifestation of our divergent views could be minimized.

However, we concluded that for the moment it appeared we could do no more than agree amicably to disagree.

310.393/2–2851

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

COPY OF MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS [2]

In my absence Mr. Younger saw the United States Ambassador on 23rd February and explained to him why we felt that it is unlikely that any procedural method can be found to bridge the gap which exists between the United States and the United Kingdom attitudes on the question of Chinese representation.

It should be said at the outset that the latest information which we have received from our representative at Lahore leads us to believe that there will in all probability be a majority in the E.C.A.F.E. in favour of ruling out of order or of postponing a decision on any Soviet resolution directed towards securing the presentation of the Central People's Government. The United Kingdom vote is therefore considered unlikely to be crucial on this occasion.

For a proper appreciation of the reasons which have led us to the conclusion that no procedural method can be found of bridging our differences in the Commission it is essential to know and understand the principles upon which our whole policy towards the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations is based, and it is therefore proposed to restate them briefly here. As Mr. Acheson said in his message, this problem is not limited to the E.C.A.F.E. but will arise repeatedly in other bodies in the near future.

Our attitude on this question is as follows. Although it has political implications the question of Chinese representation remains in our

[1] Delivered to the Department of State by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Tomlinson) on February 28. Repeated to the London Embassy in airgram A–1544, March 2 (310.393/3–251).

[2] A marginal notation on the source text reads: "See subsequent corrected draft of this message." This refers to an "Amended Copy" of the Bevin message, which the British Embassy dated March 5 (340.290/3–551). The amended text was identical with the original except for two stylistic changes which are indicated in footnotes 3 and 4 below.

view in essence and in form a question of credentials. Certain organs of the United Nations appear from their constitutions and rules of procedure to be competent to decide for themselves on questions of this sort. These include the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, the Specialized Agencies, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and the E.C.A.F.E. Other, subsidiary bodies (committees etc.) do not appear to have this power and should therefore properly await the decision of the appropriate parent body. The Committee on Disarmament is an example of a subsidiary body of this sort and it was for this reason that the United Kingdom representative voted on the same side as the United States representative when the Soviet delegate attempted to raise the question of Chinese representation in this body on 14th February.

It will be clear from the above that we do not consider that there is any legal justification for the view that the decision of the General Assembly in this matter can bind the other competent organs. We made this clear in the course of the debate on the recognition of the representation of a member state and we voted against the Assembly resolution of 14th December because we could not agree with the assumptions upon which it appeared to be based. Even so it will be recalled that resolution does no more than recommend "that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be *taken into account* in other organs of the United Nations and in the Specialised Agencies". The weight which any competent organ decides to give to the attitude of the Assembly appears to us to be entirely for that organ to decide in the normal way by a majority vote and the United Kingdom vote is cast in accordance with the view that a competent organ should take its own decision regardless of whether or not the Assembly has taken up an unequivocal attitude for itself. It was for this reason that we would now find it necessary to oppose any move to postpone the decision in E.C.A.F.E. on the lines, for example, of the Thai amendment adopted last year and were therefore unable to fall in with the United States suggestion that we might abstain on such a motion.

Your [3] message referred also to the Assembly resolution of 1st February which, *inter alia*, condemned the aggressive activities of the Central People's Government in Korea. In adopting that resolution the General Assembly has expressed very properly a moral condemnation upon the action of that government. But that does not in our view alter the fact that that government is in substantial control of China. As you [4] are aware we consider the recognition of a govern-

[3] In the amended March 5 text, the word "Your" was replaced by "Mr. Acheson's".

[4] In the March 5 communication the words "As the United States Government" were substituted for the words "as you".

ment involves no more than the recognition of a state of fact and it was for this reason that we accorded recognition to the Central People's Government of China when it became clear to us that they were in fact the controlling Government of China. In our view similar considerations should govern the question of representation of member states in the United Nations. The present case is not one of admitting to the United Nations a new member (in which event the qualifications laid down in Article 4 (1) of the Charter would have to be fulfilled). The State of China has always been a member of the United Nations and is moreover specifically mentioned in the Charter as a permanent member of the Security Council. That being so it seems to us that the only relevant consideration in this context is which government is in fact in a position to represent the State of China and to carry out so far as China is concerned the decisions arrived at in the United Nations. Moral considerations seem to us to be irrelevant in this context. After all we regard with abhorrence many of the activities of the Soviet Government, but we do not for that reason attempt to exclude its representatives from the United Nations.

On a purely political plane we feel that there is everything to be gained by our not allowing this question of Chinese representation to be magnified beyond reasonable proportions. If a satisfactory peaceful solution is to be found in Korea it must surely involve an attempt to reach also satisfactory solutions with regard to other outstanding problems foremost among which will be the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. The more firmly the United Nations commits itself to the line that the representation of the People's Government is a matter in which great moral issues are involved, the greater is the likelihood that the eventual solution of the problem in a sense satisfactory to the People's Government will appear in the eyes of the world to be a concession on the part of the United Nations. Our own attitude would be that no concession is involved since each member state is entitled as of right to be represented in the United Nations by the government which is in a position to speak for it.

It is hoped that the foregoing will make plain the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this matter. This attitude has been publicly announced on several occasions and it receives by and large the support of public opinion in this country, both in Parliament and outside. It is therefore hoped that it will be appreciated why we are led to the conclusion that it would be impossible radically to alter this attitude without compromising principles which we have frequently affirmed. This question was discussed during Mr. Attlee's visit to Washington last year and our two governments agreed to differ. We were also equally determined to prevent these differences of view from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

547-842—79——17

It is widely known that a difference of view exists between our two governments on the question of Chinese representation and that this reflects similar differences of opinion honestly held by several member states of the United Nations. The United Nations is itself based on democratic principles and on the respect for majority decisions. We do not complain that a majority has, in most organs of the United Nations, not yet seen fit to endorse our own view on this subject. Similarly the United States representative has, it is understood, announced that his government will abide by any majority decision which may eventually be taken in the Security Council on this question and will not wish to exercise the right of veto. If a similarly dispassionate treatment of this question could be evolved in every organ in which the question is raised it is our belief that the question would cease to provide opportunities for those who would rejoice to see a serious divergence between United States and United Kingdom policies. Treated in this way the question could be raised and disposed of on its merits without engendering excessive political or emotional heat. While the Central People's Government persist in their present deplorable behaviour it is likely that those member states to whom behaviour is a criterion of recognition will maintain their opposition to the change in Chinese representation, and it is therefore unlikely that our view, based on the criterion of effective control, will be shared, in most organs, by the majority of members. We should be prepared to accept this situation while it lasts, provided that we are not ourselves expected to contribute to its prolongation by any action involving a sacrifice of principle. We will certainly abide by the majority view in each competent organ.

It is therefore suggested that our respective delegations might with advantage be instructed to approach the problem in this spirit in an effort to minimize the harm which might otherwise result from this difference of view which we both frankly acknowledge and which we are both determined to render as innocuous as possible.

WASHINGTON, 28th February 1951.

310.2/2–2651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 1, 1951—5 p. m.

3979. Ref questions raised urtel 4623.

1. Re ur reference US position on competence expert and quasi-expert UN bodies decide Chi rep issue indicated Depcirgram Jan 25 as opposed our postponement position in other bodies, foll is explana-

tion. Expert bodies are such bodies as ILC, Advisory Comite on Admin and Budgetary Questions, Comite Contributions, etc. which are composed individuals elected by name by major UN organ (in above instances by GA) to serve in expert capacity. Here US will take position that any motion to unseat Member is out of order on ground these bodies are not competent take any decision re their own composition which is determined by GA. Term quasi-expert bodies refers functional Comms ECOSOC (except Narcotics Comm which is composed strictly govt reps). In accordance resolutions estab these Comms, although states are initially elected to Comms by ECOSOC, individuals, nominated by Govts after consultation UNSYG, are confirmed by name by ECOSOC; consequently, we believe any question re right such Members participate in Comms shd be raised in and decided by Council. Hence US will take position that any motion unseat Member is out of order on ground these Comms are not competent decide representation question in view method appt their members.

2. We were, of course, particularly concerned re ECAFE because voting situation extremely close. Naturally, we might again wish urge special consideration by UK of Chi representation problem in other bodies where situation critical, although forurinfo we wld not press our view when voting not close.

WEBB

340.290/3–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1951.

Subject: UK Position on Chinese Representation in ECAFE

Participants: Mr. C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
Ward P. Allen—EUR

To supplement the memorandum from Mr. Bevin on this subject which the UK Embassy presented to the Department on February 28th, Mr. Meade, on instructions, handed me the attached additional explanation of the reasons underlying the UK change of position in ECAFE between last year and this. He remarked that as received the message had included an additional paragraph (which he had discreetly omitted) gently chiding the US for having previously declared that it was appropriate and in order for ECAFE to consider the matter and then having voted against the Chairman's ruling to that effect.

[Annex]

Document Left at the Department of State by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Meade), on March 6, 1951

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

When the question of Chinese representation was raised in ECAFE last May it was our general policy in all competent bodies to abstain unless it was clear that there would be a majority in the body concerned in favour of the change-over in representation. This policy was based on our view that it was at that stage premature to raise the question in bodies where the change-over had no chance of securing a majority. We were moreover anxious not to associate ourselves, by voting in a minority with the Soviet representatives, with the high-handed Soviet policy of walking out of each body whenever a majority failed to accept their views. However, by the time the Fifth Session of the General Assembly opened in September it had become clear that our policy of abstention could not be indefinitely adhered to. The Soviet "walk-out" policy had begun to reverse itself and the fact that the People's Government remained firmly in control of China could no longer be ignored. It was therefore decided henceforth to vote openly in competent bodies for the change-over.

At ECAFE last May it was clear that a majority for the change-over would not be forthcoming and we had therefore resolved to abstain if the substantive question was raised. We therefore had no objection to abstaining on the Thai amendment directed to postponing a decision. Indeed, any other action would have been illogical since we were at that time prepared to justify our abstention on the substantive issue on the grounds that it had been raised prematurely.

Our position this year was different. We no longer take the line that consideration of the question of Chinese representation is premature; indeed we consider that the anomalous situation which has now been reached can only be regularised by a decision in favour of the change-over in each competent organ. In the debate on the Cuban Item at the last session of the Assembly we made it clear we did not consider it necessary or even desirable for competent bodies to delay taking this decision while awaiting the decision in the General Assembly. We therefore found it necessary, after the fullest consideration, to adhere to our decision to oppose any proposal on the lines of the Thai amendment the object of which was to postpone a decision being taken in ECAFE.

[WASHINGTON,] 5th March, 1951.

399.10–UPU/3–1351

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1951.

Subject: Chinese Representation in the Universal Postal Union

Participants: Mr. Redding, Assistant Postmaster General
Mr. Clubb, CA

Mr. Redding telephoned to say, in respect to the Universal Postal Union Conference in Cairo, that referendum forms were being provided for the definitive vote on the permanent seating of Chinese representatives in the UPU and that the schedule required a return of the referenda by the member Governments with their vote for the National Government, for the Peking regime, or with an abstention. The referenda should be returned to Bern, Switzerland by April 20, current.[1]

Mr. Redding pointed out the significance of the present situation with two meetings (of the UPU?) scheduled for May in Switzerland and said that we should, of course, give consideration as to what steps we would take vis-à-vis other member Governments in the present circumstances.

I said that this was a matter which would, of course, require discussion with UNP, that if he would address the U.S. referendum to me (he suggested that it would be coming over to the Department of State tomorrow), I would promptly communicate with Miss Bacon of FE and with UNP and see what was to be done.

[1] For background information on this phase of the Chinese representation question in the UPU, see Department of State circular airgram of April 3, 8:45 a. m., p. 244.

399.10–UPU/3–1651

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. David H. Popper of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: UPU Referendum on Chinese Representation

Participants: Mr. Redding, Post Office Department
Mr. Popper, UNP

I telephoned Mr. Redding with respect to this matter. Mr. Redding said that the Post Office Department would mark the US ballot in favor of representation for Nationalist China and return it to Bern. He said that he had informed Mr. Clubb about the referendum so that the Department could decide whether there should be any elec-

tioneering on the matter. Bearing in mind the conclusion reached in FE, CA and UNP that we could gain no further advantage through continued pressure on this subject in each minor case where the Chinese representation issue arises, I told Mr. Redding that we did not believe that there should be any electioneering. I explained that positions of states had not changed for some time on the Chinese representation question; we had sent a number of circulars to our posts on this problem and our position was well understood; and, we feared that further representations might be resented. I also noted with respect to the outcome of the referendum that a survey of the UPU membership indicated that there would be a substantial margin of votes in favor of Nationalist China.

D[AVID] H. P[OPPER]

399.10–UPU/4–1351: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 3, 1951—8:45 a. m.

The Executive and Liaison Committee of the Universal Postal Union, composed of 19 members, is the standing organ of the UPU. The UPU Congress at which all Members of the Union are represented meets at intervals not greater than five years.

At its meeting on May 15, 1950 the Executive and Liaison Committee seated a Chinese Communist for the 1950 session and decided to consult the postal administrations of all UPU Members by referendum on the Chinese representation question after the UNGA had acted on this issue or in any event prior to the next meeting of the Committee. Although the UNGA has not yet taken definite action on Chinese representation, the UPU Committee is scheduled to convene in Switzerland on May 21. Therefore, the Director General of the UPU, pursuant to the 1950 decision, is polling the postal administrations of all UPU Members, requesting that they mark an enclosed ballot in favor of representation for National China or for Communist China and return it to Bern by April 20, or indicate their vote by telegram by the same date. The Director General stated further that any postal administration which failed to vote by April 20 would be recorded as having abstained.

The UPU Executive and Liaison Committee is the only body affiliated with the UN which seated a Chinese Communist as the representative of China. The Department hopes that the referendum of the entire UPU membership will result in a large majority in favor of the Chinese Nationalists and that this will bring about the seating

[1] Sent to 20 Embassies in the American Republics.

of the Nationalists at the May 21 meeting of the Executive and Liaison Committee. Since less than one-third of the UPU Member States recognize the Chinese Communist regime, it would appear that the result we desire will be attained. However, we are concerned that the postal administrations of some states which have not recognized the Communist regime may fail to confer with their Foreign Offices on the UPU referendum and may not return their ballots by April 20, thus being counted as having abstained on the Chinese representation issue. You are therefore requested in your discretion to raise the above matter informally with the Foreign Office on an appropriate occasion in the very near future, indicating our hope that its postal administration will support the seating of representatives of the Chinese National Government and so inform the UPU Director General at Bern by April 20.[2]

ACHESON

[2] In a series of *démarches*, May 7–May 10, the Department of State, either through the appropriate Embassy or the United States Mission to the United Nations, New York, specifically requested support on this matter from the Governments of Portugal, Switzerland, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey; pertinent documentation is located in file 399.10 UPU. The UPU committee adopted (10–6–3) a U.S. proposal to seat the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

795B.5/4–3051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1951—7 p. m.

4969. Pls deliver fol personal message to Morrison [2] from Secy soonest:

"I am writing you about some of our common problems, especially those relating to the Far East. We each ought to understand the other's position—what we think; why we think it. We start from the common ground of desiring peace and security in the Pacific and the earliest conclusion of the Korean conflict. We agree that the United Nations must fight the attack in Korea. We are doing everything possible to limit the fighting in Korea."

[Here follows discussion on Korea; see volume VII.]

"In the political field our Governments have differed in the past regarding the wisdom and advisability of admitting the Chinese Com-

[1] According to drafting information indicated at the usual position at the bottom of the first page of the source text, Acheson drafted this telegram and cleared it with the following: the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins), the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant).

[2] Herbert Morrison was the new British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. For a message from Morrison to Acheson on the Korean situation transmitted by the British Embassy on April 17, see volume VII. The Chinese representation question was not mentioned in this initial Morrison message.

munists [3] to the United Nations. Whatever may have been the merits of this debate, can we not now agree to a moratorium upon it? At a time when the Chinese Communists are defying the United Nations, fighting its forces on a major scale, and denying the validity of every provision of the Charter, the discussion of their possible admission to the United Nations seems to me to have the most divisive possible effect between us and to give them the greatest encouragement in continuing their present course.

It is difficult everywhere in this country, and in all the countries which are supplying forces in Korea, to keep our peoples constantly alive to the rightness and necessity of the sacrifices which have to be made for a struggle limited in its nature and not susceptible of the conceptions of victory to which people have become accustomed. To add to these difficulties discussion of admitting the enemy to the organization which they are fighting seems to me so utterly confusing to the average man as to imperil the whole United Nations operation in Korea."

[Here follows further discussion about Korea.]

ACHESON

[3] According to a notation by Merchant at the end of the source text, two changes were effected with Acheson's approval in the original text. One revision was made at this point, the original text reading "Chinese Communist Government" being changed to read "Chinese Communists".

795B.5/5–1151

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM MR. MORRISON TO MR. ACHESON DATED 10TH MAY, 1951

I have given careful thought to the frank and friendly message you conveyed to me through Mr. Gifford.[1] We start, as you say, from the common ground of desiring peace and security in the Pacific, the earliest conclusion of the Korean conflict, and the limitation of the fighting to that country. I share also your determination that the attack in Korea must be repelled. We too have heavy responsibilities in the Pacific and South East Asia area.

[Here follows discussion on Korea; see volume VII.]

You mentioned Chinese representation at the United Nations. Our views have been put on record. As said to Mr. Gifford, they flowed naturally from our conception of the doctrine of recognition. To allow the effective Government of China to occupy the Chinese seat at the United Nations is in no way a measure of weakness, but is inherent in the constitution of the United Nations. I know that many people wonder why we should support a proposal which if accepted

[1] *Supra.*

would seat a Government at the council tables of the United Nations when that Government is engaged in military operations against United Nations forces which are resisting aggression. I am interested in your suggestion of a 'moratorium' but am not clear what you have in mind. Perhaps you could develop your thought on this a little further. Meanwhile, it seems to me that what matters is that we should both do what we can (the initiative in raising the issue does not of course lie with either of us, but with Russia) to prevent our known differences of view on this point from developing into a source of misunderstanding between us. The legal arguments for seating them there are in our view conclusive, though I should certainly not wish to display any enthusiasm in championing the claims of the Central People's Government of China at the United Nations so long as they are set on their present course. On the other hand, I could not act in such a way as might imply support for the fiction that Chiang Kai-shek's representative in the United Nations speaks for China.

[Here follows further discussion about Korea.]

Mr. Gifford said to me that he thought our differences on Far Eastern policy had been narrowing in recent months. I think that this is true, and I am glad. He went on to say however that he thought we might now be at a cross roads and our paths might begin to diverge again. I hope this is not so; at any rate, if the risk exists, the best way to guard against it is for us to exchange occasional messages. That is why I especially valued the candour and friendliness of your message, and I have tried to reply in the same spirit.

WASHINGTON, 11th May, 1951.

790.00/5–2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 25, 1951—7 p. m.

5480. Pls deliver immed fol personal msg from SecState to Morrison:

"I wish to say again that I very much appreciate your friendly and constructive reply of May 10 [1] to my earlier message of May 1 [2] on some of our problems in the Far East. I gave my first impressions of your reply to Sir Oliver Franks and have since been giving the entire matter further study.

Although I do not wish now to go into all of the subjects which need further attention, I think it might be necessary for us to have an additional exchange of views on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. This matter is particularly acute at this time because Mr. Malik becomes President of the Security Council on June 1 and may take occasion to raise the issue again. We believe it of great

[1] *Supra.*
[2] See telegram 4969, April 30, p. 245.

importance that we try to find some working understanding with you on this question as soon as possible. We understand that the United Kingdom Delegation would, under its present instructions, have to support the seating of the Chinese Communists if the issue is raised in the Security Council.

In your recent message to me you indicated that your view on Chinese representation flowed naturally from your conception of the doctrine of recognition and you indicated a desire to have something more as to what we have in mind for achieving a 'moratorium'.

Our hope is that you could agree that so long as the aggression continues in Korea, the Chinese representation issue should not be substantively considered by United Nations bodies and that where it appears that the Soviets or others might raise the issue, our two Delegations should consult in advance to concert on procedures which both Delegations could support for avoiding a vote on the substance.

Specifically, this might take the form of a motion to the effect that the body concerned decides not to consider such a proposal so long as the aggression in Korea continues. Alternatively, the motion might be that consideration of and action on the matter be postponed so long as hostilities continue. Such an attitude would parallel the position of Norway as stated by Foreign Minister Lange and reported in the press on April 19 that Norway opposes United Nations representation for Communist China while aggression in Korea continues.

Examples of the way in which our two Delegations could handle this matter occurred in recent meetings of the Peace Observation Commission, the Committee of Twelve on Armaments and the Narcotics Commission. In these cases our two Delegations were able to reach an agreed procedure by which a vote on the substance of the representation issue was avoided. Our two representatives, however, were not able to reach such an agreement for the Executive Board of the Children's Fund which met on May 22.

Our impression is that a majority of the Council would much prefer not to have this matter come up for consideration on its merits and under the present conditions in Korea. We ourselves would be very glad to find a way to avoid a formal registration of our basic difference. Since it appears unlikely that we shall be able to work out that basic difference, we think the best move would be for us to prevent questions being dealt with in such a way as to force a vote on the substance. A procedure for postponement would appear to us to offer a reasonable way out of the difficulty.

I shall be in communication with you further about some of the other points which we have discussed. Needless to say, we are gratified by the recent success in Korea and are giving thought to what might be done to move that matter along to a settlement.

We are looking forward to Mr. Dulles' forthcoming visit to London on the Jap peace treaty [3] and hope that we shall quickly reach full agreement on a subject on which I am sure our purposes and general approach are the same."

ACHESON

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[3] For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff. The reference is to John Foster Dulles.

330/5–2551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, May 25, 1951—7:40 p. m.

1584. USSR Presidency of SC in June.

1. In planning for Malik[1] (USSR) Presidency of SC, we see Chinese representation issue as possibly tying up SC in prolonged procedural wrangle. If UK will support US on a careful adherence to SC rules, likelihood will be reduced. Also, we feel it would be most unfortunate to unity of UN if split develops between US and UK at this time.

Given the present membership in SC we shall probably need a majority of eight votes to challenge rulings of President because Malik may deny validity of Tsiang's[2] vote as rep of China. Of course, if Malik refuses to put his challenged rulings to a vote, and this was his tactic in Aug 1950, he can tie up the SC in debate on procedure, because we assume US will be unwilling to waive challenge to any move of Malik's attempting to deny Tsiang his right to sit, speak or vote in SC.

Malik might deny the validity of the Chinese vote. That wld mean that he wld deny that we had overruled any of his improper rulings as President if our majority does not include seven votes in addition to China. This means we need solid support on questions of a proper application of rules of procedure from Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey, Netherlands, France and UK in addition to our own and China's votes. Support from Yugoslavia wld be desirable but was lacking in Aug 1950. We understand UK is being approached in London on this general question and wonder whether related approach in Paris, Quito, The Hague and Belgrade might not be desirable precaution.

2. On Chinese rep issue.

(*a*) We cannot see more than four possible votes in support of any clear cut motion for unseating Tsiang and seating pro rep. USSR, Yugoslavia, India and perhaps UK unless its present standing instructions are changed wld support such motion.

(*b*) If Malik attempts to rule as President, as he did on Aug 1, 1950 that Tsiang does not represent China and therefore shld not sit, we wld challenge this ruling[3] and hope UK wld vote with us as it did last Aug. It takes seven votes to overrule such a ruling.

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[1] Y. A. Malik, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations.

[2] Tingfu F. Tsiang, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations.

[3] Marginal notation here reads: "on ground he has no power". The word "Yugo" is also inscribed marginally, in parentheses, in apparent addition of the name of Yugoslavia to that of the United Kingdom in this sentence.

(*c*) There are other procedural ways in addition to (*b*) above in which Malik might raise the point. He might as Soviet rep object to Tsiang's credentials and then as SC President put question: "Those in favor of approving Tsiang's credentials"; here the US on a point of order under rule 30 wld challenge the question as a violation of SC rule 17. To have a clear cut overruling of Malik's form of putting the question, we need the UK vote. Otherwise the seven votes, including China but not the UK, might be disregarded by Malik and we wld then be tied up in fighting for Tsiang's right to speak or to vote under rule 17. We conclude that on this point as on Aug 1950 question of seating the ROK and not seating the NKs we shld not waive the question but insist that the SC continue to consider it until we succeeded in preventing a denial of any of Tsiang's rights as rep in the SC.

3. In planning the substantive work of the SC for June we wld recall informal agreement among SC members of last July that if Malik refuses to call a meeting, the President for the fol month, the UK, wld with the consent of all other SC members except USSR act in his stead if necessary to keep SC functioning. Two substantive matters on which attention of SC may be needed during June are Palestine and Kashmir. We assume Dept also has in mind possibility Iranian question might be brought to Council, possibly by USSR. In any of these cases if SC meeting is required this wld be additional reason for urging wide support from UK and others for firm approach to any of Malik's tactics attempting to tie up Council.

AUSTIN

330/5–2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 28, 1951—7 p. m.

951. Re urtel 1584, May 25. Confirming telephone conversation with Hyde,[1] Dept agrees with your helpful analysis of situations which may arise in SC on Chinese representation issue under Malik's presidency.

We assume challenge of Malik's ruling in Para 2(B) of urtel wld be on ground that president has no power to make such ruling particularly in light of rule 17 of SC Rules of Procedure.

We understand you will discuss in detail possible procedural situations with friendly Dels and on basis of results will inform Dept whether approach to capitals advisable.[2]

ACHESON

[1] James N. Hyde, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations.

[2] No further action seems to have occurred.

310.393/6–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1951.

Subject: Chinese Representation in the United Nations

Participants: Mr. C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA
Mr. David H. Popper, Deputy Director, UNP

The British Embassy representatives informed us that they were instructed to state that the Foreign Minister greatly appreciated the message from the Secretary of State with regard to Chinese representation [Deptel 5480 to London May 25] [2] and that he shared our desire to avoid our differences in view. The British noted that the details of the reply from London, a summary of which they left with us (attached to this memorandum) dealt primarily with the situation in the Security Council. However, they understood that no Security Council meeting had yet been called by Mr. Malik, the President for the month of June, and that the procedure outlined by the British would therefore first become operative at the Trusteeship Council meeting June 5.

The British thereupon passed to Mr. Hickerson the statement of their new position, which in essence calls for the disposition of the Chinese representation question when raised in the Security Council through a procedural motion calling for simple postponement of discussion of the question and enjoying precedence under the Security Council Rules of Procedure over substantive motions. While the British could not agree to any mention in the motion of Chinese Communist aggression, they would have no objection to reference to that aggression in the statements made by the various representatives. If the United States agreed, the British would follow similar procedures in other competent United Nations bodies.

The British also read to us a draft statement which the Foreign Office had suggested that Sir Gladwyn Jebb [3] might make when the issue arose in the Security Council. The statement took the line that "for a year now" the British had been steadily supporting the representation of the Chinese Communists in United Nations bodies since the United Kingdom had recognized the Communist regime as the

[1] This memorandum of conversation was initialed by Mr. Hickerson as his, although it is drafted in the third person. No drafting information as such is indicated. In normal practice, Mr. Popper would have been the drafting officer.
[2] Brackets in the source text.
[3] Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent British Representative to the United Nations.

government of China and still did so. However, the United Kingdom was compelled to take notice of the fact of Chinese Communist aggression and the refusal of the Chinese Communists to accept a settlement of the Korean dispute on honorable terms. Therefore, the United Kingdom representative would support a postponement of discussion of the representation question "for the time being".

Mr. Hickerson suggested that the British might give consideration to omitting "for the time being", since it might imply that the position was held only on a day-to-day basis. The British agreed that the omission of these words would be an improvement. Mr. Hickerson also suggested that the British consider the accuracy and the advisability of the reference to British support for Chinese Communist representation over a period of a year. The British said they would take this up with Sir Gladwyn Jebb.

The British representatives expressed the view that the change in the British position represented a concession of considerable importance to our views. Mr. Hickerson indicated that we fully appreciated the significance of the Foreign Minister's reply. It would be very helpful to the Secretary and would, he felt, be helpful to the British in this country.

We raised with the British the question whether the change in attitude would cover action in Specialized Agencies, with special reference to the pending meeting of the Technical Transit Committee of the UPU.[4] The British could not say; they agreed to seek London's views on this point.[5] However, they thought that the British line would probably be maintained at the forthcoming UNESCO General Conference.

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[4] Documentation in the Department of State central indexed file on this matter is located in file 399.10–UPU. The Technical Transit Committee was to convene at Pontresina, Switzerland on June 6, and the Chinese seating question would arise. The United States position was that the Committee, a subunit of the Universal Postal Union, should not even consider the Chinese representation issue but should follow the example of the UPU's Executive and Liaison Committee and seat the Nationalist representative. This position was communicated on May 29 to the 7 diplomatic missions accredited to the concerned governments (Pretoria, Rome, Lima, Buenos Aires, Copenhagen, The Hague, and Paris) in priority circular telegram 745, May 29, 11 p. m. (399.10–UPU/5–2951)

[5] Subsequent to this meeting with the British Embassy officers, in priority niact telegram 193, June 4, 6 p. m., to the Consulate at Zurich, the Department of State undertook to inform Assistant Postmaster General Redding at Pontresina of the newly emerging British position, as follows:

"UK has agreed support motions postpone discussion Chi representation issue in UN bodies. Although details not yet entirely clear, we assume this position also applies specialized agencies. USDel shld consult in advance with UKRep with view reaching agreed method for dealing with Chi representation issue either on postponement basis or preferably, if UK concurs, on basis that Comite shld not even consider Chi representation issue but shld follow action taken by Exec and Liaison Comite, standing organ UPU. Whatever arrangement is worked out you shld, of course, insist on seating Rep Chi Natl Govt." (399.10–UPU/6–451)

It was agreed that Ambassador Gross[6] would concert with Sir Gladwyn Jebb on the precise arrangements for dealing with this question.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

In his message to Mr. Morrison, conveyed under cover of a letter from the United States Ambassador in London dated the 26th May, Mr. Acheson suggested that our two delegations to the United Nations should consult in advance to concert on procedures which both delegations could support for avoiding a vote on this issue. Mr. Acheson went on to suggest that the body concerned decides not to consider such a proposal so long as the aggression in Korea continues.

It is considered that as far as the Security Council is concerned the simplest form of motion to this effect would be a purely procedural one under rule 33 (5) of the Rules of Procedure to postpone discussion of the question for the time being. The motion should not, in our view, employ phraseology like "so long as the aggression in Korea continues", so as to void subsequent attempts to define when the aggression or hostilities had actually ceased. If necessary members of the Security Council could always explain to the Council orally that the action was being taken because of Chinese aggression.

Mr. Morrison is prepared to authorise Sir Gladwyn Jebb to concert the necessary action on the above lines with his appropriate colleagues. Mr. Morrison does not however wish that the United Kingdom Delegation should take the initiative and he hopes that an appropriate motion will be introduced by the United States Delegation.

If the above procedure is adopted for use in the Security Council the United Kingdom Delegation would also follow it in other competent United Nations bodies such as the Trusteeship Council. In any other United Nations bodies where the Rules of Procedure are not strictly analogous the United Kingdom Delegation would be guided as far as possible by the same general considerations.

WASHINGTON, 1st June, 1951.

[6] Ernest A. Gross was Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations.

310.393/6–451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1951—6 p. m.

5637. Pls deliver fol personal msg from SecState to Morrison:

"I shld like to express my appreciation for your reply to my msg on the Chi representation question in the UN, which has been delivered by Reps of the Brit Emb here.

"I am certain that, thru advance consultation between our Reps along the lines on which we are now agreed, we can successfully dispose of this issue when it is raised in UN bodies without undue difficulty and without an undesirable and repeated airing of our differing views.

"The position we shall now jointly support will be very helpful to us here and will I know be well received by public opinion in this country."

ACHESON

350/6–451 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 4, 1951—6 : 39 p. m.

1601. Chinese representation in TC. In view understanding reached with UK on Chinese representation question, if Soviet makes usual proposal at opening TC tomorrow to exclude Chinese rep, Sayre [1] proposes make statement set forth below and pursue course of action indicated therein. Sir Alan Burns [2] in agreement on tactics and states UK will vote affirmatively on motion to postpone discussion.

"The opposition of the US Government to the unseating of the rep of the Chinese Nationalist Govt and to the seating of a rep of the Chinese Communist regime, has been made clear time and time again. I now reaffirm this position of my government. In the view of my govt it is out of the question to discuss the issue in an organ of the UN while the Chinese Communist regime at this very moment is engaged in aggression against the United Nations and while Chinese Communist troops are seeking to destroy the troops of the UN.

For these reasons, I move, pursuant to rule 56, subpara G of the Council's rules of procedure, that the TC postpone further discussion of this question. That motion, as the rule specifies, has precedence over the proposal of the Soviet rep if it is adopted, as my delegation strongly urges, it would result in an indefinite postponement of any further discussion of the Soviet proposal and the continuance of the Chinese Nationalist rep in this council."

GROSS

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[1] Francis B. Sayre was the United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

[2] Sir Alan Burns was British Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

350/6–751

Memorandum by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

[WASHINGTON,] June 7, 1951.

Subject: Chinese Attitude on the Representation Question in the Trusteeship Council.

New York's 1609, June 5 (Daily Unclassified Summary)[1] reports that our motion to postpone further discussion of the Chinese representation question was carried in the Trusteeship Council 11–1 (USSR)–0 on June 5. Because it was a motion for postponement of discussion it was given precedence over the USSR motion to seat the Chinese Communists.

The UK spoke in support of the motion, explaining that the UK continued to recognize Communist China as the Government of China and had hoped that Communist China would recognize the obligations of UN members not to assist aggression and to settle disputes by peaceful means. Unfortunately, the Chinese Communists had launched offensive after offensive and the UN had shown "endless patience". While still hoping that the regime would end the aggression, the UK believed that it would be appropriate to postpone the question of Chinese representation.

The Chinese Delegate (Liu) asked the President (Burns, UK) to rule the USSR motion out of order. The Trusteeship Council President apparently ignored the Chinese proposal and proceeded to put the US motion to a vote.

(*Note:* UNP reports informally that this mix-up was apparently due to an oversight on the part of our Delegation in New York in not advising the Chinese representative of our proposed tactics which had been worked out with the UK. UNP is sending instructions to our Delegations at other current conferences to make sure that the Chinese Delegation understands the new procedure.)

[1] Not printed.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 30, 1951.

US/A/3255

Subject: Chinese Representation in the United Nations

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, British Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. David H. Popper, UNP

Calling at his request, Mr. Tomlinson showed us a new draft statement intended to set the tone for remarks to be made by British representatives at pending meetings of United Nations organs with regard to the subject of Chinese representation. Mr. Tomlinson recalled that the statement used by the British over the last few months now seemed somewhat out of date. He noted that the British position in support of postponement of the issue remained unchanged.

The new statement, like the old, explained that the UK recognized the Chinese Communist regime as the Government of China, and, therefore, supported its claim to a seat in United Nations organs. The statement continued to the effect that the British have always hoped that the Chinese Communists would recognize their obligations as a Member of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means, but noted that while the Chinese Communists were attacking United Nations troops in Korea and had been condemned for engaging in aggression there, the British consider it best to postpone consideration of the representation issue.

I made a few comments on some of the wording in the statement which emphasized the temporary character of the British position. In the course of discussion on this point, Mr. Tomlinson indicated that the British did not regard the conclusion of a cease fire as *ipso facto* ending the aggression. He noted that the general tenor of the draft statement seemed much too optimistic as regards the possibility of concluding an armistice, and assured me that in this respect it would not be delivered exactly as drafted.

Mr. Tomlinson noted with regret that at the UNESCO Conference at Paris our representatives had mentioned the December 14 General Assembly resolution in the resolution postponing action on the Chinese representation question. He hoped we might avoid this in the future, as we knew the British did not regard that resolution as a guide for organs which were competent to make their own decisions on this question.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

310.2/8–1051

The First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Ringwalt) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, August 10, 1951.

No. 797

Ref: Embassy's Telegram No. 410, July 20 to Department, Repeated USUN as No. 3.[1]

Subject: British Attitude Toward Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

The Embassy's telegram under reference reported the substance of a conversation with the Head of the United Nations (Political) Department [2] of the Foreign Office in which it was stated that the conversations at Kaesong [3] might require a "very slight verbal change" in the position of the United Kingdom with respect to the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

It is now understood that, shortly after the above-mentioned conversation took place, the Foreign Office asked the British Embassy in Washington and the British delegation to the United Nations for their views as to a desirable change in the British formula for Communist China, and that the British Embassy has communicated its views to the Foreign Office about as follows:

For the past few months, whenever the question of the admission of China to the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies has been considered, British representatives have been instructed to be guided by the following: Once the United States representative has suggested that the question of which government of China should be represented in the United Nations be postponed, the British representative will state (*a*) the United Kingdom recognizes the Central People's Government, and the CPG should be represented in the United Nations and in the United Nations specialized agencies; (*b*) however, during the past few months the Chinese Communists have repeatedly attacked UN forces in Korea and have been pronounced by the United Nations as an aggressor; (*c*) therefore the United Kingdom reluctantly believes it appropriate to postpone consideration of which Chinese government will be seated in the United Nations.

British instructions on the above subject are in a process of modification as follows: (a) In addition to (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) above, the British representative would now state that whereas the United Kingdom once more supports postponement of the representation issue, it welcomes present indications that considerations which impelled the United Kingdom to take this course will soon be dispelled; and (b) if the United States motion for postponement, seconded by the United Kingdom, is defeated, the United Kingdom will have no recourse but

[1] Not printed.
[2] C. C. Parrott.
[3] This is a reference to the newly-initiated Korean armistice talks, being held at Kaesong, Korea. For documentation on the Kaesong talks, see volume VII.

to vote in favor of seating the representative of the Central People's Government.

It is further understood that the above position has the approval of the British Government. It is gathered that the British Embassy has been in close touch with the Department on this question and probably therefore the Department is well aware of this modification of the British position.

The Department's comments would be most useful as background for future discussions with the Foreign Office.

ARTHUR R. RINGWALT

310.2/8–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1951.

US/A/3267

Subject: Chinese Representation

Participants: Miss Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Ward P. Allen—EUR

In the course of a conversation on other matters, Miss Salt reported that, following our suggestion of the other day, the Foreign Office has readily agreed that when the question of Chinese representation arises in any UN body between now and the next GA, the UK representative will refrain from making any mention of the GA Resolution on the subject, provided we do likewise. They stated that they had felt forced to mention it in the past only because we had. I made clear that our self-imposed injunction would apply only to the time of the Sixth GA and that we might want to lay some stress upon it in the GA itself.

As to the Chinese representation issue at the International Telecommunications Conference, Miss Salt agreed with the suggestion that if the move for postponement fails the US and UK delegations might wish to concert on the formula we had originally desired in order to avoid a vote on the substance. However, she expressed the view, which I shared, that if the postponement motion failed it would be because of conditions which would make it unlikely that a vote on the substance could be avoided by any other means. She suggested that we leave the matter to be worked out by our respective delegations.

310.2/8–1551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, August 15, 1951—6:20 p. m.

233. Re Chinese representation, French views. In discussion with Gross, Lacoste [1] expressed "personal view" that France would be strongly tempted to vote to admit Chi Coms if latter held out prospect of a "Kaesong in Indochina."

He inquired whether US would modify or soften its position re admission of Chi Coms in event Korean armistice. Gross expressed strongest opinion contrary, commenting that matter of Chi Com admission could not in our view even be seriously considered until and unless Chi Coms radically changed their behavior and attitude toward international obligations.

To Lacoste's comment that end of fighting in Korea might meet objection we had raised to "Communist shooting their way into UN," Gross replied that end of fighting would not in itself end Communist aggression, and, moreover, we felt Chi Com misbehavior precluded serious consideration their claim for seat.[2]

AUSTIN

[1] Francis Lacoste, French Minister, Alternate Representative of France at the United Nations.

[2] The Department of State repeated this telegram to the Embassy in France on August 16, warning, however, that no approach to the French Government was desired at this time. The Department was interested in Embassy comment as to the extent to which "personal views Lacoste reflect official French views". (Department telegram 1027, August 16, 6 p.m., to Paris, 310.2/8–1551)

310.2/8–1751 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, August 17, 1951—7 p. m.

1069. Ref Deptel 1027, Aug. 16.[1] Emb officer in recent conversations with Baeyens, director Fr [*FE?*] affairs FonOff,[2] and other FonOff officials dealing with FE affairs has raised question Fr attitude toward recognition Chi-Commie regime and its entry into UN. There has been no indication that Fr FonOff wld favor either of these two courses. However, there is such desperate casting around for solution in Indochina that, if Kaesong talks shld end successfully, there wld be considerable support in Fr polit circles for negotiations to settle all FE problems in hope that somehow a solution for the seemingly

[1] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[2] Ferdinand J. M. G. Baeyens, Director, Asia-Oceanic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

never-ending IC question might be found in this context. If such negotiations were begun, Fr might well tend to turn more to Brit position in FE largely in hope IC problem wld thus be solved. We do not find any illusions on this score among FonOff officials but polit pressure among all except Gaullists might well build up along these lines.

The foregoing stems in part from somewhat gloomy reaction toward IC itself. We are reliably informed that Le Tourneau accepted post Min Assoc States in new cabinet with greatest reluctance and only after much pressure, preferring be named Min Overseas France, post he held prior to formation Ministry Assoc States. Explanation is that no one sees solution for IC, where France continues pour out men and money, and that, while De Lattre has done excellent job, he continues ask for more men and money with no end in sight. Informant added for these reasons no one wanted serve as Min Assoc States.

It is our gen impression that not even FonOff officials dealing directly with problems, much less Fr officials in gen, have thought through all of various FE problems which might suddenly confront Fr Govt in event successful conclusion Kaesong talks. This, of course, stems in part from long period of elections and delay in formation new govt. In recent conversations with various FonOff officials, we have encountered little optimism with regard to outcome Korean armistice negotiations. There seems to be gen opinion that enemy may be marking time in preparation for new offensive and has no real desire for genuine armistice. One official points to reports (from Tokyo via Chi Govt sources) of build-up of Commie strength in planes and tanks and says this may presage all-out Commie attack at moment to be decided upon by latter. FonOff officials generally view Kaesong talks as part of Soviet peace offensive and as related to Japanese peace treaty conf. They suggest possibility talks may continue until outcome conf becomes clear and then be broken off with Sov effort maintain maximum propaganda advantage. One official goes so far as to suggest as personal opinion, not based on any specific intelligence, possibility of Sov or Soviet-backed attack on Japan, if peace treaty signed at San Francisco. FonOff officials are not optimistic re possibilities polit settlement in FE, some of them pointing out that US position on Formosa prevents any settlement that problem and that Fr Govt has nothing to offer Commies in return for guarantee against intervention in IC.

Foregoing represents a gen composite of views of FonOff officials with whom we have discussed these questions and tendency on part of FonOff officials is to say that they are expressing their personal views rather than Fr Govt policy. The exception has been with respect to question of recognition Chi-Commie regime and its entry in the UN where Baeyens himself has specifically stated there has been no change

in Fr Govt position re these questions and that he knows of no indications of possible change. As stated above, however, possibility must be considered of polit pressure building up for change Fr position in this regard in event Kaesong talks successfully concluded and negotiations begun for over-all FE settlement.

Sent Dept 1069, rptd info London 277.

BONSAL

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Briefing Memorandum for the Secretary of State, For Use at the Washington Tripartite Ministerial Talks, September 1951

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.
WFM T-10/3b

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UN

PROBLEM

To reach an understanding with the UK and France concerning the handling of the Chinese representation question in the UN, and in particular at the coming session of the GA.[1]

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE

To obtain UK-French agreement to support postponement of consideration of the Chinese representation issue in the GA and all other UN bodies in order to avoid any change in Chinese representation in UN bodies.

POSITION OF UK AND FRANCE

Under the "moratorium" arrangement agreed upon last May, the U.S. and UK have jointly supported motions to postpone consideration of the Chinese representation issue. The UK bases its support of these motions on the Chinese Communist aggression. It has recently informed us that in the event of an armistice it would not "immediately" abandon the moratorium arrangement. However, UK statements of this position made under instructions at current UN meetings obviously contemplate early abandonment of postponement and support for the seating of the Chinese Communists if an armistice eventuates.

France, which has not recognized the Chinese Communists, has generally supported the U.S. position on the Chinese representation issue. However, this position has not appeared to be very firmly main-

[1] The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in Paris on November 6.

tained and France might be strongly tempted to vote to admit the Chinese Communists if there were a prospect of a "Kaesong in Indochina".

UNITED STATES POSITION TO BE PRESENTED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS

1. We consider it imperative that the Chinese Communists should not be seated in the UN and that National Government representatives continue to sit. The following are among the reasons for this position:

a. The UK and France must be aware of the effect which the seating of the Chinese Communists in any UN body would have on the attitude of U.S. public opinion toward the UN and toward cooperation with countries supporting the Chinese Communists.

b. Under the impact of the heavy sacrifices of the Korean war, the American people would find it hard to separate the elements of approval and disapproval from such issues as recognition and seating in the UN whatever the theoretical position. They would not understand any active effort to accommodate Peiping when that regime has required so much from us in resisting a brutal aggression.

c. Willingness to discuss an armistice when the military situation is not favorable is no indication of any fundamental change in Chinese Communist aggressive policies; indications are quite the reverse.

d. Seating the Chinese Communists in the near future would have the appearance of rewarding aggression and would lessen respect for the UN, would reduce the will to resist on the part of Southeast Asian states, and would substitute an unfriendly voice for a friendly one in the UN Councils.

e. The Chinese Communists would hail their seating in the UN not as a means of helping the world community but as a political victory for their regime.

f. Titoism is not necessarily produced by increased contact with the non-Soviet bloc but rather by internal dissensions within the Communist family.

g. Indications are that the Chinese Communists would use their seat in the UN for accentuating tensions, not easing them. UK recognition, for example, has not led to any appreciable easing of Chinese-UK relations. . . .

2. A new public divergence of policy between the US, UK and France on this issue would be a serious development.

3. Because of the basic difference of views between the U.S. and the UK, it is essential that agreement be reached on some procedural device by which a vote on the substance can be avoided. Accordingly, the U.S. suggests that the three governments agree to continue a policy of postponement, leaving the delegates of the three Governments to the GA and other UN bodies to work out the necessary procedural steps to achieve this result.

4. The U.S. would oppose any attempt to link the question of Chinese representation in the UN with discussions regarding Korea.

DISCUSSION

If no armistice is included, the "moratorium" arrangement with the UK will presumably continue in effect. The UK is now apparently paving the way for a termination of it in case an armistice is concluded. An armistice would also lead to increased pressure in the GA by other UN members to seat the Chinese Communists.

In a resolution of December 14, 1950, the GA recommended *inter alia* that other UN bodies "take into account" the GA's attitude on representation controversies. This resolution is likely to be an obstacle to the gradual acceptance, organ by organ, of the Chinese Communists. The UK has asked us to refrain from citing it in support of the joint postponement policy. We agreed to this up to the time of the GA. At the next GA the US and UK should agree upon the above postponement policy which would leave the representative of the National Government in the Chinese seat. If after such action has been taken by the GA the substance of this issue is put to the vote in other UN bodies, we shall argue strongly on the basis of the December 14 resolution that other bodies should be guided by the attitude of the GA (in which our views are more likely to prevail than in smaller bodies).

Some formula for continuance of the postponement policy is the only means of avoiding a sharp open divergence of attitude between ourselves and the UK. "Postponement" would have to mean, as before, that the representatives of the National Government would be seated.[2]

[2] A "Supplement" to this briefing memorandum incorporated the "Views of the Embassy in London on Probable British Attitudes on Subjects to be Discussed in the Washington Foreign Ministers' Meetings". It read in part: "The Foreign Secretary will probably express the hope that we would be willing to engage in multilateral talks with the Chinese Communists and, if real progress is made, we reaffirm our previous stand that we would not veto their UN membership." (CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159)

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Elizabeth Gough of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1951.
US/A/3314

Subject: Chinese Representation

Participants: Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
Mr. Allen, EUR
Miss Gough, UNP

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

3. *General Assembly*

Miss Salt informed us that the Foreign Office has sent a telegram to UKUN requesting the Mission to work out with USUN the Chi-

nese representation procedure for the Sixth GA. The highlights of this telegram were as follows: (*a*) the UK agreed to follow the moratorium procedure for the GA: (*b*) the Foreign Office thought that the procedural motion might "best be made at the opening session": and (*c*) the UK preferred that the motion be purely procedural with no reference in the text to the February 1 resolution or continuing aggression.

320/10–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—7 : 17 p. m.

180. Dept requests you attempt work out with UK, *ad referendum*, precise procedure for dealing with Chi Rep issue in Sixth GA. When procedure has been agreed Dept will wish you approach other Dels, particularly Canada and Fr.

Fol, in order of preference, are alternative courses which wld be acceptable Dept and which in our opinion fall within scope moratorium arrangement with UK:

(A) Motion to effect that Sixth GA decide take no action on any proposals to exclude Chi Natl Reps or seat Chi Commies in GA;

(B) Motion to postpone consideration any such proposals for duration Sixth Session, along lines discussed below.

In event adoption (*b*) and possibly (*a*) we wld seek arrange for another Del make motion and US wld support.

In developing Chi Rep procedure you shd keep in mind fol points:

1. We believe it may be preferable, by pre-arrangement with Temporary Pres, for motion be made at outset session before any substantive proposals are introduced. This wld ensure that motion wld be put vote first and without procedural wrangle. After its adoption we wld hold that no substantive proposals cld be put vote. It is, of course, possible the USSR may nevertheless submit its proposal before procedural motion is made. In this event, in order ensure that substance is not put vote first, we cld put our motion in form adjournment debate under rules 75 and 78, which wld incidentally also limit debate, or alternatively cld simply ask GA under rule 91 to vote on motion before Sov proposal.

2. We are inclined think that action shd be in terms simple motion which cld apply whether or not there is Kor armistice. UK and US, in supporting motion, cld advance such reasons as each sees fit in light prevailing circumstances. FYI we understand from Brit Emb that UK wld prefer simple motion with no reference in text to Feb 1 resolution and continuing aggression.

3. Although we are aware that UK will probably prefer that action be *sine die*, we believe it most desirable that some time limit be specified in motion in order ensure that Sovs will not be able obstruct proceedings throughout session by repeatedly raising Chi Rep issue. Only time limit which seems feasible us wld be for duration sixth session.

4. Although UK will undoubtedly prefer that seating Chi Natl Reps be implied rather than included in text motion, we believe it highly desirable that specific provision this effect be made in motion in order minimize difficulties which are bound arise later in session and you shld make every effort obtain UK concurrence to this. Less desirable alternative to specific inclusion might be to arrange for temp pres make interpretative statement before passage motion to effect that its adoption wld mean that Chi Natl Reps wld sit for duration session.

Chi Rep issue is bound be raised again in Credentials Comite and in plenary when report Credentials Comite is considered, in form challenge validity Chi Natl credentials or Sov request that Chi Natl credentials be put vote separately. In both instances, in order continue avoid vote on substance, we wld take line that GA decision along above lines had settled Chi Rep issue, and that such Sov maneuvers are therefore out of order. It wld be more difficult take this position if GA has not taken specific action seat Chi Natl Reps, or, at very least, if no interpretative statement has been made by Pres before adoption motion.

6. [*sic*] It shd be noted that above arrangement excludes re-establishment spec Chi Rep Comite to which we are opposed.[1]

WEBB

[1] The Special Committee on representation of China ("the Committee of Seven") had been established by the Fifth General Assembly in Resolution 490 (V) of September 19, 1950; for text, see telegram Delga 7, September 19, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 301. Its membership was elected by secret ballot by the General Assembly on December 12, 1950 and consisted of Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, the Philippines, and Poland. At its first meeting on December 15, 1950, the committee elected Sir Benegal Rau of India as chairman. It had never held another meeting. The question of its continuance was related to the question of the adjournment of the Fifth General Assembly which was still technically in session, pending the settlement of the several components of the China question: the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, Formosa, the question of Chinese representation.

From September onwards periodic exchanges took place between the Department of State, the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN), the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, and other officials of the United Nations Secretariat, and representatives of other Member States, regarding the "winding-up" of the Fifth General Assembly; and in this context there was continuing discussion of the Chinese representation question. On October 2, in Washington, Ambassador Nasrollah Entezam, the president of the Fifth General Assembly, was informed explicitly by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) that the U.S. Government "would not be agreeable" to a prolongation of the life of the Special Committee (memorandum of conversation, October 2, 320/10–251). On October 5, the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) informally informed

Footnote continued on following page.

310.2/10–1651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 16, 1951—4 : 47 p. m.

477. Re Chinese representation. George (Canada)[1] just telephoned to say that "Special Comite on Representation of China" this morning approved by vote of 5 to 1 (Poland with India abstaining) Canadian formula of which key phrase is "Committee authorizes chairman to inform GA that in present circumstances it has been unable to make any recommendation on the question of representation of China". George observed that this took form not of comite report but of authorization for comite chairman to take action.

George continued that Rau (India) apparently had instructions not to present any draft res of his own but to remain aloof from controversy. Consequently, Pole submitted his draft res first calling for Nats to be unseated and Chi Comms seated. This draft res was defeated 5 to 2 (Poland and India). Lopez (Phil)[2] then made effort to submit substantive draft res of his own to counter Polish res but was dissuaded from this and comite then adopted Canadian formula.

George added that since meeting was closed, comite was able to vote down Polish effort to make press release of defeated Polish draft res for circulation to UN members.

Dept please relay GADel, Paris.[3]

AUSTIN

Footnote continued from preceding page.

Secretary-General Lie that if the Special Committee felt it had to make a report, such a report should be limited to a brief statement of the facts, "namely, that the committee had met and elected its chairman, and that it had met again [on blank date] and having reached no conclusions had no recommendations to make." (USUN telegram 426, October 5, 8 : 09 p. m., 320/10–551)

[1] J. George, a staff member of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations.

[2] Salvador P. Lopez, Minister, Permanent Delegation of the Philippines to the United Nations.

[3] The Delegation itself had not yet arrived in Paris, but an advance party of USUN staff was present.

310.2/10–2251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, October 22, 1951—6 : 39 p. m.

514. Re Chinese representation: UK preoccupation with Iran has made it impossible for us to raise Deptel 180 with them until now. Jebb having gone home Saturday, Bolte[1] gave substance of reftel to

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[1] Charles G. Bolté, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, USUN.

Coulson [2] today. Coulson reacted quickly and powerfully against alternative A. He said this would be in effect substantive decision for UK; he thought under their standing instructions they would have to vote against it. He urged sticking to our established drill as in the past; procedural motion to postpone consideration *sine die*. Bolte argued advantages of alternative A but Coulson was notably unmoved. He thought UK would have difficulty even with alternative B since sixth GA might conceivably last a year and they would not wish to freeze the position for that long. He said he did not in fact suppose they would raise question themselves even if there were cease-fire in Korea, at least until they were confident of majority support.

On our suggestion that motion be made at outset session before any substantive proposals are introduced, he thought it difficult to raise until Russians introduced proposal to change occupants of Chinese chair. He preferred waiting for question to be raised and then moving postponement of consideration.

He said UK would also find great difficulty with explicit statement that Chinese Nationalist reps would remain seated. He thought this was so clearly effect on motion to postpone changing representation that he could not understand why we wanted specific statement. He thought if Assembly decided to postpone consideration there would be no problem in disposing of additional Soviet motions, as in Credentials Comite and in plenary consideration of its report. He recalled Russians did not in fact raise issue continually once they were defeated in fifth session.[3]

He said he would report our views. Then he would have to consult further in Paris.

Department please relay GADel, Paris.[4]

AUSTIN

[2] J. E. Coulson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

[3] Marginal notation referring to the last sentence of this paragraph reads: "but 5th GA put damper on with Spec Comite of 5th GA".

[4] Repeated to London and Paris in circular airgram, October 24, 8:30 a.m.

320/10–2651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 26, 1951—7:34 p. m.

Gadel 11. For Ross.[1] Ref urtel Delga 4.[2]

[Here follows discussion of Department of State views regarding certain elections that were to take place at the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.]

[1] John G. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, and head of the advance party at Paris.

[2] Dated October 20, not printed.

2. *Chi Rep*

Dept understands Deptel 180 to USUN sent Hyde [3] with his files. If this not case please inform immed. Re para Delga 4 Oct 20 concerning opening plenary of 6th session Dept does not expect Chi Rep issue arise connection agenda item on appointment Credentials Comite but will be raised as usual by Sovs at outset session. For that reason Dept stated Deptel 180 we might wish for procedural motion made by pre-arrangement Entezam before any substantive proposals made in order procedural motion will be put first. Dept concerned re points raised by UKDel reported NY's 514 Oct 22 relayed Paris same date, that there shld be mere adjournment *sine die* rather than postponement for entire session and, secondly, that there shld not be specific provision for seating Chi Nationalists. Re first point, there is no insurance against matter being raised repeatedly by Sovs and other Dels, particularly in case of armistice, unless matter settled once and for all at outset along some such line as we suggested. We shld be able meet UK worry that session will last entire year by indication our opposition this course in present circumstances and intention confine session shortest possible period with adjournment at Paris. While we wld prefer postponement for entire session, if necessary to obtain UK agreement we wld be prepared accept provision for postponement for length Paris session GA. Re second point, while we are not committed at this stage to any specific language in procedural motion we cannot see slightest possibility of action along lines of moratorium agreement without it being specifically understood that Reps Nationalist Govt be seated since Dels accredited anew each GA session. While it was possible finesse this point TC and other bodies in application adjournment motion, we think situation much different in case GA which is largest UN forum. You will recall that last year Can Res provided specifically for seating Chi Nationalists.

While we do not expect procedure this matter can be firmly agreed upon with UK prior arrival USDel Paris, pls make clear to Jebb the above points which we consider essential in working out satis procedure for giving effect to our standing arrangement with UK.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

WEBB

[3] James N. Hyde, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, USUN, was a member of the advance party in Paris.

320/10–3151 : Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Ross) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 31, 1951—2 p. m.

Delga 22. For Hickerson and Rusk. Fowler, who is only UK rep here at moment and who himself has gone to London for day's consultation today, informed me last night that no ranking member or even adviser of UK del will arrive in Paris at earliest before Sunday.[2] Jebb is coming with Eden [3] on that day, Coulson and others on Sunday or Monday. Fowler (CRO) is specialist on Commonwealth matters (Kashmir) and not sufficiently informed or ranking to warrant any assurances we cld negotiate with him any effective understandings re such vitally important polit matters as Chi rep. In going over check list of GA items with him on Monday, I urged that FonOff give most careful and serious consideration this matter. With particular ref Chi rep, I do not feel we shld rely (*a*) on my discussion with Fowler or (*b*) on any report Coulson may have made to FonOff of Bolte's presentation Dept's views as set forth in its 180, October 4 (USUN's 514, Oct 22). Because of absence responsible UK reps here will furthermore not be possible to carry out Dept's instruction on this matter as set forth in Dept's Gadel 11, Oct 26, before Sun at earliest.

This simply does not allow sufficient time to thrash out issue with Brit (and even greater importance, to build up united front with other UN members) before Mon afternoon [4] closing mtg of fifth GA when issue [will] arise, or even Tues afternoon opening of sixth GA when issue will almost certainly arise.

Assuming that Sec will be seeing Eden on Sun,[5] I do not want to have Sec in position discussing this matter with Eden if Eden is badly prepared. I therefore recommend most strongly to Dept urgent consideration that Emb London be instructed present our views directly to FonOff. In this connection, if Dept feels there is any truth in newspaper rumors that new UK Govt [6] may adopt stiffer line toward Chi Commies, it may wish instruct Emb London to put our views to FonOff more strongly than set forth in Dept's 180 and Gadel 11.

Pending agreement with UK we have, of course, in line with Dept's 180, refrained from discussing tactics this matter with other dels. In view probability we shld not be able reach agreement with UK before Sun or Mon, and since time thereafter is too short to build up

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 2272.
[2] November 4.
[3] Anthony Eden, new British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[4] November 5. The scheduled adjournment of the General Assembly's Fifth Session was to take place on that date.
[5] Acheson had been invited to a dinner at the British Embassy in Paris on Sunday evening. A bipartite ministerial meeting was scheduled for the afternoon.
[6] The new Conservative Government of Winston S. Churchill.

strong united front among other dels, Dept may wish instruct us to discuss this issue with other dels during remainder this week. I have in mind, for example, the Canadians and French, Entezam [7] as temporary Pres, Padilla [8] and Belaunde,[9] either of whom might be next Pres, and possibly a few selected others such as Muniz [10] and the Turks.[11]

Ross

[7] Nasrollah Entezam, President of the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

[8] Luis Padilla Nervo, Permanent Representative of Mexico at the United Nations, and candidate for the presidency of the Sixth Regular Session.

[9] Victor Belaunde, Ambassador, Chairman of the Delegation of Peru to the General Assembly.

[10] João Carlos Muñiz, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.

[11] Selim Sarper was Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations and Vice-Chairman of the Turkish Delegation.

320/10–3151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 31, 1951—7 : 21 p. m.

2273. USGADel Paris informs Dept (Delga 22, Oct 31, rptd by Dept to London as 2272) UK Del leaders will not be in Paris and able negotiate with USDel on principal GA issues prior Nov 4. This does not leave adequate time for consultations in Paris prior windup session 5th GA Nov 5 and opening 6th GA Nov 6 on procedural issues arising at outset, specifically Chi Rep.

Dept therefore requests you approach FonOff urgently along lines Deptel 180 to USUN, Oct 4, now being rptd London as 2272, and Gadel 11 Oct 26 rptd as 2272.

Report reaction GADel and Dept.

WEBB

[1] Repeated for information to Paris as Gadel 34.

320/10–3151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 31, 1951—7 : 21 p. m.

Gadel 35. Re last para Delga 22 Oct 31 you are authorized discuss Chi Rep issue carefully selected list key Dels such as you have indicated, stressing that at same time US is seeking reach precise agreement UK on procedural details and that these may require some last-minute modification.

WEBB

[1] Repeated for information to London as 2274.

320/11–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, November 1, 1951—6 p. m.
[Received November 1—2:37 p. m.]

2141. Re Deptels 2272 [1] and 2273 Chi representation: Emb approached UN Dept along lines Deptels and stressed urgency and importance US attaches to this question. FonOff said Eden earlier in day had approved tel to Wash and Paris reaffirming UK's earlier objections to US proposals and emphasizing UK's reluctance "even temporarily" to appear to imply Chi nationalists more entitled to seat in UN than Chi Commies.

Eden had added that present moratorium represented laboriously achieved compromise between UK's desire to maintain friendly cooperation with US and "existing commitments" and that UK wished no deviation from or revision of moratorium arrangement. Eden had been informed before approving UK position Emb making high level urgent approach on this question, and been given substance US arguments put foreward to UK UNDel. He will be briefed on question and had already anticipated discussing it with Secy in Paris. We have impression Eden at present approaching matter cautiously because of domestic pol situation.

UK's objections as given Emb by FonOff were along same lines as previously expressed to Dept (circular airgram Oct 24, 1951 [2]). UK is not confident we can prevent prolongation session and does not want to go beyond limits present moratorium arrangement in committing itself to possible prolonged postponement consideration issue. While admitting danger continued Sov obstruction, UK believes situation can be kept under control.

FonOff promised, however, to restudy US proposals before Eden leaves Sunday.

Sent Dept 2141, rptd info priority Paris for GADel 902.

GIFFORD

[1] Not printed as such. It repeated the substance of telegrams 180 to USUN, October 4; Gadel 11, October 26; and Delga 22, October 31, pp. 264, 267, and 269.

[2] Not printed as such. It repeated the substance of New York telegram 514, October 22; see p. 266.

320/11–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1951.

Subject: The Chinese Representation Question in the Sixth General Assembly.

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, UK
Mr. J. D. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. W. P. Allen, EUR
Mr. L. Henkin, UNP [1]

Mr. Tomlinson reported the views of Foreign Minister Eden on this question along the lines reported in our Embassy's telegram 2141.[2] He stressed particularly that his government was reluctant to make any revisions in the moratorium agreement, which had been carefully designed to achieve a delicate balance between UK views on the substance of the question and their desire to accommodate the view of the US. The essence of their view is that they could not support a resolution which recognizes the right of the Chinese Nationalists to represent China in the United Nations but were willing to postpone consideration of the question indefinitely. They were not prepared to agree to postponement for a long period, and the Sixth Session of the General Assembly might last a long time.

I read to Mr. Tomlinson our proposed recommendations to the Secretary on this question as contained in the Department's telegram Delga [*Gadel*] 49 November 2.[3] I stressed that we were not insisting that the resolution explicitly recognize the right of the Chinese Nationalists to continue to represent China but that as a practical matter it would have to be made clear that this result would follow. The resolution we would like to see would postpone consideration of the question for the duration of the Sixth Session in Paris. As we see it this is the only way of maintaining the moratorium without allowing the Soviet Union to harass and embarrass us by repeatedly raising this question throughout the course of the Assembly. Since Mr. Eden's chief objection to our proposal is his fear that, like the Fifth Session, the Sixth might last all year, we are fully prepared to make clear that postponement of consideration would be only for the duration of a session of normal length in Paris.

Mr. Tomlinson indicated that he did not know how his government would react to our suggestion. He thought that if Mr. Eden was prepared to accept the proposal in principle, the formula "for the dura-

[1] Louis Henkin of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] *Infra.*

tion of the Sixth General Assembly Session in Paris" would seem a satisfactory way of framing it.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

320/11–251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 2, 1951—6 : 07 p. m.

Gadel 49. For the Secretary.[2] London's 2141 rptd for GADel as 902 indicates Eden anticipates discussing with Secretary question Chi Rep in UN.

WFM T–10/3b[3] this subject still valid. Additional background: Last May US and UK agreed to moratorium on their differences over Chi Rep, thru formula for postponement action on proposals seat Chi Commies or unseat Chi Nats in UN bodies. For 6th session GA, we have proposed to UK two possible courses of action both of which we feel come within moratorium agreement: (*a*) Motion that 6th GA decide take no action on any proposals to exclude Chi Nat Rep or seat Chi Commie, or (*b*) motion to postpone consideration any such proposals for duration 6th session.

UK has indicated most it will agree to is motion postpone consideration this question *sine die*. They are afraid that like 5th Session, 6th might last all year, and they are not ready freeze position for that long. Dept feels strongly *sine die* postponement insufficient since it wld permit Sov raise question repeatedly during 6th Session.

It is recommended that you stress to Eden that US appreciates UK situation re Chi Rep in UN and spirit cooperation leading to moratorium. US in no way seeking press UK go beyond agreed compromise position. We feel strongly, however, that US proposal for procedures 6th Session only practical way maintaining moratorium position without allowing Sov opportunity to hamper GA proceedings and seek repeated propaganda victories by raising Chi Rep question over and over in Assembly. From UK point of view also, it wld seem desirable assure that question wld not arise more than once during Paris session and thus UK be spared need reassert its delicate position this question.

It is also recommended that you indicate confidence we can prevent prolongation 6th GA session. We are prepared, however, accept procedure which makes it clear that question is postponed only "for

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[1] Repeated for information to London as 2317.

[2] The Secretary of State arrived in Paris on November 1, to head the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

[3] This was the briefing memorandum of August 31, prepared for the use of the Secretary of State at the Washington Tripartite Ministerial meetings; see p. 261.

duration 6th session GA in Paris". If 6th session recesses to convene later, we wld agree consult further at that time.

UK EmbOff reiterated UK position to Hickerson Nov 2. Hickerson reviewed US position and indicated he wld recommend to you proposal in previous para.

WEBB

IO Files

Minutes of Third Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Paris, November 3, 1951 [1]

SECRET
US/A/M (Chr)/190

[Here follow list of persons (42) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. *Chinese Representation*

Mr. Taylor said that this matter was certain to arise on Tuesday [2] afternoon either by way of specific proposals or on points of order. The Russians would probably spring the matter just after the speeches by French President Auriol and GA President Entezam. The delegation was checking with Cordier [3] in the SYG's office as to any communications from Chou En-Lai [4] and the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Taylor recalled the short history of the Rau committee on Chinese Representation and how it had died with the fifth GA, the Nationalists having been seated provisionally throughout the course of that session. It was understood that the matter was not to be raised on Monday at the closing meeting of the fifth session, but no guarantee of this could be given.

The moratorium agreement, worked out with the British, to have any proposals sidetracked by postponing consideration of the matter, was outlined by Mr. Taylor. The device was simple and had worked well in some forty-odd separate cases. The US or a friendly power would move postponement. The UK would make a statement in support. The US would then state that the effect of this motion would be to seat the Nationalists. The moratorium had worked well in the past, and permitted the issue to be dealt with and shelved completely for the duration of whatever session of whichever body was considering it.

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[1] For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

[2] November 6.

[3] Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

[4] Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China.

Mr. Taylor reported that it would be hard for Entezam to rule the cloture of the debate after a Russian proposal had been made. Therefore, the US was proposing alternatives to the UK to deal with the matter with the least possible difficulty. The result of both of them would be to take care of the Chinese Representation problem for the duration of the sixth Assembly. The UK, however, objected to the reference in our scheme to talk of "duration" and also to mentioning the effect of the resolution, therein, of seating the Nationalists. They had indicated their dislike of foreclosing this issue once and for all for the sixth session. The implication behind this attitude seemed to be that if an armistice were reached in Korea, they would wish to recondsider their position. The UK seemed to prefer returning to the old simple formula. If we should accept this, it was pointed out, it would be absolutely essential to have it understood that the Nationalists would be seated and that this arrangement would last throughout the whole of the sixth session.

The Secretary said that if, after considering both alternatives, Eden did not like either one of them, it would be necessary to concert on language which would have the effect of seating the Nationalists provisionally, although from a public relations point of view this would be less desirable. Mr. Taylor said that the working arrangements we have had with the UK went farther than the exchange of notes with British Foreign Minister Morrison would seem to indicate. The difficulty for the British in the past with reference to talk of "duration" had been that this beclouded the issue with the ticklish problem of defining when a period of hostilities had ended. Ambassador Austin recalled how easily the old arrangement had worked in the Headquarters Advisory Committee of which he had been chairman since its inception. A simple rule that the matter was out of order had always sufficed. If this had been challenged, it had been put to the vote immediately, and had always been sustained.

Ambassador Gross reported that Entezam had agreed to apply Rule 75 if a USSR motion to seat the Communists or unseat the Nationalists should be followed by a motion by the US or a friendly power to postpone debate thereon. In his opinion this would be a priority motion. Entezam was not so certain, however, that it would be proper if it contained words that this postponement was for a certain duration. He did not consider Rules 75 and 78 applicable to our alternatives A and B, which were, in his opinion, non-procedural motions.

Mr. Sandifer [5] answered Ambassador Austin's question as to what the exact objective of the Department was in this regard by saying

[5] Durward V. Sandifer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs and one of two Senior Advisers to the United States Delegation (the other was John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council).

that we preferred to settle the matter by one action for the entire session. The UK, on the other hand, wanted to keep it a more open question. If there were to be an armistice, it would be much harder to deal with on a second time around. The Department felt a proper interval should follow an armistice before the General Assembly could appropriately even consider the question of Chinese Representation. If the matter were dealt with by our alternatives A or B, it would take a two-thirds vote to reopen the question, a course which would be very difficult for the proponents of the Chinese Communists.

Ambassador Austin wondered how expedient our approach was. Mr. Sandifer replied that it might be possible to get the UK to agree, and that in any case we should push them very hard on this matter. The Secretary would see Eden and attempt to persuade him of our correctness in the matter. Assuming for the sake of argument that the UK did not agree to A or B, we should try to work out language which would omit the idea that the Assembly's action was only temporary. This would be feasible only to the extent that it was made crystal clear that the Nationalists are to be seated with full rights for the session, so that the Credentials Committee's report to the Plenary would not precipitate another big debate. The Secretary would undertake to use all his persuasive powers with Eden to gain acceptance of A or B, and if that attempt failed, then to get agreement on a postponement formula which would assure seating the Nationalists. This would not give any trouble in the Credentials Committee since it was pretty well understood that the functions of that group were only clerical; that is, to look at the credentials and see that no forgeries were being perpetrated upon the UN.

In suggesting a way to support the Secretary's arguments with Eden, Mr. Nolting offered the idea that when the chips were finally down the UK would only get some seventeen votes. Thus for the UK to insist on their point of view would yield them no advantage. They were certain to lose on the vote, and the only result would be to publicize the split between us. In answer to this Mr. Sandifer said that there would be many Members who would prefer the simple UK formula, in that the acceptance of it really meant taking no position on the substance of the matter. The Secretary was inclined to agree that if the choice were put to the Assembly of a USSR motion, US alternatives A or B, or the UK formula, the last would gain the most adherents. Mr. Sandifer agreed with this estimate of the situation and said it was for this reason that we must try to get our idea accepted in place of the UK's, so that theirs would not be offered to the Assembly. Ambassador Gross said the split would involve more than just the western world. The Arab and Eastern states, too, would be split among themselves, and the issue in many countries would require a cabinet decision to resolve it. The choice was between risking

precipitating an inevitable debate, and obtaining the advantage of quick action. In some forty cases the Soviets had subsided on this matter once it had been put out of the way via the moratorium procedure. There would still be the chance that they might harass the Assembly continually on this matter.

The Secretary wondered if the delegation agreed that he should try to get Eden to agree to alternative A or B. Mr. Fisher said that the advantage of either alternative would be to clear the air after the matter was settled, since regardless of how the matter came up the Soviets would pull a big debate by some ruse or other. To settle it finally would serve well the purpose of stopping the flow after the initial onslaught. It was decided that the Secretary would approach Eden on A and B to seek his agreement. It was further decided that, if Eden would not agree to A or B, the US would not attempt to go it alone. As Ambassador Austin put it, the US, in the exercise of its great leadership in the international community today, must have somebody to lead. It can't carry the flag so far ahead of the parade that no parade follows.

In response to various questions, the Secretary said that it was generally believed that a motion to postpone the matter for the duration of the sixth session would obtain sufficient votes. The view was expressed by Ambassadors Austin, Gross, and Sayre that it was unwise to engage the US prestige on this matter, to upset a none-too-steady applecart, or to evoke emotional reactions.

It was decided that if Eden would not accept either alternative, we would seek to get his agreement on a formula something like the moratorium agreement, but with the added assurance that the postponement would last for the sixth session's stay in Paris and would keep the Nationalists in their seat.

Miss Bacon suggested that the reason behind the UK unwillingness as apparently indicated by the discussion could spring from a desire to bring the Communists into the UN for substantive discussions on the armistice terms.

CHARLES D. COOK

310.2/11–551

Briefing Memorandum for Talks by the Secretary of State With the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), Paris, November 4, 1951 [1]

CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN THE SIXTH GA

I. In your talk with Mr. Eden on the question of Chinese Representation in the Sixth GA, it is suggested that you seek his support for one of the following alternative procedures (in order of preference) which in our opinion fall within the scope of the moratorium agreement:

A. Motion to effect that the Sixth GA decide to take no action on any proposals to exclude Chinese National Representatives or to seat Chinese Communist Representatives.

B. Motion to postpone consideration of any such proposals for the duration of the Sixth Session.

In connection with alternative B, it would be understood—and you would state in your supporting speech—that the effect of its adoption would be that the Chinese Nationalist Representatives would be seated for this session.

II. If the UK will not support alternative A or B, it is suggested that you should not force the issue to the extent of proposing that we go our separate ways. In these circumstances you might suggest that we await the initiative of the USSR and move adjournment of debate on the issue under Rules 75 and 78.

In presenting alternatives A and B, you may wish to make use of the following arguments:

1. We believe it to be a matter of the highest importance that the Chinese Communists not be seated. Surely the UK, with its forces now actively resisting Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, would not wish to have the Chinese Communists seated.

2. We believe it to be of the highest importance likewise that the US and UK work together on this issue.

3. The question should be disposed of promptly and effectively so that the GA can get on to the important issues before it. Postponement *sine die* would permit the Soviet bloc to raise the issue of Chinese representation at any time. The question would become an issue also in connection with the Credentials Committee and with its report to the GA.

4. Postponement *sine die* would be too temporary a device to satisfy American public opinion which, as Mr. Eden must be aware, is deeply concerned with the question of Chinese representation.

[1] Although the date of November 5 is handwritten at the top left-hand corner of the document, inductive evidence indicates that the paper was prepared for use by Acheson at the November 4 bipartite meeting with Eden.

5. As the proposed procedures avoid any questions impinging on the substance of the problem, the UK should be able to accept these procedures without any serious difficulty.

6. If Mr. Eden objects that adoption of the US proposal might result in sealing the issue for an entire year, you might say that no one, of course, can guarantee when the session will terminate. It is our purpose—and we have so informed all friendly governments—that the session should be completed within the minimum possible time. We have been talking in terms of 8 to 10 weeks and we shall bend every effort toward this end. We would be prepared to accept language which makes it clear that the question is postponed only "for the duration of the Sixth GA in Paris."

7. In any case, the UK could certainly not contemplate seating the Chinese Communists within the near future. Even if an armistice should be arrived at, it is inconceivable that the UK would wish to take up the question of seating the Chinese Communists immediately thereafter.

CFM Files. Lot M 88. Box 159

Minutes of Bipartite Conversation, Paris, November 4, 1951

SECRET
NOVB M–1

Participants: Secretary Acheson
Ambassador Bruce [1]
Mr. Eden
British Ambassador to France, Sir Oliver Harvey

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

3. I raised the question of *Chinese Representation* in the United Nations. It appeared that Mr. Eden was not presently familiar with this situation. Mr. Eden said that he thought we should maintain the moratorium agreement. He was under the impression that this was a UN agreement and that by maintaining it no action was required in the General Assembly. It was explained to him that this was merely a United States–United Kingdom understanding to the effect that we would jointly act to postpone decisions in regard to Chinese representation during the pendency of the Korean action and not involve ourselves in the merits of the question.

I then explained to him our proposals (*a*) and (*b*) and also the possibility of the third action, which was to allow the Russians to take the initiative and then move to end the debate. I explained why our proposals were more advantageous to the Western position, be-

[1] David K. E. Bruce, United States Ambassador to France.

cause they settled the question for the duration of the present Assembly.

Mr. Eden said that in the light of what I had presented to him, he would be in favor of something along the lines of our proposal (*b*) and also he raised the issue of the duration. I suggested the duration should be the present meeting in Paris. He asked that our officers should get in touch with Mr. Shuckburgh,[2] who would work this out.

I strongly suggest that we do not overplay our hand on this matter of the language of alternative (*b*) and I would not try to press the duration question upon the present meeting in Paris.

4. The next matter raised was Mr. Eden's suggestion that it would be most helpful to him to have some three-power discussions. He handed me the attached agenda for items for such discussions. He pointed out that some of the items would have been passed before the talks occurred but that a great deal of time could be wasted on general discussions; however, it was clear that he would like to be brought up to date on the views of Mr. Schuman and me on a great many of these matters. It was decided that we would gladly cooperate in arranging a meeting with Mr. Schuman, which might take place sometime on Tuesday or as soon thereafter as convenient.

I said that I understood that it had been arranged that we would meet at three o'clock Monday afternoon, which, he said, was entirely agreeable to him.[3]

[2] Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden.

[3] In reporting briefly to the United States Delegation on November 5 on his meeting with Eden, Acheson "warned whoever was to deal with the United Kingdom on this [Chinese representation issue] not to over-trade. It appeared that they were extremely ill-informed as to the nature of the moratorium agreement, and other aspects of the problem. Since they would not accept alternative B, we must not over-push them on it. Ambassador Gross, Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Sandifer were to work on this with the UK. It was important to note that the UK were not at all worried about the matter. Thus if we did not make it complicated, the UK would accept our position." (Minutes of 4th meeting of the U.S. Delegation, IO Files, Doc. US/A/M (Chr)/191)

310.2/11–551

Memorandum by Messrs. Fisher and Sandifer, Advisers, United States Delegation, to the Secretary of State

SECRET [PARIS,] November 5, 1951.

Subject: Chinese Representation

Pursuant to your wishes, conveyed to us by Mr. Battle,[1] we went to the British Embassy at noon through arrangement made by Mr. Raynor to consult with Mr. Shuckburgh concerning the Chinese

[1] Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Representation question. Mr. Raynor was present for the conversation. As Mr. Shuckburgh was not able to be present, we talked with Mr. Parrott who handles this matter in the Foreign Office and Mr. Dunnett (?) of the British Embassy staff.

We told Mr. Parrott that we understood that the Secretary and Mr. Eden had discussed this question briefly and had reached a tentative measure of agreement on a procedure along the lines of our Alternative B position. After some discussion, at Mr. Parrott's request, we indicated the following language as the sort of thing we had in mind:

"*The General Assembly Decides* to postpone consideration, for the duration of the Sixth Regular Session meeting in Paris, of any proposals to exclude representatives of the National Government of China from the Assembly or to seat Chinese Communist representatives to represent China in the Assembly."

Mr. Parrott expressed concern as to whether or not this was the best way to handle the problem or whether it was not preferable to wait until a motion was made by the Soviets in which case a motion to adjourn debate might dispose of the matter quickly. We indicated that from our point of view it was preferable to have affirmative action initiated by us in the form of a procedural motion of the kind set forth above. Mr. Parrott thought that the language suggested met the other two matters that had concerned the British, that is some specific statement relative to continuing the Chinese Nationalists in the Chinese seat, and the question of the duration of the resolution. Mr. Parrott said that while his Government had no thought of changing its position immediately after an armistice, if one should be concluded, they preferred not to have language which tied their hands for an indefinite period of time. He seemed to feel that the phrase "meeting in Paris" would meet their needs on this point although it was made clear that our position would be the same if under any circumstances this session should continue after the Paris meeting. Mr. Parrott said that he was not in a position to definitely agree to the text and that he would take it up with Mr. Jebb before the Secretary's meeting with Mr. Eden at 3 o'clock.

Mr. Parrott agreed to the great urgency of this matter in view of the fact that it will come up for action tomorrow afternoon. We indicated that we would probably have to proceed with conversations with other governments this afternoon.

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Minutes of Bipartite Conversation, Paris, November 5, 1951, 3:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

NOVB M–2

Present:

United Kingdom

Mr. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary
Mr. Lloyd, Minister for State
Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Permanent Under Secretary
Mr. Bowker, Superintending Under Secretary for the Middle East
Mr. Parrott, Chief of UN Division, Foreign Office
Mr. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Mr. Eden

United States

Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
Mr. Lewis Jones
Mr. Hayden Raynor
For latter part of meeting—Dr. Philip Jessup

Chinese Representation

The Secretary read the draft resolution on this question which had been presented to the British on an official level at 12:00 o'clock as follows:

"The General Assembly decides to postpone consideration, for the duration of the sixth regular session meeting in Paris, of any proposals to exclude representatives of the National Government of China from the Assembly or to seat Chinese Communist representatives to represent China in the Assembly."

Mr. Eden inquired about the procedure followed last year, and the Secretary explained how the matter had developed at the Fifth Assembly. The Secretary stressed that the inclusion in the draft resolution of the reference to the Sixth Session Meeting in Paris had been included in an attempt to meet the position of the United Kingdom. Mr. Lloyd inquired if we considered this to be a procedural motion, and the Secretary replied that we did. In response to a further inquiry, the Secretary indicated that if the Russians got the floor first, we could consider it a move to limit debate.

Mr. Eden indicated that the wording of the resolution was agreeable to him, but he questioned whether it was wise for us to take the initiative on the matter. The Secretary replied that he felt it was essential that we take the initiative in order "to put the matter to sleep until February."

Mr. Eden said that he would have to consult the dominions on this matter which he could do tonight as he was dining with them. He

thought that our objective of "putting the matter to sleep" was agreeable, and he also felt that if the matter did not come up from time to time, the result would probably be to facilitate the truce negotiations rather than the reverse.

The Secretary agreed that if Vishinsky obtained the floor before he did on this matter, other tactics might have to be followed.

Mr. Eden agreed that we could go ahead in view of the urgency of the matter, as it may come up tomorrow, with discussions on this draft resolution with the French and other friendly delegations, and that we could indicate that, while the United Kingdom had not definitely approved the resolution, they were not adverse to it.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 155

Minutes of Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, Paris, French Foreign Office, November 6, 1951, 10:30 a. m.

TOP SECRET

NOVT M-1

Present:

France

Foreign Minister Schuman, M. Parodi, M. de la Tournelle, Ambassadors Bonnet, Massigli and Chauvel, M. Broustra, M. Maurice Schumann, M. de Bourbon Busset, and for part of the meeting, Mr. Lacoste.

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Eden, Messrs. Lloyd, Dixon, Shuckburgh, Bowker, Jebb, Parrott, and U.K. Ambassador to France.

United States

Secretary, Ambassadors Bruce, Gifford and Jessup, Assistant Secretary Perkins, Mr. Raynor. For portions of meeting, Messrs. Ridgway Knight, Lewis Jones and Wainhouse.

General

Mr. Schuman opened the meeting by stating that this was not a conference, but an informal meeting for a frank exchange of views. He suggested that we commence with the urgent problems now coming up in the U.N.

[Here follows discussion of a prior agenda item.]

Chinese Representation

Mr. Schuman opened this discussion by suggesting that this matter would probably be raised in the Credentials Committee.

Mr. Acheson countered with the statement that he thought it would arise in the opening plenary session of the Assembly this afternoon. He expressed the view that Mr. Vishinsky probably would attempt to get the floor to raise this question at the very opening of the meeting. Mr. Acheson felt that we should attempt to anticipate this move by taking the initiative in putting in our own resolution. He said he had in mind a resolution which would postpone the question without going into its merits. He said he would ask General Romulo [1] to make this motion, and that he would promptly support it.

Mr. Eden asked Sir Gladwyn Jebb to comment. Jebb said he thought this course of action was a possibility, but that we were confronted by the technical point that the item is not on the agenda. He wondered therefore if it would not be better to let Vishinsky get the floor and then put in our resolution as a procedural motion to end the matter. He added, however, that this was further complicated by President Entezam's feeling that the resolution was not procedural as it contained a specific date and that therefore a Soviet resolution would be voted on first. He concluded by saying that if Entezam was not convinced on this point, there appeared to be two alternatives: (*a*) the U.S. plan, (*b*) following the past procedure and adjourning the question *sine die*.

Secretary Acheson said he thought President Entezam was confused. He would agree that if our resolution followed Vishinsky's, it would not fall under rule 75, and that Entezam then was correct. He said, however, that this would not hold if our resolution was put in first. It would then have priority.

Mr. Eden observed that he did not think that any resolution Mr. Vishinsky would put forward would obtain much support. However he felt that some delegations, even some of the Dominions, would vote against or abstain on our resolution if it should be put first.

Mr. Schuman commented that the only objection to the British plan would be that Vishinsky could repeat the same process every day.

Secretary Acheson confirmed that thought and added that it could be done in each committee each day as well as in the Assembly itself. He said he felt, therefore, that what we had in mind would have to be done sooner or later and he felt it was better to do it today and get it over with, because each time Vishinsky raised the matter, he would attempt to squeeze some propaganda out of it.

Mr. Eden then said that he would agree to the U.S. proposal if both Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman felt it was the best thing to do, saying that he did not "mind it very much". The matter was then agreed.

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[1] Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Chairman, Philippine Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

The U.K. then raised a point about the language "Chinese Communist Representatives" in the resolution, pointing out that in U.N. resolutions in the past, which the U.S. have voted for, the full name of the Chinese Communist government had been used. After some discussion of this point, the Secretary indicated that while we preferred our original wording, he would be willing to tell Romulo that we would accept the inclusion of the full name of the Chinese Commie Government if Romulo agreed to put the resolution in that form.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

Editorial Note

At the meeting of the General Committee on November 10 at 2:30 p. m., the substance of the draft resolution agreed upon at the bipartite and tripartite meetings, November 5 and 6, was presented in the form of a motion by the Thai delegate (Prince Wan). After some discussion the Committee adopted the resolution 11–2–1. For the proceedings, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, General Committee*, pages 15–17.

On November 13, after some debate, the General Assembly in plenary session adopted the Report of the General Committee (UN Doc. A/1950), which included the recommendation of the Committee that the Chinese representation question be postponed. For the text of the General Committee Report (specifically paragraph 6), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 7. For the proceedings of the General Assembly on this matter, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 99–104.

An attempt by the Soviet bloc to revive the question was rejected by the General Assembly on December 7. The occasion was the consideration and adoption of the Report of the Credentials Committee by the General Assembly. For the proceedings, see *ibid.*, pages 211–214.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS; THE QUESTION OF THE ADMISSION OF ITALY AS A SPECIAL CASE [1]

310/1–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

SECRET ROME, January 12, 1951—8 p. m.

3012. As possibility increasing Italian participation UN affairs despite continued exclusion membership, Embassy suggests possibility establishing practice Italian observer request seat, without vote, on all GA committees considering problems in which Italy an "interested party", as was done connection all committee consideration Italian colonies questions.[2] Suggest possibility existing GA rules of procedure could be construed as permitting Italian non-voting participation committee consideration almost any political, security or social problem before UN on basis consideration Italy truly an interested party connection all problems effecting world peace, security and economic and social development. Certainly Italy is an interested party connection Korean question which contains inherent threat peace whole world; Italy vitally interested technical assistance and "Point IV" problems; has direct and historic interest Palestine problem, particularly in relation Roman Catholic Church interests. In these and many similar problems Embassy convinced Italian voice in GA committees could have great influence, particularly with LA delegates, and could be counted on in main to give strong general support positions US delegation.

Italians will probably continue decline official participation UN as "associate member", or in other inferior status on grounds affront to Italian dignity. However, we believe Italians might welcome committee participation as "interested party" on basis Italian colony question precedent. Gastone Guidotti, present Director General Political Affairs FonOff, will replace Mascia [3] as Italian observer late this month or

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[1] For previous documentation on the United Nations membership question, see *Foreign Relations*, volume I for 1946–1948 and volume II for 1949–1950.

[2] For documentation regarding the establishment of Italy as an Administering Authority for the United Nations over the former Italian colonies, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. V, pp. 1600 ff.

[3] Luciano Mascia, Italian Minister of Embassy (Washington) and Italian Observer at the United Nations (New York).

early February. He will undoubtedly pursue much more active role at UN than Italian delegate has in past and participation committees as suggested above might prove more effective procedure than reliance on strictly "corridor and delegates lounge diplomacy."

If Department agrees above suggestion feasible and desirable and would support Italian requests for committee participation, I would recommend Embassy be authorized explore possibility with FonOff. perhaps informing Guidotti procedure would have Department's approval and support. (Procedure could of course also be applied for other non-members whose application blocked by Soviet veto.)

Department pass USUN. Sent Department 3012, repeated information USUN 33.

DUNN

310.265/1–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1951.

Subject: Admission of Italy into the United Nations

Participants: Ambassador Tarchiani, Italian Embassy
The Secretary of State
Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., WE

Ambassador Tarchiani said that one impression he had received very strongly during his visit to Italy was the concern of public opinion that Italy was tending to be pushed on the sidelines when main issues were discussed. He felt that the Italian people were very much aware of Italy's failure to obtain admission into the United Nations and that there was some impression that Italy's allies had not supported her strongly enough in that connection. He said that if Communist China were to be admitted into the UN and Italy not, the resultant reaction on Italian public opinion would be most unfavorable.[2] I said that as he knew, we were strongly in favor of Italian admission into the UN.

[1] Drafted by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington). Initialed for the Secretary of State by Francis E. Meloy, Jr., of the Executive Secretariat.

[2] For documentation regarding the question of Chinese representation, see pp. 209 ff.

310/1–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 1, 1951—2 p. m.

3297. While agree Italy has interest in substantial number GA matters (urtel 3012, Jan 12) Dept reluctant take initiative in encouraging Italy, at this stage, to ask what wld amount to gen participation GA discussions. Heretofore, requests to participate granted only on *ad hoc* basis and in instances where non-member especially involved as party or otherwise. Grant gen permission to Italy to participate wld make it difficult reject participation any non-member state in discussion almost any subj, and wld have obvious bearing on membership problem.

Further consideration will be given to matter before next GA. Meanwhile, US will be glad maintain contact with Ital observer and will give sympathetic consideration to any Ital request participate in discussion of matter in which Italy can show some special interest. US will favor inviting Ital rep sit regularly in TC and participate fully, except for right to vote, in all deliberations relating both directly and indirectly to Somaliland.

ACHESON

[1] Drafted in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (UNP) on January 30.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador in Italy (Dunn)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 30, 1951.

DEAR JIMMY: I want to make more detailed comment than was given in the Department's telegram [1] concerning your suggestion that the Italians be encouraged to request permission to participate in discussions, in General Assembly committees, of a wide range of subjects in the political, security, economic and social fields.

As you may know, the question of granting general participation in the General Assembly to non-members has arisen several times in the past in connection with the membership problem. In April 1948, on the occasion of one of the Soviet vetoes of Italy's membership application, Senator Austin [2] referred in general terms to the possibility

[1] Telegram 3297, February 1, 2 p. m., to Rome, *supra*.

[2] Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations. In March 1948 the United States initiated and actively promoted an effort to have the Security Council reconsider and favorably act upon Italy's application for membership in the United Nations. This was terminated by a negative vote of

that the General Assembly might hear the views of non-members. The Canadians made fairly detailed suggestions to this effect, involving the creation of a status of "associated states" and the modification of some rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Dr. Arce, the Argentine delegate to the United Nations, made a similar suggestion. In discussions in New York, the British were definitely opposed to all these suggestions, and Italy and most non-member states involved showed extreme sensitiveness to the implication that they were being offered "second-class membership". We did not, therefore, pursue the matter further. During the consideration of the membership question in the General Assembly in December 1950, El Salvador proposed a resolution which would, among other things, invite the states which have been excluded from membership as a result of the veto, to send observers to the committees of the General Assembly. This provision was rejected by 27 votes to 11, with 16 abstentions. We voted against it, without in any way campaigning. We understand that Mascia opposed it strongly.

Your suggestion is somewhat different in that it would base Italy's participation on Italy's interest in the particular matter concerned. The General Assembly has proceeded cautiously in dealing with the problem of requests for participation by non-members and, in the absence of specific rules of procedure, has treated each case on an *ad hoc* basis. It has in practice limited the participation of non-member states to those problems in which they have a special interest. Even in such cases, it has further limited the participation of certain states in specific instances because they wished to utilize the Assembly as a propaganda forum without being willing to assume the Charter obligations of peaceful settlement.

Italy could claim a special interest in some United Nations questions in the discussion of which it has not hitherto participated. For example, since non-members might participate in measures against aggression and might even be asked to do so, Italy might have a special and individual interest in the discussion of such measures. We would accordingly see no objection to Italy's participation in such debate if it so requested. Wherever Italy could make a case for the view that it had a special and individual interest in a matter under discussion, the General Assembly committee concerned would probably grant a hearing readily.

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the Soviet Union on April 10 (the question being a substantive matter and the Soviet Union a permanent member of the Security Council whose negative vote constituted a "veto"). For documentation on the United States *démarche* regarding Italian membership in March and April 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 1, pp. 173 ff.

A somewhat different question would be raised by a request to participate in the discussion of a matter in which Italy had only a general interest—as a member of the international community. To grant participation in such a case would alter considerably the practice heretofore followed and would probably involve practical difficulties. A general arrangement for Italy's participation in General Assembly discussions on the scale suggested in your telegram would in effect permit any non-member state to join in the discussion of practically any matter. It would, moreover, be obvious that such an arrangement has a bearing on the problem of United Nations membership—a problem in relation to which it does not seem useful for the United States to initiate action at the present time. Accordingly, we are reluctant at this point to take the initiative in encouraging Italy to raise the question of a general arrangement for its participation in General Assembly committees.

We will, however, give further consideration in the Department to this question in the course of our preparations for the next General Assembly. In the meantime, our delegation in New York will of course be glad to consult with Guidotti. We will consider sympathetically any Italian request that may be made, to participate in the discussion of matters in which Italy can show some special interest. Of course, we are seriously concerned over the problem of bringing Italy and other deserving states into full participation in the United Nations as rapidly as possible. For example, as indicative of our desire to increase *ad hoc* Italian participation whenever feasible our Delegation to the present session of the Trusteeship Council has been instructed to favor having the Council invite the Italian representative to sit regularly in the Council and to participate fully, except for the right to vote, in all deliberations relating both directly and indirectly to Somaliland.

With regards and every good wish,

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

IO Files [1]

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Eighth Session of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations [2]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1951.

SD/T/172

Item 14 (Table of Contents): *Problems Relating to the Somaliland Trusteeship Agreement* (Item 23 of Provisional Agenda)

The Problem

The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take on certain problems relating to the implementation of the Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland under Italian administration; namely, the question of Italian representation in the Trusteeship Council, the question of the preparation of the first report on Somaliland by the administering authority, and the question of the sending of a visiting mission to Somaliland.

Recommendations

1. The Delegation should take the position that Italy should be invited to designate a representative to sit regularly in the Trusteeship Council with the right to participate fully, except for the right to vote, in the deliberations of the Council relating directly or indirectly to the administration of Somaliland and the position of Italy as an administering authority. The United States should oppose efforts to limit Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council's deliberations specifically to those occasions when reports or petitions relating to Somaliland are being examined.

2. The Delegation should support the transmission of the provisional questionnaire to Italy as the Administering Authority for Somaliland. In view of the fact that Italy has been administering Somaliland since April 1, 1950 and of the Charter requirement of an annual report by the Administering Authority on each trust territory, the Delegation should urge on the Italian Delegation that Italy agree to submit a report on Somaliland in time for examination by the Trusteeship Council at its ninth session (June–July 1951).

3. If the question arises, the Delegation should support the inclusion of Somaliland among the territories to be visited by the forthcoming visiting mission to the trust territories in East Africa.

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[1] Files of the Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State (hereafter cited as "IO Files").

[2] The United Nations Trusteeship Council held its Eighth Session at Lake Success, New York, January 30–March 16, 1951. This document is located in a "position book" which includes instructions to the Delegation on all matters on the agenda of the Eighth Session.

Basis of Recommendations

The General Assembly on December 2, 1950 approved the draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration. The purpose of this paper is to deal with certain problems which may be expected to arise in the Trusteeship Council as the result of the approval of the Agreement.

Recommendation 1

The trusteeship arrangements for Somaliland are unique in that the administering authority (Italy) is not a Member of the United Nations. Accordingly, Italy cannot be a Member of the Trusteeship Council, since the Council's membership is restricted to "Members of the United Nations" (Article 86 of the Charter). It will be necessary, therefore, for the Council to make the necessary arrangements for participation by Italy in the work of the Council so that the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland may be effectively carried out.

It is believed that the Delegation should take a broad view of Italian participation in the work of the Council. No purpose would appear to be served by an effort to limit Italian participation to those occasions when the Trust Territory of Somaliland is under examination. While Italy is precluded from exercising a vote by the terms of Articles 86 and 89 of the Charter, the Charter imposes no other restrictions regarding participation of an Italian representative. Recommendation 1 suggests that Italy should be invited to designate a representative to sit regularly in the Trusteeship Council. Except for the right to vote, he would be able to participate fully in all deliberations of the Council relating both directly and indirectly to Somaliland. The nature of the Council's deliberations is such that it is impossible to determine in advance when some matter of general application to all trust territories or of concern to Italy as the administering authority of Somaliland might arise. For example, the Council's consideration of a petition relating to Western Samoa might be of interest and concern to Italy because of analogous circumstances which might exist in Somaliland. Therefore, it is believed desirable for a representative of Italy to sit regularly with the Council with rights of participation as indicated in the recommendation.

It may be noted that the question of Italian participation in the work of the Trusteeship Council would not arise if Italy were a Member of the United Nations and, as a consequence, a Member of the Trusteeship Council. Except for the opposition of the Soviet Union, Italy would no doubt now be a Member of the United Nations. It is believed that the United States, which has consistently supported Italian membership in the United Nations, should oppose any efforts that might be made to narrowly restrict Italian participation in the deliberations of the Trusteeship Council.

[Here follow recommendations regarding the question of the preparation of the first report on Somaliland by Italy, and the question of the sending of a UN visiting mission to Somaliland.]

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 5, 1951.

US/T/92

Subject: Italian Participation in UN Trusteeship Council

Participants: Mr. Felice Catalano, Italian Embassy [1]
Mr. William I. Cargo—UND [2]
Mr. A. E. Wellons—AF

Mr. Catalano came in this afternoon at his request to review the question of Italian participation in the current session of the UN Trusteeship Council in New York. He said that the Italian observer at the United Nations, Mr. Mascia, had received strong instructions from Rome to press for full Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council even though Italy is not a member of the United Nations. He explained that by "full participation" the Italian Government includes the right to vote in spite of the fact that Article 86 of the UN Charter limits membership of the Trusteeship Council to "Members of the United Nations". I expressed doubt that such an arrangement could be made within the terms of the Charter but said I would check with the Office of United Nations Affairs on the matter. (I telephoned Mr. Cargo of UND and asked him to join the discussion.)

Mr. Catalano explained to Mr. Cargo that in the view of the Italian Government a new situation exists regarding Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council which was not contemplated when the UN Charter was adopted. This situation, he explained, is that Italy has been prevented from becoming a member of the UN several times by Soviet vetoes. Although Italy was not a member of the UN, General Assembly granted Italy trusteeship over former Italian Somaliland and Italy had accepted all the obligations of the UN in that regard. Therefore, the Italian Government felt it was justified in asking for the right to vote in meetings of the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Catalano added that the Argentine member of the Council would probably present a resolution proposing that Italy be given the right to vote by amending the UN Charter.

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[1] Catalano was a Second Secretary of Embassy.
[2] Cargo was Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

Mr. Cargo explained that Article 86 of the UN Charter limited membership in the Council to members of the UN and that, therefore, he did not see how Italy could legally be given the right to vote without an amendment to the UN Charter. Mr. Catalano then said that the Italian Government realized this but felt it would be worthwhile to press for an appropriate amendment under Article 108 of the Charter. Mr. Cargo explained that the procedure outlined in Article 108, even if the amendment received a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, would probably take several years and would require ratification by two-thirds of the members of the UN, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. If the Soviet Union vetoed Italy's application for membership, he added, it was likely that they would not ratify such an amendment giving Italy the right to vote in the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Catalano said they would not object to such a result because the responsibility would lie clearly with the Soviets.

Mr. Cargo and I also pointed out that under the terms of the Charter it would be necessary for the General Assembly to elect a nonadministering member of the Trusteeship Council if Italy should obtain the right to vote as an administering member. Mr. Catalano said that, of course, they would expect this to be done.

Mr. Cargo emphasized that the present instructions to the US representative on the Trusteeship Council were to support full Italian participation without the right to vote. He added that some members of the Council and the Secretariat desired to limit Italian participation only to matters directly affecting Italian Somaliland. Mr. Cargo and I made it clear that under the terms of the UN Charter as it now stands we did not see how it would be possible for the US to support a proposal permitting Italy to vote in the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Catalano asked if we would review the situation in the light of further discussions in New York after the Argentine proposal is introduced. We readily agreed saying that much would depend, of course, on the wording of the Argentine draft resolution.

350/2–851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 8, 1951—3 p. m.

3437. Ital Emb informs Dept Ital observer UN has been instructed press for full Ital participation TC including right to vote. Ital Govt said to believe owing Ital non-membership UN although an administering power, new situation exists which not contemplated when UN Charter adopted.

[1] Repeated for information to USUN as 694.

Dept informally explained that only ways in which Ital participation with vote cld be achieved are (*a*) Ital admission UN or (*b*) amendment Art 86 Charter in accordance Art 108. Neither these courses feasible or likely be fruitful at this time; in any case TC cannot act thereon. TC cld at most make recommendation to GA.

Accordingly, Dept indicated to Ital Emb US Del cld not support proposal for Ital vote in TC but wld of course take position outlined last sentence Deptel 3297 Feb 1.

Dept requests you informally convey our thinking this matter to appropriate officials FonOff. You shld add to foregoing our thought that attempts force either membership or Charter amendment issues at this time wld be ill-advised and, apart from US inability support Ital, might well be counterproductive for Ital, not only in TC but in more gen UN context.

ACHESON

350/2–1351

Memorandum of Two Telephone Conversations, by the Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs (Cargo)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, February 13, 1951.

Subject: Question of Italian Voting in the Trusteeship Council

Participants: Mr. Felice Catalano, Italian Embassy
Mr. William Cargo, UND

Mr. Catalano telephoned on February 12 to say that he had been informed that Mr. Mascia was still pursuing in New York certain aspects of the question of Italian voting in the Trusteeship Council. In response to my inquiry, Mr. Catalano indicated that he was aware that the Department had sent views to Rome on this question and said that he was generally aware of the nature of those views. He said, however, he wished to inquire most informally what the attitude of the Department would be regarding the possible establishment by the Trusteeship Council of a "Commission of Study" on the question of Italian voting in the Council. (Such a Committee might prepare a report for the next session of the Council). He indicated that such a suggestion was in the effort to have at least something done in the Council on the question of the right of Italy to vote.

I expressed the personal view that it would be preferable not to have the question of a possible vote for Italy in the Trusteeship Council pursued at this time even in that form. I said, however, that I would bring his inquiry to the attention of other interested officers in the Department and communicate with him further on the subject as soon as possible.

After consulting with other officers of the Department concerned with this question, I called Mr. Catalano on February 13 to say that it was felt by the Department that the establishment of a Trusteeship Council Committee to study the question of Italian voting would not be a useful step. I said that we felt that the same difficulties would eventually arise as we foresaw in connection with possible proposals at the present time to raise in the Trusteeship Council the issue of a Charter amendment on the question of Italian voting. Mr. Catalano thanked me for giving him these views. He said that Mr. Mascia in New York would determine whether the possibility of a Council Committee should be pursued further and inquired whether our Delegation to the Trusteeship Council would be able to discuss this question with Mr. Mascia. I said that I felt sure that they would, and that we would inform the Delegation of the informal consideration of the question that had taken place here in Washington.

350/2–1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, February 15, 1951—5 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

712. Tcdel. For the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council. Confirming tele cons between Dept and TCDel, Del shld support deletion phrase "upon the invitation of the President" in second sentence of rule A relating to participation Ital in deliberations of TC.[1] Phrase considered undesirable since subject to interpretation that it imposes limitation on Italy's participation in Council's deliberations on general questions relating to operation of international trusteeship system. If question arises in TC, Del shld oppose formation TC Comite to consider question of Ital voting in TC. If such Comite nevertheless formed, US membership shld be avoided.

ACHESON

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[1] At this time a committee of the Trusteeship Council was engaged in revising the Council's rules of procedure to take into account the anomalous situation created by the assumption of United Nations trusteeship authority in Somaliland by a Non-Member of the United Nations (Italy). The committee was established on January 31 with the strong support of the United States, and the United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) was actively engaged in its work. Rule A was drafted to provide for Italy's participation without vote in the work of the Council as it related to the Somaliland trusteeship and questions of general policy. One draft proposed that Italy's participation would proceed from an invitation by the president of the Council.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Donald Vernon McKay, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Eighth Session of the Trusteeship Council [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, February 16, 1951.
US/T/94

Subject: Question of Italian Voting in the Trusteeship Council

Participants: Mr. Luciano Mascia, Italian Observer
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, U.S. Delegation
Mr. Vernon McKay, U.S. Delegation

Mr. Mascia called on Ambassador Sayre this morning to inquire further about United States views regarding Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Mascia opened the conversation by stating that his instructions from Count Sforza [2] remain unchanged. He said that for reasons of internal politics the Italian Government wanted to be able to show the Italian people that the Trusteeship Council was doing everything possible to satisfy Italy's desire for full membership in the Council, including the right to vote. Mr. Mascia wondered what the United States would think of having the Trusteeship Council appoint a small committee to look into the problem and report back in six months at the next session of the Council. Mr. Sayre replied that he felt the Trusteeship Council was not the proper forum in which to raise or discuss this question. He thought that if the question were to be raised, the assembly would be the appropriate forum. Mr. Mascia responded that he did not quite agree. In his view, the Trusteeship Council might very properly call the Assembly's attention to the problem since it was a practical situation which now confronted the Council for the first time. The Italian Government, he said, recognized fully the Charter bar on Italian voting in the Council but was looking for a face saving device for the home front. He believed that the appointment of a committee would suffice for this purpose, even though the committee might be expected to come up with a report stating that nothing could be done to satisfy Italy's request for voting privileges.

Mr. Sayre expressed his doubts regarding the practicability of such a procedure but informed Mr. Mascia that he would talk informally with other members of the Council to get their reactions, and would confer again with Mr. Mascia.

VERNON MCKAY

[1] The conversation took place on February 14.

[2] Count Carlo Sforza, former Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In a recent government reorganization, the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, had assumed the portfolio for foreign affairs.

350/2–1951

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr., of the Office of Western European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 19, 1951.

Subject: Italian Role in Trusteeship Council

Participants: Mr. Catalano, Second Secretary of Italian Embassy
Mr. Greene, WE

Mr. Catalano called to ask whether we had heard anything from our Embassy at Rome in response to the instructions we had sent them on the Italian desire to obtain a vote in the Trusteeship Council. Apparently Mascia in New York had learned that such instructions had been sent and I confirmed that they had along the lines of our earlier discussions here.

Mr. Catalano said that the Italian Foreign Office has instructed Mascia to press the question or at least to keep it open, and has instructed the Embassy here to solicit the Department's support. Accordingly, Mr. Catalano thought he might come down to make formal representations seeking our support of Mascia's idea that the Trusteeship Council establish a sub-committee to study the question. Mr. Catalano said that he was aware of our opposition to this course; in response to his question, I said that that was our final position. I referred to our views on the timeliness of raising either the membership or Charter amendment issues now; Mr. Catalano said he quite understood those views but that they did not seem to constitute an answer to the question of keeping open for further study. I acknowledged that that might be so and said that speaking entirely personally, because it was not a matter in which the Department can appropriately express official views, my own thought was that since we must assume a sub-committee report would be unfavorable to the Italian thesis, it would be more of a jolt to Italian public opinion in the long run to focus the issue on such a report than quietly to let the matter drop now. Mr. Catalano said he understood the pertinance of this point and that I was expressing it completely personally. He indicated that he would not pursue the matter officially, and we agreed to keep in touch on current developments on this matter.

350/2–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL ROME, February 19, 1951—8 p. m.

3611. Department pass USUN. FonOff has expressed to Embassy Government's concern re political repercussions if Italy denied "full

participation" Trusteeship Council. There has already been some adverse press comment on our delegation's statement in TC opposing "full participation"[1] and government anticipates further attacks in Parliament soon. Line of Communist attack characterized by UNITA headlines February 14. "New hostile act of Truman's delegation to UN—America will deny Italy vote on Trusteeship Council—State Department hypocritically affirms decision motivated by necessity not prejudice our country's admission to UN."

While FonOff understands our position as stated in TC and as explained informally by us on basis Deptel 3437, February 8, they still hope we may be able at very least to support deferment final adverse decision through agreement TC refer question to a subgroup for further study and consideration. FonOff believes that if such course followed government would be able reply satisfactorily to opponents.

While it appears to Embassy doubtful that issue poses serious political problem for government, still adverse decision will be widely interpreted as diplomatic defeat at hands of Western Allies. On other hand favorable action, or even deferment final decision would enhance prestige of government and help Sforza in his relations with Parliament.

DUNN

[1] Ambassador Sayre's only statement in the Trusteeship Council on the Italian participation question before February 20 was on January 31, when he strongly supported the proposal of the president of the Council for the establishment of a committee to revise the Council's rules of procedure to take into account Italy's presence in the Council's work. At that time Ambassador Sayre said (summary record): "Italy's participation in the Council's proceedings was not regulated by the Trusteeship Agreement, and the question would require careful consideration." For the proceedings on January 31, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Eighth Session*, 316th meeting, pp. 9 ff. (hereafter cited in 1951 as TC (VIII) or TC (IX), as appropriate).

Editorial Note

The Trusteeship Council took decisive action in two steps on February 23, regarding the question of Italian participation. Concluding work begun in plenary session on February 20 and continued on February 21, the Council adopted new rules of procedure which enabled Italy to participate in the work of the Council without vote in respect of matters relating to the Somaliland trusteeship and general policy questions. Secondly, the Council approved a resolution offered by Argentina which requested the General Assembly at its Sixth Session later in the year to include on the Assembly's agenda "the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council" (Resolution 310 (VIII)). For the Council's proceedings during this period, see TC (VIII), 327th–329th meetings,

pages 94–98, 104–105, and 111–115. For the text of the resolution, see TC(VIII), *Resolutions*, page 5, or Doc. T/848, February 23, 1951.

745K.00/3–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs (Cargo)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, March 6, 1951.

Subject: Italian Participation in the Work of the Trusteeship Council

Participants: Mr. Felice Catalano, Second Secretary, Italian Embassy
Mr. William Cargo, UND

Mr. Catalano called, on instructions from Rome, to inform the Department of the appreciation of the Government of Italy at the outcome of the vote in the Trusteeship Council on the resolution to place on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly the question of Italian participation in the work of the Trusteeship Council. (This resolution was adopted on February 23 by a vote of 9–1–2, the United States voting in the affirmative, the Soviet Union against, and the United Kingdom and New Zealand abstaining.) Mr. Catalano said that his Government especially appreciated the support of the United States for this resolution. He said that while, on the surface, it might appear to be a small matter, it was of real significance in again demonstrating which countries really favored full Italian participation in the work of the United Nations. I thanked Mr. Catalano and expressed appreciation that the Government of Italy had asked him to approach the Department in this way.

He inquired whether we had as yet any views as to the handling of the question in the General Assembly next Fall. I said that the Department had not yet studied this question, but that it would of course do so in connection with preparations for the Assembly and that we would be happy to consult with Italian representatives here or in New York at a later stage.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (Green) to Mr. David H. Popper of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs [1]

[WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1951.

[Subject:] Review of Membership Question.

Confirming my suggestion at the UNA Staff Meeting last week, I should like to propose that the Bureau take a new look at the whole problem of membership and associate membership in international organizations, which has been somewhat neglected over the past year because of our preoccupation with the question of Chinese representation. It would be advisable, I believe, to establish a small working party—representing UND, UNE, UNP, and UNI—to analyze the Department's past policies in this field and to prepare recommendations for the future, to be discussed later with the regional bureaus. I am nominating Mr. Tomlinson [2] to serve on this working body.

Some of the problems which merit review are the following:

1. *Participation of Japan and Western Germany in International Meetings.*

FE and GER are constantly bringing pressure on UNA, often with rather flimsy arguments about the sovereign powers of the two countries, to arrange for participation of Japan and Western Germany in various international organizations and conferences. So far as Japan is concerned, the basic information has been assembled in the attached despatch No. 1163, dated March 1, 1951, from Tokyo.[3]

2. *Participation of the Three States of Indo-China in International Organizations.*

UNA is frequently caught in the cross-fire between EUR and FE on this problem.

3. *Associate Membership for Non-Self-Governing Territories.*

This problem continually arises, and is usually solved on a purely *ad hoc* basis. A small working body, with Paul Taylor [4] as the steering member, started a memorandum reviewing this problem, but did not. I believe, complete it.

4. *Future Role of the French in Regional Organizations.*

The assimilation of Martinque, Guadeloupe, and French Guinea [*Guiana*] as Departments of Metropolitan France has already created

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[1] Transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) March 15.

[2] John D. Tomlinson, Adviser, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

a number of problems with regard to regional organizations in the Western hemisphere. The same type of problem will arise in other regions if the French continue this policy.

5. *Future Membership of the United Nations.*

It would be desirable for the working group to look once more at the Department's policy toward the admission of the Soviet satellites (I have always been strongly opposed to the EUR line on this) and other candidates for membership in the United Nations. It would also be desirable to list the non-self-governing territories which are advancing toward independence and eventual membership in the United Nations and to see what will happen to the voting balance in the United Nations if the present tendency toward fragmentation of empires continues.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1951.

Subject: Possible Congressional Resolution on Participation by Non-Members in General Assembly Proceedings Without Vote

1. *Background*

In one of your recent appearances on the Hill you indicated that you would think over the question of a possible Congressional resolution on the above subject. Various ideas along that line have, from time to time, been mentioned during United Nations discussions of the membership problem. Most recently, (late in the 5th session of the General Assembly) El Salvador presented a resolution providing in effect that the nine states presently barred from membership by the veto be invited to send observers to sessions of the General Assembly. Such observers would be enabled to express their views and furnish information when so requested by a member state delegation, both in the main committees of the General Assembly and in the Interim Committee. This proposal was rejected by 27 to 11, with 16 abstentions, the United States joining in the negative vote.

Since that time Embassy Rome has raised the question of finding means to afford Italy a wide measure of participation in General Assembly proceedings. In your letter of January 30, 1951 to Ambassador Dunn you stated that we would "consider sympathetically any Italian request that may be made to participate in the discussion of matters in which Italy can show some special interest". Since that time the Trusteeship Council (February 23) has adopted a resolution

requesting the General Assembly to consider the "question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council".

2. *Discussion*

Finding some means of bringing non-members, at least those which the Assembly has felt to be qualified for admission, into reasonably broad and regular participation in General Assembly proceedings may prove increasingly desirable the longer the present impasse on the membership problem continues. Indeed, unless the log-jam on membership is soon broken, some such arrangement may well prove necessary if the concept of universality is ever to be approximated within a predictable period. Procedurally, this would be possible through broadening the provisions for non-member participation already applied by the Assembly in special cases such as the Greek case, Palestine and the Italian Colonies. Given the present world situation, it might be desirable for the United States to take the initiative in spurring the Assembly to promote or at least not oppose an arrangement which would bring non-members in some measure into the United Nations fold even if without the full benefits of membership. It might be difficult for the Soviets to oppose such a step, even if they could not claim credit for it. Much would depend, of course, on whether non-members as a group would regard such an arrangement as a form of "second-class membership". It is possible that their regular presence at General Assembly sessions and their consequent identification with the United Nations would tend to diminish political opposition to their admission as members.

In the light of these considerations, the question warrants further study and review prior to the convening of the sixth session of the General Assembly. However, we do not think that encouragement should be given to the House at present to adopt a resolution pointing in that direction. The views of other important and friendly member states would need to be obtained, as well as the reaction of at least those non-members friendly toward the United States. Our position on the membership problem itself will need to be reviewed later this summer. Until we are closer to the next General Assembly it would be wise to retain a flexible attitude both on the membership problem or on any alternative procedures which might in part compensate for the lack of progress on the membership issue. Such flexibility of approach would be compromised if we were to give undue emphasis now to specific procedures which are, in reality, lesser aspects of the larger political problem involved. Should the weight of our thinking by late summer incline toward some broad formula for participation by non-members, suitable proposals for appropriate procedural arrangements can be worked out at that time. Under present conditions, UNP feels that it would be well not to tie our hands by encouraging Congressional proposals of the type described.

547-842—79——21

3. *Conclusions*

Any Congressional inquiries on this subject could be answered along the following lines:

(*a*) A Congressional resolution advocating broad participation by non-members in General Assembly proceedings without vote would not be helpful at this time;

(*b*) The Department is, however, giving careful study in preparation for the next session of the General Assembly, to possible arrangements for granting to non-member states fuller participation in the proceedings of committees of the General Assembly.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1951.

Only a summary of Ambassador Dulles [1] supposedly off-the-record remarks at the Board of Trade luncheon April 3, 1951 in honor of the Latin American Foreign Ministers is available. It was on this occasion that he commented on the problem of membership in the United Nations, with the problem of the admission of Japan as his point of departure. Following is the official summary (Dept. PR242, April 3) of this portion of his remarks:

"Japan undoubtedly will apply as promptly as possible for membership in the United Nations. But their application may be vetoed, as has been the application of Italy and other peace-loving states.

"This is an aspect of the problem which I am sure you will want to consider both as belligerents in the Japanese war and as members of the United Nations. It is becoming increasingly intolerable that the Soviet veto in preventing the realization of the United Nations Charter provision that membership should be open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and which are able and willing to carry out those obligations. Denial of membership to such nations makes it difficult to develop a genuine collective security system, such as is needed in the case of Japan. I believe that the United Nations Assembly should at an early date give consideration to how this problem can be practically resolved."

We have already begun to receive official inquiries concerning any possible U.S. intentions to move in the membership field. As you know, the Italians made inquiries of Mr. Gross [2] last week and were in effect told nothing new. Moodie of the Australian Embassy [3] is

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[1] John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State.
[2] Ernest A. Gross, Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations.
[3] C. T. Moodie, Counselor of Embassy.

coming in to see Ward Allen [4] and, on instructions, will ask whether Mr. Dulles' reference means that we have something in mind.

The line we have taken thus far is that Mr. Dulles' remarks were his own; that he was simply pointing up a frustration in the UN which everyone is aware of and one with which we have been contending for a long time; that we are continuing to study the problem carefully but that we have no concrete suggestions to make at this time; and that we will be glad to keep in touch with the Australians on any develelopments in this field before the GA. We might also mention that one of the possibilities which has been suggested by the Italians and, last fall, by the Salvadorans is that of establishing some general measure of participation in the GA by non-Member states.

A working group from various UNA offices is now preparing positions on various membership problems, particularly in the specialized agencies, and UNP is now working up a basic paper both on the broad aspects of the membership situation and on the narrower question of a possible arrangement of increased participation in the UN by non-Member states.

We will keep you informed of any developments in this field.

[4] Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum Drafted in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1951.

PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PROBLEM

The unlikelihood that the USSR will agree to the admission to United Nations membership of the great majority of States who still remain outside, forces serious consideration of alternative arrangements, not subject to the veto, for securing participation for these states in the United Nations. The obvious possibility, which has frequently been suggested in the past, is some form of participation in the General Assembly. The general support for the drastic step taken in the resolution on Uniting for Peace may have laid a political basis for a similarly strong assertion of authority by the General

[1] Paul B. Taylor drafted the memorandum, but it represented completed staff work by UNP as a whole. On the same date, May 1, it was circulated by the Office Director (Wainhouse) to other components of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs for study.

Assembly to remove what is generally regarded as a scandal in the United Nations.

In its practice, the General Assembly already makes provision for participation of non-members in its proceedings. This participation on a strictly *ad hoc* basis is, however, limited both in purpose and in scope. In general, its purpose is to hear particular testimony needed in order to settle some problem, or to give a fair hearing to all parties involved. Its scope is limited to the making of statements and answering of questions, each intervention being specifically authorized by the Committee concerned.

The question involved here is, therefore, whether some general arrangement beyond existing practice can be devised which will provide a means for participation by non-members that will be satisfactory from the points of view both of general policy and of General Assembly procedures.

DISCUSSION

1. *Non-Member States Which Might be Involved*

Fourteen applications for United Nations membership are pending:

(*a*) The General Assembly has determined that nine states whose admission has been blocked by Soviet use of the veto are qualified for membership:

Austria
Ceylon
Finland
Jordan
Ireland
Italy
Republic of Korea
Nepal
Portugal

Only Italy has shown a strong interest in participation in the General Assembly. However, depending on circumstances, Austria, Ceylon, Jordan, Korea or Nepal might welcome such an opportunity.

(*b*) Five Soviet membership candidates have not received majority support:

Albania
Bulgaria
Hungary
Rumania
Mongolian Peoples' Republic

If the USSR opposed a plan for participation in the General Assembly, the Soviet applicants would refuse participation; strong Soviet opposition cannot, however, be assumed.

(*c*) The following may seek United Nations membership in the near future:

Vietnam
Laos
Cambodia
Spain
Japan
Federal Republic of Germany
Libya

Some or all of these would probably desire the privilege of participation in the General Assembly. Although all would at present meet with objection in the General Assembly, these objections will possibly decrease.

(*d*) Switzerland, whose traditional neutral position bars it from United Nations membership, might be interested in some participation in the General Assembly.

(*e*) Finally, the diminutive states—Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino—might wish to participate if they were given any encouragement.

2. *Nature and Extent of Participation*

(*a*) In the past any arrangement for participation of non-members in the General Assembly has been made on a strictly *ad hoc* basis on agenda items in which they were able to demonstrate direct interest. In such cases particular conditions have been attached to their participation, limiting it generally to committee and subcommittee proceedings and to such oral and written statements as the committee may permit, each intervention being specifically authorized.

(*b*) Possible Types of Participation

(1) Relatively full participation—short of voting—might include a seat in any committees in which all Members have the right to be represented and perhaps even in the plenary meetings of the Assembly itself, with the privilege of making oral statements and submitting proposals and procedural motions.

(2) An intermediate degree might be participation in some or all committees on which all Members have the right to be represented, with privilege of making an oral statement on the substance of each item at a time authorized by the Chairman, and of having written statements circulated to all Members.

(3) The minimal privilege might include participation as an official observer, involving nothing beyond the issuance of tickets for admission to meetings of committees and plenary sessions of the General Assembly, and circulation of documents.

Alternative (1) would be too far-reaching if granted to many non-members. Practice—and a strongly stated United States position in 1947—is against participation of non-members in plenary meetings. If allowed at all it should perhaps be in the *general debate*; the use of Rule 67 reduced to a formality the plenary debate on most committee reports and it would be undesirable to do anything to add to debate on such questions.

Full participation in procedure—on the analogy of Security Council practice concerning non-members—would probably slow the General Assembly proceedings up unduly, especially if granted to Soviet satellites.

Alternative (2) would seem adequate, with perhaps the additional privilege of making a statement in the general debate of the plenary Assembly.

3. *Possible Undertakings to be made by Non-Members as a Condition of Participation*

(*a*) Acceptance of the Principles of the Charter

The non-member might be required to accept formally the relevant parts of Article 2 of the Charter along the following lines which would be written into the basic General Assembly resolution:

"——— accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular obligations—

i. to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered (Article 2:3);

ii. to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (Article 2:4);

iii. to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action (Article 2:5).

(*b*) A voluntary financial contribution by each non-member to the United Nations budget. This should be small—i.e., less than the minimal contribution of members, which is .04% (ca. $16,000 on the present budget). Such a contribution might in theory be (*a*) a means of covering the expenses resulting from non-member participation, including documents, and (*b*) a token contribution to the maintenance of international security.

(*c*) Undertaking to be bound by United Nations decisions or actions in the consideration of which the non-member has participated, to the same extent as are members of the United Nations.

Such a provision as (*a*) would furnish a basis for developing the participation of key non-member states in United Nations collective efforts. It is, of course, not certain how many non-member states would accept such conditions. Probably a number of friendly states could be induced to accept. The provision would establish a single standard for all non-members, including Cominform countries, by which the Cominform countries would exclude themselves.

4. *Alternative Arrangements for Determining which States may Participate.*

A General Assembly resolution might be adopted, offering the type of participation decided upon to

a) any state
b) a list of named states

c) any state whose application for United Nations Membership is pending;

d) any state which accepts specified obligations—perhaps any or all of those outlined under (3) above;

e) a combination of the above alternatives might involve automatic grant of the privilege of participation to certain states or categories of states, such as (*b*) and (*c*) above, and *ad hoc* Assembly action in any requests by other states.

The above alternatives offer a range from individual selection of a single state to a blanket arrangement including the Soviet satellites and anything else that could be called a "state".

Alternative (*a*) would appear to be too broad—it would make expulsion of even diminutive states difficult.

Alternative (*b*) might include a long or short list; it seems likely however that the list would become long. Such a list might include all of the states included under, (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) of paragraph 1 on pages 1 and 2.

The assumption of obligations by the non-Member states as a condition for use of the privilege has certain advantages. However, a broad grant of the privilege, on as non-political a basis as possible, would revive much support in the United Nations and it might be difficult for us to secure an arrangement that would include our friends and exclude the Soviet satellites. This is particularly true since the concessions to the non-Members are not great in any case.

5. *Certain Problems of Arrangements for Non-Member Participation*

(*a*) Questions will arise concerning the United States attitude toward admission to this country, and privileges and immunities while in this country, of representatives of non-member States who are seeking to participate in the General Assembly pursuant to a general arrangement. The answers are not clear, and it seems essential to secure the opinion of the Attorney General on these points before moving internationally. UNI is now preparing a communication to the Attorney General.

(*b*) Such arrangements would lengthen General Assembly sessions, and could conceivably make obstruction by Soviet satellites more extensive.

(*c*) Non-Member States might regard such arrangements as "second-class membership" and refuse to participate. Obviously, advanced consultations with some of them would be necessary.

6. *Recommendation*

It is suggested that, if it seems clear that the problems set forth under 5(*a*) can be solved, we might work out a draft resolution which would in effect invite a long list of States—including the Soviet applicants and some or all of these listed under 1(*c*) to participate in the

main committees (and perhaps the plenary General Assembly) to the extent of making a statement on the substance of each item.

We might inform the UK, France and at least certain Latin American governments that we could vote for a resolution along these lines if the majority of the General Assembly and of the non-member States desired it. It would be preferable for some other States—perhaps El Salvador—to make the formal proposal.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 9, 1951.

US/A/3205

Participants: Mr. Felice Catalano, Second Secretary, Italian Embassy
Ward P. Allen, EUR

1. *Participation in GA VI.*

Mr. Catalano, calling at his request for a general discussion of the problem of Italian participation in the UN, remarked that with the major questions of Italian Colonies disposed of there would be few subjects on which Italy could properly participate at the next GA session. He expressed the hope that the Libyan question would not arise and that the Arab States and Pakistan could be persuaded not to raise it. In the present decision for a federated state, the word "federation" seems to have a highly flexible meaning, he remarked. Italy means and desires "true" federation, i.e., "as loose as possible", so that Cyrenaica cannot gain too dominant a position. I pointed out that because of the strong views held by the Moslem States there was, of course, no guarantee that the question would not arise and that in any event the reports of the UN Libyan Commissioner and of the Administering Powers are automatically on the GA agenda. These items, together with the problem of the Egyptian-Libyan frontier and the report of the UN Commissioner for Eritrea, are all items in which Italy will have a real interest at the next GA.

2. *Participation in the Trusteeship Council.*

When Mr. Catalano referred to the recent decision of the TC to give Italy participation without vote and to have the GA consider the question of voting rights, I reiterated our view that we saw no real substantive benefit from having the matter considered by the GA. The only ways in which Italy could be given a vote in the TC would be (1) by its admission to the UN, for which we continue unsuccessfully

to strive, or (2) by amendment of the Charter, equally impossible at the moment. Mr. Catalano stated that his Government is of course aware of this but the Argentine motion in the TC to refer the voting matter to the GA was "necessary at the time" because of its favorable effect on Italian public opinion.

Speculating on what course of action the GA could take on this question, Mr. Catalano suggested the possibility of some resolution that would at least "not close the door" to voting rights in the TC. I responded that, although our position had not yet been formulated for the GA, it would seem more sensible and better even for Italian opinion in the long run, not to keep the question agitated, since there is no possible way for the GA to give Italy a vote in any event. The matter might be handled best by a reiteration of the GA's opinion that Italy is qualified for full UN membership. Although I expressed the view that a reference to the International Court would be useless, Mr. Catalano clung to that as a possibility for GA action. He pointed out that the Italian people did not understand the Charter provisions which make the granting of a vote impossible, but, in response to a question, stated it would not be practical for the Government to try to explain it to them.

3. *General UN Participation Without Vote.*

Mr. Catalano desired to know whether we were planning to press for GA action to give Italy general participation without vote in various UN organs as an interim substitute for membership. I stated that in our annual review of the perennial membership problem this possibility was being considered. He commented that, so far as he knew, his Government had not changed its position of not favoring that sort of "second-class membership", adding that he personally also felt it would be unwise for Italy thus to be placed in a sort of inferior position. I responded that while there was considerable sentiment in favor of a move in this direction for qualified applicants, in reaching a decision on the matter we would of course attach considerable importance to the wishes of Italy itself.

In the course of the conversation he sought and received confirmation that the UN membership problem had not been specifically discussed in the Four Power discussions in Paris.[1]

Mr. Catalano stated that when he received any further word from his Government on these problems he would advise us.

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[1] For documentation on this meeting, see volume III.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Gerald Meade, Counselor of the British Embassy
Mr. Michael Wenner [Second Secretary, British Embassy]
Mr. W. P. Allen—EUR

Mr. Meade showed me in confidence a letter dated April 21st from the UK Foreign Office (Sir Pierson Dixon[1]) to Sir Gladwyn Jebb[2] regarding this problem which expressed the view that the Soviet threat of a break with the UN is a new factor which increases the attractiveness of a new approach to universality. The accompanying memorandum recommends that the US, UK, and France give favorable consideration to proposing to the USSR an arrangement for the admission of all pending applicants, that the Western Powers explore together methods of surmounting the technical difficulties raised by the requirements in Article 4 of the Charter. If the Americans and French agree the subject might be raised with the USSR in the Four Power Meeting. The memorandum points out the following advantages of proposing admission of all applicants:

1. It would reduce the risk of losing Asian and Middle Eastern States and of their gravitation to the Soviet orbit in the event of a break with the Soviets.
2. It would make it easier for the UN to survive a Soviet walk-out. As the letter indicates, the British fear that a Soviet break with the UN might induce the neutralists (i.e. India and others) also to leave and that then under US influence the remainder of the UN would become more and more anti-communist and it would be difficult to claim full legitimacy for the Organization.
3. It would place the Western Powers in a tactically strong position as champions of universality, while the Soviets are undertaking a campaign of division and disunity in the UN.

Mr. Meade also permitted me to read Sir Gladwyn's reply which made the following points:

1. Any possible deal involving all pending applicants would run up against the problem of the Republic of Korea. It would be impossible to shift the USSR from its opposition of the last two years to ROK's admission.
2. Thus any arrangement even omitting ROK could only result if in the admission of eight states favorable to the West and five Soviet

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[1] Sir Pierson Dixon, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[2] Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

satellites. The net effect would be of a greater benefit to the Soviet Union than to the West, since the relative increase in strength would be greater and since the new members would undoubtedly be very obstructive and very vociferous in debate.

3. It is difficult to explain away the objections to the admission of the Soviet satellites under Article 4. The admission of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania would be difficult enough, but it would be even more difficult to admit Albania (in view of the Corfu Channel case) and Outer Mongolia (which is not even recognized as a state).

4. Jebb was not greatly impressed with the argument that an increase in non-Soviet membership of eight would greatly aid the UN to survive a Soviet walk-out, or that their admission after a Soviet break would not be regarded as "legitimate". On the contrary, he suggested that we should continually remind the friendly applicants and others that it is only the Soviet veto that has prevented their admission and if the Soviets should withdraw we should emphasize this point by the immediate admission of friendly applicants.

I commented that Sir Gladwyn's views are much more in accord with ours than those expressed in Dixon's letter and Mr. Meade agreed that Sir Gladwyn was a little more aware of the practical difficulties in the way of any "arrangement". He thought Sir Gladwyn's views would prevail. I stated that as Mr. Meade was quite aware, we had examined the problem from all possible angles and had reached the conclusion that it was impractical and unfeasible to work out or even to propose for the record any arrangement involving the admission of all applicants at the present time. Mr. Meade raised the question about the possibility mentioned in Jebb's letter of working out a limited arrangement for the admission of Italy and perhaps Ceylon in return for one Soviet candidate. I replied that this possibility had not crossed our minds but that offhand this seemed equally unfeasible. It was highly unlikely that the Soviets would agree to this but that even if they did, they could undoubtedly reserve the right to pick their own candidates and I could see no single one which we could possibly accept. Thus any limited "horse trade" of two for one instead of nine for five would in no way overcome the basic objections under Article 4 to the admission of the satellites.

Mr. Meade expressed considerable interest in our tentative ideas for increasing the participation of non-members, and I outlined our thinking on this subject along the lines indicated by Mr. Hickerson in our previous meeting. Emphasizing that this was not to be taken as representing final agreed policy but that we are continuing to explore the matter. In response to his question I indicated that before we made any such proposals in the GA we would, of course, want to consult extensively with them and with the French and would review the matter with the more important of the pending applicants themselves.

We agreed to keep in touch on this subject as the thinking develops both in the Department and in the UK Foreign Office.[3]

[3] No record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files. A written notation at the end by Allen reads: "Meade asked specifically that we not bother to let USUN know of this for the present. He fears a slip with Jebb that would embarrass him. WPA."

320/5–2451

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1951.

Subject: Attached Paper on UN Membership and Participation of Non-Members in the General Assembly [1]

The attached paper represents the results of our discussions within UNP, and with Mr. Johnson and various others in UNA. Its main purpose is to develop the various alternative positions as to membership and non-member participation in the General Assembly, as a basis for determining our policy. Our preliminary conclusions are that the effort toward a broad solution of the membership problem ought, if possible, to be carried forward even if this involves no more this year than a general statement in favor of a total solution of the membership problem including Japan and other countries that have not yet applied, on the basis of the elimination of the veto. Our preliminary view, further, is that on balance the advantages to be derived from a general arrangement for participation by non-Members are probably not important enough to justify presentation of such a proposal by the U.S.; however, we think the U.S. should support such an arrangement if proposed by some other state. Our preference for putting emphasis on the membership question rather than on some scheme for participation for non-Members receives support from the new British interest in a membership deal, reported by Ward Allen in the attached Memorandum of Conversation.[2]

Since I assume you now wish to have the reactions of the geographic bureaus to these alternatives, I am giving copies of the paper to the membership team,[3] making clear that you wish to have the possibilities

[1] Not attached, but see *infra*. Apparently the paper herein mentioned, not found in Department of State files, was dated May 21 and presumably was a longer and more detailed version of the paper dated May 1, p. 305.

[2] Memorandum of conversation not attached, but see the Allen memorandum of conversation with officers of the British Embassy, May 21, *supra*.

[3] The Membership Team was an ancillary group of the United Nations Liaison Committee (UNLC). The UNLC was a Departmental committee which was set up in March 1946 to effect liaison on United Nations affairs between the office

explored in the Department but that UNA has not taken any position on the matter and that, specifically, the attached paper only represents UNP's preliminary views.

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with primary responsibility for such matters (then the Office of Special Political Affairs) and the geographic offices; each of the geographic offices appointed representatives to the committee on a permanent basis, and the functional offices (such as the Bureau of Economic Affairs) as necessary. Although the primary function of "the membership team" was considered to be the formulation of policy on the working level regarding the admission of new members to the United Nations, often its focus was directed to questions concerning the U.S. position on elections to various United Nations offices and organs, so it met fairly regularly through the years. Nevertheless there is no systematic record of its meetings and minutes in the Department of State central indexed files.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by Mr. Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON, June 6, 1951.]

SUMMARY OF PAPER[1] ON UN MEMBERSHIP AND POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBER STATES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A. MEMBERSHIP

While it is not likely that the membership question will arise soon, it might be raised before the General Assembly through (*a*) applications from the Indo-Chinese States; (*b*) an application by Libya (if independence is hastened); or (*c*) possibly by discussions of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Alternative courses seem to be:

(1) Continuation of support for 9 non-Soviet applicants and of non-support for 5 Soviet applicants.

(2) Above, plus Charter amendment suggestion of last year or, alternatively, Rusk–Hickerson suggestion of clearing all applicants plus Libya, Spain, Associated States, Japan and Federal Republic of Germany through the Security Council, leaving the time of admission to the General Assembly.

(3) Soviet agreement on one or two applicants such as Italy and Austria is a remote possibility.

It is suggested (see topic B, page 15 of long paper) that if politically feasible at least some indication, however general, of support for alternative (2) above as a program be given later on this summer or in the General Assembly.

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[1] The source text contains a notation that the "paper" of which this is a summary was dated May 21; see footnote 1, *supra*. The source text contains a further notation as to the "Summary" itself, saying "typed 6/5/51".

B. NON-MEMBER PARTICIPATION

The practical alternative approaches seem to be:

(1) An arrangement under which the General Assembly would by a separate decision grant to a non-member a broad and general privilege of participating in Committees. If this alternative is adopted, it would presumably be granted to only a few states—perhaps only to Italy—and in any case not to the satellites.
(2) An arrangement for much more limited participation which could be extended to all applicants, including five satellites, and to the non-applicants named under A (2) above.

The question of Italy's participation is likely to be raised in any case. For this reason, we think it would be desirable to discuss the subject with several other governments. However, the following considerations oppose our presenting *as a U.S. proposal*, a general plan along these lines:

(*a*) The plan would probably be discussed in the General Assembly as a major "constitutional" device that would raise many Charter and political questions; the results would not be adequate to make it worthwhile to champion the plan;
(*b*) For the U.S. to put forward either alternative above would raise difficulties:—a number of UN members would consider alternative (1) an anti-Soviet measure, while alternative (2) would not be desired by the non-communist states because it was too limited;
(*c*) The fact that representatives of non-member countries seeking to participate in the General Assembly would not be accorded the same privileges and immunities as representatives of members might be unfavorably commented upon. However, UNI does not now believe there would be serious risk of difficulty in granting visas to satellite representatives if the plan permitted their participation.

Accordingly, it is suggested that the Department at this stage take the position (provided that the geographic bureaus concur), that we would be able to support alternative (1) above if proposed by some other delegation with the idea that it would be extended to only Italy or others of the 9 non-Soviet applicants which definitely wish it, will ask for it, and will possibly accept some obligations toward the United Nations.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1951.

Subject: Italian Participation in the United Nations

Participants: Mr. Felice Catalano, Second Secretary, Italian Embassy
Mr. Allen—EUR

Mr. Catalano stated that he had still not received from his Government its definitive thinking as to tactics and position at the next General Assembly on the question of granting Italy the right to vote in the Trusteeship Council. However, the first reaction of his Government to his report of our previous conversation was a slight fear that the major powers might adopt too rigid an approach to the Charter and freeze its provisions by restrictive interpretation. Such an attitude on the part of the United Nations could be discouraging to the small members and might result in bringing about a paralysis in the Organization, which was one of the major difficulties of the League of Nations. In response to my question he indicated that this concern about a crystallization of the Charter applied to both interpretation of the present language and willingness to accept amendments.

In response I sought to assure him that the US approach to the Charter has and will continue to be based on the belief that its provisions should be as liberally and flexibly interpreted as possible in order to keep the UN a living, adaptable organization. Indeed, this was the first time I had heard the contrary concern expressed. I thought our attitude was well illustrated by our whole approach to the Uniting for Peace program which we sponsored at the last General Assembly and which was based on such a liberal interpretation of the Charter as to lead some other countries to criticize us for going too far in that direction. As to the matter of amendments, I assured him that we were approaching the problems of revision with the same flexible attitude, both on possible specific Charter amendments and on the problem of general revision which will be considered at the 1955 Conference under Article 109. Nevertheless, in proposing specific amendments it is, of course, necessary to keep in mind that under Article 108 any amendment must be ratified by all permanent members of the SC. Moreover, a flexible approach to the problem of interpretation must still operate within the framework of the clear language of the Charter itself.

As to the specific question of granting Italy a vote in the Trusteeship Council, I stated that we had studied the Charter provisions from

every possible angle and were still unable to develop any reasonable theory or rationalization which would justify permitting Italy to have a vote until such time as she became a member of the United Nations. In this respect the language of the Charter is clear and unequivocal.

When Mr. Catalano continued to express the hope that some way might be found to give Italy a vote, I suggested that since we had reached a dead end in our consideration of the legal aspects of the problem it might be useful if the legal experts in the Italian Government who have no doubt been examining this question could indicate to us any plausible theory they might have developed on which to justify such action. We would welcome any ideas they might have and would of course give them serious consideration. Failing that, it seemed to us the question would necessarily have to be disposed of by the next GA by a frank admission that Italy could not be given a vote without Charter amendment and perhaps a reaffirmation of the conclusion that Italy was qualified for full membership.

In response to my question Mr. Catalano indicated that so far as he knew his Government still took the view that it did not desire to have the Assembly grant Italy greater general rights of participation in GA work without vote. I indicated that our thinking was still fluid on this matter and that although we were favorably inclined toward increased Italian participation short of voting, we would not wish to press it on behalf of Italy if the Italian Government itself opposed the idea.

350/6–1551 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED NEW YORK, June 15, 1951—8:03 p. m.

1657. Re participation Italy in TC. Ambassador Guidotti informed US TC del that Ital del was pleased with reception by TC of first report on Somaliland. With regard to their future participation in TC now that basic examination of Somaliland report has been completed, Guidotti said that he expected to intervene only rarely and might not attend all TC sessions. He recognized that Italy had right under rules of procedure adopted last session TC to participate on all council questions relating to Somaliland or to the international trusteeship system, but said that he expected to give this a narrow interpretation and participate only when the matters under discussion related quite specifically to Somaliland under Ital administration.

GROSS

350/6–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1951.

Subject: Possible GA Action to Increase Participation of Non-Members.
Italian Vote in Trusteeship Council.

Participants: Mr. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
Ward P. Allen—EUR

Since our current working level thinking on this problem had been previously outlined to Mr. Meade in a general way by both Mr. Hickerson and myself, Mr. Meade called to report the initial, informal reaction of the UN Department of the UK Foreign Office. He stated that they did not feel it would be wise at the next Assembly to propose action to give non-members greater participation. They thought it would look as though we were tinkering with the Charter again and thought it would provoke the Russians just as much as any other move in the membership field. Moreover, they doubted that the pending applicants themselves would like this type of "associate membership" and felt it should not be thrust upon them. I thanked Mr. Meade for these comments and stated that our thinking was still only in a tentative stage; that in our further consideration of the matter we would bear in mind this preliminary indication of probable UK views and would undoubtedly wish to consult with them further when our thinking had developed.

I mentioned in passing Italy's desire to be granted a vote in the Trusteeship Council, reviewing the situation which led up to the Resolution of the Trusteeship Council to place the matter before the GA. I stated that, sympathetic as we were to Italy's participation in the UN, we saw no way by which she could be granted a vote in the TC short of either full admission or Charter amendment. I added that there nevertheless might well be lengthy debate and impractical proposals on this matter at the next GA. Mr. Meade stated he was confident that the UK would feel as we do and indicated that he would suggest that his Government on any suitable occasions seek to persuade both the Italians and Latin American Delegations in the Assembly to play down the problem.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1951.

US/T/137

Subject: Italian Participation in the Trusteeship Council

Participants: Mr. J. G. Boyd, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR

Following up a previous informal conversation with Mr. Meade of the British Embassy on this subject, Mr. Boyd called to report that since the British Foreign Office shares our view that there is no way to give Italy a vote in the Trusteeship Council under the Charter which would not be subject to the Soviet veto, they had already made this clear to the Italians and will continue to do so if the latter raise it again. They likewise feel that it would be pointless for the General Assembly to refer the question to the ICJ and will make that clear to the Italians if the latter should mention it. Mr. Boyd inquired whether in the light of our identity of views on this matter we still desired to have the subject remain on the tentative agenda for the forthcoming colonial talks. I indicated that it seemed desirable to retain the topic on the agenda, not with the thought of any extensive discussion but merely to provide opportunity to review the situation at that time in the light of any developments or any information then available as to proposals which other countries might be intending to put forward in the General Assembly. Mr. Boyd agreed.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by Mr. Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1951.

Attached are copies of three briefing papers on membership and related problems.

1. General membership policy.
2. Possible Special Provisions for Italian Participation in the United Nations.
3. Participation by Non-Members in the General Assembly.

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[1] The following notation, presumably by Mr. Sandifer, appears on the source text: "Mr. Wainhouse: Here are papers for JDH". Reference is to Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs Wainhouse and Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson.

I will also bring a draft of the telegram, embracing all three, which would be the basis for consultations of the delegation.[2]

These papers have not been cleared by the Membership Team. As to general membership policy, the discussions in the Team have shown a general feeling that this would not be a favorable year for any membership action. As to participation by non-Member states, all the members of the team except FE have no objection to discussing the question with other delegations. FE's objection is partly Miss Bacon's opposition to the measure in general and partly a feeling in FE that it would be undesirable to get into discussions which might involve Indo-China and Japan.[3] I believe that if the question were framed in such general terms that the question of Indo-China would not arise, FE would withdraw its objection. The paper on Italy has been discussed with UND and I will bring any further comments from them at the meeting.

[Enclosure 1]

SECRET

General Membership Policy

MAIN ALTERNATIVE COURSES

(1) Favor reconsideration of applications this year and maintain present position supporting 9 non-Cominform applicants and opposing 5 Cominform applicants.

(2) Proposal of an amendment to Article 4 of the Charter which would (a) remove the veto from voting on membership applications and (b) place UN membership upon a universal basis (probably removing the qualifications of "peace loving" and "willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter").

(3) As another means of accomplishing the objectives of (2), proposal of a general arrangement in which all 14 applicants, plus Libya, Spain, Japan, the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and the Federal Republic of Germany would be cleared through the SC at the outset and the GA would determine when to admit them to membership.

(4) Agreement to consider a single applicant, or a small number of applicants.

(5) Allow the membership question to remain dormant, without action.

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[2] Not attached. UNA apparently decided to set forth the Department of State position in a memorandum from Hickerson to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin); see p. 330.

[3] The FE position was set forth in a memorandum by Miss Ruth Bacon, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, July 9, not printed (320/7–951).

COMMENT

The present GA resolution on membership, adopted last year, merely requests the SC to keep the pending applications under consideration in accordance with the terms of previous resolutions; annual reconsideration is not necessary and did not, in fact, take place in 1950. Unless the SC considers applications, or proposals on membership are submitted, there will probably be no membership item on the GA agenda.

Alternatives 1 and 5. Our support for the 9 non-Cominform applicants and our opposition to the 5 Soviet applicants would necessarily remain unchanged this year unless a possibility of adopting alternative 2 or 3 should develop. In the absence of such a general arrangement, the question arises whether it would be desirable to reconsider the old applications. The probable result would be rejection of all through Soviet vetoes of non-Soviet candidates and majority rejection of Soviet candidates. However, the USSR might offer some general "deal" similar to that of 1949. While such a Soviet proposal might, according to circumstances, receive more support than before, we could probably defeat it without serious difficulty or serious propaganda disadvantage.

The disadvantages of reconsidering the old applications are that all will be rejected; that the propaganda advantage to us is small if it exists at all; and that it would tend to make a future solution slightly more difficult.

Alternative 2. This would be a step toward the adoption of workable membership provisions in the Charter, and to protect ourselves against charges that our policy does not even look toward the admission of states with differing systems. It might be resorted to in case pressure for admission of the satellites develops. Possible disadvantages are that (a) it might be confusing to American public opinion at the moment, and (b) that it would not meet with real enthusiasm in the UN.

Alternative 3. This would also achieve a total solution of the membership problem, involving far-reaching concessions by the USSR. If the Assembly is inclined toward attempts at East–West compromise on this matter, this proposal will not be popular. However, the proposal might be used in case a Soviet omnibus proposal received support.

The three above alternatives could be combined by stating that the U.S. position is alternative (1); that, however, the U.S. would be willing to give consideration to arrangements whereby the veto would be waived or removed from voting on membership applications and whereby all states (other than diminutive states) would be considered eligible for membership; and that these arrangements could be along the lines of either (2) or (3).

Alternative 4. While it seems unlikely that the admission of any states can be arranged with the USSR, the best possibility of this would appear to lie in a proposal, considered under the agenda item concerning the full participation of Italy in the Trusteeship Council, to admit Italy. This would at least offer the possibility of a new and limited approach to the problem this year. (See paper on special provisions concerning Italy.)

In discussions in the Membership Team there has been general agreement that present conditions are not favorable for any action in the membership field in general, and that the only practical possibilities lie in the fields covered by the other two papers. As to proposals for participation by non-members on the basis discussed, all members of the Membership Team except FE agree that there would be no objection to discussion of the matter with other governments. FE does not at present favor such discussions.

[Enclosure 2]

CONFIDENTIAL JULY 13, 1951.

POSSIBLE SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

There follows a discussion of three possible steps for increasing Italy's participation in the United Nations, based on its trusteeship responsibilities. They might be proposed in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly under the item submitted by the Trusteeship Council concerning Italy's full participation in that Council. These steps are as follows:

(*a*) Separate consideration of Italy's membership application, on the ground that in addition to possessing the full qualifications for admission, the discharge of its trusteeship responsibilities makes UN membership desirable.

(*b*) A proposal for an amendment of the Charter which would give Italy full voting rights in the Trusteeship Council.

(*c*) A proposal, on the same grounds, to grant to Italy a broad right of participation in the committees of the Assembly. These could be combined as indicated.

To take these steps, it would be desirable that the Fourth Committee place the item on Italy's full participation in the Trusteeship Council at the head of its agenda. Although some of these suggestions go beyond the province of the Fourth Committee, it would appear desirable to handle all of them in that Committee. All these proposals, along with others, might be submitted when the Committee begins consideration of the item from the Trusteeship Council on Italy's full participation in the work of that Council.

547-842—79——23

I. CONSIDERATION OF ITALY'S ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP AS A SPECIAL CASE

A proposal might be made that, as a means of giving Italy full participation in the Trusteeship Council, steps be taken at once in the Security Council and General Assembly to admit Italy to United Nations membership. It would be argued that, above and beyond the declarations of the General Assembly since 1947 that Italy is fully qualified for admission, the General Assembly has granted and Italy has accepted special United Nations responsibilities in connection with the operation of the trusteeship system. Italy is seriously handicapped in discharging these responsibilities if it does not have full voting participation in the Trusteeship Council, in the General Assembly, under whose general supervision the Trusteeship Council works and perhaps in other United Nations bodies. Obviously, the only completely satisfactory solution is admission to United Nations membership. The resolution would recommend that, as a special case, the application of Italy be reconsidered urgently by the Security Council.

Such a proposal would need to be considered early in the session, in order to precede a possible general membership item and in order that, if and when thwarted by a Soviet veto in the Security Council, other steps might be taken.

While Soviet agreement to Italy's admission would be most unlikely, this approach would be the most plausible basis for considering Italy's application as a special case. If the approach were adopted, it would be necessary to inform the other applicants in advance, making clear that their admission was not affected in any way.

If others move to reconsider all the old membership applications we would not object and the usual rejection of all applicants would take place. However, consideration of the other membership applications might be held to lie outside the scope of the present agenda item and thus take place either in a political committee or in a plenary meeting of the Assembly itself.

II. POSSIBLE CHARTER AMENDMENT TO GRANT ITALY FULL RIGHTS AS A MEMBER OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Background

Late in February, 1951, the Trusteeship Council (the U.S. concurring) adopted a resolution (T/848) requesting the General Assembly "to include in the agenda of its Sixth Regular Session the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council". Adoption of this resolution followed a Trusteeship Council decision to permit Italian participation, without vote, in Council deliberations relating to the trust territory of Somaliland and "on general questions relating to the operation of the International Trusteeship System". It seems clear that Italy could not obtain "full participation" in the Trusteeship Council, including the right to vote,

except (*a*) as a result of admission to UN membership; or (*b*) through amendment of Article 86 of the Charter.

Technical Aspects

On purely technical and theoretical grounds, the procedure for amending Article 86 to achieve the end in view would be fairly simple. On taking up (presumably in Committee IV) the Trusteeship Council proposal, the General Assembly could move toward amendment of Article 86 by the method prescribed in the first, unnumbered paragraph of Article 108 of the Charter. Should the Assembly, by a vote of two-thirds of the Members, approve such an amendment it would remain for two-thirds of the Member governments, *including all permanent members of the Security Council*, to ratify before the amendment could come into force.

Actual amendment of Article 86 could be accomplished by a few changes in the article as it now stands. The first sentence of paragraph 1 could be revised to read: "The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following states." ("states" being substituted for "Membership of the UN".) Sub-paragraph (*a*) of paragraph 1 could be changed to read "those states administering trust territories. . . ." ("states" being substituted for "Members".) Probably sub-paragraph (*c*) would also have to be revised to read: "as many other Members elected for three-year as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those states which administer trust territories and those which do not." (The phrase "Members of the United Nations" being replaced by "states".)

Other Considerations

It is, of course, far from clear that the Charter amendment method described above would hold greater promise of success than further efforts to obtain Italy's admission to UN. The USSR opposed the granting of trusteeship responsibility over former Italian Somaliland to Italy, and has repeatedly criticized Italy's administration since that time, despite the approving stand taken by the rest of the Trusteeship Council. Furthermore, the Soviets have repeatedly denounced Italy's participation in NATO and other important Italian government policies. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would ratify such a proposed Charter amendment, thus letting Italy partially in through the back door of the UN while they continue to keep the front door bolted.

However, the question of according Italy full rights in the Trusteeship Council will be on the Assembly agenda as a result of action taken by the Council where the U.S. supported the proposal. An effort to achieve that purpose (perhaps in conjunction with other steps to give Italy some status in the UN), even if unsuccessful, would be further needed evidence of our support of Italy and should further weaken Soviet stock and communist influence in Italy.

Admittedly a proposal for Charter amendment would be designed to deal with this particular problem. However, it is believed that the principle involved is a correct one, namely that there are states other than those which happen to be members of UN which have a very real part to play in important fields of UN activity, and that this fact should be recognized by appropriate organizational adjustment if membership cannot be obtained.

III. GRANT TO ITALY OF PRIVILEGE OF PARTICIPATING IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES

A third step would be the grant of a privilege of participation in General Assembly committees on which all members are represented. This step might be taken in case the two steps described above meet with opposition or, preferably as an interim measure pending admission to membership. The resolution, described above, requesting Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application might well provide that, pending Italy's admission to membership, it would be granted a seat in each committee on which all members are represented, with the opportunity to speak and propose motions and resolutions, at least on substantive matters.

There would be some difficulty in basing this measure solely on Italy's trusteeship responsibilities. However, it could be argued that Italy's interests arising from its trusteeship functions ramify into the fields of various committees other than the Fourth. Especially, the work of specialized agencies and proposals in the economic and social fields affect trusteeship territories. Although the connection with the work of the political and budgetary committees would be more tenuous, an argument could also be made in those fields. The general position would be that Italy's interests and responsibilities as an administering power touch so many activities and discussions of the United Nations that the only way of providing adequately for Italy's participation in such activities and discussions is to grant a general privilege of participation.

While there would probably be objection to considering the non-trusteeship aspects of the resolution in that committee, it could be argued that all members are represented there and will be represented in the plenary meeting which would give final consideration to it. Any proposal for giving rights of participation to non-members generally would be referred to another committee.

This suggestion would be a means of giving limited application to the idea of granting participation in the General Assembly to non-Members. It might be more palatable to other members, such as the UK, than a proposal drawn up in general terms.

[Enclosure 3]

SECRET

Participation by Non-Members in the General Assembly

PROBLEM

Assuming that it will not be practicable this year to secure any arrangement to admit new members to the UN, what arrangements for participation by non-member States in the GA might the U.S. support?

Possible Alternative Arrangements

(1) The GA might adopt a resolution providing that, upon specific request therefor by a non-member State, the GA might grant the State a general privilege of participating without vote in committees on which all members are represented;

(*a*) Participation might include speaking under the same rules as members on any matter before the committee, and of making proposals on matters of substance but not of procedure.

(*b*) More limited participation might involve the presentation of views on the substance of each item when expressly permitted by the committee.

(2) The GA might adopt a general resolution authorizing the committees to grant participation in their proceedings by non-member States, leaving the exact scope of participation to be determined by the committee in each case.

(3) The GA might, under the item on Italy's full participation in the Trusteeship Council, grant to Italy the privilege set forth in (1) (*a*) above; if other non-member States subsequently requested the same privilege, the GA could decide on these requests (see separate paper on special provisions concerning Italy).

(4) As an alternative to any general arrangement the U.S. might, more liberally than heretofore, support in each committee the grant of participation in that committee to a non-member State in the discussion of particular matters in which the State was interested.

COMMENT

Agenda. Unless the SC considers membership applications, or a member requests inclusion of an item on membership or on participation of non-members, the only occasion for considering proposals in this field would be the item from the Trusteeship Council concerning the question of the full participation of Italy in that Council. In case we wish the general question of non-member participation considered, it would probably be desirable for some member to submit, before September 6, an item on membership or participation by non-members, for inclusion in the provisional agenda. Discussion of a

proposal to permit participation by non-members would be likely to lead to consideration of membership applications.

Scope of Participation. It is unlikely that any lesser degree of participation than those mentioned above would be acceptable to non-member States. It has been suggested that, in order to avoid charges of setting up a substitute status to that of membership, the arrangement not involve participation in plenary meetings or the assumption of obligations by non-member States.

Non-Member States to Which Privilege Might be Granted. Any of the above alternatives might be granted to any of the nine non-Soviet applicants and, at some point, to the following countries that have not yet applied: Libya, Spain, the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Special political problems would arise in the cases of the various non-applicants.

It would probably be impractical at present to support the grant of the above privileges to Soviet satellites. If we initiated discussion of possible arrangements for non-member participation, it would be necessary to make this clear, since this would be a point of primary interest to other members.

Accordingly, the only procedure that would now be acceptable would be one which provided for a separate decision in each case by the GA.

Italy—the outstanding candidate—has thus far indicated no desire for this privilege and has apparently regarded it as "second-class membership". However, no concrete proposal has been suggested to Italy and its attitude might depend on the circumstances in which the offer was made. If the privilege were granted to one state, such as Italy, other non-Soviet countries might request it. It is understood that FE has some concern lest even the discussion of an arrangement for non-member participation give emphasis, prematurely, to the problems of some countries within their area or add to the difficulties that now exist concerning their status. The privilege could be granted to Italy—and restricted, for the time being, to Italy—most easily if considered in connection with the item concerning Italy's full participation in the Trusteeship Council (see separate paper).

The general purpose of an arrangement of this kind for participation by non-members in the GA would be to take a step toward breaking the strangle hold of the USSR on the membership question.

Such a proposal—particularly if so drawn up as to be of general applicability—would arouse controversy. It would be taken as being a measure which, in itself, provides little advantage to non-members and, therefore, as being probably intended as merely the first step toward bringing non-members into much fuller participation in the UN.

If proposals for non-member participation are to be discussed, this might well be as part of the membership problem. Discussion might take place with several delegations from different areas, and subsequently with non-member governments. If an item is to be submitted, this should be before September 6.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1951.

Attached is a memorandum [1] to Ambassador Gross [2] for your signature on the membership question and related matters to serve as a basis for discussions with the UK, French and Canadian delegations.

You will recall that at Monday's meeting [3] we discussed alternative arrangements concerning Italy. At that time it was suggested that one of the alternatives, that which concerned an amendment to the Charter to give Italy membership in the Trusteeship Council, be expanded to give Italy voting rights in the General Assembly on questions affecting Somaliland and on general questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system which have an effect on Italy's administration of Somaliland. Mr. Gerig at the time of the meeting thought that Italy might have requested such broad participation. However, inasmuch as the observations made by Italy on this matter referred only to her participation in the Trusteeship Council and also since the Trusteeship Council resolution included only the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of that Council, Mr. Gerig thought it would be preferable not to expand the alternative. We have consequently left it in its original form.

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[1] *Infra.*

[2] The addressee was changed subsequently to be Ambassador Austin.

[3] July 16. No record has been found of this meeting. Presumably the Taylor memorandum of July 16 with enclosures, *supra*, provided the basis for discussion.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 18 [*19?*], 1951.

Subject: Membership Question and Related Matters

Before formulating our position on the membership question and related matters, we should like to have the views of certain other United Nations Members. In view of past exchanges of views on the membership issue with the UK, France and Canada, particularly in connection with the Foreign Ministers meeting in London in 1950, it is requested that you have preliminary discussions with their United Nations delegations concerning the possible approaches to these matters. We would wish that these discussions be kept strictly confidential and that, in particular, no other delegations, including Commonwealth delegations, be informed. There are outlined below various alternative courses of action for your use in such discussions. It should be made clear that the United States has not yet formulated its position on these alternatives. It is also important to avoid creating the impression that these are questions to which the United States attaches particular importance at this time. Rather, they should be regarded as long-standing problems which may arise at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly and which therefore merit consideration.

A. *Membership Question*

It has been the position of the United States, and generally that of the UK, France and Canada, to support the admission to membership of nine applicants (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal, and Nepal) and to oppose the admission of five (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolian Peoples' Republic and Rumania). All fourteen applications have been rejected in the Security Council through Soviet vetoes of non-Soviet candidates and majority decisions against the Soviet candidates.

The present General Assembly resolution on membership, adopted last year, merely requests the Security Council to keep pending applications under consideration in accordance with the terms of previous resolutions. Annual reconsideration is not necessary and did not, in fact, take place in 1950. Thus the membership question could remain dormant, without any action being taken, or a proposal for reconsideration of applications this year might be submitted.

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[1] The source text was attached to the Wainhouse memorandum, July 18, *supra*, and was dated July 18. Internal evidence based on documentation both in the Department of State and the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) files suggests that the letter was sent dated July 19.

There appear to be two other alternative courses:

1. To agree to consider a single applicant, or a small number of applicants (See Section C below on Special Provisions Concerning Italy).
2. To support a general arrangement in which all 14 applicants, plus Libya, Spain, Japan, the Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and the Federal Republic of Germany would be cleared through the Security Council at the outset and the General Assembly would determine when to admit them to membership. (For a form of this arrangement, see Department's telegram 281, September 16, 1950.)[2]

In the past the possibility of amending Article 4 of the Charter to eliminate the veto from Security Council voting on membership applications and to establish the principle of United Nations membership as being universal rather than selective has been suggested from time to time. In view of the confusion that such an amendment might raise in the minds of the American people in connection with the Chinese representation issue, this alternative would not be feasible at present.

B. *Non-Member Participation in the General Assembly*

You will recall that at the Fifth Session, El Salvador submitted a proposal to permit the nine vetoed applicants to participate in General Assembly proceedings. On the assumption that it will not be practicable this year to admit new Members to the United Nations, the question would arise whether some arrangement for participation by non-Member States in the General Assembly would be desirable.

Possible alternative arrangements for participation by non-Members in the General Assembly might include the following:

(1) The General Assembly might adopt a resolution providing that, upon specific request therefor by a non-Member State, the General Assembly would decide whether to grant the State a general privilege of participating without vote in main committees of the Assembly. This participation might for example, include speaking under the same rules as Members on any matter before the committees and of making proposals on matters of substance but not of procedure.

(2) The General Assembly might, under the item on Italy's full participation in the Trusteeship Council, grant the privilege to Italy in the first instance; if other non-Member States subsequently requested the same privilege, the General Assembly could decide on those requests (see Section C below on Special Provisions Concerning Italy).

(3) As an alternative to any general arrangement, the General Assembly committees might, more liberally than heretofore, grant participation in their proceedings to non-Member States in the discussion of particular matters in which such States are interested.

Arrangements for non-Member participation would not, of course, be considered as a substitute for admission to membership. Moreover,

[2] Not printed.

such arrangements would be useless unless desired by qualified non-Member States. Italy has thus far indicated no desire for the privilege of participation in the General Assembly without full membership rights. The attitude of non-Members might, however, depend upon the circumstances in which the proposal was made. Questions might also be raised as to consistency with the Charter and as to whether or not the arrangement could be extended to the satellite countries.

C. *Special Provisions Concerning Italy*

For a variety of reasons, including in particular its trusteeship responsibilities, Italy would appear to have a claim to special consideration. Three possible steps, outlined below, for increasing Italy's participation in the United Nations might be considered by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly under the item submitted by the Trusteeship Council requesting the General Assembly "to include in the agenda of the Sixth Regular Session the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council."

(1) A General Assembly recommendation that the Security Council reconsider Italy's application as a special case during the session on the special ground that the only satisfactory way to remove Italy's handicap in discharging its trusteeship responsibilities is to have full voting participation in the United Nations.

(2) A proposal for an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter to give Italy membership in the Trusteeship Council. The first sentence of paragraph 1 could be revised to read: "The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following States." ("States" being substituted for "Members of the United Nations".) Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 could be changed to read "those States administering trust territories. . . ." ("States" being substituted for "Members".) Probably subparagraph (c) would also have to be revised to read: "as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those states which administer trust territories and those which do not." (The phrase "Members of the United States" being replaced by "States".)

(3) As an interim measure pending admission to membership, an invitation to Italy to participate without vote in main General Assembly Committees.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

310.2/8–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, August 14, 1951—7 : 18 p. m.

223. Re membership. Bearing in mind Hickerson's ltr July 19 to me and Ital feeling manifested with insistence recently that US is letting Italy down by not finding way around Sov veto so that she can

become member, we are inclined to think there wld be advantage in US, as SC pres, bringing membership question up this month. If nothing else resulted action wld at least show Itals our desire help them. GA res of Dec 4, 1950 and fact SC is seized of item wld be adequate grounds for this action. GA recommendations referred to in ref res cover only countries we wish admitted. We wld contemplate SC consideration of all these applications since it wld be practically out of the question to try to put Italy up alone (UK has commitments to Ceylon, etc.). If USSR presents usual omnibus counter res adding satellites, and result is failure of Sov res to obtain majority and veto by Sov of individual application of our friends, no harm is done and at least we have made gesture to Itals.

Gen Crittenberger [1] recently in Italy reports widespread sensitiveness there to failure Italy be admitted to UN, with tendency to criticize US for not bringing its influence sufficiently to bear to bring about admission.[2] Gov Lodge of Connecticut reported in press this morning to have confirmed Ital interest in admission to UN.

We shld appreciate Dept's views soonest in order work out our SC schedule for rest of month.

AUSTIN

[1] Lt. Gen Willis D. Crittenberger, United States member, the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council.
[2] Marginal notation: "We can't accept this."

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Ross) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] August 17, 1951.

Subject: Membership

Mr. Hickerson telephoned me this morning (Friday) to say that he had noted in the Mission's summary report a statement by Jebb (to Hyde [2]) to the effect that Italy had no better claim than Ceylon to membership in the United Nations. Hickerson then went on to express the Department's view that Italy was in a very special position; that it was felt the United States should probably take the initiative to bring up in the Security Council sometime before the General Assembly the question of Italy's admission, although this would not have to be done necessarily this month.

Mr. Hickerson also said that the Department view at the moment is that the United States should support strongly an initiative that might

[1] Addressed to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) and the Deputy U.S. Representative (Gross).
[2] James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN).

be taken by the Latin American countries looking toward an amendment of the Charter which would give Italy voting rights in the General Assembly on the ground that Italy is the Administrator of Somaliland, a trust territory.

I told Hickerson that our telegram (USUN 223, August 14) remained cancelled and I summarized for him briefly our discussion of this matter on Wednesday, and suggested that we should put the item on our agenda for Mr. Hickerson when he visits us next week.

Mr. Hickerson agreed to this and, referring to his memorandum of the middle of July,[3] said that the Department wanted us to circulate more widely on the membership question and report to the Department as soon as possible with our views and recommendations.

In view of the explicit nature of our instructions limiting our discussions to the British, French and Canadians, Mr. Hyde has been in touch with Mr. Popper[4] and we should be receiving a telegram of further instruction.

[3] Refers presumably to the Hickerson memorandum to Austin, dated July 19, p. 330.

[4] David H. Popper of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1951.

Subject: Greek Candidacy for Security Council and Membership Question

You may wish to take up the following points, particularly the first, in your conversations with USUN.[1]

1. *Greek Candidacy*

On July 20, we sent a cable to USUN which stated that the Department did not favor the election of a satellite to the Eastern European seat now held by Yugoslavia. We also stated that the Department presently favored the election of Greece provided it could obtain sufficient support from other Members. We requested that the Mission, without indicating a firm US position, ascertain the views of the UK, France, Canada, Brazil and the Philippines on the Greek candidacy. The Mission has now reported the views of the UK in favor of a satellite. We

[1] Hickerson was in New York on August 22. In a "chit" dated September 10, he informed Wainhouse that he had discussed the subjects herein with Ambassador Austin, Ambassador Gross, and the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Ross), "along the lines set forth." The "chit" was attached to this memorandum.

Regarding the Greek candidacy for election to the Security Council, see pp. 78 ff.

believe that the Mission should state to the British that we are opposed to a Soviet satellite but are still examining the question of the Greek candidacy. Furthermore, in order to stave off a movement for a satellite, the Mission should talk to the other delegations mentioned in the telegram as soon as possible.

2. *Membership*

Your memorandum to Ambassador Austin, dated July 19, 1951, a copy of which is attached, requested that USUN have preliminary consultations with the UK, France and Canada concerning possible approaches to the membership question and related matters. The Mission has reported to the Department the views of Jebb; we understand that Lacoste asked that the question be reserved for later discussion. To our knowledge, the Mission has had no discussion with the Canadians on the matter. We are therefore uncertain whether we have received the definitive views of any of the Governments with which we wished to consult. If Jebb's statements do reflect his Government's considered position, we have in any case yet to hear from Canada and France. Before further steps are taken, the Mission should complete its discussions with the French and Canadian delegations and give the Department a complete report.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

The Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State [1]

[SECRET]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Italian Government have always been of opinion that the steps they have undertaken with a view to redressing the international position of the country, when and where it was possible and proper to do so, so as to eliminate the discriminations embodied in a peace treaty which was imposed under political circumstances that no longer prevail, should strive to achieve the three following major aims:

1—A declaration whereby it should be recognized that the Preamble of the Treaty does not take into account the role played by the Italian people and the Italian Government in overthrowing Fascism and in taking part in the struggle against the common foe.

2—The removal of the present limitations to Italian armaments and production of war material. These limitations are inconsistent

[1] Handed to the Secretary of State by Prime Minister De Gasperi at the time of the North Atlantic Council meetings in Ottawa, September 15–20. Source text attached to memorandum sent to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson on September 24 by Paul B. Taylor of UNP, for purposes of briefing the Secretary of State for a meeting with Prime Minister De Gasperi in Washington on September 24; see Taylor memorandum, p. 344.

with the position of the country as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and bound, as such, to the obligations deriving therefrom.

3—The admission of Italy to the United Nations in accordance with the pledge undertaken by the signatories of the Treaty of Peace.

The three points listed above relate to three different aspects of one problem. It is only by realising these three aspirations as a whole that the Italian Government feel they will have interpreted the deep and unanimous desire of the Italian people.

It is useless to recall at this point that the admission of Italy to the United Nations, as well as the admission of numerous other democratic countries, has been blocked so far by the Soviet veto.

Though there is nothing that would give the Italian Government a greater satisfaction than the simultaneous admission to the United Nations of all the democratic countries which have been so far unjustly excluded from it, they feel however that, from a technical standpoint, Italy's position is different from that of other countries.

The General Assembly, up to now, have shown a tendency to accept an interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter in the sense that a recommendation of the Council is an indispensable requirement for the admission of new members. This interpretation of article 4, whatever one may think of a text which is far from clear, was confirmed by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of the Hague, rendered on the 3rd of March 1950. It should be borne in mind, however, that, as generally admitted, a negative vote can be justified only when specifically and exclusively based on the absence of the conditions set forth in article 4. Any other reason would be invalid. This interpretation has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice of the Hague on the 28th of May 1948.

As far as the Italian position is concerned, the Soviet Delegate has repeatedly admitted that Italy had a right to be a member of the United Nations. While he never said this of any of the other countries, in the case of a number of candidates he stated that, in his opinion, they did not meet the conditions required by article 4. Therefore the veto of the Soviet Delegate is, at least in the case of Italy's admission, null and void. It thus justifies an action on the part of the Assembly.

The precedents of the question, its juridical aspects and a plan to bring about Italy's admission to the United Nations are detailed in the enclosed memorandum.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM ON THE ADMISSION OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The constant opposition of the USSR from 1947 up to the present day within the Security Council has barred Italy's entrance to the

United Nations. The reasons they have advanced to justify their attitude were never based on the established non-existence of the three fundamental conditions indicated by article 4 of the Charter, but on political grounds. The Soviet Delegation have in effect conditioned their consent to the admission of Italy and of the other seven non Communist candidates (Finland, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Jordan, Ceylon and Nepal) on the simultaneous admission of the five communist candidates (Albania, Bulgaria, External Mongolia, Roumania and Hungary).

The Italian case presents itself in a different light from that of other countries. In comparing them, one has to bear in mind the two following main factors: the first is the Soviet veto, and this is common to all states which have so far been excluded from the United Nations; the other is the explanation of the veto and this is peculiar to the Italian case. While according to the current interpretation (confirmed by an advisory opinion of the International Court of the Hague of the 3rd of March 1950) the admission of a new member is subject to the recommendation of the Security Council in conformity with the rules that govern the voting of that body (that is, a majority of seven votes including the concurring votes of the five permanent members), there exists another equally authentic interpretation (also confirmed by a consultative opinion rendered by the same International Court on the 28th of May 1948), namely that a veto can be justified only by the lack of one of the specific conditions indicated in article 4 of the Charter. The opinion of the International Court reads as follows:

"A member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly on the admission of a state to membership in the U.N., is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said article."

It further affirms:

"A member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the state concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other states be admitted to membership in the U.N. together with that state."

The Italian position differs from the position of the seven other non Communist candidates in that the Soviet Delegation has either never expressed an opinion about them or has expressed an unfavourable one in regard to the conditions listed in article 4. Whereas, in Italy's case, the Soviet Delegation never contended the (*sic*) she lacked those conditions to enter the United Nations. On the contrary, the Delegation has repeatedly declared that the Soviet Government was, on principle, favourable to Italy's admission.

During the meeting of the 29th of September 1947 the Soviet Delegate to the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko, declared:

"The Italian people and the Italian Government must know that the USSR supports Italy's request for admission into the U.N. However, my Delegation considers that a favourable decision on the Italian application can be taken only simultaneously with favourable decisions in regard to the application of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania."

The same Mr. Gromyko, in the meeting of the 10th of April 1948 of the Security Council said:

"Undoubtedly the Italians already know the attitude of the USSR towards the question of the admission of Italy to the United Nations. This attitude has been defined several times in the past during the consideration of Italy's application. I consider it essential, however, to state that the Government of the USSR is in favour of the admission of Italy to the United Nations, but that my Government cannot agree that the admission of Italy should be realized to the detriment of the legitimate rights of several other states which are on exactly the same footing as Italy."

Lastly, the Soviet Delegate to the Trusteeship Council, Mr. Soldatov, in the meeting that said organ held on the 23rd of February 1951, and during which it discussed Italy's participation to the Council, declared:

"The United Kingdom Representative was incorrect in attributing the fact that Italy have not been admitted to the United Nations to the USSR veto. . . . This was in no way to be attributed to the USSR, but rather to the Anglo-American Bloc."

The situation afore described should be the basis of an action by the Assembly in the aim of solving the problem of the admission of Italy to the United Nations. The plan could be as follows:

The General Assembly notes that Italy, by unanimous recognition of the five permanent members of the Security Council meets all the requirements specified in Article 4 of the Charter; the same Assembly notes that the Soviet Delegation, by opposing Italy's admission, has violated the rules of the Charter and has not taken into consideration the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of the Hague of the 28th of May 1948; the same Assembly, being the highest sovereign and deliberative organ of the Organization and being the guardian of the Charter and of the principles of the United Nations, cannot admit that this protracted violation of the rules of the Charter by the USSR in a field of capital and constitutional importance for the Organization (such as the admission of new members) should render inoperative one of the essential principles of the Charter, namely that the Organization should be open to all states possessing the prescribed conditions; the same Assembly, in order to remedy the situation and to bring to an end the violation, by the USSR, of the statutory rules, decides to consider the application of Italy in a plenary meeting with the object of deciding it by a two-third majority vote.

Obviously this action implies the existence, on the part of the three powers, of a political will to surmount the stalemate caused by the Soviet attitude. Indeed such a determination would constitute the primary condition for the success of the plan. That this plan should be feasible, provided the presence of the above condition, is proved by a series of cases that present strong analogies with Italy's case and in which the Soviet veto was circumvented (enclosure A).

From what has been said, it is clear that the two necessary conditions in order to get around the veto have been: on one side the existence of a firm alignment of nations in favour of a free but logical and constructive interpretation of the Charter and, on the other, the clearly established illegal and continued failure of the Security Council in discharging its responsibilities because of the Soviet sabotage.

The second of these elements is obviously present in the case of Italy's admission. The first one certainly exists in a potential stage. It could be reenforced and further extended through the action of Italy's friends in the UN.

Annex A

Previous Circumventions of the Veto

A) *Reelection of the Secretary General*—As it is well known, according to article 97 of the Charter, the Secretary General has to be elected by the General Assembly upon a recommendation of the Security Council. This election, therefore, follows a very similar procedure to the one provided for the admission of new members to the U.N. This is made quite clear by the following resolution adopted by the General Assembly during its first session:

". . . From the provisions of articles 18 and 27 of the Charter, it is clear that, for the nomination of the Secretary General by the Security Council, an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, is required; and that for his appointment by the General Assembly, a simple majority of the members of that body present and voting is sufficient, unless the General Assembly itself decides that a two-third majority is called for. The same rules apply to a renewal of appointment as to an original appointment; this should be made clear when the original appointment is made. . . ."

Notwithstanding the very clear wording of the article of the Charter and the authentic interpretation given to it by the Assembly, this body, being confronted, on the 2nd of November 1950, by a report of the Security Council in which it was stated that the Council had been unable to agree on any name, adopted a resolution by which it reelected for another three years (that is, for a shorter period of time than the one envisaged by the Charter), Mr. Trygve Lie on whose

name the Council was unable to agree.[2] It is true that in this case it was a matter of confirming the same person or of extending his term of office. Nevertheless the wording of the proviso of the Charter was clear; it was also identical to the one followed for the admission of new members to the United Nations. It was necessary to make recourse to a liberal interpretation of the Charter. In the case of Italy's admission nothing else than this would be necessary.

B) *United action for peace* (*Acheson Plan*)—During last November the General Assembly adopted a resolution (United action for peace) whereby certain functions with regard to the maintenance of peace and international security which the Charter assigns to the Security Council were transferred to the General Assembly.[3] The resolution provides that, should the Security Council fail to discharge its functions, the Plenary Assembly can be convened in extraordinary session upon request of any seven members of the Security Council or of a simple majority of the General Assembly or of the Interim Committee in order to investigate a threat to international peace or an act of aggression, and recognizes to the same Assembly the power of recommending to its members the adoption of collective measures. The communist delegations, who also on this occasion upheld the rigid interpretation of the letter of the Charter, argued that paragraph 2 of article 11 ruled out the possibility of attributing these powers to the General Assembly in so far as said paragraph reads:

"The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security . . . but any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion."

The United Kingdom's delegate, in defending the resolution, pointed out that the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter ("the General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter . . ."), has an unlimited power to examine, discuss and make recommendations on all subjects, and affirmed that if the Security Council was not carrying out the functions it is entrusted with in a primary but not exclusive way by article 24 ("the members of the U.N. confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance . . ."), the limitation provided for by article 11 paragraph 2 to the powers of the General Assembly should not be applied.

The resolution "United action for peace" has been approved by the General Assembly against the sole opposition of the five communist Delegations.

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[2] For documentation regarding this matter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 87 ff.

[3] For documentation regarding this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 303 ff.

C) *Sanctions against China*—Similar discussions took place during the month of May on the occasion of the approval by the General Assembly of collective sanctions against communist China and North Korea.[4] This matter also, insofar as it entails action, should have been referred to the Security Council in strict accordance to article 11 paragraph 2 of the Charter.

D) *The meaning of abstention or of absence of a permanent member of the Security Council*—Again in order to circumvent the veto, the Security Council has followed the praxis of considering the abstention from voting of a permanent member or the absence of the same from the Security Council as insufficient for blocking a decision or a recommendation of the Council; this certainly represents a free interpretation of article 27, which, in paragraph 3, provides that all decisions not having a procedural character, should be made "by a affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."

[4] For documentation concerning sanctions against mainland China and North Korea, see volume VII.

310.2/9–2051 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, September 20, 1951—5 : 07 p. m.

359. Re Amb Belaunde[1] (Peru) views. Admission of Italy. Belaunde called this morning with the fol idea concerning admission of Italy to the UN which he said he had discussed ten days ago in Lima with the Italian Amb to Peru and yesterday with Trygve Lie and Kerno.

1. The GA on its initiative would advise the SC to revise its rules in order to allow candidates for membership to present proof of their qualifications under Art 4 of the Charter.
2. Such proof of Italy's qualifications would be studied and reported on by a comite or commission appointed by the SC for the purpose.
3. If there were any objection to the report of this comite (threat of Soviet veto) the GA would request the court for an advisory opinion regarding the value of the proof offered and the value of the report.
4. Assuming a favorable opinion by the court, the SC would have to apply strictly the sense of Art 4. The matter would not be vetoable because the Charter leaves no option or choice.

In developing this approach with considerable fervor, Belaunde emphasized strongly the word "judgment" as used in Art 4 which made question a "judicial" one.

[1] Dr. Victor Andrés Belaunde.

We agreed with Belaunde that his suggestion was ingenious and interesting and that we would study it carefully.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

GROSS

310.2/9–2151 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, September 21, 1951—6 : 48 p. m.

PRIORITY

366. Re Italian Membership. Guidotti called on Ross and me this afternoon to leave with us copies of *aide-mémoire* and memorandum concerning admission of Italy to UN which De Gasperi gave to SecState at Ottawa. In our discussion of this matter Guidotti stressed the Italian hope that other peace-loving (non-Cominform) applicants might be admitted. With regard to Belaunde's program, Belaunde had called on Guidotti yesterday after seeing us. We gathered that Guidotti was somewhat cool towards Belaunde's idea, largely because it would involve seeking a further opinion from the court.

I pointed out to Guidotti that in effect the Italian suggestion, which as Guidotti put it would declare the Soviet veto of Italy's application to be null and void, would have the effect of declaring null and void the decision of the Pres of the SC.

I told Guidotti that we would, of course, study very carefully the Italian suggestions.

GROSS

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

Memorandum of Comment on the Italian Government Memorandum on the Admission of Italy to the United Nations, by Mr. Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs [1]

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

The Charter difficulties of the Italian suggestion may be summarized as follows:

1. In its 1948 opinion the International Court of Justice interpreted Article 4 of the Charter as setting forth exhaustively the conditions

[1] For the Italian Government memorandum, see p. 336. This memorandum is undated, but internal evidence suggests that it was drafted for use in a meeting in the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sandifer on September 22, at which time officers of UNA reached an agreed Bureau position regarding the Italian proposal to recommend to other components of the Department. See Taylor memorandum, September 24, *infra*, and Doc. IPM D–5a, September 24, p. 345.

for admission of a state to membership. In essence, the opinion rejected the Soviet contention that Article 4 provides that a Member State may properly oppose an applicant state for *any reason whatever*, whether or not such reasons are connected with the criteria set forth in Article 4. The Court expressly stated that the General Assembly's request did not involve a judgment on the real reasons which may have entered into a Member's vote (confining itself merely to statements made by Members) and expressly disclaimed an intention to decide whether or not the particular statements made by the USSR in individual instances did or did not lie within the terms of Article 4. It confined itself to the precise, abstract and general question concerning the meaning of Article 4.

2. Working from this, the Italian *aide-mémoire* states that the Soviet vetoes were given on grounds lying outside Article 4 (with which we agreed); working from this it is suggested that the Soviet vetoes of Italy's application are therefore *null* and *void* and that, accordingly, the GA can disregard them and vote to admit Italy to membership.

3. Two difficulties arise from the above. In the first place, the Italian suggestion would treat any deviation from the terms of Article 4 on the part of any Member not casting its vote as rendering the vote ineffective rather than merely improper or wrongful. It has certainly been universally assumed that such a vote, however wrongful, would still be effective and if it were the vote of a Permanent Member would in matters of substance thwart action by the Council. Whether it would ever be possible to subject the actual vote of a Member to judicial or political scrutiny as to its reasons and on that basis to conclude whether or not the vote was effective is a large and serious question which has not been approached at all in this discussion. My own belief is that no such inquiry can be made nor is it known to any parliamentary system. Obviously, if this can be done we have opened the door to a re-hash of earlier votes not only in the GA but in the SC and not only of membership but on many other matters which might be of the gravest consequence. Specifically as applied to the veto, such a step goes far beyond the position which we have taken in agreeing to a procedure in the SC whereby, a vote on a ruling by the President or the Council may be a procedural vote to determine the character of a preceding decision.

The second essential difficulty with the above suggestion concerns who shall make the determination that a given vote is ineffective because cast for improper reasons. The Italian suggestion would have the GA do this. However at this point, one collides with the second membership opinion of the ICJ, which ends with the statement that "it is impossible to admit that the GA has the power to attribute to a vote of the SC the character of a recommendation when the Council itself considers that no such recommendation has been made." It is indisputable that the GA cannot admit a state to membership in the absence of a favorable recommendation by the SC. The Italian suggestion would be to disregard the Soviet veto and thus have the GA conclude that the SC had rendered a favorable recommendation. This

is precisely what the GA says the Court cannot do. A quite different question might be whether the SC could in any given circumstance—and by what procedure—declare that a vote cast in its deliberations was illegal and hence without effect.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

Memorandum by Mr. Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1951.

Subject: Briefing Secretary on Membership for his Conversation with De Gasperi [1]

EUR asked me yesterday (Sunday) to inform you that the briefing of the Secretary for his talks with De Gasperi will begin at 10:00 this morning. The subjects to be covered are, a review of the world situation, Italian treaty revision, Trieste and Italian membership in the United Nations. Mr. Perkins [2] asked you to do the briefing on the membership item and to be present for the rest of the briefing.

De Gasperi at Ottawa handed the Secretary an *Aide-Mémoire* [3] which is attached. The *Aide-Mémoire* argues that if the three Western Powers really desire Italy's admission they can accomplish it through a liberal interpretation of the Charter. Since the Soviet vetoes of Italy's application are illegal, they are in Italy's view null and void and the GA should simply vote Italy into membership. The attached briefing paper [4] embodies the position agreed upon with Mr. Sandifer on Saturday. We believe it is necessary not to leave De Gasperi to think we will sponsor such a proposal, since the precedents against it in the membership field are so strong. You are familiar with the other recommendations in the paper.

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[1] For documentation regarding the Washington conversations between the Secretary of State and Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi, September 24–26, see volume IV.

[2] George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

[3] *Ante*, p. 335.

[4] Not attached, but see Doc. IPM D–5a, September 24, *infra*.

USUN Files

Department of State Position Paper, Prepared for Use in Conversations With the Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1951.
IPM D–5a

ADMISSION OF ITALY INTO UN

PROBLEM

The Italian Prime Minister would like to know the intentions of the United States concerning the question of Italy's admission into the United Nations.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE

That Italy be admitted into the United Nations as soon as possible.

PROBABLE POSITION OF THE ITALIANS

The Italian Government and people are extremely anxious that Italy become a Member of the United Nations. In a number of instances Italian representatives have pressed us on this question, and have indicated their belief that some way could be found to interpret the Charter so as to make Italy's admission possible despite the Soviet veto in the Security Council. In an *Aide-Mémoire* handed to the Secretary by the Italian Prime Minister at Ottawa, the Italian Government argues that, since the Soviet Union has never questioned Italy's qualifications for membership, its vetoes of Security Council recommendations to admit Italy are null and void; and that the General Assembly should therefore disregard the Soviet vetoes and consider action to admit Italy to membership. In support of the suggestion, the *Aide-Mémoire* mentions the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the action of the General Assembly in November, 1950 in continuing Secretary General Lie in office as illustrations of how the veto has been circumvented through "liberal interpretation" of the Charter.

Short of membership, the Italians may desire that efforts be made to give Italy, as Administering Authority for the former Italian Somaliland, a vote in the Trusteeship Council. Italy now sits with the Trusteeship Council and participates without voting rights in all relevant work. The question of the full participation of Italy in the Council will arise at the next General Assembly session.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED

1. The United States has consistently and strongly supported the admission of Italy to the United Nations and will continue to do so. Our efforts, however, have always been blocked by the veto of the Soviet Union.

2. The suggestion in the Italian *Aide-Mémoire* is at variance with our understanding of the pertinent provisions of the United Nations Charter and we see basic difficulties in putting it into effect. However, we will study the *Aide-Mémoire* carefully and consult further with Italy and other interested countries, exploring all possible courses of action by which Italy's admission might be achieved.

3. We would be prepared to propose reconsideration of Italy's application by the Security Council provided this was felt to be a practicable step. We are consulting with other Governments on the advisability of such a proposal, notwithstanding the strong possibility that the reconsideration at this time would involve reconsideration of all the 14 pending applications, including the five Cominform applications (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolian People's Republic and Rumania), and result in the usual Soviet vetoes.

4. The United States could not accept any Soviet omnibus proposal under which, in return for the admission of the qualified applicants, we would vote for the Cominform applicants despite our strong objections to their admission based on the Charter.

5. As long as Italy is not a Member of the United Nations, the only legal way of granting Italy a vote in the Trusteeship Council would be to amend Article 86 of the Charter. The United States would be prepared to vote for an amendment giving Italy full voting rights in the Trusteeship Council if desired by the Italians. However, such an amendment seems to us impractical and unsatisfactory from the Italian point of view since the amendment process is cumbersome and is subject to the same disability as Italy's admission because the amendment could not come into effect unless ratified by the Soviet Union.

6. There has also been some discussion of more limited arrangements such as participation by Italy without vote in the main committees of the General Assembly. We would favor such a move if Italy desired it. However, we have been given to understand that Italy is not interested in any such arrangement.

COMMENT

The *Aide-Mémoire* handed by the Italian Prime Minister to the Secretary is a further indication that Italy's interest lies only in admission to membership and not in some form of participation short of membership.

We see Charter difficulties in the suggestion contained in the *Aide-Mémoire* that the General Assembly proceed to act on Italy's application despite the Soviet veto in the Security Council, difficulties which have led us to refrain from proposing anything along the lines suggested. In an advisory opinion rendered on March 3, 1950, the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security

Council has made no recommendation for admission either because of the failure of a candidate to obtain the required majority or because of a veto of a permanent member. We agree with the Italians that the Soviet vetoes of Italy's application have not been proper since they have not been based on Charter grounds. However, it does not follow (and despite a citation in the *Aide-Mémoire* to an earlier opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Court has never suggested) that an improper exercise of the veto right is, because of its impropriety, null and void as is argued in the *Aide-Mémoire*. Moreover, even if the Italian thesis were accepted, the Soviet Union could easily thwart the procedure suggested merely by raising the question of Italian membership in the Security Council, casting its veto, and this time offering "Charter" grounds as the reason.

The continuation in office of the Secretary General and the Uniting for Peace Resolution are not, in our opinion, analogous to the action suggested. In the first resolution, the General Assembly merely extended the term of Secretary General Lie and did not appoint him; a recommendation of the Security Council being necessary for an appointment but not for an extension of term. In the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Assembly simply exerted its own powers in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security. Under the Charter, the Assembly can in proper circumstances make recommendations in this field independently even though the Charter gives primary responsibility in this regard to the Security Council.

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Minutes of Meeting Between the Secretary of State and the Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi), Department of State, September 24, 1951, 4:30 p. m.

SECRET

IPM MIN–1

[Here follow list of persons present (19) and discussion of a prior agenda item, revision of the Italian Peace Treaty.[1]]

ADMISSION OF ITALY INTO UNITED NATIONS

AMBASSADOR ZOPPI [2] recalled that the Prime Minister had submitted an *Aide-Mémoire* to the Secretary at Ottawa on the admission of Italy

[1] Lists of persons present at this and other conversations and other subjects discussed are included in documentation in volume IV. There were 9 Department of State officers present in support of the Secretary of State including the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins), the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett), the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), and James C. Dunn, U.S. Ambassador to Italy.

[2] Vittorio Zoppi, Secretary-General, Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

into the United Nations and he asked that the United States give favorable consideration to the proposals set forth in the *Aide-Mémoire.* THE SECRETARY said that the United States is studying the matter and will continue to do so. However, we have grave doubts about the Italian proposals. The World Court has said that an application for membership in the United Nations cannot be voted upon by the General Assembly unless all permanent members of the Security Council have voted in the affirmative on the application. The World Court has also said that a permanent member should not veto an application for membership on extraneous grounds. If the Italian application for membership were to be reconsidered by the Security Council and the Soviet Union, without explaining its position, simply cast a negative vote, it would not have done anything contrary to the opinion of the World Court. However, if the Soviet Union explains the reason for its veto, this would be a different situation, and the Soviet government might be in trouble. THE SECRETARY reiterated that the United States would continue to study the problem. MR. HICKERSON said that after further consideration of the *Aide-Mémoire* the Department would discuss it with the Italian representatives in Washington and New York, and with other friendly governments. He emphasized that the United States would do everything in its power to secure membership for Italy in the United Nations. He cautioned against expecting too much along the lines of the suggestions set forth in the *Aide-Mémoire.* He pointed out that Italy is in a unique position since it is the only nation whose application for membership in the United Nations has been vetoed four times and is also in a unique position since Italy, as trust administrator in Somaliland is the only non-member administering authority. THE PRIME MINISTER said that so long as Italy is not in the UN, there is an additional moral restriction upon Italy. The counterbalance to the signature of the Peace Treaty was to have been Italy's admission to the UN. The three-power Declaration on the Peace Treaty [3] is desirable and necessary, but is not sufficient in itself to correct the moral position. THE SECRETARY said that he thought this problem would be alleviated by the support of the great majority of the nations of the world for the action to be taken on the Treaty.

[Here follows discussion of another agenda item.]

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[3] See editorial note, *infra.*

Editorial Note

In a tripartite declaration issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on September 26, indicating their desire for the removal of certain restrictions from the Italian Peace Treaty, the three governments noted, *inter alia*, that a majority of the United

Nations General Assembly had three times voted in favor of admission of Italy to the United Nations but that Italy was "still prevented by an unjustifiable veto from obtaining membership in the United Nations in spite of the provisions of the treaty and the Charter. . . . Each of the three governments hereby reaffirms its determination to make every effort to secure Italy's membership in the United Nations." For text of the declaration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, page 570.

In the meantime, at New York, in a letter dated September 24, Peru submitted a request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly: "Admission of new Members; right of candidate States to present proof of the conditions required under Article 4 of the Charter" (Doc. A/1887 (Rev. 1)). For text of this document and other relevant documentation in the legislative history of this item in the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 60 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Annexes*). The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in Paris on November 6, 1951.

310.2/9–2651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, September 26, 1951—6:48 p. m.

380. Italy—UN membership. Coulson (UK)[1] asked for a meeting with French, Canadian and US dels to continue subject of Italy's membership in UN in light of FonOff instructions just received. He presented them as indicating FonOff desire to put forward Italian application in SC "to see what happens". He requested French to sponsor Italian application, since this wld be difficult for UK considering commitments to Ceylon. Application wld be put forward separately as a special case and thereafter UK wld put forward Ceylon and other candidates.

FonOff legal adviser had suggested as possible tactic that in the light of ICJ advisory opinion that members are not entitled to attach conditions to membership other than those contained in Article 4, it cld be argued that Soviet negative vote in SC is illegal. Coulson commented that the Italians have made the same suggestion. Alternatively, president of SC cld refer case to ICJ to determine whether Soviet

[1] J. E. Coulson, British Minister, Permanent Delegation of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

negative vote need be regarded as a veto. Coulson frankly stated his doubts about this tactic.

During subsequent discussion no conclusion or consensus was reached. Gross was not aware of nature of current conversations between De Gasperi and Secretary. However, he emphasized our obligation in light of tripartite declaration re peace treaty to make every effort on membership question. He thought it might well be desirable to take Italian application to SC even though a veto results and he did not foreclose further thinking about legal tactic suggested by Italians and FonOff. He realizes that previous precedents wld need to be carefully examined to see how SC president had ruled on Soviet negative votes on Italian application. He thought we might do something with article of Italian peace treaty dealing with membership. However, he recalled Tarchiani's view that a veto might be disadvantageous to Italy as demonstrating Soviet strength and weakness of Italy's friends. On this point Coulson commented that Guidotti feels that any effort is better than none.

An earlier suggestion of Gross that there be consultation with the Russians, preferably at a high level, at beginning of GA was sympathetically received by Lacoste (France),[2] although not by Coulson. It was suggested by Coulson that Soviet objection and basis for new veto of Italian application wld be on theory that Italy is not a peace loving state in the light of current efforts to revise the peace treaty. By changing its position thus the Soviet Union wld avoid charge of illegal condition as a basis for its vote. Gross felt that if USSR were so to shift its position even though there were a veto it wld be propaganda defeat for USSR and a challenge to basic Italian foreign policy.

Lacoste saw the issue as whether we want to work with the USSR, in which case we must pay in some way for its support of application, or whether we want to fight them, in which case we wld be writing Article 4 out of the Charter. He felt that we cannot afford to sacrifice the principle that membership must be based on a recommendation of the SC in order to obtain Italy's admission. For that reason, he liked Gross' earlier suggestion for a consultation with the USSR and thought that it might be by one of us rather than a Big Five consultation. He and Gross agreed that even if consultation failed, it wld lay a better basis for us from propaganda point of view if USSR subsequently vetoed application. Coulson commented that the FonOff feels that such consultation wld not be worthwhile but personally he wld be willing to see French undertake it. Coulson also thought that approaching USSR on heels of tripartite declaration is unfortunate.

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[2] Francis Lacoste, French Minister, Permanent Delegation of France to the United Nations.

George (Canada)[3] quoted Pearson[4] as recently favoring the universality principle by admitting all applicants with possible exception of Outer Mongolia. Canadian approach to UN is more and more to make it the universal organization and bridge between USSR and free world with controversial subjects between two groups handled in NATO. Coulson cld not see how we cld support Soviet candidates in light of Article 4 and Gross commented that really Canadian proposal was to amend Article 4.

Coulson thought taking Italian application to SC wld prevent movement in GA toward "half way house of associate membership" to which UK is much opposed unless possibly Italy wld indicate desire for such status. At the end of the above discussion there was no attempt to summarize or formulate agreed position since only UK had instructions.

AUSTIN

[3] J. George, a staff member of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations.
[4] Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

310.2/10–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—5 : 03 p. m.

177. Re Italian Membership: Dept believes US, UK and France shld pursue question Italian membership with view to determining what course most likely achieve objective Italian admission or, failing this, demonstrate clearly sincerity our intentions this matter. Pls discuss following Dept views with UK and Fr Dels, and, in your discretion with Canadians.

1. Dept believes best course wld be SC reconsideration of Italy's application as special case. This plan has been under serious consideration in Dept and was recently proposed by UK (urtel 380, Sep 26). While reconsideration Italy's application might cause resentment from other applicants we also consider qualified, separate action in case of Italy can be justified to them in view Italy's special responsibilities re operation trusteeship system which it cannot discharge effectively without full rights including voting in TC and GA. We wld hope UK cld be persuaded not to raise application of Ceylon and others until after Italian application acted upon. Further, although consultations with USSR re Italian application might be unsuccessful and have disadvantage of tipping our own hand in advance, we see no objection if one of Govts principally interested in Ital admission shld undertake such consultations as part effort achieve objective.

We wld be prepared support or sponsor SC reconsideration Italy's application and make strongest possible effort for favorable recom-

mendation. In our view there is outside chance USSR might agree to vote for Italy. USSR wld, however, probably counter with omnibus proposal under which, in return for admission of Italy and possibly other non-Cominform applicants, we wld be required vote for one or more Cominform applicants. We cld not accept such a proposal.

Before deciding definitely in favor reconsideration Italy's application, we wld wish consult with Italy re this matter and question of timing. Re timing, our tentative view is SC reconsideration after GA convenes in Paris wld make it more difficult for USSR to veto and wld have more effective results in Italy.

2. The suggestion contained in Ital *Aide-Mémoire* that GA disregard veto and take action to admit Italy presents basic Charter difficulties. First, it wld be inconsistent with Para 2 of Art 4 of Charter as interpreted by ICJ in advisory opinion of Mar 3, 1950. In this opinion, ICJ concluded that under Charter, GA cannot admit a state to membership when SC had made no recommendation either because of failure of candidate to obtain required majority or because of veto of permanent member. In same opinion ICJ noted that "nowhere has the GA recd the power to change, to the point of reversing, the meaning of a vote of the SC". Second, even though Sov vetoes have not been on Charter grounds and are not in accordance with ICJ advisory opinion of May 28, 1948, it does not follow, as contended in Ital *Aide-Mémoire*, that these vetoes are null and void or that GA is in position to take action implying this.

3. We do not see merit in Belaunde suggestion (urtel 359, Sep 20) that ICJ might be requested give opinion on an applicant's qualifications. Since advisory opinion not binding, USSR cld still veto application. Further, we have serious doubts whether ICJ wld consider itself competent to determine whether an applicant is qualified in view Court's statement, in its opinion of May 28, 1948, that of factors to be taken into account in considering conditions in Art 4, "no relevant political factor . . . connected with the conditions of admission is excluded".

Dept has not yet seen details of Peruvian agenda item on rights of candidates to show proof they meet membership requirements. We will, of course, study proposal carefully.[1]

4. We also see basic difficulties in apparent UK FonOff suggestion (urtel 380) that Sov veto Italy's application might be treated by SC, presumably on ruling by Pres, as lacking effect because it was explicitly based on grounds lying outside terms of Art 4. USSR cld easily frustrate such action by vetoing on alleged Charter grounds or by stating no reasons at all. Moreover, we have grave doubts as to propriety under Charter of a proceeding, analogous to that for overriding

[1] This is a reference to the item submitted by Peru on September 24; see editorial note, p. 348.

double veto, under which judgment wld be passed on reason for Member's vote and, if those reasons found to lie outside Charter, SC wld treat negative note [*vote*] as ineffective. Such a step wld go far beyond anything we or other permanent Members of SC have ever conceived and might open way to practical elimination of veto from subjects to which it has incontestably applied. This is obviously very different matter from procedure already employed by Council to determine whether a particular matter is clearly procedural.

As to UK alternative suggestion, SC Pres cld obviously not himself refer question to ICJ for advisory opinion and SC Res requesting such opinion is probably subject to veto.

5. GA cld request advisory opinion from ICJ as to whether past SC votes on Ital membership constitute SC recommendation for Ital membership despite negative vote USSR. However, we wld have most serious doubts of desirability and propriety of submitting an issue to ICJ so predominantly political in character. Even if Court were willing to give opinion on question, favorable opinion wld seem most unlikely. Further, USSR cld complicate attempt by itself raising question of Ital membership again in SC and casting its veto on alleged Charter grounds.

6. If our efforts obtain Italy's admission fail, US wld be prepared vote for amendment to Art 86 to give Italy membership in TC if Italy desired it. However, we see little likelihood success such an amendment since it wld be subject veto by USSR. Dept wld also favor arrangement for participation by Ital without voting rights in main GA committees if desired by Italians. We understand, however, that Italy not interested in such arrangement.

7. We regret inability to suggest more positive procedure than renewed and energetic effort in SC. We feel, however, that as indicated above, no other suggestion yet made offers prospect of success. We wld be glad to give further consideration to any other proposal which promises to be effective.

8. Dept believes consultations with Italy necessary after above views discussed with UK and Fr Dels. FYI as follow up de Gasperi conversations, we plan give Italy our views on Ital *Aide-Mémoire* in detail both here and in New York.

WEBB

310.2/10–851 : Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL ROME, October 8, 1951—3 p. m.

1620. Zoppi has brought to our attention great importance that Ital Govt attaches to question Ital admission to UN and that govt is counting on our support this question in Paris UNGA. In referring

his conversations with Hickerson,[1] Zoppi expressed hope Hickerson would have opportunity prior final formulation our position to discuss question thoroughly with Guidotti, Ital observer at UN headquarters. Zoppi is somewhat concerned lest his exposition Ital position to Hickerson might not have been entirely clear and complete. For this reason he anxious that Guidotti have opportunity review problem with Dept officers to establish fuller understanding.

We have assured Zoppi we would bring matter Dept's attention and expressed view Hickerson or other appropriate officers would be glad review problem with Guidotti.

THOMPSON

[1] Regarding the context for this remark, see New York telegram 459, October 11, *infra*.

310.2/10–1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, October 11, 1951—8 p. m.

459. Italian Membership. Guidotti (Italian observer) called on Ross with Hyde present on October 10. During preliminaries he mentioned his plans to sail for Paris on 29 October. Ross suggested that days immediately preceding opening of GA are likely to be time of many diplomatic exchanges and negotiations. Therefore, he agreed with Guidotti that latter might well sail for Paris on 23 October.[1]

Ross introduced subject of Italian membership, recalling tripartite declaration and fact that we are actively studying and discussing how best to forward Italian application. He mentioned our current thinking about pressing for new SC consideration of Italian application. He added that Dept still saw difficulties in suggestions contained in Italian *aide-mémoire*.

Guidotti indicated this was the real reason for his calling, that he felt Zoppi had not fully presented the question to the Secretary and recalled Hickerson's suggestion that there be further discussion, which he had come to conduct. At this point, Ross had to leave for a previous engagement and Guidotti continued the conversation with Hyde. Guidotti stated that unless a way is found to bring Italy into the UN the language of the tripartite declaration is meaningless, because

[1] See editorial note, p. 348, regarding the Peruvian item of September 24. In the meantime, new items regarding the admission of new members were submitted on October 6, by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, jointly (Doc. A/1899), and on October 11 by Nicaragua (Doc. A/1907). For texts, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 60.

Italy has always known that the US and UK wld like to have her a member. Belaunde's idea of the supremacy of the GA is an excellent one and the real key to obtaining Italy's admission, although Guidotti cld wish that the Peruvian agenda item had not shown in advance so clearly what the tactic wld be. He feels it wld be a mistake again to bring up the Italian application in SC, because USSR might base its veto on precise language of Article 4 which wld render tactic suggested in *aide-mémoire* or by Belaunde impractical.

Guidotti restated the argument of the *aide-mémoire*, stressing the SYG case as a material precedent which shows "the superiority of the GA". He also urged that the Soviet veto is, or in the future wld be, null and void and GA shld courageously recognize this fact.

He added that there are two legal approaches to this: one, to bring about Italy's admission and thus live up to the tripartite declaration, the other, to insist on legal difficulties so that most that cld be attempted wld be reconsideration in SC and inevitable veto.

During ensuing discussion Hyde restated the substance of conversation between Zoppi and the Secretary on September 24, 1951. Hyde formulated the legal issue presented by Italian *aide-mémoire* as going far in the direction of elimination of the veto from what all permanent members agree is a substantive matter, thus a most serious and dangerous precedent might be created entirely apart from at least some possibility that Soviet withdrawal from UN cld result. He expressed doubt about theory of the supremacy of the GA and observed that ICJ opinions as suggested by Belaunde are not binding, even assuming the court wld consider such an issue. Guidotti felt it cld be framed in a non-political way.

Hyde indicated our serious thought of possibility of early reconsideration of Italian application; the fact that we had discussed this with UK and France and possibility that if very effectively presented from propaganda point of view there is some chance USSR might not veto. He also mentioned as personal idea possibility that USSR might be consulted at high level in Paris on resubmission of application. Guidotti thought these suggestions lead toward dead end, that USSR if given a new chance to vote wld veto on grounds Italy no longer peace-loving on account of its NATO connections. While he had not seriously thought of consultations with USSR, he is very doubtful. In short, this plan contains no new element in his view and only if we will recognize that issue shld be decided by Assembly and not reargued in SC are we likely to get affirmative result to which US is committed in tripartite declaration. Hyde attempted to avoid any further crystallization of views and left it that Guidotti wld talk further with USUN or Hickerson.

AUSTIN

310.2/10–1351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET ROME, October 13, 1951—noon.

1694. In an after-dinner conversation last night, the Prime Minister asked me to forward the following suggestion:

He believes that we miss a propaganda advantage by constantly being forced to take a negative attitude to Soviet proposals. He, therefore, suggests that instead of saying no to the Soviet suggestion that Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania be admitted to the UN, we should state that we would welcome and support their applications for membership as soon as they can produce evidence that they are free and democratic.

Sent Dept 1694; repeated info Moscow 30.

THOMPSON

320/10–1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, October 15, 1951—4 p. m.

1837. Following obtained from Parrott and Hope,[1] UN Department of the Foreign Office on Sixth General Assembly.

[Here follows discussion of several items on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly.]

7. *Handling of Italian Membership Problem:*

Fol is UK's suggested tactics for dealing with this matter in both GA and SC:

a. Arrange to have problem arise first in Comite IV in context of item on full participation of Italy in work of TC. Resolution wld be proposed, perhaps by France, by which GA wld request SC to reconsider Italy's application as special case. In comite debate emphasis wld be placed on Italy's special responsibilities under trusteeship agreement for Somaliland. In plenary emphasis wld be given to Italy's special qualifications for membership.

b. Pursuant to this GA resolution question wld then be taken up in SC. If, as a result, Italy shld be admitted, UK would immed propose admission of Ceylon.

c. If these tactics adopted, it would be desirable to have Comite IV action taken before new Peruvian item arises in Comite I or *ad hoc.*

d. UK sees no merit in Italian scheme for circumventing veto, in any proposal to amend Article 86, or in "associate membership" idea of increased Italian participation in GA but without vote.

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[1] C. C. Parrott, Head of the United Nations (Political) Department in the British Foreign Office, and C. P. Hope, Assistant to the Head of Department.

e. Sanders, Gerig, Allen agreed to report and consider foregoing suggestions and consult further with UK between now and GA.[2]

Repeated information USUN 17, Paris unnumbered.

GIFFORD

[2] William Sanders, O. Benjamin Gerig (Executive Officer for Committee IV Matters), and Ward P. Allen, respectively, in London at this time for discussions between the Department of State and the British Foreign and Colonial Offices regarding colonial policy problems at the United Nations; for documentation on this subject, see pp. 623 ff.

310.2/10–1551

The Chargé in Italy (Thompson) to the Department of State

SECRET ROME, October 15, 1951.

No. 912

Ref: Department's Document IPM D–5a, September 24, 1951, Conversations with Italian Prime Minister, Admission of Italy into the United Nations

Subject: Problem of the Admission of Italy to Membership in the UN or Alternatively, Fuller Participation as a Non-Member

The Embassy has taken note of the statement in the reference document that it is our objective "that Italy be admitted into the United Nations as soon as possible". However, in the light of the seemingly insurmountable difficulties as set forth in this document, it is apparent that the possibility of the early achievement of our objective is extremely limited. The Embassy would therefore present for the consideration of the Department its views with respect to a possible alternative course of action which might provide for fuller Italian participation in United Nations affairs despite continued exclusion from regular membership.

Under the present circumstances when our Government and most other friendly governments, members of the UN, are disposed to renew their efforts to obtain Italian admission during the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly, it is understandable that the Italian Government should insist on its right to full and equal membership in the Organization. In this situation it is understandable that the Italians are not particularly interested in the consideration of possible formulas for limited participation. However, in the event that all efforts to obtain Italy's admission at the Paris UNGA should fail, it is the Embassy's view that we should be prepared to propose alternative arrangements which would provide for the fullest possible Italian participation, within the limits of the Charter, as a non-member.

While it is possible that the Italian Government might of its own accord modify its views respecting limited participation should all

efforts for achievement of full membership fail, it is our view that careful consideration should be given to the possibility of our actively urging Italy to accept limited participation despite the misgivings which some Italian officials may have with respect to such an arrangement. It is understandable that due to considerations of national pride Italy is reluctant to accept an inferior position in the UN. It is also understandable that the Government might feel that acceptance of limited participation would lessen the prospects for early admission to full membership. However, in the larger interest of the UN itself, and in the furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter, it might be desirable to attempt to persuade Italy to contribute to the work of the Organization to the fullest extent possible regardless of purely national considerations. The Embassy suggests that the Department might desire to give careful consideration to the adoption of such a position as our own policy with respect to the problem.

The "limited participation" which the Embassy has in mind is a projection of the suggestion in Embassy telegram 3012 of January 12, 1951 regarding Italian membership in main committees of the General Assembly as an "interested party". Through this device, the Italian Government would have a full opportunity to participate in all debates and assist in the formulation of United Nations' decisions.

It might be expected that the voice of the Italian representative will carry great weight with many of the other delegates, and that on the great majority, if not all, of the problems placed before the UN we could count on strong Italian support for the US position.

On many problems the voice of Italy would be taken as reflecting that of the Vatican which has such great weight in the many Catholic countries, members of the UN.

Since only eight of the sixteen countries of Western Europe are members of the UN, Western Europe is grossly under-represented and the addition of the voice of Italy in the councils of the General Assembly would help to correct this unrealistic situation. It might be expected that Italian participation in debates and Italian support of UN decisions and recommendations would increase the prestige and effectiveness of those recommendations, not only in Italy, but throughout the world.

If the present situation is continued indefinitely and Italy, and other qualified applicants, continue unjustly to be excluded from participation in the Organization, it might be expected that Italy, and others, will come to depend more and more on non-UN organizations for the implementation of their international policies, and that the present feeling of need for membership in the UN will be replaced by a dependence on other organizations to the serious detriment of the prestige and influence of the United Nations itself. It is suggested that even limited participation would do much to hold Italy's interest

in the Organization and loyalty to the purposes and principles of the Charter despite her legal exclusion from regular membership.

If the above arguments are accepted, the Embassy would suggest the following procedure:

1. All possible steps should be taken, within the limits of the Charter (including the widest possible interpretation of Charter requirements—including "stretching" of certain provisions as has been done on numerous occasions when, for example, the Security Council has acted on substantive questions without the affirmative vote of all five of the permanent members despite the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article 27 e.g. the admission of Israel, action in Korea, etc.) to obtain Italy's admission to full membership. Thus, even if all such efforts fail, there will be established a clear record of overwhelming support for Italian membership and unquestionably placing of the responsibility for her continued exclusion.

2. The General Assembly might pass a resolution declaring its agreement that Italy is in every way qualified for membership in the Organization and is excluded only by the Soviet veto. The resolution might further express the will of the Assembly that Italy should, despite its technical exclusion from membership, participate to the fullest extent possible in all of the activities of the General Assembly and, as may be determined by such organizations, in all other committees, councils and other subsidiary organizations of the United Nations.

3. The General Assembly might revise its rules of procedure to provide that:

> All applicants for membership in the United Nations whose applications have been supported by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, and seven members of the Security Council, but are disqualified for membership in the Organization because of the veto of a permanent member, shall be invited to participate in all of the activities of the General Assembly, including all subsidiary organs thereof. Such participation would be on a basis of full equality with regular members with the sole exception that in Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly such countries' delegates would participate without a vote.

According to this formula, Italy, and other qualified applicants barred from membership by the Soviet veto, would participate as full members in all committees and other subsidiary organizations of the General Assembly, and would, in accordance with the revised rules of procedure of the General Assembly be entitled to vote in all such subsidiary organizations. It is believed that the adoption of such a rule of procedure is fully within the prerogative of the General Assembly, since, in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter, the Assembly itself has the right to determine its rules of procedure including the participation and voting procedure of its own committees and subsidiary organizations. Thus the only limitation to Italy's participation in the General Assembly would be in Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly itself, since Paragraph 1 of Article 18, provides that "each

member of the General Assembly shall have one vote". However, there is no reason why an Italian Delegation should not sit in Plenary Sessions and participate fully in all debates (as the Hawaiian and Alaskan Delegates participate in our House of Representatives).

It is realized that this procedure was certainly not envisaged by the drafters of the Charter. However, by the same token, neither was it contemplated that Italy, and other qualified applicants, should be excluded from regular membership of the Organization which was intended to embrace all "peace loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization are able and willing to carry out these obligations".

Not only out of justice to Italy, and other states qualified for membership but unjustly excluded because of Soviet veto, but also in the interest of strengthening the UN, of furthering the purposes and principles of the Charter, and of achieving our national objectives within the framework of the UN, the Embassy strongly recommends the Department's careful consideration of the above proposals.

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1951.

Subject: Italian Membership

The following is for your use in conversations with Guidotti on October 16 concerning the question of Italian membership:

1. The Italian application has been vetoed by the Soviet Union four times—on August 26, 1947; October 1, 1947; April 10, 1948; and September 13, 1949. The Soviet Union has given as its reason for vetoing these applications the failure of the Security Council to recommend simultaneous admission of Cominform applicants.

2. The United States has supported and will continue to support strongly the admission of Italy. Together with the UK and France, we have recently reaffirmed our "determination to make every effort to secure Italy's membership in the United Nations." We have given serious consideration to all suggested courses of action by which Italy's admission might be achieved, including the recent proposal of the Government of Italy.

3. The Government of Italy, as pointed out in an *Aide-Mémoire* handed to the Secretary at Ottawa, maintains that since the Soviet Union had never questioned Italy's qualifications for membership, its vetoes of Security Council recommendations to admit Italy are null

and void; and that the General Assembly should therefore disregard the Soviet vetoes and consider action to admit Italy. Aside from the practical consideration that the Soviet Union could again raise the question of Italian membership in the Security Council and advance alleged Charter grounds, we see basic Charter difficulties in the action suggested. In an advisory opinion of March 3, 1950, the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter, the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission either because of the failure of a candidate to obtain the required majority or because of the negative vote of a permanent member. Further, while we certainly agree that the Soviet vetoes of Italy's application have not been based on Charter grounds, it does not follow, and the International Court of Justice has never suggested, that an improper exercise of the veto right is, because of its impropriety, null and void. Nor does it follow that the General Assembly can take action implying that these vetoes are ineffective.

4. Peru has requested the inclusion on the General Assembly agenda of an item entitled: "Admission of New Members: Rights of States Candidates to Adduce Proof to Show that They Satisfy the Requirements of Article 4 of the Charter." This proposal probably is similar to the plan Belaunde (Peru) has discussed with USUN under which the General Assembly would request that applicants be permitted to present to the Security Council proof of their qualifications for membership. If there was then a threat of a veto, the Assembly would request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to the value of the proof. Assuming a favorable opinion by the Court, the Security Council, in Belaunde's opinion, would have to apply strictly the sense of Article 4 and no member could veto the application.

We see two basic difficulties in the plan. First, since an advisory opinion is not binding, a permanent member could still veto. Second, we doubt whether the Court would consider itself competent to determine whether an applicant is qualified, since the Court itself has previously stated that of the factors to be taken into account in considering conditions laid down in Article 4, "no relevant political factor . . . connected with the conditions of admission is excluded."

5. The Department of State is inclined to favor reconsideration by the Security Council of Italy's application as a special case while the General Assembly is meeting in Paris, although it would not wish to take this action if Italy opposed it. We would be prepared to support or sponsor reconsideration and believe there may be an outside chance that the USSR would not veto if the case is presented effectively. The USUN is discussing this matter with the UK and France and has explained our views to Guidotti. The latter has expressed the opinion

that it would be a mistake to propose reconsideration of Italy's application by the Security Council since the USSR would probably veto on Charter grounds and render the tactic suggested by the Italians or Belaunde even more difficult. He stressed the "superiority" of the Assembly and urged that the Assembly should recognize past Soviet vetoes as null and void. He also expressed doubt as to the advisability of preliminary consultations with the USSR, which Gross had suggested as a personal idea.

6. If our efforts to obtain Italy's admission fail, we would be prepared to vote for an amendment to Article 86 to give Italy voting rights in the Trusteeship Council if Italy desired it. However, such an amendment would probably be vetoed by the Soviet Union. We would also favor an arrangement for participation by Italy without voting rights in the main committees of the General Assembly if desired by the Italians.

7. We recommend that you inform Guidotti that we intend to do all we can to obtain admission for Italy but explain the basic Charter difficulties in the plans proposed by Italy and by Belaunde. We also recommend that you state that we are inclined to believe that the only feasible course is Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application as a special case and that we would be prepared to sponsor or support reconsideration and make the strongest possible effort for a favorable recommendation unless Italy opposed the idea. If our efforts to obtain membership for Italy should fail, we would be prepared to vote for an amendment to Article 86 and would favor an arrangement for participation by Italy without voting rights in the main Committees of the Assembly if these measures should be desired by the Italians. We would appreciate Italy's views on these matters and will, of course, continue to consult closely with Italy in the future.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1951.

Subject: Italy's Membership in United Nations

Participants: Gastone Guidotti, Minister, Italian Embassy
Mario Luciolli, Counselor, Italian Embassy
John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, United Nations Affairs
Joseph N. Greene, WE
Paul B. Taylor—UNP

[1] Drafted by Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

When Prime Minister De Gasperi saw the Secretary he undertook to study carefully an *aide-mémoire* and memorandum which De Gasperi gave the Secretary, even though we had at that time given our preliminary reactions. The present conversation resulted from a message from Zoppi, through our Embassy at Rome, that he felt he had not presented the Italian proposals on membership adequately and would like Guidotti to discuss the matter further with me. Guidotti called last week on Mr. Ross and Mr. Hyde; through USUN I offered to see Guidotti here or in New York.

I began by reviewing the record of consideration of Italy's membership application in the United Nations and I outlined the basic Charter difficulties which we see in the action which is suggested in the Italian *aide-mémoire*. I pointed out that in the Advisory Opinion of March 3, 1950 the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter, the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission; and that while we certainly agree that the Soviet vetoes of Italy have not been based on Charter grounds it does not follow that an improper exercise of the veto right is null and void. Nor does it follow that the General Assembly can take action implying that these votes are ineffective—the idea that is at the basis of the Italian plan. I pointed out again that the USSR does not even need to give any reasons whatever for its veto; but the veto nevertheless is effective.

I outlined briefly the difficulties we see in the plan of Belaunde (Peru) to have applicant states submit proof of their qualifications and to provide for an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice on the adequacy of these qualifications.

I then said that, desiring to do everything we possibly could to advance Italy's membership, we were inclining toward consideration of Italy's application by the Security Council as a special case during the period while the General Assembly is meeting in Paris. We would not, I said, take this action if Italy opposed it. I pointed out further that we were prepared to vote for an amendment of Article 86 of the Charter to give Italy voting rights in the Trusteeship Council, and to favor an arrangement for Italy's participation without voting rights in the main committees of the Assembly, if the Italians desired these arrangements.

In the discussion that followed, Count Guidotti first emphasized very strongly his belief that the Soviet reply to the Tripartite Declaration had clearly excluded any possibility of a non-forcible method of securing Italy's admission. He considered that the series of conditions set up by the Soviet Union went far beyond what had been offered before and amounted to blackmail against Italy and against the whole group of free nations. He said he was quite ready to admit that there was no juridical way which could be found to bring Italy in. It was,

he said, a matter of "power". Experts had worked on the problem for five years and had found no legal or procedural device to secure Italy's admission. He argued that what was needed was a drastic "political will" which would create a juridical procedure.

Count Guidotti questioned the political desirability of raising the Italian application once more in the Security Council. In this connection and at various points throughout the conversation he argued that the Italian people expect that a substantial change in the situation would be brought about by the Tripartite Declaration. Everyone knows, he said, there is no clear juridical avenue to membership under present circumstances. What the Italians expect is the creation of something new, and the nature of what that new procedure could be is illustrated by our previous actions in the United Nations in the extension of the term of the Secretary General, in the resolution on Uniting for Peace, and in the developments on the veto. He feared that if it were once more demonstrated that the Western Powers were unable to secure Italy's admission and that everything depended on the triumphant Soviet veto, the political effect in Italy would be very bad. However, he would report the matter carefully to his Government and let us know its views.

To Count Guidotti's review of the previous instances in which the Charter had been "stretched" I pointed out—in addition to the usual arguments—that one difficulty about the membership problem is that there has been so much practice in the United Nations, including judicial opinion, during the past five years that a sudden reversal of this constitutional practice would be impossible. In closing I noted that Guidotti had not commented upon the suggestion that Italy be invited to take a seat in the main committees of the General Assembly, and said that I had assumed his omission of this had been intentional. Both he and Luciolli replied that when I mentioned it to Luciolli some months ago the response of the Italian Government on the matter had been negative and they believed it was still "90%" negative.

310.2/10–2445 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, October 24, 1951—4:19 p. m.

526. Re Italian Membership: Italian observer Guidotti on instructions saw Gross this morning and voiced Italian Govt's "keen disappointment" that Guidotti had been told by Hickerson we had no suggestions to offer re Italian membership beyond what Guidotti called, "undoubtedly useless", step of renewed SC discussion membership question. He said in tripartite declaration we had indicated we

would take all steps possible to aid Italy and we should do just that even if it meant "stretching the charter a little".

AUSTIN

310.2/10–2451

The Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL ROME, October 23, 1951.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: I was much distressed at learning that your Government do not see their way to take any action for the admission of Italy to the United Nations in this Session beyond the presentation of a motion in the Security Council which would meet, of course, with the instant and, by now, customary Russian veto.

I have not forgotten that during our conversations in Washington you raised some doubts as to the applicability of the procedure outlined in the Memorandum I had the pleasure of submitting to you. It was however my impression at the time that you intended to pursue, in consultation with other Powers, an extensive exploration of the matter, bearing fully in mind that, as demonstrated by the experience of the last four years, a purely juridical formula to end the deadlock does not exist and that an action on the part of the Assembly or the Security Council to circumvent the veto, such as brought about in similar cases, would be necessary and indeed unavoidable.

This was, at least in my understanding and, I believe, in the understanding of the Italian people and of many friendly Governments, the meaning of the pledge undertaken with the Three Powers Declaration. Failing this, the Declaration would mark no progress on the position assumed by your and other Governments with previous pledges made in concurrence with the USSR, such as the Preamble of the Peace Treaty and the Potsdam Declaration.

In the meantime a Russian note has been received, that puts the revision of the Treaty and the admission of Italy to the United Nations on the same political plane, while making the most unwarrantable demand that Italy leave at once the Atlantic Pact as a condition for the revision and, it is to be presumed, since the two questions are interrelated, for her admission to the U.N. If a Russian veto which is

[1] Source text sent by Ambassador Dunn to the Embassy in France (under cover of a letter dated October 24), for delivery to the Secretary of State upon his arrival in Paris to attend the General Assembly session. The Secretary of State in fact saw a cable text in Washington before his departure on October 25, which was transmitted in Rome telegram 1849, October 24, 2 p. m. and received in the Department of State at 10:26 a. m. of the same day (310.2/10–2451). In sending the cable text, Ambassador Dunn took the occasion to stress how strongly the Prime Minister felt about the matter of Italian membership: "This question of admission to the UN is uppermost in the PriMin's mind and he reiterated to me yesterday that this is almost more important than the revision of the treaty."

demonstrably null and void in our case, and would be even more palpably illegal after the stand taken by the USSR in their note, were allowed to block once again the membership of Italy without any reaction on the part of the Great Powers beyond verbal protestations, I am most certain that an unfavourable impression would be created. The Russian veto would come as no surprise to anybody in Italy, but what would be much of a shock and a surprise to everybody, I fear, is to apprehend that all the efforts that the Three Powers are prepared to do, on the strength of their recent Declaration, to support Italy's admission would result merely in provoking a fresh veto from Russia.

On the legal side, moreover, the Italian people would fail to understand the cause of the inability of the Three Great Powers at finding a solution for Italy's case as it is generally known that an adequate solution was found in other cases; among which the re-appointment of the Secretary General was perhaps the most striking. May I point out very briefly, in this connection, the similarities between the two positions. The two relevant provisions of the Charter, namely articles 4 and 97, have practically the same wording and require, in both cases, a recommendation of the Security Council. It is true at that time it was not a fresh appointment but a re-appointment of the same person. But a resolution taken by the General Assembly on January 24th, 1946 (doc. A/64) reads explicitly: "The same rules apply to the renewal of appointment as to an original appointment."

In the view of my legal advisers this resolution, which was bypassed in the action taken by the Assembly, appears to have a more binding character than the advice rendered by the International Court of Justice on the case of the admission of new members which, as you know, is purely consultative.

I am afraid that these points, among others, will be made very forcibly both in Parliament and outside, and will put my Government and myself in an extremely embarrassing position.

I trust you realize the seriousness of the issue for my Government. May I add that I would be most obliged for an expression of your views on the matter. Believe me, my dear Secretary of State,

Sincerely, DE GASPERI

310.2/10–2451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 30, 1951—6 : 49 p. m.

1928. Fol is draft interim reply from Acting Secy to PriMins msg urtel 1849,[2] Oct 24. Unless you see objections to text pls deliver:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Your letter of Oct 23 to the Secy of State reached Wash just before he departed for Europe. While he received it, he did not have time to formulate a reply before sailing.

"You may be sure that the US Govt is continuing to explore every possible course of action which wld lead to the admission of Italy into the UN. I am certain that it is agreed that, in pressing for Italy's admission, we shld act within the Charter. To do otherwise might jeopardize the basic principles in support of which Italy wishes to make its full contribution as a member of the UN.

"The Dept fully appreciates the pol problem that exists and the necessity for finding a solution. It is my understanding that the Secy of State and his principal advisers will be prepared further to discuss the entire question with your Reps and with the Reps of the UK, Fr and other friendly countries, during the forthcoming mtg of the GA at Paris. Cordially, James E. Webb."

WEBB

[1] Repeated for information to Paris as Gadel 24.
[2] See footnote 1, *supra*.

320/11–151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 1, 1951—6 : 43 p. m.

Gadel 43. Position paper on membership being air pouched. Fol are Dept recommendations:

"1. USDel shld indicate US continues support strongly admission nine qualified applicants whose admission has been blocked by Sov veto and also looks forward to time when other countries qualified for membership but which have not yet applied will be admitted.

"2. At same time, USDel shld take position there are reasons for handling Italy as special case in view its trusteeship responsibilities. USDel shld, if practicable, arrange for consideration question Italy's membership by Fourth Comite at beginning of session under question of full participation of Italy in work of TC, and shld sponsor or support resolution by which GA wld request SC reconsideration Italy's application as special case. If this course not feasible, US may support special SC reconsideration Italy's application without prior GA consideration. If one of these courses decided upon, USDel shld seek to have *Ad Hoc* Pol Comite delay consideration membership question until separate action taken on Italy.

[1] Repeated for information to Rome as 1977.

"USDel shld consult closely with other UN Members, especially UK and Fr, and with Italy before deciding on either of above courses. Neither course shld be pursued by USDel unless agreed to by Ital Govt.

"3. If SC reconsideration other applications shld follow reconsideration Italy's application, US shld support admission of the non-Cominform applicants and oppose admission of Cominform applicants, to whose admission US objects on Charter grounds. It shld not accept a Sov omnibus proposal requiring our consent to admission of one or more Cominform applicants in return for Sov agreement to admit Italy and possibly other non-Cominform applicants, and shld consult the Dept if such proposal is made.

"4. USDel shld indicate its willingness consider any proposal to achieve admission of qualified states which can reasonably be found consistent with Charter. However, it shld point out basic Charter difficulties in Italian and Peruvian plans (Deptel 177 to USUN, Oct 4) and shld vote against them unless they have strong support of majority UN Members, in which case USDel shld consult Dept.

"5. If efforts obtain Italy's admission fail, USDel shld support an amendment to Art 86 to give Italy full membership in TC if desired by Italy (see SD/A/C.4/90 [2]), and shld also consult with other Dels and with Italy re possibility of arrangements giving Italy right to participate in main GA committees if this desired by Italians. Present Dept assumption is that such participation wld be without vote. USDel may support such arrangements for other interested qualified applicants as well as Italy."

WEBB

[2] See Doc. SD/A/C.4/90/Rev. 1, November 14, p. 383.

310.2/11–851

Briefing Memorandum for Talks by the Secretary of State With the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), at Paris [1]

SECRET

ITALIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The Italians are most anxious to secure admission to the United Nations; de Gasperi has said that this is almost more important than the revision of the treaty. De Gasperi has expressed distress that we have been unable to agree to the Italian proposal for circumventing the veto and unable to propose any other course of action which might

[1] A series of bipartite (Acheson–Eden) and tripartite (Acheson–Eden–Schuman) meetings were held at Paris between November 4 and November 9. For documentation on these meetings, see volume III.

This document was one of several briefing memoranda on the Italian membership question that were drafted during this period. Although this memorandum is undated, there is a strong presumption that it was drafted for use at the November 4 meeting between Acheson and Eden. The Italian membership question was not discussed at this meeting, nor indeed at subsequent meetings until the second tripartite meeting on November 9.

achieve success. The Italians have now proposed that the Security Council would pass all applications for membership to the Assembly, the Assembly being free to reject applications from the satellites while admitting Italy. The Italians have not proposed any way of getting Russian acceptance, which we consider most unlikely.

The Department has recommended that the United States Delegation should indicate continued United States support of the nine qualified applicants whose admission has been blocked by the Soviet veto, particularly Italy. The Department thinks that the Delegation should, if the Italian Government agrees and the United Kingdom and France concur, propose that the Assembly request the Security Council to reconsider Italy's application as a special case. We understand that Schuman made a suggestion along these lines to the Secretary yesterday. As indicated above, we of course agree with this and would be inclined to favor consideration of this matter in the Trusteeship Committee, which will consider the question of Italy's full participation in the work of the Trusteeship Council. If this course is not feasible, the Delegation might support special Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application without prior General Assembly consideration. If the Security Council should go on to reconsider other applications, the Department recommends that the United States should support the admission of non-Cominform applicants and oppose admission of the Cominform applicants. As to the tricky plans of Italy and Peru, the Department recommends that we should point out the Charter difficulties involved in them. If these special efforts to get Italy into the United Nations are unsuccessful, the Delegation is authorized to support an amendment to Article 86 to give Italy full membership in the Trusteeship Council if it wishes; and should also consult with the Italians and others on the possibility of making special arrangements to give Italy the right to participate without vote in the main Assembly committees.

310.2/11–851

Memorandum by Mr. David W. Wainhouse, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly [1]

SECRET [PARIS,] November 6, 1951.

ITALIAN MEMBERSHIP QUESTION

The Italian Aide-Mémoire

The Plan: A General Assembly decision by two-thirds to admit Italy to membership. All that is necessary is the political will of the

[1] With regard to specific assignments given to the U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff, Wainhouse was functioning as Executive Officer for Political and Security Matters in Committee I.

Three Powers to surmount the stalemate caused by the Soviets; the Soviet veto is contrary to the law of the Charter.

The Difficulties With It: A recommendation by Security Council is an indispensable requirement for the admission of new members. This was confirmed by an advisory opinion of the Court (March 3, 1950). To be sure attaching conditions other than those contained in the Charter are invalid, and Court so ruled on May 28, 1948. But Soviets can change reason or give no reason at all. It cannot be argued therefore, as does the Italian *Aide-Mémoire*, that Soviet vetoes are null and void and that the General Assembly is in position to take action implying this.

II

The Belaunde Initiative

The Plan: (1) General Assembly advise Security Council to revise rules to permit applicants for membership present proof of qualifications under Article 4 of Charter; (2) Such proof of Italy's qualifications would be studied by Commission of Security Council; (3) If there were objection to Commission's report (threat of Soviet veto), General Assembly would ask Court for opinion on value of proof offered; (4) If Court ruled favorably, Security Council would have to apply strictly sense of Article 4; (5) Matter would not be vetoable because Charter leaves no option or choice.

The Difficulties With It:

No merit in asking Court for opinion on applicant's qualifications. Since advisory opinion not binding USSR could still veto application. Furthermore, we have serious doubts whether Court would consider itself competent to determine whether an applicant is qualified in view of Court's statement in its opinion of May 28, 1948 that of the factors to be taken into account in considering conditions in Article "No relevant political factor . . . connected with conditions of admission is excluded."

III

The Schuman[2] *Tactic*

The Plan: General Assembly might point up the issues in the Italian membership case by requesting Security Council to reconsider Italy's application.

We can go along with this, since it is in line with our position.

The Difficulties With It: The Italians see no merit in this, and feel that another veto would not help. Without Italian approval or acquiescence, we should not press this.

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[2] Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Department of State was informed of this French *démarche* in a French Embassy *aide-mémoire* of November 1 which has not been found in the Department of State files.

IV

The United States Position

(*This is set forth in Gadel 43 of November 1, 1951.*)

Special reasons for handling Italy's application in view of its trusteeship responsibilities. USDel should arrange for consideration question of Italy's membership by Fourth Committee under question of full participation of Italy in Trusteeship Council. We are prepared to sponsor or support resolution by which General Assembly would request Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application *as special case.* If this course not feasible, we can support special Security Council reconsideration without prior General Assembly consideration. (This is also what M. Schuman has in mind.)

Neither of the above courses should be pursued by us unless agreed to by Italy.

We can, if efforts to obtain Italy's admission fail, support an amendment to Article 86 to give Italy full membership in Trusteeship Council if desired by Italy, and should also consult with other Delegates and with Italy regarding possibility of arrangements giving her right to participate, without vote, in General Assembly Committees if she so desires.

310.2/11–851

Briefing Memorandum for Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, at Paris

SECRET [PARIS,] November 8, 1951.

QUESTION OF ITALY'S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

In consonance with the Declaration of September 26, 1951 by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and our previous strong support of Italy's application for membership, the Department believes the following objectives should be pursued in the Sixth General Assembly Session, after consultation with the United Kingdom and France and agreement with Italy:

1. The United States should sponsor or support in the Fourth Committee, where the question of full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council is to be considered, a resolution by which the General Assembly would request the Security Council to reconsider Italy's application as a special case. The only satisfactory way to remove Italy's handicap in discharging its trusteeship responsibilities is to have full voting participation in the United Nations.
2. If the course outlined in 1 above is not feasible, the United States may support a special Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application without prior General Assembly consideration.

3. If efforts to obtain Italy's admission fail, the United States should support an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter to give Italy full membership in the Trusteeship Council, and consult with other delegates on the possibility of arrangements giving Italy the right to participate in the main General Assembly committees without, presumably, the right to vote.

PROBABLE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRENCH POSITIONS

The discussions in New York have indicated that the United Kingdom and France would probably go along with objectives 1 and 2 and might possibly go along with objective 3.

POINTS WHICH THE SECRETARY MIGHT MAKE

1. The discussions which USUN officers have had in New York indicate that the United Kingdom and France share generally our difficulties with the Italian proposal that the General Assembly admit Italy to membership on a two-thirds vote without a Security Council recommendation. The International Court of Justice in an advisory opinion has held that the admission of a State cannot be effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission.

2. The discussions which USUN have had in New York indicate also that the United Kingdom and France share generally our views concerning the *Belaunde Initiative** because of the basic Charter difficulties.

3. Our representative on the membership item (Congressman Mansfield)[1] should consult with his British and French counterpart on this matter.

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*The *Belaunde Initiative* is as follows: (1) General Assembly advise Security Council to revise rules to permit applicants for membership present proof of qualifications under Article 4 of the Charter; (2) Such proof of Italy's qualifications would be studied by Commission of Security Council; (3) If there were objection to Commission's report (threat of Soviet veto), General Assembly would ask Court for opinion on value of proof offered; (4) If Court ruled favorably, Security Council would have to apply strictly sense of Article 4; (5) Matter would not be vetoable because Charter leaves no option or choice. [Footnote in the source text.]

[1] Congressman Michael J. Mansfield of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly. Mansfield had been delegated responsibility *inter alia* for the membership question. Subsequently this responsibility seems to have been transferred to Congressman John N. Vorys, of the Delegation, who was handling matters relating to the revision of the Italian peace treaty.

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Minutes of Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, Paris, French Foreign Office, November 9, 1951, 11:30 a. m.

SECRET

NOVT M–2

[Here follows list of persons present: France (11), the United Kingdom (9), the United States (11). The Foreign Ministers headed each group. The Secretary of State was assisted by David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to France, Walter S. Gifford, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs and formerly United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, was also present throughout the meeting.

Here follow brief remarks about projected dates for the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Council, and a discussion of some length on the Moroccan question (see page 157).]

Italian UN Membership

Foreign Minister Schuman said he thought it was essential that action on Italian membership be initiated in the SC. He said the Italian note had failed to convince him that the Assembly could act in the absence of SC action. He said, however, that he felt in the SC all that would happen would be another debate and another veto. He said we should consider what needs to be done if this course of events occurred. He said this would be very serious to Italy and that we also should not "bend to the Soviet veto". He said he thought perhaps the SC could refer the question to the GA with a statement that it has been blocked from action. He thought then the GA could vote favoring Italy. He said the result of this, of course, would be only a moral one, but he thought even so it would help the Italian situation somewhat. He said that in the GA the Trusteeship argument could be used. He said we could argue that it was not in accord with the Constitution or with justice that a country worthy of being given a Trusteeship by the UN should be excluded from membership in the UN. No decision was taken on the matter of GA tactics in the event of another SC veto.

Mr. Acheson said that he wanted to suggest that the Trusteeship Council recommend to the GA that because of the difficulty Italy has in administering a UN Trusteeship without being a Member, something should be done about this situation. Schuman replied that this in effect had been done and was covered by Item 56 of the agenda. Mr. Acheson said that he had not completed his suggestion. He wished to propose that this agenda item be considered in the Fourth Committee and that the Fourth Committee and the Assembly pass a Resolution

calling upon the SC to reexamine the Italian application as a special case in view of the trusteeship question.

M. Schuman said he thought this was a good proposal and that Item 56 should be referred to the Fourth Committee rather than the First. He said that if we agreed in principle on this proposal, our experts could work out the details.

Although Mr. Eden did not speak, there appeared to be general agreement, and Mr. Acheson said that Congressman Mansfield, of our Delegation, would be in touch with the other two Delegations to work this out.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership"

Memorandum by Mr. David W. Wainhouse, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly [1]

SECRET [PARIS, November 9, 1951].[2]

Subject: Italian Membership

At the Foreign Ministers meeting in the Quai d'Orsay today (Nov. 9), M. Schuman opened the discussion on the question of Italian membership in the UN by saying that the three Governments (US, Fr, UK) are under an obligation to make efforts to secure the admission of Italy into the UN. M. Schuman referred to the item submitted by the Trusteeship Council for inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly relating to the participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council and stated that Italy, as the Administering Authority of the former Italian territory of Somaliland, is entitled to be treated as a special case for membership in the UN. He accordingly suggested that:

1. The three Foreign Ministers agree to have the item included in the General Assembly agenda and assigned to Committee IV for consideration.
2. Committee IV develop a resolution in which the General Assembly would ask the Security Council to reconsider Italy's application as a special case.

The Secretary agreed to the suggestion of M. Schuman and Mr. Eden nodded approval.

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[1] Addressed to Congressman Mansfield, Paul B. Taylor (Executive Officer of the United States Delegation), and O. Benjamin Gerig (Executive Officer for Committee IV Matters).

[2] This memorandum actually carries the date of November 10, which presumably is the date it was typed. This same memorandum with a November 12 date was sent on November 12 to Congressman Vorys (USUN Files). Wainhouse in drafting the November 12 memorandum to Vorys changed the name "Mansfield" to "Vorys" in the last paragraph.

The position set forth by M. Schuman is in accord with that taken by the Department. There was no consideration given by the Foreign Ministers as to the course we should follow in the event of a veto in the Security Council on the reconsideration of Italy's application.

The Secretary stated to the other Ministers that Congressman Mansfield would handle the membership question for the United States in the General Assembly.

310.2/11–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr., of the Office of Western European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 9, 1951.

Subject: Italian Admission to the United Nations

Participants: Mr. P. Francfort,[1] French Embassy
Mr. Joseph Greene, Jr.—WE

Mr. Francfort had asked whether we had any reply to give him on his *Aide-Mémoire* proposing a course of action in the United Nations for the admission of Italy to the United Nations. I informed him that our own thinking coincides, in general, with that of the French Government as set forth in the *Aide-Mémoire*. We had just had word from Paris that the three Foreign Secretaries, Messrs. Acheson, Schuman and Eden had in fact agreed on a course of action substantially as outlined in the *Aide-Mémoire*. Mr. Francfort thanked me for the information and indicated that it met his requirements for the time being.

[1] Pierre Francfort, French Counselor of Embassy.

IO Files

United States Delegation Position Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 12, 1951.
US/A/3379

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

THE PROBLEM

The question of the admission of new members and related matters will be considered by the General Assembly under several agenda items. The Fourth Committee has on its agenda the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council, an issue which directly involves the question of Italian membership in

the United Nations (see position paper SD/A/C.4/90).[1] Furthermore, Peru has submitted an item for the supplementary agenda of the Assembly entitled "Admission of New Members: Right of Candidate States to Present Proof of the Conditions Required under Article 4 of the Charter" (A/1887 Rev. 1) and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have also requested the inclusion on the supplementary agenda of an item called "Admission of New Members" (A/1899). These items will in all probability be taken up by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. In connection with the membership question, arrangements providing for non-member participation in the General Assembly may arise if the present membership stalemate continues.

What should be the position of the United States concerning the question of the admission of new members and possible arrangements for non-member participation in the General Assembly?

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation should indicate that the United States continues to support strongly the admission of the nine qualified applicants, the admission of which has been blocked by the Soviet veto; and that the United States looks forward to the time when other countries which are qualified for membership but which have not yet applied will also be admitted.

2. At the same time, the Delegation should take the position that there are reasons for handling the question of Italy's admission as a special case in view of Italy's role as a state administering a trust territory under the United Nations. The Delegation should, if practicable, arrange for consideration of the question of Italian membership by the Fourth Committee at the beginning of the session under the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council, and should sponsor or support a resolution in that Committee by which the General Assembly would request the Security Council to reconsider Italy's application as a special case. If this course does not appear feasible, the United States may support Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application as a special case without prior consideration in the Assembly. If one of these courses is decided upon, the Delegation should seek to have the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee delay consideration of the membership question until separate action is taken on Italy.

Before deciding on either of these steps, the Delegation should consult closely with other United Nations Members, particularly the United Kingdom and France, and with Italy. Neither course should be pursued by the Delegation unless agreed to by the Italian Government.

[1] Doc. SD/A/C.4/90, October 19, 1951 is not printed. See Doc. SD/A/C.4/90/Rev. 1, November 14, p. 383.

3. If Security Council reconsideration of other applications should follow reconsideration of Italy's application, the United States should support the admission of the non-Soviet applicants and oppose the admission of the Soviet applicants to whose admission the United States objects on Charter grounds. The United States should not accept a Soviet omnibus proposal requiring our consent to the admission of one or more Soviet applicants in return for Soviet agreement to admit Italy and possibly other non-Soviet applicants and should consult the Department if such a proposal is made.

4. The United States Delegation should indicate its willingness to consider any proposal to achieve the admission of qualified states which can reasonably be found to be consistent with the Charter. However, the Delegation should point out the basic Charter difficulties in the plans which have recently been proposed by Italy and Peru, and should vote against these plans unless they have the strong support of the majority of United Nations Members, in which case the Delegation should consult the Department.

5. If efforts to obtain the admission of Italy fail, the United States Delegation should support an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter to give Italy full voting rights in the Trusteeship Council provided this course is desired by the Italians (see position paper, SD/A/C.4/90), and should also consult with the Italians and with other United Nations Members with a view to exploring the possibility of giving Italy the right to participate in the main committees of the General Assembly if the Italians want such participation. The present assumption is that such participation in the committees would be without vote. The Delegation may also support such arrangements for other qualified applicants if they are interested.

COMMENT

1. The United States has consistently expressed the view that the objective of a universal United Nations membership should be achieved as rapidly as states meet the qualifications for membership under the Charter. It has supported, and continues to support strongly, the admission of the nine non-Soviet applicants, (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal), which the overwhelming majority of United Nations Members considers qualified but which have been excluded from membership by the veto of the Soviet Union. It looks forward to the time when other countries qualified for membership will also be admitted. The United States has declared that it does not intend to permit its vote in the Security Council to prevent the admission to membership of any applicant which has received seven affirmative votes in the Security Council and has repeatedly requested the Soviet Union to refrain from exercising its veto over membership applications.

The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the admission of the five Soviet applicants (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, "Mongolian People's Republic" and Rumania) because of its strong objections to their admission on Charter grounds. Almost all the members of the Security Council and the General Assembly have likewise been unable to support their admission. These applicants have been giving at least moral support to the aggression in Korea. Some have engaged in aggressive acts in the Balkans. Three of them have flouted the recommendations of the Assembly with respect to peace treaty obligations on human rights and have disregarded the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on their peaceful settlement obligations under these same treaties. One applicant, Outer Mongolia, has never demonstrated that it has the capacity to play the normal role of a state in the international community.

The Security Council has not reconsidered the pending applications since 1949 because it has been evident that reconsideration would achieve no useful purpose. The United States favors reconsideration of the applications of qualified candidates by the Security Council whenever there is a reasonable chance of favorable action. However, general reconsideration at this time would almost certainly result in the usual Soviet vetoes and perhaps in another Soviet omnibus proposal which the United States could not accept.

2. At the same time, the United States believes that there are reasons for reconsideration of Italy's application as a separate case. In addition to possessing the full qualifications for admission, Italy has trusteeship responsibilities which it cannot effectively discharge without full voting participation in the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. The United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, recently reaffirmed "its determination to make every effort to secure Italy's membership in the United Nations," and the President has stated that we "intend to keep on working for the admission of Italy." Although the Soviet Union has indicated that it will agree to Italy's admission only if Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania are admitted and if Italy withdraws from NATO, conditions unacceptable to the United States, it is believed that there is still an outside chance that the Soviet Union might not veto if the case is handled effectively as a special case. At the same time, it must be realized that, as Italian representatives have pointed out, another Soviet veto might have unfortunate repercussions within Italy in that it would highlight our impotence to obtain its admission.

The Fourth Committee has on its agenda the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council. In the case of Italy, full participation in the Council could be achieved only through membership in the United Nations or through an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter. Since United Nations membership is ob-

viously the only fully satisfactory solution, a proposal could appropriately be made in the Fourth Committee that steps be taken at once in the Security Council to admit Italy to United Nations membership. It could be argued that, above and beyond the declarations of the General Assembly since 1947 that Italy is fully qualified for admission, the General Assembly has granted, and Italy has accepted, special United Nations responsibilities in connection with the operation of the trusteeship system. Italy is seriously handicapped in discharging these responsibilities if it does not have full voting participation in the Trusteeship Council, in the General Assembly, under whose general supervision the Trusteeship Council operates, and perhaps in other United Nations bodies. If this plan does not appear feasible, the Security Council might reconsider Italy's application as a special case without prior General Assembly action. Whichever of the above procedures may be decided upon should be taken early in the session before discussion of the general membership question arises in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, in order not to prejudice efforts to handle Italy as a special case. Early action would also be desirable to permit other steps to be taken if the Soviet Union should block Italy's admission.

Before deciding on one of the above courses, consultation with other United Nations members and with Italy is necessary. Italy may prefer that neither course be taken. If Italy should persist in opposing Security Council reconsideration, the Delegation should not insist upon either of the above courses.

3. If the Italian application should be dealt with separately in the Security Council, it is probable that reconsideration of other applications will follow. In this event, the United States should, of course, give strong support to the admission of the non-Soviet applicants and oppose the admission of the Soviet applicants to whose admission the United States objects on Charter grounds. It should not accept a Soviet omnibus proposal requiring our consent to the admission of one or more Soviet applicants in return for Soviet agreement to admit Italy and possibly other non-Soviet applicants, and should consult the Department in the event that such a proposal is made.

4. Plans to circumvent the Soviet veto of membership applications have recently been proposed by Italy and Peru, and will undobutedly be considered by the Assembly in connection with Italy's application and the general membership question. These plans are likely to receive the strong support of Latin American and other countries. However, in the opinion of the United States, the proposals present basic Charter difficulties, difficulties which have prevented us from making similar proposals in the past. While the United States is in full sympathy with the objectives of these plans and is willing to consider proposals to achieve the admission of the qualified applicants which can reasonably be found to be consistent with the Charter, it is believed that the

effect of endorsement of the proposals of Italy or Peru would be to disregard our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of Italy, as pointed out in an *Aide-Mémoire* handed to the Secretary at Ottawa, maintains that since the Soviet Union has never questioned Italy's qualifications for membership, its vetoes of Security Council recommendations to admit Italy are null and void; and that the General Assembly should therefore disregard the Soviet vetoes and consider action to admit Italy. Aside from the practical consideration that the Soviet Union could again raise the question of Italian membership in the Security Council and advance alleged Charter grounds, we see basic Charter difficulties in the action suggested. In an advisory opinion of March 3, 1950, the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter, the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission either because of the failure of a candidate to obtain the required majority or because of the negative vote of a permanent member. Further, while there is no doubt that the Soviet vetoes of Italy's application have not been based on Charter grounds and have not been in accordance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 28, 1948, it does not follow, and the Court has never suggested, that these vetoes are therefore null and void. Nor does it follow that the General Assembly can take action implying that these vetoes are ineffective.

With respect to the Peruvian agenda item, this probably involves a plan Belaunde (Peru) discussed earlier with USUN under which the General Assembly would request that applicants be permitted to present to the Security Council proof of their qualifications for membership. If there was then a threat of a veto, the Assembly would request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to the value of the proof. Assuming a favorable opinion by the Court, the Security Council, in Belaunde's opinion, would have to apply strictly the sense of Article 4 and no member could veto the application.

The United States would certainly have no objection to the suggestion that a candidate be permitted to present its own case for admission. Such a procedure would sharpen the issues involved and place the onus squarely on the USSR. However, there are two basic difficulties in the proposal for an advisory opinion of the court. First, since an advisory opinion is not binding, a permanent member could still veto. Second, it is very doubtful that the Court would consider itself competent to determine whether an applicant is qualified, since the Court itself has previously stated that of the factors to be taken into account in considering conditions laid down in Article 4, "no relevant political factor—that is to say, none connected with the conditions of admission—is excluded."

Argentina appears to be studying a proposal under which the General Assembly would request the Security Council to reconsider in a spirit of compromise the various applications and submit them to the General Assembly for the will of the majority of the United Nations Members. Apparently, it is also studying a procedural maneuver analogous to that for overriding a double veto. (See memorandum of conversation US/A/3332.)[2] If this proposal contemplates referral of applications to the Assembly without Security Council recommendations thereon, the plan would be inconsistent with Article 4 of the Charter. With regard to the procedural maneuver, the President of the Security Council could hardly declare that a Security Council decision on a membership application is procedural in view of the fact that a decision on membership has always been assumed to be substantive. This step would go far beyond what the United States or other permanent members have ever conceived and might even open the way to practical elimination of the veto from decisions to which it has incontestably applied, a result which would be unacceptable to any permanent member, including the United States.

5. The question of an amendment to Article 86 to give Italy membership in the Trusteeship Council in the event that it is not admitted to the United Nations is dealt with in detail in the position paper on the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council (SD/A/C.4/90).

If Italy is not admitted to the United Nations, the General Assembly may consider some arrangement for participation by Italy in the General Assembly, presumably without the right to vote, pending its admission to membership. Such an arrangement might also be considered for other interested qualified applicants whose admission has been blocked by the Soviet veto. Italy has thus far indicated no desire for this privilege which it apparently regards as "second class membership." However, it may be that Italy might become interested if efforts to obtain its admission fail and if a concrete proposal is presented.

There are various possible alternatives. Arrangements under which non-member states qualified for admission might be permitted to participate in the committees:

(1) The Assembly might adopt a resolution providing that, upon specific request therefor by a non-member state, the Assembly might grant the state a general privilege of participating, presumably without voting rights, in committees on which all members are represented.

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[2] This is a memorandum of a conversation on October 11 between John C. Dreier, U.S. representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, and Rodolfo Muñoz, Acting Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations, at New York, not printed. Dreier went to Paris as a member of the U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff and Muñoz as Vice-Chairman of the Argentine Delegation.

Participation might include speaking under the same rules as members on any matter before the committee, and of making proposals on matters of substance but not of procedure. More limited participation might involve the presentation of views on the substance of each item when expressly permitted by the committee.

(2) The Assembly might adopt a general resolution authorizing the committees to grant participation in their proceedings by non-member states, leaving the exact scope of participation to be determined by the committee in each case.

(3) As an alternative to any general arrangement, the United States might, more liberally than heretofore, support in each committee the grant of participation in that committee to a non-member state in the discussion of particular matters in which the state was interested.

The Delegation will note that representatives or observers participating under such provisions in proceedings taking place in the United States would not be entitled to full diplomatic privileges and immunities, which, under the Headquarters Agreement, are available only to representatives of Members.

Editorial Note

On November 13 the General Assembly approved a recommendation by the General Committee that the Peruvian membership item, the joint membership item submitted by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the Nicaraguan item associating itself with the joint proposal, be included under one title: "Admission of New Members, including the right of candidate States to present proof of the conditions required under Article 4 of the Charter". The General Assembly then referred the item to the First Committee for consideration and report. The First Committee, however, did not address itself to the membership item until January 18, 1952; see pages 425 ff.

In the meantime, in mid-November, the locus of action on the membership question shifted to the Fourth Committee and consideration of the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council.

IO Files

United States Delegation Position Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 14, 1951.
SD/A/C. 4/90/Rev. 1

QUESTION OF THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ITALY IN THE WORK OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

THE PROBLEM

By resolution 310 (VIII), the Trusteeship Council requested the General Assembly to include in its agenda the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Council. The Council has already granted Italy full participation short of the right to vote, a right which is restricted to United Nations Members. What position should the United States take on this question?

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Delegation should express the view of the United States that Italy could acquire full participation in the Trusteeship Council (i.e., the right to vote) only through:

(*a*) admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations; or
(*b*) amendment to Article 86 of the Charter.

2. The Delegation should take the position that the United States will not be fully satisfied with any arrangement short of full membership of Italy in the United Nations.

3. The Delegation should, if practicable, and if agreed to by Italy, sponsor or support in the Fourth Committee action to have the General Assembly request the Security Council to reconsider Italy's application as a special case in view of Italy's responsibilities under the Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland. In the event that this action is undertaken, the Delegation should endeavor to have the Committee consider the matter at the beginning of the Session and before any general discussion of the membership question arises in the Committee I.

4. However, in the event that full participation of Italy in the Trusteeship Council is not accomplished through its admission to membership in the United Nations, and if an amendment to Article 86 providing for such full participation is proposed and is desired by Italy, the Delegation should vote for it.

COMMENT

Trusteeship Council resolution 310 (VIII), requesting inclusion of this item in the General Assembly agenda, was introduced by Argen-

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tina and adopted by the Council by a vote of 9 (US)–1(USSR)–2 (UK–NZ).

Italy falls short of full participation in the Trusteeship Council only by lack of the right to vote, a right presently restricted to United Nations Members. Article 89 of the Charter provides that "each Member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote"; and Article 86 provides that "the Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations: (a) those Members administering Trust Territories" etc. Thus the admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations would automatically make her a member of the Trusteeship Council with, of course, all the rights of Members; including the right to vote. This solution would obviously be preferable from the point of view of Italy to a solution which would limit her participation in the United Nations to full participation in the Trusteeship Council. The United States has supported and will continue to support strongly the admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations, and will not be fully satisfied until this objective is achieved.

Insofar as tactics at the Sixth General Assembly are concerned, there would be considerable merit in having the question of Italian membership raised in the Fourth Committee in connection with "The Question of the Full Participation of Italy in the Work of the Trusteeship Council". A resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee according to which the General Assembly would request the Security Council to reconsider Italy's application in view of its responsibilities under the Trusteeship Agreement should help to strengthen the position that Italy should be considered "as a special case" by the Security Council. It could be argued that, above and beyond the declarations of the General Assembly since 1947 that Italy is fully qualified for admission, the General Assembly has granted and Italy has accepted special United Nations responsibilities in connection with the operation of the trusteeship system. Italy is seriously handicapped in discharging these responsibilities if it does not have full voting participation in the Trusteeship Council, in the General Assembly, under whose general supervision the Trusteeship Council works, and perhaps in other United Nations bodies.

Full participation of Italy in the Trusteeship Council might also be obtained by amending Article 86. The first sentence of paragraph 1 could be revised to read: "The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following states." ("states" being substituted for "Members of the United Nations"). Sub-paragraph (*a*) of paragraph 1 could be changed to read: "those states administering trust territories . . ." ("states" being substituted for "Members"). Probably sub-paragraph (*c*) would also have to be revised to read: "as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be neces-

sary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those states which administer trust territories and those which do not." (The phrase "Members of the United Nations" being replaced by "states".)

As amendments to the Charter must be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, amendment to Article 86 would be not only a less satisfactory solution than admission of Italy to the United Nations but also at least as difficult to achieve.

As action to amend Article 86 would be less satisfactory than the admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations and would be unnecessary if Italy had full membership, consideration of any proposal for amendment should be delayed until a decision has been reached on the membership question.

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10 Files

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 14, 1951.
US/A/3383

(Unofficial translation)

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ITALIAN QUESTION
(French Working Paper)

The General Assembly

In view of Resolution 310 (VIII) of the Trusteeship Council concerning the position of Italy,

Noting that Italy has been charged by the United Nations with the administration of the Trust Territory of Somaliland and that it is at the present time exercising its responsibilities as Administering Power as they are defined in Chapters 12 and 13 of the Charter,

Considering that Italy should be put in a position to exercise these responsibilities with complete efficacy,

Believing it necessary to this end that Italy become a member of the Trusteeship Council and consequently that it be admitted to the United Nations,

Recommends to the Security Council that it take urgently under consideration the present resolution with a view to recommending the immediate admission of Italy as member of the United Nations.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET [PARIS, November 14, 1951.]

US/A/C. 4/209

Subject: Italian Membership—4th Committee

Participants:
Mr. Lacoste
Mr. Pignon
Mr. Naudy
—French Delegation

Mr. Coulson
Mr. Parrot
Mr. Mathieson
—United Kingdom Delegation

Mr. Gerig
Mr. Sandifer
Mr. Hyde
—United States Delegation

The French called this meeting to consider a draft resolution which they had prepared in the light of a British draft [1] carrying forward the decision of the three Foreign Ministers that the Italian membership item should be moved forward in the 4th Committee at an early stage with a resolution recommending that the SC again consider Italy's application as a matter of urgency.

We made the point that clearly the tactical decision of the three Foreign Ministers are conditioned upon the fact that Italy will approve this course and feel that it forwards her cause. We added that this seemed particularly true in the light of our commitment made in the Tripartite Declaration of September 24 [*26*], 1951. In the light of these facts, we questioned the wisdom of getting to the point of discussing a draft with the other members. The British had stated that they had shown their working paper to Australia and Canada, as well as Argentina.

Lacoste stated that of course they intended to do nothing without consulting the Italians and they expected to see the Italians today. Naudy added that his general impression from telegrams they had received from Rome is that the draft resolution is along the general lines of what the Italians understand they are going to get.

The operative paragraph of the draft simply recommends to the SC that it should urgently consider the views of the Assembly that Italy should be recommended for immediate admission to membership in the UN.

Lacoste stated that they would seek out the Italian Ambassador to France today and be certain about what his views are. He added that

[1] No text of a British draft has been found in Department of State files.

after all this was only the first act, or beginning, of what we plan to do on the Italian membership application. Coulson made substantially the same comment. We replied that this underlined the importance of talking to the Italians before we set in motion a course of action without any clear idea of what the later steps would be. We added that it might well be, in the light of what the Italians have said to us, that they would consider SC action, and particularly a veto, as prejudicing the position which they and some of their other friends will want to urge in the First Committee.

We also underlined the fact that the Italians seemed to read the Tripartite Declaration as indicating some support for the *aide-mémoire* which they had presented our three governments, although the US has indicated its difficulties with the solution proposed in the *aide-mémoire*.

Lacoste stated that he thought that the later moves might really boil down to some sort of participation of Italy in Assembly committees, possibly with a vote in the committee, provided of course that Italy wanted this. However, Naudy later stated to Hyde that he could not see from a legal point of view how Italy would possibly be given a vote in Assembly committees wthout membership in the organization.

In the light of the above discussion, it was decided that we needed more time to have an agreed position and to talk to the Italians, and that we would not be prepared to proceed in the 4th Committee before Monday, November 19. Tactical steps were thereupon discussed for reaching this result. We left it that we three would consult during the course of tomorrow, November 15.

During this discussion we mentioned the fact that strong representations had been made to us, although we did not identify de Gasperi's letter to the Secretary. Neither the French nor the British indicated that they had received any representations similar to these. We did not discuss how to handle the Peruvian and Italian *aide-mémoires* in the First Committee. However, at one point Coulson commented that perhaps there would be some way of having the International Court of Justice pass on Italy's qualifications for membership.

J. N. HYDE

IO Files

Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 15, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/199

[Here follows list of persons present (53).] [1]

With the Secretary [of State] in the chair, Mr. Taylor asked Mr. Hyde to make his presentation of the question of Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council (TC). He said this was only one of the membership problems for this Assembly. Mr. Hyde would be the adviser for Mr. Vorys, who would handle this problem in Committee.

Mr. Hyde began by stating that he would address himself to the Trusteeship Council aspirations of Italy as being only a part of Italy's general desire for UN membership. He recalled that Italy was only one of the nine candidates which in the opinion of the US were qualified for admission as members. The test set forth in the Charter in Article 4, paragraph 1, was that applicants, to be qualified for membership, must be peace-loving states, willing to accept the obligations of the Charter. In this case, the US felt that Italy was entitled to special consideration in that she had been made an administering power by the TC over her former colony of Somaliland.

Mr. Hyde recalled that at Ottawa the Secretary had been given an *Aide-Mémoire* by the Italians, stating that if the US and others were willing to try to surmount the previous difficulties in regard to Italian membership, the Italians would like to present a plan. (In this connection, Mr. Hyde pointed out the additional provision in the Charter, Article 4, paragraph 2, in which the procedure for admission of new members was set out. This could only be accomplished by the General Assembly upon a recommendation by the Security Council.) The essence of the Italian plan was that the GA by a two-thirds vote should admit Italy since the previous Soviet vetoes of her application had been legally unjustified in terms of the Charter requirements. The lack of legal justification lay in the fact that the Soviets would agree to vote for Italy's admission only if at the same time certain of the USSR satellites would be admitted.

Mr. Hyde then referred to the Tri-Partite declaration made in Washington by the US, UK, and France, to the effect that they would use every effort to obtain membership in the UN for Italy. Since the time that that declaration had been made, there had been many talks with the Italians. Much of the time had been spent in pointing out to the Italians the difficulties involved in disregarding the Soviet veto.

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[1] For the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, see pp. 37 ff.

Just as the Delegation was sailing on the *America*, Premier de Gasperi had written the Secretary urging a political will by the United States to circumvent the veto and resulting juridical difficulties. Mr. Hyde added that undoubtedly the Italian Ambassador would want to discuss this letter and its ideas with the Secretary during their appointment that afternoon.

On the problem of membership in general, and the question of the Italian problem in connection therewith, Mr. Hyde said that the position of the Department had been that the US should accept any plan which would achieve the results of admitting qualified applicants so long as such a plan were consistent with the Charter.

The Belaunde plan the Department did not think was consistent with the Charter. Thus unless strong support developed for it, the US would vote against it. Such sentiment favoring the plan would involve consultation with the Department. It involved admission of Italy by a ⅔ vote of the Assembly, on the theory that it was the supreme UN authority, and a request to the Court to find that the Soviet negative vote was without juridical basis.

There was another possibility in this matter. It could be characterized either as a deal with the Soviets or a delegation of power by the Security Council to the General Assembly. This involved having the US vote for or abstain on all European candidates, satellites included, in the Security Council. When the question came up in the General Assembly, we would have to trust in the hope that a two-thirds majority would only vote for the desirable candidates and reject the satellites. In this connection, he recalled the recent speech by Beria [2] on the occasion of the Soviet anniversary of the October Revolution. Beria had said that the USSR attitude had been, and continued to be, to let Italy in the UN if the Eastern European states were also admitted. This forecast a traditional Soviet attitude.

In regard to tactics for Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council, the Department position was to get quick action in C.4 for the Security Council to consider Italy's application as a special and urgent case. In addition we would want to hold off on C.1 debate on the Belaunde plan until this approach had been taken. Mr. Hyde added that Italian agreement would be necessary before this approach would be taken. We would not want to follow this tactic unless Italy felt it would help her. We and they were fairly well aware that a Soviet veto was a 99% certainty. Vyshinsky had intimated in the general debate that the USSR veto would be based on Charter grounds, i.e., that the Soviet Union opposed Italian membership because, it was claimed, Italian membership in NATO prevented Italy from being a peace-loving state.

[2] Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya, Deputy Chairman, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, Politburo, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Ross had talked with the Italians last night and found them agreeable to our approach being followed. However, it would seem that the Italians would then say we had tried our way and when it failed they would like to try their way. Assuming the Italians would agree to our approach, we would begin it in C.4 very soon. We had been working with the UK and France along these lines.

Should the matter come up in C.1 on the basis of the Belaunde plan, the suggested position would be to seek amendment of Article 86 in order to allow the Italians to participate in the Trusteeship Council with full voting rights. Granted that this would be a propaganda move, since the amendment process would be subject to a Soviet veto just as Security Council matters were, the next step would be to seek to give Italy the right to be represented in all the main committees, but without a vote. This would seem to be about the extent to which we could go in helping the Italians under the tri-partite statement.

The Secretary wondered if consideration had been given to the chances of submitting the results of a Soviet veto to the ICJ. Mr. Fisher thought that it would be very wise to consider ways of getting around the veto, perhaps in some such way. He recalled that an Advisory Opinion of the ICJ had held that a Security Council recommendation was essential before General Assembly action was possible. Some way would have to be found to get a Security Council recommendation which the Soviets could not veto. The other advisory opinion on membership which said that members of the Security Council could not attach to their votes conditions extraneous to those listed in the Charter had been vitiated in Mr. Fisher's opinion by the statement at the end that of course if a Security Council member simply voted against such a recommendation, without attaching reasons, there would be nothing the Court could do. Mr. Cohen suggested breaking the Gordian knot and proposing that Italy be allowed to sit in all General Assembly Plenary and Committee meetings and to express its ideas and how it would vote if it were allowed to. This would be on the assumption that we did not change our ideas on membership as expressed earlier.

Mr. Ross recalled the attitude of the Italian observers in New York which had consistently been against any glorified observership. This of course had been due in part to their bargaining position. If they had indicated they could agree to anything less than full membership, their chances of achieving it, no matter how small, would have been reduced to zero. The night before, the Italians in Paris had told him that they agreed to our approach in the following sense. It was like a frame into which the Belaunde plan or a similar scheme would properly fit.

Ambassador Kirk said that the more we did along the lines suggested the more we tipped our hand that we might be willing to reach

a *quid pro quo* arrangement. The Russian bargaining position on this matter was fairly unassailable.

Mr. Taylor said that in Washington the Italian attitude had been the same as that described by Mr. Ross. He conceded that they might change when they found how difficult the chances of surmounting a Soviet veto really were. In connection with Mr. Cohen's suggestion, he said that Mr. Dulles had been thinking of something along those lines for Japan.

Ambassador Gross wondered whether the US would only take the proposed Committee 4 approach if the Italians agreed. Mr. Hyde said that the UK and French working-level people had agreed that it would not be wise to try this approach if the Italians themselves thought it would kill their chances of getting in. It was true, however, that this had never actually been mentioned in the talks of the Secretary with De Gasperi in Washington.

Mr. Maffitt wondered if the Delegation had complete information on how much domestic harm would be done to the Italian government should our membership tactic fail. The Italians had left dark insinuations as to the calamities which would befall them. Mr. Sandifer said this aspect had been considered in Washington, but no black and white answer was possible. Mr. Vorys wondered about this aspect too. Mr. Nolting offered the information that a telegram from Ambassador Dunn placed this matter on the same level of vital importance as the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty, as far as the Italians were concerned. . . .

On the basis of his talks in New York with Count Guidotti, the Italian observer at the UN, Ambassador Gross felt that another exercise to get the Italians admitted, should it fail, would lead them to believe their destiny was really controlled by the Kremlin. Thus it would be unwise in the extreme to embark on some course from which there was no retreat, should things not go exactly as we wished.

Mr. Fisher considered what courses were available. We could go to the SC again and seek to have the Italians evince proof of their qualifications. If the USSR vetoed such a course of action, then we could ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the validity of such a veto. We should not ignore the fact that the chances of a negative reaction from the Court were very great. This, of course, would not be a bad result *per se*. It could be argued that it was better to litigate and lose than to lose only in a political arena. Perhaps a variant of the Belaunde plan might be better than going around the same vicious circle again.

Going back to Mr. Cohen's idea, Ambassador Kirk wondered if it might not backfire to the extent of the Russians trying to get glorified observership for their satellites. To this, Mr. Cohen answered that we had won so far on this matter, and indications were that we could con-

tinue to do so. Mr. Fisher thought any objective test applied to giving this type of membership would assure our favored candidates of winning and the satellites losing.

Mr. Vorys wondered how accommodating the USSR would be in voting in the SC again as they had in the past. Might they not rather veto on Charter grounds this time, thereby preventing our gambit. Mr. Fisher was inclined to agree that the ICJ in any case could only go so far as to point out that extraneous considerations had been attached, a course of action not allowed by the Charter. It would not go to the extent of deciding such political questions as whether Italy or any other state were peace-loving.

Mr. Gerig warned the Delegation that Committee 4 action on this item would come up no later than the following Monday. Mr. Sandifer added that since negotiating had already been begun on the basis of the position as described, USGADel's decision should be a clear one. The Secretary gathered that there were no differences with the basic position. All that had occurred at the meeting was to have the difficulties pointed out for the Delegation's benefit. Mr. Hyde recommended that, after the Secretary saw the Italian Ambassador that afternoon, Mr. Vorys should talk with the Italian observer on this matter. The Secretary agreed that all he himself could do would be to say that we were very willing to talk these matters over with the Italians. Mr. Ross added the information that the chief reason the Italian Ambassador would be coming to see the Secretary concerned migration. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Fisher look into the chances of coming up with a variant on the Belaunde plan acceptable to us.

[Here follows brief discussion of other matters.]

320/11–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

PARIS, November 17, 1951—1 a. m.

Delga 225. Subj: Italy's views on migration problem and Ital membership in UN. Ital Amb to France, Pietro Quaroni, called on Secy Nov 15 and first brought up migration ques. He said his govt fully understood US position this subj at recent Naples conf, and wanted only to stress Italy's interest in continuing work on migration and to urge US participation and leadership therein. He said that Italy is not developing grandiose schemes, but is very eager that Brussels mtg produce concrete results in form of continuation of present flow of migration.

Secy told Amb that US is in agreement with Ital Govt on this ques; that we were under certain limitations at Naples conf which Ital Govt understood; that we intended to work at Brussels for arrangements which would keep fleet of ships in operation with purpose of continuing flow of emigration for another year, and that we had appropriated funds for this purpose.

Amb Quaroni then raised ques of Ital membership in UN, addressing himself principally to res proposed by Fr in Comite 4. When asked whether this res was considered helpful by Ital Govt, Amb Quaroni replied that it would be so considered only if US, UK and Fr have plans which go beyond expected Russian veto in SC; that is to say, the matter would not be allowed to die in SC, but would be revived in some form in the GA after expected veto. Amb Quaroni was not clear as to what form a renewed effort in the SC, after expected veto, might take. He finally said that his govt would be satisfied with some "demonstration" which could be interpreted by Ital people as indicating that Assembly would not rest content with a veto of Italy's membership application.

Secy said to Amb that each time we take a sounding of Ital Govts attitude with respect to a suggested procedure in this matter, we get a different result. He said that we are not inclined to attempt to override the Charter in this matter, altho we are sincerely desirous of finding a formula which would be helpful to the De Gasperi govt. He asked whether the Ital Govt had considered possibility of being voted into most of the organs of the UN with the right to participate in every respect except voting. Amb replied that this had been suggested before and that his govt did not consider it a satis solution.

Subsequent conversation between Rep Vorys, USGADel staff and Guidotti [1] showed clearly that Guidotti thinks Ital Govt would not be satisfied with result of Comite 4 res as now envisaged by US, UK and French but expect much more than that as consequence of tripartite statement. Matter now stands with Itals as follows: They will check with Rome on whether or not Ital Govt desires three govts to proceed with res in Comite 4 and will communicate Ital Govt's views on Mon.

USGADel's action this matter has been based on premise that it is better to be forthright with Itals at outset than to embark on course of action, the conclusion of which they and we regard differently.

ACHESON

[1] See Hyde memorandum of conversation, November 15, *infra*.

USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 15, 1951.

Subject: Italian Membership

Present: Count Guidotti, Italian Observer
Messrs. Vorys, Fisher, Nolting, Hyde—US Delegation

Guidotti called at our request and went over all the familiar ground in arguing Italy's case along the lines of the Italian *aide-mémoire* and de Gasperi letter.

He denied, although none of us had suggested it that Italy feels that the tripartite declaration commits us to an illegal course. In restating the entire argument of the Italian *aide-mémoire*, he stressed the fact that no "juridical way" can be found to obtain Italy's admission, that action to circumvent the veto is necessary and he thought that such action had been agreed to in the light of the fact the last Soviet veto was illegal.

He went on to say that all that is necessary is a political decision and a political will on the part of the US, UK and France and from this will flow the necessary legal maneuvers which the Legal Advisers would then be instructed by the Foreign Ministers to provide. He thought his reading of the tripartite declaration was correct that it committed us to something more than the dead end of another veto or a propaganda debate in the Assembly.

Mr. Vorys commented that of course he understood that Italy wanted to come into the UN by any legal method we could discover but he felt Italy would not want to enter by the exercise of a power play in disregard of the very Charter under which Italy wanted to undertake obligations. Mr. Fisher commented that there is probably not so sharp a distinction between the legal and political aspects in that some political courses are not possible unless legal ways to accomplish them can be discovered. In other words, as Mr. Vorys added, it does not follow that where there is a will there is a way.

Guidotti went on to say that of course he was aware of what he termed the Anglo-French draft resolution. He had told Broustra that Italy would approve it and that he thought it was very good as far as it went in providing the frame into which a picture would later be placed. As Guidotti put it, after the application again goes to the SC, is vetoed and returned to the GA, he expected that the Assembly would then itself take action on the application. He had been surprised and disturbed when the French had told him on Nov 15 for the first time that the idea of a resolution taking the case to the SC is all that

was intended. This put the procedure in a very different light. He had telegraphed his government for instructions. He had recommended Italy's acceptance none the less of such a resolution, because he felt that Italy would have freedom of action in considering next steps. He expects a reply by Monday, November 19.

Mr. Vorys commented that he thought our thinking about a resolution sending the application to the SC was that it was the picture itself and not merely the frame. He added that it was rather a question of whether this course is what Italy wants and would help her, not a question of whether Italy would object or agree to it.

In response to our questions, Guidotti reacted strongly that of and by itself another trip to the SC would be extremely bad from the Italian point of view in that it is bound to result in a veto, probably based on the claim Italy is not peace loving because of her membership in NATO. He felt this would depress the just hopes of the Italian people which have been fed by the optimism of current newspaper articles. For his part, unless his government thought that a lot of noise was useful, he would prefer to see nothing done other than a general laudatory debate on Italy in the Assembly rather than undertaking this useless action.

Assuming, however, that we were to persist in this course, he pointed out that in the SC it would be possible for the President to rule that this is a procedural issue and in so doing he would act in accordance with the findings of the Interim Committee and thus avoid a Soviet veto. Hyde pointed out that neither the IC nor the GA had ever taken the position that a SC vote on membership is procedural. Guidotti also felt that the double veto technique might be used to support this tactic in the Council.

Then he went on to state the Italian thesis that since the 1949 Soviet veto is illegal, the GA might by a ⅔ vote take Italy into the UN on the ground that there exists a recommendation of the SC, the Soviet negative vote being illegal. Mr. Vorys commented that he had very great difficulty with the concept of overlooking the need for a SC recommendation in the light of the two advisory opinions of the Court, particularly the 1950 one. He suggested that Italy would not want to put herself in the position of coming into the UN by a device which might be challenged as sound Charter interpretation. He asserted that we all have the strongest political will to see Italy a member. In this connection, speaking personally, Mr. Vorys wondered whether the Assembly might put to the ICJ for an advisory opinion the question of whether the Soviet vote in 1949 is a veto or an illegal vote in violation of the rule contained in the 1948 opinion of the Court. He thought this possibly might lay a foundation for improving Italy's position and even a negative decision by the Court would not do any particular

harm. Guidotti replied that he had never thought of this idea but off hand he was opposed to it and thought that it would be the final nail in the coffin.

Having pursued this line to the end, Guidotti then suggested that the SC might recommend every present and future applicant in sight and by a selective process let each applicant argue its case before the Assembly on the theory that the satellites could not possibly get a ⅔ vote. He added that he could see no moral difficulty with this, because some UN members are just as bad as some of the applicants. He had advised his government against urging this course, however, because he thought it would be politically impossible for the US. Mr. Vorys was glad Guidotti had urged his government against this course, because he could not see how we could possibly agree and it was hard for him to understand how Italy could want to enter the UN in the same category as various gangster states.

We then raised the possibility of participation without a vote in all the main committees and subcommittees of the GA. Mr. Nolting recalled that this question had been mentioned by the Secretary to Ambassador Quaroni earlier in the day. Guidotti's reaction was definite and negative. He stated he could reject the idea without consulting his government further; it involved second class citizenship in the UN; it had been thoroughly discussed in Washington and his own experience in the Trusteeship Council showed that a state could have no prestige without a vote. He saw no useful purpose in preparing the suggestion in writing to be transmitted to the Foreign Office as Quaroni had suggested.

That brought him to the conclusion that he was very disappointed in what we had to offer, considering the language of the tripartite declaration and the statement in the acknowledgment of de Gasperi's letter that the State Department appreciates the political problem present and the necessity for finding a solution. He added that he felt he saw strong sentiment in the GA not to allow the situation of "veto, veto, veto" to continue. Is it right, he inquired, for an ally in NATO to be separated from the majority of the other NATO members and prevented in the foreseeable future from any hope of UN admission? He had stated that the realization of this would be very difficult for his government but when Mr. Vorys asked a few questions about what the Italian domestic political problem was on this issue, Guidotti did not go into detail. As he left he said that he would be more discouraged but for the fact that the Italian position had been thoroughly rejected previously. We made it clear that our own thinking is all in the direction of trying to find a way to solve the problem, acting within the Charter and in accordance with Italy's views.

320/11–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 239. Subject: Italian membership. As consequence of conflicting info re Italian position on membership item in Comite 4 and also apparently conflicting approaches in French del, Vorys together with Gross, Fisher and Hyde met with Broustra, Chauvel and others (France); Coulson and Vallat (UK) and Guidotti and Quaroni (Italy). From this meeting there emerged the fol agreed minute which in its original draft was prepared by US. This and earlier conversations will be separately reported:

"1. The item on Ital membership in the Fourth Comite of the GA, involving as it does the participation of Italy in the TC, presents a basis upon which the Fourth Comite and the GA can ask the SC to act urgently on Italy's application and as a special case.

2. It is most likely that the reconsideration of the Italian application in the SC will lead to a veto there. This course of action will provide an occasion for statements in support of Italy and in sympathy with her just claim for membership, but will probably not result in the necessary favorable recommendation by the SC.

3. The Ital reps, in spite of this fact, stated that, in the view of their govt, this course, being the only one which is open under the present circumstances, will be helpful if undertaken in the interest of Italy by France with the support of the UK and the US, and therefore recommend it to the three govts. The Ital observer will make known to friendly members of the UN his govt's support for this course of action.

4. It is understood that a Sov veto of Italy's application in the SC will not commit any of the three govts to the position that a foundation has thereby been laid for action by the GA or the SC which they might consider in violation of the Charter. However, the three govts are prepared to discuss any course of action they consider consistent with the procedures of the action Charter and with the national policies of all the govts concerned."

ACHESON

USUN Files

The Italian Observer at the United Nations (Guidotti) to the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)[1]

PARIS, November 20, 1951.

DEAR AMBASSADOR GROSS: I have sent to Rome the summary record of the conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on Saturday last, November 17, 1951.

Meanwhile, as I have already communicated to Congressman Vorys and to Mr. Hyde, as well as to your English and French colleagues,

[1] Notation: "Copy sent to Lacoste Nov 22."

a telegramme from Rome has arrived, in reply to the one I sent to my Ministry on November 15 following Ambassador Quaroni's conversation with the Secretary of State, expressing the view that in the present circumstances the French proposal should be accepted as the only alternative open to us.

I am now carrying out the pledge I have undertaken to represent to our common Latin-American friends the advisability of giving their full support to the French resolution.

I note that some misapprehension seems to have [been] aroused as to the attitude of the Italian Government or their Representatives here. I think the explanation lies in the fact that we were confronted with successive situations and, consequently, had to take successive positions.

May I resumé here briefly what happened. On my arrival here on November 1, I was informed of the French plan, which I communicated to my Government. Their reaction was that the plan was excellent as a procedure, provided that further consultations should take place as to what action to take if and when the application for the admission of Italy had been blocked by a fifth Russian veto. This may be described as a conditional acceptance. I communicated as much to M. Broustra, Chef de Conférences at the Quai d'Orsay.

On November 15, Ambassador Quaroni saw Mr. Acheson who intimated that he did not see the way for any further development if, as was to be expected, the proposed course of action should lead to a Russian veto in the Security Council. I immediately reported this to my Government, asking, in view of this situation, whether I could drop the reservation formerly attached to the Italian acceptance.

Such was the Italian position when, on Thursday night November 15, I had a very exhaustive conversation with Congressman Vorys, who was assisted by several other gentlemen, and I had the opportunity of stating it as clearly as I could.

On the morning of Saturday 17, M. Chauvel called Ambassador Quaroni by telephone, saying that the postponement of the debate on the French resolution in the 4th Committee would present some difficulty, and asking that a reply as to the Italian position be possibly given before 3 p. m. of the same day. There was no time to elicit a direct reply from Rome; therefore, as I hope to have made clear the other evening at the Quai d'Orsay, I asked for authority to accept the French proposal from M. Taviani, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was in Paris on that day. Having received the authorization, I communicated it to M. Chauvel at 3 p. m.

The press of circumstances was such that I did not think, at the moment, and I regret it sincerely, to make a similar communication to the United States and British Representatives. It was my impression that Ambassador Chauvel's request was made in the name of the

three Great Powers and that my communication would therefore be instantly circulated to the other Representatives.[2]

Yours most sincerely, GASTONE GUIDOTTI

[2] Ambassador Gross sent Count Guidotti a letter of acknowledgment on November 22, not printed (USUN Files).

310/11–2251

Memorandum by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 22, 1951.

Subject: Present Status of Italy's Application for Membership in the United Nations

As a result of some uncertainty about what the Government of Italy really wanted from the United States, United Kingdom and France in connection with our offer again to take Italy's membership application to the Security Council, representatives of the four governments met at the Quai d'Orsay on November 17. The United States was represented by Representative Vorys and Ambassador Gross.

From this meeting there evolved an agreed minute [1] accepted by the Italian Ambassador to France, Quaroni, and the Ambassador who is a United Nations observer, Guidotti. This minute states that we are willing as a matter of urgency to take Italy's case once more to the Security Council and that we think a Soviet veto there is most likely. However, this course will provide an occasion for statements in support of Italy.

The Italian representatives stated that in the view of their government this course being the only one which is open under the circumstances will be helpful if undertaken in the interest of Italy, and Guidotti agreed to make known to the Latin American delegations his government's support for this course of action which Italy recommends to the United States, United Kingdom and France.

The minute also indicated that a Soviet veto would not commit us to the position that a foundation had been laid for other United Nations action which we might consider in violation of the Charter.

The Italians have confirmed this agreement to us in writing and Guidotti tells us he is carrying out the pledge to represent to the Latin Americans the advisability of giving full support to this course. The French have also confirmed through their Embassy in Rome that our minute expresses the view of the Italian Government.

We shall, therefore, proceed on the basis of the French resolution recommending that Italy's application go to the Security Council as

[1] See Paris telegram Delga 239, November 17, p. 397.

soon as the Italians tell us they have finished their diplomatic preparation. We expect to open debate in the Fourth Committee on November 26.[2]

[2] Fourth Committee discussion occurred on November 27 and 28. U.S. Representative Vorys made a statement on November 27. The French draft resolution (Doc. A/C.4/L.142) was adopted on November 28, after a Polish draft resolution, arguing against Fourth Committee competence to handle the matter, was defeated. The resolution adopted was substantially the same as the draft of November 14, p. 385, but amplified and refined somewhat that text. For the proceedings in the Fourth Committee, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Fourth Committee*, pp. 71 ff.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 30, 1951.

US/S/1863

Subject: Italian Membership Question in the Security Council

Participants: Amb. Antonio Quevedo, Delegation of Ecuador
Amb. Ernest Gross, U.S. Delegation

Following the Security Council dinner last night, Amb. Quevedo raised with me the Italian Membership problem with which he expects to be faced in December while he is in the chair. He is clearly under great pressures from his Latin American colleagues to do what he can to assist Italian aspirations for admission to the United Nations. He asked what our attitude would be if, as President of the Security Council, he should rule that a Soviet vote against the Italian application did not constitute a "legal veto" in the event the Soviet Representative should rest his negative vote on grounds which the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion had declared improper.

Quevedo recalled that in the Fourth Committee the Soviet Representative had explained his negative attitude on the basis of "discrimination against other States" which were also applicants for membership.

Quevedo expressed the fear that if he should make such a ruling, the Soviet Union "might walk out of the Security Council" or even leave the United Nations. I expressed grave doubts that any such consequence would follow, but added that the question he raised deserved careful consideration and that we were now considering the matter and I did not think it fair or wise to express even a preliminary reaction at this time.

Quevedo then asked what I thought the situation would be if he did not make such a ruling, but left it to the Council to decide whether

the Soviet negative vote was or was not a veto under the circumstances envisaged. I pointed out this would unquestionably lead the Council at once into a double veto problem and would undoubtedly precipitate a suggestion that the question be sent to the International Court of Justice.

We agreed to resume discussion of the foregoing suggestions, which I repeated were matters to which we wanted to give careful attention and that we were not now prepared to discuss them.

Quevedo concluded the discussion by saying that he was afraid that if he did not make such a ruling or if the Security Council did not pass upon the question of the legal effect of the Soviet negative vote, the General Assembly itself might vote to admit Italy to membership on the basis that Security Council action constituted a compliance with Article 4, despite the Soviet negative vote. Quevedo thought there would be strong sentiment in the Assembly for such action, the best counter to which probably would be General Assembly reference of the matter to the International Court of Justice.

IO Files

United States Delegation Plenary Position Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] December 5, 1951.

US/A/3407

QUESTION OF THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ITALY IN THE WORK OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL: REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (A/1990)

1. UNITED STATES POSITION

The United States should vote in favor of the resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee which (*a*) notes that Italy has been charged by the UN with the administration of the Trust Territory of Somaliland; (*b*) considers that Italy should be enabled to exercise those responsibilities with complete effectiveness; (*c*) expresses the opinion that it is necessary, therefore, for Italy to become a member of the Trusteeship Council and for that purpose to be admitted to the UN and takes account of the fact that Italy satisfies Charter requirements for membership; and (*d*) recommends that the Security Council give urgent consideration to this resolution with a view to recommending the immediate admission of Italy to the UN.

The President, in accordance with rule 67, will ask the Assembly whether there should be plenary discussion of the Fourth Committee report; the United States should vote against plenary discussion.

2. HISTORY IN COMMITTEE

The above resolution was introduced by France. An amendment, proposed by Guatemala, adding the consideration that Italy satisfies Charter requirements for membership, was accepted by the sponsor. The amended resolution was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 0 abstentions. Prior to the vote on this resolution, a draft resolution, introduced by Poland, was rejected by 48 votes to 5, with 1 abstention. Under the Polish resolution the Fourth Committee would have decided not to vote on the French resolution on the ground that the question of recommending the admission of Italy to the UN was outside the Committee's competence.

3. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PLENARY

Since the delegations primarily interested in this item have indicated that they do not desire debate of the Fourth Committee report, it is likely that there will be no debate. It is probable, however, that the Soviet delegations, in explanations of vote, will vigorously oppose the resolution on the grounds that (*a*) it discriminates against other (Soviet) applicants for membership; and (*b*) it is illegal on the ground that the Fourth Committee was not competent to deal with the membership issue. Depending upon the nature of the Soviet remarks, it may be desirable for the United States, also on an explanation of vote, to make a short statement.[1]

[1] The resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was adopted by the General Assembly in a plenary meeting on December 7 (54–5–1). For the proceedings in the General Assembly, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 220 ff. No statement was made by the United States Representative. There is a text of a comprehensive draft statement prepared for the use of the United States Representative, in the event of a number of contingencies, in the UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Italian Membership".

For the legislative history of this matter, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 55.

320/12–651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 6, 1951—1 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 526. Re: Italian Membership—Tactics in SC. Further Delga 463,[1] Quevedo (Ecuador)[2] has raised with Gross question US attitude if as SC pres he shld rule that Sov negative vote on Ital membership

[1] December 1, not printed.

[2] Antonio Quevedo of Ecuador was President of the Security Council during the month of December.

application is not a legal veto, assuming that USSR rep rested his negative vote on grounds ICJ declared improper in 1948 opinion.

If Pres shld so rule, USSR might walk out of SC, which we do not consider likely, might challenge the ruling, or might declare ruling illegal. If there was a challenge, on legal grounds it wld be difficult for US not to vote with USSR to support it. Politically this wld be considered a vote against Italy and it is not certain that seven votes to over-rule the chair wld be forthcoming. Sitn has been tentatively discussed with Coulson (UK) who personally is sympathetic to fol analysis:

1. Itals regard GA action on Fourth Comite Res as "only the beginning". Wide Latin Amer support exists for this view, led by Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay. This is basis pressure on Quevedo as SC Pres.

2. When application is put to vote in SC:

(*a*). USSR might vote in favor or abstain. We discount either possibility as most unlikely. Either wld lead to desirable result of Italy's admission.

(*b*). USSR might vote against application giving no reason. Krylov [3] in '48 ICJ dissent stated USSR might do this and that such a negative vote is not "subj to control". It wld be most difficult for SC Pres to rule that Sov negative vote is illegal and not a veto if no reasons were given by USSR, which after the vote cld use device of explanation. We feel that if Pres attempts to rule such a vote with no previous explanation illegal, US shld not support it.

(*c*). USSR might cast negative vote on specific ground of art four (1) that Italy is not peace loving on account of NATO membership. Again it wld be difficult for Pres to rule this negative vote is not a veto and it wld be difficult for US to support such presidential ruling.

(*d*). Real problem wld be created for US by Sov negative vote in the language of Sov note of October 11 in reply to Tri declaration. This language was restated by USSR Rep in Fourth Comite debates, i.e., that it voted against Italy because of discrimination against Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

3. Possibility (*d*), and to a less degree (*c*), cld present US with a sitn where a presidential ruling that a Sov vote is illegal wld create serious and dangerous precedent.

(*a*). It has always been the position of US that vote on membership applications is a substantive matter. This was agreed among permanent members and by San Francisco Conf.[4] Vandenberg res of June 11, 1948,[5] in para 1, is based on this conclusion. Also 14 Sov negative votes treated by SC president as vetoes.

[3] Sergei B. Krylov, eminent Soviet jurist and Soviet member of the International Court of Justice (in 1948).

[4] For documentation regarding the Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[5] For text of the U.S. Senate resolution of June 11, 1948 reaffirming United States support of the United Nations ("the Vandenberg Resolution"), see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 18, 1948, p. 79.

IC and GA consideration of veto recognized this fact with Argentina and several others dissenting.

(*b*). We have all recognized, however, that abuse of veto by USSR can be limited and have agreed to do so through double veto procedure in certain cases where the vote is on a question which the Charter of Part I of San Fran statement [6] indicate is procedural in character. In doing so the risk was recognized of allowing a device which USSR unwittingly invoked in Czech case, of challenge of President's ruling under SC rule 32, to be invoked to decide whether a question is substantive or procedural.[7]

(*c*). Quevedo's suggestion, shared by Argentina and Peru, pushes this procedure a long step further by suggesting that on a vote admittedly on a substantive question the Chairman shall be given the power to determine the legality or illegality of the vote. The consequence of this is that any seven members of SC can decide on the legal consequences of a negative vote of a permanent member, i.e., whether or not it is a veto. It goes far beyond any step US has previously taken. In the present case, there is ICJ opinion of 1948 clearly relevant which wld give added color of legality to SC president's position. It opens an entirely new approach to limitation of the veto.

(*d*). These legal considerations wld lead US to oppose such ruling by the chair. If made, we wld be in dilemma of having to vote to challenge it, thus admitting that it can stand unless challenged, or of denying right of Pres to rule and see decision stand. Also, we wld have polit opprobrium of having contributed by it to prevent Italy's admission to UN.

In this connection, we do not attempt to evaluate possibility of Sov withdrawal from SC or UN on this issue, but we wld feel Sov attitude is more likely to be conditioned on over-all strategic considerations.

4. In the light of these considerations, we feel it important not to find ourselves in position described in two (*c*) and (*d*). Considering Latin Amer coolness toward our views and zeal for Ital membership, we recommend that US be prepared with proposal directly after SC vote and before ruling of Pres to refer to ICJ ques of legality of Sov vote and suspend ruling of Pres until advisory opinion is obtained on the question whether Ital application has or has not been recommended. There is likelihood that ICJ wld not entertain request regardless of how framed on grounds there is pending polit issue involved. On the other hand, we wld buy time by this tactic and also have some more legal basis for eventual action by SC. Of course, if USSR vetoed res to go to the court, GA cld request opinion.

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[6] For text of the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 7, 1945, issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China; and subscribed to by the Delegation of France, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1948, p. 1047. For documentation dealing in detail with U.S. policy regarding this pronouncement (known variously as the Four Power Statement, the Five Power Statement, the Declaration by the Four Sponsoring Governments, and the San Francisco Statement), see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 251 ff.

[7] The "Czech case" involved changes in the representation of Czechoslovakia at the United Nations in March 1948, following the coup in Prague; for U.S. policy regarding this matter, see *ibid.*, 1948, vol. I, Part 1, pp. 167 ff.

Similar suggestion was made by UK and reported in USUN 380, September 26, and while Dept was then cool to idea (Deptel 177, October 4, to USUN) we request its reconsideration in preparation for SC consideration if USSR casts negative vote on improper theory of discrimination against other states.

AUSTIN

320/12–1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

PARIS, December 10, 1951—9 p. m.
[Received December 10—6 : 48 p. m.]

Delga 590. Re: SC mtg—Ital membership. Protitch advised Gross in confidence that Quevedo plans to call SC mtg next week probably Dec 18 and insists upon placing on agenda membership question with GA res on Italy as sub-item. Protitch says: Quevedo is firm in his belief that notwithstanding the special treatment of Ital membership implicit in GA res, this question can be considered properly only as "an aspect of general membership question".

This info emphasizes importance of resuming discussions with Quevedo (re Delga 463, Dec 1 [1] and Delga 526, Dec 6) at earliest possible moment and Dept's urgent guidance wld be appreciated.

AUSTIN

[1] Not printed.

320/12–1051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1951—8 : 45 p. m.

Gadel 406. Re Ital membership (Delga 526, Dec 6, 590, Dec 10). This tel deals with suggested SC tactics only in event USSR casts negative vote on Italy's application giving as sole reason grounds declared improper by ICJ, i.e., only Alternative (*d*) Delga 526. Dept understands Quevedo will not raise question legality Sov vote if USSR shld veto, alleging any Charter grounds for its action or giving no reasons at all. Is this correct?

According US/S/1863, Quevedo has suggested alternative possibilities of (1) Pres ruling that Sov vote does not, in light ICJ opinion, constitute a legal veto, and SC recommendation has thus carried or

(2) submittal by Pres to SC of question whether Sov vote is illegal and void. Dept has great difficulties both alternatives and hopes Quevedo can be dissuaded from invoking either. Dept strongly of view first alternative highly objectionable. It establishes new far-reaching precedent that Pres SC has right to rule that a Member's vote illegal and void. To allow Pres make such ruling in this particular case subject only to rule 30 wld mean Pres can nullify Member's vote and vote will be void unless seven members agree override him. Thus legality any Member's vote left in hands Pres and 4 other members. In addition far-reaching Charter implications involved this procedure, dangers of abuse cannot be minimized. If, e.g. on such precedent Sov chairman SC ruled Chi Nationalist's vote illegal, it might not be possible get seven votes to overrule.

Second alternative less objectionable since it wld require in effect seven votes to declare member vote illegal. Nevertheless, as indicated, entire concept declaring member vote illegal highly questionable and troublesome. There is no clear authority for concept in Charter or in past SC practice, unlike double veto procedure which has not only precedent but is also problem inherent in Charter and contemplated San Francisco statement. Also, in vote under second alternative, serious difficulty remains since vote wld appear to be subject to veto under Charter and San Francisco statement. Justification of overruling double veto when question is "substance or procedure" is that where a particular question is defined as procedural in Charter or San Francisco statement, or is otherwise indubitably procedural. Part II, para 2 San Francisco statement does not apply. Nowhere, however, is question legality member's vote defined as procedural question nor can it be said that such question is clearly procedural. This question wld seem therefore subject to veto within Part II, para 2 San Francisco statement.

ICJ suggestion does not present above difficulties but, as indicated Deptel 177 Oct 4 to USUN, has difficulties its own.

Before firming up final views this matter, Dept wld be interested in any info Del may be able obtain other friendly SC members, particularly Ecuador, Braz, UK, Fr and Neth re most desirable SC tactics.

WEBB

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly [1]

SECRET [PARIS,] December 11, 1951.

Subject: Italian Membership Application

We have raised with the State Department the question of whether we should not step in with a request for an advisory opinion in the Security Council should Quevedo be inclined to rule that a Soviet negative vote on Italy's application *is not* a veto.

Vallat (UK Legal Adviser) and I feel that the question to the Court should be very carefully formulated. We are putting to the Court the question of interpreting Article 27 of the Charter and, therefore, interpreting the scope of the veto. In general, we will therefore want to phrase the question narrowly to avoid any attacks by individual judges on what we think to be the proper scope of the veto. Also, we want to phrase the question in such a way as to get favorable replies from our own point of view from a majority of the Court. In this connection, we can probably expect the Latin American judges to take a pretty strong line on limiting the veto. Of course, Judges Ugon and Rau may well disqualify themselves in this case.

From the point of view of narrowing the question down, it is of course better to frame the question in terms of the exact issue before the Court on the question of Italian membership. This is done in alternative *a*. On the other hand, there might be some tendency in the Court not to render an opinion on what would thus seem to be a purely political question.

Alternative *b* attempts to state the question precisely but in general terms, although not specifically mentioning Italy's application. This is in line with the 1948 majority opinion of the Court which stated that an abstract statement of the question precludes a purely political interpretation of it so that the Court might properly render an opinion. The Court cited this language of the 1948 opinion at page 7 of its 1950 opinion, stating that when framed in abstract terms a request to the Court to undertake the interpretation of a Charter provision is essentially a judicial task to which one should not attribute a political character.

Both formulations of the question recognize that in the 1950 opinion the Court specifically pointed out that it was not deciding what the effect of a negative vote in the Security Council is. It was proceeding on the theory that the Security Council had decided that such a nega-

[1] Addressed to Ambassador Gross and Representative Vorys of the United States Delegation, and Messrs. Fisher, Sandifer, Meeker, and Ross of the Advisory Staff of the Delegation.

tive vote constitutes a veto. That very question which the Court purposely avoided is the precise one we wish to put before it here.

A separate tactical question in the Security Council arises about whether we would want to request an advisory opinion even if Quevedo assured us that he would rule a negative vote to be a veto. To request an advisory opinion in this situation would be to keep the question in suspense in the General Assembly in order to prevent the Latin Americans attempting to vote Italy in. However, before deciding this we would need to evaluate what the practical chances are of a two-thirds vote on such a proposition.

[Attachment]

Two Drafts of a Security Council Resolution, Requesting an Opinion From the International Court of Justice

The Security Council

Considering Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, and

Considering the debate which has taken place in the Security Council at its _____ meetings relating to the admission of certain states to membership in the United Nations,

Considering Articles 4 and 27 of the Charter and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice entitled: "Admission of a state to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1948, p. 57",

Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion upon the following question:

[Alternative A: Did the vote in the Security Council on Italy's application for membership in the United Nations which took place on _____ constitute a recommendation by the Council for the admission of Italy, despite the negative vote of a permanent member for either of the following reasons:

(*a*) The negative vote of the permanent member was null and void because it was admittedly based on considerations not admissable under Article 4 of the Charter as determined by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of May 28, 1948; or

(*b*) The requirement of unanimity under Article 27 of the Charter, assuming it is applicable in general to recommendations for admission to membership, can not be set up to defeat an affirmative recommendation where the reasons given by the permanent member for its negative vote are not admissible under Article 4 of the Charter as determined by this Court in its advisory opinion of May 28, 1948?][2]

[Alternative B: When the Security Council has on its agenda for the day an application for membership in the United Nations, and

[2] Brackets in the source text.

seven or more members have cast affirmative votes in favor of that application, and one permanent member has cast a negative vote giving as its ground for so doing that its negative vote is conditioned upon the failure of the Security Council to consider and recommend the applications of certain other applicants for membership, and after the vote the President of the Security Council has made no ruling and the Security Council itself has taken no decision on the effect of the vote;

(*a*) What is the effect of the vote taken by the Security Council on the application for membership voted upon? In particular, by reason of the casting of seven or more votes in favor of the membership application before it has the Security Council made a recommendation within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter that the General Assembly admit that applicant to membership in the organization;

(*b*) Is the ground given by the permanent member casting a negative vote that the Security Council should not consider the application before it except in connection with certain other applications a new condition unconnected with Article 4 of the Charter?] [3]

[3] Brackets in the source text.

320/12–1051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 11, 1951—7 : 36 p. m.

Gadel 418. Re Delga 590. Dept believes GA Res on Italy shld be placed on SC agenda as separate item and not as sub-item under gen heading membership question. Latter procedure wld constitute open invitation Sovs introduce question admission satellites and we wld thus lose all benefit of focusing on clear cut question Italy's admission as special case and of making Sov veto more difficult.

Dept wld prefer that gen membership question not be raised in SC next week. However, if Quevedo and other SC members desire, and after disposal Italy's application, question admission other members cld be placed as second item or Pres cld merely ask SC members whether views re other pending applications had changed.

Pls make every effort assure Italy handled separately.

WEBB

320/12–1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 15, 1951—2 : 15 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 473. Re Italian Membership—SC. In discussions this question, you shld continue make clear to all concerned basic assumptions and considerations USG policy:

1. USG will not agree to any "deal" involving admission satellites, in return for admission of Italy.
2. USG will seek to discourage any effort obtain Ital admission by non-Charter means, i.e., by GA without SC recommendation.

Dept convinced that taking into acct above basic principles, likelihood favorable SC recommendation Ital membership greater if Ital question considered apart from gen membership question. We are unable therefore to see advantage postponing vote until after GA considers membership item. If it is felt there is advantage in postponing SC consideration Ital membership question for other reasons, Dept has no objection such postponement, although Del will appreciate that since responses Ital note scheduled Dec 21,[1] postponement vote beyond that date will make it still more likely Sovs will veto.

Del shld make every effort to assure that if Ital question considered in SC and vote postponed, consideration gen membership question which Quevedo scheduled after Ital membership question is also postponed.

Considering all factors, Dept believes best hope admission Italy to membership consists early vote in SC. If Sovs shld veto solely on non-Charter grounds, Dept prepared to support ref to ICJ to determine effect Sov negative vote. If Sovs shld veto referring question ICJ, Dept believes effects original Sov veto on Italy's admission shld be left undetermined, i.e., Chairman shld make no ruling and call for no vote on this question. This will make it easier for GA later to ask ICJ opinion what effect Sov veto in SC is. This procedure at least offers some hope and will keep issue alive for time being.

ACHESON

[1] Reference is to an Italian Government note of December 8 regarding revision of the Italian peace treaty. For documentation, see volume IV.

Editorial Note

On December 18 the Security Council became seized of the Italian membership question, upon receiving the General Assembly's resolu-

tion of December 7 (transmitted by the Secretary-General in letter of December 10 (UN Doc. S/2435, December 10)). At the same time, the Security Council adopted the provisional agenda submitted by the Council President (Quevedo), which included the general membership question. On December 19, the French Representative (Chauvel) submitted a short draft resolution, recommending the admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations. After much discussion, the Soviet Representative (Malik), following a long speech on his part, submitted a draft resolution recommending a general admission of all states which had applications pending at that time (see Paris telegram Delga 794, December 22, *infra*). Immediately following, the United States Representative (Gross) made a long statement, examining all aspects of the complicated situation that had arisen. Thereupon the Representative of France (Chauvel) moved an adjournment. The Security Council President (Quevedo) declared that it was not parliamentarily necessary to put the motion to a vote, and in the absence of any comment, took it to be the intention and the wish of the Council to postpone discussion of the question "indefinitely".

For the proceedings of the Security Council on December 18, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixth Year*, 568th Meeting; for statements by the United States Representative, see pages 5–6 and 11–12. For the Council's proceedings on December 19, see *ibid.*, 569th Meeting; for statements by Ambassador Gross, see pages 14–15, 20, 21, and 29–32.

320/12–2251 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY PARIS, December 22, 1951.
[Received December 22—4 : 22 p. m.]

Delga 794. Re SC [meeting] membership. Following is text of draft resolution submitted ISC on Dec 19.

Draft resolution concerning the admission of new members, submitted by the del Union Socialist Republics at the 569th meeting of the Council on 19 December 1951:

"*The SC*,

"*Having examined* the applications of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal for admission to membership of the UN.

"*Recommends* the GA to admit those states to membership of the UN."

ROOSEVELT

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET [PARIS, December 20, 1951.]

ITALIAN MEMBERSHIP

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN PREPARATION FOR DECEMBER 21 MEETING WITH ITALIANS

The Italian observers have asked Thompson, Sale and Hyde for a frank exploratory discussion of possibilities on the basis of the facts as they now exist concerning Italy's membership application. As Guidotti put it, we must decide whether to agree or disagree.

The tripartite declaration is a commitment by the US, UK and France to make every effort to secure Italy's membership in the UN. This declaration was formulated *after* the Italian *aide-mémoire* was presented to the Secretary of State at Ottawa. The basic premise of this *aide-mémoire* is that the US must have the political will to admit Italy and then it can find the necessary legal formula to carry out that will.

After conversations in New York, Washington and Paris, there was agreement in writing between the three parties on the one hand and Italy (Delga 239, Nov. 17) that we should take Italy's application to the SC, and Italy recommended this course to us, it being understood that a Soviet veto would not commit us to the position that a foundation had been laid for action by either the Assembly or the Council which we ourselves might consider in violation of the Charter. We agreed, however, to continue our discussions of any possible courses of action which we feel consistent with the Charter.

With French leadership, we took a resolution recommending Italian membership through the GA and into the SC. At the Dec. 19 meeting of the Council it became clear that the Soviet Union would veto the Italian application if considered alone. However, Malik put in a resolution recommending the admission of 13 applicants for membership, the 5 satellites, plus the 8 applicants whom we favor including Italy. However, he excluded one current applicant, the Republic of Korea. Also, on the day that the SC was considering this, Vietnam filed an application.

In the GA the First Committee will reach at some time, it being the next to the last item, the general membership question. There are several suggestions that will then come up with leadership from Peru, Argentina and Colombia. The general lines of the debate will probably be an attack on the veto and a recommendation to have the GA by a ⅔ vote admit Italy to membership on the theory that the Soviet

Union's 1949 veto, or its 1950 veto if we put it to a vote, are illegal. This might or might not involve the variant of requesting an opinion on this point from the International Court.

Within the past week the Italians asked us not to put their application to a vote in the SC. The resulting tactical situation would be that we will be faced with a GA move to vote Italy in or, as an alternative, that the SC consider the Soviet negative vote not a veto. The US would oppose both of these courses under our current instructions as threatening very seriously the existence of the veto.

In the light of the above facts, the following possibilities occur to me:

1. An arrangement for admitting some or all current applicants, or perhaps admitting future ones as well, by a blanket vote of the SC.

(*a*) As soon as the Dec. 19 SC meeting was over, Castro of Brazil and Guidotti suggested that the Soviet resolution might pass with a US abstention and the GA would then admit such applicants as it wanted. This would not involve any agreement by the US to vote for the satellite either in the Assembly or the SC. By putting in this resolution the USSR has committed itself and cannot seek commitments on the side, because its resolution must be put to the vote.

(*b*) Another possibility would be to amend the Soviet resolution or attempt to get them to agree to amend it to include all applicants plus Libya, Spain, Japan, the Associated States and Germany, letting the GA screen the applications.

The US has uniformly indicated that it will not agree to a deal involving the admission of satellites in return for the admission of Italy (Control 2468, Dec. 15).[1] While it could be argued that there is in no sense agreement between the US and USSR if we were to abstain on the Soviet resolution, yet we would at least be acquiescing in a tactic which is contrary to the principle which we have stated time and again that each application should be considered on its merits. The Soviet Union has twice tried exactly the same stunt and each time we have refused to agree to it. On June 21, 1949, Senator Austin rejected this idea, referring to its earlier rejection by Herschel Johnson[2] on September 25, 1947. Under the SC rules, if we did nothing the Soviet resolution could come to a vote without being divided into parts, because the sponsor can refuse to divide it. Thus, in the past we have made a procedural motion to vote on each application one at a time. If neither we nor anyone else made such a motion, then we would have to vote on the resolution as a whole. It may be an open question whether or not this suggestion involves a deal in the sense of an agreement with the Soviet Union or anyone else as to how we would conduct ourselves in the GA. However, when the Italians made a

[1] Refers presumably to Department telegram Gadel 473, December 15, p. 410.
[2] The Deputy United States Representative on the Securtiy Council, in 1947.

somewhat similar suggestion to Congressman Vorys on Nov. 15, 1951, that the SC might recommend every present and future applicant, Mr. Vorys commented that he did not see how we could possibly agree and it was hard for him to understand how Italy could want to enter the UN in the same category as "various gangster states".

There is the serious political problem for us that the Soviet resolution presents in that it includes all present applicants except Vietnam and the Republic of Korea. On the eve of the consideration of the Korean case it would be a serious thing to leave the ROK in the cold. Furthermore, looking ahead to the problems of Japan and Germany, we would be in a very poor bargaining position with all the satellites in and more of our candidates knocking at the door.

We have argued so strongly as late as Dec. 19 that the 1948 opinion of the Court entitles each applicant to a separate hearing and pointing out the illegality of the Soviet approach, that if any member of the SC wanted to raise the question, he might claim that the Soviet resolution is out of order in that it is illegal and contrary to the Charter.

As far as attempting to change the Soviet resolution to include the Korean, or to include Korea plus the future applicants in whom we are interested, the likelihood of the USSR agreeing to this seems to me extremely slight. The question is whether there are any controlling reasons in the light of our commitment to Italy to approach the Soviet Union's resolution differently from the way we have approached the identical problem in the past. In reaching a decision on this question, we must consider how we will handle a very strong movement in the GA to bring Italy in by Assembly action if the SC frustrates the will of 50-odd members of the Assembly.

2. *GA Action:* The Belaunde and Italian suggestions are based on the theory that the GA is the supreme organ of the UN and can characterize the negative vote of a permanent member of the SC as a veto or as an illegal negative vote. This is a very serious constitutional doctrine in that it would make it possible for the Assembly with or without the assistance of the Court to decide on the scope of the veto. The position of the State Dept. is that we should oppose them unless they have strong support of the majority of UN members, in which case, the Dept. wishes to be consulted further. Any decision that the Dept. takes on going along with action solely by the GA to admit a state to membership must necessarily be based on an analysis of how important the US regards the veto from the point of view of its security.

3. There are at least two ways that occur to me by which we can avoid the dilemma of having to oppose the Latin American and Italian theories in the Assembly, which would put us in the position of opposing Italy, and the dilemma of having to oppose an attempt in

the SC to have a majority vote to determine that the negative vote of a permanent member is not a veto.

The first method is by recourse to the ICJ. Without analyzing in detail what that would involve and the chances of success, it is clear that the Court has never passed on the question of when a negative vote is and when it is not a veto, and that question was left open in the 1950 opinion. Assuming there is strong sentiment in the GA for the Belaunde theory, or in the SC for having a majority decide that a Soviet negative vote is illegal, it would clearly be better to try first of all to get the opinion of the Court in support of our position. Then, although we would be admitting members without the affirmative vote of the USSR in the SC, we would have the support not only of the Assembly but also of the Court.

The State Dept. would be willing to adopt this course, if we are faced with it (Gadel 474, Dec. 15).[3] This would involve a request for an advisory opinion, preferably by the GA, the President of the SC making no ruling on the question of whether the vote on the Italian application does or does not constitute a recommendation. The present thinking of the Dept. is that an early vote in the SC and then a request for an opinion by the GA is the best hope for the admission of Italy to membership. Of course, this would be hope deferred, which Zafrullah Khan [4] has characterized as making the heart sick, because an opinion would probably not be forthcoming in time for this session of the Assembly. We have drafted a form of question to be put to the ICJ, if this course is decided upon.

4. The idea of an observership or participation without vote has been put forward to the Italians upon various occasions and they have naturally rejected it, because presumably they would prefer a whole loaf to a half. It has certain clear advantages in that it would give them something now and in no way prejudice giving them more later, and would take the pressure off us to do something for Italy even at the expense of violating what we consider a correct interpretation of the Charter. It could be put forward as an important and attractive interim measure, not only applying to Italy but also to all other applicants, including the future ones in whom we are interested.

Specifically, the GA might have a two part resolution. The first would recommend the amending of the Charter and provide simply that membership in the UN shall be open to [peace loving][5] states upon the decision of the GA by a ⅔ vote. This part of the resolution would recite that this is a democratization of the Charter since the will of the UN has been frustrated by a number of Soviet vetos.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations; Chairman, Pakistani Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

[5] Brackets in the source text.

The second part of the resolution would point out that under Article 108 such an amendment of the Charter can come into force only when adopted by ⅔ of the members of the GA and ratified with the concurrence of the permanent members. Therefore, as an interim measure and so as no longer to delay the contributions of states whom the GA considers worthy of UN membership, the Assembly would provide in conjunction with a revision of its rules of procedure for interim or associate membership in the GA by all states upon a ⅔ vote of the Assembly and, perhaps, with a concurring vote of 7 or more members of the SC. Such participation might or might not be conditioned on a veto.

The question arises as to how broad this participation should be. The State Dept. has suggested the right of Italy to participate in main committees, presumably without vote. Of course, the vote in committee would be a very attractive thing from the Italian point of view, although it is clear that a vote in the plenary would not be possible. However, associate members would be entitled to speak in the general debate in the plenary, participate in the general discussion, propose resolutions and raise points of order.

In committees or other subsidiary bodies, the question would arise whether they should have exactly the same rights of members, including a vote and the right to be chairman of such committee and other subsidiary body.

As a separate resolution, the UN would then not invite but rather request Italy to come forward and make its contribution under such an organizational arrangement, and in private conversations we could point out both to the Italians and to others that our concept of this device is broader than the Italian case and foresees similar participation by other applicants who have been vetoed and those in whom we have a considerable interest, such as Germany and Japan.

The above plan is illustrative and not entirely in accordance with the current position paper. This paper indicates that the Dept. might support an arrangement for other qualified candidates if they are interested.

A variant of the above is the suggestion of amending Article 86 to give Italy membership in the Trusteeship Council.

As the position paper points out, representatives or observers participating without membership in the UN would not be entitled to full diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Given such full participation in the work of the GA, it seems only logical that a financial arrangement should be worked out whereby states so participating would contribute financially to the support of the organization. In this connection, it would probably be well for the

Advisory Committee to suggest the amount which each participant electing to come into the UN should contribute.

J. N. HYDE

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, "Membership General IV (Beg. 1951)"

Memorandum by Mr. William B. Sale, Attaché of Embassy in Italy, at Paris

SECRET [PARIS, December 20, 1951.]

Subject: Italian Membership

Reference: Mr. Hyde's Memorandum "Possible Courses of Action in Preparation for December 21 meeting with Italians"

In connection with the reference memorandum I would like to submit the following comments concerning the problem of Italy's membership.

The Italians' objective is to make every possible effort to obtain full membership during the present session and I am convinced that they will not be interested in giving serious consideration to any scheme for any arrangement for participation short of full membership until they are completely convinced that a real effort has been made to obtain their primary objective.

On the basis of a brief conversation with Guidotti after the SC meeting I am of the opinion that he considers the new Soviet resolution recommending the admission of thirteen applicants as a real possibility. He envisages a procedure along the following lines and has asked me informally how we could object to it, especially in light of our commitment to make *every possible* effort to secure their admission.

Guidotti has suggested that if the United States would abstain the Soviet resolution would pass in the Council. He has suggested that our abstention would be consistent with our policy of refusing to exercise the veto on a membership application. We might make a statement explaining our abstention on that basis. There would be no commitment on our part to support a deal to obtain General Assembly approval of any of the applicants since the Soviet resolution appears to be unconditional agreement on their part to vote favorably on all thirteen applicants before the Council. Guidotti has expressed the view that none of the Soviet applicants would obtain the approval of ⅔ of the assembly and, if we were concerned lest they might, he suggested that through our combined lobbying powers we could certainly obtain twenty votes to block favorable General Assembly action.

With respect to the consideration of the problem of Korea and Vietnam as well as future applicants whose admission would be of interest to us; after the completion of the above procedure the eight

"good" applicants would be in the UN and the Soviet candidates would still be out, so that our bargaining position in connection with any possible future deal to admit additional candidates whom we favor would be as good or better than it is now.

I believe that in our discussions with the Italians on Friday we should be prepared, if possible, to have a frank exchange of views on the possibilities presented by the Russian resolution. If we cannot go along with something like the above procedure, we should be prepared to present convincing reasons why it is impossible for us to do so.

320/12–2251 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 22, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 799. Re Italian membership. Against background SC discussion Ital membership (Delga 733, December 18),[1] Hyde of USGADel with Thompson and Sale of Emb Rome had frank and thorough discussion with Guidotti and his staff of present impasse and future possibilities membership question. Guidotti had requested mtg as means clarify respective positions and if possible agree on future tactics most likely achieve positive results. Agreed that discussions informal and exploratory and not necessarily representative respective govt positions.

First possibility discussed was that Sov submission new blanket res recommending admission thirteen applicants (all pending applications excepting Korea and Vietnam, latter having not been circulated at time SC mtg) offered possible solution worthy careful consideration. Essential prerequisites wld be (1) abstention US, (2) affirmative vote or abstention all other permanent members, (3) seven affirmative votes. Re (1) we pointed out this presents great difficulties in view our past strong position re separate consideration each applicant on own merits as well as US internal political considerations connection condemnation most recent actions Sov satellite applicants. However, we did not exclude possibility Dept might reconcile position and make strong statement clarifying policy in explanation vote after favorable SC action. We said possibility wld be given most careful consideration by USGADel and Dept. Re (2) above, we pointed out that though apparently Sovs wld undoubtedly have to vote favorably on own res or suffer serious psychological defeat their whole membership thesis, position of UK and France not clear and position China presents real difficulties connection Outer Mongolia whose membership China so

[1] Not printed.

strongly opposes. It might not be possible persuade China refrain veto whole res for this reason. Re (3), position new council members difficult to assess and it by no means certain that seven affirmative votes cld be mustered agreed most careful planning and preparatory work required.

Above solution wld involve something along fol tactics:

(*a*) Passage Sov res, presumably after Sov veto of French res on Italy alone. Comment: It is assumed that Sovs wld accept no amendment whatsoever (including any attempt to add Korea and Vietnam or delete Outer Mongolia or any other Sov candidate).

(*b*) Statements of explanation of votes (after SC action) to clarify respective members policies and set stage for assembly action.

(*c*) Assembly action on SC recommendation to be on individual applicants separately. It wld be hoped that GA wld approve those applicants previously recommended by GA and that Sov candidates wld fail to receive necessary votes. Comment: It is recognized that there wld be strong tendency in GA to accept all candidates (1) on moral grounds that SC action represented a "deal" and that GA morally committed to pass on all applicants as "package"; also, (2) those members favoring universal membership wld be expected vote favorably on at least some Sov applicants; and (3) some, as suggested by Quevedo in last SC mtg, might believe that even non-qualified states shld be brought into UN in hope that by participation in organization their future conduct might improve. Thus there is some danger that undesirable applicants might conceivable receive two-thirds approval, and on other hand that applicants already approved by GA wld not pass unless others also admitted at same time. In recognizing these difficulties it was agreed that if the Dept were to go ahead with this scheme, and made necessary preparation, there was still a good chance of success in obtaining admittance desirable applicants and at same time exclude unqualified Sov candidates.

Other possibilities discussed, such as action by GA (with or without prior further ICJ rulings) despite "illegal" Sov veto. Guidotti felt that action under Sov res presented best possibilities. Both sides will continue consult on all possibilities and Itals agreed wld not proceed with any particular program without prior consultation with us.

ROOSEVELT

310.2/12–2751

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

SECRET—OFFICIAL ROME, December 27, 1951.

DEAR JACK: Tommy Thompson has just returned from Paris and has informed me of the status of the discussions on Italian member-

[1] Ambassador Dunn transmitted a copy of this letter to Ambassador Jessup in Paris under cover of a letter, not printed (USUN Files).

ship. You will be familiar with the matter on the basis of the telegrams sent by the delegation in Paris and also, I understand, from consultations with Ernest Gross.

It appears that the Russians have given us a good opportunity to secure the membership of Italy and a number of other friendly states, if we allow the Russian resolution to be adopted by the Security Council through our abstention. By explaining our abstention after the vote is taken, we could prepare the way for our active opposition to the satellite candidates in the General Assembly.

I am of course unable to judge what the possibilities are of defeating the satellite candidates in the General Assembly and personally would not want to advocate any procedure which would give them membership. I should think that a requisite number of votes to defeat them could be obtained without too much difficulty, but you and the delegation in Paris would have to be the judge of this.

The purpose of this letter is to underscore what great importance the Italian Government attaches to UN membership and to emphasize the political importance which this subject has in Italy. Now that this opportunity has arisen, the Italians will be resentful if, through U.S. opposition, no attempt is made to exploit it.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Philip Jessup in Paris who, I understand, will be handling the question in the General Assembly from now on. If there is any way in which the Embassy can be helpful, I hope that either or both of you will let us know.

All best regards,

Sincerely, JIMMY

310.2/1–552

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1952.

I had a talk with Mr. Hickerson this morning about the UN membership question. He feels as I do that there are too many hooks in the proposal which has been suggested in Paris. For your information, however, he privately agreed with me that we would have to do something to try to prevent the Libyans from being admitted since this would be disastrous in Italy. He felt that we might take the line that while we favor Libyan membership in the long run, it would be inappropriate for a former Italian colony, which has only just achieved independence, to be admitted to the UN until Italy herself is a Member. Mr. Hickerson seemed to feel that we could get the Latinos to go along with this position, and that if we could get the French and

British and a few more we ought to be able to make it stick. Needless to say, there will be violent opposition from NEA and the Arab countries. I suggest that you keep this under your hat.

320/1–552 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 5, 1952—10 p. m.

Delga 879. Re Ital membership in GA. Belaunde told Gross that he had met De Gasperi and discussed tactics re Italy's admission to UN. Belaunde reported that De Gasperi had asked him not to press his plan but to let things proceed for a while as they are. Belaunde seemed undetermined exactly how to handle his item when it is reached. We will keep in close touch with him.

ROOSEVELT

320/12–2251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 7, 1952—6 : 50 p. m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 624. Dept still considering future tactics membership question. FYI we see serious objections to procedure (Delga 799, Dec 22) whereby US wld use no influence prevent adoption Sov omnibus Res and abstain.

Request Del's estimate re probable date SC action membership.

ACHESON

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET [PARIS,] January 11, 1952.

Subject: Membership Question

Participants: Mr. C. C. Parrott, UK Delegation
Ward P. Allen, US Delegation

Mr. Parrott told me in confidence of a long conversation he had with Guidotti on this problem. Guidotti is making efforts among the other members of the Security Council to get them to vote in favor of

the Soviet resolution proposing the admission of all pending applicants except ROK. According to Guidotti, this is with US blessing or at least acquiescence. Guidotti has the impression that the US will itself abstain on the resolution. He asked the UK to consult with the French in an effort to persuade the latter to vote for the resolution. Mr. Parrott said the UK did not think much of that idea. Parrott raised with Guidotti the problem of the probable Chinese veto because of the inclusion of the application of the Outer Mongolian People's Republic. According to Parrott, Guidotti said that China would continue in strong opposition until the Chinese saw that the Italians had rounded up sufficient votes for the resolution, at which time they, the Chinese, "would be turned around". Parrott's interpretation of this was that Guidotti expected the US would probably urge China not to exercise its veto. (Parrott urged that the above information be treated in the utmost confidence and nothing be said to Guidotti from which he might receive the impression that Parrott had told us or that we were aware of it).

Present UK instructions are to oppose the Soviet resolution, short of actually vetoing it. So far as the UK Delegation knows, the matter has not been discussed between the US and UK during the Acheson-Eden talks.

I stated that so far as I was aware, we had not yet received instructions from the Department on this matter and I did not know what conversations, if any, had been held with Guidotti. I did not know, therefore, any basis for Guidotti's apparent belief that the US "blessed" his efforts to obtain votes for the Soviet resolution or that the US would abstain on it rather than vote negatively. I promised to get in touch with Mr. Parrott further on this as soon as we had received firm instructions from the Department.

USUN Files

Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, Member, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, to the Ambassador in Italy (Dunn)

SECRET [PARIS,] January 12, 1952.

DEAR JIMMY: I have delayed my reply to your letter of December 27th[1] because the various developments here were changing the scene daily, and I have been too much engrossed in other topics to keep abreast of all details of the membership problem. One or the other of us has had frequent talks with Guidotti and the other Italian representatives here.

[1] Ambassador Dunn sent a copy of his letter to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, p. 419, to Ambassador Jessup.

In regard to the specific plan which you discuss in your letter to Jack Hickerson, it now seems that it would not be feasible even assuming that we could go along. In the first place, there is a real possibility of a Chinese veto because Outer Mongolia is included in the Soviet group of candidates. In the second place, it seems unlikely that all seven of the non-permanent members would vote for the Soviet proposal for various reasons. Actually, we have not yet had firm instructions from the Depatment so that we have had to play a somewhat noncommittal role. We are sending off another telegram today giving the Department the latest line-up on the total membership situation and asking for instructions on a number of specific points. Of course, we are eager to do anything we can to further the Italian application and you can be sure that we will continue to work very closely with their representatives here.

Sincerely yours, PHILIP C. JESSUP

320/1–1252 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 12, 1952—11 p. m.

Delga 992. Re: Membership. Three elements of question need integration in course next few days and have been discussed by Jessup, Cooper, Gross and staff.

1. Re Ital applications in SC: Absent further instrs, we have expressed no further opinion re tactics and US attitude on vote on SC res other than that reported in Delga 799. Result is Itals are campaigning for seven votes in SC and proceeding on theory Sov res is their best hope. We have told them our active or passive position depends on further views Dept, but they are giving other dels impression we provide benevolent abstention. In this connection, they have approached UK, Turks, Neth and Greece (Delga 983).[1]

Balluseck stated Netherlands is very disinclined support omnibus res. Guidotti says Greece firmly opposed, so he taking no further soundings until US position known.

If, as Gadel 624 suggests, we shall actively oppose Sov res, we shld in fairness to Itals so inform them immediately omnibus SC res. PriMin[2] realizes Libyan draft res being tabled wld not necessarily result in its being debated or taken up ahead of Fr draft res for Italy and Sov omnibus res. We can with Fr SC Pres probably control when it is brought up for debate or vote in SC.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Mahmud Bey Muntasser, Libyan Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

We see two possible tactical situations in SC. (*a*) Possibility Itals see they lack seven votes for Sov res and acquiesce in vote promptly on two res. Then situation wld be clear for going ahead with Libyan res. (*b*) Other possibility is Itals may later ask Fr res and Sov res be held in suspense. In this case Libyan res now will be basis highlighting their application as separate case. We recognize that so long as Sov omnibus res is before SC and unvoted there is risk their amending to include Libya at any time, but in that event it wld still be better have separate res on table for Libya.

In actual calling up Libyan application for debate and handling in SC, it wld be important play it to win possible Sov support. If USSR will support to confirming instrs, we raised question US sponsoring such res to get our support on record and prevent USSR from recording its support ahead of US. Pol activity here had indicated serious risk Russians, Arabs or other taking initiative away from US.

Libyans feel such draft res in SC desirable but much prefer Pakistan sponsor, otherwise Brazil. We suggested US as co-sponsor. They politely declined, arguing they wanted Arab sponsor and to keep application out of East–West conflict. They most appreciative our offer and stated they knew [garble] true friends are. PriMin made courtesy call on Vishinsky last night. Latter stated 13 UN applications ahead of Libya and implied Libya must take its turn. PriMin did not get drawn further into discussion this issue.

PriMin requested Clark[3] to join him in seeking Pakistan sponsorship SC res which he feels can quickly be obtained. We pointed out quick action may be important to get in draft res before Sov initiative which might be in form amendment its omnibus immediately. Until SC aspect of case determined for time being, either by SC vote or decision vote shld be postponed on Ital application and Sov res, it difficult to move along other two aspects membership. Guidotti states he has asked instructions but feels that lacking seven votes for omnibus res, it and Fr res might as well be voted. He felt veto of Fr res plus four or five votes for omnibus res wld help Italy propaganda-wise. He hoped we might abstain even if seven votes lacking on Sov res and that we wld not press to vote each applicant named in it separately.

2. Re Libya: Further Delga 867,[4] it equally important have Dept views on handling and timing this application and relationship to Ital one. Itals urge this be delayed until their situation determined. See also Rome's 3115[4] to Dept.

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[3] Lewis Clark, United States Ambassador to Libya, at Paris at this time with the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

[4] Not printed.

Consistently with our commitment for strong support for Libya,[5] we raised with Libyan PriMin desirability submitting immediately to SC res proposing Libyan admission to UN. Subject to confirming if USSR will support, it will be matter of few minutes to consider it separately in SC toward end of month. SC rule re reference to membership comite can be waived on precedent Indonesian case. Forthcoming *ad hoc* comite debate may result in various approaches to USSR on behalf Libya. In voting on Libyan res in comite, putting para on UN participation separately to vote might cause fuller disclosure USSR position on application.

3. Belaunde proposed draft res will apparently cover only first element this plan, i.e. to afford states opportunity present own case for admission. Position paper indicates we cld support such res. This device with such other possible elements as request for ICJ opinion and study of pol aspects membership may provide formula for keeping question open for Italy and others and wind up consideration at this session, also avoiding more extreme summary measures. We shld recognize our support will commence chain of events looking toward eventual pol settlement this issue in GA.

Sent Dept Delga 992, rptd Rome 367.

ROOSEVELT

[5] This position was clearly set forth in a Department of State position paper (instruction) of October 9, 1951, "United States Position on the Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations Commissioner for Libya" (Doc. SD/A/C.1/374, October 9), which said in pertinent part: "When Libya's independence has been proclaimed and a membership application submitted, the United States should press vigorously for Libya's admission [to the United Nations]." (IO Files)

320/1–1552 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

PARIS, January 15, 1952—1 a. m.

Delga 1021. Re membership.

1. Belaunde (Peru) gave Jessup draft resolution contained immediately fol tel. He stated we might feel free to change it in any way since he wants to work with us. If we are troubled by paras of preamble, we can omit them. Also, we may suggest changes in operative paras.

2. Subj Dept's views re Delga 992, Point 3, we feel preamble shld be factually corrected and not contain debatable or argumentative elements. Quick reading suggests para 1 shld be struck out and para 2 developed to emphasize membership is open to all states subj only conditions Art 4 which might be recited. This para might be combined

with para 3 to state decision under Art 4 ought be based on objective facts, such as tests stated in existing para 3. Para 4 shld be restated in exact language 1948 advisory opinion. Para 5, which is essential element Belaunde's thinking, might be emphasized in a speech. We see great difficulty in formulating it so it wld receive general acceptance in GA Res. Existing para 6 might be added to redrafted paras 2 and 3, including idea judgment of organization shld be based on ascertained facts.

Para 7 cld be reworked to contain idea candidates shld be able present proofs on such questions as those mentioned paras 2 and 3 as redrafted. There might also be mentioned relevant SC rules 58 and 59.

3. Re operative paras, one shld be tested against exact language 1948 opinion; two shld indicate treaties form simply one type evidence which might be presented; three seems acceptable if modified to refer to proofs "*such as*" those mentioned in preamble and if term "recommendations" does not lend itself to reopening Argentine theory recommendation need not be favorable.

Above are immediate staff reactions. We wld hope to give Belaunde Dept's views soonest.

ROOSEVELT

320/1–1552 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

PARIS, January 15, 1952—1 p. m.

Delga 1022. Re membership: Fol is draft Peruvian proposal re admission members to UN:

"1. Taking into consideration documents which are considered precedents of UN charter prove intention their authors was establish universality of organization in such way it wld include all nations and states of mankind;

"2. Taking into consideration this universality is established in charter where it has been provided membership open to all peace-loving nations, only condition being members promise fulfil obligations charter;

"3. Taking into consideration decision whether country is peace-loving or not and whether capable and disposed fulfil obligations charter, ought be based on objective reality. If country maintaining friendly relations other countries, actually fulfilling internatl obligations and has submitted or is disposed submit any claim or controversy with another country to pacific means settlement established by internatl law, she does qualify;

"4. Taking into consideration according advisory opinion of ICJ conditions established in Article 4 of UN charter are limited and restricted in such way that excludes possibility judgment UN cld be inspired by motives different from those established in Article 4 of charter;

"5. Taking into consideration advisory opinion ICJ entirely agreement with well known rule of law that it is not possible exercise power discretionally when there are objective facts or rules for exercise such a power;

"6. Taking note that charter does not speak of simple opinion of UN but of real judgment of organization that must be decided objectively upon ascertained facts. Love of peace being linked to objective peaceful policy, only guarantee of promise to fulfil certain obligations is fact that state is fulfilling obligations it has already;

"7. Taking into consideration, not only for these reasons but also according to principles internatl justice, it is not possible deny to states candidates for membership to UN right to present proofs that at present they maintain friendly relations with other nations, are fulfilling all their internatl obligations and have accepted or are disposed accept for their internatl disputes peaceful means settlement established by internatl law;

"(1). Declare that judgment of organization on admission new members ought be based exclusively on juridical conditions established by Article 4 of charter;

"(2). Invite all states applying for membership to present to SC and GA treaties they have signed establishing friendly relations with other countries and instruments of conventions for peaceful solution their internatl problems;

"(3). Recommends SC reconsider all applications for membership presented already, as well as future applications, in light these proofs and base its recommendations exclusively on objective conditions established in charter in measure in which they have been proved."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–1552 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 15, 1952—8:24 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 722. Re Membership:

1. Peru proposal: Dept concurs with excellent analysis and comments (Delga 1021, Jan 15) Peru proposal and authorizes USDel negotiate redraft along lines suggested reftel. Dept has fol additional comments:

a. Re Para 3, draft Res, objective aspects shld not be overemphasized. Para shld be redrafted to be consistent with statement in

1948 ICJ opinion that "Art 4 does not forbid taking into acct of any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith connect with conditions laid down in that Art. Taking into acct of such factors is implied in very wide and very elastic nature of prescribed conditions; no relevant polit factor—that is to say, none connected with conditions of admission—is excluded". Further, it shld be made clear tests stated existing Para 3 are examples and not exhaustive listing.

b. As urtel implies, Para 5 shld be omitted.

c. Re operative Para 2, Dept recommends deletion words beginning with "treaties" and substitution of fol: "all appropriate evidence relevant to their admission under Art 4". In addition, Dept questions whether GA can invite applicants present evidence to SC although it cld make recommendation SC this effect. Further, is presentation evidence to be oral and/or written?

d. Re operative Para 3, "action" wld appear preferable to "recommendations".

Dept wld appreciate opportunity comment on revised draft if time permits.

2. Dept assumes no GA action contemplated looking toward participation non-member states in GA or revision Art 86 to give Italy membership in TC. Is this assumption correct?

ACHESON

320/1–1652: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 16, 1952—11 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 1064. Re: Membership. Gadel 722, further Delga 1021. Fol redraft Belaunde proposal prepared in light reftel and accepted by Belaunde. He will put it before LA caucus Thurs or Fri and believes with our support this will be main theme membership discussion and will head off any Central American efforts vote Italy in at this session. He added his own sampling indicates there wld not be two-thirds support for that course; therefore he has himself dropped it.

"*The GA*,

1. *Taking* into consideration that charter of UN provides that membership is open all states not original members organization and this universality subject only conditions they be peace-loving and accept obligations contained in charter; and judgment of organization they willing and able carry out these obligations and are otherwise qualified for membership ought be based on objective reality decided upon ascertained facts; and such facts include such subjects as: Maintenance friendly relation with other states, fulfillment international relations with other states, fulfillment international obligations and

record of state's willingness and present disposition submit international claims or controversy to pacific means settlement established by international law;

2. *Taking* into consideration that according to advisory opinion ICJ of 28 May 1948, a member of UN voting on state who is applicant for membership in UN is not juridically entitled to make its consent to admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by para 1, art 4 of charter; and this opinion excludes possibility that, consistently with letter and spirit of charter, members can base their votes on motives which are outside scope art 4 of charter;

3. *Taking* into consideration, not only for these reasons, but also according to principles of international justice, that it not possible deny to states candidates for membership in UN right to present proofs on facts such as those recited para 1;

4. *Declares* the judgment of the organization on admission new members ought be based exclusively on juridical conditions contained art 4 of charter;

5. *Invites* all states applying for membership to present to SC and GA pursuant to procedures established by their respective rules procedure all appropriate evidence relating their qualifications under art 4 of charter, such as treaties to which they parties establishing friendly relations with other states, and instruments or conventions for peaceful solution their international problems;

6. *Recommends* that SC reconsider all pending applications for membership as well as future applications in light such pacts as states applicants for membership may present; and that SC base its action exclusively on conditions contained in charter and on basis of facts establishing the existence these conditions."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–1752 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

PARIS, January 17, 1952—11 p. m.

Delga 1083. From Gross. Re: Italian membership. Guidotti informed me this evening that Ital Amb to Paris Quaroni had seen Maurice Schumann [1] yesterday and had asked for Fr position re Sov membership res pending in SC. Quaroni told Schumann he understood that Fr wld abstain if US abstained in vote on Sov res.

According to Guidotti, Schumann replied this was not case at all but that Fr wld in any circumstances vote in favor of Sov res. Guidotti with obvious elation characterized this as "opening of a new deal". He said he had told Chauvel [2] about Quaroni–Schumann conversation,

[1] Reference is to Maurice Schumann, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Representative, French Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

[2] Jean Chauvel, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.

which surprised Chauvel very much. Chauvel said he would look into matter.

New subject.

Pak[istan] has now sponsored Libyan application for UN membership in SC. SC Pres Chauvel has informed Pak he does not think question should be taken up in SC until after Comite One membership debate is concluded.

Sent Dept Delga 1083, rptd info Tripoli 35. [Gross.]

ROOSEVELT

IO Files

Minutes of Forty-sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 17, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M (Chr)/233

[Here follow list of persons (46) present and discussion of prior agenda items.]

3. *Membership*

Mr. Hyde recalled the prior decisions of the Delegation on this matter and mentioned the developments that have occurred since then. In the Security Council the Italian application rested after a Soviet resolution had been tabled which would, as usual, condition the admission of Italy on the admission of all other pending applicants except the Republic of Korea. This created a dilemma. The Soviets insisted that all applicants should be admitted together whereas the Latin Americans would interpret the Charter to allow the Assembly to decide irrespective of Security Council action. Belaunde's draft resolution was, Mr. Hyde suggested, a solution for this session. It recommended that applicants for membership should be invited to come forward with evidence that they meet the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter. This they can do now under the rule of the Security Council in its Membership Committee. We had redrafted Belaunde's resolution to limit it to this point and we could support it under our instructions. However, we must recognize that, in Belaunde's view, this is the first stage of a plan to have the General Assembly alone decide on Membership applications. His draft resolution would only solve the matter for this session. The Soviets were already reportedly offering or thinking about a new "package deal", which would admit Italy, Austria, Eire and Portugal in return for the admission of certain satellites. The Central Americans were alleged to be coming up with new ideas. Mr. Hyde suggested that what the Delegation could do at present was

to support the proposed approach contained in Delga 1064—the draft Belaunde resolution.[1]

[Here follows brief discussion of other matters.]

CHARLES D. COOK

[1] First Committee consideration of the membership item began on January 18. For the proceedings of the First Committee on this matter, on January 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 29, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, First Committee*, pp. 215–257 and pp. 283–285 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *First Committee*).

320/1–1252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1952—3 : 48 p. m.

Gadel 755. Re Membership (Delga 992, Jan 12) : and Hyde–Popper telecon Jan 18.[2]

1. We have had difficulty in reaching firm position on attitude toward Sov Res on membership [in the Security Council] because of complex of interests and factors involved. On one hand, we strongly desire admission of Italy and other qualified applicants and we realize Sov Res appears offer only present hope their admission. On other hand, if we were to give benevolent abstention to Sov Res, we wld create new problems arising from fol considerations (over and above our insistence since 1946 on treating each application separately on merits) :

a. We cld not adequately explain to Amer public why we gave tacit approval proposal involving admission Sov satellites, including Hungary, especially at this time.

b. Sov omnibus Res omits ROK. How cld we give tacit approval to Res which includes MPR, shadowy "state" whose independent existence cannot be demonstrated, while Res omits state (ROK) functioning as independent entity under UN Comm Observation and fighting together with UN repel aggression against it? Failure include ROK wld have most serious effect in Korea.

c. We attach great importance Japan's admittance. Adoption Sov Res and SC approval Sov applicants wld deprive us future bargaining power re Japan and others we favor.

d. If Sov Res approved by SC, there is risk some or all Sov applicants wld be admitted by GA either this or future sessions.

2. Conclusion we reach is that US must oppose Sov Res although we wld not cast veto but wld abstain if res obtained seven affirmative votes. Problem is to minimize adverse Ital reaction while opposing

[1] Repeated for information to Rome as 3268.
[2] Not printed.

Res in way which cannot be misunderstood. Recent Del reports Neth, Greece, UK either opposed or disinclined support when coupled with expected Chi opposition and our own, indicate Res will not receive seven votes.

3. Del shld therefore inform other SC members US intends speak in SC in opposition Sov Res and plans vote against; in unlikely event Res receives seven votes we will abstain; US statement will make it clear in SC that if any such Res shld pass we wld insist in GA on case-by-case consideration in which we wld oppose applicants we believed unqualified.

4. UK and Fr shld be approached first for their reactions. Del shld then in frank explanation to Guidotti explain as appropriate reasons we are opposed to Sov Res. On basis Del's best info re position other members SC, Del shld express view Guidotti that admission by means Sov Res is not feasible and that further consideration this possibility not worthwhile. Del shld make clear to Guidotti we have given most sympathetic consideration his views (Delga 799, Dec 22) but that for reasons he will understand we cannot give our tacit approval to proposition. Del shld leave no doubt in Guidotti's mind that (1) we are opposed to Sov Res and (2) if as we anticipate Sov Res wld not obtain seven affirmative votes we wld cast negative vote.

5. Consult UK, Fr, Italy and others re desirability disposing of Sov Res by demanding separate vote on each applicant. If it appears desirable and feasible Del shld in its discretion seek to apply this procedure.

6. Re Fr Res we believe best tactic wld be favor early vote in SC on Fr Res unless Itals prefer latter not be put to vote. If USSR shld veto Fr Res solely on non-Charter grounds SC or GA cld request ICJ for opinion of effect of Sov negative vote (Gadel 473). Tactics shld be worked out in consultation Itals and other Dels. If Itals oppose putting Fr Res to vote Del shld report their views Dept.

7. No aspects membership question discussed during US–UK talks.[3]

ACHESON

[3] This refers to the Truman–Churchill talks in Washington; documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume VI.

320/1–1652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1952—7:09 p. m.

Gadel 767. Re Membership (Delga 1064 and Popper–Hyde telcon).

1. Redraft Belaunde proposal (Delga 1064) represents great im-

provement over draft contained Delga 1022. While USDel authorized support Res as now stands, it may wish, however, make fol additional suggestions:

Re para 4, suggest "juridical" be deleted.

Re para 5, Dept believes presentation evidence to both GA and SC wld entail unnecessary duplication and wld prefer only presentation to SC. We wld also hope presentation wld be written only. USDel might suggest para be rephrased to recommend to SC that it invite applicant states present evidence pursuant its rules procedure. If Belaunde insists presentation to GA also desirable, additional para inviting presentation to GA and revising rules of procedure if revision considered necessary cld be included.

USDel shld not give any indication that US approval this Res means US might consider eventual GA action to admit states in absence favorable SC recommendation.

2. Tactical situation and timing Re Libyan application and Fr and Sov Res as mentioned Hyde Telcon unclear to us. Request clarification soonest. Is our understanding correct that separate vote is considered desirable on Libyan application before Fr and Sov Res considered and before Belaunde proposal inviting submission evidence is approved by GA?

3. USDel shld support Vietnam application and oppose Viet-Minh. Dept believes latter's communication to SYG, if it must be considered by SC at all, shld be disposed of in same manner as North Korean 1949 communication.

ACHESON

320/1–2052: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 20, 1952—8 p. m.

Delga 1122. Subject: Italian membership. US position on Sov SC omnibus res, explained to Guidotti by Gross, Allen present. Gross stressed thorough consideration US has given to problem and reviewed both general considerations and specific factors set forth Gadel 755 which make necessary US oppose res. Guidotti indicated he fully understood, but on his own optimistic estimate he still believes some chance passage res and expressed some regret that US instructions did not permit placing favorable complexion on US abstention "if Itals can obtain seven other votes". Also regretted impossible US refrain from speaking vs res in SC until after vote taken.

Fol is Guidotti's present estimate voting line upon Sov res:

Fr—he continues believe "no possible doubt" re affirmative vote;
Chile—Santa Cruz [1] told Guidotti he strongly in favor of res and seeking instructions. Ital mission in Santiago being instructed raise with FonOff;
Brazil—Muniz [2] told Guidotti he believes he can vote for;
Pakistan—not yet approached but Guidotti confident since Pakistani are "universalists"
Neth—if its vote were the seventh needed vote, Von Balluseck told Guidotti he certain govt wld authorize vote for;
Turkey—same as Neth;
Greece—strongly opposed to res;
UK—strong representations being made by Ital Amb in London;
China—not approached; opposition assumed; veto uncertain.

ROOSEVELT

[1] Hernán Santa Cruz, Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations.
[2] João Carlos Muniz, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET [PARIS,] January 21, 1952.

Subject: Membership Question

Participants: Count Guidotti, Italian Observer to the UN
Mr. Francisci, Italian Observer to the UN
Ward P. Allen, US Delegation

Following the discussion with Ambassador Gross and myself on Saturday, Count Guidotti gave me this morning confidentially a draft private letter which he is considering sending to the other Members of the Security Council, pertinent parts of which read: "I am informed that, should the seven votes be available (i.e., for the Soviet omnibus Security Council resolution), the US Delegation, though it remains opposed in principle to the idea embodied in the Soviet draft resolution, would abstain. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain whether the indispensable majority can be found in the Security Council." It ends up with a request for a favorable vote. Count Guidotti asked me to discuss it with Ambassador Gross and to give them any views we may have.

I promised to do so but stated that I was confident that our position must be that we cannot advise the Italian Delegation as to whether they should or should not transmit the letter or whether the letter does or does not accurately state the US position. Fearing that Guidotti might still remain under some illusions as to US views, I read him pertinent portions of Gadel 755, seeking to reinforce what Ambassa-

dor Gross had already advised him. I stated that under our instructions we would make known this position to the other members of the Security Council and, in spite of his hope to the contrary, I stated we were obliged under the instructions to lay greater stress on the negative aspects of opposition to the Soviet resolution than on the affirmative aspect of our abstention in the unlikely event it obtained seven votes.

Turning to the Membership item in Committee One, Guidotti expressed the strong view that the draft resolution submitted by Peru is very unwise and can only do harm.[1] I stated the reasons which had led us to agree to support it. In response to my question he indicated that the Argentine Delegation had shown him some ideas which they intended to submit either as a separate resolution or as an amendment to Belaunde's resolution by which the General Assembly would declare Italy to be admitted to the UN without further reference to the Security Council, because the last Soviet veto was illegal and hence void. I responded that, as I was sure Guidotti was aware, the US considered such a resolution extremely unwise and the procedure both illegal under the Charter and from a practical point of view unworkable since the Soviets could, by the simple expedient of another veto, giving no reasons, block the success of the procedure. I said that the US would oppose and vote against the Argentine resolution if it were introduced and urged Guidotti, in the best interests of Italy, to use his influence with the Argentine Delegation to dissuade them from putting it forward. He then said that he thought the Argentinians were also thinking as a possible alternative along some lines of asking Security Council reconsideration of Italy's application and wondered if that would not be less objectionable to the US. I stated that it was, of course, less objectionable, but it seemed to me at best useless since the General Assembly has already done this and the Security Council is now in the process of reconsidering the application.

After checking with Messrs. Gross and Wainhouse, I confirmed the above stated position to Messrs. Roberti and Francisci. Mr. Roberti, who seemed increasingly pessimistic about the entire situation, stated that if Italy does not succeed in obtaining admission this time, then he thought there was a good chance that Italy would withdraw its application. He felt that as a matter of dignity his country could not continue indefinitely knocking on the doors of the UN and being constantly denied admission.

[1] For text of the Peruvian draft resolution as submitted to the First Committee on January 18, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, agenda item 60.

320/1–2252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece and to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 22, 1952—10 : 52 a. m.

Grk Rep informed Dept of approach by Ital UN Del in which latter is said to have stated Ital belief US attitude toward Sov "package" admission plan had changed. According Grk Rep Ital stated US, instead of voting against Sov proposal, wld abstain and added this wld make Grk vote most important in attainment Ital ambition UN membership. Grks replied that while desirous aiding Itals if possible, they wld for obvious reasons have be very careful about any res which wld admit Alb and Bulg to UN membership. Grk Rep then asked for info re US position this subj.

Grk Rep was informed that USDel wld make it clear that we were against this Res. If vote for Res failed show seven affirmative, US wld vote against. If affirmative vote showed seven in favor, US wld abstain in view its policy of not exercising veto on membership question.

ACHESON

[1] Sent to Athens as 3438 and Paris as Gadel 783.

320/1–2152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 22, 1952—6 : 30 p. m.

Gadel 793. Re Membership: Although Dept does not have text Sov Res on membership introduced Comite 1,[1] we gather from Delga 1127 [2] that text only requests that SC reconsider 13 of old applications plus Libya. Dept assumes USDel will oppose and vote against this Res, pointing out for example it excludes ROK.

In membership debate USDel shld also state case for separate consideration applications on merits each case.

ACHESON

[1] The Soviet Union submitted the following draft resolution to the First Committee on January 21: "*The General Assembly, Recommends* that the Security Council should reconsider the applications of Albania, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal, and consider the application of Libya for membership in the United Nations." (Doc. A/C.1/703). For the official text, which is incorporated into the proceedings of the First Committee for January 21, see GA (VI), *First Committee*, p. 221.

[2] The Delegation's Daily Unclassified Telegram Summary, January 21, 1952, 11 : 45 p. m. (320/1–2152).

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] January 22, 1952.

Subject: Membership Question

Participants: (Separate conversations)
Ambassador Arne Sunde, Norwegian Delegation
Mr. Pierre Pescatore, Luxembourg Delegation
Ward P. Allen, US Delegation

Ambassador Sunde stated that Norway will vote for the Chilean amendment [1] which deletes paragraphs 2 through 6 of the Peruvian resolution and for paragraph 7 which merely substitutes a recommendation that the Security Council reconsider the pending applications. He believes those amendments will be approved, but if they should not pass, the Norwegian Delegation is still uncertain as to whether it will vote against or abstain on the Peruvian draft.

After I had explained to Mr. Pescatore our position on the Peruvian resolution, he stated that the Luxembourg Delegation is opposed to it and will probably vote against, but may abstain. Their objections are that the resolution destroys by over-emphasis the legal aspects of the qualifications; disregards the necessary subjective judgement of each Member necessarily involved in their determination of whether a state is "peace loving" etc., violates the right of each state not to reveal the reasons which leads it to a vote and disregards the political imponderables which necessarily go to make up the decision of each member in a given case.

He agreed with my view that the Argentine amendment [2] calling for a special session of the General Assembly to consider the problem would not be advisable and could produce no productive results and similarly that the Argentine amendment calling for Security Council reconsideration and report to the present session of the General Assembly was equally undesirable. As to the Chilean amendment, I indicated, of course, that we would oppose the proposal for the deletion of paragraphs 2 through 6 and with respect to the Chilean substitute for paragraph 1 pointed out the lack of clarity and the technical omission of the Libyan and Vietnam applications.

[1] UN Doc. A/C.1/706, January 22, 1952; for text, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, agenda item 60.

[2] UN Doc. A/C.1/704, submitted to the First Committee on January 22. The text is incorporated into the proceedings of the First Committee; see GA (VI), *First Committee*, p. 230.

320/1–2352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

PARIS, January 23, 1952—2 p. m.

Delga 1148. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re: Membership. After frank and sympathetic explanation to Guidotti re US position on Sov SC res on membership (pursuant Gadel 755, Jan 18), I explained our position to Brit, French, and, following that, to Muniz (Braz), Santa Cruz (Chile), Balluseck (Neth), Kyrou (Greece) and Sarper (Turk). I have now recd letter from Guidotti (transmitted Delga 1149, Jan 23).[1]

Obviously Dept's position re Sov res is most displeasing to Itals, as Dept understood. I have understood that our task is to "minimize adverse Ital reaction while opposing res in a way which cannot be misunderstood". But Guidotti's task is to do all he can to get seven SC votes for Sov res, and anything we do which interferes with formation of a seven-vote majority is deeply resented.

Muniz, who asked for our views, told me he had previously advised Guidotti he wld recommend his govt vote for SC res only if US "acquiesced" in Sov res. Accordingly, when I told him we did not acquiesce but opposed, he told me he wld recommend Braz either abstain or vote against Sov res since any other course he wld consider "unfriendly to US".

I am certain we can now anticipate that Ital Govt will with great excitement complain to Amer Embassy Rome that I am sabotaging and scuttling Ital aspirations. I have been most frank and friendly with Guidotti, and he has no reason whatever to say he has misunderstood our position, which both Allen and I explained to him fully. I made it a point to tell him precisely what we were going to say to our colleagues on council.

In addition I made clear in Comite I debate yesterday our opposition to Sov packages res tabled in comite,[2] and Guidotti, I understand, is very upset about our attack upon this res. The line I took yesterday now confirmed by instructions in Gadel 793, Jan 22.

Under these circumstances I am sure both Dept and Emb will realize that US GADel's position here vis-à-vis Guidotti is not too comfortable and that latter may well feel he must cover himself with his govt because of his previous over-optimistic reports to his govt.

Sent Dept Delga 1148; rptd info Rome 389. [Gross.]

ROOSEVELT

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[1] *Infra.*

[2] For Ambassador Gross' statement to the First Committee on January 22, 1952, see GA (VI), *First Committee*, pp. 234 and 235.

320/1–2352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 23, 1952—1 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 1149. Subject: membership. Following is text of letter dated Jan 22 from Guidotti (Ital) to Gross, referred to in Delga 1148:[1]

"The Brazilian Amb, M. Muniz, has related to me a conversation he had with you today. Following this conversation, Amb Muniz, who had previously told me he wld advise his govt to vote in favor of the Russian draft res, declared that he wld now have to vote against.

"This makes me realize that, in spite of various exchanges of views I had honor to have with you in these days, I was still labouring under most serious misunderstanding. I had impression that your del, although strongly opposed on principle to Russian proposal, wld do nothing that wld interfere with formation of possible majority of seven votes in its favor, in SC. In fact it seemed to me that it was only on this condition that the possibility of your del abstaining in presence of *seven favorable votes cld have a meaning. The result of* your conversation with Amb Muniz clearly shows that I was wrong in my assumption.

"In these circumstances, not only wld the formation of the indispensable majority of seven votes which was, of course the preliminary condition for abstention of your del and consequently for ultimate success of such an action, be utterly impossible, but I feel very strongly that any further effort in that direction wld place both my govt and myself in a most unpleasant predicament.

"You will, therefore, understand that I am compelled to report this state of affairs to my govt and, pending their instructions, abstain from undertaking any further efforts which, under these circumstances, would prove to be both undignified and pointless."

ROOSEVELT

[1] The letter text is in USUN Files.

320/1–2352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY PARIS, January 23, 1952.

[Received January 23—11 : 55 a. m.]

Delga 1153. Re membership. Fol are texts Comite One draft resolutions in addition Peru revised draft already reported.

USSR (A/C.1/703) "GA recommends SC reconsider applications Albania, Peoples Republic Mongolia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal, and consider application Libya membership UN".

Argentine amendment USSR draft res (A/C.1/705)[1]

"Insert fol para before operative part: 'Noting increasing general sentiment favor universality of UN, membership in which open all peace-loving states which accept obligations contained charter and, in judgment organization, are able and willing carry out these obligations,' at end operative part: 'and report GA during present regular session' ".

Argentine amendment Peru draft res (A/C.1/704) "add fol para: '8. Decides that, on receipt evidence to which para 6 refers, and not later than 15 March 1952, GA shall be convened in special session with view to satisfactory solution problem admission new members' ".

Chile, Colombia, Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras joint amendment Peru revised draft res (A/C.1/706)

"Delete paras 2 to 6 and insert fol: 'recalling advisory opinion ICJ 28 May 1948 and GA's resolutions 197 (III) B, 8 Dec 1948 and 296 (IV) K, 22 Nov 1949,' delete para 7 and insert fol: 'recommends SC reconsider all pending applications membership' ".

Lebanon and Syria joint amendment Peru revised res (A/C.1/707)

"1. Delete word 'juridical' para 5.
2. Delete para 6.
3. Para 7 to read: 'Recommends that SC reconsider all pending applications for membership: that in this reconsideration as well as in consideration of all future applications SC take into account such facts as states applicants etc. (End of para unchanged)'.
4. Add new para at end: 'Requests permanent members SC confer with one another soon with view assisting SC come to positive recommendations regard pending applications membership' ".

Gross stated in gen debate US opposition and negative vote on Sov Res[2] (Delga 1139).[3]

ROOSEVELT

[1] This was a second Argentine amendment, the first being an amendment to the Peruvian draft resolution (UN Doc. A/C.1/704); see footnote 1, p. 435.
[2] See footnote 2, p. 438.
[3] Not printed.

320/1–2352: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

PARIS, January 23, 1952.
[Received January 23—2: 58 p. m.]

Delga 1158. Re membership. Fol is second and latest rev Peru draft res (A/C.1/702/Rev.2) tabled 23 Jan:

"*GA*

First, taking into consideration that Charter of UN provides membership open all states not original members organization and this

universality is subj only conditions they be peace-loving and accept obligations contained in Charter and, in judgment organization, able and willing carry out these obligations;

Second, taking into consideration judgment organization that they willing and able carry out these obligations and otherwise qualified for membership ought be based on facts such as: Maintenance friendly relations with other states, fulfillment international obligations and record state's willingness and present disposition submit international claims or controversy to pacific means settlement established by international law;

Third, taking into consideration that according to advisory opinion ICJ, 28 May 1948 member UN voting on application of state for membership in UN is not juridically entitled make its consent admission dependent conditions not expressly provided by para 1, Article 4 of Charter; and this opinion excludes possibility that, consistently with letter and spirit Charter, members can base their votes on motives which outside scope Article 4 Charter;

Fourth, taking into consideration, not only for these reasons but also according principles international justice, that it is not possible deny states candidates membership UN right present proofs on facts such as those recited para 1.

Fifth declares that judgment organization on admission new members ought be based exclusively on conditions contained Article 4 Charter;

Sixth, invites all states which have applied or may apply membership present SC and GA, if they consider it necessary do so, pursuant procedures established by respective rules procedure those organs, all evidence which they consider appropriate relating their qualifications under Article 4 Charter;

Seventh, recommends SC reconsider all pending applications membership; that in this reconsideration well as in consideration all future applications membership SC take into account such facts as state's applicants membership may present; and that SC base its action exclusively on conditions contained in charter and on basis facts establishing existence these conditions. Requests permanent members SC confer one another soon with view to assisting SC come to positive recommendations in regard pending applications membership."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–2352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, January 23, 1952—7: 21 p. m.

Gadel 813. Re Membership: Dept was seriously concerned re letter Guidotti considered sending other SC members as reported Delga 1128,[1] since letter wld have given distorted impression re our position.

[1] Not printed.

However, in view recent developments (Delga 1148 and 1149), we assume Guidotti now has no intention send such letter.

ACHESON

320/1–2352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1952—7 : 21 p. m.

Gadel 812. For Gross from Hickerson. Re Membership: Appreciate your Delga 1148 explaining developments Ital membership case. You may be sure your action completely in accord with instructions pursuant Gadel 755 and we continue maintain policy set forth therein. Dept rptd Gadel 755 to Rome Jan 18 so Emb wld be completely informed our position. [Hickerson.]

ACHESON

[1] Repeated for information to Rome as 3347.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL

[PARIS,] January 23, 1952.

Subject: US Position on Soviet Omnibus Resolution in the Security Council

Participants: Mr. Roberti, Italian Observer
Ward P. Allen, US Delegation

I stated to Mr. Roberti that I was very sorry that, as Mr. Guidotti stated in his letter to Ambassador Gross, there had been, despite our best efforts, some apparent misunderstanding in Guidotti's mind as to the US position on this matter. I said that I was frankly at a complete loss to understand it since Ambassador Gross had stated very fully and completely to Mr. Guidotti the exact position and since I had on subsequent occasions read to Mr. Guidotti and to Mr. Roberti and to Mr. Francisci the exact text of pertinent portions of our instructions including a paragraph which instructed us to make known our views to the other Members of the Security Council. I recalled that Mr. Francisci had said that under the circumstances it would be best for us to do so immediately. Mr. Roberti recalled my having read the instructions and stated that they had been distressed principally because Brazil had been one of their surest affirmative votes and with

lightening rapidity Ambassador Muniz had reversed himself. I assured Mr. Roberti that in talking to Muniz Ambassador Gross had not urged Muniz to change any position he might have taken, but simply had informed him of our instructions exactly as we had previously advised the Italians.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] January 24, 1952.

Subject: Membership

Participants: Ole Bjorn Kraft, Danish Foreign Minister
Ward P. Allen, US Delegation

All of the Scandinavian Delegations intend to vote for the Soviet resolution on the admission of thirteen pending applicants [in the First Committee], making clear that they do not regard the list as inclusive. The principal reason which impells them to this position is the basic consideration that Europe is very under-represented in the UN and if the UN is to succeed it must have the full participation of Europe. The European peoples and countries are still interested in the UN and have a certain faith in it, but as they see problem after problem arise in the UN and be dealt with by what they regard as the irresponsible and uninformed majority of Latin Americans, Arabs and Asians they will gradually lose their interest and conviction that the UN can be even as valuable as the late League of Nations. Moreover, on specific issues a larger European membership would be of assistance to the US in its increasingly difficult task to cope with the irresponsible actions of others. In short, the advantages of blanket admissions lie all with the west.

The Foreign Minister expressed the view that even though the US found itself unable to permit the admission of all pending applicants at the present time, nevertheless this is one of the easiest of the questions on which the East and West are at odds and as soon as there is any relaxation of international tension this should be perhaps the first question in the UN on which the US should seek accomodation with the USSR. It would cost nothing or very little and would help redress the present inbalance which is harmful to Europe, the UN and the US itself.

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] January 24, 1952.

Subject: Membership Item

Participants: (Separate conversations)
Mr. Thor Thors, Iceland Delegation
Mr. Hans Engen, Norwegian Delegation
Mr. Boyesen, Norwegian Delegation

Minister Thors stated that his Delegation will vote for the first part of the Argentine resolution, against the second part, and for the Soviet resolution with the qualification that the list of candidates named is not inclusive.

Messrs. Engen and Boyesen were very disturbed at the latest Latin move introducing a new resolution on reference to the Court.[1] Although they suspect that the Italians are behind the move since the Italians have not liked the Belaunde resolution, they strongly deplore what seems to be the complete irresponsibility and free-wheeling characteristics of most of the Latin delegations. It tends to bring the General Assembly into disrepute. They will not vote for the Belaunde resolution and think the idea of reference to the Court is probably a dangerous one.

On the general subject of membership they indicated that Norway of course favors universality. From the moral and legal point of view they see no objections to a deal to admit all pending applicants since, after all, the original membership of the UN was the result of several political deals and the present membership of the UN bears little relations to the real ability or willingness of governments to carry out their obligations. On the other hand, since voting for admission is based on purely subjective judgment and is largely a political decision, Norway can understand the fact that we and other great powers cannot now vote for wholesale admission.

[1] See Paris telegram Delga 1180, January 24, p. 446.

320/1–2452 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 24, 1952—1 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 1163. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re Italian membership. Santa Cruz (Chile) told me Italians have informed his govt Italy "now counts six SC votes for Sov Res" and hopes Chile will not fail to be seventh and decisive vote. Balluseck (Neth) last night told me Ital Emb Hague had talked to Neth Govt along same lines, urging Neth not to block adoption Sov Res by failing to cast the "seventh necessary vote". Same tactics used with Brazil and Turkey according to earlier info from their dels here.

French Govt still undecided whether to vote for Sov Res or abstain according to Lacoste who told me in confidence Schumann is torn between desire to do all he can for Italy and unwillingness to take course too markedly different from UK and US. [Gross.]

ROOSEVELT

320/1–2452 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 24, 1952—midnight.

PRIORITY

Delga 1179. Re membership. Guidotti (Ital observer) told Gross and Hyde separately he is in favor proposal of Central Amers contained in next fol tel (Delga 1180) to go to ICJ on question negative SC votes on Ital application. He said his first reaction was that the timing and drafting this proposal are satisfactory and he stressed he regarded support for it as entirely consistent with support for Belaunde plan.

Gross indicated we are inclined in light Ital position to favor reference this issue ICJ.

In separate conversation with Vallat (UK) and Nisot (Belg) subj of whether to redraft question to court discussed. There is tactical question whether better take language of sponsors or improve language at risk associating ourselves with responsibility for possible unfavorable answer from court.

Nisot suggested narrowing question and discussed with Vallat and Hyde fol roughly translated from French: "Is there a recommenda-

tion of the SC, within meaning para two of Art 4 of Charter, for admission of states as member of UN in a case in which seven members of the council have voted for its admission, altho, while recognizing that the state fulfills conditions required by para one, Art 4 of Charter, a permanent member of SC has voted against its admission."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–2452 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

PARIS, January 24, 1952.

[Received January 24—8 : 12 p. m.]

Delga 1180. Re membership. Fol is text joint draft res submitted by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, tabled Comite 1 Jan 24, and referred to in preceding tel :[1]

"*The General Assembly,*

Considering that the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 3 March, 1950, concerning the admission of new members, held that it was not the object of the request for an advisory opinion, contained in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 November 1949, to determine how the Security Council should apply the rules governing its voting procedure in regard to admissions or, in particular, that the court should examine whether the negative vote of a permanent member is effective to defeat a recommendation which has obtained seven or more votes, since, in the opinion of the court, the question, as it had been formulated, assumed in such a case the nonexistence of a recommendation; and that, in view of these circumstances, the court considered solely whether the General Assembly can make a decision to admit a state when the Security Council has transmitted no recommendation to it.

Considering that in the course of the debates on the item entitled "Admission of new members, including the right of candidate states to present proof of the conditions required under Article 4 of the Charter" during the 6th session of the Assembly, a number of delegations have repeatedly expressed doubt whether in this matter, which is governed by article 4 of the Charter (which speaks of a "recommendation" by the Security Council and of a "decision" by the General Assembly) the voting procedure which under article 27 applies to "decisions" of the Security Council is applicable.

Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following two questions:

a. What are the rules or criteria to be followed in interpreting the result of votes in the Security Council on recommendations for the admission of new members?

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[1] The official text (UN Doc. A/C.1/708) is in GA (VI), *Annexes*, agenda item 60.

b. Can the negative vote of one of the permanent members nullify a recommendation for admission which has obtained seven or more votes?" [2]

[ROOSEVELT]

[2] On January 25 the First Committee took favorable action on the Peruvian and Soviet draft resolutions, but delayed action on this item (until January 29). For the proceedings of January 25 in which are set forth the complicated parliamentary situation and the voting on the various amendments to the Peruvian and Soviet resolutions, see GA (VI), *First Committee*, pp. 255 ff.

Subsequently the Central American states prepared for submission to the next First Committee meeting on membership a joint draft resolution which: (1) requested the Security Council to report to the General Assembly at its Seventh Session on the status of applications for membership then pending; (2) directed that an item on admission of new members be included in the agenda of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly; and (3) referred the first joint draft resolution submitted by the same states (text above) to the General Assembly at its Seventh Session for consideration under the membership item. For text of this second joint draft resolution proposed by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (UN Doc. A/C.1/716) (and submitted to the First Committee on January 29), see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 60.

320/1–2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 27, 1952—4 : 32 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 850. Re Membership (Delga 1179 and 1180). While not enthusiastic re referral to ICJ, Dept willing support referral if Itals desire and if there is general sentiment in favor.

If matter to be referred to ICJ, Dept believes question submitted shld be calculated to assure ICJ will consider question and increase likelihood desirable decision. Dept therefore does not favor LA proposal Delga 1180. Preamble confuses issues, and at least first question calls for general exposition on SC voting which is difficult and unfruitful to give, and which ICJ may well refuse undertake.

Dept believes, if question submitted, it shld be along lines Nisot proposal Delga 1179. Dept prepared accept question as there drafted, although we have some difficulty with word "recognizing". It is not clear whether an explicit statement that applicant is qualified is contemplated, or whether recognition of qualification can be inferred indirectly, e.g., from Sov willingness include Italy in omnibus Res.

Dept has taken position membership application is subject to veto. We are reluctant to go to ICJ on question the answer to which in our opinion is clear. However, if LA states and others insist, we wld support Res which submits two questions to ICJ: (1) Question contained in final Para LA proposal Delga 1180 and (2) Nisot question.

Suggest you consult with LAs, Itals and others re this matter, but it is desirable others take lead this aspect membership question and Del shld not cosponsor without prior consultation Dept.

ACHESON

320/1–2852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 28, 1952—12 : 24 p. m.

NIACT

Gadel 852. Re Membership: Request urgently answers to fol:

1. Does your latest estimate indicate Sov SC Res has any chance receiving seven affirmative votes in SC or that Sov GA Res may obtain two-thirds vote in plenary?
2. When are SC and GA plenary expected take up membership?

ACHESON

320/1–2852 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 28, 1952—10 p. m.

NIACT [Received January 28—4 : 28 p. m.]

Delga 1234. Re: Membership. Replies Gadel 852. Para 1: Negative. FYI today Gross obtained seven LA commitments to switch from abstentions to vote against Sov res in plenary.

Para 2: Plenary Feb 1 or 2 and SC probably few days later.

ROOSEVELT

Editorial Note

On January 29 the First Committee completed action on the membership item by adopting the second joint draft resolution of the Central American states (see footnote 2, page 447), with minor modifications. This became Resolution III of a three-part omnibus resolution then submitted by the First Committee to the General Assembly for adoption. The Peruvian and Soviet resolutions adopted by the First Committee on January 25 became Resolutions I and II, respectively, of the omnibus resolution. For the proceedings of the First Committee on January 29 on the membership item, see GA (VI), *First Committee*, pages 283–285. For the texts of the three resolutions, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 60.

310.2/2–152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1952.[1]

Subject: United Nations Membership

Participants: H.E. Alberto Tarchiani—Italian Ambassador
Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. Sale—EUR
Mr. Popper—UNP

The Ambassador called at his request to discuss the situation with regard to the membership question in the General Assembly and the Security Council. He indicated that he knew that we were fully aware of the Italian position, and stated that he merely wished to reiterate certain points which he summarized in an informal memorandum he handed to us (copy attached). He elaborated upon the memorandum, and he expressed some fear as to the consequences of our position upon the results of the forthcoming municipal elections in south Italy, where the Communists were strong. He also stated that the Soviets, by linking the Libyan application with the idea of a blanket deal, had gained the support of the Arab bloc for the blanket thesis. He intimated that on this basis possibly the General Assembly would pass the Soviet membership resolution.

I told the Ambassador that our latest information from Paris was to the effect that there was no prospect of a two-thirds majority for the Soviet resolution on membership in the General Assembly, and similarly no prospect that the Soviet resolution would receive seven votes in the Security Council. I explained to the Ambassador in some detail the difficulties we encountered here in attempting to reach a position on the membership question which would take into account Italy's aspirations without running counter to the terms of the Charter. I assured him that we would not lightly disregard the Italian position.

The Ambassador on his part stated that he appreciated fully our problem: that he realized that our action was motivated by moral considerations as well as political factors in this country.

The Ambassador indicated that the Italians were dubious about the merit of the Central American proposal to refer certain aspects of the membership question to the International Court of Justice. He felt that it might result in putting the Court on record more explicitly than heretofore in favor of the view that membership applications are subject to veto in the Security Council, and should be considered on their merits.

[1] Dictated on February 1.

Reverting to the Ambassador's reference to the municipal elections, I told him I was sure that the Italian Government would be able to convince all reasonable Italians that it was the Soviet Union which was responsible for their exclusion from the United Nations. I stressed the insult involved in making Italian admission subject to that, say, of Outer Mongolia, or Albania—as the Soviets were doing. I told the Ambassador that we would not cease to search for legitimate means by which the Italians might be admitted to membership and that we hoped to work together with the Italians to this end. The Ambassador accepted my remarks in a spirit of cordial and emotional understanding.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

[Annex 1]

The Italian Embassy to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, January 30, 1952.]

The question of the failure of admitting Italy to the UNO entails, in the opinion of the Italian Government, among others, the following consequences of internal and international character:

In the internal field, it is to be expected that the communistic propaganda, according to which it is the United States that by their attitude practically prevent Italy's entrance into the UNO, will finally take hold.

Internationally, it is to be expected that the deadlock will finally play in the hands of the Soviets. For instance, if the Arab states wish to obtain the admission of Lybia into the UNO, they must adhere to the Soviet thesis of the contemporaneous admission of the satellite States. The day may come, therefore, when the United States may be compelled either to oppose its veto to the Soviet motion, or surrender, in view of the increasing popularity of the universality thesis, appearing as having been defeated.

Editorial Note

In two meetings on February 1, the General Assembly took up the three membership resolutions recommended by the First Committee, adopting Resolution I and Resolution III (the Peruvian resolution and the joint resolution of the five Central American states, respectively), and rejecting Resolution II (the Soviet resolution). In the voting on Resolution II, the United States successfully invoked the "important question" two-thirds majority rule.

For the proceedings of the General Assembly on this matter on February 1, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 456 ff. For two statements by Ambassador Gross, see *ibid.*, pages 456 and 457 (a statement against the Soviet draft resolution) and pages 467 and 468 (remarks made in invoking the two-thirds majority rule). For official texts of the two resolutions that were adopted, Resolution 506 A (VI) and Resolution 506 B (VI), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Resolutions*, pages 4 and 5.

320/2–252 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, February 2, 1952—9 p. m.

Delga 1291. Re membership. Kyrou [1] plans to call SC meeting Feb 5 on membership.[2] He proposes to have SC consider Fr draft on admission of Italy and Sov omnibus draft. He feels SC shld not at this time consider Pak draft on Libya or Peruvian res approved by GA.

Laskey [3] (UK) says they feel it preferable to have brief remarks here without vote, SC then deferring further discussion until NY. UK wishes based partly on fear Itals after Sov veto will go straight to GA, asking for admission there, partly on dislike of prolonged SC debate here leading foregone conclusion. He says UK may suggest continuation of discussion in NY on ground desire for consultation among permanent members as suggested in last para Peruvian draft as adopted by GA.

Laskey says UK wld also prefer to have Libya considered and if necessary voted on along with others rather than referring it to com on new members.

Dept's views requested on consultations with Kyrou and other members on tactics to be followed.

ROOSEVELT

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[1] Alexis Kyrou, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, President of the Security Council for the month of February 1952.

[2] The last formal action of the Security Council on this matter took place on December 18 and 19, 1951; see editorial note, p. 410.

[3] D.S. Laskey, Secretary-General of the Delegation of the United Kingdom.

320/1–2852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 4, 1952—12 : 17 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 894. 1. On assumption confirmed Delga 1234 Jan 28 Sov Res will not receive 7 votes, question of timing SC membership action is tactical matter to be handled in light our previous instrs and on which we do not feel strongly, so long as it does not interfere with prompt GA adjournment.

2. We can see some advantage in winding up SC membership debate in Paris between Feb 5 and 15, thus avoiding dilatory proceedings after SC returns NY. If consultation indicates this possible, we wld prefer it.

3. Since Sovs have hinted strongly they will veto Libya's admission unless it is considered as part of successful package deal, we might acquiesce either in blanketing Libya in with other applicants or considering it separately. Note Gadel 739 Jan 16.[1] See no particular point in referring Libyan application membership Comite.

4. Re Fr Res, you will recall we suggested prior consultations with Itals re desirability bringing it to vote. Suggest you concert with Itals and Fr this point.

5. Re consultation under Peruvian Res, you may, both privately and publicly, make it clear you are prepared to consult with other Permanent Members at any time. We do not think consultation shld be used as pretext for delay in SC.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed.

[2] In a lengthy session on February 6, 1952, the Security Council addressed itself to the two draft membership resolutions. In the course of five hours of often acrimonious debate the French draft resolution providing for the admission of Italy as a special case failed of approval, on the negative vote of the Soviet Union (10–1); and the Soviet draft omnibus resolution (amended to include Libya) was rejected by six votes to two, with three abstentions, the United States voting against. For the proceedings of the Security Council on this matter, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Seventh Year*, 573rd Meeting, pp. 3–39.

310.2/12–2751

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador in Italy (Dunn)

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 12, 1952.

DEAR JIMMY: I have been waiting to answer your letter of December 27, 1951, concerning the Soviet resolution on membership,

until the Security Council acted on this resolution. Since you have the telegram setting forth our position on the Soviet proposal and you have undoubtedly read a number of our statements on this matter, I will not go into too many details here. I would, nevertheless, like to review with you some of the considerations which led to our decision to oppose the Soviet "package deal".

First, I would like to say that all of us constantly had in mind the importance, both to Italy and to ourselves, of Italian membership in the United Nations and the political significance of this matter within Italy. We fully realized, moreover, that the Soviet resolution offered the only present hope for Italy's early admission, and that our opposition to the Soviet resolution might have unfortunate political repercussions in Italy.

At the same time, as you well know, there were other considerations which we had to weigh carefully. Since 1946 we have consistently taken the position that under the Charter each membership application should be considered separately on its merits. It has also been our position that in present circumstances the Soviet applicants are unqualified for membership. We believed that at this time the American people would support no other view, and I felt confident that failure on our part to oppose the Soviet resolution recommending the admission of the Soviet as well as non-Soviet candidates would be utterly incomprehensible to the American public, especially in view of the recent incident involving our fliers in Hungary.

We also had to take into account the possible outcome in the General Assembly if the Soviet resolution were approved by the Security Council. We were not certain that the General Assembly would refuse to admit the Soviet applicants, especially if the United States were to give its tacit approval to the Soviet resolution in the Security Council. Another real problem that we had to consider was the fact that the Soviet proposal omitted the Republic of Korea while including the Mongolian People's Republic. Further, we realized that Security Council approval of the Soviet resolution would decrease our bargaining power regarding future applicants, like Japan, to whose admission we attach great importance.

Some members of the Department contended that the arguments against the Soviet resolution were so overriding that we should vote against it in any event, even if our negative vote constituted a veto. Those who supported this view believed that the policy we have reiterated in the past not to veto membership applications should apply to a vote on single applications only. At the same time, there were others who felt that the United States, if it opposed the Soviet proposal, might bear responsibility for killing the best hope for achieving Italy's admission, and urge that we use no influence against the resolution and abstain if it should receive seven affirmative votes,

explaining after the vote that we abstained because of our policy not to veto membership applications and stating clearly that we would oppose, in the General Assembly, the admission of applicants we consider unqualified.

The position which we finally decided upon—to oppose the resolution in the Security Council but not to veto—represented a middle course between these two positions. I myself believed that we had no other alternative than to oppose the Soviet resolution and to cast a negative vote if it received less than seven votes. However, I also thought that it would be most unfortunate if we should use our first veto to block a membership resolution, and while I was confident there was little or no likelihood the resolution would receive seven votes as long as we opposed, I agreed that we should abstain in the event we were faced with the veto problem.

Looking back at the situation now that the Security Council debate and vote has taken place, it would seem that regardless of our position, there was never too much likelihood that the resolution would receive seven votes. Furthermore, I think there is also the possibility that if there had been a chance that the resolution would pass, the Soviet Union might have itself blocked approval in the absence of a commitment from ourselves and others to agree to the admission of the Soviet candidates in the Assembly.

We all, of course, deeply regret the continued exclusion of Italy from the United Nations, and can well understand the bitter disappointment of the Italians over the failure of the Security Council to make a favorable recommendation. However, I hope their disappointment will not obscure the fact that the real blame for Italy's exclusion lies in the arbitrary use of the veto by the Soviet Union rather than in the opposition of the United States and other Security Council members to the Soviet "package deal".

My warmest regards to Mary and yourself.

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD SOVIET PEACE PROPAGANDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND RELATED MATTERS [1]

I. "THREATS" BY THE SOVIET UNION TO LEAVE THE UNITED NATIONS

661.00/2–1751: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [2]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 17, 1951—9:05 a. m.

[Here follows discussion of two subjects, part of "the weekly collection of items considered as possibly foreshadowing Soviet tactical trends" which was prepared in the Department of State by the Division of (Intelligence) Research for the USSR and Eastern Europe (DRS).]

Moscow's Attempts to Discredit UN. An *Izvestiya* editorial broadcast on February 11 denounced the UN as a "servile" instrument of the "warmongers" and praised the World Peace Council as the people's choice to "mobilize . . . for the defense of the cause of peace." [3] After praising a World Peace Council attack on the UN for branding Communist China as an aggressor, the editorial asserted that "The statement of the World Peace Council on the most fundamental problems of the international situation confirms its determination to

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[1] For previous documentation on this general subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 371 ff.

[2] Sent to 54 diplomatic missions, 8 special missions, and 13 consulates and consulates general.

[3] From 1949, Soviet propaganda mounted a steadily expanding "peace" campaign representing the Soviet Union as the champion of peace and accusing the Western nations led by the United States of plotting another war. The principal vehicle of this Soviet campaign was the so-called "World Peace Council", established by the Warsaw "Peace Conference" in October 1950, but which had its origins in the "Partisans of Peace" established in Paris in April 1949. In March 1950 the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace had adopted the Stockholm Appeal demanding the prohibition of atomic weapons, strict international control of the atomic bomb, and condemnation as a war criminal of the first government to use atomic weapons. A major effort of both the Partisans of Peace and subsequently the World Peace Council was to launch a large-scale signature drive calling for a Big Five "Peace Pact." At the very time of the despatch of this circular airgram, a session of the World Peace Council was being held in East Berlin, which was to intensify the drive for a Big Five "Peace Pact"; and to exert pressure on the United Nations by sending an international delegation thereto to demand that the United Nations should return to its "assigned role" and "serve as the area of agreement between governments and not as the instrument of any dominant group".

For the text of the Stockholm Peace Appeal, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 396, footnote 1. For documentation on the Soviet peace propaganda campaign in 1950, see *ibid.*, volume IV.

fulfill the role that has been entrusted to it by the people. The ordinary people of the whole world are insistent upon this, as it is clear to everyone that the United Nations is unable to resist the instigators of a new war." The *Izvestiya* statement reflected the general militancy of the current Soviet propaganda line. The creation of the World Peace Council was in itself a militant action since it was clearly designed to intimidate the UN, discredit decisions opposed by the USSR, and ultimately serve as an alternative agency if and when Moscow felt withdrawal from the UN to be expedient. At the very least, therefore, the current intensification of efforts to discredit the UN represents extreme intimidation designed perhaps to force favorable action by UN members particularly on Soviet disarmament proposals scheduled to be pressed by the World Peace Council.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The contents of an interview of Soviet Premier I. V. Stalin by the official Soviet news organ, *Pravda*, became known in Western countries on February 17. According to a text printed in the *New York Times* on that date (the interview itself occurred on February 17), Stalin made the following comments about the United Nations, in partial response to the lead-off question of the interview: "How do you estimate the decision of the United Nations Organization which proclaimed the Chinese People's Republic an aggressor?" (a reference to the Resolution of February 1, 1951 of the General Assembly of the United Nations; documentation on this matter is in volume VII).

"The United Nations Organization, created as the bulwark for preserving peace, is being turned into an instrument of war, into a means for unleashing a new world war. . . . The United Nations Organization is at the same time ceasing to be a world organization of nations enjoying equal rights. . . . The United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans, an organization acting on behalf of the requirements of the American aggressors. . . . The United Nations Organization is therefore taking the inglorious road of the League of Nations. In this way it is burying its moral prestige and dooming itself to disintegration." (*New York Times*, February 17, 1951, page 3)

Stalin identified the "aggressive core" of the United Nations to be the ten North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and the twenty Latin American countries.

For immediate official United States comment on the Stalin interview, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 5, 1951, pages 367 and 368. It was pointed out that the Voice of America and the Wireless Bulletin of the Department of State were emphasizing "the fact

that, whereas the Soviet state has heretofore used its puppet rulers and stooges to propagandize the world with the fake charges and claims of the Kremlin, the Chief of the Soviet Union, himself, has now put himself on record and on trial before the world by lending his own name to the Soviet deception on an international scale."

330/3–151

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer)

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] March 1, 1951.

Subject: Discussions with Malik and Zinchenko [1]

For "straw collectors division", following summary of talks with Malik and Zinchenko may be of interest.

After Security Council Dinner, February 27,[2] I found Malik in talkative mood. After giving him message from Dulles [3] (reported by phone to latter 28 February), Malik smilingly commented that he and Dulles were on "two different paths." When I asked what he meant, he replied, "Only one of us is taking the path to peace." I said this was an unfair comment, and that our course of action, both within and outside the UN, was based on the conviction that a peaceful solution of all issues could be found if Soviet policies were changed so as to eliminate fear of her intentions. Malik said that only the Soviet Union had cause to fear, and that we were using fear as an excuse. We talked about "defense", but through history his country had always been attacked by people who insisted they were "defending themselves." Napoleon marched on Moscow, saying he was defending France, and Hitler attacked his country for "self-defense."

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[1] Y. A. Malik, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations, and Constantin E. Zinchenko, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs.

[2] The Security Council is organized to function continuously, but it had had only two meetings in 1951 as of this date (January 31, February 21). The Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly was still in session, but the only main committee of the fifth session that met in 1951 was the First Committee (Political and Security Questions); the Committee had been active in January in addressing itself to the Korean question and matters concerning China; documentation on these questions is found in volume VII.

On February 21 and throughout the months of March and April the Security Council was seized of the India–Pakistan dispute (the Kashmir question); for documentation on this subject, see volume VI, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff. Thereafter the Council was seized of the complaint of the failure by the Iranian Government to comply with provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case; for documentation on this matter, see volume V.

[3] John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State (for negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty).

At this time Jebb [4] and Lacoste [5] joined us. The latter, who heard Malik's comment concerning Napoleon and Hitler, said he could not believe the Russians really feared that armies were preparing to march against the Soviet Union.

Malik replied, "No, not marching." But American officials were talking every day about dropping bombs on Moscow and many Senators made speeches saying we should attack the Soviet Union. No one heard any Soviet official talk about marching against Detroit or Chicago, or bombing American cities. Lacoste said this was true, but there was a fear in Western European countries that the large armies the Soviet Union had maintained might be used against them.

This precipitated a long, somewhat dialectical, argument by Malik that people were lying about the size of the Soviet armies. He repeated Stalin's [6] thesis that it was impossible for the Soviet Union to have a large military establishment because of her use of manpower to rebuild cities and factories which Hitlerite armies had destroyed. Malik brushed off attempts by Lacoste to develop the point that it was a fact that fear of Soviet intentions was widespread.

I brought the discussion around to the UN by saying that many people were "misinterpreting" Stalin's *Pravda* interview to mean that the Soviet Union was considering leaving the UN. I thought this was seriously affecting the prestige of the Soviet Union in the UN, and that it might be desirable for the Soviet Government to correct these "misinterpretations."

As I anticipated, the unexpected direct mention of Stalin caused Malik to consider his reply quite deliberately. He thought for a moment and then said that what we had done during this Assembly was making the UN a different kind of organization than had been agreed upon at San Francisco.[7] The General Assembly was not a substitute for the Security Council. We knew we could always rely on the "twenty and ten" votes in the Assembly. (Obvious reference to the Latin Americans and the Atlantic Pact countries.) Any additional necessary votes could be found by using pressure. We had "our rope around the necks of many countries" and that was how we managed to get Trygve Lie [8] elected again. He had been told this by one Delegate who was "not a friend of the Soviet Union", but who admitted to Malik that his Government had voted for Lie "because the

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[4] Sir H. M. Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

[5] Francis Lacoste, Deputy Representative of France to the United Nations.

[6] Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[7] For documentation on the United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[8] Trygve Lie was Secretary-General of the United Nations.

US had tightened the rope." [9] Malik accompanied this comment with a gesture at his throat.

Jebb, who had been silent up to this moment, said it was "obvious the UN could not succeed unless the *Four* Powers agreed among themselves." When Malik failed to reply to this comment, Jebb repeated it. I commented that the UN might help to bring about such agreement eventually.

Malik, who appeared determined to concentrate on the US, said that the US was trying to keep the peace by pointing a pistol at the Soviet Union. He referred to a recent editorial he had read in the *New York Times* which was entitled "Shotgun Wedding". The US insisted on a "shotgun wedding."

We were afraid of a business depression and wanted a large arms program. We also thought we could intimidate the Soviet Union with our atom bombs and air force.[10]

I said I had frequently observed that Soviet representatives in discussing these matters refused to accept the facts, and the facts were clear that, as Lacoste had said, there was great fear of the Soviet Union. It was this fear which accounted for the decision of the rest of the world to make itself so strong that it could not be attacked.

Malik replied this was exactly the theory expressed by Secretary Acheson a year ago. The Secretary talked about "situations of strength".[11] This was only an excuse to bring pressure, and that was what was causing tension.

The conversation ended more or less on this note. Malik was as intransigent as I have ever heard him, but was not grim. At frequent intervals he smiled, or put his hand on my arm in a friendly fashion. He gave me the impression of pointedly confining his remarks to the US and, while not rude to Jebb or Lacoste, paid little or no attention to their comments.

Later in the evening, I approached Zinchenko, to compare his attitude with that of Malik.

I tried the same heavy-handed approach of saying that Stalin's *Pravda* interview was being "wrongly interpreted" by many as indicating that the Soviet Union intended to leave the UN. It seemed to me this was doing the Soviet Union more harm than it was doing the UN.

Without hesitation, Zinchenko replied that Stalin meant no such thing. The significant thing to notice, said Zinchenko, was that whereas

[9] For documentation relating to the question of the Secretary-Generalship in 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 87 ff.

[10] For documentation regarding United States national security policy, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[11] For documentation regarding United States policy in 1950 to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations to meet aggression, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303 ff.

before Stalin had referred to the UN as a useful "instrument of peace", a great deal had happened since then. Decisions had been made "by a certain majority" which "did not always take into account the interests of the minority." But this was not at all the same thing as saying the Soviet Union would leave the UN.

(At this point I left Zinchenko to join Jebb for a discussion with Rau [12] on Kashmir, separately reported).

On March 1, after the Security Council meeting, I found Malik in the Delegates' Lounge, and in passing remarked I had just been told his Government had agreed to a meeting of the Deputies in Paris.[13] He took hold of my arm and said he had heard that the Americans "were going to the meeting without any enthusiasm" and wanted to know if this were true.

I replied I could not imagine where he had heard this, since we hoped that the meeting would be useful. He said he had just heard from a reporter that Gromyko would head the Soviet Delegation and asked who would represent the US. I told him I believed Jessup [14] would be our Deputy. I said it seemed obvious to me the Soviet Union had it within its power to make the conference a success because it had created the causes of tension in Europe and could remove them by changing its policies.

Malik asked what I meant by "causes of tension", adding the "cause of tension is Germany." I said that the notes which we had sent to his Government set out the problems quite clearly. He repeated that Germany is the "real problem", and said somewhat sarcastically that we talked about the Austrian question, "as if Austria and Germany had the same importance."

I said I was without authority to discuss the matter, but, speaking personally, it seemed clear there are many causes of tension in Europe and they could not be ignored as if they did not exist. The military establishments in Eastern Europe are an obvious example.

Malik said that he could only "judge facts as he knew them." The US had 100,000 troops in Germany and another 100,000 in England and other places in Europe. This is "not consistent with peaceful intentions." I asked whether he seriously believed that US troops in Europe were there as part of an aggressive plan against the Soviet Union. I added that it was disturbing to hear him talk as if he expected such absurd conclusions to be taken seriously. In reply, he repeated much of what he had said in our previous conversation,

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[12] Sir Benegal N. Rau, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, and at this time President of the Security Council.

[13] For documentation regarding the discussions looking toward a resumption of the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see volume III.

[14] Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large.

reported above, about American industrialists fearing depression, "warmongering" by political leaders, etc.

I said I thought it was almost a tragic thing that he appeared to be unable or unwilling to believe the simple truth—We had demobilized after the war, we much preferred to make things our people could use in their daily lives, we had been driven reluctantly to set up a large military budget in order to be strong enough to defend ourselves. He asked me to explain the word "reluctantly", which he did not understand. When I did so, he replied with some warmth, "What can we do to convince you that we do not want war and that we do not want to conquer the world?" I said I thought they could demonstrate this most clearly by their actions, both at the meetings of Ministers and after.

700.001/3–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

4704. FonOff has received from British Embassy Moscow information to effect that at public lecture on 27th F. N. Oleschuk, believed to be deputy head of agitation propaganda department of Central Committee of CPSU (B) said if UN does not respond to representations of delegate[s] of World Council of Peace,[1] USSR would have no alternative but leave UN.[2]

GIFFORD

[1] The members of the international delegation which the Berlin meeting of the World Peace Council sent to the United Nations (see footnote 3, p. 455) are listed in telegram 1283, March 15, p. 463. See also Doc. SD/A/245, September 11, 1951 in the Master Files of the Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State (hereafter cited as IO Files).

[2] In telegram 559 to Moscow, March 9, the Department of State requested further information on the Oleschuk lecture, "if available" (310.361/3–951).

661.00/3–1051 : Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 10, 1951—8 : 05 a. m.

[Here follows discussion of two subjects, part of the weekly collection of items considered as possibly foreshadowing Soviet tactical trends, prepared by DRS. The second item described a *Pravda* edi-

[1] Sent to 54 diplomatic missions, 8 special missions, and 13 consulates and consulates general.

torial of March 1, which asserted that the scope of the signature campaign, launched by the Berlin meeting of the World Peace Council, in support of a Big Five Peace Pact, "is to be far beyond that of the Stockholm Appeal".]

Moscow Warns of Possible Withdrawal from UN. Following the decision of the World Peace Council to send a delegation to the UN to demand that it "return to the role assigned it by the Charter," a leading Soviet propagandist is reported to have stated in a public lecture in Moscow on February 27 that if the UN did not "respond to the representations" of the World Peace Council delegation, the USSR "would have no alternative but to leave the United Nations." A *Pravda* editorial broadcast March 3 implied the same when it asserted that the UN had the choice "either to fulfill the demands of the World Peace Council . . . or to doom itself to disintegration." This heightened Soviet campaign against the UN appears at present designed primarily to intimidate the UN into adopting a more positive attitude toward Soviet demands, rather than as a firm indication of an intention to withdraw from the UN. In this connection, Soviet UN delegates have recently stated positively that no such intention was to be inferred from Stalin's recent remarks on the shortcomings of the UN. Nevertheless, the appearance of a frank prediction of withdrawal if this effort fails, when considered in conjunction with Soviet moves to create parallel organizations and the systematic drive to discredit the UN, must be considered as increasing the chances of an actual withdrawal.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

WEBB

310.361/3–1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, March 14, 1951—5 p. m.

1660. Re Deptel 559, March 9.[1] Oleschuk February 27 lecture, "The USSR as the leading force of the democratic camp—the struggle of the USSR for the peace and security of the peoples", commented on militaristic activities US in Germany and Japan, although those peoples against war, and portrayed USSR as not fearing co-existence, since growth working class movement would ensure end of capitalist system.

Oleschuk then reported as stating that aggressive bloc (in UN) of 30 powers had obstructed every proposal for preserving peace. Therefore, on initiative of USSR, the World Peace Movement had been formed. Peace Council appeal constitutes a second warning to

[1] See footnote 2, p. 461.

UN to carry out her chief function—preserving peace. If warning has no results, and UN continues to serve cause of US aggression, then peace loving countries would have to leave it, since they could not uphold its authority by participation. Oleschuk also quoted as remarking that USSR no longer stands alone, but enjoys support of 10 democratic countries and also of World Wide Peace Partisans.

Inference foregoing somewhat different from that of Deptel 559, in that Oleschuk portrays Council appeal as second warning, which UN must heed or face secession (rather than making Soviet bloc action contingent on actual reception accorded by UN to specific Peace Council delegation). Thus, CP SU will judge whether UN is heeding warning and ceasing to support US aggression.

Since creation Peace Council last November, Embassy has felt that body would be and was being developed as potential rival UN, to be used only when and if USSR deems desirable. If public pressure able to achieve conclusion big five peace pact Soviets may resume support UN. If results are otherwise, Soviet bloc may choose to leave over dramatic incident in which delegations of simple peace loving people of world (Robeson, Uphaus, *et al.*) unable to receive proper hearing or even admission at UN. Noteworthy WPC set no definite date for its delegation to UN.

Oleschuk reported Deputy Chief of Propaganda Department of party Control Committee. He is not member of Soviet Peace Committee elected at second Soviet conference for peace, or of World Peace Council. He was not reported as attending WPC Berlin session.

KIRK

700.001/3–1551 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, March 15, 1951—8 : 35 p. m.

1283. Re World Peace Council (WPC) Delegation. Following is unofficial translation (from French) of letter received by SYG Lie, dated Paris, March 8, from WPC President, M. Joliot Curie:

"The second Congress of Peace approved an appeal addressed to the United Nations containing proposals with a view to maintaining the peace of the world. The text of this appeal was sent to you by telegram and your secretariat acknowledged receipt under date of December 5, 1950. The World Council for Peace, which is an outgrowth of the Congress, held its first meeting in Berlin between 21 and 26 February. It was decided to send a delegation to the UN to deal with the different points of this appeal and the decisions of the council with regard to this appeal. This delegation will be composed of the follow-

ing people: Sr. Nenni (Italy), Mme. Isabel Blume (Belgium), Mrs. S. O. Davies (Great Britain), Mrs. Jesse Street (Australia), M. d'Astier de la Vigerie (France), Mr. Tikhonov (USSR), Mr. Yao Tsung-wu (CPR), Mr. Hromadka (Czechoslovakia), Mr. d'Arboussier (Black Africa), Sr. Neruda (Chile), Gen. Jara (Mexico), Paul Robeson, The Rev. Uphaus (USA), Dr. Atal (India).

"The gravity of the international situation and the absolute necessity to put forth all our efforts to avoid new conflict compels me to ask you to receive this delegation without delay, and I beg of you to let me know what date will be convenient."

Lie via Cordier replied briefly by letter dated March 15, as follows:

"The Secretary-General has asked me to state in response to your letter of March 8 he hopes to meet your delegation at some point in Europe—perhaps Paris, Geneva, Rome—in the course of the trip he plans to take in the near future. I will communicate with you again soon with regard to the exact time and place."

GROSS

700.001/3-3151

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL Moscow, March 31, 1951.

No. 576

Reference: Embassy despatch 301, December 18, 1950.[1]

Subject: The First Session of the World Peace Council and Subsequent Developments

This despatch contains Embassy comments on the activities of the World Peace Council session in Berlin, and on subsequent related developments, as they were reported in the Moscow press, as well as on probable Soviet-Peace Partisan tactics in the future. The World Peace Council proceedings have not been reported in complete detail, since the Embassy's main reference source was the Moscow press and since it is assumed that those proceedings have already been fully covered elsewhere.

Summary

The Soviet propaganda machine gave tremendous publicity to the activities of the Peace Council. The opening day, February 21, was marked by unusually heavy attacks on the UN in the Soviet press. Stalin's February 17 interview in *Pravda* obviously exerted a great influence on the Council proceedings. This influence was so apparent that it should increase Peace Partisan vulnerability to attack as Communist inspired and controlled.

[1] Not printed.

The course of events since the Second World Peace Congress (November, 1950) was reflected in the sharper and more aggressive tone of the Council speeches, as compared with those of the Congress. As was to be expected, the Council's activities in no way deviated from the regular Party line. The Appeal for a Peace Pact, which one speech described as an even more important document than the Stockholm Appeal, has received the greatest publicity thus far. Among the other Council decisions, the resolutions on the United Nations and on German remilitarization also received considerable comment.

Although they received much less notice, the Council's discussion and decisions concerning ways and means of expanding the Peace Partisan movement and obtaining new allies were of great importance, for to a large extent the future success of that movement will be contingent on the possibility of attracting new supporters, particularly those who are respected and not considered pro-Communist, but who are politically naive and susceptible to manipulation. Specific reference was made to the possibility of contacting religious groups and adherents of world government, as well as those who favor pacifism or neutrality (in other words, those who may serve to help widen the split in non-Communist ranks).

Particularly alarming was the Council's reference to the possibility of joint action with the Quakers, for such an event would undoubtedly constitute a major achievement for the Partisans (page 10). It was clear from the Council speeches that the Partisans had worded their program in such a way as to attract the greatest possible number of people.

A large number of conferences were planned or discussed, most of which will obviously do much to give the World Peace Council the appearance of a world organization engaged in solving all sorts of problems. This aspect of the program is apparently calculated to build-up the World Peace Council still further as a rival to the UN. The International Economic Conference, scheduled for this summer, in Moscow, appears particularly suitable for Soviet propaganda purposes (page 12). The fact that some of these conferences have been scheduled for this summer (and one in Moscow) will probably not be overlooked by many on both sides of the Iron Curtain who are concerned regarding the possibility of war this year.

The Soviet Peace Defense Act and the European Workers' Conference Against Remilitarization of Germany, in Berlin, were two further developments in the peace campaign which received great publicity in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the recent exchange of messages between the UN and the World Peace Council (concerning the desire of the WPC delegation to visit the UN) was only briefly reported in the local press and has not been played up editorially.

The World Peace Council is undoubtedly scheduled for further development as a rival to the UN. However, ultimate Soviet action will probably be influenced by the results of the present Paris talks and the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, and the possibility of obtaining a Peace Pact. The Soviet Union could find both advantages and disadvantages to seceding from the UN. In the future, its decision may well be determined to a large extent by its estimate of the probable effect of secession on the important neutral countries (page 18). Meanwhile, anti-UN propaganda continues and the World Peace Council is being rapidly developed for future use, either as a threat or as an actual rival.

[Here follow 14 pages of detailed discussion under the subheadings of "World Peace Council", "Council Activities", and "Some Subsequent Events".]

III—*Possible Future Developments*

The World Peace Council session and its decisions appear to bring the Soviet Union and the Peace Partisans closer to a showdown with the UN. Undoubtedly, strenuous efforts will be made in the future to justify the portrayal of the Council as the most representative international organization. At the same time, Soviet-Peace Partisan attacks on the UN will probably continue, unless Soviet power and influence in the UN is greatly increased by some drastic change in the international scene.*

Soviet action vis-à-vis the UN will probably be influenced by several factors, including, among others: the possibility of securing a Five Power Peace Pact; the results of the present Paris discussions and, possibly, of a future Council of Foreign Ministers meeting; and the likely repercussions of secession from the U.N.

If the USSR were to achieve a Five Power Peace Pact it would presumably prefer to remain in the UN and continue to exercise its influence in that organization and to use it as a forum for its propaganda.

If the Soviet Union were to obtain what it considered to be outstanding diplomatic successes at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers,[2] it might well decide against seceding from the UN, on the grounds that such action would probably arouse fresh alarm and provoke new energetic measures among the principal anti-Soviet governments which would undo or nullify the previous Soviet gains. In

*One noteworthy forecast of future international developments was made by Nenni, in his speech at the Council, in which he stated that the most likely result of the "American war policy" was a "prolonged period of neither peace nor war", which will create a particularly favorable soil for every sort of adventure, including those of a facist and Nazi type". [Footnote in the source text.]

[2] For documentation regarding this subject, see volume III.

the absence of any substantial gains for the Soviet Union at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, such considerations would not, of course, exert an influence on Soviet thinking regarding secession.

No matter what the results of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, the Soviet Union might well try to utilize that meeting to minimize, at least indirectly, the influence and prestige of the UN, by arguing that the most important problems are, perforce, settled by direct negotiation among the Great Powers and outside the UN.

Secession by the Soviet bloc would tend to increase, at least on paper, the importance of the World Peace Council. The latter now "represents", in its own peculiar way, the "peace-loving peoples" of 81 countries. Following secession, on the other hand, the UN would appear to be less of a world organization than it is today. To dramatize its charges that the UN is not truly representative of the people of any country, whatever, the Soviet bloc might well seize on the inability of the Peace Council delegation to obtain satisfaction from the UN as the most appropriate occasion for leaving that organization, should other developments seem to make such action advisable at that time.

Secession, however, would not be without drawbacks for the Soviet Union. For one thing, it would leave the non-Soviet countries in a single organization and free from Communist vetoes. Moreover, in addition to the above mentioned repercussions on the major anti-Soviet governments, secession might well have the effect of reducing sympathy for the USSR among the countries which are not consistently anti-Soviet, and among various groups which favor pacifism or neutrality. Undoubtedy, the USSR hopes to manipulate those countries and groups so as to widen the split in non-Soviet ranks, and it would, presumably, prefer to avoid any action which would reduce the opportunity for such manipulation. Therefore, the ultimate Soviet decision with regard to secession eventually may be determined by Soviet thinking regarding the effect such action would have on the important neutral countries.

At any rate, whether the Soviet bloc will ever actually secede from the UN or not, the Peace Council can be, and is being, developed as a useful club which the Soviets can either wield for intimidation or actually use at the most propitious moment.

For the Ambassador:
M. Gordon Knox
First Secretary of Embassy

700.001/4–2151 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 21, 1951—8:15 a. m.

WORLD PEACE COUNCIL

Department considers it essential that spurious Soviet peace propaganda, now in high gear, under the imprimatur of the recently established "World Peace Council," and likely to mount for some time, be combatted with imagination and vigor. Accordingly Department currently engaged in preparation of materials for use in serious campaign to counter phony peace propaganda. These will be made available in the form of guidances and backgrounders. The following, for such use as you deem appropriate, is Department thinking re current anti-UN phase of the Soviet-sponsored WPC program:

Sov-commie propaganda has for some time engaged in systematic efforts to undermine confidence in the UN. Simultaneously it has been trying to build up the "World Peace Council" as a possible heir presumptive to the UN. The following events appear significant:

The Warsaw "Peace Congress," November 1950, described the UN as a new Holy Alliance, called for a "return to the true UN Charter" and addressed a communication to the UN to consider the terms of the Warsaw Appeal.

Stalin in his *Pravda* interview of February 15 attacked the UN as unrepresentative, as a failure in its task of achieving peace and as a tool used by the US to bring about World War III. Stalin claimed ten NATO countries and twenty Latin American countries form aggressive core of UN and added that "UNO is taking the inglorious road of the League of Nations. In this way it is burying its moral prestige and dooming itself to disintegration."

The Berlin meeting (February 21–26) of the Soviet sponsored WPC demanded that the UN consider the resolutions of WPC and that it return to the role assigned it by the Charter, namely to serve as an area of agreement between the governments and not as the instrument of any dominant group. WPC also announced its decision to send a delegation to the UN to present its demands.

Romanian paper *Scanteia*, declared February 23, "Turning UN into instrument of aggression has disappointed people and this disappointment has led to setting up WPC." Other commie journals began refer to WPC as "new world power."

On February 27, Soviet propagandist Oleshchuk stated Moscow in public lecture that the WPC appeal constituted a second warning to the UN to carry out its chief function—preserving peace, and that if warning had no results and the UN continued to serve the cause of US aggression, the peace loving countries would have to leave the UN.

Pravda editorial, March 3, echoing Stalin line, asserted: "The UN has the choice either to fulfil the demands of the WPC or share the inglorious fate of the League of Nations and doom itself to distintegration." *Pravda* added: "In making its demands to the UN the WPC

is acting as the most representative organ of all nations. . . . The demands of the WPC are the demands of hundreds of millions of people of good will of the whole world."

The latest North Korean communication to the UN is apparently based on the WPC resolution re Korea.

While the possibility cannot be disregarded that the present campaign may have the object of preparing Soviet withdrawal, there are no indications that the USSR has reached such a decision. Current Department thinking that USSR would have no compunction about withdrawing from the UN if it should decide that continued membership no longer serves Soviet ends. WPC resolutions and Sov statements indicate, however, that the USSR plans for the present to continue its efforts to make the UN more responsive to Soviet pressure and that the USSR is now using the threat of withdrawal and of the establishment of a rival organization as a means toward this end.

In view proportions and significance this Sov campaign it is important that we counter with appropriate information. Following points should be stressed:

1. WPC is a Soviet controlled group representing no serious body of opinion in free world. It exists only to advance Soviet purposes. Comparison of Soviet policy statements of past year with demands of WPC reveals remarkable identity.

2. Analysis of political creeds of 85% of the 225 original members of the council reveals that all are either communists or fellow-travellers. Data on the remaining 15% is unavailable. Members of the Council were selected by 2nd Congress Peace Partisans from lists drawn up by the Bureau and Secretariat on the basis of nominations made by various national delegations. These delegations, for most part, nominally chosen by national "peace" officials and other commie-front organizations but as matter of practice delegates often self-appointed or selected by executive members of organizations or the communist parties. Actual control wielded by the Bureau and Secretariat of Peace Partisans—a staff of 27 persons of whom all but two are either communists or fellow-travellers.

3. The WPC claim to represent public opinion is based on signatures to the "Stockholm Appeal." Those signatures never authenticated. Moreover, overwhelming majority obtained in USSR and the Sov satellite states.

4. Soviet "peace" protestations and the Stockholm Appeal relating to atomic weapoins, fell with dull thud last summer when communist forces invaded ROK and world opinion recognized that Stalin could have prevented aggression in Korea had he desired.

5. Had UN failed to oppose communist aggression in Korea UN might have been reduced to status of the League of Nations, following League failure to take effective action in the Corfu, Manchuria and Ethiopian cases. However, the UN did act, supplying an impressive

example of the vindication of the rule of law in international affairs. Fifty-three member nations indicated in communications to the SYG of UN that they supported the action of the UN pursuant to the SC resolution. Any subsequent differences among UN members as to conduct of the UN Korean campaign only confirm that the UN is a genuinely democratic organization and is not dominated by any one member.

6. Well known that the USSR has obstructed UN efforts to establish just and enduring peace. Despite Soviet obstruction, UN has important achievements to its credit: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, establishment of independent Indonesia, cease-fire in Palestine and Kashmir, role in maintenance of Greek independence, defense of ROK: this in addition to valuable work done by the specialized agencies in fields of health, agriculture, food, relief, economic progress, education and advancement of non-self-governing people.

7. Fundamental UN political and security decisions of General Assembly were supported by a vast majority including not only the NATO countries and the Latin American Republics, but also the Middle East and Asian states. This is true of such decisions as resolutions on atomic energy, disarmament and Essentials of Peace.

8. USSR failed in its efforts to impose its own will on the United Nations. Soviet threat of withdrawal is a threat that unless majority capitulates to Soviet plans, the Soviets will repudiate their Charter obligations. The United States wants the Soviets to stay in the United Nations and is willing to cooperate with them as with any other Member. However, continued membership of any Member, large or small, cannot be bought at a price of a compromise with Charter principles.

9. Exchange of correspondence between UN SYG Trygve Lie and President of Soviet-sponsored WPC Joliot-Curie, reveals that whereas Lie expressed willingness to receive WPC deputation in Paris and notified Joliot-Curie to this effect 10 days in advance of his arrival in Paris, WPC officials declined to keep the appointment. By declining Lie's offer and insisting that its deputation go to New York the WPC has manifested greater interest in obtaining propaganda advantages connected with their appearance at UN headquarters than in peace itself.

10. UN SYG Lie in excellent statement (which merits heavy emphasis) enclosed with his letter to Joliot-Curie (Wireless Bulletin 90) set forth these themes:

a. The UN offers best hope to all people everywhere who are genuinely interested in peace.

b. Those whose actions tend to weaken the UN, to undermine its authority, to sharpen the discords that are inevitably present in a world organization—they are no true friends of peace no matter what they profess to be.

c. Support the UN with understanding and loyalty and you shall have peace.

FYI: Brit FonOff has instructed its missions along similar lines requesting that where appropriate they bring UK views on this matter to attention of other governments and seek to obtain recognition by press and public of the fantastic and impudent nature of the claims advanced on behalf of the WPC. Department suggests you discuss the above with your British colleague and other interested colleagues in your discretion.

Department interested in obtaining detailed reports concerning

a. appeal and impact of Soviet "peace" propaganda on local population and manner of selection of local representatives to the WPC.

b. nature and scope of local efforts to combat fraudulent peace movement.

c. suggestions and recommendations re action required to deflate Soviet "peace" campaign, discourage signatures, etc.

Further guidance, particularly re WPC proposal for a 5 Power Peace Pact, will be upcoming shortly.

This airgram is being sent to the Soviet orbit posts for their information only.

Further instructions to missions in the other American Republics follow.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

An official United States statement regarding Soviet propaganda about leaving the United Nations was included in a speech made at Milwaukee, Wisconsin on April 27 by John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1951, pages 731 ff. The speech was entitled "The 'Phony' Peace Offensive" and the remarks regarding the United Nations were incorporated under a subheading entitled "Answering Soviet Charges Against U.N.".

Assistant Secretary Hickerson said in part:

"The Soviets charge that the United Nations has failed because it has turned into a docile instrument of United States policy. This is nothing but an absurd way of saying that the majority of free nations of the world have been alert to Soviet subversion. . . .

"The United States cannot honestly be blamed because other nations find their interests at odd with those of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are themselves responsible. Their unreasonable and uncompromising positions have engendered a real fear among the majority of the members of the United Nations. . . .

"In organizing its phony 'peace' campaign, what has the Kremlin in mind concerning the future of the United Nations? That is any-

body's guess on this side of the iron curtain. This 'peace' campaign professes a wish to bring the United Nations back to its original purposes. In this manner the World Peace Council seeks to discredit the United Nations and thus lessen the stigma of the United Nations' denunciation of the North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression.

"By building up their World Peace Council, the Soviets seek to exert propaganda pressure against the United Nations—a sort of blackmail. . . .

". . . We are not, however, blind to Soviet aims and tactics, and we must not allow them to subvert the United Nations to their ends. We have fought their attempts to do this since 1945 and will continue our efforts to strengthen the United Nations as an effective organization on world peace. . . .

"If they insist on slandering the United Nations, we must lay the blame for the inadequacies of that organization squarely where it belongs—on the Soviet Union and its policies of obstruction and subversion. We must block the Kremlin's efforts to deceive and divide."

700.001/4–2851 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 28, 1951—4: 05 p. m.

WORLD PEACE COUNCIL #2

Major efforts of Commie controlled World Peace Council are devoted to obtaining signatures in all countries for vaguely worded Five Power Peace Pact appeal.

Circular Airgram of April 21, 1951, dealt with WPC organization and implied Soviet threat of blackmail toward UN. Subsequent instructions will deal with other aspects of combatting WPC "peace" campaign.

Department considers it essential that World Peace Pact signature drive be exposed vigorously through the use of all media and other suitable means including, where appropriate, approach to foreign governments.

Peace appeal as adopted by Commie-picked WPC February 1951 in Berlin declares:

"To fulfill the hopes cherished by millions of people throughout the world, whatever may be their views of the causes that have brought about the danger of a world war;

"To strengthen peace and safeguard international security;

"We demand the conclusion of a pact of peace among the Five Great Powers: the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain and France.

"We would consider a refusal to meet to conclude such a pact, by the government of any of the Great Powers, no matter what it might be, as evidence of aggressive design on the part of the government in question.

"We call upon all peace-loving nations to support the demand for this pact of peace, which should be open to all countries.

"We set our names to this appeal and we invite all men and women of good will, all organizations that hope for peace, to add their names in its support."

Pact is designed to appeal to illusion that present world problems can be solved if big five sit down together and cooperate. However, it is apparent from long and patent efforts of US, UK and France to negotiate with Soviets in CFM and other bodies, that "cooperation" in Soviet terms means submission to Soviet demands.

Provision of appeal that aggressive intent evidenced by refusal to conclude a pact clearly attempts to create propaganda basis to stigmatize other major powers for declining "peaceful" international settlements on Kremlin terms.

Soviets have never specified in detail what provisions "peace pact" would contain. Vagueness of WPC resolution and its emotional appeal may deceive well meaning uninformed people.

Agitation for signatures now under way on a world-wide basis. Appeal for Peace Pact is combined with regional appeals such as opposition to rearming Japan and Germany, for settlement of Korea war and opposition to commie-defined Colonialism. Peace drive is conceived as grass roots campaign aimed at exploiting: 1—Individual and national fear of rearmament, war and increased taxation; 2—Economic dissatisfaction; 3—Social and political unrest and anti-colonalism; 4—Pacifist and neutrality sentiment; and 5—What Communists call "initiative of churches" on behalf of peace.

WPC drive appears to have short range propaganda purpose of underscoring myth that Kremlin is the power for peace while other great powers are for war, and to prevent or delay anti-communist defenses. Long range purpose is to weaken unity and strength of free world against Soviet aggression, to further Kremlin's dynamic program for achieving world domination and to prepare naive and uninformed masses, now outside of party or front organizations innocently to accept part in revolutionary expansion of Communism.

Five power peace pact proposal is largely similar to earlier USSR proposals in UN General Assembly and confirms Kremlin control of WPC as a propaganda pressure vehicle for USSR ends. Following recent history may clarify Soviet intent:

1—Pact proposal referred to by Stalin in interview with Kingsbury Smith January, 1949 and formally placed on UN General Assembly agenda September 1949. It was overwhelmingly rejected by GA which adopted as counter-measure "Essentials of Peace" resolution which offered a plan of action for real peace. Soviets again introduced proposal in GA September, 1950 and again it was overwhelmingly re-

jected by GA which adopted as a counter measure the "Peace through Deeds" resolution. Soviets voted against both UN resolutions.

Sole vague reference to the contents of a peace pact which Soviets were considering was made by Vishinsky November 23, 1949 in GA political committee. Vishinsky declared that the pact was "intended to ensure the peaceful settlement of all differences; to curb the preparations for a new war; to reduce military budgets and lighten the burden of taxation; to eliminate foreign military and air bases; and to bring an end to aggressive blocs such as the one resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty."

2—World Peace Congress in Rome, October 1949, adopted three point appeal to all parliaments which included provision for peace pact within the framework of UN. Expanded version given rubber-stamp approval by Eastern European parliaments in February 1950 while Western governments were offered a simpler formula, excluding provision for a peace pact. Periodic references to peace pact made in Soviet and communist propaganda throughout 1950.

3—Warsaw Peace Congress in November, 1950, called on UN to convoke meeting of Big Five to discuss differences. In December 1950, Polish delegate to UN asked SYG to circulate to all members memorandum adopted by Warsaw Congress which called, among others, for a meeting of Big Five. The memorandum contained single-package version of all Communist propaganda themes, including proposal of so-called Stockholm Peace Appeal of 1950 which demanded banning of atomic weapons.

4—New World Peace Council, composed of 262 Communist or party line members reverted to peace pact proposal in Berlin, February 1951 and made it the main theme of signature drive.

Vigor and imagination required to combat spurious peace appeal which, if successful, could only lead to a peace of MVD policed slave labor camp. All techniques perfected by Communists in Stockholm Peace Appeal are certain to be used again and new methods attempted. Soviet propaganda now devoting unusually large proportion of time to peace theme.

Following points should be stressed against peace pact appeal:

1—UN Charter constitutes solemn peace pact to which all member countries, including Five Great Powers, have subscribed. All members have assumed obligation to settle their differences peacefully and to refrain from the use or threat of force. If these basic obligations were honored by all members, including Soviet Union, true peace would be insured. Need exists for fulfillment of UN charter and other obligations, which Kremlin attempts to sabotage, rather than new pact of Great Powers.

2—Kremlin has violated existing obligations to such extent that world has lost confidence in its respect for treaties. There is no sense in

Soviets assuming new treaty obligations until they have restored confidence of world in their word by honoring existing obligations. Emphasize Soviet violations of war time agreement, UN charter and examples of lack of cooperation such as:

a—Enslavement of Eastern European countries by Kremlin controlled Communists.

b—Sealing off, as Soviet reservation, of Eastern Germany and Northern Korea.

c—Fomenting civil strife and aggression against Greece; Berlin blockade.

d—Militarization of East German Police.

e—Soviet stripping of machinery and factories in Manchuria; detachment of large land areas from China.

f—Soviet supported aggression against South Korea.

g—Communist support of Communist rebels and bandits in Indochina and Malaya.

h—Threat of force against Yugoslavia and Turkey.

i—Support of re-militarization of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania in violation of peace treaties.

j—Soviet maintenance of disproportionately high armaments at a time when Germany and Japan were demilitarized and all other powers rapidly and radically reduced their armaments below level where they could constitute threat to Soviet Union.

k—Persistent Soviet refusal to cooperate in UN majority approved plans for control of atomic energy and regulation of armament.

l—Imperialist extinction of Baltic nations and vast extension of Soviet power by threats and force against smaller states.

m—Refusal to conclude treaty on Austria after five years of negotiations.

n—Conspiracy and constant incitement by Kremlin-instructed communists to overthrow governments and weaken peaceful countries by civil war.

o—Persistent refusal of Soviet Union to cooperate in efforts of UN specialized agencies for social and economic improvement.

p—Use of police terror, slave labor and erection of iron curtain to prevent relations between people of the Soviet block and outside world.

3—Big Five pact could mean control of world by great powers without a voice by smaller nations in their own fate.

4—Soviet hopes that peace pact will provide instrument more amenable to their will than United Nations, and that pact will wreck or impair efforts to build up General Assembly and NATO to cope with aggression. Soviet veto in UN Security Council has not proved as effective an instrument for Soviets as they hoped. To meet Soviet obstruction in Security Council, importance of General Assembly increased and NATO developed.

5—Fifth Power in proposed pact, Communist China, already stands condemned by free world through UN as aggressor in Korea and is openly and actively supporting aggression.

6—Machinery exists in Council of Foreign Ministers for settlement of issues appropriate to major power discussions. Efforts to achieve agreement in CFM at six conferences from 1945 to 1949 thwarted by obstructionism of Kremlin which considers agreements only as assent of others for Soviet proposals. However, we are willing to try again as in present Paris talks.

7—Growing strength and determination of free world deters Kremlin from imposing its imperialist will and objectives on world. When Soviets recognize their inability to impose their will on free nations by force, threats or subversion, means and methods will be found for negotiating differences with due regard for legitimate Soviet national interests.

8—Methods for achieving true peace for which free world strives contained in "Essentials of Peace" resolution adopted by 1949 General Assembly by 53 members of UN and opposed only by Soviets and satellites. This resolution reaffirmed urgent necessity for members to act in accordance with UN charter principles; called on all nations to refrain from threatening or using force or fomenting civil strife, to carry out international agreements in good faith, to cooperate with UN bodies, to promote respect for basic human rights, to promote higher living standards, remove obstacles to free exchange of information and ideas, to settle disputes peacefully, to cooperate to attain effective regulation of conventional armaments and international control of atomic energy.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

There follows a list of certain Department of State position papers or "Instructions" which were prepared for the guidance of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly which was to convene at Paris on November 6, 1951. These papers were organized into a Delegation book entitled *Soviet Peace Propaganda at the 6th GA.*

1. "Present status of problem of provision of armed forces for use by Security Council pursuant to Article 43" (Doc. SD/A/243, September 27, 1951);
2. "Possible Soviet charges of discriminatory United States trade policies" (Doc. SD/A/244, October 6, 1951);
3. "World Peace Council" (Doc. SD/A/245, September 11, 1951);
4. "Five Power Pact proposal of the Soviet Union" (Doc. SD/A/246, October 9, 1951);
5. "United States position on Resolution 377 (V) C (Syrian-Iraq resolution calling for Big Five meetings and report thereon)" (Doc. SD/A/247, October 1, 1947);
6. "General Assembly resolution on regional and collective self-defense organizations" (Doc. SD/A/249, October 10, 1951);

7. "Soviet propaganda tactics in the General Assembly" (Doc. SD/A/250, October 10, 1951);
8. "Soviet charges on establishment of United States military bases" (Doc. SD/A/252, October 19, 1951);
9. "Possible Soviet proposals for information-cultural exchanges" (Doc. SD/A/253, October 19, 1951).

II. THE TWO SOVIET "PEACE" ITEMS AT THE SIXTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: (1) "MEASURES TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF A NEW WORLD WAR," ETC. (THE OLD SOVIET ITEM); (2) "COMPLAINT OF AGGRESSIVE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERFERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES," ETC. (THE NEW SOVIET ITEM)

Text of United Nations Document A/1944, Paris, November 8, 1951 [1]

"1. *The General Assembly declares* participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territory incompatible with membership of the United Nations.

"2. *The General Assembly recognizes* it to be essential that:

"(*a*) The countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude a truce and withdraw their forces from the 38th Parallel within a period of ten days;

"(*b*) All foreign troops, and also foreign volunteer forces, should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months.

"3. *The General Assembly calls upon* the governments of all States, both those which are Members of the United Nations and those which are not at present in the United Nations, to consider at a World Conference the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

"*The General Assembly recommends* that the above-mentioned World Conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 1 June 1952.

[1] English language text of draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union as an additional item in the agenda of the sixth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Source text is from United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings;* pp. 27 and 28 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Plenary*).

On November 10, the General Committee of the General Assembly recommended inclusion of the item in the General Assembly's agenda as agenda item 67. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) made a short statement to the committee at the time, explaining that the United States Delegation supported inclusion of the item "for several reasons", among them being the opportunity provided thereby for the correction of misstatements about the use or nonuse of atomic weapons. (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, General Committee,* pp. 17 and 18; hereafter cited as GA (VI), *General Committee*). Agenda item 67 was captioned "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations". This became known subsequently as "the old Soviet item".

"4. *The General Assembly calls upon* the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to conclude a peace pact and to combine their efforts for achieving this high and noble aim.

"*The General Assembly also calls upon* all other peace-loving States to join in the Peace Pact."

320/11–2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 23, 1951.
[Received November 23—12 : 47 p. m.]

Delga 315. Re addl USSR GA agenda item: Fol is text new Sov agenda item and explanatory memorandum submitted Pres GA November 22.[1]

"The aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of 100 millions dollars to pay for the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, and outside the territory of those countries."

1. On 10 October 1951 Mr. Truman, the President of the United States of America, signed the "Mutual Security Act of 1951",[2] which provides for special appropriations to the amount of 100 million dollars for the financing, as stated in the act, of "any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania . . . either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty organization or for other purposes . . ."

This act provides for the financing by the Government of the United States of America of persons and armed groups in the territory of

[1] The text of the new Soviet item is included in the first paragraph herein. The explanatory memorandum comprises the four numbered paragraphs that follow. For official texts of these and other related documents which were formulated subsequently, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 69 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Annexes*).

For text of the note on the same matter submitted by the Soviet Union to the United States on November 21 through the diplomatic channel, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 3, 1951, pp. 910 and 911. The communications of the Embassy in the Soviet Union on this event were telegrams 875 and 876, November 21 (740.5 MAP/11–2151).

[2] "An Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security"; 65 Stat. 373. For the relevant sections at issue in the Soviet protest, see Doc. US/A/C.1/2518, December 21, 1951, "Excerpt from Mutual Security Act of 1951", *infra*.

the Soviet Union and a number of other states for the purpose of carrying out subversive and diversionary activities within those states.

The act provides for the financing of traitors to their native lands and of war criminals who have fled from their countries and are hiding in the territory of the United States and a number of other states, for the financing of armed groups for the purpose of fighting against the Soviet Union.

The financing by the United States of America—as provided by the act passed in the United States—of subversive organizations and diversionist groups, both in the territory of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving democratic countries and beyond the frontiers of their territory, for the purpose of fighting against those countries constitutes an act of aggression towards the Soviet Union and the states of the peoples democracies.

Such action by the United States of America constitutes an unprecedented interference by the United States in the internal affairs of the said states.

2. This direct interference by the United States of America in the internal affairs of other states is a violation both of generally-recognized rules of international law and of the principles on which the charter of the United Nations is based.

3. Moreover, the adoption of the "Mutual Security Act of 1951," is a flagrant violation by the United States of America of the Soviet-American agreement of 16 November 1933 concluded by Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and Mr. F. D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. By that agreement the parties entered into a mutual obligation to refrain from subsidizing and supporting military and other organizations having as an aim the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the contracting parties.[3]

4. By reason of the foregoing, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposes for inclusion in the agenda of the sixth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the important and urgent matter of the "aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of 100 million dollars to pay for the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and a number of other democratic countries, and outside the territory of those countries."

AUSTIN

[3] For the Roosevelt-Litvinov exchanges of November 16, 1933, see *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 27 ff.

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper

US/A/C.1/2518 [PARIS,] December 21, 1951.

EXCERPT FROM MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1951
Public Law 165—82d Congress
Chapter 479—1st Session
H. R. 5113

AN ACT

To maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Mutual Security Act of 1951".

Sec. 2. The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security. The purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1571–1604), the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1501–1522), and the Act for International Development (22 U.S.C. 1557) shall hereafter be deemed to include this purpose.

Title I—Europe

Sec. 101. (*a*) In order to support the freedom of Europe through assistance which will further the carrying out of the plans for defense of the North Atlantic area, while at the same time maintaining the economic stability of the countries of the area so that they may meet their responsibilities for defense, and to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1952 for carrying out the provisions and accomplishing the policies and purposes of this Act—

(1) not to exceed $5,028,000,000 for assistance pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1571–1604), for countries which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and for any country of Europe (other than a country covered by another title of this Act), which the President determines

to be of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose increased ability to defend itself the President determines is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States (any such determination to be reported forthwith to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives), and not to exceed $100,000,000 of such appropriation for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States. In addition, unexpected balances of appropriations heretofore made for carrying out the purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, through assistance to any of the countries covered by this paragraph are hereby authorized to be continued available through June 30, 1952, and to be consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this paragraph. Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1579), is hereby repealed.

(2) not to exceed $1,022,000,000 for assistance pursuant to the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1501–1522) (including assistance for further European military production), for any country of Europe covered by paragraph (1) of this subsection and for any other country covered by section 103 (*a*) of the said Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended. In addition, unexpected balances of appropriations heretofore made for carrying out the purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, are hereby authorized to be continued available through June 30, 1952, and to be consolidated with the appropriation authorized by this paragraph: Provided, That not to exceed $10,000,000 of the funds made available pursuant to this paragraph may be utilized to effectuate the principles set forth in section 115 (*e*) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended.

(*b*) Not to exceed 10 per centum of the total of the appropriations granted pursuant to this section may be transferred, when determined by the President to be necessary for the purpose of this Act, between appropriations granted pursuant to either paragraph of subsection (*a*): Provided, That the amount herein authorized to be transferred shall be determined without reference to any balances of prior appropriations continued available pursuant to this section: Provided further, That, whenever the President makes any such determination, he shall forthwith notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

Editorial Note

In an exchange of messages between the United States Delegation at Paris and the Department of State, on November 23, that crossed one another, the Delegation and the Department concluded independently that the United States should not oppose inclusion of the new Soviet item on the agenda of the General Assembly. (Paris telegram 334, November 23, midnight; Department telegram Gadel 231, November 23, 6:25 p. m., 320/11–2351 and 320/11–2251, respectively) The Paris telegram was the result of a meeting of the Delegation advisory staff and the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) on the evening of November 23. The full United States Delegation meeting on November 24, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations, confirmed the preliminary action taken on November 23 (IO Files, Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/205). A subsequent staff meeting with certain members of the Delegation on November 24, made the decision to have a joint statement on the Soviet charges issued by the two Members of Congress who were members of the Delegation and who had participated in the legislative process with respect to the passage of the Mutual Security Act, Representatives Michael J. Mansfield and John M. Vorys (IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/2508). For text of the joint statement of the two Congressmen, issued to the press at Paris on November 27, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 24, 1951, pages 1010 and 1011; the statement was captioned in the *Bulletin* as "Soviet Distortion of Mutual Security Act".

Later exchanges between the Delegation at Paris and the Department occurred December 3–18, culminating in a Department of State telegraphic instruction on December 18 (Department telegram Gadel 493, December 18, 12:10 p. m., 320/12–1851). The substance of this instruction and an earlier one of December 3, Gadel 326, is incorporated in Doc. US/A/C.1/2516, December 19, *infra*.

In the legislative history of the item, the General Committee on November 27 recommended inclusion of the item on the General Assembly's agenda. The United States supported this move with a strong statement by Ambassador Gross, Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (GA (VI), *General Committee*, pages 21 and 22). A statement by Ambassador Gross in plenary meeting of the General Assembly on December 14, when that body considered adoption of the agenda, suggested that the new Soviet item be considered directly by the General Assembly in plenary meeting rather than first be referred by the Assembly to committee. The General Assembly however referred the item to the First Committee (GA (VI), *Plenary*, pages 271–273).

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] December 19, 1951.

US/A/C.1/2516

Subject: New Soviet item, on Mutual Security Act

This memorandum is intended to summarize briefly the main points concerning the Kersten amendment in the MSA and the line which the US will take in Committee I in replying to the Soviet charges.

The MSA

1. The MSA authorizes appropriations totaling about 7.5 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1952, the purpose of which is to support and strengthen the security of the free world.

2. The assistance provided by the MSA will go to a number of countries, including a large amount for the countries participating in NATO.

3. The Kersten amendment, which became Section 101(*a*), authorizes the appropriation of "not to exceed $100,000,000 . . . for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or the Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied areas of Germany or Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the NATO or for other purposes, when it is . . . determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the NA area and to the security of the US".

Line to be taken by US in Committee

1. The US denies flatly the Soviet charges.

2. The authorization of the $100,000,000 in the Kersten amendment is permissive, as shown by the legislative history of the MSA, and is not mandatory upon the President.

3. The Soviet complaint relates to the mere enactment of legislation, and not to any concrete action taken under the legislation. The true meaning and character of the legislation in question is to be determined from the action taken under it.

4. Prior to action under the Kersten amendment, the meaning of that amendment can be judged by reference to its context and to the purposes of the amendment as disclosed in the legislative history. The context of the Kersten amendment is the whole of the MSA. The purposes of the Act are stated to be "to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the US by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interests of international peace and security," and "to strengthen the individual

and collective defenses of the free world; to develop their resources in the interests of their security and independence and the national interest of the US; and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the UN system for collective security". The history of the Kersten amendment shows that it was intended to apply to persons who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain, or who may in the future so escape, *after* they have come over to this side.

5. Present conditions behind the Iron Curtain make it clear why inhabitants of the Eastern European countries desire to escape and come over to the free world.

6. The Roosevelt–Litvinov agreement, cited by the USSR in its complaint, was violated from the beginning by the Soviet Union, which itself has consistently engaged in interference in the affairs of other countries and more recently in open aggression.

7. The US is confident that the GA will reject quickly and decisively the groundless charges contained in the new Soviet item so that the UN can return to its great constructive tasks in the field of disarmament, raised living standards, extension of human rights to all peoples, and the establishment of a firm peace based on justice and tolerance and mutual understanding.

8. Whether or not the USSR introduces a resolution or resolutions under its item concerning the MSA, we do not believe any counterproposals or substitute resolutions by the Western powers are called for or desirable.

320/12–1951 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 19, 1951.
[Received December 19—10 : 59 p. m.]

Delga 745. Subject: New Soviet item. Following is res which USSR tabled in Comite One this afternoon after an initial 15 minute statement by Vyshinsky :[1]

"Complaint of aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of 100 million dollars to finance the recruitment of persons and the organization or armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, as well as outside the territory of these countries.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft resolution.

The General Assembly condemns the 'Mutual Security Act of 1951' which has been adopted in the United States of America and which

[1] For official text, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 69.

provides for the appropriation of funds for conducting subversive activities against certain states, as an act of aggression and interference in the internal affairs of other states, in contravention of the principles of the United Nations charter and of the generally acknowledged terms of international law.

The General Assembly recommends the Government of the United States of America to take the necessary measures to abrogate this act."

ROOSEVELT

320/12–2151 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY PARIS, December 21, 1951.

[Received December 21—3 : 53 p. m.]

Delga 777. Subject: New Soviet item. Comite One this afternoon rejected Sov res by vote of 5–39–11 (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen). The absentees were Bolivia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Panama, Union of South Africa, all of whom would have voted against Sov res.[1]

ROOSEVELT

[1] For the proceedings in the First Committee concerning the new Soviet item, December 19–21, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, First Committee*, pp. 103–120 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *First Committee*).

In a statement at the beginning of the debate on December 19, the United States representative handling this item in committee, Congressman Mansfield, declared that the United States Government "denied, without reservation, the USSR allegation that the United States was interfering in the domestic affairs of the USSR or the States responsive to the USSR's control" (*ibid.*, p. 103). At the end of the debate, on December 21, Congressman Mansfield spoke again, noting that "The sole purpose of the [Kersten] amendment in question [section 101 (*a*)] was to permit refugees to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The act would be administered by the President of the United States for that purpose. The United States Government and people had no apologies to make for giving that opportunity to refugees from USSR tyranny or for the arrangement to defend the North Atlantic area . . . a defensive, not an aggressive, arrangement" (*ibid.*, p. 119).

For the Report of the First Committee on the new Soviet item to the General Assembly, in which the committee declined to recommend the draft Soviet resolution to the General Assembly for adoption, see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 69.

320/12–2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 29, 1951—5 : 20 p. m.

Gadel 565. Re MSA Item. Number abstentions MSA vote in Comite perhaps indicative failure these states to realize how directly issues involved concern whole free world. In handling MSA item in plenary

Dept believes continued emphasis shld be placed significance Mutual Security Act entire free world. Wording of Sov draft Res affords one such opportunity. Del might point out that while Sov complaint addressed to only one of many sections MSA, Sovs reveal true motives in Res calling for abrogation entire Act. Point out this wld mean abrogation aid Greece and Turkey, econ and technical assistance Africa and Near East, aid Far East including UN Korean Reconstruction Agency, appropriations for technical assistance Amer Republics, for UN Relief and Works Agency Palestine, for refugee relief and resettlement in Israel, and UN technical assistance program in addition funds for defense and development free Europe. Sovs thus again demonstrate insincerity of charges and underlying hostility to broad purpose defense and econ development free world.

In determining whether above point shld be used, Del may wish bear in mind possibility of Sov rebuttal to effect that inclusion these appropriations in MSA proves technical assistance etc only a facet of alleged "militaristic imperialistic US program of world domination".

Above point may have to be made briefly since Dept considering statement on treatment US fliers by Hungary in connection with explanation vote on MSA in plenary. Further instrs will fol.

ACHESON

IO Files

United States Delegation Plenary Position Paper

RESTRICTED [PARIS,] January 9, 1952.

US/A/3429

COMPLAINT OF AGGRESSIVE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERFERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AS INSTANCED BY THE APPROPRIATION OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE THE RECRUITMENT OF PERSONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, ROMANIA, BULGARIA, ALBANIA AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF THOSE COUNTRIES: REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/2030)

1. UNITED STATES POSITION

The First Committee has not recommended any resolution to the GA for adoption. The Assembly will have before it, however, a Soviet resolution which was rejected by the First Committee and has been reintroduced in the plenary (A/2031).[1] The United States should

[1] The text was the same as that submitted by the Soviet Union to the First Committee on December 19 and substantially transmitted in Paris telegram Delga 745, December 19, p. 484.

vote against this resolution which (*a*) condemns the United States Mutual Security Act as an act of aggression and as interference in the internal affairs of other states; and (*b*) recommends that the United States Government take steps to repeal this Act.

The United States should abstain on the question whether there should be plenary debate of the First Committee report (Rule 67). If there is debate the United States should make a statement along the lines of *Annex A* attached; if there is no debate the United States, in explanation of vote, should make a statement along the lines of *Annex B* attached.[2]

2. HISTORY IN COMMITTEE

After 4 meetings of debate the First Committee rejected Soviet resolution (identical to that indicated above) by 39 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen). Since the Soviet resolution was the only proposal introduced under this agenda item, the First Committee did not recommend any resolution to the Assembly for adoption.

3. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PLENARY

It is unlikely that the required number of states (one-third) will desire plenary debate of the First Committee report. In this event, however, the Soviet states can be expected, in explanations of vote, to renew their attacks against the United States. As indicated above, the United States, in explanation of vote, should make a statement along the lines of *Annex B* attached.[3]

[2] Neither Annex is printed, but see footnote 3, below.

[3] On January 11 the General Assembly considered the new Soviet item and after some discussion rejected the Soviet draft resolution 42–5–11 (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran). For the proceedings, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pp. 306 ff.

Congressman Mansfield made a lengthy statement in explanation of the United States position, describing the Soviet charges as propaganda aimed not just at the Mutual Security Act, but as "part of a general assault launched by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the beginning of this session against the United Nations collective security system and the regional collective security systems which strengthen it." (*Ibid.*, p. 309)

Editorial Note

On January 12, 1952 the First Committee began consideration of agenda item 67, "the old Soviet item"; see Doc. A/1944, November 8, page 477. This matter had been displaced in the legislative process by "the new Soviet item", which the Soviet Union had submitted on November 22, 1951 and on which the General Assembly had completed final action on January 11, 1952 (agenda item 69). The documents that

follow reconstruct the chronological development of the United States Delegation involvement with agenda item 67.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] December 12, 1951.

US/A/C.1/2512

Subject: Soviet Resolution on NATO

Participants: General Dwight Eisenhower, SHAPE
Amb. Ernest A. Gross, U.S. Delegation

At dinner on December 11 I had the opportunity to discuss informally with General Eisenhower the problem of how best to meet the Soviet attack on NATO which we anticipated in connection with the Soviet resolution. I said we had been considering alternatives such as making our case and letting the General Assembly vote down the Soviet resolution, or having the General Assembly determine affirmatively that NATO participation is consistent with UN membership.

General Eisenhower's tentative reaction was that a more convincing response might be a resolution dealing with Soviet prohibitions and restrictions on freedom of movement and communication. The Soviet Union is aware their attack upon NATO was hollow and they merely seek propaganda advantage. General Eisenhower felt we would accomplish more by making a frontal attack upon issues which would put the Soviet Union on the defensive, in addition to meeting their NATO charges.

Of course, he was not committing himself to this view nor did he have all relevant considerations placed before him. However, it seems to me that his suggestion might fit into the general concept of "Peace with Freedom." Our Working Group should draft a resolution along these lines for the consideration of the Delegation. Such a resolution might be sponsored and presented under the initiative of small Powers.

320/12–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 14, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 664. For the Secretary. Re old Soviet item. As Dept has long anticipated, it seems likely that Soviets in connection their omnibus

item [1] will launch major attack on NATO. US and other NATO countries will wish to respond with vigorous offensive showing reasons for creation of NATO and in giving our idea of NATO's proper relationship to UN. USDel here in Paris has been considering how best to conduct this offensive when Soviet item is reached.

One idea that has been put forward is that political comite, in course of debate on Soviet item, might invite or request NATO to send a rep to make a statement before comite. Such statement might be made by General Eisenhower, as the single individual who most genuinely symbolizes and represents NATO as an organization. Such an appearance by General Eisenhower before comite would need to be concurred by appropriate agreement among the 12 govts concerned, after prior consultation with General. Contemplated Eisenhower statement wld be most broadly conceived, to place NATO in true perspective, to state reasons for its existence, and to state its purposes in world situation where San Francisco expectations of great-power cooperation are not a reality today.

Del has discussed above suggestion, and a number of considerations have emerged as favoring suggestion, while at same time certain difficulties have been seen.

Fol are some of difficulties: Appearance of General Eisenhower before UN wld dramatize debate on Soviet item and perhaps lend additional magnitude to Soviet charges directed against NATO. Western Eur countries and certain Asian countries might resent appearance of General Eisenhower as indirect pressure by US to compel greater sacrifices by them for achievement of current NATO goals. There might be unfavorable reaction to appearance of high military figure in UN deliberations. Such appearance by NATO reps in political comite might imply a degree of answerability and even subordination of NATO to UN which countries such as UK and Fr might object to. Some question has been raised as to possible adverse effect on US domestic political situation of appearance by Gen Eisenhower before UN at Paris session.

On other side of ledger, fol considerations have been advanced: Appearance by General before UN wld actually serve to emphasize bipartisan character of US foreign policy in regard to NATO, and tend to withdraw this issue from 1952 campaign. Magnitude of UN debate on Soviet attack against NATO may in any event be determined by USSR rather than West. Appearance of General Eisenhower in political comite wld serve as dramatic counterweight to role Vyshinsky has played at this session, where for some time he has been single most dominating figure on scene. Positive and broadly philosophical statement by General Eisenhower before UN wld help free world in disposing decisively of Soviet charges. It could show that

[1] That is, agenda item 67. See Doc. A/1944, November 8, p. 477.

NATO is not rival or alternative to UN, but that existence of NATO accords with UN and is in support of UN purposes and principles. US statement on behalf of NATO powers would serve as reassurance to Western European countries as well as Middle East countries concerning US intentions in current East-West conflict.

In light of del discussions and above considerations, del believes question of Eisenhower appearance before UN shld be weighted carefully in Wash. In preliminary discussion Dec 13 Congressman Mansfield and Vorys and Amb Gross expressed strong doubts as to wisdom of suggestion, while Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen warmly supported it. Cooper, Strauss and Tobias also support. Jessup absent from mtg but opposes.[2]

AUSTIN

[2] All persons named herein were Members of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly. For information regarding the composition and organization of the Delegation and its advisory staff, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44. The Delegation discussion described herein is recorded in the minutes of the December 13 meeting (IO Files, Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/219).

320/12–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 14, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 665. For President and Secretary of State from Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen. Limited distribution. We shld like you to have our personal views on the matter covered in Delga 664.

This Assembly is probably proceeding as well as might be expected in light of troubled world conditions. If the Assembly did not reflect the strife and malaise existing in the world it wld be remote from realities. But nonetheless if we wish to retain popular faith in UN and prevent disillusionment, it seems to some of us that it is important that we try to find some way of dramatizing the importance of the Assembly in world affairs and at the same time to allay the unreasoning but genuine fears prevalent in Europe and the east as to how the US may exercise the military power it is creating—fears which may increasingly handicap the operations of NATO as well as other efforts of ours to unify and strengthen free Europe and the free world.

The Sov item attacking NATO as incompatible with UN membership may give us this opportunity if we seize it boldly. We have already met the Sov attack with calm and rational explanations here and elsewhere. But something more is required to allay widespread emotional apprehension, particularly among our friends and allies.

It had seemed to some of us that if a way cld be found to have NATO, either at its own request or on the suggestion of some friendly

states, invited by the Assembly's President or the pol comite, to send a representative to explain the purposes of NATO and its relations to UN, and if General Eisenhower cld be chosen to act as NATO rep before the Assembly for this purpose, we cld most dramatically demonstrate to world opinion that NATO exists to uphold the principles of UN and not to undermine them, to preserve the peace and not to threaten it. In such event the General wld of course appear with due humility in civilian garb, and solemnly affirm the devotion of NATO and its members to the principles of the charter, pointing out that under the North Atlantic Treaty the parties have expressly undertaken not to use force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the charter. Such an appearance wld not in our judgment be regarded as an intrusion of a military leader into UN but the recognition by a military leader of the supremacy of the rule of law. It cld have a profound effect upon public opinion throughout the world.

We cannot believe that such an appearance wld have any adverse effect on the political situation at home. It wld, if anything, only emphasize our bipartisan foreign policy and tend to prevent any backwash from next year's political campaign adversely affecting that policy. [Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen.]

AUSTIN

320/12–1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 22, 1951—2:06 p. m.

Gadel 541. Re old Sov item (Delgas 664 and 665). Irrespective of any domestic pol considerations, gen view in Dept is that, on balance, arguments against Eisenhower appearance in First Comite outweigh those in favor. Fol points seem to us especially important:

1. We question whether Eisenhower appearance before UN Comite wld have as great a psychological effect as those supporting it believe. Wld it not have only a limited and temporary effect?

2. No matter how invitation and statement are phrased, we will not be able to avoid fact that NATO is being defended in UN by a mil man and an American, with all that that connotes in terms of alleged US domination of NATO and imagined domination of US policy by mil arm.

3. Sov propaganda to above effect wld be especially difficult to refute because Gen Eisenhower does not, properly speaking, represent NATO in its totality as distinct from SHAPE as a mil org in one area of NATO. If we wished to have a NATO spokesman appear in UN, we shld think it more appropriate for that spokesman to be a pol rep—say Pearson as Pres of NATO Council. As you know, we are endeavoring to refute charges that NATO is no more than a mil alliance.

4. We believe that sound relationships between NATO and UN are being gradually worked out over period of time, and that comprehen-

sive statement of UN–NATO relationships such as Gen Eisenhower wld have to make wld be premature at this stage. In fact, we wld foresee greatest difficulty in obtaining consent all NATO members to Eisenhower statement if it went beyond broadest generalities. Indeed, it seems to us preferable UN Reps of NATO countries themselves defend NATO in GA, coordinating their activities.

5. Moreover, we wld rather not use our heavy ammunition for anything less than a major crisis. Sov attack on NATO is after all only one portion of a typical Sov agenda item composed of diverse charges against the US and the West. The substance of most of these charges (e.g. disarmament and Korea) will have already been dealt with when Comite 1 begins discussion of old Sov item. We wld anticipate that there will be very little difficulty in these circumstances in disposing of Sov item with same scale of effort we applied last yr, or, if needed, by counter Res along lines position paper SD/A/249 [1] with sponsorship suggested by Lie as indicated Delga 589 Dec 11.[2]

6. We are also concerned re possibility of establishing precedent under which regional grps wld be answerable in the UN for their activities and wld be required appear before UN organ to explain or justify those activities beyond specific Charter requirements. This wld imply a degree of intimacy of regional orgs to UN which we wld not now desire.

7. If, notwithstanding the considerations mentioned in Paras 4, 5, and 6 Del believes appearance some NATO Rep desirable, suggest Del discuss with Can Del and Dels other NATO countries possibility appearance by Pearson.

ACHESON

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[1] Not printed. This paper, dated October 10, 1951, was entitled "General Assembly resolution on regional and collective self-defense organizations". It was one of several amalgamated into a Delegation position book entitled *Soviet Peace Propaganda at the 6th GA*. See editorial note, p. 476.

[2] Delga 589 was a classified Daily Summary from the U.S. Delegation. On this particular item it was reported that "During a discussion with Gross and Ross, SYG Lie indicated still felt it would be desirable not merely to vote down old Soviet item resolution but to develop a constructive counter initiative." It was agreed that the disarmament aspect would have been disposed of "in large part" and that "the Korean aspect should not be discussed pending the outcome of the armistice negotiations. . . . With regard to the remaining aspects . . . NATO and the Five-Power Pact . . . , Lie believed there should be a counter-proposal . . . a positive affirmation of NATO's legality." Lie spoke of NATO as a free association of large and small nations "brought together to carry out UN Charter principles. . . . Lie thought a group of small powers should develop the constructive counter-initiative and that the Scandinavian and Low Countries would be very much interested. In dealing with the NATO aspect of the Soviet resolution, he suggested obtaining a couple of Latin American states in order to bring in the OAS concept . . . and a couple of Arabs . . . to bring in the Arab League concept." (Paris telegram Delga 589, December 11, 2 a.m., 320/12–1151)

320/12–1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 22, 1951—2 : 06 p. m.

Gadel 542. For Roosevelt and Cohen from the Secretary. Re Delga 665, see Gadel 541, general conclusion of which the Pres and I ap-

proved after taking into consideration views which you expressed. It seemed to Pres that this shld be handled by the reps of the NATO countries to the GA. Pres felt Mrs. Roosevelt was the ideal person to handle it for US.

We will inform Mrs. Roosevelt here if she has left Paris.

ACHESON

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper[1]

SECRET [PARIS,] January 7, 1952.

US/A/C.1/2526

Subject: The Old Soviet Item

The Soviet draft resolution on "Measures to Combat the Threat of a New World War and to Strengthen Peace and Friendship Among Nations" consists of four principal parts:

1. An attack on NATO and on United States bases.
2. A proposal for settlement of the Korean war which would involve withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel within ten days and withdrawal of all foreign troops and foreign volunteer units within three months.
3. A series of paragraphs (three through seven) on prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
4. A proposal for the conclusion of a five-power peace pact and a call upon other states to join it.

If we are successful in our argument that the Assembly should not consider Korea while the armistice talks continue at Panmunjom, we can dispose of the second item quickly.

The paragraphs on prohibition and disarmament have already been disposed of in the Committee; they were embodied in the Soviet amendments to the three-power proposal on disarmament. It is unlikely that many members of the Committee will wish to discuss these proposals again so soon.

The attack on NATO is met in part by the resolution the Committee is expected to adopt this afternoon on the CMC. The 8th paragraph of the preamble and the 6th operative paragraph applaud regional and collective self-defense arrangements and urge members to seek support for United Nations collective measures in such bodies.

The proposal for a five-power peace pact was considered and rejected by the Assembly in 1949 and 1950.

[1] Addressed by David W. Wainhouse, Executive Office for United States Delegation matters relating to political and security affairs, to all Political Officers of the Advisory Staff of the Delegation.

This analysis suggests that the Soviet item can be disposed of this year by simply voting it down. The resolutions on disarmament and the CMC are positive contributions towards peace in which the United States is taking the lead. Vyshinsky has already said five or six times in the debate on these two items anything he could be expected to say in the debate on his own resolution. We believe committee members are bored with this performance and that repetition of the same old succotash will not make much new impression on world opinion. In these circumstances, the effort needed to prepare and put across a counter-resolution would seem to dignify beyond its deserts the Soviet resolution; and it is unlikely that we could produce anything whose effect on public opinion would be sufficient to warrant this effort.

We should try to get other states to speak before us in rebuttal to Vyshinsky, since it is only the United States which is attacked by name in this resolution and since the United States has taken the lead so far in the First Committee. A particular effort should be made to get representative of the Organization of American States and of the Arab League to support the principle of regional and collective self-defense arrangements: it should be pointed out to members of these other organizations that, although NATO is named, the OAS and the Arab League operate on the same principle and can likewise expect to be attacked when it serves the purposes of Soviet policy to do so. It might also be possible to get some of the smaller states to attack the provision of the five-power peace pact, even though they are as an after-thought invited to subscribe to it, on the grounds that they don't want the big five dividing up the world and settling questions of interest to themselves.

There is much useful material in the background book on "Possible Soviet Propaganda Tactics in the General Assembly",[2] in particular three papers analyzing the five-power pact, the attack on NATO, and the United States bases abroad (SD/A/245, 249, and 252). It would also be useful to refer to what we and others have said in previous years, in order to help demonstrate that this is a tired old item which the Assembly need not take too seriously. (There is useful material in the President's Reports to Congress for 1950—pages 109 through 112—and for 1949—pages 24 through 28. Statements by United States representatives in committee and plenary for these years are contained in United States Delegation press releases Nos. 735 of November 11, 1949, 760 of November 29, 1949, 1033 of October 26, 1950, and 1035 of October 28, 1950.)

Political officers should take this line immediately with other delegations in the hope that the item can be disposed of with the minimum of fuss compatible with the maximum of exposure.

[2] Regarding this background book, see the editorial note, p. 476.

Text of United Nations Document A/C.1/698, Paris, January 12, 1952 (a revised draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union)[1]

1. The General Assembly declares participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territories incompatible with membership in the United Nations.

2. The General Assembly recognizes it to be essential that:

(*a*) The countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude an armistice and withdraw their forces from the 38th parallel within a period of ten days;

(*b*) All foreign troops and also foreign volunteer units should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months.

3. The General Assembly, considering the use of atomic weapons as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations, proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously.

The General Assembly instructs the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 June 1952, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already-manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.

4. The General Assembly recommends the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—to reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption.

5. The General Assembly recommends that forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers, all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. These data

[1] This English language source text is from GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 67. Printed also in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 28, 1952, p. 127.

shall be submitted with reference to the situation obtaining at the time when the above-mentioned decisions are adopted by the General Assembly.

6. The General Assembly recommends the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ, the functions of which shall be to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify the data submitted by States regarding the situation of their armaments and armed forces.

With a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments, the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis; but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

7. The General Assembly calls upon the Governments of all States, both Members of the United Nations and those not at present in the Organization, to consider at a world conference the question of the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

The General Assembly recommends that the above-mentioned world conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 15 July 1952.

8. The General Assembly calls upon the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact, and to combine their efforts for the achievement of this high and noble aim.

The General Assembly also calls upon all other peace-loving States to join in the peace pact.

Editorial Note

For the proceedings in the First Committee on January 12–17, 1952, when that committee considered agenda item 67, see GA (VI), *First Committee*, pages 179 ff. A summary version is contained in the Report of the First Committee, Doc. A/2067, January 18, 1952; see GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 67, pages 3 and 4.

The First Committee on January 17 adopted a substitute resolution offered by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which referred the proposals in paragraphs 3 to 7 of the Soviet draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission. Before adoption of this tripartite draft resolution the First Committee rejected paragraphs 1, 2, and 8 of the Soviet draft resolution.

In the General Assembly consideration of agenda item 67 on January 19, 1952, that body immediately approved the three-power draft resolution recommended in the Report of the First Committee. The General Assembly then debated and rejected a draft resolution introduced into plenary by the Soviet Union (Doc. A/2068), which had the same text as the Soviet draft resolution of January 12, 1952 (see Doc. A/C.1/698, *supra*). For the proceedings of January 19, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pages 379 ff.

For a statement made to the First Committee on January 12, 1952 by the United States spokesman, Ambassador Gross, see GA (VI), *First Committee*, page 182. The position of the Western governments was formally stated by the Representative of France, Mr. Jean Chauvel, when he introduced the tripartite draft resolution on January 14, 1952 (*ibid.*, pages 185 and 186). For Ambassador Gross' statement in the plenary debate on January 19, 1952, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pages 383 and 384.

III. THE COMPLAINT BY YUGOSLAVIA OF HOSTILE ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

320/9–2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1951.

Subject: Action Which Yugoslavia Proposes To Take at Forthcoming General Assembly Session

Participants: The Honorable Vladimir Popovic, Yugoslav Ambassador
Dr. Mirko Bruner, First Secretary, Yugoslav Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary (UNA)
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR [1]
Mr. David H. Popper, UNP [2]

Pursuant to remarks which he had made in a conversation with the Secretary on September 25, the Yugoslav Ambassador called on Mr. Hickerson to apprise us of three steps which the Yugoslav Government has in mind in connection with the forthcoming General Assembly.[3]

1. *Agenda Item on Soviet Aggression Against Yugoslavia*

The Ambassador said that his government desired to put on the agenda an item relating to the aggressive policies of the USSR and

[1] Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.
[2] Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
[3] The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene at Paris on November 6.

the satellites against Yugoslavia. Under the item the Yugoslavs would seek Assembly condemnation of the Soviet aggressive policy, including frontier violations, hostile speeches and statements, the treatment of Yugoslav minorities in satellite states, the treatment of Yugoslav diplomats, the economic warfare of the Soviet bloc—in fact, the whole range of hostile Soviet activities vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. The Ambassador stated that the form in which the item would be presented was not yet clear, and that his government would welcome our view on this question as well as on the matter of whether this was an appropriate time to introduce such an item. It appeared that the Yugoslav objective would be an Assembly resolution of condemnation calling upon the Soviets to halt their aggressive procedures. In answer to my questions, the Ambassador indicated that the Yugoslav attitude on possible use of the Peace Observation Commission or other fact-finding machinery was not yet fixed and might depend on the results of consultations with friendly states. He took the line that a Yugoslav initiative of the type proposed would be useful regardless of whether or not a Soviet peace offensive developed at the General Assembly.

Although Mr. Popovic pressed for an indication that I regarded the idea favorably, I told him that I would prefer not to give him an offhand opinion but would consult urgently with my colleagues in the Department and give him more definite word within a few days.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

JOHN D. HICKERSON

320/10–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1951.

Subject: Yugoslav Proposals for Forthcoming General Assembly Action

Participants: The Honorable Vladimir Popovic, Yugoslav Ambassador
Dr. Mirko Bruner, First Secretary, Yugoslav Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary (UNA)
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR
Mr. David H. Popper, UNP

1. *Proposed Yugoslav Item on Soviet Bloc Aggressive Policies Against Yugoslavia*

I explained to the Ambassador that we had given very careful consideration to the Yugoslav request of our views on the advisability of submitting for the Sixth General Assembly an item on the aggres-

sive policies of the Soviet bloc directed against Yugoslavia. Noting that our comments were solely in the nature of advice, and that the Yugoslav Government must of course make its own decision in the matter, I read to the Ambassador the attached memorandum. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the thorough consideration which we had given to the matter and indicated that his government would take our views into account in whatever action it might now take.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

JOHN D. HICKERSON

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM

1. It would appear desirable for Yugoslavia to bring the threats to its security to the attention of the General Assembly at the Sixth Session, provided

a. the case presented by Yugoslavia is carefully documented and will convince the Members of the United Nations and world opinion, and

b. the measures proposed by Yugoslavia in the General Assembly command the general support of the members.

2. Obviously the Yugoslav Government wishes to proceed in the Assembly in such a way as to produce the most striking and effective results. For this purpose it would be important that the Yugoslavs should not press for the hasty adoption of a resolution phrased in drastic condemnatory terms, before it has been possible to persuade the greatest possible number of non-Soviet delegations of the strength and justice of their case. Indeed, it would be in the interest of Yugoslavia to extend the proceedings over a considerable period of time, reaping the utmost advantage in moral pressure upon the Soviet bloc and in propaganda effect.

Accordingly, it might be desirable for the Yugoslavs to present initially a strong case, backed by full evidence, and to seek, not an immediate condemnation of the Soviet bloc, but an expression of the Assembly's concern with the situation disclosed by Yugoslavia and a sober and unbiased inquiry into the facts. This would involve the establishment by the General Assembly of machinery which would examine the facts carefully and impartially. Yugoslavia would, of course, cooperate in every way to make such an inquiry possible. This would make it easier to obtain subsequent findings by the Assembly that the Cominform States have threatened and are threatening Yugoslavia and would also give much greater weight to these findings.

Perhaps the most important objective of General Assembly action and of the machinery which it would establish should be to enhance

the security of Yugoslavia by deterring the Cominform States from aggression against it.

If aggression should occur there would be available to the United Nations and to the judgment of the world impartial and authoritative reports which could be the basis of prompt and effective United Nations action.

The most desirable and most acceptable action by the General Assembly, and one which could command the full and active support of leading delegations, would be a resolution which would:

a. Note with grave concern the serious charges brought and the evidence adduced by the Government of Yugoslavia against the Governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

b. Request the Peace Observation Commission to despatch a subcommittee and/or observers, who, with the consent of the states concerned, should observe on a continuing basis the situation charged by the Yugoslav Government, and to report to the General Assembly as appropriate.

Observers designated by the Peace Observation Commission would be carefully chosen to assure that pro-Cominform personnel are excluded.

The effectiveness of this plan would be far greater if Yugoslavia were to indicate that it is prepared to admit such observers even if the Cominform States do not. If Yugoslavia is reluctant at the outset to declare its willingness to admit observers unconditionally, it can postpone the decision and minimize the political disadvantages by indicating consent conditional on the consent of the other States involved.

4. Other courses of action which would meet the objectives of the Yugoslav Government and might receive the necessary support, depending on the strength of the Yugoslav case, are:

a. The Assembly, in addition to expressing its grave concern, could appoint a special committee to receive and consider the evidence offered by Yugoslavia and any defensive material which the Cominform States may offer. This Committee could report back to the Assembly when its studies are completed.

b. One of the main political committees of the Assembly, perhaps by a sub-committee, might consider the case on its merits, on the basis of statements before the Committee and documentary evidence circulated to all the delegations. While this might make possible findings by the Assembly during the Sixth Session, it is less likely to bring about a careful examination of the facts which would satisfy the various governments and world opinion. Also this program would not provide machinery for keeping the case under continued surveillance by the Assembly.

Either of these two courses would be more acceptable if, in addition, the General Assembly were to despatch a sub-commission or observers

from the Peace Observation Commission to observe the situation on a continuing basis.

5. The Yugoslav Government should present a new item for the agenda of the Sixth Session, if possible before October 6 when the supplemental list closes. To put the case on the agenda later would, under the Assembly's Rules, require the Yugoslav Government to satisfy other countries that the case is of "an important and urgent character," although most of the evidence has been available for many months.

The agenda item might be entitled "Threats and Hostile Acts against Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union and other States". The explanatory memorandum supporting the inclusion of the item should be brief, factual and as dispassionate as possible. There is no need to prove the case or even to state it in detail in this memorandum.

6. The Yugoslav Government should lay the groundwork for Assembly action in the Sixth Session by discussion with key delegations of the free world. It should be careful to emphasize that its purpose is not merely propaganda but that it is seriously concerned for its security; and that it will present a full case and expect a thorough consideration of this matter which seriously affects the security of Yugoslavia and relations with the Cominform States and, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the Assembly under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter.

320/10–851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1951

Subject: Possible Yugoslav Case

Participants: Dr. Bruner, Yugoslav Embassy
Mr. Ward P. Allen—EUR

Dr. Bruner called at his request to state that the Yugoslav Government has definitely decided to submit a separate agenda item on its case against the USSR, and to give us their views on the suggestions we had previously made to them on this matter. The item is to be titled "Threats and Hostile Acts of the Government of the USSR and Eastern European Countries Against the Independence and Sovereignty of the FPRY". The documentation and evidence presented will be along the line of the Yugoslav White Book, to which will be added all the information accumulated since its publication in order to bring the case up to date. The Yugoslav Government has accepted our guidance and assures that for their part they will do their utmost

to keep discussion as dispassionate, sober, unprovocative, and objective as possible. They intend to seek by all possible means to force the USSR to give concrete anwers to concrete questions, and to respond specifically to specific evidence against them.

The Yugoslav Government desires that the GA pass a resolution along the following lines: "The GA, having heard the discussion on the relationships of the USSR and other Eastern European countries, through the FPRY, expresses its serious concern regarding the existing situation and its possible continuation, and accordingly invites the countries concerned to take concrete measures which would make possible the improvement of their relations by removing the causes of the present situation." These measures should include:

1) The creation of mixed commissions for the examination of frontier incidents;
2) The discontinuance of aggressive, war-inciting propaganda (this is not intended to exclude the continuation of legitimate criticism of different regimes);
3) The observance of the provisions of the Peace Treaty (i.e., limitation of Hungarian and Bulgarian armaments);
4) Full respect for all international obligations. The GA invites the countries concerned to regulate and maintain their international relations in the spirit of international cooperation in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Regarding the POC, Dr. Bruner reported that the Yugoslav stand had not changed. They are willing to accept the POC provided the satellite countries will do so. They do not desire to accept it unilaterally and promote it in Yugoslavia unless it goes behind the iron curtain. They are prepared to make this statement in the GA and point out that unless it is received on both sides of the frontier it cannot fulfill its purposes. They are more favorably disposed, although they have not reached a final decision, to our alternative suggestion of a special committee to examine the evidence submitted or a subcommittee of the Political Committee to report back to this session. They will let us know their attitude shortly.

As to the time of submission of the item, there was in any event no time to submit it before the October 6 deadline. However, they are inclined to think that it might be better to wait until very shortly before the GA convenes. They fear that if the USSR knows about it in detail too far in advance this will give the USSR an opportunity to put diplomatic pressure of one sort or another on such delegations as the Indians and others who might be reluctant in order to seek to prevent strong GA action. They might for example threaten to leave the UN or pretend to be highly provoked if the matter is taken up and action is taken by the GA.

Dr. Bruner asked for our reactions to the foregoing, which I promised shortly. I did not seek to discuss them in detail with him

except to express our keen disappointment that they had not seen fit to accept the POC even tho the satellites did not. (I think it would be useful for the reason that this step is desirable from the Yugoslav point of view to have it pointed out again and in some detail to the Yugoslavs). Dr. Bruner asked whether his information was correct that the US intended to submit a separate case on violation of human rights in the Soviet orbit. I stated that we were considering such a case and had consulted with the UK, French, and Canadians on it; that they were not inclined to take a favorable view. We are still, however, considering the advisability of such a move. In any event, we appreciate the relationship between that possible case and the Yugoslav case, and even if we should decide not to go ahead we would make full use of the material in the course of the discussion on the Yugoslav case. Dr. Bruner asked to be advised if we decide to go ahead with a separate case.

[Here follows discussion of another matter.]

IO Files[1]

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET [PARIS,] November 13, 1951.

US/A/AC.53/2

Subject: Yugoslav Item and Possible Use of Peace Observation Commission in the Balkans

Participants: Dr. Ales Bebler,[2] Yugoslav Delegation
Dr. Sava Kosanovic,[3] Yugoslav Delegation
Mr. Benjamin Cohen,[4] US Delegation
Mr. Eric Stein,[5] US Delegation
Mr. Thomas Cory,[6] US Delegation

At lunch today the two Yugoslav officials gave the following information concerning the item their delegation has proposed for the agenda of the General Assembly:

They expect to lead off with a hard speech along the lines of their explanatory memorandum. Simultaneously, or shortly thereafter, they

[1] Short title for the Master Files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

[2] Bebler was Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations and also at this time a member of the Yugoslav Delegation to the General Assembly.

[3] Kosanović was Minister of State and a member of the Yugoslav Delegation.

[4] Benjamin V. Cohen was a member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

[5] Stein was a Department of State specialist in international security affairs and a member of the advisory staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

[6] Thomas J. Cory was an attaché at the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) and a member of the Delegation's advisory staff.

will submit a draft resolution which will be considerably more mild than the speech itself. The general purpose of the draft resolution, as the Yugoslavs see it, will be to create an atmosphere of "general solidarity" in the General Assembly in respect to the Cominform pressures against Yugoslavia. They promised to hand the US Delegation a copy of their draft resolution tomorrow.

According to the two Yugoslav officials, the draft resolution will express the serious concern of the General Assembly over the situation. It then will invite the Cominform countries to reduce their aggressive propaganda against Yugoslavia. (The Yugoslavs seemed to welcome the US suggestion that the language of this provision could well be based on General Assembly Resolution 110 (II), against war mongering). Another provision of the draft resolution will call for the creation of mixed frontier commissions to examine border incidents along the various Yugoslav satellite frontiers. (The two Yugoslav officials agreed that there is little likelihood of the Cominform countries accepting membership in these commissions, particularly if they are to operate also in satellite territory). Another provision of the draft resolution will, according to the Yugoslavs, call for an improvement in the status of the diplomatic missions maintained by Yugoslavia in the Cominform countries and vice versa.

The Yugoslavs seemed to view General Assembly consideration of their item as a short term operation. They said they had not considered the possibility of the *Ad Hoc* Committee setting up a fact-finding subcommittee to examine evidence adduced in connection with the Yugoslav item. They, however, agreed to discuss this suggestion in their delegation. The two Yugoslavs manifested a particular interest in having a large number of delegates speak in support of their item. They indicated that so far they had spoken only to the US, UK and France but that they plan also to speak at least with Uruguay, Egypt and India with a view to persuading these last three delegations also to take part in the committee discussions and give them support. They said that although the UK initially was opposed to Yugoslavia raising the item, nevertheless, it now appears that the UK is more interested but that the Yugoslav Delegation still would appreciate the US using its influence to the end of persuading the UK to take a fuller interest.

Within the Committee, the Yugoslavs agreed that it would be preferable if their own speech is followed by a few speeches of other smaller powers, with the UK, France and the US coming in later with major statements. The Yugoslavs would expect each of the five Soviet satellites to speak on the subject after which the Yugoslavs themselves would deliver a second major speech and then hope for a committee vote on their draft resolution.

The two Yugoslavs confirmed that they have a large amount of very good material on the violation of human rights in the satellite

countries. They explained that there are now in Yugoslavia some 8,500 refugees from Cominform countries and that these refugees have prepared statements, copies of which now fill a large case in the premises of the Yugoslav Delegation. The Yugoslavs said they also have some material from their own intelligence sources on the degree and form of rearmament of the satellites in violation of their respective Peace Treaties. They agreed on the desirability of making some of this material, particularly on human rights, available to other delegations which normally possess little knowledge or data concerning the Balkans.

Dr. Bebler seemed surprised that the present order of items in the *Ad Hoc* Committee calls first for discussion of the UNSCOB report, then for the Yugoslav item and thirdly for the item on creation of a UN Commission to examine the possibility of free elections in Germany. They had assumed from a talk with Mr. Cordier several days ago that the order of the first three items would be reversed. Due to their desire for time to prepare their own item, they raised no objection to the UNSCOB item being considered first.

Mr. Cohen outlined current US views regarding future UN machinery for the Balkans. He explained that the United States would hope for the termination of the UNSCOB and its replacement by a small sub-committee of the Peace Observation Commission. He added that we see some advantages in establishing the POC sub-committee under the Yugoslav item rather than under the UNSCOB item. Mr. Cohen explained that perhaps the sub-committee could be established to sit in New York and remain on call for use in either Greece or Yugoslavia at the request of either or both of those governments.

The two Yugoslavs made no substantive comment concerning the use of the POC but undertook to consult within their delegation and to inform the US of any instructions they receive. Their general attitude seemed to indicate a decided preference for the establishment of the POC sub-committee for the Balkans under the Greek item rather than the Yugoslav item. The representatives of the two delegations agreed to meet again as soon as they receive further instructions from their respective governments.

320/11–1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, November 14, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 190. Re draft res on Yugo item. Bebler and Kosanovic gave us fol rough draft res on Yugo item on which they indicated wld welcome drafting aid:

"*The General Assembly*

"Having considered the complaints submitted to it by the del of the FPR of Yugo;

"Viewing with concern the situation created by the attitude of the Govt of the USSR and the Govts of Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania, as well as the Govts of Czechoslovakia and Poland, towards Yugo;

"Mindful of the purpose of the UN 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace' (Art 1, para 2 of the UN Charter);

"Mindful of its authority to 'recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the gen welfare of friendly relations among nations' (Art 14 of the UN Charter);

"Takes note of Yugo's readiness to contribute on her part everything necessary for the carrying out of the recommendations of the present resolution;

"Recommends to the Govts of the USSR and the Govts of Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania, as well as the Govts of Czechoslovakia and Poland;

"1. To modify their attitude towards Yugo in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter;

"2. To normalize their diplomatic relations with Yugo and to conform their diplomatic intercourse with the rules which are customary in international relations;

"3. That Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Albania—for the purpose of normalizing their border relationship—regulate the border regime in agreement with Yugo and settle possible border disputes by means of mixed border-commissions.

"4. To use all other means for the peaceful settlement of outstanding questions between them and Yugo."

Bebler told us Kardelj [1] ready support proposal if made by US under Yugo item, for establishment of POC Sub-committee for Balkans which wld sit in New York and be ready provide observation on request of any Balkan state on whose territory observation wld take place.

Yugo item probably second item on agenda comite.

BRUCE

[1] Edvard Kardelj, Vice-Chairman of the Yugoslav Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Chairman of the Yugoslav Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files

Minutes of Sixteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 21, 1951 [1]

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/203

[Here follows list of persons (46) present. Ambassador Warren R. Austin, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations and Chairman of the United States Delegation, was in the chair.]

Ambassador Austin called upon Mr. Stein to present the Yugoslav item to the Delegation. Mr. Stein began by recalling the rise to power of Marshal Tito [2] during and after World War II; the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform in 1948, and the consequent open call for revolution within Yugoslavia by the Cominform states. The White Book published by Yuogslavia documented the campaign which had been waged against Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union and its satellites ever since. The Yugoslavs had now placed on the agenda the charge against the satellites and the Soviet Union of a system of aggressive pressures being directed against Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav memorandum on the item sets out the various counts being alleged: economic blockade, a compaign of incitement "unequalled in international relations", terroristic activities, deportation of Yugoslav minorities along the satellite borders, withdrawal of Soviet and Satellite Ambassadors from Yugoslavia, isolation of diplomatic practices, abrogation of some 46 commercial and other agreements, and violation of the peace-treaty limits on armaments of the ex-enemy satellite-states. The Defense Department had verified the last count above: Rumanian and Bulgarian forces were three times the limits set out in the peace-treaties, Hungarian forces twice the limit.

Yugoslavia charged that these actions were violations of the Charter, and asked the General Assembly to note them and seek to ameliorate conditions. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington had asked for the Department's views on bringing this matter before the United Nations and had received encouragement from the Department. Later in Paris, the Yugoslav Delegation had talked with the United States Delegation about this matter. The Yugoslavs hoped to realize various aims in making this charge. Since they were members of no bloc within the United Nations, and since they were about to lose their Security Council seat, they felt the need of an expression

[1] For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

[2] Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense.

of solidarity from the United Nations for their position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites. This expression of solidarity, it was hoped, would come through speeches and votes on the Yugoslav item. They themselves planned to deliver a very tough speech, to be followed by General Assembly adoption of a mild resolution. They proposed this as a one-shot operation, not to be followed up as a recurring matter for General Assembly consideration.

The position proposed by the Department was generally to give support to the Yugoslavs. There were good reasons for the Department's suggested position. First, the Yugoslav army was the best in that part of Europe outside of the Iron Curtain countries. Every effort should be made by the United States, acting in its own security interests, to prevent the reabsorption of this army behind the Iron Curtain. Yugoslavia's strategic location was also important. Secondly, furthering the split among the Communist governments of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union would give added incentive to a possible extension of "Titoism". Thirdly, the debate on this item should demonstrate that it was not enough for a country to have a Communist system in order to get along with the Soviet Union; absolute subservience was required by the Soviets. Fourthly, support of this item would assist in showing up Soviet "peace" propaganda in general for the spurious thing that it was. We must, however, avoid a position of all-out backing of all Yugoslav charges in every detail since it would be unwise to support charges which might be shown later to be false. We must also avoid any impression of taking sides in a family fight between two Communist factions. The U.S. support for Yugoslavia should be based on the proposition that Yugoslavia, as any other state, was entitled under the Charter of the United Nations, to be free from aggressive pressures.

Mr. Stein then turned to the draft resolution offered by the Yugoslavs, as set out in Delga 190. He pointed out that in the preamble they sought a finding that the situation had been created by the Soviets and satellites. It made reference to Charter provisions. The General Assembly would note the willingness of the Yugoslavs to make all efforts to end the state of tension. It would recommend that the hostile attitude be modified, that relations be normalized, and that mixed border commissions be established to regulate the border regimes and settle border disputes. It also had a somewhat meaningless clause asking that all other means of settling disputes peacefully be used. Messrs. Cooper and Cohen had suggested to the Yugoslavs that it was up to them to present a factually convincing case. The answer to this had been a reference to the White Book which, they said, had been given to other delegations. The Yugoslavs did not want any fact-finding body established and were opposed to using the Peace Observation Commission. In consequence, Messrs. Cooper and Cohen had told the

Yugoslavs that the resolution should not speak in terms of findings or conclusions of fact. They also suggested that the recommendations be addressed both to Yugoslavia and the Soviet group. It was suggested that the resolution indicate that the situation constituted danger to international peace and security. Bebler (Yugoslavia) was not impressed with either of these suggestions, but said he would take matters up with his Foreign Minister. It had been made clear to the Yugoslavs that this item was their own, and they would be responsible for full presentation of facts and for the initiative on it. (See Delga 264, Daily Classified Summary # 15, of 21 November, page 1.)[3]

Senator Cooper said there would be some differences between the U.S. and the Yugoslavs on the manner of handling this item. With regard to the hostile acts alleged, and the threats to Yugoslav independence charged, the U.S. would want to show great concern. A suggestion that the General Assembly be asked to condemn the Soviets and satellites for this aspect of their behaviour, however, had received a negative response. The Yugoslavs feared untoward provocation from such a course. Thus, their approach was to have the General Assembly adopt a weak resolution. Other parts of the Yugoslav charges and portions of the resolution referred to the abnormal condition of diplomatic relations, and made proposals that these be regularized. With such matters, Senator Cooper felt, the U.S. should not be so concerned. Asked by Ambassador Austin as to what these terms really meant, Senator Cooper and Mr. Cohen both said that it was better not to talk in such vague terms, and rather to speak of the general standards of international relations.

Ambassador Kirk remarked that Mr. Stein's presentation of the charges made by Yugoslavia had been borne out by the actual events of the last few years. He added that many people thought this was a personal feud between Stalin[4] and Tito which could never be resolved by a return to normal diplomatic relations. "Regularization" in such a case would be very difficult. As for the question of troop concentrations, verification of such allegations would also be difficult. But the charges of treaty violations of a commercial nature were a clear matter of record.

Admiral Badger spoke briefly on the views of the military on this question.

Mr. Cory said that talks would be had with various delegations about the mass deportations involved in the Yugoslav charges, as being perhaps the only chance of a discussion of Human Rights violations by the Soviets during this Assembly Session. He alluded to the fact that the Department had earlier given consideration to the possi-

[3] Not printed.

[4] Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

bility of sending a POC team to Yugoslavia to keep an eye on the situation there. This idea had been dropped when the Yugoslav reaction had been received as a firm negative. He referred to the violent reaction the Soviets had shown to Yugoslav charges in the General Committee and predicted that there would be an equally violent one in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Mr. Cory's final point was that the draft resolution contained in Delga 190 was still in a fluid condition and would be the subject of further consultations.

Mrs. Roosevelt commented on a conversation she had had with Mr. Dedijer [5] of the Yugoslav delegation in regard to the Zagreb conference. She warned him that although the United States would support the Yugoslavs in many things, they should not forget that as a whole the people of the United States still thought of Yugoslavia as fundamentally a Communist state. He had answered that the U.S. must not forget that the Yugoslavs are moving toward a greater democracy. Mrs. Roosevelt felt that when, in the draft resolution or in other places, the Yugoslavs referred to regularization of their relations with other states, it came from a feeling of need on their part to establish closer ties both with East and West, neither of which could be foregone. She felt that we ought not to overlook the changes within Yugoslavia that are occurring, and that, perhaps faced with the necessity of living with some Communist states in the world, Yugoslavia was one of them with which we could more easily live.

Mr. Lubin asked whether the Delegation had available any information on the truth of the Yugoslav charges of commercial treaty violations by the Soviets and Satellites. He recalled that in ECOSOC, the Poles had come up with the statement that the Yugoslavs had been the ones to break the treaties. Mr. Cory answered that we lacked any real information thereon.

Ambassador Austin called for a statement on the relationship between this item and the Greek case. Mr. Cohen said in this connection that the POC subcommission on the Balkans to be set up in the Greek case would be available, according to present plans, to go anywhere in the Balkans where requested. This of course would include Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs did not want them to come in now, but were not against the idea in principle, and might well support the creation of this POC subcommission in the General Assembly.

In commenting on the Yugoslav draft resolution, Mr. Hyde saw an implicit admission therein of all the Yugoslav charges. He further feared that it could be a two-edged sword, one that could be turned against Yugoslavia and the West by the Russians, either by amendment or by a companion resolution which would call upon the Western

[5] Vladimir Dedijer, Member of the Yugoslav Delegation, Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Yugoslav National Assembly.

countries to regularize their diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and other countries of similar persuasion. Senator Cooper said Bebler had explained what this referred to. Yugoslavia in the past had participated in "mixed border commissions" with good results and hoped for equal success in this case.

Ambassador Kirk expressed agreement with Mr. Cory's estimate of the violence of Soviet reaction to be expected in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on this item.

Mr. Nolting wondered whether this draft resolution was supposed to have a deterrent effect upon the Soviets and satellites in their plans for military aggression, or whether it was intended as an aid to domestic consolidation within Yugoslavia. Senator Cooper said that it was hoped the resolution would have a deterrent effect. He also thought it would help the internal situation. He added that the U.S. should decide whether to keep its attitude of support for the Yugoslavs in this matter on the broad basis of opposing aggression and hostile activities, or whether to support the Yugoslavs in smaller detailed parts of their particular case, especially with reference to economic matters.

Ambassador Jessup returned to the point made by Mr. Nolting. He said that the USSR was our chief antagonist in the world today. In our relations vis-à-vis the USSR we often behaved differently in different places, as a result of strategic considerations. Thus we were seeking to make peace in Korea. In another place we would be hitting them very hard. Our general strategy throughout the world should be coordinated, even if for various reasons we followed different tactics. He had no concrete ideas to offer on this particular problem, but was merely suggesting that this need for global coordination of strategy must be taken into account.

Ambassador Austin suggested that, if there were no objection, the Delegation not take final action on the matter under discussion, but rather postpone a decision till a later date. Ambassador Gross asked how the matter would be presented again for Delegation consideration, and specifically, whether it would come up in the form of a new resolution negotiated with other delegations and the Yugoslavs. On reconsidering, Ambassador Austin suggested adding this matter to the next day's agenda for the Delegation meeting.

Mr. Winslow cautioned the Delegation that a French Communist demonstration on the Champs Elysees was scheduled for 6 P. M. that night, in alleged protest against the rearming of Germany. The police, he said, were fully alerted, and would doubtless have matters well in hand.

CHARLES D. COOK

547-842—79——34

320/11–1451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 21, 1951—7 : 12 p. m.

Gadel 216. Re Yugo draft Res Delga 190 Nov 14, Dept notes with approval moderation its terms, in belief such Res likely attract maximum support. At same time Res has sufficient substance avoid anticlimactic effect when introduced after strong speeches. Focus Res upon "attitude" rather than alleged acts Sov bloc seems advantageous in that it minimizes need for detailed investigation as prerequisite for passage since alleged attitude indisputable, and can be easily proven in addresses *Ad Hoc* comite by quotation Cominform sources.

While recognizing terms Res primarily up to Yugos, Dept offers fol specific comments:

1. Yugos may wish to move Para beginning "Takes note, etc." to end of Res.

2. We assume omission of reference mistreatment Yugo minorities indicates this not intended to be a substantial part Yugo case. If Yugos shld introduce this element USDel may find appropriate opportunity to use data on human rights violation in speeches.

3. Recommendation in Para 3 re estab mixed border commissions might properly be addressed to Yugo Govt as well as satellites. Dept does not consider border comms inconsistent with, or adequate substitute for, impartial UN observing machinery. In view terms draft Res Delga 222,[2] re POC sub-comite under Greek case, suggest discussing Yugo Del question additional para recommending that Yugo and satellite govts request POC Balkan sub-comite established under previous Res send observers to area. Assuming Yugos continue oppose unilateral admission POC observers, inclusion indicated provision wld still provide them opportunity make declaration willingness admit observers provided satellites also agree. If this suggestion not acceptable Yugos Dept believes some ref this machinery under Yugo case might be introduced by Yugos, or by US or other Dels with Yugo consent. If Yugos object to this procedure appropriate separate Res under Yugo item might be considered.

As an alternative approach to present Yugo draft Res that may be mentioned at discretion USDel in event Yugos encounter or anticipate difficulties in attaining wide support of Res, Dept offers fol possibilities:

1. Dept appreciates Yugo desire make clear situation of which it complains entirely of Sov making, and that Yugo sinned against but not sinning. Nevertheless, in its own interest to increase support Res, Yugo may wish to consider modification on grounds present draft Res, while moderate, compels members to take sides against Soviets in

[1] Repeated for information to Belgrade as 559.

[2] November 16, not printed.

Yugo–Sov dispute more decisively than many may be willing to do. Proposed recommendations may also lose force in eyes other Dels since addressed only Cominform states and not Yugo. Since these call only for steps required by Charter and by friendly internatl relations and practices, Yugo may not oppose having them addressed in effect to it as well. In light ref Yugo charges in preamble, this cld not reasonably be interpreted as criticism Yugos. By stating principles in gen terms, steps recommended wld appear considered judgment GA rather than program demanded by one party; it wld appear more fully accord purposes cited preamble Res, and might gain wider support other Dels. Also, it wld render immaterial any Sov charges Yugo violations, make Sov rejection Res more embarrassing, and add weight affirmation Yugo willingness cooperate.

2. Under above suggestions, after 4 Paras preamble draft Res wld read along fol lines:

"*Considers* that in the interest of strengthening Universal Peace the Govt of Yugo and the Govts of the USSR, Hung, Bulg, Rum, Albania, Czech and Pol shld:

a. Conduct their mutual relations in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter.

b. Normalize their dipl intercourse to conform with the rules and practices which are customary in internatl relations.

c. In the case of Yugo, and Bulg, Hung, Rum and Albania regularize their border relationships by agreement, and estab mixed border commissions for the settlement of possible border disputes.

d. Employ all other appropriate means for the peaceful settlement of outstanding questions between them.

Notes with approval that the Govt of the FPR of Yugo has shown itself ready to act in accordance with the principles set forth in the previous para, and has expressed its readiness to take all the necessary steps for putting them into practice, and calls upon the Govts of the USSR, Hung, Bulg, Rum and Albania as well as the Govts of Czech and Pol to do likewise."

If suggestion acceptable, having Yugo introduce Res addressed to itself among others may be somewhat anomalous but is not inappropriate. Also possible have this suggestion come as amendment by some other Del, which Yugo can gracefully accept. Despite Yugos initial reaction reported Delga 264 Nov 20,[3] they may be interested this suggestion later date.

WEBB

[3] Not printed.

320/11–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, November 21, 1951—7 p. m.

Delga 297. Subj Yugo item. Fol is Yugo draft res reflecting comments given to Bebler by Ordonneau (Fr),[1] Jebb (UK),[2] and Cooper with USDel staff. Yugos will table res next Saturday or Monday: "The General Assembly.

"Having considered the complaint submitted to it by the del of the FPR of Yugo concerning the activities of the Govt of Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania, as well as the Govts of Czecho and Poland, against Yugo;

"Viewing with serious concern the evidence of tension presented in connection with that complaint;

"Mindful of the purpose of the United Nations" to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen international peace;

"Mindful of the authority of the Gen Assembly to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations;

"Takes note of the declaration of the Yugo del that the Govt of Yugo for its part is ready to do all that is necessary for the carrying out of the recommendations of the present resolution;

"Recommends to the govts concerned that they (1) conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the UN charter; (2) conform in their diplomatic intercourse with the rules and practices which are customary in international relations; (3) settle frontier disputes by means of mixed frontier commissions or other peaceful means of their own choice; (4) refrain from "engaging in any form of propaganda which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression".

French and UK dels objected somewhat to bracketed [*numbered?*] para 4 and Bebler said he wld see whether Kardelj agrees drop it.

Sent Dept Delga 297, rptd info Belgrade 83.

ACHESON

[1] Pierre Ordonneau of the French Delegation's Advisory Staff.

[2] Sir H. M. Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

IO Files

Minutes of Seventeenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 23, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/204

[Here follows list of persons (47) present.]

Ambassador Austin asked that immediate consideration be given to the Yugoslav item so that the Delegation could deal also with other urgent business.

Mr. Stein explained the revised Yugoslav draft resolution contained in an unnumbered document before the Delegation. It represented, he said, a redraft of the draft resolution considered by the Delegation at the last meeting. Its terms had been generally agreed to by Senator Cooper, Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Ordonneau in a meeting with Bebler of Yugoslavia. The resolution incorporated a number of suggestions by the US including our suggestion that the recommendations be directed toward all parties concerned and not just to the Soviets and satellites.

Mr. Stein explained further that pursuant to a suggestion by Ambassador Gross,[1] we had raised with the Yugoslavs the possibility of including in the resolution a paragraph envisaging the use of the POC Balkan Sub-committee in connection with this case, if the tension does not subside. The precise language suggested to Bebler was before the Delegation in a paper entitled "Possible Addition to the Yugoslav Draft Resolution". This would have the Governments concerned, "if the international tension in the area does not subside", request the Sub-committee of the POC to arrange for "observation and reporting on the situation along the frontiers between Yugoslavia on the one hand and Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania on the other." Mr. Stein reported that Bebler had not been enthusiastic about this suggestion, but had agreed to take it up with M. Kardelj and report his decision promptly. Mr. Stein noted that it had been pointed out to Bebler that if the Yugoslavs wished the UN to take cognizance of this case, it would be fitting and proper that UN procedures available for handling such cases be utilized. Bebler had remarked that this seemed very logical, but he doubted at the same time whether it was politically advisable. Senator Cooper added that Bebler had indicated that although they might not wish to incorporate this language in the Yugoslav draft resolution, they might be able to accept it if it were offered as an amendment by some other delegation. Referring to a telegram from the Department (Gadel 216), Mr. Stein noted

[1] Ernest A. Gross, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations and member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

that the approach the Delegation had been taking was strictly in accordance with the Department's views. Mr. Stein added that Senator Cooper would make a tough speech in Committee, in the course of which he would make clear the US position on this matter. Senator Cooper said he had little to add to Mr. Stein's presentation, except that some members of the Assembly might conceivably have difficulty in taking sides in the controversy between the Yugoslavs and the satellites.

[Here follows further discussion with the Delegation having no objection to the revisions or amendments proposed herein.

The Delegation then proceeded to discuss another agenda item.]

320/11–2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, November 23, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 331. Subj: Yugoslav item. Fol is present status Yugo draft resolution:

Draft resolution was circulated confidentially to friendly dels by Yugos yesterday. Is identical with text transmitted in Delga 297, Nov 21, except for elimination of bracketed [*numbered?*] para 4 and revision of sentence "recommends to the govts concerned that they" to "recommends that the govts concerned". Dept will note that prior to receipt of Gadel 216, Nov 21, GADel already had successfully suggested to Yugos that their draft resolution be addressed in effect to Yugo as well as Cominform states.

Previous to receipt of Gadel 216 Cooper and staff last night strongly urged Bebler that Yugo draft contain additional recommendation as fols:

"Recommends further to the govts concerned that if the international tension in the area does not subside; they request the subcommission of the peace observation commission, provided fol in the resolution (VI) to arrange for observation and reporting on the situation along the frontiers between Yugo on the one hand, and Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania on the other".

In explaining this suggestion, Cooper argued that US believes it wld be inconsistent for Yugos, after raising their complaint against Cominform states not to take advantage of existing UN machinery designed to meet situation. Cooper also said that some use of POC doubtless wld seem quite logical to number of dels which just previously had approved establishment Balkan subcommission under Greek item in same comite.

Bebler last night appeared unenthusiastic, but undertook to discuss suggestion with his del. He observed that Yugo may not be willing propose such recommendation in its own resolution and that if it has to come it wld be better submitted in form of amendment from some other del. He inferred that in such case Yugo wld find it hard to vote against it. He also commented that while US suggestion doubtless has merit from logical point of view, still he wonders whether any use of POC in Yugo at this time wld be politically wise.

Bebler told Cory this a. m. that Yugo del earlier today had decided adversely on latest US suggestion and hopes US will not press it either itself or through other dels, either as addition to present untabled draft or as amendment in comites. He said that Yugo feels such recommendation, if incorporated now in draft resolution, wld attract intensive Soviet attack on general grounds that such use of POC wld constitute unnecessary "imperialist" meddling in Balkans. He added that with this in mind his del hopes to avoid any mention of POC in its own speeches but that, of course, if questions are raised regarding Yugo opinion on use of POC Yugo del wld have to express itself. He said also he hopes that if any del intends to recommend use of POC under Yugo item it will consult in advance with Yugo del, in which case Yugo wld attempt to dissuade.

Cory replied that we will of course promptly transmit Bebler's remarks to US GADel and Dept, but that to be perfectly frank he felt it only fair to state that US still believes limited use of POC wld be desirable altho, of course, final decision necessarily rests with Yugo. He added that there obviously can be no assurance Yugo and other interested dels wld be successful, even if they try, in dissuading other states from presenting an amendment which wld be pertinent and helpful to Yugo draft resolution.

First reaction by Barnes [1] (USDel [*UKDel*]) to suggested addition was adverse but he agreed US wld go along if Yugo accepts it. Ordonneau (Fr) was non-commital.

Speaking of his conversations with other dels re Yugo item, Dr. Bebler last night said that of 20 dels which he has so far consulted 19 dels seem favorably disposed toward item and believe that Yugo draft resolution is sufficiently mild to merit their support. One exception was India which, Bebler said, was non-commital. He added that Pakistan, which abstained on vote to include item in agenda in general comite; showed more positive interest than before.

It is very likely some other del will propose ref to POC in some form during debate which will open Nov 26. In such case we shall support appropriate amendment. If no such proposal made we shall review situation.

[1] R. C. Barnes, Adviser, United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly.

Re para 2, Gadel 216, we propose refer human rights violations in speech by USDel.

Sent Dept Delga 331, rptd info Belgrade 84.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

Documentation relating to the legislative history of the Yugoslav item is either printed or cited in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 68. The text of the resolution submitted by Yugoslavia and adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee is substantially the same as that in Delga 297, November 21, except for the elimination of numbered item 4 in the operational paragraph; the first preambulatory paragraph also included the Soviet Union in the list of countries named (UN Doc. A/AC.53/L.10/Rev. 1, November 30). For the debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on November 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and December 1, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, pages 39 ff.

Senator John Sherman Cooper, the representative of the United States on the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, made a statement of some length on November 29. In this statement he made reference to the interest of the United States Government in linking existing United Nations machinery with the situation described in the Yugoslav complaint:

"Meanwhile, since the Committee had approved the setting up of a Balkan sub-commission . . . the United Nations would be able at the request of any State or states concerned to watch developments and call upon a body equipped to observe and report on any situation likely to endanger the peace in that area. It was very much to be hoped that the services of the sub-commission would not be needed and that the Yugoslav draft resolution would achieve its purpose." (*ibid.*, page 53)

At its 355th plenary meeting, December 14, 1951, the General Assembly adopted the resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. For discussion at the meeting, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 273 ff. Sen. Cooper made a brief statement which conveyed the strong feelings of this Government regarding "the aggressive campaign" to which Yugoslavia was being subjected, in the course of which he warned:

"If this campaign continues, there is danger that it could lead to serious trouble in the Balkans, and have repercussions throughout the world. It is clear to all of us that any new recourse to aggression in

the world might strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace." (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, page 278)

For the official text of the resolution as approved by the General Assembly, Resolution 509 (VI), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Resolutions*, page 10.

MATTERS ARISING UNDER CHAPTERS XI, XII, AND XIII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (TRUSTEESHIP AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES)[1]

I. THE EWE QUESTION IN THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Editorial Note

The thrust of United States policy at the United Nations regarding dependent area questions was made evident in the positions adopted by this Government at the time of the Washington colonial policy discusions between the United States and (individually) the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium, in July 1950 (see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume II, pages 434 ff.). The documents that follow are illustrative of an attempt by this Government in early 1951 to apply general policy to a specific problem: the question of the division of the Ewe tribes of Togoland in West Africa between British and French administration. The first two documents which date from the year 1950 are included as conveying essential background information.

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 434 ff.

350/6-950

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the memorandum presented by Mr. Meade of the British Embassy dated June 9, 1950 [1] in which the views of the United Kingdom Government relating to the Ewe question in the Trusteeship Council were set forth and with respect to which the official views of this Government were requested.

The memorandum, together with the attached documents, has been studied by the Department of State and this Government is prepared to support the proposal to enlarge the composition and terms of reference of the Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland Affairs. The United States regards the proposal as a step toward the solution of this difficult political question.

[1] Not printed.

This Government is further prepared to support the proposed positions of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, as outlined in the memorandum, regarding the three modifications which might be suggested in the Trusteeship Council.

It is noted that the memorandum to be presented to the Trusteeship Council does not contain details as to the method of electing the members of the enlarged Consultative Commission. This Government, and probably others in the Trusteeship Council, would be interested in such details, particularly as to the plans for securing the appropriate proportional representation of various elements of the population.

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1950.

IO Files

Department of State Instruction for the United States Delegation to the Eighth Session of the Trusteeship Council

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1951.

SD/T/167

Item 13: *The Ewe Problem* (Item 17 on the Provisional Agenda)

The Problem:

The problem is to formulate the position of the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council regarding the Ewe problem (Item 17 of the provisional agenda). As presently listed on the agenda, this problem will be raised in connection with General Assembly Resolution A/1616 of December 2, 1950 (copy attached as Annex A to this paper). Presumably discussion of this problem will also include consideration of the report requested by Trusteeship Council Resolution 250 (VII) (copy attached as Annex B). A number of petitions are also related to the Ewe problem (list attached as Annex C).

Recommendations:

1. The Delegation should, as in the past, be guided by the principle of support for such proposals as seen most likely to achieve demonstrable progress, with the least possible delay, toward a solution of the problem raised by the Ewe unification petitions.

2. The Delegation should point out the desirability of considering the British and French progress report on the expanded Consultative Commission (Trusteeship Council Resolution 250 (VII) in conjunction with the French report on its investigation of complaints by the Ewes concerning the manner in which elections to the Commission were carried out in French Togoland (General Assembly Resolution A/1616). The Delegation should also take the position that, until action has been taken by the Council on Item 17, consideration of petitions relating to the above matters should be held in abeyance.

3. The Delegation should consult with the Department as necessary with reference to such specific proposals as may emerge consequent to the consideration of the above-mentioned reports. The discussion section of this paper contains an analysis of previous proposals and provides certain tentative lines of guidance.

Discussion:

Since the history of the Trusteeship Council's consideration of petitions concerning the Ewe unification movement and related questions has been summarized in previous position papers (especially those for the 6th and 7th sessions), this discussion will attempt only to summarize major developments at and since the Seventh Session of the Council.

The major development at the Seventh Session was the adoption by the Council of Resolution 250 (VII). (See Annex B.) This resolution took into account 140 petitions, the report of the UN Visiting Mission to West Africa, the oral statements made by certain petitioners, and the plan put forward by the Administering Authorities (T/702) as explained and amended in the statements made in the Council on July 11, 1950. This plan was to expand the standing Consultative Commission for Togoland Affairs "to make it fully representative of all the people of both Territories" and charge it with the task of "ascertaining the real wishes of the whole population of the two Trust Territories". The plan was amended on July 11, 1950 by the Administering Authorities to make clear "that the Commission is not precluded from submitting to the Administering Authorities recommendations for the 'unification of any parts of the two Trust Territories' ". The Administering Authorities also accepted the interpretation of the United States Representative that such recommendations could include unification "either under British, French, or Franco-British administration" (T/SR 308). The Council expressed the hope that the Administering Authorities would proceed along the lines proposed and would "take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Consultative Commission will equitably represent the different sections and groups of the two Trust Territories", and it requested "the Administering Authorities concerned to inform the Council at its next session of the steps which have been taken to give effect to the plan for the expanded Consultative Commission and to submit to the Council a progress report on the deliberations of the Consultative Commission to date". The representative of the All-Ewe Conference, Mr. Sylvanus Olympio, stated (T/SR, 308) that "although he appreciated the great concession which had been made by the Administering Authorities in permitting the Ewe people at least to discuss their unification, he could not accept that as a satisfactory solution. He could, therefore, do no more than simply inform the people he represented that the concession had been made". Subsequently, however, (see T/PET.6/201–7/166/Add.1) the

All-Ewe Conference agreed to cooperate in the formation and work of the expanded Consultative Commission.

The All-Ewe Conference later reversed this decision. The events leading up to this reversal were brought to the attention of the United Nations by a petition (T/PET.7/160–6/194 and Addenda 1–5) from the President of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise*, French Togoland affiliate of the All-Ewe Conference. Discussion of this petition was introduced into the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (Fifth Session) by the representative of the Philippines. The petition contains two principal complaints. The first of these is that in French Togoland the method of selecting delegates to the standing Consultative Commission did not result in the choice of delegates who were generally representative of the people. Instead, delegates were elected by electoral colleges whose members were selected by the chiefs, who were under the influence of the administration. As a result of the protests of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise*, the French administration modified the electoral procedure so that: "The population of each village shall appoint a certain number of grand electors (members of the electoral colleges) under the auspices of the village chiefs or regents in council, traditionally responsibile for order, and without intervention of the Administration." The *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* interpreted this to mean that village meetings could thereupon be held to appoint "grand electors", and it proceeded to organize such meetings. Arrests were made on the charge that the meetings were held in an illegal manner. This resulted in the second complaint of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise*, which was that persons were arrested and imprisoned because "they wished to have indigenous customs observed in the elections".

After these arrests, the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* decided to withdraw from further participation in the procedures for selecting delegates to the enlarged standing Consultative Commission. While, in general, the selection of delegates in British Togoland took place without difficulty, the All-Ewe Conference, in protest against the electoral procedures in French Togoland, declared that the Ewes in both Togolands would not participate in the work of the Consultative Commission until the "French Togoland elections were revoked and free elections held" (T/PET.6/201–7/166). Should this not be done, the Conference announced that the Ewes would not feel bound by the proposed Commision's decisions.

Considerable discussion of the complaints contained in the petition from the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* took place in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The representative of France denied that the chiefs had imposed their choice of electors upon the people of their villages. He pointed out that among African indigenous people, opinions were usually made known and decisions

taken through free general discussion at gatherings in the village square. He asserted that the petitioners' allegations that instructions had been issued to the local administrative officials to exert pressure upon the electoral colleges was "an absolutely false and unfounded accusation". With regard to the arrests which had taken place, he pointed out that they had been made on charges of (1) calling a meeting without the advance notification required by law and (2) uttering threats of armed violence.

The discussions in the Fourth Committee led to the adoption by the General Assembly of its resolution of December 2, 1950 (A/1616). (See Annex A.) This resolution noted not only the complaints made in the petition from the President of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* but also the comments to the contrary contained in other related petitions. It noted, furthermore, the declarations made on these matters by the representative of France in Committee Four. Its principal operative paragraph recommends that the Administering Authority of Togoland under French Administration investigate promptly the practices complained of with a view to ascertaining whether the methods of election which have been applied ensure that the views of all sections of the population are faithfully reflected, and to report thereon to the next session of the Council. The discussion preceding the adoption of this resolution indicates that most of the members of Committee Four did not consider that there was sufficient evidence on which to come to a decision as to the validity of the complaints contained in the petition of the President of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise.*

It should be noted, however, that the consideration of petitions relating to the Ewe question by the Fourth Committee not only established a precedent but also was evidence of the growing impatience of a number of non-administering countries with the slow progress made by the Administering Authorities concerned and by the Trusteeship Council toward a solution of the problem. This demonstration of concern by members of the Fourth Committee introduces a new element of urgency and gives greater weight to the desirability of making demonstrable progress before the next session of the Assembly.

Whatever may be the results of the investigation recommended by the General Assembly, it is apparent that the enlarged standing Consultative Commission is not presently fully representative of the different sections and groups of the two trust territories, being boycotted by the representatives of the Ewes, the largest single group concerned. It would seem, therefore, that while it may be important for the Council to determine whether or not there is any truth in the allegation that the methods of election prevented the views of the population from being fully represented, it would seem more important for the Council to devise a procedure for ascertaining the real wishes of

the population which would be acceptable both to the Administering Authority and to a majority of the peoples concerned. Several proposals have been made at previous sessions. These include (1) a plebiscite under United Nations supervision, (2) a special mission to visit the two trust territories and to make new recommendations, and (3) new elections to the standing Consultative Commission under United Nations supervision.

A Plebiscite Under UN Supervision

The idea of a plebiscite under UN supervision was suggested by the representative of the All-Ewe Conference. Although feeling that the views of the Ewes had aleady been adequately explored, Mr. Olympio stated that the Conference was prepared to put the issue to such a plebiscite (T/SR.303). However, he evidently conceived of the plebiscite as taking place only in the Ewe areas, including those in the Gold Coast, for he stated that "the All-Ewe Conference was most anxious that the unification of the Ewe people and the unification of the two Territories of Togoland should be treated as two separate questions." The Council not only failed to adopt the idea of a plebiscite [supported by the Philippines; opposed by the two Administering Authorities], but Resolution 250 (VII) clearly indicates that the Council accepts the view of the Administering Authorities that the interests of the inhabitants of all parts of the two Trust Territories and must be ascertained. The Council has, of course, never attempted to extend its competence outside the Trust Territories. The Council's failure to adopt the idea of a plebiscite was probably in part the result of its realization of the difficulties involved in carrying out a plebiscite on such a complex matter. At any rate, it seems unlikely that this solution will ever prove acceptable to the Administering Authorities.

A Special Visiting Mission

The suggestion of sending a special mission to Togoland and the idea of holding elections under the supervision of the UN were made by the representative of the Philippines. As these suggestions may arise again at the eighth session, it will be well to give some consideration to their merits. The idea of sending a special mission to the Togolands involves certain difficulties. The original Philippine proposal (4th Committee, 161st meeting) envisaged a mission "to investigate on the spot the various grievances which had been voiced" in connection with the elections in French Togoland. This proposal could only be reintroduced and adopted by the Council if a majority of its Members were dissatisfied with the investigation carried out by the French Administration. Such a situation seems unlikely. More likely would be a proposal for a mission to visit both Togolands in order to study the entire problem on the spot and to recommend new procedures for a solution. It might even be suggested that this task be assigned to

the next Visiting Mission to East Africa, as a special additional function to be carried out en route to or from East Africa. It might well be objected, however, that any mission would find it as difficult to make specific recommendations as did the previous Visiting Mission to West Africa. Furthermore, the Ewes might consider such a mission merely a device for postponing action; nor are the Administering Authorities likely to look with favor on the idea.

New Elections to the Standing Consultative Commission

The suggestion of holding new elections for delegates to the enlarged standing Consultative Commission under the supervision of the United Nations would seem to be of doubtful value unless electoral procedures acceptable to all of the principal parties concerned can be agreed upon. Possibly some kind of United Nations assistance might be helpful in enabling the parties to formulate and agree upon such procedures. The Council might recommend consultation by the Administering Authorities with leaders of all important indigenous groups with the aim of working out agreed election procedures, offering its assistance should such consultations fail. Of course, there is the possibility of discarding the Consultative Commission as a means of ascertaining the wishes of the people; however, in as much as it is not the Commission itself, but only the procedures for selecting its members that has brought about the present impasse, it would seem desirable to pursue the attempt to arrive at acceptable procedures. In any event, it is apparent that the cooperation of all the principal groups concerned is essential to any successful solution.

Annex A

Text of General Assembly Resolution 441 (V) of December 2, 1950, on the Ewe Problem [1]

The General Assembly,

Noting the action taken by the Trusteeship Council in respect of the Ewe unification movement and related questions in the Trust Territories of Togoland under French administration and Togoland under British administration,

Noting, in particular, the endorsement by the Trusteeship Council of the decision of the Administering Authorities concerned to establish an expanded Standing Consultative Commission for the purpose of ascertaining the real wishes and interests of the peoples concerned, and the expression by the Council of the hope that the Administering Authorities would take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Com-

[1] This text does not incorporate three footnotes which include citations to the official records of the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

mission would equitably represent the different sections and groups,

Noting the complaints made by the President of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* in a petition to the Secretary-General (T/Pet.7/160–6/194, T/Pet.7/160–6/194/Add.1, T/Pet.7/160–6/194/Add.2, T/Pet.7/160–6/194/Add.3, T/Pet.7/160–6/194/Add.4, T/Pet.7/160–6/194/Add.5) against the methods of election prescribed by the Administering Authority of Togoland under French administration and the allegation that persons have been arrested and imprisoned because they wished to have indigenous customs observed in the elections,

Noting the comments to the contrary contained in other related petitions (T/Pet.7/163–6/197, T/Pet.7/165–6/199 and T/Pet.7/165–6/199/Add.1),

Noting the declarations made on these matters by the representative of France in the Fourth Committe on 18 and 31 October 1950.

1. *Recognizes* the great importance of the Ewe problem, and impresses upon the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authorities concerned the importance of finding an adequate solution as soon as possible and in full accordance with the real wishes and interests of the people concerned;

2. *Impresses*, in particular, upon the Administering Authorities the necessity of conducting elections to the Standing Consultative Commission in a democratic manner that will ensure a true representation of the people;

3. *Recommends* that the Administering Authority of Togoland under French administration investigate promptly the practices complained of in the petition of the President of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* and in other petitions on the subject with a view to ascertaining whether the methods of election which have been applied ensure that the views of all sections of the population are faithfully reflected, and report thereon to the next session of the Trusteeship Council for such action as the Council may consider appropriate in the light of the relevant discussions in the Fourth Committee and of the results of the investigations of the Administering Authority of Togoland under French administration;

4. *Requests* that the Trusteeship Council devote a special chapter or sub-chapter of its annual report to the next session of the General Assembly to setting forth all the steps undertaken in connexion with the Ewe question.

Annex B

Text of Trusteeship Council Resolution 250 (VII) of July 14, 1950, on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Questions

The Trusteeship Council,

Having noted the petitions listed in the annex to this resolution, concerning the problem of unification in the Trust Territories of Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration,

Having considered the report of the Visiting Mission of the United Nations to the Trust Territories of West Africa (document T/463).

Having heard the oral statements made by the petitioners, Messrs. Sylvanus Olympio, F. Y. Asare, S. G. Antor, Dr. Pedro Olympio, Dermann Ayeva before the Council at its sixth and seventh sessions at Geneva and at New York,

Takes note of the plan put forward by the Administering Authorities (document T/702) as explained and amended in the statements made in the Council on 11 July 1950, which has as its purpose the ascertainment of the real wishes and interests of the inhabitants of all parts of the two Trust Territories;

Notes in particular that the Consultative Commission is required to make a "detailed study of the representations which have been or may be made" and that the Commission is not precluded from submitting to the Administering Authorities recommendations for the "unification of any parts of the two Trust Territories";

Expresses the hope that the Administering Authorities will proceed along the lines proposed and will take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Consultative Commission will equitably represent the different sections and groups of the two Trust Territories;

Requests the Administering Authorities concerned to inform the Council at its next session of the steps which have been taken to give effect to the plan for the expanded Consultative Commission and to submit to the Council a program report on the deliberations of the Consultative Commission to date;

Recommends to the Administering Authorities concerned to take all necessary and appropriate measures in order to ensure that, until a definitive settlement is reached, the common traits and traditions of the Ewe people in the two Trust Territories be preserved.

Annex C

Petitions Concerning the Ewe Unification Movement and Related Questions

1. Petition from the Togoland Youth Association (T/PET.6/192–7/157)
2. Petition from Mr. Augustine de Souza (T/PET.6/194–7/160 and Add. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5)
3. Petition from the Pan-Ewe Union, Kadjebi, Buem (T/PET.6/195–7/161)
4. Petition from Mr. Sawli Katiejeri (T/PET.6/196–7/162)
5. Petition from Mr. Dermann Ayeva (T/PET.6/197–7/163, and Add. 1 and 2)
6. Petition from the Togoland Union (T/PET.6/198–7/164, and Add. 1 and 2)

7. Petition from the Togoland Progress Party (T/PET.6/199–7/165, and Add. 1)

8. Petition from the All-Ewe Conference (T/PET.6/201–7/166, and Add. 1)

9. Petition from the Congress of British Togoland (T/PET.6/202–7/167)

10. Petition from Dr. Olympio, M. Dermann Ayeva and Chief Biregah (T/PET.6/203–7/168)

11. Petition from the "Assemblee Representative du Togo" (T/PET.7/169)

12. Petition from the Togoland Union (T/PET.6/205–7/170, and Add. 1)

13. Petition from the Togoland Union (T/PET.6/206)

14. Petition from the Convention People's Party (T/PET.6/207)

15. Petition from Mr. Ako Adjei on behalf of Mr. Tey Kwaku Ameh (T/PET.6/208–7/171)

16. Petition from the Parti Togolais du Progres (T/PET.6/209–7/173)

17. Petition from Mr. Radji Salami (T/PET.6/211–7/174)

18. Petition from Mr. Frico Dabida (T/PET.6/213–7/175)

19. Petition from the Akpini State Council (T/PET.6/214)

USUN Files

The Permanent Delegation of the United Kingdom at the United Nations to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, February 6, 1951.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE—EWE PROBLEM

(Position as on the 5th February, 1951)

1. In implementation of the proposals put forward by the two Administering Authorities and endorsed by a resolution of the Trusteeship Council on the 14th July, 1950, the enlarged Standing Consultative Commission was duly set up in Togoland in order to ascertain the real wishes of the whole population of the two Trust Territories with regard to their political future.

2. Elections to seats on the Commission were held in British Togoland in September and in French Togoland in October.

3. In British Togoland all 17 representatives were elected by the local authorities in accordance with the normal practice.

4. In French Togoland the elections were held in two stages. It became clear, at the "primary stage" that the representatives of the Comite de l'Unite Togolaise, led by Sylvanus Olympio (who favoured

the unification of the Ewe-inhabitated area of the two Togolands) would only secure election to 6 seats out of a total of 30.

5. The C.U.T. therefore decided to boycott the second stage of the elections and addressed petitions to the United Nations General Assembly regarding the electoral methods and the manner in which these elections had been conducted.

6. Representation of six constituencies where there was a clear C.U.T. majority was held open by the French Government until the last moment, but the C.U.T. nevertheless persisted in their boycott and, in accordance with the electoral law, these seats were therefore filled by those candidates who secured the next highest number of votes.

7. The C.U.T. petitions referred to above reached the General Assembly at the moment when the Trusteeship Council's report on the Ewe question was being considered by the 4th Committee.

8. The 4th Committee therefore adopted a resolution (later adopted by the General Assembly on the 2nd December) calling upon the French authorities to investigate the complaints made and to report to the 8th Session of the Trusteeship Council.

9. This resolution, as adopted by the General Assembly, tacitly endorsed the Anglo-French proposals for the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission, but it had no effect in inducing the C.U.T. to change their attitude.

10. When the Consultative Commission met on the 7th November, the C.U.T. was unrepresented, and out of sympathy with their French colleagues five representatives of southern British Togoland decided not to attend.

11. The final figures therefore of those attending were 29 out of 30 representatives for French Togoland and 12 out of 17 representatives for British Togoland.

12. Statements made at this first session of the Consultative Commission indicate clearly a majority, not only of those present but also of the Commission as a whole, in favour of maintaining the existing system of administration in the two Trust Territories.

13. Nevertheless, both the British and French authorities consider that before the two Administering Authorities can communicate to the Trusteeship Council the conclusion that the *status quo* should be maintained, the representatives of the Ewe unification parties in both Trust Territories should be given a further opportunity of attending the Commission and of expressing their views.

14. It is also considered that a second session of the Commission should in any case be held in order to enable members further to consider the various solutions put forward and thus to complete the implementation of its terms of reference.

15. For both these reasons it is proposed to arrange for a second session of the Commission in the near future and to provide the unification parties with another opportunity of sending representatives to this second session of the Commission. The precise way in which this can be done is still under discussion in the two Trust Territories. The final formula will be worked out in time for a full statement to be made by the two Administering Authorities at the present session of the Council and it is hoped that this will be ready by the 26th February.

16. The French Government has undertaken to make a statement on the electoral methods to which reference was made in the petitions which came before the 4th Committee, and the British authorities are confident that the French delegation will be able to show from the results of the investigation undertaken by the French Government that, as already stated by the French representative at the 4th Committee, the electoral methods employed in French Togoland were fair and that the election results accurately reflect opinion in the two Trust Territories.

17. Against this background it is the hope of the two Administering Authorities that the Trusteeship Council will be able to endorse the proposals for the future operation of the Consultative Commission outlined above and that it will urge the unification parties to join in the work of the Commission so that it may fulfill the terms of reference which have already been endorsed by the Trusteeship Council.

18. The two Administering Authorities regard it as of the utmost importance that a satisfactory solution to the Ewe problem be found and in order to enlist as much support as possible for this action, it is hoped that the other Administering Authorities on the Council will be able to support this line of approach. If the other Administering Authorities find it possible to support this line, it is proposed to convey to them in due course the full text of the Anglo-French statement referred to above before it is delivered to the full Council.

19. For tactical reasons it is not the intention of the two Administering Authorities to make any approach to the non-Administering Authorities since they are of the opinion that any such approach would result in a leakage to the unification parties in West Africa and thereby lead to a series of artificially stimulated demonstrations and petitions which might jeopardise the success of the plan for securing the participation of the dissident parties in West Africa.

20. An approach has been made in the capitals of all the Administering Authorities seeking their support for this line and it is to be hoped that their Delegations to the Trusteeship Council will be able to lend their support to this as being the only practical procedure in all the circumstances.

IO Files

Minutes of Meeting of Administering Members of the Trusteeship Council, New York, February 16, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

US/T/95

Subject: Meeting of Administering Members to Discuss Ewe Problem

Participants:

Sir Alan Burns Mr. W. A. C. Mathieson	United Kingdom Delegation
Ambassador Roger Garreau Mr. Henri Laurentie Mr. Francis Hure	French Delegation
Mr. Pierre Ryckmans Mr. Jacques Houard	Belgian Delegation
Mr. D. O. Hay Mr. Roy Peachey	Australian Delegation
Mr. G. R. Laking Mr. Charles C. Craw	New Zealand Delegation
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre Mr. Vernon McKay	United States Delegation

Upon the invitation of Sir Alan Burns, representatives of the six administering Members of the Trusteeship Council met at the offices of the UK Delegation in the Empire State Building from 11:00 a. m. to 12:45 p. m. on Friday, February 16. The main purpose of the meeting, as stated by Sir Alan Burns, was to enable the British and French Delegations to explain their proposals for dealing with the Ewe problem. Sir Alan said the British and French Delegations hoped that the other Administering Authorities, and the Trusteeship Council, would be able to approve these proposals.

Sir Alan stated that either he or Ambassador Garreau would present to the Council a joint Anglo-French statement summarizing the facts regarding the elections to the enlarged Anglo-French Standing Consultative Commission. At the moment, he said, he and Ambassador Garreau each thought the other should introduce the joint statement. The Joint statement would be printed and circulated as a Council document.

With regard to the elections in British Togoland, Sir Alan said that there had been no difficulties. The people had been satisfied. Only one petition protesting these elections had been received, and it had no validity.

Ambassador Garreau then commented on the elections in French Togoland. He said that an investigation had been held and that a special representative was coming to the Trusteeship Council to pre-

sent a report on this investigation. The investigation had revealed that the elections were perfectly fair, and that absolutely no pressure had been exerted by the government to influence the elections. The elections had shown that the Ewe unity party (Comite de l'Unite Togolaise) was only a small minority in the whole of the two Togos although it was a majority in the Ewe area. After the first stage of the elections, the Ewe unity party had seen that it would win only six seats, and had decided to boycott the second stage of the elections. The French had postponed the second stage of the voting. The French then held the elections anyway and the pro-French party, the Parti du Progres, had elected candidates to all six of the seats which otherwise would have gone to the unity party.

In this situation, Ambassador Garreau said, the French had to decide between two alternatives in formulating a position to be presented to the 8th session of the Trusteeship Council. On the one hand, they could unseat the six Parti du Progres candidates from the seats they won as a result of the unity party's boycott. But they had decided this would be extremely difficult, in fact, illegal, as the Parti du Progres had won these seats in a fair election. Consequently, the French had decided upon a second alternative—to leave those six seats to the Parti du Progress, and to enlarge the Commission further in order to give seats to the unity party. Because of this enlargement of the Commission, the French had agreed to increase the extra seats for the unity party proportionately, from 6 to 8. As the unity party was given one seat in any case without an election, its total representation would be 9 seats out of 60 (38 for French Togoland and 22 for British Togoland). Sir Alan explained that this would also mean 5 extra seats for British Togoland, which would be divided up, one for each of five districts. Ambassador Garreau concluded by expressing the hope that the Trusteeship Council would adopt a resolution asking the Ewes to participate on this basis in the enlarged Commission.

Mr. Ryckmans (Belgium) expressed the belief that the first question in which the non-administering members of the Trusteeship Council would be interested was whether the elections were fair. Mr. Ryckmans (Belgium) asked Ambassador Garreau if the report which the Special Representative would bring to the Council was really convincing on this point. If not, the non-administering members would want new elections. Ambassador Garreau answered that the report would be absolutely convincing.

Mr. Laking (New Zealand) thought the non-administering members might take the following position: they might say they had accepted the British-French proposal for an enlarged commission in the beginning because the British and French had said it would con-

tribute to a solution of the problem. But now it appeared that even if the Ewes were persuaded to participate, they would be completely outvoted. The non-administering members might therefore ask, "What does this do for the Ewes?" Ambassador Garreau's only comment on this question was that the Ewes are a minority in the two Togos.

Mr. Ryckmans said, in partial response to Mr. Laking's question, that the Ewes might have a chance to convince the others of the merits of their case. If the results of the Consultative Commission indicate that the majority does not want unification, then the Trusteeship Council could take up the question of whether the Ewes could secede from the two Togolands.

Mr. Sayre remarked that the immediate objective was to get the Ewes to participate. The question before the group, he said, was a practical one. It was not a question of apportioning blame or challenging the validity of the elections. Everyone might agree that the Ewes were at fault in boycotting the elections. But what of it? A practical solution which would induce them to participate must now be searched for, in order to enable the Trusteeship Council to complete the consultation process it had agreed upon. Mr. Sayre quoted the conclusion of the visiting mission: "In closing these observations the Mission feels that it is its duty to point out that the problem has attained the force and dimensions of a nationalistic movement and that a solution should be sought with urgency in the interest of peace and stability in that part of the world." He pointed out that the Mission was made up of practical and responsible persons, including Mr. Gerig of the United States.

The question in his own mind, Mr. Sayre said, was whether the Ewes would accept the Anglo-French proposal. Whether it was a fair proposal or an unfair proposal, would the Ewes accept it? Mr. Sayre then asked Sir Alan and Ambassador Garreau if they thought the Ewes would accept it. Ambassador Garreau said he didn't know. He then asserted that the Trusteeship Council had decided to appoint a Consultative Commission. The first duty of the petitioners, he declared, was to comply with the Trusteeship Council decision. But they had not done so. He declared that France could not be "bullied" by a small fraction of the population; this would be undemocratic and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations (at this point, Mr. Ryckmans intervened to comment that a statement such as the one just made by Ambassador Garreau should not be made publicly before the Trusteeship Council).

Sir Alan also said he didn't know whether the Ewes would accept the new Anglo-French proposal. Following Ryckmans' suggestion, he said that if they did participate, they would have an opportunity to convert others to their point of view.

Mr. Sayre then stated that the Department of State was at present studying the problem, and had instructed him to seek certain information from the United Kingdom and France which would help the Department in formulating a position. He then read from the Department's telegraphed instructions the following question: "Would it be feasible to hold new elections to the Consultative Commission organized on a simplified basis in both Togolands?"

Ambassador Garreau said he had no instructions from his government on this point, but he was positive that new elections would be unacceptable to France, as they would imply a condemnation of France. Moreover, new elections would lose time and the Ewe unity party might not get as many seats as they were now assured of under the new Anglo-French proposal. The Communist party, he asserted, had entered the picture and was now exploiting the situation, which was bad for France because France was responsible for maintaining peace. Ambassador Garreau concluded with the categorical statement that France would not accept new elections.

Mr. Sayre again stated that there was no question of doubting the validity of the first elections. The question was a practical one of finding a proposal which the Ewes and the United Nations would accept, thereby enabling the Council to complete the consultative process it had begun.

Mr. Ryckmans, in partial response to Mr. Sayre's question, thought that the Ewes probably would not accept the proposal—but he thought the Council should tell them anyway that they should participate. After they had participated, if their views did not prevail, they could appeal to the Council again, and the Council could take up the question of whether the Ewes had a "right of succession". Mr. Ryckmans doubted the advisability of new elections. The Africans, he said, were not ripe for elections. If the Trusteeship Council asked for another vote, the people might vote differently, against their own convictions.

Sir Alan stated that the British had never considered the possibility of new elections in British Togoland.

Ambassador Garreau intervened to say that if the question of elections were raised in the Trusteeship Council, a proposal might be made for an international supervisory committee for the elections. This would be quite intolerable as it would enable the Secretariat to intervene. Ambassador Garreau then repeated at some length a denunciation he had made on several previous occasions of Daniel Chapman, a Gold Coast Ewe on the UN Secretariat. Chapman is now in the Gold Coast on leave from his UN job. Garreau said Chapman may not be making public speeches now, but is certainly intriguing privately on behalf of the Ewes. Ambassador Garreau also said that he has a photostatic copy of a long letter from Chapman to Sylvanus Olympio giving Olympio advice on the Ewe question.

Mr. McKay [1] remarked that he thought Mr. Ryckmans was right in saying that the Trusteeship Council ought to try to carry through the consultative process it had begun. Mr. McKay hoped a way could be found to induce the Ewes to participate. Since the administering authorities considered that new elections were not feasible, he wondered if the discussion could revert for a moment to the two alternatives Ambassador Garreau had mentioned in his opening remarks. Ambassador Garreau had said that the second alternative had been decided upon, namely, the present Anglo-French proposal. Mr. McKay wondered if the first alternative, namely, placing six Comité de l'Unité Togolaise candidates in the seats won by default by the Parti du Progres, would be more likely to induce the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise to participate in the work of the Commission. He wondered if there was any possibility of reconsidering the decision, and reverting to this first alternative. Mr. Laurentie responded in the negative.

Sir Alan then asked whether he should approach Mr. Khalidy [2] to see if Mr. Khalidy would be willing to sponsor the resolution proposed by the British and French (the text of this resolution is attached). Mr. Sayre thought it would be better to wait until the administering authorities had further time to study the Anglo-French proposal.

Mr. Sayre wondered what would happen if the Ewes refused to participate in the Commission on the basis of the present proposals. Ambassador Garreau did not answer this question precisely, but gave a general reply to the effect that the Ewe unity faction was an insignificant group. At this point Mr. Ryckmans intervened to remind Ambassador Garreau that one couldn't get away from the fact that the Visiting Mission had concluded that the Ewe unity movement was very strong, and that the Trusteeship Council had endorsed this conclusion. He hoped that Ambassador Garreau would not state publicly in the Council that the Ewe unity group was insignificant. The question now was to find means of reconciling Ewe aspirations with the wishes of the rest of the Togolanders.

Mr. Mathieson (UK) expressed the opinion that the Council should tell the Ewes to take part in the Commission, and the Council should not allow itself to be blackmailed by the Ewes.

Mr. Laking replied that he thought, on the contrary, that the Trusteeship Council would serve no useful purpose in passing this resolution if it would not be accepted.

Mr. Huré (France), in response to Mr. Laking's earlier question, said that nobody knew whether the Ewes would abide by the terms of the resolution being proposed by the British and French.

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[1] Donald Vernon McKay, Specialist on Dependent Area Affairs. McKay drafted this U.S. version of the minutes of meeting.

[2] Awni Khalidy, Representative of Iraq on the Trusteeship Council.

Mr. Laking wondered whether the Council would want to pass such a resolution if nobody knows what results it might produce.

Mr. Mathieson (presiding following Sir Alan's departure for another engagement at 12:30), suggested adjournment in order to give those present further time for study of the Anglo-French proposals. It was tentatively agreed that a second meeting on the subject would be held at 11 a. m. on Wednesday, February 21.

Mr. Sayre again remarked that he wanted to make it clear the US had not yet taken a position, but had asked its questions today for the purpose of obtaining information.

[Here follow informal, off-the-record remarks by some of the representatives.]

[Enclosure]

CONFIDENTIAL

SKELETON DRAFT RESOLUTION TO INDICATE THE MAIN POINTS WHICH THE FRENCH AND UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATIONS WOULD WISH TO SEE EMBODIED IN THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION ON THE EWE PROBLEM

The Trusteeship Council

Having considered the General Assembly resolution of the 2nd December, 1950 (document A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting with satisfaction the statements made by the Administering Authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for elections to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the Trust Territories of Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under British Administration;

Considering that these methods were such as to enable all sections of the population to express their true opinions;

Noting that certain groups in the two Trust Territories declined to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

Regrets that, as a result, it has not been possible for certain points of view to be expressed in the Commission;

Notes with approval the steps which the Administering Authorities propose to take in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the Commission;

Urges these groups to take advantage of these proposals and to take part accordingly in the second session of the Commission;

Recalls its resolution of the 14th July, 1950; and

Invites the Administering Authorities to proceed as soon as possible with further implementation of the plans set out in document T/702 and to report to the Council at its next session on the work of the enlarged Consultative Commission.

745K.00/2–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs (Cargo)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1951.

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Ambassador Roger Garreau, French Representative on the Trusteeship Council
M. Paulin Baptiste, French Legal Expert who investigated Consultative Commission elections in French Togoland
M. Gabriel Rosaz, Attaché, French Embassy
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND [1]
Mr. Jefferson Jones, UND [2]
Mr. William Cargo, UND

Ambassador Garreau, at his request, called on Mr. Gerig to discuss the Ewe problem which is to be considered in the current session of the Trusteeship Council. He brought with him M. Baptiste, who had just returned from French Togoland where he had been sent by the French Government to investigate the elections to the Consultative Commission held pursuant to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly last Fall. Ambassador Garreau handed to Mr. Gerig a copy of the report prepared by M. Baptiste and said that the report was being sent to the Secretariat for distribution to the members of the Trusteeship Council as the report of the French Government on the conduct of the elections. He summarized the report by saying that no election irregularities on the part of officials had been found, although the pro-unification C.U.T. (*Comité de l'Unité Togolaise*) had exerted great pressure on the population during the election campaigns.

Ambassador Garreau then indicated that the purpose of his call was to explain the proposals which France and the United Kingdom intended to present jointly to the Trusteeship Council on the Ewe question and to express the hope that the United States would be able to support these proposals. (Ambassador Garreau outlined the Anglo-French proposals as presented to the Department in *Aide-Mémoires* recently received from the French and British Embassies. The plan calls for the further enlargement of the Standing Consultative Commission by 13 members, 8 to be selected for French Togoland by the C.U.T. and 5 to be selected for British Togoland by the existing parties in proportion to their present strength in the Consultative Commission.) In explaining the basis of the Anglo-French proposals, Ambassador Garreau stated that the two governments had rejected

[1] O. Benjamin Gerig, Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs.
[2] J. Jefferson Jones, III, Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

certain other alternatives. He said that completely new elections had been rejected, because that would imply that the administering authorities had conducted the elections improperly. Such a solution was therefore regarded by Ambassador Garreau as inadmissible. The two administering authorities had also rejected the possibility of annulling the elections in French Togoland for the six seats which clearly would have gone to the C.U.T. had they participated in the second stage of the elections. He pointed out that the supporters of the anti-unification Progress Party (the Pedro Olympio group), who were now occupying those seats, had complied fully with the electoral regulations; and the French Government felt it difficult to unseat them merely because the C.U.T. did not participate in the second stage of the elections. Accordingly, the French Government had concluded that the most feasible way to make a further effort to secure the cooperation of pro-unification Ewes was to allow the six Progress Party supporters to retain their seats and, as the Anglo-French proposal provides, to increase the membership of the Consultative Commission by adding C.U.T. representatives. He hoped that the Trusteeship Council would urge the C.U.T. to participate on this basis in the work of the Consultative Commission and that the United States would lend its support to this plan.

Mr. Gerig pointed out that we were faced with the practical problem of whether or not the Ewes who favored Ewe unification would participate on the basis of the Anglo-French proposals. If they would not participate, he wondered how it would be possible for the Consultative Commission to ascertain the "real wishes and interests" of all the inhabitants of the two Togolands as its terms of reference required. Mr. Gerig said that the new Anglo-French proposal would commend itself to us if it showed promise of Ewe participation. He then referred to the increasing difficulties which would likely arise for France if the Ewe question continued to be an issue in the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. We felt that every effort should be made to avoid the Ewe problem developing into an insoluble problem for the United Nations. He felt that this would place France as well as the other administering members in a most difficult position. The United States wished to do everything possible to help find a practical solution of the long-standing Ewe problem.

Mr. Gerig inquired what were the long-range objectives of France with regard to the Ewes and what were their ideas as to how the question could be ultimately resolved. This question elicited no specific reply. However, Ambassador Garreau observed that questions of boundaries were not matters for consideration by the United Nations. He felt that the adoption by the Trusteeship Council of its resolution on the Ewe question in 1947 had been a mistake and implied that France might well have resorted to the domestic jurisdiction clause of

the Charter [3] at that time. Ambassador Garreau said that there were many similar boundary questions in Africa and indeed in independent states throughout the world. For example, there was the problem of the Kurds, a people who were divided among several states, who had a long historical record of existence as a people, and who generally desired separate recognition. He felt that there were many cases, such as this, where the questions required answers to be given by non-administering states.

Mr. Gerig observed that possibly other cases likewise merited attention, but that such a fact, if true, in no way argued against the strength or the desire for separate recognition held by the Ewes and of the particular necessity for taking steps to meet this desire if a very troublesome situation in West Africa were to be averted. He wondered whether thought had been given to the possibility of some kind of a Mixed Commission for the Ewe area, which would deal with common problems of local government and administration. Ambassador Garreau replied generally to this inquiry by referring to what he regarded as the dangers of the growth of Ewe nationalism. He said that to recognize the Ewe claims would be to replace the present North–South frontiers between the two Togolands by still stronger East–West frontiers. He said that this would cut off the peoples of the north from access to the sea and cause economic hardships for them. Ambassador Garreau referred also to the elections which had recently been held in the Gold Coast which, he said, had resulted in a majority of "fellow travelers" in the Gold Coast Legislature who "received their orders from the Cominform". (The United Kingdom does not, however, assess the Gold Coast elections in this way.) He thought that the communist threat in this area should not be under-estimated and was a factor which the United States should take into account in evaluating the Anglo-French proposals.

Mr. Gerig recalled that the United States had supported the Anglo-French proposals last summer to enlarge the Standing Consultative Commission only with some reluctance. He pointed out that we had been disappointed that the two administering authorities had found themselves unable to propose a substantive solution for the Ewe problem. It was therefore of considerable concern to us to see whether in fact the Consultative Commission could be made to work out as projected.

Mr. Gerig referred again to the high desirability of the administering authorities putting forth proposals that were so reasonable in character that the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly would feel that the pro-unification groups should accept them and participate in the work of the Consultative Commission. He felt that the present Anglo-French proposal left something to be desired when

[3] Article 2(7).

evaluated on this basis. He believed that France could well afford to be magnanimous in this situation and offer not one suggestion but perhaps two alternatives for the Ewes to choose from. If the Ewes then rejected both alternatives, their position would evoke much less sympathy. He felt that the French and British might well present the proposal which they had drawn up and, in addition, the alternative of new elections in the southern part of French Togoland where the Comite de l'Unite Togolaise had not participated. The groups which had failed to participate in the work of the Consultative Commission might be asked to choose which alternative they preferred.

In the ensuing discussion, Ambassador Garreau indicated his willingness to consider the possibility of new elections in the southern part of French Togoland, although he and M. Baptiste thought that new elections, if held, should be confined to the six seats which were the subject of the present Anglo-French proposals. Mr. Gerig indicated that the question of precisely what districts should be covered by new elections should be examined carefully. He said that this would be done, on our part, at once, and that it might be possible to discuss the question further with the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs and other interested officers of the Department. (This was agreeable to the French representatives and arrangements were made for a second meeting to be held in Mr. Sandifer's[4] office at 4:00 p. m.)

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[4] Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

745K.00/2–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Curtis C. Strong, Assistant on Dependent Area Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1951.

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Ambassador Garreau, French Representative on the Trusteeship Council
M. Paulin Baptiste, French legal expert who investigated Consultative Commission elections in French Togoland
M. Gabriel Rosaz, Attaché, French Embassy
Mr. Sandifer—UNA
Mr. Gerig—UND
Mr. Strong—UND
Mr. Godley—WE [1]
Mr. Lavalle—AF

Ambassador Garreau summarized the Anglo-French proposal for obtaining the participation of the pro-Ewe-unification parties in the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission. He stressed the fact that, although an investigation had shown the entire correctness of the elections in French Togoland, the French and British considered it desirable to make another attempt to obtain the participation in the Commission of the abstaining parties. They wished the Commission to carry out the functions for which it was designed and hoped that it might contribute to a solution of this complex problem.

Mr. Sandifer said that the chief concern of the United States was that any proposal made should enlist the cooperation of the Ewes and secure majority support in the United Nations. He said that we had studied the Anglo-French proposals, as well as the proposed joint resolution whereby the Trusteeship Council would endorse these proposals, and that we had an additional alternative to suggest. It was embodied in a modified version of the draft Anglo-French resolution, which he would ask Mr. Gerig to explain.

Mr. Gerig handed to Ambassador Garreau and the others present a draft containing the suggested modifications in language (copy attached). The principal new element would be to offer the Ewe-unification group a choice of an additional alternative consisting of the holding of new elections in the five districts of the southern part of French Togoland (namely Lome-town, Lome-subdivision, Tsevie, Palime (Klouto), Anecho, and Atakpame).

Ambassador Garreau said he had indicated to Mr. Gerig in their earlier conversation that the French Government might be willing to

[1] G. McMurtrie Godley II, of the Office of Western European Affairs.

propose the holding of new elections in those areas where the anti-unification party had been elected by a minority of electors due to the abstention of the pro-unification party (namely Lome-town, Lome-subdivision, Tsevie, and Palime (Klouto)), but he saw no reason for new elections in Anecho and Atakpame, where he understood that the anti-unification party had clearly won the election.

Mr. Gerig thought that new elections might be proposed in all areas where the Ewes were the predominant, or a substantial, element of the population even though in the two districts the result might be the same. This would obviate most of the C.U.T. complaints.

There was some discussion of possible modifications in the language of the United States alternative relative to the holding of new elections. Mr. Strong asked if it were not true that the pro-unification party had abstained from participation in the elections in Anecho and Atakpame, as well as in the other four districts and M. Baptiste indicated that this was true, although in these two districts a majority of the electors had participated and had voted for the Parti du Progres. To hold new elections in these two districts would throw into question the validity of elections properly won by majority votes.

Ambassador Garreau agreed and did not think the French Government could agree to new elections in these two districts. He noted the serious difficulties that such a decision would make for local administrators, and indicated that he felt sure the local administration would strongly oppose this part of the proposal.

Mr. Sandifer said we did not question the validity of the elections and that we appreciated the difficulties that new elections might cause. To offer new elections in all six of the southern districts would indeed be a concession on the part of the French Government, but we were inclined to feel that it would be an act of statesmanship. We thought that to make a proposal that would not obtain the participation of the pro-unification group would not be fruitful, and that every effort should be made to frame a proposal that would obtain such participation, as well as the support of a majority of the Members of the United Nations. Taking these considerations into account, we felt that new elections in the six districts would offer a reasonable choice.

Ambassador Garreau asked as a matter of tactics whether we had in mind joining the British and French in sponsoring the resolution as modified, or whether we were considering introducing the modified language as an amendment. If the latter, were we considering obtaining co-sponsorship of the amendment from one or two non-administering Members of the Council. Mr. Gerig said that we were considering an amendment and would probably seek co-sponsorship of it along the lines Ambassador Garreau mentioned.

Mr. Sandifer said we would wish to know, before submitting such an amendment, whether it was acceptable to the French and British.

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Ambassador Garreau said he would have to refer our proposal to his government and to the British Government. He was extremely doubtful as to the acceptability to his government of new elections in Anecho and Atakpame; however, he would transmit the United States alternative to his government in the language of our modified draft. He wished to know whether, if our amendment were adopted, we would support the amended resolution as a whole. Mr. Sandifer replied that if our amendment was accepted we would be able to support the proposal as a whole.

Ambassador Garreau, in closing, indicated that it would be necessary to postpone consideration of the Ewe question by the Trusteeship Council, presently scheduled to begin Monday, February 26, as it might take at least a week to receive a reply from Paris.

Note: Mr. Godley and Mr. Lavalle, after the departure of the French representatives, indicated general agreement with the approach contained in the United States proposal as explained by Messrs. Sandifer and Gerig.

[Attachment]

PROPOSED REVISION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION SUGGESTED BY FRENCH AND UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATIONS [2]

The Trusteeship Council

Having considered the General Assembly resolution of the 2nd December 1950 (document A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting with satisfaction the statements made by the Administering Authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for elections to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the Trust Territories of Togoland under French administration and Togoland under British administration;

Considering that these methods were such as to enable all sections of the population to express their true opinons;

Noting that certain groups in the two Trust Territories declined to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

Regrets that, as a result, it has not been possible for certain points of view to be expressed in the Commission;

Notes with approval [the steps which] *that* the Administering Authorities propose to take *steps* in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the Commission;

Urges these groups to take advantage of these proposals and to take part accordingly in the second session of the Commission;

Recalls its resolution of the 14th July, 1950; and

[2] Revisions in the Anglo-French text indicated by brackets (omissions) and italics (additions).

Invites the Administering Authorities *concerned* to proceed as soon as possible with the further implementation of the plans [set out in document T/902] *to ascertain the real wishes and interests of the people concerned by means of an Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission, and for this purpose to offer to those groups which declined to take part in the previous elections a choice between the two following alternatives:*

a. the further enlargement of the Standing Consultative Commission by thirteen members, eight from French Togoland and five from British Togoland, the former to be selected by the C.U.T., the latter to be apportioned among the parties in proportion to their present representation,

or

b. the holding of new elections in the districts of Lomé-town, Lomé-subdivision, Tsevié, Palimé (Klouto), Anecho, and Atakpamé.

and to report to the Council at its next session on the work of the enlarged Consultative Commission.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Curtis C. Strong, Assistant on Dependent Area Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1951.

US/T/102

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Mr. J. K. Thompson, Colonial Attaché, British Embassy
Mr. D. C. Tebbit, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. O. B. Gerig, UND, Department of State
Mr. W. I. Cargo, UND, Department of State
Mr. C. C. Strong, UND, Department of State

Mr. Thompson and Mr. Tebbit called at the Department this morning. They were received by the above-named officers and presented them with a memorandum of today's date on the Ewe question (copy attached).[1] Mr. Thompson made clear that the contents were strictly in confidence between our two governments.

Mr. Gerig took the opportunity to hand Mr. Thompson a United States suggestion for an amendment to the proposed Anglo-French resolution on the Ewe question and to inform the British representatives that, as we had informed Ambassador Garreau yesterday, we were considering the possibility of introducing the modified language as an amendment and would like the reactions of the British and

[1] Not printed.

French to this proposal.[2] (The principal point in the modified language was to provide for offering to the Ewe-unification group the choice of an additional alternative to the present Anglo-French proposal for securing Ewe participation to the Consultative Commission; namely, the holding of new elections in the five districts of the southern part of French Togoland.)

Mr. Thompson was aware of our proposal, having seen Ambassador Garreau after the latter's call at the Department yesterday afternoon. He saw objections to our proposal, particularly from the viewpoint of the local administrators. He also felt that the holding of new elections would be harmful to the political education of the inhabitants of that part of West Africa, encouraging the belief that, if one lost an election, one only had to protest energetically to the United Nations to have a new election held. He felt that the holding of new elections where the first election was conceded to have been validly carried out was highly irregular. Mr. Gerig observed that the Anglo-French proposal to have a party which had failed to participate in the election select eight delegates was equally irregular; however, we were faced with a situation where exceptional measures were called for. He stressed the importance we attached to proposals being offered to the Ewes which provided the greatest likelihood of securing their participation in the work of the Consultative Commission, or, failing that, convincing the majority of United Nations Members that every possible effort had been made to secure their participation.

Mr. Thompson presumed that the French Government in Paris, having probably been informed by Ambassador Garreau of our proposal, might already be in touch with the British Government in London; however, he would also communicate with London and seek his Government's reactions.

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[2] See text of suggested revisions, *supra*.

645K.51T3/2–2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 22, 1951—1 p. m.

4959. Lack of understanding allegedly evinced by Department regarding proposed joint Anglo-French resolution concerning Ewe problem causing great concern Foreign Office. We were told that suggested measures by French and British to insure representation of Commission Togo Union in Consultative Commission and draft resolution agreed upon by French and British had been accepted by Ministry Overseas France, which is responsible for administration French Togoland, only after long struggle.

Foreign Office stated that any alternative measures, as suggested by Department as possible amendment to resolution, would create situation of endless recriminations, with no settlement of problem possible. Holding of new elections would be admission that original elections not properly conducted, and might give rise to demands for review of electoral results in districts other than those predominantly Ewe.

Ministry Overseas France would categorically refuse hold new general elections which they believe would create disorder in territory. French, and Foreign Office assures us that British also, consider that increase in size Consultative Commission with proportionate representation of Ewes based on results general elections recently held is only equitable settlement, and authority of Trusteeship Council should be brought into play to convince Ewes to take part.

Foreign Office has requested us to convey to Department its hope that latter will reconsider its present attitude and support Anglo-French proposals, since they consider this solution only means of putting end to what otherwise might develop into prolonged and increasingly complicated problem.

Sent Department 4959; repeated info London 1184.

BRUCE

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. D. Vernon McKay of the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] February 23, 1951.

US/T/100

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Mr. Awni Khalidy, Iraqi Delegation
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, US Delegation
Mr. Vernon McKay, US Delegation

On Mr. Sayre's invitation, Mr. Khalidy called this morning to discuss the Ewe problem.

Mr. Sayre opened the discussion by recalling that Mr. Khalidy and Mr. Gerig had worked together on the Visiting Mission to West Africa which had studied the Ewe problem. He hoped that the US and Iraq could continue to work together and could come up with a constructive proposal for dealing with this difficult question. Mr. Khalidy thanked Mr. Sayre and said he accepted this suggestion with enthusiasm. He said that as yet his own thinking had not crystallized into a definite plan.

Mr. Sayre then asked if Mr. Khalidy had heard of the Anglo-French proposal for dealing with the problem. Mr. Khalidy said that

he had been informed of the general lines of the Anglo-French proposal. However, he stated that he knew from one dependable source that the Sylvanus Olympio party would reject a proposal along these lines.

In order to obtain a further clarification of Mr. Khalidy's views, Mr. Sayre read the Anglo-French proposal (without the proposed US amendment) to Mr. Khalidy, and Mr. McKay pointed out what the practical effect of this proposal would be in terms of the relative strength of the P.T.P. (Parti Togolais du Progres) and C.U.T. (Comite de l'Unite Togolaise) in the Consultative Commission.

Mr. Khalidy commented that any proposal of this sort would result in the Ewe unification party being overwhelmingly outnumbered. He said that in the south of French Togoland, for all practical purposes, there is no other party than the Ewe unification party of Sylvanus Olympio. The Pedro Olympio faction (P.T.P.) he said, is a very weak, make-shift pro-French arrangement which was artificially inspired and had no actual roots in the history, tradition and culture of the people. The Anglo-French proposal was thus nothing but a joke. (This is particularly interesting because the UK and French Delegations had previously informed the US Delegation that they felt that Mr. Khalidy could be persuaded to co-sponsor the Anglo-French proposal.)

The discussion then turned to the report on the elections in French Togoland which a special representative from France is expected to present to the Council next week. Mr. Sayre commented that Garreau had told him that this report would show that the elections were absolutely free, and that there had been no coercion by the government. Mr. Khalidy responded that this report would be quite "immaterial". Mr. McKay asked if Mr. Khalidy would explain why he considered that this report would be immaterial. Mr. Khalidy responded that of course the report would say that the elections were honest. Perhaps it might even be partly true that the French government did not exert direct pressure to induce voters to support the P.T.P. But the very nature of the French election system made it impossible for the C.U.T. to win a fair representation in the Consultative Commission. What happened in the French elections was this: in each district the chiefs or elders owed their position to the French, and these chiefs made it clear to the voters who they should vote for. This explained, he said, why the Parti du Progres won the election in Anecho and Atakpame, where the great majority of the people were actually supporters of the unification party. In other places he thought the local administrator probably did call together the chiefs or the government clerks and tell them how to vote.

Mr. McKay asked if Mr. Khalidy intended to express this view publicly in the Council. Mr. Khalidy responded that he certainly would

express the above opinions publicly in the Council. This was not only his Government's policy, but he considered that his personal honor and honesty as Chairman of the Visiting Mission was involved.

Mr. Sayre then asked Mr. Khalidy what ideas he could suggest for a solution. Mr. Khalidy responded that tentatively he thought new elections should be held, with the Council having agreed in advance on a fixed number of seats to be given to P.T.P. and C.U.T. Mr. Sayre wondered if new elections in the south would not be enough. Mr. Khalidy responded that this might be enough but the important thing was to fix the ratio of seats.

Mr. Sayre wondered if the C.U.T. would accept a proposal for new elections if the US and Iraq could join in such a proposal. Mr. Khalidy responded that he was afraid the C.U.T. would be very "vehement", although he said that he would accept anything that the C.U.T. would accept. He said that De Souza and Sylvanus Olympio are writing him regularly. Mr. Sayre asked if there was any way by which Mr. Khalidy could contact Olmypio to see if the unification party would accept a proposal for new elections. Mr. Khalidy responded that the French would know what he said if he cabled, and would open any letter that he wrote, so he did not think it would be possible to make such a contact.

Mr. Khalidy thought that possibly the oral petitioners from the Togoland Congress, if they appeared, could answer this question. Mr. McKay wondered if any rivalry were developing between Sylvanus Olympio and Togoland Congress leaders. Mr. Khalidy thought this was possible, but felt that the only thing to do under the circumstances was to wait and find out whether the Togoland Congress representatives could tell us what the C.U.T. would accept. Mr. Khalidy also thought it possible that Sylvanus Olympio might come again to the Council.

Mr. McKay called attention to the fact that it was important that Mr. Khalidy and Mr. Sayre have a common understanding of what kind of elections they were each referring to. On the one hand there might be new elections at the primary and secondary stages under the system used by the French in the previous elections. Mr. McKay assumed, from the remarks of Mr. Khalidy, however, that such an arrangement would not be satisfactory to him since the results of new elections on this basis would very likely return so large a number of Parti du Progres candidates that Mr. Khalidy would not find it acceptable. Mr. Khalidy responded that this was precisely the case. He was opposed to new elections on the old basis.

Mr. Khalidy again insisted that the ratio of P.T.P. and C.U.T. seats in the Consultative Commission was the important thing. Mr. McKay asked if Mr. Khalidy did not agree since the northerners outnumbered the southerners, that the C.U.T. would be outnumbered in the Com-

mission. Mr. Khalidy agreed, saying that he only insisted that in the south, where the C.U.T.'s following overwhelmingly outnumbered the P.T.P., the C.U.T. should have most of the representation. Mr. McKay asked if Mr. Khalidy had any figures in mind for this ratio. Mr. Khalidy responded that for French Togoland as a whole, the P.T.P. might be given 23 seats and the C.U.T. 18.

In response to a further question from Mr. Sayre, Mr. Khalidy made the following five suggestions (some of which overlap) as alternative proposals for dealing with the Ewe problem: (1) Do away with the Consultative Commission entirely and ask the administering authorities to come up with a new plan; (2) Do away with the Consultative Commission entirely and have the Trusteeship Council present a new plan to the administering authorities; (3) New elections to the Consultative Commission in all French Togoland on a new basis; (4) Have the Trusteeship Council and the administering authorities, either publicly in the Council or privately behind the scenes agree on a fixed ratio of P.T.P. and C.U.T. seats. (If 23 and 18 were decided upon, for example, the P.T.P. could then elect any 23 people it wanted, and the C.U.T. could elect any 18 people it wanted); (5) Do away with the present Consultative Commission in favor of a Mixed Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of (*a*) the administering authorities, (*b*) the Trusteeship Council, (*c*) the C.U.T., and (*d*) the P.T.P.

Mr. Khalidy also stated that he would gladly accept a UN supervised election or plebiscite. He pointed out that at the seventh session of the Council he had remarked that the elections proposed by the administering authorities would not be satisfactory unless they were under some form of Trusteeship Council control.

Mr. Sayre thanked Mr. Khalidy for these interesting suggestions, and it was agreed that Mr. Khalidy would call on Mr. Sayre again on Tuesday February 27 at 11 a. m. to discuss the problem further.

VERNON MCKAY

IO Files

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1951.

US/T/103

Subject: Ewe Problem

Participants: Mr. J. K. Thompson, Colonial Attaché, British Embassy
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones III, UND, Department of State

During my conversation with Mr. Thompson this morning regarding the visit to the United States of the Acting Chief of the External Affairs Branch of the Gold Coast Government, Mr. Michael de Normann Ensor, Mr. Thompson brought up the subject of the joint Anglo-French resolution on the Ewe question.

Mr. Thompson said that he was discouraged at the possibility of arriving at an agreement over this difficult problem. He added that this feeling was intensified by the reports which he had just received from New York setting forth Khalidy's views as to how the question should be dealt with.

Mr. Thompson said that he strongly doubted the advisability of holding new elections to the Consultative Commission because, in his opinion, a decision of the Council to this effect would set back the education of the Africans in democratic methods by at least ten years. He fears that if new elections to the Consultative Commission are held the African people will be given the impression that if a certain party does not win an election it is not necessary for it to abide by the electorate's decision but to demand another election.

I replied that while I considered that his argument had some validity, I did not think it was a completely convincing one in the present circumstances. In the first place, I pointed out that in my opinion some differentiation should be made between elections to a Consultative Commission and to a legislative body in any one of the African territories. I added that if the American suggestion for holding new elections in the southern districts of Togoland found general acceptance, we expected to emphasize that the administering powers had agreed to the new elections not from necessity but from out of their desire to be magnanimous so that there could be no doubt that the wishes of the majority of the Ewe people were taken account of in the Consultative Commission. Mr. Thompson said that logically he could understand our position on the matter, but that he was afraid that the average African would be unable to make the distinction between elections to the Consultative Commission and to territorial legislative assemblies.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. D. Vernon McKay of the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] February 27, 1951.

US/T/104

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Ambassador Roger Garreau, French Delegation
Mr. Henri Laurentie, French Delegation
M. Paulin Baptiste, French Legal Expert who investigated Consultative Commission elections in French Togoland
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, United States Delegation
Mr. Vernon McKay, United States Delegation

At Ambassador Garreau's request Mr. Sayre and Mr. McKay met with members of the French Delegation this afternoon to discuss the Ewe problem.

Mr. Garreau stated that he wished to convey to the United States Delegation the information that his Government rejected the suggested United States amendment to the Anglo-French proposal for dealing with the Ewe problem. He stated that the French Ambassador in Washington was approaching the Department at a high level this afternoon with the same information. Mr. Garreau expressed in strong terms his disappointment that the United States took this position at a time when the Western countries were trying to stand firm together in the face of a world crisis.

Mr. Garreau further stated that in any case he did not think that the Trusteeship Council was competent to deal with a question involving a change of political boundaries. He said that he had pointed this fact out to the Council three years ago but his advice had been ignored. If necessary, he said the French Government would refer the question of the Trusteeship Council's competence to the International Court of Justice.

Mr. Sayre expressed his regret at the sharp difference between the point of view of the French and United States Delegations on the Ewe problem. He said that the United States in no sense was attempting to challenge the validity of the French elections or apportion any blame regarding them. The United States Delegation was looking for a practical solution which would promote peace and stability in that part of the world. With regard to the competence of the Council, Mr. Sayre pointed out that no one had ever suggested that the Trusteeship Council could change political boundaries. However, he said that it was his personal view that in order to reach towards some con-

structive solution, it might be that the Council would wish on some occasion to make recommendations to the Administering Authorities on such a subject and presumably had the competence to do so. Mr. Sayre remarked, however, that he did not know what the official position of his Government would be.

VERNON MCKAY

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs (Cargo)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1951.

US/T/106

Subject: The Ewe Question

Participants: M. Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
M. Gabriel Rosaz, Attaché, French Embassy
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND
Mr. William Cargo, UND
Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley, WE

M. Daridan called, at his request, on Mr. Gerig to give to the Department the views of the French Government with regard to the possible amendment to the Anglo-French proposals suggested by the United States. (The proposal was to establish an additional alternative under which new elections would be held at both the first and second stages in the southern districts of French Togoland, including Anecho and Atakpamé.) M. Daridan explained that the French Government was greatly concerned about the Ewe problem. They regarded the Ewe movement as subject to communist influence and, in that sense, a danger. They believed that new elections would further disturb the political situation in the area and consequently were opposed to them. He expressed the hope that the United States would be able to support the original Anglo-French proposals and would not feel obliged to pursue the suggested amendment.

Mr. Gerig said that the United States had put forward the suggestion only in an effort to be helpful to France and thereby, of course, to be helpful to the United States and the other administering powers. M. Daridan replied that his Government understood that this was the spirit in which the suggestion had been made and regretted that there was not a meeting of minds at this stage about it. Mr. Gerig said that we felt that a proposal on the Ewe problem should either result in the participation of the pro-unification groups in the Consultative Commission or, in the event that these groups should still be unwilling

to participate, should make the refusal of these groups appear unreasonable to the great majority of Members of the United Nations. He said that the United States would be quite happy about the Anglo-French proposals if we could be assured that they would meet one of these objectives. Our present information, however, indicated that they would achieve neither. Mr. Gerig said that even if the United States supported the Anglo-French proposals, we believed that they could not receive more than the votes of the six administering powers and perhaps not all of those. They would accordingly not carry in the Trusteeship Council. In the General Assembly, he pointed out, the situation would be serious indeed, in view of the fact that the administering powers are but a small minority of the total membership. In that body, far-reaching proposals involving United Nations investigations or supervised elections might readily be made. On the other hand, if Iraq and other non-administering Members of the Trusteeship Council were to give their support to a suggestion such as the United States proposal, we believe that serious difficulties in the General Assembly might be averted. It was recognized that a proposal such as the one we had suggested would involve difficulties for the local administration, but it was felt that the facing of such problems now might avoid greater difficulties at a subsequent time.

M. Daridan indicated that he appreciated the force of these arguments, but that he was instructed by his Government to state that the amendment suggested by the United States was unacceptable and that if it was pursued in the Trusteeship Council the French Delegation would vote against it. He observed that the Ewe question was very complex and regretted that he had no compromise solution to put forward. Consequently, the position, at the present time, was as he had stated it.

M. Rosaz said that the position in the Trusteeship Council would no doubt be clearer after the various delegations had had an opportunity to study the report on the previous elections in French Togoland presented by Mr. Baptiste. Mr. Gerig said that this was no doubt true and that we felt that we should proceed slowly in this matter, taking into account the views of other Council Members.

M. Daridan said that he expected to have further communications from his Government on the Ewe question and that he would therefore hope to be able to discuss it further with Mr. Gerig. Mr. Gerig said that he would be glad to discuss the matter at any time.

645K.51T3/2–2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 27, 1951—8 p. m.

5040. Embtel 4959, February 22, 1951. Concurrently with Ambassador Bonnet's approach to Department [1] FonOff reiterated to us their disappointment and perplexity that Department persisted in jeopardizing joint Anglo-French resolution re Ewe problem by wishing to present amendment which would entail new elections and prolong difficulties with no assurance of settlement. They asserted that Department had not given convincing arguments which could in any way alter carefully prepared position British and French. Resolution, they said was result of two months' study and discussion between British and themselves, and they would be obliged to oppose any alterations which might be unfeasible and incompatible with their responsibilities as administering powers.

In conclusion FonOff deplored possible parading of lack of unanimity among North Atlantic powers before Trusteeship Council on Ewe problem. French unshakeably convinced they have fulfilled Council's instructions regarding elections and believe joint Anglo-French proposal equitable means for concluding problem.

Embassy in no position to judge question but is impressed with seriousness with which French regard matter and their desire to settle issue this session Trusteeship Council.

Sent Department 5040, repeated info London 1205.

BRUCE

[1] Ambassador Bonnet apparently did not approach the Department on the Ewe question until March 1; see the memorandum of conversation, *infra*.

350/3–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1951.

Subject: The Ewe Problem Before the Trusteeship Council

Participants: Ambassador Bonnet, M. Jean-Pierre Benard, First Secretary } French Embassy
Acting Secretary Webb
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND

Ambassador Bonnet, at his request, called on Secretary Webb today to present the views of his Government on the Ewe question as it is

[1] Initialed for the Acting Secretary of State by Francis E. Meloy, Jr., of the Executive Secretariat.

now developing in the Trusteeship Council. M. Bonnet, after explaining the main elements of the question, said that Paris was very much disturbed at the Department's suggestion in regard to the possibility of holding new elections in the southern part of Togoland, even elections at the second stage. Such elections, he felt, would not only reflect on the validity of the previous election but might cause confusion and even disturbances in that area which might be very difficult to deal with. On this point the local authorities in French Togoland were particularly concerned. He went on to say that the proposal which the French and British were about to lay before the Trusteeship Council, providing for the appointment of eight additional representatives of the Ewe people to the Consultative Commission, would, in the French view, be a fair way to compensate for the non-participation of the unification parties in the recent elections. The French Delegation believed that if the United States supported this proposal it would receive a majority and thus take care of a problem which has become embarrassing for everybody. He hoped, therefore, that we would support the French proposal and not put forward the suggestion for new elections which he said his Government was unable to accept.

Secretary Webb said that our suggestion had only been made informally to the French and the British and that it was put forward in the hope of contributing to a solution of the difficulty which had arisen. The last thing in our minds was to create more difficulties for the French and we thought that by offering the Ewes who refused to participate in the previous election a choice of two alternatives, it would be more difficult for them to reject either one and would, at the same time, secure wider support in the Trusteeship Council and perhaps obviate an acrimonious discussion later in the General Assembly. As to whether the French proposal would secure a majority if the United States supported it, Mr. Webb said that our estimate of the position was somewhat different from that expressed by M. Bonnet. We believed that even with our support of the French proposal, it was not likely to get a majority in the Council. Besides, we had considerable doubt as to whether it would be accepted by the discontented Ewe leaders themselves. The result, therefore, would be to leave the problem unsolved and perhaps even aggravated. Mr. Webb assured M. Bonnet, however, that the Department and our Delegation in New York were most anxious to make a positive contribution to a solution of this question and would continue to study the French proposal and any other proposal with that in view.

M. Bonnet said he had no doubt the Department was considering the question with a view to finding a constructive solution and this was very much appreciated by his Government. The question really resolved itself in a difference in the estimates which our two Delega-

tions attached to the voting position in the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Webb agreed that that difference existed and said that if we could be assured that the proposal would receive a Council majority and be accepted by the Ewe leaders, we would be most happy to support it. If, however, we were all turned down, it would be more difficult for the administering members, and especially the French and the British, immediately concerned, to find a way out of the impasse.

Mr. Webb asked Mr. Gerig if he had anything further to suggest and the latter said that our Delegation at the Trusteeship Council had not intended to speak against the French proposal. Further, what would be very helpful would be some indication that the French proposal for enlarging the Consultative Commission by appointment would be accepted by the Ewe leaders themselves. Our impression was, from indirect sources, that the Ewes were not likely to accept the French proposal, even if it secured a majority in the Council. Mr. Webb added that the strategy of our suggestion was in part that if a choice between two alternatives were offered to the Ewe leaders, it would be more difficult for them to reject both, and in doing so it would emphasize their unfairness and strengthen the position of the French and other administering members in the subsequent United Nations debates.

M. Bonnet thought that the Ewes would accept the single French proposal but if our alternative were put forward, they would almost certainly accept it in order to show that they did not need to accept the proposal made by the French. Mr. Gerig said that there was a possibility that the Ewes might reject both proposals on the ground that either one would still make them a minority in the Consultative Commission—a position which they evidently did not like. M. Bonnet and M. Benard agreed with this possibility and M. Bonnet added that the dislike of the Ewe unification party for being in a minority was probably the main reason why they boycotted the previous election.

Mr. Webb said that we fully understood the French position and he wished to repeat that our whole purpose was to be helpful in this difficulty. We would study the question further and would be glad to consult with the French in regard to any new developments. M. Bonnet concluded by saying that he would try to find out what the prospect of acceptance by the Ewes of the single French proposal would be and would let us know as soon as possible.

645K.51T3/2–2751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

4533. Dept has given careful study to points raised in Embtels 4959 [2] and 5040 [3] re Ewe problem as well as reasons given Dept by Ambs Garreau and Bonnet why Fr unable agree our suggested amendment.

US suggestions were made privately to Fr and Brit in effort be helpful meeting situation with which both confronted in TC and were motivated by fol considerations: (1) desirability that any proposal be acceptable to Ewes thus enabling fully representative Consultative Commission carry out intended functions; (2) desirability that such proposal, if not acceptable to Ewes, seem sufficiently reasonable to majority UN Members that they would blame failure Ewes to accept it on Ewes rather than Fr. Dept believes that present Anglo-French proposals will not receive TC majority and even if adopted would be rejected by Ewes and as result inflamed Ewe problem would arise in next GA. Result would be acrimonious debate with majority bloc non-administering powers securing adoption by GA more extreme proposals, such as UN investigating Comite, UN supervised elections, or UN supervised plebescite. Fr Govt will appreciate that adoption by GA of extreme proposal involving increased UN intervention in Ewe problem would establish precedent similar intervention in administration other trust territories.

Request Emb at its discretion bring these considerations to attention of Fr and assure them US does not consider its proposal implies that conduct of original elections in any way questionable. Emb also requested inform Fr we share objective of securing promptest solution Ewe problem in manner fairest to all elements concerned and one not likely cause subsequent serious difficulties in UN and locally. Dept agreed with Fr Emb Rep here that it would be desirable proceed slowly in TC taking into account views which will be expressed by TC Members fol their study Baptiste Report. At this stage USDel does not plan to speak on question or initiate action but will await trend of debate.

WEBB

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[1] Repeated for information to London as 3988 and to New York for USUN as 750.

[2] Dated February 22, p. 546.

[3] Dated February 27, p. 555.

745K.00/3-551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1951.

Subject: Ewe Question

Participants: Sir Alan Burns, United Kingdom Representative in the Trusteeship Council
Mr. C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. J. K. Thompson, Colonial Attaché, British Embassy
Mr. Hayden Raynor, BNA
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones III, UND

Sir Alan Burns stated that he would like to bring before the Department the views of the British with respect to the Ewe problem. He expressed the opinion that the gravity of the situation should not be minimized as he believed that failure to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problems would have unfortunate repercussions not only in the areas directly concerned but throughout the whole African continent. Failure to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Ewe problem might also adversely affect the procurement of strategic materials in Africa. Sir Alan asked if Department officials had observed a recent statement of the South African Prime Minister which was critical of the policy followed by the British in the Gold Coast on the basis that the British were moving too fast in granting self-government to the Colony. Sir Alan believed that if the Ewe problem was not solved it might afford a basis for further criticism by Mr. Malan of the British policy of promoting self-government in Africa with the greatest possible rapidity.

Sir Alan stated that the United Kingdom Government had been giving a great deal of thought to a means of reconciling the views of the French and United States Governments on the Ewe question. He wondered if the United States could accept a proposal whereby new secondary elections would be held for the six delegates from the four districts in French Togoland where the Ewe-unification group had a clear majority. He felt that there was some basis for the French objections to holding new elections in the two districts of Anecho and Atakpame (with a total of eight delegates), since the Baptiste Report clearly demonstrated that the *Parti Togolais du Progrès* had a clear majority in those two areas. Sir Alan said that if such a proposal was acceptable to the United States the British would strongly urge the French to accept. Mr. Jones said that, speaking personally, he doubted that the proposal which Sir Alan had advanced would fulfill

the objectives which the United States had in mind in suggesting its proposal to the French viz, the adoption of the Trusteeship Council of a resolution which would secure the cooperation of the Ewe-unification groups or, at the very least, would appear sufficiently reasonable to the majority of the non-administering Members of the United Nations as to obtain their approval. Mr. Raynor said that if the British submitted their proposal, as outlined above, to the French it would be better if they did not indicate to the French that such a proposal was acceptable to the United States.

Sir Alan said that since it was the preliminary reaction of the United States officials present that the proposal which he had sketched was not acceptable, he wondered if it would not be preferable for the Council to approve a resolution merely taking note of the statements of the two Administering Authorities concerned and inviting them to continue their efforts to complete the participation in the Consultative Commission in such a way that it would reflect the views of all sections of the population. He believed that the adoption of a "holding resolution" would give more time to the French and British in their attempts to solve the problem. He also said that he thought that French, British, and United States Governments should consult closely during the interim period that the passage of such a resolution would afford in order to cooperate in working out substantive proposals. He hoped that the Department would participate in such discussions in order to assist the British in prevailing upon the French to take a more reasonable line in connection with this problem than they had heretofore adopted.

Mr. Jones remarked that of the two proposals which Sir Alan had described he thought that a resolution along the lines of the last proposal was to be preferred. He asked what Sir Alan would think of adding another paragraph to such a resolution requesting the Administering Authorities to present proposals for the substantive solution of the problem at the next meeting of the Council. Sir Alan replied that while he anticipated that the French and British would be in a position to present substantive proposals at the next Council meeting he did not think that it would be necessary to spell this out in the resolution. Mr. Jones also asked what the British reaction would be to a proposal providing for the establishment of a committee to assist the Administering Authorities concerned in working out substantive proposals for the solution of the Ewe problem. Sir Alan said that he would not object to the establishment of such a committee provided that it did not visit the two Trust Territories of Togoland.

At the end of the meeting arrangements were made for Sir Alan to call upon Mr. Sandifer the next day at 10 a. m., and he was informed that at that time the Department would be in a position to give a definitive reply to the proposals which he had advanced.

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Jones) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1951.

Subject: Position to be Adopted by the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council on the Ewe Question

Recommendations:

It is recommended:

1. that the United States Delegation introduce an amendment to the proposed Anglo-French Resolution (Enclosure 1[2]) along the lines set forth in Enclosure 2, after having determined that such an amendment is acceptable to the French and British Delegations.
2. that, as to the language of our amendment, the Delegation, at its discretion, seek to obtain the agreement of the French and British Delegations to the modifications in language set forth in Enclosure 3.
3. that the Delegation seek to obtain the co-sponsorship of one or more non-administering members of the Council for our proposed amendment.

Discussion:

The above recommendations are based on the following considerations:

1. The Anglo-French proposal for obtaining the participation of the Ewe-unification groups in the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission and the proposed resolution which would endorse their proposals seem unlikely to be adopted by the Council. Even should they be adopted, it is very doubtful if they would secure Ewe participation in the Consultative Commission or persuade a majority of Members of the United Nations that every feasible step had been taken to obtain Ewe participation.
2. The United States proposal to hold new elections in the southern section of French Togoland as a means of obtaining Ewe participation in the Consultative Commission is entirely unacceptable to the French, and to the British as well.
3. Consultations have been carried on both in New York and Washington with the British and French in order to work out an acceptable solution.
4. Sir Alan Burns has suggested both to the Delegation in New York and to officers of the Department that a way out of the impasse might be for the Trusteeship Council merely to take note of the steps thus far taken by the two Administering Authorities in regard to the Ewe question, to request them to continue their efforts to set up procedures for consulting all elements of the population of the two Togo-

[1] Forwarded to New York under cover of a memorandum from Jones to Ambassador Sayre, March 6.

[2] For text of enclosure 1, see enclosure to minutes of meeting of administering members, February 16, p. 537.

lands, and to request them further to report back to the next session of the Council.

5. The United States Delegation drafted an amendment to the proposed Anglo-French resolution to achieve the objectives outlined by Sir Alan. The resolution as amended is attached as Enclosure 2. This draft was discussed with members of the French Delegation on the afternoon of March 5 and Ambassador Garreau expressed full agreement with it.

6. The changes in drafting set forth in Enclosure 3 are proposed by UND in the interest of harmonizing the original draft with our amendment. However, the Delegation should consult closely with the French and British as to the exact language of the amendment and if the British and French Delegations find it impossible to accept any of the drafting changes, the United States should not press them.

Enclosure 2

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION DISCUSSED BY U.S. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL DELEGATION WITH FRENCH TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL DELEGATION ON MARCH 5, 1951

The Trusteeship Council

Having considered the General Assembly resolution of the 2nd December 1950 (document A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting with interest the statements made by the Administering Authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for elections to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the Trust Territories of Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under British Administration;

[*Considering* that these methods were such as to enable all sections of the population to express their true opinions;] [3]

Noting that certain groups in the two Trust Territories declined to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

Regrets that, as a result, it has not been possible for certain points of view to be expressed in the Commission;

Notes with approval that the Administering Authorities propose to take steps in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the Commission;

Urges these groups to take advantage of these proposals and to take part accordingly in the second session of the Commission;

Recalls its resolution of the 14th July 1950;

Invites the Administering Authorities concerned to proceed as soon as possible with the further implementation of the plans set out in document T/702, or with any other methods for completing the com-

[3] Brackets in the source text.

position of the Consultative Commission in such a manner as to make it representative of the principal elements in the population; and

Recommends, whether or not the composition of the Commission is completed, that the Administering Authorities formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practicable solution of the question, and inform the Council accordingly [at its next session].[4]

Enclosure 3

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION DISCUSSED BY U.S. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL DELEGATION WITH FRENCH TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL DELEGATION ON MARCH 6, 1951, WITH DRAFTING CHANGES SUGGESTED SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE DEPARTMENT

The Trusteeship Council

Having considered the General Assembly resolution of the 2nd December, 1950 (document A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting with interest the statements made by the Administering Authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for elections to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the Trust Territories of Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under British Administration;

(*Note: The following considerandum to be omitted*)

[*Considering* that these methods were such as to enable all sections of the population to express their true opinions:] [4]

Noting that certain groups in the two Trust Territories declined to take part in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

Regrets that, as a result, it has not been possible for certain points of view to be expressed in the Commission;

Notes with approval that the Administering Authorities propose to take steps in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the Commission;

Invites the Administering Authorities concerned to proceed as soon as possible with the further implementation of the plans set out in document T/702, or with any other methods for completing the composition of the Consultative Commission in such a manner as to make it representative of the principal elements in the population;

(*Note: The following two paragraphs to be shifted so as to come after, rather than precede, the above paragraph; the "urges" paragraph to be redrafted as follows:*)

[4] Brackets in the source text.

Urges the groups which declined to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission to cooperate with the Administering Authorities to this end;

Recalls its resolution of the 14th July, 1950; and

(*Note: The words underlined* [5] *at the end of the following paragraph to be added*)

Recommends, whether or not the composition of the Commission is completed, that the Administering Authorities place before the Council as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practicable solution of the question, and inform the Council accordingly *at its next session.*

[5] Printed here as italics.

745K.00/3–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1951.

Subject: The Ewe Question

Participants: Sir Alan Burns, United Kingdom Representative in the Trusteeship Council
Mr. J. K. Thompson, Colonial Attaché, British Embassy
Mr. Michael de Normann Ensor, Acting Chief, External Affairs Branch, Gold Coast Government
Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, UNA
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones III, UND
Mr. Curtis C. Strong, UND

Mr. Sandifer stated that the appropriate officers in the Department had been considering the two suggestions which Sir Alan had made at the meeting yesterday with respect to proposals on the Ewe question which might be submitted to the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Sandifer said that the Department had been impressed with Sir Alan's suggestion that a resolution be introduced in the Council taking note of the statements made by the administering authorities concerned and requesting them to continue their efforts to complete the composition of the Consultative Commission. Consequently, we had embodied his idea in an amended version of the original Anglo-French resolution and had already discussed our amended version with members of the French Delegation in New York. The French Delegation, including Ambassador Garreau, found the amended version acceptable but would prefer to have the major changes introduced as an amendment after the

French and British had introduced the original Anglo-French resolution. It was our understanding that the French Delegation was now consulting Paris to ascertain the French Government's reaction. Mr. Sandifer then gave to Sir Alan a copy of the amended resolution which we had discussed with the French [enclosure (attached) to Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. Sandifer of March 6,[1] entitled "Position to be adopted by the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council on the Ewe Question"].[2]

Sir Alan said he thought that the amended resolution was an excellent one and that it was acceptable to the United Kingdom Government. He would be glad to urge the French to accept this draft, and particularly to make every effort to obtain the approval of the French Government in time for the Anglo-French resolution and the United States amendment to be submitted to the Council when it began its discussion of the Ewe question. Sir Alan suggested that it might be well to attempt to obtain another non-administering member of the Council in addition to Iraq to co-sponsor the amendment with the United States. He thought that it would not be difficult to prevail upon either the Dominican Republic or Thailand to co-sponsor with Iraq and the United States.

With regard to the following clause in the Anglo-French resolution, which the United States had suggested might be omitted, Sir Alan expressed doubt that the French Government would be willing to agree to its omission:

"*Considering* that these methods were such as to enable all sections of the population to express their true opinions".

Mr. Ensor remarked that he considered it preferable to retain this clause, in as much as its inclusion might be a factor of importance in prevailing upon the Ewes to cooperate with the French and British authorities in arriving at a substantive solution of the problem.

The British representatives thought that it would be desirable that the phrase "at its next session" be added at the end of the paragraph recommending that the administering authorities formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practicable solution of the question and inform the Council accordingly. The basis of the British views on this question was that the inclusion of the phrase might be used as a lever with the French to prevail upon the latter that it was necessary to agree upon substantive proposals for the solution of the problem before the next session of the Council.

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[1] The Jones memorandum to Sandifer with its enclosures 2 and 3 is printed *supra*. The enclosure to which reference is made herein is enclosure 2.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. D. Vernon McKay of the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] March 7, 1951.

US/T/109

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Sir Alan Burns, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Henri Laurentie, Mr. Francis Huré } French Delegation
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, Mr. Benjamin Gerig, Mr. Vernon McKay } United States Delegation

Members of the British and French Delegations called on Mr. Sayre at his request this morning to discuss the text of a ninth draft of a proposed draft resolution on the Ewe problem.[1]

Mr. Sayre presented the British and French representatives a text which included (1) the terms of a resolution which Mr. Khalidy of the Iraqi Delegation yesterday told members of the US Delegation he was willing to accept, and (2) three additional phrases to which Khalidy had indicated strong opposition but which members of the US Delegation felt Khalidy might still be persuaded to accept.

Sir Alan Burns and Mr. Laurentie agreed to the text of this resolution providing it included the three points which Khalidy had not yet accepted. It was suggested that this text be submitted, if Khalidy would agree, as an Iraq-US amendment to the Anglo-French text. In a move to increase the chances of getting Khalidy to accept this text, Sir Alan asked Mr. Laurentie if the UK might not introduce the Anglo-French text as a UK resolution alone. This might make it easier for Khalidy to accept the idea of proposing the new text as an amendment. Mr. Khalidy had previously informed both the US and UK Delegations that he would not under any circumstances agree to the idea of an Iraqi-US amendment to something that France had proposed, as this would give France an initiative which his delegation could not agree to. Mr. Laurentie accepted Sir Alan's suggestion.

Sir Alan said that if Khalidy refused to accept the new text, he thought we should revert to the text which he had agreed to yesterday in a meeting at the Department of State. Mr. McKay remarked that the new text was a text which would get France, the UK and the US into a lot less trouble in the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly. He wondered, since the British and French had just agreed to the new text in principle, if it would not be better to go ahead with the new text, with or without Khalidy's co-sponsorship.

[1] There is no record of nine drafts as such in either the Department of State files or the files of the United States Mission to the United Nations.

Sir Alan agreed and suggested that the Thailand and Dominican Delegations be approached to seek their agreement or possible co-sponsorship of the new text whether or not Khalidy agreed to co-sponsorship. Mr. Sayre replied that the US Delegation would approach the Thailand and Dominican Delegations. Sir Alan suggested that if Khalidy refused to accept the above plan, the US, UK, and French Delegations discuss the situation again.

VERNON MCKAY

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. D. Vernon McKay of the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] March 7, 1951.

US/T/111

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Mr. Awni Khalidy, Iraqi Delegation
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, Mr. Vernon McKay } United States Delegation

Mr. Gerig and Mr. McKay approached Mr. Khalidy at Lake Success this afternoon to persuade him to accept the text of a tenth draft of a proposed Iraqi-United States amendment to the Anglo-French proposal on the Ewe problem. (The French and UK Delegations expressed to the US Delegation this morning their approval of this text, although they informed us that they would abstain when it was put to the vote).

Mr. Khalidy stated that his government had authorized him to join the US in presenting a suitable text of a draft resolution. He said that he had cabled his government the text which he had discussed yesterday with Mr. Gerig and Mr. McKay, and which he was sure would be acceptable. (This text differed in three important parts from the text which the French and UK Delegations this morning insisted upon maintaining without change). Mr. Gerig reminded Mr. Khalidy that the text Khalidy had wired to his government was only a text which we had discussed provisionally, and not one that the US had agreed to. Mr. Khalidy recognized this fact but said that he did not think he could go beyond this text.

The three disputed points were then discussed and rediscussed at considerable length. Mr. Gerig and Mr. McKay stated that the US felt that the *Considering* clause and the *Urges* clause should be maintained, (see Attachment A) and that the words "seriousness of the situation and the desirability" should be replaced by the word "necessity" in the *Draws the attention* clause. Mr. Khalidy contested all

three points. Mr. Gerig and Mr. McKay pointed out that all three clauses had already been considerably modified in order to meet Mr. Khalidy's views. Mr. Gerig said that the US Delegation was in a difficult position because the Department had studied the problem at great length, had in fact taken the matter up at the level of the Secretary's office, and the Department wanted the Delegation to maintain all three of the points which Khalidy now opposed.

Mr. Khalidy responded that he could see the difficulty of our position and, in a spirit of cooperation, he was willing once more to go over the three contested points to see if there was a way out of the impasse. On the *Considering* clause, Mr. McKay pointed out that it had already been modified twice to meet Khalidy's views; the words "were such as to enable" had been changed to "represented a sincere effort to enable", and later the word "sincere" had been dropped along with the word "true" in the next line. Mr. Khalidy stated that these changes had improved the clause from his point of view but he still didn't like it. He suggested, however, that it might be acceptable if "all sections of the population" could be changed to "the population". Mr. Gerig said he was sorry but the Department considered this an important point. (We knew that it was an important phrase to the French). Mr. Khalidy then suggested "the population concerned", and Mr. Gerig countered with "the sections of the population concerned". Mr. Khalidy accepted this change.

Mr. Khalidy then again asked for the deletion of the *Urges* paragraph. Mr. McKay recalled that it had already been toned down from urging the Ewes to cooperate in the Consultative Commission, to the much less objectionable phrase of urging them to cooperate in seeking a solution. Mr. Khalidy suggested adding the words "of the Ewe problem" at the end of the *Urges* clause. Mr. Gerig pointed out that the problem involved other peoples than the Ewes. Mr. Khalidy then suggested "of the problem" which we quickly accepted. (We had agreed with the British and French in the morning to accept no changes, but the above two changes were so inconsequential that the British and French could easily and gladly accept them, a fact which we shortly verified with them).

The third point, on the word "seriousness", was next discussed and Khalidy reluctantly accepted our revision. However, he then said that he did not want to accept the idea of amending even a UK resolution, let alone a French one. He didn't want the UK to get the credit for the resolution. Mr. Gerig pointed out that after our amendment was accepted, there would be almost nothing left of the UK original resolution, and that Iraq and the US would certainly get the credit for vastly improving the resolution. Mr. McKay added that procedurally an amendment was better because it was certain to be voted on first. If we put in a separate resolution, the UK proposal might be voted

on first. Mr. Khalidy recognized this danger but still opposed the idea of an amendment because the resolution would have been introduced by the UK, and might be reported in the Iraqi press as a UK resolution.

Mr. Khalidy suggested that Sir Alan Burns be approached at once to see whether he would object to a separate resolution instead of an amendment. (We knew that the French wanted the amendment rather than the separate resolution but thought that the text agreed to by Khalidy met all the latest Anglo-French position, so we thought it worth approaching them again on this point). Mr. McKay therefore asked Sir Alan to step out of the Council Chamber for a few minutes. Sir Alan promptly agreed to Khalidy's desire for a separate resolution and said that if we would wait for him he would consult Laurentie at once. In a few minutes Sir Alan returned with Laurentie's consent.

It was then agreed that in order to ensure the success of the arrangement, the US Delegation should approach the President and tell him that the French, Iraq, UK and US Delegations all wanted him to put the Iraq-US proposal to the vote first. (President Urena subsequently agreed to this procedure).

Mr. Khalidy concluded by expressing his pleasure that we had been able to reach agreement, but emphasized that this agreement depended upon there being absolutely no further changes in the text. Mr. Gerig responded that we were in entire agreement with him on this point. Mr. Khalidy also stated that in making his remarks in support of our draft resolution he intended to be quite moderate, and would not go into details on the French elections or other matters. He would emphasize that in his view, however, the two administering authorities were being given one more chance, and the future depended upon their coming up wih a satisfactory solution at the next session of the Trusteeship Council.

VERNON MCKAY

Attachment A

Text of United States-Iraqi Joint Draft Resolution on the Ewe Problem

The Trusteeship Council

Having considered the General Assembly resolution of 2 December 1950 (document A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting the statements made by the Administering Authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for elections to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the Trust Territories of Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under British Administration;

Considering that these methods represented an effort to enable the sections of the population concerned to express their opinions;

Noting that certain groups in the two Trust Territories did not find it possible to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

1. *Notes* that the Administering Authorities propose to take steps in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the Commission;
2. *Urges* these groups to cooperate with the Administering Authorities in their efforts to seek a solution of the problem;
3. *Regrets* that a satisfactory solution of the problem has not yet been reached notwithstanding the delays involved;
4. *Draws the attention* of the Administering Authorities to the necessity of seeking a solution with the utmost expedition;
5. *Invites* the two Administering Authorities to continue their efforts to solve the problem in the spirit of the Resolution of the Trusteeship Council of July 14, 1950;
6. *Recommends*, whether or not the composition of the Consultative Commission is completed, that the Administering Authorities formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practicable solution of the question and inform the Council accordingly not later than July 1, 1951.

Attachment B

Text of French-British Joint Draft Resolution on the Ewe Problem

The Trusteeship Council

Having considered the General Assembly resolution of 2 December 1950 (A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting with satisfaction the statement made by the Administering Authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for election to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration;

Considering that these methods were such as to enable all sections of the population to express their true opinions;

Noting that certain groups in the two Trust Territories declined to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

Regrets that, as a result, it has not been possible for certain points of view to be expressed in the Commission;

1. *Notes* with approval the steps which the Administering Authorities propose to take in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the Commission;
2. *Urges* these groups to take advantage of these proposals and to take part accordingly in the second session of the Commission;
3. *Recalls* its resolution of 14 July 1950; and
4. *Invites* the Administering Authorities to proceed as soon as possible with the further implementation of the plans set out in document T/702 to report to the Council at its next session on the work of the enlarged Consultative Commission.

645K.51T3/2–751 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, March 7, 1951—7 : 48 p. m.

1240. For Jones, UND. Re: Ewe problem. Ewe problem Thursday agenda. UK, France, Iraq, US Dels agreed following procedure: UK–France will present original Anglo-French draft resolution as communicated earlier to Department. Iraq–US will present text below as separate draft resolution. This procedure necessary because Khalidy cannot accept submission Iraq–US text as an amendment. Chairman will call for vote on Iraq–US resolution first. This text expected to pass by 9–2 (UK, France)–1 (Soviet). Anglo-French draft resolution will thus not come to vote.

"The TC having considered the GA resolution of the 2nd December 1950 (Doc A/1616) on the subject of the Ewe problem;

Noting the statements made by the administering authorities regarding the electoral methods adopted for elections to the enlarged Consultative Commission for the trust territories of Togoland under French administration and Togoland under British administration;

Considering that these methods represented an effort to enable the sections of the population concerned to express their opinions;

Noting that certain groups in the two trust territories did not find it possible to take part either in certain stages of the elections or in the proceedings of the enlarged Consultative Commission;

Notes that the administering authorities propose to take steps in order to encourage these groups to take part hereafter in the work of the commission;

Urges these groups to cooperate with the administering authorities in their efforts to seek a solution of the problem;

Regrets that a satisfactory solution of the problem has not yet been reached notwithstanding the delays involved;

Draws the attention of the administering authorities to the necessity of seeking a solution with the utmost expedition;

Invites the two administering authorities to continue their efforts to solve the problem in the spirit of the resolution of the TC of July 14, 1950;

Recommends, whether or not the composition of the Consultative Commission is completed, that the administering authorities formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practicable solution of the question and inform the council accordingly not later than July 1, 1951."

GROSS

Editorial Note

For the proceedings of the Trusteeship Council on March 8 and 9 with regard to the Ewe question, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Eighth Session*, pages 193–195 and pages

197 and 198. The Anglo-French draft resolution was submitted first (Doc. T/L.140). Subsequently the Iraqi-United States draft resolution was tabled (Doc. T/L.141). The United States Representative (Sayre) made a brief statement calling on the Trusteeship Council to address itself to "a substantive solution of the problem." These events occurred on March 8. On March 9 the Council proceeded to vote on the two resolutions. According to United Nations parliamentary practice, the last was voted on first; and the Iraqi-United States proposal was adopted nine votes to none, with three abstentions. The French delegate, Ambassador Garreau, made a statement regarding the French abstention, and then indicated that France desired to withdraw the Anglo-French draft resolution. Sir Alan Burns, the British delegate, concurred in the French proposal. This ended the Trusteeship Council's consideration of the Ewe question at its eighth session.

For the official text of the Trusteeship Council's resolution on this matter (Resolution 306 (VIII)–Doc. T/864, March 9, 1951), see United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 1, Resolutions*, pages 3 and 4. (Subsequent citations to the Council's official records in this chapter will follow the form, TC (VIII) or TC (IX).)

645K.51T3/3–1251 : Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, March 12, 1951—12:02 p. m.

PRIORITY

1261. For Hickerson from Sayre. Re Ewe question. In talk with Sir Alan Burns concerning Ewe problem after passage Iraq–US resolution I expressed my sincere hope no time be lost seeking solution to be laid before TC at June meeting. If administering authorities fail submit satisfactory solution there seems strong probability that after sharp exchanges in TC problem will be brought before GA next autumn with most unfortunate developments.

Sir Alan expressed entire agreement and wondered whether Department which had come to rescue of administering authorities at March meeting might not wish to press through diplomatic channels for early consideration and formulation of substantive proposals for practicable solution of Ewe question. In order avoid dangerous procrastination I hope and recommend that Department take appropriate steps. [Sayre.]

GROSS

645K.51T3/3–1451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council (Sayre)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 14, 1951—7 p. m.

783. For Sayre. Urtel 1261. Dept considers undesirable make any representation to Fr and Brit re Ewe problem at present time. Your statement in TC and text of TC Res make amply clear urgency of submission by Administering Authorities acceptable substantive recommendations next TC. It is Dept view that Fr and Brit require time to consider what steps they may take next. Meanwhile Dept will be re-examining Ewe question with view to determining most useful role US can play to assist in achievement of practicable solution prior to next GA.

WEBB

[1] Repeated for information to Paris as 4801 and London as 4177.

350/4–1251 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 12, 1951—8 : 50 a. m.

Transmitted under separate cover for your info are copies of two res on Ewe problem introduced in Trusteeship Council at Eighth Session (Documents T/L.140 and T/L.141).[2] After considerable consultation with French, British and other interested dels fol plan was evolved: that Franco-British res (T/L.140) would be introduced by British rep with appropriate statement; that Iraq–US res (T/L.141) would then be introduced; that President would call for vote on latter first; that France and UK would abstain on this vote; and that adoption of Iraq–US res would render unnecessary vote on Franco-British res. This plan was successfully followed, resulting on March 9, 1951, in adoption of vote 9–0–3 (UK, France, USSR) of Iraq–US res.

You will observe from Franco-British res that these Govts wld have preferred that TC endorse Franco-British proposals for urging Ewe participation in Consultative Commission. However, they were eventually persuaded that this approach wld not win general support in TC and that it might give rise to serious difficulties in GA. Both expressed their appreciation to US Del for our help in persuading Iraq to cosponsor res which avoided serious clash on Ewe question in TC.

[1] Sent to the Embassies in France and the United Kingdom, the Consulates General at Lagos and Dakar, the Consulate at Accra, and the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN).

[2] Regarding these documents, see the editorial note, p. 571.

Comparison of the two res reveals that most important difference between Iraq–US res and Franco-British is that former drops emphasis on procedural devices, especially Consultative Commission, and recommends that Administering Authorities formulate substantive proposals and inform TC accordingly not later than July 1, 1951.

The French and British Govts will presumably consult this Govt before next session of TC with view to obtaining our support for such substantive proposals as they agree to make. This Govt has not yet arrived at position as to exactly what sort of proposals it cld support, nor does it wish to intervene at this stage with detailed suggestions. The Dept wld appreciate such indications of French and British thinking re this matter as you may be able to obtain informally from time to time. Indications as to developments in Togolands affecting strength of Ewe-unification movement would also be most helpful. Latter question particularly is drawn to attention of consular posts in area.

ACHESON

350/5-3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1951.

Subject: The Ewe Question

Participants: Sir Alan Burns, U.K. Representative on the Trusteeship Council
Mr. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. J. K. Thompson, Colonial Attaché, British Embassy
Mr. J. O. Rennie, First Secretary, British Embassy
Assistant Secretary Hickerson
Mr. Durward Sandifer, UNA
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND

Sir Alan Burns called at the Department at his request to discuss the steps which have been taken on the Ewe question, which is now before the Trusteeship Council, since the previous session of the Council. Sir Alan said that although the Council resolution urged the United Kingdom and French Governments to get together to make substantive proposals at the Council before July 1, he regretted to say that the two Governments had not yet gotten together on the subject. The United Kingdom had offered to go to Paris or to receive officials

of the French Government in London, but no meeting was held so far.

Mr. Hickerson said we were hopeful that the two Governments would find a substantive solution which would be acceptable both to the Ewe people and to the other Members of the United Nations. He regretted that this had not yet been done but expressed the hope that between now and July 1 an acceptable solution would be found. He said that he personally was not familiar with all the details of the problem. But looking at it without this detailed information, he wondered what the obstacles were against regarding the Ewe nation as a separate people with possible nationhood as an objective. Sir Alan said that there were at least three objections to such a course: first, the Ewe people themselves were divided; secondly, it would prejudice the future of the inland tribes whose ultimate rights had also to be taken into account; and third, it could not be a viable nation.

Sir Alan then referred to the summary report of the local Consultative Commission and said that some of its recommendations for fiscal, economic, and cultural amelioration of the Ewe people seemed to offer some constructive suggestions. He wondered whether the Department had yet received a copy of the summary report and when informed that we had not, he left a copy for our information. He went on to say that it was the view of his Government, and himself personally, that the only feasible next step on the Ewe question was in effect to maintain the *status quo*. Any alternative solution was worse and would be found to be impracticable.

Mr. Gerig questioned whether the summary report of the Consultative Commission would be acceptable either to the non-administering Members of the Trusteeship Council or to a majority of the Ewe people themselves since the latter had boycotted the meetings of the Consultative Commission and the report, therefore, would be regarded by them as not representing their views. Sir Alan replied that these Ewe leaders had an opportunity to be present but refused to avail themselves of it and therefore they could only blame themselves. Mr. Gerig thought that even so it was doubtful whether this view would be accepted by the majority of the United Nations Members or the most vocal Ewe leaders.

A general discussion of the problem followed but no clear course of action seemed to develop. In this discussion, however, a possible long-range development was forecast by Sir Alan in which he thought that since the Gold Coast had now been given almost complete self-government, the next steps would be that British Togoland would wish to be more closely associated with the Gold Coast, and later it was probable that a majority of the inhabitants of French Togo would likewise see the possibility of attaining self-government earlier by

547-842—79——38

associating themselves with British Togo and the Gold Coast. It was recognized, however, that this would take time and that there would be serious difficulties with the French in agreeing to such a development.

On the matter of tactics it was suggested that any proposals which the British alone, or the British and French Delegations to the Trusteeship Council bring forward should not be described as "maintaining the *status quo*". It was generally agreed that any resolution should give a list of economic, fiscal and cultural ameliorations which could be put into effect to obviate the difficulties complained of by the Ewe leaders in regard to all manner of frontier restrictions.

Mr. Hickerson thanked Sir Alan and his associates for giving us this information even though it was less positive than had been hoped for. He said we would continue to do what we could to assist the British and French Delegations to arrive at a solution satisfactory to a majority.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

SECRET [NEW YORK,] June 27, 1951.

US/T/124

Subject: Anglo-French Proposals on Ewe Question

Participants: M. Henri Laurentie, Alternate Representative on the Trusteeship Council, French Delegation
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation

M. Laurentie told me that the British and French Delegations had received during the day copies of the Joint Anglo-French proposals on the Ewe question for submission to the Trusteeship Council and that it was planned to furnish the United States Delegation with a copy of these proposals some time later in the afternoon.[1]

M. Laurentie said that in brief the proposals merely provided for the continuance of the *status quo* and the establishment of a Joint Advisory Commission of Ewes in British and French Togoland. He doubted that these proposals would be "satisfactory" to the United States and personally considered them as "disappointing". He said that criticism of the proposals by the United States would be welcomed and indicated that the expression of dissatisfaction on the part of the United States would be a factor of considerable importance in

[1] Neither this nor certain related documents have been found in the files of either the Department of State or USUN.

bringing the French Government around to a more liberal policy in dealing with the problem in the Council.

According to M. Laurentie, M. Pignon, after his return from Togoland, almost succeeded in prevailing upon the French Government the adoption of a more forward-looking policy with respect to French Togoland including the broadening of the powers of the Territorial Assembly and widening the franchise for elections to the Territorial Assembly. M. Laurentie believes that if such a policy had been adopted, it would ease the French position in dealing with the Ewe problem in the Trusteeship Council. The French Delegate could then say that, while it was impossible at this time to obtain a clear-cut expression of the views of the Togoland peoples with respect to their political future, the French Government was developing self-governing institutions with the objective of placing the people of French Togoland in a position to be able to evaluate all factors in arriving at a decision regarding their political future.

M. Laurentie said that one method of dealing with the problem, i.e., of holding a plebescite to determine the wishes of the people concerned, could never be accepted by his Government. Such a plan was inadmissible because the Togoland people were not able at present to take into account all the factors which would be brought into play by a change in their political status or to realize the implications of each of the possible changes in political status which could be placed into effect.

350/6–2751 : Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 27, 1951—11 p. m.

1731. For Gerig.

1. UKDel gave us advance copy Anglo-Fr memo to TC re Ewe and allied petitions which two dels expect submit council when it considers Ewe problem. Memo pouched Dept tonight.[1]

2. Most important provisions memo follow:

a. Two administering authorities have reached conclusion as result consultation with people of territories and subsequent joint examination of problem by administering authorities: "It has been proved no alteration boundaries or political allegiance can be proposed which commands general assent peoples of two territories or even agreement of majority." Administering authorities satisfied no change this nature can be undertaken "which does not raise fresh set problems, whether political, economic or fiscal, in place those which they are now considering."

[1] Not printed.

b. Administering authorities believe consultative commission has served purpose and should be succeeded by new organization of continuing nature which should be "meeting place of representatives peoples of two Togolands wherein views on development of respective territories can be exchanged and coordinated and measures of development in every field harmonized."

c. Foregoing organization would advise two administering authorities on "planning and implementation of program of development, economic and social, in light available resources and on all other practical questions relating to preservation close connection between peoples on each side of frontier."

3. Fr and UK would appreciate US views on memo at meeting administering powers 10:30 a. m., June 28 to discuss question. When informed difficulty submitting US views by that time Fr said even "preliminary action" would be helpful in view short time before Ewe question scheduled for consideration by TC.

4. Dept's instructions requested.

GROSS

350/6-2951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 29, 1951—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

1029. Re: Ewe Problem. Urtel 1731 June 27.

1. On general question tactics Dept believes US can be most helpful by devoting efforts to reconciling views this problem in TC in order arrive at generally acceptable solution. This was role US performed successfully on same question last session. If US to act similar capacity this session we shld not, in order have room negotiate, push Brit and Fr into submitting proposal containing maximum to which they can agree. On other hand proposal shld not be so weak as to be rejected by members TC as basis for action.

2. This respect Dept considers Brit-Fr memo as minimum but as basis on which procede. Chief difficulty wld appear be that memo will be regarded as negative and defensive. Correction this wld require extensive revision memo to build up positive character proposal for new commission in terms need for and role it to perform. Brit and Fr likely consider time insufficient such revision. One helpful revision which cld be made wld be change impression given by statement quoted para 1[2]*a* reftel that door closed to political unification. Although this may be fact, wld be difficult for TC to endorse statement this time. You might also suggest Annexes to memo be issued separately since

they tend indicate reliance Brit and Fr chiefly on views of Consultative Commission boycotted by Ewes and detract from claim that Ewe views given due consideration in preparation memo.

3. If US to follow course outlined para 1 above US wld reserve public comment until other members TC react. Task then wld be work out with Brit and Fr and with key pro-Ewe members TC suitable proposals strengthen role of new Commission. Granting of some degree financial responsibility only promising step this direction now apparent. Some such steps wld seem necessary to differentiate new Commission from previous Consultative Commission.

4. Re last sentence para 21 memo, suggest you inquire Brit and Fr when details for giving effect to proposal wld be available, since matters such as composition of commission wld be important.

ACHESON

IO Files

Minutes of Meeting of Administering Members of the Trusteeship Council, New York, July 3, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

US/T/127

Participants: Sir Alan Burns, Representative of the United Kingdom Delegation in the Trusteeship Council
Mr. W. A. X. Mathieson, Alternate Representative, United Kingdom Delegation
M. Leon Pignon, Representative of the French Delegation
M. Henri Laurentie, Gouverneur des Colonies, Alternate Representative on the Trusteeship Council, French Delegation
Mr. Pierre Ryckmans, Representative of the Belgian Delegation
Mr. B. C. Ballard, Representative of the Australian Delegation
Sir Carl Berendsen, Representative of the New Zealand Delegation
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, Representative in the Trusteeship Council, United States Delegation
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation

After passing copies of the redraft of the Anglo-French memorandum on the Ewe question to the representatives present, Sir Alan Burns said that he would like to make a few general comments on the redraft. In the first place, the French and British in redrafting the

memorandum had attempted to embody in the new draft as many of the suggestions made by those present at the last meeting as was practicable.[1] For example, the order of the memorandum had been changed and what was considered the more positive parts of the memorandum, i.e., the proposals dealing with the establishment of the Joint Advisory Commission, had been placed in the first part of the memorandum followed by the provisions explaining why unification was not possible. Sir Alan said that the United States criticism that the original memorandum would create the impression that the door was permanently closed on all forms of unification had been taken into consideration in redrafting the memorandum, and that paragraph 7 of the memorandum had been altered in order to indicate clearly that the administering authorities concerned did not mean to imply that unification was permanently ruled out. Sir Alan said that he would appreciate the support of the other administering powers in obtaining Council endorsement of the memorandum, and that he considered it particularly important to emphasize that the two administering authorities had earnestly considered various possible solutions and had reached the conclusion that no solution involving a change in political boundaries could satisfy more than a minority of the peoples concerned.

Mr. Mathieson said that he would like to make a few comments of a more detailed nature regarding the alterations in the original memorandum contained in the redraft. The British and French had decided to make an addition at the end of paragraph 4 of the original memorandum clearly stating that the administering authorities were satisfied that the Consultative Commission had served its purpose and had no role to play in the future. According to Mr. Mathieson, it was thought that this addition would be helpful in making plain that the Joint Advisory Commission described in the memorandum was not merely a refurbishing of the Consultative Commission. Commenting on the new paragraph 6 in the redraft, Mr. Mathieson said that the British and French had decided to include in the memorandum a statement that the large majority of difficulties to the Togoland people resulting from the frontier between the two Togolands had been removed. Referring to the criticism made at the previous meeting by various representatives that the functions of the Joint Advisory Commission were not sufficiently spelled out, Mr. Mathieson said that the British and French accepted this criticism and had

[1] The minutes of the June 28 meeting (U.S. version) are not printed; the meeting was lengthy and inconclusive. *Inter alia*, the U.S. Representative (Sayre), pending receipt of instructions from the Department of State, requested clarification of several points of the memorandum. (IO Files, Doc. US/T/125)

attempted to delineate more clearly what, in their opinion, should be the functions of the prospective commission, and particularly had tried to set forth more clearly the financial responsibilities of the commission.

In reply to a question by Ambassador Sayre, Sir Alan said that he had transmitted to London the United States suggestion that the minutes of the two Consultative Commission meetings be issued separately from the memorandum, but that it was believed in London that the reports should be issued as annexes to the memorandum. Sir Alan said that he personally doubted that the inclusion of the reports on the Consultative sessions would adversely affect the reaction of non-administering powers to the proposals embodied in the memorandum.

Ambassador Sayre asked if the British and French thought that any purpose would be served in retaining in the memorandum that portion of paragraph 4 which was critical of the Ewe groups which did not participate in the Consultative Commission. Ambassador Sayre questioned whether it might not be better to omit these portions of the paragraph, since their inclusion might lessen the chances that the All-Ewe-Conference Members would be willing to participate in the Commission. Sir Alan replied, with the concurrence of the French, that it was thought that this portion of the memorandum should be retained, and that its retention would not affect either one way or the other the Ewe reaction to the document.

Ambassador Sayre said that he would like to have some clarification of the portion of the redraft dealing with the financial responsibilities of the proposed Development Commission (paragraph 17). Sir Alan commented that, while it was true that the Commission would have only advisory functions, it was likely that its advice would be followed by the appropriate governmental bodies. Sir Alan in attempting to illustrate the role of the proposed commission said that if, for example, the Gold Coast Government decided to build a school in Togoland, it would request the advice of the commission as to where the school should be located and would undoubtedly follow the advice given. Both Sir Alan and M. Laurentie pointed out that there should be no overlapping of functions between the legislative assemblies of French Togoland and of the Gold Coast with the Commission; that the two legislative assemblies by law were charged with certain responsibilities and could not transfer these responsibilities to the Commission. Moreover, care would have to be exercised to keep from "treading on the toes" of the local governmental bodies which were extremely jealous of their prerogatives.

Governor Ryckmans asked if the British and French had any idea of what the reactions of the Gold Coast and Ewe leaders, including

Nkrumah, Antor, and the two Olympios,[2] would be to the proposals. M. Laurentie said that he did not know but that he anticipated that their reactions would become known since Antor was already in New York and would remain at least until after the Council discussions of the Ewe question. It was also expected that both Pedro and Sylvanus Olympio would be present at Council discussions of the Ewe problem. M. Laurentie stated that Sylvanus Olmpio had altered his views and now favored Togoland unification rather than Ewe unification. Governor Ryckmans said that his experience as a colonial administrator had convinced him that the administering authorities who possessed the responsibilities for administering a particular territory were in a better position to know what was best for the people of that territory than was any one from the outside. He would, therefore, support the proposals contained in the memorandum. He made no further mention of his previous suggestion for the establishment of an "Ewe Provincial Assembly" within the framework of the Commission.

Sir Alan then asked if Sir Carl would care to give his comments on the redraft. Sir Carl replied that he had received the comments of the New Zealand Government on the original memorandum and that his Government considered the memorandum to be "ineffectual". The New Zealand Government also believed that, even if the Council accepted the memorandum, the solution which it provided would cause "violent altercations" in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

Mr. Ballard expressed regret that he had not as yet received the views of his Government on the memorandum.

Ambassador Sayre stated that, in his opinion, the redraft constituted an improvement over the first draft but that the United States would like to have the views of other Members of the Council and of the peoples directly concerned before determining its final position with respect to the memorandum.

Sir Alan reiterated his hope that the various administering authorities in their talks with other delegations would support the Anglo-French proposals. He also said in reply to a question from Ambassador Sayre that if the Council approved the proposals it was anticipated that the Advisory Commission would be established immediately and would be functioning before the time the General Assembly was convened. Sir Alan said that it should be remembered that next year a

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[2] Respectively, Kwame Nkrumah, head of the Gold Coast Convention People's Party and soon to be Prime Minister of the Gold Coast under constitutional changes impending in the Gold Coast Government; S. G. Antor, Togoland Congress leader (the Togoland Congress was an association of British Togoland political parties); Sylvanus Olympio, head of the *Comité de l'Unité Togolais*, French Togoland party which supported the All-Ewe Conference (that is, unification and independence of the two Togolands); and Pedro Olympio, head of the *Parti Togolais du Progrès*, French Togoland party which supported the French administration.

visiting mission would visit the West African trust territories including the two Togolands and, since the Commission would have been functioning for almost a year at that time, it would be possible for the visiting mission to make a realistic appraisal of the accomplishments of the Commission.

A copy of the redraft of the original Anglo-French memorandum is attached.

[Annex]

REDRAFT OF ANGLO-FRENCH MEMORANDUM

Paras. 1–4 as in original draft.
Add at end of (4)

"Nevertheless they must add that they are satisfied that the Consultative Commission had served its purpose of elucidating the views of the majority of the people of the two Trust Territories, and they desire to place on record their appreciation of the manner in which the Commission has carried out its terms of reference, handicapped as it was by the absence of a section of its members. Even in its expanded form, however, it was a special body elected for a specific task and that task has now been fulfilled. In the positive arrangements for the future the Administering Authorities envisage no continuing role for the Consultative Commission."

II. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM

5. In preparing this memorandum, and indeed from the outset of the matters with which it deals, the Administering Authorities have been conscious that any proposals which they finally put forward must conform to two principles;

1. they must pay full regard to the known wishes of the peoples of the two territories and command general acceptance or at any rate acceptance by a large majority;
2. any change in political organisation in the territories must be practicable from the economic and fiscal aspects as well as on political grounds.

Throughout this memorandum these two principles are regarded as fundamental to the examination of the problem with which it deals and to be the basis both for the proposals put forward and for the criticisms which are advanced of alternative suggestions for a solution.

III. PRACTICAL STEPS OF AN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND FISCAL CHARACTER

6. It must be stated at the outset that much has been accomplished in the four years in which this matter has been before the Trusteeship Council to alleviate the difficulties which the presence of the frontier causes. The Administering Authorities sympathise with the Ewes in

their desire to retain their cohesion and with all the inhabitants of the two Togolands whose family connections and normal avocations have been affected by the existence of the boundary between the two territories. They have always been ready, and are now, to do everything practicable to meet all legitimate grievances and remove every impediment to free association across the frontier. Already by the end of 1948 considerable ameliorations had been effected and these are fully described in paragraphs 13 to 52 of the Special Report made by the Visiting Mission on the Ewe problem, which for convenience of reference are appended as Annex II to this memorandum. They include extensive improvements in such fields as the movement of persons, goods and currency, public health, education, communications and taxation. In the intervening period since 1948 progressive improvements have been accomplished and as a result of the extensive concessions which have been made there is now complete freedom of movement of persons and only the minimum restraint on other traffic. The efficacy of these improvements can be gauged by the fact that no significant complaints of difficulties caused by the frontier were brought to the notice of the two Governments in 1950.

7. That further progress in this field is possible is evidenced by the recommendations made in paragraph 7(iv) and (v) of the Summary Statement of the second session of the Consultative Commission in regard to economic, social and cultural matters. In the comparatively short time which has elapsed since the close of the second session of the Commission the Administering Authorities have given earnest and urgent consideration in conjunction with the authorities on the spot, to the implementation of these recommendations. While some raise issues of considerable complexity involving also administrative arrangements which cannot safely be improvised a number of decisions have already been reached and put into effect which will be communicated to the Trusteeship Council by the Special Representatives of the two territories.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES

8. The Administering Authorities recognise that the practical steps described in the preceding paragraphs cannot yet be regarded as completely satisfying the aspirations of the peoples concerned. They are fully conscious that the existence of two separate administrations exerts a sundering influence on these peoples of the two Trust Territories who feel natural ties of kinship and they have considered together, in response to the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council at its Eighth Session, in what way an effective link can be maintained between the peoples on each side of the frontier. For reasons which are analysed in detail in the concluding section of this memorandum they have reached the decision, based on the fullest possible consulta-

tion with the people of the territories, that it is conclusively demonstrated that no solution involving an alteration of boundaries or of political allegiance can *currently* be proposed which commands the general assent of the peoples of the two territories or even the agreement of a majority. They are equally satisfied that no change of this nature can be undertaken which does not raise a fresh set of problems, whether political, economic or fiscal, in place of those which they are now considering. They feel that the setback which the disruption of any change would cause in the political and economic fields must outweigh the advantages to be derived from the gratification of the ambitions of political groups in the territory, none of which represents a majority. They particularly wish to make clear one point which they feel has not always been evident to all the advocates in the respective territories of unification in one form or another. Unification must imply the creation of a political entity. Such an entity must have its own constitutional organisation, whatever may be its relationship to one or more of the neighboring territories. It must have its own administrative organisation and its own fiscal and economic structure which will enable it to stand on its own feet financially and to maintain and develop itself. If new frontiers are created, new controls and customs barriers must be set up on those frontiers if the separate existence of the new entity is to be established and preserved. The renunciation by one part of the present Trust Territories of its present status must inevitably mean the abandonment by it of the advantages which it enjoys under its present state in exchange for any which might be conferred by its new state; and this in its turn must greatly influence the prospects of viability of the new territory.

9. Within the framework of existing boundaries, however, there is scope for closer relations between the peoples of the two Territories. The Administering Authorities have noted with considerable interest the reference in paragraph 4 (*a*) of the Summary Statement of the Second Session of the Consultative Commission to the desirability of harmonising the policy of development in the two Trust Territories as an essential corollary to their advancement towards self-government. The Administering Authorities are fully in sympathy with this view, and it has been and will remain their object to administer the territories in the closest co-operation. They feel that the problem which has been raised in the Trusteeship Council by Ewe and other petitions cannot be considered in isolation and is not of a nature which permits of some immediate solution. In Togoland, as in West Africa as a whole, developments and changes are going on at a rapid pace in all fields. On both sides of the frontier which divides the two Trust Territories, important developments are in progress in the shape of regional and local government and in the manner of participation by the inhabitants in the administration of public affairs. The final pattern cannot yet

be set; in the meantime the inhabitants of the Trust Territories are gaining political experience and maturity by participation in these developments. This was recognised by the 1948 Visiting Mission which in its Special Report on the Ewe problem (Document T/798, paragraph 101) said "The Political formula that will in the opinion of the Mission meet the situation in the future depends to a large degree on the people of two Togolands themselves, on the extent of a well informed public opinion, and on the political maturity of the people. Such a condition appears to be rapidly advancing in the South".

10. In order to associate the people more directly with their efforts to ensure congruity between these developments, the Administering Authorities have decided that a joint body of representatives of the two Trust Territories should be created which would be an effective instrument in establishing these closer relations. Although it is clear that any such new body can have no executive or legislative power extending over both Trust Territories, it should nevertheless be a meeting place of representatives of the peoples of the two Togolands wherein views on the development of the respective territories can be exchanged and co-ordinated and the measures of development in every field harmonized and stimulated.

11. The new body would meet at regular intervals and as often as the occasion demands. It would have the opportunity of discussion and consultation with the senior Administrative and Technical Officers from each side and would consider and advise the two Administering Authorities jointly on the planning and implementation of the programme of development, economic and social, in the light of available resources and on all other practical questions relating to the preservation of close connection between the peoples on each side of the frontier, together with any further amelioration of conditions caused by the existence of the frontier. It will of course review the progress of the measures referred to in paragraph 7 above and also advise on their development. One important feature of the functions of the new body will be to advise the Administering Authorities on the projects of common interest on which they consider it necessary that funds should be expended and on the priority which should be accorded among such projects in the expenditure of funds as they become available for such purposes from the respective administrations. Discussions are now in progress between the most senior representatives of the two Administering Authorities on the detailed organisation and functions of this body which will make it effective for the purposes set out above.

12. The Administering Authorities believe that by this means it will be possible for them to maintain and develop the administration of their respective Trust Territories in accordance with the terms of the Charter and of the Trusteeship Agreement. They believe also that

given this link, together with the existing close collaboration between French and British Authorities, both locally and at the Metropolitan level, the legitimate aspirations of the people of the Trust Territories will be assured and any prejudice to their interests avoided during the period of their advance towards self-government.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR UNIFICATION WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES

13. The Administering Authorities have not reached the conclusions indicated above without the most searching re-examination of all the various proposals for "unification" which have been advanced from time to time by different groups in the Territories. As is made clear by careful analysis in the report of the Visting Mission on the Ewe problem, the term "unification" does not imply any single or agreed solution of the demands put forward by the petitioners. There is, on the one hand, a group consisting of the pan-Ewe parties which advocates unification of the areas inhabited by Ewes; on the other hand, there are elements, in the main based solely in Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship which advocate unification of the two Trust Territories as a whole. Either of these projects, viewed within the framework of British and French Administration, is capable of more than one interpretation; there may be unification under French Trusteeship, under British Trusteeship or conceivably under some form of Anglo-French Trusteeship.

Here insert paragraphs 8–16 of original draft as paragraphs 14–22.

VIII. CONCLUSION

23. It is for these reasons, which in view of the history of this question they felt bound to expose in some detail for the consideration of the Trusteeship Council, that the Administering Authorities have reached the conclusion that the proposals set out in section IV of this memorandum offer the best prospect of leading the two Trust Territories towards the most rapid and harmonious attainment of the aims embodied in Chapter XII of the Charter and they commend them to the Trusteeship Council and to the peoples of the Territories.

645K.51T3/7–351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 3, 1951—10:23 p. m.

23. For Gerig from Sayre. Re Ewe question. At meeting administering powers today Brit Fr gave us copy redraft their joint memorandum on Ewe question (ourtel 1731 June 27) embodying suggestions made by various reps including US present at June 28 meeting. Redraft pouched Dept tonight.

Most significant changes in redraft follow:

1. Order of memorandum is changed to put "more positive" provisions, i.e., those relating to joint advisory commission for two Togolands, in first part of memorandum followed by portions of memorandum explaining why Ewe or Togoland unification not practicable.

2. Effort was made to avoid impression door closed permanently unification by revising para 17. Key sentence this para now reads: "For reasons which are analyzed in detail in concluding section this memorandum, they (administering authorities) have reached decision based on fullest possible consultation with people of territories it is conclusively demonstrated no solution involving alteration boundaries or political allegiance can currently be proposed which commands general assent of peoples of two territories or even agreement of majority."

3. Functions of joint development commission somewhat more clearly delineated in redraft. For example, redraft states one important feature of functions of new body will be "advise administering authorities on projects common interest on which they consider it necessary funds should be expended and on priority which should be accorded among such projects in expenditure of funds as they become available for such purposes from respective administrations."

Burns (UK) told me he had transmitted to London US suggestion that minutes of consultative commission sessions be issued separately but had received reply UK Govt considered advisable issue them as annexes to memorandum.

Redraft has now been submitted London and if clearance obtained it will be given secretariat for distribution to council in near future, probably Thursday.[1]

Our preliminary comment is that redraft, although it constitutes improvement over original memorandum, leaves much to be desired particularly in form of presentation and will probably arouse unfavorable reaction among at least some non-administering members TC. Dept will be kept advised comments other members TC. [Sayre.]

AUSTIN

[1] Subsequently the joint Anglo-French memorandum was submitted to the Trusteeship Council as Doc. T/931, July 5, 1951; with annexes (Doc. T/931/Add. 1, July 6, 1951). For texts, see TC (IX), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 12.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] July 10, 1951.
US/T/132

Subject: Anglo-French Memorandum on the Ewe Question

Participants: Mr. Awni Khalidy, Representative of Iraq to the Trusteeship Council
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, Representative of the United States in the Trusteeship Council
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

Ambassador Sayre opened the conversation with the statement that he thought it might be mutually helpful if he and Mr. Khalidy could exchange views, informally and personally, with respect to the Anglo-French memorandum on the Ewe question which the two administering authorities had submitted to the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Khalidy said that his first reaction to the memorandum was that it was "at least a beginning" and "better than nothing". He summarized his views on the memorandum with the remark that it was "worse than he had hoped for and better than he had expected".

Mr. Khalidy said that in his opinion the Ewe question could be analyzed from two points of view—either as a local problem of the Ewe people or as a broader question intricately related with the future of all West Africa. If the problem was considered to be purely the question of satisfying the Ewe desire for unification under one administering authority, the Anglo-French memorandum did not contribute to its solution. If, however, the problem was considered in the broader West African context, it would be necessary to take into consideration the recent political developments in the Gold Coast. As the results of the acquisition of a substantial degree of self-government by the Gold Coast people, there was a tendency on the part of the inhabitants of British Togoland to look towards the Gold Coast rather than to continue their efforts to obtain unification with the French Togoland Ewes. On the other hand, in the opinion of Mr. Khalidy, the Ewe unification movement was as strong as it had ever been among the French Togoland Ewes.

When Ambassador Sayre asked Mr. Khalidy if he had any specific suggestions to make with respect to the Anglo-French memorandum, Mr. Khalidy replied that he thought that the only action which the Council could take with respect to the memorandum was to attempt to strengthen the powers of the "Commission" or "Council" described in the memorandum. His two concrete suggestions were that the Com-

mission might be empowered to advise the two administering authorities with respect to political questions and educational questions. In this connection, he said that the Consultative Commission had been able to go into political questions and he saw no reason why the powers of the new Commission should be more restricted than those possesssed by the Consultative Commission. According to Mr. Khalidy, there were two methods by which a joint group from French and British Togoland might be permitted to advise the two administering authorities on political questions. In the first place, the Commission itself might advise the administering authorities on political as well as economic, social, and educational problems. Then, an alternative possibility might be the establishment of a separate body to advise the two governments on political questions. This body might be composed of some of the members of the French Togoland Representative Assembly and the Togoland members of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly.

Ambassador Sayre informed Mr. Khalidy that while the Department's position with respect to the Anglo-French memorandum had not been established, it was his personal view that several of the proposals contained in the memorandum were worthy of careful consideration. In the first place, it was his belief that, as stated in the memorandum, the Consultative Commission had served its purpose and should be discontinued. Moreover, he thought that the establishment of some sort of joint organization composed of representatives from the Togoland peoples might be a constructive step.

Mr. Khalidy said that he had strong doubts that the Ewe unification group headed by Sylvanus Olympio would agree to participate in the Commission described in the Anglo-French memorandum. In reply to a question from Ambassador Sayre, he expressed doubt that the Olympio group of Ewes would participate in the Commission even if it was strengthened in accordance with the suggestions which he had made. Ambassador Sayre asked, if it was true that the Ewe would not participate even in a strengthened position, what purpose would be served in attempting to increase the scope of responsibility of the Commission. Mr. Khalidy replied that he believed that the only action which would satisfy the pro-unification Ewes would be agreement on the part of the British and French to the adjustment of political boundaries so that all Ewes would be included within one political unit. Such a solution, however, was clearly impossible in view of the present attitude of the French and he, therefore, considered that the only action which the Council could take in the light of these circumstances was to urge the enlargement of the field of activities of the Commission. Moreover, if the Council did take action to strengthen the Commission, there would undoubtedly be a more favorable reaction in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly when the question was considered by that body.

Mr. Khalidy reiterated that the movement for Ewe unification continued to be as strong as it ever was in French Togoland and added that he had received information to this effect from the leaders of the Ewe unification groups in the territory. He was highly critical of the tactics followed by the French in Togoland under French administration in dealing with the Ewe problem, and of their policy of suppressing the growth of political consciousness in the territory. He said that it was likely that the Council would receive within the next few days a petition from Mr. Augustino de Souza complaining about the action of the French authorities in breaking into his home in French Togoland. It is this sort of action by the French authorities which in Mr. Khalidy's opinion is so unwise.

At the conclusion of the conversation, it was agreed that Ambassador Sayre and Mr. Khalidy would meet again in the near future to discuss the problem.

645K.51T3/7–1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William L. Yeomans of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1951.

Subject: Ewe Problem in the Trusteeship Council

Participants: M. Naudy (French Delegate to the Trusteeship Council)
M. Van Laetham (French Embassy)
Assistant Secretary Hickerson (UNA)
Mr. Allen (EUR)
Mr. Godley (WE)
Mr. Lavalle (AF)
Mr. Cargo (UND)
Mr. Yeomans (UND)

M. Naudy recalled that the Trusteeship Council will be discussing the Ewe problem in French and British Togoland within the next ten days and referred to the joint Anglo-French memorandum which had been submitted to the Council (UN Doc. T/931). He said that terms of reference for the new commission envisaged by the joint memorandum would be presented more fully in the oral statement to be made by Sir Allan Burns and M. Pignon. The composition of the commission was being studied but he did not think that it would be decided before the end of the Trusteeship Council session.

The French government hoped that the United States would find the Anglo-French proposals acceptable and wished us to know in advance that the French government has decided to grant self-government to

French Togoland by "steps". A government on the order of that in the Gold Coast is envisaged. There would be an executive council with ministers and the powers of the legislature would be increased. Universal suffrage would also be introduced. M. Naudy said that M. Pignon would outline these steps in a statement to the Trusteeship Council and requested that we keep the information confidential until that time in order not to decrease its effectiveness in the Council. The importance of this step would be the attainment of increased political maturity by the people of French Togoland who would thereby be better able to assess the issues involved in the Ewe problem.

M. Naudy referred to those sections of the Anglo-French memorandum dealing with the difficulties of unification and pointed out that the situation had changed in the past four years since the Ewe problem was introduced into the Council. He noted in particular the developments toward self-government in the Gold Coast and mentioned that in the recent elections in French Togoland the opponent of unification was successful. In reply to a question, M. Naudy stated that Sylvanus Olympio was being very silent and was "embarrassed" as a result of his relations with Nkrumah of the Gold Coast.

On the subject of the terms of reference of the new commission to be established, M. Naudy considered that it would be difficult to grant the commission any powers, even advisory, in the political field, mentioning in particular that a problem would exist in relation with the Gold Coast government. He indicated, however, that he considered education to be included in the social field. It was suggested to him that it might be well to specify education separately in view of the Trusteeship Council's general practice in this respect.

Assistant Secretary Hickerson informed M. Naudy that we find the framework of the proposed new commission to be an acceptable basis on which to work toward a solution and that we will be very interested in the reactions of other members of the Council since we feel that in this type of question we can be most helpful in reconciling the various points of view. Although we can not foresee what the solution of the problem will be, we hope that it will be possible to work out something which would be widely supported. In response to a question as to the type of resolution which M. Naudy thought the Council might adopt, he replied that he thought the Council might note the joint Anglo-French memorandum and approve of the steps which the Administering Authorities propose therein.

645K.51T/7-1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 12, 1951—11:05 a. m.

73. For Gerig. Re Ewe question. We have discussed informally and confidentially with UK and Fr dels Khalidy's views on Anglo-French memo re Ewe question (ourtel 66, July 10 [1]), particularly his belief that Joint Commission should be strengthened by including political and educational matters within scope commission's advisory responsibilities.

Burns (UK) said he was certain British would not object inclusion educational matters within scope commission's functions. He personally saw no objection inclusion political matters but would want clear this point with London. Hure (Fr del) was willing accept inclusion educational matters but evidenced considerable reluctance to inclusion political matters. He was fearful use of broad term "political matters" would confuse situation; also that commission would waste time in bootless political bickering rather than directing its energies constructively to solution real economic and social problems.

AUSTIN

[1] Not printed.

645K.51T3/7-1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] July 12, 1951—9:50 p. m.

80. For Gerig. Re Ewe question. Following is text of resolution on Ewe question which French would like TC to approve.

"*The Trusteeship Council,*

"1. *Recalling* its resolution 306 (VIII) 9 March 1951 on Ewe question,

"2. *Having considered* memorandum presented jointly by delegations of France and UK in response to this resolution, and minutes of proceedings of consultative commission annexed that memorandum, in which is to be found expression of views of different groups and parties in two territories, including those of C.U.T. and all-Ewe conference, even though these two parties did not take part in work of commission.

"3. *Considering* these various views are contradictory among themselves and that it did not appear to members of commission themselves that they could in their present form be reconciled.

"4. *Considering* in these circumstances it is desirable to concentrate on those questions which can promote common interests of inhabitants of two territories rather than on those issues which tend exacerbate differences between various elements.

"5. *Having considered* in this connection various petitions submitted by different groups, parties and individuals to TC.

"6. *Takes note* with interest joint memorandum presented by delegation of France and UK.

"7. *Approves* establishment by administering authorities of joint council with powers and functions in all matters in economic, social, educational, and cultural fields of common interest to the two territories.

"8. *Urges* various elements of populations of two territories give their full support to this body.

"9. *Invites* administering authorities keep TC informed of work of joint council and also of every step of common interest taken as result this work.

"10. *Decides* visiting mission which will in normal course visit two Trust territories in summer 1952 will make particular inquiry on this question and report to TC on development of political situation and on manner in which measures referred to above have been implemented."

If necessary in order to obtain GC approval, Fr del wld be willing insert following para after para number 7 in foregoing draft resolution:

"*Invites* administering authorities consult joint council on question of political development in these territories."

According to Laurentie (Fr del), UK is in complete agreement with Fr on wording of this resolution.

AUSTIN

USUN Files

Memorandum Transmitted by Mr. Leon Pignon, Representative of the French Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, to the United States Representative to the Trusteeship Council (Sayre)

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, July 13, 1951.

Subject: Ewe Problem

As it has already informed the United States delegation, the French delegation is convinced that the Ewe question presents itself in 1951 in a completely different light from that in which it was usually considered in the past. Not only have the difficulties, which the in-

habitants of the French territory may have suffered as a result of the war and the fact that the frontier was closed been completely eliminated today, but in addition the annexationist tendencies of the Gold Coast do not permit of giving any further thought to the constitution of a truly autonomous Ewe territory.

On the first point there is little to add. It is obvious that the liberal and democratic policy pursued by France in the territory placed under her trusteeship and the common desire of the United Kingdom and France to eliminate all exchange difficulties between the two territories have likewise borne fruit. The advocates in French territory of unification can no longer invoke any reason for popular discontent; they must fall back on arguments of principle, which have infinitely less effect on the masses and are being questioned by the leaders themselves. As shown by the last election (June 17).

As to the annexationist tendencies of the Gold Coast, that is the very factor which makes many hesitate who heretofore took an active part in the unification movement. It seems to them, rightly, that the autonomous Eweland of which they had dreamed would come up against the new political tendencies of the Gold Coast; the system established in the country appears, in fact, to be incompatible with the setting up on the frontier of a rival government which would be based on a tribal principle and would by that very fact threaten the integrity of the Gold Coast. Prestige, power and the science of organization give to leaders at Accra a considerable advantage over the all-Ewe Conference and the Committee on Togo Unity, at least over those of their members who were sincerely advocating the formation of an autonomous Eweland; there is therefore reason to think that the unification movement would in reality work only to the advantage of the Gold Coast, which for this purpose has the mass of Ewelanders in Keta. The United States delegation is aware of the situation; acts and talk leave no doubt as to intentions and methods of the leaders in Accra.

That is why, without even mentioning the other inhabitants of French Togo, who have clearly and resolutely opposed all unification, one has every reason to think that, at least in French territory, the Ewelanders themselves are beginning to ask themselves more or less confusedly what would happen to their originality and their influence if the progress of events reduced them to only one district of some province of the Gold Coast.

My Government deems it just to give them time for reflection, since the circumstances, that is, the present calm prevailing in Togo, permit it. In order to prepare them for a perfectly clear choice, it has decided to develop considerably the local political institutions in the trust territory. Suffrage will be considerably extended; the territorial Assembly's administrative power and power of decision will at the

same time be greatly increased; and executive positions in which the Togolanders will share in the responsibilities of government are in the process of being set up. Thus the territory will take a long step in the direction of self-government, while by this means the inhabitants, particularly the Ewelanders, will be able, within a reasonable period of time, to decide their own fate with full knowledge of the facts.

To act differently, to hold, for example, a consultation on the real scope of which the people would not be informed, would be a sort of deceit. It would also be an error of policy with respect to West Africa in general.

The French government has followed with great interest the political evolution of the Gold Coast as well as that of Nigeria, and considers that the progress made in these two territories, although obtained in different ways, is no less worthy of interest than that from which the French territories of Black Africa have themselves benefited. But it is needless to point out to the United States delegation the political, strategic, and economic drawbacks of a West Africa in which the interior frontiers would become infinitely less fluid than they were during the colonial period.

Now if Gold Coast trends may, *a priori*, appear to be tending toward the formation of a large African combination, the actual situation would be of a different nature. The exclusive hegemony of Accra on the contrary, is in danger of ending in a partitioning that will render more difficult the establishment of harmonious relations among the various regions of the continent. The government of the Gold Coast is now giving evidence it has of a leaning in that direction; in seeking to annex British Togo and all or part of French Togo, it is manifesting the desire to enlarge its own domain without consideration for the sentiment of the neighboring countries or for a higher regional interest. Nothing can be more contrary to an organized or even merely harmonious concept of West Africa than this closed imperialism of classic form.

The French delegation takes the liberty of calling special attention to this aspect of the problem. In its opinion, any action that succeeded, by surprise, in encouraging Gold Coast expansionism at the expense of French Togo, would, besides being a strange infraction of the rules of the trusteeship system, constitute a precedent the results of which might be extremely serious both for the African peoples in general as well as for the position of the Atlantic powers in Africa.

I shall mention, in order to make my thought more clear, that my government will endeavor to seek the conclusion with the British territories of all possible economic agreements, local or regional, on transportation, roads, agriculture, stockraising, electric power, etc. This policy of agreements, according to the observations which the E.C.A. representatives were led to make in Black Africa, will have as

its purpose not only to ensure the better employment of capital but also to prevent the frontiers from being closed and to create lasting bonds between the various countries of West Africa. Thus, in the absence of unity proper, it will be possible for solidarity and consequently harmony to prevail in this part of the continent despite the variety of political systems.

Those are positive measures that will help to spare West Africa a political and economic partitioning that would obstruct the progress of the people and the legitimate concern of the Atlantic powers for security. Quite to the contrary, the tendencies concealed in the self-styled Ewe propaganda of today would only lead to rash acts if they were satisfied.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] July 13, 1951.
US/T/136

Subject: The Ewe Problem

Participants: Mr. Awni Khalidy—Delegation of Iraq
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre—US Delegation
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III—US Delegation

Ambassador Sayre opened the conversation with a statement that he thought the further exchange of views between him and Mr. Khalidy might be helpful in furtherance of their efforts to work out a joint position on the Ewe problem, which might serve as the basis for a resolution to be submitted to the Trusteeship Council which Iraq and the United States might co-sponsor. Ambassador Sayre said that the United States Delegation had given further thought to the ideas advanced by Mr. Khalidy in the last conversation which they had had together, and thought that it might be possible to go along with Mr. Khalidy's ideas, particularly his belief that the Joint Council for the two Togolands should be strengthened by empowering it to advise the two administering authorities with respect to political and educational development matters, as well as social and economic matters. Ambassador Sayre then went over briefly what in his opinion might be the most important provisions of such a resolution.

Mr. Khalidy replied that "his thoughts had crystallized" on the question since the last meeting and that he had reached the conclusion that he should abstain on such a resolution as Ambassador Sayre had described, rather than co-sponsor or support it. He thought that the failure of the Council to obtain a solution of the problem after con-

sidering it for four years was to be deprecated. Ambassador Sayre expressed surprise at this change of attitude, as he had thought from the last meeting that the two delegations were in substantial agreement as to the most constructive action which the Council might take under all the circumstances. He went on to say that he believed that there could be no present solution to the underlying problem which would gain the approval of the majority of the people of two territories, and that it would seem to him difficult and most unwise for the Council to attempt at this time to impose a permanent solution, particularly since, as Mr. Khalidy had agreed previously, the situation in the two trust territories was extremely fluid. Ambassador Sayre said that, so far as he could see, the establishment of a Joint Council such as that envisaged in the Anglo-French memorandum, would be the most constructive step which could now be taken, provided of course that the functions of the Joint Council were strengthened along the lines which Mr. Khalidy had suggested at their former meeting. Such a Council would furnish the means for all groups concerned to get their views before the United Nations and the world.

Mr. Khalidy said that he would have no objection to statements on the part of the French and British that no solution could be currently reached with respect to the Ewe problem under present conditions. He did resent, however, the constant efforts on the part of the British and French to stave off a final solution by current successive proposals which did not and could not solve the problem. According to Mr. Khalidy, the French administration in French Togoland was following a policy of attacking him personally as well as of criticizing the activities of the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council; and in his opinion it was high time that the two administering authorities be made to realize that they must move forward towards solving the problem or reap the consequences. He reiterated that it would be better for the Trusteeship Council to take no action at present rather than to endorse another "experiment" like that of the Consultative Commission. He considered the new Joint Council to be nothing but another "experiment". He felt that it might be better for the Trusteeship Council to take no action other than noting the Anglo-French memorandum, leaving it to the General Assembly at its next session to decide whether or not constructive action should be taken.

Ambassador Sayre asked what kind of a joint proposal Mr. Khalidy would be willing to support. Mr. Khalidy replied that he would be glad to put his ideas in writing and give them to Ambassador Sayre at this afternoon's session of the Council. Ambassador Sayre said that he would appreciate his doing so in order that he might obtain the Department's opinion whether it would be better for the United States to proceed along the lines of the resolution which had previously been suggested and which Mr. Khalidy agreed not to oppose, or whether it

would be preferable to attempt to work out some sort of different resolution which the two Delegations could co-sponsor.

645K.51T3/7–1351 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 13, 1951—7:42 p. m.

86. For Gerig. Re Ewe question. With reference to Gerig–Jones telecon this afternoon, there follows text of rough draft of resolution on Ewe question, prepared by Khalidy of Iraq:

"1. The Council notes the joint paper which might be yet another attempt to arrive at a conclusion in the Ewe problem.

"2. The Council realized that this paper is not a solution of the Ewe problem, and to that end the Council decides to await at the next session a plan that will aim directly at the solution of that question.

"3. The Council takes no responsibility for the joint paper presented, but the two administering authorities may put it into action on their own responsibility, if they think that it will contribute to the solution of the problem; and to that end welcome the cooperation of the indigenous groups with the two administering authorities for the solution of the problem.

"4. The Council, while realizing that there are difficulties in the situation, nevertheless should express its regrets that a solution of the problem has not been found after five years of the reception of the original petition, and after the report of a visiting mission."

Khalidy said he would be prepared co-sponsor resolution along foregoing lines.

Ross

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] July 16, 1951.

US/T/139

Subject: Trusteeship Council Action on Ewe Problem

Participants: Mr. Rodolfo Munoz, Argentine Delegation
Mr. Quesada Zapiola, Argentine Delegation
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, United States Delegation
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, United States Delegation

Ambassador Sayre said that he had requested the meeting with Mr. Munoz in order that they might have an exchange of views on

what action the Trusteeship Council might most wisely take with respect to the Ewe question. Ambassador Sayre said that United States thinking on the Anglo-French memorandum was that certain parts of it could be approved by the Trusteeship Council, particularly the portion setting forth the plans of the administering authorities to establish some sort of joint body of representatives of the two Togolands and also the suggestion that the Consultative Commission had no further role to play in the future. The United States believed, however, that the joint body mentioned in the memorandum which we understand is to be called a Joint Council, should be strengthened, and that the Trusteeship Council should urge that its advisory powers should be increased so as to include matters relating to political and also educational development. Ambassador Sayre stated that he did not know whether or not the British and French intend to submit a resolution to the Council on the Ewe question, but that if they did, we hoped that Argentina would join us in submitting an amendment broadening the powers of the Joint Council along the foregoing lines. We also hoped that if the French and British did not introduce a resolution, Argentina would join us in submitting a proposal to the Council along the same lines.

Dr. Munoz replied that his Delegation might wish for the record to vote for more extreme proposals which Mr. Khalidy might submit even though it realized that such proposals had little chance of passage. Mr. Sayre replied that he had talked to Mr. Khalidy about the Anglo-French memorandum and that Mr. Sayre judged from what the latter had indicated that he did not expect to present an Iraqi proposal to the Council. Mr. Khalidy had said that while he did not feel that he could co-sponsor a resolution with the United States along the lines which Ambassador Sayre had already described, he would not oppose such a resolution but would abstain if such a resolution was put to the vote. Mr. Sayre said that he considered his proposal as a liberalization of the conservative Anglo-French position and he hoped the Argentines would come along with us in this effort. After further conversation Dr. Munoz stated that upon further consideration he thought that the Argentine Delegation might be able to associate itself with the United States in introducing the United States proposals. He promised to take the question up with the Argentine Government and to let us know definitely within two days if possible. In answer to Mr. Sayre's question, he added that in his message to the Argentine Government he would recommend to his Government that they join with the United States in sponsoring the Resolution.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

US/T/140

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] July 17, 1951.

Subject: The Ewe Question

Participants: Mr. Awni Khalidy, Iraqi Delegation
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, United States Delegation

Mr. Khalidy stopped me just outside the Trusteeship Council chamber to discuss the Ewe question. He reiterated his reservations to Council action along the lines the United States had in mind. He went into considerable lengths in his argument that the United States should support a resolution along the lines of the draft which he had given us. He said that he would be perfectly willing to give the administering authorities another chance and to authorize them to submit to the Council definitive proposals for settlement of the question at the next session of the Council. He also said that unless the administering authorities were confronted with a Council demand for action, they would let the question drag on interminably.

Mr. Khalidy said that he would like to bring to the attention of the United States Delegation his firm view that, unless some definitive progress was made toward solving this problem, there would be an "eruption of violence" in the Ewe areas. He referred to the *New York Times* news article of recent date regarding rioting in the Gold Coast and French Togoland and said this was merely a foretaste of what would happen unless concrete steps were taken at once to work towards a settlement of the problem.

Mr. Khalidy said that he thought that the United States was deeply concerned in the problem for two reasons: (1) In case of another world war, it was likely that the Mediterranean Sea would be closed to the free world in the same way that it was during the last war. If this proved to be true, western Africa would become vital to the Western nations in their communications with the East. Consequently, it behooves us to attempt to win the sympathetic understanding of those peoples who would probably control that area of Africa within the next several years. (2) Unless progress was made in solving the Ewe problem, there would inevitably be a tendency on the part of the Ewe people to fall under the domination of more extremist elements, particularly the Communists. Mr. Khalidy thought that for this reason, if for no other, the United States would wish to follow a policy which would retain the friendship of the Ewes.

In my reply to Mr. Khalidy, I advanced again the reasons which form the basis of the United States attitude with respect to Trustee-

ship Council consideration of the Ewe problem. I took advantage of the occasion to ask Mr. Khalidy to clarify the statement which he had previously made to me with respect to the possibility that he might be able to vote for the United States resolution rather than abstain. He replied that if the United States resolution, as finally presented, contained a sufficient number of his ideas, he might be able to vote for the resolution as a whole although abstain on certain paragraphs. I pointed out the difficulty in the way of amalgamating the views of the two delegations in one resolution, and particularly the fact that such a resolution would "go in two directions at once". I said, however, that we should be glad, of course, to give consideration to his suggestion.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] July 17, 1951.

US/T/142

Subject: The Ewe Question

Participants: H. R. H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thailand Delegation
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, United States Delegation
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, United States Delegation

Ambassador Sayre said to Prince Wan that he had requested him to lunch with him in order that they might take counsel together as to what would be the most constructive action the Trusteeship Council could take with respect to the Ewe question. Ambassador Sayre stated that the United States Delegation thought that the Anglo-French memorandum on the Ewe question submitted to the Council contained some suggestions which were worthy of careful consideration. For example, we thought that the idea advanced in the memorandum of establishing a joint body, or joint council, composed of representatives of the two Togolands was a good one. We thought, however, that the joint council should be strengthened in that it should be empowered to advise the two administering authorities with respect to educational and political matters as well as social and economic matters. Ambassador Sayre gave to Prince Wan a copy of the resolution embodying the United States views on constructive Council action and said that he hoped that, if Prince Wan agreed with these views, he would be able to join with the United States, and possibly some of

the other members of the Council, in co-sponsoring a resolution along these lines.[1]

Prince Wan stated that he agreed with Ambassador Sayre's view that there was no permanent solution of the Ewe unification problem which could be effected at this time that would obtain the approval of the majority of the inhabitants of the two trust territories. Prince Wan thought that the idea of a joint commission was a practical one. He cited the collaboration which had taken place between Indo-China and Thailand as an example of what might be accomplished by the establishment of a joint Togoland council with respect to the solution of frontier problems. After reading the draft resolution, he noted with approval the provision in the resolution recommending that the scope of responsibilities of the proposed joint council be broadened to include the giving of advice on political, economic, social, educational, and cultural development matters. He indicated that he thought that the Thailand Delegation would be able to co-sponsor a resolution along these lines with the United States.

[1] No copy of the draft resolution as such has been found, but see the U.S. text incorporated in Department of State telegram 38, July 18, 4 p. m., *infra*.

645K.51T/7–1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 18, 1951—4 p. m.

38. *Verbatim text.* You authorized re Ewe question use following draft res as basis negotiation other TC members with view seeking support both administering and non-administering members and co-sponsorship with Argentine, Thailand or Dominican Republic as either new resolution or amendment of a Brit-Fr Res: [1]

The Trusteeship Council

1. *Recalling* its Resolution 306 (VIII) of 9 March 1951 on the Ewe Question;

2. *Having considered* in this connection various petitions submitted by different groups, parties and individuals to the Trusteeship Council, which are listed in the annex to this resolution;

3. *Notes* with interest the Anglo-French memorandum regarding the Ewe and Allied Petitions (T/931 and T/931/Add.1) submitted to the Trusteeship Council by the two Administering Authorities in response to Resolution 306 (VIII) of 9 March 1951;

4. *Concurs* with the view of the two Administering Authorities expressed in their Joint Memorandum that since the Consultative Com-

[1] This was submitted to the Trusteeship Council as Doc. T/L.213, July 24; official text is in TC (IX), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 12.

mission has served its purpose there would now seem to be no reason for continuing its existsence;

5. *Approves* the proposal of the Administering Authorities to establish a Joint Council composed of representatives from Togoland under French Trusteeship and Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship to advise the two Administering Authorities on matters of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories;

6. *Recommends* that the two Administering Authorities proceed with their plans immediately to establish such a Joint Council in order that it may have functioned for a sufficient period of time for the United Nations Visiting Mission to the West African Trust Territories in 1952 to form an evaluation of its accomplishments;

7. *Recommends* that the two Administering Authorities ensure that the scope of responsibilities of the proposed Joint Council be sufficiently broad to enable it to exercise its functions with respect to all questions of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories, including questions of political, economic, social, educational, and cultural development;

8. *Recommends* that the method of determining the composition of the Joint Council be such as to ensure, if possible, the participation of the major groups in the two Territories;

9. *Urges* all elements of the population of the two Trust Territories to cooperate in the establishment and operation of the Joint Council in order that the Joint Council's decisions may fully reflect the views of all concerned;

10. *Requests* the two Administering Authorities to report as soon as possible on the action taken pursuant to this resolution.

ACHESON

645K.51T3/7–1951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 19, 1951—7 : 29 p. m.

117. TC—Ewe question. As authorized Deptel 38, July 18, 1951, we have consulted almost all TC members regarding our draft resolution on Ewe question.

Our discussions British and French dels have convinced us they are pleased and gratified with resolution. French, however, would prefer deletion para 8 resolution recommending to administering authorities that method determining composition joint council be such as ensure, if possible, participation major groups in two territories. Real basis French objection this provision is their wish prevent any onus for failure Ewe unification groups participate joint council, if such proves to be case, from falling on shoulders of two administering powers. We believe para 8 should not be dropped and, if any change made, it be somewhat strengthened, possibly along lines suggested by Bunche (see

Sayre–Bunche memo of conversation, July 18, 1951 [1]). Basis for foregoing view is our belief that non-administering members, who we hope will co-sponsor resolution with us, would react adversely deletion this para and our own feeling administering authorities should not be placed in position enable them avoid all responsibility in case Ewe unification groups refuse participate joint council.

Australians, although authorized co-sponsor resolution present form, would prefer somewhat weaker resolution. New Zealanders first reaction as strongly set forth Sir Carl Berendsen, is that adoption our resolution will not prove step forward in solution of problem as unification groups will refuse participate joint council.

With respect non-administering powers, Dept aware Iraq reversal of opinion on resolution and its present view council should not in any manner endorse proposals contained in Anglo-French memo but should express regret at British and French failure submit constructive proposals settle problem in five years it has been before TC and calling upon two governments submit further proposals next session TC. Khalidy (Iraq) has informed us he will abstain our resolution and we fear abstention his part will lessen chances unification groups will accept Anglo-French proposals. Argentine, Dominican Republic, Thailand reps have indicated willingness co-sponsor resolution with us, but Argentinian co-sponsorship contingent upon favorable instructions Buenos Aires.

We believe nature of clarifying statements made by British and French at TC debate on problem is of utmost importance and might be determining factor in crystallizing attitude towards Anglo-French proposals non administering members TC, political groups in Togoland, and also non administering members fourth comite next GA. We therefore believe British and French should be urged make clear their statements during council debate their intention that proposed joint council will be a strong body, and that its advice will be given serious and sympathetic consideration. Two specific points which arise re British-French statements in council debate follow: (1) We consider it important that British-French indicate before end of debate their willingness empower joint council deal with political development matters. Khalidy (Iraq) for example, feels such action by British and French would be most desirable (2) It would also be most helpful if British and French could give satisfactory assurances in debate that method of selection members of joint council will be such as to provide unification groups with fair and reasonable opportunity secure proportionate share of seats. We believe British and French should be approached before debate begins especially re last point above as our conversations these reps have indicated they, and particularly French, have in mind method of appointment mem-

[1] Not printed.

bers council which would not be generally acceptable either majority members council or Ewe unification groups.

AUSTIN

645K.51T3/7–2151 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 21, 1951—2:43 p. m.

128. For Gerig from Sayre. Re Ewe question. Burns (UK) informed me today British and French Dels have not yet decided whether or not to introduce their own resolution on Ewe question. Burns gave me in strict confidence copy of draft resolution which British and French will submit if they decide advantages of submission of own resolution outweigh disadvantages. Burns will let me know as soon as decision made. Text of resolution follows:[1]

"*The Trusteeship Council,*

"*Recalling* its resolution 306 (viii) of the 9th March 1951 on the Ewe question.

"*Having considered* the memorandum presented jointly by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom in response to this resolution, and the minutes of proceedings of the consultative commission annexed to that memorandum, in which is to be found an expression of the views of the different groups and parties in the two territories, including those of the Comite de L'Union Togolaise (CUT) and the all-Ewe conference, even though these two parties did not take part in the work of the commission.

"*Considering* that these various views are contradictory among themselves and that it did not appear to the members of the commission themselves that they could in their present form be reconciled.

"*Considering* that in these circumstances it is desirable to concentrate on those questions which can promote the common interests of the inhabitants of the two territories rather than on those issues which tend to exacerbate the differences between the various elements.

"*Having considered* in this connection the various petitions submitted by different groups, parties and individuals to the trusteeship council.

"*Approves* the joint memorandum presented by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom.

"*Welcomes* the establishment by the administering authorities of a joint council with powers and functions in all matters in the economic, social, educational and cultural fields of common interest to the two territories.

"*Urges* the various elements of the population of the two territories to give their full support to this body.

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[1] This was submitted to the Trusteeship Council as Doc. T/L. 212, July 24; official text is in TC (IX), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 12.

"*Invites* the administering authorities to keep the trusteeship council informed of the work of the joint council and also of every step of common interest taken as a result of this work."

[Sayre]
Ross

Editorial Note

On July 23 and July 24 the Trusteeship Council received and discussed the joint Anglo-French draft resolution (Doc. T/L.212), and the amendment to the draft submitted concurrently by the Dominican Republic, Thailand, and the United States (Doc. T/L. 213). The Council on July 24 adopted the amendment, in turn amended in two places by Argentine motion; and then proceeded to adopt the joint Anglo-French draft resolution as amended. In support of the three-power amendment, the United States Representative (Sayre) made a strong statement on July 24 explaining that the United States "was deeply concerned with the problem of the Ewes and of the peoples of the two Togolands" and that this Government was convinced that the powers of the new proposed Joint Council should be broadened to include "all questions of common concern to the inhabitants of both Territories" (that is, political as well as economic and social questions). For the proceedings of the Trusteeship Council on this matter, see TC (IX), 379th meeting, page 296, and TC (IX), 380th meeting, pages 297–304.

II. CONSULTATIONS ON DEPENDENT AREA QUESTIONS WITH NON-ADMINISTERING MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ODA Files, Lot 62 D 228

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1951.

Subject: Consultations on Dependent Area Questions with Non-Administering Powers

Problem

The problem is to determine whether and in what form it would be advisable and practicable to consult with non-administering Members of the United Nations on dependent area questions prior to the next session of the General Assembly, having regard to the successful results of our consultations last year with administering Members.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

1. Consultations be initiated with as many as possible of the non-administering countries, with the exception of the Soviet bloc, and that priority be given to certain key non-administering countries.
2. With the exception of certain European countries, all consultations be on a bilateral basis.
3. The consultations be held in Washington, on an informal basis, and generally at the Office Director level.
4. The attached outline of suggested topics be submitted to the various Governments invited to consult at the time the invitation is extended, with the understanding that the consultations will be sufficiently flexible to permit discussion of such other dependent area questions as they or we may wish to raise.[1]
5. The objective of the consultations be a frank and informal exchange of views on general dependent area questions arising in the United Nations, but that specific questions be discussed as appropriate with particular countries.
6. During the course of the consultations the attached *aide-mémoire* be handed to the representative concerned for transmission to his Government, if he deems such action desirable.[2]

Discussion

1. The path of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly would undoubtedly be smoothed by as great a degree of consultation with the non-administering powers as is practicable, particularly since such countries know that the United States has already held similar conversations with certain administering powers. It might be held that an unfavorable impression would be created if the United States arranged wide-spread discussions with a large number of countries on what is primarily a United Nations matter, particularly if publicity is given to the discussions. Such a view does not appear to be valid, particularly if the discussions are held on an informal basis and it is emphasized that they are merely one aspect of the continuous consultation carried on by the United States with other United Nations Members on United Nations questions. Stress could be given to our belief that such consultations would provide an occasion for a mutually profitable exchange of views, affording each an opportunity to explain the basic motivations and objectives. Publicity of course should be limited to the minimum.

The major obstacle in the way of arranging consultations with all the non-administering countries, except the Soviet bloc, is the phys-

[1] Not printed; but for revised list, see memorandum dated August 19, p. 611.
[2] Not printed; but see Department of State memorandum (transmitted to the Embassy of Pakistan), dated August 29, p. 612. The final form of the memorandum was substantially the same as initial drafts, with the exception of revisions necessitated to bring the memorandum up-to-date by taking into account developments that had occurred since drafting began in March.

ical difficulty of completing the discussions in the time available before the next General Assembly session. The physical difficulty would be decreased, however, if consultations were initiated in the near future and, in the majority of cases, were limited to a brief discussion of selected dependent area questions arising in the United Nations. It is anticipated that the duration of the majority of the discussions would be about two hours. It is possible that some of the non-administering countries might not wish to enter into consultations, and the attitude of the countries should of course, be ascertained informally before the invitation is extended.

2. In general it is believed that bilateral discussions are preferable and would be more effective than multilateral discussions because representatives of the non-administering powers would probably speak more frankly in bilateral discussions, and would appreciate an invitation to participate in such discussions on an equal basis with the United States.

Nevertheless, there appears to be no objection to arranging consultation on a multilateral basis with some of the European non-administering powers such as Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Iceland.

3. It would be extremely difficult to hold discussions with a large number of countries prior to the next session of the General Assembly either in the capital of the particular country or in New York. Neither the Assistant Secretary or the Deputy Assistant Secretary is likely to have the time to participate in discussions with a large number of non-administering countries. Moreover, the holding of discussions on the Office Director level, or perhaps in some instances at a lower level, would have the effect of making the discussions more informal. In some cases, however, such as the Philippines, it might be desirable to have the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant Secretary head the United States group. The participation of the geographic office concerned would be assumed.

4. The submission of an outline of suggested topics would be of value in that it would not only clarify, to the Government invited to enter into discussion, the scope and objectives of the consultation, but would also afford it an opportunity to prepare for discussion of the matters listed as well as related questions in which it might have a particular interest.

5. The primary objective of the consultations would be to obtain as wide an understanding and as full an acceptance as possible of the views of the United States on United Nations treatment of dependent area questions. Consequently, it is believed that the discussion should deal mainly with the broad subject of United Nations consideration of questions involving trust and other non-self-governing territories. It would also appear desirable to include some particular questions which

are likely to come to the fore in the next session of the General Assembly.

6. It would seem helpful, both to this Government and to the various governments consulted, to hand to the representatives of the latter during the course of the consultation an *aide-memoire* summarizing the views of the United States on the various items on the outline of suggested topics. This would assist in ensuring that our views are fully, accurately, and uniformly reported to each government concerned.

B[ENJAMIN] G[ERIG]

Editorial Note

In the subsequent weeks, there was discussion within the Department on the Gerig proposal (which was submitted on an official basis by the Bureau of United Nations Affairs). Concerned officers of the Bureau of European Affairs, specifically within the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, reacted guardedly; and in the end the plan seems not to have been applied to that area. On the proposal of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs the discussions with the Latin American countries were held in the field rather than in Washington; this procedure led to a great deal of memorandum writing in the Department before instructions were sent out to the Embassies in that area, mainly in September. Conversations with countries within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs were held as proposed in Washington, in August and September. In October the Washington discussions were extended to include China, the Philippines, and Thailand. Subjects discussed corresponded to those in the list printed *infra*. The memorandum handed to the foreign representatives in Washington and the Foreign Ministries in the American Republics was the same, *mutatis mutandis;* for text, see page 612. Pertinent documentation is found in Department of State decimal country files; in files 320, 320.14, 350, and 700.022; and in ODA Files, Lots 60 D 152 and 62 D 228 (working files of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs). Documentation is located also in the files of the United States Mission to the United Nations.

350/8–1351

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1951.

SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON DEPENDENT AREA QUESTIONS ARISING IN THE UNITED NATIONS

A. GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. Basic views of the United States and _____ with respect to questions involving non-self-governing peoples and the treatment of such questions in the United Nations.

2. Relationship of the General Assembly (Committee Four) to the Trusteeship Council and to the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter.

3. The functioning of the Trusteeship Council.

4. The functioning of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter.

B. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. South West Africa

2. Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council

3. General Assembly consideration of Trusteeship Council procedures

4. The transmission of political information under Article 73(*e*)

5. The question of "the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory is or is not a territory whose peoples have not yet achieved a full measure of self-government"

6. The Ewe problem [1]

[1] This item was not on the list originally drafted to accompany the March 29 memorandum from Gerig to Hickerson, p. 607.

350/8–2951

The Department of State to the Embassy of Pakistan [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM [2]

Mindful of their own colonial origin and their successful struggle for independence, the people of the United States have always maintained an attitude of sympathetic understanding towards dependent peoples striving for their freedom. In consonance with this attitude, the United States Government favors the progressive development of all dependent peoples towards the goals of self-government and, where conditions are suitable, of independence. It is believed that these views are shared by the Government and the people of Pakistan.

The application of the principle enunciated above will obviously vary in accordance with the conditions prevailing in each territory, particularly the adequacy of resources for the social and economic development of the people as well as their degree of political maturity. The general principle that too great political or economic fragmentation is undesirable should also be kept in mind.

It is the policy of the United States to support firmly the provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing with questions of dependent peoples. This Government believes that the United Nations has made, and will continue to make, noteworthy contributions to the political, economic, social, and educational progress of peoples of dependent areas. The United States welcomes the freest exchange of points of view in the United Nations and believes that the administering and non-administering Members alike can benefit from frank discussion conducted in a helpful and scientific spirit. The development of sharp cleavages between administering and non-administering Members would limit the ability of the United Nations to contribute to the welfare of non-self-governing peoples as well as operate to the advantage of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The scientific approach has, fortunately, become more evident in recent meetings of United Nations organs and committees. The United States welcomes this encouraging trend.

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[1] Handed to the Pakistan Minister, Mr. Osman Baig, by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig), on August 29.

[2] As noted in the editorial note, p. 610, this was one of 15 or so memoranda handed to as many foreign diplomatic representatives in Washington mainly in September. As it is printed as a model, there is accordingly no special significance attached to the selection of Pakistan here as the recipient government.

Copies of the memorandum, together with the list of topics for consultation (*supra*) and the record of the conversation that took place (none printed), were subsequently transmitted by the Department under cover of an instruction to the U.S. diplomatic mission in the country concerned for appropriate discussion with the local Foreign Ministry. This correspondence is located in the central indexed files of the Department of State, files 350 and 700.021.

As the Government of Pakistan has been informed, the United States initiated discussions on dependent area questions prior to the last session of the General Assembly with representatives of some of the administering powers. It believes that these conversations were fruitful and that they resulted in a greater realization, on the part of the Governments participating, of the growing interest of all Members of the United Nations in the welfare and advancement of the dependent peoples, a realization which was reflected in more positive cooperation by these Governments in United Nations bodies dealing with dependent area questions.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (COMMITTEE FOUR) TO THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL AND THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73(*E*) OF THE CHARTER

The United States believes that it is important to differentiate clearly between the functions of Committee Four of the General Assembly on the one hand and the functions of the Trusteeship Council and of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*) on the other. The United States believes that there should be a proper distribution of functions and that the Fourth Committee should generally be regarded as the organ of the United Nations which deals with developments in trust and other non-self-governing territories in their broader aspects.

In contrast to the Fourth Committee, the Trusteeship Council, though operating under the authority of the Assembly, is a body of "specially qualified persons" established by the Charter for the purpose of reviewing in detail and on a continuing basis, political, economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories placed under the international trusteeship system. The United States considers that, generally speaking, the Fourth Committee should function primarily as a reviewing body and not as a rule make detailed recommendations on specific questions involving individual trust territories. On the other hand, the General Assembly, as the organ representing the views of all Members of the United Nations, may usefully bring to the attention of the Trusteeship Council general problems which, in its view, are of such importance as to merit consideration by the Council in relation to conditions in the trust territories or the operation of the trusteeship system, setting forth at the same time to the Trusteeship Council, if circumstances warrant, its own general views on the subject. The Trusteeship Council in its deliberations should, of course, be mindful of the views of the General Assembly.

Similarly, the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*), although it is a temporary body with powers and functions which differentiate it from the Trusteeship Council, might best function as a body of specially qualified persons. As a result of

its smaller membership and of the practice of including technical advisers in delegations, the Special Committee would seem better constituted than the Fourth Committee to give such detailed and expert consideration as is necessary to difficult problems of the non-self-governing territories. The United States believes that the studies and recommendations of the Special Committee have been of great value and assistance to the General Assembly.

The views of the Government of Pakistan as to the relationship of the General Assembly to the Trusteeship Council and to the Special Committee would be appreciated.

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

The United States considers that the Trusteeship Council as an organ exercising supervisory functions in connection with the international trusteeship system is effectively fulfilling the functions assigned to it in the Charter, and that it has already made a significant contribution to the advancement of non-self-governing peoples. In connection with the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands this Government will continue to give the most careful consideration to the observations and recommendations of the Council.

The United States believes, moreover, that the Trusteeship Council might be made an even more effective forum for a constructive interchange of ideas relating to the administration of the peoples under the international trusteeship system. The administering Members of the Council can manifestly benefit from such an exchange of ideas with all Members of the Trusteeship Council and can contribute on the basis of their particular experience in the administration of the trust territories and other territories for which they are responsible. The non-administering Members of the Council can contribute much of value to such Council discussions on the basis of the experience which they may have had in dealing with comparable economic and social problems in their own countries. The United States hopes that this useful aspect of the Council's work will be further developed in the future.

It is recognized that apart from the Soviet Union, Members of the Trusteeship Council have not sought to use the Council for propaganda purposes. With the exception noted, both the administering and the non-administering Members of the Council have participated constructively in the work of the Council in its consideration of the complex problems arising in the administration of the trust territories. The United States is convinced that the maintenance of an atmosphere of cooperation in the Council is essential to the steady advancement toward the objectives of the trusteeship system; for only on the basis of such cooperation can the full potentialities of the Trusteeship Council to contribute to progress of the peoples of the trust territories be realized.

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 (*E*) OF THE CHARTER

The attitude of the Government of the United States toward the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*) is based on its conviction that the United Nations should make a positive and constructive contribution to the welfare and development of non-self-governing territories, at the same time fully respecting the distinction clearly laid down in the Charter itself between the functions of the United Nations with respect to the trust territories and the other non-self-governing territories.

The original vote of the United States against the establishment of the Special Committee in 1946 was based not on a belief that the General Assembly could not legally establish such a body but on doubts as to whether a committee of political representatives was the best type of mechanism to consider the technical data transmitted under Article 73(*e*). In an effort to obtain an adequate test, the United States supported the continuation of the Special Committee on a year-to-year basis in 1947 and 1948, and in 1949 sponsored a proposal for the continuation of the Committee for a three-year period. This Government has not sought to confine the Committee to a purely procedural role but has, on the contrary, supported the right of the Committee to make recommendations in the economic, social, and educational fields, provided these did not relate to individual administering Members or to particular territories. The United States also co-sponsored with Mexico in 1949 a proposal that the Special Committee give particular consideration each year to one of the three fields within its terms of reference without neglecting the other two. The United States considers that the 1950 session of the Committee was a constructive one.

The Government of the United States hopes that the Government of Pakistan will share its view that considerable credit for the success of the 1950 session of the Special Committee should go to those administering Members who, in spite of their misgivings about the legality of the Special Committee and of the appropriateness of the functions assigned to it by the General Assembly, participated helpfully along with the non-administering Members in its work at that session. Since the effectiveness of the recommendations of the United Nations is directly related to the spirit with which they are applied in the territories by the administering authorities, the United States attaches the greatest importance to the willing cooperation of such Members in the work of the Special Committee and Committee Four.

The United States hopes that the harmonious atmosphere of the 1950 session of the Special Committee will continue during the 1951 session and believes that, barring unforeseen circumstances, it would not be desirable to modify the existing functions of the Special Committee during the present trial period. Valuable contributions were

made by non-administering Members of the Committee to the Special Report on Education and the United States feels certain that they will make a similarly valuable contribution to the discussion of economic conditions and development in the non-self-governing territories to be undertaken in the forthcoming session. The United States on its part will cooperate to the best of its ability to achieve this objective.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. *South West Africa*

As the Government of Pakistan is aware, the General Assembly, at its Fifth Session, established a committee of five to confer with the Union of South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question of South West Africa. This Committee has held an exchange of views with representatives of the Union Government. While consultations are not yet completed, the Union's views have been heard and a draft agreement embodying procedural measures considered necessary by the Committee for implementing the Court's opinion has been submitted to the Union Representatives. The United States, as a sponsor of the resolution establishing the Committee, and as a member of the Committee, has exerted, and will continue to exert, every effort to work towards a satisfactory solution of this difficult problem, and considers that the Committee has taken a useful forward step.

The United States, in its participation in the work of the Committee, has been guided by the belief that means should be found for implementing the opinion of the Court, as well as by its recognition that an attempt should be made to find such means in cooperation with the Government of the Union of South Africa. The process undertaken by the Committee of exploring carefully with the Union Government various procedures for implementing the Court's opinion seems at this stage to be the best means of protecting the interests of the inhabitants of South West Africa. While opinions must be somewhat tentative until the Committee has made its report, the views of the Government of Pakistan on this question would be welcomed.

2. *Italian Participation in the Trusteeship Council*

It will be recalled that the approval by the Fifth General Assembly of the Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland under Italian administration required the Trusteeship Council to work out the necessary arrangements for the participation of Italy in the work of the Council. Special arrangements were necessitated by virtue of the fact that Italy is not yet a Member of the United Nations.

The Trusteeship Council at its Eighth Session gave attention to this question and, in the opinion of the United States, made provision for the participation of Italy in the Council's work in the fullest degree

compatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Rules of procedure were adopted enabling the representative of Italy to be seated at all times during the sessions of the Council and providing for participation by Italy, without vote, in the deliberations of the Council relating to Somaliland and to general questions relating to the operation of the international trusteeship system. The right to vote was specifically excepted, since Articles 86 and 89 of the Charter of the United Nations make clear that membership in the Trusteeship Council is limited to Members of the United Nations and that the right to vote in the Council is accorded only to Members. Representatives of Italy participated effectively in the Ninth Session of the Council in accordance with the above-mentioned rules of procedure.

The Trusteeship Council, taking into consideration the strong desire of the Government of Italy to be empowered to vote in the Trusteeship Council, adopted a resolution by a vote of 9–1–2 requesting the General Assembly to include in the agenda of its Sixth Regular Session the question of "the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council".

The United States considers that Italy could acquire the right to vote in the Trusteeship Council only through admission to membership in the United Nations or through special amendment to Article 86 of the Charter. The United States has supported and will continue to support the admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations. The Government of Pakistan is familiar with the consideration of this question in the United Nations. In the view of the United States, the adoption of an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter would be at least as difficult to achieve as the admission of Italy to membership, since an amendment would also require approval by all permanent Members of the Security Council. Moreover, it would appear to be far less satisfactory to Italy. The views of the Government of Pakistan on any aspect of this question would be welcomed.

3. *General Assembly Consideration of Trusteeship Council Procedures*

The Government of Pakistan will recall that consideration by the Fifth General Assembly of the procedures of the Trusteeship Council resulted in three resolutions: General Procedures of the Trusteeship Council, Organization and Methods of Functioning of Visiting Missions, and Examination of Petitions. Although the United States voted for these resolutions in the plenary session of the Assembly, this Government has some misgivings lest the feeling become widespread that the General Assembly should give the Trusteeship Council specific directives regarding the Council's rules of procedure.

The United States recognizes that under Article 87 of the Charter the Trusteeship Council takes actions under the authority of the General Assembly. The General Assembly, therefore, has not only the right but the duty to consider the results attained by the Council in taking

those actions. On the other hand, the provisions of Article 7 of the Charter clearly designate the Council as a principal organ of the United Nations, and Article 90 provides that the Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Moreover, since the functions of the Trusteeship Council are of a special character, the United States believes that the Council, on the basis of its own experience, is the body best qualified to develop the rules of procedure necessary for the most effective accomplishment of its work.

As a Member of the Trusteeship Council, the United States is of course continually endeavoring to improve the procedures of the Trusteeship Council and believes that the Council should take fully into account any suggestions made in the Assembly which might improve the Council's work. It is in this sense that the United States supported actions in the Trusteeship Council at its Ninth Session pursuant to the three above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions on procedures. While the Council did not complete its review of its procedures at that session, the United States considers that several improvements were made, and it will continue to urge such further improvements as in its view appear to be necessary in the light of the Council's experience. The Government of the United States would be glad to have the views of the Government of Pakistan on this question.

4. *The Transmission of Political Information Under Article 73(e)*

The United States is of the opinion that the specific language of Article 73(*e*) was intended to exclude any obligation on the part of administering Members to transmit political information on non-self-governing territories. Hence, the United States has voted against resolutions stating or implying that the transmission of such information is required. As the Government of Pakistan is aware, however, the United States believes that the transmission of political information is desirable and has from the beginning voluntarily transmitted such information under the appropriate rubric of the Standard Form. Furthermore, the United States has supported resolutions of the General Assembly inviting administering Members to transmit political information voluntarily. It believes that this is a more appropriate and constructive approach to the problem than an attempt to require the submission of such information.

5. *The Question of "The Factors Which Should Be Taken Into Account In Deciding Whether a Territory Is Or Is Not a Territory Whose Peoples Have Not Yet Achieved a Full Measure of Self-Government"*

The United States considers that this question, which the General Assembly assigned to the Special Committee for study and which will be on the agenda of the 1951 session, presents great difficulties. The

problem is manifestly complex not only because of the bewildering variety of political relations between territories and their respective administering Members but also because of the rapidity with which these relationships are evolving. However, the United States believes that a consideration of this question is within the competence of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee and wishes to participate as helpfully as possible in the discussion.

6. *The Ewe and Togoland Unification Questions*

As the Government of Pakistan is aware, the General Assembly by its resolution of December 2, 1950, on the Ewe problem, requested the Trusteeship Council to devote a special chapter or sub-chapter of its next annual report to setting forth all steps undertaken in connection with the Ewe question. It is not proposed to outline these steps in this memorandum; however, occasion is taken to point out the continuing concern of the United States that solutions to the complex problems raised by the Ewe petitions be found. In the view of the United States it is not possible at this stage to arrive at a single solution which would have the adherence of all major groups in the two Togolands. It is largely for this reason that the United States, in the Ninth Session of the Trusteeship Council, took the position that a useful step forward could be accomplished by the establishment of a Joint Council composed of representatives of the two territories to advise the two administering authorities on matters of common concern.

It is now the view of the United States that every effort should be made to set up the new Joint Council in a manner which will obtain the participation of all major groups in the two territories and that the new body should be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to prove its effectiveness as a means whereby the inhabitants of both Togolands can influence developments in which they have a common concern. If the foregoing conditions are fulfilled, it should be possible, as contemplated in the resolution adopted by the Trusteeship Council on July 24, 1951, for the 1952 United Nations Visiting Mission to West Africa to form an evaluation of its accomplishments. Slow though such a process may be, it is the most feasible one, in the opinion of the United States, which can be undertaken at present in order to avoid the possibility of doing serious harm to the interests of important groups in the territories. The United States would be very much interested in the views of the Government of Pakistan on this question.

The United States Government will appreciate any further views on the questions discussed in this memorandum which the Government of Pakistan may wish to express, as well as its views on other questions in the field of non-self-governing territories which are likely to come before the next session of the General Assembly.

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1951.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1951.

DISCUSSIONS ON DEPENDENT AREA AFFAIRS WITH NON-ADMINISTERING COUNTRIES

I refer to Mr. Gerig's memorandum of June 11, 1951,[1] which you approved, setting forth the plans for holding discussions on dependent area affairs with non-administering members of the United Nations. UND, assisted by appropriate officers from the geographical bureaus, has now held discussions with representatives of the missions of all NEA countries with the exception of Ethiopia. Discussions were also held with representatives of the missions of China, Thailand and the Philippines. It was not found possible to arrange to hold discussions with the Burmese and Indonesians because of the imminence of the opening of the General Assembly at the time the missions of these countries were invited to consult. Copies of the memorandum setting forth United States views, however, were transmitted to the missions of these two countries. As you are aware, it was decided to hold the consultations with a majority of ARA countries in the field and despatches from our missions indicate that most of these discussions have now been held.

I consider that the discussions were successful and that they resulted in a greater appreciation on the part of the representatives of the participating governments of the United States positions with respect to the consideration of dependent area questions by the United Nations. I am not certain, however, that the favorable outcome of the discussions will counter the intensification of the anti-colonial trend which will undoubtedly result from the raising of the Moroccan question[2] and other recent developments in the Middle East. Consequently, I fear that the general atmosphere in the Fourth Committee will not appear to have been altered substantially as the result of the non-administering talks.

There is attached a report summarizing briefly the views set forth by the non-administering representatives on the more important subjects discussed. As would be expected, it was the consensus of the majority of the representatives that the progress of dependent peoples towards self-government or independence was too slow and should be accelerated. One point which emerged during most of the conversations in

[1] Not printed.

[2] For documentation regarding the Moroccan question at the Sixth General Assembly, see pp. 135 ff.

which I participated impressed me greatly: the non-administering powers made a clear distinction between the United States and the other administering powers. While their statements along these lines must be discounted to a certain degree, I am still convinced that the non-administering powers do not consider the United States as motivated by the same considerations in the colonial field as the other administering powers.

I think that we should give consideration to the advisability of carrying out similar consultations prior to the 1952 meeting of the General Assembly. If this suggestion is adopted, I strongly recommend that the invitations to consult be transmitted at a sufficiently early date to permit the missions here in Washington to obtain the views of their governments on the topics to be discussed. It was unfortunate, in my opinion, that in the consultations which we carried out this year the great majority of the representatives stated that they had not had time to obtain the views of their government and that, consequently, it should be understood that they were expressing only their personal views.

[Enclosure]

Summary of Colonial Talks With Non-Administering Powers of the UN

In an attempt to summarize the views expressed by representatives of the non-administering members of the UN in the Colonial Policy Talks, several factors must be kept in mind. In some cases the representatives who were called in were unprepared to state the official views of their governments on the topics discussed. They were also unprepared through lack of background knowledge to set forth even their personal views on some questions. It is believed that in those cases where unofficial views were expressed there will not be too wide a divergence with the official attitudes and positions of the respective governments.

In many cases it is noted that the area of agreement stated with respect to the United States position is more apparent than real. It is believed that this is especially true with respect to the Latin American countries, with whom talks were held in the field.

Keeping these considerations in mind, we have made an attempt to summarize the talks by cataloging those positive points which were made during the talks and which reflect an attitude somewhat different than the United States position. Absence of a country from the list of those who maintained a certain position does not necessarily imply agreement by that nation with the United States position. Reticence and the often resulting apparent agreement might be caused by lack of instruction, background knowledge, or both.

GENERAL QUESTIONS

The most persistent theme in the discussions with non-administering states on colonial problems was that the achievement by non-self-governing peoples of independence or self-government should be expedited. In a few cases the suggestion was advanced that a timetable be set up for the achievement of these objectives (Syria, Saudi Arabia and Thailand).

The Representative of Pakistan expressed his belief that the prestige of the UN was diminishing because of many compromise solutions reached by the General Assembly and the failure of that body to take a clear-cut stand based on the right or wrong of any given issue. His evaluation of the British and French colonial administrations is worth noting: whereas in the colonies French administration was superior because of the absence of discrimination, the French government in the Metropole, unlike the British government, was bad because of its lack of organization and fixed responsibility.

The Liberian Representative was critical of the lack of training in self-government given by the Administering Members to their African colonials.

The Representative of India expressed the view that the inhabitants of trust territories could be made more aware of their special status.

In response to a statement that the Trusteeship Council was functioning effectively, the Indian Representative pointed to the growing tendency of the General Assembly to assume the functions of other UN bodies which were not functioning effectively. The "Uniting For Peace" resolution was cited as an example.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

The opinion that the General Assembly should take a firm stand on this question was expressed by the Representatives of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Philippines and Cuba. The Pakistani Representative thought that the primary short-range problem of the UN in the field of dependent area affairs was to prevail upon the Union of South Africa to submit reports.

ITALIAN PARTICIPATION

The Pakistani Representative thought it wrong to assign any administrative functions in Africa to Italy. The Representative of Syria expressed the same opinion based on the belief that Italy's colonial attitude had not changed. The Indian Representative believed that the only solution for Italian participation lay in agreement by the Members of the Security Council on the whole question of Membership.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL PROCEDURES

The Representative of Saudi Arabia thought it would be unwise to attempt to restrict General Assembly discussion of Trusteeship Coun-

cil procedures. The officer of the Cuban Foreign Office with whom the discussions were held emphasized the broad powers of discussion available to the General Assembly.

TRANSMISSION OF POLITICAL INFORMATION

The Representatives of Saudi Arabia, China and Uruguay while recognizing that the Charter did not specifically require the submission of political information on the non-self-governing territories thought that it would be desirable for Administering Members to submit such information voluntarily. The Representative of Saudi Arabia suggested that the United States urge other Administering Members to follow its example in submitting this information.

FACTORS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING IF A TERRITORY IS OR IS NOT A TERRITORY WHOSE PEOPLE HAVE NOT YET ATTAINED A FULL MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

The Representatives of the Arab States almost without exception expressed the view that it was not desirable to establish criteria of too restrictive a nature in determining if a territory is ready for self-government or independence. For example, the Iraqi Representative maintained that lack of political and economic development should not be given too much emphasis in determining whether colonial peoples were ready for self-government.

One of the arguments most frequently advanced against the establishment of criteria of too restrictive a nature, was that in many independent countries the level of social, economic and educational advancement was low. One Arab Representative compared the stage of development in the independent country of Yemen with that of Morocco, and concluded that, since Yemen was independent, Morocco which was much more advanced was also entitled to independence.

The Representative of Lebanon did not believe that the final determination of whether or not a territory is self-governning should be left exclusively to the Administering Member concerned. The Indian Representative thought that before the General Assembly approved a change in status it should make certain that the wishes of the people concerned had been considered.

III. BILATERAL TALKS ON COLONIAL POLICY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM (LONDON) AND FRANCE (PARIS), OCTOBER 1951[1]

Editorial Note

Proposals for United States–United Kingdom talks on colonial matters at the United Nations, along the lines of the 1950 Washington

[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 434 ff.

colonial policy discussions were broached informally by British representatives at New York on November 20, 1950 (for memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume II, page 473); the 1951 talks would be held in London. The initial British suggestion that the talks be held in January 1951, before the eighth session of the Trusteeship Council, did not prove to be feasible; nor did subsequent entertainment of a May date. In a meeting on May 7 between the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and officers of the British Embassy, tentative agreement was reached on a date between late July and October; the dates were finally set at October 10 through 13. Informal discussions with the French Embassy in August and September resulted in an arrangement for United States-French talks in Paris after the London talks.

On July 10 an exchange took place between officers of the Department and the British Embassy regarding the proposed agenda for the talks, work on which began in the Department as early as April. In July and August work was pushed by officers of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs and the geographic bureaus on the preparation of position papers, many of which appear below.

Documentation regarding the above-described events is located in Department of State decimal files 350, 700.022, 741.022, and 751.022; and in ODA Files, Lots 60 D 512 and 62 D 228. Memoranda, position papers, and the minutes of the Paris meetings come exclusively from the lot files named, which were office working files of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Agreed Agenda for Colonial Policy Talks Between the United States and the United Kingdom, and the United States and France, London and Paris, October 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

I. General review by United Kingdom Representatives of the position of the colonial territories in the current world situation

II. Suggestions by United States Representatives of additions to the agenda (United States suggestions have been incorporated at appropriate places in the agenda)

III. Review of tactics in dealing with colonial and trusteeship questions in the United Nations in 1951 including

(*a*) Appraisal of United Nations activities in the colonial field during 1950–51 in the light of the consultations on colonial policy held during July 1950

(*b*) Ways of improving the atmosphere in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly

(*c*) Ways of raising the prestige of the Trusteeship Council in the opinion of Members of the Fourth Committee

IV. List of the detailed items that will or may arise in the United Nations during 1951

(*a*) Important items

1. The Ewe problem
2. Cyprus
3. General Assembly Resolution 334(IV) (definition of non-self-governing territories) and Resolution 222 (III) (submission of political and constitutional information)
4. Administrative unions
5. South West Africa

(*b*) Other items

1. General Assembly Resolution on Rural Economic Development in Trust Territories
2. Handling of the 1951 Special Committee, including the General Assembly Resolution on the implementation of the Declaration of Human Rights in non-self-governing territories, and including the question of the revision of the Standard Form (including the possibility of making arrangements whereby the smaller colonial territories would be required to transmit information at intervals longer than one year)
3. Relations between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly
4. Actions arising out of General Assembly Resolution 435(V) (information on the implementation of Trusteeship Council and General Assembly resolutions relating to trust territories)
5. Revision of the Trusteeship Council's Questionnaire
6. Colonial Application Clause
7. Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council
8. More effective measures to counter Soviet inspired activities in colonial areas and Soviet exploitation of the theme of "Western Imperialism" in their propaganda
9. Indian proposal on Fourth Committee procedure (simultaneous discussion of developments in both trust and non-self-governing territories)
10. Questions relating to Caribbean and South Pacific Commissions

V. The question of further diplomatic approaches to other Member States of the United Nations prior to the 1951 General Assembly

VI. Summing up of the talks. Review of the contributions colonial territories are making and may make to the strength of the free world (including such topics as the production of essential raw materials)

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Items III (a) and III (b)) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item III (*a*)—*Appraisal of United Nations activities in the colonial field during 1950–51 in the light of the consultations on colonial policy held during July 1950*

Item III (*b*)—*Ways of improving the atmosphere in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly*

I. *Problem:* To appraise United Nations activities in the colonial field during 1950–51 in light of consultations on colonial policy held during 1950; to determine ways of improving atmosphere in Fourth Committee of GA.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. We should appreciate that public opinion in various administering countries differs in its approach to dependent area problems. For example, our public opinion, because of our history, shares much of approach of non-administering Members and we recognize that opinion expressed by Australia and New Zealand is more in accord with our opinion than is that of some of other administering powers. Accordingly, we do not expect administering powers can adopt identical approaches in all cases to dependent area problems arising in UN.

B. Colonial policy talks held last year, and more positive approach taken in UN should be judged highly successful as evidenced by:

1. Improved atmosphere in Fourth Committee; and
2. Numerous favorable comments by various non-administering delegations regarding cooperative attitude shown by administering powers.

C. Policy followed in Fourth Committee last year by administering powers should be repeated and further developed during Sixth GA.

1. Our experience in Fifth GA demonstrated that it was at least partially responsible for ability of administering powers to prevent GA from adopting more extreme resolutions.
2. Moreover, seemingly uncooperative or reticent attitude also offers base for effective propaganda by Communist bloc.

D. In determining their policies with respect to UN consideration of dependent area questions we, the administering powers, should bear in mind that

1. There is among majority UN Members deep concern for welfare of dependent peoples and feeling of responsibility for accelerating their progress through UN channels as rapidly as possible;

[1] This and similar papers are not located chronologically; the arrangement is by agenda item number (see memorandum on the agreed agenda, *supra*).

2. We are greatly out-numbered by non-administering powers and are obliged to face opposition which is, in part, ill-informed and which contains segment of immovable and often times influential Members who are convinced that administration of dependent peoples by metropolitian powers could not be considered good under any circumstances;

3. As results of beliefs current in number non-administering countries that no colonial administration is morally defensible unless clearly desired by dependent peoples concerned, administering powers obliged to demonstrate to the world at large that interests of peoples presently dependent, as well as rest of world, can best be served by enlightened colonial administrations working towards increased self-government;

4. Our records of colonial administration are, on whole, extremely good and will stand up under scrutiny; and

5. Many non-administering powers, having experienced colonial relationship, have suggestions to make with regard dependent area administration. Some of these suggestions are worthwhile, some are subject to serious practical objections. Full exchange of views with non-administering powers, outside as well as within UN sessions, may serve to persuade non-administering powers to modify or withhold introduction of some of their proposals.

E. U.S. fully appreciates U.K.'s experience and record of achievement in dependent area field and British aversion to self-praise. However, U.S. believes situation calls for full and frank, although modest, presentation of facts of accomplishment, in order to:

1. Win friendly support of largest possible number of non-administering powers;

2. Avoid being accused of being uncooperative and hiding facts; and

3. Utilize Committee's time for constructive exchange of information and to prevent, if possible, waste of Committee's time by irresponsible and garrulous delegates, such as Cuban Delegate at last session.

F. We believe that it would be good tactics for administering powers to:

1. Commend, as appropriate, achievements of other administering powers by citing specific examples of general interest; and

2. Express constructive criticism from time to time of other administering powers which would be answered frankly and accepted without misunderstanding.

G. We are anxious that gains made in Fourth Committee during Fifth GA should be maintained and augmented during Sixth Assembly. We are convinced that only by keeping performance of UN representatives of administering powers on high standard will there be opportunity to pursue constructive policies for dependent peoples with minimum of criticism and fomenting of dissatisfaction.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item III (c))

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Item III, (c)—*Ways of raising the prestige of the Trusteeship Council in the opinion of members of the Fourth Committee.*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position as to methods which might be adopted by Administering Members to raise increasingly low opinion in which many Non-Administering Members hold TC.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. not only considers it important in principle to maintain at high level prestige of TC as major UN organ, but also believes heightened prestige advantageous to Administering Members as means countering tendency on part of certain Non-Administering Members to favor extension of direct GA action in trusteeship field.

B. U.S., recognizing that psychological factors are of major importance in attitude toward TC of Non-Administering Members, considers it of vital importance that no representative of an Administering Power deprecate value of TC and Fourth Committee in conversations with Non-Administering Delegates or Members of Secretariat.

C. U.S. considers that narrow legalistic attitude by some Administering Authorities on proposals, procedural or other, made by Non-Administering Members in TC is factor contributing to low estimate of TC by Non-Administering Members of Committee Four. U.S. believes that it would be advantageous to accept them, wherever possible, in order reduce criticism of TC by Non-Administering Members in GA.

D. U.S. considers that TC activities have on whole been of benefit to U.S. administrators. For example, Visiting Missions brought to light problems in minds of inhabitants of which administration not fully aware. U.S. would like to suggest that, whenever usefulness TC activities to Administering Authorities demonstrated, latter give full and favorable publicity in TC and GA.

E. U.S. also believes it would be to advantage of Administering Members to give careful consideration to next selection new Non-Administering Members TC with view to choosing Members who will be not only responsible and effective, but also of stature to affect favorably prestige of TC among other Non-Administering Members of UN.

F. We of course realize TC is major organ of UN. Nevertheless our experience in GA has indicated that, if measures adopted in TC are

out of line with general attitude of GA, there will be strong attempt in Committee Four to inquire into, and in some instances reverse, TC decisions. This fact should be kept in mind by Administering Authorities in determining their policies on issues arising in TC.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (a) 1)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Item IV, (*a*), 1: *Ewe Problem*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position on the question of Ewe or Togoland unification.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. believes Anglo-French proposal to establish Joint Council of representatives both Togolands to advise on matters common concern two territories a forward step, but is concerned lest manner of implementing this proposal provoke Ewe boycott, extreme reaction in Fourth Committee by non-administering Members, and therefore hopes U.K. and France will work out manifestly fair and reasonable procedures for selecting members Joint Council.

B. U.S. considers Joint Council of doubtful value if it fails to get adequate participation and, therefore, hopes every effort will be made to obtain participation of all major groups at each stage in establishment and functioning of Council, such participation being in our view even more important than prompt establishment of Council.

C. U.S. also considers that, whether or not it proves possible to obtain participation unification groups, steps taken by the two Administering Authorities should be such as to obtain, if possible, majority support in Fourth Committee.

D. U.S. is of opinion that successful establishment of fully representative Joint Council likely to avoid move in Fourth Committee to send special U.N. mission or investigator to examine situation on spot, especially in view plans regular U.N. Visiting Mission to go to Togolands in 1952; however, should method of establishment of Joint Council arouse widespread substantial opposition in the General Assembly, administering authorities might well be confronted with proposal for special investigation, and U.S., in these circumstances, might have to reconsider its position on this point.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (a)3 (a))

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Item IV [(a)] 3(a): *Problems in Connection with the Definition of the Concept of "Non-Self-Governing Territory"*

I. *Problem:* To determine position on definition by UN of term "non-self-governing". Non-administering Members support right of UN to define term, some feel GA may apply definition. Administering Members do not oppose, on principle, right of UN to define, feel task sterile, oppose UN attempt to apply to particular territory.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. maintains each administering Member has right to determine constitutional status of any territory under its sovereignty; however, assumes all Members would wish to respect any ICJ opinion on Chapter XI.

B. U.S. does not consider interpretation of terms in Chapter XI matter wholly for unilateral determination; therefore, considers that GA, under Article 10, not exceeding authority to

1. Discuss, attempt to define this expression,
2. Recommend that administering Members consider such definition,
3. Express opinion on guiding principles in determining status of territories.

C. U.S. should urge administering Members to participate, offer constructive suggestions in Special Committee discussions of "factors to be taken into account" in determining status of any territory (Res. 334 (IV)); since

1. Further discussion this problem in UN cannot be avoided,
2. Smaller, balanced Committee best forum.

D. U.S. still considering best course for Committee to follow pursuant to Res. 334(IV):

1. We think that

a. Committee should undertake comply with invitation of GA
b. In the course of our participation in the discussion, we might point out difficulties of definition as educative process for non-administering Members.

2. We feel it would be extremely difficult, and probably politically unwise, to formulate all-inclusive definition but list of factors which should obviously be taken into account might be drawn up for consideration by GA.

E. If unacceptable definition emerges, U.S. inclines to view submission some aspects of problem to ICJ for advisory opinion might be appropriate.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (a) 3 (b))

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Item IV, [(*a*)] 3, (*b*)—*Submission of Political Information to UN*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position on submission of political information under Article 73(*e*). USSR bloc demands mandatory submission; majority administering, non-administering Members support voluntary submission; U.K., Belgium oppose both; France has supported voluntary submission, reserve position in 1949.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. maintains view that submission political information not required by Article 73(*e*), but itself voluntarily submits political information and hopes others will do so.

B. On use of voluntary political information, U.S. maintains

1. Terms of reference of Special Committee apply as in case of other information under Article 73(*e*); viz., can make general recommendations on functional fields, but not re specific territories.

2. GA competent to utilize such information in discussing general definition "non-self-governing"; but should not make recommendations on this matter on specific territories. U.S. maintains voluntary submission does not prejudice right of administering Members to determine status of their territories under Chapter XI.

C. U.S. considers that, in revision of Standard Form, provisions of Resolution 327(IV), para. 3, should be complied with. (This recommends that information on geography, history, people and human rights should cease to be classified under general category of Standard Form.)

D. U.S. believes it desirable, in principle as well as for tactical reasons, that

1. Democratic governments expound, discuss, and defend democratic institutions, and problems of their evolution, particularly in respect to areas in which they are responsible for development of such institutions.

2. Any other course invites unjustified suspicions, presuppositions and insinuations.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (a) 4)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV, (*a*) 4—*Administrative Unions* (for talks with UK only)

I. *Problem:* To determine position on question of administrative unions between trust and adjacent territories with particular reference to future development of such unions in British territories. Non-administering Members view unions with suspicion, support investigation of them, desire safeguards for political identity of trust territories. So far as question of principle is concerned, administering Members, including U.S., support unions, cite provision for them in various trusteeship agreements (UK has three unions: Togo with Gold Coast; Cameroons with Nigeria; Tanganyika with Kenya–Uganda. France has none. Belgium has one: Ruanda-Urundi with Belgian Congo. Australia has one: New Guinea with Papua. U.S. has none.)

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. should maintain previous position on general question of administrative unions, i.e.:

1. U.S. aware that unions authorized under certain conditions by trusteeship agreements, believes that in certain circumstances they may have positive advantages, such as more economical administration, avoiding fragmentation, etc; cannot be condemned per se.

2. U.S. would judge each administrative union by following standards:

a. Status and identity territory should be maintained until inhabitants reach stage political maturity enabling own decision as to form of government, political associations, if any;

b. Political, social, economic, educational advancement should not be subordinated to interests any other territory;

c. Union should not prevent separate financial, statistical, other records to TC.

B. Re specific unions and their future development, U.S. will continue policy of examining operation using above standards, and

1. U.S. would be glad to know UK views on future relationship between Togoland and Gold Coast and between Cameroons and Nigeria, with particular reference to the constitutional developments in these areas. U.S. is aware that UK considers that Togo–Gold Coast and Cameroons–Nigeria are not strictly "administrative unions" but come under 5(*a*) of the trusteeship agreement.

2. U.S. believes that although not required, it would nevertheless be advisable to inform TC in advance of major changes involving administrative unions as matter courtesy, good tactics. With reference to the Tanganyika union, U.S. will give careful consideration to any

UK proposals for future of East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, which is presently under review.

C. U.S. believes TC's Standing Committee on Administrative Unions is functioning satisfactorily and may possibly serve to reduce agitation on this subject.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (a) 5)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1951.

Item IV, (*a*), 5: *South West Africa*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position as to further steps which might be taken with regard to the question of South West Africa.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. continues to favor achieving agreement, consistent with advisory opinion of ICJ, with Union of South Africa on the future status of the Territory of South West Africa.

B. U.S. considers that *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa made careful and commendable effort to achieve agreement with Union. We regret that Union was unable to accept as basis for discussion draft agreement submitted to it by Committee. We consider this draft agreement fair and reasonable; furthermore, it is doubtful if any proposal containing less than principles set forth therein could be considered to be in conformity with Court's opinion or would be approved by GA. Therefore, we hope that the Union will reconsider its stand and accept the Committee's offer of further consultations on the basis of the Committee's draft.

C. U.S., while aware of difficulties inherent in further delays on this question, considers that it would be advantageous to continue exploring possibilities with Union if the latter shows any willingness to consult further on basis of Committee's proposal; however, should Union maintain its position that it cannot accept the Committee's proposals as a basis for discussion, U.S. may be obliged to conclude no further mediatory role possible.

D. U.S. continues to be willing to examine any further suggestions as to procedures for implementing Court's opinion, and would welcome any suggestions UK [France] [1] may wish to make; however, U.S. could not support procedures which would wholly divorce GA from supervisory machinery.

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[1] Brackets in this document are in the source text.

E. U.S. willing as one of remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be one of contracting parties to an agreement such as that proposed by the Committee if UK and France agree, and if approved by the GA, and would therefore be interested in knowing views of UK [France] on this question.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 1)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV, (*b*), 1: *General Assembly Resolution on Rural Economic Development in Trust Territories*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position with respect to GA resolution on Rural Economic Development in Trust Territories.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. As indicated in opening speech of Secretary of State to Fifth General Assembly, U.S. believes there is urgent need for efforts to meet problems of use and ownership of land. U.S. therefore co-sponsored GA Resolution 438(V), Rural Economic Development of Trust Territories.

B. U.S. believes rural economic development, with particular emphasis on land problems, constitutes appropriate and potentially useful field of study for TC.

C. Committee of Rural Economic Development of TC has made useful beginning in its study of land problems in trust territories, having determined what data is necessary as basis for Council's recommendations and having requested these data from administering authorities.

D. While it is not feasible to arrive at definite decision on question of recommendations of TC until such time as all data requested from administering authorities has been received and studied by Council, U.S. preliminary thinking on this question is as follows:

1. In view of diversity of conditions in various trust territories, U.S. believes Council's recommendations, if any, should be of specific nature for each territory.

2. However, if it should be found possible to formulate meaningful general recommendations, U.S. would be prepared to consider advisability of this approach, especially if such general recommendations were supplemented with specific recommendations for particular trust territories.

3. Recommendations of Council should not be inconsistent with those of other UN bodies dealing with land problems, particularly ECOSOC, but it should be borne in mind that conditions in trust

territories differ in certain respects from those in many other areas of world.

E. It is strongly urged that an energetic effort be made by all concerned to accelerate consideration of this question by TC so that it may be in position to make full and constructive report to Seventh Session of GA.

F. Although it will not be practicable for emphasis to be given to interim report of TC on this question in forthcoming session of GA in view of strictly preliminary nature of Council's work up to present, administering authorities might well take advantage of opportunity afforded by Fourth Committee's discussion of TC's report on question to describe measures already taken in trust territories under their administration to improve land situation.

ODA Files, Lot 60 D 512

Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 2)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1951.

Item IV (*b*) 2: Handling of the 1951 Special Committee including the General Assembly Resolution on the implementation of the Declaration of Human Rights in non-self-governing territories, and including the question of the revision of the Standard Form (including the possibility of making arrangements whereby the smaller colonial territories would be required to transmit information at intervals longer than one year).

I. *Problem:* To determine the best methods of handling the work of the 1951 Special Committee, including the questions of human rights and the revision of the Standard Form.*

II. *Recommendations:*

A. It is recommended that the British [French] [Belgians] [1] be informed that:

1. The United States believes

a. that the constructive approach of the Administering authorities in dealing with educational problems at the 1950 Session of the Special Committee was beneficial to and was appreciated by other Members of the Committee;

b. that the same constructive approach, including the assignment of an expert to each delegation if at all practicable, should be continued.

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*This paper was drafted prior to the meeting of the Special Committee in 1951. Some of the recommendations contained herein may be obviated by the results of that Committee's work. [Footnote in the source text.]

[1] Brackets in the source text.

2. In keeping with its policy of according full respect to recommendations of the General Assembly, the United States has already prepared, and intends to submit to the Secretary General, a detailed Report on the Application of Human Rights in Non-Self-Governing Territories Administered by the United States. The United States believes

a. that no useful purpose would be served by failing to submit this information, particularly if any attempt were made to justify the failure to submit information on the ground that such information should be submitted by self-governing as well as non-self-governing territories;

b. that such an attitude of non-cooperation might tend to disrupt the work of the Committee, and might jeopardize the harmonious and constructive trend which characterized the discussions of the 1950 Session;

c. that the other administering Members should likewise submit information on human rights in their territories, and that if they do not have this information ready for submission by the time the Special Committee meets, that they inform the Special Committee that the information is in preparation;

d. that the submission of this information would strengthen the position of the Administering Authorities in the Third Committee in supporting Article 60 of the Draft Covenant on Human Rights in which the signatories of the Covenant undertake to submit reports concerning progress made in achieving the observance of human rights;

e. and that the actions of the Administering Members, in respect to submitting information on human rights in their non-self-governing territories will be a significant step forward in the furtherance in all countries of the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

3. With regard to the revision of the Standard Form, the United States Delegation intends to await further clarification of the proposals by the United Kingdom and to await the reaction of the other members of the Special Committee, especially the non-administering members. The United States understands from this document (A/AC.35/SC.1/L.4)

a. that the United Kingdom wishes to reduce the burdens on the small administrative staff in 19 of its smaller colonies by submitting full information from those colonies every three years beginning in 1952 instead of annually;

b. that the Secretary General would be empowered to use any supplementary material in his summaries and analyses prepared in three years placed at his disposal by administering members concerned, relating to educational, social, and economic conditions in those territories;

c. that the United Kingdom would, in addition, supply annually to the Secretary General the information described in the introduction to the revised Standard Form relating to significant developments in the 19 territories concerned;

d. The United States is aware, however,

(1) that the United Kingdom proposal might lead to the charge by the non-administering Members that it is a plan to withdraw further from the obligations of Article 73(*e*) of the Charter;

(2) that some difficulty might be experienced in defining the term "small" territory; and

(3) that the action of the United Kingdom in withdrawing from annual reporting on 19 of its small territories would establish a precedent which might be followed by other administering Members.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 3)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV, (*b*), 3: *The Relationship Between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position on relationship between General Assembly and Trusteeship Council. Non-administering Members cite Articles 85, 87 in contending Council executive body of Assembly; administering Members maintain Council principal organ with powers of deliberation, conclusion; cite balanced nature, majority rule of Council.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. should maintain its position on general question of relationship TC to GA; i.e.:

1. Assembly should not attempt detailed resolutions on Council's work; direct recommendations from Assembly to Administering Authority should not be encouraged; such action more appropriate for TC.

2. Authority of Assembly (per Articles 85, 87) should not be exercised in a manner which would deny Council independent, deliberative qualities.

3. If the question arises, US should state that it considers inadvisable at this time attempt by Assembly or ICJ to define relation of Council to Assembly, since

a. Restrictive definition of Council's powers disadvantageous;
b. Broad definition might encourage direct recommendations by Assembly to Administering Authorities.

4. It is desirable Administering Authorities avoid provoking non-administering Members to carry issues from Council to Assembly and should seek to dissuade latter from doing so unless we think such procedure justifiable.

B. In its consultations with non-administering Members, U.S. has outlined its concept of the relationship between the TC and the GA.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 4)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV, (*b*) 4—*Actions arising out of GA Resolution 436(V) (information on the implementation of Trusteeship Council and General resolutions relating to trust territories*)

I. *Problem:* To determine position of U.S. on question of implementation of TC and GA recommendations relating to trusteeship and trust territories. [Non-administering Members are increasingly pressing for more prompt and complete implementation of GA and TC recommendations and for recognition of obligatory character such recommendations, also increased insistence on reports from Administering Authorities on implemental action.] [1]

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. should take position consonant with general UN policy, i.e., that although UN recommendations do not have force of law, every effort should be made to carry them into effect.

B. In view U.S. policy strengthen GA and respect for its actions, U.S. should seek to avoid, insofar as possible, debate or decision by GA on obligatory character its recommendations re Fourth Committee affairs which might have compromising effect on GA actions in other fields.

C. U.S. will make every effort in administration of Trust Territory of Pacific Islands to implement resolutions of Trusteeship Council and to report fully thereon. U.S. hopes to devote more space in future annual reports to description and discussion of implementation. U.S. considers full, frank reporting on implementation, indicating thorough and sympathetic effort to carry out recommendations, is best antidote to criticism and pressure on this matter.

D. If legal question implementation GA recommendations in Trust Territory Pacific Islands is raised, U.S. should take position that while legal non-competence GA is clear (in view its status as strategic trust territory), U.S. will avoid narrow interpretation of Charter in this matter and will, in absence of strategic considerations, make every effort carry out GA views, without, however, prejudicing its position under Article 83.

E. Should any proposals concerning implementation arise in Sixth GA as result of consideration of report of Secretary-General called for in Resolution 436(V), U.S. in formulating its position will take into account the foregoing considerations.

[1] Brackets in the source text.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 5)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV, (b), 5: *Revision of the Trusteeship Council's Questionnaire*

I. *Problem:* To determine the position of the United States on the question of the revision of the Trusteeship Council's Provisional Questionnaire.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. The U.S. considers the reporting function to be among the most important features of the Trusteeship System since

1. it provides a standard, authoritative method of publicizing policies and accomplishments of administering authorities in the trust territories, and
2. full, accurate information is best weapon against generalized, tendentious criticism.

B. U.S. believes, therefore, that in revision of questionnaire the tactical, political advantages of full and frank reporting as well as considerations of the substantive value and usefulness of information for purposes of Trusteeship Council should be kept in mind.

C. In view of above, U.S. position on revision of questionnaire will be based on following principles:

1. Questionnaire should be sufficiently inclusive and detailed to provide opportunity for complete reporting on all important aspects of administration,
2. Emphasis should be placed on information which will assist TC to perform review, supervisory functions,
3. Every effort should be made to eliminate redundancy, duplication and to insure conciseness without sacrifice of completeness,
4. A short, unduly vague questionnaire is not necessarily advantageous since from point of view of preparation of reports, a full and specific outline is helpful, and since, from tactical point of view, it is important to avoid grounds for suspicion that administering authorities are attempting to subordinate reporting function,
5. In the absence of overriding considerations to the contrary, the U.S. believes that efforts should be made to determine what information, particularly statistical information, will be requested from administering authorities on annual basis by specialized agencies, other UN bodies and make provision for such information in questionnaire thus enabling all regular requests for information be met in a single report,
6. Form of questionnaire should be that of topical outline rather than series of questions thus being consistent with preferred narrative-type report and allowing more flexibility in presentation information,
7. Following revision questionnaire, administering authorities should make every effort to follow outline closely and consistently in order to facilitate examination of reports. Where items in question-

naire do not apply, report should so state with explanation, if necessary, in order to avoid implication of omission or suppression of information.

D. U.S. has submitted Secretariat draft revision of questionnaire to appropriate administrative officials for comment, but until such comments are received we are not able to comment in detail on specific points in Secretariat draft.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 6)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Item IV(*b*)6: *Colonial Application Clause*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position with respect to inclusion of "colonial application article" in international treaties, conventions or agreements.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. should maintain attitude of sympathetic understanding of the constitutional problem of the U.K. and other metropolitan states which in some cases cannot extend the application of a convention to a territory without the consent of the local government.

B. U.S. does not desire to have problem of federal-state article linked with colonial article in U.N. formulation of treaties, but U.S. desires that special constitutional problem of this country in this connection be recognized.

C. While U.S. thus recognizes in principle the legal requirements of some metropolitan states, consideration should be given to measures for securing more general understanding of the problem.

1. Legal issues involved have been skillfully confused so that many governments normally anti-Soviet consider colonial application clause to be a legal device for imperialistic exploitation, as evidenced by substantial majorities against the colonial clause in past two sessions of Committee 3.

2. Much misunderstanding might be eliminated by more precise explanation of constitutional problem to other states outside U.N. sessions.

3. U.S. believes that prompt consideration should be given to finding an acceptable formula for a colonial clause which will make clear to other states the fact that the metropolitan states do desire to apply conventions as widely as possible.

4. The U.S. believes that in cases where the (clause) convention would be suitable for application and could be applied, prompt action to secure application would remove unnecessary suspicion.

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Discussion Brief (Rev. 1) for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 7)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1951.

Item IV, (*b*), 7: *Italian Participation in the Trusteeship Council.*

I. *Problem:* To determine United States position on question posed by TC resolution requesting GA include on agenda 6th Session matter of "the full participation of Italy in the work of the TC." Italy falls short of "full participation" only by lack of right to vote, a right presently restricted to Members of UN.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. considers Italy could acquire right to vote in TC only through:

1. admission to membership in UN
2. amendment to Article 86 of Charter

B. U.S. has supported and will continue to support admission of Italy to membership in UN. (*Note:* The possibility of resubmitting Italy's application to the Security Council as a special case on the basis of her special responsibilities as the administering authority of a trust territory is, as of the date of this paper, being discussed by the U.S., U.K., and French Missions in New York.)

C. U.S. considers adopting of amendment to Article 86 of Charter would be at least as difficult to achieve as admission of Italy to membership in UN, since amendment would also require approval of all permanent Members of Security Council; moreover it would appear to be far less satisfactory to Italy. However, if Italy is not admitted to membership in the UN, we would be prepared to vote for amendment to Article 86, if Italy desires.

D. U.S. would welcome views of UK [France] [1] on possibilities of achieving "full participation" of Italy in TC by either of above means, or by any other means.

[1] Brackets in the source text.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 8)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV (*b*) 8—*More effective measures to counter Soviet-inspired propaganda activities in colonial areas and Soviet exploitation of the theme of "Western Imperialism" in their propaganda*

I. *Problem:* To determine more effective measures to counter Soviet-inspired propaganda. Some reasons for the apparent success of Soviet propaganda are:

1. Soviet propaganda has been cleverly designed to capture the imagination of colonial peoples and play upon their susceptibilities, particularly of those whose standard of living is low;

2. Soviet attack is facilitated by the fact that nations which have risen to independence from colonial status consider colonialism an anachronism in world of today. This attitude also makes it difficult for Administering Authorities convincingly to defend colonial relationship.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. We believe that general measures to counter Soviet propaganda should include:

1. A progressive colonial policy providing for rapid political and economic advancement which would include the following:

(*a*) development of organs of self-government,
(*b*) training of peoples to assume political, administrative and managerial responsibilities, and
(*c*) rapid promotion of sound systems for improvement of territorial economies and educational and social reforms necessary to support political structures.

2. Consideration of desirability of advance announcement, wherever possible, of impending attainment of self-government or independence in particular territories, as for example, was done in cases of Philippines, Libya and Somaliland. Such announcement would, in our opinion, be potent weapon in deflating Soviet propaganda.

3. Pointing out, where appropriate and when colonial relationship as an institution is attacked, that all Members of UN have subscribed to Chapters XI and XII.

(*a*) Administering Authorities might argue that all Members of UN have (1) thus recognized constitutional bases of colonies, and good faith of Administering Authorities to provide good government, and (2) further agreed their policy in respect to these territories must be based on general principle of good neighborliness.

B. We believe specific measures in UN should include these tactics:

1. Answering Soviet attacks calmly, fully and authoritatively;
2. Including more representatives from territories in national delegations to various meetings in order that they can assist in countering Soviet propaganda;
3. Giving wide publicity to progress achieved in various territories; and
4. Using every effort to keep discussion in Committee 4 on substantive questions. However, we suggest that advantage should be taken of every opportunity to point out that principal threat to dependent peoples today is conspiracy of Soviet imperialism. It might be remarked at appropriate opportunities that world's real concern is with number of independent countries which have recently become dependent, thus reversing world trend.

C. Following suggestion made by Belgian and U.K. representatives, U.S. has begun study and suggests that there be discussion at later date on question of best tactics to meet standard Soviet resolutions.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 9)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV, (*b*), 9—*Indian Proposal on Fourth Committee Procedure (simultaneous discussion of developments in both trust and non-self-governing territories)*

I. *Problem:* To determine U.S. position on Indian proposal that since functional (economic, social and educational) problems are essentially same in both trust and non-trust territories, there should be common discussion of such problems, it being provided that ensuing recommendations would be differentiated to take account of constitutional differences under Charter. Proposal was withdrawn last year for lack of support for opposite reasons from both administering (France, Belgium and Denmark) and non-administering Members (Brazil, Venezuela, Byelorussia, Chile, Mexico).

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. initially felt that since Committee Four will, in any case, discuss these functional problems in relation to both trust and non-trust territories, single rather than double discussion would have advantages. Following arguments can be made in favor of proposal:

1. It would save time;
2. It would subject administering authorities to only one "barrage";

3. It should decrease emphasis on political aspect only of colonial problems;

4. Proposed procedure might also help develop desirable differentiation between role of GA (general principles and trends) and that of TC (attention to specific territories) and would avoid duplication; and

5. We have felt that Indian proposal had further merit of inscribing in resolution "marked difference" between responsibilities of GA in respect of Chapters XI and XII of Charter. We understood initial UK reaction at 1950 Assembly was similar to ours.

B. Further reflection has caused U.S. to have some doubts as to proposal. Following arguments can be advanced against proposal:

1. Single discussion of two types of territories might tend to blur Charter distinction;

2. Question arises as to whether Fourth Committee or specialized agencies furnish most appropriate forum for technical discussions in economic, social and educational fields;

3. While rational, proposal is perhaps not rational enough since functional problems are not really peculiar to non-self-governing and trust territories and might really best be discussed on regional basis; and

4. Since such functional problems cannot be exhaustively or intensively discussed in Fourth Committee, their discussion in relation to trust territories, where GA has unquestioned responsibilities, might be regarded as sufficiently representative to render similar discussion regarding Chapter XI territories redundant.

C. Department considers question premature in light of last year's reactions and does not propose to raise it. However, should it be raised again, we now intend to assume attitude of indifference during debate, consider abstention in the vote, and accept either procedure because it seems whatever valid arguments can be leveled against single discussion can be equally leveled against double discussion, if not more so.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 10)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV (*b*), 10—*Questions Relating to Caribbean Commission* (For UK talks only)

I. *Problem:* To determine how the Commission can be made a more effective body in the economic and social development of the area. British are critical of Carribean Commission accomplishments but do little or nothing to carry out recommendations of the Commission or its auxiliary bodies.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. believes in purposes of Commission and will continue to support and strengthen it. At end of first five years of operation, helpful to assess its accomplishment and shortcomings.

B. We strongly endorse Commission's placing the emphasis of its work programs in economic field for next several years. This, we believe, is sound procedure based upon five years of research into basic problems of region. Such projects might be in fields of housing, cooperatives, industrialization, fisheries, forestry, tourist facilities.

C. In order to achieve positive results and make best use of limited funds, Commission, we think, should devote greater proportion of annual budget to concrete projects; and without serious curtailment of essential research and informational services of the Commission, concentrate on carrying out several specific projects a year; and direct its Research Council to work out details of such projects.

D. We believe Commission can be really effective regional body only if the recommendations of the Commission and, so far as agreed on by the Commission, of its Research Council, and of the West Indian Conference are adopted by Metropolitan and Territorial Governments in terms of specific action programs. Some of the Caribbean peoples are critical and disillusioned because of lack of action upon recommendations they make through their own political and technical representatives. Technical conferences are increasingly popular and unless programs are based upon these recommendations, the Commission will fail of its purposes.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 10)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1951.

Item IV (*b*), 10—*Questions Relating to Caribbean Commission*
(For French talks only)

I. *Problem:* To determine how the Commission can be made a more effective body in the economic and social development of the area. The French are critical of Caribbean Commission accomplishments but do little or nothing to carry out recommendations of the Commission or its auxiliary bodies.

(1) French should be assured again that the United States has no political solutions in the French Antillean Departments and has no intention ever to use the Caribbean Commission for this purpose.

(2) French have always feared possible Caribbean Commission interference in the French Antillean Departments and have consist-

ently attempted to limit the Commission's operations in every way especially through budget reductions.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 10)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item IV (*b*), 10—*Questions Relating to South Pacific Commission*
(For U.K. talks only)

I. *Problem:* To determine the position on matters pertaining to South Pacific Commission.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. is gratified that Commission has been established on what we believe to be sound, workable basis and that its comprehensive Work Program is now showing very real promise of producing results which will fully justify efforts being made.

B. U.S. wishes express its appreciation to U.K. for:

1. Its active support in Commission and cooperation from British Pacific Territories, particularly Government of Fiji, in substantive work of Commission;
2. Helpful attitude of His Majesty's Government in Fiji which contributed greatly to successful outcome of First South Pacific Conference of Native Peoples; and
3. Its making available the new Secretary-General-Elect, Sir Leslie Brian Freeston.

C. U.S. believes application of principle of regional cooperation to economic and social problems of South Pacific area is eminently sound and economical and believes Commission can be strengthened by:

1. Continuation of high degree of cooperation and confidence already developed among Commissioners;
2. Continued development of regional approach to problems through territorial representatives at South Pacific Conference and by meetings of experts in Research Council and at technical meetings;
3. Consultations for development of technical assistance programs to promote development and welfare in area;
4. Strengthening of relations on informal basis (we see no need to formalize these unnecessarily) relations with UN and specialized agencies whenever cooperation of these organizations can be helpful; and
5. Encouraging more active interest and support by other Governments in work of Commission.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item IV (b) 10)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1951.

Item IV, (*b*), 10—*Questions Relating to South Pacific Commission* (For French talks only)

I. *Problem:* To determine position on matters pertaining to South Pacific Commission. The French have requested assurances from the United States that it will not take the position in the Commission which tends to extend its activities beyond the advisory function stated in the Agreement. The French interpretation of the Agreement is extremely rigid as compared to the other five Member Governments.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. U.S. is gratified that Commission has been established on a sound, workable basis and that its modest, though comprehensive, Work Program is now showing promising results which will fully justify efforts being made.

B. U.S. believes application of principle of regional cooperation to economic and social problems of South Pacific area is eminently sound and economical and believes Commission can be strengthened by:

1. Continuation of high degree of cooperation and confidence already developed among Commissioners;
2. Continued development of regional approach to problems through territorial representatives at South Pacific Conference and by meetings of experts in Research Council and at technical meetings;
3. Consultations for development of technical assistance programs to promote development and welfare in area;
4. Strengthening of relations on informal basis (we see no need to formalize these unnecessarily) with UN and specialized agencies whenever cooperation of these organizations can be helpful; and
5. Encouraging more active interest and support by other Governments in work of Commission.

C. U.S. expresses its appreciation to French Government for:

1. Cooperation of French Government and Government of New Caledonia for:

(1) assisting in the development of the headquarters site by making available funds for reconstruction of the Pentagon Building;
(2) encouraging the building of houses for the staff and;
(3) the generous assistance of the Officers of the Institute Français d'Océanie in the development of the Work Program.

D. The United States Government is in sympathy with:

1. The difficulties encountered by the French Government in thoroughly examining the reports of experts, recommendations of technical meetings, etc., owing to the lack of adequate translation and interpretation facilities at the headquarters.

2. The position taken by Dr. Bugnicourt at the Third Research Council Meeting that a branch office for Economic Development should not at this time be established outside of New Caledonia, although the United States Government recognizes that Article XVI of the Agreement does permit the Commission to establish such offices at other places, and that such action may become feasible in the future.

E. The United States Government does not agree, however, with:

1. The French position that the Commission activities should be limited strictly to the scope of its work to advisory functions. For instance, the French Senior Commissioner has expressed concern over the undertaking of a survey for the establishment of a vocational training school. The United States is of the opinion that the Commission should not be limited to a specific survey and can continue with extended tasks to explore further the vocational training field. The detailed plan, authorized by the Commission, is really an extension of formulating expert advice as to the feasibility of a central vocational training school—in this case, detailed to take account of building plans and costs which none of the participants in the project to date were technically able to supply. With this information then, the Commission will be in a better position to make recommendations to metropolitan and territorial governments as to vocational training in the area.

2. The attitude of the French Government that relations with UN and the Specialized Agencies should be limited and in particular, the view of the French Government that the recommendation of the Commission as an associated organization with UNESCO would result in an organic connection with the United Nations. It is the United States view that this recommendation would not result in an organic connection with the United Nations since:

1. UNESCO is an international organization with its own separate treaty quite distinct from the UN, and
2. the relations between UNESCO and UN are defined in a special agreement which in no way impairs the autonomy of UNESCO, thereby, not infringing upon Article XV, paragraph 55 of the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission.

The United States believes that these relations should be strengthened whereby the Specialized Agencies can cooperate with the Commission by

1. providing experts
2. co-sponsoring technical conferences.
3. Disseminating technical information upon technical problems for the benefit of the peoples of the area.

3. The position of the French Government that the preparation of and the publication of text books as a function of the South Pacific

Literature Bureau is outside the Commission's terms of reference. In our view, these operations are to develop materials for the consultative and advisory program in the social development field and no Government will be forced, collectively or individually, to take this material in the manner of executive function.

Note: In May 1951, all Commissioners received a letter from the Senior Commissioner for France on the relationship with UNESCO, the South Pacific Literature Bureau, and Vocational Training. The United States reply in detail, dated July 10, 1951, is along lines set forth in Section E above. Our position is similar to that of Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in the Commission. Any concession to the French would constitute not only a reversal of our previous positions, but also weaken the effectiveness of the Commission and create serious difficulties for us in relation to the majority of the Members of the Commission.

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Discussion Brief for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Policy To Be Held at London and Paris (Agenda Item V)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Item V: *The Question of Further Diplomatic Approaches to Other Member States of the United Nations Prior to the 1951 General Assembly.*

I. *Problem:* To determine the advisability of making diplomatic approaches regarding dependent area questions to other Member States of the United Nations prior to the 1951 General Assembly.

II. *Recommended United States Position:*

A. The Department believes that much good will and a better understanding would be created by U.S. consulting frankly on dependent area questions with the non-administering members of the U.N., other than the Soviet bloc, as well as with the administering Members.

B. Such consultations would be most effective, in our opinion, if they were bilateral discussions between the U.S. and each of the non-administering States.

C. In accordance with the foregoing, the Department has consulted on dependent area questions with representatives of the Washington Missions of the Near Eastern [and Far Eastern] [1] countries; and has requested U.S. Missions in the Latin American countries to hold similar consultations with the Foreign Offices of the Governments to which they are accredited.

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[1] Brackets in the source text.

D. The Department has in most cases discussed the following questions with the afore-named Governments:

1. *General Questions*
a. Basic views of the United States and _____ with respect to questions involving non-self-governing peoples and the treatment of such questions in the United Nations
b. Relationship of General Assembly (Committee Four) to the Trusteeship Council and to the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter
c. The functioning of the Trusteeship Council
d. The functioning of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter
2. *Specific Questions*
a. South West Africa
b. Italian participation in the Trusteeship Council
c. General Assembly consideration of Trusteeship Council procedures.
d. The transmission of political information under Article 73(*e*)
e. The question of "the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory is or is not a territory whose peoples have not yet achieved a full measure of self-government"
f. The Ewe and Togoland Unification questions

The British [French] [Belgians] [2] are familiar with the U.S. views on these topics.

E. The U.K. [French] [Belgian] [2] Government, if it has not already done so, may also wish to consider the desirability of consulting on dependent area questions before, during, and after the General Assembly, with non-administering Members of the U.N., when it believes that such consultations would be productive.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

Editorial Note

John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, was to head the United States group at the bilateral talks on colonial policy in London and Paris, October 1951, but was prevented from attending just before departure. Mr. William Sanders, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary Hickerson, was designated to replace Hickerson. Other members of the group were Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, and Mr. O. Benjamin Gerig, Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs. Detailed from their respective Embassies were Miss Margaret Joy Tibbetts (for the London talks) and Mr. John E. Utter (for the Paris talks). Gerig proceeded to London from Geneva where he was attend-

ing the meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73 (*e*) of the Charter of the United Nations.

The talks with the British at London were held from October 10 (afternoon) to October 12 (morning). The principal officers engaged on the British side were, from the Foreign Office, Messrs. Paul Mason, Superintending Under Secretary, and C. C. Parrott, Head of the United Nations (Political) Department; from the Commonwealth Relations Office, Mr. Neil Pritchard, Superintending Under Secretary; and from the Colonial Office, Messrs. John Martin and Andrew Cohen, Assistant Under Secretaries of State. Messrs. P. C. Hope and D. I. Dunnett also attended from the Foreign Office; and there was a supporting element of eight officers from the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices. Mr. J. K. Thompson, Colonial Attaché at the British Embassy, Washington, was also present. Mr. Ernest Davies, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, opened the conference and presided the first day.

The colonial policy talks with the French Government were held in Paris on October 15 and 16. M. Léon Pignon, Representative of France on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, presided. Delegates attending from the French Foreign Ministry were: M. André Naudy (Ministry Delegate to the United Nations), M. Jean-Daniel Jurgensen (Africa Division), M. Pierre Salade (Far Eastern Department) and M. Jules (?) Charles-Roux (Caribbean Department). M. Kresser represented the Ministry of Overseas France.

A summary report on the London and Paris talks by William Sanders, dated December 7, 1951, is printed *infra*. The United States Minutes for the British talks (in brief form and not "agreed" minutes) are located in Department of State file 741.022/10–1851, under cover of London despatch 1826, October 18, 1951. The United States Minutes for the French talks are located in Department of State Office Lot File 62 D 228 (ODA Files), "Colonial Policy Talks UK and France–1951", as part of Tab A of the Sanders Report of December 7. (Tab A also included a set of the minutes of the British talks.)

The London Embassy despatch forwarding the London minutes (No. 1826, October 18) emphasized that the British participants regarded the discussions to be of very considerable value. It was noted that the Colonial Office participants had been most frank. The Foreign Office had reiterated its belief to the Embassy that only through such conversations could the Colonial Office be assured of the value of a less legalistic and more flexible approach to dependent area questions in the United Nations. The London Embassy stated that "unquestionably" the morale of the Colonial Office had been raised "by the evidence of a friendly United States interest in these problems." (741.022/10–1851)

ODA Files, Lot 62 D 228, "Colonial Policy Talks UK and France–1951"

Memorandum by Mr. William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), to Mr. Hickerson[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1951.

Subject: Report on the Talks on Colonial Policy Held in London and Paris, October 10 to October 16, 1951

Copies of the attached minutes (Tab A)[2] of the talks prepared by members of the United States group have been distributed to interested Officers in the Department. Matters on which immediate follow-up action was required were discussed and appropriate decisions taken at a meeting held in my office on October 23, 1951. These matters are listed in the attached memorandum of the same date. (Tab B).[2]

The American group operated as a well-coordinated team. Mr. Gerig and Mr. Allen did yeoman service and in London Miss Margaret Joy Tibbetts, Embassy Attaché, as Secretary of the group and as liaison officer, did an outstanding job. As was to be expected, the American group relied heavily on Mr. Gerig's background and experience and his close personal relations with most of the United Kingdom and French participants in the talks.

The United Kingdom and French Foreign Offices apparently consider that the talks were helpful. The American Embassy in London reports that there is continuing evidence that the United Kingdom participants were highly pleased and consider that the discussions are of real value. The American Embassy in Paris reports that the French were very pleased with the exchange of views.

As to the future, the United Kingdom definitely expects the talks to become an annual feature. The French will no doubt accept annual meetings but will not, I think, press for them. I think the talks should be continued but that no formal agreement to have annual meetings is necessary or desirable. Their usefulness is clear from our experience the last two years. The talks not only anticipate future difficulties in such a way as make our negotiations in the United Nations easier, but they are of general political and psychological value. They reassure the UK and the French regarding our desire to be helpful, our willingness to hear their side, and our readiness to apply in colonial matters the London agreements of 1950 regarding consultations.

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[1] Attached to the memorandum was an undated "chit" handwritten by Mr. Hickerson: "Mr. Sanders [,] I read *all* of your excellent memo [presumably Hickerson meant by this, both sets of U.S.-UK and U.S.-French minutes, and related miscellaneous matter which is not printed here] and I agree with your conclusions. After Gerig returns I want us to go into this whole question fully. There are some very basic differences between us & the Br[itish] & Fr[ench] that we must face realistically. J[ohn] D. H[ickerson]."

[2] Not printed.

The talks indicated that the UK and France continue to see the advantages of a less legalistic and more flexible approach to these problems. This fact has tended to create the impression that the issues between them and us relate primarily to questions of timing and tactics. While reflecting a healthy optimism which should be encouraged, this impression is misleading. For example, the talks in London revealed a strong and continuing concern that the practice of yielding to pressures calling for the submission of information on constitutional and political matters or to do other things not required by the Charter may, through a cumulative effect, establish a principle which would end in giving the UN additional powers. Among the "hard core" issues are:

(*a*) In the trusteeship area, the United Kingdom will not accept prior consultation and the alleged right of the General Assembly to tell the administering powers how they should discharge their responsibilities.

(*b*) In the non-trusteeship area, the United Kingdom will not accept resolutions that do not apply to all members or recommendations regarding particular territories; it insists that the United Nations should not discuss constitutional questions or political questions except as incidentally related to social, economic, or other similar matters; it also will not admit that there is an obligation requiring prior consultation.

The American group made it clear that the US did not want to tell the UK and France how they should administer their territories. It indicated that perhaps the basic difference between our respective approaches turns on the judgment we pass on the liabilities of a negative attitude in the United Nations on questions that involve strong political and psychological reaction. The estimate made by the US leads it on balance to the conclusion that more is to be gained by submitting information, even though not legally required, and by discussing such information, than by taking a negative or antagonistic attitude. The UK and the French, on the other hand, concentrate on the other side of the coin, on the difficulties and hinderances created in the administration of territories by such submissions and discussion.

In summary, I think it is important for us not to be deluded by the the appearance of happy agreement. Under the smooth surface there are many rocks that are bound to cause serious difficulties as we deal with specific issues in the United Nations. It is one thing to discuss these problems in general terms in the relatively relaxed and friendly atmosphere of the talks in London and Washington; it is quite another to discuss the same issues in specific terms while being prodded and needled, frequently in what seems to us to be an irresponsible way, by the non-administering powers in the relatively psychopathic atmosphere of Committee 4. The flare-up last year over the Michael

Scott[3] affair shortly after the Washington talks, and the one this year over discussion of political conditions in non-self-governing territories, give accent to this point.

These two instances involved one or more of the "hard core" issues mentioned above. The United Kingdom in these and other similar cases has taken the attitude that our failure to give them complete support represented a departure from the understandings reached during the colonial talks. This reaction on the part of the United Kingdom raises a basic question as to what these understandings were and who has been converted to whose gospel. After the Washington talks last year the United Kingdom sent circulars to its missions saying the talks had been successful in convincing the United States of the validity of the United Kingdom position. We, on our part, thought we had persuaded the United Kingdom of the advantages of a more flexible approach. Instances of the kind referred to have shown how far apart we remain and how the contradictions in the two approaches emerge to join issue over specific problems. For our part we see that, at least on the issues where the new approach is really needed, the United Kingdom continues to maintain the inflexibility which characterized its attitudes during the period prior to the colonial talks.

Some of our troubles are created by UK and French representatives in the actual negotiations in the United Nations who have not participated in the colonial talks and are not conditioned to the more flexible attitudes which the talks promote. No doubt the UK is saying the same thing about us, in view of their recent comments about our representative in Committee 4 in Paris. Study of these and other aspects of our experience with the discussions will offer helpful hints on where and how we move from here with the talks.

For one thing I believe they should increasingly focus on specific issues expected to arise in the UN. I think also that we should soft-pedal exhortations about the virtues of more democracy and self-government and independence for dependent peoples and generalized concepts as to how Soviet tactics may be met. The same applies to generalizations about the historical factors which explain our attitude toward these problems. The United Kingdom and the French profess to fail to understand why we do not take into account that the clock has long since passed the hour of "colonial imperialism" and that the "enlightened" colonial policy of today is a far cry from the policy that led to the American revolution.

This does not mean that our approach to the talks should be governed by excessive consideration for United Kingdom and French

[3] This refers to the Rev. Mr. Michael Scott, Anglican clergyman from the Union of South Africa who regularly sought to appear before the Fourth Committee at sessions of the General Assembly, on behalf of the Herero and Nama peoples of South West Africa. For documentation on these matters, see pp. 673 ff.

susceptibilities. The point is that diminishing returns have set in on some of our standard arguments. We should begin to take for granted, at least for purposes of discussion with them, that the United Kingdom and France accept certain basic propositions of the new approach which supposedly has evolved out of the talks. Perhaps one way to do this is to develop a series of such basic propositions which could serve as points of departure in the discussion of specific issues. They could include points that both sides could assume have become axiomatic in the new approach, e.g., the desirability of greater flexibility and the merits of explaining what is being done to improve the welfare and increase the self-government of dependent peoples. The idea would be to set a platform under the progress already achieved. The application of these standards to specific issues would promptly reveal where the shoe pinches without requiring a recapitulation of basic philosophy.

This may not be the way to do it but I do believe that if we do not do something of the kind we will continue to alternate each year between the sometimes misleading optimism of the talks, and the pessimism produced by the frustrations in the United Nations.

IV. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE COMPETENCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE FOURTH COMMITTEE IN REGARD TO DEPENDENT AREAS

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations [1]

RESTRICTED
SD/A/C.4/87

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1951.

INFORMATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO TRUST TERRITORIES: THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly on the question of the implementation of Trusteeship Council and General Assembly resolutions relating to Trust Territories.

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[1] The General Assembly was to convene in Paris on November 6. For information regarding the composition and organization of the U.S. Delegation and its Advisory Staff, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

Although neither the Fourth Committee nor the General Assembly took action on this item until January 1952, this position paper is printed here as of interest in this phase of Department's policy formulation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. On the general question of the implementation of General Assembly and Trusteeship Council resolutions, the United States Delegation should base its position on the following two factors:

a. The United States does not consider that the nature of the obligations arising from recommendations by the General Assembly or the Trusteeship Council on trusteeship affairs differs from that arising from recommendations by the General Assembly on other subjects.

b. With respect to the nature of the obligation arising from such recommendations, the United States considers that, although such recommendations do not have the force of law, they should be accorded the greatest respect and every effort should be made to carry them into effect.

2. The United States Delegation should seek, insofar as possible, to minimize any discussion of the nature of the obligation arising from recommendations concerning trusteeship and to avert the introduction or adoption of any proposal thereon in the Fourth Committee. Should a proposal be introduced which would attempt to establish or recognize a legal obligation on the part of administering authorities to implement recommendations of the General Assembly or the Trusteeship Council on trusteeship affairs, the Delegation should initially take the position that such a proposal is concerned with an aspect of the general question of the nature and extent of the obligations imposed on Members by all recommendations of the General Assembly and therefore involves matters which are beyond the scope of the Fourth Committee. The Delegation might, on the above grounds, (1) seek to have such a proposal withdrawn or (2) if appropriate, favor referring the question to the Sixth Committee. If substantive action in the Fourth Committee cannot be averted by these or other means, the Delegation should (1) oppose such a proposal or (2) if necessary, favor amendments to make the proposal acceptable in terms of the position set forth in Recommendation 1.

3. The Delegation should take into account the foregoing considerations in any discussion of specific issues covered by the Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Resolution 436 (V). Should the question of further reports by the Secretary General arise, the Delegation should take the position that there is no need for such reports since, pursuant to Trusteeship Council Resolution 128 (VI), the Reports of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly include information on the implementation of resolutions, and should, if necessary, vote against a proposal for further special reports by the Secretary General, making clear that it was doing so on the procedural grounds outlined above.

4. If the question of the implementation of General Assembly recommendations in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is raised,

the Delegation should take the position that the United States is making and will continue to make every effort to carry out the views of the General Assembly, subject to security considerations and without prejudice to the status of the Territory as a strategic area. If the Secretary General's report pursuant to Resolution 436 (V) includes data on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the United States should not object to inclusion in the Secretary General's report of data on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the information of the Assembly.

COMMENT

The question of the implementation by administering authorities of recommendations of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council relating to trusteeship matters has received increasing attention at recent sessions of the Assembly. The General Assembly at its Fourth Session adopted four resolutions, (320(IV), 322(IV), 323(IV), and 324(IV)), dealing respectively with political, economic, social and educational advancement in trust territories. Each of these resolutions included a recommendation that the Trusteeship Council include in its report to the Assembly a special section on the implementation by administering authorities of recommendations in each of these fields. Accordingly the Trusteeship Council at its Sixth Session adopted Resolution 128(VI) in which it resolved to include in future reports to the Assembly special sections on the implementation of recommendations of the General Assembly and information on the application of the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council. As a result of this decision separate sections on implementation were included in those parts of the Council's report to the Assembly covering its Sixth and Seventh Sessions which were adopted after the passage of Resolution 128(VI). Thus, for example, the Council's report on British Togoland, adopted at the Seventh Session, includes in Part I, under each of the functional fields, a section which quotes each previous recommendation dealing with that field, followed by detailed information on the implementation of that recommendation based on information from the annual reports by the administering authorities and the statements made by the representative and special representative of the administering authorities during the Council's discussion of the annual report on the Territory. It should also be noted that the Trusteeship Council's Provisional Questionnaire, upon which the annual reports of the administering authorities are based, includes as question 246 the following: "What has been done to implement the suggestions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly?" Annual reports have included, in varying degrees of detail, information in response to this question.

Despite the action noted above, however, a draft resolution was introduced into the Fourth Committee at the Fifth General Assembly by the

Mexican and Cuban delegations which requested the Secretary General to prepare a list of Assembly and Council resolutions, and to report annually to the Assembly on the implemental action pursuant to these resolutions, setting forth the reasons for delay in cases where no implemental action has been taken. The United States opposed this resolution on the grounds that it would result in a duplication of effort, was unnecessary, ill-timed, and might result in confusion. Other administering authorities also opposed the draft resolution, chiefly on procedural rather than substantive grounds; however, in commenting on the draft, the United Kingdom delegation stated that the administering authorities were not required automatically to apply resolutions of the General Assembly or the Council; they considered those resolutions as mere recommendations and felt bound to accept them only if they judged them to be compatible with the conditions in the Territory concerned and in accordance with the essential aims of the Trusteeship System. Shortly after this unfortunate statement, the Philippine delegate, stating that he could not agree with the British statement, introduced an amendment to the preamble of the draft resolution, the first paragraph of which read as follows:

"Considering that the Administering Authorities have a clear obligation to implement the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council in matters relating to Chapter XII and XIII of the Charter;"

In introducing and defending this amendment, the Philippine delegation made it clear that this amendment referred to a "binding obligation", resting upon a legal basis.

In discussing the above amendment at a subsequent meeting, the United States urged the Philippines to withdraw the amendment since it had only a tenuous connection with the draft resolution and raised the broad issue of relations between the General Assembly and Member States with respect to Assembly resolutions, a matter which affected the work of all Committees of the General Assembly. The Cuban delegation also urged withdrawal of the amendment, although it supported the principle and would vote for it as a separate draft resolution. The Indian delegation stated that it supported the principle of the amendment but would abstain in the vote since it regarded the amendment as unnecessary. The Philippines thereupon withdrew the amendment but reserved the right to submit it at another time as a separate resolution. In withdrawing the resolution, the Philippines attempted to refute the various arguments which had been advanced against it and, in particular, took exception to the United States view that the principle raised the question of relations between the General Assembly and Member states. In the Philippines view the principle concerned only relations between the Assembly and administering authorities of trust territories. Following the withdrawal of the

amendment, the draft resolution was adopted by the Fourth Committee by a vote of 31–11–5 and in the plenary by a vote of 33–11–12. In both cases the six administering authorities voted negatively.

In view of the background of this question, it is possible that the question of implementation will be a major issue in the Fourth Committee of the Sixth Assembly and that the Secretary General's Report called for in the above resolution will serve as a point of departure for a discussion of the nature of the obligations of administering authorities arising from recommendations with respect to trusteeship. Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that an attempt will be made to introduce a proposal along the lines of the Philippine amendment of last year. Such a situation poses a difficult problem for the United States since, while making every effort to strengthen the General Assembly and respect for its actions, it might be forced to support a restrictive position with respect to the legal obligations deriving, from Assembly recommendations. While the United States position on the substance of the issue is clear, (see Recommendation 1, (*b*)), it would obviously be preferable for the United States to avoid, if possible, emphasizing the negative aspect of that position. A discussion of the question might very well result in other administering authorities stressing the non-obligatory character of Assembly recommendations. Furthermore, a divisive debate on this issue could well have unfortunate effects on United States efforts to encourage both administering and non-administering Members to adopt a broad, constructive and cooperative attitude in United Nations' discussions of colonial affairs.

In view of the consideration outlined above, it is believed that the United States should make every effort to keep discussion of this question to a minimum and, by appropriate informal consultation, to avert the introduction of any proposal dealing with the nature of the obligation arising from recommendations concerning trusteeship. While it would be preferable that no proposal on this subject be debated in the Fourth Committee in view of the implications which such a debate would have with respect to Assembly actions in other fields, such an outcome may prove impossible. Should a proposal along the lines of the Philippine amendment of last year be introduced, the United States should seek to prevent its adoption without, if possible, taking a position which would emphasize the legal limitations inherent in the obligations attaching to Assembly or Council actions. This might be achieved by taking the position that such a proposal raises the broad issue of the nature and extent of obligations imposed on all Members by Assembly recommendations and therefore extends beyond the scope of the Fourth Committee. This would provide a basis, without taking a position on the substance of the proposal, for urging that the proposal be withdrawn or referred to the Sixth Committee. The latter tactic may be useful since the Sixth Committee is less likely

to be influenced by the political and emotional factors which are inherent in Fourth Committee discussions and therefore less likely to support the thesis that recommendations of the Assembly and the Council with respect to trusteeship differ from other recommendations in that they impose on administering authorities a legally binding obligation for implementation. This was the main argument advanced by the Philippine delegation at the Fifth Assembly in support of its amendment and, judging from the brief discussion of the issue at that time, there may be considerable support for this argumentation among non-administering members. Briefly stated, this argument holds that the Assembly under Article 18 (2) makes "binding decisions" with respect to trusteeship rather than "recommendations" as in the case of matters involving international peace and security; furthermore, resolutions of the Assembly on trusteeship affairs were directed to states, not as Members of the United Nations, but as Administering Authorities of Trust Territories, who are regarded as "agents", responsible to a higher authority and bound by its decisions. While this argument is believed to be susceptible of refutation along the lines outlined below, the atmosphere of the Fourth Committee may indicate that the Sixth Committee would be a more sympathetic forum in which to debate what is essentially a legal issue.

If, however, neither withdrawal nor reference to the Sixth Committee appears feasible, a proposal of the type anticipated might successfully be opposed in the Fourth Committee by refutation of the argument outlined above without taking a definitive position on the issue of the obligation involved in Assembly action. Thus without debating the issue of the nature of the obligation involved, the enthusiasm of many non-administering members for a legally binding obligation with respect to trusteeship matters may be dampened if the position can be established that—whatever the nature of the obligation is—it does not differ from that placed upon all Members by Assembly actions. The following points might be used to establish this position:

1. Article 10 of the Charter provides that the Assembly may discuss and make "recommendations" with respect to any questions and matters within the scope of the present Charter, except as provided in Article 12.

2. While Article 18 (2) provides that "decisions" of the Assembly on certain questions (including trusteeship matters) shall be by a two-thirds majority whereas "recommendations" are specifically mentioned only with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, it cannot be concluded that this represents an attempt to differentiate with respect to the obligation involved between "decisions" and "recommendations". It is obvious in the context of the Charter that the term "decisions" is employed to describe all actions adopted by the Assembly which may include recommendations, requests, expressions of opinion or desire, etc. If it is argued that the term

"decisions" in this instance implies a particular sort of obligation, it would follow that the same sort of obligation must arise in those matters covered by Article 18 (3) where it is provided that "decisions" on "other questions" shall be made by a simple majority. A similar deduction would have to be made with respect to Article 67 concerning actions of ECOSOC and Article 89 concerning actions of the Trusteeship Council.

3. Furthermore, Articles 81, 85 and 87 provide that the relationship between a state, in its capacity as an Administering Authority, and the General Assembly shall be established by individual trusteeship agreements and that the actions of the Assembly and the Council in carrying out their functions shall be in conformity therewith. There are no provisions in the trusteeship agreements adopted thus far upon which it could be concluded that administering authorities have accepted an obligation with respect to Assembly actions, the nature of which differ from that of other Member states.

If despite refutation along the above lines, there does not appear to be sufficient opposition to ensure the outright defeat of a proposal of the type envisaged here, the remaining alternative would be amendment of the proposal to make it acceptable in terms of the the fundamental position of the United States as set forth in Recommendation 1 (*b*). Consideration of this alternative has been left to the last, however, since as was stated before, it is preferable that no proposal of any type be adopted on this question. Since the United States considers that the obligation attaching to recommendations of the Assembly in the case of trusteeship affairs does not differ from that in other cases, any proposal or amendment to a proposal which would emphasize the legal limitations involved in the obligation with respect to trusteeship would, *ipso facto*, imply that the same limitations applied in all other cases. Obviously such an implication would be undesirable in view of United States' efforts to strengthen the Assembly and to emphasize the general responsibility of Members to respect and implement its recommendations. While it is difficult to foresee all of the tactical possibilities which might arise in consideration of a proposal of this type, it should be borne in mind that a situation might develop in which the objectives of the United States might be achieved by abstention.

Although a proposal of the type dealt with above is likely to be the major problem which will arise in connection with the agenda item on implementation of Assembly and Council resolutions, it is possible that a proposal may be made to require further reports by the Secretary General of the type submitted this year. In its original draft form, Resolution 436 (V) called for annual reports by the Secretary General; this was changed in a subsequent revision to provide for one report covering action up to the present time. While the United States and other administering authorities opposed the draft resolution in both forms, as unnecessary and repetitious, proponents of the resolu-

tion pointed out that it would be advantageous to Members to have all the information available to date on this subject collected into one document for ready reference. Even if this consideration were of sufficient importance to justify the report called for in Resolution 436 (V), it would not appear to have any validity with respect to further reports, particularly on an annual basis. As was pointed out before, the Trusteeship Council includes sections on implementation in its annual report to the Assembly. There appears to be no justification for changing the position adopted by the United States on this issue at the Fifth Assembly, and the United States should therefore oppose further reports by the Secretary General on implementation.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the United States, has been designated as a strategic area under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, and Article 83 (1) of the Charter provides that all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas shall be exercised by the Security Council, which shall avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council in performing those functions relating to political, economic, social and educational matters. Relations between the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council with respect to strategic areas were the subject of a resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 415th meeting on March 7, 1949, (S/1280), which requested the Trusteeship Council to perform on behalf of the Security Council to the functions specified in Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter, subject to any decisions made by the Security Council with respect to security considerations. The Trusteeship Council was also requested to submit to the Security Council its reports and recommendations on strategic areas. Three such reports have been submitted to the Security Council thus far but have not been discussed in that body.

On the basis of a strict interpretation of the Charter, the General Assembly may be regarded as exercising no functions with respect to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. However, should the question of implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands arise, the United States should avoid a narrow, legalistic position which might arouse suspicions as to the actions or intentions of the United States in the territory or which might prejudice the United States efforts to promote a cooperative and progressive attitude toward trusteeship affairs. While making a brief and general reservation with respect to the status of the territory as a strategic area, the United States should state that it is making and will continue to make every effort to carry out the views of the Assembly and the Council. Should the Secretary General include in his report information on implemental action by the United States as administering authority, the United States might state, if appropriate, that it has no objection to the inclusion in the Secretary Gen-

eral's report of data for the information of the Assembly on the implementation of resolutions in the Trust Territory.

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 23, 1951.
US/A/C.4/211

COMPETENCE OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the Delegation's attitude on a proposal laid before the Fourth Committee by Iraq to the effect that "The Fourth Committee reaffirms that in accordance with the terms of the Charter it is empowered to discuss political matters and political aspects in regard to non-self-governing territories".

This matter has arisen out of an effort on the part of the Arab States to introduce a discussion of the Moroccan question in all of its aspects in the Fourth Committee. To this the French Delegation has taken vehement exception on points of order on the ground that a discussion of political and constitutional aspects of Morocco is beyond the competence of the Fourth Committee under the terms of the Charter. On Friday morning the French Delegation, in protest, walked out of the Committee and has been bringing strong pressure on the British and United States Delegations to do likewise.[1] References by Guatemala to the political situation in British Honduras, by Greece to the Cyprus question, and by Yemen to alleged British violations in Aden, have precipitated the same question.[2]

The basic question as to the limits of the competence of the Fourth Committee, and indeed of the Assembly, in regard to political aspect of non-self-governing territories has been before the Fourth Committee for several years. The Iraqi motion is intended to force a decision in favor of the widest interpretation of the Committee's powers on this question.

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[1] The events described in this paragraph regarding Morocco occurred on Thursday and Friday, November 22 and 23. The French delegates withdrew on November 23. For the proceedings of the Fourth Committee during these two days, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Fourth Committee*, pp. 41 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*).

For documentation on the Moroccan question in the General Committee at this same session, see pp. 135 ff.

[2] Events in the Fourth Committee at this same time with regard to South West Africa were also related to this problem; see pp. 673 ff.

DISCUSSION

Legal Aspect

Under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter, Members of the United Nations agree to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in" non-self-governing territories which are not under trusteeship. The General Assembly set up a Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter to consider these reports and to report its conclusions to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. Since under Article 73(*e*) there is no requirement to transmit *political* information to the United Nations, this Special Committee has concentrated on economic, social and educational matters.[3]

The Fourth Committee, however, has in practice taken up discussion of both trusteeship matters and of non-self-governing territories, some of which are of a political nature. For instance, under Article 73(*a*), Members of the United Nations agree "to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement". Under Article 73(*b*), Members agree "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions . . .".

Although under Article 73(*e*), Members are not required to transmit political information concerning non-self-governing territories, a majority of the members of Committee 4 take the view that the General Assembly, under Article 10, and under the specific provisions of Article 73(*a*) and 73(*b*) does have the right to discuss questions concerning the political advancement and the political aspirations of the peoples of non-self-governing territories. The British, French, Belgians and others have stoutly maintained that Sections 73 (*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*) are a part of a unilateral declaration and are not within the competence of the General Assembly or any of its Committees. They maintain that they would never have subscribed to the Charter on any other interpretation. It would seem, however, that on legal grounds, this view is open to serious question.[4]

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[3] For documentation regarding U.S. policy with regard to Chapter XI of the UN Charter in general, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 340 ff., and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 434 ff. For documentation with particular reference to Article 73(*e*), that is, the transmission of information regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, see *ibid.*, 1947, vol. I, pp. 279 ff., and *ibid.*, 1948, vol. I, Part 1, pp. 275 ff.

[4] For the proceedings of the Fourth Committee from November 19 when the Committee began its discussion of the Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73 (*e*) of the Charter (UN Doc. A/1836), see GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 21 ff.

Political Aspect

The question has a serious political aspect. France has manifested from the beginning a super sensitivity with regard to the discussion of conditions in Morocco, and, as stated above, walked out of the Fourth Committee when the Committee showed its determination to discuss conditions in Morocco. The British position is that, whatever the legal interpretation of the Charter may be, firmly maintained at San Francisco, that it must be clearly understood that the United Kingdom would not assume responsibility for international accountability with respect to its dependent areas.

The British and French take so serious a view of the matter that if the United States takes the position that the Fourth Committee is competent to discuss political questions, they will feel seriously affronted. The United States consequently finds itself in a position where failure to side with France and Great Britain may cause serious political difficulties. Belgium, Australia and the Netherlands, as well as several other delegations held much the same view as the UK and France.[5]

Parliamentary Situation

The problem is made the more difficult by the situation in the Fourth Committee, which is composed of eight administering authorities, and 52 non-administering authorities. The latter, in most cases lacking experience and knowledge of colonial problems, many of them smarting under former discriminatory treatment by the white races, as a rule make common cause against the administering authorities. While the eight administering powers on particular issues often secure the support of some twelve others, some thirty to thirty-five votes are usually cast against them.

So far as practical results are concerned, a point of order by an administering authority, in the course of the debate, may prove quite futile, since even if the President sustains the point of order, he can be, and frequently is, over-ruled by an overwhelming vote against the administering authorities.

Public Relations

In the discussions of the Fourth Committee, the issues are usually phrased in terms of human rights and the majority attempt to make it appear that the administering authorities, having opposed majority proposals, are engaged in the denial of human rights. Many of the NGO's appear to support the majority opinion and exercise considerable influence on the American public and press. It is clear, therefore, that public relations and press aspects of this question are important factors to take into account.

[5] For a statement to the Fourth Committee on November 21 by Channing H. Tobias, the United States delegate, see GA (VI) *Fourth Committee*, pp. 32 and 33.

IO Files

Memorandum of an Informal Meeting of Certain Members of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 24, 1951

SECRET

US/A/C.4/213

[Here follow list of persons (25) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. After the working group on this matter had withdrawn to undertake the drafting job, the Delegation, or those members present, were asked by Mr. Taylor [1] to stay and consider an urgent problem to be presented by Mr. Gerig [2] and Ambassador Sayre [3] concerning developments in the Fourth Committee. This had to with the French walkout of the day before, following a political discussion of Morocco in Committee 4, and an Iraqi motion that Committee 4 had the power to discuss political questions concerning the non-selfgoverning territories.

Mr. Gerig said that a serious crisis had arisen in Committee 4 when the French had walked out. The Belgians and UK were taking the same general line as the French although they had not walked out. He pointed out that by Monday afternoon when the Committee would meet again, a decision would be necessary from the Delegation on how to deal with this matter for the US. He added that Padilla Nervo [4] was meeting at that time with the UK and French and might later see the Iraqi. Padilla Nervo was understood to feel that this matter should not go into the General Committee but rather that he would go to the Chairman of Committee 4 who, it was hoped, would say that this was not a proper proposal and that he would not put it to a vote in the committee. That was the line which the UK and the French were seeking to pursue at that time. Padilla Nervo might also approach Khalidy,[5] the Iraqi, and point out to him the very dangerous results that could follow from carrying through on his draft resolution. The results would be dangerous for not only Committee 4 but also for the very existence of the Special Committee to Receive Information submitted under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter. The result might be that no more information would be submitted. The hope would be that Padilla Nervo could get Khalidy to withdraw his motion or get him to suspend pushing it forward to a vote. The problem for the US however was what to do if the approaches currently being made were un-

[1] Paul B. Taylor, Executive Secretary of the U.S. Delegation.

[2] O. Benjamin Gerig, Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs and member of the Advisory Staff of the Delegation.

[3] Francis B. Sayre, United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

[4] Luis Padilla Nervo, of Mexico, President of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

[5] Awni Khalidy, Chargé d'Affairs, Permanent Delegation of Iraq to the United Nations, delegate of Iraq on the Fourth Committee.

successful. The Arabs in their speeches, he pointed out, were covering the whole problem of Morocco in all its aspects. The last few years had seen a process develop within Committee 4 of what the UK called amendment to the Charter by resolution. New functions and powers were being given to Committee 4 by resolution saying that the Committee was so empowered. The colonial powers of course insisted that they had not subscribed to any such agreement at San Francisco.[6]

The French, according to Mr. Gerig, felt that they were being maltreated in the UN in regard to Morocco and were getting quite nervous about it. The UK had taken the matter up on the highest levels. It was desirable to have the question withdrawn in favor of a rule of thumb heretofore practiced by which it was generally agreed that since one could not separate completely the political aspects from what were primarily economic, social and educational questions, if the bounds of reason were maintained there would be no objection to occasional reference to these political aspects. The UK reluctantly has accepted this but if the rule of thumb method was disregarded a ruling would have to be made that political matters were outside the scope of the Committee to discuss. This latter position of the UK was felt by the Legal Adviser to exceed the limits of propriety. An attempt was in progress to draft a speech for Dr. Tobias to make on Monday afternoon expressing the US position on this matter.

Ambassador Austin asked what the parliamentary situation was. Mr. Gerig said that Committee 4 had received the motion one hour before it adjourned on Friday. It would therefore come up Monday. Ecuador and Iraq had moved in a short statement to the effect that Committee 4 was empowered to discuss political matters in connection with the report on the territories which were non-selfgoverning. Ambassador Austin[7] wondered whether the non-selfgoverning part of this statement took it outside of the general mandate of Article 10. Mr. Gerig said that on the contrary the feeling was that Article 10 was the generally permissive basis on which the present motion had been made. Mr. Meeker[8] said that the Legal Adviser felt that this was not a problem of Charter interpretation or of what powers in general the Assembly had, but related solely to the propriety of Committee 4 action of such a nature. This was a much narrower issue. He pointed out that while Article 73(*e*) did not call for political information, the countries responsible for non-selfgoverning areas submitted political information. Our feeling was that when the discussion under Article 73(*e*) got too far away from the basic purpose of that article,

[6] For documentation on the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[7] Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations, and Delegation chairman.

[8] Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs and member of the Delegation's Advisory Staff.

it would be appropriate to have the chair call the meeting back to that primary purpose.

Ambassador Sayre agreed with this legal opinion. He pointed out that the French feel that a discussion of political matters by Committee 4 was illegal. They said that Chapter 11 of the Charter was a unilateral declaration by the countries responsible for the non-selfgoverning areas and not an agreement. They would submit information but they were not bound to come and discuss it before the special committee, at least on the political aspects. He agreed with Mr. Meeker also that this was an unsound legal position to the extent that it denied the general competence of the Committee to discuss political matters. If the GA could discuss political matters under a general mandate, so could Committee 4. The UK and French position was not of course a purely legal one. There had been a long-continuing fight going on in Committee 4 wherein the non-colonial powers would ask political representatives of the colonial powers to appear in Committee 4 and talk to political matters. They might further consider the idea of sending visiting missions out to the non-selfgoverning areas. This would be clearly illegal. The important question was where to fight the big battle that would inevitably have to be fought. Should it be fought out when the non-colonial powers adopt the clearly illegal position of sending out these visiting missions, or should we decide now to depart from firm legal grounds and fight it out for political considerations connected with the UK and French desire to take the stand now? Ambassador Sayre felt that the US should continue to stick to its legal position but show a readiness to fight, if illegal steps were taken as indicated above. He preferred to wait till the battle lines were drawn on firm ground and not to fight on the quicksand of the present position. Ambassador Sayre felt that the UK and France had gone too far in saying that no political questions could be discussed, and that the Iraqi had gone too far in saying all political questions could be discussed. He therefore proposed that a middle ground be sought and that the US seek also to bring the two sides somewhat nearer this middle.

Mr. Ross [9] felt he might somewhat overstate his case out of strong feelings on the subject but he disliked intensely the tendency of the present US position. He admitted that each country was entitled to its own legal interpretation of this or any matter. The UK and France felt that our interpretation was wrong in this case, that the Charter was being interpreted by this motion, and that the US was at fault for making *ex cathedra* statements about the legality of this matter. He recalled the difficult history of Committee 4 between the "enlightened policies" of the colonial powers and the "irresponsible demands"

[9] John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, one of two Senior Advisers on the Advisory Staff of the Delegation.

of the noncolonials. He felt that we had come upon the crisis of which the UK and France were so certain. Our conduct vis-à-vis the nonselfgoverning areas and the East–West struggle was highly important. The best analogy he could recall would be the recent decision to back the French to the fullest in Morocco.[10] An equally firm stand would have to be taken in this case, in his opinion. This would not of course prevent our urging calm counsel upon our friends.

Mr. Nolting liked Mr. Ross' analogy. Mr. Meeker said, in response to a question by Mr. Nolting, that the legal adviser's opinion was that the Iraqi motion ought to be opposed not on the basis of the Charter but on the basis of "allocation of work". Ambassador Austin called for hitting the problem squarely on the nose. This, he said, was a constitutional announcement of a judgment that the Charter empowered Committee 4 to discuss these political items in the particular connection mentioned. This was a new item, and had not been assigned to any committee yet. There was only an accidental relation of this item to the Moroccan matter. According to Mr. Gerig, Padilla Nervo was going to object only to the form of the motion by Iraq and not to the substance of it. Mr. Nolting said that we should approach this problem one step at a time. Ambassador Sayre gave an exact recapitulation of what happened and how the issue arose and how tangled the procedure was. He also pointed to a difficulty underlying all this business which was the necessity for the US to avoid giving the impression it was basing its actions on the "unhumanitarian" ground of backing the colonial powers in their differences with the non-colonial ones.

Ambassador Austin could not see how this Iraq resolution could be advanced in Committee 4 since it had not gone through the appropriate procedures for new matters. Mr. Sandifer[11] said he approved of the Chairman's suggestion that this matter be dealt with on procedural grounds. We would only be faced with the policy conflict outlined by Mr. Ross if this procedural approach failed. On the substance of the matter he would disagree with Mr. Ross, in the argument that we should back up the UK and French on untenable legal grounds, and for that reason he felt we should seek to steer clear of the substantive issues by getting the UK and France onto procedural grounds.

Ambassador Austin wondered how France could avoid coming back into Committee 4 and raising a point of order on the Iraqi motion. Ambassador Sayre said that the French had raised a point of order on the Egyptian speech which had precipitated this whole matter. It was during the course of the Committee 4 chairman's attempting to dodge a ruling on the point of order that the Iraqi motion had been presented. Ambassador Austin wanted to see the fuzziness of the

[10] A reference to the Moroccan question in the General Committee; see footnote 1, p. 663.

[11] Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and Senior Adviser on the Delegation's Advisory Staff.

parliamentary situation erased and the record kept straight. Mr. Gerig said that in view of a clear cut decision going against our point of view, a certain amount of fuzziness would not be a bad idea, unless of course the proposal we made for the rule of thumb were to be adopted. This could hardly come out of a ruling by the Chair. Ambassador Sayre urged seeking the middle ground he had suggested earlier. In view of the alarm of nearly everyone on the Committee and the particularly nervous state the UK and France were in over this matter, it would be useful to compose their differences this way.

Mr. Taylor said that it would be wise to try first the suggestion by Ambassador Austin to solve the question on procedural grounds. In the event we should lose on this move, which seemed likely, we could consider how to vote on the resolution. In any case, we could talk around with the other more reasonable members of the Committee tomorrow concerning the most effective procedural approach.

Mr. Maffitt[12] agreed with Mr. Taylor that the procedural gambit be tried and asked whether the time element were not the most important one. Ambassador Sayre agreed, saying that if one week's time could be gained on the item or motion, the Committee would then be on to other matters and the matter would probably not bother us. However, there was an aspect that might recur. This was that the Arabs were continually trying to plague the French over Morocco and might try it in other ways if this particular method failed. He agreed, too, that the procedural approach be tried first.

CHARLES D. COOK

[12] Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Mission to the United Nations, member of the Advisory Staff.

IO Files

Minutes of Nineteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 26, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/206

[Here follows list of persons (48) present.]

Mr. Taylor asked Mr. Gerig to report on Committee 4 developments. Mr. Gerig reviewed the highlights of the French walkout in that Committee after the Egyptian delegate had discussed political matters with regard to Morocco in considerable detail in connection with the debate on the report of the Special Article 73(*e*) Committee and the Secretariat summaries of the reports of the administering authorities on non-selfgoverning territories. Mr. Gerig recalled that in the past Committee 4 had allowed some political remarks to be made but that Delegations had generally adhered to a "gentlemen's agreement" that

such remarks should be strictly germane to the item under discussion. In this case the Egyptian had gone too far. After the French had walked out in protest over this development, the Iraqi had introduced a motion which stated that the Fourth Committee was acting within its proper limits in discussing political matters in connection with a discussion of the reports submitted to the Special Committee under Article 73(*e*). It was feared that the results of such an explicit statement as to Committee 4's competence would be very dangerous for the proper functioning of either the Special Committee or of Committee 4 itself. The UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia, and of course France, were extremely concerned about these developments. The non-administering powers on the Committee were equally adamant in insisting that the powers of the Committee should be spelled out in the proposed fashion.

Mr. Gerig stated that an attempt was underway to persuade the Chairman of the Committee 4 to rule the Iraqi motion out of order, on the grounds that it involved a constitutional question of a very broad character and was not at all germane to the agenda item under which it was being introduced.

Dr. Tobias said that he wanted to see Urena [1] use the power of his prerogatives as Chairman to declare the motion out of order, and that he would be prepared to raise the point of order himself if necessary. A speech which the US Representative could make to this point had been prepared. Dr. Tobias stated, however, that he was not too enthusiastic about making any great polemical endeavor in this regard since there were certain considerations which gave him pause. He found it difficult to erase from the back of his mind the recollection that the United States itself had once been a non-selfgoverning territory. Since those days, of course, the US had grown in size and stature, and had also acquired dominion over several territories. The US was justifiably proud of its record of enlightened policy vis-à-vis these territories, and ought therefore to be extremely careful in how it dealt with such problems in the context of the present day. He added that it was obvious to him that recommendations for reporting political matters under 73(*e*) had been omitted for reasons other than mere chance. He felt the intention, nevertheless, was to examine these reports and make recommendations thereon in the light of all the necessary considerations, which of course would have to include the political.

Mr. Sandifer stressed the importance of disposing of the Iraqi proposal on a procedural basis and noted that we had solid grounds on which to do this. In view of the importance of our relations with the UK and France, it would be exceedingly unwise to consider or deal

[1] M. Henriquez Ureña (Dominican Republic), Chairman of the Fourth Committee.

with the resolution on a substantive basis, the UK and France were, in fact, claiming that the US was not doing enough in colonial matters to back them up. Although this claim was unjustified, it was nevertheless being made. Should there be a showdown on the substance of this issue, the US might well have to stand in support of the right of the Fourth Committee to discuss the political aspects of the economic, social and educational problems presented to it.

Mr. Fisher[2] liked the legal position as outlined by Mr. Gerig, and felt that it was so valid that it would be unfortunate for the US position to lose on a vote. He wondered how the voting strength lined up. Mr. Sandifer said that it would take a good deal of active political liaison work to ensure acceptance of our position; Mr. Gerig noted that if we could convince Padilla Nervo and Urena of the correctness of our position, we could probably swing the Latin American vote.

Mr. McKeever[3] wanted the US to get some middle country like India to join the US in raising the point of order, to avoid the appearance that the US was siding with the colonial against the non-colonial powers. Mr. Sandifer responded that although this was technically a point of order, it was not really the US intention to operate on that basis. The proposed statement referred to earlier would be given, according to his understanding, only in the event that a vote was likely to be taken. The current attempts were to keep this matter from being voted upon, at all.

Mr. Plitt[4] said that while it sometimes appeared that the Indians and others could influence the Arabs, in a case like this the Arabs were presenting a united front. Ambassador Sayre feared that Committee Four's future would be jeopardized in the extreme if present developments were allowed to continue. The Iraqi resolution seemed to him completely out of order and if adopted would lead to a "quagmire" of difficulties. He offered to talk with Urena and felt he could convince him to accept our position. If that approach did not succeed, Ambassador Sayre thought the US ought to demand a ruling, and if it should go against our position, appeal the ruling and demand a vote thereon. Thereafter, the delegation approved the approach outlined by Mr. Gerig.

[Here follow brief comments about another matter.]

[2] Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, member of the Delegation's Advisory Staff.
[3] Porter McKeever, head of the U.S. Delegation's Information Office.
[4] Edwin A. Plitt, U.S. member and president of the International Commission of Control, International Zone of Tangier.

Editorial Note

For the proceedings of the Fourth Committee on November 26, see GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, pages 55 ff.

At the outset of the meeting the chairman, Henriquez Ureña, made a short statement regarding Committee procedure and his conduct of the Committee's business as chairman. He announced that he would "continue to conduct the meetings as he had previously, in other words, he would remind speakers to confine their remarks to essential points and to deal with political questions only if they were related to economic problems. He was not making a ruling." (GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, page 55) The Iraqi delegate, immediately following, "appreciated the statement just made by the Chairman; it contained, he felt, the substance of what his delegation wished to say in its draft resolution. For that reason, while he did not withdraw that proposal, he did not want it put to a vote for the time being." (*Ibid.*)

The United States delegate (Tobias) made a short statement, which, however, was directed more to remarks made by certain delegates of the Soviet bloc (*ibid.*, page 62).

V. THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA QUESTION [1]

IO Files [2]

Department of State Position Paper

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1951.

SD/A/AC. 49/1

COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

The General Assembly, by its resolution of December 13, 1950 (Annex A),[3] established a Committee to confer with the Union of South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The Committee also was authorized, as an interim measure, to examine, in accordance with the procedure of the former mandates system of the League of Nations, reports, petitions, and any other materials relating to the territory of South West Africa that may be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to submit a report on its actions to the next regular session of the General Assembly. The problem is to determine the position to be taken by the United States Representative on this Committee.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 474–508.

[2] Short title for the master files of the Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

[3] For the text of Resolution 449 (V), Part A, see United Nations, *Official Records of the United Nations, Fifth Session*, pp. 55 and 56.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Organizational Questions*

(*a*) The United States should favor a reasonable delay in the initiation of actual negotiations in order that the Union Government may find it easier to change from the inflexible views expressed by certain officials during the August election campaign in South West Africa and thus make possible a calmer atmosphere in which negotiations may be undertaken.

(*b*) The Committee should meet at Lake Success.

(*c*) The United States should support the representative of Thailand as chairman. The United States should not accept the chairmanship of this Committee.

(*d*) In drawing up its agenda, the Committee should first seek to perform its major function; namely, conferring with the Union on procedures for implementing the Court's opinion. After such negotiations have been initiated, the Committee should turn to its interim function, the examination of any reports and petitions which might have been received regarding the territory.

2. *Work of the Committee*

(*a*) The United States Representative should propose that after its election of officers the Committee inform the Union of South Africa of the action taken and perhaps invite the Union Government to designate a representative to confer with the Committee at a later date.

(*b*) If a proposal is made to examine petitions or reports, the United States Representative should suggest that discussion of the substantive business of the Committee should be postponed for a reasonable period to give the Union Government Representatives an opportunity to confer with the Committee. The United States Representative might suggest that a necessary step should be a request to the Secretariat to prepare a study of the procedures of the Mandates Commission for Committee examination (a digest of the Mandates Commission procedure is attached as Annex B).[4]

DISCUSSION

In 1949 the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to furnish an advisory opinion regarding the international status of the territory and the international obligations of the Union arising therefrom. On June 11, 1950 the Court delivered its opinion advising:

"that South-West Africa is a territory under the international Mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa on December 17th, 1920;

"that the Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League

[4] Annex B not printed.

of Nations and in the Mandate for South-West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and petitions are to be submitted, and the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be replaced by a reference to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 37 of the Statute of the Court;

"that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter are applicable to the Territory of South-West Africa in the sense that they provide a means by which the Territory may be brought under the Trusteeship System;

"and that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to place the Territory under the Trusteeship System;

"that the Union of South Africa acting alone has not the competence to modify the international status of the territory of South-West Africa, and that the competence to determine and modify the international status of the Territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations;".

The Court also stated in the body of the opinion that:

". . . The degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not therefore exceed that which is applied under the Mandates System, and should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Council of the League of Nations. These observations are particularly applicable to annual reports and petitions."

At the fifth session, the General Assembly accepted the Court's opinion and established a committee of five, consisting of the representatives of Denmark, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, and the United States, to confer with the Union of South Africa concerning procedural measures necessary for implementing the Court's opinion. This committee was also authorized to examine, in accordance with the procedures of the former Mandates System of the League of Nations, reports and petitions relating to the territory that may be transmitted to the Secretary-General.

COMMENT ON RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Organizational Questions*

(*a*) It would appear desirable to postpone negotiations with the Union Government until at least March or April in order to give time to the Union officials to reflect on, and perhaps adjust as far as possible, to the views of the Court and the Assembly, and to allow public opinion in the Union to cool off with respect to the territory of South West Africa. It is reported that the press in the Union has recently contained some editorial comment to the effect that the action of the General Assembly is not unacceptable to the Union. This might be interpreted as indicating an attempt by the Union officials to prepare the public for some retreat from the Union's previous position

that it had no obligations to the United Nations with respect to the territory and toward an acknowledgement in some measure to the United Nations.

(*b*) There appears to be no reason why the Committee should meet elsewhere than at the United Nations Headquarters.

(*c*) The difficulty of achieving results acceptable to both the Union and the General Assembly are so great that it seems highly desirable for the United States to avoid the chairmanship. The United States will be in a better position as an ordinary Member of the Committee to exert maximum leverage during the negotiations and to strive to avoid an impasse between the Committee and the Union.

(*d*) It is possible that petitions may be received early in 1951. A petition from the Reverend Michael Scott,[5] representative of the Herero tribes, has been discussed by a group of non-governmental organization representatives in New York. The Committee's examination of this or other petitions before conferring with the Union as to the procedures for such examination might be deeply resented by the Union and might jeopardize the negotiations which are the major function of the Committee.

2. *Work of the Committee*

(*a*) Manifestly, the Committee will not be able to begin negotiations with the Union of South Africa until the latter designates a representative to confer with the Committee concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The next step, therefore, after the election of officers, might logically be for the Committee to notify the Union of South Africa that it has convened and is organized to carry out the General Assembly resolution, and to invite the Union of South Africa to designate a representative to confer with the Committee at a later date. The Committee should then recess. If a proposal is made by any of the members to take up substantive questions, the United States Representative should suggest that substantive matters should be postponed until the Union Government Representative has had an opportunity to confer with the Committee.

(*b*) If a proposal is made to examine petitions, the United States Representative should suggest that the Committee first request the Secretariat to prepare a study of the procedures of the Mandates Commission so that the Committee may utilize this material in conforming its procedures to the opinion of the Court.

No notification that any petitions are actually pending has been received from the United Nations Secretariat. Unless, therefore, a proposal is made that the Committee consider the "petition" made on

[5] The Reverend Mr. Michael Scott was an Anglican clergyman who appeared regularly at sessions of the General Assembly on behalf of the Herero people of South West Africa.

behalf of the Herero tribes by the Reverend Michael Scott to the Fourth General Assembly, it would not appear that the question of petitions procedure would arise at this meeting.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 15, 1951.
US/A/AC.49/1

Subject: Question of South West Africa

Participants: Ambassador Jooste,[1] Mr. B. J. Jarvie,[2] Embassy of the Union of South Africa
Assistant Secretary Hickerson [3]
Mr. Hayden Raynor, BNA [4]
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND

Ambassador Jooste called today at his request to ascertain the Department's views on several questions which might arise in the UN's Committee on South West Africa. (Before taking up these points Mr. Hickerson expressed the Department's appreciation on the manner in which the Union Government had paid their tribute to the late United States Ambassador Erhardt, in response to which Ambassador Jooste said that the Union Government had felt this loss very keenly because Ambassador Erhardt had so quickly learned to understand some of the special problems with which the Union was faced.)

Ambassador Jooste then asked a series of specific questions as to our probable attitude, in particular as to the questions of (*a*) competence of the Committee to receive "new information" which might have changed the Court's opinion, and (*b*) probable willingness of the Committee to receive suggestions or proposals which might not completely seem to correspond to a literal interpretation of the Court's opinion. Ambassador Jooste prefaced his points by saying that the Union Government had accepted the principle of international accountability but it was on the details of implementation that the difficulties might arise.

On the question of the Committee's competence to receive new information, Mr. Hickerson said, and Mr. Raynor and Mr. Gerig agreed, that it was doubtful in our minds whether the Committee was competent to receive and consider "new information" which the Union Gov-

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[1] G. P. Jooste, Ambassador of the Union of South Africa to the United States.
[2] Counselor of Embassy of the Union of South Africa.
[3] John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
[4] G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

ernment thinks might have changed the Court's opinion. Mr. Donges, at the Fourth Committee, had referred to this material at some length and therefore the Assembly was apprised of this matter before it adopted its resolution setting up the negotiating committee, with its present terms of reference. He added, however, that such information might very well be brought to the attention of the next Assembly by the Union Delegation and, indeed, the Union Government might find some other way of bringing the matter to the attention of the Court. Ambassador Jooste appeared to accept Mr. Hickerson's view that the Committee should not be presented with this question.

On the question of the Committee's competence to receive suggestions which might fall short of a literal reading of the Court's opinion, Mr. Hickerson gave it as his own opinion that the Committee should and would receive such suggestions. Mr. Gerig and Mr. Raynor both agreed. Mr. Raynor thought that such suggestions could be taken as a basis for negotiations and in the course of the discussions it would be seen how close together the committee and the Union Representative would come.

Ambassador Jooste then said that the Union Government, in accepting the principle of international accountability, had had in mind that an agreement could be entered into with the United Nations which would incorporate certain of the articles of the mandate under which the Union would undertake, *inter alia*, to promote the material and moral well-being of the inhabitants, prohibit forced labor and the supply of intoxicating beverages, insure freedom of conscience and worship, regulate the arms traffic, etc. Mr. Gerig thought that the Committee would welcome a proposal that an agreement should be negotiated, even though the contents of an agreement might be the subject of some difficult negotiations.

Mr. Hickerson said that it would be a good start to assume that an agreement could be negotiated, and he expressed the hope that the Union Government would not take a rigid position in the nature of "freezing" their position at the outset. Ambassador Jooste agreed and said he hoped the Committee, on its side, would not take a rigid position either but would be willing to consider various ways of expressing the undertakings in such an agreement. For example, he felt that if the Committee would start to say that unless annual reports were submitted there was no use going on, it might be very difficult. He would not say that such reports in some form would not be agreed to by his Government—he didn't know—but language might be found which would deal with this question under the principle of international accountability which would be satisfactory to all parties concerned.

Mr. Hickerson said that since the Union Government accepts the principle of international accountability he would hope that the Union would make a statement agreeing in principle to the opinion of the Court which would leave open a wide area for negotiating the details. He thought this was the more possible since the opinion of the Court was really not onerous and asked no more of the Union Government than they were able to accept for twenty years under the Mandates System. Mr. Jooste said he hoped they could consider some such approach.

Mr. Gerig said that the question of open or closed meetings of the Committee would probably arise when the negotiations started. All seemed to agree that although certain meetings should be open for a kind of *pro forma* discussion, it would be impossible to carry on such delicate negotiations in public. While there would probably be no great public interest in some of the questions, others would be discussed in a manner which would tend to get positions fixed in such a way that agreement would be rendered much more difficult. Mr. Hickerson said that Mr. Gerig, as the United States Representative, would try to get the Committee to conduct its meetings in a manner most conducive to successful negotiations. Mr. Raynor also agreed that the meetings should be closed.

Ambassador Jooste ended the conversation by referring to the reply which the Union Government had made on the Indian question in South Africa.[5] He pointed out that the reply, though negative, might have used much more vehement language. It was, however, a restrained reply, and, he thought, indicated that the Union Government was really desirous of getting along with the United Nations so long as its domestic position was not interfered with. Mr. Hickerson said he had noticed this reply and was encouraged to think that the Union was making a real effort to strengthen the United Nations as well as itself. On the big issues, such as Korea, the East–West conflict, etc., we agreed. It was only on certain other minor matters that we had differed and he believed that as soon as these were cleared away the Union Government would be able to play the role in the United Nations for which it was fitted.

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[5] For documentation on this matter, see pp. 842 ff.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 28, 1951.

US/A/AC.49/4

Subject: South West Africa

Participants: Ambassador Jooste, Embassy of the Union of South Africa
Mr. B. J. Jarvie, Embassy of the Union of South Africa
Assistant Secretary Hickerson
Mr. Raynor, BNA
Mr. Gerig, UND

Ambassador Jooste came in today at his request to explain the attitude of the Union Government in regard to the forthcoming negotiations with the United Nations Committee re South West Africa.

Mr. Jooste said that in his recent visit to the Union he had an opportunity to discuss this matter fully with the Prime Minister and others and he was very glad to report that the Union Government had decided not only to negotiate with the UN Committee, but that they would approach the negotiations in an attitude of hopefulness. The Union Government had not taken a "frozen position" on this subject. They were prepared to be reasonable in the negotiations and hoped that the Committee would take an equally reasonable and realistic attitude toward the problem at issue.

Mr. Hickerson said that he was very gratified to hear of this decision by the Union Government in regard to the negotiations. He was particularly pleased that the Ambassador had referred to the attitude of the Union Government as not frozen, but rather that their approach would be an open-minded search for a solution.

Ambassador Jooste then referred to the date for opening the negotiations. June 18 had been mentioned by the Secretariat, but this date might be a little too early to meet the convenience of the Union since the Ambassador was very anxious that Mr. Steyn, one of the legal advisers to the Union Government, should be present to assist him in the negotiations. This was the more important since Mr. Steyn would be returning to the Union before the next Assembly and would be able, therefore, to present a clear picture of the negotiations to the Prime Minister. He hoped that the delay in starting the negotiations would not be more than a week or ten days and he thought that we would be hearing from the Secretariat on this matter in a few days.

The question was then raised as to the nature of the meetings—should they be open or closed. It was agreed by all present that such negotiations could only be conducted in private. Mr. Hickerson sug-

gested that Mr. Gerig should get in touch with the Chairman of the Committee, Prince Wan, to see whether he would not consult with the other members of the Committee in favor of closed meetings. Mr. Gerig thought that the press might make some difficulties and suggested that perhaps the Chairman might be entrusted by the Committee to make brief and general statements in regard to the progress of the negotiations. Mr. Jooste, however, felt that even this might be disadvantageous since an impression might be given out which would require some explanation on his part. It was generally agreed that the negotiations should be conducted in closed meetings, it being understood, of course, that the conclusions and report would be openly discussed by the General Assembly later on.

Ambassador Jooste repeated in closing the conversation that Dr. Malan held very strongly to the opinion that if there was no hope in arriving at an agreement it would be better not to have any negotiations at all. The fact that the Union Government was agreeing to negotiate was evidence that they still entertained hope that the results would be fruitful.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 29, 1951.

US/A/AC.49/5

Subject: South West Africa

Participants: Prince Wan, Ambassador of Thailand
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND

At the suggestion of Assistant Secretary Hickerson I discussed with Prince Wan, Chairman of the United Nations Committee on South West Africa, as to the manner in which the forthcoming negotiations with the representative of the Union of South Africa might be conducted. I said that our feeling in the Department was that these negotiations could best be conducted in private since that would give the conferees greater ease in putting forward suggestions. We felt that since the whole report in any event would be submitted to the General Assembly for public discussion, it would greatly facilitate the negotiating state if conversations could be carried on in an informal manner and without press and public attendance.

Prince Wan said that his own views were identical with ours and that he also believed that such a procedure would commend itself to the other members. He said he was going to New York shortly and would be seeing the other members of the Committee and try to get

them to accept this procedure. I said this would be very satisfactory to us.

Prince Wan felt that perhaps the first meeting on June 18 might be an open meeting in which the representative of the Union and members of the Committee might wish to make some general remarks of a hopeful nature but without going into detail. His thought was that he would then adjourn the meeting and state that the Committee would go into executive session for the purpose of exchanging views on the way in which the negotiations could be carried forward. He believed that there would be no further difficulty and that there would be no need for issuing communiqués and for him, as Chairman, to contact the press. If such need should develop however, he would take it up with the Committee before making any decision.[1]

[1] The *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa held 11 meetings between June 18–July 12. For a summary of the negotiations conducted between South African representatives and the committee during that period, see paragraphs 13–24 of the Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly, dated October 8, 1951, in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 38. For a summary of the position of the Union of South Africa, see paragraph 25 of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's Report. For the text of a "counter-proposal" adopted for submission by the committee to the Union Government, see paragraph 27 of the Report.

Relevant public documentation relating to all subsequent aspects of the South West Africa question in 1951 is in the above-named fascicule, hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Annexes*, agenda item 38.

320/7–1351

Memorandum by Mr. J. R. Fowler of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs to the Director of That Office (Gerig)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1951.

Subject: Possible diplomatic approach to Union of South Africa urging acceptance of *Ad Hoc* Committee draft as basis for negotiation.

Should a decision be made to approach the Union of South Africa directly, either in Washington or Pretoria or both, some of the following points may be useful in urging the Union Government to consider favorably the draft agreement presented to the Union by the Committee:

1. Appropriate reference might be made to the positive attitude of the Union Government in agreeing to meet with the Committee and in taking the initiative in proposing that a new agreement be negotiated clarifying the status of South West Africa.

2. The attitude might be taken that the Committee draft represents not so much a counter-proposal as a development of the original

proposal of the Union for a new agreement, in effect, a spelling-out of the points which might be a part of such an agreement as that proposed by the Union.

3. Reference might be made to the common ground which exists between the Committee and the Union, that this augurs well for the attainment of a satisfactory solution and that, in view of the progress made to date, it would be unfortunate for all concerned if such a solution were not achieved. Existing common ground between the parties at present appears to include the following points: (1) a new agreement concerning the Territory is possible, (2) such an agreement would "clarify" (thus evading the subsidiary issue of "continue" *vs.* "re-establish") the status of the Territory, (3) the status of the Territory would be based upon the essential concepts of the Mandate system, (i.e., recognition of the principles of "non-annexation" and the "sacred trust"), (4) the agreement would re-state the obligations of Articles 2–5 of the Mandate, (5) the non-fortification provision of the Mandate would be replaced by the obligation of the Union to ensure that the Territory plays its part in the maintenance of international peace and security and the right of the Union to establish military installations in the area.

4. It might be pointed out that the United States, for its part, would be prepared to have the agreement entered into between the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Union of South Africa with approval by the UN, if this should be desired by the Union Government and be agreeable to the UK and France.

5. Emphasis should be placed upon the tactical and political advantages which would flow from a satisfactory agreement:

a. The problem of South West Africa is within the competence of the General Assembly and, failing some positive action on this question, it will be a recurrent subject for discussion in the Fourth Committee where the emotional atmosphere of the past may be expected to continue, if not increase, and where failure to achieve a settlement will crystallize present attitudes and result in yearly discussions of South West Africa in a manner sharply critical of the Union Government.

b. Since the problem is and will continue to be before the Assembly in any event, it will be advantageous to remove it from the status of a "special" problem and place it in a more normal context. The position of the Union Government in the UN would be improved and the volume and nature of the criticism *re* South West Africa would be reduced and changed by adoption of an agreement along the present lines. Criticism of members administering dependencies cannot be eliminated, but experience has shown that it can be moderated. Experience has shown that there is a body of moderate opinion in the GA which can be appealed to on such issues as this. The friends of the Union would be in a far better position to assist in obtaining fair consideration of the problems of administration which the Union faces if the status of the Territory and the position of the Union were satisfactorily established.

6. While it is not possible to predict the reception which an agreement along the present lines might have in the GA, the possibility of obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority to confirm will be greatly increased if the Committee and the Union can agree on the general terms of a new agreement. There appears to be no hope of obtaining GA approval for any proposal which the Committee cannot accept and recommend.

7. With respect to the substance of the issues involved, the following points might usefully be made:

a. While it is obvious that the views of the Union and members of the Committee on the ICJ opinion do not coincide, these divergencies in legal opinion do not constitute an insuperable difficulty; such legal issues as whether the mandate has or has not terminated, whether the UN has or has not succeeded—in law—to the functions of the LN, etc., could be left to one side if agreement in principle were reached that the new agreement would, in so far as is possible, re-establish the procedures which obtained under the Mandate.

b. The establishment of machinery as proposed in the Committee draft would result in consideration of South West Africa by bodies whose composition and procedures would be most favorable to the Union. Such features as the unanimity rule, closed meetings, the expert character of the primary consideration given to the administration of the Territory, would serve to protect the interests of the Union.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 16, 1951.

US/A/AC.49/6

Subject: Counter-Proposal of the *Ad Hoc* Committee re South West Africa

Participants: The South African Ambassador the Honorable G. P. Jooste
Mr. W. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyck, First Secretary
Mr. Hickerson, UNA Mr. Allen, EUR[2]
Mr. Gerig, UND Mr. Shullaw, BNA

The South African Ambassador, Mr. Jooste, called on me today at my request to discuss the counter-proposal regarding Southwest Africa which the *Ad Hoc* Committee presented to the South African representatives in New York on July 12. I told the Ambassador that I believed real progress had been made in the negotiations between the

[1] Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

[2] Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant for United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

Committee and the South African representatives. I said that the counter-proposal made by the Committee included the three basic principles which were generally agreed on by the negotiating groups. These principles were:

1. That an agreement be negotiated to regulate the future status of Southwest Africa.
2. That provision might be made for some form of implementation, and
3. That certain modifications might be made in the terms of the present mandate.

The basic difference between the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the Union Government is with regard to the mode of implementation. I said that in actual practice, however, this difference would not be great since even in the absence of an agreement the General Assembly would certainly discuss Southwest Africa. Discussions in UN, in our opinion, would be far less hostile if agreement with the UN were achieved on the basis of the counter-proposal of the Committee. This counter-proposal affords the Union Government safeguards by establishing a commission of experts which would examine annual reports and which might meet in private. Furthermore the proposed small Political Committee would include South Africa and would act on the basis of unanimity.

I told Mr. Jooste that we believed there was a chance of getting the General Assembly to approve an agreement along the lines of the counter-proposal but that anything less, we were firmly convinced, would not get the necessary two-thirds vote. I said that speaking as a friend of South Africa I most earnestly urged that the South African Government accept the counter-proposal in principle with the details to be worked out with the Committee. I said that I believed such action was in the interests of South Africa since a solution of the problem of Southwest Africa would enable South Africa to play the role in UN to which its importance as a nation entitled it.

In replying to my remarks, Ambassador Jooste said that it was not the details but the principles to which his Government would object. He said that he did not believe his Government would accept any agreement which resulted in reports finding their way directly or indirectly to the General Assembly. He remarked that this was a matter not only of Government policy but also of public opinion. In the past discussion of the administration of Southwest Africa had inevitably led to a discussion of the racial policies of South Africa itself, this notwithstanding Article 2(7) of the Charter. In response to a question, Ambassador Jooste stated it would be clearly impossible and undesirable for South Africa to pursue a different racial policy in Southwest Africa than in the metropole because 1) to do so would admit that the latter policy was wrong; 2) in Southwest Africa segregation is

necessary for the protection of the native versus the white man; and 3) geographical contiguity would make it impossible. He remarked that the question of reports had been exaggerated out of all reason and that the *amour propre* of both the UN and South Africa had become involved. He expressed doubt that the Committee would even accept negotiation of an agreement between the remaining Allied and Associated Powers and South Africa. Mr. Gerig remarked at this point that the Committee had not rejected the idea of the agreement being negotiated with the three remaining Allied and Associated Powers with subsequent General Assembly approval. The United States would be quite prepared to join the United Kingdom and France as the contracting powers provided the latter were willing and the General Assembly did not oppose this procedure.

The Ambassador recalled that in the negotiations he had from the beginning attempted to keep the position fluid. He said that Mr. Steyn, who has now returned to South Africa, will endeavor to persuade the South African Government to delay its reply to the Committee's counter-proposal for a month or even two months and not to reject it immediately as they would probably be inclined to do.

In the general discussion which followed the Ambassador's remarks, the point was repeatedly stressed that Southwest Africa would continue to be discussed in UN regardless of whether or not agreement were reached with the negotiating Committee. Acceptance of the counter-proposal would place South Africa in a stronger position and would lessen the acrimonious character of the discussions, since such discussions in the General Assembly would then be within the framework of South Africa's own report as transmitted by the Committee of which South Africa is a member. Moreover, we felt that with the problem of the agreement removed from the political arena, the other question of the treatment of Indians would assume less importance and arouse much less controversy and interest. Furthermore the safeguards provided in the counter-proposal for South Africa did protect South African interests.

The Ambassador said that while the individual members of the Committee had been friendly and even sympathetic, they had in some instances been the spokesmen for UN blocs and their freedom of action had been inhibited by that fact. He mentioned as an example the position of the Syrian representative on the Committee. He admitted, however, that to date the negotiations had accomplished one thing at least. They have demonstrated to the South African Government that it is possible for South Africa to discuss this problem with a cross section of the UN without coming to blows. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the helpful attitude of the United States on the Committee and for the time we had given him and said that he would communicate over [*our?*] views to his government.

320/7–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 17, 1951—6 p. m.

13. Negots between GA *Ad Hoc* Comite SW Afr and Union have reached point where Dept considers approach thru dipl channels may be useful. Accordingly Dept called in Jooste yesterday urge acceptance in principle by Union new draft agreement (text by air pouch) along lines submitted by Comite using arguments outlined below. You shld take same line, in your discretion and as opportunity affords, with officials FonOff.

US strongly hopes Union will agree accept Comite draft in principle since

a. Comite proposal includes three basic principles agreed to by Union rep and Comite; i.e., (1) new agreement regulating future status terr be negotiated, (2) provision cld be made for implementation, (3) certain modifications re mil and security provisions be made in terms mandate.

b. US confident GA will continue discuss SW Afr any event, hence little practical gain to Union in restricting implementation to ICJ thru judicial supervision as Union proposes rather than accepting Comite proposals for implementation thru UN paralleling LN procedures far as possible. Latter arrangement wld result in far less hostile, acrimonious GA discussion, thus favoring Union and indirectly other free nations friends of Union. Successful negot agreement will remove question SW Afr from category "special" UN problem attracting undue attention, lead to consideration more normal atmosphere.

c. Union interest adequately safeguarded under proposed procedures since reports wld be examined by expert Comm which cld meet privately and which wld report to small polit comite, including Union, resembling League Council and operating basis unanimity. Such procedure wld place ultimate report to GA under control since wld have to be unanimously approved by 15 members GA.

d. US given careful study to proposal of Comite and considers that, while GA approval agreement on present lines possible, any proposal containing less than principles set forth present draft wld fail to obtain required two-thirds majority in GA.

As to parties to such agreement, US wld be willing as one of remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be one of contracting parties, if GA approved, and if UK and France agreed, and if such arrangement were still desired by Union as proposed by Union rep when putting forward Union proposal.

In view above considerations and after careful study question, U.S. strongly urges acceptance points in Comite draft as best means liquidating question and removing cause for attacks in UN on important member free community of nations.

FYI Jooste said Govt acceptance difficult in view present state public opinion and accordingly he and Dr. Steyn recommending delay of

month or six weeks for further reflection. Dept gained impression counter proposal wld not be rejected *in toto*. Believes suggestion for delay in reply may be useful. Jooste feels fact negots with Comite representing cross section UN held in such cooperative and friendly atmosphere represents significant progress and will help show his Govt it possible deal amicably with UN on vital matters.

ACHESON

320/8–351 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Union of South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRETORIA, August 3, 1951—5 p. m.

38. Union unlikely accept UN counterproposal on South West Africa Secy FonOff Forsyth [1] said privately Aug 1 during our discussion based on Deptel 13, July 17 and Depgam 4, July 18.[2] He stated officially Cabinet now considering matter and thought its decision wld be taken in about two weeks.

Forsyth expressed his appreciation of *ad hoc* comite's efforts, their proposal showing they had given careful and sympathetic consideration to problem and Unions view. But comite proposal still required submission reports petitions to UN body reporting to GA, and he did not see how Cabinet cld agree to this in view Prime Minister's several public statements Union wld not submit reports to any UN body and low esteem in which Cabinet regard UN. To comment that if problem not settled and taken out of lime-light South Africa wld continue be subject charges and adverse criticism in UN he replied he thought present govt did not particularly care if this happened. He agree proposal took case out of Comite 4 and acknowledged unanimity requirement protection for Union but remarked countries like India, Arabs States, Mexico, etc., which were Union's severest and loudest critics altho they had no direct interest in or knowledge of colonial problems wld still be able make accusations when 15 nation comite reports to GA. Attitude these countries long been sore point with Union.

In addition UN connection, another unacceptable point in comite proposal Forsyth mentioned was obligation enfranchise natives (presumably para 6 draft) even tho such a stand wld be very long way off. This he said wld be polit impossible for any South African Govt in view public opinion as wld lead to end white supremacy. (We feel he is correct on this point).

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[1] D. D. Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs (Prime Minister D. F. Malan was Minister of External Affairs).

[2] Not printed.

Asked about Union's attitude if body to which reports were submitted was composed of countries having overseas possessions and thus familiar with problem and nominated by, for example, ICJ, he replied that in that event he did not foresee great difficulty in a satisfactory agreement being reached.

From Forsyth's remarks we conclude (1) Union wants settle SWA case but (2) almost no chance it will accept any agreement giving GA final say in matter.

CONNELLY

320/8–1151 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Union of South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRETORIA, August 11, 1951—11 a. m.

46. Cabinet has made decision on South West Africa (reEmbtel 38 August 3) FonOff Secy Forsyth told one of my colleagues several days ago. Reply to *ad hoc* comite's July 11 ltr to Jooste now being drafted will:

(1) Reiterate Union's willingness enter agreement with US, UK and France as remaining principal allied and associated powers.
(2) Be based on provisions League Nations mandate.
(3) Provide for any two of three powers to take a disputed point to ICJ.

Forsyth reported as saying while report's petitions will not be submitted to any UN body Union reply will still "leave door open" for further negotiations. Copies Union reply will be given US, UK, France for info.

While above comes second-hand we have no reason doubt it represents present position. Will check with Forsyth earliest opportunity.

CONNELLY

320/8–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 20, 1951—3 p. m.

43. Dept believes procedures suggested para four Embtel 38 Aug 3, wld not be acceptable necessary majority members UN who wld regard nomination of body, which presumably comparable Comite rather than Comm in *Ad Hoc* Comite draft, as irregular and impracticable. Unlikely that non-administering members who constitute large majority UN wld agree to complete exclusion from body. Moreover, inclusion non-administering members probably advantageous since wld obviate adverse criticism which wld certainly arise in GA if reports approved

by body composed entirely administering countries. Furthermore US position based on respect for ICJ advisory opinion and Dept doubtful suggested procedure consistent with this position. Therefore, substance para four shld not be put forward as US suggestion nor shld SA be encouraged advance such suggestion. Dept believes no deviation from Comite proposal shld be put forward at this time in order avoid possible misunderstanding between Union and Comite.

ACHESON

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations [1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1951.

SD/A/C.4/89

THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position which the United States Delegation should take with regard to the question of South West Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Delegation should favor continued efforts to achieve agreement, consistent with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, with the Union of South Africa on the future status of the territory of South West Africa.

2. The Delegation should support the position of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa as outlined in its report to the Assembly and any action by the Assembly urging the Union to reconsider its stand and accept the Committee's offer of further consultations on the basis of the Committee's draft agreement.

3. If there appears to be any possibility of further consultations with the Union along the lines proposed by the Committee, the United States should endeavor to discourage any action by the Assembly which might prejudice such consultations.

4. If the Union maintains its stand that the Committee's proposal is unacceptable to it as a basis for further consultations, the Delegation should attempt to moderate any unduly critical or condemnatory action by the Assembly but should support any reasonably moderate action such as (*a*) urging the Union to implement the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, (*b*) recommending resump-

[1] The General Assembly was to convene in Paris on November 6. For information regarding the composition and organization of the U.S. Delegation, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.

tion of reporting by the Union on South West Africa or (*c*) recommending acceptance by the Union of the Committee's draft agreement.

5. The Delegation may indicate its willingness to examine any further suggestions as to procedures for implementing the Court's opinion. However, it should not indicate support for any procedure which would wholly divorce the General Assembly from the supervisory machinery.

6. If the question is raised as to whether the United States, as one of the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers, would be willing to be one of the contracting parties to an agreement with the Union the Delegation should indicate that the United States would be willing to do so if the United Kingdom and France agreed and if the agreement is approved by the General Assembly.

7. With regard to the petitions attached to the report of the Committee on South West Africa the Delegation should take the position that as they have been forwarded to the Union Government in conformity with the procedures of the former Mandates System it would be preferable that no action be taken pending receipt of comments from the Union Government during the six months period allowed for the transmission of such comments.

COMMENT

The question of South West Africa is on the Assembly's agenda by virtue of General Assembly Resolution 449 A (V), of which the United States was one of the co-sponsors. Paragraph 3 of the operative part of this resolution "establishes a Committee of five consisting of representatives of Denmark, Syria, Thailand, United States of America and Uruguay, to confer with the Union of South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and to submit a report thereon to the next regular session of the General Assembly". Paragraph 4 "authorizes the Committee, as an interim measure, pending the completion of its task referred to in paragraph 3, and, as far as possible in accordance with the procedure of the former Mandates System, to examine the report on the administration of the Territory of South West Africa covering the period since the last report, as well as petitions and any other material relating to the Territory that may be transmitted to the Secretary-General, and to submit a report thereon to the next regular session of the General Assembly."

With regard to paragraph 3, the report of the Committee recounts the activities of the Committee, including the proposal made to it by the Union of South Africa, the counter-proposal made to the Union by the Committee (in the form of a draft agreement for South West Africa), and notes the unwillingness of the Union to accept the Com-

mittee's counter-proposal as a basis for further consultations. The Committee, while thus having reached an impasse at the time of the adoption of its report, continued to hold the door open for further consultations on the basis of its own counter-proposal.[2]

The United States played an active role in the work of the Committee and considers that the Committee made a careful and commendable effort to achieve agreement with the Union. We regret that the Union has been unable to accept as a basis for discussion the draft agreement submitted to it by the Committee. We consider this draft agreement fair and reasonable; furthermore, it is doubtful if any proposal containing less than the principle set forth therein could be considered to be in conformity with the Court's opinion or would be approved by the General Assembly. We hope, therefore, that the Union will reconsider its stand and accept the Committee's offer of further consultations on the basis of the substance of the Committee's proposal.

While there are difficulties inherent in further delays on this question, the United States considers that it would be advantageous for the Committee to continue consultations with the Union if the latter shows any willingness to consult further on the basis of the substance of the Committee's counter-proposal. However, should the Union maintain its position that it can not accept the Committee's counter-proposal as a basis for discussion, it is difficult to see any useful purpose that could be served by endeavoring to continue consultations. In the face of such an attitude on the part of the Union, the United States, in order to maintain a consistent position, would be obliged to support action by the Assembly urging the Union to implement the Court's opinion and while the Delegation should endeavor to avoid condemnatory action by the Assembly, it could scarcely oppose a resolution which contained certain critical implications.

With regard to paragraph 4 of Resolution 449 A (V) the report of the Committee states that the Committee was unable to comply with the General Assembly's instructions because no reports were submitted. So far as the examination of petitions is concerned the Committee reports that it considered two communications addressed to the Secretary General on the question of South West Africa, accepted them as petitions and, in accordance with the procedures of the former Mandates System, transmitted them to the Union Government for comment. Copies of the petitions are attached to the Committee's report. It would not seem appropriate, therefore, to take any further action on these petitions, both of which were addressed to the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, pending the receipt of comments thereon by the Union Government during the six months period allowed for the transmission of such comments under the procedures of the former Mandates System. Should new petitions be

[2] Regarding the work of the committee and its report, see footnote 1, p. 682.

brought up for consideration in the Fourth Committee, they would have to be judged on their merits and the Delegation would consult the Department as necessary.

In connection with the examination of any further suggestions as to procedures for implementing the Court's opinion, the United States could not support procedures which would wholly divorce the General Assembly from the supervisory machinery because such procedures would not be in conformity with the advisory opinion of the Court. The Court arrived at the conclusion "that the General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified to exercise the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with regard to the administration of the Territory, and that the Union of South Africa is under an obligation to submit to supervision and control of the General Assembly and to render annual reports to it".

The Union, in its proposal to the Committee, suggested that it might make an agreement with the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (i.e., United Kingdom, France and United States) establishing its responsibility toward South West Africa. The representative of the United States on the Committee was authorized to state that the United States was willing to be one of the contracting parties to an agreement such as that proposed by the Committee if the United Kingdom and France agreed and if it was approved by the General Assembly. There appears to be no reason why this position should be altered.

320/10–1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1951.

Subject: General Assembly Questions

Participants: Ambassador Jooste, Embassy of the Union of South Africa
Mr. M. I. Botha, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Union of South Africa
Mr. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, UND
Mr. Taylor, UNP [1]

[Here follows discussion of certain questions to come before the General Assembly.]

South West Africa

Ambassador Jooste said that in the last communication of the Union Representative to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa the

[1] Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

Union Government had indicated that it was prepared to continue the discussions on the basis of the proposal which it had made to the *Ad Hoc* Committee. He reiterated the South African position that it could not submit reports on the administration of the territory. He then said that the Committee had rejected the South African proposal on the basis that it did not fall within the Committee's terms of reference and indicated that South Africa would look with favor upon the re-establishment of the Committee or a similar committee with broader terms of reference which would permit it to consider the South African proposal. Mr. Hickerson expressed doubt that such a course was feasible. Ambassador Jooste said that he hoped that the General Assembly would not take the position that the counter proposal of the *Ad Hoc* Committee constituted the only basis for a future agreement between the United Nations and the Union with respect to this question. He added that he hoped that the General Assembly would appreciate, as he was certain that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had, that South Africa in its negotiations with the Committee had made an honest and sincere effort to arrive at an agreement on this complicated question.

[Here follows discussion of other General Assembly questions.]

320/11–1651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 16, 1951—6 : 43 p. m.

Gadel[2] 175. Re question South West Africa Dept has reached fol conclusions on procedural aspects, particularly pros and cons continuation *Ad Hoc* Cmte (ref London despatch 1826 October 18, 1951) :[3]

1. If Union South Africa replies to Cmte accepting offer continue consultations on basis of "substance of Cmtes counter-proposal" Del shld work actively to have Cmte continued or reconstituted for this purpose.

2. If Union indicates general willingness continue consultations, without specifying its proposal or Cmte's counter-proposal as basis, Dept believes Del shld support continuation or reconstitution of Cmte, provided Del convinced such action represents an encouraging substantive change of position on part of Union.

3. If in reply to Cmte Union repeats statement of willingness continue consultations on basis Union's proposals, Dept sees no usefulness in continuation Cmte these circumstances. In this case Del shld not vote for continuation or reconstitution Cmte unless majority of Fourth Cmte favors this course.

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[1] Repeated for information to London as 2554 and Pretoria as 111.

[2] The Gadel series was directed to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, in Paris, November 6, 1951–February 5, 1952.

[3] Not printed.

4. If Union makes no reply to Cmte, Dept considers Del shld support continuation or reconstitution of Cmte only if majority support appears likely.

With regard question re-establishing Cmte with broader terms ref which wld enable it consider Union proposal, possibility raised by Jooste with Hickerson (see memo conversation October 18, 1951), Dept sees no reason alter view expressed by Hickerson that such course of doubtful feasibility and believes Del shld not favor unless likely receive majority support in Fourth Cmte.

WEBB

320/11–2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman)[1] *to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, November 20, 1951—5 p. m.

141. Members my staff and I had occasion at luncheon today to talk with number Cabinet Mins about developments at GA.

I spoke in turn with Havenga,[2] Sauer [3] and Naude.[4] All three said that action of Trusteeship Comite in agreeing receive Herero petitions on So West Afr came as complete surprise to govt.[5] All three expressed concern about action. Havenga stressed particularly that govt was unprepared for this and characterized situation as "very serious." I found that he was not inclined to say more. Sauer emphasized that So African Govt was trying very hard to coop with West. Actions, such as taken by Trusteeship Comite, however, aroused public opinion very much. That made govts position very difficult. Govt now was faced among other things with difficult problem placating public opinion. Naude said he felt govt shld avoid any extreme action at this time so as not to call any more attn to the Trusteeship Comite action than absolutely necessary.

Host at luncheon was Malga, political correspondent of *Die Burger*, who returned only last week from three months visit to States. Malga is close personal friend of Prime Min and is generally very well informed. Malga expressed opinion to me that while govt was "very resentful" of action taken by Trusteeship Comite he did not think so extreme a step as withdrawal from UNO was now contemplated.

Robert Jones, counselor in charge FonOff polit section, told Connelly and Robertson [6] yesterday Comite 4 action outside its compe-

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[1] Gallman's appointment as Ambassador was effective August 22.
[2] N. C. Havenga, Minister of Finance.
[3] P. O. Sauer, Minister of Transport.
[4] J. F. T. Naude, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.
[5] See editorial note, p. 699.
[6] David A. Robertson, First Secretary of Embassy.

tence and cld only be dealt with by GA. He said if GA approves this resolution wld establish dangerous precedent. Here he cited a similar possible GA irresponsible action resolution demanding withdrawal Brit troops from Suez.

Sole [7] FonOff UN expert emphasized to us no legal basis for Comite 4 action since GA not Comite 4 set up *ad hoc* comite which was instructed operate along League mandate comite procedure requiring petitions be submitted through administrating power for later transmittal with its comments to mandate comite. Hence matter is properly one only GA can consider, not Comite 4.

Webber, editor govt mouthpiece *Die Burger* told Sweeney [8] govt took a serious view of US abstention.[9] He claimed Cabinet considered ordering Donges [10] to leave Comite and return to Union, but did not consider leaving UN.[11] Cabinet, according to Webber felt that it had been unwise in committing Union wholeheartedly to West defense effort because US now thought it can count on Union and cld afford placate other powers. Webber believes solution SWA problem is outright incorporation of territory into Union.

Sent Dept 141, rptd Paris (for USDel).

GALLMAN

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[7] D. B. Sole.

[8] Joseph H. Sweeney, Attaché of Embassy in the Union of South Africa.

[9] Regarding the U.S. abstention, see editorial note, p. 699.

[10] Dr. T. E. Donges, South African Delegate in the Fourth Committee, was also Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of South Africa to the General Assembly. He was Minister of Interior in the Union Government.

[11] In a letter of November 24 to Luis Padilla Nervo, President of the General Assembly, Donges set forth at some length the reasons for South African opposition to the Fourth Committee's action of November 16, and why the Union Government considered that action illegal. The letter concluded with a notification of South Africa's temporary withdrawal from the Fourth Committee and a request for a "review of the constitutionality of the resolution in question by the General Assembly." (GA (VI), *Annexes*, agenda item 38) Padilla Nervo in replying in a letter of November 29 said he could "find no valid basis for following the course of action you propose." (*Ibid.*)

IO Files

United States Delegation Working Paper: Draft Resolution on South West Africa

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] December 1, 1951.

US/A/C.4/212

The General Assembly,

Believing that an agreed solution of the vexed question of South West Africa would not only bring greater peace and harmony to the Continent of Africa, but would contribute significantly to the relieving of tensions in wider areas of the world;

2. *Considering* that the general acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950 would greatly strengthen the rule of law and reason in international affairs and thus the defenses of the United Nations;

3. *Having* by resolution 449 (V) of 13 December 1950 accepted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice with respect to South West Africa;

4. *Having* established a Committee of five consisting of the representatives of Denmark, Syria, Thailand, the United States of America and Uruguay to confer with the Union of South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice;

5. *Having* authorized this Committee, as an interim measure, to examine the report on the administration of the Territory of South West Africa covering the period since the last report, as well as petitions and any other matters relating to the Territory that may be transmitted to the Secretary-General;

6. *Having* received the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa (A/1901, A/1901/Add.1, A/1901/Add.2, A/1901/Add.3);

7. *Noting* that the Union of South Africa submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa a proposal which the *Ad Hoc* Committee found unacceptable because it did not allow for an adequate implementation of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and because the proposal made no provision for the supervision of the administration of the Territory of South West Africa by the United Nations;

8. *Noting* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted to the Union of South Africa a counter-proposal based on the existing Mandates Agreement and providing for a procedure for the supervision of the administration of the Territory of South West Africa by the United Nations as nearly as possible analogous to that which existed under the League of Nations, and to the extent practicable, involving international obligations no more extensive or onerous than those existing under the League of Nations;

9. *Noting* that the Union of South Africa, in reply to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's counter-proposal, was willing to resume negotiations only on the basis of its own proposal, and informed the Committee that the Union of South Africa was unable to accept the principle of submission of reports on the administration of the Territory;

10. *Noting* with concern that the *Ad Hoc* Committee was unable to comply with the resolution of the General Assembly to examine the report on the administration of the Territory of South West Africa because no report was received and that no petitions were transmitted by the Union of South Africa;

11. *Recalling* that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice with respect to the Territory of South West Africa sets forth, *inter alia*, that

(*a*) The Territory of South West Africa is a territory under the international Mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa on 17 December 1920;

(*b*) the Union of South Africa, acting alone, has not the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa, and that the competence to determine and modify the international status of the Territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations;

(*c*) the Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate for South West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions are to be submitted;

12. *Commends* the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa for its earnest and constructive efforts to find a reasonable basis of agreement;

13. *Endorses*, in principle, as a minimum, the proposal of the Committee, appended hereto;

14. *Deplores* the fact that the Union of South Africa, in the course of the negotiations with the Committee, while prepared to negotiate on the basis of certain articles of the Mandate, indicated its unwillingness to give adequate expression to its international obligations with respect to South West Africa, and in particular with regard to the supervisory responsibility of the United Nations toward this Territory;

15. *Declares* that since the Union Government cannot escape its international obligations by unilateral action, the United Nations cannot recognise as valid any measures taken unilaterally by the Union of South Africa, which would modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa;

16. *Appeals* solemnly to the Government of the Union of South Africa to reconsider its position, and urges it to resume negotiations on the basis of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's proposal for the purpose of concluding an agreement providing for the full implementation of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; and urges it further to submit reports on the administration of the Territory of South West Africa and to transmit petitions from communities or sections of the population of the Territory to the United Nations;

17. *Continues* until the next regular session of the General Assembly the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, established by resolution 449 (V), and requests it to continue to confer with the Union of

South Africa concerning means of implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice;

18. *Authorizes* the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, as an interim measure, and pending the completion of the negotiations with the Union of South Africa, and as far as possible in accordance with the procedure of the former Mandates System, to examine reports on the administration of the Territory of South West Africa as well as petitions and any other matters relating to the Territory that may be transmitted to the Secretary-General;

19. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit a report on its activities to the next regular session of the General Assembly.

Editorial Note

On November 16 an event had occurred in the Fourth Committee with important consequences for the ongoing debate on the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The Fourth Committee voted favorably on a nine-power (Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines) joint draft resolution which provided that the Committee would hear petitioners from the Herero and Nama peoples of South West Africa in the person of certain named chiefs or headmen and/or other spokesmen designated by them (UN Doc. A/C.4/L.136; for text, see UN Doc. A/C.4/190 which has the same text, GA (VI), *Annexes*, agenda item 38). The joint draft resolution was adopted by 37 votes to 7, with 7 abstentions. The United States abstained from voting.

The United States Delegate, Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, made a statement to the Committee just before the vote. He said that "largely for the reasons put forward by the Danish representative" and partly because the *Ad Hoc* Committee of which the United States was a member had already expressed its view on the question, the United States Delegation would abstain. The Danish Delegate, Mr. Lannung, in an earlier statement had emphasized that he did not believe that the Fourth Committee was entitled to grant hearings in this case without the consent of South Africa. (GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, page 19)

This was the basis of the position set forth by Dr. Donges, the Delegate of South Africa, in a strong statement which drew a distinction between the Committee's powers with regard to trusteeship territories vis-à-vis Non-self-governing Territories outside the United Nations trusteeship system. "The United Nations Charter contained no provision for the hearing of oral petitions from non-self-governing terri-

tories." At the conclusion of his statement, Dr. Donges cautioned the Committee:

"The Committee would make its own decision; all he could do was to draw its attention to the implications involved in accepting the draft resolution. He had done so to the best of his ability and, whatever the outcome, the responsibility would rest on the shoulders of the Committee." (GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, page 18)

IO Files

Minutes of Twenty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 4, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/212

[Here follows list of persons (37) present. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the chair.]

1. *South West Africa.* Mr. Gerig recalled that this question had been before the UN for several years. The territory of South West Africa was the last of the League mandates not turned into a trust territory or given its independence or otherwise provided for under the UN. Pointing out that the territory of South West Africa was about the size of Pennsylvania, populated principally by Hereros, Mr. Gerig noted that some 600 miles of border contiguous with the Union of South Africa served to complicate the situation. The territory had been mandated under the League of Nations since 1920 to the Union Government, which had rendered annual reports on it to the League and allowed written petitions to be accepted and examined. When the League came to an end, the Union took the position that it was no longer bound by the mandate. In fact, the Union Government had been taking steps to incorporate this territory into its own. An opposite view had been taken by the vast majority of states, who believed that the elements of international status still clung to the territory, and regarded the incorporation of the territory into the Union as an improper procedure. This latter position had been considerably strengthened when the Malan government came into power in South Africa and promulgated the Group Areas Act—legislation which enforced a policy of apartheid, or racial segregation, of an extreme nature. Parenthetically, Mr. Gerig noted that it was at this point that the question of South West Africa touched upon the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa.

The question of whether the mandate of the League carried over had been submitted to the International Court of Justice, for an Advisory Opinion. The Court stated that the mandate did continue in force and that the Union Government could not unilaterally act to

end the mandatory status of the territory, without the consent of the UN. The advisory opinion stated further that the Union Government was obliged to render reports to the UN on conditions in South West Africa and to transmit petitions. In response to this advisory opinion the Union Government said that it would continue to govern the territory in the spirit of the mandate in the policies it pursued but refused at the same time to recognize that the mandate continued in force.

Mr. Gerig remarked that the US had submitted its views on this question to the Court when it was considering the case. As the advisory opinion followed so closely the views expressed in the US submission, there was an added reason for the US to take all possible steps to seek the acceptance of and compliance with the opinion. In this connection he said that the Advisory Opinion had expressed the idea that the UN should not impose upon the Union Government undertakings which were more onerous than those required by the League Mandate. As examples of League conditions which do not exist under the UN, Mr. Gerig mentioned the requirement of unanimity and secrecy which attached to the mandate procedure.

When the question was discussed at the 5th GA, the US felt that in order to implement the Advisory Opinion, and to gain the assent of the Union Government, it would not be wise to have the General Assembly dictate the terms of settlement. We had previously indicated our preference for taking representatives of the Union Government into the negotiations on this question, and so had urged the creation at the 5th General Assembly of a Committee of Five to meet in New York and seek an agreed settlement. During the course of these committee meetings, the Union Government indicated its willingness to make an agreement with the US, the UK and France as the remaining Principal Allied Powers of World War I with whom they could deal on this matter, Japan and Italy having since been deprived of their role in this connection. To these three powers the Union Government would be willing to submit reports on the conditions prevailing in the territory and their conduct of the administration of South West Africa. They refused to submit this information to the UN as a whole. If there were any charges of non-compliance with the terms of the agreement they could be presented to the Court.

Mr. Gerig commented that the representatives of the Union Government had indicated privately that annual UN debates on the policies of the Union Government in the territory would make the domestic political situation unbearable. The Committee of Five felt that the Union Government's position was too far removed from the Advisory Opinion of the Court and therefore had made proposals to the Union to bring them nearer to that position. These proposals were rejected by the Union Government.

This had been the situation when the Sixth Session of the Assembly convened in Paris. Since then Committee 4 had taken action which Mr. Gerig felt to be a bit impetuous, by inviting the Herero chieftains to come and present their case to the Committee. This he felt exceeded the policies of the League under the mandate. The Union Government in response to this action by the Committee had sent a letter to the President of the Assembly, of which we had only unofficial cognizance which stated that the Union Government was compelled by this action to instruct its delegates to withdraw from further participation in Committee 4 on this matter. When this became generally known in Committee 4, Mr. Gerig predicted further violent reaction.[1]

The position paper prepared by the Department, document SD/A/C.4/89,[2] indicated that the US Delegation should continue to support the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. In accordance with this paper, Mr. Gerig and Ambassador Sayre had been informally in touch with Prince Wan of Thailand, Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, and with a number of others, regarding a draft resolution which they termed the "grand appeal". This draft resolution was before the Delegation in document US/A/C.4/212.[3] In the words of the draft resolution itself, this was to be a "solemn appeal" to the Union Government to reconsider its position, and to resume negotiations through the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Five with a view to reaching agreement on the basis of the Court Opinion. In the course of formulating this draft, there had been evidence of support for this approach on a very broad basis. In addition to requesting the Delegation's approval of this draft resolution, Mr. Gerig and the staff wished to raise the question of sponsorship. Pointing out that there was nothing contained in Gadel 175 on this question, he believed that unfortunate results would flow from absence of US sponsorship.

Ambassador Sayre added to this presentation what he considered to be the important points requiring Delegation decision. First, there was a problem of the tone of the resolution. This was connected with the substance of the resolution itself. There were many "firebrands" in Committee 4 who were pressing for strong condemnatory action by the Committee. This draft, negotiated with Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Denmark, Iraq, Thailand and others, was intended to keep the door open to the possibility of furthering negotiations, as a way of implementing the Advisory Opinion of the Court. It would constitute one further appeal. The second problem involved sponsorhip. Recognizing the fact that US sponsorship of this resolution might incur the ill-will of the Union Government, he nevertheless felt it absolutely necessary in order to avoid loss of a restraining influence over poten-

[1] Regarding the Donges–Padilla Nervo exchange of November 24 and November 29, see footnote 11, p. 696.
[2] Dated October 11, p. 690.
[3] Dated December 1, p. 696.

tial "firebrands" in Committee 4 who would push for a strong condemnatory resolution. Mrs. Roosevelt asked what the precise purpose of the resolution was. Ambassador Sayre said that this resolution contemplated keeping the door open with the hope that there might be a change in attitude on the part of the Union Government.

Dr. Tobias [4] asked the indulgence of the Delegation while he expressed himself on the general nature of the problem. In detailing his connections with this matter he pointed out that he was the director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a philanthropic foundation, which had established the Institute of Race Relations in the Union of South Africa. This Institute was predominantly a church organization, and as such was only a part of the church movement in South Africa. The leaders of the Dutch Reform Church in South Africa, he recalled, were behind the Malan government. But this group at the Institute had been responsible for a pamphlet being written by Alan Paton, author of *Cry, the Beloved Country*, which contained a sober analysis of problems within the Union. He felt that the US ought to be extremely careful in its approach to this subject. In this connection he felt that the position paper of the Department had been "oversoft" in its wish to "moderate any unduly critical or condemnatory action by the assembly." He pointed out that this was not a question of how the Union Government handled its internal affairs. Were it such a question, the US and the UN would be "estopped" from investigating therein. He recalled that in Committee 4 a speaker had raised the question of the competence of the Committee to inquire into matters within non-self-governing territories, especially as to their capacity for statehood, or independence. Although he abhorred the internal policies of the Union Government, Dr. Tobias firmly supported the doctrine that the UN could not penetrate the barrier of domestic affairs. This was not the question in the case of South West Africa. It was a matter of international concern, recognized as such by the ICJ. The US could not afford to lean so far backward in a conciliatory attitude toward South Africa that its position would raise questions at home as to the consistency of our statements and actions. The people who firmly believe in freedom, as evidenced by the bloody struggle during the Civil War, would not be content with such a soft position, even given the necessary limitations of conducting international affairs. The US need not go out of its way to conciliate. Whereas the UK had a vested interest in South Africa, the US was not burdened with such interests. The US must live up to its traditions, and not succumb to the deplorable traditions of others.

Ambassador Sayre said that he felt very deeply the righteousness of Dr. Tobias' position. If anything could be done to stop South Africa from its present course, that should be done. He did not feel, however,

[4] Channing H. Tobias, member of the U.S. Delegation.

that the draft resolution was being soft upon them. He indicated that the language in paragraphs 14, 15, *et alia*, was exceedingly strong in its approach. Dr. Tobias answered that he was not questioning the draft resolution, which he supported, but only the language in the position paper itself. Mrs. Roosevelt felt that the draft resolution was the only possible course. She personally felt the Union Government was courting disaster just as fast as could be done. She added the hope that when any US Delegate or staff member spoke to the South Africans they would make clear that the US was not being soft toward them. Dr. Tobias remarked that the only way people within the Union could ever achieve a change in policies was to have every possible support from without. Mr. Gerig remarked that high level conversations with the South Africans had been held in Washington, during which the disapproval of the US with the policies of the Union Government had been made very clear.

Mr. Vorys [5] questioned the listing in the position paper of various courses of action vis-à-vis the Union Government in the alternatives. He felt they should all be pursued. Mr. Gerig indicated that the draft resolution was doing exactly what had been suggested by Mr. Vorys. Ambassador Gross [6] was concerned with the use of two qualifying adjectives—"general" and "greatly"—in the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution. It seemed to him that they unnecessarily weakened the effect and could well be redrafted to indicate our actual intentions. Mr. Gerig said that these words had not been intended to limit the effect in the way Ambassador Gross indicated, and could easily be changed. On the question of sponsoring, Mr. Gerig indicated the possibility that Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, and Thailand would join the US if the Delegation authorized the US to seek such action.

Mr. Cohen [7] thought that the emphasis on non-condemnatory language in the position paper blurred and weakened the US position. He did not object to the draft resolution, the language of which he felt to be quite satisfactory, but only the attitude of the Department which showed a tendency to weaken the position of the US in matters of this kind. Mr. Sandifer [8] commented that this resolution was as mild as an "electric sledge hammer", considering the history of the GA approach to this case. It was, he said, a very firm, even severe, resolution.

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[5] John M. Vorys (R–Ohio), member of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly.

[6] Ernest A. Gross, Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations; member of the U.S. Delegation.

[7] Benjamin V. Cohen, member of the U.S. Delegation.

[8] Durwood V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs; one of two Senior Advisers to the U.S. Delegation.

Mrs. Roosevelt took it that the position of the Delegation was that there was no objection to the draft resolution or to the US seeking to co-sponsor it. The only objection was the the language contained in the position paper of the Department, which was too mild.[9]

[Here follows brief discussion of another matter.]

CHARLES D. COOK

[9] In Paris telegram Delga 494, December 4, 1 p.m., the Delegation transmitted the text of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution (paragraphs 12–19) to the Department. The Department of State was informed that it was the "unanimous" feeling of the Delegation that the United States should agree to cosponsor such a resolution "now being drawn up by dels of Thailand, Denmark, Iraq, Egypt, Cuba, Ecuador and others . . . since such wide co-sponsorship will apparently secure near unanimous support of resolution in committee. Unless Dept instructs otherwise, del [will] follow this course." (320/12–451)

350/12–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, December 6, 1951—5 p. m.

155. I called on Secy for External Affairs Forsyth this morning for purpose of introducing Robertson.[1] After a brief exchange of pleasantries. Forsyth embarked on discussion of UN SWA issue and the "Illegality", in the absence of any authority provision in the Charter, of the Trusteeship Comite action in inviting Scott [2] to appear before it. In response to my observation concerning difficulty of getting Cabinet consideration on important developments, with Prime Min already in Capetown and other Cabinet members preparing to leave, he stated categorically that Cabinet had met some days ago and made full decision on its position if Trusteeship Comite "Carried the matter too far." He stated that Union was more determined than ever to face this issue squarely and gave as reasons:

1. Illegality, in absence of Charter provision, of Trusteeship Comite's action to invite Scott and Herero chiefs to appear for a hearing.
2. Act [*Fact?*] Herero tribe in SWA represent only limited minority of natives in territory while endeavoring to exercise claim over large part of territory.

At this point discussion was interrupted by telephone call from Prime Min in Capetown and we excused ourselves from his office. Upon our return Forsyth, intimating that subj of discussion had been UN

[1] David A. Robertson, First Secretary of Embassy, was appointed on October 24, 1951.

[2] Regarding the Reverend Mr. Michael Scott, see footnote 5, p. 676.

SWA issue, stated firmly Union wld not only refrain from participation in Trusteeship Comite while issue being considered but that, if Comite action pushed "too far," decision concerning Union withdrawal from entire UN might become imminent. I interjected that this wld be not only most unfortunate for Union, but also for all of us who were joined in common cause. He proceeded to reiterate that treatment being accorded Union "Completely illegal under Charter" and was almost unbearable to his govt, particularly coming on top of UN action on Indian issue, a "domestic issue." [3]

Forsyth stated that as an internationalist he was being placed in most difficult position in a govt which came to power as strong nationalist group, but which fortunately had wisdom at least to try out participating in intl cooperation on probs confronting us all today. Many of Union nationalist leaders were now pointing to error of this course, were thoroughly dissatisfied and now seemed determined to call a halt in face of mounting "mistreatment" from UN Trusteeship Comite. His people were beginning to feel that Union is being treated as small and unimportant country. When France raised objection to Trusteeship Comite inquiry concerning its territories I [*it?*] promptly dropped from consideration,[4] but comite virtually ignoring protests from Union. I assured him at this point US considered Union neither small nor unimportant. Contributions to West cause, I added, were fully appreciated by me and my govt.

We were impressed by frankness and deep feeling with which Forsyth talked to us.

Sent Dept 155, rptd info Paris unn (for USDel).

GALLMAN

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[3] This refers to the agenda item regularly inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly by India, concerning the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa; see pp. 842 ff.

[4] This refers to a protest in the Fourth Committee on November 23 by the representative of France, that the Fourth Committee was not competent to discuss political conditions in a Non-self-governing Territory, in this case French Morocco; and the withdrawal of the French Delegation from the meeting. For documentation on the question of the competence of the Fourth Committee, see pp. 655 ff.

320/12–751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PARIS, December 7, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 551. Subject: South West Africa. Joint resolution South West Africa handed in today sponsored by Cuba, Den, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Philippines, Thailand, and US. Text same as that submitted in US/A/C.4/212 [1] except small verbal changes first two paras, substitution "regrets" for "deplores" in para 14 and alteration of para 17 to provide for reconstitution new *Ad Hoc* Comite unnamed blank states because Den insisted getting off comite.

Reconstitution new comite therefore offers possibility US also discontinue serve, although strong pressure being brought to continue. Dept's reaction this point wld be appreciated. Appears likely res will be adopted huge majority.[2]

AUSTIN

[1] Dated December 1, p. 696.

[2] On December 8 Ambassador Sayre told the Fourth Committee that the draft resolution "was the culmination of the Committee's sincere efforts throughout the years to find a just and practicable solution to the thorny question of South West Africa. . . .

"It was greatly to be regretted that those efforts had failed. All the Committee could do was to support the opinion of the International Court of Justice and to hope that the Government of the Union of South Africa would give effect to that opinion. It was essential to maintain the rule of law and reason in international affairs. A just solution in respect of South West Africa would bring greater peace and harmony not only to Africa but also to the world as a whole. The people and Government of the Union of South Africa believed in the rule of law and had contributed much to its maintenance. . . . He therefore felt that a solemn appeal should be made to the Government of the Union of South Africa to reconsider its position and to resume negotiations on the basis of the proposals of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa. . . . The joint draft resolution was couched in reasonable, though firm terms, and he trusted that it would win unanimous support." (GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, p. 131.)

320/12–1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 11, 1951.

Delga 621. Subject: South West Africa. Committee 4 today adopted eight-power joint resolution on Southwest Africa by vote of 39–5 (Soviet bloc)–8 (Australia, Belgium, Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, UK, Yugoslavia.)

Para 13 first eliminated on suggestion of Dominican Republic and agreed to by all sponsors. Reason given for its elimination was that it gave too much emphasis to proposals of *Ad Hoc* Committee (it was

apparently not realized by proponents of elimination that this was the one para most unacceptable to Union). Consequential vote eliminated words "on basis of the *Ad Hoc* Committee" proposal from para 16.[1]

AUSTIN

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[1] For the proceedings of the Fourth Committee on this matter, December 5, 8, 10, and 11, see GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 103–108, 125–133, 135–141, and 143–152.

Concurrently, with the passage of the 8-power joint draft resolution, the Committee had entertained a 5-power (Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, and the Philippines) joint draft resolution (UN Doc. A/C.4/L.157). This proposed that the General Assembly would reaffirm the position stated in its resolution 449 B (V) of December 13, 1950, that the normal way of modifying the international status of the Territory of South West Africa would be to place it under the United Nations trusteeship system by means of an instrument negotiated under Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter. Immediately after the vote on the 8-power resolution extending the life of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, on December 11, the Fourth Committee adopted the 5-power draft resolution, 33 votes to none, with 17 abstentions. The United States abstained from voting.

The following is the official summary record of the United States Delegate's statement on this occasion:

"82. Mr. Sayre (United States of America), in explanation of his vote, said that it was not obligatory for the Government of the Union of South Africa to put South West Africa under the International Trusteeship System, although that could be regarded as the desirable and normal procedure. He felt, therefore, that nothing was to be gained by repeating General Assembly resolution 449 (V), and that there would even be a danger of cheapening United Nations resolutions by reiterating the previous year's resolution. A solemn appeal had already been made to the Government of the Union of South Africa to reconsider the implementation of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and he felt it inadvisable to urge that Government at present to go farther. He would therefore abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.4/L.157." (GA (VI), *Fourth Committee*, p. 152)

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, December 12, 1951—7 : 11 p. m.

Gadel 428. We have been advised that PriMin Malan intends issue this eve statement announcing temporary withdrawal South African Del from GA and recall of Donges for consultation. If statement is actually issued Dept will not issue press statement but in response questions will say "We regret that the South African Govt has decided to withdraw its Del from the UN GA. We note that the withdrawal is temporary and hope that on further consideration the South African Govt will decide to return its Del to the GA."

Suggest Del and Emb fol same line.

WEBB

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[1] Repeated for information to Pretoria as 125.

320/12–1351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

PARIS, December 13, 1951—1 a. m.

Delga 641. Re: Southwest Africa. We noted from Pretoria's 155 to Dept, Dec 6, Forsyth's insistence that South Africa was being deprived of its legal rights in UN concerning SW Africa. Forsyth appears to have maintained that Fourth Comite action in inviting Herero chiefs and reps to Paris was in violation of court's opinion on SW Africa. Both Forsyth in Pretoria and South African del in Paris have based their walkout from Comite Four on what they contend is illegal action of Fourth Comite.

According to South Africans, action is illegal because under mandate oral petitions were not permitted in League of Nations practice, and no oral hearings on written petitions were permitted. South Africans appear entirely to overlook fact that GA in considering SW Africa item is doing more than simply exercising internatl supervision of South Africa's mandate administration over SW Africa. We of course agree that GA in exercising such supervision shld fol ICJ opinion under which UN supervision of mandate administration is to fol League of Nations pattern; under League of Nations practice, there were no oral petitions or oral hearings on written petitions. But GA is considering item which also includes problem of future status of Southwest Africa, which under ICJ opinion is status that can be modified only by agreement between South Africa and UN.

In considering latter aspects SW Africa item, GA and its comites are obviously entitled, in accordance with long-standing practice, to invite individuals to GA session for purpose of making statements to Comite Four and presenting views which comite might find relevant in its discussions. Believe we shld make it entirely clear to South Africans that in US view, South African assertion that Comite Four illegal action is groundless and can constitute no basis whatsoever for South African walkout from comite. South African govt may be under impression that US agrees with it on this issue or at least believes there may be some merit in South African view. Any such thought on part of South African Govt shld, it seems to us, be effectively dispelled.

Suggest, therefore, Dept may wish to instruct Embassy Pretoria to discuss matter further with Forsyth, for purpose of explaining to him US views on legality of Fourth Comite action in inviting Herero chiefs and reps. We believe Union legal position on Fourth Comite action, to effect that South Africa is being deprived of its legal rights by unconstitutional action of comite, may be serious obstacle to achievement of our primary objective at this time with respect to SW Africa,

which is acceptance by the Union of the ICJ opinion. We wld hope that if South Africa cld be shown that their legal position was not sound, or at least that it was not shared by other UN members, such as US, South Africa might be more ready to accept ICJ opinion.

We note from report of conversation with Forsyth that he referred to Moroccan item in GA as example of how improper agenda items were definitely disposed of when western great powers were determined to stand together on an issue concerning non-self-governing territories. It might be well in this connection to point out to Forsyth that action taken by GA on Moroccan item has simply been to postpone consideration for present. This action was taken by GA on basis of definite statements made to Assembly by responsible French ministers concerning a program of evolution which French Govt was determined to push ahead in Morocco. It cld be pointed out that South Africa on the other hand, instead of announcing any progressive programs relating to such GA items as Southwest Africa and the treatment of Indians in South Africa, for three years proclaimed its intention to try to turn the clock back and institute in the territories under the control of the South African Govt a political and social system which the great majority of UN members find contrary to the purposes and aspirations of the UN in the field of human rights and incompatible with the obligations of members under Article 55 and 56.

Sent Dept Delga 641, rptd Pretoria 3.

AUSTIN

350/12–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PRETORIA, December 13, 1951—noon.

164. Prime Min Malan announced in Capetown last night for release this morning's papers that South Africa (re Embtel 155, Dec. 6) wld withdraw from proceedings Gen Assembly "pending the possible hearing and satisfactory consideration our complaint against fourth comite". Full text given Reuters by SAPA. Emb airmailing copy today. Substance as fols:[1]

1. Claims "overwhelming majority of the people" feel "deep indignation" over UN action. "In conflict with UN in own charter and rules of procedures contact has been made over our heads with individuals in Southwest Africa and Michael Scott, a well-known, hostile and fanatical foreigner and agitator, has been called on give evidence against us." Thus "rights allocated to us under the Treaty of Versailles have been violated. The UN has committed aggression against us".

[1] A verbatim text was sent to the Department in Pretoria's despatch 376, December 13, 1951 (320/12–1351).

2. South Africa no longer satisfied with ordinary protests. "More forceful and, if needs be, drastic action called for".

3. Donges recalled for oral report.

4. "The fundamental principle of the charter is this: That, this organization will not poke its nose into the domestic matters of other countries. If we had not laid down such a principle there wld have been absolute chaos. No one in the world, no nation, big or small, wld have known where it was.

"Unless nations are acknowledged as being sovereign and conduct their own internal affairs according to their own concept and their own system, you will have chaos in the world.

5. On basis reply of president GA refusing Donges appeal, Union assumes Assembly "silently associates itself with action of Fourth Comite, and onus now rests on GA to prove to the contrary and provide opportunity for presentation and discussion our complaint.

6. Lest anyone think this first time South Africa experienced antipathy of UN or that this applies only to present govt, he quoted from Smuts'[2] speech to Union Senate on Jan. 30, 1947 to show that Smuts had same experience.

7. From outset, UN alleged it had claim on trusteeship of Southwest Africa, "and for that reason, it cld force us into anything it wished in spite of charter".

8. UN even went further and after Smuts' last voluntary annual report, trusteeship comite "openly, or by implication, demanded full equality in all respects between all races and colors in Southwest Africa, including equal franchise, removal of residential separation in urban area, and breaking up of native reserves".

9. "Our withdrawal from the proceedings of the UN at least for this session, does not mean the resignation of our membership of that organization. We still want to believe that that organization has done much, and still can do much, for the maintenance of world peace. We will therefore continue to participate in the political comite in the discussions on gen disarmament and on Korea".

10. Dr. Malan appealed to all South Africans of all political parties, to support the govt in its action.

Dept pass Paris. Sent Dept 164, rptd Paris unn (for GADel).

GALLMAN

[2] The late Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, one of the founders of the South African Union, sometime Prime Minister of the Union, prominent world statesman.

320/12–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—5 : 27 p. m.

128. Re Delga 641, Dec 13, rptd Pretoria as Paris No. 3.

Dept inclined believe no useful purpose wld be served by raising this issue and arguing legal case with So Afr Govt. Dept inclined believe further in view of high state emotions Southwest question has created

[1] Repeated for information to Paris for the U.S. Delegation as Gadel 456.

in So Afr it would be very difficult raise this question with So Africans without impairing relations with them. In event, however, charges illegality Fourth Committee action in inviting Herero Chiefs are rptd in subsequent conversations you are authorized, in your discretion, state that on analysis legal issues involved, US considers GA committees entitled if they so desire invite persons appear before them.

ACHESON

320.14/12–1751

Memorandum by Mr. Robert R. Robbins of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Statements by Ambassador Jooste re United States Position on South West Africa

A memo of conversation of December 7, 1951,[1] reports that in a recent conversation with Mr. Ross (GADel) Ambassador Jooste made the following three points concerning the United States position on South West Africa:

1. That you and other United States representatives had assured him that "the Allied and Associated Powers idea" merited consideration;
2. That he had also been assured the United States would not join in any action condemnatory of the Union;
3. That characterizing the *Ad Hoc* Committee's proposals as a "minimum" left "no room for negotiation".

With respect to these points you may be interested in the following information:

1. Records of the several conversations between you and Ambassador Jooste refer to the "Allied and Associated Powers idea" only once, (July 17 [*16*], 1951).[2] Ambassador Jooste remarked that he did not believe that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would accept that idea. Mr. Gerig remarked that the Committee had not rejected the idea that the agreement be between the Powers and the Union with Assembly approval. The United States was quite prepared to join the United Kingdom and France as contracting powers provided the latter were willing and the Assembly did not oppose this procedure. This position was also stated in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and has been the consistent United States position on so much of the Union's proposal as dealt with the parties to an agreement.

[1] Not found in Department of State files.
[2] See memorandum of conversation, July 16, p. 684.

Jooste's statement to Ross appears to confuse the issues of procedure and substance and to imply that the United States had been sympathetic to the Union proposal on both. While the United States has never opposed idea of the remaining Allied and Associated Powers as parties to the Agreement, it has never indicated any support for the Union's proposal that the terms of agreement be limited to a resumption of Articles 2–5 of the original Mandate and has always told the Union that it strongly supported the Committee's draft of the terms of an agreement.

2. Whether the resolution recently adopted by the Fourth Committee may be termed "condemnatory" or not is obviously a matter of interpretation. It seems almost certain, however, that had the United States not taken the initiative in co-sponsoring a moderate resolution—which in final form merely "regretted" rather than "deplored" the Union's action—proposals indubitably condemnatory would have been made. Thus the United States not only did not support "condemnatory" action by the Assembly, but played an active part in the formulation and approval of a resolution which, in the circumstances, was extremely moderate.

3. With respect to the Committee's proposal as a basis of negotiation, you told Jooste in the July 17 conversation that while we believed there was a chance of getting Assembly approval for the Committee's proposal, we were firmly convinced that anything less would fail to get a two-thirds majority. Jooste should therefore have been aware that the United States would support the provision in the resolution (which was eliminated in final voting), by which the Assembly endorsed the Committee's proposal "in principle, as a minimum".

Copies of this memorandum are being sent to the Delegation for information.

320/12–1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 18, 1951—3:35 p. m.

130. Fol is background on SW Africa question at GA: USGADel, in view US membership and active role in *Ad Hoc* Comite on SW Africa, was instructed support that Comite's report in Comite Four. Also, if Union maintained stand that *Ad Hoc* Comite's proposal unacceptable as basis further consultations Del was instructed attempt moderate any unduly critical or condemnatory action by GA. As situation in Comite Four made move for such action likely, Del joined with two other members *Ad Hoc* Comite (Denmark, Thailand) and other interested members Comite Four in exploring possibilities moderate Res acceptable to majority Comite Four. When draft of such Res

emerged Del felt US shld agree co-sponsor in order help secure widest support in Comite Four, and Dept agreed.

Draft Res submitted on Dec. 7, co-sponsored by Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Philippines, and above-mentioned Comite members, and adopted by Comite Four Dec. 11 by vote 39–5 (Soviet bloc)–8 (Aus., Belg., Guatemala, Mex., N.Z., Peru, UK, Yugoslavia). First eleven paras are recital of background and not of controversal character. Operative paras, except certain minor verbal changes not recd in Dept, being sent in fol tel.[1] Re para 16, election members reconstituted Comite not yet held.

Del discussed earlier draft of Res with Union Del. Latter particularly objected to word "deplores" with which para 14 originally opened. This was subsequently changed to "regrets". During adoption Res by Comite para which stated endorsement *Ad Hoc* Comite proposals "in principle, as minimum" was eliminated as suggestion Dom. Rep. with concurrence all sponsors. Reference to *Ad Hoc* Comite's proposal in para 15 of Res also eliminated. Over-emphasis on Comite's proposals stated as reason for these amendments. Del states these references among most unacceptable to Union. Del has informed Dept that "Union Del aware US playing important role adoption firm but reasonable Res based acceptance Court's opinion". However, it also true that Jooste has predicted to Del that "South Africa will probably never again return to Comite Four".

In future conversations you may have on this question with Union Govt officials, you may wish emphasize that if US had not participated actively in preparation and sponsorship Res, it is almost certain that a Res much more critical of Union and more unsatis to them wld have emerged and wld have been difficult, if not impossible, defeat. Many supporters eight-power Res might, for example, have given support extreme Guat Res had not widely sponsored moderate Res been introduced first.

With Ref statement urtel 155, Dec. 6, regarding possibility Union withdrawal from UN, Dept strongly hopes Union will not consider such action necessary. You may wish express this view to Union Govt officials on appropriate occasion, pointing out grave damage that wld result to unity of free world at this critical time.

ACHESON

[1] Telegram 131 to Pretoria, December 18, not printed.

350/12–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRETORIA, December 29, 1951—3 p. m.

Unnumbered. Personal for the Secretary. Prime Minister Malan asked me to call his residence this morning. He explained that as a result of an exchange of views with Donges, who would leave South Africa by air Monday the 31st for Paris, he wished to make a personal appeal to you through me.

Donges, is returning to Paris with draft resolution which he wishes, on appropriate occasion, to introduce in Assembly. Sense of resolution is that, in the absence of charter provision, committee four's action in inviting Herero chiefs to appear before it is illegal. Prime Ministers request is that you ask our UN delegation to get in touch with Donges, on his return to Paris.

I told Malan that I would convey his request to you. I inquired though why he was asking that our delegation take initiative in approaching Donges. His reply was that Donges had appealed to President of Assembly for hearing on committee four's action but that President of Assembly had said he could do nothing. That had led to South Africa "provisionally" and he repeated "provisionally" withdrawing from General Assembly proceedings the onus for present situation therefore rests with Assembly, first step in trying to resolve situation, he said, should come from source other than South Africa.

How I asked did he envisage getting proposed resolution before Assembly when South African delegation was abstaining from proceedings. That, he replied, was something Donges would want to discuss with steering committee.

Before leaving this subject Malan said he hoped very much way could be prepared for bringing proposed resolution before Assembly and that action favorable to South Africa by Assembly would result. Otherwise the result would "at least" be prolonged abstention of South Africa from General Assembly proceedings.

Malan then at length reviewed "intolerable" treatment of South Africa by UN in spite of what South Africa was doing in defense of Africa and Middle East and in Korea. From this he turned to detailed justification of administration of Southwest Africa. He made much of South Africa's "right" under League mandate system, to integrate Southwest Africa administratively in South Africa. Administratively South Africa and Southwest Africa were "one" if outsiders questioned

[1] Repeated to the Embassy in France as Gadel 570, December 31, 1 : 33 p. m., for the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, with the addition of the following: "Dept advises utmost caution due serious implications this request. Instructions follow soonest." (350/12–2951)

acts of South African Parliament, they were interfering in internal affairs.

I responded that what South Africa was doing in Korea, was prepared to do in the defense of Africa and the Middle East, and was doing through sharing its mineral wealth in strengthening free world was fully appreciated by US. As for Southwest Africa, I said that it was true that South African Govt had administrative rights, "up to a point", but it was also true that the IJC had rendered opinion that international status of Southwest Africa could not be changed unilaterally, the important thing to remember, however in these difficult days was that all free nations suffer through weakening of UN. There must be give and take. I added that if it had not been for role our delegation in Paris had played, chances are that resolution on [South?] West Africa more critical of South Africa would have been adopted. We very much hope that South Africa would return to Committee Four and General Assembly proceedings. Complete withdrawal from UN by South Africa would be most harmful to South Africa and cause of whole free world.

Malan replied that his govt valued highly the good relations with the United States, especially in struggle against Communism leading part played by the United States in that field was deeply appreciated here. South Africa needed the United States in building up its armaments, and it was glad in turn to assist the United States with its mineral wealth.

On taking leave I told Malan that I wanted to keep in close touch with him [and?] he said he wanted that too.

GALLMAN

IO Files

Minutes of Fortieth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 5, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/227

[Here follows list of persons (34) present. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair. Three prior agenda items were taken up and disposed of.]

4. *South West Africa proposal by South Africa*

Mr. Taylor noted that South Africa wanted the United States to support a declaration in the plenary that Committee Four's action in inviting the Herero chieftains to be heard had been illegal. (See Delga 848).[1] No instructions had been received from the Department as yet. The Delegation might, he suggested, send some suggestions on the matter to the Department for its consideration.

[1] Not found in Department of State files.

Mr. McKay noted that South Africa had moved that the item on South West Africa be moved from last place on Committee Four's agenda to the second place. After considerable acrimonious debate, the Herero chiefs had been invited to come to Paris to participate. The resolution proposing this had been adopted by a vote of 37–7–7, the United States abstaining. Mr. McKay referred to Delga 848 which listed the arguments the South Africans had made in connection with the International Court's opinion on South West Africa. He reported that Robinson, a Canadian, had approached him the day before with the confidential information that the South Africans had proposed in a Commonwealth meeting the tabling of this resolution in the plenary which would declare the Committee Four action illegal. At that meeting the United Kingdom and Australian delegates had strongly opposed this move. Mr. Donges, the South African delegate, had been considerably shaken at this lack of support from quarters which usually were amenable to his ideas. Robinson suggested that, were the United States to follow up with another strong expression of opposition to the South Africans' proposed move, perhaps they could be persuaded to refrain from offering it.

Mr. Allen mentioned a conversation he had had with Ambassador Jooste, of South Africa, in which the various factors compelling the South Africans to make this or some other move had been set forth. Mr. Taylor asked if the Delegation were agreed that as to the merits of this proposed move the South Africans were in the wrong. He took it that we agreed the Fourth Committee had acted legally. He then asked how the United States could assist the South Africans in view of this position on the merits. One suggestion had been to let them put in a new item which would be referred to Committee Six on the legal aspects of their contention. Or conceivably South Africa could put its resolution in the plenary as an additional resolution connection with the South West Africa item. He wondered whether it would be politically desirable for the United States to take this advanced position in assisting South Africa.

Ambassador Jessup took it that the Delegation disagreed on the merits with the South African position, but that it would be undesirable to spell this out too clearly. However, he felt that we ought to tell them that we could not vote for their resolution. If they wanted, nevertheless, to air it in the Assembly we might agree to help them get the necessary ⅓ vote for discussion of the Fourth Committee report so that they could present the constitutional issues, while warning them that it would not be a wise course to follow. We should advise them that they would get a bad beating on this, and that it would be better to raise the matter in some other way. Possibilities in this connection might be submittal of the question to the Sixth Committee or conceivably to the ICJ. Dr. Tobias saw a difference between not trying

to gag them and in actively helping them. Senator Cooper thought that South Africa's position was unsound. Mr. Tate said they had no legal grounds, and seemed, in fact, to recognize this, in that they had based their proposed action on the very broad and loose basis of Article 10 of the Charter. The question in his opinion was only one of policy as to whether we wanted to help them have a hearing, i.e., to "get another black eye". Senator Cooper said that the basic weakness of South Africa's position is that it would not agree to put South West Africa under the Trusteeship system. Dr. Tobias saw the United States in the peculiar position of wanting to help South Africa in Committee Four when they had absented themselves from that Committee.

Ambassador Sayre thought that the merits of the case were clear: the United Nations could not compel South Africa to put South West Africa under the Trusteeship system, but if they would not, then the territory remained under the former mandate system, and reports on their administration of it were required. The United States more than any other state had tried to move the situation along to a solution. At our instigation a meeting had been held which had resulted in keeping the resolution on this item down to a relatively moderate tone, compared with the wishes of most of that group. He thought it would be unwise to throw the South African proposal into the Assembly since it would only succeed in getting a "red hot" retaliatory resolution aimed against them. This in turn would add fuel to Malan's adamant policies.

In regard to the invitation to the Herero chiefs, Ambassador Sayre agreed with the Department that the action was entirely legal. Committee Six would doubtless say that Committee Four had the right to invite indigenous representatives. The result of such a determination however might well be to turn Committee Four into an arena to hear the grievances of non-official indigenous representatives. As to practical courses which could be taken, the only thing Ambassador Sayre could say was that the United States could not support South Africa in its discriminatory practices. He cautioned that even putting our finger in the pot might cause it to be burned.

Mr. Allen had a short suggestion to make. This matter was not a question of whether or not to be nice to South Africa. It was rather a question solely of tactics to be followed within the Assembly vis-à-vis the South Africans and what they might do in Plenary. Since it was generally agreed that it would be undesirable to open up a Pandora's box in Plenary, we should try to head off the South Africans by having them put in something which would raise the constitutional question for Committee Six or ICJ determination, phrased in general terms rather than the specific one of the invitation to the Hereros.

Ambassador Jessup suggested that it be pointed out to the Department, along the lines indicated by Ambassador Sayre, that the Moroc-

can issue [2] and various others might be opened up if an explicit statement by Committee Six were given that the Committee Four action had been legal and justified. Mrs. Roosevelt noted that Tunisia might be one of these issues, and that the general Arab displeasure with the United States should be borne in mind in addition to Morocco. She said that the Delegation should tell the Department that the Delegation would have to be honest with the South Africans and tell them that we would have to vote against their policies because we could never agree to them. We should emphasize that we would stand for what we believed to be right.

Ambassador Sayre suggested that the Delegation tell the South Africans that if they would come into the Assembly with clean hands everything would be much improved.

Mr. McKay asked about the Canadian suggestion that the United States follow up the strong representations against the South African proposed move made by the United Kingdom and Australia. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the Delegation must report upon this matter to the Department to the effect that it would be necessary to add our pressure to that given already by the United Kingdom and Australia. Mr. Allen's idea of going to Committee Six or the ICJ for a determination on Committee Four's action would also be reported together with the arguments for and against it.

CHARLES D. COOK

[2] For documentation regarding the Moroccan question at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, see pp. 135 ff.

320/1–652 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 6, 1952—6 p. m.

Delga 890. Subject: Southwest Africa. Re proposed SA move in GA described Gadel 570,[2] USGADel has considered matter in light existing conditions here and of the various procedural possibilities, and offers fol recommendations to Dept in hope they will be helpful:

1. Del believes it would be useful to give SA del our views in most frank and friendly way, as far in advance Jan 11 plenary session as possible in hope dissuade SA from course which we consider seriously detrimental SA's own interests.

[1] Repeated to Pretoria as 148, January 8, 1952, 4 : 31 p. m. (320/1–652).
[2] See footnote 1, p. 715.

2. Del considers it tactically desirable to make this approach to SA del soonest in view confidential info from Robinson (Canada), Delga 851,[3] that Donges was visibly shaken at Commonwealth group mtg yesterday when UK and Australia, whom he relies on for most support, strongly urged SA not to attempt to have Comite Four res declared illegal. Robinson felt immediate US approach, following strong UK-Australian opposition yesterday, might dissuade Donges.

3. Fol points might be made:

(*a*) In view consistent US position concerning right GA comites hear such persons as necessary for performance of tasks, and in view our belief that Comite Four res to hear Herero spokesmen was legal, US cannot support res to have GA declare Comite Four res illegal.

(*b*) Such a res as SA contemplates wld certainly fail, and such a GA decision wld set a dangerous precedent which wld be cited in future efforts obtain Comite Four hearings for others.

(*c*) Submittal res under which GA wld declare Comite Four res illegal wld open acrimonious debate in which SA conduct wld be attacked and vilified by numerous dels who might in turn introduce strong res condemning SA. (USGADel fears this might give Malan additional fuel for extremist action concerning SA relations with UN.)

4. In discussing other ways by which SA might accomplish its objective, del examined possibility of suggesting that SA might introduce new agenda item referring to Comite Six a constitutional question concerning the general problem of granting hearings in Comite Four, but del concluded it wld be undesirable for issue be raised in this or any other form.

ROOSEVELT

[3] The Delegation's Daily Classified Telegram Summary No. 46, January 5, 1952, 1 a. m., not printed.

350/12–2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 7, 1952—5 : 20 p. m.

PRIORITY NIACT

145. Reur unnumbered Dec 29 3 p. m. your reply to Malan's criticism UN treatment SoAfr is approved.

We believe SoAfr wld derive no benefit from introduction in GA of Res to effect action Comite 4 in inviting Herero Chiefs for hearing was illegal. First even if such Res strongly supported by US we consider chances its passage nil, and its introduction wld undoubtedly provide occasion renewed criticism SoAfr policies. Moreover as stated

[1] Repeated for information to Paris priority and niact as Gadel 619.

Deptel 128 rptd Paris Gadel 456 [2] we think GA Comites empowered if they so desire invite persons appear before them but believe advisability such invitations quite another matter and one which depends upon circumstances each case and particularly upon extent hearings wld contribute solution particular problem concerned. In general, Dept believes such invitations shld be issued sparingly. We do not see therefore how USDel cld support Res along lines desired by Union.

Dept still considers that SoAfr interests wld best be served by negotiating agreement along lines proposed SWAfr Comite. If such an agreement were negotiated it wld in general establish procedures with respect to SWAfr which existed under League Nations Mandates System and wld thereby strengthen SoAfr position in opposing such invitations as that issued by Comite 4 to Herero Chiefs.

USDel at its discretion authorized approach Donges upon his return acquaint him US views as set forth foregoing Paras. You may also set forth same views if you consider desirable in future conversations you may have with Malan or other SoAfr officials. While Dept wishes you use ur discretion it seems desirable from here it be made plain SoAfr Govt that in our opinion Fourth Comite invitation to Herero Chiefs was not *ultra vires*.

We are considering taking advantage opportunity afforded by Malan's approach to you to send appeal from Secy to Malan along fol lines "I have given much thought to question SWAfr and consideration of this question by UN since my conversation with Dr. Donges during 1950 session GA. Developments at present GA session have intensified my concern over question. I am convinced proposal of *Ad Hoc* Comite for SWAfr affords basis generally agreeable settlement. Proposal contains very real safeguards for Union and wld recognize unique status territory. I therefore hope it will be possible your Govt continue negotiations on basis of *Ad Hoc* Comites proposal with new SWAfr Comite to be set up under Res adopted by Comite 4 on Dec 11 and in this way to work toward solution which wld be satis your Govt and majority members UN and which wld enable Union continue play its full part in work of UN to which it has already made such effective contribution". Ur comments both re advisability such *démarche* and its contents are requested. Dept particularly interested knowing whether in your opinion chances effectiveness this appeal sufficiently great justify involving Secys prestige.

Delga 848 recd Dept this afternoon and being rptd Pretoria. Info contained therein does not alter foregoing. Depts reaction to specific questions raised, however, will follow in separate tel.

ACHESON

[2] Dated December 14, p. 711.

320/1–752 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, January 7, 1952—6 p. m.

Delga 908. Re Southwest Africa. Fol is rough draft proposed res handed USGADel by Jooste today:

"*Whereas* charter makes no provision for right petition to UN except in case trust territories;

"*Whereas* WSA is not a trust territory;

"*Whereas* GA in accepting ICJ advisory opinion in WSA has subscribed, *inter alia*, to courts' statement that re SWA "degree of supervision to be exercised by GA shld not therefore exceed that which applied under mandate system, and shld conform as far as possible to procedure followed by the Council of League";

"*Whereas* procedure of Council of League re mandated territories preclude hearing of oral petitions;

"*Whereas ad hoc* comite on SWA was appointed by GA and authorized as interim measure to examine, *inter alia*, petitions and other matters relating to territory of SWA that may be transmitted to SYG as far as possible in accordance with procedure of former mandate system;

"*Whereas* certain communications were recd by SYG and considered and treated as petitions by *ad hoc* comite and transmitted to the SA Govt as petitions for its observations in accordance with procedure followed under former mandates system;

GA

"*Noting* that its Fourth Comite decided accept oral petitions from Hosea Kutako and other chiefs or headmen of Herero, Nama and Damara tribes or spokesmen designed by them; and called upon Michael Scott to address it during its consideration of item on SWA, and at 222nd meeting heard Scott;

"*Noting* further that communications on which committee purported to act emanated from same source, were of same nature and in certain cases were same communications which were treated as petitions by the *ad hoc* comite.

"*Finds* that in acceding to request for oral petitions form reps of a section of population of a country which is not a trust territory, and in inviting individual not representing any section of population to address it, Fourth Comite exceeded its legal competence."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–852 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 8, 1952—9 p. m.

Delga 928. Subj: Southwest Africa. Doubt whether appeal by Secretary referred to Gadel 619 [1] wld be successful in persuading SA accept *Ad Hoc* Comite's proposal as basis for negots. Believe, however, such an appeal wld be appropriate and timely, as it might strengthen present Commonwealth and other efforts to dissuade SA from contemplated GA move, and might moderate SA reaction since we wld oppose SA res in GA, since message by Secretary wld emphasize importance we attach to SA views. Further believe approach to Malan appropriate because indications here are that SA del has no discretion to moderate SA position.

ROOSEVELT

[1] Same as Department of State telegram 145, January 7, 1952, 5:20 p.m., to Pretoria, p. 720.

320/1–952

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET PARIS, January 9, 1952.

Subject: Proposed South Africa resolution in plenary on hearing Herero chiefs.

Participants: Ambassador Jooste, (South Africa)
Mr. Wessels (South Africa)
Mrs. Roosevelt
Ambassador Sayre
Mr. Allen

Mrs. Roosevelt explained to Ambassador Jooste the reasons why in the US view it would be very inadvisable for South Africa to present in the plenary its proposed resolution on the legality of Committee Four's decision to hear the Herero chiefs. She pointed out that South Africa's own interest, in our view, would be gravely harmed by the bitter debate which would follow, and the certain defeat of the resolution. The US felt that such a definite decision by the Assembly might also have unfortunate consequences as a precedent in other cases, and this matter was an aspect with which other countries, as well as South Africa, are concerned. She stated that after careful consideration of the legal issues involved, the US had come to the conclusion that the action of Committee Four was legal, although in general, the US believes invitations to individuals should be issued only sparingly.

Thus, if the resolution were presented, the US would not be able to support it. She strongly hoped, therefore, that South Africa would reconsider its decision to proceed, believing that the better course would be to continue negotiations with the *Ad Hoc* Committee to work out an agreement following the procedures of the Mandate. Ambassador Sayre substantiated Mrs. Roosevelt's statement, pointing out the difficulty of obtaining moderate action by the majority in Committee Four, and the assistance of the US in the passage of the main resolution.

Ambassador Jooste replied that the South African government realized the seriousness of the contemplated move, and was aware of the risks and difficulties, but found themselves under overwhelming pressure from public opinion in South Africa, inflamed at this latest act, to take *some* action. His government feels that it must try to seek clarification by the General Assembly as to whether in the future the Charter limits, and Mandate procedures will be respected or not. He stated that it is very painful and inconsistent with the dignity of a country to walk out of a Committee, and is harmful to the interest of the organization. It is not the course that South Africa desires to take, but it must know where it stands.

In the ensuing discussion of the influence of domestic and world opinion, particularly on racial questions, Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out that the US has learned in connection with its racial problem the importance of taking into serious consideration the strong currents and attitudes of work in the world, Governments can do much to influence their domestic opinion at home and can help ward off emotional attacks upon their policies abroad by continual and full dissemination of facts of the situation and of the efforts they are making to solve such problems.

Ambassador Jooste stated he would convey the views of the US on the proposed resolution to Minister Donges, and he thought it might be desirable to have further consultations on this matter in a day or so.

Subsequently, Jooste indicated to Mr. Allen that one of the purposes of the further consultations would be to have Minister Donges explain in detail the constitutional basis for South Africa's position. Mr. Allen suggested that while we were always glad to discuss any question, he frankly thought no useful purpose would be served by further detailed discussion on the legalities. When Jooste, nevertheless, indicated a strong desire to hold them, Mr. Allen suggested that as an alternative, it would be better for the South African delegation to set forth their legal arguments in an informal memorandum which we would be glad to bring to the attention of the delegates and the Department, although it would probably not alter the opinion.

When he pressed further as to whether the statement that the US "would not support South Africa's resolution" meant that we would

vote against or abstain, Mr. Allen explained that this phrase was the language of our instructions, but that he personally felt we would probably vote against. Jooste again stated that the following countries had assured South Africa that they believed the Committee Four action was illegal: UK, France, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, and Belgium. He suggested it would be undesirable, since all these countries would vote in favor of the resolution, for the US to vote against. (UK and Australia subsequently confirmed their position that the action was illegal. M. Naudy stated that the French Government was inclined to the view that the action was illegal, but was not certain how definite M. Schuman [1] had been with Jooste on this point.)

[1] Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, Chairman of the French Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files

Minutes of Forty-third Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 10, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/230

[Here follow list of persons (50) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. *South West Africa.* Mr. McKay referred to an item in the Classified Summary, Delga 946,[1] page 1, in regard to the formal request the Rev. Michael Scott was making to speak again to the Fourth Committee on the question of South West Africa. Rev. Scott planned to indicate that the reason the Herero chiefs had been unable to come to Paris and present their views was that the South African Government had not given them the necessary travel documents. Sir Alan Burns of the United Kingdom had reported that Khalidy of Iraq offered to intervene with the Arabs to restrain them from expressing strong views or asking leading questions of Rev. Scott if in turn the Latin Americans could be persuaded to show similar restraint.

The chances of having Dr. Tobias seek to dissuade Scott from making his presentation to the Committee had been discussed. Scott had already presented a formal written request, however, and he felt a moral obligation to speak on behalf of the Hereros. It was therefore unlikely that he could be dissuaded. In view of the overwhelming support for allowing him to speak, it was felt best not to oppose his speaking *per se* but rather to have him, if possible, present his remarks in a restrained vein. Mr. McKay noted the urgent need to begin ap-

[1] Daily Classified Summary No. 50, January 10, 1952, 1 a. m., not printed.

proaches on this subject, since the Committee had scheduled four meetings for a two-day period and could conceivably reach the South West Africa item by the next day.

Ambassador Gross asked what might result if we did not seek to restrain Rev. Scott. Mr. Ward Allen recalled that the United States was undertaking strenuous efforts in conjunction with other delegations to prevent the South Africans from "blowing the lid off" in Plenary on their suggested tactic of having the Plenary declare the Committee Four invitation to the Hereros illegal. The relationship of these two problems satisfied Ambassador Gross of the need to follow the suggested course.

Mr. Sandifer added that it would be unwise to have the Committee end on a crescendo of confusion. He thought our approaches should be made to more delegations than just the Latins. In addition it should not be made in terms of "coercing" them, but rather explaining to them our view of the matter.

Mrs. Roosevelt noted that she had for the first time in her conversation with the South Africans the day before received the impression that they were admitting that they were trying to do something which would ease the situation, and that the solution to their problems would take some time to accomplish. She asked Ambassador Sayre whether her impression was unique or whether he had ever seen similar intimations. He answered that he had occasionally seen such signs, but warned that Malan was the one with whom we would have to reckon, and that he was completely rigid. Dr. Tobias said that any loosening in Jooste's attitude was due to a stiffening in the US position. They still wanted the United States, however, to do what was incompatible with our tradition and belief. He added a note of caution indicative of the scope of the problem with which we had to deal—that the Dutch Reform Church in South Africa was a warm supporter of Malan's policies.

Mr. Ward Allen noted that there was a possibility that Rev. Scott's views might be sent to the UN by letter rather than being presented orally. He had followed that practice once before in answering questions put to him by the Committee. Mrs. Roosevelt wondered whether his absence in England might be due to illness, and whether that fact might not be an appropriate reason for asking his views by letter. Mr. McKay thought an approach might be made by Dr. Tobias along those lines, but he doubted the success of such an approach. Dr. Tobias indicated he would feel able to make a personal appeal to Scott stressing the need for caution by him in his presentation.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

320/1–1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 11, 1952.

Subject: South Africa's Proposed Resolution On Illegality of Invitation to Hereros

Participants: Minister Donges, South Africa
Ambassador Jooste, South African Delegation
Mr. Wessles, South Africa Delegation
Mrs. Roosevelt, US Delegation
Ambassador Sayre, US Delegation
Ward P. Allen, US Delegation

After expressing regret at the misunderstanding which had led us to firm up our position [1] in advance of further discussion with him, Dr. Donges re-stated the reasons which prompt South Africa to take this step. He pointed out that the situation in South Africa is one of "extreme gravity" and that it is absolutely essential that some such move as this be made in order to "stave off something more serious". Minister Donges re-emphasized in the first place the importance of permitting debate on this item in the Plenary so that South Africa can be heard and stated he would not dare prophesy the results of the "added insult hurled on us" if they are not given an opportunity to speak. It would, in his view, be a "tragedy".

They do intend to introduce their proposed resolution, except in the event that Committee 4 between now and the time of the Plenary should pass a condemnatory resolution regarding the refusal of South Africa to grant passports and facilities for the Herero chiefs to make their appearance. Mr. Donges pointed out since the South African government was convinced the invitation was illegal they were, of course, unable to grant these facilities since to do so would have made them in fact "accessories after the Fact" to this unconstitutional act. If Committee 4 does pass such a condemnatory resolution, the South African Delegation will not present its resolution to the Plenary, but would of course want to have the condemnatory resolution rejected and this they would regard as a "second best" solution to the problem. If Committee 4 does not pass such a resolution, then South Africa does intend to introduce its resolution in the Plenary. Minister Donges felt there was a real possibility that it might be ruled out of order. Then at least the government could not be blamed for [not?] having tried.

[1] This is a reference to the position adopted by the Department of State, and set forth in Department's telegram Gadel 619, January 7, 1952 (telegram 145 to Pretoria, p. 720), that in the opinion of the United States Government the Fourth Committee invitation to the Herero chiefs was not *ultra vires*. This clarification is contained in the Delegation's telegram to the Department, reporting this conversation with Donges; see footnote 2 below.

In that case South Africa would of course like other countries to support them in the course of the debate which would give them some consolation. (Although he was careful not to say so, it was the impression of the US representatives that Minister Donges is rather hoping that the resolution will be ruled out of order since this would provide a way out for his Delegation).

In the course of the discussion Minister Donges pointed out that South Africa is not actuated in this proposed move by petty motives. There is a serious danger in his view to "our Organization". He went on to say that South Africa does regard the UN as their Organization as much as anybody else's and they are fully prepared to stand by the Charter as it was originally conceived at San Francisco. He pointed out that those who are most vociferous in attacking South Africa and in seeking to extend the Charter procedures do not show up very well in the last analysis when their support of the UN is put to the test of making actual sacrifices and contributions of men and wealth in support of the Charter.

He made a plea that the various delegations should see South Africa's unique situation in a broader light. He pointed out it was difficult to discuss her particular situation with persons who have not actually been in South Africa and understand it. It is possible in such matters, even if all the facts are correctly stated, to come out with an entirely wrong picture.

Mrs. Roosevelt replied that we would immediately transmit Minister Donges' points to the Department and request that they give them careful consideration and send us further instructions.[2] She stated that, however, she was not "overly hopeful" that it would be possible for the Department to change its basic position, but pointed out that Minister Donges had introduced a new element in referring to the possibility that the resolution might be presented but ruled out of order and not pressed to a vote. She stated that the US continues to feel that efforts to work with South Africa in an approach of friendly and frank understanding are important to the US and stated we did have a full appreciation of the contribution South Africa is making to honor its commitments under the Charter. In the ensuing discussion Ambassador Sayre pointed out our fear that if the resolution were pressed to a vote and rejected, as it certainly would be, that rejection would be taken as a precedent to hear all sorts of individuals in Committee 4 and our efforts to keep such invitations to a minimum would

[2] The Delegation reported this conversation to the Department of State in Paris telegram Delga 979, January 11, 1952, 5 p. m. At the end, the telegram reads: "We intend obtain views Padilla Nervo and others on question whether [proposed South African] resolution would be in order. We have not yet told Donges exact US position on this point or on support for plenary debate. . . . If South Africa continues determined present resolution it may be that after debate a presidential ruling or plenary decision that it is out of order will be best solution." (320/1–1152)

be useless. Minister Donges replied that then at least we would all know where we stood and all be in the same boat.

IO Files

Minutes of Forty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 16, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/232

[Here follows list of persons (42) present.]

1. *South West Africa.*

Mr. Taylor stated that Mr. Ross and Mr. Allen had talked with Mr. Jooste of South Africa on this subject which would be taken up in plenary on Friday, the 18th. The Secretariat had planned that only Committee Four Items would be considered at that meeting. Mr. Allen then recalled the previous Delegation decision to seek to dissuade the South Africans from attempting to put a resolution into the plenary which would seek to declare illegal the action of Committee Four in inviting the Hereros. He reported that considerable effort had been made along these lines, with results as outlined in Delgas 983 and 1035.[1]

The latest proposal made by the South Africans, according to Mr. Allen, was that they approach Padilla Nervo, Assembly President, on the question whether their proposed resolution would be in order. If he thought it were not in order and if the US and other Western Powers would make speeches critical of Committee Four Action from which some sympathy for South Africa could be inferred, then South Africa might not have to introduce the resolution, Mr. Allen thought there were four questions which the Delegation would have to consider:

1. Should US Delegation vote for plenary discussion of the South West Africa item? (This was the Union's wish.)
2. If Padilla Nervo privately should tell the South Africans he had doubts on whether the proposed resolution would be in order, could the US Delegation make a statement along the lines mentioned by the South Africans?
3. If the question were put to a vote whether or not the South African resolution was in order, which way should the US vote?
4. On the resolution itself, if it came to a vote, which way should the US vote?

Mr. Ross saw clearly that in view of our opposition to the proposed resolution itself, and because the South Africans were trying to find a way to satisfy both their home opinion and their instructions, they

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[1] Classified Daily Telegram Summaries No. 52 and No. 55, respectively, January 12, 1952, 5 p. m., and January 16, 1952, 1 a. m. (320/1–1252, 320/1–1652), neither printed.

would certainly make a strong speech against the Committee 4 Action, even if the resolution were not put in by them. Mr. Jooste had understood we would still support the substantive resolution on South West Africa as passed by the Committee. Mr. Ross noted that South West Africa placed more importance on who supported them, rather than on how many, on the issue of the invitation to the Hereros. In addition, in a somewhat "blackmailing" manner, Mr. Jooste had put this matter in terms of South African support for the UN in general.

In regard to hearing Rev. Scott, Mr. Ross stated that he could not approve the general practice of inviting people to come to present their unofficial views to the UN. He saw this as an unhealthy development. He felt that the resolution on South West Africa was basically sound, but the procedural action taken in connection with it was "not so good". On balance, he felt that if the US could "raise its eyebrows" at least, it would tend to help move things along.

At Ambassador Gross' request, Mr. Allen read from Delga 908 the proposed draft resolution of the South African Delegation and in particular the operative paragraph which would find that Committee Four had exceeded its legal competence. Mr. Tate wanted it to be clear that the question was not one of the legality of Committee Four Action but whether we should say that its legal powers had been exercised unwisely. Mrs. Roosevelt recalled that the Delegation had previously decided that Committee Four action was legal. We were now discussing the question of how to approach the South Africans and how far we could go in stating that it was unwise for Committee Four to have taken the action it did. She noted that the South Africans had stressed, in their talks with her their participation in Korea. Mr. Ross said that Mr. Jooste had not mentioned this point.

The South Africans, Dr. Tobias felt had realized from their talks with Mr. Allen the lack of wisdom in their proposed move. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that there was no sense in their proposal. Dr. Tobias said that that was the precise reason for not attempting to aid them in their present predicament. They had refused to conform with the mandate, or heed the opinion of the International Court of Justice to report on South West Africa, but they now asked us to support them on a technicality which "evades the moral issue involved". That, to Dr. Tobias, was the sum and substance of the whole question.

The world knew that South Africa was wrong, and would be weighing our every step. Particularly was this true of colonial peoples. The basic substance of the matter was that a state was suppressing 4/5ths of its population. South West Africa had been a League of Nations mandate to which the UN had indirectly fallen heir. South Africa asked that it be left alone to administer the area in accordance with its own principles which were based on disrespect for the human rights of 4/5ths of the population.

Admitting that not much could now be done, Dr. Tobias analyzed the present situation in South Africa. He said that if discrimination were based on ignorance, it could be removed by education and study. If it were based on poverty or uncleanliness, those too could be removed. But if discrimination were based on "what a person is as God made him, it is not removeable." It would be a very dangerous thing to support any group basing its practices on a "God-made difference". In contrast to South Africa, conditions in the US were improving. Discriminations were yielding. For this reason, Dr. Tobias had felt able to state to the Soviet Delegate in Committee that freedom must be for all or it was not freedom.

Stressing the importance of this question, he recalled that in 1946 he had spoken to President Truman after returning from Africa, and having just heard of lynchings in Georgia. He told the President that something must be done to protect US prestige. What the US had done in the past must not be undone. No technicalities should be supported which give comfort to those in a predicament resulting from a practice whereby the government had its "foot on the necks" of 4/5ths of the population. What would the US appear to be, he asked the Delegation, if it backed a group which had been "babyish" enough to walk out when it could not stand up and answer justified criticism. Concluding, Dr. Tobias stated that he opposed any proposal, regardless of his being the Committee Four Representative, that would have the US call Committee Four to task for having sought information from various sources. If the proposal were out of order, it could be called so. But complete suppression of a population could not be supported.

Mr. Allen observed that perhaps South Africa was not bluffing when they said that if something were not done they might leave the United Nations. He had been inclined in the past to regard this as "bluffing" on their part. Now he was not so sure they did not mean it. If they did, of course, they would be the first to withdraw, and would thereby set a dangerous precedent.

Ambassador Sayre thought that the US position was quite clear on this question. The instructions were to vote against the proposed South African resolution in the Plenary. Everyone agreed to the wisdom of that course. He sincerely hoped that the issue would not be forced in the plenary so as to cause all the Fourth Committee, and the Plenary too, to stand in favor of the Committee's prior action. For the US to oppose the invitation would put it in an untenable legal position. It would be very unwise to place the US on the "wrong side" in the bitter struggle now going on within the UN. The Latin Americans and Arabs were so inflamed on this matter that for the US to range itself on the South Africans' side would be politically disastrous. If the resolution were introduced, the US should definitely vote against it.

Ambassador Sayre then read from Delga 890 [2] and the reply thereto in Gadel 628 [3] which approved of the position taken by the Delegation. And in Deptel 145 to Pretoria,[4] the Department had said that the US should oppose any resolution which purported to call the Committee Four action illegal. This left us no choice on the matter. We should do everything possible to prevent the introduction of the draft resolution, but vote against it if it were tabled. South Africa was a manifest wrong-doer and should keep quiet on this matter.

Senator Cooper noted that, as he had mentioned earlier, and also during the Fifth Session of the Assembly, when he had worked on the South West African problem, his views were thoroughly in accord with those of Dr. Tobias. Mr. McKay pointed out that on the South West African issue in Committee Four it was not only the Arab-Asian-Latin American group which pushed for the action taken by the Committee, but that countries like Norway, Sweden and Denmark had also supported this action. Norway and Sweden had in fact made statements in support of the hearings. With regard to the comment just made that the action of the Committee on South West Africa had been "excessive", he thought this a matter of opinion. He would agree that the Committee action on other problems had been "excessive", but on the South West Africa question this year he felt that the Committee had been less extreme than might have been expected. The main resolution had been moderately phrased, and the decision to hear the Herero spokesman, although impractical under normal circumstances, was admittedly legal and could perhaps be justified by the exceptional character of the South West African case.

Mr. McKeever thought that this was a good example of the kind of dilemma the US faced in the propaganda battle going on in the world. We forced ourselves into unclear, and complex positions. Such positions could never get into the headlines, which was what was effective in the propaganda battle. Long explanations of complicated positions were not read. If we intended to oppose the South African resolution, we should do just that and not be-cloud the issue with conditions and explanations.

Mr. Maffitt noted that the US had exercised a moderating influence which made it unpopular both with the NATO colonial powers and with the Latin Americans on the other side. This moderating influence could be lost however, by supporting the "oil-on-the-waters" scheme of Mr. Jooste. For this reason he opposed such a scheme. Such opposition would preserve our delicate balance. He further speculated that perhaps South Africa was provoking UN censure by its proposed move in order to pave the way with domestic opinion for withdrawing from the UN. If it wanted to withdraw, there was not much anyone could do.

[2] Dated January 6, p. 719.
[3] Dated January 8, 1952, 3 : 43 p. m. (320/1–452)
[4] Dated January 7, p. 720.

Ambassador Jessup thought there was no serious question on the substance of the resolution: the US would of course oppose it. On the broader policy level, the question was how the US could most effectively benefit the people of South Africa on behalf of the freedoms enumerated by Dr. Tobias. He hoped the US could back up the people within the Union of South Africa who might be able to effect a change in present policies. On balance, as all these matters must be measured, Ambassador Jessup felt that we had reached a point where we could not do much along the latter lines. Therefore we should not make a statement along the lines requested by Jooste which would criticize the Fourth Committee action and thereby imply sympathy for South Africa. Miss Strauss agreed with Ambassador Jessup.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that there was no question of not voting against the resolution. We had tried to keep South Africa in the UN so they could feel the pressure of world public opinion as expressed through all the delegations. She felt we must honestly tell them that we would not make a speech as requested. If this were the consensus of the Delegation nothing further need be said.

Mr. Allen noted, not in opposition to the position of the Delegation as just stated by Mrs. Roosevelt, but in the hope of knowing the full decision of the Delegation, that all his original questions had not been fully answered. He favored voting for plenary discussion on the South West Africa item, even if it meant that the South Africans would be censured. He wondered how the Delegation should vote if the question were put on whether the South African resolution were in order. Mr. Sandifer read from Gadel 628 previously referred to by Ambassador Sayre, in which it was assumed that the resolution would be in order. He stressed the purely technical nature of such a vote. Mr. Tate also felt the resolution would be in order, as pertinent to the business under discussion. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the Delegation would vote for its being in order if put to a vote. On the resolution itself we would vote against. Senator Cooper wondered what the implications would be if the only vote taken were on whether the resolution was in order and it were voted out of order with the US on the losing side. He felt that an explanation of vote would be necessary to make clear that the US position was based purely on the technical legal ground that such a resolution could be put, without in any way supporting the resolution itself. Dr. Tobias thought that this would be the case, and that such an explanation would be an excellent idea.[5]

CHARLES D. COOK

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[5] In Paris telegram Delga 1049, January 16, 1952, 5 p. m., the Department was advised of the Delegation's decision at this meeting not to assist South Africa in the proposed resolution (320/1–1652).

320/1–1752 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 17, 1952—8 p. m.

Delga 1078. Re: Southwest Africa. Donges (South Africa) informed Mrs. Roosevelt that Pres Nervo has advised South African dels that in his view proposed resolution (Delga 908 [1]) wld be technically out of order if introduced in plenary.

South African del has therefore decided not introduce res but will still insist that item be debated in plenary and will make strong speech. Mrs. Roosevelt advised Donges US wld vote for plenary debate but wld not be able make statement. Donges referred to purported current effort block debate and expressed disappointment that we unable advise him US wld actively campaign for having debate.

ROOSEVELT

[1] Dated January 7, p. 722.

Editorial Note

For the final texts of two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on January 19, 1952 with regard to South West Africa, Resolution 570 (VI), Parts A and B, respectively, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Resolutions*, pages 63 and 64. In Part A the General Assembly reconstituted the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, which was "to continue to confer with the Government of the Union of South Africa concerning means of implementing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice." The membership was to consist of representatives of Norway, Syria, Thailand, the United States, and Uruguay. In Part B the General Assembly reasserted the position adopted in its resolution 449B(V) of December 13, 1950, that "the normal way of modifying the international status" of South West Africa would be to incorporate the Territory into the International Trusteeship System "by means of a trusteeship agreement" under Article XII of the United Nations Charter.

For the proceedings of the General Assembly on January 18 and 19, 1952, at which the question of South West Africa was considered, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 355 ff. For the legislative history of the South West Africa item, with selected documentation, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 38.

HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SETTING: THE UNITED STATES POSITION [1]

I. THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON, April 1951.]

SD/E/CN.4/56

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

PROBLEM

What should be the position of the United States Delegation at the Seventh (1951) Session of the Commission on Human Rights with respect to the inclusion of provisions on economic, social and cultural rights in the International Covenant on Human Rights?

RECOMMENDATION

1. As a first position, the Delegation should support—or, in its discretion, propose—the view that the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights in the International Covenant on Human Rights should be limited to general language along lines proposing the promotion of economic, social and cultural progress and development. The Delegation may, if it is deemed advisable, submit and support language along the lines of the alternative texts (*a*) and (*b*) set forth in the Annex, preferably alternative (*a*). The Delegation should explain that the United States, in view of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 4, 1950, is prepared to support the inclusion of such language in the Covenant. If necessary to strengthen support in the Commission for general language in the Covenant, the United States Delegation may consult with other Delegations with respect to language along the lines of alternative (*c*) in the Annex and support such language in the Commission.

2. If the Commission rejects the United States proposal to limit the language in the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights along

[1] For previous documentation on these matters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 509 ff.

547-842—79——48

general lines and decides to include language in the Covenant which is detailed, the Delegation should undertake to limit this language as far as possible along practical lines generally in harmony with American practice and constitutional principles, and should vote for such detailed provisions if so modified. It should be assumed, in considering the provisions for inclusion in the Covenant, that they will be subject to a federal state article.

DISCUSSION

Delegations of the United States to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights during 1948, 1949 and 1950 consistently opposed the addition of articles on economic, social and cultural rights to the present text of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights. The United States urged that provisions relating to economic, social and cultural matters be set forth in separate protocols for separate ratification. This position of the United States was in the majority in the Commission.

When the same question was raised in the General Assembly consisting of representatives of 60 members, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on December 4, 1950 expressly deciding "to include economic, social and cultural rights in the draft Covenant on human rights" and calling "upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with the spirit of the Universal Declaration to include in the draft Covenant a clear expression of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner which relates them to the civic and political freedoms proclaimed by the draft Covenant."

The United States opposed the inclusion of these provisions in the December 4, 1950 resolution, but the General Assembly nevertheless voted to include them in the resolution. The vote in the General Assembly in favor of these provisions was 23 to 17 with 10 abstentions.

It appears that when this issue is voted again in the General Assembly at its 1951 session, the vote for the addition of provisions on economic, social and cultural rights in the Covenant will again be favorable to their inclusion in the Covenant.

In view of the decision at the 1950 session of the General Assembly and the anticipated repetition of this decision at the 1951 session of the General Assembly, it seems advisable for the United States to proceed with the development of language expressive of economic, social and cultural rights which is generally in harmony with United States practice and constitutional principles, and to take appropriate steps to advise friendly members of the Commission on Human Rights of such language.

It is particularly important that the United States proceed along this line in order to prevent the USSR and Yugoslavia from winning

the acceptance of their proposals for inclusion in the Covenant at the next session of the Commission. It is felt that only if the United States proceeds along this line will there be a possibility of forestalling the acceptance of the USSR and Yugoslav texts in the Commission.

The USSR and Yugoslav proposals have been submitted to previous sessions of the Commission. The language of these proposals is in general not consistent with American practice and constitutional principles and accordingly is unacceptable to the United States. The proposals are in general drafted along typical communist totalitarian lines, with particular stress on governmental control. The USSR texts include the usual Soviet effort to restrict the freedom of the individual and to obtain United Nations approval of ambiguous language ostensibly promoting freedom but actually not doing so.

In accordance with the recommendations set out above, if the Commission decides to vote on language such as the USSR and Yugoslav texts for inclusion in the Covenant, the United States should propose and support modifications of these texts to conform them as much as possible along practical lines generally in harmony with American practice and constitutional principles.

With respect to articles on economic, social and cultural matters in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which may be proposed by other delegations for inclusion in the Covenant, the United States should propose necessary modifications to these also to conform them as much as possible along practical lines in harmony with American practice and constitutional principles. In general, these articles are now phrased in terms of rights to which all individuals are entitled immediately. Obviously, for inclusion in the Covenant, many of them must be rephrased as objectives to be promoted by parties to the Covenant.

Considerable discretion in phraseology is necessarily left to the United States Delegation to the Commission since it is difficult to foresee all the various texts that may be submitted for consideration to the Commission at its next session.

The United States Delegation should in particular emphasize in the Commission that much of the work in implementing and effectuating the promotion and safeguards of economic, social and cultural rights is being done and should continue to be done by specialized agencies such as the ILO, WHO, UNESCO, etc.

Annex

(See Recommendation 1 of this Paper concerning these alternatives)

Alternative (a)

"Each State party hereto undertakes to promote conditions of economic, social and cultural progress and development for a higher

standard of life in larger freedom for all, with due regard to the organization and resources of the State; and to cooperate for effective international action in economic, social and cultural matters with organs of the United Nations and with specialized agencies established by intergovernmental agreement and brought into relationship with the United Nations under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."

Alternative (b)

"Each State party hereto undertakes to promote conditions of economic, social and cultural progress leading to the development of high levels of education, health, leisure, culture and living and working conditions in larger freedom for all and with due regard to the organization and resources of the State. In addition, each State party hereto undertakes to further these objectives through cooperation for effective international action in economic, social and cultural matters with organs of the United Nations and with specialized agencies established by inter-governmental agreement and brought into relationship with the United Nations under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."

Alternative (c)

"Each State party hereto, believing that all human beings have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity, undertakes, with due regard to the resources and organization of the State, and in cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies established by inter-governmental agreement and brought into relationship with the United Nations under the provisions of the United Nations Charter to promote:

"(*a*) The highest attainable standard of health;

"(*b*) Provisions for adequate education designed to enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society to the extent of their capabilities, to develop fully the human personality, and to strengthen respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

"(*c*) Measures to raise the standard of living, to give special protection to mothers and children, to provide adequate nutrition, housing and facilities for recreation and culture;

"(*d*) The effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the cooperation of management and labor in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures;

"(*e*) Policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, equal pay for equal work, adequate protection for the

life and safety of workers in all occupations, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection;

"(*f*) The opportunity for everyone to engage in occupations and businesses in which they can have the satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their skill and attainments; and

"(*g*) Measures to provide basic security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond the control of the individual."

[If other delegations insist on a reference to full employment, the United States Delegation may agree to the words "full employment and" being inserted at the beginning of paragraph (*f*). Actually paragraph (*f*), as set forth above, already covers full employment.] [2]

[2] Brackets in the source text.

Editorial Note

The Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights held 50 plenary meetings at Geneva, April 16–May 19, 1951. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the United States Representative on the Commission. James Simsarian of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (UNE) was Adviser to the United States Representative. Simsarian submitted five official weekly reports to the Department on the progress of the Commission's work. Some are found in Office Lot File 55 D 429 (Files of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, Durward V. Sandifer). An article by Simsarian, "Economic, Social, and Cultural Provisions in the Human Rights Covenant: revisions of the 1951 session of the Commission on Human Rights", is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 25, 1951, pages 1003 ff. This includes a complete text (73 articles) of the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, as it stood after the work of the Seventh Session.

The official text of the Draft Covenant is found in United Nations, *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirteenth Session* (hereafter cited as ECOSOC (XIII)), *Supplement No. 9, Commission on Human Rights Report of the Seventh Session* (Doc E/CN.4/640), Annex I. Annexes II–X of the *Report* contain complete information on draft proposals, amended texts, statements, etc., or exact documentary references thereto.

Annex II of the *Report* contains an official statement of the United States on the Draft Covenant on Human Rights as prepared at the Seventh Session, as follows:

"1. The United States wishes to call attention to the desirability of including in the Covenant on Human Rights an article on the right of everyone to own property.

"2. The United States wishes to call attention to the express reservation it made in the Commission on Human Rights on 19 May 1951 with respect to the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights drafted in this session of the Commission. The United States feels that there should be a careful reconsideration of these provisions. This is not, however, to be interpreted as indicating any lessening of the interest or efforts of the United States for the achievement of economic, social and cultural rights through the United Nations or through the various specialized agencies in this field.

"3. The United States participated in the work of this session of the Commission on Human Rights in attempting to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly to draft economic, social and cultural rights with a view to their inclusion in the Covenant. The United States did so, despite its initial view that such rights should not be included in the same Covenant with civil and political rights. Our experience in the present session of the Commission on Human Rights has been such that we are now of the view that the provisions in the Part of the Covenant dealing with economic, social and cultural rights—being loosely drafted and not being expressed in terms of legal rights and with different implementation and undertaking—should be dealt with in a separate legal instrument."

Sandifer Files, Lot 55 D 429

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James Simsarian of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1951.

Subject: Position of United States Concerning Draft Covenant on Human Rights in ECOSOC and General Assembly

Participants: Mrs. Roosevelt
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Sandifer
Mr. Sanders [2]
Mr. Tate [3]
Mr. Meeker [4]
Mr. Green [5]
Mr. Simsarian

At Mrs. Roosevelt's request she came to Washington on Tuesday to report to the President and to the Department concerning the session just closed of the Human Rights Commission. Mrs. Roosevelt met with

[1] The source text reflects general drafting changes made by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer). On June 1 it was forwarded by Sandifer to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson).

[2] William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary (Hickerson).

[3] Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser.

[4] Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.

[5] James F. Green, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs.

the persons above listed in the morning and again at lunch. At noon she saw the President and in the early afternoon the Secretary.

By way of background for the discussion of the problem of the position to be taken by the United States on further work on the Human Rights Covenant in the Summer session of the Economic and Social Council and in the sixth session of the General Assembly, Mrs. Roosevelt summarized some of the impressions she had gained on broader related questions in conversations with various members of the Human Rights Commission, particularly with the new Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Charles Malik, Representative of Lebanon. Dr. Malik stressed heavily and at length the needs and aspiration of the under-developed countries. He pointed out the tremendous social and cultural problems in the countries of the Middle East and in all the under-developed countries, the incompetence and corruption in the governments, and the need on their part for leadership and technical assistance. He said this leadership and assistance must come from the United States and that the United States must both tell these countries what to do and how to do it. This same view was expressed to Mrs. Roosevelt by other members of the Commission but in a less articulate fashion. As applied to the Human Rights Covenant, Mrs. Roosevelt said that in the minds of Dr. Malik and others this meant that the Economic and Social Articles had become a symbol of the aspirations and needs of these countries. They did not understand or attach the same importance to civil and political rights as does the United States and some of the more developed countries. They may not fully understand the Economic and Social Articles but they look to them as a lever which may help to raise them out of their present depressed condition. They do not understand the concern of the United States over the question of whether these "rights" shall be stated and treated as legal rights and obligations. In most of these countries the rights are definitely regarded as goals or objectives—as something to be achieved and not as legal obligations. They do not understand, and in fact resent, the unwillingness of the United States to state them in terms of rights. These matters are covered in the Constitutions of most of these countries but the attitude there toward the effect of such constitutional provisions is different from the attitude in the United States. Most of the other members of the Commission therefore insist tenaciously on stating these propositions in terms of rights and including them in the Covenant with Civil and Political Rights.

One point that Dr. Malik stressed was that the leaders in many of these countries, and especially the leaders of the opposition, want and need these economic, social, and cultural international guarantees as a standard with which to challenge and prod their own governments and the leaders in their countries to greater effort in the direction of attaining social improvement.

In terms of future policy on the Human Rights Covenant, Mrs. Roosevelt felt strongly that this general situation confronted us with a very difficult problem. It is a first-rate propaganda problem in relation to the Soviet Government and its reckless propaganda campaign. Mrs. Roosevelt felt that it means that we must find some way to protect our interests and maintain our position in an affirmative way. For example, she thought that we could not win a campaign, no matter how hard we pressed diplomatically, to separate the Economic and Social Articles from the Civil and Political. By such an effort we would generate a great deal of ill will, lose our position of leadership and end by failing to attain our objective. She fully recognized the difficulty the Covenant with the Economic and Social Articles presented in this country. In the general language in which they are drafted, they can cause us a great deal of trouble both in terms of public opinion and in terms of their actual application. Unless very carefully safeguarded, their inclusion in the Covenant would mean the rejection of the whole Covenant by the Senate.

In the ensuing discussion, the general problem as presented by Mrs. Roosevelt was very thoroughly canvassed. There was reluctant agreement that a campaign to separate the Economic and Social Articles from the present Covenant would be unproductive and unwise. There was discussion of the maturity and completeness of the present Covenant, particularly the Economic and Social Articles, and of the strategy that might be followed with respect to the timing of consideration of the Covenant in the General Assembly. This included discussion of the question of possibly having the Assembly send the Covenant back to the Human Rights Commission for further study and of the problem of having the Covenant debated in the General Assembly in New York in 1952 during a Presidential election year in the United States.

The substantive discussion concentrated on the question of the method by which we might deal with the problem of stating the economic and social rights as "rights" with the implication in American law of their being binding legal obligations. This was still a problem, it was felt, despite the general introductory Article to the economic and social rights. Mr. Tate suggested that this problem might be handled by a reservation (which might take the form of a unilateral reservation by the United States or by a general Reservation Article) stating in substance that the economic, social, and cultural rights represented objectives to be attained by progressive action and not legal obligations. This reservation would have to be very carefully worded to make quite clear the different character of these rights as contrasted with the political and civil rights in the Covenant. There was general agreement, after some exploration of this suggestion, that it might offer a satisfactory approach that would have the advantage

of making it possible for the United States to go along with the development of the Covenant as a whole and also of making it unnecessary for the United States either to press for the separation of the economic and social section or to press for an Article providing for adherence to separate parts of the Covenant.

There was agreement that the Economic and Social Council should not get into the substance of the Covenant and that it would probably have to send the Covenant forward to the General Assembly for action. There was no clear agreement as to the form which the Report and Recommendations of the Council to the Assembly should take. There was uncertainty as to the approach which the United States should take in the General Assembly on further action on the Covenant. It was finally agreed that Mrs. Roosevelt should raise with the President the question of the timing of consideration by the General Assembly, particularly the question whether consideration of the question by the General Assembly in a Presidential election year in the United States would cause serious difficulty. Mrs. Roosevelt would also explain to the President the nature of the problems involved in the Economic and Social section of the Covenant.

At lunch Mrs. Roosevelt reported that the President expressed the positive view that the United States should not hang back in going forward with the Covenant. He saw no difficulty in having the Covenant debated in the General Assembly in the United States in 1952. He thought, in fact, there might be some advantages in having it debated then since in an election year neither party would be in a position to oppose a program of economic and social improvement. At the same time the President felt that it was important for the United States to take an affirmative position in the handling of the Covenant in the General Assembly this Fall and that we should go along with the general sentiment in the Assembly on the question of timing.

It was finally agreed tentatively, subject to further study in the Department and discussion with other agencies, that an effort would be made to develop the reservation procedure suggested by Mr. Tate. The United States would support action by ECOSOC forwarding the Covenant to the General Assembly. We would go along with the development of a Covenant including economic and social rights. We would also go along with the consideration of the Covenant in detail in this session of the General Assembly if that were the general sentiment. If opportunity offered, we would point out the incompleteness of the Covenant in its present form and the fact that the Commission had not had time to carry out all of the directions from the fifth session of the General Assembly. In the end, if this seemed feasible, we would support action by the Assembly returning the Covenant to the Human Rights Commission for further study and report to the next session

of the Assembly. However, we would not get out in front on this question or put any pressure on to bring about this result. We would, as in the past, insist on the inclusion of a federal state clause in the Covenant. If an adequate federal state article is not included, the United States would at the appropriate time make a reservation setting forth an adequate federal state provision.

IO Files

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1951.

SD/E/561

REPORT OF SEVENTH (1951) SESSION OF COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ITEM 18)

PROBLEM

What action should the United States support in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in regard to the report of the Seventh (1951) Session of the Commission on Human Rights?

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States should support the view that:

1. ECOSOC should note and comment the report.

2. ECOSOC should not undertake a drafting revision of each of the provisions of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights. ECOSOC should instead discuss the provisions of the Covenant and forward such comments as are made at its 13th Session to the General Assembly. If majority sentiment in ECOSOC is against this view, the United States should urge as a second position that recommendations be formulated and forwarded to the General Assembly rather than an article-by-article revision of the provisions of the Covenant. Such recommendations should if possible be limited to the provisions of Parts III and V of the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights and on reporting.

3. If there is a discussion of drafting changes in ECOSOC, the United States Delegation should be guided by Annex A and not propose or support changes except as set forth in Annex A.[1]

4. If general sentiment in ECOSOC favors the view that the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights should remain in the Covenant, the United States should support the retention of such pro-

[1] Not printed.

visions in the Covenant. The United States would prefer to have these provisions separated from the Covenant and provided for in a separate instrument, but it does not intend to attempt to oppose majority sentiment in ECOSOC on this question for reasons stated below in the discussion section of this paper. Accordingly, if general sentiment in ECOSOC favors the separation of these provisions, the United States should continue to support this view.

5. The United States should, during the consideration of the Covenant in ECOSOC, make a statement of understanding along the following lines with respect to the provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights:

"The United States desires to make clear for the record its understanding of the term 'rights' as used in the economic, social and cultural provisions in Part III of the Covenant in contrast to the use of the term 'rights' in the civil and political provisions in Part II. The civil and political rights are of such a nature as to be given legal effect promptly by the adoption of legislative or other measures as may be necessary. The economic, social and cultural rights, while spoken of as 'rights' are, however, to be treated as objectives towards which states adhering to the Covenant will within their resources undertake to strive by the creation of conditions which will be conducive to the exercise of private as well as public action for their progressive achievement.

"The United States wishes to reiterate in the Economic and Social Council, as its Representative repeatedly stated in the Commission on Human Rights, this understanding of the United States Government that the economic, social, and cultural rights in the Covenant are recognized as objectives to be achieved progressively, as provided in Article 19".

In making this statement the United States Delegation may wish to point out to the Members of the Economic and Social Council the part that the United States is taking with other countries toward the attainment of improved economic, social and cultural conditions in the World. It is scarcely necessary to enumerate the many activities of the United States in this respect. The United States feels that all the Members of the United Nations should not only support the Covenant as a standard of action in economic, social and cultural matters but should also actively participate in the many specialized agencies which are doing daily constructive work in these fields. It might also be pointed out that the Soviet Union talks about achievements in these fields but contributes very little constructively to the improvement of economic, social and cultural conditions in other countries either through the specialized agencies or through the United Nations.

6. The United States favors the position that ECOSOC forward the draft Covenant to the 1951 Session of the General Assembly with no recommendation as to whether it be completed in that session of the General Assembly or be forwarded by the General Assembly to

the Commission on Human Rights for further consideration. The United States should, however, go along with prevailing sentiment in ECOSOC on this question. If prevailing sentiment favors recommending that the General Assembly complete the Covenant at its 1951 session, the United States should support this view. If prevailing sentiment favors recommending that the General Assembly forward the Covenant to the Commission on Human Rights for further consideration, the United States should go along with this view.

7. The United States should continue to oppose the inclusion of provisions in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups or organizations. The United States should point out such provisions should be included in a separate protocol or protocols. The United States should also oppose the inclusion of a provision in the Covenant referring to other international instruments authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups or organizations.

8. ECOSOC should take action with respect to the other sections of the report of the Commission on Human Rights as set forth in Parts C and D of the discussion below, except that with respect to the draft Declaration of the Rights of the Child, see separate position paper on this subject.

DISCUSSION

A. Work of the Commission in General

The Commission on Human Rights at its five-weeks 1951 session considered only the draft International Covenant on Human Rights and the confidential list of communications. It did not have time to consider any other matters on its agenda.

B. Draft International Covenant on Human Rights

1. *General*

The Commission on Human Rights drafted two new parts on economic, social and cultural rights and revised the implementation machinery with respect to civil and political rights. The Commission did not have time to review the other parts of the Covenant. Part III of the Covenant now sets forth the economic, social and cultural rights. Part V sets forth the new reporting requirements and Part IV sets forth the implementation machinery with respect to civil and political rights. Parts I and II on civil and political rights remain unchanged. Part VI which contains drafts of the federal state article, the territories article and procedural articles was not considered except to include the territories article which was approved by the General Assembly at its Fifth (1950) Session.

2. *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*

It is provided in recommendation 4 above that if general sentiment in ECOSOC favors the view that the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights should remain in the Covenant, the United States

should support the retention of such provisions in the Covenant. The United States would prefer to have these provisions separated from the Covenant and provided for in a separate instrument, but it does not intend to attempt to oppose majority sentiment in ECOSOC on this question. Accordingly, if general sentiment in ECOSOC favors the separation of these provisions, the United States should continue to support this view. The United States intends to follow a similar position in the General Assembly, i.e., that of going along with general sentiment on this question.

The United States expects that there will be majority sentiment in the General Assembly favoring the retention of the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights in the Covenant and any effort on the part of the United States to press for the separation of these provisions will not be successful and will rebound unfavorably with respect to the general political position of the United States vis-à-vis other countries, particularly the many underdeveloped countries urging the inclusion of these provisions in the Covenant.

After a careful consideration of the factors involved in the drive by other countries for the inclusion of these provisions in the Covenant, both at the 1950 session of the General Assembly and the 1951 session of the Commission on Human Rights, the United States realizes that the inclusion of these provisions in the Covenant constitutes a symbol of the needs and aspirations of these countries. They look to these articles as a lever which may help to raise them out of their present depressed condition. They do not understand the preference of the United States that these provisions not be included in the first Covenant. They do not understand, and in fact resent, the reluctance of the United States to state these provisions in terms of rights. They insist on the use of the term "rights"—many of these provisions are already stated in terms of rights in their Constitutions. In general they regard these provisions as goals or objectives, not as immediate obligations. In particular, the individuals representing governments in the Commission and in the General Assembly feel that they need such provisions in the Covenant as a standard with which to challenge and prod their own governments and leaders in their countries to greater effort in the direction of attaining economic and social improvement.

It is also necessary to consider this question in connection with the propaganda problem it presents, vis-à-vis the Soviet Government and its unscrupulous propaganda tactics.

Since it appears that even an intensive diplomatic campaign to separate the economic, social and cultural provisions would not be successful and would only create a great deal of ill-will against the United States, it is the recommendation of this paper that the United States simply go along with the majority on this question, without pressing for one side or the other in this matter.

At the same time, however, the United States should make it clear, as appropriate, that the economic, social and cultural provisions are obviously different in a number of respects from the civil and political provisions of the Covenant. These differences were recognized by the Commission on Human Rights and are acknowledged in the draft Covenant.

See Annex A for changes which should be proposed or supported by the United States with respect to the economic, social and cultural provisions in the present text of the draft Covenant. If appropriate changes are not made in the present text of the draft Covenant, the United States contemplates making reservations as necessary at the time of signature or ratification.

3. *Reporting on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*

The Commission initially drafted a new Part V in the Covenant to provide that States ratifying the Covenant would submit reports concerning progress made by them in achieving the observance of economic, social and cultural rights. At the same time, the Commission provided in Article 60 that these reports would be submitted in conformity with the recommendations of ECOSOC and the General Assembly in the exercise of their general responsibility calling upon all Members of the United Nations to provide such reports. The United States should support Article 60 as set forth in the draft Covenant.

There was strong sentiment in the Commission that all Members of the United Nations should be called upon to submit these reports, whether or not they ratified the Covenant on Human Rights. It was recognized of course that only States ratifying the Covenant could be obligated under the Covenant to furnish these reports, and that other Members of the United Nations would not be under a similar obligation to do so. It was felt, however, that since it was being provided in the Covenant that the reports would be considered by the United Nations, all Members of the United Nations should be requested to submit the reports by the adoption of recommendations to this effect by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

The United States should support the provisions on reporting except as set forth in Annex A.

4. *Implementation of Civil and Political Rights*

The Commission revised Part IV of the draft Covenant on the implementation of the civil and political rights. The United States should support the revised text of these provisions. See, however, the change proposed in Article 33 (in Annex A).

The United States should oppose the application of the implementation procedure set forth in Part IV in the economic, social and cultural rights. There was no sentiment at the 1951 session of the Commission for the application of this procedure to economic, social and cultural

rights. It was practically the unanimous view in the Commission that this complaint procedure would not be appropriate for the economic, social and cultural rights. These rights are to be achieved progressively and the obligations of States with respect to these rights are not as precise as with respect to the civil and political rights. The Commission felt it was important to stress the assistance to be accorded to States to achieve economic, social and cultural progress rather than to stimulate complaints against States. The Commission felt that the gradual character of the economic, social and cultural program envisaged was not conducive to an effective complaint procedure.

The Commission at its 1951 session again rejected the inclusion of a provision in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups and organizations. This proposal was rejected by a vote of 7 to 10 with one abstention. The seven countries voting in favor of this proposal were Chile, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Lebanon, Sweden, and Uruguay. The ten countries voting against this proposal were Australia, China, France, Greece, Pakistan, Ukraine, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. Denmark abstained.

Guatemala proposed that a provision be included in the Covenant referring to other international instruments authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups and organizations. This proposal was also rejected by the Commission by a vote of 7 to 9 (US) with 1 abstention.

The United States should continue to oppose the inclusion of provisions in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups or organizations. The United States should point out that such provisions should if they are to be set forth, be included in a separate protocol or protocols. The United States should also oppose the inclusion of a provision in the Covenant such as that proposed by Guatemala to refer in the Covenant to other international instruments authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups and organizations.

5. *Federal State Article*

The United States should make entirely clear its view that a federal state article should be included in the Covenant on Human Rights and should be applicable to economic, social and cultural provisions as well as to the civil and political provisions in the Covenant. See Article 71 in Annex A for the text of the federal state article supported by the United States for inclusion in the Covenant.

This new Article 71 is designed to meet the proposal of India to the 5th (1949) session of the Commission on Human Rights, the proposals of the United Kingdom at the 5th (1949) and 6th (1950) sessions of the Commission on reporting and the proposal of Denmark at the 1951 session of the Commission to phrase this article in terms of an approved reservation.

This proposal should help to meet the criticism expressed at the 1950 session of the General Assembly with respect to the earlier language submitted by the United States for a federal state article. In order to secure the support of other delegations to authorize the Commission on Human Rights at its 7th (1951) session to study the inclusion of a federal state article in the Covenant, the United States indicated in the 1950 session of the General Assembly that it would be willing to take the views of other delegations into account as much as possible in a revision of the federal state article.

Three principal points were made in the discussion in 1950 session of the General Assembly: (1) there was objection to the use of the word "appropriate" in the United States proposal; (2) there was a general preference for the Indian proposal rather than the United States proposal, a number of delegations feeling that the Indian proposal was stated in a more objective sense than the United States proposal; and (3) considerable support developed for the United Kingdom proposal that a reporting requirement should be included in the federal state article.

The language proposed for Article 71 in Annex A undertakes to meet these three principal objections to the previous United States proposal for a federal state article as well as the proposal of Denmark, made in the Commission on Human Rights at its 1951 session, to call for a reservation on this matter by a federal state. The new language also states with added clarity and emphasis the limited character of the obligation a federal state assumes with respect to its constituent units.

At the same time, it is proposed in this paper that a reporting requirement also be included in the Covenant with respect to all States adhering to the Covenant. If a reporting requirement is included in the federal state article requiring a federal state to submit information received from constituent units to the Secretary General of the United Nations, each unitary state should also be required to report with respect to the manner in which provisions of the Covenant are being given effect in that state. In this way, there will be less stress given to the reports of federal states, and unitary states will not be in as strong a position to criticize the reports of federal states. The noncompliance of a unitary state with provisions of the Covenant, as reflected in its reports, will be open for close scrutiny.

6. *Territories Article*

It was decided in the 1951 session of the Commission on Human Rights that the territories article approved by the General Assembly at its 1950 session should be included in the Covenant as Article 72. The United States should not oppose the inclusion of this article in the Covenant.

7. Other Articles of Covenant

The United States should support the articles in Parts I and II and Articles 70 and 73 in Part VI of the Covenant except as set forth in Annex A.

C. Confidential List of Communications

The only agenda item considered by the Commission at its 1951 session other than the draft Covenant was the confidential list of communications. At a brief meeting the Commission received the confidential list of communications and observations from governments concerning human rights prepared by the Secretary General. The Commission simply noted these communications and called the attention of ECOSOC, in its consideration of the question of petitions to the fact that the Commission has been receiving communications concerning human rights since its establishment. No action on the part of ECOSOC is necessary on this point.

D. Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination

The Commission did not reach the consideration of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as requested by the 1950 session of the General Assembly. If this question is raised at ECOSOC, the United States should support its consideration at the Eighth (1952) Session of the Commission.

Editorial Note

At meetings on August 27, 28, and 29, 1951, the Economic and Social Council considered the *Report of the Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights*, that is, the Commission's Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and measures of implementation. On August 29, the Council adopted Resolution 384 (XIII), which took note of the Report of the Commission; expressed appreciation for the Commission's efforts to formulate basic economic, social, and cultural articles; noted that lack of time had prevented the Commission from completing tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly, in particular the revision of the first 18 articles of the draft Covenant and the preparation of recommendations regarding a federal-state article; and in respect of the latter requested the Commission at its next session to proceed to the completion of those tasks. The resolution provided for the transmission of the Commission's reports and drafts to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, together with the Council's own deliberations on the subject, for the information of governments not represented on the Commission or the Council. For text of the resolution, see ECOSOC (XIII)), *Supplement No. 1, Resolutions.* For the proceedings of the Council on this matter, see ECOSOC

(XIII), 522d meeting, 523d meeting, 524th meeting, and 525th meeting, pages 396–419. For statements to the Council by the Alternate United States Representative (Kotschnig), see *ibid.*, pages 406–407 and 417. In the first statement, August 28, Mr. Kotschnig specifically reserved this Government's understanding of the term "rights" as used in the economic, social, and cultural provisions of the draft Covenant (Part III) in contrast to the use of the term "rights" in Part II (provisions on civil and political rights).

340.1–AG/9–1451

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1951.

MY DEAR MRS. ROOSEVELT: Enclosed is a copy of the resolution on the draft International Covenant on Human Rights adopted by the Economic and Social Council in Geneva on August 29, 1951 together with an explanatory statement concerning the vote for Part C of the resolution and on the resolution as a whole.[1]

The fourth paragraph of Part A of the resolution was adopted 11 to 7. Part B was adopted by a vote of 15 to 3.

A review of the minutes of the meetings of the Economic and Social Council at which this resolution was discussed shows that only six of the eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council expressed the view that the economic, social and cultural provisions should be removed from the Covenant. These six countries were India, Belgium, Uruguay, Canada, United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries expressed the view that these provisions should be retained in the Covenant: Mexico, France, Pakistan, Philippines, Chile, China, USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Peru also tended toward this position. Sweden reserved its position, and Iran did not express its point of view on this question.

There was wide sentiment in the Council discussion that the Covenant should be returned to the Commission on Human Rights for its further consideration after its review by the General Assembly.

We are proceeding with the preparation of a position paper on the draft International Covenant on Human Rights for the next session of the General Assembly. When our work has advanced sufficiently on this paper, we would very much like to discuss it with you.

Sincerely yours, DURWARD V. SANDIFER

[1] Not attached.

IO Files

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations [1]

RESTRICTED
SD/A/C.3/145

[WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1951.

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

THE PROBLEM

What should be the position of the United States concerning the draft International Covenant on Human Rights?

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The United States would prefer to have the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights separated from the present draft Covenant on Human Rights and provided for in a separate instrument. The following course of action should accordingly be followed:

(*a*) The United States should, if it finds majority sentiment in the Assembly favorable, support the position that two instruments instead of the present single instrument on human rights be drafted. One instrument would contain civil and political rights and the other instrument would contain economic, social and cultural rights.

(*b*) If it appears majority sentiment in the General Assembly is unfavorable to position (*a*) and the General Assembly decides to refer the draft Covenant to the Commission on Human Rights for its further consideration, the United States Delegation should, if it is likely to obtain majority support in the Assembly, propose and support the position that the General Assembly defer its decision and request the Commission to prepare three instruments for the consideration of the Assembly at its 1952 session—the first instrument would contain civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; the second instrument would contain only civil and political rights; and the third instrument would contain only economic, social and cultural rights. The Assembly would at its 1952 session then decide whether all these rights should be in one or two instruments, accepting either the pattern of the first instrument or the pattern of the second and third instruments.

(2) If majority sentiment in the General Assembly appears unfavorable to recommendations 1(*a*) and 1(*b*) and favorable to the inclusion of economic, social and cultural provisions in a single Covenant with civil and political rights, the United States Delegation should not oppose but should vote for the inclusion of economic, social and cultural provisions in a single Covenant. In this event the United States should explain that it intends to vote for the retention of these

[1] The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in Paris on November 6, 1951.

provisions because of the general sentiment in the Assembly favoring this view. The United States Delegation should not oppose majority sentiment in the Assembly on this question for reasons stated below in the comment section of this paper.

(3) The United States should, during the consideration of the Covenant in the General Assembly, make a statement of understanding along the following lines with respect to the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights:

"The United States desires to make clear for the record its understanding of the term 'rights' as used in the economic, social and cultural provisions in Part III of the Covenant in contrast to the use of the term 'rights' in the civil and political provisions in Part II. The civil and political rights are of such a nature as to be given legal effect promptly by the adoption of legislative or other measures as may be necessary. The economic, social and cultural rights, while spoken of as 'rights' are, however, to be treated as objectives which states adhering to the Covenant will within their resources undertake to achieve progressively by private as well as public action.

"The United States wishes to reiterate in the General Assembly, as its representatives repeatedly stated in the Commission on Human Rights and in the Economic and Social Council, this understanding of the United States Government that the economic, social and cultural rights in the Covenant are recognized as objectives to be achieved progressively, as provided in Article 19."

In making this statement the Delegation may wish to point out the part that the United States is taking with other countries toward the attainment of improved economic, social and cultural conditions in the world. The United States believes that all the Members of the United Nations should not only support the Covenant as a standard of action in economic, social and cultural matters but should also actively participate in the many specialized agencies which are doing daily constructive work in these fields. It might also be pointed out that the Soviet Union talks about achievements in these fields but contributes very little constructively to the improvement of economic, social and cultural conditions in other countries either through the specialized agencies or through the United Nations.

(4) The United States should go along with prevailing sentiment in the General Assembly for the completion of the Covenant in this session or its reference to the Commission on Human Rights for further consideration. The Delegation should explain that it is prepared to participate in the completion of the Covenant at this session if it is possible to do so and if other delegations are also prepared to do so.

(5) If the General Assembly undertakes a discussion of drafting changes in the Covenant, the United States Delegation should be guided by Annex A. If the Assembly proceeds with the drafting of the Covenant, the Delegation should indicate its preference that the

Assembly begin with the consideration of Article 1 since in this way the first 18 articles would be discussed first. The United States considers these articles as being closer to a satisfactory completed drafting stage than the other articles of the Covenant.

(6) The United States should continue to oppose the inclusion of provisions in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups or organizations. The United States should point out that such provisions should, if they are to be provided, be included in a separate protocol or protocols. The United States should also oppose the inclusion of a provision in the Covenant referring to other international instruments authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups or organizations.

(7) The United States should urge the inclusion of a federal state article in the Covenant on Human Rights as set forth in Article 71 of Annex A in order that it will be expressly clear that the obligations of the United States under the Covenant are limited to matters which, under the Constitution of the United States, are in their federal jurisdiction. This article should be applicable to the economic, social, and cultural provisions as well as the civil and political provisions of the Covenant.

COMMENT

1. *General*

The Commission on Human Rights at its 1951 session drafted two new parts of the Covenant, one setting forth economic, social and cultural rights and another setting forth reporting requirements. In addition, the Commission revised the complaint provisions with respect to civil and political rights. The Commission did not have time to review the other parts of the Covenant. Part III of the Covenant now sets forth the economic, social and cultural rights. Part IV sets forth the complaint provisions and Part V the new reporting requirements. Parts I and II on civil and political rights remain unchanged. Part VI which contains drafts of the federal state article, the territories article and procedural articles was not considered except to include the territories article which was approved by the General Assembly at its Fifth (1950) session.

2. *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*

As pointed out above in recommendation 1, the United States would prefer to have the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights separated from the present draft Covenant and provided for in a separate instrument. It is hoped that majority sentiment in the Assembly will support the course of action proposed in recommendation 1. If, however, Assembly sentiment is unfavorable to this recommendation and favorable instead to the retention of economic, social and cultural

provisions in a single Covenant with civil and political rights, the United States Delegation should not propose or support recommendation 1 but should instead vote for the retention of these provisions in a single Covenant.

After a careful consideration of the factors involved in the views expressed by other countries for the inclusion of these provisions in the Covenant, at the 1950 session of the General Assembly, the 1951 session of the Commission on Human Rights and the July–September 1951 session of the Economic and Social Council, the United States has come to the conclusion that it would not be wise to oppose majority sentiment in the Assembly at this session on this question. To press for the separation of these provisions in the face of majority opposition in the Assembly would only invite a great deal of ill-will against the United States and rebound unfavorably with respect to the general political position of the United States vis-à-vis other countries, particularly in view of the many underdeveloped countries urging the inclusion of these provisions in the Covenant.

The economic, social and cultural provisions in the Covenant constitute a symbol of the needs and aspirations of these countries. They look to these articles as a lever which may help to raise them out of their present depressed condition. They do not understand the preference of the United States that these provisions not be included in the same instrument as civil and political rights. They do not understand, and in fact resent the reluctance of the United States to state these provisions in terms of rights. They insist on the use of the term "rights"—many of these provisions are already stated in terms of rights in their Constitutions. In general they regard these provisions as goals or objectives, not as immediate obligations. In particular, the individuals representing governments in the Commission and in the General Assembly feel that they need such provisions in the Covenant as a standard with which to challenge and prod their own governments and leaders in their countries to greater effort in the direction of attaining economic and social improvement, despite the fact that it is realized that they are handicapped in the full attainment of these objectives by the lack of funds, technical "know-how," etc.

It is also necessary to consider this question in connection with the propaganda problem it presents, vis-à-vis the Soviet Government and its unscrupulous propaganda tactics.

At the same time, however, the United States should make it clear, as appropriate, that the economic, social and cultural provisions are obviously different in a number of respects from the civil and political provisions of the Covenant. These differences were recognized by the Commission on Human Rights and are acknowledged in the draft Covenant.

3. *Reporting Requirements*

The Commission initially drafted a new Part V in the Covenant to provide that States ratifying the Covenant would submit reports concerning progress made by them in achieving the observance of economic, social and cultural rights. At the same time, the Commission provided in Article 60 that these reports would be submitted in conformity with the recommendations of ECOSOC and the General Assembly in the exercise of their general responsibility calling upon all Members of the United Nations to provide such reports. The United States Delegation should support Article 60 as set forth in the draft Covenant.

There was strong sentiment in the Commission that all Members of the United Nations should be called upon to submit these reports, whether or not they ratified the Covenant on Human Rights. It was recognized of course that only States ratifying the Covenant could be obligated under the Covenant to furnish these reports, and that other Members of the United Nations would not be under a similar obligation to do so. It was felt, however, that since it was being provided in the Covenant that the reports would be considered by the United Nations, all Members of the United Nations should be requested to submit the reports by the adoption of recommendations to this effect by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

The United States Delegation should support the provisions on reporting except as set forth in Annex A.[2]

In adopting Part V at its 1951 session, the Commission postponed its decision as to whether the reporting requirements of this Part should apply only to the economic, social and cultural rights recognized in Part III or also to the civil and political rights in Part II of the Covenant.

On this question, the United States would prefer that the reporting requirements of Part V be applicable solely to the economic, social and cultural rights in Part III and to limit reporting on the civil and political rights along the lines of the United States reporting proposal for an additional paragraph 4 for Article 1.

As a second position, however, if sentiment in the General Assembly favors the extension of the reporting program of Part V to the civil and political rights, the United States Delegation should go along with this view.

4. *Implementation of Civil and Political Rights*

The Commission revised Part IV of the draft Covenant on the implementation of the civil and political rights. The United States should support the revised text of these provisions. See, however, the change proposed in Article 33 (in Annex A).

[2] Annex A not printed. It was a detailed commentary on all 71 articles of the Draft Covenant.

The United States should oppose the application of the implementation procedures set forth in Part IV to the economic, social and cultural rights. There was no sentiment at the 1951 session of the Commission for the application of this procedure to economic, social and cultural rights. It was practically the unanimous view in the Commission that this complaint procedure would not be appropriate for the economic, social and cultural rights. These rights are to be achieved progressively and the obligations of States with respect to these rights are not as precise as with respect to the civil and political rights. The Commission felt it was important to stress the assistance to be accorded to States to achieve economic, social and cultural progress rather than to stimulate complaints against States. The Commission felt that the gradual character of the economic, social and cultural program envisaged was not conducive to an effective complaint procedure.

The Commission at its 1951 session again rejected the inclusion of a provision in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups and organizations. This proposal was rejected by a vote of 7 to 10 with one abstention. The seven countries voting in favor of this proposal were Chile, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Lebanon, Sweden and Uruguay. The ten countries voting against this proposal were Australia, China, France, Greece, Pakistan, Ukraine, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. Denmark abstained.

Guatemala proposed that a provision be included in the Covenant referring to other international instruments authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups and organizations. This proposal was also rejected by the Commission by a vote of 7 to 9 (US) with 1 abstention.

The United States Delegation should continue to oppose the inclusion of provisions in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups or organizations. The United States Delegation should point out that such provisions should if they are to be set forth, be included in a separate protocol or protocols. The United States Delegation should also oppose the inclusion of a provision in the Covenant such as that proposed by Guatemala to refer in the Covenant to other international instruments authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups and organizations.

5. *Federal State Article*

The United States should make entirely clear its view that a federal state article should be included in the Covenant on Human Rights and should be applicable to economic, social and cultural provisions as well as to the civil and political provisions in the Covenant. See Article 71 in Annex A for the text of the federal state article supported by the United States for inclusion in the Covenant.

This new Article 71 is designed to meet the proposal of India to the 5th (1949) session of the Commission on Human Rights, the proposals of the United Kingdom at the 5th (1949) and 6th (1950) sessions of the Commission on reporting and the proposal of Denmark at the 1951 session of the Commission to phrase this article in terms of an approved reservation and to reflect the federal state article included in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons at Geneva on July 25, 1951.

This new proposal for Article 71 should help to meet the criticism expressed at the 1950 session of the General Assembly with respect to the earlier language submitted by the United States for a federal state article. In order to secure the support of other delegations to authorize the Commission on Human Rights at its 7th (1951) session to study the inclusion of a federal state article in the Covenant, the United States Delegation indicated in the 1950 session of the General Assembly that it would be willing to take the views of other delegations into account as much as possible in a revision of the federal state article.

Three principal points were made in the discussion in the 1950 session of the General Assembly: (1) there was objection to the use of the word "appropriate" in the United States proposal; (2) there was a general preference for the Indian proposal rather than the United States proposal, a number of delegations feeling that the Indian proposal was stated in a more objective sense than the United States proposal; and (3) considerable support developed for the United Kingdom proposal that a reporting requirement should be included in the federal state article.

The language proposed for Article 71 in Annex A undertakes to meet these three principal objections to the previous United States proposal for a federal state article as well as the proposal of Denmark, made in the Commission on Human Rights at its 1951 session, to call for a reservation on this matter by a federal state. The new language also states with added clarity and emphasis the limited character of the obligations a federal state assumes with respect to its constituent units and includes some of the language of the federal state article approved for the Refugee Convention.

At the same time, it is proposed that a reporting requirement also be included in the Covenant with respect to all States adhering to the Covenant. If a reporting requirement is included in the federal state article requiring a federal state to submit information received from constituent units to the Secretary General of the United Nations, each unitary state should also be required to report with respect to the manner in which provisions of the Covenant are being given effect in that State. In this way, there will be less stress given to the reports

of federal states, and unitary states will not be in as strong a position to criticize the reports of federal states. The noncompliance of a unitary state with provisions of the Covenant, as reflected in its reports, will be open for close scrutiny.

6. *Territories Article*

It was decided in the 1951 session of the Commission on Human Rights that the terrorities article approved by the General Assembly at its 1950 session should be included in the Covenant as Article 72. The United States should not oppose the inclusion of this article in the Covenant.

7. *Other Articles of Covenant*

The United States should support the articles in Parts I and II and Articles 70 and 73 in Part VI of the Covenant except as set forth in Annex A.

340.1–AG/10–251

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 2, 1951.

No. 118

The Secretary of State requests the United States Representative to the United Nations, if he perceives no objection, to discuss with the British, French, Canadian and Australian Delegations to the United Nations the attitude of the United States with respect to the consideration of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights in the sixth (1951) session of the General Assembly as set forth in the attached statement and at the same time to hand a copy of this statement to these delegations and to request a statement of the views of their Governments on these issues.

There is enclosed for the information of the United States Representative three copies of the position paper concerning the draft Covenant on Human Rights at the sixth session of the General Assembly which has been finally approved as the position of the United States.[1]

[Annex]

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The United States would prefer to have the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights separated from the present draft Covenant on Human Rights and provided for in a separate instru-

[1] *Supra.*

ment. The United States accordingly proposes to take the following course of action at this session of the General Assembly:

(*a*) The United States will support the drafting of two instruments instead of the present single instrument on human rights, provided that there is majority sentiment in the General Assembly favorable to this position. One instrument would contain civil and political rights and the other instrument would contain economic, social and cultural rights.

(*b*) If it appears majority sentiment in the General Assembly is unfavorable to position (*a*) and the General Assembly decides to refer the draft Covenant to the Commission on Human Rights for its further consideration, the United States intends, if it is likely to obtain majority support in the Assembly, to support the position that the General Assembly defer its decision and request the Commission to prepare three instruments for the consideration of the Assembly at its 1952 session—the first instrument would contain civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; the second instrument would contain only civil and political rights; and the third instrument would contain only economic, social and cultural rights. The Assembly would at its 1952 session then decide whether all these rights should be in one or two instruments, accepting either the pattern of the first instrument or the pattern of the second and third instruments.

2. If majority sentiment in the General Assembly appears unfavorable to these recommendations and favorable to the inclusion of economic, social and cultural provisions in a single Covenant with civil and political rights, the United States does not intend to oppose the inclusion of economic, social and cultural provisions in a single Covenant.

3. The United States Delegation intends, during the consideration of the Covenant in the General Assembly, to make clear for the record its understanding of the term "rights" as used in the economic, social and cultural provisions in Part III of the Covenant in contrast to the use of the term "rights" in the civil and political provisions in Part II; i.e., that the economic, social and cultural rights, while spoken of as "rights" are, however, to be treated as objectives which States adhering to the Covenant will within their resources undertake to achieve progressively by private as well as public action.

4. The United States intends to go along with prevailing sentiment in the General Assembly for the completion of the Covenant in this session or its reference to the Commission on Human Rights for further consideration. The United States intends to explain that it is prepared to participate in the completion of the Covenant at this session if it is possible to do so and if other delegations are also prepared to do so.

5. The United States intends to continue to oppose the inclusion of provisions in the Covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups or organizations. The United States intends to point

out such provisions should, if they are to be provided, be included in a separate protocol or protocols.

6. The United States will urge the inclusion of a federal state article in the Covenant on Human Rights. This article should be applicable to the economic, social and cultural provisions as well as the civil and political provisions of the Covenant.

The United States would appreciate receiving the views and support of the British, French, Canadian and Australian delegations with respect to the following draft of a federal state article for Article 71 of the Covenant:

"A Federal State may at the time of signature or ratification of, or accession to, this Covenant make a Declaration stating that the provisions of the Covenant are not entirely, under the Constitution of the Federal State, within the jurisdiction of its federal authority but are in part within the jurisdiction of its constituent states, provinces or cantons. In the event such a Declaration is made, the obligations of the Federal State shall be:

"(1) In respect of provisions of the Covenant that in the absence of this Covenant would come within the jurisdiction of the federal authority the obligations of the Federal State shall to this extent be the same as those of Parties not filing such a Declaration.

"(2) In respect of provisions of the Covenant that come within the jurisdiction of its constituent states, provinces or cantons, which are not under the constitutional system of the federation bound to take legislative action, the obligations of the Federal State shall to this extent be (*a*) to bring these provisions with favorable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of the constituent units at the earliest possible moment, and (*b*) to request such authorities to inform the Federal Government as to the status of the law of the constituent units when compared with these provisions of the Covenant. The Federal Government shall transmit such information received from constituent units to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

"The Secretary General of the United Nations shall inform other States Parties to the Covenant of such Declaration."

This new Article 71 undertakes to incorporate language proposed by India to the 5th (1949) session of the Commission on Human Rights, the proposals of the United Kingdom at the 5th (1949) and 6th (1950) sessions of the Commission on reporting and the proposal of Denmark at the 1951 session of the Commission to phrase this article in terms of an approved reservation and to reflect the federal state article included in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons at Geneva on July 25, 1951.

This article should meet the criticism expressed at the 1950 session of the General Assembly with respect to the earlier language submitted by the United States for a federal state article. In order to secure the support of other delegations to authorize the Commission on Human

Rights at its 7th (1951) session to study the inclusion of a federal state article in the Covenant, the United States Delegation indicated in the 1950 session of the General Assembly that it would be willing to take the views of other delegations into account as much as possible in a revision of the federal state article.

Three principal points were made in the discussion in the 1950 session of the General Assembly: (1) there was objection to the use of the word "appropriate" in the United States proposal; (2) there was a general preference for the Indian proposal rather than the United States proposal, a number of delegations feeling that the Indian proposal was stated in a more objective sense than the United States proposal; and (3) considerable support developed for the United Kingdom proposal that a reporting requirement should be included in the federal state article.

The language proposed for Article 71 meets these three principal objections to the previous United States proposal for a federal state article as well as the proposal of Denmark, made in the Commission on Human Rights at its 1951 session, to call for a reservation on this matter by a federal state. A Declaration rather than a reservation seems preferable to the United States to avoid the many complexities involved with respect to reservations. It has also seemed useful to use some of the language of the federal state article approved for the Refugee Convention.

IO Files

Minutes of Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 12, 1951 [1]

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/196

[Here follow list of persons (49) present and discussion of two prior agenda items.]

3. Mr. Green noted that the other principal items in Committee 3—freedom of information and refugees—would be taken up with the Delegation at a later date. He gave a brief account of the attempts at drafting the Human Rights Covenant, by which the principles of the Human Rights Declaration would be embodied in a treaty. The Human Rights Commission had wanted, at its last session, to add to the Human Rights Covenant certain portions on economic, social, and cultural rights in addition to those on civil and political rights.

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[1] For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44. The Secretary of State presided at this meeting.

There would be two major questions for Committee 3. The first was whether or not to sustain the latest ECOSOC recommendation that the Covenant should be returned to the HRComm for further consideration. The proposed position was that we should be prepared to draft the Covenant at any time that was practicable, i.e. either in C.3 or in the HRComm. This would depend entirely on which way the majority tended. We would follow the majority, recognizing that the drafting of the HRC wherever done would be a big job. Ambassador Austin interrupted to ask if our decision on procedure might be affected by our position on the substance. Mr. Green said we would have to have an argument on the substance at some point, and it did not too much matter where it came.

Mr. Cohen said there was a difference in not opposing the majority and supporting it. His view was that we must not act with undue haste on this matter. His substantive views had been made apparent at meetings of the Delegation during other sessions of the GA.

Mr. Green explained that the second major question was whether to include economic and social rights in a single covenant, or to insist on two separate covenants, as had been our position in the past. We had taken our previous position from a feeling that a separate covenant on civil and political rights would receive the largest number of ratifications. Supported by the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and occasionally India, we had argued that economic and social rights were of a different character from civil and political rights. The majority did not support us in this position, or at least favored a single covenant. The Latin Americans, Near Easterners, and Far Easterners took a different view, since they were not concerned by the fact that their governments would become a party to obligations which they could not fulfill at the present. They felt that the inclusion of such rights would act as a lever in raising their economic and social status. The general emotionalism of the underdeveloped countries lay behind the majority feeling in C.3. They also felt that, if there were two covenants, one would be considered more important than the other, and many states might not adhere to the lesser one regarding economic and social rights. ECOSOC had, by an 11–5 vote, supported our position of separate covenants.

The general US position was not to risk all of the ill will we had obtained last year by opposing the majority. It would be better to have a flexible position, thereby being able to take the leadership away from the Soviets. Thus, if the majority should favor drawing up two covenants, we would agree. In the event that the majority wanted a single covenant and also was willing to let the drafting take place in the HRComm, we would take the position that the Commission should draw up two sets of covenants: one would be the single covenant, the other would contain two covenants, one on civil and political rights,

the other concerning economic and social matters. In this way we could offer for full consideration the two alternatives, in a side-by-side comparison. If the majority wanted a single covenant drafted now by the 3rd Committee, our position would be flexible enough to agree to this. We would not, however, lose the opportunity to make known our position and the domestic difficulties which a single covenant would present. We would thus make clear at every turn the fact that we regarded the so-called economic and social rights as objectives, and not legally enforceable obligations. The papers offered by Mr. Green for consideration of the Delegation also included a draft statement to be made by us on this latter matter, and detailed proposals on drafting the covenant.

Dr. Lubin pointed out that the US in last summer's ECOSOC meeting had obtained an agreement that, if the result were to be two separate covenants, they would both be submitted for ratification and signature to governments at the same time. Mr. Green said he would note this in the US position.

Dr. Tobias wondered about the relation between the HRC and the obligations of states under Article 73(*e*) of the Charter. Ambassador Sayre thought the covenant would not change any of the obligations of the Charter as to the nature of the Reports submitted under that Article. Mr. Sandifer pointed out that the question of ratification would still be up to the various states after the HRC had been drafted. Mr. Fisher posed a sample problem along these lines. If France should become a party to the HRC, and the Moroccans should protest under the appropriate procedures of the HRC, this would have no effect on Article 73(*e*). The matter would not be kept away from the Assembly because of the reports submitted under that article either. It would come to the Assembly, or to the UN's consideration, even if not raised as an Item on the GA agenda.

CHARLES D. COOK

IO Files

Minutes of Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 13, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/197

[Here follow list of persons (47) present and discussion of a prior agenda item. The Secretary of State was in the Chair.]

2. In a continuation of the Human Rights Covenant discussion, Mrs. Roosevelt offered background information on the C.3 situation. This, she felt, would serve to explain why the US had so many pos-

sible positions. The US and the western Europeans had been outvoted by the underdeveloped countries on the basis of emotion rather than reason. For example, the Indians had behaved quite irrationally in not carrying out their instructions and in voting against their previous stand. The day before, Professor Bokhari of Pakistan had told Mrs. Roosevelt that he did not favor trying to draft the Covenant over again in C.3. But he still wished to put all the economic and social rights into a single Human Rights Covenant. The Egyptians had taken the lead on this position in the UN. Even the NGO's from the US had disagreed with the US position on this matter, wanting to go much further, and in particular opposing the limitation of the right of petition to governments only. They did not seem to realize the practical difficulties involved, especially in connection with ratification by Congress.

Another point which the underdeveloped countries had insisted upon was that there would be no difficulty in having economic and social "rights" which were not justifiable. To avoid difficulties the US had devised a way of saying that these were not really "Rights", but only objectives to be sought. Mrs. Roosevelt would warn the other countries that the US would have a serious problem in trying to obtain ratification, and probably would not succeed. Furthermore the Federal-State clause, which was highly unpopular was of major importance to the US. It would probably be voted down just as the UK's territorial clause had been.

Mrs. Roosevelt added that she was aware of the tremendous legal difficulties encountered by the US, but she also feared the danger that the US might seem to be opposed to the cause of Human Rights. We would have to go along with the majority if it insisted on a single covenant, and we would leave it up to Congress to make whatever reservations they felt were needed. Above all we should not give the impression that the US was afraid to broaden the application of Human Rights provisions either at home or abroad. She said that a two-covenant situation would make it possible for the US to consider favorably the adoption of the one with civil and political rights.

In answer to a question by Miss Strauss, Mrs. Roosevelt said that the 5th GA had voted for a single covenant. ECOSOC had obtained a vote recommending reconsideration of this decision; but C.3 was far more representative of the Human Rights Commission than it was of ECOSOC.

Ambassador Sayre asked why the US position was not to oppose but to vote in favor of a single covenant, including the economic, social and cultural rights, when we did not think it was right and when we did not believe in it. Mrs. Roosevelt responded that we should not again be completely against a large majority. We should show that we were not trying to dictate and that we would go along, provided it

was very clearly understood just what our position was. The Department felt that it would hurt the US more to be adamant when it would obviously lose anyway, than to go along with the majority and let them know of our objections. We would have to gauge the temper of the majority at the time the matter came up for a vote, and at that time decide whether to abstain or vote in favor. Replying to Ambassador Gross' question, she said that the USSR was always in the lead on this matter, but it tried to amend everything to give more enforcement power to individual states, rather than to retain the international flavor.

Dr. Tobias asked if the US was only supporting two covenants from a feeling that Congress would just [accept] the civil and political one. Mrs. Roosevelt said that it was very important that we should ratify the civil and political rights covenant, even if it were necessary to have a big debate in the Congress on the anti-discrimination clause. This would be a good thing for the US. She felt we would never ratify economic and social rights in a treaty. Such rights meant all things to all peoples. We would be getting something if we achieved a ratified covenant on civil and political rights.

Senator Cooper wondered if the Delegation were to take final action that morning on the US position. Mrs. Roosevelt said that was not expected, but that since C.3 discussion toward the end of the week might conceivably get to this matter, it was wise for the Delegation to be thinking seriously about it. Mr. Cooper asked to reserve his rights to comment later when he had had time to study the matter further.

[Here follows discussion of another agenda item.]

CHARLES D. COOK

320/11–3051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 30, 1951.
[Received November 30—8 : 12 p. m.]

Delga 450. Following is draft resolution (A/C.3/L.182) on Human Rights Covenant submitted in committee 3 by Chile, Egypt, Pakistan and Yugoslavia:

"Whereas the Economic and Social Council requested, by its decision of 9 August 1950, the General Assembly to make a policy decision concerning the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the Covenant on Human Rights,

Whereas the General Assembly affirmed, in its decision contained in resolution 421 E (V), that (the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are intercon-

nected and interdependent) and that (when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not represent a human person whom the universal declaration regards as the ideal of the free man),

Whereas the General Assembly, in the aforementioned resolution after a thorough and all-round discussion, confirmed the principle that economic, social and cultural rights should be included in the Covenant on Human Rights,

The General Assembly, having in mind resolution 384 (XIII) of the Economic and Social Council of 8 August 1951, but taking into account the fact that the Commission on Human Rights, at its seventh session, with the cooperation of the international labour organization, educational, social and cultural organization and world health organization, had already elaborated the first draft of economic, social and cultural rights in fourteen Articles, reaffirms its decision recorded in resolution 421 E (V) that economic, social and cultural rights should be included in the Covenant on Human Rights."

AUSTIN

320/11–3051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 30, 1951.
[Received November 30—6 : 28 p. m.]

Delga 451. Following is Chilean draft resolution (A/C.3/L.180) in Committee 3 on human rights covenant:

"*The General Assembly*,

Having considered the report of the Commission on Human Rights (seventh session) and the records of the discussion thereon at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council,

Noting that only lack of time prevented the Commission on Human Rights from undertaking certain of the tasks which the General Assembly assigned to it under Resolution 421 [E] (V) in connection with the draft international covenant on human rights.

Noting, likewise, that the Economic and Social Council decided to request the Commission on Human Rights to proceed, at its next session, with these tasks, in particular the revision of the first eighteen articles of the draft covenant and the preparation of recommendations aimed at securing the maximum extension of the covenant to the constituent units of federal states and at meeting the constitutional problems of those states,

1. *Reaffirms* the directives already given by the General Assembly in Resolution 421 [E] (V) and requests the Economic and Social Council to transmit to the Commission on Human Rights the records of the General Assembly meetings containing the discussions on the report of the Commission on Human Rights and the comments of representatives on the draft covenant, in order to guide the commission in its work;

2. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to take appropriate measures to ensure that the Commission on Human Rights shall have

the necessary time at its disposal to complete before the fifteenth session of the council the work assigned to it in connection with the international covenant on Human Rights so that the council may submit it, together with its own recommendations, to the seventh session of the General Assembly."

AUSTIN

320/12–751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 7, 1951.
[Received December 7—6 : 35 p. m.]

Delga 554. Re: Human Rights Covenant. Following is Belgium–India–Lebanon–US amendment (A/C.3/L.185) to Chile–Egypt–Pakistan–Yugoslav resolution (Delga 450, Nov. 30) on Human Rights Covenant:

"1. After the third para of the preamble, insert the following:

—'whereas—the GA at the request of the ECOSOC in resolution 384 (XIII) of 29 August 1951, reconsidered this matter at its 6th session.'

"2. Substitute the following for the 4th para of the preamble and the operative para:

—'Requests—the ECOSOC to ask the Commission on Human Rights to draft two covenants on Human Rights, to be submitted simultaneously for the consideration of the GA at its 7th session, one to contain civil and political rights and the other to contain economic, social and cultural rights, in order that the GA may approve the two covenants simultaneously and open them at the same time for signature.' "

AUSTIN

320/12–1951 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 19, 1951.
[Received December 19—7 : 02 p. m.]

Delga 743. Re Draft Covenant on Human Rights. Following are texts of three resolutions submitted in Comite Three:

1. Guatemala 12 Dec Document A/C 3/L 190:

"The GA considering that it is desirable that the Covenant on HR should include provisions relating to the admissibility or non-

admissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them, in particular with regard to the validity of the covenant as between the reserving state and other states ratifying the covenant, considering that the ICJ and other organs of the UN, including the GA, have studied the problem of reservations and that it is desirable that their conclusions should be taken into account in so far as they are appropriate to the purpose of this resolution, decides to recommend to the ECOSOC that it should instruct the Commission on HR to prepare for inclusion in the Covenant on HR one or more clauses relating to the admissibility or non-admissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them".

2. Ecuador and Guatemala Dec 13 doc A/C 3/L 189:

"The GA considering that the Commission on HR has by virtue of GA res 421 E (V) of 4 Dec 1951, prepared various articles on economic, social and cultural rights, considering that the wording of those articles, which have been examined during the present session of the GA, should be improved in order to protect more effectively the rights to which they refer calls upon the ECOSOC to request the Commission on HR to take into consideration when revising those articles of the draft covenant the views expressed during the discussion of the draft covenant and also such views as the specialized agencies [garble] and govts of member states may think fit to advance."

3. Syria, Dec 18 doc A/C 3/L 191.

"The GA considering that the measures for the implementation of the international Covenant on HR so far recommended by the ECOSOC and the Commission on HR do not provide for commissions of investigation and enquiry, considering that commissions of investigation and enquiry could if made to offer adequate guarantees of good faith and impartiality contribute greatly towards the implementation of the Covenant on HR and in particular of the provisions concerning economic, social and cultural rights, whereas commissions of investigation and enquiry are already widely used by the organs of the UN as means of study and investigation, requests the ECOSOC to consider the possibility of including commissions of investigation and enquiry, offering adequate safeguards of good faith and impartiality among the measures of implementation provided for by the Covenant on HR and of giving the Commission on HR specific directives on these lines."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–1052: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, January 10, 1952—5 p. m.

Delga 960. Human Rights Covenant. In conversation with Daza Ondarza of Bolivia [1] today, he confidentially advised Mrs. Roosevelt

[1] Ernesto Daza Ondarza, Minister in the Permanent Delegation of Bolivia to the United Nations, member of the Bolivian Delegation to the General Assembly.

he had just recd instructions from FonOff vote for single covenant on human rights. He expressed thought that request was very likely made to his govt by another govt to vote for single covenant. He feels it would be difficult to explain action of his FonOff on any other grounds.

Daza Ondarza urged Dept approach all FonOffs in LA, including Bolivia FonOff, through US Embassies to counteract request to these FonOffs for support single covenant.

USGADel has not yet found that any other LA del has recd instructions similar to those of Bolivia and considers any general approach in other capitals undesirable.

Daza Ondarza is wiring FonOff immediately to point out arguments presented him by Mrs. Roosevelt for two covenants. He indicated appreciation for simultaneous support for US position through Dept. We suggest Dept may wish instruct Embassy La Paz in its discretion bring foregoing to attn FonOff and explain briefly our reasons for supporting two covenants.

Vote on two covenant issue is close in GA. Single vote may be decisive. Vote expected in committee Friday or Saturday, January 11 or 12.

ROOSEVELT

Editorial Note

For the exhaustive deliberations of the Third Committee on the Draft Covenant (including the question of insertion of a self-determination article), November 30–December 21, 1951 and January 14–30, 1952, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Third Committee*, pages 67–150 and pages 235–403 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Third Committee*). For the complicated parliamentary history of this item in committee, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Annexes*, fascicule for Agenda item 29 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Annexes*).

The General Assembly considered the Report of the Third Committee on the Draft Covenant at plenary meetings on February 4 and 5, 1952. For the proceedings, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 501–520 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Plenary*). For texts of the resolutions concerning human rights adopted by the General Assembly on February 5, Resolutions 543 (VI)–549 (VI), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Resolutions*, pages 36 and 37 (hereafter cited as GA (VI), *Resolutions*).

The essential components of the resolutions were as follows: The General Assembly decided that two draft covenants should be formu-

lated for the consideration of the Assembly at its Seventh Session, one to contain civil and political rights and the other to contain economic, social, and cultural rights (Resolution 543 (VI)). Resolution 544 (VI) requested the Commission on Human Rights to improve the wording of the economic, social, and cultural articles, taking into account the views expressed during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly decided to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights an article on self-determination, and formulated a draft text relating thereto (Resolution 545 (VI)) (see documentation immediately following). Resolution 549 (VI) requested the Economic and Social Council to hold a special session to precede the Eighth Session of the Human Rights Commission, "at which it shall take the necessary action to enable the Commission to complete the work entrusted to it . . . before the end of the Council's fourteenth session, so that the Council may submit the drafts to the General Assembly at its seventh regular session together with its recommendations."

II. PROPOSALS FOR THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES AND NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON, April 1951.]

SD/E/CN.4/58

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
RIGHT OF PEOPLES AND NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

PROBLEM

What should be the position of the United States at the 7th (1951) session of the Commission on Human Rights with respect to the request set forth in the Resolution (Section D) adopted by the 1950 session of the General Assembly that the Commission on Human Rights "study ways and means which would ensure the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination and to prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixth session?"

RECOMMENDATION

1. If majority sentiment in the Commission favors the consideration of this subject, the United States Delegation should join in its consideration.

2. If majority sentiment in the Commission favors some affirmative action in the Commission, the United States Delegation should pro-

pose—if some other delegation does not do so—that a resolution on this subject should be adopted rather than the inclusion of a provision on the right of self-determination in the Covenant on Human Rights. Such a resolution might call on Members of the United Nations as well as the United Nations itself and its organs to give due attention in their work to the principle of self-determination of peoples in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

3. If the Commission decides to include a provision on the right of self-determination in the Covenant, the United States Delegation should seek to limit this to a reference in the preamble.

4. If the Commission decides to include a provision on the right of self-determination in the text of the Covenant rather than in the Preamble, the United States Delegation should seek to limit this to a provision along the following lines: "Each State party hereto agrees to promote the principle of self-determination of peoples in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."

DISCUSSION

Background.

During the consideration of the draft Covenant on Human Rights at the 1950 session of the General Assembly, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia proposed that a provision be included in the resolution being considered by the General Assembly requesting the Commission on Human Rights "to study ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, and to prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixth session." This paragraph is included in the resolution by a vote of 31 to 16 with 5 abstentions and 9 absent in the Third Committee.

The vote on this paragraph was as follows:

For the proposal: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Byelorussia, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against the proposal: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstentions: Brazil, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Siam, Venezuela.

Absent: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Panama, Paraguay.

In explaining the opposition of the United States to the proposal of Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, the United States pointed out that the Commission on Human Rights is not an appropriate forum for the consideration of the question of self-determination of nations and peoples.

A Lebanon proposal calling for the inclusion on the agenda of the 1951 session of the General Assembly of the item, "The study of the ways and means which would ensure the right to nations to self-determination," was rejected by the Third Committee by a vote of 7 to 16 with 28 abstentions and 9 absent.

The vote on the Lebanon proposal was as follows:

In favor of the Lebanon proposal: Denmark, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru.

Against the Lebanon proposal: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, New Zealand, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, United Kingdom, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Abstentions: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, South Africa, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Absent: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Panama, Paraguay.

Considerations.

In view of the 31 to 16 vote in the General Assembly for the consideration of the subject of self-determination in the Commission, it is deemed advisable for the United States Delegation to join in the consideration of this subject in the Commission, if a majority sentiment in the Commission favors this position.

The United States Delegation should point out, if appropriate, that the right of self-determination is a group right and includes many questions relating to minorities. A definition of minorities is being drafted in the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, and it seems entirely inappropriate to include provisions in a Covenant on Human Rights on this question prior to a further report from the Subcommission. In fact, the Subcommission itself has on the agenda of its next session the consideration of a convention on minorities.

The two express references in the Charter of the United Nations to the principle of self-determination are in Articles 1 (paragraph 2) and 55 (introductory paragraph).

Editorial Note

Due to the press of time, neither the Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights nor the Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council was able to address the question of self-determination.

320/12–851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 8, 1951.
[Received December 8—6 a. m.]

Delga 564. Following is text resolution on self-determination (A/C.3/L.186) submitted in third committee by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen:

"*Whereas* the General Assembly at its fifth session recognized the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as a fundamental human right,

Whereas the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights, due to lack of time, were unable to carry out the request of the General Assembly to find ways and means which would ensure the above-mentioned right to peoples and nations,

Whereas the violation of this right has resulted in bloodshed and war in the past and is considered a continuous threat to peace,

The General Assembly

(*a*) *To save* the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

(*b*) *To reaffirm* faith in fundamental human rights, and

(*c*) *To take due account* of the political aspirations of all peoples and thus to further international peace and security, and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

Decides to include the following article in the International Covenant on Human Rights:

All peoples shall have the right to self-determination."

AUSTIN

320/12–851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
NIACT

PARIS, December 8, 1951—7 p. m.

Delga 573. Re joint resolution on self-determination (Delga 564, Dec 8), staff intends recommend USGADel take following action in Committee Three Monday morning, Dec 10:

(1) Speak in favor of general principle of self-determination as related to nonself-governing territories, countries which have lost their independence in recent years and countries whose independence may be threatened.

(2) Introduce following amendment to operative paragraph:

"Decides to include a provision in the International Covenant on Human Rights recognizing the principle of self-determination of peoples enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations."

AUSTIN

IO Files

Minutes of Twenty-ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 10, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/216

[Here follows list of persons (51) present. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair.]

1. *Committee 3 Developments*

Mr. Taylor called upon Mr. Green to outline the developments in Committee Three which required the urgent attention of the Delegation. Mr. Green referred to the joint draft resolution submitted by twelve Moslem states, calling for the inclusion in the Covenant on Human Rights of an article which would read as follows: "All peoples shall have the right to self-determination". (See A/C.3/L.186.) The resolution might well be entitled "Variations on the old Moroccan Theme". He recalled that the Fifth General Assembly, over the opposition of the United States, had adopted a resolution requesting the Human Rights Commission to study the problem of self-determination of peoples. The matter had not been considered in the Human Rights Commission in its session of the past summer, and so was being reintroduced by the Moslem states at this time. The United States would find this language very difficult to accept in that it was extremely ambiguous, both as to when it would become applicable and in what manner. The Assembly had decided in its last session to make all the provisions of the Covenant applicable equally to states ratifying the Covenant and to the non-self-governing territories administered by such states. When this proposed new article was read in connection with that action of the Fifth General Assembly, the implications of this move for Morocco were obvious. It could be argued that a party to the treaty was obligated to grant the right of self-determination immediately to its territories. This obviously would create difficulties for the United States and other administering powers.

Mr. Green commented that the situation in Committee Three had been additionally complicated by a speech made by the Belgian Delegate, Mr. Dehousse, last Friday. In it he had said that certain delegations which were characterized by "obsolete monarchies", religious persecutions, and suppression of minorities were not qualified to talk

about human rights. This statement had provoked considerable reaction and hostility among many states, especially the sponsors of the joint resolution.

The immediate problem was what approach the United States should take to this latest maneuver. He suggested that the United States could say it had always favored the right of self-determination as a principle, and wanted to obtain acceptance for this principle on as broad a basis as possible. The objection which we had to the proposed new article was that it did not show that this principle already obtained in the Charter itself. For this reason the United States could propose the amendment contained in paragraph (2) of Delga 573.[1] This would refer to the Charter provision on self-determination and imply that all states, not simply those which adhere to the Covenant, are bound to respect this principle. The amendment would also bring out the fact that the Charter binds all states to respect this principle in their colonies, and in "satellitized" countries and states infiltrated by the Soviets, and not just in non-self-governing territories. He asked for the Delegation's views on this proposed course of action.

Mrs. Roosevelt felt that this amendment would not be satisfactory to the sponsors of the joint resolution, even if it were a better argument than we had made in the past on this point. She foresaw a defeat for the United States on this proposal. She added that it was an improper course for the Assembly to adopt articles for insertion in the Covenant. She felt that the best argument we could make was that the joint resolution would have the effect of limiting rather than broadening the mandate of the Charter on self-determination. All states were obligated by what was contained in the Charter, whereas this joint resolution would apply only to those states becoming parties to the Covenant and by implication would leave others free to observe or not those principles of the Covenant.

Mr. Plitt favored the widest possible broadening of the principle here referred to. He pointed out that this joint resolution was sponsored by the solid bloc of Islamic powers with the single exception of Turkey. We must at some stage go along with these powers in order to break up their bloc. To oppose their joint resolution would be "adding another rivet to this super-heated steamboiler". Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that something must be done along those lines but felt it extremely hard to break up such a bloc on such a measure.

Mr. Vorys called such a provision "selfish determination" and thought such ideas in the present-day world were false. It was extremely unwise, in his view, to favor such fractionalization in the world where no state could today depend on its neighbors to respect the rights of sovereignty. "Unlimited self-determination", he said, "is as 'phony'." Mrs. Roosevelt commented that the United States can very

[1] Dated December 8, *supra*.

well say that when talking about itself, but to say it abroad where there are so many countries in which human rights are not being observed would sound very inappropriate. Mr. Vorys agreed that his remarks were not germane to the discussion, but he wished to register his views on the general topic.

Mr. Cohen asked whether a provision for self-determination was now contained within the Human Rights Declaration. If it were not, he suggested that it would be much wiser to work for its inclusion there, and not, by insisting on its insertion in the Covenant, thwart whatever possibilities the Covenant had for ratification. It could better be declared as a standard toward which all could agree to work. It would be unfortunate to endanger the Covenant and any value it might have in such a way.

Ambassador Gross stated that he was not afraid of the language in either form. He felt that it took an "overspecialist" to object to the 12 power language and not to our amendment. If this matter were submitted to the American public, 99-½% would express themselves in favor of affirming the right to self-determination. It might be that they would do so without an adequate understanding of the problems involved, but no such understanding would be elucidated in the United Nations.

Mr. Gerig said that the Committee 4 aspect of this question was whether the United Nations would put itself on record in favor of the right of secession of peoples from a unitary state. Considering our own history, he felt that the question was raised of how far the United States should go in accepting this principle. Mrs. Roosevelt said that that was the very reason it should not go into the Covenant. However, since it would go in anyway in some form or other, it was up to the United States to work for language in the best possible form, even if this meant being voted down.

Miss Bacon supported the remarks of Ambassador Gross. She suggested voting for the proposed language, while explaining in full the reasons for which we would prefer different language, and stating our understanding of what the proposed language would mean. Mrs. Roosevelt was not sure this would be satisfactory to the sponsoring delegations. Mr. Maffitt also adhered to the point of view expressed by Ambassador Gross and Miss Bacon. He said that the United States should not appear to be opposing the fight for self-determination. We could merely state the preference for wording this matter another way.

In agreeing with Mrs. Roosevelt, Mr. Maktos said that the United States ought to anticipate the argument that since this matter was already expressed in the Charter the United States could surely not oppose the further expression of it in this Covenant. Mr. McKeever said that a United States vote against this proposal would be misunderstood both at home and abroad. The technical reasons we might

put forward for opposing it would not be understood, however justified. He asked, therefore, why the United States must "saddle itself with that albatross for a Pyrrhic victory"! Ambassador Jessup submitted that albatrosses were not worn as saddles.

Ambassador Kirk referred to the Belgian attitude, and stated that in view of the great importance of the Belgian Congo, as the primary source of uranium ore, both to Belgium and the United States, it would be wise for the United States not to forget its own self-interest in this problem. Mrs. Roosevelt commented that the United States was not forgetting its own interests, but the Belgian speech, which incidentally had been on a very high plane, had contained this unfortunate reference to "obsolete monarchies" and has aroused the national and religious prides of many a country. She felt that the result of the speech would be to set us back considerably and perhaps lose the fight for two Covenants. If, however, the Delegation felt that the United States should say we think the proposed joint resolution is bad procedure, we could offer our amendment as better procedure. We could then stand in favor of this right, and if our amendment were not accepted, not oppose the joint resolution as a principle.

Senator Cooper wondered whether the United States would be willing to agree that for example Hawaii or Alaska could determine for itself whether it wished its independence. Mrs. Roosevelt recalled the Civil War and the fact that we had fought to keep peoples within our federation, and that although this might seem slightly inconsistent, the greater principle had been for the freedom of the individual. Senator Cooper thought that the United States should stay on the ground that it agreed in principle with this idea, as a purpose toward which we could work. To include it in the Covenant would make ratification very difficult for the United States and others.

Ambassador Key said that since everyone agreed to the principle of self-determination, the problem was one of drafting. The 12 power draft was a step backward. We wanted words which would conform to the Charter.

In regard to Ambassador Kirk's remarks on uranium, Dr. Tobias stated that the United States should keep in mind the principles which it sought to safeguard by the protection the atom bomb gave.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that this joint resolution gave the right to one state to protest that other states were not granting the right of self-determination. The United States questioned the propriety of such a step at this time.

Ambassador Gross recalled the Genocide Convention discussion, and the fact that the United States was certain to face a similar defeat on this matter. The more we attacked the position that would succeed in the end, the worse we would appear in the end for having opposed

it and lost. He preferred the amended wording, but the choice of final acceptance by the General Assembly was of course not up to us.

Mrs. Roosevelt summarized the feelings of the Delegation to be that the United States would make the best possible speech, indicating the reasons for its preference for the amendment language. The United States would not oppose the inclusion of this right of self-determination, but would in fact support it, while at the same time making clear that ratification of a Covenant with this wording in it might experience further difficulties.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

CHARLES D. COOK

320/1–2652 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 26, 1952.
[Received January 26—4 : 11 p. m.]

Delga 1208. From Green. Following . . . is resolution on self-determination adopted by Comite 3, Jan 25 :

"*Whereas* if fifth session recognized right peoples and nations to self-determination as fundamental human right,

"*Whereas* ECOSOC and Commission Human Rights, due lack time, were unable carry out request of GA to find ways and means which would ensure above-mentioned right peoples and nations,

"*Whereas* violation this right has resulted in bloodshed and war in past and is considered continuous threat to peace,

"*GA*

(*a*) *To save* present and succeeding generations from scourge war,

(*b*) *To reaffirm* faith fundamental human rights, and

(*c*) *To take due account* of political aspirations all peoples and thus to further international peace and security, and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for principles of equal rights and self-determination peoples,

"*Decides* include in international covenant or covenants human rights an article on right all peoples and nations to self-determination in reaffirmation of principle enunciated in Charter UN drafted in foll terms: All peoples shall have the right to self-determination.

"Said article to stipulate that all states, including those having responsibility for administration non-self-governing territories, should promote realization that right, in conformity with purposes and principles of UN and that states having responsibility for administration of non-self-governing territories shld promote realization that right in relation to peoples such territories,

"*Requests* Commission Human Rights prepare recommendations concerning international respect for self-determination peoples and submit these recommendations to GA at seventh session,

"Such recommendations must include invitation to states members of UN responsible under UN Charter and universal declaration human rights for safeguarding and defense of said principle, to avoid recourse to manoeuvres calculated frustrate principle of right peoples to self-determination, including obstruction free expression of people's will and of realization their legitimate national aspirations, aggression under guise of defense or masked by disinterested motives, such as struggle for truth, freedom, humanitarian principles or any other equally high ideal, exploitation of internal dissensions, trivial or ephemeral national divergencies or conflicting interests in foreign countries and non-self-governing territories, threats and terrorism or any other method contrary to purposes and principles of UN as set forth in Charter".

[Green]
[ROOSEVELT]

IO Files

Minutes of Fiftieth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 31, 1952

SECRET
US/A/M (Chr)/237

[Here follows list of persons (41) present. Mrs. Roosevelt presided. There was discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. *Tactics for Committee 3 Items.* Mr. Green noted that the Oatis case had been effectively presented by Dr. Tobias the day before. In regard to the Plenary, he called attention to Document US/A/C.3/L.226,[1] the first operative paragraphs of which requested two covenants on human rights. This was the result of a joint amendment submitted by the United States, Belgium, India and Lebanon; the vote in Committee had been 29–21–6. He felt that a minority in the Plenary might attempt to invoke the two-third majority Rule. The Reference Section of the Delegation had found that no Committee 3 item had ever required a two-third vote. We could therefore argue, both from history and logic, that this was not a two-third situation. He urged, however, active liaison work to obtain as many votes as possible for the two-covenant position.

In Document US/A/C.3/L.228,[2] in regard to self-determination, Mr. Green noted that this resolution was based on the original 13-Power text which sought to insert an article in the Human Rights Covenant to the following effect: "All people shall have the right to self-determination". The United States Delegation had tried to head

[1] The "US" indicator should not be on this or other documents cited here; these are United Nations General Assembly documents.
[2] For text, see p. 788.

off such a development, by avoiding such precise language. We had first offered an amendment to include a "reaffirmation" of the principle of self-determination. Thereafter, we tried to insert a "provision" which would reaffirm that principle. Finally, we had agreed to the Afghanistan amendment to "an article", but all without success. By a vote of 33–9–10, this rigid language in L/228 had been adopted.

Mr. Green felt that the United States had come out of the situation with a maximum of goodwill. On the one hand, we had shown the Arabs and others our willingness to compromise; we on the other hand, had also demonstrated effectively to the colonial powers that we would not be pulled to the extremes that the majority demanded.

The last paragraph of L/228 contained a recommendation to the Human Rights Commission which contained incredible language.

The United Kingdom and France had urged us simply to vote against this resolution in Plenary, although we would be in a minority of nine, without making any attempt to change any of the language. Mr. Green pointed out that some of the Arabs, including the Iraqi, in addition to many Latin American Delegations, were dissatisfied with the language of the resolution. France had given the United States Delegation the "full treatment" in seeking to have us drop our efforts at a compromise. They were worried that this would be a new principle in international law, which would support expropriation in the economic field and render useless the principle of the sanctity of contracts.

Mr. Green pointed out a suggested revision of the resolution on self-determination, contained in Document US/A/5447. He asked the Delegation to decide whether we should vote with the UK and France against the resolution as adopted by the Committee, taking the matter next year, or whether to seek better language, over the serious concern of the United Kingdom and France, who preferred this "ambiguous monster".

Mrs. Roosevelt said that France had gone beyond the economic threat, saying that the United States would one day find its military bases taken over. Mrs. Roosevelt had countered this by saying that one day she hoped the United Nations would be strong enough so that the United States would have no need for bases. She promised to repeat to the Secretary all their strongest feelings, suggesting however that their trouble may well have been brought about by their own slowness. They had brushed aside this argument. She added that even if we could obtain better language, she felt that we would not want to co-sponsor it. There was every reason to assist in obtaining a clearer recommendation and to have it introduced by means of better wording, but only with "behind-the-scenes" support from the United States. We had obtained considerable goodwill by not standing in the way of their reactions to what they felt was an incorrect situation. She also

hoped that we could put across the idea that the vote on the covenant was not a two-thirds matter.

Mr. Allen noted the danger of urging our draft language upon others without co-sponsoring. This would leave us open to the possibility of even worse language than existed at present. He was inclined on balance to recommend relaxing and voting against the present language.

Mr. Sandifer felt that Mrs. Roosevelt's analysis contained entirely sound and good procedure. However, we could not get too far ahead in drafting legal obligations. Mr. Cohen wondered about the idea of stating our real position on self-determination in connection with conditions existing in the world today. When bogged down by technical details, when ultimate desiderata become lost, we should take the opportunity to emphasize the important highlights in the whole matter which would take us out of the bog of language difficulties. Mrs. Roosevelt thought this could be done, but she felt we should be careful not to make "grand speeches" unless we could carry out what we say. She wanted it clearly understood that we were overwhelmingly in the minority because the rest of the world often think we do not mean what we say. For this reason, she was unwilling to make such a speech unless we would back it up. Mr. Cohen certainly hoped we would be able to carry out what we said. Mrs. Roosevelt stated that this would make the British and French very unhappy. She would prefer, however, to stick to what we believe to be right. She added that there was much truth in the idea that putting ourselves in such situations as this, in backing the British and French, was just what the Soviets wanted.

She suggested giving this language, as re-drafted by the staff, to the Arabs, as a much better draft, but telling them we could not go out and work for it since we had already exhausted our every effort. Both Miss Strauss and Ambassador Jessup agreed with this suggestion. Mrs. Roosevelt added that she would then be willing to think about a Plenary speech, but would want the help and the ideas of all the members of the Delegation.

Mr. Taylor announced that a joint meeting of Committee 1 and joint 2 and 3 was still scheduled for that evening at 8:30. Santa Cruz strongly opposed such a meeting, however. The Plenary meeting would be taken up all morning with the 20-year peace program. Thereafter, Committee 6 matters would come before it. The next group for Plenary consideration would be Committee 1 items.

Mr. McKeever recalled the plans for making a recording of the Delegation meeting the next morning. The subject would be an appraisal of the entire assembly.

CHARLES D. COOK

547-842—79——51

Editorial Note

The same United Nations official public documentation cited in the editorial note on page 771 is relevant also in respect of the self-determination question, as the essential question was whether a self-determination article should be included in the draft of the Covenant or Covenants. The appropriate texts and sources are also included in the fascicule on agenda item 29 cited *ibid.* For the text of the resolution as adopted by the General Assembly on February 5, 1952, Resolution 545 (VI), see GA (VI), *Resolutions*, pages 36 and 37. The United States voted against the resolution both in the Third Committee on January 25, 1952, and the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on February 5, 1952. For the statement by the United States Representative (Roosevelt) to the Third Committee on January 25, 1952, explaining the negative United States vote, see GA (VI), *Third Committee*, page 345.

320/2-652

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1952.

Subject: US Position in UN on Self-Determination Resolution.

This morning's unclassified summary from Paris reports that the US voted against the resolution on self-determination in the GA at its closing session. The resolution passed by a vote of 42–7–5.

The US thus appeared in opposition to a resolution relating to a peculiarly American concept, while the overwhelming majority of the UN—with the Soviet bloc of course included—registered support for it. For the Far East, and Asia as a whole, the propaganda consequences of this vote are obvious and unfortunate.

In searching about for an explanation of our position I find that in previous votes we had voted in favor of all parts of the resolution with two exceptions. The texts of these exceptions are given below.

In Delga's 1299, February 4[1] it is stated that the US Delegate "expressed regret for the US negative vote on the self-determination text, explaining that her Delegation did not oppose inclusion of a practical article but did feel the Commission should have drafting leeway. The proposed text was not satisfactory she said."

I realize that in the rush of the closing of the UN session the Delegation probably did not have opportunity to send full reports to the

[1] Not printed.

Department on this question or obtain instructions from the Department. From the statement quoted above it would appear that our opposition to the resolution was based chiefly upon technical considerations, i.e., a belief that the GA should not prescribe to the Human Rights Commission the exact language to be included in the international covenant or covenants but should leave the phrasing for determination by the Human Rights Commission.

While not questioning the soundness of this technical argument I question whether our position would not have been adequately indicated by our negative votes on the paragraphs in question. Considering the very great importance from a political and propaganda point of view of our stand on self-determination, we might then have voted for the resolution as a whole. This course seems in fact to have been followed by the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark.

I realize that the issue is closed for this session. It occurs to me, however, that the problem raised by this vote—the relative weight which our Delegation should give to technical consideration as against larger political issues—is a recurring one and one which might well be discussed within the Department in connection with preparations for the next GA.

The US voted against the following parts of the resolution in question:

"*The GA*

"*Decides* to include in the international covenant or covenants on human rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination in reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Charter of the UN and drafted in following terms: All peoples shall have the right to self-determination."

"*Requests* the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations concerning international respect for self-determination of peoples and to submit these recommendations to the GA at its Seventh Session."

340.1 AG/2–752

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 7, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As it is possible that the French Ambassador may raise with you the question of including an article on self-determination in one or both of the Covenants on Human Rights, I thought I might give you the background of the situation as it developed in the General Assembly. This is a subject about which the French Government appears to be deeply concerned, and about which

they will probably want to consult the Department in the coming months.

At the end of the debate on self-determination in the Third Committee the French Delegation was so upset about our attitude that two of their members, Mr. Broustra and Mr. Epinat, called Mr. Utter and, later, Mr. Bonsal of our Embassy to the Foreign Office to discuss the matter. When we indicated that we would be glad to have a more detailed exchange of views, Professor Cassin, Mr. Broustra, Mr. Epinat, and Mr. Juvigny invited me to lunch, together with Mr. Green and Mr. Simsarian, to discuss the problem further. The French have made no further approach to the Embassy since this luncheon conversation.

In their conversations with Mr. Bonsal, Mr. Utter, and with me the French expressed their very great concern over the resolution on self-determination adopted by the Third Committee. I enclose a copy of this resolution, which was adopted on February 5 in the Plenary. You will note that the resolution prescribes the exact text of an article on self-determination for inclusion in one or both of the Covenants and gives the Human Rights Commission no discretion to revise it.

The history of this resolution is that we tried to make changes by cooperation with the Afghanistan member, who was one of the thirteen co-sponsors. The co-sponsors proposed the inclusion of an article which should simply say, "All peoples have the right to self-determination." We felt that it should be left to the Commission on Human Rights to reaffirm the principles already in the Charter, either in the preamble or in any other way they saw fit. We lost on this. Finally, we accepted the fact that there should be an article with the understanding that the wording should not be limited to these words—"All people shall have the right to self-determination."—but could be elaborated by the Commission and safe-guarded in any way they felt necessary. The final resolution, however, was a hodge-podge of Soviet amendments, a Syrian amendment, and various other wordings. As a resolution emerged from the Committee, it made no sense. Even the Delegate from Iraq was willing to have it amended. Our Delegation agreed that we should not co-sponsor any amendment, but might suggest language to others, and vote for the new wording if somebody else proposed it.

No amendment was submitted in the Plenary, but the Danish Delegation proposed that the two operative paragraphs of the resolution be voted in parts, so that the Assembly might have a chance to delete some of the unsatisfactory language. Unfortunately, no change was made in the first operative paragraph, but the Plenary did delete the long second sentence in the second operative paragraph. The resolution, with this deletion was adopted by 42–7 (US)–5.

The French are very much worried about the inclusion of any kind of article on self-determination, no matter how carefully drafted the language might be. They fear that this will lead to economic self-determination of peoples and not be limited to the political self-determination alone. I feel that at present the only idea in the minds of most of the sponsors in the Arab countries at least, is purely political. However, I am not at all sure that in the minds of the Soviets, who warmly uphold the Arabs on this, there is not the thought underlying their support of how they can use it to embarrass the free countries of the world in different ways. The French pointed out that the inclusion of the right of self-determination in a treaty might mean the abrogation of treaties and contracts in the economic field. They pointed out to us that it might easily mean the abrogation of agreements on military bases. They tried to frighten us in every possible way and they are very much frightened themselves. I feel, though they avoid saying so, that the political implications are of major importance to them.

I do not myself see, however, what is to be gained by having introduced an absurd resolution of recommendation to the Human Rights Commission and just voting against it. The vote in Committee 3 was overwhelmingly against us: 33–9–10. We were among the 9, because we could not vote for the present wording. The French prefer to continue in the minority and say it is important that we should be with them. I think that though they are bringing out the economic and military points, they are more concerned really on the political self-determination of peoples as it touches Morocco and Tunisia. I think also the British are concerned from this point of view primarily.

There is a desire on the part of the Arab and Afghanistan Delegates to have the article on self-determination included in both Covenants so that no matter who ratifies which Covenant, this remains. We would, of course, make every effort to have the entire article only in the economic and social covenant, but we would probably be defeated and so my only hope is that we might be able to accept a civil and political covenant, making a reservation on this article.

I am not wholly in sympathy with the French attitude, but I realize why it is hard for a government with colonial possessions not to be excited and I promised to put before you their whole argument and point of view and I have done so as nearly as I can remember the points put forth by them. They are frank in saying that with such an article included they could not possibly ratify a Covenant and they doubt if it can be put in legal form.

I should also say that an Afghanistan adviser, who speaks only French, told me their anxiety was that their point of view would not be brought before the Human Rights Commission. I assured him that if no one else presented it, I would do so, though I could give no com-

mitment as to what our attitude would be on it. He said he understood that and he only wanted to be assured they would be represented. I think it fair to assume that Pakistan, which is on the Commission, will state their case.

I have gone over the Human Rights Commission membership for the next meeting, and we will be 9–9 when Uruguay votes with us and that is by no means always the case. Direct opposition to self-determination, therefore, seems to me useless and the effort to get the least objectionable article almost a necessity.

Very cordially yours, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

[Enclosure]

United Nations Secretariat Document A/C.3/L.228 Circulated at Paris January 26, 1952 (Sixth Session, Third Committee, Agenda Item 29)

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEASURES OF IMPLEMENTATION

Draft resolution approved by the Committee at its 403rd meeting held on 25 January 1952

INCLUSION OF AN ARTICLE RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Whereas the General Assembly at its fifth session recognized the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as a fundamental human right,*

Whereas the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights, due to lack of time, were unable to carry out the request of the General Assembly to study ways and means which would ensure the above-mentioned right to peoples and nations,

Whereas the violation of this right has resulted in bloodshed and war in the past and is considered a continuous threat to peace,

The General Assembly

(i) To save the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

(ii) To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, and

(iii) To take due account of the political aspirations of all peoples and thus to further international peace and security, and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

*See General Assembly resolution 421 D (V). [Footnote in the source text.]

1. *Decides* to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination in reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations. This article shall be drafted in the following terms: "All peoples shall have the right to self-determination", and shall stipulate that all States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories, should promote the realization of that right, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and that States having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories should promote the realization of that right in relation to the peoples of such Territories.

2. *Requests* the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations concerning international respect for the self-determination of peoples and to submit these recommendations to the General Assembly at its seventh session. Such recommendations must include an invitation to State Members of the United Nations, responsible under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for the safeguarding and defence of the said principle, to avoid recourse to manoeuvres calculated to frustrate the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, including obstruction of the free expression of the people's will and of the realization of their legitimate national aspirations, aggression under the guise of defence or masked by disinterested motives, such as the struggle for truth, freedom, humanitarian principles or any other equally high ideal, the exploitation of internal dissensions, trivial or ephemeral national divergencies or conflicting interests in foreign countries and the Non-Self-Governing Territories, threats and terrorism or any other method contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter.

III. THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1951.
SD/A/C.3/146

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

(Agenda Item 11—Report of the Economic and Social Council)

THE PROBLEM

Faced with a decision of the Economic and Social Council reversing the recommendation of the Assembly's *Ad Hoc* Committee, which had

suggested the calling of a special conference to complete the proposed Convention on Freedom of Information, the General Assembly must decide upon some form of definite action to dispose of this Convention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should strongly support the decision of the Economic and Social Council and, in consultation with other delegations, seek the adoption of a resolution postponing indefinitely further consideration of this Convention (see Draft Resolution #1, Annex A);

2. In the event the above proposal is defeated and the Assembly decides to complete the Convention at this session, the Delegation should be guided by the detailed comments with respect to each article which are contained in Annex B;

3. If a majority favors the calling of a special conference to complete the text, the U.S. should propose that the Conference's terms of reference be broadened to enable it to consider other proposals relating to freedom of information and that governments be represented by persons drawn from the fields of press, radio and film; and

4. In any event, the U.S. should propose that the completed Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction be opened for signature without further delay (see Draft Resolution #2, *Annex A*) and that the appropriate member of the delegation sign the Convention on behalf of the U.S.

COMMENT

As contrasted with the limited scope of the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction (also known as the "Newsgathering Convention"), which was adopted at the Second Part of the Assembly's Third Session but has not yet been opened for signature, the proposed Convention on Freedom of Information covers a very broad field. The Newsgathering Convention merely facilitates the work of foreign correspondents as a limited group. The Draft Convention on Freedom of Information on the other hand provides that contracting states shall secure the right to seek, to receive and to impart information and opinions. It forbids contracting states to regulate the use of the media of information in any manner discriminating against their own nationals or those of other contracting states on political grounds, or on the basis of race, sex, language or religion.

At the Second Part of the Third Session of the General Assembly, the Third Committee considered the Freedom of Information Convention only briefly and, after adopting revisions of the first five articles, decided that it could not complete the draft at that session and recom-

mended that it be placed on the agenda of the Fourth Session. At the same time the Assembly decided not to open for signature the completed Newsgathering Convention until it takes "definite action" on the Freedom of Information text.

At its Fourth Session in 1949, the General Assembly, on the initiative of the United States Delegation, rejected proposals to complete the Freedom of Information Convention. At its Fifth Session, however, the Assembly reversed its decision of the previous year and appointed a special committee to prepare a new draft of the Convention on Freedom of Information, having rejected by a vote of 14 to 25 a United States motion to postpone further action pending definite action on the Draft Covenant. The Assembly further instructed the Committee "to report to the Economic and Social Council at its Thirteenth Session on the results of its work and to submit recommendations, in particular, with regard to the advisability of convening a conference of plenipotentiaries with a view to the framing and signature of a convention on freedom of information" (Resolution 426(V)).

The Committee constituted for this purpose was seriously unbalanced geographically, including four Arab states, India, and three Latin American states, but no representative of the Scandinavian states and inadequate representation of the Far East and the British Commonwealth. It met from January 15 to February 7, 1951 and adopted a new text of the Convention. It also recommended that the Economic and Social Council should convene a special plenipotentiary conference to complete the text.

The Committee's Report (doc. A/AC.42/7) was considered by the Economic and Social Council at its recent session and its recommendations were not approved. Instead, the Economic and Social Council adopted the following resolution by a vote of 10 (U.S.)–1–7:*

"*The Economic and Social Council,*

"*Having studied* the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee appointed by the General Assembly at its fifth session to prepare a draft convention on freedom of information and the observations of the Governments thereon,

"*Considering* the existence of a wide divergence of views on this subject,

"*Having decided* not to convene a plenipotentiary conference,

"*Transmits* this decision to the General Assembly together with the records of the discussion which took place at the thirteenth session of the Council on the report of the Committee on the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information."

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*The vote in the Social Committee, more significant as a test, was 10 for (Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Peru, Poland, Sweden, USSR, UK, US), 7 against (Chile, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Philippines, Uruguay), Pakistan being absent. [Footnote in the source text.]

DRAFT CONVENTION ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

The United States position against the completion of the Freedom of Information Convention is based on the probability that if the Convention were to be completed at this time it would emerge in a form unacceptable to the United States and detrimental to this Government's efforts to promote worldwide acceptance of our concept of freedom of information. It would constitute a serious setback to the promotion of freedom of information by the United Nations whether or not the United States and a few like-minded countries adhered to it, because it would place a United Nations stamp of approval on a number of restrictive practices which, though current in many countries, do not now enjoy international sanction.

The revised text of the Convention prepared by the special committee of the General Assembly is an improvement over the original Geneva text in several respects. Even as revised, however, the text is not consistent with long established principles of freedom of speech and of the press as understood in the United States.

Article 2, for example, would permit objectionable limitations on freedom of expression, together with other restrictions which, while perhaps not objectionable in principle, are so formulated as to lead to the probability of their abuse by governments so inclined. Above all, the method of so-called "specific enumeration" employed in this Article is considered by this Government to be completely impractical and an open invitation to the addition of still more objectionable limitations, as demonstrated by Resolution *A* of the Committee. This resolution, calling for a study of the feasibility of adding to the present set of limitations certain still more objectionable restrictions indicates the open-ended nature of the formulation adopted by the Committee.

This method, because it aims at an exhaustive listing of permissible limitations on freedom of expression, would compel every government participating in any further consideration of the text to press for the inclusion of any and all restrictions which are presently in force as a matter of its domestic legislation or which it may deem to be necessary for the future. It would lead to the drafting of an agreement embodying the lowest common denominator of freedom of information rather than an instrument capable of safeguarding and promoting the maximum of freedom.

Other Articles of this text are also objectionable. Article 4, which would permit the establishment of "a right of reply or a similar corrective remedy", sets forth no legal safeguards and does not indicate whether the right would operate domestically or internationally. Article 5, which incorporates a sort of model code of ethics for journalists (unrelated to the code which the Subcommission on Freedom of Infor-

mation and of the Press has undertaken to prepare) suggests the possibility of undesirable governmental pressure on organizations of journalists.

Articles 6 and 7, which deal with economic problems affecting the media of information, are drafted in a sweeping and arbitrary manner. While many of these problems are indeed worthy of attention, the language presently employed interposes no legal test of reasonableness or of necessity. The only test prescribed is that they are deemed necessary by the Contracting States which impose them; no other Contracting State would have a right even to contest their decisions.

Furthermore, while the Committee kept open the possibility of including an article dealing with federal-state problems as proposed by the United States Representative, it rejected another article proposed by the United States which would have made clear the non-self-executing nature of the proposed Convention. This Government could not consider becoming party to any Convention of this nature without such a provision.

Attention should also be drawn to the undesirability of attempting to complete a detailed convention covering one of the major rights to be included in the proposed Covenant on Human Rights in advance of the completion of the Covenant. The problem is illustrated by Article 10 of the Committee text, which provides that "in any case of incompatibility" between the provisions of "the general agreement" (i.e. the Covenant) and this Convention "the general agreement shall prevail." It seems to this Government that to undertake obligations in a *detailed* agreement which, by their express terms, may be nullified or altered by a second, more *general* agreement (whose provisions are not yet fixed) will almost certainly lead to conflicts of interpretation.

Much as this Government would welcome a convention which could serve as a means of advancing and safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press throughout the world, it cannot give its support to the text under discussion, and does not deem it suitable for consideration by a special conference. This Government cannot agree with the assumption which seems to underlie much of the present text, namely that the pressing task of the moment is to define ways and means by which governments may curb the reporting of news which they consider undesirable. Any proposal which might in any way further restrict the availability of news and information to the peoples of the world would, in the view of the United States Government, be singularly inappropriate at this time when governmental restrictions on the flow of news threaten increasingly to deprive the public of the information which it needs to form conclusions on the many vital problems affecting world peace. The U.S. Delegation

should urge that priority be given instead to the completion of the Draft Covenant on Human Rights and that the Assembly should take definite action to table the Freedom of Information Convention until world conditions are more conducive to the preparation of a more affirmative instrument.

The Delegation should stress that the United States will not enter into any agreement which might have the effect of impairing freedom of speech and of the press as guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. Moreover, even if the Convention were drafted in such a manner as to preclude this effect in the United States (as indeed the present text is, because the limitations are permissive in character) this Government would nevertheless be opposed to its completion because it would not want to see the press in any other country subjected to some of the restrictions permitted by the Convention and not prohibited by this basic law.

The United States Delegation should also point out that there is no indication that the press in any free nation favors this Convention. On the contrary, there is much recent evidence of the fact that the press in several countries is currently engaged in fighting similar restrictions which have been enacted, or are being considered for enactment, in the laws of their countries. This Government does not believe the prestige of the United Nations should be used to sanction such restrictions.

In the event the Assembly decides to complete the Convention at this session, the United States Delegation should be guided by the detailed comments appearing in *Annex B*, of the detailed comment paper contained in the Background Book on Freedom of Information.

If, on the other hand, a majority favors the calling of a special conference, it is suggested that the United States Delegation seek as a minimum to have the terms of reference of the Conference broadened to enable it to consider not only the Committee's text, but also any other text which might be submitted, together with other items relating to the present state of freedom of information.

If the Assembly decides to convene the special conference, the United States Delegation should also suggest that the governments be represented by persons drawn from the field of the press, radio and films. It is also suggested that the list of governments eligible to participate in the Conference include non-Members as well as Members, as suggested in *Annex C* of the Background Paper on this subject (SD/A/C.3/144) and be determined on the basis of the formula employed in the case of the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information.

The United States Delegation should oppose any suggestion to call on the Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press to prepare an agenda or any material for the proposed conference. It may be anticipated, however, that an attempt will be made to include

on the agenda of the conference the consideration of the Model Code of Ethics for journalists which the Subcommission has undertaken to prepare. While this Government has expressed its opposition to the draft Code as it emerged from the last session of the Subcommission, it is believed that there is no reasonable basis for opposing its inclusion on the Conference's agenda.

CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF NEWS AND THE RIGHT OF CORRECTION

The "Newsgathering" Convention which was adopted by a vote of 33 (U.S.) to 6 (the Soviet bloc), with 13 abstentions at the second part of the third session of the General Assembly was not opened for signature because of the strong feeling on the part of a bare majority that it should be coupled with the Freedom of Information Convention. In Resolution 277 (III) A, the Assembly decided "that the draft Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction shall not be open for signature until the General Assembly has taken definite action on the draft Convention on Freedom of Information".

It should be noted that when the United States Delegation acquiesced in the decision of the third session not to open for signature the Newsgathering Convention (partly in order to secure support for deferring the freedom of information text and partly in the knowledge that very few delegations were prepared to sign it), it insisted that the two texts were in no way organically related. The Newsgathering Convention is completely self-contained and there was never any intimation during its preparation that it would be linked with another instrument. Furthermore, it is obvious by now that there is no reasonable prospect of agreement on the freedom of information text and there is no point in further delaying the activation of the Newsgathering Convention.

Having reviewed the Newsgathering Convention in the light of present circumstances, this Government has concluded that a strong attempt should be made to open it for signature and acceptance without further delay. With the increase in political tensions and the growth of totalitarian regimes following the war, the operations of foreign correspondents and news agencies have been increasingly subjected to restrictions and harassment, with a resulting curtailment in the international flow of news. This has reached a peak in the Soviet states, as illustrated by the Oatis Case (see separate position paper [1]), but the trend is not confined to those states.

Since the Convention is intended to provide an international norm for the treatment of foreign correspondents and an agreed limit on

[1] See Department of State Instruction, undated, p. 806.

peacetime censorship of news despatches, its activation at this time would be especially desirable.

Moreover, it would establish the only feasible system for "correcting" false or distorted reports which has proved acceptable to a majority of governments and it would, therefore, meet a need which has been loudly proclaimed by those states which have not yet managed to develop strong news agencies.

An analysis of the Convention and of the position taken by the respective delegations during its consideration will be found in the Background Book on Freedom of Information.

OTHER FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ISSUES

In the course of the debate on this item the United States Delegation should refer to the suggestions advanced by the United States Representative at the recent session of the Economic and Social Council for affirmative action which might be taken by the United Nations to promote freedom of information. These suggestions indicate that there are many urgent problems in this field which have largely been ignored because so much attention has been centered on the freedom of information convention. They will be found in Press Release #1262, which is included in the Background Book on Freedom of Information.

Annex A

Draft Resolution No. 1

(CONVENTION ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION)

The General Assembly

Believing that freedom of information must be protected by every possible means (and that a special convention on this subject would be desirable);

Convinced that the present divergence of views renders impossible the drafting of an acceptable convention on freedom of information at this time;

(*Notes* with appreciation the Report of the Committee on the draft Convention on Freedom of Information;)

Decides to postpone indefinitely further consideration of this Convention; and

(*Recommends* to the Economic and Social Council that it review the situation at a future session and, if it finds that prospects for agreement on a constructive text have improved, that it establish appropriate machinery for completing the Convention.)

Note: Clauses in parentheses to be included only if necessary to secure adoption of a resolution along these lines.

Draft Resolution No. 2

(CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF NEWS AND THE RIGHT OF CORRECTION)

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the widest dissemination of news is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and to economic and social progress;

Believing that, in order to promote the greatest international flow of news, it is highly desirable to establish an international standard for the treatment of foreign correspondents and their dispatches and an international right of correction;

Decides to open for signature the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction.

Annex B

Detailed Comments on Freedom of Information Convention

Note: Reference to the "present text" are to the text as adopted by the special committee of the General Assembly.

Preamble: The United States Delegation should support the Preamble as presently worded and should oppose any suggestions for expanding it.

Article 1: The present text of Article 1 embodies virtually all of the changes in the original Geneva text which were suggested by the United States and, as now worded, constitutes a forthright and adequate statement of the freedom to be guaranteed.

It should be noted that the present text is ambiguous in referring to "freedom *without* governmental interference" which might be interpreted as meaning that this freedom is to be secured against *private* as well as *governmental* interference. The American concept of free speech and a free press has, in general, involved only the minimum of governmental action necessary to prevent private infringements on the enjoyment of this freedom (e.g. anti-trust and libel legislation). Previous United States attempts to clarify this point by substituting "freedom *from* governmental interference" for the present language have been unsuccessful. It is suggested accordingly, that the United States Delegation should not seek to revise this language, but that if a question is raised, it state for the record that this Government interprets this phrase to mean that contracting states would be obligated to secure this freedom *from* governmental interference.

Article 2: Article 2 constitutes the most serious deterrent to United States support for this Convention. In accordance with this Government's policy in respect to the Covenant on Human Rights, the United

States has strongly opposed the attempt to enumerate in specific terms the restrictions which governments may legitimately impose on freedom of information. The United States had advocated instead a *general* limitation provision delimiting the boundaries of governmental power in this sphere.

The United States position rests largely on two grounds: (1) The debate to date on this matter has shown clearly that adequately to protect governmental powers in this area, even in terms of existing valid laws in the countries where freedom of speech and press exists, would require the listing of even *more* limitations than are contained in the present text. Even then, there would be no assurance that all essential governmental authority had been safeguarded in terms of the future. (2) Moreover, to attempt to list specific limitations which are considered to be necessary and desirable by the various governments constituting the majority on this issue inevitably leads to undesirable compromises of the "log-rolling" variety, with the result that undesirable limitations wanted by a minority of delegations are supported by a majority (See text adopted by Third Committee of the General Assembly). The result is a statement of the lowest common denominator of freedom prevailing among a majority of States.

Although the present text of Article 2 does not contain the most objectionable provisions of the original Geneva text, namely paragraph (*j*) concerning the dissemination of false or distorted reports, it retains other undesirable restrictions. These include "expressions which . . . are dangerous for youth and intended for them" and "legal obligations . . . including disclosure of information received in confidence in a professional or *official* capacity". The latter clause refers to Official Secrets Acts in force in many countries (including the United Kingdom) under which public officials may be prosecuted for disclosing matters of governmental policy even if they are not officially classified or otherwise prejudicial to national security.

There is every reason to believe that if this text were used as a basis of discussion by a special conference it would be expanded to include still other permissive restrictions. The special committee itself recommended study of the feasibility of including such other limitations as "matters likely to injure the feelings of the nationals of the State", and "false or distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between peoples or States". (Resolution A of the Committee's Report).

The third paragraph of Article 14 of the Draft Covenant (the freedom of information Article), embodies essentially the formulation which the United States has consistently advocated for this Article. The Article reads:

ARTICLE 14

"1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

"2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression: this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

"3. *The right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may therefore be subject to certain penalties, liabilities and restrictions, but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary for the protection of national security, public order, safety, health or morals, or of the rights, freedoms or reputations of others.*" (UN Doc. E/1681)

The United States Delegation should support the substitution of the formulation employed in paragraph 3 above for Article 2 of the present text, but should modify it slightly for the purpose of this Convention, as follows:

The exercise of the freedoms referred to in Article 1 shall be subject only to such restrictions as are provided by law and are necessary for the protection of national security; for the prevention of disorder; for the protection of public safety, health or morals, or the rights, freedoms or reputations of others.

In the event the above proposal is rejected, the United States Representative should move the deletion of the following clauses from the text of Article 2 as adopted by the special committee:

Paragraph (*d*) "which are dangerous for youth and intended for them"

Paragraph (*h*) "including disclosure of information received in confidence in a professional or official capacity"

If these clauses are deleted and the article is not otherwise altered, the United States Delegation should abstain on the final vote on this Article, but vote in favor of the Convention as a whole with such an amended article, provided the remainder of the Convention is satisfactory.

Article 3: The United States Delegation should support this Article which was adopted by the special committee on the proposal of the United States. While not necessary, the inclusion of this Article is desirable to make it clear that this Convention could not so be interpreted as to limit any freedom now guaranteed by the Constitution or to restrict any rights in this field recognized under existing international treaties.

Article 4: The United States Delegation should propose the deletion of this article on the ground that: (*a*) the Convention in no way limits the right of any Contracting State to establish a "right of reply"; (*b*) the present language is hopelessly vague since it does not indicate whether the right of reply would operate nationally or internationally, voluntarily or compulsorily, etc., and (*c*) an international right of correction is provided by the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction.

547-842—79——52

Article 5: It should be noted that the Committee's revision of this article is a considerable improvement over the Geneva Conference text. The draft adopted by the Conference implied that information personnel have a number of responsibilities beyond those of straight reporting, including that of facilitating the solution of economic, social, and humanitarian problems, promoting respect for human rights, etc. The Committee's revision on the other hand, accords with the conviction of this Government that the only primary obligation of information personnel is to seek the truth and report the facts, and that the other desirable objectives mentioned in the Conference draft will result from the honest performance of this primary obligation. The maintenance of this modification is essential since the Soviet objective in the field of freedom of information is to secure recognition of the thesis that organs of information have a duty to carry out affirmative "tasks" assigned to them by the government, such as, promoting peace and security, combating fascism and racial hatred.

Despite these improvements, however, this article still suggests the possibility of governmental pressure on organizations of journalists. It is believed that some governments would interpret the intent of this article, namely that they should "encourage" the establishment of such organizations, as justifying such practices as requiring journalists to belong to approved organizations before they could engage in the profession, issuing and withholding identity cards, etc. Moreover, the Sub-Commission is now preparing another Model Code of Ethics for journalists and there is no need to include one in this Convention.

For these reasons, the United States Delegation should move the deletion of this article.

Articles 6 and 7: The United States Delegation should urge the deletion of these Articles on the ground that the remainder of the Convention would in no way prevent a Contracting State from taking, on a reasonable basis, the measures set forth therein. Experience at the Conference on Freedom of Information, in the Third Committee of the General Assembly and in the special committee has shown that many governments look upon these articles as a means of incorporating still more restrictive provisions.

If the articles are retained, however, they should be modified so as to make them less sweeping and arbitrary. The words "which it deems" in Article 6, for example, should be deleted in order to make it possible for other Contracting States to contest the necessity for measures taken pursuant to this article which may appear to discriminate against them. As the article now stands the state imposing the restrictions for alleged balance of payments reasons could not be questioned as to the necessity for its action.

The same change should be made in Article 7. In addition, the words "until such time as they are fully developed" in paragraph (*a*) should

be deleted since it may be assumed that such enterprises are never fully developed unless they enjoy a complete monopoly.

Article 8: The United States Delegation should support Article 8 in its present form. While the first part of the article, relating to the right to edit newspapers and periodicals, could be used to hamper the publication of foreign-owned newspapers or periodicals, it is a fact that many states devoted to freedom of the press (e.g. The Scandinavian States) require such a provision.

The last clause, relating to the right to operate telecommunication facilities, is required by the United States, where aliens are prohibited from owning or operating radio stations.

Article 9: The United States Delegation should support this article in its present form. The present text of this article, providing that a state may refuse entry to any particular person, is identical with the first part of paragraph 7 of Article XII of the "Newsgathering Convention". While the United States strongly opposed this provision in the Newsgathering text and finally succeeded in adding a proviso that it could not be applied to refuse entry to a correspondent as such, it is not considered as objectionable in the context of the present convention. Whereas the Newsgathering agreement related only to a very limited and clearly defined group, foreign correspondents, the present agreement affects all nationals of all Contracting States. Moreover, this provision accords with the immigration practices of most governments and will receive strong majority approval. It is not inconsistent with United States laws and regulations even though the latter operate in terms of defined classes of excludable aliens.

The second paragraph is designed to take cognizance of the rather unique immigration practices of this country which permit certain normally excludable aliens to enter conditionally and is particularly important in connection with persons coming to observe or cover the proceedings of the United Nations. An identical provision was accepted as Article IV of the "Newsgathering Convention".

Article 10: This article points up the difficulty of attempting to draft a specific convention dealing with one of the rights covered by the Draft Covenant. Under this provision, Contracting States would agree *in advance* that in any case of conflict between this detailed Convention and the much more general language of Article 14 of the Covenant (which may be modified in the course of further consideration), the Covenant would prevail!

If the Covenant is to have precedence, as it probably should, some such provision is necessary in this Convention. A suggestion which reduces the difficulty somewhat, and which should be proposed if there is an opportunity, would involve the substitution of the words "but in any case where this is not possible" for the present language which reads "but in any case of incompatibility".

Article 11: The United States Delegation should support the present text of this article.

Article 12: Article 12 of the present text provides for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to settle disputes arising under the Convention if no other mode of settlement is agreed upon.

The United States Delegation should urge that no article dealing with the settlement of disputes should be included in the text at the present time. It should point out that the subject matter of this Convention exactly duplicates that of Article 14 (on freedom of information) of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights. Hence it is important that contracting states not be subject to two different modes of settling disputes arising under the same international obligations.

The United States Delegation should suggest that this article be held in abeyance until the corresponding provisions of the Draft Covenant have been agreed upon. At that time the provisions of the Covenant, if suitable, could be incorporated in the Convention by agreement among the Contracting States. This proposal should not be pressed if a majority strongly favors the present provision.

Articles 13–15: The United States Delegation should support these articles in their present form.

Article 16: The formulation of an acceptable colonial article is made difficult by the necessity of having to reconcile two widely divergent points of view. The colonial powers have pressed for a formulation which recognizes the fact that, for constitutional reasons or because certain non-self-governing territories have achieved varying degrees of self-government, the prior consent of the governing authorities of such territories must be obtained in some cases before the Convention can be extended to those territories.

On the other hand, the non-colonial powers, especially the USSR group of states with strong support from the Middle East, the Far East and some Latin American States, have urged a formulation which would make these instruments applicable automatically to non-self-governing territories of contracting states. The present text, sponsored by the Arab representatives on the special committee, would make the Convention applicable automatically to the non-self-governing territories of contracting states.

The United States position must take into account the customary practice of this Government which has always extended instruments of this type automatically to territories for the international relations of which it is responsible, without prior consultation with the governing authorities of such territories.

Since the Article 16 of the present text accords with United States practice and will certainly be supported by a large majority, the United

States Delegation should not oppose it, even though it is objectionable to the United Kingdom and other colonial powers.

Articles 17–19: The United States Delegation should support these articles as they stand.

New Articles: If at this stage the remainder of the Draft Convention has been modified to bring it into substantial conformity with the views of this Government, the United States Delegation should propose the inclusion of federal state and non-self-executing articles. Their inclusion is an essential prerequisite to United States support for an otherwise acceptable text.

Federal State Article: For a federal state article, the United States Delegation should propose an article along the lines proposed for the Covenant on Human Rights in the position paper on the Covenant.

The incorporation of a federal state article in this Convention is essential to take into account the situation in which the United States and other Federal States find themselves in bringing a Convention of this kind into operation domestically. This Convention deals essentially with the non-exercise of certain governmental powers (i.e. states shall secure freedom from governmental interference in the exercise of the right to freedom of information). In such matters as freedom of speech and press, censorship of films and books, etc., state governments can violate the Convention as well as the Federal Government. In short, while it is clear that the Federal Government has jurisdiction in respect of the inter-state and international aspects of the subject matter of this Convention, and has control of radio broadcasting, the power to violate some provisions of this Convention is as much state as it is federal. The article suggested is an adaptation of Article 19 (7) of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization as amended in 1946 which has received wide acceptance.

It may be anticipated that the new article suggested will be opposed by a number of delegations, principally on the ground that it constitutes a wide "loophole or escape clause" for federal states. A few delegations, not understanding the operations of a federal state, may propose that no such article be included. It has proved difficult in the course of numerous consultations regarding this issue to convince such delegations that this article, far from constituting an escape clause, is necessary to clarify the precise situation of the United States Federal Government, the legislative and executive branches of which cannot determine with finality the exact limits of federal vs. state reponsibilities in this field. The boundaries between federal and state action are constantly being reviewed by court decision and it is only by reference to these court decisions that the particular responsibilities of the state and federal jurisdictions can be determined with reference to a particular set of facts, and at a given time.

At its last session the General Assembly when considering the Covenant on Human Rights agreed in principle on the need to consider a federal-state article. The special committee of the Assembly which prepared the revised text of this Convention did not consider a federal-state article, having decided to await the action of the Human Rights Commission with regard to the Covenant. The Human Rights Commission at its last session did not have time to review the matter.

Non-Self-Executing-Article

"Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each Contracting State undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of this Convention, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the freedoms recognized in this Convention."

A similar provision has already been incorporated by the Commission on Human Rights into the Draft Covenant, which should facilitate its acceptance for this Convention.

Since in the United States and in many other countries the provisions of treaties which they ratify come into force automatically, a question would immediately arise as to whether the precise words of the Convention could be enforced as domestic law (and be interpreted by the courts in conjunction with existing laws) or whether its provisions may not be so general in character that more specific legislation is needed to enforce the Convention.

The provision suggested above is intended to make it clear beyond doubt that in so far as there are no existing legislative or other measures giving effect to the terms of Article 1 of the Convention, the United States would undertake to adopt such measures in accordance with its constitutional processes. Thus, since the treaty itself would stipulate that it would become operative only through legislative or other measures already in existence, or which are subsequently adopted, to bring its provisions into effect as a matter of domestic law, the language of Article 1 referred to could not be considered automatically to become the "supreme law of the land" in the United States.

Under this provision, the Convention would still become binding internationally upon the deposit of the required number of ratifications or accessions and at that moment Contracting States will assume the obligation to adopt legislative or other measures in accordance with their constitutional processes to give effect as a matter of domestic law to the terms of the Convention—to the extent that the rights set forth in the Convention are not already provided by such measures.

It should be noted that the Special Committee of the Assembly rejected by a large majority the proposal of the United States Repre-

sentative to incorporate this article. In the course of a very brief and confused debate several representatives charged that this article would operate to enable this Government to evade its obligation. They contended that the United States should, if necessary, act to bring its legislation into complete conformity with the Convention simultaneously with its acceptance of the instrument.

Resolution A of the Special Committee

In a separate resolution the special committee requested the Secretary General to prepare a report on the legal problems raised by several amendments which had been rejected in the course of the Committee's debate. The objective of this resolution is to seek suitable language expressing the intent of the rejected amendments in order to see if they could at a later stage be incorporated in the Convention.

The amendments involve the addition to Article 2 of the following clauses:

(*a*) "matters likely to injure the feelings of the nationals of the state"

(*b*) "false or distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between peoples or States"

(*c*) "reports regarding racial, national or religious discrimination".

The United States Delegation should oppose any further consideration of these proposals. Although these proposals were sponsored in the Committee by non-Soviet representatives, they are proposals which have always in the past been sponsored by the Soviet states. Based on a totalitarian conception of press control, they could only be enforced by state censorship and control of the media of information. The objective which the sponsors of these proposals seek should be the subject of long-range education, not repressive legislation.

Annex C

In the event the General Assembly decides to convene a special conference to complete the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, the question will arise as to which countries should be invited to participate. Following the precedent of the original Conference on Freedom of Information and of recent conventions sponsored by the United Nations, it is certain that invitations would be addressed to certain non-member states.

In order to counter Soviet arguments in favor of the participation of Outer Mongolia and Communist China and against the participation of Spain, etc., it would be desirable to utilize a formula which has been used by the United Nations in similar circumstances and

which is acceptable to the United States. Such a formula is contained in Resolution 368 (IV) of the General Assembly, which reads:

"INVITATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO NON-MEMBER STATES TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE"

"*The General Assembly*,

"*Considering* that article XI of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved by General Assembly resolution 260 (III) A of 9 December 1948, provides, *inter alia*, that the Convention shall be open to signature and ratification or to accession on behalf of any non-member State to which an invitation has been addressed by the General Assembly,

"*Considering* that it is desirable to send invitations to those non-member States which, by their participation in activities related to the United Nations, have expressed a desire to advance international co-operation,

"1. *Decides* to request the Secretary-General to dispatch the invitations above-mentioned to each non-member State which is or hereafter becomes an active member of one or more of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, or which is or hereafter becomes a Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice;

"2. *Remains convinced* of the necessity of inviting Members of the United Nations which have not yet done so to sign or ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as soon as possible."

266th plenary meeting, 3 December 1949.

It is suggested that the United States Delegation seek support for this formula as the one to be employed for any conference which may be called on freedom of information.

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

SD/AC.3/149

TREATMENT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CASE OF WILLIAM N. OATIS

(Agenda Item 11, Report of the Economic and Social Council)

THE PROBLEM

What action should the United States Delegation take in the General Assembly with regard to the imprisonment by Czechoslovakia of Associated Press correspondent William N. Oatis? [1]

[1] For documentation on developments in the Oatis case as they proceeded in the diplomatic (bilateral) channel, see volume IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Delegation should:

1. On the assumption that majority support can be obtained, support a resolution incorporating the substance of the resolution on this subject which was passed by the Economic and Social Council (Annex A attached).

2. Make a strong statement condemning the Czech action as a flagrant violation of accepted principles of freedom of information and exposing the absurdity of Oatis' conviction under the Soviet-type espionage law.

3. Refer to (*a*) the evidence concerning violations by Rumania of freedom of the press and publication submitted by the United States in the cases involving violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 385(V) of November 3, 1950, citing this material as a means of demonstrating in detail the policies of the communist governments respecting freedom of the press; and (*b*) other examples in Eastern Europe of the violation of accepted principles of freedom of information.

4. If the question of the Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* should arise, follow the position set forth in Annex B.

5. Make available informally to interested delegations the prepared document containing background material and the verbatim record of the Oatis trial. Because of the importance of gaining active support from other delegations, these documents should be relied upon as providing evidence of the good faith of our position. However, the trial transcript and related documents should be made available only to delegations who remain doubtful of our position in regard to the case, and in no case should unrestricted circulation to all delegations be permitted.

COMMENT

William N. Oatis, an American national and chief of the Associated Press Bureau at Prague, was convicted on July 4, 1951 on charges of "espionage" after a mock trial, the transcript of which indicates that his offense lay in attempting conscientiously to carry out in a communist state the normal duties of a foreign correspondent. He was convicted under Czechoslovakia's "espionage" law and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and expulsion from Czechoslovakia after completion of the term, which may be reduced to five years for good behavior.

Oatis was convicted of betraying "state secrets" to a foreign power under a law which defines state secrets as ". . . everything that should be kept from unauthorized persons in an important interest of the Republic, particularly in political, military or economic interests." (See translation of para. 86 of Czech Penal Code in Despatch No. 7,

of July 13, 1951 from Prague, contained in the Background Book on Freedom of Information.[2]) The trial gave evidence of having been rehearsed, but the essential element in the conviction was the use of the definition of espionage as set forth in the Czech Penal Code, a definition which includes, for all practical purposes, the acquisition or dissemination of any information not made public by the Czech Government. (See transcript of trial in Background Book on Freedom of Information). Granted the acceptance of such a definition, the normal functions of a foreign correspondent amount to "espionage".

In order to exhaust all possibilities to obtain Oatis' release and in accordance with Congressional and public opinion, the Department authorized the United States Representative to the recent session of the Economic and Social Council to seek support for a general resolution which, while not referring to the Oatis case as such, would condemn the continuing actions of Communist governments in cutting off virtually all free reporting from their territories. A resolution sponsored by the United States (Annex A) was adopted by a vote of 14 to 3 (The Soviet bloc), with Pakistan abstaining.

While the Czech Government has given no indication to date of its willingness to release Oatis, the recent actions of the United States to prohibit Czech airline flights over Western Germany, to prohibit exports of US goods to Czechoslovakia, to discourage Czechoslovak imports, etc. are known to be causing it increasing concern.[3] It is believed that additional pressure in the form of an airing of the case in the General Assembly will assist in securing Oatis' release. In order to coordinate this Government's efforts in Oatis' behalf, however, it is important that the Delegation keep the Department informed of the progress of its negotiations concerning this case and of the timing of any action by the Assembly.

Judging by the experience in the Economic and Social Council, however, the United States Delegation is likely to encounter considerable reluctance on the part of many delegations to support a resolution on this case. While they supported the United States proposal in the Economic and Social Council, for example, the non-Soviet delegations did not participate actively in the debate. Their reluctance was based on the following factors:

(*a*) They were concerned lest, by joining in this action, they would be committing themselves to any future action which might be undertaken by this Government as a means of exerting pressure on the Czech Government. For this reason it is important to avoid any direct reference to the measures which have been taken by this Government in an

[2] Not printed.

[3] For documentation on political problems related to Czechoslovakia, see volume IV. For documentation regarding the question of imports and exports in U.S.-Czechoslovak trade in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see vol. I, pp. 1381 ff.

attempt to obtain Oatis' release. (See Background Book on Freedom of Information). Moreover, it will be noted that the Economic and Social Council resolution does not call upon other governments to take any action.

(*b*) There was some doubt expressed by members of the Economic and Social Council as to the real nature of Oatis' position and activities in Czechoslovakia. The United States Delegation should assure any delegation which appears to doubt Oatis' innocence that he was a bona fide correspondent and that allegations concerning his "espionage" activities are completely false. By making available to interested members of the Third Committee documents containing an impartial presentation of the facts regarding the background of the trial of Oatis and containing without comment the verbatim record of the trial, itself, the United States can most effectively persuade other delegations of the good faith of the United States position.

(*c*) Some delegations felt that the Oatis case was but one of a series of recent major denials of freedom of information and that their moral position would be much stronger if it could be considered together with other similar cases. The case of *La Prensa* in Argentina was singled out in this connection. While the United States Delegation should be ready to recognize the seriousness of recent major violations of freedom of information, it should not initiate any discussion specifically on *La Prensa*. (If the case of *La Prensa* is raised, the delegation should be guided by the position set forth in Annex B.)

At the same time this feeling may be somewhat mitigated by the fact that the United States will be in a position to refer in detail to the evidence which it has submitted, and which will be before United Nations Members, with regard to violations of freedom of the press and publication in Rumania, as well as to evidence on this subject regarding Bulgaria and Hungary. Other delegations will doubtless be in a position to add accounts of the difficulties of their own national correspondents in Eastern Europe and probably also of the three peace treaty satellites.

(*d*) Although this issue was not raised in the Economic and Social Council, some delegations may doubt the advisability of raising in the United Nations the case of an individual as such on the ground that the matter is outside the Assembly's competence. The United States Delegation should point out that, although the Oatis case is the flagrant example which largely prompted its action, the Economic and Social Council resolution is carefully drafted to avoid this problem. Moreover, the fact that we will be discussing other violations of freedom of information will also be helpful in this regard. The ECOSOC resolution, it may be emphasized, does not refer to the Oatis case as such, but to "all governmental action aimed at the systemic exclusion of bona fide correspondents, the imposition of arbitrary personal restraints and the infliction of punishments upon such correspondents solely because of their attempts faithfully to perform their duties in gathering and transmitting news."

As a means of stimulating an active debate on this issue, it is suggested that, in its consultations with other delegations, the United States Delegation should urge them to discuss the problems of all foreign correspondents who attempted to work in the Soviet states. At the same time and previous to the opening of the debate, efforts should be

made to ensure that at least several other delegations will actively support in the debate not only the resolution but also the United States stand on the Oatis case itself.

Annex A

RESOLUTION DIRECTED AT OATIS CASE

THIRTEENTH SESSION–ECOSOC (DOC. E/2110)
ADOPTED 14–3–1 (PAKISTAN)

The Economic and Social Council,

Recognizing freedom of information as one of the fundamental freedoms referred to in the Charter and the high importance accorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers,

Desiring to implement the right of all peoples to be fully informed,

Conscious of the need of continually stressing the vital importance of safeguarding and developing this essential freedom in order that all peoples may, by freely exchanging information and ideas, come to understand one another, develop friendly relations among themselves and achieve true international cooperation in solving problems of vital concern to all nations,

1. *Views with extreme concern* all governmental action aimed at the systematic exclusion of bona fide correspondents, the imposition of arbitrary personal restraints and the infliction of punishments upon such correspondents solely because of their attempts faithfully to perform their duties in gathering and transmitting news;
2. *Urges strongly* that personal restraints be removed and sentences imposing arbitrary punishments be revoked; and
3. *Appeals* to Governments to do all within their power to safeguard the right of correspondents freely and faithfully to gather and transmit news.

Annex B

With regard to the *La Prensa* issue, the United States Delegation should,

1. refrain from taking any position which would make it appear that the United States condones Argentina's action against *La Prensa*, but should also,
2. refrain from taking the initiative in encouraging or proposing General Assembly action.

The reason for 1. is that there can be no question of United States disapproval of direct or indirect suppression of such an important symbol of a free press as *La Prensa* was. This position has been made clear by United States officials in statements which constitute per-

haps the only expressions of official attitude which have been made by officials of any government on this issue. The most important reason for 2. above, is that United States initiative or leadership is certain to be exploited in Argentina in a manner which will react unfavorably against both United States interests and the interests of press freedom in that country, and will contribute to nothing so much as the strength of Peron.

Specifically, the United States Delegation should,

1. Refrain from initiating or encouraging proposals for General Assembly action in the *La Prensa* issue.
2. If the issue is raised by another delegation in connection with the ECOSOC Resolution bearing on the Oatis case, the United States may vote in favor of an appropriate amendment to the ECOSOC Resolution.
3. Vote in favor of a separate resolution condemning the suppression of *La Prensa*, if one is proposed by another delegation.

(*With reference to points 2 and 3, the Department should, if possible, be consulted on the text of any amendment or separate resolution which may be proposed*).

4. Not initiate any remarks on this issue in general debate and limit any remarks that may be necessary in reply to questions to factual statements falling within the sense of this position paper.

320/11–551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, November 5, 1951—5 : 52 p. m.

Gadel 64. Dept informed Oct 30 by Fr Emb that French considering proposing GA open for sig a Convention on the Right of Correction, consisting only of Arts 1, 9, 10, 11 and certain of the "Miscellaneous" provisions of Newsgathering Convention. Remainder Newsgathering text wld be abandoned. Fr *aide-mémoire* [1] follows air pouch.

Dept strongly opposes Fr proposal on grounds:

(1) US supported inclusion Right Correction provisions in Newsgathering text primarily as means attracting support for provisions re correspondents and censorship and despite propaganda risk involved. Since US correspondents outnumber all others, US likely be main target corrections. Moreover correction provisions of little utility. Any govt now able request corrections through diplomatic channels.

(2) Main objectives Newsgathering Convention are estab intl standard for treatment fon correspondents and limiting censorship outgoing dispatches. By abandoning these objectives Fr proposal wld constitute further setback efforts promote FOI.

(3) While Fr insist anxious avoid reopening arts as presently drafted, proposal opens door to amendments other Dels seeking trans-

[1] Not printed.

form present essentially voluntary provisions into mandatory ones or possibly even attempting incorporate parts FOI Convention.

Proposal may be maneuver force US reconsider position FOI Convention. USDel shld maintain position as stated recommendations 1, 2 and 3 of SD/A/C.3/144.[2]

Possible Fr may offer "compromise" proposal to separate Newsgathering text into two distinct parts, with new provision for optional acceptance one or both parts. USDel shld strongly oppose since such separation most likely result in activation Right of Correction and loss of Gathering and Interl Transmission News.

In view difficult negotiating situation, with Fr in position exploit dissatisfaction over ECOSOC decision to shelve FOI Convention, suggest immediate high level approach Fr Del urging they not advance proposal. In addition above arguments, suggest point out proposal likely lead to acrimonious debate 3rd Comite as last year with result other GA issues in which Fr-US interests heavily involved likely be adversely affected. Suggest Amb Austin, in view his concern over FOI Convention, discuss with Fr.

If Fr press proposal USDel shld consult other Dels urging opposition proposal and affirming US readiness sign Newsgathering Convention as whole. Dels which voted for Convention 3rd GA (list of 33 follows air pouch) shld be urged maintain support. USDel shld take propoganda initiative in debate pointing out seriousness abandonment this time of agreed standards for promoting free flow news.

If necessary as means persuading Fr not press their proposal, USDel may agree it will make no effort at this session open Newsgathering text for signature. In any event effort shld not be made unless prior assurance majority support for whole text as now drafted. Recommendation 4 of SD/A/C.3/144 is modified accordingly.

WEBB

[2] This paper is the same as the text of Annex B of Doc. SD/A/C.3/146, p. 797.

320/11–1751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, November 17, 1951—1 : 14 p. m.

Gadel 183. On further consideration Fr proposal re Newsgathering Convention and after consulting Canham [1] (memo of conversation pouched Nov. 14 [2]), Dept inclined maintain position set forth

[1] Erwin Canham, United States Representative on the United States Delegation to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1948–1949; he was the U.S. Delegate concerned with freedom of information issues.

[2] Not printed.

Gadel 64. However, require report status USDel consultations suggested Gadel 64 in order decide whether US opposition to possibility dividing convention two parts with provision for optional acceptance shld be reconsidered.

Dept sees possible advantage under certain circumstances in agreeing such division if this is only means preventing adoption Fr proposal for separate convention on right of correction standing alone. Wld not agree such division however unless reasonable assurance necessary support to bring first part convention re newsgathering into force, since otherwise wld merely result activation right of correction alone. If necessary resort to such division, US cld either sign only first part re newsgathering, or first and second part (re correction) with reservation that, if ratified by Senate, US obligation under second part wld extend only vis-à-vis States which also accepted first part re newsgathering.

If tempo negots preclude reference Dept, USDel authorized discuss on confidential basis possibility division of convention on above basis with such Dels as UK, Fr, Neth, Canad, Swed, Den, Leb, Urug and Grk. USDel shld not formally propose division unless necessary prevent adoption Fr proposal for separate Convention on Right Correction. USDel shld first make every effort as suggested Gadel 64 to head off or defeat Fr proposal.

WEBB

320/11–2251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 27, 1951—11 : 48 a. m.

Gadel 259. Do not understand reference Delga 312 to Fr proposal to divide Newsgathering Convention into two Conventions.[1] Has Fr abandoned proposal single Convention Right Correction in favor dividing Newsgathering text into two optional conventions?

Dept awaiting report high-level approach FrDel suggested Gadel 64 [2] and concerned that USDel may be forced accept two conventions without any assurance support for newsgathering provisions. Even with such assurance important divided convention be supported only last resort as means preventing adoption original Fr proposal as suggested Gadel 183.

WEBB

[1] In the Delegation's classified information summary for November 22, transmitted in Delga 312, November 22, mention was made that the United Kingdom was "indifferent" to a "French proposal" to divide the Newsgathering and Right of Corrections Convention into two conventions (320/11–2251).

[2] Dated November 5, p. 811.

320/12–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET PARIS, December 20, 1951—11 p. m.

Delga 757. Daily Classified Summary No. 41, December 20, 10:56 p. m.

. . . . . .

Freedom of Information

US objections to the completion of the Freedom of Information Convention were reiterated to Schuman[1] (France) by Mrs. Roosevelt. She held that the present climate of opinion was unfavorable to completion of the convention. The US hoped, she said, the earlier convention, which was already completed, might be opened for signature at this session.

Schuman acknowledged differences of opinion on the draft Freedom of Information Convention were almost irreconcilable but stated his Government felt strongly something was needed to "balance" the Convention on Transmission of News and the Right of Correction. He suggested a resolution, a declaration, or a code of ethics might serve this purpose.

The US, Mrs. Roosevelt responded, would be very glad to consider concrete proposals of the French Delegation.

. . . . . .

ROOSEVELT

[1] Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

320/12–2251 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PARIS, December 22, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 795. As follow-up of conversation between Mrs. Roosevelt and Schuman (France) concerning newsgathering and FOI conventions,[1] USDel staff met with Kayser (France)[2] to consider possible alternative lines of action in GA when FOI discussion opens in Comite 3. This subject likely to be reached beginning third week January.

Kayser stressed point that Fr del is continuing to press for some action in GA to save right of correction provisions of newsgathering

[1] See Delga 757, December 20, *supra*.

[2] M. Jacques Kayser, French journalist, Technical Adviser on the French Delegation to the General Assembly.

convention. Fr del continues to prefer adoption resolution in GA simply opening these provisions for separate ratification. Fr del might be willing to go along with res opening newsgathering provisions for separate ratification also.

In view US opposition to convening internatl conf to complete FOI convention, Fr del urging that US join France in supporting at same time some affirmative action on FOI at this session GA.

Fr suggest that same resolution postponing completion FOI convention refer to drafting of code of ethics. Kayser claimed his del was simply seeking to place moral duties on correspondents through a code of ethics to be adopted and admin by private journalist organizations and not through govt controls. One suggestion was that FOI subcommission draft code of ethics might be sent by ECOSOC to private organizations for implementation by latter. Under this provision ECOSOC itself wld not undertake to make any changes in subcommission draft.

As pointed out Delga 757, Schuman expressed to Mrs. Roosevelt strong support his govt for some "balance" in FOI field, which might be in form of code of ethics.

Kayser also urged desirability of provision in res against monopoly which limits free flow of info. Free competition wld be stressed in such provision. State action might be called for this connection to prevent monopoly by few which wld handicap others in furthering free flow of info.

USDel wld appreciate receiving from Dept by January 5, any suggestions on code of ethics and monopolies which Dept considers cld appropriately be included in GA Res on FOI.

[ROOSEVELT]

320/12–2251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, January 3, 1952—4 : 57 p. m.

Gadel 582. Dept unable agree Fr request US join in support res on code ethics and monopoly Delga 795.[1] Consider such action, when coupled with Fr proposal re Newsgathering Convention, as completely negative Freedom of Info (FOI) approach.

Cannot see how "balance" between rights and duties of correspondents which Fr desire is attained by adoption Right Correction provisions convention and stress on code and anti-monopoly in return for killing or seriously jeopardizing affirmative protection of correspondents afforded by first part convention. Throughout most of world "bal-

[1] Dated December 22, *supra*.

ance" now heavily against rights correspondents and US strongly opposed any action which tends add weight UN prestige to action many Govts restricting and harassing correspondents.

Suggest immediate consultations UK, Scandinavian and other like-minded Dels in order effect concerted approach FrDel along lines Gadels 64 and 183 and urge FrDel not place itself in position leader anti-FOI elements in GA. While playing role compromiser in past FOI discussions, Fr has shown reluctance be separated completely from Western Eur US and UK Dels and may be persuaded abandon present drive despite assurance majority support if certain of strong opposition these Dels. In private talks USDel shld if necessary urge Fr take into acct strong opposition press and other quarters US to their proposals.

With regard code ethics shld be noted FOI Subcom will review and complete it as first item business in Mar session, after which transmitted ECOSOC for referral professional bodies for voluntary adoption. GA action this time therefore not only unnecessary but likely increase suspicion professional bodies code intended as Govt instrument control press. While USDel may of course support reference in otherwise acceptable res merely noting code in process drafting shld oppose any form GA endorsement giving above as reasons.

Reference Govt anti-monopoly measures undesirable since plays into hands Sov propaganda. US cld support such reference only if point clearly made that greatest threat FOI is totalitarian Govt monopoly but USDel shld note UK and other Dels having BBC type monopoly may have difficulty supporting. Because of this difficulty previous attempt draft such res resulted in feeble and ambiguous text worse than none (see res 27 E/CONF.6/79). If find necessary oppose inadequate reference monopoly, USDel shld stress US opposed all forms FOI monopoly, pointing out US Govt has recently used anti-trust legislation in successful prosecutions few instances private abuse US.

ACHESON

320/1–2252 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 22, 1952—11 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 1143. Re Comite Three agenda. Presently anticipated Third Comite will complete consideration Covenant on Human Rights item about Jan. 28. Two items will then remain on agenda: (1) Sec-

tions 2 to 10 of chapter 5 of ECOSOC report and (2) draft protocol on stateless persons.

If present efforts to have only joint Comite Two and Three consider reorganization ECOSOC are successful, Comite Three will have only freedom of info as remaining principal subject for consideration under ECOSOC report. Although we anticipate introduction and wide support for res for postponement freedom of info convention, some two days' debate expected, through Jan 30.

In view anticipated termination practically all other comites by Jan 30, USGADel proposes urge postponement item on draft protocol on stateless persons until seventh session GA. Even to obtain postponement, likely to be at least one day of debate, thus permitting termination Third Comite by end of day Jan 31.[1]

Above estimates reflect USGADel and secretariat thinking, if Oatis case is not raised in Third Comite in connection with FOI subject.

Staff of opinion though strong statement shld be made on Oatis case, preferable not submit res, even along general lines of ECOSOC res as result discussions with UK, Fr, Canada, Leb, New Zealand, Neth, Yugo for fol reasons:

(1) Negative sentiment created in Third Comite with regard discussion of individual cases as result of rejection in comite of Polish res on 24 inhabitants of Barcelona and resentment when Israel raised in comite Jan 22 case of two Jews executed in Iraq.
(2) Insistence by US on approval res wld very likely extend session GA additional five or six days.
(3) Difficulty found in comite to obtain affirmative action on res after termination all other comites. Staff particularly concerned that USGADel might be forced to withdraw res in order not hold up termination GA.
(4) Submission of res by other dels on other human rights matters wld be encouraged. Sovs and Arabs likely exploit such opportunity keep GA considering their proposals.

Staff of opinion however USGADel shld make statement in Third Comite re ECOSOC res on Oatis case in connection consideration ECOSOC report. In opinion staff this will extend session Third Comite additional three or four days, since there will be supporting speeches other dels and opposition speeches from Sov bloc. There will also no doubt be many speeches on other human rights matters, such as Negroes in US, Morocco, etc.

Staff estimate accordingly is that with proposed discussion Oatis case in Third Comite, this comite will not terminate its work until Feb 2 or 4.

[1] Regarding this item, the Department of State responded in Gadel 819, January 24, 1952, 4: 43 p. m.: "Department entirely agrees Delegation proposal urge postponement subject item until seventh session of the General Assembly." (320/1–2252)

Urgent USGADel receive immediate view of Dept on line of action proposed above with respect Third Comite.

ROOSEVELT

320/1–2252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 23, 1952—6:17 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 808. Re Delga 1143 [1] Oatis case. View considerations urtel Dept agrees Del opinion not feasible secure adoption res Oatis case. Sufficient make strong ref Oatis in statement re pertinent Sec ECOSOC Report. However view obvious importance of issue and in absence submission res Dept stresses importance adequate US statement along lines special text of statement re Oatis transmitted to Del by Dept in memo Dec. 11 to Green and Simsarian.[2] Dept still hopes Del able persuade other Dels make appropriate supporting statement.

ACHESON

[1] Dated January 22, *supra*.

[2] Memorandum not found in Department of State files. James F. Green and James Simsarian were Advisers on the United States Delegation, and both were engaged in Committee Three matters.

IO Files

Minutes of Forty-ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 25, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/236

[Here follows list of persons (42) present.]

1. *Freedom of Information and Oatis Case.*

Mr. Simsarian said that after considering human rights, Committee Three would proceed to discuss Chapter 5 of the ECOSOC report. Section 5 of Chapter 5 was on freedom of information and the Oatis case. This dealt first with the Newsgathering Convention. He recalled that this convention has been initially drafted in the Freedom of Information Conference in 1948, on the basis of a United States proposal. It had been completed by the Assembly in 1949, and was designed to protect foreign correspondents in their work. The United States had been prepared to sign this Convention at that time, but the Assembly held up opening it for signature until a Convention on Freedom of Information was also completed or finally disposed of. The

Delegation's instructions on the Newsgathering Convention had been modified to allow the postponement of final action on this Convention.

The second part of Section 5 of Chapter 5 of the ECOSOC Report had to do with the Freedom of Information Convention. It was initially placed before the United Nations by a proposal from the UK. The US favored the postponement of consideration of this Convention at this time, since it was not felt to be in satisfactory condition, and we were anxious to have it postponed indefinitely. It appeared that we would be successful in having its consideration postponed at this session because of the lack of time for its adequate consideration.

The third point that would be coming up under this section of the ECOSOC Report, related to the Oatis case. Mr. Simsarian recalled that in the last session of ECOSOC the United States Representative had made a strong statement on the Oatis case and a resolution was adopted with the Oatis case primarily in mind. This matter would not be before Committee Three in the ECOSOC Report. The Department had recommended that the Delegation make a strong statement condemning the action of Czechoslovakia in the Oatis case (see Gadel 808 [1]). The staff felt that other delegations would join in making strong statements to the same point. The staff had been concerned, however, lest these statements would unduly prolong the work of Committee Three and thereby that of the Assembly itself. A telegram explaining this situation had been sent to the Department, with the recommendation however that a strong statement be made on the Oatis case in spite of this fact. The Department expressed its agreement with this recommendation. The staff was now working for support for our statement from other delegations.

Mr. Simsarian stated that it was deemed advisable not to submit a resolution on this case for a number of reasons. The Committee had rejected the consideration of a Polish resolution in regard to Spain. In addition, counter pressures might be expected if we tabled a resolution, which might be so strong as to compel the withdrawal of our resolution. Hence, on balance, it had been decided by the staff that the most effective tactics on the Oatis case would be to confine the United States approach at this time to very strong statements. The Department had endorsed this approach.

Mr. Taylor asked what the reactions of other delegations had been to our proposed move. Mr. Simsarian said that a number of them had indicated they would make strong statements. Mr. Allen inquired whether the move he understood was being contemplated to postpone consideration of the Freedom of Information item would interfere with our plans for making a strong statement on the Oatis case. Mr. Simsarian explained that he did not believe that the submission of this

[1] Dated January 23, *supra*.

resolution would preclude strong statements on the Oatis case in the Committee.

Mrs. Roosevelt recalled that a Yugoslav delegate had approached her to ask whether the US would allow freedom of information to be discussed. She had pointed out to him that the US was not going to stand in the way of any discussion of freedom of information. Mr. Simsarian added that the Latin Americans, in addition to the Western Europeans, would probably make supporting statements on the Oatis case. In answer to a question by Mr. Lubin, he said that France had agreed to withdraw its proposal for a corrections convention, and would instead support postponement of a detailed discussion of freedom of information this year.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

CHARLES D. COOK

320/1–2952 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 29, 1952.

[Received January 30—12 : 20 a. m.]

Delga 1243. Re Comite 3 joint draft res Jan 29. Fol is text of joint draft res tabled Comite 3 Jan 29 (Chile, Egypt, France, India, Lebanon, Mexico, Philippines and Yugoslavia).

(Joint Draft Res A/C.3/L.227/Rev : 1).

Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter V) Chile, Egypt, France, India, Lebanon, Mexico, Philippines and Yugoslavia: Revised Joint draft resolution.

Freedom of information.

The General Assembly,

Regretting that the progress of the proceedings at its sixth regular session does not allow it to devote a detailed discussion to the problems of freedom of information, and especially to the study of the draft convention of freedom of information.

Decides to place consideration of all these problems and of this situation on the agenda for its seventh regular session, and to give it priority.

ROOSEVELT

Editorial Note

At its plenary meeting on February 4, the General Assembly in Resolution 541 (VI) took note of the fact that the Third Committee had

not been able to give the consideration "that they deserve" to the documents relating to freedom of information; and decided to postpone the item until the Seventh Session. For the appropriate documentation that had been tabled for the consideration of the Third Committee, see fascicule for agenda item 11 in GA (VI), *Annexes*, pages 11 ff. The brief proceedings of the General Assembly on the item are recorded in GA (VI), *Plenary*, pages 496–498. For text of the resolution, see GA (VI), *Resolutions*, page 35.

Third Committee consideration of the item was taken up almost wholly with extensive discussion of the Oatis case, on January 30 and 31 and February 2, 1952. For an initial statement of some length about the Oatis Case by the United States Representative (Tobias), see GA (VI), *Third Committee*, pages 413–415. For the Third Committee's proceedings as a whole on this matter, see *ibid.*, pages 413–446.

IV. MATTERS RESPECTING REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS

Editorial Note

In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 429 (V) of December 14, 1950, a diplomatic conference assembled at Geneva, Switzerland on July 2, 1951, to complete the drafting of and to sign a convention relating to the status of refugees. The conference was also to effect similar action for a draft protocol on stateless persons.

The conference adopted a final text on July 25, 1951, and 13 governments had signed *ad referendum* by mid-August, not including the United States.

For an authoritative statement by the United States Representative to the Conference, George L. Warren (Department of State Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons), as to reasons why the United States had not signed, see article by Mr. Warren, "U.N. Action on Status of Refugees and Displaced Persons", Department of State *Bulletin*, September 24, 1951, pages 502–504. The principal reason was that "the convention was not well adapted to United States laws and practices, under which refugees already receive rights shared by all other legally admitted aliens and, except in special instances, are in effect assimilated in status to that of citizens. Little, therefore, would be gained for refugees by United States adherence to the convention."

Mr. Warren pointed out, however, "that the United States Government had an interest in assisting in every way possible to secure broad adherence to the convention, particularly on the part of European states, because the legal establishment of rights and privileges for refugees under the convention would regularize the position of refugees and thus contribute to peace and order in areas in which large numbers of refugees reside."

For text of the Refugee Convention of July 25, 1951, see United Nations, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Displaced Persons, *Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (Palais des Nations, Geneva, 1951).

IO Files

United States Delegation Position Paper, Superseding Two Earlier Department of State Instructions on Refugee Problems [1]

RESTRICTED [PARIS,] January 2, 1952.

US/A/C.3/341

REFUGEE ITEMS BEFORE THE THIRD COMMITTEE

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take in the Third Committee on the two refugee items on the agenda. Two principal questions arise: clarification of the Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (see Annex A [2]) and the creation of a special fund for assistance to refugees in cases of urgent need.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Delegation should avoid taking the initiative in the debates and should, wherever appropriate, support postponement of decisions until the next session of the General Assembly.

2. The Delegation should support a resolution by which the Assembly would note the Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees and commend him for the progress made in establishing his Office and initiating the work of protection for refugees.

3. With regard to clarification of the Statute of the High Commissioner, as a basis for further consideration of his budget by the Fifth Committee, the Delegation should:

a. Support the position that the administrative expenses of the High Commissioner's branch offices are a proper charge on the United Nations budget, but that the activities of the branch offices should not extend beyond those permitted in the Statute.

b. Support the position that "administrative expenses" of the High Commissioner's Office, which according to paragraph 20 of the Statute shall be borne on the United Nations budget, should be limited to those expenses required to carry out the functions prescribed by the Statute.

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[1] The earlier papers were Doc. SD/A/C.3/147, October 13, 1951, "Refugees and Stateless Persons . . ." and Doc SD/A/C.3/148, October 12, 1951, "Problems of Assistance to Refugees". (IO Files)

[2] Not printed.

4. The Delegation should oppose any proposals which involve a step-up of program operation above the general lines contemplated in the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

5. The Delegation should oppose any action by the General Assembly looking toward the establishment of an international fund for assistance to refugees. In the event that substantial support for the establishment of an international fund for assistance to refugees should develop, the Delegation should endeavor to have action on the proposal referred to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly for consideration. If it is decided to take action at this session, the Delegation should take the following positions:

a. In the event that the High Commissioner proposes an amendment to paragraph 10 (3) of the Statute if the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees, which removes the requirement that the High Commissioner have prior approval by the General Assembly to appeal to governments or to make a general appeal for funds to be administered by his Office for the relief of refugees, the Delegation should oppose the adoption of such a proposal.

b. In the event that the High Commissioner requests authorization under paragraph 10 (3) of the Statute to appeal to governments or to make a general appeal to both governments and non-governmental organizations for funds to be administered by his Office for the relief of refugees, the Delegation should oppose such authorization.

c. If it is proposed that the General Assembly should authorize the High Commissioner to appeal to individuals and non-governmental organizations for funds, the Delegation should abstain or, if a preponderant majority appears to be in favor of the proposal, should vote affirmatively.

6. The Delegation should make clear that the United States Government continues to be concerned in the plight of refugees and hopes that the temporary migration organization established by the Brussels Conference will assist in the resettlement of many of the refugees remaining after the termination of the International Refugees Organization. The Delegation should support any proposal expressing the view that refugees within the mandate of the High Commissioner's Office should receive a fair share in any opportunities for migration which will be provided.

DISCUSSION

The Third Committee has agreed to consider simultaneously the two refugee items on its agenda:

Refugees and stateless persons:

(*a*) Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees

(*b*) Report of the Economic and Social Council Problems of assistance to refugees: reports of the International Refugee Organization and of the High Commissioner for Refugees.

The High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. J. G. von Heuven Goedhart, had requested that the Third Committee consider these items in early December in order that its views might be available to the Fifth Committee when the latter reviewed the High Commissioner's budget. The Third Committee decided, however, not to interrupt its general debate on the Human Rights Covenant and to take up the refugee items on January 2.

The present position paper consolidates the position papers previously prepared in the Department concerning the two agenda items (SD/A/C.3/147 and 148), together with new material on the clarification requested by the High Commissioner of the statute of his office.

There follow detailed comments on each of the foregoing six recommendations.

1. The first recommendation takes account of the rather negative character of the Delegation's position and the tactical advantage of not attempting to meet head-on any general desire to increase the High Commissioner's budget or to establish an international fund for assistance to refugees.

2. The High Commissioner submitted a report to the General Assembly through ECOSOC at its Thirteenth Session (E/2036 and E/2036/Add. 1) and supplemented his report with a lengthy oral statement. ECOSOC noted the report and commended the High Commissioner for the progress made in organizing his Office. In general, the United States position is to support the efforts of the High Commissioner to facilitate the assimilation of refugees lacking a legal status pending the acquisition of citizenship on their part. The organization of effective protection involves the patient development by the High Commissioner of services for refugees in countries in which refugees are concentrated in coordination with related services to be provided by governments. For various reasons the High Commissioner has not had time as yet to develop this program and as a result will need to spend the next year in further development of the specific contribution which his Office can make to the resolution of the problem of refugees. In this basic effort, the High Commissioner will have the full support of the United States Government in order that a sound program may eventually be developed. In consequence, the United States Delegate may appropriately support a resolution noting the High Commissioner's Report and commending him for the progress made in organizing his office and initiating the work of protection for refugees.

3. The Secretary General had included in his original estimates a sum of $727,100 to cover the costs of the Headquarters Office of the High Commissioner in Geneva and the branch offices it was proposed to open during the course of 1951 and 1952.

The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended a reduction of $227,100, or a total of $500,000. Referring to the High Commissioner's proposals concerning the establishment of branch offices, the Committee stated that it had "reached the conclusion that reasons of economy make it imperative, at any rate in the initial stages, that a far more conservative policy should be pursued and that both the number of such offices and their provisional establishment should be scaled down." The Advisory Committee pointed out the need for a clear definition of the term "administrative expenses" which, under paragragh 20 of the Statute, are to be borne on the budget of the United Nations, as well as the need to ensure that the activities of branch offices do not extend beyond what is permitted in the Statute and thus become dissimilar in nature from those performed at the Headquarters Office in Geneva.

When the High Commissioner appeared before the Third Committee to request an early consideration of the refugee items, he said that before the Fifth Committee reviewed his budget it should have the Third Committee's views on the following two questions: (1) Should the administrative expenses of branch offices be borne on the budget of the United Nations? (2) What is meant by the phrase "administrative expenses" in paragraph 20 of the Statute?

Just before the Christmas recess, the Fifth Committee, and later the Plenary, approved a provisional estimate of $500,000 for the High Commissioner's Office, on the understanding that the budget estimates would be discussed in detail at a later stage in the light of any observations on the activities of the High Commissioner which the Third Committee might wish to make.

The third recommendation is designed to meet the apparent desire of the High Commissioner to obtain the support of the Third Committee for an increase in his budget over the $500,000 recommended by the Advisory Committee. It states that the administrative expenses of both the Geneva Headquarters and the field offices, to be borne on the United Nations budget, should be limited to those expenses required to carry out the functions prescribed by the Statute. By limiting itself to this position, the Delegation need not debate in the Third Committee the number or size of the branch offices required—a matter for the Fifth Committee to consider—but need merely state that it questions whether the functions prescribed by the Statute require at this time as many posts as the High Commissioner requested. Similarly, the Delegation can avoid becoming involved in a detailed discussion of what constitutes "administrative" and "operational" expenses by adhering to a general definition of "administrative expenses"—those required to carry out the functions of the Statute.

4. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as indicated earlier, has recommended that the $727,100

requested by the High Commissioner be reduced to $500,000. The Delegation has been instructed to support the Advisory Committee's recommendations in the Fifth Committee "unless, on individual items, the Secretary General is able to supplement his statement of October 8 with overwhelming evidence of the need for restoration". The High Commissioner may present arguments for the establishment of more liaison offices in countries where refugees reside than would be permitted by this budget. It has been the Department's view, prior to hearing further budget justifications, that this budget will prove sufficient for the orderly development of the Office in its second year, because the specific services which the High Commissioner is to render in supplementation of services to be provided refugees by the governments of residence have not yet been clarified. The foregoing budget should provide the essential requirements of the headquarters office in Geneva and liaison offices in the important countries of refugee residence.

5. The General Council of the International Refugee Organization has submitted to the General Assembly a communication (A/1948), dated November 10, 1951, on the residual problems which will remain at the termination of the activities of the IRO. The communication refers to limited numbers of refugees—in Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, the Middle East, China, and the Philippines—who face "doubtful prospects of achieving assimilation or self-maintenance in the immediate future". It states that 1,000 to 1,500 refugees are entering Germany, Austria, Turkey, Greece, Trieste, and Italy from Eastern European countries monthly. The communication concludes that the problems inherent in this situation "are so grave in terms of human suffering that they call for urgent consideration by the United Nations." (For full text of conclusions, see Annex B).

The High Commissioner, in Part III of his report to the General Assembly (E/2036/Add. 2), refers to the urgent need for relief of the remaining refugees in the countries cited by the communication of the IRO General Council. He mentions 5,000 in Shanghai, 150 in Samar, and 900 in Trieste, but does not give precise figures concerning emergency cases elsewhere. In a private conversation, the High Commissioner indicated that he felt that approximately 12,000 persons would be in need of material assistance after the termination of the IRO. In his report to the Assembly he concludes that he should be authorized to raise voluntary contributions to establish a limited relief fund to deal with the emergency needs of these residual refugees and of new refugees. (For full text of his conclusions, see Annex C).

The fifth recommendation is based upon the assumption that the United States Government will not make any further contributions for assistance to refugees. The Congress has made clear its intention

in this regard, and the Department has assured Congressional leaders that it will request no further appropriations for refugee work. It is considered furthermore, that an international fund for relief purposes is not necessary, for the reasons outlined below.

Western European governments which have since World War II been accustomed to having indigent refugees on their territories assisted from international funds are reluctant at present to resume the function of assisting such refugees unilaterally. The pressure from these sources to expand the fund and to use it for a growing range of problems, will tend to increase in succeeding years.

There remain the residual United Nations refugees following the termination of IRO. The numbers of these requiring assistance are relatively small, totalling less than 100,000 in all Europe and approximately 3,000 in South East Asia and the Far East. Arrangements for the continuing care of those refugees among them who require institutional care, including their dependent relatives will be substantially completed by IRO through an expenditure of $22,000,000 for this purpose. This latter group number approximately 34,000 of the 100,000. The total group is so distributed over many countries that the burden of relief for them on the economy of any one country is not such as to justify the establishment of an international fund for their assistance.

The argument for an assistance fund may also be based on the apparent lack of international provision for the 1,000 to 1,500 refugees who are escaping monthly from Eastern Europe. These refugees consist in part of younger persons able to withstand the rigors of escape through a closely protected border. Opportunities for their emigration from Europe may soon be provided through provisions for them under international arrangements now under active discussion for moving surplus migrants out of Europe.

Anticipating the termination of IRO, the United Nations has taken steps in further efforts to resolve the problems of refugees who lack legal status. The office of High Commissioner for Refugees has been established, and a Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees has been recommended to the governments for acceptance by a diplomatic conference convened by the Nations. These steps are not considered sufficient by some governments and by segments of the general public. However, this pressure for further action by the General Assembly has not resulted in the formulation to date of specific proposals other than that an international relief fund should be provided.

It is not anticipated that the proponents of an international assistance fund will be in a position to present convincing data justifying the establishment of such a fund or a budget of relief requirements, beyond those made available by the national relief administrations of the coun-

tries of residence of refugees. In the absence of a specific program it is the United States view that action by the General Assembly should be postponed until the Seventh Session pending the development of further facts relating to the problem. In the intervening period the results of a world survey of the refugee problem, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation to the extent of $100,000, will become available. Later reports of actual experience in individual countries will also indicate particular areas where relief needs, only vaguely assumed to exist at present, may actually arise in fact. Taking into account the limited resources and funds available to the United Nations, action of this character should only be taken on the basis of clearly demonstrated needs and a clearly defined program.

6. To offset any criticism of its opposition to an appeal to governments for contributions to an international fund, the Delegation may need to refer to the continuing concern of the United States Government in the plight of refugees, as evidenced by its large contributions to UNRRA and IRO. The Delegation can point out that emergency relief is no longer necessary and that the most important need today is for emigration of surplus populations, including refugees, from the overcrowded areas of Europe. It can refer to the establishment of a temporary migration organization by the Brussels Conference as a major effort in this direction. The Delegation may find it useful to endorse the principle set forth in the recommendation of the High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees, to the effect that refugees within the mandate of his Office should receive a fair share in any opportunities which will be provided. (For full text, see Annex D).

Annex B

Communication From the General Council of the International Refugee Organization: Conclusions

(A/1948, November 10, 1951)

1. It must be borne in mind that in most of the countries mentioned above the situation of refugees coming within the mandate of the IRO is rendered precarious by the large numbers of refugees or other persons entering these areas, who, while outside the scope of the competence of the IRO, at the same time reduce considerably the opportunities of housing and employment available to refugees under the protection of the Organization.

2. In considering these residual problems for which it is not expected that satisfactory solutions will be found before the termination of IRO operations, the representatives of the Member Govern-

ments at the Eighth Session of the General Council were not prepared to present the position of their Governments as to measures which might be taken, in further efforts to resolve those problems by the General Assembly.

3. Nevertheless, they are agreed that, although the problems inherent in the situation as here set out are clearly not of sufficient magnitude to justify the maintenance of the IRO, they are so grave in terms of human suffering that they call for urgent consideration by the United Nations.

Annex C

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the General Assembly: Part III, Conclusions

(E/2036/Add.2, November 13, 1951)

The seriousness of the situation which faces refugees within the mandate of the IRO who will not be resettled has been clearly outlined in the communication of the General Council of the IRO. The basic facts analysed in this communication cannot be denied. The constant influx of new refugees into areas from which the IRO has not been able to resettle all the refugees, coupled with the residual problems of refugees remaining in countries with their own refugee difficulties, present an urgent problem which demands the attention of the United Nations.

This problem, although it is of considerable magnitude can, in my opinion, be solved if it is divided and tackled in its component parts. There are, in my opinion, three lines of action:

1. In the first place, a limited relief fund should be established which would provide for the basic needs of certain refugee groups, such as those in the Far East and Middle East, whose conditions will be desperate after the cessation of IRO emergency relief. This fund should also be able to cope with temporary emergency situations which might arise from the influx of refugees in countries of first asylum, and could be administered by my office. I therefore request that I be authorized by the General Assembly to undertake the necessary negotiations and appeals to raise voluntary contributions for it.

2. In the second place, long-term plans should be made and methods evolved for financing and implementing economic reconstruction measures calculated to afford to residual groups some areas possibilities of a normal livelihood. Accordingly, Governments and appropriate specialized agencies should be urged to work out in close collaboration with my office all suitable plans toward that end.

3. Thirdly, that it would be desirable that those States willing make a further international effort to promote migration should consider the possibility of taking the measures necessary to ensure that refugees within the mandate of my office will receive a fair share of any opportunities for migration which will be provided.

Annex D

RECOMMENDATION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

(A/AC.36/R.1, December 18, 1951)

The Advisory Committee, after considering the problem of assistance raised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is of the opinion that the drawing up of long-term plans with a view to satisfactory assimilation of refugees in the various countries of refuge is an appropriate means of contributing to the solution of the refugee problem. The Committee draws the attention of the High Commissioner to the urgent need to enter into relations with the competent organs of the United Nations for this purpose.

The Committee, aware of the continuing needs of a certain number of refugees, takes note of the High Commissioner's intention to ask the General Assembly to authorize him to open the necessary negotiations and to appeal for voluntary contributions with a view to creating a special fund for assistance to refugees in cases of urgent need.

While assimilation and integration of refugees within their countries of present residence must be the aim, the committee considers that in present circumstances migration is an appropriate means of contributing to the solution of the refugee problem. The Committee agrees with the opinion expressed by the High Commissioner that it would be desirable that those states willing to make a further international effort to promote migration should consider the possibility of taking the measures necessary to ensure that refugees within the mandate of his Office will receive a fair share in any opportunities for migration which will be provided.

320/1–252 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

PARIS, January 2, 1952—6 p. m.

Delga 814. Position paper SD/A/C.3/147,[1] para 3, recommends USGADel oppose authorization for High Commissioner for Refugees appeal to govts or make general appeal for funds. Staff recommends that, if proposed, GA authorize HC appeal only to individuals and NGO's would help counteract effect of USGADel negative position on (1) appeal to govts and on (2) sizeable increase in HC's budget.

Advise soonest. Vote may be taken January 4 or 5.

ROOSEVELT

[1] See footnote 1, p. 822.

IO Files

Minutes of Thirty-eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 3, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/225

[Here follows list of persons (40) present. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair.]

1. *Refugee Items before Committee Three* [US/A/C.3/341 [1]].

Mr. Green described the general situation in Committee Three by saying that there were really two related items being considered at once. The first was a more general one and concerned the report of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. J. G. von Heuven Goedhart. The second involved a proposal for creating an international assistance fund for refugees to care for those remaining after IRO was terminated. Because of the obvious relationship between these two items the Third Committee was taking them up together.

The staff had combined the two earlier position papers on these items, together with new material on recent developments, into a single document which was before the Delegation as US/A/C.3/341. Mr. Goedhart had wished to take up his report earlier in the session in order to have had Committee Three action on it completed before Committee Three undertook the budgetary aspects of it. It had not been possible to accede to his request, so Committee Five had included an item for $500,000 in the budget without prejudice to future action they might take pending receipt of Committee Three's report. $300,000 had been allocated to the Commissioner for 1951, and he was now asking for $727,000 for 1952. The Advisory Committee had reduced this amount to $500,000, and had questioned the number and size of the branch offices of the High Commissioner's office. They felt these branches to be overstaffed and could not agree that over one half the Commissioner's budget should go for these expenditures. Admittedly this involved an interpretation of paragraph 20 of the Statute of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Quoting paragraph 8, sub (*c*) and (*d*), the Advisory Committee had said that clarification was needed in regard to the legitimate administrative expenditures which could be made for branch offices, in order to assure that the activities of these offices conformed to those of the main office.

In his formal introduction on the previous day, Dr. Goedhart had avoided the administrative question. He had confined his presentation to a request for an endorsement in general terms by the Committee of the need for branch offices. He had referred in this connection to

[1] Dated January 2, p. 822.

League of Nations experience, which indicated the necessity of having branch offices. Recommendation 3 of the position paper, US/A/C.3/341, had tried to anticipate these ideas of the Commissioner, with a view to keeping Committee 3 out of this particular wrangle. The recommendation was that the US support the position that branch offices are a proper charge upon the UN budget but that their activities should be limited to those allowed in the Statute of the Commissioner's Office. Mr. Green felt that we might become involved in a debate on this question, but that it would be wisest to place the matter in the hands of Committee Five, to decide how much money would properly be required.

Mr. Green said that the second problem before the Committee was the more difficult one. This dealt with the question of assistance to refugees after IRO went out of existence early this year. The General Council of the IRO had been asked for an opinion on the remaining problems in the field of refugees after the end of IRO. These were set forth in a communication, the conclusions of which were annexed to the position paper. The IRO had settled over one million people, and had cared for 40,000 others, but still others would remain uncared for when IRO ceased to function. These were set forth in a list. The General Council concluded in paragraph 3 of the conclusions that this situation did not justify the retention of the IRO, but did call for immediate attention in some other way.

Dr. Goedhart had used this conclusion as a springboard in his presentation to ask for an international assistance fund to aid the remaining refugees—some 200 in the Philippines, 2,000 in Shanghai, 400 tuberculosis cases in Trieste, and others. He asked for $3,000,000 for 1952 to care for these people after considering IRO experience and in view of the continuing flow of escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. He proposed that the money be spent through private or public agencies other than his own office. To raise the necessary amount he suggested an appeal to governments. This could not be done consistent with the terms of paragraph 10 of the Statute of his office without the approval of the General Assembly. A resolution was now being drafted to this effect.

In paragraph 5 of the position paper before the Delegation Mr. Green indicated that the recommendation was to oppose the creation of an international fund for assistance to refugees. The idea behind this recommendation was that there was no real need for a special fund. The number of persons concerned was small and those people should be cared for by the states in whose territory they were to be found. Otherwise, the UN would be receiving annual and ever increasing appeals from the High Commissioner's Office for items of that sort. This would have the effect of cutting into bigger UN relief programs such as Palestine, Korea, and UNICEF. In addition UN pres-

tige might conceivably be decreased if the responses anticipated by Dr. Goedhart were not forthcoming. The US Congress had made its position quite clear that it would not again give funds for refugees. The Department was committed not to ask Congress for such funds. If the proposal were adopted by the Assembly, the Department would be placed in a delicate position in view of the moral force of a resolution adopted by the Assembly.

In paragraph 5 of the position paper a certain amount of flexibility was preserved. The recommendation was that if the appeal for money for the international assistance fund were limited to private organizations and individuals, the Delegation would abstain or, if a preponderant majority appeared to favor such a course, vote in favor. The staff had requested authorization from the Department on this position.

Mr. Green mentioned that the appeal by the High Commissioner had made a big impression on the other delegations in Committee 3, and indications were that many states—including the British Commonwealth and Western Europe—would support a resolution authorizing the Commissioner to make his appeal to both governments and private sources, while recognizing the fact that they were not committing their governments to making any contribution. $3,000,000 did not seem like too large a sum for the work proposed to be done. This was the same problem the Delegation had been faced with in regard to UNICEF, when 51 states had voted in favor of the appeal, none had opposed, and only the US and Thailand had abstained. A similar situation could arise again.

In addition Mr. Green noted that there seemed to be no enthusiasm for limiting the appeal to non-governmental sources. Dr. Goedhart himself was not favorably inclined to such a limitation. He wanted to be able to approach governments with the moral authority of a General Assembly recommendation behind him.

Mr. Green noted that the first and last paragraphs of the position paper dealt with tactics. The US should avoid active leadership on this item and should try to give special emphasis to the new migration body created by the recent Brussels Conference. This organization would be able to assist in the general area. The paper suggested the tactic of having this appeal postponed to the following year, but he was not hopeful that this could be accomplished.

In summarizing this matter, Mr. Green stated that the recommendation with regard to the budgetary problem was that the US support the High Commissioner's contention that branch offices were necessary, but that their expenditures should be limited to those allowed by the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner. In regard to an international fund for assisting refugees, the most that could be hoped for would be to limit the appeal proposed by the Commissioner to non-governmental sources, or vote in favor if the overwhelming support of

all other delegations developed. He suggested that the Delegation consider the type of tactics that should be employed in this latter matter.

Mrs. Roosevelt thought it was unwise for the head of an organization to go around to governments asking for funds when there was no budget indicating exactly how they would be spent. At the same time she recognized that Dr. Goedhart's appeal for $3,000,000 was not excessive. She mentioned that Dr. Goedhart had pointed a finger at the US. It was over our Voice of America radio that we were asking people to flee from behind the Iron Curtain, and then when they did escape, we put them in camps and tried to persuade them to join the Western armed forces. Otherwise they were not taken care of by us. She recalled that Radio Free Europe had been able to get a special fund from the Ford Foundation because of the fact that they had been able to persuade people to flee from Iron Curtain countries and then had no facilities for taking care of them. This whole question put the US in a highly delicate and embarrassing position. She doubted whether anything the Delegation or the Department could do would cause Congress to be generous in this regard. At the same time the US would be placing itself in a highly unpopular position vis-à-vis other delegations if it turned out that we were the only ones in opposition to this proposal. She felt certain that $3,000,000 could be raised from private sources very easily.

Mrs. Roosevelt mentioned that there had been considerable lack of confidence in many of the people Dr. Goedhart had gathered around him. She recommended telling him that the reason we and other government could not support him fully, was because of a lack of trust in his personnel. She honestly feared, however, that US opposition in this case would be entirely alone.

Mr. Sandifer thought that the Department's position was basically sound. Although the facts cited by the Commissioner were highly appealing, the proportions were such that each individual state should take care of those cases within its borders. A loose, open-ended appeal of the type proposed by Dr. Goedhart was not sound. Only a limited amount of money and goodwill existed in the world. To dissipate it, so that places like Korea did not receive the necessary share, would be unwise. In addition, Mr. Sandifer pointed out that the Department had given a written assurance to Senators McCarran and McKellar that there would be no more appeals for funds for the IRO or a successor organization. The only apparent exception to this had to do with the Migration Group created by the Brussels Conference. In fact, this was a different case, and did not deal with refugees per se. He suggested that the Delegation consider stating specifically to the Department what the situation was and asking them for the authority to abstain if the parliamentary situation required it in view of the various political factors involved. Mrs. Roosevelt asked about the migration

organization. Mr. Sandifer said that this group would not touch the refugee situation for which Dr. Goedhart wanted to make his appeal. Mrs. Roosevelt thought there might be some escapees from behind the Iron Curtain who could qualify for migration and thus could be helped by the new organization. Mr. Sandifer said there might be a few but the new group was not essentially connected with refugees. The trouble was, in his opinion, that Dr. Goedhart was too "good-hearted" and could not be relied upon to keep to the limitations prescribed for his office.

Mr. Lubin suggested telling Dr. Goedhart what the US position was vis-à-vis Congress, and that we would not publicly oppose his appeal if he would assure us that in the US he would only raise money through private sources. In return the Department could place at his disposal all the available services for raising money for foreign causes within the US. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she had told Dr. Goedhart not that he could not go to Congress himself, but only that he might be most successful in the US seeking funds from private organizations like the Ford Foundation. She did raise with him the question of why his Office's branch office was established in Washington rather than in New York where all the large private fund raising organizations were located. She felt that he was very honest and would try to do his best with his administration, but she agreed with Mr. Sandifer that his heart was too easily and too often touched.

Ambassador Jessup suggested that the US could make a strong statement along the line that authorizing an appeal to be made was not agreeing to support that appeal with a contribution. He favored the middle course advocated by Mr. Sandifer. Senator Cooper recalled the original IRO resolution, and the questions that had then been raised. He thought that Mr. Goedhart should be allowed to make his appeal so long as he understood the attitude Congress took. He did not favor Mr. Lubin's idea of making a deal with the High Commissioner. Mr. Cohen agreed fully with Senator Cooper.

In summarizing the views that had been thus far expressed, Mrs. Roosevelt understood Ambassador Jessup and Mr. Sandifer to favor an abstention if the Department would authorize it. She understood Senator Cooper and Mr. Cohen to favor voting for the appeal while clearly stating that it must be made to private sources. Ambassador Sayre endorsed the stand taken by Senator Cooper and Mr. Cohen. Ambassador Jessup said that if we argued that we were willing to let Dr. Goedhart try to raise the money, but that Congress cannot appropriate any money for this fund, we could state that we could not vote in favor of an appeal to governments but would abstain and, if the appeal were limited to private sources we would vote in favor. Mr. Sandifer wanted to be sure the Delegation received the proper instructions from the Department. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed with Am-

bassador Jessup's suggestion. Mr. Cohen wondered as to what stand the Delegation would take if the resolution authorized an appeal both to private and governmental sources. He thought we would only favor for ourselves the private appeal but for others, if they were willing, a governmental appeal was all right. Mr. Sandifer and Mrs. Roosevelt both felt that we should abstain on such a combined appeal.

Mr. Ross strongly sympathized with the ideas expressed by Senator Cooper and Mr. Cohen, but felt it politically unwise for the US to vote in favor of an appeal which the US would not follow through on. He suggested not voting in favor of the resolution if an appeal to governments was at all involved. Mr. Sandifer made it clear that there was no change in his feeling that an appeal to governments was unsound, but for political reasons he would acquiesce in an abstention. He felt that getting an authorization for even this would be difficult. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed with Mr. Sandifer.

Dr. Tobias asked if the US would be all alone in opposition to the proposed appeal. Mrs. Roosevelt answered that only the Soviets and the US appeared to oppose it at the present time. She recalled that the pattern of US voting in the past had been not to vote in favor of any matter in which we were convinced that the US Government would not follow through. She thought it best to continue to follow this pattern. Hence she was inclined to favor asking the Department for authorization to abstain, but to be able to vote for a resolution which proposed an appeal limited to private sources. Since there were no further comments, it was so decided.

CHARLES D. COOK

320/1–352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED NIACT PARIS, January 3, 1952—3 p. m.

828. Re refugee items. Del decided at meeting today to urge Dept to authorize del to abstain rather than vote against proposed general appeal to govts NGO's and individuals for three million dollar assistance fund to aid sick and destitute emergency refugee cases.

Del feels strongly that preliminary [*parliamentary?*] situation in Third Comite calls for an abstention rather than negative vote on this fund. Del recognizes weaknesses of proposed appeal for funds. However, it now appears that US is isolated in Third Comite with perhaps only one or two other dels and Sov bloc in opposition to fund. US has privately stated to number of dels its opposition to establishment of fund. UK, for example, has informed us of intent to support author-

izing UN High Commissioner for Refugees to institute general appeal for funds since it does not feel that GA shld oppose an appeal for funds to assist emergency destitute and such cases along limited scope proposed. Commonwealth countries being influenced by this view of UK. Denmark, Neth and Belg prepared take lead in sponsoring resolution for fund. Latin Amer, Far East and Middle East countries likely in any event support fund in view its consistent opposition UN refugee functions.

Del feels that in view over-all political situation in GA, it wld be unwise weaken US position other subjects by outright opposition to appeal in third comite. It does not appear that limited scope of appeal warrants such drastic position. In abstaining, USDel wld explain there is no prospect US Govt contribution to proposed fund.

This tel supersedes Delga 814.[1] Not likely that situation in third comite will permit vote by USDel limiting appeal to only individuals and NGO's. Del recommends, however, that it be authorized to vote affirmatively in event appeal limited to individuals and NGO's. As in case of broader appeal this appeal wld also have wide support in third comite.

In view termination IRO communication from IRO General Council of Oct 27, 1951 that current problems inherent in refugee situation "so grave in terms of human suffering that they call for urgent consideration by the United Nations" and moderate scope of proposed fund, deferment of this question found impractical at this session GA. Dept's views needed urgently since vote scheduled Friday January 4.

ROOSEVELT

[1] Dated January 2, p. 830.

320/1–352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
NIACT

PARIS, January 3, 1952—3 p. m.

Delga 829. For Hickerson and Warren [1] from Sandifer. I want to emphasize in strongest terms political necessity for approving USGADel's request for authorization to abstain on Goedhart's proposal for assistance fund (Delga 828 [2]). Specific and limited character of Goedhart's proposal as presented Comite Three makes abstention

[1] George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons.
[2] Dated January 3, *supra*.

possible without stultifying our basic position. In peculiar political atmosphere this GA, USGADel cannot afford loss of good will and prestige involved in voting in very small minority perhaps of one against limited and popular Goedhart proposal. [Sandifer.]

ROOSEVELT

320/1–352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 3, 1952—8 p. m.

Delga 836. Re USGADel decisions mtg 3 Jan. Re Comite Three refugee items. In view support by practically all other dels except Sov bloc for proposal to authorize commissioner appeal to govts and private sources for international assistance fund, and of polit disadvantages of our opposition, agreed request authorization from Dept (*a*) abstain on proposal for general appeal to govts and private sources but (*b*) vote in favor of appeal if it is limited to only private sources. Del wld make clear in comite that del not in position to commit govt with respect to contribution to fund. (See separate tel.)

ROOSEVELT

320/1–352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED PARIS, January 3, 1952—4 : 52 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 581. Re Delga 828 and 829 January 3 you are auth ur discretion to abstain on Res Third Comite auth HC appeal for asst funds.

ACHESON

320/1–452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 4, 1952—5 : 21 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 591. Re Gadel 581 Jan 3 fol considerations re Goedhart request for relief funds may prove helpful in event USDel decides its discretion intervene discussion this subj.

Auth to appeal for funds even in modest amount requested will estab principle acceptance by UN of responsibility for providing relief refugees. Problems presented by Goedhart are permanent rather than temp in character and therefore UN assumption this responsibility will involve permanent obligation. Proposal is based on assumption that because IRO provided such relief UN shld cont relief as required. IRO was temp agency set up to deal with internatl postwar problem. Problem now posed by Goedhart is basically one involving adequacy of relief measures of individual govts for very ltd nrs refugees remaining their territories. Situations described do not impose such burdens on individual govts as to justify application internatl funds. However all Eur govts welcome opportunity transfer their normal relief responsibilities to refugees to internatl fund and demands on fund will grow substantially in fol years. Plea that govts concerned suffer econ distress hardly justifies internatl action when such small nrs involved. Before auth is granted HC might be requested confer with govts concerned to determine their willingness accept responsibility supply relief required by special measures if necessary. This admittedly impractical in China where largest nr refugees involved Goedhart proposals located. Relief refugees China raises question policy in sending hard currency behind Iron Curtain for relief persons whose resettlement any other area has proved impossible partly because suspected security risks. Furthermore view lack responsible organ Shanghai to admin funds locally no assurance funds will be properly used. Subsidization vol agencies while justified in IRO efforts make permanent arrangements for hard core and to facilitate maximum resettlement difficult refugees cases shld be carefully reexamined as matter of policy in light permanent nature residue refugee situations.

Auth requested Delga 836 Jan 3 granted. Ltr fol.

ACHESON

320/1–452 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 4, 1952.
[Received January 4—2 : 01 p. m.]

Delga 852. Re refugees. Following is joint draft res Colombia, Netherlands, UK, Uruguay and Yugo on problems of assistance to refugees submitted in Comite Three document A/C 3/L 199.

Colombia, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Yugoslavia joint draft resolution:

"*The GA*

"1. *Takes note* of part I (1) and part II (2) of the annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees submitted through the ECOSOC to the GA in accordance with paragraph 11 of his statute;

"2. *Expresses* its satisfaction at the conclusion of the convention relating to the status of refugees;

"3. *Invites* member states and nonmember states which have demonstrated their interest in the solution of the refugee problem to become parties to that convention as soon as possible;

"4. *Reiterates* its call upon governments to cooperate with the High Commissioner as recommended in its resolution 428 (V)."

[ROOSEVELT]

320/1–452: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 4, 1952.

[Received January 4—7: 45 p. m.]

Delga 854. Re refugees. Following is draft resolution submitted by Byelorussia on problems of assistance to refugees in Comite 3 document A/C 3/L 201.

Sixth session Third Committee agenda items 30 and 31 refugees and stateless persons and problems of assistance to refugees Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic: Draft resolution refugees and stateless persons:

"*GA*

"*Notes* the failure of the Governments of the US, the UK, France and other countries to implement its resolution 8 (I) of 12 February 1946 on encouraging and assisting the early return of the displaced persons to their countries of origin,

"*Condemns* the policy which was pursued by the IRO and is being continued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and which is designed to substitute for repatriation the forced resettlement of displaced persons in other countries,

"*Condemns* as incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with the accepted practice of international law, the attempts by certain member states, and primarily by the US by all possible means to recruit displaced persons for subversive and diversionary activities in the territory of the USSR and the peoples democracies,

"1. *Recommends* to the governments of the above-mentioned countries and to the governments of other countries in whose territories there are still refugees and displaced persons, that they should take steps to implement the above-mentioned resolution so as to complete the repatriation of the displaced persons and refugees to their countries of origin during 1952,

"2. *Proposes* to the governments of the states members of the United Nations in whose territories there are refugees and displaced persons to submit to the Secretariat of the United Nations full information regarding the refugees and displaced persons in their territories."

ROOSEVELT

320/1–452 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 4, 1952.
[Received January 4—7 : 33 p. m.]

Delga 855. Re refugees. Following is joint draft resolution (Colombia, Denmark, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK, Uruguay) on problems of assistance to refugees submitted in Comite 3 document A/C 3/L 200. Communications: Sixth session Third Committee items 30 and 31 refugees and stateless persons and problems of assistance to refugees Colombia, Denmark, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Uruguay: Joint draft resolution.

"*The GA*

"*Taking note* of the communication of the International Refugee Organization on residual problems, (3) and the observations of the High Commissioner for Refugees contained in Part III (4) of his report on the problem of assistance submitted in accordance with Resolution 430 (V) of the GA;

"*Having noted* the serious unsolved problems which in certain areas will face refugees who will not have been repatriated or resettled by the end of the operations of the IRO;

"1. *Authorizes* the High Commissioner, under paragraph 10 of his statute, to issue an appeal for funds for the purpose of enabling emergency aid to be given to the most needy groups among refugees within his mandate;

"2. *Recommends* all states directly affected by the refugee problem, as well as the appropriate specialized agencies of the UN and other intergovernmental agencies concerned, to pay special attention to this problem (when drawing up and executing programmes of economic reconstruction and development), and requests the High Commissioner to contribute to the promotion of activities in this field;

"3. *Appeals* to states interested in migration to take measures to ensure that refugees within the mandate of the High Commissioner benefit from projects to promote migration."

Note: (3) A/1948
(4) E/2036/add 2/E/2036/add 2/corr 1 (not French and Russian) E/2036/add 2/corr/2.

ROOSEVELT

Editorial Note

For the proceedings of the Third Committee regarding the several refugee items, January 2–14, 1952, see GA (VI), *Third Committee*, pages 151–233. The documentation of these proceedings is found in GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 30 and agenda item 31. For the proceedings in the General Assembly, February 2, 1952, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pages 480–484. The General Assembly adopted two resolutions. Resolution 538 (VI) had two parts: Part A noted the General Assembly's satisfaction at the conclusion of the refugee status convention and invited governments to become parties to the convention "as soon as possible": Part B of the resolution authorized the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "to issue an appeal for funds for the purpose of enabling emergency aid to be given to the most needy groups among refugees within his mandate." The other resolution, Resolution 539 (VI), simply postponed consideration of the draft protocol relating to stateless persons until the next regular session of the General Assembly. For the texts of these two resolutions, see GA (VI), *Resolutions*, page 35.

V. THE QUESTION OF THE TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

IO Files

Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 20, 1951.

SD/A/C.1/360

TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the United States position with respect to the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Although the United States delegation should not take the initiative in proposing a resolution, its preferred position should be to sup-

port a resolution, noting efforts of the United Nations in the past to promote respect for and observance of human rights generally and its efforts to solve this particular problem; noting the failure of the parties to enter into negotiations; and calling upon them to reopen discussions. The delegation should actively oppose any move to have this question placed automatically on the agenda of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.

2. The delegation should determine in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the Assembly the degree of participation, if any, which the United States should have in this question, keeping in mind that the United States is interested in this item principally as a leading Member of the United Nations which enjoys friendly relations with both parties and which has pursued a policy of active cooperation in United Nations efforts to promote universal observance of human rights.

3. In private consultations with other delegations the United States should encourage any appropriate initiative by other states and particularly by members of the British Commonwealth designed to achieve increased cooperation between the parties and to reduce the hazard of a clash over color policies which will redound to the disadvantage of the Western democracies.

4. In the event that substantial support develops for a more far-reaching resolution the United States delegation should attempt in private conversations to moderate any proposed condemnatory action. If, however, a resolution similar to 395 (V) of December 2, 1950 is proposed and secures substantial support the delegation should vote in favor of all sections of such a resolution which state our belief in the responsibility of United Nations Members to promote respect for an observance of human rights, and which recommend the resumption of talks and the utilization, if necessary, of an agency of the United Nations to aid the parties in this regard.

The United States should explain our position by reiterating the views expressed by the United States delegate in the General Assembly in the past along the following lines:

". . . it is the part of statesmanship to proceed cautiously in this delicate field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which may create serious repercussions on sensitive domestic policies. Without closing the doors to the progressive development of international law in this field, certainly at this stage of our constitutional development, the Assembly should devote itself primarily to finding ways and means of composing differences and securing universal acceptance and observance of common standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms. At this stage in view of the serious constitutional issues involved we should exercise the greatest self-restraint . . .".

5. If the resolution consists of provisions along the foregoing lines the delegation should vote in favor of the resolution as a whole. If the resolution goes beyond these provisions the delegation should consult the Department for further instructions.

COMMENT

This question, involving the complaint of India against the discriminatory treatment of some 250,000 nationals of the Union of South Africa of Indian extraction, was considered by the General Assembly in 1946, 1947, 1949 and 1950 without settlement. In the course of the Spring Session in 1949 the Assembly adopted a resolution (265 (III)) inviting the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa to enter into discussions at a round table conference, taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. As a result of correspondence between the parties, during the fall and winter of 1949, a preliminary conference was held in February 1950 at Capetown to discuss the agenda for a proposed Round Table Conference. The three Governments agreed on the inclusion of two concrete items of the agenda: (1) reduction of the Indian population of South Africa (proposed by South Africa); and (2) removal of political, social and economic disabilities of South African nationals of Indo-Pakistan origin and the provision of opportunities for their fullest development (proposed jointly by India and Pakistan).

Towards the end of April of that year, however, the Union Government introduced in Parliament the Group Areas Bill, which would establish in the Union additional areas of exclusive occupation or ownership on a racial basis. This bill was regarded by the Indians and Pakistani as an extension of *apartheid* (policy of segregation) and therefore prejudicial to negotiations on the basis of the agreed to agenda.

The Governments of India and Pakistan requested the Government of the Union of South Africa to postpone executive action under the Asiatic Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1949 and the enactment of the Group Areas Bill until the Round Table Conference had been held. The Government of the Union of South Africa refused to accede to these requests and the Group Areas Bill was approved by the Parliament.

The Indians believed a Round Table Conference under these conditions would be one-sided and could provide no solution for the problem. In July 1950, the Government of India, therefore, refused to proceed with the conference and placed the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa on the agenda of the Fifth Session, requesting the General Assembly to take note of these facts and take appro-

priate steps to ensure that the treatment of Indians in South Africa would conform to the principles and purposes of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.

During the Fifth Session, the General Assembly passed a resolution (A/1604 of December 4, 1950) which recalled the previous history of this case and the Declaration of Human Rights. It recommended that the parties proceed with the holding of a Round Table Conference, on the basis of their agreed agenda. In the event that the parties failed to do so before April 1, 1951, or to reach agreement at the Round Table Conference within a reasonable time, it provided that there be established for the purpose of assisting the parties, a Commission of three members, one member nominated by each party and the third nominated by the other two members. In default of agreement between the two members to select a third the Secretary General was to appoint the third member. In addition, the resolution called upon the governments to refrain from taking any steps which would prejudice the negotiations and in particular for South Africa to refrain from the implementation of the Group Areas Act. The resolution automatically placed the question on the agenda of the Sixth Session.

In the Spring of 1951, there was an exchange of correspondence between the parties. The Government of India inquired of the Union of South Africa if it were willing to participate in a Round Table Conference in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly's resolution. The Union of South Africa stated that although it was willing to enter negotiations on the basis of the previously agreed agenda, it was not able to accept the General Assembly resolution as a basis for the Round Table Conference. The terms of that resolution constituted, in its opinion, an intervention in a matter which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union. In addition, the Union of South Africa found the establishment of the three-member commission unacceptable.

On April 12, the Representative of India transmitted copies of its correspondence with the Union of South Africa on this subject to SYG Lie. There have been no further negotiations between the parties on the question. The Government of the Union of South Africa has begun the implementation of the Group Areas Bill and the designation of restricted areas, though not complete, is progressing.

320/12–451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 4, 1951—10 p. m.

Delga 504. Re Indians in South Africa. Miss Strauss[1] who will handle this item is thinking of throwing out following idea in her comite statement without making any formal proposal:

Americans and other people have had experience in dealing with racial problems. We in US have made considerable progress and there is number of outstanding citizens who have done great deal of thinking and work in this field. Perhaps Union of South Africa on one hand and India and Pakistan on other could agree to select one of three men who would act entirely in private capacity and help parties to get together again for the purpose of discussing their differences.

Would appreciate Dept's reaction to this idea. This item scheduled to come up following German item which now in Comite V.

AUSTIN

[1] Anna Lord Strauss, Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly. (*Nota Bene:* In the United States system of representation on organs of the United Nations, Alternate Representatives had the same status as Representatives.)

320/12–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 5, 1951—7:02 p. m.

Gadel 352. Re Delga 505 [*504*], Indians in South Africa. Practical value of idea using any third party would be as reserve, compromise suggestion if extreme proposals eventuate, but Dept doubts its acceptability to all three parties even in those circumstances.

Dept sees fol additional drawbacks:

1. Only task third party wld be as stated ref tel, to help parties get together and not become involved substance of question. For such limited, catalytic purpose, racial expert not necessary and probably undesirable.
2. US has consistently urged UK carry ball in this Commonwealth dispute. Suggested idea wld tend relieve them this responsibility, leaving US in unprofitable position holding bag for likely failure.
3. Putting US forward for such role wld open way for propaganda counter charges by unfriendly states re racial situation in US to confusion basic issue.

WEBB

320/12–851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 8, 1951—5 p. m.

Delga 569. Indians in South Africa. Taking into account Dept's Gadel 352, Dec 5, Miss Strauss suggests and staff concurs with inclusion of fol para in her brief statement:

"Perhaps we need at this moment the moral leadership of a personality in whom the parties have confidence—one person above political controversies who can help bring them together. This has led to resolving of the most difficult controversies in the past. Parties in dispute who seriously wish to seek understanding and agreement for their own and the common good have often had recourse to this method. It is a method which men often prefer because it gives them a chance to preserve their self-respect while they seek to achieve a mutual accommodation in practical arrangements. I emphasize this idea because I believe so strongly in the method of conciliation."

AUSTIN

320/12–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 10, 1951—6:40 p. m.

Gadel 402. Dept agrees inclusion para on Indians in South Africa quoted in Delga 569 on basis it not formal proposal and so not in conflict with position paper recommendations.

Dept suggests substitution "assistance" for "leadership" in first sentence; deletion "the most" from second sentence; change in penultimate sentence phrase "to preserve their self-respect while they seek" to "in a calm objective atmosphere".

WEBB

IO Files

Minutes of Thirty-first Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 12, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/218

[Here follows list of persons (40) present. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair. The agenda item was "Indians in South Africa (SD/A/C.1/360, Delgas 504 and 569, Gadels 352 and 402)".]

Mr. Meeker opened a discussion of this case with a brief history of the immigration of peoples of Indian origin to the territory of South Africa. He referred to the coming to power of the Malan government with its stringent racial policies. There were three difficulties which the people of Indian origin faced in the Union. Rigorous laws restricted their right to hold property in many areas. Civil liberties were severely curtailed. Finally, the policies of the Malan government included an extreme form of segregation, called *apartheid*, as promulgated in the Group Areas Act.

The United Nations history of this case dated back to 1946 when the Indians first brought their complaint to the Assembly. They originally based this complaint on: (*a*) certain agreements between the South African Government and the British Government of India which allegedly bound the former to grant proper treatment to people of Indian origin residing in South Africa; and (*b*) provisions in the Charter guaranteeing respect for human rights. This case had been brought up in succeeding years. Beginning in 1949 the Indians dropped the first ground and relied solely on the human rights provisions of the Charter. The Department had made a study of the legal grounds alleged by the Indians in regard to their first claim, and found no justification for holding that the South African Government was bound by previous agreement with the British vis-à-vis the present Indian government.

At the fifth General Assembly a resolution had been adopted calling for the South Africans to confer with the Indians and Pakistani in an attempt to resolve their differences. This resolution recommended that a conference be held on the basis of an agenda to which the parties had previously agreed. The previous year the Indians and Pakistani had asked that the South African Government suspend the implementation of the Group Areas Act pending the outcome of negotiations. This the South Africans had refused to do, although an agenda had been agreed upon. The fifth General Assembly wanted the parties to go ahead from there. A Commission was to be appointed consisting of one representative for both India and Pakistan and one for the South Africans, and a third to be chosen by the first two, or in default of agreement, by the United Nations Secretary General. South Africa refused to negotiate on the basis of the General Assembly action, maintaining that to do so would be accepting interference by the United Nations with its domestic affairs, in violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter. They agreed to negotiate, but outside the framework of the United Nations. They had indicated that appointment of a United Nations commission under the resolution was not acceptable to the Union.

Mr. Meeker turned to the position paper which was before the Delegation in document SD/A/C.1/360. There it was suggested that the United States not take the initiative in proposing a resolution, but

support one which would note the previous efforts of the United Nations to obtain observance of human rights generally and in particular with regard to this problem, which would note the previous failure of the parties to enter into negotiations, and would call upon them to re-open discussions. The Department did not want the action this year to provide for automatic inclusion of the item on the agenda of the seventh General Assembly. At the same time the United States should seek to have the members of the British Commonwealth take the appropriate initiative in this case.

Mr. Meeker reported that the Indians wanted a commission created by this session of the Assembly, even if it were necessary for the General Assembly to appoint a representative for the Union Government. He added that they did not seem to have thought the whole problem through carefully, and did not appear to know exactly where they wanted to, or would, come out as a result.

Mr. Meeker referred to an exchange of telegrams between the Delegation and the Department, set forth in Delgas 504 and 569, and Gadels 352 and 402, in which the question was considered of including a suggestion that some prominent personality be called upon by mutual agreement of the parties to help them compose their differences. From the exchange it was obvious that the Department did not want the Delegation to take the lead in this matter. The Department did, however, concur with a new formulation of this suggestion which would keep it on an informal basis, not as a proposal, and therefore within the terms of the position paper. Miss Strauss added that it was hoped that other delegations might take up this idea and themselves come forward with a proposal along these lines.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked why it was that we felt it necessary to be soft with the South Africans. Mr. Sandifer said that the United States had long considered this as a problem primarily of the Commonwealth. The United States had so often taken the lead in various problems within the United Nations that it was highly appropriate for the Commonwealth to assume the responsibility in this case. At the last General Assembly, he recalled, Senator Lodge had taken a vigorous part in this item and had helped in formulating a strong resolution. Mrs. Roosevelt felt that Senator Lodge had not wanted the United Nations to be too soft with the South Africans. She pointed out that this problem was not solely domestic, but had international implications. It involved the feelings of many people around the world. She thought that we should be, and were not, giving our support to those elements within South Africa who were fighting the Group Areas Act and the policies it stood for. Mr. Laugier, formerly Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations for Social Affairs, was circulating a pamphlet which virtually implied that this sort of inattention to

vital problems was what was bringing Communism to many areas of the world.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that there was a close relation between this case and that of the South West African problem. It also affected our general relations with the Government of South Africa. The Indians had not "come into court with clean hands" in this case. Furthermore, in other matters, South Africa had given us wholehearted support, whereas India, as had happened in Committee Five the last two days, virtually "slaps us in the face." Mr. Maffitt recalled that when the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty was brought up in the United Nations debates, the United States had taken the position with the Latin Americans that our opposition to it was based on the violation of the human rights clauses in the peace treaties and not in the Charter.

Miss Strauss liked Mrs. Roosevelt's ideas favoring encouragement of those moderate elements within South Africa which might succeed in getting the upper hand.

Mr. Cohen said that we should be careful to distinguish between the views we express as to our feelings in this or other cases, and the question of taking initiative when we do not know exactly where it would lead us. He cautioned against taking an attitude of restraining our expression of feelings in important matters like the present one. In long-range terms of our struggle with the Soviets, our position should be clear and unequivocal, so no one could question our motives. When the moment arrives that we have to decide whether one resolution or another most appropriately will achieve the ends we seek, and we have to choose one over another, no one could then question our general feelings on the subject matter, or our position of fighting for the observance of human rights. We should avoid the kind of position the United Kingdom often takes, in being firmly against Iron Curtain violations of human rights, but abstaining on questions which involve the Commonwealth. He also commented that in the Mindszenty case the United States by no means excluded the United Nations Charter as a basis for Assembly action.

Senator Cooper thought that last year the question had been one of what type of resolution we would support. Many had wanted a strong condemnatory one, without any plea for conciliation. The United States had sought conciliation. Since it was obvious that South Africa would not now conciliate, the United States should try to avoid the inevitable move for a condemnatory resolution by taking the initiative. In regard to Senator Lodge's participation in the item, the question had been as to how strong a speech he should make. It had been agreed, in Senator Cooper's recollection, to make a strong speech which also admitted our own faults.

Mr. Gerig noted that South Africa was feeling very much pressed by the United Nations in view of the fact that the South West African

resolution had been adopted in Committee Four. The feeling had been expressed to him several times that the limit could easily be reached and the Malan cabinet decide to withdraw from the United Nations. We ought to decide whether this attitude of theirs should have any effect on our position.

Ambassador Gross thought that this problem was perhaps more a bilateral one than was recognized. It was not fair to saddle the United Nations alone with this problem. Our government ought bilaterally to assist solution of this question before the General Assembly convenes, and the Delegation ought to know the extent of such efforts so that it could better estimate what type of United Nations action on the problem would be feasible. As it was, we came into the Assembly without sufficient knowledge as to what could be accomplished through the United Nations, and what ought better be left to be done outside.

Dr. Tobias commented that the Department seemed to feel that the United States Delegation could go too far, and matters might boomerang on us. He could not agree that that would be the case. We should take the same attitude with the South Africans as with the Soviets in cases of such extreme violations of human rights. He felt that the United States had some pretty firm ground to stand upon, if it were ever challenged in the United Nations as to its domestic treatment of minorities. There existed an enlightened public opinion, and absolute rights of citizens who daily obtained from the courts protection for those rights. The United States should stand on principle and present its own case, if the need arose, with no cause for hesitation.

Mr. Ross spoke about the frustration that had existed in the United Nations on the item in its long history. This had led to many emotional speeches and actions by the Assembly which tended to irritate further the feelings of the South Africans without bringing the problem any nearer to a solution. He was inclined to agree with the reasons listed by Mr. Sandifer for avoiding the position of taking the lead on this item. At the same time he felt that the United States could take a very strong position behind the scenes to develop a firm background for a solution. He suggested perhaps giving the Secretary General a role to play in bringing the parties together for negotiations. Mrs. Roosevelt said this seemed to be about the general position of the Delegation.

Mr. Williams said that the fundamental question involved here was how to respond to other resolutions on this subject. He drew a contrast between our approach on this subject in which we initially, at least, were against a commission working on this problem since the parties did not seem to want a commission, whereas in the case of the German elections, we said that a commission should be appointed to investigate the conditions behind the Iron Curtain in Germany as to

the possibility of holding elections although it was obvious that the Soviets would not allow a commission to come to Eastern Germany. Mrs. Roosevelt said that we would avoid condemning the South Africans and urge that the parties get together. She realized the difficulty pointed out by Mr. Williams, but thought that a sufficient difference could be demonstrated in the two cases.

Mr. Vorys said that any resolution on which the United States votes support a solution of this problem in South Africa should be worded so that we would be prepared to have it apply to the United States as well, bearing in mind what Dr. Tobias had said.

Mr. Taylor recalled that there would be a plenary meeting the next day to hold Security Council elections and to vote for a replacement for Argentina on the Trusteeship Council. We would support El Salvador to replace Argentina. Morocco and the General Committee report on the new Soviet item on the Mutual Security Act, plus the Yugoslav item, would also be considered in plenary. The report of the Sixth Committee on procedures for handling the drafting of resolutions would be postponed to the following week.

CHARLES D. COOK

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 12, 1951—3 p. m.

Delga 623. Re USGADel decisions mtg 12 Dec. Re Indians in South Africa case, approved position in Doc SD/A/C.1/360. Will avoid taking lead but seek develop strong behind-scenes support for reopening discussion between parties. In speeches USGADel will make clear moral position US takes on issue of human rights in this and other cases.

AUSTIN

320/12–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 13, 1951—7:05 p. m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 442. You will have noted serious implications re So Afr participation UN raised by Forsyth, Secretary So Afr External Affairs,

[1] Repeated for information to Pretoria as 127.

reported Pretoria's 155, Dec 6,[2] rptd Paris for USDel. It shld be borne in mind Forsyth is a Moderate or as he put it an "internationalist" of which there are few in Union.

Dept has long felt So Afr threats withdraw UN not entirely empty. How much they will continue to take is entirely speculative but Dept believes there is a limit beyond which they will not go. Last year's Indian Res for which US voted was strongest passed to date. This year's Res South West [Africa], which US co-sponsored, although right, is very strong. Shld this be followed by another strong Indian Res, serious results might ensue.

US interests So Afr, on which Arneson can give Del info, of great importance and require maintenance close and good relations with Union Govt.

In light above considerations Del requested exert every effort create and maintain Indian discussion this year in as friendly and quiet atmosphere as possible and attempt keep Res as mild as possible. US Del shld not support any Res tougher or going beyond last year's strong resolution.

ACHESON

[2] See p. 705. The whole question of South African participation in the United Nations had been raised by General Assembly (or Fourth Committee) consideration of the South West Africa question; for documentation on this subject, see pp. 673 ff.

320/12–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1951—7:05 p. m.

Gadel 443. Re Delga 623, Dec 12. Indians South Africa. Dept endorses proposal develop strong backstage support to get parties talking but believes in light considerations outlined Gadel 442 Dec 13, particularly desire not further alienate South Africans from UN, Del shld avoid unduly emphasizing HR issue.

ACHESON

320/12–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

PARIS, December 14, 1951—1 a. m.

Delga 651. Daily Classified Summary No. 35. December 14, 1951, 12:10 a. m.

. . . . . .

Indians in South Africa

The task before the General Assembly in the question of Indians in South Africa is to see to it that last year's resolution is implemented, in the opinion of Panikkar (India). Since no conference had been held under the resolution, it was time to establish the commission provided for in it, he said.

Panikkar believed that if South Africa declined to appoint its representative on the commission, the UN should arrange for the appointment of a representative on behalf of South Africa. Thus, the Commission would comprise one representative appointed by India and Pakistan and two representatives appointed by the UN.

As to the possibility of the appointment of a single mediator, Panikkar stated his delegation would have to ascertain the attitude of the Indian Government. The conversation indicated the Indian Delegation had not made real preparation for consideration of the item next week, and apparently does not have any particular resolution in mind.

In speculating on possible developments in the question of Indians in South Africa, Tweedsmuir (UK) expressed the opinion India would introduce a resolution which would be sufficiently strong to arouse the ire of South Africa. He thought the Union would reply by attacking inequalities in India with the result that other countries would pitch in and it might develop into a very hot battle.

The UK and the US, in Tweedsmuir's opinion, would have to do everything possible to reduce the temperature and be prepared to present a resolution on which agreement could be obtained. He hoped his speculation would be wrong and debate might not be as heated as he feared.

Tweedsmuir saw no inclination on the Union's part to take a more cooperative view.

Hamilton (South Africa) reiterated to the US General Assembly Delegation that he believed there was a chance of changing the South African Government's position if top-level continuing pressure were exercised in Washington. He also thought a top-level conference in Paris, arranged through the South African Ambassador to the US, might have some effect or at least be a move in the right direction toward settlement of the question of Indians in South Africa. (Hamilton is a General Smuts appointee who is not in sympathy with the Malan Government in some of its positions.)

. . . . . .

AUSTIN

320/12–1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—6:39 p. m.

Gadel 459. Ref Delga 651. Indians SoAfr. Dept strongly opposes Indian proposal estab Comm since SoAfr wld certainly decline appt Rep and UN appt wld be contrary intent last yr Res which was premised on minimum anticipated compliance parties in naming own Reps. Without Reps both parties, character of body wld be basically altered from that of pacific settlement to one of investigation and judgment. Proposed Comm might seek admission SoAfr which likely precipitate chain reaction which could result SoAfr withdrawal from UN.

We wld hope it wld be possible to obtain Res which, tho permitting convocation round table Conf whenever parties agree, in effect wld amount to dropping item from future GA agenda. If this cannot be done, possibility appt single individual to assist in bringing parties together seems to Dept at this time best means countering provocative Indian Res.

Suggested top-level pressure not considered feasible in present climate US–SoAfrs relations.

ACHESON

320/12–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 20, 1951.
[Received December 20—6:39 p. m.]

Delga 754. Re Indians in South Africa. Dels of Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq introduced fol draft res in *ad hoc* pl comite today: sixth session.

Ad hoc political committee.

Agenda item 25.

Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa—Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq:

Draft resolution—

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 44 (I), 265 (III) and 395 (V), relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, having considered that the Government of the Union of South Africa has been unable up to the present time to accept the General Assembly resolution 395 (V) as a basis for a round-table conference,

Noting that the promulgation on 30 March 1951 of five proclamations under the group areas act rendering operative thereby the provisions of the act in direct contravention of paragraph 3 of resolution 395 (V) having in mind its resolution 103 (I) of 19 November 1946 and against racial persecution and discrimination, and its resolution 217 (III) dated 10 December 1948 relating to the universal declaration of human rights,

Considering that a policy of "racial segregation" (apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination:

Recommends that a commission of three members be established for the purpose of assisting the parties, namely the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa, in carrying through appropriate negotiations; the said commission being composed of one member to be nominated by the Government of the Union of South Africa, another to be nominated by the Governments of India and Pakistan and the third to be nominated by the other two members, or in default of agreement between these two in reasonable time, by the Secretary General of the United Nations,

Calls upon the Governments of the Union of South Africa, India, and Pakistan to nominate member within 60 days from the date of adoption of this resolution,

Calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation of enforcement of the provisions of the group areas act pending the conclusion of the negotiations,

Decides to include this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

ROOSEVELT

IO Files

Minutes of Thirty-sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 21, 1951

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/223

[Here follow list of persons (47) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. *Indians in South Africa* [Gadels 442, 443, 459; SD/A/C.1/360; A/AC.53/L.20].

Mr. Taylor pointed out that the resolution contained in document A/AC.53/L.20 might come up for a vote in the *Ad Hoc* Committee that day. Mr. Meeker referred to this draft resolution which was similar to the one passed by the Assembly at its Fifth Session. It called for a commission for which the US had voted the previous year. The Indians had indicated that they might prefer to have the assembly appoint a member to this commission for the Union Government if the latter failed to make such appointment. The Department was strongly opposed to this idea. Gadel 459 stated that South Africa would cer-

tainly refuse to make the appointment, and a move of this sort would basically change the character of the Commission as a negotiating body, and possibly precipitate the withdrawal of South Africa from the UN.

The Department's instructions had also been consistently against active US participation in this matter. The Department felt that the idea of a single mediator would not be adopted without an active push from the US Delegation which the Department would not authorize. The Indians were not interested in this idea. It had been concluded by the staff that it would be unwise to put in a resolution calling for a single mediator since it could not succeed without efforts the Delegation was not authorized to make. Consequently the US would only throw this idea out during the course of its speech. It was hoped that some other Delegation might pick up this idea.

In connection with the voting on the joint draft resolution of Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq, the US would vote for it as a whole, since it did not go beyond the resolution of last year. If a paragraph by paragraph vote were requested, the US might wish to vote against or abstain on the paragraph referring to specific legislation of the Union of South Africa, and providing for inclusion of the item on the agenda of the Seventh Session. Mr. Meeker felt that the US vote would not defeat these paragraphs, and it might be politically wiser to vote in favor.

Mr. Stein felt that the US should not support a recommendation that the UN tell a country not to enforce specific legislation. He suggested that at least the US should vote against operative paragraph three calling upon South Africa to suspend the enforcement of the Group Areas Act. Mr. Cohen did not think that anything in the Charter prevented this type of recommendation by the UN, but that it was merely a question of policy. South Africa was of course embarked on a course fraught with grave danger. The US should abstain on this paragraph. Mr. Meeker agreed that the Assembly had the power to take this action, and that the question was one of the political effect such a course might engender. If the US abstained or cast a negative vote on these various paragraphs, the South Africans might well take this as an indication that we had reservations on the matter, and they would feel justified in refusing to abide by the resolution.

Mr. Pollak underscored the remarks of Mr. Meeker and called for considering this matter also in terms of the Genocide charge recently launched against the US by American Communists and the Civil Rights Congress.[1]

Mr. Sandifer suggested voting against operative paragraph three since our vote in favor of the resolution as a whole would be the really

[1] Documentation on this matter is located in file 320.

important vote. Ambassador Kirk pointed to the inconsistency of our apparent stands in Committee One on the Soviet charge against our Mutual Security Act, and in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on this item. Mr. Vorys said the difference was that as far as the laws were concerned, "ours was nice, and theirs naughty".

Mr. Cohen suggested that we offer an amendment showing exactly where we stood on this matter, and after its probable defeat, abstaining on operative paragraph 3. Miss Strauss proposed language to the following effect: "that the Union Government take no action which would further racial segregation." This would avoid reference to specific legislation and accomplish the same result. If such language did not succeed, then we could vote for the resolution as a whole.

Mr. Ross thought that the whole history of this item showed it to be self-defeating, and accomplishing only a strengthening of the policies of the Malan Government. He thought that a much simpler approach along the lines of an exhortation, plus the proffering of the assistance of the UN Secretary General would be the only possible way of retrieving this situation. Mr. Maktos cautioned against pushing South Africa so far by resolutions aimed against it that it would withdraw from the UN.

Dr. Tobias was not impressed by these expediency considerations and the telegrams concerning it. He felt a policy of expediency would return to plague us in the future. We were faced with a situation which he had tried to make clear in Committee 4, where we had not a world government, but only a limited organization which reflected internal policies. He could only agree with Mr. Meeker that the US could vote for the resolution as a whole, in that it was similar to last year's. But on specific paragraphs, he thought we would get into trouble. This was not the same type of problem as the one of South West Africa. He did not think the UN could ask for internal changes, however justified or desirable they might be.

Ambassador Gross recalled that last year's resolution recommended that the Group Areas Act not be enforced. He felt this gave us valid grounds for abstaining, in that the first preambular paragraph referred to the previous resolutions. Ambassador Jessup supported Mr. Ross, and asked whether we had exhausted all chances of having others put a resolution in along the lines Mr. Ross suggested. We could then fall back to the present one, if necessary.

Miss Strauss referred to the Delegation's suggestion to which the Department had only recently moved, of the idea of a single mediator. We could ask others to suggest this idea, but it would be unfair if we could not assist in pushing it along. This we were not authorized to do. Mr. Taylor pointed out that the situation might well be different, depending on when the matter came to a vote before Christmas. We

should try to have the resolution voted on only as a whole, in which case we would support it. If it came up for a paragraph by paragraph vote, we could abstain on the operative paragraphs if necessary.

Mrs. Roosevelt felt we should vote for it as a whole. We could abstain on preambular paragraph 3, indicating that this was already taken care of by reference in paragraph 1. Then we could abstain on the last two operative paragraphs. The Department's instructions would permit that much leeway. She felt we might explore Mr. Ross' suggestion if the vote did not come on until after the recess. She said that of course we did not wish to see any state leave the UN, and there were practical reasons for keeping South Africa and others in, too. In regard to the recent Communist propaganda gambit entitled "We charge Genocide", she said that the US could explain its position satisfactorily here in the UN. At home was where this matter was dangerous, especially when tied in with the South African and Moroccan items. Every time we went back on a principle, she said, it meant rough sailing in the future. She added that often times we did not see things "the whole way 'round," although there were probably overriding considerations for our present attitude. Senator Cooper suggested that Mr. Ross' idea was such a good one that we ought to seek postponement on any action today.

[Here follow remarks appropriate to the fact that this was the last Delegation meeting before the Christmas holidays and that certain members (Congressmen Mansfield and Vorys) were leaving permanently.]

CHARLES D. COOK

320/12–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET PARIS, December 20 [*21?*], 1951—7 p. m.

Delga 770. Re: USGADel decisions mtg 21 Dec.

. . . . . .

2. Re Indians in South Africa item, joint draft res discussed. US will vote in favor whole res if comes to vote before recess. On para-by-para vote, US will abstain on third preambular para and operative paras numbered 2 and 3. If vote postponed until after recess, will communicate with Dept re possibility stimulating introduction of res which will promote and assist negotiations between parties.

[ROOSEVELT]

320/12–2351 : Telegram

The Senior Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 23, 1951—3 p. m.

Delga 800. Subj: Indians in South Africa. Miss Strauss in *ad hoc* polit comite yesterday gave US statement, which included suggestion of neutral individual to assist in bringing the parties together. Suggestion apparently well-received by Indian deleg, which for first time showed real interest in this idea. Indian deleg said it wanted to study idea and indicated it might wish to incorporate an appropriate paragraph in five-power draft resolution, either by way of substitution or as an addition to five-power text. US del has not proposed any specific language, but has prepared, to hold in reserve for possible use if necessary, fol language:

"Requests the Secretary-Gen to lend his assist to the govts concerned in the event that such assist might prove helpful in initiating discussions between them with a view to resolution of their differences;"

We believe seed planted by Miss Strauss statement has taken root in minds of sponsors; we propose for present to let situation develop before we engage in further activities this subj.

As reported in Delga 770, deleg believes that assist of neutral individual such as SYG might be more helpful in bringing parties together than commission such as five-power draft proposes, since it appears that South Africa will again ignore recommendation for commission.

Will keep Dept informed of developments.

JESSUP

320/12–2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 28, 1951—7:01 p. m.

Gadel 562. Re Indians in South Africa Delgas 754 and 800. Dept believes five power draft Res as unlikely achieve desired end as last year's Res and previous efforts. Passage wld only exacerbate feelings, solve nothing and keep problem coming back in GA every year.

While Dept believes chance of settlement this case thru UN action remote, sees no harm in attempting a fresh approach such as USDel idea of neutral individual to bring parties together. We believe how-

ever USDel has gone as far as it can or shld at this time by planting seed. If it germinates in minds of sponsors you may help in pruning, but if it needs cultivating UK shld be head gardener in commonwealth garden.

USDel shld approach UKDel on this basis to encourage UK play lead in seeking solution.

ACHESON

320/1–252 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 2, 1952—11 p. m.

Delga 823. Re Indians in South Africa. Nehru and Haksar (Ind del)[1] approached Miss Strauss this morning and advised her Ind Govt favors suggestion made in her speech for appointment of neutral individual on understanding this suggestion wld be incorporated as addition to five-power draft res (Delga 754 Dec 20). Fischer (Israeli del)[2] who joined conversation also indicated strong interest in US suggestion.

Miss Strauss indicated we have assumed that since our suggestion has received favorable reaction from several speakers in comite some others dels wld submit appropriate formal proposal. On basis conversation fol para was prepared to be inserted as new numbered para 3 of five-power res: "Requests the SYG in event that members of comm have not been nominated in accordance with preceding para, to lend his assistance to govts concerned in case such assistance appears helpful in initiating discussions between them with view to carrying through appropriate negotiations; and in his discretion after consulting govts concerned to appoint individual who wld be available to render such assistance."

Nehru and Fischer then agreed that latter will approach some LA dels such as Uruguay and request them to formally propose above para as amendment.

Re last para Gadel 562, we have repeatedly raised matter of UK initiative with UK del but were given clearly understand UK del unwilling take initiative.

ROOSEVELT

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[1] Respectively, R. K. Nehru, Alternate Representative on the Delegation of India to the General Assembly, and P. N. Haksar, Adviser to the Indian Delegation.

[2] Maurice Fischer, Israeli Minister to France.

320/1–252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 4, 1952—6:17 p. m.

PRIORITY

Gadel 594. Re Indians in South Africa.

1. We approve additional para re neutral individual Delga 823 Jan 2.

2. We approve Del decision 21 Dec abstain on third preambular para and operative paras 2 and 3 of draft Res (Delga 754 and 770 Dec 20).

3. Del shld also abstain on the second preambular para in view of fact we voted against para 3 of Res last year which South Africans are now charged with contravening.

4. In accordance position paper SD/A/C.1/360, Del shld vote against para placing item on agenda seventh session.

5. In vote on Res as whole Del authorized vote in favor as Res generally similar to last year's Res on which we voted affirmatively in plenary. Dept convinced, however, Res unlikely accomplish anything and there is risk that coming on top present SW African situation it will make return S African Del to GA more difficult.

ACHESON

IO Files

Minutes of Fortieth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 5, 1952

SECRET

US/A/M(Chr)/227

[Here follow list of persons (35) present and discussion of two prior agenda items.]

3. *Indians in South Africa*

Mr. Stein reported on the recent word from the Department on this item and the 5-Power resolution contained in Gadel 594. The Department proposed that the Delegation modify its decision on the voting by paragraphs on this resolution as follows:

(*a*) abstain on the second preambular paragraph. (Since the United States had voted against the General Assembly resolution referred to in that paragraph, we should abstain on references to it.)

(*b*) vote against the last paragraph of the resolution which called for automatic consideration of the item by the Seventh Session. Otherwise the Delegation should vote in favor of the resolution as a whole.

Mr. Stein suggested that the Delegation adopt the Department's ideas. Miss Strauss, he said, could explain the United States views in regard

to the last paragraph. In fact, any member could place this matter on the agenda anyway. Should the possible mediatory efforts of the Secretary-General hold a chance of success, it would be unwise to have the item fall automatically on the agenda and run the risk of disrupting such a chance. Mr. Stein reiterated his suggestion that the Delegation support the proposed modifications.

Miss Strauss agreed in general with the Department's position but regretted having to vote against the last paragraph since she thought the South Africans might feel the United States was not taking a serious interest in this matter. In general, she said, she could not favor the automatic placing of items on the agenda. There were special reasons for her position in this particular case however.

Mr. Allen wondered if there were still time to try to get the last paragraph changed to the effect that the Secretary General would report to the Members on whether his special position in the matter gave him reason to believe the question should be included in the agenda or not. Miss Strauss liked this idea but pointed out the difficulty of obtaining sponsors for such an amendment. Mrs. Roosevelt doubted that there would be sufficient time to attempt such a move. Miss Strauss asked if the Delegation would approve of her seeking to have some other delegation put in an amendment to this effect, on the "off-chance" that she could persuade someone to do it. Mr. Stein said that the Department's instructions indicated they would not object. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she heard no objections to this course. The vote would be according to the new instructions.

[Here follows discussion of another matter.]

CHARLES D. COOK

IO Files

United States Delegation Plenary Position Paper

RESTRICTED [PARIS,] January 10, 1952.

US/A/3427

TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: REPORT OF THE AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/2046)

1. UNITED STATES POSITION

The United States should vote in favor of the attached resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. If the resolution is voted upon paragraph-by-paragraph the United States should (*a*) vote in favor of preambular paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, and operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; (*b*) abstain on preambular paragraphs 2 and 3 and operative paragraph 4; (*c*) vote against operative paragraph 5.

547-842—79——56

The United States should vote under Rule 67 against plenary discussion of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

2. HISTORY IN COMMITTEE

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee devoted 6 meetings to the consideration of this agenda item. After adoption of the resolution paragraph-by-paragraph, the resolution as a whole was adopted by 41 votes to 2, with 13 abstentions.

3. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PLENARY

Since South Africa has indicated that it does not desire plenary debate, and it is unlikely that India will desire debate, there will probably not be a debate. It is likely, however, that there will be a number of explanations of vote. It will not be necessary for the United States to explain its vote.

[Annex]

RESTRICTED

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE 1/5/52

TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 44(1), 265 (III) and 395(V), relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa,

Having considered that the Government of the Union of South Africa has been unable up to the present time to accept General Assembly resolution 395(V) as a basis for a round table conference,

Noting that the promulgation on 30 March 1951 of five proclamations under the Group Areas Act renders operative thereby the provisions of that Act in direct contravention of paragraph 3 of resolution 395(V),

Having in mind its resolution 103(I) of 19 November 1946 against racial persecution and discrimination, and its resolution 217(III) of 10 December 1948 relating to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Considering that a policy of "racial segregation" (Apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,

1. *Recommends* that a commission of three members be established for the purpose of assisting the parties, namely the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa, in carrying through appropriate negotiations, the said commission to be composed of one member to be nominated by the Government of the Union of South Africa, another to be nominated by the Governments of India and

Pakistan and the third to be nominated by the other two members, or in default of agreement between these two within a reasonable time, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

2. *Calls* upon the Governments of the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan to nominate members within sixty days from the date of adoption of the present resolution;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the event that the members of the Commission are not nominated in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, to lend his assistance to the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa, provided such assistance is deemed necessary and helpful by him, with a view to facilitating appropriate negotiations between them; and further, in his discretion and after consulting the Governments concerned, to appoint an individual who would render such additional assistance for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of the said negotiations;

4. *Calls* upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act pending the conclusion of the negotiations;

5. *Decides* to include this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

320/1–1352 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 13, 1952—8 p. m.

Delga 1007. Re Indians in South Africa. In estimating the influence of the Arab-Far Eastern group in this Assembly, Dept may usefully compare this year's *ad hoc* comite vote on five-power res on above subj with vote in same comite last year.

Last year essentially same res was approved in comite by vote of 26 to 6 with 24 abstentions. This year res was adopted by vote of 41 to 2 (Australia being only country joining the union of SA) and 13 abstentions. Even West Eur ranks broken e.g. with Norway voting in support of res rather than abstaining and Neth abstaining rather than opposing it.

Perhaps fact that essentially same res has once been approved by Assembly was undoubtedly contributing factor in large vote. Another factor although with limited effect on voting constellation, might have been insertion of Israeli amendment providing for neutral mediator. Nevertheless, we believe that considerable increase in support for India since last year in this troublesome case is significant and can not be disregarded.

Prior to vote in comite, Miss Strauss made strong pleas for elimination of last para of 5-power res providing that this matter be inserted on agenda of next Assembly. She urged comite members to vote against this para. It is significant that only Australia, Belgium, France and South Africa responded to this plea.

39 members voted in favor of retaining the para and 11 members abstained. Last year same para was included by comite vote of 31 to 3 with 22 abstentions. The increase of support for this para despite strong US plea and despite fact that many reps are personally tired of hearing same old story again and again is also of interest.

Sov bloc made speeches of unprecedented brevity limiting its anti-discriminating harangues generally to state of affairs in South Africa. This bloc switched from abstention last year to affirmative vote.

After voting in comite, Nehru (India) thanked USDel profusely for our support. Jordan of South African del indicated satisfaction over inclusion of Israeli amendment and said US negative vote on last para was "better than nothing." He also said if SYG Lie undertakes his efforts get parties together with specific ref to comite res there might be hope for resumption of discussions.

From viewpoint of our relations to NE and FE states affected by our recent positions on such matters as Morocco,[1] this year's debate on above item was not unhelpful.

ROOSEVELT

[1] For documentation on the Moroccan question in the General Committee in the opening phase of the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, see pp. 135 ff.

320/1–1352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 16, 1952—6 : 34 p. m.

Gadel 734. Re Indians in SoAf Delga 1007. In analyzing large vote this year Dept believes fol factors also important: 1) fact that not until plenary did US indicate support for similar Res last year; 2) irritation over failure SAfr be more forthcoming re solution SWAfr question; 3) resentment over SAfr partial GA walkout.

Clarify Jordan remark that "if SYG Lie undertakes his efforts get parties together with specific ref to Comite Res there might be hope for resumption of discussion". Dept also interested any indications Jordan line of thinking might be shared by Jooste or Donges.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Respectively, G. P. Jooste, South African Ambassador to the United States and Vice-Chairman of the Union's Delegation to the General Assembly, and T. E. Donges, South African Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Union Delegation.

320/1–2452 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 24, 1952.
[Received January 24—12 : 50 p. m.]

Delga 1171. Re Gadel 734 re Indians in South Africa. Sentence on which Dept requests clarification shld read as follows:

"If SYG Lie undertakes his efforts get parties together without specific ref to comite resolution there might be hope for resumption of discussion."

We understand Jordan's remark to mean Govt of South African Union wld be willing cooperate with SYG in his efforts get parties together provided he does not base his efforts on a GA Res. This coincides with past attitude of Union Govt that it is willing enter discussion with Indian Govt at any time outside UN and without recognizing UN Res as basis for discussions.

In conversation with USGADel staff member on Jan 21, Jooste said South Africa still remains ready to negotiate with India and Pak, in Capetown, Karachi, New Delhi or anywhere else on basis of still valid Capetown agrmt, i.e., on basis that problem of Indians in SA shld be discussed at round-table conference and there should be no limitation on questions which either side puts on agenda. If SYG, under GA Res, approaches SA, this is reply they intend make. SA will not negotiate on basis of GA Resolutions themselves. Jooste said this offer cannot remain open indefinitely.

ROOSEVELT

Editorial Note

For the proceedings of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on this question, on December 20 and 21, 1951 and January 2–5, 1952, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, pages 152–162 and pages 163–174, respectively. For the proceedings of the General Assembly on this matter on January 12, 1952, see GA (VI), *Plenary*, pages 327–331. Appropriate documentation is found in GA (VI), *Annexes*, fascicule for agenda item 25.

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on January 12, 1952 recommended the establishment of a commission of three members for the purpose of assisting the parties engaged in the controversy (India, Pakistan, and the Union of South Africa) "in carrying through appropriate negotiations." The resolution also outlined means for implementing this procedure. For text of the resolution, Resolution 511 (VI), see GA (VI), *Resolutions*, page 11.

Editorial Note

At the time that Mrs. Roosevelt took over as Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation in December 1951, she circulated a memorandum dated December 18, 1951, to members of the Delegation, "for it explains much that is happening in Committees 2, 3 and 4" (IO Files, Doc. US/Gen. 499, December 18, 1951). In the memorandum Mrs. Roosevelt had included remarks (English translation) excerpted from an address by M. Henri Laugier, former Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Social Affairs, before the World Federation of United Nations Associations, Geneva, July 31, 1951. Although these remarks were subsequently severely criticized as Communist propaganda by Deputy Assistant Secretary Sandifer, when he read the document, their content is included here as relevant to an understanding of the intellectual climate prevailing at the Paris General Assembly, 1951–1952, with regard to human rights questions, and the problems posed thereby for United States policy.

M. Laugier's remarks follow:

"First of all, allow me to bring to your attention the facts to which Committee 3, the Social Committee of the Assembly, was a witness last year. I have always thought, and I am more than ever of the opinion, that a group of historians and observers, men with imagination and with an eye for criticism, should be set up at the Secretariat of the United Nations to analyze methodically the policy of the different states, and particularly their votes in the different committees of the Assembly. In the absence of such a body whose job would be to think and consider, I have modestly attempted to fulfill its functions myself, and the votes in Committee 3 have been of great value not only to me but to you, and I think to all those who attempt to foresee the future by taking into account the present events. What happened is this, and I cordially invite you to consider carefully the following facts:

"In many important votes on the following subjects: the colonial clause in the Covenant, freedom of information, the right of self-determination, the insertion of economic and social rights in the Covenant; we saw after many very noble speeches and a roll call vote, a majority of some 30 to 35 states (depending upon the circumstances), made up of most of the South American countries, Middle Eastern countries, Asiatic and Soviet states, join together against a minority of 12 to 16 votes (depending upon the circumstances) of the highly developed states such as Great Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, Australia, etc. The phenomenon is of great importance and deserves to be studied in great detail. A conference should be given over to it, or even a book written on it, bringing a possible solution to this question: What does it mean? What it means is that in the Social Committee of the United Nations, where governmental pressure is not as great as in the political, economic, trusteeship, or financial committees, the highly developed countries have lost the control, the leadership of the international community; and that this control and this leadership have gone over to the disinherited countries. It means and signifies the following: that there exists today in the world several

hundred million men, women, and children who are leading a life which is not fit for a human being, in slums and with insufficient food, among sickness, ignorance and illiteracy; and who today, in this world of technical progress are not willing to resign themselves to their fate. The same problem existed fifty years or a hundred years ago. But at that time these men come into the world, lived, gave birth to children, and died on their own land like plants or animals. Today in this scientific world they know that within reach by plane, a few hours from misery, there exist countries where there is plenty of everything, nay, where squander and waste are the order of the day. And they no longer resign themselves to their sad fate; they demand, discreetly today, imperatively tomorrow, an international night of August 4;* the disinherited countries arise to ask that these states abandon their privileges, states which history and geography have made into privileged countries. These disinherited countries know that they cannot expect a significant improvement in their fate through national action alone, and with mingled hope and despair, they turn towards the United Nations, calling for help and relief. That is to say that within a short time, the world, already menaced by imperialist wars, is going to be threatened with a social revolution pitting the disinherited countries against the privileged countries; and that undoubtedly only a generous, brave, and fearless action is capable, not of forestalling this imperious demand for international social justice, but at least of guiding it into the peaceful ways of cooperation among peoples of the World. It is, in any event, particularly important that these countries which history and geography have made happy, powerful, rich and strong, be made to feel that that this power, this good fortune, this wealth, and this strength, do not give them special rights or authority in the international community, but impose upon them responsibilities and extra duties of generosity, devotion and self-sacrifice to the cause of suffering humanity." (Translation of an excerpt from address given before the World Federation of United Nations Association, Geneva, July 31, 1951)

*August 4, 1789, when all feudal rights and privileges of the [French] nobility were relinquished to the Constituent Assembly. [Footnote in the source text.]

CANADA

POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA [1]

711.56342/2-951

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Canada

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, February 19, 1951.

No. 134

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's instruction No. 89, dated December 15, 1950, and to the Embassy's despatch No. 970 of February 1, 1951,[2] concerning surveys by the United States Air Force of communications sites in Newfoundland and Labrador. As stated in its note No. D–41 of January 30, 1951,[3] the Canadian Government's approval related only to the carrying out of surveys and the Canadian Government was awaiting a further request from the United States for permission to carry out the communications project.

The Department transmits herewith a copy of a letter dated February 9, 1951 from the Secretary of Defense [3] explaining in detail the communications facilities which the United States Air Force desires to construct in Newfoundland, and requesting the Department to seek the approval of the Canadian Government. The attached letter also requests that authority be obtained to permit the Northeast Command, together with the Chief of the United States Army Engineers, to assist the Canadian Government in acquiring the privately-owned lands involved, which in turn would be incorporated in a supplementary lease from the Canadian Government to the United States.

It is proposed that the conditions of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement [4] be made applicable to the additional areas to be acquired near

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[1] For documentation on discussions with Canada concerning the use of atomic weapons and the use of Canadian bases in case of atomic warfare, see vol. I, pp. 802 ff.

For documentation on economic and military cooperation between the United States and Canada during 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 583 ff.

[2] Neither printed.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Reference is to the Leased Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941, between the United States and the United Kingdom, in which the United Kingdom leased certain bases in Newfoundland to the United States for a period of 99 years. When Newfoundland became a part of Canada in 1949, Canada assumed the commitments made by the United Kingdom in this agreement. In 1950, the United States and Canada negotiated some revisions in the agreement, which were formalized in an exchange of notes in 1952. For text of the 1941 Agreement, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 235, or 55 Stat. 1560. For documentation on the revision of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol II, pp. 393 ff. and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 583 ff.; for the exchange of notes in 1952, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 3, (pt 3), pp. 4271–4275.

Ernest Harmon Air Force Base and Pepperrell Air Force Base, and that tenure run for the balance of the existing 99-year lease. If the Canadian Government is agreeable, this procedure could be followed by authority of Article XXVII of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement, which provides that the United States may acquire supplementary leases.

In the letter of February 9, 1951 from the Secretary of Defense, it is further stated that it is understood that the lease of this property and all construction connected therewith will be without expense to the Canadian Government, and that the United States will re-imburse the Canadian Government for any expenses which Canada may incur in connection with the acquisition of property.

There are attached two charts showing the location of the areas which the United States Air Force would like to acquire near Ernest Harmon Air Force Base and Pepperrell Air Force Base.

For the Embassy's information, the question of additional communications facilities at Goose Bay will be taken up in connection with the broader problem of an over-all lease in that area.[5]

[5] Negotiations for a 20-year lease of portions of the Royal Canadian Air Force Station at Goose Bay, Labrador, were in progress. See the Department's instruction 168 to Ottawa, April 3, 1951, p. 881. An agreement was effected by an exchange of notes on December 5, 1952. For text, see 3 UST (pt. 4), 5295–5299.

711.56342/2–2651

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED AIR PRIORITY OTTAWA, February 26, 1951.

No. 1098

Subject: Leases for Communications Sites

Upon receipt of the Department's Instruction on this subject[1] the Embassy forwarded to the Department of External Affairs on February 21 a Note[2] summarizing the request of the United States for approval by the Government of Canada of proposals to construct communications facilities in Newfoundland and to lease certain lands in that connection.

The Embassy's Note included the following paragraph:

"In order to facilitate the detailed arrangements which may be necessary, it is requested that the necessary authority be granted by the Government of Canada to permit the United States Northeast Command, together with the Chief of the United States Army Engineers, to assist the Government of Canada in acquiring the privately owned lands involved. It is proposed that these lands, together with

[1] *Supra.*
[2] Not printed.

the Crown lands included in the sites, be leased to the United States under authority of Article XXVII of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement, which provides that the United States may acquire supplementary leases, that the conditions of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement be made applicable to the additional areas to be acquired near Ernest Harmon Air Force Base and Pepperrell Air Force Base, and that tenure run for the balance of the existing 99 year lease. The approval of this proposal by the Government of Canada is requested together with permission for the United States Air Force to undertake the construction program outlined above."

The first sentence of this paragraph creates no problems, and is accepted as a convenient collaboration in working out the final details, including the exact location of the sites. It is understood that the Government of Canada will acquire title to the privately owned lands for defense purposes. Under legislation which will soon go through Parliament, the Minister of Defense will be authorized to lease government property on the authority of an Order-in-Council. Such Orders-in-Council, however, must be laid before Parliament and are finally valid only if Parliament does not take action to disapprove within a specified time limit.

With these proposals thus subject to political review, and taking into account the somewhat delicate relationships between the Federal Government and the Province of Newfoundland in matters of sovereignty, officials in the Department of External Affairs are very much concerned over the political implications of the second sentence in the paragraph quoted above. They feel so strongly about this that the Embassy's Note has been held in the Department of External Affairs and has not yet been referred to Cabinet Ministers, pending exploration of the possibility of modifying the request of the United States in certain respects, as outlined in the following paragraphs.

1. The most serious Canadian objection is to the proposed tenure of 99 years, which turns over these outlying areas to the United States for the same term as the Leased Bases themselves, which were granted to the United States under quite different conditions and for quite different purposes. Canadian officials feel that there would be strong protests against any action which seemed to establish the principle of an intention by the Government of Canada to cede additional territory to the United States. As a practical matter, it is pointed out, there is no necessity for a lease of such duration for communications facilities which may become obsolescent in a much shorter time and which may not actually be needed for this period. Furthermore, similar communications facilities are being established at Goose Bay for a much shorter period. Officials suggest that twenty-five years might be a reasonable tenure, subject to renewal if desired. Alternatively, a form

of words leaving the tenure open for a reasonable period, or during such time as the communications facilities are needed, might solve the problem.

2. Canadian officials are also reluctant to make the lease contingent on the authority of Article XXVII of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement, for much the same political reasons. They would much prefer a request based on a need for communications facilities essential to the defense of the North Atlantic area.

3. The request of the United States would also be more acceptable to Canada if it were not specified that the conditions of the Leased Bases Agreement be made applicable to the additional areas to be acquired. It was pointed out that this really involves only three things: (*a*) the tenure of the lease, discussed above; (*b*) the right to establish canteens, which appears not to be necessary for these particular areas; (*c*) the question of jurisdiction which, if excluded, would place U.S. personnel in these off-base areas under the same conditions as U.S. personnel anywhere in Canada outside the base areas.

There is no objection to appropriate references to the Leased Bases, since these communications facilities are definitely linked with their operations. The only objection is to an extension of the areas included in the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement, in an effort to avoid possible political difficulties over the question of sovereignty to which Canadians, and particularly Newfoundlanders, are so markedly sensitive.

The Embassy has been assured that the Government of Canada is most anxious to avoid creating any unnecessary difficulties in development of the communications project, which is cordially approved in principle. The purpose of these suggestions is in fact, to expedite the process of final approval and to make certain that there will be no last-minute objections on political grounds.

In order to expedite the necessary considerations by all agencies of the Government of Canada, the Department of External Affairs has already informed the Department of Transport of these proposals in order that they may be studied in their technical aspects. In that connection certain questions have been raised by the technicians, to which it is desired to have answers as soon as possible. These questions may have bearing on the possible necessity for adjustments in the Canadian system of communications.

[Here follow several technical questions.]

For the Ambassador:
DON C. BLISS
Minister

711.56342/3–151

The Chargé in Canada (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED AIR PRIORITY OTTAWA, March 1, 1951.

No. 1126

Subject: Leases for Communications Sites

A copy of the Embassy's despatch no. 1098 on the above subject [1] has been shown to Mr. R. A. MacKay, Defence Liaison Division, Department of External Affairs, who indicated that it was a complete and accurate statement of the position of the Government of Canada in this matter as originally explained to the Embassy.

In an effort to expedite consideration of the United States request for use of these communications sites, I made a preliminary draft yesterday of a revised Note, which I have discussed with Mr. MacKay. We concluded that the United States approach might be made in two different ways in an effort to eliminate the politically dangerous references to the Leased Bases Agreement. One such approach could be made in general terms, leaving the tenure of a lease indefinite, for such time as the lands may be required for the maintenance and operations of the communications system. Another approach would link this proposal with the Goose Bay lease, which also includes facilities for global communications. After discussing the matter with Under Secretary Heeney the Department of External Affairs has indicated that it would prefer the second approach.

There are attached hereto copies of the proposed Note as now redrafted.[2] Numbered paragraph five [3] represents the text which would be acceptable to officials in the Department of External Affairs and in their view more acceptable to Cabinet Ministers and to Parliament than the original United States proposals. These, which were incorporated in the Embassy's original Note, were set forth in the penultimate paragraph in the letter from the Secretary of Defense attached to the Department's Instruction No. 134 [4] as supplemented by the third paragraph of the Department's Instruction.

In sum, this redraft omits any reference to a lease, avoids linking the proposal to the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement, and puts use of these facilities on much the same basis as those to be made available at

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed.

[3] Paragraph five was as follows: "In view of the importance to the defense of the North Atlantic Region of the proposed communications facilities, and in view of the heavy capital investment which will be entailed in their construction, the Government of Canada is requested to make available the lands described above to the United States for its exclusive use for 20 years for the purpose of installing and operating these facilities. If the United States should make a request for extension at the end of the 20-year period, it is understood that such a request would be considered by the Canadian Government in consultation with the United States Government in the light of the common defense interests of the two countries."

[4] Dated February 19, p. 870.

Goose Bay. The justifications provided are the defense of the North Atlantic Region and the heavy capital investment of the United States in these facilities.

In the consideration of this redrafted Note in Washington the Embassy suggests that the following questions must be weighed:

1. Are there any political or practical reasons for desiring a lease of these communications facilities, as distinct from those at Goose Bay, for a period of eighty-nine years as against the Canadian suggestion of twenty years subject to renewal if the facilities continue to be required for purposes of mutual defense?
2. Is it necessary to refer to the authority of Article XXVII of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement, or is the United States satisfied to justify its request on the considerations set forth in numbered paragraph five?
3. Is the application of the conditions of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement to these areas a matter of significance? As indicated in the Embassy's despatch no. 1098 the only relevant feature of these conditions would be the question of jurisdiction, the significance of which will have to be determined in Washington.
4. The Secretary of Defense furnished an undertaking that the United States would reimburse the Canadian Government for any expenses which Canada might incur in connection with acquiring these properties. (Numbered paragraph seven of draft Note.) One such expense would be the cost of purchasing the lands and obtaining title in the name of the Federal Government. It is understood that when the Newfoundland Bases were acquired, the United States reimbursed the United Kingdom for its expenditures in acquiring the lands included in the Leased Base Areas. That, however, was in connection with a lease for ninety-nine years. The question arises, therefore, as to whether or not the United States would be willing to reimburse the Government of Canada for such expenditures when the lands involved are turned over to the United States for a much shorter period.

The Embassy expects in due course to receive appropriate instructions from the Department in connection with the points raised in this despatch.

DON C. BLISS

Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444, "Memoranda for the President, 1951"

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense concerning the extension and coordination of the aircraft control and warning nets of Canada and the United States.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 15, 1950 transmitted to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–United

States, for consideration a plan for the extension and coordination of the Canadian and United States air defense systems. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense was requested to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether the plan which had been developed by the Air Forces of the two countries was acceptable.

The Board carried on discussions at two meetings in January, 1951 with a view to determining various matters such as the division of costs and the operational control of the system. As a result of these discussions, the Board prepared a formal Recommendation to the two Governments for approval stating that a plan substantially as set forth by the two Air Forces for the extension and coordination of the air defense systems of the United States and Canada was feasible and acceptable and should be implemented forthwith as a matter of great urgency.[1]

As the Department of Defense was primarily concerned, the Recommendation of the Board was first transmitted to that Department, and there is attached a copy of a letter dated February 23, 1951 from the Secretary of Defense indicating his approval, as well as the concurrence of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.[2]

I believe that the Recommendation of the Board represents an equitable and feasible basis for cooperation in this joint defense project by the United States and Canada and I recommend that you approve the action of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for this Government. Following your approval, this Department will initiate action to put the Board's Recommendation into effect through an exchange of notes with the Canadian Government.

There are enclosed copies of the pertinent documents, including a letter addressed to you from Major General Guy V. Henry, U.S. Army (Retired), Acting Chairman of the United States Section of the Board.[3]

JAMES E. WEBB

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[1] Recommendation 51/1, February 16, 1951, not printed, was attached to the memorandum. It provided that Canada should acquire and retain title to the sites, that the costs of construction, equipment, and operation should be shared on a basis of approximately two-thirds by the United States and one-third by Canada, and that Canada and the United States should each initially have responsibility for manning and operating certain specified installations but that Canada might by agreement assume the manning and operation of additional stations.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall on April 25 that the President had endorsed the recommendation on April 14, "Approved, subject to the availability of required funds." This limitation, Acheson thought, was intended only to signify that the United States commitment would be dependent on the appropriation by Congress of the necessary funds. (711.56342/4–2551).

711.56342/5-2351

Memorandum by the Minister of Embassy in Canada (Bliss)[1]

SECRET OTTAWA, April 3, 1951.

Subject: Northeast Command

During the war, even before the United States was directly engaged, the defense of Newfoundland was a matter of concern to both the United States and Canada. As the war progressed both countries invested heavily in new military bases for the defense of northeastern Canada against attack by land, sea or air. The Newfoundland Bases played an important role on the air route to the United Kingdom from the United States and Canada, as well as in the sea and air protection of ocean convoys.

In connection with these activities Canada constructed a naval base at St. John's for the British Admiralty, greatly extended the air fields at Gander and Botwood, and built new air bases at Goose Bay and at Torbay. The United States, following conclusion of the Newfoundland Bases Agreement in 1941, constructed an army garrison post at Fort Pepperrell, near St. John's, a naval base at Argentia and an air field at Stephenville, all on territory leased for 99 years. In addition, the United States shared with Canadians the air base facilities at Gander and at Goose Bay. All of these air fields became of great importance as staging and transit points on the main route to Europe.[2]

After the war and until 1950 the U.S. Leased Bases in Newfoundland relapsed to a peace-time basis. U.S. facilities at Gander were turned back to Canada, but a portion of the installation at Goose Bay was still used by the United States, mostly for MATS operations, and the continued operation of Goose Bay as an air base was agreed by the PJBD as necessary for mutual defense. Argentia became primarily a U.S. naval depot and training station, and the naval air field at Argentia became the USAF station for weather and rescue services. Fort Pepperrell, upon departure of the army garrison, became headquarters of the U.S. Newfoundland Base Command of the USAF, using for communication purposes the nearby Canadian air field at Torbay, now a civil airdrome operated by the Canadian Department of Transport. Harmon Field at Stephenville continued as a U.S. air base to function as a transit point for USAF traffic to Europe, supplemented by Goose Bay.

To some extent in 1949, but at a greatly increased tempo in 1950, the entire picture changed as international tensions increased and as

[1] Bliss gave a copy of this memorandum to Norris S. Haselton, the Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs, when Haselton visited Ottawa in April.

[2] For a detailed account of U.S.-Canadian defense arrangements during World War II, see Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939–1945*, in the United States Army in World War II series (Washington, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959).

the United States turned to rearmament and to the formulation of global air strategy for a possible conflict. For the next two or three years, as the strategic planning develops, Newfoundland will become of growing importance to the United States. Requirements for planned strategic air operations have been stepped up to a point where existing facilities available to the United States are wholly inadequate. As a result, steps have been taken to lease a portion of the Goose Bay Air Base by the United States for a period of twenty years [3] and to construct important installations for operational requirements of the U.S. Strategic Air Command.[4] Arrangements are going forward to lease additional small areas in the vicinity of the existing bases for the installation of a global communications system. Present plans call for a possible United States requirement for a greatly expanded air base at Torbay. There is also the possibility that still another large air base may be constructed by the United States in Newfoundland on a site not yet determined.

These Torbay projects, which are still in the planning stage, have not yet been considered by Canada on the government level, and they may be modified by political considerations. The proposal to use Torbay for the purposes of the Strategic Air Command as an operating base or even as a transit point, may have to be abandoned in the face of objections that it is too near a center of population. In that case it may be necessary to develop an alternative in the form of an entirely new base at a safe distance from any settled community, and possibly still another one. Goose Bay, of course, does not involve such considerations and that project has been approved.

These projected developments have profoundly affected the nature and extent of United States military activity in northeastern Canada. In the case of global conflict, taking into account the plans of the United States Strategic Air Command, northeastern Canada will be much more than a staging area on the route from the United States to Europe. It is now rapidly becoming an operating area, with bases from which attacks on the enemy may be launched and to which enemy counter-attacks may be directed.

In view of this radical development the U.S. military organization was modified toward the end of 1950 by establishing the Northeast Command under Major General Whitten, USAF,[5] with headquarters at Fort Pepperrell. The MATS operations in this area, formerly

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[3] See the Department's instruction 168 to Ottawa, April 3, 1951, *infra*.

[4] For documentation on U.S.-Canadian discussions on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 802 ff.

[5] The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the U.S. Northeast Command as a unified command (controlling forces of more than one service) on October 1, 1950, and appointed Maj. Gen. Lyman P. Whitten, USAF, as Commander in Chief, Northeast (CINCNE). At the same time the U.S. Air Force inactivated the U.S. Newfoundland and Greenland Base Commands and the Air Force component of the U.S. Northeast Command, also with Maj. Gen. Whitten as Commander.

directed from the United States, have been incorporated in this command. General Whitten's command now covers all United States military activities in northeastern Canada except those of Argentia Naval Base, which is quite appropriate in view of the fact that all such activities are carried on by the USAF.

Extensive revision of present Canadian arrangements may also be necessary. Certainly the existing status at Torbay, as a civil airport operated by the Department of Transport, will have to be radically altered. Before that field can be extended and rebuilt to meet U.S. requirements, it will have to be taken over by the RCAF, with perhaps a portion set aside for civil air operations. If the war-time pattern is repeated new construction will be at the expenses of the United States, but further use of Canadian territory by the United States will be necessary.

In this connection there is an observable Canadian reluctance to enter into any new arrangements which will have the effect of turning over additional Canadian territory to the United States for a long period, as in the case of the Newfoundland Bases Agreement. The present tendency, of which the current Goose Bay lease is an example, is to limit such arrangements to twenty years, thus linking them theoretically with the life of the North Atlantic Treaty, and to justify additional U.S. activities as essential to the defense of the Atlantic area.

During the war the defense of Newfoundland and neighboring territories, together with the operations based on that area, were organized as a joint command in which the United States and the Canadian commanders collaborated by mutual agreement. Under present conditions the Northeast Command, which is responsible for the great bulk of military activity in northeastern Canada, far overshadows the Canadian command structure. Canadian operations are of relatively minor significance, commanded by officers far junior to General Whitten. Up to the present they have coordinated Canadian activities through a committee of the designated commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force, but they may soon be placed under a single commander, probably an Air Force officer.

In case of hostilities General Whitten, under his directives, would be responsible for the defense of the Leased Bases and of any other installation which the United States operates or may develop at Goose Bay, Torbay, in Greenland or elsewhere. This defense responsibility, as matters stand, is limited to air defense, including the air defense of Argentia outside the actual naval base.

With the rapid development of military activities in Newfoundland the responsibilities of Canada for defense of that area have been greatly increased. It is of course a fact that air defense of the U.S. installations

will have the effect of providing a measure of defense for the entire northeastern area. However, General Whitten's responsibilities will not extend to the defense of Canadian installations apart from those used by the United States nor will it extend to the civilian population. The strategic planning which is in progress will, as already indicated, involve the population of northeastern Canada heavily and Canadian responsibilities for their defense will decrease [*increase*] correspondingly.

As far as we know there has been no planning for combined U.S.–Canadian action in northeastern Canada in the event of an emergency, beyond an assumption that something like the pattern of World War II might be repeated. There is some doubt among the Canadian planners that this would be adequate in the circumstances, taking into account the drastic increase in military activity which might be expected. There is also doubt among Canadian planners as to their ability to obtain from their government the Canadian military facilities which the situation would demand, especially in view of the fact that the very existence of these requirements derives from activities for which the United States is primarily responsible. It is therefore believed that some careful thinking should be devoted to this problem.

Presumably no joint command would be adequate in the circumstances, but Canada would find it difficult to accept a U.S. command as a result of a bilateral agreement. Cabinet Ministers already have enough trouble, and will have more trouble, over the political problems created by United States activities in Newfoundland. As one aspect of this situation it may be remarked that American and Canadian collaboration in defense is provided for in the structure of NATO, but as yet this has been implemented only through creation of the Regional Planning Group. In the rest of the NATO organization these planning groups have been superseded by commands and the commanders-in-chief have been named. There is no ready explanation for the exception which has been made in the case of the United States and Canada.

However, if this gap in the NATO structure were filled by the creation of an appropriate command a number of useful purposes might be served. It would certainly facilitate Canadian contributions to the defense of northeastern Canada, since they would not be the result of pressure from the United States but would represent Canadian participation in the defense of the Atlantic area. Incidentally, Canada's share in this would then represent a contribution to NATO, for which Canada would receive credit in the international accounting. Finally, of course, the establishment of a NATO command in this area might solve the otherwise difficult problem of naming an American com-

mander with defense responsibilities for a significant portion of Canadian territory.[6]

DON C. BLISS

[6] Haselton wrote to Bliss on May 23 that the idea of a joint command had been considered on several occasions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that for the time being there was no possibility that such a command structure would be established (711.56342/5–2351).

711.56342/4–351

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Canada

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 3, 1951.

No. 168

The Secretary of State transmits herewith a copy of a self-explanatory letter dated March 17, 1951 from the Secretary of Defense [1] requesting the Department to initiate with the Canadian Government an exchange of notes by which certain areas of the Royal Canadian Air Force Station at Goose Bay, Labrador, would be leased to the United States for military purposes.

The letter from the Secretary of Defense attaches a copy of a proposed note [2] which has been agreed upon by the Air Forces of the two countries. Also attached are copies of excerpts from the Journals of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for its meetings of March, 1950 and February, 1951 [3] containing the discussions in the Board on Goose Bay, the arrangements regarding jurisdiction and other matters at the Newfoundland Bases, and the form of the proposed Goose Bay lease.

At the February, 1951 meeting of the Board, the Canadian authorities indicated that they wished to make no reference in the proposed lease agreement to the subjects of jurisdiction, customs and excise privileges, and postal facilities. However, it was made clear that the Government of Canada had not changed its position on these points and that it was prepared to proceed with the arrangements agreed upon at the Board's meeting of March, 1950.[4] The Canadian Section offered, and the United States Section agreed to accept, a letter from the

[1] The letter from Acting Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett to Secretary of State Acheson, March 17, 1951, is not printed (711.56342/3–1751).

[2] The draft note, dated February 19, 1951, stated that the Canadian Government was willing to grant the United States a 20-year lease, under specified terms, of portions of the Royal Canadian Air Force Station at Goose Bay (711.56342/3–1751). It was identical to a note from the Canadian Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to the U.S. Ambassador, December 5, 1952, which was part of a formal exchange of notes on that date effecting an agreement. For the text of the agreement, see 3 UST (pt. 4), 5295–5299.

[3] Not printed.

[4] According to the excerpts from the PJBD Journal of the March 1950 meeting, the Board agreed that the arrangements which it recommended at the same meeting for the Leased Bases in Newfoundland should also apply to the leased areas at Goose Bay (711.56342/3–1751). The Board's recommendation concerning the Leased Bases was put into effect in an exchange of notes February 13 and March 19, 1952. For the text of this agreement, including the text of the PJBD recommendation of March 28–30, 1950, see 3 UST (pt. 3), 4271–4275.

Canadian Government to accompany the exchange of notes expressing the Canadian Government's intention to seek legislation which would give the United States the same privileges at Goose Bay as at the other bases in Newfoundland. The attached letter from the Department of Defense states that an exchange of notes substantially in the form enclosed will be satisfactory from the military point of view if accompanied by such a letter from the Government of Canada. However, the Department of Defense wishes to reserve final concurrence to the note and associated papers which will be submitted by the Government of Canada to the United States Government.

The Embassy's attention is invited to Section IV, subparagraph 7 of the Board's Journal of the March, 1950 meeting, which states that "all proposed United States service projects in Canada based on the United States area to have the prior approval of the Canadian Government". It is noted that this provision is not included in the proposed exchange of notes regarding Goose Bay. The Department understands that representatives of the United States Air Force discussed this question informally with officials of the Royal Canadian Air Force and it was decided to omit this condition. However, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, it is suggested that the Officer in Charge discuss this point informally with officials of the Department of External Affairs, in order to confirm that the Canadian Government is willing to omit this provision.

The proposed note has been reviewed by interested officers of the Department and no objection is perceived to it.

The Officer in Charge is requested, therefore, to seek the agreement of the Canadian Government to the enclosed note for the lease of Goose Bay, and to obtain from the Canadian Government a draft of the proposed letter regarding privileges and immunities which is to accompany the lease agreement. The Embassy is requested to transmit the Canadian draft letter and other supporting papers, as well as the proposed Canadian note (if any changes are made in the attached draft) to the Department for final approval by this Government before the formal exchange takes place.

642.00/4–1051

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED AIR PRIORITY OTTAWA, April 10, 1951.

No. 1325

Subject: "Canadian Foreign Policy in a Two-Power World."

A major policy address was given by External Affairs Minister L. B. Pearson [1] to a joint meeting of the Canadian and Empire Clubs

[1] Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson.

in Toronto on April 10. The full text of an advance copy of the speech is herewith enclosed.[2]

The speech should be read in entirety as it is a rather disjointed exposition of present Canadian foreign policy with particular emphasis on United States–Canada relations. It is expected that this aspect of the speech will receive the greatest attention in the press and radio and it is probably true that such attention will concentrate on direct statements rather than on qualifying phrases or on those sections which praise United States leadership.

A local newspaper, the *Ottawa Journal*, headlines its article: "Free and Easy U.S.–Canadian Day is Done—Pearson lays down Ottawa's 'Declaration of Independence' ". The headline is based on the following statement in the address: "The days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbor are, I think over." This may be taken as indicative of the manner in which press and radio will handle the speech.

That section of the address pertaining to U.S.–Canada relations is not critical of the United States Government but of attitudes which Mr. Pearson senses as current in some quarters in the United States. He feels that Americans are too quick to criticize Canada, and he seeks to refute the grounds on which these charges are laid.

For the Ambassador:
L. DEAN BROWN
Second Secretary of Embassy

[2] Not printed.

611.42/4–1751

Memorandum by the Minister of Embassy in Canada (Bliss) to the Ambassador in Canada (Woodward)

OTTAWA, April 17, 1951.

Subject: Pearson's Speeches.

Haselton has informed me by telephone that Tony Satterthwaite [1] proposes to telephone you tomorrow regarding the United States reaction to Pearson's speeches on the subject of relationship between Canada and the United States. It appears that Pearson's statements have received considerable attention in the Department of State at the Assistant Secretary level, even at the time when the MacArthur affair [2] might have been expected to monopolize attention.

[1] Livingston Satterthwaite, Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

[2] On April 11, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was relieved of his command of United States Army forces in the Far East and United Nations forces in Korea. For documentation on this subject, see volume VII.

Tony appears to think it desirable to let Pearson know that his views have been carefully noted in the State Department, have been widely discussed, and have received careful attention. He does not propose that you argue the matter with Pearson or give him the impression that we are unduly concerned. However, it might contribute to a more friendly attitude if you could convey to Pearson, in a joshing manner, the impression that his viewpoint has received full attention in the State Department.

611.42/4–1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Canada (Woodward)

OTTAWA, April 18, 1951.

Subject: Mr. Pearson's Toronto Speech, April 10, 1951

In a conversation today with Minister of External Affairs L. B. Pearson, I told him that the State Department had asked me to assure him it had given most careful consideration to the remarks made in his Toronto speech on April 10th, and that the speech had received a very wide coverage in the American press—in fact, a bigger spread than anything which had happened affecting US–Canadian relations for a long time. At the suggestion of the Department,[1] I added that the only possible ill effect of his remarks might be that those in agencies of the Government other than the State Department might question the "special position" Canada had always enjoyed. By this I meant in the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Pentagon, where other countries and the representatives of other countries were always seeking special consideration for priorities on scarce materials, machine tools, etc. I said that the Department had wanted me to mention this not as a cause for alarm, but only as a possibility.

Mr. Pearson confirmed a statement made to me earlier by Mr. Heeney, Under Secretary of State,[2] to the effect that the speech had been made primarily for Canadian consumption and to prepare Canadian public opinion for possible action by the Canadian Government with respect to the Far East. By this, Mr. Pearson explained, he meant that if the fighting in Korea spread to China, his Government might have to reconsider its position with respect to the commitment of troops in the Far East, in spite of any action the United States Government might take. In other words, Mr. Pearson said, if General

[1] Apparently made in an unrecorded telephone conversation.

[2] Woodward discussed Pearson's speech with Under Secretary of State for External Affairs A. D. P. Heeney on April 11, reported in despatch 1340, April 13, not printed (642.00/4–1451).

MacArthur could not be controlled, and led the United Nations Forces into war on the Chinese mainland, the Canadian Government might well feel that it could not associate itself in such a military venture. Mr. Pearson added that his Government had lost all confidence in General MacArthur,[3] and that he would not have made his remarks the way he did, had he known that General MacArthur was to be relieved as he was within a few hours after the Toronto address. Pearson added that he greatly appreciated Mr. Acheson's telephoning Mr. Wrong[4] in Washington at midnight, April 10th, an hour or so before the White House announcement on General MacArthur.

The Minister also said that he felt Canadian public opinion, and to some extent, United States public opinion, should be educated to the fact that Canada is growing up as a nation. Some years ago Canada had always been fearful of too much control from London, and to a certain extent it had now transferred this fear to Washington. He had made a number of speeches in New York at the United Nations and elsewhere, in Parliament, and throughout Canada, to which little attention had been paid, saying the same thing—that Canada had to assume its responsibilities in the world today, and especially in the "two-power world" today. He had always gone out of his way to express his gratitude for the fact that Canada was not like Poland, although each lived beside one of the two great powers—but that nevertheless Canada had to learn to approach its problems in a spirit of independence, recognizing and being thankful for the leadership of the United States in the free world. This part of the Toronto speech Mr. Pearson said he would have made anyway, MacArthur or no MacArthur.

The Minister seemed to be pleased with the attention paid to his remarks in the American press, as well as by the fan mail he had received from Canadians.

At the conclusion of our conversation I jokingly reminded the Minister that I had been invited by the Ottawa Kiwanis Club to attend a luncheon meeting next week at which he was to be the guest speaker, and that the topic announced by the Club was "United States–Canada Friendship Day". Mr. Pearson laughed and said that he guessed he had better speak about "the undefended border and the 135 years of peace". As I left I invited him and his wife to dinner at the Embassy, and he invited me to attend the opening baseball game with him at Lansdowne Park.

STANLEY WOODWARD

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[3] For documentation on the Canadian viewpoint concerning the Korean War and General MacArthur, see volume VII.

[4] Canadian Ambassador to the United States Hume Wrong.

711.56342/5–1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph J. Wolf of the Office of European Regional Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1951.

Subject: US–Canadian Base Negotiations.

Participants: Peter M. Towe, Third Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Joseph J. Wolf, Bureau of Regional Affairs EUR: RA

Mr. Towe called at 10 a. m. May 10 at his request. He resumed the conversation reported in Memorandum of Conversation of May 7,[1] (when he had obtained clarification of the US–Iceland Defense Agreement of May 5, 1951)[2] by saying that he would like to obtain clarification, on a personal basis, of some further aspects of the bases field.

He then referred to the fact that the meeting of the PJBD now going on[3] might lead to some area of disagreement. In this respect he read from a memorandum of instructions to the Canadian members of the PJBD which he said had been approved by the Prime Minister.[4] The instructions made three points.

1. Canada's intention to cooperate whole-heartedly and fully with the United States with respect to base requirements in the common defense.
2. Canada's firm belief that any rights granted must not be at the expense of Canadian sovereignty.
3. Long-term leases should not be considered as an appropriate vehicle.

With respect to the latter item, Mr. Towe raised the question as to whether the Iceland formula or something like it might apply. He also suggested something along the line of a year-to-year right of user, rather than a vested right for a fixed period.

I responded that I assumed that if Canada was merely going to grant permission to use bases, such would assume Canadian construction at full Canadian expense. Mr. Towe disclaimed any such Canadian intention, and asked whether the infra-structure conversations now going on in the Deputies[5] might not govern these bases. I said that we were studying the infra-structure proposals, but were not yet sure what our position would be with respect thereto. I also said that I thought urgency might compel us to move forward on certain projects before a final overall solution of infra-structure or sharing of the burden was accomplished. Mr. Towe asked what I thought might be a

[1] Not printed.
[2] For text, see 2 UST (pt. 1), 1195–1201.
[3] The PJBD met in Kingston, Ontario, May 7–10, and at Chalk River, Ontario, May 10–11. The Journal of the meeting may be found under file number 711.56342/5–1151.
[4] Louis St. Laurent.
[5] The reference is to discussions in the North Atlantic Council of Deputies of the distribution of costs for permanent military facilities built in connection with the NATO program. For documentation, see volume III.

fair financial formula. I responded that we hoped that host countries, would provide the facilities, particularly if they had the raw materials and manpower, and did not have to expend other than local currency. We agreed that overall budget problems would be relevant. Mr. Towe asked whether any such construction would be given credit as a defense effort with regard to the sharing of the burden exercise, and I said that I could not respond officially, but personally believed that such would be the case.

Reverting to the term of the agreement, Mr. Towe said that Canada did not want to establish long-term lease-holds such as the 99 year lease base agreement, or the 20 year term at Goose Bay, nor did it wish the United States to retain rights after the emergency had expired. He pointed out that the North Atlantic Treaty had connotations going beyond the defense effort, and that we all hoped that the Treaty would continue in force after the present defense emergency was over. He indicated that arrangements made under NATO joint planning should be limited in term to the existence of the NATO military requirement as the maximum term. He specifically asked whether all of our requests would be NATO requests. I said I did not know the details of our refined requests at this time.

In this respect, he remarked that the Prime Minister's memorandum said that the PJBD should be used as the vehicle for negotiation, but said that he personally wondered whether requests for NATO purposes should be obtained through a vehicle other than the PJBD, which had been established primarily with reference to hemispheric defense.

I pointed out to Mr. Towe that from the financial, political, and military point of view, it was necessary to have firm rights which could be used during an emergency and which would not be subject to termination on short-term notice by either party. I remarked that the latter would give no basis for major financial investment, would make uncertain military plans and operations, and would create an atmosphere of political uncertainty. I remarked that the close friendship between Canada and the United States certainly would result in Canadian permission remaining open during any emergency period, and emphasized that it would be best to firm this up clearly in the agreement.

742.561/8–151

The Minister of Embassy in Canada (Bliss) to the Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs (Haselton)

SECRET OTTAWA, May 16, 1951.

DEAR NORRIE: Herewith I am sending you two copies of Canadian draft note [1] on extension of the continental radar defense system, of which you have already received a text from the Canadian Embassy in Washington. This note represents a revision of a Canadian draft, worked out at our meetings yesterday between Johnson of the U.S.A.F.[2] and officials of Defence Liaison.[3]

Before we got into the substantive problems, I raised the question of why the Government of Canada objects to the exchange of notes and we got a long grumble from Wershof, who felt that we were inconsistent in our attitude. He felt that in the past we have been able to carry out many PJBD recommendations without exchanging diplomatic notes, and indicated that the Canadians are quite satisfied to have the agreement of the President in this instance; Johnson replied that this particular PJBD recommendation obviously required further action than contemplated in the recommendation itself, and that very few PJBD recommendations can stand by themselves. Wershof also felt that our insistence on registration with the UN is not entirely sound when obviously we cannot tell the whole story and in effect hold back vital information; there was no dispute over the necessity for withholding such information, but I suggested that we would at least be informing the UN that we do have such an agreement in giving a general idea of its nature. Wershof remained unconvinced, but there was no further argument along this line.

However, MacKay indicated his own concern because this exchange of notes must be laid before Parliament, which he is reluctant to do. He feels that it implies another cession of territory by Canada to the United States, the advent of additional U.S. troops on Canadian soil, and all that, and that Canadian public opinion will react adversely to this and other projects now in train. Johnson and I, discussing this after the meeting, felt that the Canadian public is not as sensitive in these matters as MacKay implies. My own feeling is that the Cabinet, which in effect is the Government of Canada, is the sensitive point, and a real problem is to get officials to put through proposals and persuade their Ministers to accept them. After that hump is passed it is fairly easy sailing.

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[1] Not found in the Department of State files, but apparently similar in substance to the note that was sent by the Canadian Ambassador to the Secretary of State, August 1, 1951, in an exchange of notes constituting a formal agreement. For text, see 5 UST (pt. 2), 1721–1724.

[2] John A. Johnson, Associate General Counsel, U.S. Air Force.

[3] R. A. MacKay, Head of the Defence Liaison Division, Canadian Department of External Affairs, and Max H. Wershof.

Without going into detail regarding our redrafting, I can indicate a few of the points which were considered. Generally speaking, our problem was to prepare a note which represented a compromise between opposing Canadian and American objectives. The Canadians wanted no note at all but if they did have to have one they wanted it made clear that Canada is not giving away anything to the United States, remains in full possession of the sites and permanent structures erected on Canadian soil, and has the option of manning the stations with Canadian personnel. In a collateral discussion with Air Vice Marshal James [4] it was established by Johnson that the R.C.A.F. does not see its way clear to man any more than a minimum number of stations, but MacKay wants to suggest, for Canadian consumption, that Canadian personnel may be used if too many Americans seem to be intruding on Canadian territory. Johnson, on the other hand, wanted a paper which would make it clear that the United States has an interest in these radar stations, including a property interest sufficient to justify appropriations for their construction and operation on foreign soil. He would be much happier if paragraph 6 did not contain a reference to "structures permanently affixed to the realty" [5] but MacKay seemed to feel that this is necessary from the Canadian viewpoint.

An important twist in the revised draft has been a rewording of the phraseology to disassociate the manning of the stations from the operation of the stations.[6] By doing this it makes it possible for the Canadians to represent themselves as manning or at least authorized to man, any or all of the stations with Canadian personnel. At the same time it makes it possible for Johnson to maintain that the United States has operating responsibility, thus justifying an appropriation for this purpose, whether for the maintenance of U.S. personnel on the stations or for their manning by R.C.A.F. personnel on a contractual basis. It is only this gimmick which makes it possible, to my mind, for Johnson even to suggest that this draft might be saleable in the Pentagon.

It is my own feeling that the reference in paragraph 6 to permanent structures is a somewhat excessive Canadian requirement, since it makes these structures Canadian property as soon as they are erected. It is difficult for me to understand why Canada could not

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[4] Air Vice Marshal A. L. James, Royal Canadian Air Force.

[5] Paragraph 6 of the Canadian note cited in footnote 1 above stated that the United States should retain ownership of all property which it placed on the sites, "other than structures permanently affixed to the realty."

[6] Paragraph 2 of the Canadian note cited in footnote 1 above provided that the United States and Canada should each assume financial responsibility for the operation of those stations allocated to them by agreement between the two governments. Paragraph 7 provided that both countries should initially man certain stations according to arrangements agreed upon by the two governments and that Canada might, by agreement, take over the manning of stations initially manned by the United States.

accept an arrangement whereby these structures would remain U.S. property as long as a station is in operation, on the understanding that they would revert to Canada when operations are discontinued. If we want to fight on any point, this is the one I would pick. On the other hand, if we can overlook it perhaps it would be wiser to do so.

The Canadians also inserted a proviso in paragraph 5 (*a*) regarding prior approval for construction and installations. This is an analogy of the Goose Bay arrangement.[7] Apparently the R.C.A.F. felt that without such a proviso the U.S.A.F. might undertake over-ambitious construction which might involve Canada in excessive operating costs. I doubt that it has great substance, other than as a precaution. In response to my direct question MacKay indicated that he thought the existence of this proviso in the Goose Bay lease had exercised some influence on U.S. planning for that project. Anyway, they seem to attach some importance to it.

As I informed you over the telephone, I have arranged with MacKay that the next action in this case will be taken by the United States after Johnson has endeavored to sell his draft in Washington. We agreed that Johnson has the harder task. MacKay would not commit himself to Canadian acceptance of this draft, but his general attitude was one of confidence that he could persuade his Minister to accept it and that it would go through the Cabinet Defence Committee. However, it will not be presented to the Cabinet until we hear from you.

Sincerely yours, BLISS

[7] The proposed agreement for a U.S. lease at Goose Bay provided that "all new major construction in the Leased Areas shall have the prior approval of the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay" (711.56342/3–1751).

742.13/6–1251

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1951.

Subject: Discussion with Canadian Minister for External Affairs Pearson on June 13.

Mr. Pearson is leaving for England at the end of the week. He is to receive an honorary degree at Oxford and also plans to see a number of British and Western European officials while he is on his trip in addition to taking a holiday. In view of the fact that he will be talking to a number of Western Europeans, we think it is likely that he intends to talk with you at dinner Wednesday [1] largely on European

[1] June 13.

questions in order to get the benefit of your current thinking on these problems.[2]

Tab A [3] contains a reference to the Far East and the U.N. which we recommend that you raise with Mr. Pearson inasmuch as potential differences in this area constitute, in our opinion, the only important source of disagreement with Canada on foreign affairs.

Under Tab B [4] is included a list of some of the questions which Mr. Pearson may well raise concerning our European policy. Since there are few points of actual difference between the two countries with respect to European policy, this list merely contains questions in which the Canadians have shown considerable interest. The annex does not attempt to brief you on these questions as they comprise our major European problems with which you are familiar, and as the talk on both sides will almost certainly be in the nature of an exchange of background views.

Tab C [5] contains for your background information certain observations with respect to the present status of U.S.-Canadian relations in general.

[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, June 12, 1951.]

BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING STATUS OF UNITED STATES-CANADIAN RELATIONS

1. *Attitudes in the Department of External Affairs*

Since the end of the war, many Canadian officials in the Department of External Affairs have viewed the relative decline in British economic and military power as an opportunity, and even as a compulsion, for Canada to assume a new role of leadership in the Commonwealth and in international organizations generally. These officials, headed by Mr. Pearson himself, and Mr. Arnold Heeney, the Under Secretary, and supported by many junior officers, now stress the independence of Canada's decisions in international matters and her increasingly important role in multilateral negotiations. On the reverse side of the coin, they have a tendency to play down the effects of Canada's bilateral ties with the U.S., to insist on the inviolateness of Canadian

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in the Department of State files. On June 14, Acheson and Pearson, along with other Canadian representatives and members of the State Department, discussed various aspects of international affairs. For the record of this conversation, see vol. I, p. 845.

[3] "Far East," not printed.

[4] "Europe," not printed.

[5] See Annex, below.

territory and to become easily irritated over what they consider our lack of appreciation of Canadian interests and views. This attitude, while strongest in External Affairs, is not uncommon in Canadian intellectual circles. It is responsible in some measure for the importance which Canadian External Affairs officials attach to problems with the United States, particularly in regard to cooperation in joint defense projects. The tendency in External Affairs to exaggerate the sensitivity of the Canadian public creates difficulties and delays in the implementation of various defense measures, even though the arrangements have been approved by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

2. *Pearson's speech of April 10, 1951*

In this speech, Mr. Pearson reflected clearly the attitude mentioned above. He foresaw the end of relatively "easy and automatic political relations" with the United States due to the growing importance of multilateral contacts for both countries. The speech generally emphasized the points of difference between the U.S. and Canada rather than the points of agreement. Mr. Pearson has attempted to explain the speech as a means of preparing Canadian public opinion for feared further public differences with the United States in the UN on the Far East. It has caused some government officials in Canada, both in External Affairs and in other Departments, to view questions with the U.S. not simply as problems to which solutions should be found, but as international incidents involving Canadian prestige. The Department's policy has been to ignore the speech completely, and, by giving it little publicity, to contain its effects. It is suggested that the Secretary treat the speech with a minimum of comment.

3. *Attitude of the Canadian Public Towards the United States*

The attitudes prevailing in External Affairs do not appear to be shared to any appreciable extent by other Canadian Government Departments or by the public at large. As has been the case for many years, there does exist in Canada a moderate amount of feeling against the United States compounded of frustration, envy, and fear of absorption. There is little indication that this feeling is much stronger now than previously. However, ill-considered criticisms of United States policy by Canadian Government leaders and unfavorable action by the Congress on the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project,[6] which has wide support among the Canadian people, could create in Canada considerable public irritation against this country.

[6] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 903 ff.

711.56342/7–1451

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Canada

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, July 23, 1951.

No. 9

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's instruction No. 134, dated February 19, 1951,[1] regarding the request of the United States Air Force for the use of sites for global communications facilities near Ernest Harmon and Pepperrell Air Force Bases in Newfoundland. Reference is made also to the Embassy's despatch No. 1098, dated February 26, 1951, and to despatch No. 1126, dated March 1, 1951, on this same subject.[2]

The Department transmits two copies of a letter dated July 14, 1951, from the Secretary of Defense,[3] giving further details about the communications facilities and their operations, in accordance with the request contained in the Embassy's despatch No. 1098. The letter also states that the draft note attached to the Embassy's despatch No. 1126 is acceptable to the United States Air Force with three exceptions which are noted in detail.

The Air Force states that 180 acres of land are now desired at the Flat Rock site near Pepperrell Air Force Base in lieu of the seventy-two acres previously requested.

The United States Air Force also requests that efforts be made to have the Government of Canada bear the expense of the acquisition of land areas necessary for the project, inasmuch as these communications facilities are of importance to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic region, and since they will be acquired and owned by the Canadian Government and merely made available to the United States for a period of twenty years.

With respect to jurisdiction and other privileges and immunities, the Department requests the Embassy to seek the Canadian Government's agreement that United States personnel on the communications sites shall receive the same privileges as those accorded to United States personnel on the Leased Bases.

The Officer in Charge is requested to seek the approval of the Canadian Government for the use of the global communications sites by the United States Air Force, on the basis indicated, and to inform the Department as soon as possible of the reply.

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[1] See p. 870.
[2] See pp. 871 and 874.
[3] Not printed.

742.561/8–151

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1951.

Subject: Exchange of notes with Canada providing for construction of Continental Radar Defense System

Discussion

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–United States, some months ago agreed on the details of a continental radar defense system to consist of 31 stations located in Canada, to be built jointly by the U.S. and Canadian Governments, with the U.S. paying two-thirds ($100 million) of the cost, Canada paying the balance. The recommendations of the P.J.B.D. have been approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State and by the President.[1] The Canadian Cabinet has likewise approved the recommendation.

The texts of the notes to be exchanged formalizing the understanding[2] were agreed upon some weeks ago. At the last moment, however, Canada told us that although the text of the notes was still acceptable to the Canadian Government, it was unwilling to agree that the exchange of notes should be registered with the U.N. This position was apparently based on fear of adverse public opinion in Canada. The U.S. Air Force, which is the action agency on our side, continued to maintain very strongly, however, that it must have something more than the P.J.B.D. recommendation in writing to justify to Congress the expenditure of the funds. The Department of State has maintained throughout that, if notes were exchanged, they would have to be registered with the U.N. In view of Canada's unwillingness to agree to registration it became necessary to find some acceptable compromise, which was achieved when the Canadians indicated that they would agree to our suggestion that registration of the notes need not necessarily take place in the immediate future and that before registration is accomplished we would consult with the Government of Canada. This position is acceptable to L.

In connection with the exchange of notes, the Canadians also desire assurances on two points: (1) that the U.S., as previously agreed, will sign, as promptly as possible, contracts for the construction of our part of the project; and (2) that we will assure the Government of Canada (in reply to a letter which the Canadian Ambassador will presumably hand you today) that the U.S. Government does not consider that this project in any way constitutes U.S. aid to Canada. BNA is assured by

[1] See the memorandum for the President, March 2, p. 875.

[2] The texts of the notes exchanged in Washington on August 1 are printed in 5 UST (pt. 2), 1721–1724.

the Air Force that there should be no undue delay as regards the first of these two points, and has cleared with L the matter of assuring Canada that no implication of aid is involved.

Recommendations

(1) That you sign the attached note in reply to the note which will be handed to you today by the Canadian Ambassador, the exchange constituting an inter-governmental agreement; (2) that you tell the Ambassador that the Department will not press for registration in the immediate future, and that it will consult with Canada before registering the notes; (3) that you inform the Ambassador that the Department has been assured by a responsible official of the U.S. Department of Air Force that there should be no undue delay in finalizing the various construction contracts; and (4) that, if the Canadian Ambassador hands you a letter requesting a statement that the project involves no U.S. aid to Canada, you reply that a communication to this effect will be forthcoming in due course.

742.561/8–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs (Haselton)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1951.

Subject: Exchange of Notes on Radar Screen

Participants: Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador
EUR—Mr. Perkins
BNA—Mr. Raynor
BNA—Mr. Haselton

Ambassador Wrong handed Assistant Secretary Perkins at 4:30 today the Canadian Embassy's note No. 454, dated August 1, 1951,[1] setting forth the Canadian Government's understanding of the agreement, based on the recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, on the extension and coordination of the continental radar defense system. The Ambassador told Mr. Perkins that Canada had decided to exchange notes and enter into a formal inter-governmental agreement on this project only with reluctance and chiefly because the situation of the Canadian Defense Production Minister, who had been advancing funds for U.S. account without formal authorization from the U.S., had become "intolerable". These advances now total something over $6 million, the Ambassador said. Canada's attitude with respect to exchanging notes with the U.S. is due largely to its reluctance to agree to registration of the inter-governmental agreement with the U.N. The Ambassador stated frankly that his Government

[1] Not printed.

feared some adverse public reaction when the terms of the agreement were published, and for this reason asks that the Department not proceed to register these notes with the U.N. "in the near future", and that the United States consult with Canada before registering the agreement. The Ambassador added that he understood the phrase "near future" to mean at least a year. Mr. Perkins said the Department is willing to agree not to press for early registration of the agreement and will consult with Canada before registration takes place. On the other hand, the Department could not commit itself to any specific period in this connection.

The Ambassador asked that in view of the delay in finalizing the agreement and the advances which have been made by the Canadian Government for U.S. account, that the Air Force proceed as soon as possible to finalize the contracts with Defense Construction, Ltd., covering construction of the radar stations. Mr. Perkins told the Ambassador that the Department had been assured by responsible officials of the USAF that this matter would be taken care of as soon as possible.

The Ambassador then read and handed to Mr. Perkins a letter dated August 1 (copy attached),[2] requesting assurances that nothing in connection with the radar project would be interpreted as constituting U.S. aid to Canada. Mr. Perkins told the Ambassador that a reply to this effect would be forthcoming in the very near future.

Mr. Perkins then handed to the Ambassador the Department's note dated August 1 agreeing to the terms of the Canadian note on the radar project and constituting a formal agreement between the two countries.[3]

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[2] *Infra.*

[3] For text, see 5 UST (pt. 2), 1721–1724.

742.561/8–151

The Canadian Ambassador (Wrong) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 1, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with today's exchange of notes [1] constituting an agreement between our governments for the establishment of a radar chain in Canadian territory as part of the defences of the North American Continent, I have been asked to bring to your attention a question regarded as of considerable importance by the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government does not receive financial or economic assistance from the United States and is anxious

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[1] See *supra.*

to avoid the appearance of being a recipient of aid.[2] The radar network is a project which the defence authorities of the United States consider to be essential for the protection of the United States; at the same time its construction is in the interests of Canada. It is thus a co-operative defence project which is being undertaken in the interests of both countries, and it would be completely incorrect if it were to be interpreted as constituting in any way United States aid to Canada.

The understanding of the Canadian Government is, therefore, that the conclusion of this agreement in no way implies that Canada can be regarded as becoming a recipient of aid from the United States. I should be glad if you would confirm that you share this understanding, and also if you would take steps to ensure that, as a result of the agreement, Canada will not be incorrectly classified by any agency of the United States Government as one of the countries receiving aid from the United States.[3]

Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours very sincerely, HUME WRONG

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[2] Canada had been included in a list of countries receiving assistance from the United States in connection with the Kem Amendment to H.R. 3587, signed by the President on June 2, 1951, which forbade aid from the United States to countries exporting certain items to the Soviet bloc. Canada had been included in the list because of a loan from the Export–Import Bank to a Canadian company, but the Legal Division had subsequently determined, as reported in a memorandum of July 16, 1951, by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Michael H. Cardozo, to the Director of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, John M. Leddy, that, since the company was controlled by United States interests, the loan did not constitute aid (460.509/7–1651). On July 18, Acheson noted in a memorandum that the National Security Council had that day authorized the removal of Canada from the list of countries receiving assistance within the terms of the Kem Amendment. (Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444)

For documentation concerning the Kem Amendment, see vol. I, pp. 993 ff.

[3] Perkins wrote to Wrong on August 7: "You may assure your Government that this Department is in full accord with this understanding, and that it will use its best efforts to ensure that other agencies of the United States Government not interpret the agreement as involving, in any manner, the extension of aid to Canada" (742.561/8–151).

711.56342/7–1451

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Canada

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 16, 1951.

No. 67

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's instruction No. 9, dated July 23, and to previous correspondence regarding the request of the United States Air Force for the use of sites for global communications facilities near Ernest Harmon and Pepperrell Air Force Bases in Newfoundland.

The Department understands that the Canadian Government has not yet replied to the Embassy's letter of July 25,[1] in which a draft note on the subject was transmitted to the Canadian authorities. The matter was discussed informally at the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense on August 21–23, 1951, at which time the Acting Department of External Affairs Member stated that the United States request "would have to be presented to the Cabinet". No information has been received since that time as to whether this action has been taken.

The Officer in Charge is requested to approach again the Canadian Government with a view to obtaining approval of the project. The Department will appreciate being informed of the present status of the matter.[2]

[1] Not printed.

[2] In despatch 396, October 18, not printed, the Embassy reported that the United States request had been in the hands of the Canadian service departments but was now being considered in the Department of External Affairs, which planned to submit it to the Cabinet in the near future. The major consideration in the Department of External Affairs, the Embassy reported, was how to reconcile the U.S. request for a 20-year lease with the position taken by the Prime Minister in May against the granting of any more long term leases for defense purposes (711.56342/10–1851). See memorandum of conversation, May 11, p. 886.

711.5/10–1751

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1951.

Subject: Background information regarding action in the JCS on possible Canadian Participation in the U.S. Northeast Command.

As you will recall, General Vandenberg[1] raised with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the question of Canada's participation in the Northeast Command and the JCS inquired whether the Department considered that Canadian participation would be desirable from a political point of view.

Mr. Raynor, in his conversation with you on August 8,[2] stated that BNA perceived no objection on political grounds inasmuch as the advantages vis-à-vis Canada would outweigh any possible disadvantages with Denmark.[3] It was our understanding that, upon receiving this affirmative reply from the Department, the JCS would undertake a careful study of the military aspects of the problem.

BNA has learned in confidence that the Air Force introduced in the JCS a proposal that a Canadian officer be assigned under General

[1] Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

[2] Raynor described the conversation in a memorandum of that date, not printed (711.5/8–851).

[3] The U.S. Northeast Command's area of responsibility included Greenland.

Whitten as Deputy Commander of the U.S. Northeast Command. The Air Force states that it realizes that the Joint Chiefs would probably not look with favor on making the Northeast Command a Combined Command with the Canadians; therefore, the role of the Canadian officer would have to be carefully defined and limitations would have to be placed on his authority. The Air Force feels that he might be used in bringing about an integrated U.S.-Canadian air defense system for the Island of Newfoundland. They also consider that the Canadian officer might be used by the Northeast Command as a channel of communication with Ottawa for getting Government permission for certain projects, for keeping the Canadian Government informed, and for handling civil defense and other important matters.

The Air Force paper quotes excerpts of a conversation between General Foulkes, Chief of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and General Bradley, during the latter's visit to Ottawa.[4] General Foulkes said that Canada was becoming disturbed at the magnitude and importance of the U.S. Northeast Command. In view of the Command's widespread activities, the Canadians thought that they should have a high-ranking officer on General Whitten's staff to coordinate air defense, civil defense and other matters. General Foulkes hinted that what they desired was the position of Deputy Commander, or a Combined Command. It was stated that Canada would not be satisfied with having a "liaison officer" on General Whitten's staff. This proposal had been made by the Air Force and refused by Canada, because it was felt that Canada should have a more important and active role.

BNA has also learned in confidence that the United States Navy will probably dissent strongly within the JCS when the Air Force proposal is discussed. The Navy position, in which it believes the Army will join, is as follows:

1. The U.S. Northeast Command is a U.S. Unified Command, responsible directly to the JCS, and set up to give the JCS greater operational control over U.S. forces. It has no territorial command. It is not desirable to attempt to make a Unified Command into a Combined Command.

2. The U.S.–Canada Regional Group under NATO does not have a NATO Commander and no such command is foreseen at this time. The U.S. Air Force apparently envisages an integrated air defense of the Island of Newfoundland. The Navy considers this undesirable, in that it would imply that the United States was responsible for the defense of Newfoundland.

3. The Navy considers it would be embarrassing to appoint a Canadian officer as Deputy Commander of the Northeast Command, and then to restrict his activities so severely that he would be Deputy in name only. The alternative, however, would mean that the Canadians would probably assume more and more functions until the Command became, in fact, a Combined Command.

[4] General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Ottawa on August 1 and 2.

The U.S. Navy, as an alternative to the Air Force suggestion, has proposed that a high-ranking Canadian officer be appointed to the Planning Staff of the Northeast Command. This officer would have no command over U.S. troops and such an arrangement would avoid the concept of a Combined Command. This Canadian officer, however, would be in a position to have an intimate knowledge of the plans and operations of the Northeast Command and to coordinate civil defense and other necessary activities. The Navy feels that its proposal would preserve the advantages of Canadian participation in the Northeast Command without the disadvantages which might be brought about by the Air Force proposal.

If the JCS approves the Navy position, they will probably transmit the matter to the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense with the request that the Board carry out exploratory discussions with the Canadians. BNA believes that the U.S. Navy position is probably as far as the Department of Defense would be willing to go at present. If the U.S. Section were to make this proposal it would, therefore, have little room for negotiation with the Canadians, who may well find the proposal unsatisfactory. This might bring about a situation which would have the opposite effect from that which the Air Force intends, namely, to gain greater Canadian cooperation on U.S. projects and operations within Canada.

Should this matter be presented to the P.J.B.D., the State Department Member (N.S. Haselton, BNA) plans to advise caution in approaching the Canadians. Although the Department of State has on several occasions in the past urged the U.S. military services to take the Canadians into their confidence and to coordinate more closely with them, it might be better tactics, in view of the above considerations, to wait until we receive a formal approach from the Canadian Government. We would then be able to offer the Navy position as a counter proposal. On the other hand, if the military services insist that we make an offer in order to improve their working relations with the Canadians, Mr. Haselton plans to suggest that we sound out the Canadians informally at a high level, possibly through a private conversation between General Henry, Chairman of the United States Section, and General McNaughton, Chairman of the Canadian Section.[5]

It is hoped that the above information will prove useful in case the Northeast Command should come up for discussion in your meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[5] Gen. Andrew George Latta McNaughton, Chairman, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–U.S.

711.56342/11-951

The Canadian Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs (Reid) to the Ambassador in Canada (Woodward)[1]

RESTRICTED
No. 322

OTTAWA, November 9, 1951.

The Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States of America, and has the honour to refer to the Ambassador's Note No. 112 of July 27, 1951, in which the approval of the Canadian Government was requested for the establishment by the United States Air Forces of global communications facilities in certain specified areas in Newfoundland.

The Canadian Government agrees to the extension of global communications by the United States Air Force within the areas in Newfoundland as defined in the Ambassador's Note. The approval of the Canadian Government is given on the following conditions:

(1) The land necessary for the facilities will be acquired by the Canadian Government, which will retain title to it.

(2) This land will be available without charge to the United States for its exclusive use for as long as, in the opinion of both Governments, there is a continuing need for the facilities.

(3) If, at any time in the future, it is decided by either Government that the facilities are no longer necessary for joint defence or for NATO purposes, the land, together with any immovable facilities on it, will, on twelve months' notice, revert to the use of the Canadian Government.[2]

(4) Any movable property placed on the land by the United States may be removed by the United States at any time prior to the evacuation of the property by U.S. forces, or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(5) Arrangements respecting such technical matters as frequencies and powers will be co-ordinated with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Department of Transport of Canada, and will be subject to the approval of the Department of Transport.

The Canadian Government does not wish at this time to make any commitments on the question of privileges and immunities until the position of the NATO Forces Agreement has been clarified.[3] The

[1] A copy of this note was enclosed with despatch 471, November 9.

[2] In a letter of December 11 from the Acting Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense Lovett, inviting the Defense Department's comments on the Canadian note, the State Department called attention to this provision and observed: "In the case of NATO facilities the Department of State could not agree that the Canadian Government would have a unilateral right to determine whether these were necessary for NATO purposes. The Department understands, however, that the global communications project in Newfoundland is a United States requirement, rather than a NATO requirement." (711.56342/12-1151)

[3] For documentation on U.S.-Canadian discussions concerning the applicability of the NATO status of forces agreement to the Newfoundland bases, see volume III.

Canadian Government nevertheless agrees that U.S. forces stationed on the land in question will be granted privileges and immunities on a standard no lower than those set forth in the NATO Forces Agreement, conditional on the approval of that Agreement by the Parliament of Canada.[4]

E[SCOTT] R[EID]

[4] Negotiations concerning the global communications sites continued in 1952.

711.5/12–551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1951.

Subject: Recent developments regarding possible Canadian participation in the U.S. Northeast Command

Reference is made to Mr. Perkins' memorandum of October 17, 1951,[1] regarding General Vandenberg's proposal in the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Canada be given representation in the U.S. Northeast Command, with headquarters in Newfoundland.

On October 26, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–U.S. to carry out exploratory discussions with the Canadian Section to ascertain as far as possible Canadian desires and intentions. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that Canadian representation on the staff of the Commander in Chief, Northeast Command, in positions other than that of Deputy Commander, would be welcomed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not consider it necessary or desirable to reorganize the Northeast Command to form a combined Canada–U.S. Command.

At the meeting of the Joint Defense Board on November 12, 1951, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented to the Canadian members. At that time, General MacNaughton, Chairman of the Canadian Section, gave the following reply:

"The Canadian Section appreciates the information contained in General Henry's memorandum regarding Canadian participation in the U.S. Northeast Command. The Canadian Section feels the Canadian Chiefs of Staff would desire to await the results of conversations known to be going on between the Commanding General, U.S. Air Defense Command and CINCNE, as well as their own decision regarding defense of the Labrador Coast, before expressing their views on Canadian participation in the U.S. Northeast Command."

[1] See p. 898.

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING THE PROSPECTIVE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT

Editorial Note

In an Executive Agreement of March 19, 1941, the United States and Canada had agreed, subject to the approval of the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament, to undertake the joint construction of a deep waterway and power project on the St. Lawrence River. Since 1941, legislation to approve and implement the agreement had been introduced annually in Congress, but no action had been taken. The House Committee on Public Works held hearings on the subject from April 24 through May 10, 1950, but discontinued the hearings before their completion. For the text of the Executive Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, volume III, pages 157–168; for documentation on developments of the interim period, see *ibid.*, 1947, volume III, pp. 104 ff. and *ibid.*, 1949, volume II, pp. 393 ff. For the 1950 hearings, see House Committee on Public Works, *Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Basin:* Hearings on H.J. Res. 271, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1950). The Secretary of State's statement at the hearings is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 15, 1950, pages 765–768.

611.42321 SL/12–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs (Benninghoff)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1950.

Subject: The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project

Participants: Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador
Mr. Gordon Cox, Canadian Embassy
Under Secretary Webb
Mr. Benninghoff, BNA

The Canadian Ambassador called on Mr. Webb as a result of a previous informal conversation in regard to the St. Lawrence project. Mr. Wrong stated that he had just been authorized to suggest that in the

near future, perhaps in the middle of January, there be called a conference of experts of both countries to go into the question of the cost of the project. He said that Canadian engineers had gone into this problem more recently than had American experts, and that the people in Ottawa had more up-to-date figures than were available in Washington. He said that Mr. Lindsay of the Department of Transport would lead any such Canadian delegation, and that he supposed that the Army engineers and the Federal Power Commission would be the agencies most interested in the United States in such a technical discussion.

Mr. Webb said that although he could not commit the Administration, he personally felt the suggestion to be a good one and would pass it along with his recommendation. Mr. Wrong promised that he would send a short memorandum on the subject to Mr. Benninghoff for use in preparing further documents.[1]

With regard to the project as a whole, Mr. Wrong conveyed the impression that the Canadian Government was getting anxious about the passage of the Bill in Congress. He pointed out that the time factor was becoming more and more important. If the project is approved at the next session of Congress, the earliest date by which power can be expected in Ontario is 1956, and the consumption of power in Ontario is increasing so rapidly that unless the project is approved fairly soon Canada will, of necessity, be forced to seek other sources. In this connection he mentioned steam power plants, and said that his Government would also probably raise the question of a New York–Ontario agreement if Congressional action is not taken.

With regard to the Seaway, he said that likewise time was a factor. Iron ore from Labrador will be reaching Montreal in 1953 or 1954 when the railway now under construction is finished, and unless the Seaway has definitely been agreed upon, Canada will have to make other arrangements for handling the ore. He mentioned in this connection possible expenditures of about $20 million for rail and dock facilities in Montreal, and the possibility that Canada might build a seaway completely within its own boundaries.

In connection with the above, the Ambassador said that his Government would probably reconsider the whole situation if the Congress had taken no action by approximately April 1951, or otherwise indicated that the Bill would not pass during the next session.

Mr. Webb stated that in addition to recommending the early meeting of the experts referred to in the first paragraph, he would convey to the White House the Ambassador's observations regarding the urgency

[1] Not printed.

of action on the St. Lawrence project.[2] He expressed his own desire that the project advance as rapidly as possible. He said that he knew the President was personally interested in seeing something done, but that he had had no opportunity to ascertain what the White House proposed to do at the next session of Congress. In reply to the Ambassador's question, Mr. Webb said that he knew of no change in present arrangements whereby the Department of Commerce has primary responsibility for pushing the Bill through Congress.

The Ambassador mentioned the possibility that at an appropriate time it might be advisable for two or three members of the Canadian Government to make speeches in Canada and the United States favoring the St. Lawrence project, and otherwise enter into a publicity campaign. Mr. Webb said that this would be worth looking into to ascertain whether public utterances by Canadian officials would help the project along.

[2] In a memorandum for the President, December 15, 1950, Webb recommended approval of the proposal for a meeting of technical experts and that urgent consideration should be given to the handling of the St. Lawrence project during the coming sesssion of Congress (611.42321 SL/12–1550). Arrangements were made through the State Department for a meeting of technical experts on January 11, 1951 (611.42322 N/1–551).

611.42321 SL/12–1950

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1950.

CABINET MEETING, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1950

St. Lawrence Seaway

Secretary Sawyer[1] brought up the question of the St. Lawrence Seaway, stating that he had recently had a visit from Mr. C. D. Howe.[2] He stated that he was bringing up the question since the President had assigned him the responsibility in the last session of Congress of pressing for legislation; that he considered the enactment of the necessary legislation as a matter of urgency, and urged assistance from all present. He requested the Vice President to speak to Senator Connally[3] in an endeavor to get a more friendly subcommittee than we had had last time, and requested General Marshall[4] to take steps to see that the National Military Establishment fully supported the move to obtain action in this session of Congress. He emphasized the defense value of this project, which seemed to be generally agreed.

[1] Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer.
[2] Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce.
[3] Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
[4] Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall.

In addition to the arguments put forward by Secretary Sawyer, I emphasized the fact that further delays on this project were sure to cause difficulties in our relations with Canada, and that the State Department considered it also a matter of real urgency.

I believe Secretary Sawyer intends to push this matter with real vigor.

JAMES E. WEBB

611.42321 SL/2–751

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED OTTAWA, February 7, 1951.

No. 1015

Subject: Ambassador's interview with Prime Minister regarding St. Lawrence Waterway.

On February 6 by appointment I called on the Prime Minister [1] to discuss the latest developments in connection with the St. Lawrence Seaway project. Present also in the Prime Minister's office were Minister of Trade and Commerce C. D. Howe, Minister for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, and Minister of Transport Lionel Chevrier. I indicated to the Prime Minister that as we regard this project to be a matter of mutual interest to Canada and the United States, and in view of this mutuality of interest I wanted him to be fully informed regarding the latest political developments in Washington.

These developments, of which I gave him a chronological review, included the interdepartmental meeting at the White House on January 22,[2] and the meeting at the White House on January 26,[3] at which time the Defense Mobilization Administrator, Mr. Chas. E. Wilson, stated his approval, and the resolution introduced by Senator Green [4] with the endorsement of more than 20 others on February 1. I suggested that Mr. Howe undoubtedly deserved some credit for influencing Mr. Wilson's views in this matter.

I also gave the Canadian Cabinet members an account of the legislative measures which have been introduced in the Congress with bipartisan support. This and other developments I said accounted for the President's statement to me that the prospects for United States action on the St. Lawrence Treaty are better than they have been for the fifteen years he has been working on it.

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[1] Louis St. Laurent.

[2] The Administration's plans to secure Congressional approval of the St. Lawrence project were discussed at the meeting, described in a memorandum by the Canadian desk officer, William N. Dale, January 22, not printed (611.42321 SL/1–2251).

[3] No record of this has been found in the Department of State files.

[4] Senator Theodore Francis Green, of Rhode Island, introduced S. J. Res. 27 on February 1.

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation of these developments, and asked me to convey his thanks to the President for his personal interest and leadership. This has been done under separate cover. The Prime Minister and the other Canadian Ministers then discussed the situation among themselves, the Prime Minister suggesting that it might be well for Canada not to press the St. Lawrence question too vigorously at this time. It was agreed that Chevrier, who said that he was booked for three speeches on the subject, could carry out his obligations provided he spoke only on the Canadian aspects of the problem. Pearson also remarked that it would be well to avoid any more Canadian representatives going to Washington in this connection.

This remark of Pearson's may have been a reference to the recent activities in Washington of Richard Hearn, General Manager of the Ontario Hydro-electric Commission, who made a series of trips to Washington during January to discuss the St. Lawrence Seaway project with Mr. Wilson, to whom he obtained access through a mutual friend in Commonwealth Electric. According to a recent report from our Consul at Niagara Falls, Mr. Hearn returned from Washington in a state of exuberant optimism over the prospects.

STANLEY WOODWARD

611.42/5–1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1951.

Subject: Conversation with Canadian Ambassador

Participants: Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador
Secretary
Mr. Haselton, BNA

The Canadian Ambassador called by appointment at 2:30 today. He opened the conversation by saying that he is leaving tomorrow for a short visit to Ottawa and merely wished to see if there were any thoughts or messages which I might like him to convey to Mr. Pearson or other officials in Ottawa. I said I had nothing particularly in mind but asked that my personal regards be given to Mr. Pearson.

[Here follow summaries of brief discussions of various subjects.]

The Ambassador said he intended to discuss the St. Lawrence problem in Ottawa. There is a possibility, he said, that a "high-level approach" may be made to the Department on this subject before long. The Prime Minister has been under considerable domestic pressure to

[1] Drafted by Norris S. Haselton, Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs.

make a statement, such as has already been made by a number of public figures in Canada, to the effect that Canada will go ahead with the Seaway project on its own if favorable U.S. action is not taken during the present session of Congress. The approach to which the Ambassador referred would apparently involve a suggestion that the power and seaway features of the project be separated; that Ontario and New York be authorized to proceed jointly on the power part of the project; and that Canada, alone, undertake the Seaway within its own territorial waters, which could be done, the Ambassador said, at a cost of only about $30 million more than has been estimated for the joint project. The Ambassador said his position up to this time has been that the Prime Minister should defer a public statement on the subject as long as possible—at least until the House Public Works Committee has made its position clear.[2] I confirmed that in my opinion a statement now by the Prime Minister would not be helpful and might tend to complicate the situation rather than to clarify it.

[2] The Committee had conducted hearings from February 20 through April 30 on various resolutions to approve and implement the 1941 St. Lawrence Agreement. House Committee on Public Works, *St. Lawrence Seaway: Hearings*, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1951). The Secretary of State's statement before the Committee is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 12, 1951, pp. 432–434.

611.42321 SL/6–1351

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1951.

Subject: An additional topic which Mr. Pearson may wish to discuss with you on June 13, 1951.

Discussion

Since the preparation of the briefing memorandum for you of June 12,[1] it has been learned through the Canadian Embassy that Mr. Pearson may bring up the subject of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project with you this evening.

From the Canadian point of view this is the year of decision as far as the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project is concerned. The domestic pressures, particularly in Ontario Province, for the project are so great that if the Congress fails to approve the legislation this year the Canadian Government feels that it must issue a statement at the highest level concerning alternative action by the Canadian Government.

When Mr. Saunders, Chairman of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission, called for such a statement from the Prime Min-

[1] See p. 890.

ister, the White House heard about it and requested the Department [2] to inform the Canadian Government that we thought the legislation still had a "fighting chance", and that an official statement from the Prime Minister or other Cabinet officials would diminish this chance. The Canadian Embassy then informed the Department very informally [3] that they believed there should be confidential conversations between the two Governments as to alternative procedures if the legislation should receive an adverse vote in the Congress and before any statement was made by the Prime Minister. The White House agreed that this was desirable and it was suggested that these consultations would be more fruitful if the ground work were laid in advance of Congressional action, thus avoiding the pressure and publicity of last minute talks. The Canadian Embassy has now agreed to ascertain from Ottawa what alternative the Cabinet has in mind and to inform the State Department so that discussions can be held with the White House.

It has been learned [4] that the President might be willing to consider a bargain with the Canadians if the legislation for the joint project fails in Congress this session. There are indications that the President would consent to construction of the power aspect of the project by Ontario and New York State in return for a firm commitment that the Canadians would undertake to construct the Seaway by themselves. It is quite possible that the Canadians have a similar plan in mind.[5]

The House Public Works Committee has just returned from a trip to the Mesabi iron range and the St. Lawrence River, and the trip appears to have enhanced somewhat the chances for a favorable Committee vote on the St. Lawrence legislation. In view of the slightly improved outlook, the White House does not wish to press the Canadians for discussion of alternative proposals at this time.

Recommendation

If Mr. Pearson brings up the subject of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project and the alternative means of securing it, it is suggested that you inform Mr. Pearson that you believe the legislation now before Congress still has a chance of approval. Since it cannot be denied, however, that the legislation may very possibly be defeated, it is recommended that you tell Mr. Pearson we believe there should be consultation prior to Congressional action in order to lay the ground work for an alternative course of action.

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[2] This request, made by David Bell of the White House staff in a telephone conversation on May 19 with William N. Dale, was reported by Dale in a memorandum of May 22 (611.42321 SL/5–2251).

[3] This telephone conversation on May 21 with Canadian Minister W. D. Matthews was reported by Dale in the memorandum cited in footnote 2 above.

[4] Bell gave Dale this information in a telephone conversation on May 21, reported in the memorandum cited in footnote 2 above.

[5] In the margin next to this paragraph was the handwritten notation "For your information only."

In view of the White House attitude, it is not believed that Mr. Pearson should be pressed to initiate these conversations immediately unless his Government wishes to do so.[6]

[6] No record of any discussion of the Seaway question during Pearson's visit has been found in the Department of State files.

611.42321 SL/8–451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister of Embassy in Canada (Bliss)

OTTAWA, August 4, 1951.

In a discussion today with External Affairs Minister Pearson he expressed the view that Canada is still most anxious to proceed with the joint seaway-power project. If the President can find a way of getting the proposed legislation through Congress that will be the ideal.

However, in view of apparent legislative difficulties in Washington [1] it is necessary for Canada to proceed immediately to serious consideration of the possibility of an alternative program. This is now receiving Cabinet consideration for the first time and active study of the physical possibilities is being initiated. The problem will probably be discussed in Parliament during the coming session.

The preferable alternative from the Canadian vewpoint is an arrangement whereby Ontario and New York will be enabled to proceed with a joint power project (Ontario is desperately anxious to obtain additional power promptly and work on such a project must be initiated promptly if industrial needs are to be met.) Such a project would also facilitate construction of the Seaway by raising the level of the river and eliminating the necessity for costly excavation. This would of course involve the Boundary Treaty [2] and would have to be approved by the Joint International Commission,[3] which could legally give clearance without further recommendations to Governments. It would take about a year, however, to complete the necessary studies.

I pointed out that approval by the President of an Ontario–New York scheme would entail a modification of his previous attitude of insisting on a joint government project. It would also involve some domestic political problems of concern to the White House. Pearson indicated that if there were objections to the Ontario–New York

[1] The House Committee on Public Works voted July 26 to table the St. Lawrence resolution.

[2] Treaty Concerning the Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, 1909. For text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 548, or 36 Stat. 2448.

[3] The International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, established by the treaty cited in footnote 2 above.

project by the White House, on whatever grounds, Canada would feel that the President then became responsible for blocking the project and the reaction north of the border, especially in Ontario, might be strong. I suggested that if no other solution were possible, the President would probably not wish to interfere, and Pearson agreed that this was his opinion also.

A final alternative, of course, is Canadian construction of a Seaway alone, but this is still a rather remote possibility. It will be studied here, however.

Canadian public reaction to the recent action of the Public Works Committee has been widespread. Ontario and Quebec are most strongly in favor of Canadian action to get both the power and the Seaway projects going as quickly as possible. The Prairie Provinces want the Seaway especially. The Maritime Provinces are opposed to the whole business. The Pacific Coast is indifferent.

611.42321 SL/8–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William L. Kilcoin of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1951.

Subject: St. Lawrence Seaway and Hydroelectric Project.

Participants: Mr. W. D. Matthews—Canadian Minister
Mr. G. E. Cox—Canadian Embassy
Mr. Charles S. Murphy—Special Counsel to the President
Mr. Dave Bell—White House Staff
Mr. Davis—Department of Commerce [1]
Mr. Don C. Bliss—US Minister, Ottawa, Canada
Mr. N. S. Haselton—BNA
Mr. W. L. Kilcoin—BNA

This meeting was set up by Mr. Haselton at the request of Mr. Bell of the White House Staff. Mr. Murphy opened the discussions by stating that the recent action of the Public Works Committee in tabling the last joint resolution approving the 1941 US–Canadian agreement for development of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Hydroelectric Project necessitated a review and reappraisal of the situation. He said that the Executive Branch of the Government had not yet established a particular line of approach or position. He felt that informal exploratory discussions with Canadian representatives would be helpful in determining appropriate steps now to be taken and would be helpful to both governments in setting their policies and future courses of action. He asked Mr. Matthews to comment on the present Canadian

[1] Assistant Secretary of Commerce Thomas W. S. Davis.

thinking based on the rejection of the last joint resolution before the House Public Works Committee.

Mr. Matthews stated that significant support from Ontario and a wide section of the press was developing for Canada to undertake the Seaway alone and for joint Ontario–New York development of the hydroelectric resources. The Canadian Government has not deviated from its traditional advocacy of a joint US-Canadian project but if there appears to be no hope for US legislative approval in the near future, it might be necessary to reverse this policy. Parliament is not now in session which eases immediate political pressures, but a position will have to be taken by the Government by the time Parliament convenes on October 9. He stated that a select committee of members of the Cabinet had just been appointed to consider the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project and to recommend to the Government the steps it should take now that legislation respecting the project had been tabled by the Public Works Committee of the House. Mr. Matthews had not been advised concerning the membership of this Committee but Mr. Bliss supplied this information. The Committee is comprised of Mr. Howe, who heads the Ministries of Defense Production and Trade and Commerce, Mr. Chevrier, Minister of Transport and Mr. Winters, Minister of Resources. Mr. Bliss emphasized that this was the first time that Canada had officially undertaken to study any alternatives to the joint US-Canadian Project.

Mr. Matthews indicated that if Canada decided to proceed unilaterally on the Seaway, and jointly with New York on the hydroelectric project, new studies and surveys would have to be undertaken (replanning the Seaway would take at least a year), financial and other problems would have to be carefully considered, and it might be several years before the waterways phase of the program could be initiated. In answer to Mr. Bell, he said that Canada had ample financial resources to undertake construction of the Seaway, and although it might constitute some drain on Canadian gold and US dollar reserves, this should not be too serious, as not more than $50 million would be required in any one year. The real problem lies in physical resources—manpower, materials and equipment and the Canadian Government is really concerned over this aspect of the situation.

Problems involved in joint Ontario–New York development of hydroelectric power and Canadian construction of the Seaway were then discussed. Mr. Murphy stated that State rather than Federal development of this power would be a departure from Federal policy but that the President might be prepared to withdraw his objection to the New York State proposal if this was the only way in which the Seaway could be constructed. It was pointed out by Mr. Haselton that if the joint New York–Ontario Hydro scheme was approved, some provision would have to be made to meet legitimate needs of various New

England states for hydroelectric power. Mr. Murphy was of the opinion that the Federal Power Commission could insert a proviso protecting the interests of other states if and when the New York application is reconsidered. In so far as treaty obligations regarding boundary waters are concerned, the International Joint Commission, it was agreed, could approve these programs after referral without further recourse to their respective Government. However, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Bell were careful to underscore and stress the point that the U.S. members of the International Joint Commission would have no authority to consider or act on proposals for an all Canadian Seaway and a joint Ontario–New York State hydro project unless directed to do so by the President acting through the Department of State. The inference was clear—U.S. approval and support of the hydro project would be contingent on firm assurances that construction of the Seaway would be undertaken by Canada without undue delay. On balance development of the Seaway is more important to the U.S. strategically and economically than development of the hydroelectric resources of the St. Lawrence. The reverse is true for Canada. Although not directly stated, it was implied by Mr. Murphy that a departure from National Policy in approving a joint Ontario–New York hydro undertaking could only be justified on the basis of our over-riding need for the Seaway.

Mr. Matthews was extremely cautious in estimating when construction of the Seaway might be started providing Canada decided to proceed unilaterally. The impression left was that Canada would not proceed with any great speed and it was indicated that some years might elapse before this project could get under way. He was asked if the United States might be able, if legislative approval is later obtained, to join with Canada in construction of the waterways. He was doubtful whether Canada would agree to our participation if the planning and financing were well advanced. Mr. Bliss strongly backed up Mr. Matthews' impression that the Canadians, once a decision is made, would want to proceed on their own as a matter of national pride and prestige. Mr. Matthews said that the additional costs to construct an all Canadian route would not be heavy. Tolls would unquestionably be charged but under agreements and in consonance with US-Canadian relations they would be applied equally and without discrimination.

Mr. Cox asked if Senator Moody's [2] proposal to back the St. Lawrence resolution on the Foreign Aid Bill was likely to be considered and accepted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Neither Mr. Bell nor Mr. Davis were in a position to give an opinion. Mr. Cox asked if the bill could be considered in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. Mr. Murphy said that under Congressional customs and prac-

[2] Blair Moody, Michigan.

tice the House Foreign Affairs Committee would not accept a measure which was being considered by another Committee of the House. If a Senate bill, however, contained such a provision, the House Committee could either accept or reject it in conference.

Mr. Davis was strongly of the opinion that the recent action of the House Public Works Committee should not be considered as final. He expected a number of changes in the membership of the Committee and was hopeful that action might be possible in the near future, say within a period of 6 weeks or 2 months. The situation should be much clearer in about a month. He stated that the proponents of the resolution were prepared to carry on the fight and that they were encouraged by the large number who had voted against tabling the last measure. He pointed out that development and distribution of the St. Lawrence Power by the State of New York would be a significant departure from national policy which the Executive Branch might find it difficult to support. If a new joint resolution is introduced, he said that Section 5 would probably be deleted.

After considerable discussion, it was agreed that efforts would be continued to have the joint resolution reported out by the House Public Works Committee, or by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a part of the Foreign Aid Bill if this appears preferable or practical. In a month or 6 weeks the prospects or possibilities of favorable committee action could be properly appraised and he indicated that a further meeting should be held at that time. Mr. Murphy agreed to this proposal. This would provide ample time before the reconvening of Parliament to permit the Canadian Cabinet Committee to outline its position and policy on the basis of the latest available information. If a joint resolution is reported out by the Committee, Mr. Davis warned that a protracted fight can be expected on the floor of both Houses.

611.42321 SL/9–2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT OTTAWA, September 22, 1951—6:01 p. m.

49. For Perkins EUR pass Murphy White House. Following the President's instructions, I have told PriMin St. Laurent that the Pres wld be prepared to consider a proposition on the development of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

The PriMin has now requested an appointment with the Pres to state Canada's proposals which are as fols:

1. To proceed with the project at once, or as soon as it can be done legally; that is, with clearance from the IJC, with Parliamentary approval, and with US sanction for New York-Ontario power development.

2. Hydro-electric power in the international section to be developed by Ontario and New York State, if New York participation approved by US Govt.

3. The Can Government to build the seaway as proposed, but on the Canadian side.

4. Tolls to be the same for US and Canadian shipping.

5. The door to be left open for US participation in project if we so desired. (Some cabinet members still prefer US-Canadian joint development on grounds it wld cost Canada less and canal shld be partly on US side for engineering reasons.)

The PriMin wants to make these proposals to the President in person. From his point of view it is urgent to do so before opening of Parliament on Oct. 9.

The Emb has nothing in writing, but I have been told the same thing by the PriMin, Foreign Min Pearson and Min of Transport Chevrier who is in direct charge. The proposal can thus be considered firm.

Suggest that perhaps the Pres may wish to obtain assurances from the PriMin in Washington as to when work might start on the navigation project and when it might be completed. The PriMin might wish assurances as to US Federal Power Commission approval of the power project.

I recommend that we examine the proposals as outlined above, and if found satisfactory, give the PriMin the appointment he has requested, if possible, for Thurs.[1] We should bear in mind that Canadian Govt will raise the St. Lawrence issue anyway in one way or another and that we cannot stop them from doing so.

If the appointment is made for PriMin at White House, I think the Pres cld simply let the PriMin state his case, since it was on St. Laurent's initiative that the appointment was requested, and it is a matter of prime importance to Canada.

No exchange of notes or memoranda appears necessary at this time. The Canadian Govt has got up a big head of steam on the St. Lawrence and we should take full advantage of it. It is the best possible moment for us to give them the go-ahead signal, if we can possibly manage it.

The PriMin wants to make his visit to Washington strictly business. He wld like to fly down late Wednesday, stay at the Canadian Emb, and call on the Pres Thurs, returning to Ottawa by plane the same day. He has asked particularly for no honors or ceremony.

To the press he cld be expected to say very little. He is naturally reticent and wld in any event wish first to give any info to Parliament.

WOODWARD

[1] September 27.

611.42321 SL/9–2751

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the President

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Prime Minister St. Laurent on September 28 to discuss the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project has, as you know, been a continuing problem in our relations with Canada for a great many years. It appears now that the Canadians may try to force the problem to a head within the next few months. Our handling of it, vis-à-vis the Canadians, is very important from now on, not only as far as the project itself is concerned but also from the point of view of Canadian-American relations in general.

The attitude of the Canadian Federal Government towards the St. Lawrence problem has changed markedly over the past year. As far as we can ascertain, the Government was satisfied to cooperate with us in attempting to secure Congressional approval of the joint project, as set forth in the 1941 St. Lawrence Agreement, up to the fall of 1951. Our failure to secure Congressional passage in 1950 of legislation approving the Agreement, however, caused the Canadians to believe that favorable action on the joint project was next to impossible under present conditions. As an indication of their changing attitude, Transport Minister Chevrier delivered an outspoken address in September of that year in which he said that Canadians "cannot sit idly by and wait forever" for the Congress. He said further that when Canada is convinced that no progress can be made on the combined scheme, other means must be found for securing the power and seaway development.

On December 11, 1950, in a conversation with Mr. Webb of this Department, the Canadian Ambassador advised us that although the Canadian Government prefers the joint project it would reconsider its position in the event that favorable Congressional action was not forthcoming this year. When the legislation authorizing the St. Lawrence dual purpose project was tabled in the House Public Works Committee late in July this year, the Canadian Government accepted the defeat as firm evidence that Congress would not approve the project this year. A special Cabinet subcommittee composed of Trade and Commerce Minister Howe, Transport Minister Chevrier and Resources Minister Winters was set up to study alternatives to the 1941 Agreement procedure. This committee has worked out an arrangement with the Province of Ontario, the terms of which we do not yet know, outlining the responsibility of both the federal and provincial governments under a new procedure. Proposals embodying the new

procedure will probably be the subject of the Prime Minister's discussion with you on the 28th.

The Canadian Liberal Government is in a difficult political position with respect to the St. Lawrence issue. The Conservative opposition Party is in power in Ontario and its spokesmen, Premier Frost and Mr. Saunders, Chairman of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission, have claimed often and loudly that the Central Government has not pushed the St. Lawrence project with sufficient vigor in Washington. Continued failure to secure Congressional approval tends to lend validity to these charges in the public mind. Mr. Saunders claims that the industrial development of Ontario Province is hindered by lack of low-cost power and predicts a severe power shortage in the years following 1956 unless development of the St. Lawrence can be undertaken within a year. Since Ontario cities, such as Toronto, have been subjected to power brown outs periodically over the last several years, these statements may make considerable impression. While Ontario Province is primarily interested in securing the power, the Federal Government itself is eager to have the seaway. East-west transportation routes are essential if Canada is to be bound together economically. The seaway would provide a ready outlet for the agricultural produce of the prairies. Moreover, the Canadian Government is anxious to facilitate shipment of iron ore from the new Labrador iron ore fields to our steel mills and sincerely believes that both the seaway and power developments are essential to the defense of the North Atlantic area.

For these reasons, the Canadian Government believes that the project must not be stalled indefinitely for lack of Congressional action on the 1941 St. Lawrence Agreement. If the United States cannot participate in construction of the seaway, the Canadians will probably wish to build it themselves. With a substantial budget surplus they foresee no insurmountable financial obstacle. With respect to the power they realize fully that United States approval in some form is required. They feel, moreover, very strongly that if the Administration cannot secure Congressional approval of the 1941 Agreement it should not prevent Ontario and New York from proceeding on their own to develop the power resources of the river. The Canadian Government is firmly of the opinion that Canada has a *right* to build the seaway itself and to secure development of their share of the St. Lawrence River power and that it would be unjust for us to stand any longer in their way. If the Canadians think that by insisting on Congressional approval of the joint project even after it is a lost cause, our Administration is blocking the project, the Canadian Government will probably react very strongly. Intense resentment caused by such a belief might well spread into other areas of our relationship with Canada and to some extent jeopardize the essential cooperation now existing between the two countries.

The Department has been informed by Ambassador Woodward that the Prime Minister's proposal to you will include the following principal points:

(1) The Canadian Government to build and finance the seaway on the Canadian side.
(2) Hydro-electric power in the international section of the St. Lawrence River to be developed by Ontario Province and New York State, if New York participation is approved by our Government.
(3) Both the seaway and power aspects of the project to be begun as soon as the necessary clearances have been obtained and financing arranged.
(4) Tolls to be the same for United States and Canadian shipping.
(5) Opportunity for United States participation in the project to be maintained as long as possible.

In order to anticipate the opposition, we are informed that the Prime Minister would like to make some arrangement with you quickly so that he may announce it in the Speech from the Throne opening Parliament on October 9. If we are unable to accept his proposal or some mutually agreeable variation of it, it is probable that he will make some reference to the St. Lawrence in any case at that time. The State Department's Legal Division has prepared a paper on some of the legal and constitutional questions which are involved in the Prime Minister's proposal and a summary of their findings is attached hereto as Tab "A". A brief biographical sketch of the Prime Minister is attached as Tab "B" and a simplified artist's drawing of the proposed project is included as Tab "C".[1]

As far as our relations with Canada are concerned, the State Department would like to see this Government go along with the Canadians as far as possible in their new proposal. We believe that the Canadians have been exceedingly patient in waiting for Congress to act these many years and that their present proposals would benefit both countries.

However, the Department realizes fully that there are many other government departments concerned in this matter and that domestic political factors and constitutional problems of first rate importance must also be considered. In any case, however, we believe that this Government should avoid putting the Canadians in a box in which it appears to them that they cannot get the project either through Congressional action or through cooperation with the Administration. If the Canadians were to gain this impression it would probably injure our relations with Canada more than any other single incident which has occurred during this century.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the proposal be received sympathetically and that you tell the Prime Minister that you will en-

[1] Tabs B and C not printed.

deavor to work it out from the United States side in the light of the constitutional and political problems which exist. It is further suggested that you tell him that naturally no conclusion has yet been reached as to the necessity of procuring Congressional approval for a proposal such as he has suggested.

JAMES E. WEBB

[Annex]

CONCLUSIONS TO STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL OPINION CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT

1. Under Articles VIII and III of the 1909 Treaty Concerning Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, has authority to approve "uses, obstructions, and diversions" in the St. Lawrence River, affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters, with the authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada within their respective jurisdictions. Such approval can be conditional. Approval by the two Governments and the International Joint Commission of a project does not constitute an international agreement; it merely authorizes the respective projects for the approval of which application is made.

2. Under the terms of Article I of the 1909 Treaty, the United States has the right to use, on terms of equality, the Canal which Canada contemplates building on the Canadian side of the Boundary.

3. Under Article VIII of the 1909 Treaty, Canada is entitled to equal right in the use of the boundary waters for power purposes.

4. Accordingly, it would be within the Executive power to enter into an agreement with Canada containing assurances in harmony with paragraphs (2) and (3).

5. In the view of the Department, however, the Executive could give no assurance that power would continue to be developed in the manner indicated by the project.

6. Also, an agreement between the Power Authority of the State of New York, "a political subdivision of the State of New York", and the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission, an agency of the Province of Ontario, for the purposes indicated, would be contrary to the provision contained in Article I, section 10, of the Constitution, that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power". It seems clear that under this provision what a State may not do, its political subdivisions may not do.

611.42321 SL/9–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1951.

Subject: St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project

Participants: Mr. Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada
Mr. Hume Wrong, Ambassador of Canada
Mr. Norman Robertson, Secretary to Cabinet
Mr. J. W. Pickersgill, Personal Assistant to Prime Minister
Mr. Harry S. Truman, President of the United States
Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Stanley Woodward, Ambassador to Canada
Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Charles Murphy, White House
Mr. Joseph Short, White House
Mr. David Bell, White House

After an exchange of greetings the Canadian Prime Minister opened the conversation by stating that the situation in the Canadian economy required urgently that a decision be made on the development of the St. Lawrence. They felt it was important to develop both the transportation facilities and the power facilities. These facilities were needed in Canada as quickly as possible. He explained that the power situation in Ontario could not be allowed to drag along much longer. The development of Ontario was proceeding at what they believed to be a normal and desirable rate and this indicated that unless steps were taken immediately they would, in the not too distant future, be short in power. They had no hydro-electric alternative to the St. Lawrence project. Therefore, if this were not to be completed, they would have to install coal burning power plants. The construction of these power plants would require a large investment. Once this were started it would very much dampen the interest in Ontario in the St. Lawrence development. But they would have to go ahead with steam development if no arrangement in connection with the St. Lawrence were made. Therefore, the St. Lawrence decision was urgent. He also pointed out that if Ontario lost interest in the St. Lawrence project, it would be very difficult for the Canadian Government to go ahead with it without the assistance of the Province of Ontario. The Prime Minister also pointed out that this situation did not exist in Quebec as they had other possibilities for power development which would not interfere with the St. Lawrence Seaway. He further stated that Ontario would, he

[1] Another record of this conversation, consisting of notes made by David E. Bell, was sent to the State Department on October 10 with a memorandum by Bell for W. J. McWilliams, Director of the Executive Secretariat (611.42321 SL/10–1051).

believed, provide half the cost of the power development which would include part of the Seaway cost. The Canadian Government, he said, was ready to ask Parliament to set up an Authority to build the Seaway. They felt that it was feasible to have it on the Canadian side only, and that confining it to this side would add little more to the cost. The Authority, of course, would also cover power development.

The President said that he had first come in contact with the St. Lawrence project when he was in the Senate in 1935. He has been for it ever since and has tried to get it through our Congress, but he has been hampered by the interests of Railroads and certain Eastern ports. He indicated his willingness to continue to try to press it through. He was anxious to see it completed and agreed that if it could not be worked out jointly, he would go along with the Canadian proposal.

The Prime Minister pointed out that they too preferred the joint arrangement and felt that the 1941 Agreement was satisfactory. He also indicated that they too had Railroad and other opposition in Canada. However, they had come to the conclusion that a development which helps the general economy helps all parts of the economy of the country, and they were confident that Parliament would now give them the necessary authorization.

The President indicated that he hoped that their meeting today would have some influence on the legislation which was now before Congress, but, if it did not, we must find some way to proceed. It was important to have the Seaway at the same time as the power development. He also evidenced special interest in the ability to transport iron ore from Labrador to the Great Lakes area.

The Prime Minister reiterated the importance of getting started on the provision of power for Ontario and the difficulty that would arise if Ontario started on the steam plant development.

The President pointed out that the same type of situation existed in New York State; that he was interested in the development of both the Seaway and the power project; and that he liked the international proposition best.

The Prime Minister said he was primarily interested in getting results. They would support the Province of Ontario in its efforts to get agreement to the joint power scheme, and they felt they could get approval for the Seaway plan.

In response to the President's question as to the depth of the proposed Seaway, the Prime Minister replied that it was to be 27 feet and in accordance with the 1941 Agreement.

The President felt this was satisfactory.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if the iron ore development was to be successful, it must be on a mass production basis and must be

useful to the United States markets. He also indicated that he felt it would be desirable for the Canadians to talk about something constructive rather than the cost of living.

The President said that he had tried to get the people of the United States behind the project. His heart was in it and he would do all that was possible.

The Prime Minister indicated that he would like to be able to say that the matter had been discussed here, and that there was still hope that it could be done on the basis of the 1941 Agreement. In the meantime, they would continue to work out agreements with the Province of Ontario. However, they would have to negotiate with some United States authority before the project went to the International Joint Commission.

The President suggested that the Prime Minister designate someone to work out a statement to be made after the meeting. The Prime Minister agreed to this.[2]

The Prime Minister pointed out some of the advantageous aspects of a joint effort, saying that United States assistance would in particular help to expedite the project from the manpower, material and financial points of view. They could, of course, do it alone, but with United States participation the project would move more quickly.

The President asked the Prime Minister to remember that the United States has a great many obligations. But he felt that this was important and that probably the necessary materiel allocations could be made for the work.

In closing, he expressed his appreciation for the Prime Minister's having come to see him.

G[EORGE] W. P[ERKINS]

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[2] The press release issued after the meeting is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, p. 581.

611.42321 SL/10–3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Canadian Affairs (Dale)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1951.

Subject: Implementation of Prime Minister St. Laurent's proposals for construction of the St. Lawrence Project

Participants: Mr. Matthews, Minister, Canadian Embassy
Mr. LePan—Canadian Embassy [1]
Mr. Bell—White House
Mr. Tate—L [2]
Mr. Haselton—BNA
Miss Whiteman—L/ARA [3]
Mr. Dale—BNA

Mr. Matthews said that he believed the Embassy would soon be requested by the Canadian Government to send a note to the Department requesting our cooperation in the joint construction of power works and an all-Canadian Seaway. With this thought in mind, he asked whether we had any suggestions as to points which might be usefully covered in such a note.

Mr. Bell made several recommendations in this connection. In view of the constitutional prohibition against agreements between states and foreign powers, he thought that the Canadians should avoid the use of words implying any agreement between the two countries. He believed that the note should leave our hands untied as to the procedure to be followed in this country in implementing Prime Minister St. Laurent's proposals. Mr. Bell mentioned that the note might profitably include a firm statement of Canadian intent to construct the Seaway. It was also suggested that it might contain a proposal for joint exploratory studies of engineering and technical problems. Mr. Bell recommended that since the procedure proposed by Prime Minister St. Laurent involves very delicate legal and political problems for the US, we would appreciate it if we could see the note in draft. Finally, he suggested that the note include mention of the alternative which, it is understood, the proposed Canadian enabling legislation will contain: namely, to proceed with congressional approval if possible and otherwise by administrative action. There followed some discussion of the possible use to which an exchange of notes might be put in connection with a projected special Presidential message to the Congress in January. Mr. Matthews agreed that these suggestions were useful, and he

[1] Douglas V. LePan, Counselor, Canadian Embassy.
[2] Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser.
[3] Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs.

will undertake to see that they are considered in preparation of the note.[4]

The timing of action on the Prime Minister's proposals in relation to congressional consideration of the St. Lawrence was then considered. Mr. Bell said the President thought that the Congress should be allowed a couple of months more to act on legislation approving the 1941 Agreement before we announce a decision to proceed with the Prime Minister's proposal. Mr. Matthews said it is his Government's view that since Congress did not act on the Blatnik bill during the session just concluded, there is no substantial hope of Congressional approval, and that we should proceed immediately with the Prime Minister's plan. It was subsequently pointed out that the Prime Minister's suggestion involves a large amount of preliminary work which could well be done while Congress is considering legislation. Therefore, the two alternatives are not mutually exclusive at an early stage. With this thought in mind, it was tentatively decided that following receipt of the Canadian note, we would undertake to set up a joint working committee to consider engineering and technical questions involved in construction of the project without Congressional approval.

After Mr. Matthews' departure, the discussion with Mr. Bell was continued briefly. It was pointed out to him that two decisions would have to be made by the White House before studies to any considerable extent, even of an exploratory nature, could be undertaken. First of all, the White House must decide whether to proceed along the lines suggested in the Federal Power Commission's brief which involves approval by the Commission of an agreement between Ontario and New York, or along the lines of the State Department's proposal centering around an International Joint Commission recommendation.[5] Secondly, the White House will have to establish a definite cut-off date with respect to congressional action, since this point was not covered in the Prime Minister's conversation with President Truman. Mr. Tate also raised the question as to whether the IJC as at present constituted could effectively handle the St. Lawrence Project, and Mr. Bell indicated that he had this problem in mind. Mr. Bell signified his agreement that decisions on these matters must be made by the White House before any substantial progress can be made on the U.S. side with respect to Prime Minister St. Laurent's proposals.

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[4] After further discussions, an exchange of notes took place on January 11, 1952. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 11, 1952, pp. 234–235.

[5] The Federal Power Commission brief has not been found in the Department of State files. For the Department position, see the Annex to the Under Secretary of State's memorandum to the President, September 27, p. 919. These proposals were discussed at an interdepartmental meeting on October 24, reported in a memorandum by William N. Dale (611.42321 SL/10–2451).

THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

FOURTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN STATES, HELD AT WASHINGTON, MARCH 26–APRIL 7, 1951 [1]

363/12–1550

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1950.

Subject: Proposed Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers.

Article XXXIX of the Charter of the Organization of American States,[2] drawn up at Bogota,[3] provides for the holding of Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs "in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States". Article XL provides that any member state may request that a meeting of Consultation be held. It should be emphasized that such Meetings are different from the "Inter-American Conferences" also provided for in the Charter and which are much broader in scope. The Meetings of Consultation are of an emergency nature and their agendas are restricted.

The first point to be considered is should there be a Meeting at this time? There has been a desire expressed from time to time by Latin

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[1] For additional documentation and analytical and summary accounts of the Meeting, see *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951: Report of the Secretary of State* (Department of State Publication No. 4928, Washington, 1953); Pan American Union, *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Held in Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951: Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), hereinafter cited as *Proceedings; Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics: First Intermediate Report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments*, House Report No. 210, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1951); and *Research Summary on Inter-American Cooperation for Defense: Results of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics: Eighth Intermediate Report Prepared by the Staff for the use of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments*, House Report No. 671, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1951).

[2] For text of the Charter, signed at Bogotá, April 30, 1948, and entered into force for the United States on December 13, 1951, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2361, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2 (pt. 2), p. 2394.

[3] Reference is to the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948; for documentation on the conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 1 ff.

Americans for a Meeting of Consultation.[4] While this desire has reflected the Latin Americans' feeling of being neglected, specific pretexts have been advanced for a Meeting such as control of communism. Since Korea there has been an increased desire for a Meeting which we have discouraged primarily because until recently the desire for such a Meeting had been focused on the immediate question of Korea; it was our feeling that since this problem was being dealt with in the UN it was premature for OAS consideration of it. Since the Chinese Communists came into Korea we have been thinking more seriously about a Meeting, but we have been worried about the absence of a definite long-range program within our Government which could be presented for implementation to the Latin Americans in so far as their efforts and resources are concerned. We now feel that the impact of the President's speech [5] and of the program announced therein will be such in relation to Latin American public opinion as to make it inevitable that we will have to have a Meeting. All of us in ARA are convinced of the inevitability of a Meeting. We are also convinced now of the desirability of a Meeting for the purpose of identifying the Latin Americans more closely with our struggle and our objectives in the struggle and insuring their more spontaneous cooperation.

The next question then is whether we should take the initiative and make an immediate announcement of our intention to hold a Meeting. I strongly favor making an immediate announcement tomorrow or Sunday of our intention to request the OAS under Article XL of the Charter to convoke such a Meeting in the near future for the purpose of considering matters of an urgent nature related to the present emergency. Such prompt initiative on our part would have an electrifying effect upon public opinion throughout Latin America and would strongly crystallize opinion in our favor. The alternative to doing this is for the pot to boil over during the next week or two and for the smaller states to begin to make requests for meetings on specific grounds which might embarrass us with the result that we would ultimately appear to assent reluctantly to such a Meeting.

This, of course, raises the question of what would be the subject matter of the Meeting. It is not our intention to announce the agenda but rather our initial announcement would state that we will consult

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[4] In a memorandum dated August 14, 1950, to Rollin S. Atwood, Acting Director of the Office of North and West Coast Affairs, Edward A. Jamison, Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems in the Office of Regional American Affairs, stated in part: "The recent Bolivian initiative toward holding a South American foreign ministers conference on communism, and the Chilean ideas about OAS coordination of assistance for Korea, indicate an attitude which may result in an early demand from Latin America for a Meeting of Consultation. There is also certainly a possibility that we may wish to ask for such a meeting in connection with developments in the Far Eastern situation." (720.001/8–1450)

[5] Reference is to President Truman's address on "The National Emergency," broadcast from the White House on December 15, 1950; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington, 1965), p. 741, or Department of State *Bulletin*, December 25, 1950, p. 999.

on the agenda items. In general we would anticipate that the following would be the main subjects of discussion:

1) Production and control of strategic materials.
2) Allocation of manufactured goods and meeting Latin American requirements to sustain their economies and to provide for development, especially with regard to materials essential to the war effort.
3) Internal economic controls essential to maintain and stabilize economic life of Hemisphere.
4) Implementation of United Action for Peace resolution [6] on regional basis, including general problem of utilization of Latin American manpower.
5) Common political defense measures in regard to communism, sabotage and exchange of information.

It is obvious, in response to Mr. Acheson's question,[7] that as of this date there are some pitfalls in connection with such an agenda in the sense, for example, that we have not now within the Government a requirements policy which we could announce to Latin America immediately. However, it is not our intention to have such a Meeting until the middle of February at the earliest or possibly a month later. By then we should be in a position to discuss these questions intelligently enough to meet the very general requirements of a Meeting of Consultation. It should be emphasized that these Meetings are not intended to result in detailed programs of action and the implementation of many of the specific points at issue can be delegated by the Ministers to standing agencies of the OAS such as the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Defense Board. In regard to matters of political defense, it might be desirable to consider the creation of an Inter-American Committee on Political Defense under the OAS similar to the body which operated in Montevideo during the war. The ARA staff has met twice today on this problem and we are unanimous in recommending strongly that the President and the Secretary authorize us as soon as possible to issue over the weekend an announcement along the line of the attached.[8]

[6] Reference is to Resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 3, 1950. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 10–12.

[7] In his summary of the Secretary's regular morning staff meeting for December 15, 1950, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat William J. McWilliams recorded in part that Director of the Policy Planning Staff Paul H. Nitze "reported that Mr. Miller has expressed a desire to send out a call for a meeting of the OAS immediately following the President's speech tonight. The Secretary said he thought this should be thought through very carefully since meetings of this kind can sometimes cause more harm than they do good. He asked Mr. Matthews to have this come up through the staff in an ordinary fashion." (Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609)

[8] Mr. Miller stated in a memorandum of December 16, 1950, to Mr. Matthews, that a meeting of senior officials of the Department held that morning had unanimously approved the proposed conference. He asked permission to announce the U.S. request for it immediately. (363/12–1650)

363/12–1650: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 16, 1950—2 p. m.

277. Secy Acheson made fol announcement 3 p. m. today:

Verbatim Text. "Pursuant to instructions from Pres Truman, I have today instructed the rep of the US in the Council of the Organization of Amer States to request that a Mtg of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be held in accordance with Art 39 of the Charter of the Org, which provides that such Mtgs shall be held 'to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the Amer States'.

"The aggressive policy of intnatl Communism, carried out through its satellites, has brought about a situation in which the entire free world is threatened. The free world is mtg that threat by resolute action through the UN, in keeping with the principles of the UN Charter. As Pres Truman announced in his speech last night, the US, for the purpose of organizing its strength in support of these principles, has embarked on an emergency program of economic and military preparedness.

"Within the UN, the US is also part of the established regional community represented by the OAS. All twenty-one members of that community have jointly dedicated themselves to the cause of freedom. This common cause, even more than geography, has prompted them to work together for their common security. Their cooperation is based on the principle that the defense of any one of them is inseparable from the defense of all of them. What is at stake in the present situation, with respect to this inter-Amer community of ours, is the survival of all that it stands for in the world.

"The US, having embarked on urgent mobilization for the common defense, wishes to consult its fellow members in the inter-Amer community with respect to the situation which we all face and on the coordination of the common effort required to meet it. That is the reason why it is requesting that a Mtg of Consultation be held.

"In the near future this Govt, after consultation with Cong leaders and the Govts of the other Amer Reps, will have proposals to make respecting the date and place of the Mtg and its agenda." *End Verbatim Text.*

You shld as soon as possible seek urgent interview Pres or FonMin and communicate fol: US Govt contemplates suggesting mtg be held about mid-Feb with agenda limited to broad outlines of appropriate inter-Amer cooperation to meet emergency in three fields: Polit, Mil, Econ. Announcement timed to obtain maximum effectiveness in relation Pres Truman's speech re natl emergency, in view of many aspects intensified US preparation which have special importance to other Amer Govts. We wld be happy have mtg in Washington. We desire advice judgment which Govt to which you accredited may have to offer re proposal, contents agenda, and gen approach. For your info and possible use in carrying out this instr, this Govt attaches major

importance to limiting agenda items to those directly and immed related to emergency.

Primary reason for calling Mtg under Art 39 OAS Charter rather than under Rio Treaty [1] provisions is latter might imply failure or loss of confidence in security action by UN.

For your own info, present plan is that US Rep will make brief statement of request at COAS mtg next week,[2] at same time indicating mtg (in 2 weeks).[3] Time thus afforded for consultation on major points.

ACHESON

[1] Reference is to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States on December 3, 1948; for text, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[2] For text of the press release announcing that the U.S. request for a Meeting of Consultation would be brought before the Council of the Organization of American States (COAS), see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1, 1951, p. 8; for text of the request, which was placed before the COAS on December 20 and approved the same day, see *ibid.*

[3] The Department of State issued a press release on December 29, concerning U.S. proposals for the agenda of the Meeting of Consultation; for text, see *ibid.*, January 8, 1951, p. 66.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26 [1]

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Colombia (Beaulac)

CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMAL

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1950.

DEAR WILLARD: I was sorry that events moved so rapidly toward the end of last week that we were required to announce our intention to convene the Foreign Ministers' meeting before we had time to consult with the other governments. Once we had seen the last draft of the President's speech, it seemed to us that a Foreign Ministers' meeting, for which there already had been pressure among the Latinos, would become inevitable, and consequently it was important for us to take the initiative very strongly and immediately. A related factor was the intention which we heard about last Friday of the Guatemalan Government to request a meeting on the Haya de la Torre case.[2] This would seem to us unfortunate (*a*) because the general question of asylum appears to us to be a matter for the Inter-American Juridical Commission and not a matter of consultation, and (*b*) because the specific case of Haya has been resubmitted to the World Court.[3]

[1] Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953.

[2] For documentation on the Guatemalan request, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 865 ff.

[3] For documentation on the Haya de la Torre case, see pp. 1579 ff.

I am delighted to see from your telegram 458 [4] how favorable the reaction has been in Colombia. You may assure President Gomez [5] and Minister Restrepo [6] that we will cooperate closely with Zuleta [7] at this end.

I naturally hope that you will consent to serve as a member of the Delegation, since your help and advice will be indispensable to the success of the Conference. We will advise you when the details are worked out. In the meantime, there will be no objection to your letting Gomez and Restrepo know informally that it is planned for you to come to Washington (if this is agreeable to you, as I hope it will be). The timing of the meeting is still somewhat uncertain. We cannot hold it until about February 15 at the earliest because of the importance of having the new Brazilian regime [8] in power, and also because it will take us some time to work out agreed positions in our own government on such controversial questions as our priorities and allocations system. It seems a little more likely that we will hold the meeting after the 15th of March, by which time the incoming Administrations of Uruguay and Guatemala [9] will have been sworn in, as well as the incoming Brazilian Administration. Also, I had planned to go to Uruguay for their inauguration on March 1, which would give me a very convenient opportunity to talk to Vargas and Peron [10] on the trip [11] and perhaps nail down their cooperation a little better. I would welcome your views on the question of timing.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

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[4] Not printed.

[5] Laureano Gómez, President of Colombia.

[6] Gonzálo Restrepo Jaramillo, Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[7] Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Colombian Ambassador to the United States.

[8] Reference is to the administration of Getúlio Dornelles Vargas, elected President of Brazil on October 30, 1950.

[9] Reference is to the administration of Andrés Martínez Trueba, elected President of Uruguay on November 26, 1950, and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, elected President of Guatemala in mid-November 1950.

[10] Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.

[11] Assistant Secretary Miller visited five Latin American countries between mid-February and early March 1951: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. The main purpose of his trip was to discuss with the appropriate officials of these governments matters relating to the forthcoming Meeting of Consultation. For documentation on Mr. Miller's discussions with Brazilian and Argentine officials, see pp. 1184 ff. and 1079 ff., respectively.

396.1/1–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Albert H. Gerberich of the Office of South American Affairs [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1951.

Subject: Agenda for Foreign Ministers' Conference

Participants: Ambassador Zuleta-Angel, Colombian Amb.
Mr. Dreier, Amer. Amb. to OAS
Mr. Spalding, ARA/I
Mr. Gerberich, OSA

General Observations:

The Ambassador said he wanted to inform himself regarding our ideas on the various problems to be considered under the agenda proposed for the Foreign Ministers' Conference on March 25.

Regarding the first section of the agenda—Politico-Military matters—he said he wanted to make it clear that he is not asking for any special assistance to Colombia or any other republic in its particular problems. He said it is essential that all such matters be put aside in the interests of overall American solidarity. He said that in his opinion the failure of the Conference would be nothing less than an international disaster.

On the second point for discussion—Subversive Activities [2]—he said that thus far the American Republics have taken one step forward by Resolution 32 of the Final Act of the Charter of Bogotá,[3] but have never implemented it. Perhaps they should go farther. He questioned whether it was wise to declare the Communist Party outlawed throughout Latin America. Colombia has not done so. He thought it might be more advisable to continue to keep the Communist Parties under close surveillance and restrict their many fields of activity.

As to Economic Assistance he had been thinking of one project in particular—the Inter-American Highway.[4] He thinks it would be a valuable project to complete because of the facilities it would offer for transporting supplies from one country to another and permitting each country to perform its share of the defense effort more efficiently. It would also be a very popular project throughout Latin America.

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[1] The source text indicates that the codrafters of this memorandum were Hobart A. Spalding, Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative to the COAS.

[2] For previous documentation relating to the policy of the United States regarding anti-communist measures within the inter-American system, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 193 ff., and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 624–671, *passim*.

[3] For text, see *Ninth International Conference of American States, March 30–May 2, 1948: Report of the Delegation of the United States with Related Documents* (Department of State Publication No. 3262, Washington, 1948), pp. 222–276, hereinafter cited as *USDel Report*.

[4] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1038 ff.

In conversations with Nelson Rockefeller [5] he has discovered that he is also thinking of going ahead with this project, but that he has in mind a route farther to the eastward than the one drawn at present. The Ambassador did not elaborate further on this.

He mentioned a conversation that he had had with Luis Quintanilla,[6] and said that while Quintanilla has the best interests of America and of his country at heart he is not to be relied on as a spokesman for the whole Latin American community, as he dares not depart from the traditional Mexican position of suspicion and distrust of "US imperialist" motives.

Organization of Conference:

Ambassador Zuleta said he understood that there were some differences of opinion regarding the organization of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers among the members of the COAS Committee, and he expressed a desire to know the United States view. Mr. Dreier reported that the Committee that morning had agreed on a compromise between those who felt the Foreign Ministers should handle all difficulties in person and those who leaned toward a maximum use of committees to give preliminary consideration to all subjects. The Department believed it was important that the Foreign Ministers be presented with proposals which had already been considered by technical committees. Ambassador Zuleta recalled the experience at Bogotá where committees had wrestled with problems without making any progress until the riots of April 9. Thereafter the heads of delegations had met and solved all major problems promptly—except for economic questions which continued to be handled by a committee and were in the last analysis a failure. Ambassador Zuleta therefore argued in favor of maximum discussion by the Foreign Ministers themselves. Mr. Dreier emphasized the importance in this regard of the preliminary work in the COAS whereby the main issues could be defined and presented to the Foreign Ministers for decision, leaving the working out of details to the committees. It was agreed that further consideration should be given to this important aspect of the Meeting.

Combatting Communism:

With reference to Point (2) of the agenda, Mr. Spalding assured the Ambassador that our thinking and his were running along parallel lines and that like himself we did not favor blanket decrees "outlawing" the Communist Party of the Hemisphere. Our belief was set forth

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[5] Mr. Rockefeller had been appointed Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board on November 24, 1950.

The Advisory Board was established in pursuance of Section 409 of Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 (Public Law 535), approved June 5, 1950; for text of the act, see 64 Stat. 198. For additional information, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 4, 1950, p. 880; *ibid.*, December 18, 1950, pp. 973–974.

[6] Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States.

that much of our own legislation, if copied and strictly enforced in other countries, would provide an effective method of dealing with communist and pro-communist activities, and it was explained to the Ambassador that although by US law to be a member of the Communist Party was not illegal, to act as such was now in nearly every case in contravention of US law. Reference was made to the Smith Act [7] and certain provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 [8] as the type of legislative provision that we had in mind, and the Ambassador expressed his satisfaction and approval of this approach to the problem.

Mr. Spalding indicated that we felt that communist activities among organized labor were of particular importance and that on that score we were exploring the possibilities of advocating legislative measures somewhat similar to certain provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 [9] which might deny the benefits of favorable labor legislation to communist-led groups, in addition to other measures to eradicate the influence of Soviet-oriented leaders in the labor field. Ambassador Zuleta expressed the greatest interest in this and asked that we provide him with any information that we might be able to supply concerning US legislation along these lines.

In closing, our ideas on the merits of a counterpart to the Emergency Advisory Committee for the Political Defense of the Hemisphere (CPD) [10] were outlined to the Ambassador. He expressed general agreement with the necessity for a technical body of manageable proportions to work out the details and the implementation of anti-subversive measures.

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[7] Reference is to the Alien Registration Act (Public Law 670), commonly known as the Smith Act, approved June 28, 1940; for text, see 54 Stat. 670.

[8] For text of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Public Law 831), approved September 23, 1950, see 64 Stat. 987.

[9] For text of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Public Law 101), approved June 23, 1947, see 61 Stat. 136.

[10] For documentation on the work of the Emergency Advisory Committee, which was established in 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. v, pp. 74–107; *ibid.*, 1943, vol. v, pp. 2–39; and *ibid.*, 1944, vol. VII, pp. 1–26.

363/1–1751

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1951.

After talking with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, Ambassador Zuleta and Dr. Lleras,[1] I believe we can anticipate a strong move at the Confer-

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[1] Alberto Lleras Camargo, Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

ence of Foreign Ministers for a resolution reaffirming Point IV and economic development. It seems to me that we should be prepared to take a positive position on this by drafting a resolution which could be entitled "Emergency Programs to Strengthen the Home Front", and which could include some of the following points which have been suggested by one or more of the three individuals named:

(1) Setting targets for food production over a given period of five or ten years, and instructing IA–ECOSOC to work out detailed plans.

(2) Setting targets for disease control under Health and Sanitation activities (i.e., 5-year program to eliminate malaria, as proposed by Dr. Soper to Mr. Rockefeller), and instructing IA–ECOSOC and PASO to work out detailed plans.

(3) Direction to IA–ECOSOC and Governments to collaborate on preparation of plans for an internal transportation system keyed to strategic materials.

(4) Direction to IA–ECOSOC to study plans for maximum utilization of available manpower throughout the Hemisphere for war production purposes (including possibility of moving unused plants from Germany, as suggested by Vargas).

(5) Instructing IA–ECOSOC to make studies for post-war development and maximum utilization of unusable dollar accumulations.

363/1–1751

Memorandum by Mr. Ivan B. White[1] *of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1951.

The following comments are submitted in regard to your two memoranda of January 17[2] re economic agenda items for the coming Consultation of Foreign Ministers:

a) I suggest that if a modification of Item 3*b* is required, it take the following form: "Production and distribution of products and services in short supply to provide within limits imposed by the emergency for the requirements of the American republics and for the continuation of

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[1] Mr. White became Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs on February 19, 1951.

[2] One of the two memoranda by Mr. Miller under date of January 17 is printed *supra*; in the other memorandum, which was addressed to Mr. Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Ambassador Dreier, Ambassador Fletcher Warren, Director of the Office of South American Affairs, and Ambassador Albert F. Nufer, Acting Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, Mr. Miller suggested that, in view of his discussion with members of the International Development Advisory Board and anticipated comments from Latin American governments, the U.S. seek a modification of agenda item III (*b*) to read as follows:

"Production and utilization of products and services in short supply to provide within limits imposed by the emergency for the requirements of the American republics for continuation of essential economic activity and expansion." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

essential economic activity and expansion of essential productive facilities." [3]

b) I am becoming increasingly dubious about the advisability of a resolution entitled "Emergency Programs to Strengthen the Home Front" for the following reasons: [4]

(1) In view of the fact that Congressional action will not have been taken at the time of the Conference either in respect to the fiscal year 1952 Point Four programs or expansion of lending authority of the Eximbank, Congressional reaction to U.S. participation in such a Resolution would be unfavorable. Furthermore, we would run the risk of a recurrence of commitments in excess of performance.[5]

(2) In view of the fact that there are wide variations country by country in economic development financial needs, in U.S. previous performance in meeting such needs, and in governmental attitudes towards U.S. Point Four assistance, economic development and technical assistance materials can most efficiently be dealt with on a bilateral basis.

c) With respect to the five specific suggestions, I submit the following comments:

(1) We intend that targets for production of essential foods will be set forth as a result of: (*a*) U.S. determination of requirements; (*b*) a Conference Resolution setting forth such targets in connection with the "production for defense" item in the agenda; and (*c*) subsequent IA–ECOSOC planning of the production program in pursuance of a general directive from the Consultation of Foreign Ministers.

(2) With reference to disease control, it is my opinion that the U.S. reaps greater returns in goodwill from the masses through the operation of the Health & Sanitation programs of the IIAA [6] than it does from OAS multi-lateral activities in the same field. If this conclusion is correct, it points to an expansion of the IIAA Health & Sanitation programs, and we have, in fact, made pro-

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[3] On January 31, the Department of State proposed a revision of draft agenda item III (*b*); for text of the relevant communication from Ambassador Dreier to Secretary General Lleras Camargo, dated January 31, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 12, 1951, p. 266.

[4] In a memorandum to Mr. Miller, dated January 23, 1951, Ambassador Nufer stated in part that he was "inclined to share Mr. White's doubts as to the advisability" of a resolution along the lines suggested by Mr. Miller (363/1–1751).

[5] In a memorandum to Mr. Miller, dated January 23, 1951, Ambassador Warren stated in part the following: "It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of refraining from making or implying any commitment which we cannot fulfill. It would be better to go on record for less than we intend to give." (363/1–2351)

[6] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was originally incorporated in 1942 and became a U.S. Government corporation in 1947. It was established to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply. As of mid-1950, the IIAA operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the IIAA's activities and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol II, p. 679.

visions for a doubling of this program in the Point Four budget for fiscal 1952 which has been submitted.

(3) In my judgment, our internal transportation activities during the emergency period should be concentrated on specific needs to meet specific situations in the individual countries, whether such situations arise from the need to maintain the basic economy of the country or to facilitate the production and distribution of strategic materials. I visualize this as a process which should take the form of bilateral programming and financing. On the multi-lateral front, I fear that we will be fortunate if we are able to go ahead with the Inter-American Highway and question the advisability of attempting any continental network of roads beyond that point during the emergency period.

(4) From what we already know of the economic and production pattern in Latin America, I believe we would be well-advised to concentrate on manpower utilization in the fields of military manpower and of the expansion of production in minerals, fibres and essential food products. These are the things which the Latin Americas, from the economic standpoint, can best do. Our task is to put over in Washington the basic concept of utilizing Latin America to do these things as a means of meeting U.S. manpower and supply deficiencies and to get a policy which will permit the shipment to Latin America of the agricultural equipment, fertilizers and other items needed to make such a program effective.

(5) I propose as an alternative to the suggestions of Nelson Rockefeller and the others that we proceed along the following lines in dealing with the problem of economic development:

(*a*) That the Secretary, in his opening address [7] at the Consultation of Foreign Ministers, set forth, and possibly elaborate, the basic U.S. policy in regard to economic development and technical assistance in Latin America as set forth in the President's budget message.

(*b*) That the Latin American Governments be informed prior to the Conference that, during the stay of the Foreign Ministers in Washington, the U.S. Government is prepared to discuss with them individually economic development and technical assistance problems.

(*c*) That Nelson Rockefeller and his group be informed of the foregoing and of our intention to include Dr. Bennett [8] and his staff in those bilateral discussions which relate to technical cooperation.

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[7] For text of Secretary Acheson's address, delivered before the opening regular session of the Meeting of Consultation on March 27, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, pp. 569–573.

[8] Henry G. Bennett, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration.

363/1–2051 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, January 20, 1951—9:35 a. m.

COAS January 17 approved for transmission by Representatives to their governments following program Fourth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers:

1. "Political and military cooperation for the defense of the Americas [1] and to prevent and repel aggression, in accordance with inter-American agreements and with the Charter of the United Nations and the Resolutions of that Organization.
2. "Strengthening of the internal security of the American Republics.
3. "Emergency economic cooperation:

(*a*) Production and distribution for defense purposes;
(*b*) Production and distribution of products in short supply and utilization of the necessary services to meet the requirements of the internal economies of the American Republics."

Plenary Meeting February 7 set for final consideration program and approval. Primary questions raised in COAS discussions centered on whether topics broad enough to cover consideration of all projects deemed essential. General agreement that Item 1 in no sense limits consideration to measures strictly within narrow concept continental defense against armed attack; that item 2 covers consideration measures cooperation as well as strictly unilateral action; and that item 3 permits consideration all economic and financial problems essentially related immediate emergency. In your discretion you should take appropriate opportunity discuss above with officials Foreign Office, pointing out desirability that COAS representatives have adequate instructions to vote on this program at February 7 meeting.

FYI Department will shortly provide you with further instructions regarding the presentation by the various governments in advance of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of draft resolutions or other proposals which the governments may have in mind submitting for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers.

In the meantime, it is of course highly desirable to report promptly to the Department any indication of views you may obtain regarding the attitude of the government to which you are accredited toward the draft agenda. If asked concerning the views of the United States, you may say that, in the Department's view, the agenda appears to be satisfactory, but that the U.S. Government is, of course, giving full and final consideration to the matter between now and February 7.

[1] For documentation concerning U.S. policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

For your own information, the latter clause is intended to cover the possibility that it may be found necessary to make a slight modification in one of the agenda items to cover aspects of the problem now under consideration; however, it is impossible at this stage to know whether any further changes in the agenda will be necessary from the U.S. point of view.[2]

ACHESON

[2] For text of the agenda for the Meeting of Consultation, as finally approved on February 7 and 14, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, p. 568.

363/1–2551

Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1951.

This refers to your memorandum of January 17 and to the comments thereon made by Mr. White, Ambassador Nufer and Ambassador Warren.

I should like to emphasize my strong agreement with your view that we should approach the general problem of Latin American interests in the most positive way we can. Recently I sent you a memorandum [1] on special reasons why Latin Americans should recognize the absolute necessity for entering the Meeting of Foreign Ministers with a strong desire to collaborate with us rather than to bargain. I think there are equally strong reasons why the United States must take the same attitude. The full benefit of this critical meeting can only be gained by a strongly positive approach from both this Government and those of Latin America.

I do not feel the Meeting of Foreign Ministers can be a success if it does not give recognition to the needs and aspirations of the general public of both this country and Latin America. The main reason we do not have more foreign troops in Korea is that other peoples are not sure that we are fighting for goals of equal importance to them. I believe by and large that feeling is shared by Latin America, despite the attitude of cooperation displayed by all the Latin Governments in the UN.

From talks I have had with Ambassador Zuleta, Ambassador Nieto del Río [2] and others, I am sure we are going to have formal proposals from some Latin American Governments to broaden the agenda of the

[1] No memorandum fitting the description given here was found in the Department of State files.

[2] Félix Nieto del Río, Chilean Ambassador to the United States.

Meeting of Foreign Ministers to deal specifically with some aspect of the general problem of strengthening the economies of the Latin American countries. I have expressed my personal hope that it would be possible to find some way to work out an agreement on this matter before February 7 (when the COAS meets to give final approval to the agenda), so that we could avoid having a strong division created in the COAS, with the United States taking a defensive and negative stand. Accordingly, I would welcome an explicit inclusion of the general subject of economic improvement in the agenda. It is clear that this general subject should be approached clearly in the light of the limits imposed by the current emergency.

I believe both your proposal and Mr. White's regarding a revision of Item 3(*b*) meet this requirement. Another approach would be to add a Point 3(*c*) saying "Problems of Economic Improvement During the Emergency."

With regard to the points which might be covered in a resolution "Emergency Programs for Strengthening the Home Front," I should like to make one main observation in addition to stating my general agreement with this approach. The observation is that the adoption by the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of a resolution advocating certain general goals and activities does not necessarily mean that all such activities must be carried out through OAS agencies. For example, a general declaration of policy in favor of the elimination of various diseases might include a recommendation that Governments collaborate to this end through multilateral and bilateral agreements. This would enable us to carry out certain activities through an expanded program of the IIAA, leaving others to the PASO. Likewise, a resolution advocating the study of transportation problems and the undertaking of programs to improve transportation facilities required by expanded emergency production, may well be used as a background for U.S. bilateral approaches, as well as any activity by the IA ECOSOC which might be helpful.

In considering any resolutions which will reflect a general policy to carry out certain activities, I believe we should carefully analyze the benefits to be achieved from bilateral as compared with multilateral programs, and use both these approaches to the extent they are considered useful. Resolutions can form the background for both types of activity.

Similarly, I agree entirely on the importance of bilateral discussions with visiting Foreign Ministers on their specific economic problems. This does not in any sense, however, seem to me to lessen the desirability of some general statements by the Meeting of Foreign Ministers which can be used to focus public attention on certain important positive goals of inter-American cooperation.

363/2-951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1951.

Subject: Possible Discussion of Asylum at Forthcoming IAM

Participants: Ambassador Berckemeyer [1]—Peruvian Embassy
Ambassador Warren—OSA
Mr. McGinnis—OSA

Ambassador Berckemeyer called upon Ambassador Warren today at his own request. The Peruvian Ambassador stated that his Government was greatly concerned over the Guatemalan proposal at the COAS meeting recently to reaffirm the right of asylum. He said that his Government strongly opposed the introduction of this subject as extraneous to the general purposes of the IAM. Furthermore, he considered the proposal as a disguised attempt to bring the Haya case before the OAS. Ambassador Berckemeyer asked what the Department's views were on this proposal.

The Peruvian Ambassador was told that we did not favor the inclusion in the agenda of the Conference any matters not relevant to the emergent problems which the meeting has been called to consider. Ambassador Warren added that he was doubtful whether the Guatemalan proposal would have any more success than that Government's previous endeavor to bring the Haya case before the OAS.[2] Ambassador Berckemeyer was also told that we continue to believe that it would be inappropriate to discuss the Haya case while the matter is under consideration by the International Court of Justice.

Before departing, Ambassador Berckemeyer stated that it would be very "difficult" for Peru to participate in the IAM if the Haya case were to be discussed either directly or indirectly.

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[1] Fernando Berckemeyer, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States.

[2] On February 14, 1951, the COAS rejected the Guatemalan proposal to include on the agenda a fourth item concerning the right of asylum.

363/3–251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1951.

Subject: Draft Resolutions for Meeting of Foreign Ministers

Participants: Dr. Alberto Lleras, Secretary General of the OAS
John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative on the COAS

I took the opportunity this afternoon to show Dr. Lleras in greatest confidence some draft resolutions on economic subjects [1] and on subversive activities, in order to gain his reaction to the general content thereof. I explained very carefully that these were in no sense approved drafts, and asked him to keep confidential for the time being the fact that he had even seen any such papers. This he assured me he would do.

After reading over the general economic resolution and the one on economic development (the only ones I showed him), he commented that he felt they were lacking in anything tangible or even significant. He said they would immediately be compared with the resolutions of Chapultepec [2] and that the general impression would be that the policy of the American republics had gone backwards since that time. For example, he compared the vague statement of relative equal sacrifice with the much stronger statement of equal treatment contained in the Chapultepec resolution.

Dr. Lleras recommended that we do not use these draft resolutions to consult other Governments, since the effect will be unfavorable. When I asked him what he felt the Latin American countries specifically looked for in resolutions at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, he said frankly that he doubted whether the Latin Americans had thought things out sufficiently to know what they wanted in concrete terms. However, there was no doubt but that what they sought in general was assurance of fair treatment by the United States, so that they would not have to experience all the same problems of the last war in regard to basic interference with their economic operations. Actually Dr. Lleras pointed out that this kind of assurance could not well be stated in resolutions of the 21 Foreign Ministers because it really involved the policy and practice of only the United States. Therefore, he said the important thing for the United States was not the resolu-

[1] Versions of draft resolutions on economic subjects prepared by the United States for presentation to the Meeting of Consultation are contained in OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665; final drafts are printed in *Proceedings*, pp. 67–71, and Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1951, pp. 614–615.

[2] Reference is to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Chapultepec Conference), held at Mexico City, February 21–March 8, 1945; for documentation on the conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. IX, pp. 1 ff. For text of the Final Act, containing the resolutions of the conference, see Pan American Union, *Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February–March, 1945* (Washington, 1945).

tions but the statements of policy which we made, in which we could give the Latin American Governments the reassurance they wanted that we were cognizant and sympathetic to their needs.

After reading the draft resolution on subversive activities,[3] Dr. Lleras said he felt it substantially better than the economic resolutions because it was so much more specific; it set up a staff to do a specific job, told them what to do and to whom to report. In contrast the economic resolutions made references to "studies" by the IA ECOSOC without sufficient indication of what they were to contain, when they were to be completed, and what was to be done with them when and if they were ever finished.

Going back to the economic resolution, Dr. Lleras particularly advised against showing the Latin American countries any draft resolution which contained the language found in paragraph three under allocations and priorities. This reference to "such international arrangements as may be established", he said, would recreate fears that the United States would, at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, merely turn the Latin Americans over to the international conference on allocation of materials where they would be at the mercy of other countries of the world. He said that a recommendation such as that included in paragraph three, would be all right once the Latin Americans were fully familiar with the commodity group set-up, but at the present time might do a lot of harm.

[3] For text of the final draft of the resolution on internal security, jointly submitted to the Meeting of Consultation by Bolivia, Ecuador, the United States, and Uruguay, see *Proceedings*, pp. 60–62, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, p. 573.

363/3–851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1951.

Subject: Conversations with Latin American Representatives as Indicated Concerning U.S. Position on Points II and III of Agenda for IAM, March 6 and 7.

The following summarizes the views expressed by Latin American Representatives in conversations with Ambassador Dreier, and at times Ambassador Warren, Mr. Spalding and Mr. Corliss,[1] on March 6 and 7.

1. *Brazil:* Mr. Dreier met with Ambassador Accioly [2] of Brazil in the latter's office and showed him the draft resolution on internal security and the summary memorandum of positions on economic

[1] James C. Corliss, Office of Regional American Affairs.
[2] Hildebrando Pompeu Pinto Accioly.

questions. Ambassador Accioly was extremely well impressed with the paper on internal security and particularly applauded the suggestion that a meeting of Ministers of Justice might be called to consider the recommendations of the proposed staff. He agreed with the role assigned to the COAS in this matter.

On economic questions, Ambassador Accioly confined himself to saying he had no personal objection to it, but that he did not consider himself well qualified to deal with economic problems. He stated that his Foreign Minister [3] had reported favorably on the conversation held with Mr. Miller in Rio. The Foreign Minister had also asked Ambassador Accioly, he said, to draw up some proposals under the political subjects under Point I of the agenda.

2. *Costa Rica:* Ambassador Oreamuno [4] came to Mr. Dreier's office and was shown the text of the two documents referred to above. He found the resolution on internal security satisfactory but made a few suggestions for drafting changes, which have been conveyed to Mr. Spalding. He expressed doubt that the COAS would consider itself able to judge on the necessity for a meeting of Ministers of Justice without submitting the document to their Governments for review first.

In the economic field, Ambassador Oreamuno also expressed his general satisfaction. He said he felt that under II–G some consideration should be given to the relative impact of refusal of allocation of a needed commodity on various projects, depending upon the degree of completion. Failure to allocate a bit of machinery to a project 90 percent completed would, he argued, be much more serious than to deny the same item to a new project not yet begun. Ambassador Oreamuno also urged that Article III–C, last sentence, should be clarified in its effect on the Latin American countries. Does this mean, he asked, that if a country puts a price control on imported products, it must also impose price controls on its exports to the United States? Finally, Ambassador Oreamuno urged more attention to the problem of the gradual relaxation of price controls, so that dollar balances will not be lost through price rises, as was the case after the last war.

3. *Chile:* Ambassador Nieto del Río, Minister Rodríguez [5] and Mr. Burr [6] came to Mr. Dreier's office and discussed the above documents for about two hours. With reference to internal security, they expressed particular interest in the role of the COAS and felt that it should be made clear that the Council would have no substantive responsibility for the recommendations of the staff. They felt the

[3] João Neves da Fontoura.
[4] J. Rafael Oreamuno.
[5] Mario Rodríguez A., Minister-Counselor, Chilean Embassy.
[6] Jorge Burr, Commercial Counselor, Chilean Embassy.

formula proposed was generally satisfactory, the Ambassador making a few suggestions for drafting changes which Mr. Spalding took down.

On Point III, the Chileans said that what concerned them about our paper was not what it contained but what it did not contain. When asked for examples, they mentioned the importance of the subject of synthetic production that interfered with such basic industries as nitrates; also the importance of maintaining an effective relationship between the prices of exported and imported products, particularly after the emergency had been relaxed and price controls removed. They felt it was extremely important to have some adequate system for attending to Latin American export needs, and complained about the recent inability to get 1500 tons of synthetic rubber for essential civilian needs in Chile.

The Chileans showed Mr. Dreier a confidential circular [7] from their Foreign Office outlining their general attitude on the economic questions in connection with the IAM. This circular outlined five main subjects of interest: (*a*) Production and prices of strategic materials; (*b*) filling the requirements for machinery, etc., for economic development programs; (*c*) methods of financing economic development; (*d*) planning economic development on an inter-American basis for more effective integration; and (*e*) avoidance of disruptions to the economy at the conclusion of the emergency. The paper outlined the problems of Chile which are well known, emphasizing the increases which Chile suffered in the prices of imported materials during the last war in comparison with the relatively stable prices of her exports. Much attention was also given to the vicious circle in which Chile found herself with respect to economic development: she could not import capital goods because of the need for consumer goods, and could not produce consumer goods because of the need for capital goods. The circular concluded with a request for the Embassies to discuss these subjects with the other governments and particularly to obtain information on the situation and views of other countries with respect to the five points mentioned above.

4. *Ecuador:* Ambassador Peñaherrera [8] and Minister Moscoso [9] were shown the two documents. The Ambassador had little comment to make on either one. Dr. Moscoso urged stronger references to democratic liberties in the resolution on internal security.

On economic questions, the Ecuadorans asked whether the study of transportation requirements would cover the possible control of tariffs, which they felt constituted an important aspect of the problem. They also urged that more attention be given to the question of maintaining price controls on manufactured goods after the emergency.

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[7] Not found in Department of State files.
[8] Luis Antonio Peñaherrera.
[9] Alfonso Moscoso Cárdenas, Minister-Counselor, Ecuadoran Embassy.

The Ecuadorans expressed an interest in discussing the draft resolution [10] which the Foreign Minister [11] had given to Mr. Miller in New York, and it was agreed that another meeting [12] would be set up for this purpose and to go more fully into the economic questions mentioned above.

5. *Peru:* Ambassador Berckemeyer and Ambassador de Lavalle [13] came in and were shown copies of both documents. On economic questions, their only comment was to urge that it be clarified that the controls recommended under Point III of our memorandum were temporary and not to be permanent. They said they would transmit the text of the memorandum to their Government but indicated they had received no expression of their Government's views on the IAM so far, other than the general desire to cooperate with the United States.

With respect to the internal security question, the Peruvian Ambassadors expressed general satisfaction, but indicated they had no instructions.

6. *Bolivia:* Ambassador Martínez Vargas,[14] Ambassador Mollinedo [15] and Minister Peñaranda [16] came in to discuss the economic paper, having already been informed fully about the internal security paper. The main comment was that increased production of strategic materials was a question of price. They asked for a definition of the meaning of the phrase "relative equality of sacrifice", which we were not able to give them in a firm way. They also spoke of the importance of looking forward to the problems of post-emergency with sudden stoppage of production on which countries like Bolivia depended for their livelihood.

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[10] Apparent reference to a resolution concerning the peaceful settlement of inter-American disputes (363/3–651) ; no copy of the Ecuadoran draft was found in the Department of State files.

[11] L. Neftalí Ponce Miranda.

[12] Ambassador Peñaherrera, accompanied by Minister-Counselor Moscoso, called at the Department of State a few days later for further discussion of the matter with Mr. Miller, Mr. White, and Mr. McGinnis. In a memorandum of that conversation, dated March 13, 1951, by Mr. McGinnis, Assistant Secretary Miller was reported to have stated in part that the United States had prepared a draft resolution concerning the peaceful settlement of inter-American disputes which was "very similar to the Ecuadoran draft," and that "the question of sponsorship was somewhat difficult since obviously any country which had pending disputes with another American Republic would not be a good sponsor for the proposal." He further commented: "In order for the proposal to gain unanimous acceptance it would be advisable . . . to have some country such as Mexico or Brazil sponsor it." Ambassador Peñaherrera was reported to have replied in part that "if the United States did not wish to present the proposed resolution, Mexico would be an acceptable substitute." (363/3–1351)

On March 28, 1951, the United States and Mexico jointly submitted to the Meeting of Consultation a draft resolution on the importance of maintaining peaceful relations among the American states; for text, see *Proceedings*, pp. 55–56, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, p. 574.

[13] Juan Bautista de Lavalle.

[14] Ricardo Martínez Vargas.

[15] Alfredo Mollinedo.

[16] Juan Peñaranda Minchin, Minister-Counselor, Bolivian Embassy.

363/3–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs (Krieg)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1951.

Subject: Foreign Ministers Meeting

Participants: Dr. Otanez,[1] Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Venezuela
Dr. Perez Matos,[2] Secretary, Venezuelan Mission to OAS
Mr. Mann,[3] Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Ambassador Dreier, US Representative on the OAS
Mr. Krieg, Officer in Charge, North & West Coast Affairs

Dr. Otanez and Dr. Perez Matos called at Mr. Mann's request to discuss the policy which this Government will follow at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics. Mr. Mann handed to each of the callers a memorandum entitled "General Views of the US Government with Respect to Economic Problems in Connection with the IAM".[4] He pointed out in this connection that the paper on our military policy is still under consideration and that Ambassador Leparvanche[5] had discussed internal security with Ambassador Dreier and Mr. Spalding on another occasion. The economic portion of the agenda would undoubtedly require the most attention from the Foreign Ministers, and it was on that subject that Mr. Mann said he wished to talk with the Venezuelans.

Mr. Mann commenced by emphasizing that the principles included in the memorandum have been accepted by all appropriate branches of the U.S. Government; they therefore represent a great deal more than the views of the Department of State. Resolutions will be drawn up covering the general principles set forth in the memorandum. The text of the draft resolutions should be ready in about a week, and Mr. Mann said he would be glad to discuss them with Dr. Otanez if the latter wished. Dr. Otanez replied that he was more interested in the basic principles than in the detailed wording and pointed out that Foreign Minister Gomez Ruiz[6] is leaving Venezuela on the 14th. Dr. Otanez went on to say that the principal difficulty at the present time lies with allocations and priorities. The Embassy staff, he said, are referred from one office to another among the defense agencies and

[1] Aureliano Otañez.
[2] Martín Pérez Matos.
[3] Thomas C. Mann.
[4] Not printed.
[5] René Léparvanche Parparcén, Colombian Representative to the COAS.
[6] Luis Emilio Gómez Ruiz.

after a wearisome procedure are finally informed that arrangements should be made first with a manufacturer after which the subject of priority could be considered. The manufacturer, in turn, states that they cannot accept orders without a priority.

Mr. Mann admitted that there is much confusion at the present time and pointed out that our emergency governmental organization is still in the process of being created. He had every expectation that it would improve in effectiveness with the passage of a few months and that in the meantime the Department is prepared to give all possible help and assistance to the Venezuelans in procuring materials essential to their economy. Mr. Mann emphasized, however, that we are facing a real emergency. We must first arm the United States, and then we must arm Western Europe, which is in the fore front of the battle line against Soviet aggression. The question of arms for Japan must be considered, and Indo-China is immediately threatened and fighting is actually going on in Korea, Mr. Mann went on, and is consuming large amounts of materials and men; he pointed out that United Nations troops in Korea have suffered 50,000 casualties to date. In these circumstances, he continued, there are bound to be scarcities of essential materials, and we must all share these shortages and the consequent hardships. It cannot be expected that the Latin American countries will be able to purchase everything they want while the emergency lasts, but he wished to assure the Venezuelans that we will make every effort to see that their essential requirements are attended to.

There followed a discussion of some of the points listed in the memorandum, and Dr. Otanez indicated general approval of the statements made. Ambassador Dreier said he would greatly appreciate receiving the views of the Venezuelan Government on these points, and Dr. Otanez said he would be glad to inform us as soon as he had received his Government's comments.

363/3–1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1951.

Subject: United States Position on Political and Military Subjects for IAM

Participants: Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Angel of Colombia
Mr. John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative on the COAS
AR—Mr. Ivan White (for part of the time) and
Mr. Edward A. Jamison.

Having displayed a constant and special interest in supporting the United States in regard to political and military matters at the Meet-

ing of Foreign Ministers, Ambassador Zuleta was informed that we could discuss confidentially with him some draft resolutions which were still in the semi-final stage of approval. He was shown copies of the draft resolutions on hemisphere defense and support of the United Nations.[1]

After reading them, Ambassador Zuleta commented that they would create no problem for the Latin Americans. He observed that they were rather weak and that he would have preferred a single resolution in place of two separate ones. He also asked why no reference was made to the Inter-American Defense Board in the resolution on the United Nations.

Mr. White explained that it was a matter of priorities and that the implementation of the "uniting for peace" resolution of the UNGA would rest principally with the UN. In response to Ambassador Zuleta's further comments, Mr. Dreier explained the U.S. position as follows:

There were three main lines of military effort to be considered at the present time: Korea, hemisphere defense, and the use of UN forces in some future emergency. The views of our Government were that in regard to Korea, it would be better for the U.S. Government, at the unified command of the UN, to deal directly with other Governments in an effort to increase the contribution of troops to the Korean campaign. With respect to the OAS, the first task was hemisphere defense and this was being assigned to the IADB. In view of the fact that the IADB would be fully occupied, and that the immediate requirement problem of forces for Korea would be handled bilaterally, it was our view that it would be best not to direct the IADB to consider plans for future UN military forces. Moreover, such forces, even if planned, could probably not be equipped any way, due to shortage of material. Furthermore, there were differences in the nature of the military forces required for Korea—where ground troops were essential—and for hemisphere defense—where air and naval forces would play a more important role. It appeared impossible, therefore, to accomplish planning for hemisphere defense and for future UN collective forces at one time.[2]

Ambassador Zuleta indicated that he accepted this view. He said he would have no difficulty in supporting and gaining support for the resolutions, although he displayed no great enthusiasm over them, repeating that the UN resolution was weak, since it gave no cue to how it

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[1] Copies of the referenced draft resolutions are attached to a memorandum by Mr. White to Mr. Miller, dated March 12, 1951, not printed (363/3–1251).

An interdepartmental working group, comprised of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, drafted the resolutions dealing with military and hemisphere defense matters. Documents pertaining to the deliberations of the military working group are contained in OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665, Box 98.

[2] For additional documentation on these subjects, and the position of the Department of Defense concerning the Meeting of Consultation, see pp. 985 ff.

was to be implemented. Mr. Dreier said he thought the UN resolution had two important values: it would focus attention on the broader problem of the UN; and at the same time, would constitute support for whatever efforts might be made to obtain more forces for Korea.

Ambassador Zuleta agreed that we would discuss at another time questions of how to handle these resolutions. He simply reiterated his previously expressed view that it would be desirable to have them introduced jointly by several countries.[3]

[3] On March 27, 1951, the draft resolution on support for the United Nations was jointly submitted to the Meeting of Consultation by Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Paraguay, the United States, and Uruguay; for text, see *Proceedings*, p. 51, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, p. 573.

On the same date, the draft resolution on inter-American military cooperation was jointly submitted by Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, the United States, and Uruguay; for text, see *Proceedings*, pp. 52–53, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, p. 574.

OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665 [1]

Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1951.

IAM D–1/1a

[Here follow a cover sheet and a negotiating brief on emergency economic cooperation.]

IAM/ECONOMIC

The agenda of the IAM provides for consideration of the following:

III Emergency Economic Cooperation—

(*a*) Production and distribution for defense purposes.
(*b*) Production and distribution of products in short supply and utilization of necessary services to meet the requirements of the internal economies of the American Republics; and measures to facilitate in so far as possible the carrying out of programs of economic development.

PROBLEM

The objective of the United States is to secure the full cooperation of Latin America in the mobilization of economic resources, goods and services to assure their maximum production, distribution, and utilization, and the adoption of measures of economic defense, for the common purpose of achieving security. The consideration of this objective

[1] Basic collection of records of meetings of the Organization of American States, other major inter-American governmental organizations, and inter-American conferences together with related subject files for the years 1939–1962, as retired by the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, and subsequently preserved as item 39 of Federal Records Center accession 71 A 6682. Documents pertaining to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation are contained in Boxes 98–99.

will precipitate IAM discussions of issues which are complicated per se. Furthermore, LA holds certain grievances based on allegedly indifferent consideration by the United States of their economic problems and development aspirations during World War II and thereafter. Specifically, problems will arise concerning formulation of an inter-American policy with regard to:

1. General Framework of Emergency Economic Cooperation
2. Increased Production
3. Allocation of Production
   essential economic activities by means of allocations and other administrative devices
4. Price Controls
5. Intergovernmental Consultation
6. Transportation Facilities
7. Technical Cooperation Programs
8. Economic Development
9. Economic Defense and Security Measures

Problems (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (9) are of immediate emergency concern to the defense effort. Problems (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) are of great importance to Latin America both as a corollary to emergency economic cooperation and for the post-emergency period.

The position of the United States must be realistic with relation to the exigencies of the defense programs, the maintenance of economic equilibrium in the Americas, and the continuance of inter-American solidarity. This position must be within the policy frames approved by the CFRS [2] on February 7, 1951 (IAM D–1).[3]

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States must seek to obtain the IAM acceptance of certain principles (for procedure see specific draft resolutions in the Negotiating Brief under economic subject headings) as follows:

1. *General Framework of Emergency Economic Cooperation:*

A unanimous declaration of common cause and common sacrifice in economic cooperation for the defense of the free world.

2. *Increased Production:*

Full inter-American cooperation in maximizing production of strategic materials, and of other basic materials and essential manufactured goods, in meeting the needs of the common defense programs and the essential civilian requirements of the free world.

[2] Reference is to the interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Requirements and Supplies (CFRS), established January 19, 1951, as part of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The committee was charged with the responsibility for reviewing and evaluating foreign requirements for supplies produced in the United States and United States requirements for supplies from foreign sources.

[3] Not printed; it is contained in OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665.

3. *Allocation of Production:*

Full inter-American cooperation in (*a*) the international allocation of basic materials in short supply and to assure acceptance of principle that highest priority be given defense requirements, (*b*) that essential civilian economic activities be sustained, (*c*) that in reducing less essential civilian needs, the principle of relative equality of sacrifice should prevail.

4. *Price Controls:*

Maximum cooperation in the acceptance of necessary price controls as a means of facilitating commodity flow, curbing inflationary tendencies, and avoiding market dislocations and consumer distress.

5. *Intergovernmental Consultation:*

Full opportunity for Governments to consult with each other on the effect of emergency controls on international trade, but excluding any commitment for consultation prior to the imposition of controls.

6. *Transportation Facilities:*

The cooperation of Latin America, through IA–ECOSOC, in planning for the maximum utilization of all inter-American transportation facilities in anticipation of an emergency.

7. *Technical Cooperation Programs:*

Agreement on the desirability of actively planning and prosecuting technical cooperation programs.

8. *Economic Development:*

Agreement that priority consideration of economic development programs must be viewed in the light of, and in relation to, the defense effort; this criterion will place emphasis on economic development programs for the production of basic materials essential to the defense program but does not preclude consideration, in so far as possible, of the carrying out of other economic development programs.

9. *Economic Defense and Security Measures:*

Agreement on full inter-American cooperation in (*a*) applying export controls to direct shipments and transshipments to the Soviet Bloc of Items of strategic significance or in short supply, (*b*) controlling air cargo and maritime resources with a view to prohibiting the carriage to or within the Soviet Bloc of goods which are the subject of embargo, and (*c*) such other economic defense measures as may become necessary.

DISCUSSION

The IAM has been called by the United States for two basic reasons, i.e., (1) the necessity for enlisting the full collaboration of Latin American Republics in the political, military and economic fields, so as to further the common defense of the free world, and (2) because

the impact of our national rearmament program upon Latin American countries is so great as to make such a meeting essential from their standpoint.

General Framework of Emergency Economic Cooperation:

The broad purpose of the United States in the economic field is to gain acceptance of Latin America that the defense program is vital to both and that each of the American Republics must contribute to the common effort for the benefit of the free world. A declaration of common purpose and common responsibility would be of help to the United States later in getting Latin America to take practical steps of economic cooperation, would develop a sense of common sacrifice, and would help to create an auspicious atmosphere for negotiations. Appropriate consideration must also be given to reserving the resources of Latin America for the free world.

The economic items on the agenda are of particular importance to the United States because (1) failure to reach agreement on economic cooperation will adversely affect political and military objectives, and (2) because Latin America is both a major supplier of materials vital to the common defense programs and also a consumer of industrial products from the United States and Western Europe which will be subject to increasing economic controls.

In 1950 Latin America exported to the United States $2.8 billions of goods, or about 35 per cent of total U.S. imports; in addition to basic foodstuffs such as coffee and sugar, Latin America supplied 25 per cent of U.S. imports of metal and manufactures, 46 per cent of wool imports, 61 per cent of petroleum, and more than 50 per cent of imports of copper, lead, nitrate, and henequen fiber.

In turn, the U.S. exports to Latin America in 1950 totaled $2.5 billions, representing 30 per cent of U.S. total exports of machinery, 30 per cent of iron and steel exports, 38 per cent of chemicals, 40 per cent of textile manufactures, 44 per cent of automobiles, and 44 per cent of iron and steel advanced manufactures.

Latin American imports from the United States in 1950 represented about 50 per cent of Latin America's total imports from all sources, indicating the high percentage of dependence on U.S. supplies.

The economic items on the agenda will be complicated and controversial, both because of their inter-relationship with each other, and because of the history of Latin American economic relations with the United States during and after World War II. At the Rio Conference in 1942 the United States, recognizing the mutuality of the war effort, committed itself to equal treatment in the allocation of goods to cover civilian needs in Latin America and in the United States. Latin America holds the views that:

1. During a substantial period of World War II, the Latin American requirements for civilian supply were neglected by the United

States as compared with treatment given to the U.S. civilian population;

2. During World War II the United States purchased materials from Latin America at controlled prices, whereas after the war, when Latin America was able to convert their dollar earnings into U.S. supplies, the United States lifted price controls and sharp price increases occurred;

3. That after World War II the United States did not give sufficient priority to Latin American aspirations for economic development.

The United States does not concede the validity *in toto* of these Latin American views, but their existence presages difficulties in negotiations in the IAM.

The new emergency faces the United States with precisely the same problems in these fields as arose during the last war, the difference being only in degree. The main lesson to be drawn from U.S. experience with the Rio doctrine is that the United States must avoid over-commitments on supply, and must insure administrative implementation of such commitments as are made.

Increased Production:

Latin America is today a vitally important producer of raw materials and production could be increased, substantially in most cases, with guidance and assistance from the United States. Also, Latin America has a modest industrial base which, within limitations, could be used for the production of manufactured goods of use to the common defense program.

Latin America is the major foreign source of the following materials on the U.S. stockpile list:

Item	*Source*
1. Abaca (manila fiber)	Central America
2. Antimony	Mexico, Bolivia and Peru
3. Asbestos (certain grades)	Bolivia
4. Beryl	Brazil
5. Bismuth	Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru
6. Castor Oil	Brazil, Mexico, Haiti, Ecuador, Central America
7. Copper	Chile, Mexico, Peru, Cuba
8. Iodine	Chile
9. Ipecac	Central America and Brazil
10. Manganese	Brazil, Cuba and Mexico
11. Mica	Brazil and Argentina
12. Monazite	Brazil
13. Quartz crystals	Brazil
14. Quebracho	Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil
15. Sisal	Haiti and Brazil
16. Tantalite	Brazil
17. Tin	Bolivia
18. Vanadium	Peru
19. Wool (apparel)	Argentina and Uruguay
20. Zinc	Mexico, Peru and Bolivia

Latin America is also a significant supplier of the following stockpile items: agar, chromite, cotton (long-staple), industrial diamonds, fluorspar, hog bristles, molybdenum and nickel.

The Western European countries are also dependent on Latin America for both strategic materials and essential civilian items, notably grain, meat, foodstuffs, cotton and wool.

In order to increase production of basic materials in Latin America, the United States may in some instances have to overcome difficulties from (*a*) the shortage of risk capital, especially in the case of marginal production, (*b*) the Latin American fear of economic dislocation upon termination of U.S. procurement programs, and (*c*) lack of assurance that capital equipment necessary for expanded output will be available from the United States and Western Europe. Other very important factors affecting the production capacity of Latin America will have to be taken into consideration by the IAM, such as inadequate standards of health and sanitation, ineffective manpower techniques, illiteracy, and inefficient agricultural methods; such problems are, and will be, dealt with through the Technical Cooperation Program with increased importance in relation to the common defense program.

Allocations and Priorities:

There is strong evidence that Latin America considers the maintenance of their civilian economies as the first line of civilian defense against internal subversive elements. As a means of securing adequate civilian supplies, Latin American governments are inclined to link their cooperation in supplying strategic materials to firm guarantees for reciprocity in material supplies from the United States. This will present a very difficult negotiating problem because while the United States is necessarily limiting supplies to Latin America, at the same time the United States must ask Latin America to expand the exports of basic materials. In this connection the United States, as principal supplier to Latin America, has a strong bargaining position, but an intransigent U.S. attitude might precipitate serious economic friction, jeopardize defense efforts, and create political disharmony. Consequently the United States must be prepared to meet the legitimate civilian requirements of Latin America in order to secure Latin American economic cooperation for the defense program. The United States must also place the problem of cooperation in the broad context of the defense of the free world and on the footing of a common cause. Divergent viewpoints must be balanced out within the supply limitations.

Price Controls:

The U.S. price ceilings on basic commodities imported from Latin America are, with very few possible exceptions, favorable to Latin America both historically and with regard to the relations between

imported raw materials and exported manufactured goods. The United States considers that price controls confer reciprocal benefits and are a potent anti-inflationary measure. Under present price control policies the United States will be able to undertake to avoid discrimination against raw materials or against imported goods. Latin America is concerned, however, with the future purchasing power of the dollar balances which they will accumulate by reason of increased sales to the United States, and would like to arrive at some formula for maintaining the post-emergency purchasing power of these dollar balances. The United States is not able to give any practicable assurances on this latter point.

Intergovernmental Consultation:

The United States will provide the Latin American governments with full opportunity to consult with regard to the effect of emergency controls on international trade, but cannot commit itself, in all cases, to the prior consultation desired by Latin America.

Transportation Facilities:

Inasmuch as the maximum utilization of all transportation facilities will be increasingly important, cooperative studies of inter-American requirements versus availabilities should be prepared for possible emergency.

Technical Cooperation Programs:

Effective progress in the technical cooperation field is of immediate and increasing importance (*a*) as a shield against Soviet penetration by strengthening the inter-American front economically and socially, and (*b*) during this emergency period, its relation to the defense programs. The faith of Latin American peoples in the free-world system must be confirmed by concrete efforts to help them to help themselves in overcoming poverty, ignorance and disease. With technical cooperation, as planned, labor productivity may be increased and wealth created with a view to improving human welfare in economic and social fields. There will be strong pressure from Latin American delegations and U.S. groups for the affirmation by the IAM of a positive program of technical cooperation, and a realistic agreement in this regard is entirely consistent with U.S. policy objectives.[4]

Economic Development:

While material requirements for defense programs and basic civilian economic activities must have priority over other material requirements, there is the problem of facilitating, in so far as possible, economic development in Latin America during the emergency period. The free-world rearmament program will materially affect supplies of

[4] For documentation on United States technical assistance policy toward the American Republics as a group, see pp. 1038 ff.

capital goods required in Latin America to (1) maintain and develop existing civilian industrial and agricultural industries, (2) complete developments recently started and not yet finished, and (3) carry forward developments which are planned. Opposition elements in Latin America are propagandizing that the free-world rearmament program will be used as an excuse by the industrialized countries to choke off economic development in Latin America and thus reduce Latin America to a dependent "colonial area". Among pro-United States elements there is the feeling that since 1946 the United States' emphasis on economic aid to Europe has left Latin America in a "neglected" status. Latin America will probably seek to obtain in the IAM a positive affirmation that economic development must go forward and that there be effective cooperation in facilitating the material requirements necessary for such development. This means that the United States must be prepared to assure the consideration of requests for capital assistance and material supplies for economic development, within the realities of the supply limitations. In this connection, experience gained in the last war proved that it is often possible constructively to relate other development (such, for example, as development of transportation and port facilities) with development for the production and distribution of defense materials.

Economic Defense and Security Measures:

In order to broaden the area of international cooperation in denying to the Soviet bloc strategic materials, services, or the use of funds, the United States should seek agreement on full Latin American cooperation in the matter of security controls. In this connection a resolution, to be unanimously acceptable to the Latin American countries, must avoid specific public reference to the Soviet bloc, but should provide for agreement on principle under which appropriate measures can be developed by bilateral or multilateral discussions. As regards financial controls, it is recommended that, if the opportunity presents itself, consideration be given to holding informal discussions on the technical aspects of foreign funds controls.

363/3–2251

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (White)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1951.

Subject: Draft Economic Resolutions

I showed Dr. Lleras yesterday our draft economic resolutions, and discussed with him the tactics which should be followed in presenting them to the Conference. In particular, I mentioned Mr. Thorp's suggestion that we defer putting them in until he could have an opportunity at the first meeting of the Economic Committee Tuesday afternoon of explaining that these resolutions had been prepared after months of consultation with other governments, the purpose of Mr. Thorp's suggestion being to prevent our draft from being looked upon in the eyes of Latin Americans as a purely United States draft, thus requiring them for purposes of home consumption to try to get numerous changes inserted.

Dr. Lleras agrees that there is something in Mr. Thorp's point, and also believes that it is essential that from the beginning of the Conference there be a more or less "official" U.S. draft which will eliminate the need of numerous other drafts, some of which might be so expansive in the beginning as to create the illusion that much more was going to be forthcoming.

Consequently, Dr. Lleras suggests a compromise approach, namely, that our three economic resolutions be submitted at the beginning of the Conference, with an explanatory statement which would constitute a summary or preview of Mr. Thorp's remarks to the effect that our resolutions have been prepared after consultation with the other countries. I attach an outline of such a statement.[2]

As to the form of the resolutions, I believe they are generally all right,[3] but in the Emergency Economic Resolution I have one comment, namely as to the role of IA–ECOSOC. This body is referred to only once in the resolution, in the last paragraph on transportation. It seems to me that it would be preferable to add at the end of the resolution a separate paragraph, giving the IA–ECOSOC a general direc-

[1] Addressed also to Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan, United States Representative to IA–ECOSOC, and Mr. Charles F. Knox, Jr., Consul General at Curaçao, on temporary detail to the Department of State, January 23–April 27, 1951.

[2] Not printed.

[3] In a memorandum to Mr. Miller, dated March 12, 1951, commenting on the draft economic resolutions, Mr. White had stated in part the following: "While the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development Resolutions have been improved, I still regard them as on the cautious side and as inadequate from the standpoint of providing inspiration to the peoples of the Hemisphere." He had recommended, *inter alia*, that the "Technical Cooperation and Economic Development subjects be incorporated in one strong and comprehensive Resolution based on the 'Point IV concept' in the broad sense of the term." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

tive with regard to its continuing functions in all of the different fields covered by the resolution. Thus, the IA–ECOSOC would be given through the Conference a function comparable to the function conferred by the meeting upon the IADB in its field of competence.

OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1951.

IAM D–6a

AFFIRMATION OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS SUPPORT FOR THE UN

Problem:

What position should the U.S. take regarding affirmation by the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of American Republics' support for United Nations action against aggression or the threat of aggression.

Recommendation:

The U.S. should initiate or support approval by the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of a resolution in which the responsibilities of the American Republics as members of the UN to support UN action against aggression in other parts of the world would be emphatically affirmed. A proposed draft resolution is attached.[2]

Discussion:

The first item of the IAM agenda of the Foreign Ministers Meeting is entitled "Political and Military Cooperation for the Defense of the Americas, and To Prevent and Repel Aggression, in Accordance with Inter-American Agreements and with the Charter of the UN and the Resolutions of that Organization." The wording of this agenda item and the discussions in the Council of the OAS while it was being considered have made it unmistakably clear that action by the Consultative Meeting in support of UN efforts to prevent and repel aggression is anticipated by the Governments of the American Republics. The question to be decided, therefore, is not whether there will be such action, but the nature of the action which will be most desirable. This action will have greatest political and practical value if it is directed at strengthening the support of the other American Republics for the UN efforts most directly related to the emergency which is the basic reason for the meetings being held.

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[1] The cover sheet to the source text reads in part as follows: "The attached position paper and accompanying proposed resolution . . . have been finalized in the Departments of State and Defense."

[2] Not printed.

The UN action in Korea and the Uniting for Peace program adopted by the General Assembly [3] are based upon the principle that defense against aggression is indivisible and that each member state of the UN has a responsibility to contribute within its capabilities to the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. The U.S. has accepted this principle and played the leading role in the adoption by the UN of these two programs. The success of both programs depends on maximum cooperation by the members of the UN. The U.S. is particularly anxious to gain further positive support and participation of the 20 American Republics. The Meeting of Consultation affords an excellent opportunity for reawakening and stimulating this support and participation.

While the American Republics are all members of the UN and have almost unanimously approved the above UN actions (Argentina abstained on the Uniting for Peace Resolution) there is an inevitable inclination among the Governments and peoples of some of them, reinforced by traditional hemispheric or nationalistic isolationism, to concentrate exclusively on local or hemispheric problems. There is a tendency also to consider that hemispheric defense and universal collective security are mutually exclusive, and that self-defense and hemispheric defense action through the OAS machinery excludes participation in UN programs for maintaining peace and security in other parts of the world. So far as the UN is concerned, the Latin American countries all too often appear to assume that their UN responsibilities are fulfilled by merely voting their support for UN programs for collective security. These attitudes are not only unfortunate from the UN point of view, but they foster an irresponsible approach which is not helpful in dealing even with localized hemispheric defense problems. They also tend to fail to take into account the danger to hemispheric security which results from aggression in other parts of the world.

For these reasons, it is imperative that the backing of the American Republics for the UN, and particularly for the Korea and Uniting for Peace programs, be reaffirmed in an effective manner by the Meeting of Consultation. The military resolution is directed at tasks and policies, which appear from the military point of view to fall directly within the province of the regional organization, should be complemented by action in which the responsibilities of the members of the OAS as members of the UN are affirmed. It is particularly important to have this affirmation because of the position that, from the U.S. military point of view, the OAS machinery should not be used in present circumstances to provide military forces for action outside the hemisphere.

[3] For documentation on the Uniting for Peace program, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303 ff.; related documentation concerning United States policy with respect to proposals for strengthening the United Nations system in order to meet aggression may be found in vol. I, pp. 616 ff.

It is of the utmost political importance that the Uniting for Peace Program was adopted by the UN General Assembly as a result of U.S. efforts. These efforts were based upon the importance of building upon the effort improvised for UN action in Korea and in order to maximize the military contributions of UN member states other than the U.S. Accordingly, U.S. silence or a negative U.S. attitude on this highly important program of its foreign policy, taken together with the rather restricted military resolution, would have unfortunate public and political repercussions, both in the U.S. and among the other American Republics, which the U.S. must avoid. It can be expected that this Uniting for Peace program will in any event be raised by some of the Latin American Delegations. In fact, the agenda item specifically encompasses the Uniting for Peace program and the necessity that it do so was strongly argued by a number of the representatives of other Governments in COAS discussions of the agenda.

Editorial Note

On March 26, President Truman delivered an address to the opening session of the Meeting of Consultation concerning the purpose of the meeting; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), pages 195–198, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 9, 1951, pages 566–568.

On March 27, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp addressed Committee III (Economic Cooperation) of the Meeting of Consultation on the common economic problems confronting the American Republics; for text, see *ibid.*, April 30, 1951, pages 693–698.

On March 31, President Vincent Auriol of France, who was in the United States on a state visit from March 28 to April 2, delivered an address to a special session of the Meeting of Consultation; for text, see *Proceedings*, pages 153–160. In a memorandum to President Truman, dated January 24, 1951, recommending that the appearance of President Auriol at a session of the meeting be encouraged, Secretary Acheson had stated in part the following: "A brief address by President Auriol to the Foreign Ministers would serve to remind the Latin Americans of their ties with Western Europe and would tend to counter suggestions that we move toward a policy of Hemisphere isolation." (363/1–2651) For documentation relating to President Auriol's visit to the United States, see volume IV.

On April 7, Secretary Acheson made informal remarks to the closing session of the Meeting of Consultation concerning the meeting's

achievements; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1951, pages 616–617.

On April 18, Ambassador John C. Dreier delivered an address, in which he assessed the results of the Meeting of Consultation, to the Pan American Society of Massachusetts and Northern New England, at Boston, Massachusetts; for text, see *ibid.*, April 30, 1951, pages 688–693.

363/3–1351

Memorandum by Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1951.

Subject: Status Report on Committee Work at Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics.

There are attached for your information, as background for the Plenary Session scheduled for Monday afternoon, brief reports on the status of work in the three technical committees of the Foreign Ministers Meeting.

A script for the Monday afternoon meeting, with recommendations,[2] will be submitted Monday morning on the basis of week-end developments.

W. T[APLEY] B[ENNETT, JR.]

[Annex 1]

MARCH 31, 1951.

STATUS OF WORK OF COMMITTEE I—POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION

Chairman: Restrepo Jaramillo (Colombia); *Rapporteur:* Sevilla Sacasa [3] (Nicaragua)

The principal results in this Committee to date are:

(1) General approval by the full Committee of a "Declaration of Washington," based upon drafts presented by Brazil and Chile.[4] Along with declarations of hemispheric solidarity, this draft contains an emphatic affirmation of support for action of the United Nations. Although they did not refer to the UN aspect directly, the Foreign

[1] Addressed also to Mr. Miller.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States.

[4] For text of the Brazilian and Chilean draft resolutions, see *Proceedings*, pp. 43–45.

Ministers of Argentina, Guatemala and Mexico,[5] all of whom have given indication of resisting any IAM action in relation to the UN, expressed their approval of the Declaration.

(2) Preparation by a working group of a draft resolution on hemispheric military cooperation combining most aspects of that sponsored by the United States and other countries with certain detailed amendments made by Peru and Bolivia. This draft, which appears to raise no serious problems for us, must be considered by Subcommittee A of Committee I, before going to the full Committee.

(3) A tentative decision by a working group of sponsors to separate the resolution on UN support jointly sponsored by the United States and four other countries from a Bolivian proposal[6] directed specifically at support for the Korean operation.

(4) Approval by Subcommittee C (on which the United States was not represented) of (*a*) the joint U.S.–Mexican proposal on peaceful settlement in the hemisphere; (*b*) a Venezuelan proposal[7] to reaffirm certain principles contained in the 1940 Convention on Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas,[8] to which Guatemala has added a preamble restating a Bogota Conference action expressing the aspiration that colonialism in the hemisphere should be brought to an end (the United States abstained at Bogota); (*c*) a Venezuelan proposal[9] that the American Republics make certain that their laws on military service do not adversely affect students of other American countries. This Subcommittee also approved referring a Haitian proposal[10] regarding individual responsibility for war to the Inter-American Council of Jurists.

The principal potential problem stems from the point of view expressed or implied early in the meetings of Committee I by Argentina, Mexico and Guatemala—that the OAS should not in this Meeting concern itself with extra hemispheric security actions or resolutions of the UN. In spite of approval of the Declaration of Washington, containing an affirmation of the importance of UN action to the hemisphere, it is almost certain that those countries will attempt to water down the recommendations of the Resolution on UN support[11] which specify steps which the American Republics should take as members of

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[5] Hipólito Jesús Paz, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship; Manuel Galich, Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Manuel Tello, Mexican Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[6] For text, see *Proceedings*, pp. 41–42.

[7] For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 55–56.

[8] For text of the Convention, signed at Havana, July 30, 1940, and entered into force, January 8, 1942, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 977, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1273.

[9] For text, see *Proceedings*, pp. 54–55.

[10] For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 45–50.

[11] In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated April 3, 1951, discussing the proposed Mexican amendments to the draft resolution on support for the United Nations, Ambassador Beaulac stated in part that "the Mexican amendments do not adhere with any consistency to a rigid separation of United Nations and Organization of American States matters—except with regard to that part of our draft resolution which deals with the section of the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' recommending that governments maintain elements of their armed forces in

the UN to place themselves in a better position to contribute to its collective security efforts.

The two Venezuelan proposals mentioned above (3*b* and 3*c*) are also likely to create difficulties for us when they are considered by the full Committee. An effort is being made, however, to work out with the Venezuelans a draft of 3c which we could accept.

[Annex 2]

MARCH 31, 1951.

STATUS OF WORK OF COMMITTEE II—INTERNAL SECURITY

Chairman: Dr. Ernesto Dihigo [12] (Cuba); *Rapporteur:* Dr. Alfonso Moscoso (Ecuador)

The Cuban draft resolution on the "Strengthening and Effective Exercise of Democracy" [13] was unanimously approved by the full committee on March 30. The United States supported this resolution. The resolution suggests that the X International Conference of American States at Caracas in 1953 [14] consider measures to give full effect to Bogota Resolutions XXX (on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man) and XXXII (on "The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America"). As a technical contribution to this end it entrusts the Inter-American Juridical Committee with making preliminary studies and the Inter-American Council of Jurists with drawing up draft conventions or other instruments, to be presented for discussion at the Caracas conference.

The Mexican draft resolution on the "Improvement of Social, Economic and Cultural Level of the People of America" [15] was likewise unanimously approved by the Committee on March 30. The United States Representative [16] made a statement in favor of the text as adopted, pointing out for the record that since the resolution contains a

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condition so that they can be made available for service as United Nations units." (363/4-351)

The Department of State's telegram 599, to diplomatic offices in the American Republics, dated April 7, 1951, reads in part as follows: "early indications Mex, Arg, and Guat would attempt to weaken original proposal [concerning support for the United Nations] cosponsored by US arguing possible conflict OAS–UN jurisdiction. Amendments proposed by Mex wld have undoubtedly had this effect had they been accepted, but Colom, Urug, and Cuba took lead with US in counteracting this trend; Res emerged at least as strong as orig form; and was unanimously approved after Arg first abstained and then approved with reservation." (363/4-751)

[12] Ernesto Dihigo y López Trigo, Cuban Minister of State.

[13] For text, see *Proceedings*, pp. 58–59.

[14] Reference is to the Tenth Inter-American Conference held at Caracas, Venezuela, March 1–28, 1954.

[15] For text, see *Proceedings*, pp. 59–60.

[16] Presumably William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

reference to the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees,[17] the United States reservation to that Charter should be noted. The resolution recommends that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Cultural Council [18] prepare plans and programs for promoting effective cooperation among the American Republics to raise the economic, social and cultural levels of their peoples.

A subcommittee of nine representatives, including the United States, is now considering the draft resolution on internal security sponsored jointly by the United States, Uruguay, Ecuador and Bolivia.

[Annex 3]

MARCH 31, 1951.

STATUS OF WORK OF COMMITTEE III—ECONOMIC [19]

Chairman: Neves Da Fontoura (Brazil)
Rapporteur: Dominguez Campora [20] (Uruguay)

Economic Commission Committee III got off to a bad start, wasting two full days in procedural discussions. However, after two subcommittees had been appointed and these in turn had appointed smaller working groups, progress has been fairly satisfactory since Friday afternoon. The Subcommittees will begin substantive discussions on Monday. The following subjects are now ready for consideration by these committees: Allocations and Priorities, Transportation, Prices and Consultation, International Commodity Problems, Strategic Production and Economic Development.

There are three main problems facing the U.S. The first, and so important that it could conceivably affect the successful outcome of the meeting, is the difference in philosophy between Brazil and the United States. The Brazilians take the position that there are two emergencies, the internal communistic threat faced by Latin America and the external communistic threat faced by the United States. While agreeable to the idea that the United States should build up its military defenses, the Brazilians take the position that the defense role of Latin America is to make itself economically strong through programs of economic development. While our other Latin American friends are far too realistic to give Brazil outspoken support, the philosophy of the majority appears to be that perhaps Brazil will win

[17] For text of the Charter, incorporated as article XXIX in the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference, and the reservation made by the United States delegation, see *USDel Report*, pp. 250–259.
[18] Organs of the Organization of American States.
[19] Drafted by Merwin L. Bohan, United States Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA–ECOSOC).
[20] Alberto Domínguez Cámpora, Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs.

concessions for them. Hence, they have so far adopted in public a somewhat benevolent neutrality towards both sides, although there is much agreement with the United States in private.

The other two problems concern prices and post-emergency problems. The Latin American countries are almost unanimous in desiring resolutions reiterating the principles of parity and the fixing of ceiling prices in relation to the costs of production, and the provision for prior consultation in connection with the setting of prices and allocations. In the field of postwar economic problems our Latin friends would like to have assurances of the post-emergency purchasing power of accumulated exchange holdings, the continued control of prices of manufactured goods, and assurances affecting the liquidation of stock piles and the marketing of surplus production. The United States Delegation will attempt to funnel these problems through a general study resolution on the grounds that some of them appear unanswerable and others require investigation and study before any general indication of measures can be considered.

OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665

Unsigned Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation Members on Committee III, Department of State, 9:15 a. m., April 4, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

USDel Com III M–7.

1. Mr. Thorp requested progress reports on the activities of Committee III, its subcommittees and working groups.

2. Ambassador Bohan reported that in the Economic Development resolution, approved by Subcommittee A, all changes requested by the United States were incorporated in the revised resolution.

3. Ambassador Bohan brought up the question of U.S. position on a proposed resolution of Cuba on "Social and Economic Improvement of the Workers in the American Republics."[1] This resolution calls on the American Republics to support the principles of various multi-lateral agreements, including the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees, incorporated in the Bogota Charter. Ambassador Bohan stated that the Cubans felt very strongly about the necessity of incorporating such a resolution in any final act of this Meeting. They feel that the resolution passed by the Plenary Session on "Raising the Economic and Social Standards of the American Republics" was not adequate. Mr. Burrows presented the previous attitude of the United States in regard to this resolution and pointed out that strong

[1] For text, see *Proceedings*, p. 105.

opposition to it was voiced by the Department of Labor. Mr. Arnow [2] of the Department of Labor said that not only does his Department feel that approval of this resolution would be inconsistent with our position before the ILO, but certain concepts contained in the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees cannot be supported and must be opposed by the U.S. Government. He said that the resolution of Committee II on the same subject, already passed by the Ministers, was strongly objected to by the Department of Labor. Mr. Miller pointed out that our representative on Committee II called attention to this point and entered a reservation for the United States. However, this problem might be solved administratively by achieving uniform treatment of both resolutions. It was generally agreed that when the Cuban proposal came up, the United States would present its reservation to Committee III.

4. Mr. Leddy [3] reported that the Price Control resolution might come up this morning and stated that the draft prepared last night contains an outstanding disagreement between the United States and some of the Latin American Delegations, especially in the matters of prior consultation and its relation to cost indices of essential civilian products. It was generally agreed that if such a matter came up in Committee III, the United States would try to advance a broad text containing general language on this subject. Mr. Leddy reported that the Subcommittee agreed on a consultation provision which says that each country would provide opportunities for consultation and whenever practical, to consult before action is taken. Consultation will be held as soon as possible after such action and on request of other nations.

5. Mr. Wythe [4] reported on the "Priorities" Resolution and stated that the Subcommittee had adopted a clause on export quotas which grants responsibility of the export country to determine the liscensing distribution of products exported. On one clause on which the United States position was over-ridden, Mr. Wythe had a revised draft which he was planning to submit at today's session.

6. Mr. Wythe brought up the question of the Brazilian insistence on a Bilateral Supply Agreement which the United States opposes. At this point, Mr. Miller asked the opinion of Mr. Thorp on the advisability of arranging a meeting between Secretary Acheson and the Brazilian Foreign Minister to secure an understanding of Brazil's position and the reasons for her opposition so far in the Conference. There was general agreement that such a meeting would be most useful and Mr. Miller agreed to arrange it. Mr. Miller recorded the five major

[2] Philip Arnow, Associate Director, Office of International Labor.
[3] John M. Leddy, Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy.
[4] George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.

U.S. objections to entering into a Bilateral Supply Agreement which would be included in the briefing material for the Secretary during his talk with the Brazilian Foreign Minister. A prolonged discussion ensued as to possible alternative approaches that could be made to secure the agreement of the Brazilians on this matter. Mr. Knox commented that the Brazilians seem to be determined to secure approval of their position on this matter before any arrangements for the increased production of strategic materials are entered into.[5]

7. Mr. Brown [6] reported that a draft text on Stockpiling had been approved by the Subcommittee, calling for producing nations to be given at least four months' notice before stockpiling operations cease.

8. Mr. Leddy mentioned that the Economic Security Resolution proposed by the United States had been passed over in the Subcommittee and on his initiative, a new and separate resolution on the matter will be introduced before Committee III today. Mention was made of the fact that certain Delegations believe that the Economic Security Problem is so tied up with political overtones that it would more appropriately belong in Committee I. Mr. Miller agreed to have introduced into Committee I the U.S. resolution on this matter.

9. Mr. Nolan reported on the progress made in the transportation resolution and mentioned the efforts of Brazil to secure aid for the Santos-Arica Railroad. Mr. Miller said that the U.S. should offer a reservation to this resolution, indicating that it does not belong in this Conference of Foreign Ministers.

10. Mr. Brown indicated that since the Economic Development resolution was ready for approval by Committee III, it might not be appropriate to continue U.S. approval on this resolution until the completion of all the other economic resolutions. It was agreed that the U.S. would support the Economic Development resolutions in Committee III, but that its approval was subject to review when the text on allocations and priorities was finalized.

11. Brief discussions followed on matters in regard to the resolution on Increased Production and Strategic Materials and the resolution on IMC Activities.

12. The members of the U.S. Delegation on Committee III will meet again in Room 5106, New State, Thursday, April 5, at 9:00 a.m.

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[5] An unsigned summary, dated April 5, 1951, of the eighth meeting of the U.S. delegation members on Committee III, which took place at the Department of State on the same date, reads in part as follows: "Mr. Thorp reported that the Brazilian attempt to obtain Bilateral Supply Agreements in Committee III resolutions were unsuccessful." (OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665)

For further information on bilateral discussions between representatives of the United States and Brazil concerning a supply agreement, see the editorial note, p. 1195.

[6] Winthrop G. Brown, Director, Office of International Trade Policy.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Chargé in Argentina (Mallory)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

DEAR LES: Thank you for your letter of March 26 enclosing the CAS memorandum[2] on the Argentine delegation to the Conference.

In general the memorandum has proved to be sound, though some of the details have turned out differently. The Argentines have been cooperative for the most part up to the present and have not engaged in "theatrical tactics." At the same time they have spoken up on a number of subjects and are definitely playing a part in the Meeting. As far as I know they have not made serious efforts since their arrival to form a bloc vis-à-vis the United States.

Concerning U.S.–Argentine relations,[3] our friends seem to be playing a game not unlike our own—one of inaction. Just as we have not brought up problems with them, they have not raised any with us. Whether they plan to discuss any specific problems later, we do not know.

Since the Meeting is not over, our fingers are still crossed, but it seems unlikely that at this late hour Paz and Co. will take any action to realize the more sinister of the intelligence reports which we received—such as Argentine sabotage of the IAM, etc.[4]

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Office of South American Affairs.
[2] Neither printed.
[3] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1079 ff.
[4] Beneath Mr. Miller's signature appears the following unidentified handwritten notation: "Meeting now over. All OK"

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250 [1]

Notes of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Department of State, 10:15 a. m., April 6, 1951 [2]

SECRET

UM N–328

[Here follow a list of those present (20) and discussion of matters unrelated to the Meeting of Consultation.]

Inter-American Foreign Ministers Meeting

9. Mr. Miller reported that the Inter-American Foreign Ministers Meeting has been concluded and has surpassed all expectations. There are several reasons why this meeting was a success. We were very well prepared and everyone in the Department, as well as the entire Government, cooperated extremely well. Mr. Thorp did an outstanding job on the economic problems and got everything that we were after and still maintained good-will. The other agencies worked very closely with us and our relations with Defense were extremely good. We hope to get greater support for our operations in Korea. Our general attitude of restraint and modesty was a good one and was appreciated. The Secretary's active participation in committee and subcommittee meetings was a great personal contribution.

10. Mr. Thorp reported that the economic phase of this conference was partly a defensive operation. We got what we wanted out of the conference, which was an agreement that production should be expanded, especially the production of raw materials. Also we got agreement on cooperation for economic defense. We gave assurances of a fair deal on priorities and prices. With respect to prices, we agreed that there would always be an opportunity for consultation on prices and if possible this consultation would take place in advance. We also agreed to study the possibilities of stabilizing foreign exchanges. When the question of parity on industrial products was raised, we agreed that in giving consideration to prices we would consider raw material and manufactured prices.

11. Mr. Thorp pointed out that we have only one reservation in signing the final act. Two resolutions regarding improvements of conditions of American workers were passed. The resolutions, in effect, called for carrying out the Bogotá agreement regarding social guarantees. We reserved at the time of the Bogotá agreement and we will hold to the same reservations now. We must do this since some of the guarantees are in conflict with the ILO agreement.

[1] Master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's Meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

[2] The Under Secretary's Meeting convened weekly; it was customarily attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and certain office directors. Under Secretary of State James E. Webb presided at these meetings.

UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF INTER-AMERICAN COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CARIBBEAN AREA [1]

720.00/4–2551

Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 25, 1951.

Subject: Termination of Special Committee for the Caribbean.

It seems to me that early steps should be taken to bring to an end the Special Committee for the Caribbean (so-called Watchdog Committee), which was established by the COAS/OC over a year ago.[2] You probably recall that an effort to do this was made last October, but that this failed largely because of the attitude of the Dominican Republic. Just before the Foreign Ministers Meeting,[3] it was agreed in the Committee that the favorable opportunity offered by the presence of the principally interested Foreign Ministers in Washington should be used to accomplish this purpose. Unfortunately, the Dominican attitude toward Cuba, especially Foreign Minister Dihigo,[4] spoiled this opportunity.

Actually, the only elements of controversy which still devolve from the COAS/OC Resolutions of April 8, 1950 [5] are a remnant of the controversy between Cuba and the Dominican Republic over Cayo Confites [6] (which the latter seems unwilling to relinquish), and the Dominican resentment over propaganda attacks by Dominican revolutionaries located in Cuba.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 641 ff.

[2] The Special Committee for the Caribbean had been appointed on April 8, 1950, in connection with the efforts of the Council of the Organization of American States (COAS) to resolve problems resulting from charges and counter-charges of subversive activities by several Caribbean governments. For documentation relating to the committee's establishment and its activities during 1950, see *ibid.*

[3] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. For documentation on the conference, see pp. 925 ff.

[4] Ernesto Dihigo y López Trigo.

[5] For the text of these resolutions, see *Annals of the Organization of American States* (Washington, 1950), vol. 2, pp. 147–151.

[6] Reference is to an abortive invasion against the Dominican Republic in 1947 allegedly instigated by Cuban authorities; for documentation on the incident, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 629 ff.

This problem has been discussed with MID and Tom Mann [7] who agree that the Committee should be terminated at an early date. To accomplish this, I believe we should suggest that the Committee complete its final report, the main point of which would be that there appear to be no remaining problems which cannot be resolved through normal diplomatic channels. When agreed upon in the Committee, this report should be transmitted to the directly interested governments (Cuba, Haiti, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic), with an express statement that it will be issued within a specified period of time—say one week—and without any indication that it is being submitted for approval or disapproval.

If you approve,[8] I shall get in touch with Chairman Mora [9] immediately and recommend that a meeting of the Committee be arranged, if possible before the departure of Ambassador Zuleta Angel,[10] in order to see whether the Committee will agree upon this procedure and the text of a final report.

[7] Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[8] At this point, the source text bears a marginal notation which reads: "OK EGM[iller]".

[9] José A. Mora, Uruguayan Ambassador to the United States and Representative on the COAS.

[10] Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Colombian Ambassador to the United States and Representative on the COAS.

363/5–1551

The United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1951.

COAS 21

Subject: Termination of the Special Committee for the Caribbean

On Monday, May 14, the final report [1] of the Special Committee for the Caribbean, established on April 8, 1950 by the Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, was delivered to the Secretary General [2] of the Organization of American States and released to the press.

The report was drafted and approved at the final meeting of the Special Committee on May 7. On May 10 it was sent to the Representatives on the Council of the four directly interested governments (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Haiti) for their confidential advance information. The receipt on May 14 of a note dated

[1] A copy of the report, dated May 14, 1951, is attached to the source text, but it is not printed; for text, see *Annals of the Organization of American States* (Washington, 1951), vol. 3, pp. 338–339.

[2] Alberto Lleras Camargo.

May 12[3] from the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic,[4] addressed to Ambassador José Antonio Mora of Uruguay as Chairman of the Special Committee, provoked an all-day informal consultation among the members of the Special Committee. It was decided, however, not to change the final report under which the Committee terminated its labors. An explanation of the position adopted by the members of the Special Committee was incorporated in a note which Ambassador Mora sent on May 14[5] to Dr. Alberto Lleras, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, transmitting the Dominican note for inclusion in the documentation of the Committee.

Copies of the final report of the Committee and of Ambassador Mora's confidential note to Dr. Lleras are attached. Although the report of the Committee was released on May 14 for publication in newspapers of May 15, the Members of the Committee decided that the note to Dr. Lleras transmitting the Dominican note of May 12 would not be made public unless the Dominican Ambassador released his note.

The Committee's final report was drafted in such a way as to make it possible for the Committee to cease its activities. It will be recalled that an effort was made in November 1950 to issue a report which would have wound up the Committee's affairs by declaring the controversies, which were the subject of the resolutions of April 8, 1950, to have been ended. At that time the Government of the Dominican Republic, overruling the informal opinion expressed by the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic who was in New York at the time, declared that it would not accept a statement of that sort, since it did not consider its dispute with Cuba settled in all respects.

In order to avoid any repetition of this difficulty, and believing genuinely that the need for the Committee no longer existed, the members of the Committee prepared their final report with great care. They avoided any broad statements concerning the existence of an attitude of harmony amongst all the Caribbean states, but did indicate that any remaining difficulties which might exist were fully capable of being handled through normal diplomatic channels. No indication is given in the report that the states directly concerned have approved it, nor was their approval sought. The Committee refers to the resolution by which it was established more than a year ago with "provisional character" and states that it considers its work ended.

It was the hope of the Committee that the report would be accepted without any adverse comment on the part of any of the member states of the Organization of American States. The members of the Committee shared the belief that liquidation of the Committee itself might, in

[3] Not printed.
[4] Luis Francisco Thomen.
[5] A copy of the note in Spanish is attached to the source text, but it is not printed.

a small measure, contribute to the realization on the part of those governments concerned in the resolutions of April 8, 1950, that any remaining difficulties should be settled through direct negotiation.

Hopes for tacit acceptance of the Committee's final report were dashed when, on Saturday, May 12, the Dominican Ambassador, Dr. Luis Thomen, telephoned Ambassador Mora to state that he had received the report of the Committee, but wished to submit to the Committee a note containing further information which would indicate that the situation in the Caribbean was not as favorable as the Committee believed. He argued that it was important that the Committee not be terminated. His note was delivered on Monday morning, May 12, to Ambassador Mora with copies to all other members of the Committee.

The note, of which a copy is attached, makes charges concerning new conspiratorial meetings in Cuba alleged to be sponsored by President Prío Socarrás [6] and other high Cuban officials. The note also refers to various arms smuggling transactions in Mexico, Guatemala and the United States by persons believed to be enemies of the Dominican Government.

Ambassador Mora requested the members of the Committee to meet with him informally on May 14 to consider the nature of the reply that he should make to the Dominican note. All members of the Committee except the undersigned strongly held the view that the Committee was no longer in existence and it was, therefore, understood that the persons present were there in their capacity as former members of the Committee only. The Colombian representative, Dr. Jorge Mejía Palacio, argued in favor of a simple reply to Ambassador Thomen to the effect that the Committee, having already terminated its existence, could do nothing about his note but transmit it to the Governments for their consideration. This was opposed by others, including the U.S. Representative, on the grounds that it would inflate the significance of the new charges, which were generally felt to represent primarily a last minute attempt of the Dominican Ambassador to prevent liquidation of the Committee. It was finally decided to transmit the note to the Secretary General, under cover of a letter signed by Ambassador Mora, which would carefully explain why the Committee had felt that it should not alter the decision taken on May 7 to terminate its work. As will be seen from the attached copy of the note, the Committee attaches importance to the fact that it was given a clearly provisional character which did not justify its indefinite continuation; that normal diplomatic channels were open to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of clarifying problems mentioned in its note; and that the termination of the Committee in no way limited the right or opportunity

[6] Carlos Prío Socarrás, President of the Republic of Cuba.

of the Dominican Government to take up with appropriate inter-American organs any situation which it felt threatened the peace.

With the transmittal of its final report to the Secretary General and its release to the press, the Special Committee for the Caribbean may now be considered to be definitely terminated.

JOHN C. DREIER

739.00/8–2351

Memorandum by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1951.

Subject: Strange story of the vessel *Quetzal*, formerly the *Fantasma*

This is the kind of story which could happen only in the Caribbean—or possibly in the Balkans of the old days.

About a month ago the Dominican Foreign Office gave our Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo a new bill of charges of revolutionary plotting against Trujillo.[2] One of the charges was that the vessel *Fantasma* which had been seized by the Cuban Government from the Cayo Confites revolutionists when that expedition was broken up in 1947, had recently been turned over by the Cuban Government to Caribbean plotters against Trujillo and would be used in a new attempt against the Dominican Government. Information received about the same time from our Embassy in Habana indicated that the vessel had been sold at auction to a group apparently headed by the Cuban Deputy and long-time active foe of Trujillo, Enrique Cotubanama Henriquez, President Prío's brother-in-law. A message from our Embassy in Guatemala at the same time was to the effect that the vessel had been sold to the Guatemalan Government. According to both Embassies, the vessel was to be reconditioned in Cuba and to sail to Guatemala, assertedly to participate in legitimate commercial activities; the crew, however, continued to be composed of Cuban, Dominican, and Guatemalan veterans of the Cayo Confites affairs. The vessel's name was changed to the *Quetzal* and it was apparently transferred to Guatemalan registry.

On or about July 25 the *Quetzal* sailed from Cuba bound for Livingston, Guatemala, but failed to arrive. About the middle of August, the Dominican Foreign Minister[3] informed Ambassador Ackerman[4] that President Trujillo planned to release publicly a

[1] Addressed also to Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Officer in Charge of Caribbean Affairs, Office of Middle American Affairs.

[2] Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, President of the Dominican Republic.

[3] Virgilio Díaz Ordóñez.

[4] Ralph H. Ackerman, United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republi

strong statement regarding the activities of the vessel, with supporting documents in order to make known to all anti-Trujillo plotters that the Dominican Government was aware of their schemes in the hope that this would deter them. In the mean time the United States Coast Guard office in Miami had been requested by sources not divulged to Washington Coast Guard headquarters or to the Department whether it could supply any information on the fate of the vessel.

It was not until the receipt of Ciudad Trujillo's despatch 105 of August 17 [5] that we received information indicating that the Dominican Government was fully aware of the fate of the crew and probably of the vessel, and probably had a hand in preventing its arrival in Guatemala. According to a public announcement put out by the Dominican Government on August 16, the Captain of the vessel, one Alfredo Brito Baez, is now in the Dominican Republic, "having reentered the Dominican Navy after having been abroad on special service". Ambassador Ackerman has been confidentially informed that all the crew are also in the Dominican Republic. He had not obtained any definite information as to the fate of the vessel, but says it is believed that it has either been turned over to the Dominican Government or scuttled. The Naval Attaché is investigating this point.

One possible explanation of the change in course of the vessel after leaving Cuba is that the Captain and/or the crew were bought off by Dominican agents to sail the vessel to the Dominican Republic, or to scuttle it somewhere on the high seas and be picked up by a Dominican vessel. Another possible explanation is that a unit or units of the Dominican navy intercepted the vessel after it left Cuba and took it and its crew to the Dominican Republic, or sank the vessel on the high seas after removing the crew.

The vessel's documents, which the Dominican Government asserts have come into its possession and which were published in the Dominican newspaper *El Caribe* on August 16, are cited by the Dominican Government as proving that the vessel was engaged in revolutionary activities against it. Actually there is nothing in the published documents definitely establishing this. It appears from the documents that the actual owner of the vessel may have been the Dominican revolutionist Miguel Angel Ramirez, one of the leaders of the Cayo Confites and Luperón [6] affairs. The only document allegedly found on the vessel which might be interpreted as evidence of a recurrence of active revolutionary plotting was an undated receipt signed by Ramirez for a quantity of arms and ammunition received from Costa Rican authorities at San José. However, this could very well be a receipt for the arms received by Ramirez from the Costa Rican Government (i.e.

[5] Not printed.

[6] For documentation on this incident, which involved an attempted invasion of the Dominican Republic in June 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 451 ff.

Figueres)[7] prior to the Luperón invasion attempt in 1949 (during the OAS Caribbean Investigating Committee's activities last year it was ascertained that some of the weapons seized by the Dominican authorities at Luperón had originally been licensed for export from the United States for the use of the Costa Rican Government.

Another interesting point in this whole affair is that the Captain of the *Quetzal*, Alfredo Brito Baez, has been out of the country for some time, and, if I remember correctly, was the Captain of another vessel of which the Dominicans were suspicious early last year, after it had been sold by a Cuban firm and taken to Guatemala. Captain Brito told us at that time that he was a Cuban, but now the Dominican Government asserts he is a Dominican who, as stated above, has "reentered the Dominican navy after having been abroad on special service."

Information just received from Habana is that the Dominican Chargé has left precipitously for the United States asserting his life is in danger from Dominican exiles and their sympathizers, who are asserting publicly the vessel was captured and sunk by the Dominican armed forces. It is conceivable that the incident might lead to a new flare-up in Caribbean tension and necessitate OAS action.[8]

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[7] José Figueres Ferrer; he had become President of the Founding Junta of the Second Republic in Costa Rica in May 1948.

[8] The following handwritten notation, initialed by Mr. Bennett, appears on the source text: "There is also today's reappearance—in President Prio's mansion—of Enrique Henriquez after two days of being 'kidnapped'. All this means that the pot is boiling again—we can expect repercussions from Guatemala soon. If the Dominican navy did capture or sink the Guat. vessel, then that is an act which would ordinarily be considered an act of war."

637.39/10–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1951.

Subject: Cubans Imprisoned in Connection with "Quetzal" Case in Dominican Republic.

Participants: Dr. Luis Machado, Ambassador of Cuba to the United States
Dr. Gonzalo Guell, Cuban Representative on the COAS
John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative on the COAS
Edward A. Jamison, AR.

By arrangement with Ambassador Guell and Ambassador Machado, the latter having called me on the phone, I called at the Cuban Embassy to speak to them and convey to Ambassador Guell the Department's reaction to the questions which he had put to me last night

(see memorandum of conversation of today's date).[1] Ambassador Machado opened the conversation by repeating in general terms the main points of the Cuban position, emphasizing their desire to avoid any public dispute in the Caribbean among members of the anti-Soviet group.

I told Ambassador Guell that, having considered the matter more fully, I had come to the conclusion that it would not be possible for me to take any step in the matter as Chairman of the Peace Committee without consulting members of the Committee. I said that I had discussed the problem which he had outlined to me last night with others in the Department in a sincere desire to work out any arrangement which might enable us to help avoid the development of any further dispute among the Caribbean countries. We had come to the conclusion that it would not be possible for any U.S. representative to attempt to intervene in the matter unofficially, since any such move would be considered to represent official U.S. policy. Moreover, I pointed out that our relations with the Caribbean countries were so intimate and broad in scope that anything that we did in the way of intervening in a situation of this sort would be liable to misinterpretation in the light of other completely unconnected aspects of our relations. We therefore had come to the conclusion that any insinuation of suggestions or requests on our part would be too likely to be misinterpreted and to worsen rather than improve the situation. Such a move would be neither in the interest of Cuba nor of the United States.

Ambassador Guell expressed some disappointment at this. In connection with one of his remarks I stated that he had asked me a second question, namely, whether we would advise him to see Accioly.[2] I repeated what I had said Sunday night, namely, that we saw no reason why he should not do so in view of Ambassador Accioly's known abilities and prestige as an impartial, intelligent and experienced international jurist and diplomat. I added that I had no idea what Ambassador Accioly's reaction would be, since I had not spoken to him of the subject, but that it might be possible that Brazil could feel they were sufficiently removed from the area to avoid some of the dangers which we foresaw for ourselves.[3]

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[1] In a memorandum of a conversation which took place on October 21, by Ambassador Dreier, dated October 22, 1951, Ambassador Güell was reported to have asked in part whether Ambassador Dreier, in his capacity as Chairman of the Inter-American Peace Committee and probable future chairman of the COAS, could "express semi-officially to the Dominican Government" the hope that the Cuban request for the release of the five imprisoned Cuban crew members of the *Quetzal* would be granted without further delay (637.39/10–2251).

[2] Hildebrando Pompeu Pinto Accioly, Brazilian Representative on and Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States.

[3] On October 23, 1951, Ambassador Dreier discussed the *Quetzal* matter with Ambassador Accioly at the latter's office in the Pan American Union. The memorandum of that conversation, dated October 23, reads in part as follows: "When

Footnote continued on following page.

Ambassador Guell then referred to the Peace Committee and said he was authorized to discuss the matter with members of the Committee. He said he might talk with them before the meeting this afternoon, or might on the other hand see them individually. I advised him informally to follow the latter course starting with Accioly, since if he discussed the matter with the whole group at once before the meeting today, the matter might get out of his control and wind up in the meeting itself without his so desiring. Guell indicated that he would probably follow this course, first calling Habana, if possible, for further instructions.

At the close of the conversation Guell seemed to be somewhat at a loss to know what to do. He spoke of the necessity for Cuba's doing something, and presumed that they might have their Chargé at Ciudad Trujillo again request release of the Cubans and then just wait awhile. I mentioned at this point that the Uruguayan Ambassador to Peru was apparently also just waiting in Mexico, and observed that he might presumably be going back to Ciudad Trujillo in due course.

Ambassador Guell said he would keep me informed of any steps he took, while Ambassador Machado would do likewise to the Department. After he and I had left Washington, Minister Barón [4] would keep in touch with Mr. Burrows.[5]

Footnote continued from preceding page.

Accioly asked me what the U.S. was going to do about this matter, I explained why we could do nothing. He expressed regret at this, since he felt it would be difficult for any other country to do anything if the U.S. did not. I then mentioned the Uruguayan intervention on behalf of Guatemala, which also apparently was news to Accioly. I asked him whether Brazil might do anything in this case, being more removed from the area, and he said he did not know. He had informed his Foreign Office of Guell's conversation, but he doubted whether the Brazilian Government would want to step in where the U.S. did not." (637.39/10–2351)

[4] José T. Barón, Cuban Alternate Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States.

[5] Charles R. Burrows, Office of Regional American Affairs.

637.39/11-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Office of Middle American Affairs [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1951.

Subject: *Quetzal* Case [2]

Participants: Ambassador Nufer, Director of MID
Ambassador Beaulac, U.S. Ambassador to Cuba
Mr. Charles R. Burrows, Deputy Director of AR and U.S. Acting Representative on the Inter-American Peace Committee.
Mr. Edward A. Jamison [3]—AR
Mr. Hobart Spalding, Intelligence Adviser—ARA
Mr. Harvey R. Wellman, Acting Officer in Charge, Caribbean Affairs—MID
Mr. Charles C. Hauch, Caribbean Affairs—MID

This meeting was held to review the Department's position with reference to the "Quetzal" case, particularly in the light of information from the Embassy at Habana that the Cuban Foreign Minister was planning to come to Washington in connection with "Quetzal" matter and would probably wish to discuss it with Ambassador Beaulac, now on consultation in the Department.

After considerable discussion of the whole "Quetzal" matter, the sense of the meeting was as follows:

1. That the Department and particularly the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba should avoid getting involved in the controversy between the Cuban and Dominican Governments which had been referred to the Inter-American Peace Committee.
2. That Ambassador Beaulac not change his travel plans but return to Habana on December 1 as projected.
3. That the Department should receive the Cuban Foreign Minister or other Cuban representatives if they should call for an appointment and that Ambassador Beaulac should be present at any such meeting, but that the Department should discourage any call by the Foreign Minister at the Department to discuss the "Quetzal" matter, in view of its having been placed before the Peace Committee and the desirability of avoiding prejudicing the position of the United States representative on the Committee.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Hauch on December 4, and rewritten by Mr. Wellman on December 10.

[2] On November 23, 1951, the Dominican Government had put the crew members of the *Quetzal* on trial. All of the crew were convicted of engaging in subversive activities; the three Guatemalan and five Cuban sailors were sentenced to 30 years at hard labor. Upon appeal, the two Dominicans involved were acquitted, and the sentences of the others were reduced. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal files 637.39 and 739.00.

[3] Officer in Charge, Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs.

4. That if the Cuban Foreign Minister or other Cuban representatives in discussions with Department officers should make a final effort to get the U.S. to influence the Dominican government to release the Cuban seamen, the suggestion be made to the Cuban representatives that they communicate with the Chairman of the Peace Committee. (In this connection Ambassador Beaulac stressed that our reply to any such Cuban suggestion should be of a nature acceptable to Cuba and helpful to a solution of the problem.)

5. That if prior to Ambassador Beaulac's return to Cuba, the Cuban Foreign Minister should wish to discuss the matter with him, the Ambassador should of course see him, but should make clear our position in the foregoing sense.

6. That the Department should interpose no objection to the fulfillment of an order of the Dominican Government for three combat aircraft from Canada. (Ambassador Nufer communicated that this decision had been taken at the ARA staff meeting.)

637.39/1–1052

The United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1952.

COAS 53

Subject: "Quetzal" Case

On December 25, 1951, at 11 p. m., Representatives of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, signed, before the Inter-American Peace Committee, a declaration of non-intervention and mutual respect,[1] thus bringing to an end the consideration before the Committee of the so-called "Quetzal" case. The following report is submitted by the undersigned as U.S. Member of the Inter-American Peace Committee.

The "Quetzal" case was brought before the Inter-American Peace Committee by the Government of Cuba in a note dated November 26.[2] This note, transmitted in accordance with the Committee's procedures to the Dominican Government, elicited a reply dated December 7.[2] In their reply the Dominican Government stated it would not object to consideration of the "Quetzal" case before the Peace Committee provided opportunity were also given to the Dominican Government to present its complaints against Cuba, particularly the charge that the Cuban Government had violated inter-American agreements by returning the "Quetzal" to Miguel Angel Ramirez, well-known leader of the abortive Cayo Confites expedition of 1947.

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[1] The declaration is incorporated into the minutes of the meeting of the Inter-American Peace Committee held on December 25; a copy of the minutes in Spanish is attached to the source text, but not printed. For English text, see *Annals of the Organization of American States* (Washington, 1952), vol. 4, pp. 218–219.

[2] Not printed.

Further communications with representatives of the two countries in Washington revealed that the Foreign Ministers of both countries would come to Washington on or about December 19 for the purpose of consulting with the Peace Committee. A formal meeting of the Committee with Ambassador Gonzalo Guell and Ambassador Luís Thomen representing Cuba and the Dominican Republic respectively, was held on December 18,[3] but developed very little substantive information, since both Foreign Ministers were shortly expected to be in town. Following the arrival of the two Foreign Ministers, the Acting Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Quintanilla of Mexico (who assumed the Chairmanship according to the regulations when the current Chairman, Ambassador Guell of Cuba, stepped down from his post for this case) consulted informally with both, at the request of the Committee, and made arrangements for a formal meeting on December 21. In the meantime, members of the Committee further discussed the case informally with both Foreign Ministers.

At the meeting of the Committee on December 21, a lengthy speech was delivered by the Foreign Minister of Cuba, who offered an impressive amount of evidence to support his contention that the "Quetzal", engaged in a peaceful voyage and violating no laws, was seized by a Dominican war vessel and brought to the Dominican Republic either by force or fraud. He attacked the jurisdiction of the Dominican courts over the members of the crew of the "Quetzal" in view of the manner in which they had been brought to Dominican territory.

In reply the Dominican Foreign Minister emphasized the long record of revolutionary activity of the "Quetzal" and its owner. It is worthy of note, however, that at no time, either in the formal session of December 21 or in other informal conversations, did the Dominican Foreign Minister offer any explanation of how the "Quetzal" had been brought into Dominican waters. His main defense was the charge that the "Quetzal" had an illegal registry, and was obviously bound on a revolutionary mission, and therefore was properly considered outside the law.

Following the lengthy session of the evening of December 21, the members of the Committee proceeded to hold a series of informal conversations with the two Foreign Ministers separately. Most of these conversations took place at the respective Embassies of Cuba and the Dominican Republic or at the residence of Acting Chairman Quintanilla. It soon became clear that a fair chance of resolving the case was to be found in a formula embracing the following three points:

1) Liberation of the Cuban members of the "Quetzal" crew by the Dominican Government.

[3] A copy of the minutes of the meeting of December 18 is filed under decimal file number 363.1/12–1851.

2) Submission to the Court of two legal points which seemed capable of adjudication: namely, the Cuban charge that Dominican courts lacked competence and jurisdiction in the case of the "Quetzal" crew; and the Dominican charge that Cuba had violated the Habana Convention in turning over the "Quetzal" to its former owner, Miguel Angel Ramirez.

3) A Declaration by both parties before the Committee of non-intervention in each other's affairs, restitution and accommodation of diplomatic representatives, abstention from hostile propaganda by either government, and finally, agreement to bring any other outstanding questions that might develop before the Committee.

At first both Foreign Ministers indicated general agreement with the formula outlined above, it being understood that the Committee would make no public reference to the liberation of the Cuban sailors, nor would the written agreement between the parties touch upon that subject. However, the written agreement would not be signed and made public until the Cuban members of the "Quetzal" crew were released.

As the Committee attempted to reduce this formula to satisfactory written terms, however, a major difficulty was encountered. The Dominican Foreign Minister, who had previously emphasized merely the return of the "Quetzal" to its former owner, Miguel Angel Ramirez, as the case they wished to bring before the International Court, indicated that he actually had in mind a broader subject, namely, various aspects of the Cayo Confites incident of 1947. The Cuban Foreign Minister insistently refused to permit any aspect of the Cayo Confites case to be brought up before the International Court, claiming that this subject had been fully aired and dealt with by the Organ of Consultation and the Inter-American Peace Committee in past years. Working day and night—twice until the early hours of the morning—the Committee attempted to find a satisfactory written formula which would accommodate the views of both Foreign Ministers on this subject.

Another serious obstacle to the Committee's work developed on Sunday afternoon, December 23, when in the midst of a discussion with the members of the Committee the Dominican Foreign Minister and Ambassador Thomen announced that they had just received word that the Guatemalan members of the "Quetzal" crew had been released that day in Ciudad Trujillo. This announcement fell like a bomb in the midst of the Committee which had already made known its fears that any such action by the Dominican Government, while leaving the Cuban sailors in prison, would have a most disturbing effect upon Cuban opinion and would probably render useless any further efforts by the Peace Committee. So strongly did the Committee make known its disappointment over this action of the Dominican Government, that the Dominican Foreign Minister offered to take special measures to obtain assurances that the Cuban members of the "Quetzal" crew would be released immediately, once agreement was reached with Cuba on

the other points referred to above. The Committee was also pleased to receive the cooperation of the Cuban Foreign Minister, who delayed his return to Habana in order to avoid having to break relations with the Dominican Republic, as he had intended to do in the event the Guatemalan sailors were freed without similar action on behalf of the Cubans.

The following day, when efforts to produce agreement on the submittal of cases to the International Court proved to be in vain, Ambassador Quintanilla suggested that a happy solution would be offered by the agreement of both parties to drop both of the cases referred to in point 2 above, leaving only point 3 to be included in the written agreement. After some consideration of the merits of this idea, which was backed by other members of the Committee, both Foreign Ministers gave their assent. Final approval of the agreement was therefore made possible at once. The signature was delayed until the late hour on Christmas Day only because of difficulties in obtaining official word from Ciudad Trujillo that the Cuban sailors had in fact been released to the Chargé d'Affaires of Chile, who was at that time representing Cuban interests. [4]

In connection with paragraph number 3) of the agreements signed on December 25, copy of which is attached, some background is worth placing in the record. The proposal of the Committee to include in the agreement an item on propaganda was inspired by a remark of the Dominican Foreign Minister on this subject early in the negotiations. Before trying to include these topics in their proposals, however, the Committee pointed out to the Dominican Foreign Minister that it was hardly possible to prevent the issuance of anti-Dominican statements by private groups and persons in Cuba. Dr. Díaz Ordoñez said that he fully accepted this fact and that what he had in mind preventing was official or officially-inspired propaganda which the Cuban Government under their constitution was fully empowered to prevent. This view of the Dominican Foreign Minister was made known to the Cuban Minister of State, Dr. Sánchez Arango, by the Committee.

One other point connected with the negotiation of the agreement concerned the restoration of diplomatic representatives by the two countries. The Cuban Minister of State informed the Committee of the report which he had received from the former Cuban Chargé in Ciudad Trujillo, concerning an interview he had had with President Trujillo during which the latter had made various offensive remarks about Cuba and its high officials. Dr. Sánchez Arango said he could not send a new Chargè d'Affaires to Ciudad Trujillo so long as that incident remained on the record without some public denial by a high

[4] In telegram 124, from Ciudad Trujillo, dated December 25, 1951, Chargé Belton informed the Secretary of State that the Cuban members of the *Quetzal* crew had been released (637.39/12–2551).

Dominican source. The matter was taken up with Dr. Díaz Ordónez, who had been present during the interview. It was possible to arrange for an exchange of letters [5] between each Foreign Minister and the Chairman of the Committee, in which this incident was erased from the record.

From the remarks made by both Foreign Ministers, and their letters of appreciation [6] sent to members of the Committee, it would appear that both of them were genuinely gratified with the outcome of their discussions before the Committee. The Cuban Minister of State informed the Committee that it could consider the "Quetzal" case closed so far as the Government of Cuba was concerned.

JOHN C. DREIER

[5] Not found in Department of State files.
[6] Not printed.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING HEMISPHERE DEFENSE, PROVISION OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN REPUBLICS, AND PARTICIPATION BY AMERICAN REPUBLICS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT [1]

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443 [2]

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Director of International Security Affairs for the International Security Affairs Committee [3]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1951.

ISAC D–5

STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO A JUDGMENT REGARDING THE INITIATION OF A UNITED STATES GRANT MILITARY AID PROGRAM TO THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS IN FISCAL YEAR 1952

I. PROBLEM

Do the security interests [4] of the United States require legislative authorization and appropriations for the provision of grant military assistance to the Latin American Republics in Fiscal Year 1952?

II. BACKGROUND

The problem under consideration has arisen urgently in connection with the formulation of the position which the United States will take at the meeting of the American Foreign Ministers in March 1951.[5]

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 599 ff.

[2] Top secret records relating to the activities of the International Security Affairs Committee for the period February–October 1951, including action summaries, memoranda of meetings, minutes, and other papers, as maintained in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[3] The International Security Affairs Committee was an interdepartmental committee comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA); it was charged with responsibility to conduct a continuing review and coordination of policy and programs relating to international security affairs and mutual defense assistance matters. The committee was chaired by Mr. Thomas D. Cabot, Director, International Security Affairs, a position established in the Department of State effective January 8, 1951. For additional information, see the editorial note in vol. I, p. 267, and the press release, dated January 4, 1951, in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1951, pp. 155–156.

[4] For documentation relating to the national security policy of the United States, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[5] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. Documentation concerning the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.

This task, in turn, involves the measures which this Government will take in furthering the implementation of Section C of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Uniting for Peace";[6] the military obligations under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance;[7] and the preparation of Fiscal Year 1952 foreign aid legislation which the Executive Branch of this Government will submit to Congress in April 1951.

III. DISCUSSION

A. *Alternative Points of View*

1. That it is in the interest of the United States to provide grant military assistance which it is considered that Latin American countries now need to increase their ability to fulfill their roles in hemisphere defense; and to furnish military units to be used outside of Latin America in support of collective action against aggression.

2. That the other requirements for available and potential United States military resources are such that it is not in the interest of the United States to initiate a program of grant military aid to Latin American countries in Fiscal Year 1952.

In a memorandum drafted on November 13, 1950 (see Tab A),[8] the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State made the following recommendations:

"That the Agreement of the Department of Defense be sought to a request to Congress for legislative authorization to permit this Government to make available to governments of the other American Republics military training, equipment and supplies on a grant basis for units of their armed forces which they may decide, in conformity with Section C of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions entitled 'Uniting for Peace', to maintain for possible service as United Nations units."

The Secretary of Defense[9] in a letter of January 10, 1951 (see Tab B),[10] to the Secretary of State said:

"For fiscal year 1952, it is the judgment of the Department of Defense that military grant aid in an amount not to exceed $100,000,000

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[6] Reference is to Resolution No. 377 (V) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 3, 1950. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 10–12.

[7] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[8] The cited memorandum, drafted by Mr. Edward A. Jamison, Officer in Charge, Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 672. It indicates that the initiative for the development of a military grant aid program for Latin America was originally taken in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

[9] George C. Marshall.

[10] Printed as an annex to the source text.

for Latin America should be included in the Mutual Defense Assistance legislation now being drawn up."

Task Force VI of the Foreign Aid Steering Group,[11] in a memorandum of February 6, 1951 (Tab C)[12] to the Chairman of Task Force I of the FASG stated that:

"If the military aid for Latin America were handled as a separate title, it would probably not have any substantial effect in the balance of the program, even if considerable opposition to that part of the program developed."

B. *Summary of the Arguments for and against Grant Military Aid to Latin America in Fiscal Year 1952* (Note: Prepared in S/ISA as a guide for developing the issues on proposals for furnishing military aid on a grant basis to the Latin American countries).

1. For Grant Military Aid to Latin America:

a. In the light of the United States strategic interest in Latin America and the undesirability of diverting United States forces to this area in time of emergency, it is considered militarily sound to provide such military assistance to Latin American countries as may be required in order to enable them to discharge fully their respective roles and missions.

b. Under present legislation the United States is severely limited in its ability to assist the people and governments of the other American Republics in fulfilling the positive roles which many of them wish to take, and are potentially capable of taking, in the struggle of the free world against Communist aggression. This is in sharp contrast with the military assistance being given to governments in other areas of the world in the form of outright grants.

c. The present high degree of voting support which the 20 Latin American countries provide in support of United States policies and objectives in the United Nations and in the OAS is not sufficient; in addition, a much greater degree of practical and psychological support is needed from the governments and peoples of these countries.

d. Any steps which elicit more tangible Latin American contribution to coordinated action against aggression will (1) strengthen recognition by Latin American Governments of the indivisibility of defense against Communist aggression; (2) increase their willingness to make contributions; and (3) eliminate what they have considered a valid basis for their failure to participate more fully.

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[11] The Foreign Aid Steering Group (FASG), established in late 1950, was an interagency group comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the Office of the Special Assistant to the President Averell W. Harriman, and the Bureau of the Budget. Representatives from other agencies sometimes attended the group's meetings, which were held at the Department of State. The FASG was charged with the responsibility for developing a unified foreign assistance program. For additional documentation, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.

[12] Not printed.

e. Grant military aid will increase among the people of Latin America a sense of responsibility which their governments have for participating in collective efforts, and thus increase the ability of these governments to contribute military forces to some form of a collective action, either within, or outside the hemisphere.

f. Contributions which each government makes will serve as a stimulus to other governments to make contributions.

g. The political recommendation for grant aid is based upon the assumptions:

(1) that military grant aid will put the Latin American Governments in an improved position to contribute to coordinated action against aggression;
(2) that this purpose will be fully accepted by governments receiving such aid; and
(3) that those governments will commit themselves to making tangible contributions in accordance with an approved plan.

h. Finally, the adoption of the draft military resolution to be submitted to the forthcoming consultative meeting of the American Foreign Ministers will serve to clarify to public opinion throughout the Hemisphere the broad concept of Inter-American defense which the United States is anxious to promote.

2. Against Grant Military Aid to Latin America:

a. The geographic location and the political, religious and cultural orientation of Latin American countries toward the United States will cause them to cast their lot with us in the long run. We should, therefore, conserve military equipment now available or expected to be available in Fiscal Year 1952, as much as we can, as far as Latin America is concerned, and concentrate it where it is most immediately needed—to equip the people of Europe and the Far East who are threatened by or fighting against Communist aggression on their own ground in areas which are vital to the security of the United States.

b. In order to strengthen political unity, and to further effective use of the manpower resources of the free world, the United States has furnished equipment which certain United Nations members needed to participate in the United Nations action in Korea. This assistance has been furnished on a "pay if you can, if not settle up later" basis. Although several of the Latin American countries have indicated a willingness to participate in the Korean operation, the net results from all of them have not been outstanding. Accordingly, no amounts of aid which may be made available for such operations should be specifically earmarked for the Latin American countries until the relative merits of other claimants for such aid have been determined in the light of factors peculiar to the particular operations.

c. In addition to the larger considerations, the major serious disadvantages within Latin America of a grant military aid program are: (1) the propaganda against the substantive problem of United States hegemony, and its adverse effect on the will for self-help; (2) changes in the balance of power within the region; and (3) the dissipation of some undefined proportion of the aid

for intra-hemisphere political reasons, rather than for the stated purposes.

d. It is a basic assumption implicit in both the military (Tab B) and the political (Tab A) recommendations for grant military aid that the resources of the Latin American countries are not sufficient to enable them to accomplish the mission which the United States desires them to accomplish. It does not necessarily follow from this assumption that grant military aid is the best method of achieving United States objectives in Latin America. If any form of grant aid is proven necessary to achieve these objectives, it is arguable that such aid should be furnished through the media of Point Four Assistance, Export-Import Bank loans, and MDAP offshore purchases. These methods may be expected to have the effect of freeing dollars for purchase of arms in the United States, raising the standard of living and so increasing internal security, fostering the further development of Latin America as a source of strategic materials, and improving transport and communication within the area. It should be noted in this connection that the military recommendation (Tab B) is confined to furthering hemisphere defense, without indicating whether this concept includes extra-hemisphere operations.

IV. CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRING ELUCIDATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

A. What is the present status of Inter-American defense planning, first, on an international basis, and, second, on a unilateral U.S. planing basis?

1. Has a strategic concept been developed, and, if so, what is it?
2. Has the strategic concept been translated into defense plans for all, or some parts of, the area, with objectives and missions stated and developed, and, if so, what are the salient features?
3. Have defense plans been converted into force requirements of a general or specific nature, first, for the area as a whole, and, second, for individual countries and, if so, what are these?

B. What is the military basis for the proposal that $100,000,000 is required to furnish military assistance to Latin America in FY 1952?

1. Is it based on equipment deficiencies developed from force requirements under defense plans of the character mentioned in 1 above, and, if so, to what extent will this $100,000,000 fill such deficiencies, generally, and by countries? If this is not the basis, what is the basis?
2. To what extent are the forces for which such assistance is intended now in being? To the extent that they are not now in being, have they been budgeted for and when will they be activated, or are there at least plans for their activation?
3. What proportion of the total assistance proposed is designed to provide spares, replacements, etc., to make operable U.S. equipment now in the hands of the intended recipients? What general types and quantities of such equipment are now on hand and in what countries?

What proportion of the total assistance represents new capital equipment? What proportion represents training programs?

4. What is the present thinking as to the general breakdown as between countries and services of the $100,000,000 of assistance recommended?

C. What is the estimated total cost to the United States in future years, if any, of carrying forward the kind of program that would be initiated by the $100,000,000? Of implementing any defense plans which have been developed or are in process? In other words, is this a one-shot proposition, and if not, what is the general character, duration and magnitude of the commitment we are undertaking or visualize for the future?

D. To what extent, if any, will the provision of the assistance proposed interfere with the provision of assistance under other MDAP programs? From a military standpoint, and considered as of now, what priority should be accorded to any FY 1952 programs for Latin America in relation to MDAP programs for other areas? Given such a priority, and the general type of equipment to be provided, what is the best forecast as to when it would be possible to (*a*) make token deliveries, (*b*) make substantial deliveries, and (*c*) substantially complete the FY 1952 Latin American programs?

E. How long will it be, taking into account the time required to furnish assistance, any training required, and the present status and the potentialities of the various Latin American military establishments, to accomplish the objectives, as they are stated in answers to questions above, of the proposed military assistance program? In other words, when, as a practical matter, is it contemplated that such forces will be in a position to do each of the following: (*a*) discharge their roles under any Inter-American defense plans; (*b*) carry out specific missions of importance to Inter-American defense; (*c*) perform, in any global war, important tasks for which U.S. forces would otherwise be required; (*d*) contribute forces of substantial size and value for overseas operations in a global war; and (*e*) make significant contributions to any United Nations force?

[Annex]

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State [13]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 10, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is the opinion of the Department of Defense that the Mutual Defense Assistance legislation for Fiscal Year 1952

[13] A copy of this letter is also filed under Department of State decimal file number 720.5–MAP/1–1051.

should include a provision for a military grant aid program to Latin America.

The primary United States strategic military objective in Latin America is to establish an Inter-American defense structure which associates the military and strategic resources of the other American Republics with those of the United States and assures an increased production and delivery of essential strategic materials.

In the light of the United States strategic interests in Latin America and the undesirability of diverting United States forces to this area in time of emergency, it is considered militarily sound to provide such military assistance to Latin American countries as may be required in order to enable them to discharge fully their respective roles and missions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now preparing a hemisphere defense plan [14] which, supported by bilateral agreements with the Latin American countries, would be the military basis for programming aid.

For Fiscal Year 1952, it is the judgment of the Department of Defense that Military grant aid in an amount not to exceed $100,000,000 for Latin America should be included in the Mutual Defense Assistance legislation now being drawn up.

If the Department of State is in substantial agreement with the foregoing, it is recommended that this matter be referred to the Foreign Aid Steering Group for inclusion in foreign aid legislation.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[14] For previous documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense planning, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 599 ff.

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443

Minutes of the Third Meeting of the International Security Affairs Committee, Held in the Department of State, 10:30 a. m., February 13, 1951

TOP SECRET

ISAC M–3

[Here follows a list of those present (22).]

DISCUSSION BY GENERAL BOLTE [1] OF GRANT AID TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

1. GENERAL BOLTE explained in general terms why, from the military point of view, it is considered desirable to extend grant military assistance to Latin American countries. He said that the Department

[1] Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army, and Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

of Defense is interested essentially in getting approval of the principle of extending this grant aid, and that the proposed figure of $100 million which was arbitrarily fixed and is already being revised downward, underscores the fact that it is mainly the principle rather than the amount of such assistance which the Department of Defense is looking at. He mentioned that the Inter-American Defense Board has recently taken positive steps in developing a sound hemispheric defense plan and that the other American Republics are evidencing a cooperative spirit. In addition the other American states are taking a positive stand against world Communism. He said it would help the United States to exert real influence and take positive leadership in the forthcoming conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics in Washington beginning March 26 if the U.S. Delegation had at least agreement in principle on the matter of grant aid to the other American Republics. General Bolte said he realized a firm figure based on detailed justification would have to be developed for the FY 1952 presentation and that this job would not be extremely difficult because we already have a good idea of what the Latin Americans need.

2. General Bolte said that we are quite clear on what we expect to achieve through the extension of this grant aid. For one thing we would seek to strengthen the forces of those countries which could assist in the protection of the Panama Canal, especially at a time when our armed forces are committed elsewhere in the world. We also expect to develop plans with the Latin Americans for submarine patrol of shipping lanes in the event of total war. A further direct gain we would expect to accrue from the extension of grant aid is in the realm of base rights and communications facilities through certain of these countries. He added that although commitment by these countries of forces to Korea would not be treated as a *quid pro quo* for grant aid, the extension of grant aid would undoubtedly have an effect in causing these countries to be more cooperative in contributions to UN forces in Korea.

3. General Bolte said that the U.S. is disappointed in the kind of support these Latin American countries have given to the UN action in Korea, but he admitted that part of the blame is ours in the way we handled requests for contributions and in the conditions which we attached to the acceptance of offers of help. He stated that he recognized that there might be adverse Congressional reaction to extending grant aid to Latin America in the light of their poor showing with respect to Korea but that this opposition could probably be overcome through other considerations.

4. Mr. Gordon [2] asked whether we are pressing the Latin Americans to make contributions in the Korean war and whether there is any

[2] Lincoln Gordon, of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President.

likelihood of further developments on this score before April 2 (target date for Congressional presentation of FY 1952 aid program). GENERAL BOLTE said that we are pressing on various fronts for further Latin American contributions in Korea but that he doubted whether there would be anything substantial before April 2. MR. WHITE [3] added that we are increasing our pressures, that Mr. Mann [4] is in Mexico City at the present time discussing the possibility of a Mexican contribution and that Mr. Miller,[5] on his forthcoming trip,[6] will also press this matter in various capitals he visits. MR. GORDON asked whether General Bolte expected that firm programs similar to those on which arms aid for Europe and the Far East will be based can be developed for Latin America in time for the Congressional presentation. GENERAL BOLTE said that it can be done inasmuch as we already have a good estimate of what those countries require in the way of arms assistance. He mentioned that at the present the Latin Americans can only obtain assistance on a cash basis under Section 408(e)[7] and that because those countries have lowest priority they have not been able to get equipment even for cash. This, he mentioned, has caused an adverse reaction on the part of the Latin Americans.

5. MR. GORDON asked why we should give arms to the Latin Americans in view of the fact that they have dollar reserves and are in general enjoying a good foreign exchange position. MR. WHITE pointed out that we are admittedly aiming at the political problem in Latin America since our proposed program is so small. Grant military aid would at least be a kind of acknowledgement of the fact that the Latin Americans are paying off their lend-lease obligations, that they were not included in the Marshall Plan,[8] and that to date other countries have been getting free arms while the Latin Americans have not been able even to purchase arms from the United States. These, he said, are important political factors which must be taken into account in assessing this question. He also pointed out that it is not expected that in the coming year the Latin American countries generally will enjoy the

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[3] Ivan B. White, Office of Regional American Affairs; he became Director of the Office on February 19, 1951.

[4] Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[5] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[6] Mr. Miller visited five Latin American countries between mid-February and early March 1951: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. The main purpose of his trip was to discuss with the appropriate officials of these governments matters relating to the forthcoming Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Documents pertaining to his trip are in Department of State decimal file 110.15–Mi and Lot 53 D 26.

[7] Reference is to a section of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949; for text, see 63 Stat. 714.

[8] For documentation on the European Recovery Program, popularly known as the Marshall Plan after Secretary of State George C. Marshall (1947–1949), see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. III, pp. 197 ff.

same foreign exchange situation they enjoy today. MR. HEBBARD[9] stated that the Treasury Department as a matter of principle opposes extending aid to build up the dollar positions of other countries. However, Treasury recognizes that there are quite a number of considerations which have a bearing on this problem of grant aid to Latin America and considers the foreign exchange and dollar positions of these countries merely as aspects of the larger problem.

6. MR. HALABY[10] asked whether in the extension of this proposed grant aid substantial increases in forces in the recipient countries are contemplated, increases which might have an adverse effect upon the economic stability of those countries. GENERAL BOLTE stated that this program would not have any substantial effect on the size of the military establishments in the recipient countries.

7. MR. CABOT stated that the discussion this morning was by way of informal consideration of the problem in expectation of formal consideration at the next meeting of ISAC. He pointed out that a decision on the question of whether to extend grant military aid to Latin America in FY 1952 is required at an early date and that he expected ISAC could come to a decision at the next meeting.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to the question of military grant aid to Latin America.]

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[9] William L. Hebbard, Assistant Director, Office of International Trade, Department of the Treasury.

[10] Najeeb E. Halaby, Jr., Assistant for International Security Affairs, Economic Cooperation Administration.

710.5/2-1451

Memorandum by Mr. Ivan B. White of the Office of Regional American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1951.

Subject: Inter-American Military Cooperation

In my judgment, the U.S. has reached a point in its history where, for the first time, the prompt and effective military cooperation of the Latin American countries is of real importance. The evolution of this cooperation over the period of the next several years will be an important test of the efficacy of the Good Neighbor Policy. If these conclusions are correct, it follows that the orientation of U.S. diplomatic efforts in Latin America in the immediate future should be in the direction of a heavy concentration on obtaining prompt and effective military collaboration.

The key considerations which have led to the conclusions stated above are as follows:

1) It is generally regarded that the period of the next eighteen months, during which our own defense mobilization will be in the course of preparation, and the effective defenses of Western Europe in the process of erection, will be a vital one in the world's history.

2) The need to create situations of strength as set forth last year by Secretary Acheson is a real one. In its assessment of the world situation, the Soviet Union has probably appraised Latin America as being important as a producer of strategic materials but as a negligible factor, at least over the short term, in the military sphere, should there be an outbreak of general hostilities.

3) If a collective inter-American military force could be created in the near future, with a portion available to combat current aggression and the balance available for overseas operations in case of a widening of hostilities, this force would constitute a new factor in the world balance of power situation.

4) From the standpoint of the most effective utilization of resources, the creation and activation of the force outlined above would be most beneficial to the U.S. during this period of shortage of military manpower and equipment because:

(*a*) Latin America has available ground forces of 500,000 men who have already had varying degrees of military training and experience (attached is a country list of these forces), and

(*b*) the larger countries of Latin America already have a good nucleus of U.S. equipment, as a result of lend-lease and war surplus property operations, and, therefore, the need for equipment is a supplementary rather than a complete one.

5) The above considerations are important up to the point where Latin American countries could contribute forces within their economic capabilities so that no appreciable additional strain would be created on U.S. economic and financial resources.

6) With a rapidly growing U.S. public opinion that our allies should assume a more proportionate share of the military burden abroad, active military participation by the Latin American countries would greatly strengthen U.S.-Latin American relations during the coming years.

7) Finally, active military participation by the Latin American countries may, over the long run, accrue to their advantage. As larger percentages of U.S. and Western European output go into defense production, the chances of a Latin American country getting, in practice, a reasonable break on material supply will be greatly enhanced if it is in the position of a full ally. Furthermore, Latin America now has an opportunity to come of age, politically speaking, and to establish a real position in the world power framework.

The things we would like to have from Latin America in the near future in the military field may be summarized as follows:

1) *Participation in Korean Operations.* The need in this category is for ground forces. Latin American units sent to Korea will make it possible for the U.S. to accelerate the rate of dispatch of its own units to the European theater during the coming critical months. According

to the Department of Defense, several Latin American countries have the military capability of making available immediately for Korea units of the size indicated below:

Brazil—1 Division
Argentina—1 Division
Mexico—1 Regimental combat team
Chile—1 Battalion

In addition, it would be most helpful if Uruguay and Peru could supply a battalion each.

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense is prepared, as in the Colombian and Cuban cases, to assist in the training, equipment and supply of these units.

2) *Approval of the Inter-American Defense Scheme.*[1] I attach[2] a copy of the Inter-American Defense scheme and of the Department's airgram[3] regarding our desire to obtain the prompt approval of the Latin American Governments to this document. It would be most helpful if the Latin American countries could make an affirmative decision on this matter in time for formal action to be taken by the Consultation of Foreign Ministers. Although this document is primarily concerned with hemisphere defense in the narrow sense, it does have two advantages; (1) it names the probable aggressor specifically, and (2) it recognizes that in case of general hostilities, the Western Hemisphere should take the offensive.

3) *Adoption by the Consultation of Foreign Ministers of Adequate Resolutions on Military Cooperation.* There is attached a copy of the Draft Military Resolution[4] which is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. The key policy question raised by the Draft Resolution is whether the American Republics at this juncture are prepared to recognize that the defense of the hemisphere requires the projection of its military forces beyond the lines of demarcation set forth in Article IV of the Rio Pact.[5]

4) *Implementation of Resolutions.* Once the meeting of Foreign Ministers is concluded and the active planning of the Inter-American Defense Board is under way, it is hoped that favorable Congressional action on military aid for Latin America will make possible bilateral negotiations looking forward to the earmarking, training and equipment of a coordinated force which would be available for action wherever necessary, should there be an outbreak of general hostilities. In my judgment, the minimum force of this type which could be created in Latin America without undue strain on the economies of those coun-

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[1] Reference is to the Inter-American Common Defense Scheme, approved by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) on October 27, 1950, and by the Department of State on January 15, 1951; for information, see Secretary Marshall's letter to Secretary Acheson, December 16, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 679.

[2] No attachments were found with the source text.

[3] Circular airgram, dated January 30, 1951, not printed (710.5/1–3051).

[4] For text of the draft resolution on inter-American military cooperation as submitted to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation by the U.S. and several Latin American countries, see Pan American Union, *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held in Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951: Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), pp. 52–53, hereinafter cited as *Proceedings*.

[5] Rio Treaty; see footnote 7, p. 986.

tries would be along the following lines, including such units as may be made available for Korea:

Brazil—2 Divisions
Argentina—1 Division
Mexico—1 Division
Regimental combat teams from the medium-sized countries of Chile, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba.
Battalions from the 12 smaller Latin American countries.

I am fully cognizant of the political difficulties which will have to be overcome to make effective a program of the type outlined above. I believe it is most important, however, that we proceed as promptly and vigorously as is possible, recognizing that in some cases, governmental leaders, even if favorably disposed, will need a period of time to obtain acceptance from their own people of the concept of active military participation. In some cases, we may very well find that certain countries will count themselves out of this enterprise and that we may have to offset their non-participation by greater participation from more cooperative countries. In such an event, it seems inescapable to me that we will have to review our policy of economic cooperation with individual countries for the purpose of adopting a selective approach, rather than the general one envisaged in the U.S. position paper[6] prepared for the coming Conference.

[6] Presumably a reference to the position paper prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the final draft of which was designated IAM D–1/1a and dated March 21, 1951; for text, see p. 949.

720.5–MAP/2–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld of the Office of the Director of International Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1951.

Subject: Position to be taken by the Department regarding grant military aid for Latin American republics.

Participants: Mr. Thomas D. Cabot, Director, International Security Affairs
Mr. Ivan White, AR
Mr. W. H. Bray,[1] S/ISA
Mr. H. F. A. Schoenfeld, S/ISA

Mr. Cabot explained that he had learned this morning at the Secretary's staff conference that Mr. Nitze,[2] S/P, expects on Tuesday next, February 20, to discuss the above question with JCS. At the same time he had understood that in view of the forthcoming departure of As-

[1] William H. Bray, Jr., Office of the Director, International Security Affairs.
[2] Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff.

sistant Secretary Miller for a round of visits to certain Latin American capitals, the latter was anxious if possible to have some indication of an agreed position within the Department of State on the above subject. Further, Mr. Cabot had sought guidance at the Secretary's staff meeting as to whether he was to assume a quasi-judicial capacity as between divergent views within the Department on the subject, or whether he would be expected to follow his own inclination, which was adverse to grant military aid to Latin America at this time, and take a position as an advocate of this view. Mr. Cabot had not been enlightened as to what was expected of him in this respect, and was therefore seeking the views of interested officers both within the Department and in Defense and elsewhere. He had had an opportunity to examine ISAC D–5 [3] only following the meeting of ISAC of February 14 when General Bolte had spoken to that Committee in very general terms regarding the expediency of giving grant military aid to Latin American republics. On the other hand, Mr. Cabot could not construe General Bolte's statement as a response to the questions raised in Section IV of ISAC D–5, the answers to these questions, or at least the more controlling ones, being required for a judgment.

Mr. White said that ARA appreciated the difficulties caused by the absence of the information required from Defense as set forth in Section IV of ISAC D–5. ARA was prepared, however, to go on record in expressing the opinion that without grant military assistance to at least some of the Latin American republics, these perhaps including the most important members of the group, ARA was confident that if cooperation with the United States in a military sense should be urgently required and called for in the future, it would not be forthcoming, and this was a source of concern to ARA.

Mr. Bray pointed out that according to preliminary information from the Department of Commerce, which would be confirmed shortly, the Latin Americans had already begun to build up important dollar balances in 1950, which were expected to be substantially increased in 1951 and 1952, and which, consequently, might be available for purchase of military equipment adequate to their needs. Mr. White disagreed with this suggestion, pointing out that these balances would be required for many purposes more appealing to Latin American populations and governments than military expenditures.

Mr. Schoenfeld invited attention to the fact that the lack of the information called for in Section IV of ISAC D–5 in the case of the Latin American problem was making most difficult, if not impossible, the kind of judgment which had attended the development of MDAP for recipient countries under the various titles of the MDAA, or which had been considered in submitting requests to Congress for funds for

[3] Dated February 15, p. 985.

this purpose. Consequently, the Department was handicapped in approaching the problem so long as the necessary underlying data from Defense were not available. Mr. Cabot telephoned to General Burns [4] in the Department of Defense to inquire if these data could be expected in time for the scheduled meeting of the ISAC on February 16. Mr. Cabot reported that General Burns could give him no assurance to this effect. Mr. Cabot further indicated that General Burns had intimated the existence of some difference of opinion within the Department of Defense, which had not been settled by the official expression of the Defense view that an amount not exceeding $100,000,000 (later orally revised downward to $80,000,000) should be sought from Congress.

In response to Mr. Cabot's query whether there was any information regarding the probable magnitude of future needs for grant aid to Latin America in addition to the amount now under discussion, he was able to elicit no statement either from General Burns or from Mr. White.

The conversation ended on the agreed note that in all probability ISAC would be unable at tomorrow's meeting to make any determination regarding grant military aid for Latin America, and that the issue would have to be deferred for later consideration. Consequently, it was understood that Assistant Secretary Miller would be obliged to leave for his Latin American trip without a decision on this question.

[4] Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, U.S. Army (ret.), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the International Security Affairs Committee, Held in the Department of State, 11:00 a. m., February 16, 1951

TOP SECRET

ISAC M–4

[Here follow a list of those present (18) and a discussion of previous minutes.]

Grant Aid to Latin America

2. MR. CABOT said that the Department of State is not prepared at this time to make a decision with respect to the proposed grant aid program for Latin America because it is felt that more information as to the nature of and justification for the program are needed in State before such an important policy decision can be made. MR. CABOT

listed some of the considerations which enter into his own thinking on this question:

a. This is a very important question of policy and not merely a problem of the dollar amount involved. A decision to extend even the modest amount of grant aid proposed will subject us to persuasive pressures to increase the amount to unforeseeable proportions over the next few years.

b. According to the State Department estimates denial of this grant aid would make it unlikely that the UN could raise Latin American forces for foreign duty under the UN, whether in Korea or elsewhere.

c. The increasing shortage of war materials, and the low priority we have given Latin America as a claimant on available war materials, make it clear that the Latin American countries would not receive shipments of any consequence for 12 or 18 months, even under a grant aid program.

d. It is anticipated that the flow of dollars to Latin America will increase considerably during FY 1952 as a result of our stepped-up defense effort, so it is not clear why the Latinos should not buy what arms they require.

e. It is open to question whether the Congress would support such a grant aid program, and it is possible that its inclusion in the 1952 legislation might weaken our total case.

MR. CABOT stated that it was not clear to him what we could reasonably expect to gain in terms of U.S. security through this proposed program, since we could only promise aid and would not be able to deliver within the next year or year and a half.

3. MR. CABOT stated that it would be most helpful for the Department of State to have answers, even though not specific and not complete, to the questions raised by Mr. Ohly [1] with respect to the proposed program (paragraph IV, page 5, of ISAC D–5).[2] He concluded by saying that since the Department of State is not in a position to make a decision on this question at the present time he suggested that the Department of Defense undertake to provide him with as much of the needed information as possible so that the question could be decided in ISAC at a future meeting. He mentioned that Mr. Nitze is meeting with elements of the JCS early next week and that in these talks he might be able to get the kind of information which the Department of State requires for a decision on this matter.

4. GENERAL BURNS stated that he had hoped that the information supplied by General Bolte at the previous meeting would answer most of the State Department's questions. However, Defense will provide as much information as it can in reply to the questions in Paragraph IV of ISAC D–5. He pointed out that this grant aid proposal has only recently been approved in the Department of Defense and that there are no detailed plans developed in support of it. MR. GORDON pointed

[1] John H. Ohly, Acting Assistant Director, International Security Affairs.
[2] Dated February 15, p. 985.

out that since an early decision on this question is required to meet the needs of the Foreign Ministers Meeting (March 26) and the Congressional Presentation (April 2) a firm decision should be reached by March 1. MR. WHITE stated that although Mr. Miller realized it was not possible for him to have this decision before leaving on his trip, he wants to be consulted before a final decision is taken, and if it is felt that a decision must be reached before Mr. Miller returns to Washington (between March 10 and 12) it will be necessary to consult him by cable.

5. MR. HALABY pointed out that at this stage the grant aid question is largely between Defense and State, and that although ECA and the other member agencies have a less direct interest, it should be up to State and Defense to work out an agreed line and merely keep the other agencies informed of developments. While agreeing generally with Mr. Halaby, MR. GORDON and MR. HEBBARD asked that they be kept up to date on State-Defense discussions. MR. CABOT stated that he would work this out with General Burns and would tentatively schedule the question for final decision at the ISAC meeting on February 23.

6. MR. GORDON stated his understanding that a decision by State on the grant aid question is not conditioned upon full and complete answers by Defense to the formidable list of questions posed in paragraph IV of ISAC D–5. He pointed out that we should not expect that a new program such as the one proposed can be supported by as detailed a programming job as we can reasonably expect in connection with the European MDAP. MR. CABOT agreed with this observation and emphasized that he only wants a clear picture of what this program is intended to achieve in order to decide whether it warrants the major policy decision required.

7. MR. HALABY stated that there should be an estimate of the financial and economic capabilities of the Latin American countries to be affected by the proposed program in order that the economic impact may be assessed. MR. HEBBARD stated that he would undertake to get at least a rough estimate on the financial capabilities of these countries. He noted, however, that Treasury appreciates that a strong dollar position of a Latin American country is only one element which would affect a decision on the question of extending grant aid.

8. MR. WHITE, addressing the document ISAC D–5, said that ARA could not approve it because they did not think it possible adequately to set forth the pro's and con's on the question until there is more complete information available. Apart from this fact, he stated his reservations on the area approach taken by this paper, pointing out that each Latin American country presents a different problem and that a more selective approach is sounder. He stated that two of the questions listed in paragraph IV of the paper particularly interest him, namely,

for what purposes do we contemplate making Latin American troops available; and from what countries would they be drawn. In conclusion, MR. WHITE urged that the financial condition of a Latin American country not be taken as the controlling element in a decision on whether or not to extend grant aid, since psychological, political, and strategic factors are also major consideration.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to the question of a military grant aid program for Latin America.]

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443

Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the International Security Affairs Committee, Held in the Department of State, 10:30 a.m., February 23, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET

ISAC M–6

[Here follow a list of those present (18) and discussion of a matter unrelated to the question of grant aid to Latin America.]

Grant Aid to Latin America

5. MR. CABOT said that the State Department accepts the Defense Department's recommendation of an $80 million grant aid program for Latin America and will not oppose the inclusion of this item in the 1952 budget presentation. He said that it may be necessary to refer the matter back to ISAC for further consideration should it be determined that the justification is inadequate and that it might jeopardize the success of the 1952 legislative program.[2]

6. MR. WILLIS [3] said that the Latin American countries are in a strong financial position and in general will continue in this position. He believed that the Administration should not be expected to present adequate justification to Congress based on the inability of Latin American countries to pay. This does not mean that Treasury objects to the program since there are no doubt many reasons why we do not request the Latin American countries to pay. He said the decision in this respect should be with State and Defense because of strategic and other reasons. Treasury will approve the decision to grant aid to Latin America subject to the same reservation stated by Mr. Cabot.

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[1] No representative from the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs was present at this meeting.

[2] The Department of State was informed by the Department of Defense, in a memorandum by Maj. Gen. S. L. Scott, Director, Office of Military Assistance, to Mr. Cabot, dated February 22, 1951, that the upper limit for the proposed military grant aid program had been reduced to $80,000,000; the Department of State's acceptance of the Defense Department's recommendation was communicated in a letter from the Acting Secretary of State (Webb) to Secretary of Defense Marshall, dated March 9, 1951, not printed (720.5–MAP/3–951).

[3] George H. Willis, Director, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.

7. General Burns said he interpreted this to mean the green light for Defense but that the case is subject to later review.

8. Mr. Gordon said Mr. Harriman agreed on the matter. He added that there are two appropriate points in this connection: (1) the Latin American countries should have a low priority in all programs the JCS recommend; and (2) the amount of aid should be small and contingent upon some *quid pro quo* since it is fairly obvious that Latin America does not need the grant. The program is being proposed in order to achieve certain U.S. objectives. Mr. Gordon said that Task Force I of the Foreign Aid Steering Group should consider, in working out the legislative program, whether the Latin American program could be made more appealing by having the legislation include the following: (1) that assistance be given only in relation to the recipients' participation in an agreed Western Hemisphere defense plan; (2) that the grant aid be associated with commitments outside the recipient countries with relation either to hemispheric defense or in support of UN actions outside the hemisphere; and (3) that grants be made only pursuant to bilateral agreements that provide for maximum self-help and mutual aid.

9. Mr. Halaby remarked that ECA had no direct interest in this program and did not expect to be called upon to defend it. On a personal basis, he asked whether the legislation could be drafted so that the aid would be given on a reimbursable basis (rather than on a grant basis) in return for payment either in cash or strategic materials. He questioned the desirability of our giving aid to countries that are building up dollar reserves when we are "squeezing" the European countries on their dollar reserves, or giving grant aid to those who can pay. He said that with regard to legislative strategy it might be better to place this request in a separate title.

10. Mr. Cabot asked Mr. Gordon to include his points and those raised by Mr. Halaby in a paper to be presented to Task Force I. He remarked that the action of ISAC in approving the program would make it hard to resist requests for aid from all other countries.

11. There was additional discussion whether ability to pay is a criteria in determining grant aid programs. It was agreed that ISAC was not deciding the over-all relation of end-item programs with ability to pay.

[Here follows discussion of additional matters unrelated to the question of grant aid to Latin America.]

363/3-551

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 5, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of the world situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it of military importance to use the occasion of the forthcoming Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, scheduled to open in Washington on 26 March 1951, to press for the achievement of certain military objectives in Latin America. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the validity of the military measures and objectives outlined in both the Analysis and the Conclusions of NSC 56/2, "United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration," dated 18 May 1950.[1] They consider, therefore, that those points should be pressed in general and in detail.

From the military point of view, action to achieve the following purposes appears to be particularly important at this time:

(*a*) The acknowledgment by the American Republics of the necessity for self-help and mutual aid in preparation for meeting and defeating aggression. The principle that each nation has a moral obligation to prepare itself to contribute its full share to defense of the hemisphere should be emphasized. Likewise, the necessity for assisting neighbor republics through mutual aid should be stressed. Some of the forms of mutual aid contemplated are the use of military bases, the provision of strategic raw materials, assistance in the procurement of military equipment and the provision of military training facilities;

(*b*) Approval by the several Latin American nations of the "Common Defense Scheme for the American Continent." This scheme, adopted by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), has as yet been approved only by the governments of the United States and Cuba;

(*c*) Willingness on the part of the Latin American Republics to proceed urgently with *additional* military plans to assure effective collective hemisphere defense. Such plans would include statements of the strategic military objectives of the American States, of the roles and missions of the several states in meeting such objectives, and of the strategic military requirements of the several states as derived therefrom. The development of military assistance programs for Latin America, if they are to be both effective and economical, must be based upon a foundation of such objective military planning;

(*d*) Acknowledgment of the necessity as a primary matter for using contingents of the armed forces of the several American Republics within the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere in order to maintain the security of the hemisphere. Its defense with Latin American forces

[1] For text of the National Security Council (NSC) document numbered NSC 56/2, adopted at the 57th meeting of the National Security Council, May 18, 1950, and approved by the President on May 19, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 628.

operating in Latin America should be regarded as the initial task for the Latin American nations. The machinery of the hemispheric regional organization should not be used to provide armed forces for service outside the region. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would find serious military objection to the establishment, for the Western Hemisphere, of a military organization parallel or similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because such an organization would not be in consonance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept of operations in the Western Hemisphere and in fact would otherwise seriously interfere with the effective conduct of a global war;

(*e*) Agreement that the several Latin American Governments will support actively the work of the IADB and will consider promptly the plans and recommendations of that body. In this connection, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not acquiesce in any arrangement for the command participation of the IADB in western Hemisphere strategy or operations; and

(*f*) Establishment of the principle of the maintenance of national armed forces tailored to meet the requirements of hemisphere defense. Such a principle is in direct contrast to the existing nationalism in Latin America which dictates a policy of military power balance in all arms vis-à-vis neighbors. Each nation should be encouraged to strengthen those military forces best adapted to the execution of the tasks which it accepts in the defense of the hemisphere.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that the processes used in the subject conference relating to the approval, from the military point of view, of position papers or draft resolutions will follow the procedures already established in connection with other Meetings of Heads of State or with the Councils of Foreign Ministers.

I am in full accord with the preceding recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and urge that this Government take every advantage of the opportunity offered by the forthcoming Inter-American Meeting to secure their adoption by the other participating nations, as primary military objectives of the United States.

On the other hand, these present recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not, in my opinion, preclude a determined effort by this Government to awaken the Latin American nations to their responsibility to provide ground forces for service in Korea in the near future, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and set forth in my letter to you of 30 January 1951, to which your reply of 23 February 1951 refers.[2] Such action in support of the United Nations will be consonant with the Program of United Nations Action to Stop Aggression, approved by the President as U.S. Governmental policy on September 16, 1950, following consideration in the National Security Council. Subparagraph (*d*) above postulates that the machinery of the Organization of American States, including the Inter-American

[2] These letters are printed in volume VII.

Defense Board, should not be used to provide armed forces for service outside the Western Hemisphere. Any steps in this connection should therefore be pursued by the United States in its capacity as executive agent for the United Nations in accordance with the Security Council resolutions of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950,[3] rather than within the framework of the Inter-American System.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[3] For text of these resolutions, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year: Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1950*, pp. 4 and 5; they are also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 155, 211, and 329.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26[1]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1951.

[Subject:] Cancellation by the Navy of Proposed Transfers of Excess Destroyer Escorts to Certain Latin American Governments.

The decision, which I understand Admiral Sherman[2] made yesterday not to go through with the proposed transfer of certain excess destroyer escorts to Peru, Uruguay, Colombia and Venezuela, after the Department of the Navy had completed discussions in this matter with Peru and Uruguay and had, in fact, drawn up in final form the proposed contracts for Admiral Sherman to sign, is a most unfortunate development. Coming as it does just before the Meeting of American Foreign Ministers where the question of military cooperation will figure prominently, it may very well cast serious doubts in the minds of the Foreign Ministers of our sincerity to cooperate in this field, and it may quite likely affect adversely the cooperation of these countries in economic matters, particularly the supply of strategic raw materials.

I believe that with respect to Peru and Uruguay this matter has gone too far for the Navy at this point to cancel indefinitely the transfer of these vessels.

It was my understanding that the House and Senate Armed Services Committees were well aware of the current negotiations with these Latin American countries for the sale of certain excess destroyer escorts, and that as a result of a discussion between Admiral Sherman and Mr. Vinson,[3] there was not included in Section 4 of Public Law 3

[1] Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953.

[2] Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.

[3] Carl Vinson (D–Ga.), Chairman, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives.

(copy attached)[4] any mention of destroyer escorts as being in the category of ships for which prior congressional approval would be needed for their transfer. In fact, in connection with congressional attitude on this whole program of excess ships to Latin America, it is noteworthy that, while the further sale of cruisers is precluded by this Act, both the House and Senate reports on the bill state specifically that this section was not intended to cast any reflection on the negotiations and recent sale of light cruisers to friendly Latin American countries.

The Peruvian and the Uruguayan naval attachés,[5] after having been told for the past month by the Navy that this bill of Mr. Vinson's would not affect the sale of these destroyer escorts, learned yesterday that as a result of a last minute opinion of the Navy's Judge Advocate General[6] the term "destroyer" as used in the Act is a generic word which would include destroyer escorts. As a result, they were informed Admiral Sherman would not approve the contracts and no further transfers would take place for the balance of this fiscal year. While the formal offer of sale to these countries has not been made, the foreign naval representatives had been asked formally several months ago by Navy to enter into these discussions with a view to negotiating the technical details incident to the sale. In fact, in the middle of January, all the naval attaches of these countries were taken by the Navy to Coral Gables, Florida, to inspect the ships which they would receive. In anticipation of the proposed sale, the Peruvian and Uruguayan Embassies had, therefore, prepared the way for acceptance by their respective Governments of the transaction and had received appropriations to cover the purchase of the vessels.

Recommendation:

I suggest you get in touch with Admiral Sherman as soon as possible and explain the Department's concern as outlined above. You might emphasize we cannot afford, particularly before an important inter-American meeting, to jeopardize our relations with friendly Latin American Governments whose cooperation in Hemisphere defense we are actively seeking. We therefore urge Admiral Sherman to reconsider his decision. If he feels he cannot do so because of the Judge Advocate General's decision that destroyer escorts are considered destroyers within the meaning of Public Law 3, you might suggest that officers of Navy and State discuss the problem with the Chairman of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee[7] to ascertain

[4] Not printed here; for text of Public Law 3, entitled "An act to authorize the construction of modern naval vessels, and for other purposes," approved March 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 4.

[5] Commander Juan Manuel Castro, Peruvian Naval Attaché; Capt. Eduardo Beraldo, Uruguayan Naval Attaché.

[6] Rear Adm. George L. Russell.

[7] Senator Richard B. Russell (D–Ga.) was Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

their views on this point and try to work out with them a solution satisfactory to all concerned.[8]

[8] Three destroyer escorts were sold to Peru and three to Uruguay; the transfer of the vessels was authorized in September 1951. For additional documentation, see pp. 1579 ff. and 1611 ff.

In a letter to Secretary Acheson, dated April 24, 1951, not printed, Secretary of Defense Marshall stated in part that in view of the passage of Public Law 3 prior to any firm commitments having been made for the sale of destroyer escorts to Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela, and the increased need of the United States for anti-submarine vessels, it was the opinion of the Department of Defense that no destroyer escorts should be sold to these governments (720.5621/4–2451); in his reply, dated May 24, 1951, not printed, Secretary Acheson stated that the Department of State concurred (720.5621/4–2451).

795B.5–MAP/3–1651

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: Military Assistance for Korea

On February 13th a meeting was held with the Department of Defense[2] concerning the possibility of securing additional military assistance for Korea. It was then agreed that the Department of State should approach the representatives of a number of countries where there was some possibility of securing additional assistance. As a result of the decisions taken in that meeting, approaches have been made to a number of governments and the following progress can be reported:

American Republics

Cuba—The President of Cuba[3] has asked the Congress for authorization to send a battalion to Korea rather than a company as originally offered. This request has evoked considerable criticism among the opponents of the present administration, including Ambassador Belt,[4] formerly the Cuban Representative to the United Nations. A special session of the Cuban Congress convened on February 26 and has been considering the President's request. The Cuban desk officer[5] doubts that Congress will give its approval during the special session, but he believes that authorization is more probable during the regular session of Congress which is scheduled to convene on March 19.

[1] Drafted by the Officer in Charge, International Security Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bechhoefer).

[2] This meeting took place at the Department of State; a copy of the minutes of the meeting, dated February 16, 1951, is filed under Department of State decimal file number 795.00/2–1651.

[3] Carlos Prío Socarrás.

[4] Guillermo Belt, Cuban Ambassador to the United States, 1944–1949.

[5] Harvey R. Wellman.

Colombia—Colombia has been training one battalion for service in Korea. This battalion was originally scheduled to complete its training in Colombia by May 15. However, the Department received a telegram on March 13 [6] requesting that arrangements be made for the battalion to leave Colombia as soon as possible. If arrangements are made to transport this unit from Colombia before May 15, it will be necessary to give this unit additional training. This brings up the question as to the availability of transportation at this time. Further, it has not been decided where the Colombian unit would be sent for additional training.

Mexico—Mr. Mann spoke to both the Foreign Minister [7] and Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico during his recent visit to Mexico City, and after his return, took the matter up further with the Embassy in Washington. It was agreed that the public in Mexico was not conditioned to the idea of Mexico furnishing ground troops to Korea and that therefore any possibility of assistance at this time was remote.

Brazil—During discussions between Assistant Secretary of State Miller and the newly appointed Foreign Minister,[8] the Foreign Minister raised the issue of assistance to the United Nations in Korea. He indicated that Brazil was seriously considering furnishing assistance commensurate with Brazil's international prestige. He cited the possibility of furnishing an entire division. In preparation for any such steps, it would be desirable to condition public opinion in Brazil, and the Foreign Minister requested the assistance of the United States Embassy. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs is working with the Pentagon on this matter, and in particular is planning for a speech by General Bolte which could be translated into Portuguese and given broad publicity. The discussions will be continued at the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington. It seems advisable to concentrate on Brazil in the efforts to secure assistance from Latin America because of the possibility of a large size Brazilian contribution and because of the extensive amount of American equipment the Brazilian army already possesses.

Uruguay—Mr. Miller, during his recent visit to Montevideo, discussed the matter with the Foreign Minister [9] who stated that his government was still anxious to have Uruguay send a battalion to Korea. However, the opposition party was bitterly attacking any such project. Mr. Miller, with the consent of the Foreign Minister, spoke to the leader of the opposition. The leader of the opposition proclaimed his complete support of the United States, but at the same time stated his

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[6] Apparent reference to telegram 666, from Bogotá, March 12, 1951, not printed (363/3–1251).
[7] Manuel Tello, Acting Foreign Minister.
[8] João Neves da Fontoura.
[9] Alberto Domínguez Cámpora.

opposition to sending Uruguayan troops to Korea. Since the general status of public opinion in Uruguay is lukewarm, it seems unlikely that the Government could secure in the near future the necessary authorization from the Uruguayan Congress.

Chile and Peru—Mr. Miller brought up the question of assistance for Korea with the Foreign Offices in both Chile and Peru, but received a lukewarm response.

Argentina—Due to existing political conditions, Mr. Miller found it advisable not to discuss the matter. There had previously been some discussion of the possibility of an offer from the Government of Argentina of two air force contingents. The Assistant [*sic*] Secretary of Defense [10] in a letter dated March 9th [11] indicated that, even though the tactical value of Argentine squadrons would be nominal in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would accede to loaning suitable aircraft on the premise that the action might be a lever for securing substantial Latin American ground forces from Argentina and from the other Republics. ARA has indicated informally that nothing further should be done to secure such an offer from Argentina at this time because of the unfavorable political situation and because of its doubts that the furnishing of two Argentine squadrons would in fact lead to the result desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Here follows discussion of the progress of United States efforts to secure additional military assistance for Korea from certain nations other than the American Republics.]

[10] Robert A Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense.
[11] Not printed (795B.5/3–951).

363/3–551

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 20, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of March 5, 1951 [1] in which you forward the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense regarding military objectives which should be sought in the forthcoming Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. It is my understanding that representatives of our two Departments are preparing draft resolutions on these matters which will be submitted to the same procedures of review as those established in connection with other meetings of Heads of State or with the Council of Foreign Ministers.

In addition to seeking in this Meeting to further the accomplishment of the inter-American military objectives which the Joint Chiefs of

[1] *Ante*, p. 1004.

Staff regard as particularly important at this time, I believe that the Foreign Ministers should take action to stimulate political support and more active backing by the other American Republics for the United Nations collective security efforts and for the General Assembly resolution on "Uniting for Peace". It is my view that this can be done without using the machinery of the Organization of American States to provide troops for action outside the hemisphere, to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff find objection.

As approved for the Governments by the Council of the Organization of American States, item I on the agenda of the Meeting reads: "Political and military cooperation for the defense of the Americas, and to prevent and suppress aggression, in accordance with inter-American agreements and with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of that Organization." Not only does this wording justify a positive assertion of support for the United Nations, but it may be safely predicted that failure of the Meeting to take such action will be widely interpreted as retrogression from the high degree of political cooperation which exists among the American Republics in United Nations peace and security matters.

On this political basis, therefore, the Department of State plans to propose or support a resolution, along the lines of that presented in the attached paper,[2] in which the Meeting of Consultation would affirm the support of the American Republics for United Nations action to prevent and suppress aggression.[3]

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

[2] No attachments found with the source text.

[3] For text of the resolution on this subject, as submitted to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation by the U.S. and several Latin American Governments, see *Proceedings*, p. 51.

710.5/4–2051

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1951.[2]

Subject: Third Progress Report on NSC 56/2, "United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration".[3]

NSC 56/2 was approved as governmental policy on May 19, 1950. It is requested that this Progress Report as of March 23, 1951 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

[1] Drafted by Duncan A. D. Mackay of the Office of Regional American Affairs; cleared by the Offices of South American Affairs and Middle American Affairs, and in draft by the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs.

[2] Drafting of this document began prior to the opening of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation, but all necessary clearances were not obtained until after the meeting had adjourned.

[3] Dated May 18, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 628.

1. There has been continued collaboration among the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force in the execution of the policy and procedures set forth in this paper. In this connection, the Secretary of Defense has designated the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board to represent the Department of Defense and the three services in advising the Department of State in the coordination of the implementation of the policies set forth in NSC 56/2.

2. With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense has designated the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board as the principal military advisor to the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States.

3. The Hemisphere Defense Scheme called for in NSC 56/2 has been approved by the Inter-American Defense Board and submitted to the governments of the member states of the Organization of American States for their approval. The Governments of Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and the United States have formally indicated their approval of the Defense scheme. In addition, the Governments of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru and Paraguay informally have indicated to our missions that they approve the Defense Scheme. The Department of State is taking action to encourage the expeditious approval of the Defense Scheme by the remaining governments.

4. A United States proposal for action by the Meeting of American Foreign Ministers, which starts on March 26, to further accomplishment of the objectives contained in NSC 56/2, particularly those deemed of immediate importance, has been prepared. Advantage will be taken of the presence in Washington of the Foreign Ministers and their military advisors to lay the groundwork for subsequent bilateral negotiations on the defense roles of certain countries. Progress achieved in either or both of these aspects will be the subject of a subsequent Report being prepared.

5. The Departments of State and Defense have agreed to support before the Congress the inclusion in the proposed foreign aid legislation for the fiscal year 1952 of a sum not to exceed $80 million in support of military grant aid for Latin America to assist certain governments in Latin America to undertake specific defense roles, on the basis of prior agreement, and to assure the maximum practical availability of the armed forces of these governments in the event of global war. Representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Defense have agreed that, although NSC 56/2 prescribes a chronological sequence of steps to be taken, some of these actions necessitate concurrent action to save time.

6. Planning talks between representatives of the Governments of the U.S. and Venezuela concerning the security of vital installations

in Venezuela were begun in the Panama Canal Zone on March 19, 1951.[4] The results of these planning talks will be the subject of a subsequent report.

7. The report of the Joint U.S. Military Survey Team, requested by the President of Cuba to study Cuba's defense needs, was completed and submitted to the Cuban Government. The Cuban Government has accepted the recommendations and has initiated discussions with a view to implementing certain of them. In this connection, an agreement was signed on December 22, 1950 with Cuba,[5] establishing in Cuba a U.S. Air Force Mission under the supervision of the Commanding General, Caribbean Air Command.[6] The Cuban Government has also requested the establishment of a U.S. Army and Navy Mission, and has approved draft contracts which have been submitted, subject to minor modifications.[7]

8. The U.S. Government has sold two light cruisers each to the Governments of Argentine, Brazil and Chile under the provisions of Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. This is the first significant transfer of excess military equipment to Latin America under this Act as amended.[8]

9. The Inter-American Defense Board has prepared and forwarded to the Governments of the nations of the Western Hemisphere a study[9] of the defense of inter-American maritime routes. On the basis of the reactions from the military authorities of the various Governments, this study will serve as the foundation for a plan for the employment of forces of the Western Hemisphere to protect the delivery of strategic raw materials from Latin America to the United States.

[4] For documentation concerning these talks, see pp. 1623 ff.
[5] For text of the agreement providing for the services of a United States Air Force Mission to Cuba, signed at Washington, December 22, 1950, and entered into force on the same date, see TIAS No. 2166, *or United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 1, p. 887.
[6] Brig. Gen. Emil C. Kiel.
[7] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1329 ff.
[8] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 599 ff.
[9] Not found in Department of State files.

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1951.

Subject: Fourth Progress Report on NSC 56/2 "United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration".

NSC 56/2 was approved as governmental policy on May 19, 1950. It is requested that this Progress Report as of June 1, 1951 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Jamison.

1. The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which met in Washington on March 26 to April 6, 1951, took constructive action toward the development of inter-American policy towards military collaboration in a number of respects. On the basis of full cooperation between the Departments of Defense and State, the United States, as co-sponsor with certain other governments, proposed three draft resolutions, which with relatively minor changes, were unanimously approved as Resolutions II (Preparation of the Defense of the American Republics and Support of the Action of the United Nations), III (Inter-American Military Cooperation), and IV (Importance of Maintaining Peaceful Relations Among American States) of the Final Act of the Meeting.[2] The following are regarded as the principal positive results:

a. A recommendation (Resolution III) that the American Republics orient their military preparation so that through self-help and mutual aid they can (1) increase those resources and strengthen those armed forces best adapted to the collective defense and maintain those armed forces in such status that they can be immediately available for the defense of the continent, and (2) cooperate to develop the collective strength necessary to combat aggression against any of them. This for the first time provides an inter-American policy basis for directing the development of military strength toward collective defense of the Continent, with military forces utilized in the performance of specific roles and missions which will contribute to the common defense.

b. A directive to the Inter-American Defense Board (Resolution III) to prepare vigorously and keep up to date the military planning of the common defense and to submit plans formulated to the governments for consideration and decision. Emphasis was placed upon the importance of Delegations to the Board maintaining close liaison and consultation with their governments regarding the work of the Board.

c. A recommendation (Resolution III) that the Governments (1) maintain adequate and continuous representation not only on the Council of Delegates of the IADB but on the Staff and any other organ which the Board may establish, (2) actively support the work of the Board and consider promptly the results of its work, and (3) cooperate in organizing within the Board a coordinated system of exchange of appropriate information. Items (*b*) and (*c*) should contribute to improved recognition of the functions of the IADB, to more firm backing by the Governments, and improvement in its ability to carry out its functions.

d. A declaration (Resolution II) that (1) the present world situation requires positive support by the American Republics for achievement of the collective defense of the Continent through the OAS, as well as for cooperation in the United Nations, and (2) a recommendation (Resolution II) that, in accordance with the concepts of the UN General Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, each government immediately examine its resources and determine what it can contribute to defense of the continent and United Nations collective security efforts, particular attention being given to the development and

[2] For text of the Final Act, signed April 7, 1951, see *Proceedings*, pp. 234–267.

maintenance of elements of its armed forces which could promptly be made available for those purposes.

e. A declaration (Resolution IV) that observance of inter-American commitments on non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes among the American Republics makes it possible for each to concentrate the development of its capabilities upon the tasks best adapted to the role it is best qualified to assume in collective defense.

The resolution entitled "Inter-American Military Cooperation" (Resolution III) is tied closely at several points to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The resolution contained qualifications intended to indicate clearly that the development and possible use of military strength for common defense shall be (1) in conformity with constitutional processes, (2) in accordance with the countries' own judgements of their capabilities, (3) without prejudice to individual self-defense and internal security.

The Resolutions approved in the economic field which have an important bearing on the objectives and conclusions of NSC 56/2 were those on "Economic Development" (Resolution XII), on "Increase of Production and Processing of Basic and Strategic Materials", (Resolution XIII), and on "Defense and Security Controls" (Resolution XV). Also pertinent to the objectives and conclusions of NSC 56/2 was the Resolution entitled "Strengthening of Internal Security" (Resolution VIII).

2. Advantage was taken of the presence of high level political and military officials of various governments at the Foreign Ministers Conference to hold bi-lateral conversations between officials of the U.S. and representatives of Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Uruguay and Chile. Although considerable emphasis was placed upon the importance of ground force contributions to Korea, those meetings also served to more fully acquaint these governmental officials with the principles and objectives of collective continental defense in accordance with the concepts of NSC 56/2.

3. At the instigation of the U.S. Delegation, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has taken the first step toward assuming the new responsibilities assigned that body under Resolution III of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation noted above. By motion passed on May 17, the Board directed its Staff to proceed with the preparation of adequate plans for the common defense of the hemisphere. Those plans are to be based on the broad, general principles enunciated in the "Common Defense Scheme for the American Continent." In the remarks preceding the introduction of this motion, the U.S. Delegation indicated that if the motion were passed, it proposed to make its views on these plans known to the Staff and hoped that the other delegations would do likewise. It is considered that this procedure will enable the U.S. Delegation more effectively to utilize the multilateral procedures

of the IADB in attaining the objectives of NSC 56/2 inasmuch as the Staff is under the direction of a general officer of the U.S. Army.[3]

4. In the period since the Third Progress Report,[4] the Inter-American Defense Board has been officially informed of the approval of the Common Defense Scheme for the American Continent of the governments of Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala and Ecuador. Since the governments of Chile, Cuba, the Dominician Republic, Haiti and the U.S. had previously given such notice, this brings to ten the number of governments which have so approved.

5. As a result of the planning talks held at Quarry Heights from March 19–23, 1951 agreement was reached between the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean, outlining the general area of mutual interest in protection of the oil industry and other strategic materials in Venezuela against external aggression and internal sabotage. The general areas of vulnerability and desirable security measures were outlined. The foregoing agreement signed ad referendum was submitted to the two governments for approval and is currently being studied by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JAMES E. WEBB

[3] Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert.
[4] *Supra.*

371.75/8–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Duncan A. D. Mackay of the Office of Regional American Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1951.

Subject: Meeting With Representatives of the U.S. Delegation to the IADB To Consider Problems of Inter-American Military Collaboration.

Participants: Brig. Gen. E. L. Sibert, Director of Staff, IADB
Col. D. S. Somerville,[1] G–3, Army
Col. J. H. Anderson,[2] G–3, Army
Col. Crawford,[3] G–3, Army
Capt. J. A. Lark,[4] Op. 35, Navy
Lt. Col. R. A. Collins,[5] Op. 35, Navy [*Marine Corps*]
Col. Willis Smyser, Opn. Div, AF

[1] Duncan S. Somerville.
[2] John H. Anderson.
[3] Stuart M. Crawford.
[4] Jacob A. Lark.
[5] Ralph A. Collins.

Col. W. F. Lewis,[6] Opn. Div, AF
Lt. Col. R. O'Connor,[7] Opn. Div, AF
S/ISA—Mr. Schoenfeld
AR—Messrs. Burrows,[8] Jamison and Mackay

The meeting was held in Mr. Burrows office at 2:30 to take up certain current problems of inter-American military collaboration. These were (1) the formulation of U.S. comments on the "General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent" (Document T–020),[9] recently completed by the Staff of the IADB, and made available July 26 to the Council of Delegates with a request for their written comments by August 28, 1951; (2) the security of information turned over to the IADB for use in planning; (3) the relationship of non-American possessions to inter-American military planning; and (4) possible items for inclusion in the NSC 56/2 Progress Report due September 1.[10]

1. *Comments on the IADB Military Plan:* Mr. Jamison expressed State's appreciation for the early consultation by the Defense representatives on this document. He stated that certain comments on the plan had been prepared in State, and that a copy of these comments would be made available informally to the Secretary of the U.S. Delegation. The general impression of the document, he stated, was that, with a few drafting changes and clarification on some substantive points, it would serve as a "broad umbrella" under which bilateral agreements could be worked out between the U.S. and other countries on the three defense sectors.

Following a review of the drafting suggestions in the State memorandum,[11] the following substantive questions were discussed:

(*a*) *U.S. Responsibility in Caribbean-Panama-Galapagos Sector.* It was agreed that it would be more appropriate in VC1b(1) to express as a recognition of responsibility, rather than a grant of authority, the coordination and planning by the U.S. on CPG Sector. Colonel Somerville indicated that the U.S. would not be precluded from bringing in other countries to assist in the defense of this sector, and that Defense planned to make this clear by having some language inserted which would permit Brazil, for example, to be brought in to assist in plans "pertaining to the sector" which were of concern to her.

(*b*) *U.S. Responsibility in South Atlantic and South Pacific Sectors.* In response to a query of Mr. Jamison's whether the U.S. was specifically excluded from planning and coordination in other two

[6] Willis, F. Lewis.
[7] Roderic D. O'Connor.
[8] Charles R. Burrows, Office of Regional American Affairs.
[9] Approved on November 15, 1951, by the Council of Delegates of the Inter-American Defense Board as Document C–019; for information, see the editorial note, p. 1028.
[10] *Infra.*
[11] Not found in Department of State files.

sectors, General Sibert stated that the JCS had determined that, except for a possible base in Brazil or a refuelling point in Chile, the U.S. had no requirements in the other two sectors, since it was assumed that any threat to U.S. interests would come in the Caribbean area. The countries in these sectors, he stated, are primarily responsible for the defense of the sector, although bilaterals could be worked out with the U.S. on particular points. He also made it clear, in this connection, that the bilateral negotiations contemplated under Title IV of the Mutual Security Program would be carried on by us without reference to the Board.

(*c*) *Control of High Seas.* Captain Lark clarified the meaning of paragraph VC3 on page 8. Coastal waters, he stated, would be the responsibility of the country concerned; "high seas", i.e., beyond the coastal limits, would be the responsibility of the United States.

(*d*) *Internal Security.* It was suggested that reference should be made in this section on page 13 to Resolution 32 of Bogota [12] and Resolution 8 of the IAM,[13] as a means of emphasizing previous inter-American action on which exchange of information could be based.

(*e*) *Detailed Plans of Action.* General Sibert acknowledged that this document is actually a plan which would enable governments primarily concerned with particular problems to make detailed plans among themselves. In response to a query of Mr. Jamison's, General Sibert stated that he did not believe that this proposed decentralization of planning in the three defense sectors would necessarily eliminate the need for future action by the IADB, since there would remain many hemisphere military problems with which the IADB could deal. General Sibert stated that he understood that General Goes Monteiro [14] of Brazil was planning to recommend formally that the IADB review and coordinate the defense planning of all three sectors. If such a suggestion were made, General Sibert indicated it would be disapproved by Defense.

Mr. Jamison pointed out the need in this section VIIA (page 11) for some qualifying statement to cover the probable necessity for working out arrangements with European states regarding their possessions in this hemisphere (see also paragraph 3 of this memorandum).

2. *Security of Information in the IADB:* General Sibert in a conversation with Mr. Miller on July 25 had expressed concern over the

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[12] Reference is to the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948; for text of the Final Act of the conference, which includes Resolution XXXII, see Department of State Publication No. 3262, *Ninth International Conference of American States . . .: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America with Related Documents* (Washington, 1948), pp. 222 ff. For documentation on the Bogotá conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 1 ff.

[13] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of American States; for text of the Final Act, which includes Resolution 8, see *Proceedings*, pp. 234. ff.

[14] Pedro Aurélio Góes Monteiro.

participation of Guatemala as a full member of the IADB on security grounds, and had inquired whether there was any way either to exclude Guatemala from the IADB or provide limited participation on its part. An ARA memorandum on this subject was discussed. It was agreed that, as a realistic matter, it would have to be assumed that any information passed on to twenty countries in a body of this kind would, in many cases, find its way into the wrong hands. In determining, therefore, what information should be given to the IADB by Defense, it was agreed that only such information should be transmitted which, even if it were to come into possession of a potential enemy, would not seriously affect the security of the United States. It was recognized that the advantages to be gained in keeping intact the inter-American system, even though a limit might be imposed on the subjects which could be discussed multilaterally, outweighed limiting or excluding participation of any one country.[15]

3. *Relation of non-American Possessions to Inter-American Military Planning:* Mr. Jamison stated that a decision would have to be reached soon on the assistance which would be required by the U.S. in the protection of the European possessions in case of war. He referred to certain illustrative tasks which had been cited by Defense in support of the $40 million grant aid for Latin America [16] indicating the possible use of Latin American troops in Curacao and Aruba. It was emphasized that the explosive political effect which the use of Latin American forces might have on the European territorials in the Caribbean area should be taken into account. He read portions of a series of letters from Mr. Knox,[17] Consul General in Curacao, indicating the extreme sensitivity which the Dutch officials have on this question.

Colonel Somerville stated that there was not at the present time in the Department of Defense any concrete plan for garrisoning Latin American forces in any of the European possessions in the Caribbean. He explained that any such proposal such as had been made by way of illustration in the Defense presentation on the MSP, would only be formalized if it was determined that there were no overriding political objections. In any event, he stated that any such proposal would not be taken up in a military way with any Latin American country until there had been full coordination with the European government concerned. He cited in this connection the primary responsibility of the U.S. in the defense of the Caribbean area, and the planning talks which had been held separately with the Venezuelan and Dutch military representatives over the protection of the oil industry.

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[15] Pertinent documents on this subject are in decimal file 710.5.

[16] The $80,000,000 figure agreed upon by the Departments of State and Defense as necessary for the military grant aid program to Latin America for FY 1952 was reduced as a result of hearings at the Bureau of the Budget.

[17] Charles F. Knox, Jr.

The further question of the desirability of the representatives of the industry being advised of these plans at an appropriate time was fully discussed.

4. *Suggested Items for NSC 56/2 Progress Report:* The next quarterly progress report on NSC 56/2 "Inter-American Military Collaboration", is due September 1. The following items were suggested for inclusion: (*a*) completion of the IADB "War Plan"; (*b*) status of Military Planning Talks between Venezuela and the U.S.; (*c*) negotiation for U.S. Army and Navy Missions in Cuba; (*d*) progress on the proposed $40 million grant aid for Latin America.

5. *Other Business: Deviation from long-range Defense standardization goal in the agreement with Venezuela for formation of Venezuelan Vampire jet interceptor squadron as a part of Venezuelan requirements for defense of oil industry:*—The Air Force representatives were informed of the substance of letters received from Ambassador Armour [18] in Caracas expressing his concern over the recent reported sale by the British Government of 5 additional Vampire jet aircraft to Venezuela, and transmitting a suggestion of the Air Attaché, Colonel Duncan,[19] that U.S. armament for these jet aircraft be offered to the Venezuelan Government by the U.S. Mr. Mackay pointed out that Colonel Duncan's suggestion appeared to indicate an acquiescence on the part of the USAF in the Venezuelan purchase of British jets, which was also reflected in the recent military agreement with Venezuela. Colonel Lewis, in reply to Mr. Jamison's query whether this was not a modification of standardization policy, stated that, as a matter of realism it was recognized that Venezuela had already seven Vampires, and that, since she had a requirement for three jet squadrons, it seemed more economical to fill out one of these with the British aircraft. Recognizing this fact, it seemed desirable, he stated, to salvage for standardization at least the armament on the British aircraft. Mr. Schoenfeld stated that it was not clear that the British had consulted with the U.S. on their decision to sell further jets to Venezuela, and that this matter was timed very badly with the Mutual Security Program pending in Congress. Mr. Mackay stated that a letter [20] to Defense had been prepared in State outlining the NATO standardization and Mutual Security aspects of this problem and would request consultation with Defense on this matter. Colonel Smyser and Colonel O'Connor indicated that a recent similar problem involving Italy and Guatemala had prompted an Air Force request to Defense for policy guidance on the possible conflict between the disposal of NATO surplus and the standardization policy for this hemisphere.

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[18] Norman Armour.
[19] Lt. Col. William F. Duncan.
[20] Not printed.

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951.

Subject: Fifth Progress Report on NSC 56/2, "United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration."

NSC 56/2 was approved as governmental policy on May 19, 1950. It is requested that this Progress Report as of September 6, 1951 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

1. As a result of unanimous acceptance by the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the principle of collective defense, and a directive (Resolution III) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) to prepare a plan for the common defense of the hemisphere for the consideration and decision of the governments, the Staff of the IADB has completed a "General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent" and presented it to the Council of Delegates who will submit their comments by October 15, 1951. There has been close consultation on this plan between representatives of the U.S. Delegation to the IADB and officers of the Department of State.

2. The Departments of Defense and State have approved in substance an initial "Agreement Document" resulting from joint discussions held at Quarry Heights, March 19–23, 1951, between the Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean, and the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, concerning the security of vital installations in Venezuela. The Document lists requirements for military supplies and equipment which were presented unilaterally by the Venezuelan representatives. Since, under current priorities, other U.S. commitments for military supplies and equipment take precedence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire further conversations, including a detailed joint survey of the requirements, before making any decision to award Venezuela an equipment priority which would permit furnishing the items requested. Venezuela has agreed to bear the entire cost of any equipment found needed.

3. Agreement has been reached with the Cuban Government for the establishment of a U.S. Army and Navy Mission in Cuba. The establishment of these Missions, in addition to the Air Mission, which was authorized in December 1950, was part of a series of recommendations made by a Joint U.S. Military Survey Team requested by the President of Cuba to study Cuba's defense needs. Negotiations are in progress with the Uruguayan Government to conclude an agreement for the establishment of a U.S. Air Force Mission in Uruguay.[2] The

[1] Drafted by Mr. Mackay.

[2] The agreement was signed at Washington on December 4, 1951; it entered into force on the same date. For text of the agreement, see TIAS No. 2369, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 2517.

Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Nicaragua remain the only Latin American countries, in which there is at present no U.S. service mission.

4. Authorization for an appropriation for grant military aid to Latin America, included in the general Mutual Security Bill, has been approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House version included a sum not to exceed $40 million for this purpose, while the measure as approved by the Senate authorized $38,150,000. The grant aid is to be used to assist those Latin American governments who will agree to undertake specific hemispheric defense roles, for which otherwise the U.S. would have to provide forces. Agreement has been reached between the State and Defense Departments on the general procedures which would be followed in negotiating agreements with these governments, once an authorization for military grant aid has been given, and the necessary appropriation made.

5. Because of the high costs of available equipment and the low priority assigned to Latin America for its allocation, the U.S. is at the present time unable to provide Latin American nations with many major items of new equipment or spare parts and maintenance items necessary for equipment previously received from the U.S. As a result, several of these countries are now seeking fulfillment of their needs from European sources, including sources behind the Iron Curtain. The acquisition of such European types of equipment is likely to conflict with the long-range objectives, outlined in NSC 56/2, for standardizing Latin American training, equipment and doctrine along U.S. lines. The Departments of State and Defense are presently reviewing this problem.

JAMES E. WEBB

795B.5/8–1651

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 10, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to that portion of the letter of August 16, 1951[2] of the Acting Secretary of Defense[3] which sets forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Latin American military participation in the Korean operation. This letter states:

"The JCS consider that Latin America is probably the most promising source of substantial contributions. They recommend that efforts be continued to obtain forces from the nations reported on by the Sec-

[1] Drafted by the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Cale) and Mr. Jamison; cleared by the Bureaus of United Nations Affairs and Far Eastern Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, and the Offices of South American Affairs and Middle American Affairs.

[2] For text, see volume VII.

[3] Robert Lovett.

retary of State, including Mexico, and that Argentina be requested to make a substantial contribution. It is considered that offers by Argentina and Brazil should be in the order of a division each."

As stated in Mr. Matthews' letter of September 27, 1950 [4] to the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State agrees that it is desirable that Latin American forces participate in the Korean military operations. Since the date of this letter, a Colombian battalion has reached Korea and a Colombian frigate has participated in naval operations off the Korean coast. The Department of State will continue to make every practicable effort to increase Latin American participation.

As you know, representatives of the Department of Defense have been negotiating in Washington with General Goes Monteiro of Brazil concerning the despatch of Brazilian troops to Korea. The Department of State considers the negotiations with Brazil on this matter to be most important not only because that country currently represents our best chance of obtaining additional Latin American troops but because it is believed that active Brazilian participation will make it more difficult for other and more reluctant Latin American states, including Mexico, to postpone making similar contributions.

While there are a number of important questions raised by the negotiations with Brazil, I wish in this letter to direct your attention to the question of reimbursement for the assistance we give to countries sending units to Korea. General Goes Monteiro has been informed, in general terms, that Brazil is expected to agree to reimburse the U.S. for the cost of assistance provided, and that the terms of such reimbursement will be negotiated in the future. I believe it is essential for our two Departments to be in agreement as to the meaning of this stipulation and the procedures to be followed in the negotiations referred to, and for the Brazilians to be informed as soon as possible in order to avoid possible misunderstanding.

Specifically, it is suggested that the Brazilians should be informed: (*a*) that we expect Brazil to agree in advance, by an exchange of notes, to reimburse the United States for the assistance it receives from the United States; (*b*) that shortly after a Brazilian contingent enters into active participation in the UN operation, the United States Government will begin to keep the Brazilian Government currently informed of the cost of assistance rendered; (*c*) that, at that time, Brazil will be requested to indicate whether it is in a position to begin immediately to reimburse the United States for the assistance received.

Should it become apparent, at any stage in the negotiations with Brazil, that they will not make a firm offer of troops for Korea if they must accept an obligation, immediately after the arrival of the Brazilian contingent in Korea, to maintain full dollar reimbursement or some other form of settlement on a current basis, it is recommended

[4] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 664.

that the Brazilians be informed that we are prepared to accept the offer of troops and to defer further negotiations with respect to payment.

While this approach differs in some respects from that which has been followed in the negotiations initiated with certain of the governments contributing forces to the Unified Command, it is believed that its acceptance will offer a practicable basis for negotiations with Brazil and other Latin American governments. If it is acceptable to the Department of Defense, I recommend that it be followed with Brazil and the other Latin American governments from which we seek troops for Korea. Similarly, I recommend that if the Government of Colombia indicates that it is unable to maintain full dollar reimbursement or some other form of settlement on a current basis, we agree to defer reimbursement negotiations with Colombia.[5]

Sincerely, JAMES E. WEBB

[5] For additional documentation relating to this question, see pp. 1291 ff.

720.5-MAP/10-2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs (Jamison)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1951.

Subject: Mutual Security Program, FY 1952—Latin America.

Participants: Assistant Secretary Miller
General Robert L. Walsh [1] (USAF)
Major General John L. McKee [2] (USA)
Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles [3] (USN)
Lt. Col. Ralph A. Collins (USMC)
Capt. Jacob A. Lark (USN)
Col. Stuart M. Crawford (USA)
Col. Francis Hill (USA)
Col. James D. Alger (OSD)
Lt. Col. Craig Davis (OSD)
Col. Willis F. Lewis (USAF)
Lt. Col. Roderic D. O'Connor (USAF)
Col. Willis M. Smyser (USAF)
Col. John H. Anderson (USA)

[1] Chairman and Air Member, Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission; and Chairman, United States Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board.
[2] Army Member, Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission; Delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board.
[3] Navy Member, Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission; Delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board.

Col. T. W. Sharkey [4] (USA)
S/ISA—Mr. Bingham [5]
S/ISA—Mr. Schoenfeld
AR—Mr. Jamison

Mr. Miller opened the discussion by saying that it had occurred to him that the most effective utilization of the military grant-aid program funds appropriated by Congress for Latin America might be achieved by allocating the major share of the amount to Brazil. He emphasized that this was not a formal position of the State Department, but that he wished to explore the idea with those planning the program in Defense, since they were in possession of details on which he had not been informed and were, therefore, in a better position to consider the matter. He suggested that in view of the relatively small size of the appropriation, as well as the fact that it has become available so late in the Fiscal Year, there might be merit in concentrating on Brazil, particularly in view of the extensive discussions which had been held with General Goes Monteiro.

General Walsh, pointing out that he was only speaking for the Air Force, indicated that he had an open mind on the matter, and implied that there might be some room for allocation of a greater share of the funds to Brazil. In this connection, he mentioned that consideration was being given to the possible re-establishment of what he referred to as the "South Atlantic Group", in which case there would be considerable chance that we would want to reopen bases in Brazil. In connection with this, it would be reasonable to expect Brazil to perform more air defense missions and, therefore, to have additional units of its air force assisted by us. He added that he felt that there was a strong possibility that we would be unable to obtain from Mexico the agreements necessary to carry out the program, thus leaving funds which it might prove desirable to use in assisting Brazil. Mr. Miller said that General Walsh's comment on Mexico illustrated what he believed would be an important problem in dealing at this stage with a considerable number of the countries, i.e., that we would be unable to obtain the necessary agreements in the time available.

General McKee, speaking for the Army, said that it was also disposed to have an open mind on the subject, but that he did feel that there was considerable danger of incurring the resentment of a number of the countries if all of the funds were allocated to only one or two, and that this had been a consideration in the Army's decision to recommend initiation of negotiations with several countries.

Admiral Miles said that his viewpoint was different from that of his two colleagues in that the Navy would like to get naval cooperation from as many countries as possible. He mentioned Argentina's naval

[4] Thomas W. Sharkey.
[5] Jonathan B. Bingham, Assistant Director, Non-European Affairs, Office of the Director, International Security Affairs.

role in the defense of the River Plate and the Straits of Magellan trade routes. He subsequently acknowledged that the naval program did not at present contemplate an allocation to Argentina, except for the possibility of its being included in on-the-spot training, requiring provision of training equipment. Admiral Miles also mentioned that of the ten and one-half million dollars tentatively allocated to the Navy, it was planned that two million would be used for training and that countries not now contemplated in the navy program for defense missions might be included in this training. He mentioned specifically training naval personnel by those countries in the use of certain types of modern naval equipment, which we alone could furnish.

Mr. Miller asked what proportion of the funds it was contemplated to allocate under the present plans to Brazil, and was told that the amount was something over thirteen million, or about ⅓ of the total amount available. He asked what specific tasks Brazil would be expected to perform and was told that on the Army side it was expected that the funds would be utilized to rehabilitate a regimental combat team and three anti-aircraft battalions. Mr. Miller then asked whether, if one of the other countries was unwilling to perform a task contemplated, funds would be available for additional tasks for Brazil. With reference to the inclusion of Argentina, which was referred to repeatedly, it seemed to be the consensus that the likely decision not to approach that country would leave funds available for allocation to additional Brazilian units, and that this might well prove to be the case with regard to Mexico as well.

(During this discussion, it became apparent that the present planning in Defense only goes to the point of determining types of armed force units within countries which can be made more effective with U.S. assistance to perform defense tasks, and that there has not been a determination of specific tasks which any given country will be expected to perform. Presumably, units brought up to standard efficiency will be available for the performance of such tasks as an emergency may call forth. It was also pointed out that all discussions with foreign governments regarding military assistance under the program is confined to end-items of equipment and other services and does not include any discussion in terms of dollars.)

There was no final determination and no statement of the position the State Department will finally take with regard to Defense's proposals for countries with whom negotiations should be initiated, which proposals will soon be sent to State by Secretary Lovett. The Defense representatives indicated, however, that the determination to be contained in the letter from Secretary Lovett had been approved by the JCS and that there might be considerable difficulty in getting it reversed or altered in any significant way. It was agreed, however, that no time should be lost in reaching the necessary decisions, since im-

plementation of the program should proceed as rapidly as possible.

At one point in the discussion, question was raised as to whether equipment found to be necessary for distribution to the Latin American countries will be available, and it was indicated that the problem of obtaining the necessary priorities would be extremely tough to deal with, and that it might prove to be very difficult to obtain the priorities necessary to transfer even the relatively small amount of equipment which $38.15 million now authorized [6] could be used to pay for.

[6] The Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, authorized $38,150,000 for the purpose of furnishing military grant aid to the other American Republics; for text of the act, see 65 Stat. 373. An appropriation for this amount was included in the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1952 (Public Law 249), approved October 31, 1951; for text, see 65 Stat. 731.

720.5-MAP/10-3151

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 9, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your letter of October 31, 1951 [1] informing the Department of State that you approve a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that programs be initiated, in conformity with Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, to furnish military grant-aid in support of forces to be provided by certain Latin American countries which you listed.[2] As you requested, the Department of State has reviewed from the political viewpoint the list of countries recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of State concurs in seeking the President's approval for the initiation of programs of military grant aid with the countries listed in your letter, but suggests, for reasons set forth below, that Venezuela be added, tentatively, to the list.

With regard to negotiations which may be carried on with these countries, however, this Department would like to make the following further recommendations:

1. In conformity with your suggestion regarding Argentina,[3] negotiations with that country should be delayed until a more appropriate time, and the matter should be kept under constant review. Should the political situation in that country continue to preclude initiation of these negotiations, the Department agrees with your further suggestion that the funds tentatively allocated to that country in this year's program should be reallocated in adequate time to insure that they will not remain unobligated at the end of the fiscal year.

2. Unless there are overriding military considerations to the contrary, negotiations initiated with Ecuador should include the oppor-

[1] Not printed.

[2] These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.

[3] For additional documentation concerning the inclusion of Argentina in the military grant aid program for Latin America, see pp. 1079 ff.

tunity for the country to prepare units of two Services rather than the one Service now contemplated by Ecuador's inclusion in the first priority Air Force list. It is this Department's view that, because of the tense political situation existing between Peru and Ecuador, an approach to the former involving possible assistance to all three of its Armed Services without a more nearly comparable approach to Ecuador than that indicated, would not only provoke resentment in Ecuador but might adversely affect the possibility of obtaining Ecuador's agreement to afford this Government base rights in the Galapagos Islands, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated to be a requirement in the event of global war.

3. In view of recent indications of Brazil's increased desire to cooperate in hemisphere defense, the Department of State recommends strongly that Brazil be given high priority in such reallocation of funds as may be required as a result of failure of one or more of the other Governments to qualify for inclusion in this year's program. The traditional ties of U.S.–Brazilian friendship and cooperation, as well as the progress made in negotiations recently carried on with General Goes Monteiro, make it highly desirable that the total allocation to Brazil be the maximum feasible.

I understand that Venezuela was not included in the list to receive military grant-aid because of indications at the recent Panama Staff Talks of that country's readiness to pay for equipment to meet its military requirements.[4] While agreeing on the desirability that Venezuela pay its own way militarily, the Department of State believes that we should obtain more concrete evidence that the attitude then displayed represents a firm governmental position. It is therefore recommended that Venezuela be included tentatively in the list submitted to the President, pending verification at the earliest possible time of that Government's views. Because of the importance to our national security of insuring the defense and continued flow of Venezuela's strategic materials, we should be in a position to assist that country in accomplishing this task should it become necessary.

As soon as the President's approval is obtained and I am so informed, this Department will be ready to issue instructions to our Diplomatic Missions in the countries to be approached, with a view to ascertaining whether the Governments of such countries are willing to enter upon negotiations for the conclusion of the necessary agreements.

Sincerely yours, JAMES E. WEBB

[4] For additional documentation concerning the possible inclusion of Venezuela in the military grant aid program for Latin America, see pp. 1623 ff.

Editorial Note

On November 15, 1951, the Council of Delegates of the Inter-American Defense Board approved "The General Military Plan for

the Defense of the American Continent", which had been prepared by the Board's Staff, and forwarded it to the respective governments. The plan was formulated in pursuance of the provisions of Resolution III of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States. For text of the resolution, see *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, March 26–April 7, 1951: Report of the Secretary of State* (Department of State Publication No. 4928, Washington, 1953), pages 69–70. The text of the plan, filed under Department of State decimal number 720.5/11–1551, was not declassified in time for publication.

720.5/12–1351

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board (Walsh)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 13, 1951.

MY DEAR GENERAL WALSH: It seems quite likely that one of the most difficult problems in connection with negotiations for military grant-aid to Latin American countries will be that presented by the adverse reactions of countries not included among the probable recipients. Even more serious than the feeling of resentment which will probably develop will be the sense of omission from significant planning for hemisphere defense. These factors may well have a negative effect upon both political and military cooperation by these countries, and perhaps upon the continued effectiveness of the Inter-American Defense Board.

It has occurred to us in the Department of State that there might be considerable advantage in the U.S. taking the initiative in stating its objectives and intentions in initiating the program of military grant-aid, as clearly and precisely as would be consistent with security, in the most appropriate inter-American forum, which, in this case, would be the Inter-American Defense Board. Such a statement probably need not go much beyond what has been said in connection with presentation of the program to Congress, but might well emphasize such aspects as (1) the relationship of the program to Inter-American Defense Board planning; (2) the obvious necessity of concentrating on certain types of military preparation; and (3) the fact that it can only be regarded as one part of the entire problem of building more adequate hemisphere defense in which every country has responsibility and concern.

It is our view that a statement of this kind, by General Bolté or yourself, before a session of the Council of Delegates of the Inter-American Defense Board in the near future, and before negotiations have been initiated, would constitute an important factor in minimiz-

ing the possible adverse results described above. If you and the other members of the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board believe that this suggestion has merit, we in the State Department shall be happy to discuss the matter with you and to assist in any way we can in the preparation of such a statement.[1]

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

[1] A memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jamison, dated January 3, 1952, involving Assistant Secretary Miller; the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs, Office of South American Affairs (Kidder); Maj. Gen. Walsh; and Col. Sharkey, reads in part as follows:

"It was Defense's view that any consultations either with the 'have' or 'have nots' should be kept at the governmental level along the lines of the communications sent to the field. Mr. Miller said that he accepted General Walsh's judgment as to the undesirability of the IADB approach. He asked however whether this was a matter which he, Mr. Miller, might handle in one of a series of speeches which he expects to make soon. He suggested that he might devote a few paragraphs to this subject in one of these speeches and that the text of the talk might then be sent around to the various Latin American Embassies here in Washington. There was general agreement that this would be a sound approach, and Mr. Miller said that he would see to it that the text of any such statement was checked with General Walsh and other Defense officials when it had been prepared." (710.5/1–352)

720.5–MSP/12–1451: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:26 p. m.

535. Re State–Defense circ agam, Nov 6, 1951, 2:05 p. m.[2] Re procedures carry out grant mil assistance Program under Mutual Security Act of 1951. President has found that country to which you are accredited, along with certain other Amer Republics, may be furnished mil assistance under section 401 Mutual Security Act of 1951 in accordance with Defense plans establishing a need for its participation in Missions important to defense Western Hemisphere. You are requested inquire FonMin whether his Govt desires enter into dipl-mil conversations aimed at reaching bilateral mil assistance agreement required by Act, as well as separate mil plan relative to prep unit or units its armed forces for hemisphere defense missions and to provision grant aid by US to assist in such prep. Plans under which Presidential authorization has been given, which constitute basis for initiation of program, contemplate US assistance in prep of unit or units all three armed services countries being approached, except Cuba, where air

[1] Drafted by Mr. Jamison and Mr. Schoenfeld; cleared by the Offices of South American Affairs and Middle American Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, and the Department of Defense.

[2] Not printed (720.5–MAP/11–651).

force alone involved, and Ecuador and Mexico, where naval units not rpt not involved.

You shld explain to FonMin if his Govt approves initiation these conversations, you will be assisted in them by reps Dept Defense, who will also be auth carry on necessary supplementary negots with mil reps his Govt, and these negotiators are prep arrive in that country promptly, shld his Govt approve. Mil negot teams include one officer Gen or flag rank, assisted by 2 or 3 other officers. Entirely your discretion, you may wish confirm your inquiry by *aide-mémoire* with view eliciting favorable written response.

Fol for your background info re above approach:

1. Copies of draft bilateral agreement, dated Nov 20, 1951,[3] of type contemplated for negot with LA countries, together with explanatory comments on Agreement in gen and each of its provisions have been sent by air pouch. This draft corresponds to those negotiated with countries now receiving US grant mil assistance, except for certain adaptations required either because of nature LA program or recent changes in pertinent Acts US Congress. While you shld refrain from presentation this draft until after initiation detailed negots, you may wish refer in gen to its provisions, emphasizing their similarity those negotiated in detail with other Govts receiving US grant aid. You will note final Art draft stipulates it must be registered with UNSYG and will be, therefore, a public doc. Mil plan, however, will be classified Secret and treated accordingly.

2. Emb will have noted that program involves prep units armed forces of countries receiving grant aid for possible use, in event of war or grave emergency in which Rio Treaty wld be applicable, for missions important to defense Western Hemisphere which may involve utilization of forces outside natl terr but within hemisphere. Shld questions as to nature these missions and the circumstances under which they wld be performed be raised, you shld indicate our hope and belief that any problem which may arise this connection can be resolved satis during detailed negots.

Strictly for your own info, precise nature of mutual undertakings, including those for utilization forces, will be spelled out in bilateral mil plans as finally negotiated. These plans will be tied closely to provisions of Rio Treaty. Fulfillment of undertakings will in gen depend upon subsequent agreement when specific situation calling for joint action arises. Therefore, unless it appears that Govt is clearly unwilling even consider possibility preparing units for hemisphere defense missions which may involve utilization (subj to that Govts agreement at that time) forces outside natl terr, related questions shld not constitute obstacle to initiation of negots.

3. It is US view that finally negotiated bilateral mil plan shld be in consonance with Inter-American Defense Board Common Defense Scheme and the gen mil plan. Latter was recently approved by Council of Delgs of IADB for submission to Govts. Again strictly FYI, for

[3] An annotated draft of a model Military Assistance Bilateral Agreement is attached to a memorandum by Mr. Jamison to Mr. Miller, dated November 23, 1951, not printed (720.5–MAP/11–2351).

those Govts which have not yet approved Common Defense Scheme, substantive approval of this doc or gen mil plan will be a prerequisite to our making available grant mil assistance. Of countries now being approached, Braz, Mexico and Urug have not as yet indicated approval.

Shld question be raised re publicity re negots, you may say that, while every reasonable effort will be made to conform to desires of FonMins Govt in this respect, and while we wish avoid heavy publicity until actual results can be reported, it will probably prove necessary and desirable that there be brief gen announcement in Wash, which can be timed to coincide with local release, when the mil negotiating team arrives in that country. This wld be confined to brief statement that conversations re mil matters related to US Mutual Security Program and to defense Western Hemisphere being carried on. You shld emphasize importance maintenance secrecy info as to specific Govts being approached until that time.

Report by tel results your approach including, if response favorable, date on which FonMin Govt desires conversations begin.

Request you pass info in this message to US service attachés and Chiefs US service missions.

FYI only this tel being sent to Mexico City, Habana, Bogota, Rio, Lima, Quito, Santiago, Montevideo.

ACHESON

720.5–MSP/12–1751

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 17, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am forwarding to you for your information a copy of my letter to the President dated 5 December 1951 regarding the Title IV Mutual Security Program. In this letter I have recommended that the President make a finding to the effect that United States defense plans establish a need for the participation in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere of certain designated Latin American countries. I further recommended that because of this requirement, the President find that military assistance may be furnished these countries in accordance with the provisions of Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This letter was coordinated with your Department.

You will note that the list of countries and the forces each is to be requested to make available reflects the recommendation regarding Ecuador made by you in your letter to me dated 9 November 1951.[1]

[1] *Ante*, p. 1027.

Furthermore in addition to the tabulated countries and their force contributions, I have recommended to the President that Venezuela be included tentatively in the list of countries eligible to receive military grant aid. This action again reflects another of the recommendations contained in your letter referred to above. In the case of this latter country, I consider that every effort should be made to secure the full participation of Venezuela in the Mutual Security Program by means of reimbursable aid; however, if in the course of future conversations or negotiations it appears from a political point of view that Venezuela's omission from the list of countries to receive military grant aid may threaten the defense and continued flow of Venezuela's strategic materials, this consideration would be overriding. In such an event, the eligibility of Venezuela to receive grant aid will have been established in the finding by the President.

With further reference to your letter of 9 November 1951, I agree that Brazil should be granted a high priority if any reallocation of funds which may be required as a result of failure of one or more of the other governments to qualify for inclusion in this year's program. However, the amount of military grant aid to be given to Brazil should be in consonance with Brazil's willingness to accept hemisphere defense tasks, and also her ability to absorb efficiently and utilize effectively such materiel assistance. Further any reallocation of funds among the Latin American countries must be effected so as to insure the balanced progress of the total program.

On notification of the President's action with reference to the recommended findings, I understand that you are prepared to issue the necessary instructions to the diplomatic missions in the countries to be approached with a view to ascertaining whether the governments of these countries are willing to enter upon negotiations for the conclusions of the required agreements.

Sincerely yours, WILLIAM C. FOSTER

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 5, 1951.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 authorized the appropriation of $38,150,000 for the purpose of furnishing grant military assistance to the other American Republics. The Congress, in the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1952, made such an appropriation. However, the furnishing of such assistance is contingent upon compliance with the relevant general provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and upon several

special provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Among the latter is this requirement: "That such assistance may be furnished only in accordance with defense plans which are found by the President to require the recipient country to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."

The Department of Defense has for a number of years been giving careful study to the roles which the various Latin American countries might play in support of Western Hemisphere defense. This study has resulted in the conclusion that in addition to maintaining the minimum armed forces required to preserve internal security (including the performance of such tasks as protection against enemy clandestine operations or raids; protection of sources, and of installations required in the production or distribution, of strategic materials; safeguarding vital lines of communication; and insuring the local security of bases and other military installations), selected Latin American countries could, provided that they were furnished adequate equipment and training, supply forces capable of executing certain specific and essential common defense missions within this hemisphere. These missions, if not performed by the selected countries, would necessitate the diversion of substantial United States forces to the area in time of war. The specific missions are based on a current United States war plan, but the general concept of this plan is in consonance with the Common Defense Scheme which was prepared multilaterally by the Inter-American Defense Board and will also be reflected in the defense plan currently being developed by the Board. Ten Latin American governments and the United States have approved the Common Defense Scheme and formal approval of this document, or of the defense plan, by each of the proposed countries will be a prerequisite to receipt of military grant aid under this Program.

In accordance with the war plan, each of the Latin American countries concerned will be asked to provide specific forces to perform hemisphere defense missions. These forces will generally be employed extra-territorially and the details regarding the units to be provided by each country will be contained in the military understandings which, together with the bilateral agreements required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, will be negotiated with each country. It is considered highly desirable from a military standpoint that the several Latin American governments indicated in Tab (A), provided they can be assisted by adequate military grant aid, make forces of the general types and sizes shown available for the performance of hemisphere defense missions in accordance with the war plan.

In advance of negotiations, it is of course not possible to know within any accuracy the extent to which individual governments are prepared to agree to provide specific forces of the types indicated to

perform hemisphere defense missions. Consequently, the details with respect to the precise units which would be furnished by each country will need to be negotiated with each government and incorporated in the military understanding.

The Department of Defense has therefore recommended that the several governments indicated in Tab (A) be approached and that, upon agreement between the United States and the Latin American nations concerned, programs be initiated to supply grant military assistance for the purpose of supporting the forces to be provided by each. The Department of Defense has further recommended that in the event that satisfactory agreements cannot be concluded with one of the nations, the following course of action be followed:

1. In the case of army forces, one of the other countries shown on the list would be asked to provide the additional forces required. The decision as to which nation to substitute would depend on the type of forces to be furnished.
2. In the case of navy forces, one of the other nations listed would be asked to supply the deficiency.
3. In the case of air forces, the following countries, in the order of priority indicated, would be approached: (*a*) Argentina; (*b*) Dominican Republic; and (*c*) Bolivia.

In requesting the concurrence of the Secretary of State from a political standpoint in the foregoing list of proposed recipient nations, I pointed out that the decision to include Argentina in the Mutual Security Program was made only after an extensive study and was based primarily on military considerations. I further indicated that in view of the current political situation in Argentina, the Secretary of State might wish to delay negotiations with that country until a more appropriate time.

The Secretary of State has concurred in the foregoing proposals with respect to the countries to be approached subject, however, to a specific recommendation with regard to including Venezuela as a recipient of grant aid.

Venezuela was not included in the original list because, in the course of military staff conversations earlier this year, Venezuelan military authorities stated that the Venezuelan government would purchase any of the equipment which might be required for its defense forces. The Secretary of State has recommended that Venezuela be included tentatively in the list of countries proposed as recipients of grant aid pending verification of the ability and willingness of the Venezuelan government to pay its own way in procuring the equipment required by those forces which it should support in order to carry out vital hemisphere defense missions. In order to secure the continued flow of strategic materials to the United States and in view of the possibility

that political considerations may become overriding as a result of future conversations, I concur in the recommendation of the Secretary of State to include Venezuela tentatively in the list of countries eligible to receive military grant aid.

The Secretary of State in addition to making the above recommendation, agreed that the political situation in Argentina was currently of such a nature that negotiations with that country on this subject should be delayed until a more appropriate time.

In view of the importance of proceeding to implement the aforementioned plans and our desire to initiate diplomatic-military negotiations with the proposed recipient governments at the earliest practicable date, it is recommended that you now make a finding to the effect that United States defense plans establish a need for the participation in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere of the proposed recipient countries indicated in Tab (A), with the addition of Venezuela tentatively. It is further recommended that you find that, because of the above, military assistance may be furnished these countries in accordance with the provisions of Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

The Department of State concurs in this recommendation, and I am transmitting this letter through the Director for Mutual Security [2] so that he may indicate his concurrence or comments. In the event that you make the finding recommended, it is proposed immediately to approach the several countries indicated (with the exception, for the reasons hereinabove set forth, of Argentina and possibly Venezuela) with a view to initiating negotiations.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[2] W. Averell Harriman assumed the office of Director for Mutual Security on October 31, 1951.

[Tab A]

The Department of Defense list of countries and the forces which each is expected to contribute (with the support of military grant aid) is indicated below:

Country	*Army*	*Navy*	*Air Force*
Argentina	2 AAA Gun Bns.		
Brazil	1 RCT w/Sv Spt. 1 AAA Gun Bn.	2 Light Cruisers 5 Destroyers 8 Patrol Craft 5 Mine Craft 2 Rcn. Sqdns. (Air)	3 Fighter Sqdns. 4 Light Bomb. Sqdns.
Chile	1 Rcn. Bn.	2 Light Cruisers 13 Patrol Craft	1 Fighter Sqdn. 2 Light Bomb. Sqdns.
Colombia	1 AAA AW Bn.	4 Patrol Craft	1 Fighter Sqdn. 1 Light Bomb. Sqdn.
Cuba			1 Transport Sqdn. 1 Light Bomb. Sqdn.
Ecuador	1 AAA AW Bn.		1 Fighter Sqdn.
Mexico	1 AAA Gun Bn.		1 Fighter Sqdn. 1 Light Bomb. Sqdn.
Peru	1 AAA AW Bn.	6 Patrol Craft	2 Fighter Sqdns. 1 Light Bomb. Sqdn.
Uruguay	1 AAA AW Bn.	2 Patrol Craft 1 Rcn. Sqdn. (Air)	1 Fighter Sqdn. 1 Light Bomb. Sqdn.
			Air Force Alternate countries: (*a*) Argentina (*b*) Dominican Republic [3] (*c*) Bolivia

[3] For documentation pertaining to the effort of the Department of State to have the Department of Defense upgrade the priority assigned to the Dominican Republic vis-a-vis the military grant aid program for Latin America, see pp. 1367 ff.

ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS AS A GROUP [1]

S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26 [2]

Memorandum by Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld of the Office of the Director of International Security Affairs [3] to Mr. William H. Bray, Jr., of That Office

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 21, 1951.

[Subject:] TF II D–12, January 31, 1951 [4]—Justification of Point IV Program in the Other American Republics.

You have asked that the FY 52 Point Four Program for Latin America proposed in TF II D–12, dated January 31, 1951, be reviewed in the light of United States security interests.

The proposed program is limited for the present to technical assistance under the Act for International Development.[5] It contemplates

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 672 ff.

[2] Files of the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, containing material for the years 1949–1951. This lot, and related lots 52–19, 52–24, 52–40, and 52–51, are part of Federal Records Center Accession 62 A 613. Lot 52–26 contains basic subject files on military assistance program development; records of committees and task forces concerned with military and economic assistance programs are in Lot 52–51. For additional information, see the list of sources at the beginning of this volume.

[3] The position of Director, International Security Affairs was established in the Department of State effective January 8, 1951; Thomas D. Cabot assumed the position on February 2. In that capacity, Mr. Cabot also chaired the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC), an interdepartmental committee comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The committee was charged with responsibility to conduct a continuing review and coordinaton of policy and programs relating to international security affairs and mutual defense assistance matters. For additional information, see the editorial note in vol. I, p. 267, and the press release, dated January 4, 1951, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1951, pp. 155–156.

[4] Reference is to a paper prepared in the Department of State by Task Force II of the Foreign Aid Steering Group (FASG); a copy is printed as Annex A, below.

The Foreign Aid Steering Group, established in late 1950, was an interagency group comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Office of the Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman, and the Bureau of the Budget. Representatives from other agencies sometimes attended the group's meetings, which were held in the Department of State. The FASG was charged with the responsibility for developing a unified foreign assistance program. For further documentation, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.

[5] The Act for International Development was Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 (Public Law 535), approved June 5, 1950; for text, see 64 Stat. 198.

an increase in expenditures over those of FY 51 which are around $11 million. It recommends at present that approximately $44 million be employed for bilateral technical cooperation projects in the other American Republics in FY 52 and $2 million as the U.S. contribution to the technical assistance program being undertaken by the Organization of American States.

The composition of the proposed *bilateral* technical assistance program in Latin America is as follows:

	Cost to US (thousands of dollars)
1. Joint Commissions and Economic Surveys	703
2. Agriculture	26,812
3. Education	5,157
4. Health	7,445
5. Industry and Labor	528
6. Transportation and Communications	1,314
7. Mineral Resources	631
8. Water Resources	547
9. Government Administration and Technical Services	360
10. Other	130
Total	$43,627

The justification for this Program stems from the fundamental assumption that ". . . this [western] [6] hemisphere, backed up by The Rio Treaty,[7] represents the inner citadel of our defenses". The corollaries of this assumption, as stated in the document under consideration, involve the closest political, economic and military support by Latin America for the world policy of the United States.[8] Within these assumptions, the proposed technical assistance program for Latin America has the double objective to: (1) increase production for defense purposes by expanding, on an emergency basis, technical aid programs so that they can effectively assist the Latin American Governments in solving problems, especially in health and supply, that will result from our expanding raw materials requirements, and (2) assist in overcoming the basic Latin American weaknesses which contribute to insecurity.

The justification points out that the proposed program takes into account the "reluctance of Latin American Governments to go in for defense production programs except in the concept of an economic

[6] Omission and brackets in the source text.

[7] Reference is to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[8] For documentation relating to United States national security policy within a global context and the development of the military assistance program in 1951, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.; for documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

program which gives consideration to their essential requirements as well as the adverse effect on their economies of the eventual termination of specific productive programs".

As you have indicated, a statement of the relative strategic importance of any country, or area, to the United States rests upon certain hypotheses regarding the nature and direction of U.S. actions in relation to those of the potential enemy. These hypotheses, against which the fundamental assumption and the corollaries of the foregoing Program Justification must be compared are contained in NSC 56/2,[9] and in the Hemisphere Defense Scheme (approved by the U.S. Government) of the IADB, dated October 27, 1950.[10]

The fundamental assumption, cited above, in the justification for the Point Four Program for Latin America may be considered to be implicit in the first conclusion of NSC 56/2, which states that "In global war, the security of the western hemisphere and U.S. access to its resources and manpower would be essential to the transoceanic projection of major U.S. offensive power".

The corollaries which the justification under consideration draws from this assumption are consistent with the basic U.S. military objectives in Latin America. These objectives, as stated in NSC 56/2, are to see to it that the Latin American countries can maintain their internal security; defend themselves against isolated attacks or raids; protect their sources of strategic materials; maintain lines of communication and military bases; and that certain countries, beyond the foregoing roles, should be capable of performing additional tasks as appropriate.

Section V A 1 of the Estimate of the Situation of the Hemisphere Defense Scheme cited above, states that the political, social and economic methods to counteract the probable aggressor are:

"*a.* Demonstration of the effectiveness and of the virtues of our democratic system through the development of their [The American Republics] [11] basic institutions.

b. Development of adequate educational systems to maintain democratic faiths among our peoples.

c. Efforts to raise the economic and social level of the American peoples to a point consistent with principles proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter."

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[9] Reference is to the National Security Council (NSC) document numbered NSC 56/2, adopted at the 57th meeting of the National Security Council, May 18, 1950, and approved by the President on May 19; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 628.

[10] Reference is to the Inter-American Common Defense Scheme, approved by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) on October 27, 1950, and by the Department of State on January 15, 1951; for information, see Secretary Marshall's letter to Secretary Acheson, December 16, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 679.

[11] Brackets in the source text.

Section V B of the Estimate states, *inter alia*, as the requirements for the defense of the continent:

"*a.* a standard of living to assure true well being for all citizens.
b. coordinated industrial development.
c. adequate public information systems."

In the light of the foregoing analysis, S/ISA should express the belief that the basic assumption and the argument in TF II D–12 are consistent with the major policy statements on United States security interests in Latin America, and accordingly, that it is in the interests of United States security to seek legislative authorization and appropriation to furnish Point Four assistance to Latin America in FY 52 as proposed in TF II D–12.

[Annex A]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1951.
TF II D–12

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE POINT FOUR PROGRAM IN THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS—FY 1952

A. *Rationale of the Point IV Program.*

Whether or not the U.S. will be able to hold outer defenses along far distant fronts in other parts of the world, the security of the U.S. depends ultimately on the collective security of the Western Hemisphere. U.S. security is inseparable from hemisphere security. Behind the present outer defenses of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty [12] this hemisphere, backed up by the Rio treaty, represents the inner citadel of our defenses.

The continued support of Latin America for the policy of the United States in the world is one of the elements on which our national security depends. The Latin Americans represent over half of the votes that support us in the United Nations. In case of another world war we would depend on them for the local defense of the hemisphere and for such protection of vital installations and communications as would release United States manpower for other activities. Moreover, it is becoming evident that in another world war much may depend on the degree to which we have on our side actual military manpower recruited from the 150,000,000 people of Latin America. Finally, the economic effort to build the strength of the free world today depends on

[12] For text of the treaty, signed at Washington, April 4, 1949, and entered into force for the United States, August 24, 1949, see TIAS No. 1964, or 63 Stat. (pt. 2) 2241. Documentation on the negotiation of the treaty is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.

the contribution of raw materials from Latin America; in the event of a deepening of the present emergency and the accompanying mobilization, and especially in the event of total war, our dependence on the economic contributions of Latin America would be vital.

Today we can and do count on the support of Latin America. There are, however, historic forces at work which make it evident that we cannot take that support for granted. We must actively develop our Latin American policy in order to counter these adverse forces and to maintain the cooperation on which we depend.

Nationalism that regards international cooperation as contrary to the national interests is a force working against us today. An example of this is in Argentina, where the domestic strength of nationalism is such that the Government must appease it by advocating the "Third Position".[13]

Latin American governments today must, to an extent never hitherto known, reflect in their foreign policy the drifts and prejudices of public opinion at home. Unless the people themselves support inter-American cooperation positively, the governments will be increasingly unable to do so.

Although our cooperation with Latin America has a historic background that is lacking in our more recent cooperation with countries in Europe and Asia, our cooperation in Europe and Asia has involved programs of grant assistance far beyond anything we have given to Latin America, where our assistance has been confined essentially to loans, for which the Latin Americans pay full value, and to jointly financed technical cooperation. Aside from economic assistance, the fact is that today our legislation authorizes us to give grant military assistance to almost all of the free world except Latin America, which must pay for our military equipment at high rates. While there are reasons bearing on the present emergency for this situation, the psychological effect on the Latin Americans has been bitter and constitutes a major problem of present United States policy in Latin America.

Because of the insignificant part played in our Latin American relations by the kinds of grant assistance that loom so large in our cooperation with many countries of Europe and Asia, the role of Point IV technical assistance is relatively much more important in Latin America. Not only does the Point IV program occupy an essential and dominant position in the developing picture of our Latin American relations, it also is the one type of program that goes directly to the problem of enlisting the good will of the masses of people in Latin America, persuading them that we are on the side of their aspirations. The people in Latin America today are rebelling in their own minds against the misery that has been their lot for ages past. They are no longer willing to accept it. They have everywhere been subjected to

[13] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1079 ff.

a barrage of communist propaganda that offers communism as the only means of their redemption. They have been told that to the capitalist United States they are only a source to be exploited as long as they serve the selfish purposes of the United States, and they have had past history interpreted to them in this sense. The stark fact is that "revolution" is a respectable word today among most of the peoples of Latin America. An intelligent effort is being made to insure that "communism" itself is associated by many of them with a vision of salvation.

It must be recognized in evaluating the potential of hemisphere security that there are basic weaknesses in Latin America today which make for political instability. These lie in economic and social insecurity, the weaknesses effectively exploited by communists and other agitators. The population of Latin America is equivalent to our own, but the lot of the masses is on the whole one of poverty, ignorance and sickness. Nevertheless, the ability of the Latin Americans to maintain good order within their jurisdictions, to exclude enemy elements, and to support themselves in essential respects are vital for our own survival. And should political and economic instability result in the outbreak of conflicts between Latin American states such as occurred up to a dozen years ago, this might render the inter-American system unworkable, thus constituting a dangerous threat to hemisphere security. The role of Latin America in the present "war for men's minds" is critical. The success of Latin American states in making freedom work effectively will have a significant moral value throughout the world as it will demonstrate that the inter-American system is viable within the framework of democracy.

In addition to the absolute security aspects of our relations with Latin America the availability of certain raw materials from Latin America is an essential element today in the economic strength of the free world coalition. The strategic raw materials whose flow from Latin America must be increased immediately include:

antimony
asbestos
bauxite
beryl
cadmium
cobalt
copper
diamonds, industrial
lead*
manganese
quartz crystal
sulphur
tin
tungsten
zinc
cacao bean
fats and oils
hard fibers
hides and skins
hog bristles
kenaf
molasses
rubber*
softwoods
wool

*Increased Latin American production may be required. [Footnote in the source text.]

In order to make our inner citadel secure and to maximize supplies for the free world coalition it is imperative to increase Latin American productive capacity. With respect to the financing of new capacity it is expected that increased dollar earnings of Latin American plus sizeable investments of private and public loan capital will improve the ability of the area to finance the required additional economic plant, including production of strategic raw materials. Consequently, the proposed program of economic assistance for Latin America does not contemplate the use of grant aid to finance the capital requirements of development projects but instead is limited to technical assistance in which a major accomplishment will be the development of the kind of plans and the creation of economic environments which will attract both domestic and foreign investment in the process of sound economic development.

In the interest of hemisphere security, then, as well as to increase the availability of strategic materials the proposed Point IV program for Fiscal 1952 has the double objective to (1) increase production for defense purposes by expanding, on an emergency basis, technical aid programs so that they can effectively assist the Latin American Governments in solving problems, especially in health and food supply, that will result from our expanding raw materials program, and (2) assist in overcoming the basic Latin American weaknesses which contribute to insecurity. Technical assistance will, therefore, be directed toward exploration to prove up additional mineral reserves, to improve transportation, to develop power resources, to increase food production, to train teachers to train workers, to improve sanitation and initiate elementary measures to eliminate the sources of prevalent fevers and infections especially in the mining camps and jungle areas where an influx of population will inevitably result from our raw materials program.

Thus it would be unthinkable to drop existing programs which attack the basic Latin American weaknesses. On the contrary, there should be an expansion of the agricultural, health and sanitation, as well as educational programs which were started by reason of wartime necessities during World War II. At that time, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was provided with $153 million for the FY 1942–46,[14] to carry on a technical assistance and information program supplementary to the raw materials programs of such agencies as the Rubber Development Corporation, the Metal Reserve Corporation and the Foreign Economic Administration. The programs which the Coordinator's office initiated by reason of wartime necessity were continued on a very modest scale after the war and today they consti-

[14] For background information on this subject, see *History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs* (Washington, 1947).

tute a sound foundation on which the required expansion may be projected efficiently and without waste.

It has been these relatively modest programs that have made the most effective attack on the basic Latin American weaknesses; and that have engendered effective U.S.–Latin American cooperation which has reached the masses and created good will by reason of direct personal benefit which they have provided. They have driven home a convincing demonstration of democracy at work wherever they have operated and have measurably raised the production of the working forces. The results obtained from our experience, therefore, demonstrate that, through the expansion of these programs, it will be possible to increase the production of staple foods (e.g. corn, beans, potatoes, rice, meat) and other essential materials which will minimize the dependence of Latin American countries on imports. Although technical assistance in the field of agricultural development has increased food production where programs were in operation, these programs were continued on so limited a scale that population growth continues to outpace the production increases. Today, according to FAO, even if the 1952–53 production targets are met, the volume of crop production would be only 95 percent of the per capita production before 1942 and, moreover, in the majority of the countries the nutritive value of the supplies would remain inadequate. Now, because of the emergency situation we must assist the Latin American governments to expand their food supply not only sufficiently to meet the normal requirements of their own increased population but also the special demands which will be engendered by the large scale of the metal, fibers, rubber and other raw material production. The basic goal of this program, therefore, will be to increase the production to a level adequate to assist in meeting the requirements of expanding defense production.

Because of deficient production of certain essential foods it is necessary in many countries, even during eras of peacetime world trading, to depend upon foreign sources to fill the gap in order to satisfy low consumption levels. In the case of emergency such supplies would have to be made available mainly by this country. Even if this would not constitute an excessive strain on the agriculture of this country, Canada and Argentina, it should be borne in mind that under emergency conditions maximum savings should be made in transportation and the corollary demands on manpower and fuel arising therefrom. Other essential imports which are susceptible to increased local production and which impose a burden upon shipping include fuels, heavy chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

The proposed program also takes into account the reluctance of Latin American Governments to go in for defense production programs except in the context of an economic program which gives con-

sideration to their essential requirements as well as the adverse effects on their economies of the eventual termination of specific production programs. Concentration of our efforts upon minerals, transportation, power, food production, training workers and upon elementary health and sanitation programs will not only contribute to defense production, but in the longer run also lead to better levels of living and economic security for the people of Latin America. Without such technical assistance the Latin Americans by their own efforts will continue to make some progress. Owing to the serious lack of technical skills, however, so little progress will not constitute a significant contribution in the present situation to either defense production or hemisphere security. This could be our Achilles' heel in the hour of crisis.

[Here follows further discussion of other aspects of the proposed Point IV program for Latin America.]

S/ISA Files, Lot 52–51

Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET

Economic and Technical Cooperation Program in the Other American Republics

I. General Summary

A sound cooperative economic and technical assistance program for Latin America is necessary to reduce the deficiencies in the Latin American economy that make for economic, political, and social instability. As has been stated above, the essence of that deficiency is the lot of the Latin American masses, which by and large, is one of poverty, ignorance, and sickness. Although there are obvious differences among the twenty Republics, those differences are of degree rather than of kind with respect to the basic problems. All of the countries have an inadequate, and often-times, declining, rate of agricultural production resulting from unscientific and exploitative land-use methods. The productive capacity of the populations of all the countries is undermined by the prevalence of disease, resulting from malnutrition, the absence of environmental sanitation and the inadequacies of the preventive measures now being employed. The incipient industrial development in all of the countries is handicapped by inefficient organization and deficient training of the labor force. In all of the countries, the funds available for governmental services are inadequate in relation to the urgent needs. This inadequacy is accentuated by the ineffi-

[1] Drafted by Task Force II of the Foreign Aid Steering Group, and incorporated as Tab 2 of a document designated TF II D–17/5a, dated March 7, 1951, prepared for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget as part of the FY 1952 foreign aid program.

ciency with which those funds are used. In most of the countries, there is weak administrative organization and inadequate technical competence in the administration of the social services which the various governments are now beginning to provide for their people.

Notwithstanding the great handicaps that history and geography have imposed, the people and the governments of the Republics of Latin America are today on the march. Throughout the area the people are demanding, and the governments are gradually providing, an increasingly firm foundation for the general economic development that alone will provide a higher standard of living. Everywhere the governments are assuming more leadership in projecting national programs for the improvement of the lot of their people. The governments and the private citizens of the Latin American countries are investing greater funds than ever before in agriculture, transportation, power, and industrial facilities. Throughout the area the governments are increasing their annual budgets for education, health, social security, public works, agricultural development and other social services to a degree that would have been inconceivable even ten years ago.

In virtually every country of Latin America, the increased funds devoted to national programs of social betterment have not provided a corresponding increase in the standard of service. A major reason for this is to be found in the fact that adequate technical and administrative skills and the structure of administrative organization that would permit effective utilization of available resources, are lacking in those countries.

Increasingly, as the nature of the problem becomes understood by them, the governments of Latin America are turning to the United States for the minimum of economic assistance and technical "know-how", which can make their own great effort productive. For that reason, in this area of vital interest to the United States, extraordinary results can be achieved with a program of technical cooperation, supplemented by a relatively small expenditure of funds to enable the United States technicians to provide actual demonstrations of effective action programs related to specific problems.

The recognition by the Latin American Republics of the vital relationship that a program of technical assistance can have to their own national programs of economic and social development, is founded on the extremely rich experience of the technical assistance program which the United States initiated during World War II.[2] At that time, because of wartime necessity, including our need for the active support of the Latin American countries against the Axis, the technical assistance program was projected on a comparatively extensive scale. A

[2] Apparent reference to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the program of its subsidiary, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA). For information on the IIAA, see footnote 11, p. 1059.

great part of that program was related to the problems involving the allied military forces stationed in the hemisphere and other large-scale raw materials acquisition programs of the United States. Notwithstanding the handicaps under which these programs were initiated, including the dislocation of shipping and the diversion of civilian goods normally going to Latin America, they achieved real success. During the subsequent period of post-war retrenchment the cooperative programs were reduced and in some countries discontinued.

The post-war reduction in the scope of the program has been even greater than appears from the limitation of the funds employed because of the inflationary spiral that has characterized the Latin American economies since the war. In fact the funds available for the technical cooperation programs of the U.S. since the war period have been decreasing at a time when great inflationary pressures have been operating throughout Latin America. For this reason, the rate of operation has declined even more than the reduction in expenditures would indicate. The costs of all the elements that enter the programs, including salaries and wages, materials, supplies, and equipment, have in most instances more than doubled. In short, the 11 million dollar program of 1951 represents no more than a 5 or 6 million dollar program in 1945, although at that time we were spending several times that amount.

The programs that have been developed with this limited budget have been extraordinarily effective as demonstrative activities. However, the nature of the problem of maintaining Latin America as an area of democratic strength during the years immediately ahead, and of developing the region as an even more important source of materials for the free world, requires that we assist the Latin American countries to help themselves at a substantially increased tempo. The existing basic programs do not extend to many countries in which the needs are very large; in countries where the programs have been in operation, their benefits and impact on the economies should be broadened.

The program during the last eight years has demonstrated the manner in which our technical "know-how" can supplement and make effective the efforts of the Latin American nations in their own behalf. In addition, our experience has provided us with the specialized knowledge and understanding of sound methods of initiating and operating a technical cooperation program. The description of the proposed program, which is largely an extension of existing programs, must be presented against a description of what those successful methods are.

There are in general three major ways in which the United States has made available to the Latin American Republics its resources of technical knowledge and skill. One has been advice by technical experts who surveyed a particular problem and recommended a course of action to be carried out by the other government. For some types of

problems, such as those of public administration and fiscal policy, the advisory approach may be the simplest and most effective. Another has been for United States technicians in the other country to assume full responsibility for the execution of the work programs along lines that have been agreed upon with the host government in advance. Such an approach has been feasible in the procurement of strategic materials. A third method is to have the host government create a cooperative agency, usually known as a "Servicio" (or cooperative service) within an appropriate Ministry with authority to carry out a technical program in a given field. This Servicio is then staffed with nationals of the host country and a limited number of United States technicians; its activities are jointly planned and executed; and its operations are financed with funds contributed by both governments.

In practice, what has been referred to as a "Servicio" may be called by some other name. But the cooperative agencies through which the agriculture, health, and education programs have been carried on have significant characteristics in common. In each case the Servicio is in effect a bureau within the appropriate Ministry. The United States representative known as the Chief of the Field Party is nearly always also the Director of the Servicio and is thus, at least technically, an officer of the host government as well as a representative of the United States. The relationship between the Minister and the Chief of the Field Party in handling Servicio operations is that of co-equals, since the program agreement provides that there must be agreement between the Chief of the Party and the Minister in the development of basic policies and procedures, the planning and operation of specific projects, and the hiring of key Servicio personnel.

The United States makes two distinct types of financial contributions to programs using the Servicio plan. One is the direct contribution to project funds which is deposited to the credit of the Servicio along with the contribution of the host government which may often considerably exceed the U.S. portion. The other U.S. contribution is the payment of the salaries and expenses of the field party.

The use of the Servicio makes for a fuller sense of mutual responsibility; the control which the United States technicians exercise over Servicio operations assumes more effective use of the knowledge and skills of the United States technicians working on the program; it brings technicians and administrative personnel of the two countries together in an extremely close working relationship in a single agency attempting to solve common problems and produces a greater degree of mutual understanding and respect; and lastly, the Servicio approach means that the nationals of the host government learn and absorb information from the United States technicians in a context of operating responsibility which trains them to assume responsibility for such operations on a permanent basis.

The Latin American governments have shown enthusiasm for this type of operation. During the fiscal year 1951 there were 34 Servicio-type programs in operation in 18 of the Latin American Republics. In addition, the United States carried out advisory and training programs on a varying scale in all of the 20 Latin American Republics. The funds made available for these purposes from the technical cooperation appropriation for FY 1951 totalled approximately $11,350,000 exclusive of the cost of Washington administration.

It is proposed that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, the United States carry out a program of technical and economic cooperation in the Republics of Latin America in the basic fields and in approximately the amounts indicated by the following table:

1. Agricultural development and food supply and related activities (including food processing, feeder roads, etc.)	$13,650,000
2. Health and Sanitation	7,900,000
3. Education	5,100,000
4. Mineral and Power Development	2,000,000
5. Industry and Labor	1,100,000
6. Public Administration and Technical Services	1,600,000
7. Transportation, Joint Commission, Special Projects, etc.	2,400,000
Total	$33,750,000

The above budget:

(*a*) will permit the United States to continue its current technical cooperation programs,

(*b*) will permit the expansion of existing programs in order to make them more effective in relation to the magnitude of the problem in these countries,

(*c*) will permit the initiation of basic programs such as agriculture and education, etc., in countries where such activities are not now being carried on, and

(*d*) will provide needed balance in the country programs.

Approximately $11,500,000 of the sum requested will permit the continuation on an annual basis of the minimum programs underway in fiscal year 1951 in accordance with item (*a*) above.

To provide for the expansion of these going activities to a scale more commensurate with the requirements of the job to be done will require that a minimum of $8,500,000 be added to the $11,500,000 annual budget now used. This means that the sum of $20,000,000 of the proposed budget is required to develop the existing programs to the extent made necessary by the problems being attacked and the approaching emergency, in accordance with item (*b*) above. This expansion provides for special development of the actual food supply programs in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, in response to special emergencies that are developing in those countries, and which are of strategic importance to our defense effort. Approximately $3,500,000 of the proposed $8,500,000 expansion is absorbed by this factor alone.

In addition, the proposed program provides approximately $11,000,000 for the initiation of basic programs of the type already successfully developed, in other countries that need and request them, and which do not have them at the present time. This expansion would provide for agricultural development programs in 8 new countries at a cost of approximately $5,000,000, for education programs in 9 new countries at a cost of approximately $2,500,000, and for new programs in health and sanitation, mineral and water development, public administration, industry, and other fields in all 19 republics at a cost of approximately $3,500,000. The proposed program will also provide approximately $3,000,000 for the development of activities such as industry and labor, fiscal administration, economic surveys and joint commissions for economic development that are essential to a broad program of economic and technical cooperation, but have been developed heretofore.

Since 1942, the financial contribution of the Latin American governments to the co-operative programs has been increasing. That contribution consists of funds given directly to the programs of services and facilities provided by the local governments, and of contributions made by third parties, usually communities that desire such facilities as environmental sanitation and water systems. In the past, the total of these contributions has increased year by year until it constitutes more than 50% of the cost of the programs. Under the program proposed for fiscal year 1952, also, the host governments will be required to contribute all they can afford as a condition to the initiation or continuation of these cooperative programs.

The proposed program provides for the major concentration of effort in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico, in that order, and over 40% of the proposed budget will be used in these five countries. These countries have approximately 60% of the population of Latin America. All of these countries are of strategic importance in relation to our defense effort. In all of them it will be necessary to expand considerably our technical cooperation program to assist them in carrying forward their economic development programs, and thus enable them to acquire greater strength as allies, and to increase their production of essential raw materials for us and industrial products for themselves. Chile, for example, has recently opened a steel plant which will enable her to supply not only most of her own needs, but also a large percentage of the needs of the neighboring Republics. The development of a new industrial center in Chile, which this plant is bringing about, is causing severe strains on other segments of the economy, especially those related to food supply, since the new industrial area is draining off supplies, already inadequate, of the Santiago region. The same situation obtains with respect to the increased production of copper in the northern region of the republic. There too,

an influx of population into the expanding copper mining camp has resulted in an acute shortage of food supplies. A cooperative agricultural program in Chile has been started, but this assistance should be made more extensive in order to enable Chile to solve its food supply problem.

Similar situations obtain in connection with Bolivia, Mexico, and Brazil. The expanded programs of mineral production developed in response to United States needs, have created serious food shortages. In all of these areas there are parallel problems related to health and sanitation and to industrial training. The proposed program will provide some of the assistance required by the governments in their attempts to solve these problems.

It will be noticed from the above table that relatively heavier emphasis is being given to the programs of agricultural development, food supply, and related fields. More than 40% of the total budget proposed will be used for this purpose. Approximately 24% of the proposed budget is to be used for health and sanitation and related activities.

The $5,000,000 proposed for educational programs is sufficient to continue those programs, if the problem of inflation is taken into account, merely at the rate at which they were initiated and to expand the program into several new countries. Education projects account for 15% of the budget.

The other activities proposed in public administration, mineral and power development, industry and labor, and joint economic surveys, which are essential factors in a total program, account for the remaining 21% of the proposed budget.

The Republics of Latin America desire U.S. technical assistance. No better proof of this can be found than their willingness during the last eight years to assume an ever-increasing share of the direct cost of the cooperative programs. In addition, they have increased their own budgets to continue, on a permanent basis, the services initiated by cooperative action. The direct contribution of the Latin American Republics increased year by year until in 1950 it was approximately $14,000,000 for all the U.S. programs. In addition, the work of the cooperative programs affected the form in which many millions of dollars in the Latin American budgets were employed. On the basis of past experience, therefore, it is anticipated that under the proposed program they will bear a large, fair share of the cost. Because the proposed program for FY 1952 is on a scale that is more nearly commensurate with the extent of the problem than has been true during the last few years, it will involve a proportionately large increase of U.S. expenditures over FY 1951. Most of this increase will be used to initiate new programs or to intensify food production in areas that are now of strategic importance. In these two situations it is not reasonable

to expect a ratio of contributions by the Latin American governments equal to the ratios that have been reached in old established programs after several years of operation. For that reason, although a reasonable increase in the direct contribution of the Latin American governments is to be expected, they will, in all probability, not maintain the ratios of 1951.

[Here follows further discussion of other aspects of the technical assistance program proposed for Latin America.]

820.00–TA/3–1951

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (White) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1951.

With reference to your appearance before the Bureau of the Budget in justification of the Foreign Aid Program for Latin America, I present the following suggestions:

1) At the meetings of the Inter-departmental Committee on International Security Affairs, which I attended while you were in Latin America, it became abundantly clear that other government agencies, and to an extent, Cabot himself, were not so much concerned about the worthwhileness of aid to Latin America as they were about the two following problems:

a) Taking into account the tremendous magnitude of the funds to be requested of Congress and the growing urgency of "shoring up" the countries on the periphery of the Iron Curtain, was the administration justified in asking for grant funds for Latin America?

b) With the foreign exchange position in the Latin American countries improving rapidly as a result of favorable prices, should not military aid be on a reimbursable rather than grant basis?

2) With reference to (*a*) above, I believe it would be valid to point out that, while Communism in Latin America has not reached the critical point, we may very well be engaged in a marathon contest with the Soviet Union. If this is the case, one dollar invested wisely and now in Point IV programs answering to the aspirations of the people may prove to be an important and more effective instrument than ten dollars invested at a later date when the political situation my have deteriorted due to the conditions of poverty and hopelessness.

3) With reference to (*b*) above, I think it should be pointed out that with the dollar and gold reserves of Latin America still a billion dollars below the level prevailing at the end of 1945 and with much greater deterioration reflected in the purchasing power of those reserves, the Latin American countries are not going to be disposed to spend any

sizable funds on equipment needed for them to assume military roles which we desire in our own interests.

4) It seems to me that in connection with both economic aid and military aid, both the Budget Bureau and, at a later date, Congressional committees should be brought to face squarely the extremely low level of national income and the inherent financial limitations which act as a definite ceiling on what the Latin Americans can do to help themselves. In my judgment, this has been clearly and concisely set forth by DRA in the following briefing memorandum:

"The population of the twenty Latin American republics in 1949 is estimated at about 150 million, approximately equal to that of the U.S. The national income of the Latin American countries for the same year is estimated at about $24 billion as compared with the national income of the United States of $217 billion.

"The budgeted federal expenditures of these republics during 1949 totalled over $4.4 billion, compared to expenditures of the United States Government of over $40 billion in the same period. In the case of Latin America, as a whole, and that of the United States, budgeted expenditures comprised 18.5 percent of national income.

"The burden of federal expenditures in relation to national income varies greatly, however, among the individual Latin American countries. In five republics, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, the cost of administration absorbs between 30 and 32 percent of their national incomes. In El Salvador and Paraguay, on the other hand, these costs amount to less than 10 percent of national income.

"In 1949, the budgets of the Defense Ministries of the Latin American nations called for expenditures approximating $1.0 billion, roughly equivalent to one-twelfth of defense expenditures in the United States. These military disbursements by the other American republics comprised 4.2 percent of the total national income of Latin America. In the United States, the cost of national defense represented 5.5 percent of the country's national income.

"Costa Rica and Panama have no true military establishments or separate defense ministries; their security forces consist entirely of armed policy and civilian reserves. Only Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile have military establishments adequate for maintenance of internal security.

"Any significant increase in the size of the Latin American defense establishments would require the allocation of a substantially higher proportion of their national incomes to military expenditures".

820.00-TA/3-2151

Memorandum by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Economic Affairs (Dort)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1951.

Budget Hearings (3/21/51)

LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC

The following points were of particular significance.

Mr. Miller made the following general points:

(1) That the economic program in Latin America was primarily one of long term significance and should not be viewed simply as an emergency program.

(2) That we should extend aid even though some countries temporarily might have governments we do not particularly like. Governments come and go and we can not constantly change our basic attitude toward the countries in Latin America with each change in government. By cooperation and steady pressure we can influence them for the better.

(3) The Inter-American Highway program should be a part of the omnibus bill [1] since it has the same basic objectives, i.e., securing greater production and greater cooperation. It also has some significance for defense.

(4) In answer to possible criticism that Latin America had a low priority at the present time and therefore all assistance should be directed to other areas, he said that this concept of priority was fuzzy. We do have an absolute interest in Latin America.

The following remarks of particular significance were made by the Budget Bureau representatives:

(1) The justification should be greatly sharpened up in relationship to the increase of production, particularly of vital materials, which would result directly or indirectly from the program.

(2) Whereas it might not be hard to justify the programs at current levels only a particularly significant objective would justify any substantial increase in view of the current demands on our resources.

(3) Although the questioning ultimately developed relatively clear purposes and concrete results in connection with the programs, this was not evident in the written justification. The justification was largely in generalities, building good will, etc. They felt that for Congress it was essential to develop a comprehensive country picture indicating specific goals and anticipated results from the programs together with indications from past experience of the effectiveness of the work. As a result of the testimony on several sample countries they seemed satisfied that such material was available.

[1] For documentation on foreign aid legislation, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.

S/ISA Files, Lot 52–51

Summary Minutes of a Meeting of the Foreign Aid Steering Group, Held at the Department of State, 3:30 p. m., March 22, 1951

SECRET
SG S–11

[Here follow a list of those present (25) and discussion of matters unrelated to the proposed Point IV program from Latin America.]

Other Task Force II Problems

30. Mr. Stinebower [1] reviewed the last Steering Group action on the Inter-American Highway [2] and said that the (State) Bureau of American Republics Affairs had asked to have the problem reconsidered. He said that the only question is whether to include the project in the omnibus bill, since it would go over in one form or another. Mr. Atwood,[3] of ARA, reviewed the recent legislative history, including last year's authorization of 8 millions, with appropriations of 4 millions, which have been used up. The Bureau now is requesting 24 additional millions of authorizations with appropriations of 28 millions. As for inclusion in the omnibus bill, ARA feels that highway construction is a number 1 project for under-developed areas. Generally, loans have been used for this purpose; but Mr. Atwood did not believe that the countries could borrow enough to complete this highway, although some loans for feeder roads, etc., should be feasible. Our present desire is to complete an all-weather highway to the Canal Zone in two years. The project would improve hemisphere defenses but could not be justified on solely military grounds.[4] However, the economic development programs of the area are tied directly to highway availability, making the project an essential part of our aid to the area and to Latin America, where it is the only large grant element contemplated. ARA wants it to receive number 1 priority. Completion

[1] Leroy D. Stinebower, Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, and Chairman, Task Force II, of the Foreign Aid Steering Group.

[2] The summary minutes of the tenth meeting of the Foreign Aid Steering Group held in the Department of State, March 7, 1951, read in part as follows:

"*Inter-American Highway*—The funds for this project were originally intended for inclusion in the FY '51 supplemental appropriations request. TF II decided to include it in the omnibus bill, although uncertain of Department of Defense support, and to leave it to the Bureau of the Budget to decide the best legislative course to pursue. The prevailing sentiment of the Steering Group was that it should decide not to put this program into the omnibus, subject to the right of ARA to have this decision reconsidered." (Lot 52–51, Box 124)

[3] Rollin S. Atwood, Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs.

[4] In a letter to the Secretary of State, dated March 7, 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall stated in part the following:

"The Department of Defense considers that, as stated by the IADB, the completion of this highway would be of value to the collective defense of the continent. However, in considering the over-all military requirements of the United States, the completion of this highway is of relatively low priority and expenditure of funds for this purpose at this time cannot be justified for purely military reasons." (820.2612/3–751)

in two years would save money in the long run. We are "committed" to completion of the road by the implications of the legislative history.

31. Mr. Gordon [5] felt that new conditions since Korea call for re-examination of implied commitments developed in the last war which might today look like "business as usual".

32. If the highway goes into the bill, he thought it should have a stronger justification than he has yet heard. The question is whether, in an international security bill, you should include a long-range development plan similar to those which have to be forfeited in some US localities. He also felt that we would damage the character of the bill and run the risk of appearing to be wrapping something in a security cloak.

33. Mr. Stinebower asked whether, if a stronger case could be made for the Highway as such, it should be included in the bill.

34. Mr. Lawson [6] said he would prefer to see it included.

Action:

35. It was agreed that Task Force II should re-examine the Inter-American highway project to justify it in whole or in part on the basis of more immediate results, such as food production and raw materials development, as a part of the omnibus bill.

36. It was pointed out that this approach might have the effect of reducing the project to its more justifiable components, with perhaps a smaller total amount requested.

37. Since additional country studies are being prepared for Latin America already, it is not expected that re-examination of the highway will alter the timetable.

Programs submitted to Budget

38. Mr. Lawson commented that in the papers so far reviewed at the Bureau, they have yet to see a total country program to embrace loans, grants, technical assistance and military aid. In the Latin American submissions, US objectives, economic military and political are not shown country-by-country, so they cannot be related to the economic programs. This statement of objectives is necessary. Other deficiencies have been evident in the treatment of the internal and external financial positions, strategic materials, detailed military programs, possibility of government loans or private financing in short, the documents submitted do not add up to programs based on stated objectives by area and country, although the oral presentations at the Budget have been good.

[Here follow additional discussion of and action on matters unrelated to Latin America.]

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[5] Lincoln Gordon, Office of the Special Assistant to the President.

[6] George W. Lawson, Jr., Chief, International Activities Branch, Estimates Division, Bureau of the Budget.

S/ISA Files, Lot 52–51

Minutes of the First Meeting of the Expediting Group,[1] *Held at the Department of State, 3:00 p. m., April 18, 1951*

TOP SECRET
EG M–1

APRIL 20, 1951.

[Here follow a list of those present (35) and discussion of several matters unrelated to Latin America.]

Proposed Revisions on Title IV Programs (FWG IV D–1)[2]

COLONEL BONESTEEL[3] said the FWG had recommended three appeals: (1) to restore the military program to $70 million; (2) to raise the technical cooperation programs by $1.9 million over the markings; and (3) to request the restoration of new authorization for the Inter-American highway in the amount of $4 million.[4]

[Here follows a brief discussion of the military grant aid program appeal.]

Inter-American Highway

MR. MANN[5] explained that the paper treats the problem with the same approach that was used in the original submission, and that the only new element is that we request half as much as we did before. He said that ARA would prefer to be over-ruled than to agree to a 16-year program for the highway which a $4 million annual expenditure rate would necessitate. COLONEL BONESTEEL was concerned about asking the Secretary or Under Secretary of State[6] to go through an appeal process since nothing new had been added. AMBASSADOR WOOD[7] felt that the only way to gain a restoration in the highway will be to request it at a high level on a frankly political basis. Therefore, no extensive figures would be required. MR. MANN indicated that he expects Con-

[1] An interdepartmental group called into existence for several days to resolve questions relating to the redrafting of the foreign aid program for appeal to the Bureau of the Budget.

[2] Reference is to a paper prepared in the Department of State by the Final Working Group (FWG) for Title IV (Latin America) of the proposed foreign aid bill, dated April 17, 1951, and designated FWG IV D–1, for use in connection with hearings on the bill at the Bureau of the Budget; a copy is in Lot 52–51, Box 128.

[3] Charles H. Bonesteel, III, Executive Director of the European Coordinating Committee, temporarily designated Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, effective March 16, 1951, to assist in preparing the foreign aid program for presentation to Congress. Mr. Bonesteel served as the Department of State's representative on the Executive Group for Foreign Aid; for documentation on the Executive Group, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.

[4] The original requests submitted to the Bureau of the Budget by the Department of State were as follows: $80,000,000 for military grant aid, of which $10,000,000 was allowed; $33,781,000 for the technical cooperation program, of which $17,000,000 was allowed; and $8,000,000 for the Inter-American Highway program, which was disallowed.

[5] Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[6] James E. Webb.

[7] C. Tyler Wood, Deputy United States Representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration, and member of the Executive Group on Foreign Aid.

gressional support for the highway, but AMBASSADOR WOOD cautioned that the Executive position must be properly established before the hearings. MR. LINCOLN GORDON expressed the belief that support for the program within the White House is stronger than the Budget attitude indicates, and that it would therefore be a mistake not to appeal it. COLONEL BONESTEEL made it clear that his only concern is to provide the top appealing officer with a good case. MR. MANN agreed to rewrite the appeal justification emphasizing the importance of the program for the prevention of social unrest and political revolution.[8] COLONEL BONESTEEL felt that Mr. Webb would go along with a properly constructed paper emphasizing the significance of the highway in the general context of Latin American policy, its effect as a deterrent on political unrest and the domestic political interest in it. AMBASSADOR WOOD felt it is important to introduce something new before a high level appeal is made. COLONEL LINCOLN [9] proposed that the last sentence of 1 under *Problem* be deleted and that the last paragraph on page 2 be removed altogether. COLONEL BONESTEEL informed the group that Mr. Webb had indicated generally that he would be willing to make the $4 million appeal.

Technical Cooperation (OAS)

MR. STINEBOWER explained that the only appeal is in the bilateral Point IV material.

MR. MANN said that this section is only an outline which will require revision. An additional paper on UN programs will also be prepared. MR. IVERSON [10] explained that the working group had cut to a figure for grants but the finally requested amount was about $600,000 more than the Budget markings ($5,116,000 compared to $4.5 million in the markings). He said that the IIAA [11] programs have generally increased over the past year but noted that programs in recent years

[8] In a memorandum to Mr. Webb, dated April 25, 1951, Mr. Mann stated in part that the principal basis for the appeal on the Inter-American Highway request "is that the five Central American countries concerned, and Panama, have extremely low living and health standards and, in varying degrees, are already suffering from social and political unrest. The greatest single contribution which this Government can make to their economic progress and stability is to complete the highway which will provide the only overland means of communication between all of them, open up new areas to agricultural development and complement the Point IV program in the area." (Lot 52–51, Box 128)

[9] George A. Lincoln, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and member of the Executive Group on Foreign Aid.

[10] Kenneth R. Iverson, President, Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA).

[11] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs was originally incorporated in 1942 and became a U.S. Government corporation in 1947. It was established to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply. As of mid-1950, the IIAA operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the IIAA's activities and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 679.

have been marginal. There has been some feeling in Latin America that we should raise our contribution since the participating countries often put in 6 or 7 times more than we do. COLONEL BONESTEEL understood from the Budget markings that the Bureau would go along with a considerable program but wanted a realistic evaluation as to whether 1952 personnel can be processed by July 1. MR. IVERSON replied that: (1) there is already a program going on in the hemisphere; (2) they have had no trouble with finding the necessary people; (3) the figure here already includes a lapse of three months; (4) we are building programs with the Point IV money available and our proposal would increase the FY 1951 programs by a third. Therefore, he felt that there are reasonable answers to the comment on lapses. COLONEL BONESTEEL suggested that general points of this kind be put on top of the details of our justification, so as to indicate that we accept generally the Burget position but account for the specific points. MR. IVERSON agreed to do so.

The deadline for the preparation of the three "rebuttals" to Budget, military Inter-American highway and technical assistance was agreed to be Friday noon. The appeal of $1.9 million was accepted by the group subject to re-drafting of a justification.

MR. STINEBOWER felt that any appeal papers prepared for Mr. Webb should be couched in more general terms. COLONEL BONESTEEL agreed and said that two or three main points should suffice. It was agreed that the appeals would be re-written in the form of a memorandum from Colonel Bonesteel to Mr. Webb for the Under Secretary to use in making an oral appeal to the Director of the Budget.[12] The memorandum should state that the Executive Group recommend an appeal (*a*) on the military program (with the main arguments stated and the details tabbed in); (*b*) on the highway (about a paragraph with three of four strongly stated points plus a table on programs); and (*c*) technical assistance (in summary, synthesized form).[13]

[12] Frederick J. Lawton.

[13] The appeal to the Bureau of the Budget was embodied in a paper prepared by the Final Working Group for Title IV, dated April 23, 1951, and designated FWG IV D–1a, not printed; a copy is in Lot 52–51, Box 128.

As a result of appeals by the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget increased the FY 1952 budget marking for technical assistance programs in Latin America to $22,000,000, which the Department proposed as of late August to apportion in the following manner: $18,000,000 for bilateral technical cooperation programs (all countries except Argentina), $1,000,000 for OAS programs, and $3,000,000 for multilateral programs administered through the UN (820.00–TA/8–2851).

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, however, authorized a limit of $21,250,000 for technical assistance programs under Title IV (American Republics); for text, see 65 Stat. 373. The actual appropriation included in the Military Security Appropriation Act of 1952 (Public Law 249), approved October 31, 1951, was for $21,245,653; for text of the act, see 65 Stat. 731.

Pertinent documents relating to contributions by the United States for technical assistance programs in the individual Latin American countries are in Department of State decimal file 820.00–TA for 1951 and S/ISA Files, FRC Accession 62 A 613.

[Here follows additional discussion of matters unrelated to Latin America.]

820.00–TA/5–251

Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Halle) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1951.

Subject: Policy on Assistance to Latin America.

There has been general agreement that our foreign aid programs should tend to make the recipient countries less dependent rather than more dependent on outside assistance. This has been the understanding of Congress in supporting the IIAA programs as well as such other programs as those of the ECA.

The IIAA policy has, accordingly, been one of helping Latin American governments to initiate programs of development and then gradually transferring to those governments the burden of continuing them. At a meeting of the IIAA Board of Directors on July 1, 1949, "it was the consensus of the meeting that any case in which it was proposed to increase the ratio of the Institute's contribution to Servicio program funds above the ratio that prevailed in the preceding year was to be submitted to the Board or to the Executive Committee for consideration and approval, except that this would not apply to very minor increases in ratio not exceeding 1% or 2%".

Another basic feature of the IIAA programs is that they are programs of "technical cooperation", not programs of grant aid. The IIAA contributions of project funds have always been explained as being quite incidental to the technical contributions and in support of them.

Through the medium of the IIAA we could, if we were not careful, decrease rather than increase the self-reliance of the Latin American countries. We could do this by building up their governmental services with our funds to an extent that was beyond the capacity of their economies to support. By augmenting our project contributions we could also convert the IIAA programs into programs in which grant assistance played a more dominant role.

To illustrate: I suppose it is true today, as it was a couple of years ago, that there was no prospect of the Costa Rican Government's being able to pay, in the foreseeable future, more than about 50% of the project costs of the cooperative food production program. This raised

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[1] Addressed also to Mr. Mann, Mr. Ivan B. White, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs; Mr. Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs; and Mr. Fletcher Warren, Director, Office of South American Affairs.

the question whether that excellent program was not, in fact, too large and expensive for the scale of the Costa Rican economy—whether it could ever be turned over entirely to the Costa Ricans. However, subject to the agreement of our Embassy in San José, $58,000 of TCA funds is now to be allocated to supplement the $125,000 of regular program funds for the program for F.Y. 1951. Point Four funds are also to be made available to supplement the regular project contributions in other programs—in some cases on a very large scale.

In the past few years we have repeatedly faced situations in which cooperating governments have complained that they could not afford to sustain their share of the cost of particular programs. At the same time, IIAA chiefs of field party have urged the expansion of those same programs with increased contributions of U.S. project funds.

I raise the policy question involved here without at the moment being prepared to offer a considered answer. My disposition is to suggest that we should regard our IIAA programs as long-range programs that may be continued with our participation over an indefinite number of years with the objective of eventually building something that the other countries can permanently support. In order words, I would not propose that on all of these programs we aim at turning them over entirely to local support by a definite date in the foreseeable future. I think we should, however, resist the pressures for indiscriminate enlargement generated by (*a*) the availability of funds and (*b*) the zeal of those who are in command of the field operations. The Board did, in July of 1949, draw a rough sort of line to limit our assistance under ordinary circumstances. This may not have been the best solution and, in any case, it may not be taken seriously today.

We ought, I think, to work out a policy that would govern operations to the end of increasing the self-reliance of the Latin American peoples.

LOUIS J. HALLE, JR.

361/8–251

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Nufer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 2, 1951.

Subject: The Technical Cooperation Program of the Organization of American States

I understand that Dr. Lleras[2] plans to call you in the near future to discuss with you the financial problems of the Technical Cooperation

[1] Drafted by Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Office of Middle American Affairs.
[2] Alberto Lleras Camargo, Secretary General, Organization of American States.

Program of the OAS and to urge that this government make another payment to the Special Account for the Program. For that reason, I thought you would like to have briefly the status of the Program and recommendations on what you might say to Dr. Lleras.

Status of the Program

About $276,000 has been paid into the Special Account. This has been allocated, except for $24,000, to four projects and administrative expenses. Funds allocated to the following three projects are probably sufficient to carry them through December 31, 1951:

Project No. 1—Nurse's Training Center
22—Housing Research and Training Center
77—Aftosa Center

Funds allocated to Project No. 39 for three training centers for agricultural extension workers are expected to last until about August 31. Eight other projects approved as of first priority by the IA ECOSOC are about ready to begin but there are no funds available.

Status of Pledges and Contributions

	Pledge	*Payment*
(a) Pledges paid in full:		
El Salvador		$4,571
Haiti		2,000
Honduras		3,143
Panama		2,714
Dominican Republic		4,571
(b) Pledges paid in part:		
United States	$1,000,000	$250,000
Uruguay	19,100	9,550
Venezuela	15,429	3,857
(c) Pledges on which we have information Government is acting to make payment:		
Argentina	87,857	
Brazil	128,000	
Colombia	26,857	
Ecuador	6,142	
Guatemala	5,000	
Nicaragua	3,000	
Peru	17,428	
Total	274,284	

(d) No pledge:

Bolivia	Chile
Costa Rica	Mexico
Cuba	Paraguay

Efforts made to obtain pledges and payments

In the basic resolution of April 10, 1950,[3] all Member Governments agreed to make a pledge. On September 28, 1950, the IA ECOSOC invited all Member States, by October 31, 1950, to make a pledge to the Special Account for the program. During the month of December, Dr. Lleras discussed the subject of pledges and payments with the heads of the delegations of all Member States that had not pledged and urged them to have their governments announce a pledge. On January 25, 1951, the IA ECOSOC authorized its Chairman[4] to communicate directly with each government that had not made a pledge urging them to do so. Subsequently Dr. Lleras also communicated with each such government. Again on May 24, 1951, the Chairman of the IA ECOSOC communicated with all the governments urging them to make pledges or to make payments on the pledges already made. The Executive Secretary of the CCTA has made two trips to various Latin American countries to explain the program and to urge the payment of pledges.

Action on payment of United States pledge

In a letter from the US Representative[5] to the Chairman of the IA ECOSOC of October 31, 1951,[6] the United States announced a pledge of $1,000,000 provided it did not exceed 70% of the total amount pledged. It was agreed within the Department that we would make our first payment when all the pledges were assembled and that that payment would be ½ of the total amount we expected to pay or $500,000. When it became apparent that the Program would not get started unless the United States made a payment, ARA urged, and UNA reluctantly agreed, to make a payment of $250,000 even though all the pledges were not in. This payment was made on January 19, 1951.

After the OAS Program was approved in its entirety on March 13, the OAS requested informally whether the United States would make a second payment. In a memorandum of March 22, 1951,[6] to TCA–Dr. Bennett,[7] you requested that a second payment be made. This was approved by TCA but disapproved by UNA which has final responsibility for all payments to international organizations. Your staff favors a second payment though not necessarily of $250,000, but in view of the fact that there has been almost no change since your

[3] Apparent reference to the resolution establishing the program of technical cooperation of the Organization of American States, approved at a special meeting of the IA–ECOSOC held in Washington, March 20–April 10, 1950; for text of the resolution, see *Annals of the Organization of American States* (Washington, 1950), vol. II, pp. 261–267.

[4] Julio E. Heurtematte, delegate to the IA–ECOSOC from Panama.

[5] Merwin L. Bohan.

[6] Not printed.

[7] Henry G. Bennett, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration.

request of March 22, 1951, it is doubted that UNA would approve any payment. The possibility is being explored, however.

Recommendations

In your discussions with Dr. Lleras you might want to point out that we are aware of the financial difficulties of the OAS Program and are very sympathetic toward his desire to obtain additional funds. However, this is an international program and we want to maintain its international character. We cannot do that if almost all of the funds are US funds. At present about 90% of the funds in the Special Account are US funds. We are now in the process of justifying to the Congress our participation in the Program. The Department is being criticized for paying too large a share of the financial support for international organizations. A bill recently passed the House to limit our contributions to international organizations to 33⅓%. In the face of the lack of support for the Program by other governments as evidenced by their pledges and payments, we may have a difficult time justifying such participation and consequently an equally difficult time obtaining funds for next year's contribution. We would be hard pressed to explain any additional payment until other governments match our present payment on a 70–30 basis.

You might suggest to Dr. Lleras that he again discuss the financial problems of the Program with the heads of the Delegations of those countries which have not made payments on their pledges or have not pledged. You might also want to reiterate a suggestion made to him on two previous occasions—that he suggest to these governments that they deposit their payment to the credit of the PAU in local currency in one of their own banks so that it would become immediately available and then the government would not need to be concerned about the loss of dollar exchange. Any local currency can be utilized in the Program and at present there appears to be no problem of convertibility.

You might also want to consider whether a suggestion that Dr. Lleras visit several of these countries to impress upon them the necessity for their financial support of the Program would be advisable.

A suggestion that our embassies consult the governments that have not pledged or have not made payments and urge them to do so has been considered. This approach is not recommended.[8]

[8] Beneath the text of this memorandum appear the following handwritten notations: "I agree with these recommendations J[ohn] C. D[reier, U.S. Representative to COAS]," and "So do I. T. C. M[ann]."

Editorial Note

The Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States

was held at Panama City, Panama, August 20–30, 1951. Assistant Secretary Miller served as Chairman of the United States delegation. The agenda of the meeting included the subject of more effective contributions by member states to the technical cooperation program of the OAS. In his report on the results of the meeting, which was attached to a memorandum by Mr. Bohan to the Secretary of State, dated November 20, 1951, Mr. Miller stated in part the following: "While the discussion on financing was thorough and brought out forcefully the obligation of all countries to support the Program financially, and although Argentina and Chile said they were taking action to make their payments, there is some doubt that actual payments will be forthcoming immediately." Mr. Miller also commented that the meeting "may be considered a success from the United States point of view since we were able to support all the decisions taken . . . [and] because of the practically unanimous agreement reached on all agenda items." (365/11–2051) Additional pertinent documents relating to the meeting are in Department of State decimal file 365 and Lot 60 D 665. For further information, the text of committee reports and resolutions adopted by the meeting, see *Annals of the Organization of American States* (Washington, 1951), volume 2, pages 366–382. For the text of Mr. Miller's address concerning hemispheric economic problems delivered to the plenary session of the meeting on August 28, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 17, 1951, pages 475–478.

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250 [1]

Notes of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Department of State, 10:15 a. m., October 29, 1951 [2]

SECRET

UM N–413

[Here follows a list of those present (20).]

Point IV Program

1. In introducing the subject of the proposed reorganization of TCA, Mr. Webb explained that Mr. Heneman [3] and his Management Staff are now assisting the Under Secretary as a specialized group of

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[1] Master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's Meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained and retired by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[2] The Under Secretary's Meeting convened weekly; it was customarily attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and certain office directors. Under Secretary of State Webb presided at these meetings.

[3] Harlow J. Heneman, Director, Management Staff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

people who can make a study of a job to be done and come up with sound organizational and administrative proposals. In effect, A/MS is serving as a group of industrial engineers would in a large corporation. The proposed reorganization of TCA [4] is a pilot model of that type of study which could take place in other areas of the Department.

2. Mr. Heneman reviewed the proposed reorganization of TCA and referrred to an organization chart at hand to indicate the specific changes to be made. He pointed out that it was not until recent Congressional action had taken place that it could be decided how TCA should be organized and what job it had to do. One of the primary problems is to determine how to set up TCA, as well as the regional bureaus, to handle Point IV matters. TCA is to be set up as a focal point in the Department on Point IV matters, and within this organization there are specific points of contact for the regional bureaus and the other agencies on their problems at hand. Originally, TCA was set up on a functional basis, but now the emphasis has changed to a geographic organization with certain technical and general staff functions. Mr. Heneman explained that there are two development services—one for Latin America and one for the Near East, with the possible establishment of one at a later time for Asia and Africa. One problem which A/MS faced in making their current study was the integration of the IIAA into the TCA operation. He pointed out that there would be duplication of staff and facilities, if IIAA were allowed to continue as is. Mr. Heneman pointed out that an effort had been made to keep the Washington organization as small as possible and only develop staff by responding to the needs from the field. With the Institute becoming a part of TCA, then the personnel and know-how already developed by the Institute could be utilized on a global basis. In other words, some of the people in the Institute would be utilized to assist in other areas.

3. Mr. Heneman pointed out that the Country Directors which would be set up in the field would be under the Ambassador. He also stated that the appointment of key people going to the field would be discussed with the responsible regional bureau. He stated that if TCA expands its procurement and supply functions, it would be necessary to set up an assistant administrator for this particular task, but at the present time the job does not warrant this position.

4. Mr. Heneman explained that this plan had been developed in consultation with the staffs of the regional bureaus, and it is hoped that the working relationships with the bureaus would be improved by this arrangement.

[Here follows discussion of the basis of the Point IV program for underdeveloped areas.]

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[4] For documentation on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 1641 ff.

8. With respect to the IIAA, Mr. McGhee,[5] because of his past experience with that organization, pointed out how effective it is in the field. He felt that its power and authority should not be diluted merely to achieve administrative consistency. Mr. Heneman assured Mr. McGhee that the IIAA as an organization was not being abolished but would be better utilized under the TCA reorganization.

9. Mr. Miller agreed with Mr. McGhee's comments on the Institute. He pointed out that he had not heard of the proposal discussed by Mr. Heneman and took exception to it. He stated that the creation of TCA did not facilitate the work of the IIAA, and he is very apprehensive of the proposal made by Mr. Heneman. With respect to the Country Director proposal, Mr. Miller reserved his position on this. He felt that in some cases a Country Director should report to the Counselor for Economic Affairs. The pattern for the Country Directors should not be the same for every country.

10. Dr. Bennett referred to his great respect for the IIAA and indicated his efforts to give the Institute freedom and to step up its program. He explained that the proposal was not to abolish the IIAA but was to reduce the Washington overhead by not duplicating staff. Thus, the top-flight people in IIAA could be utilized to help in other areas. Mr. Heneman emphasized that if the staff in IIAA is left intact, it would duplicate staff required in other areas. The value of the IIAA is recognized and the proposal made in the reorganization was not made merely for the sake of organizational neatness. Dr. Bennett assured Mr. Miller that the Institute would not suffer under his direction. Mr. Humelsine[6] suggested that all of the "development services" be called "institutes". Mr. McGhee agreed that this would be a good idea, and Mr. Miller added that the name of the IIAA is invaluable in Latin America. Mr. Heneman agreed that the "development services" could be called anything desired. Mr. Webb pointed out that the "development services" are not "institutes". He pointed out that we cannot maintain separate corporations such as the IIAA, because the tendency in government, in both the Executive and Legislative branches, is against this type of organization. Mr. McGhee agreed that it need not be a corporation but pointed out that an "institute" could serve as a focal point within the government for providing this type of aid to a certain area. In addition, he stated that it would be much easier to get a better man to become "president" of an "institute" than merely a "director" or "chief" of a "development service". Mr. Webb pointed out that the decision on this question of the "institute" was not final.

[Here follows discussion of the need for a regional administrator of the Point IV program in the Middle East area.]

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[5] George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[6] Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563[1]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State[2]

TOP SECRET

Latin America Aid Programs

MILITARY PROGRAM

[Here follows discussion of military grant aid to Latin America under the Mutual Security Program.]

(An estimate of the cost, beyond the amount which may be authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1952, will be made by the Department of Defense).

C. Extent to Which Program Meets Needs of National Security.

Successful completion of the program will contribute to collective security of the hemisphere. The defense tasks which it is hoped this grant aid will enable other countries to perform are so essential to the national security of the U.S. that there would be no question that U.S. forces will be required to perform them if Latin American forces are not available.

ECONOMIC PROGRAM

A. Minimum Objectives and Tasks.

1. To stimulate the volume and types of production of basic materials required for defense production and stockpiling by helping the Latin American Governments to solve problems that would otherwise inhibit the expansion of raw materials production.

2. To assist in overcoming present weaknesses in the Latin American economic structure which contribute to political and economic instability to the end that the orientation of the governments and people of the Latin American countries toward the U.S. may continue to be at least as favorable as at present.

B. Nature and Magnitude of the Program.

Measured against development efforts which are expected to be undertaken through private investment and loan capital the program will continue to be only a significant catalytic agent to stimulate efforts by local governments to help themselves. Primary reliance will continue to be placed on private investments and loans and on public investment by the Latin American Governments themselves to meet development needs in Latin America. U.S. Government funds will be used only to the extent necessary to increase production in Latin

[1] Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1947–1953.

[2] Prepared at the staff level for the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC), and attached to a paper approved by ISAC, entitled "Summary Statement of Recommended Aid Programs for Non-European Areas", dated September 12, 1951, and designated ISAC D–20/1a, not printed.

America to the level which is required for the defense production effort and for assuring our political objectives in the region.

In addition to the general assumptions given on pages 2 and 3 of ISAC D–22/3a of August 31, 1951,[3] the following special assumptions are applicable to the Latin American portion of the Mutual Security Program:

1. No technical assistance will be projected for Argentina but the current policy of extending no additional technical aid to Guatemala will be subject to revision should political conditions change.
2. In some of the Latin American countries, economic problems faced are of a magnitude too great to be solved by technical assistance alone.
3. There will generally be disappointment in Latin America that the grant aid program is not expanded more rapidly.
4. The relative contributions from Latin American countries will continue to increase or, in any event, will not be reduced.
5. Private capital will continue to be available in at least the current volume for economic development in Latin America.
6. The level of anticipated loan operations in Latin America by the Export-Import Bank and the IBRD will not vary significantly from the figure of approximately $350,000,000 attained in fiscal year 1951.

It is impossible to speak with certainty as to the cost of the program or even as to all of the elements which should comprise the program. This is true both because of the uncertainty as to the validity of the general and specific assumptions made with respect to the Latin American program and because of other uncertainties such as:

a. The amount of funds that will be authorized and approved by the U.S. Congress for the program for fiscal year 1952.
b. The extent to which the governments of Latin America will be able and willing to contribute to the program for fiscal year 1952.
c. The magnitude of U.S. import requirements of strategic and critical materials which, it is understood, have not yet been estimated by ODM.
d. The extent to which the maintenance of lower prices in the U.S. than in the world market for strategic and critical materials will interfere with the imports of such materials from Latin America and the extent to which it may accordingly be necessary to subsidize such importation either directly or indirectly.

In the light of these and other uncertainties, the following tentative estimates are made as to the elements and costs of the programs for fiscal years 1953 and 1954:

1. Elements comprising the program:

a. An expanded technical cooperation program which would be an extension and intensification of the present technical cooperation activities.
b. Contribution to the construction of the Inter-American Highway on a scale to assure its completion by 1959.

[3] Not printed.

c. U.S. grant aid in the construction of other highways in Latin America to facilitate the production and acquisition of strategic and critical materials.

The lack of overland transportation facilities is a major impediment in Latin America to achieving a rapid increase in the production of strategic and critical materials. The lack of such facilities not only limits access to the strategic and critical materials but interferes with the production and transport of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs, needed in connection with the production of the materials. In general, primary reliance for the construction of transportation facilities will continue to be placed on the governments of the Latin American countries and private investment and on loans which may be floated in connection with particular raw materials projects. For example, it appears that it will be possible to use private capital and loan funds in Brazil to help finance the completion of a better 240 kilometer road in the Amapa region and in improving access to the Urucum deposits in order to speed up production of manganese. It is believed, however, that there are cases where it would be in the interest of the U.S. to use grant assistance in the construction of highways to facilitate the speeding up of strategic and critical materials production, especially where our potential need for the materials is great and the construction of transport facilities might seriously interfere with development of deposits in the event of a rapid increase in requirements of the materials. For example, new roads will be necessary in Brazil if remote deposits of tungsten are to be opened up, in Chile if certain copper mines are to be brought into production, in Bolivia to encourage increased production of tin and tungsten, and in Guatemala access to, and production of, rich lead and zinc properties is limited by the necessity of transporting ores approximately 200 kilometers by mule back. These and other cases should be thoroughly explored to determine just how far it would be in the interest of the U.S. to help improve access to raw material resources. It is believed that there are a number of cases where inadequate transport facilities in Latin America are not only seriously limiting current production of strategic and critical materials but that they would constitute an even more serious limitation on a rapid expansion of such production and that the only way of overcoming the deficiency at present may be the extension of grant aid.

2. Estimated cost.

The cost of the program for each of the two years is estimated as follows:

a. Technical assistance	$30,000,000
b. Inter-American Highway	$ 8,000,000
c. Grant aid for other highway construction in Latin America	$25,000,000

547-842—79——69

C. Extent to Which Program Meets Needs of National Security.

So long as the Latin American Governments maintain their present political orientation toward the U.S. and our dependence upon them for raw materials continues, increased production in Latin America should promote the national security of the U.S. The factors limiting the economic aid program proposed for Latin America are our desire to rely to the maximum extent possible on private enterprise, loans and the Latin American Governments themselves to finance their own economic development needs. Maintenance of the present ratio of Latin American contributions to U.S. contributions in technical cooperation activities means that the rate of expansion of such activities is limited by the ability and willingness of the Governments of Latin American countries to contribute. The program proposed for Latin America is also limited by the general assumption that there will be no general war and that our need for encouraging production of strategic and critical materials is therefore not as great as it would be in the event of such a war during this period. Should this assumption prove incorrect our requirements for strategic and critical materials would not only increase but these increased requirements would undoubtedly have to be met to an even larger extent from Western Hemisphere sources.

340.210/11–2751: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 27, 1951—2:35 p. m.

CONTINUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

It will be recalled that prior to the Fourth Session of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Mexico City in June,[2] the Department had been considering a plan for the possible merger of ECLA into the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC), or, if this could not be agreed, for the holding of annual simultaneous sessions of the two bodies.[3] The Department is in receipt of a despatch from the Embassy at Quito [4] inquiring with regard to

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[1] Sent also to diplomatic offices in London, The Hague, and Paris.

[2] The Fourth Session of ECLA was held in Mexico City from May 28 to June 16, 1951. Documentation on U.S. participation in the session is in decimal file 340.210 and Lot 60 D 665. For additional information, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 11, 1951, pp. 955–956.

[3] For previous documentation on the status of ECLA, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 672 ff.

[4] Not printed.

the Department's current views in connection with this matter, and considers that the following information may be of general interest.

It will be recalled that after the Second Session of ECLA in 1949 at Havana, members of the delegation concluded that a merger of the two organs might be desirable, on the grounds that there was no need for two Multilateral economic organs in the same region. Several influential Latin American Delegations had indicated that they might accept some solution along these lines, and it appeared that such a step might be taken in 1951, which was time when the UN–ECOSOC would be considering the reorganization of its three regional commissions, including ECLA. However when the matter came up for reconsideration early in 1951, the situation had changed. By this time, Dr. Raoul Prebisch,[5] who had taken over as Executive Secretary of the Commission, had built up a very considerable degree of support in Latin America both for his own work, and for the Commission itself. When, therefore, the matter was discussed informally with some of the Foreign Ministers of Latin America while they were in Washington in April,[6] although there was some support for the idea of a merger from some countries including Colombia and Venezuela; nevertheless, Brazil and Chile were opposed to the plan; the Mexican attitude was cautious and certain other countries were non-committal. In view of these facts, it became clear that general agreement to a merger could not be obtained.

The U.S. Delegation was accordingly instructed to seek a solution to this problem at the Fourth Session of ECLA, in Mexico, on the basis of simultaneous sessions of the two bodies. A suggestion to that effect was advanced by the Mexican delegation. In spite of the apparent logic of this solution, it met with determined opposition. Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Cuba were strongly opposed. Mexico indicated that it did not wish to press the matter against determined opposition. Colombia and Venezuela did not attend the session. Personal conversation with influential delegates indicated that many Latin Americans suspected that the U.S. desired a merger of the two bodies as a means through which it could dominate both. Several delegations stated that ECLA was the only economic organ in Latin America which was genuinely Latin American in sentiment. The delegate from Brazil stated privately that he was under personal instructions from the President[7] himself not even to admit the existence of the problem of coordination at a governmental level. As the Mexican delegation stated at a closed session, the problem was fear and suspicion and such feelings could not be dealt with by logic.

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[5] Raúl Prebisch was an Argentine economist.

[6] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held in Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. Documentation concerning the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.

[7] Getúlio Dornelles Vargas, President of Brazil.

As a result of this, the Commission adopted a resolution which calls for the establishment of a Committee on Coordination between IA–ECOSOC and ECLA which will be made up of the Executive Secretaries of both bodies and other secretariat officials. This Committee would handle coordination of effort between the two secretariats.

In addition the resolution designated Dr. Prebisch to consult with an official of the Organization of American States (presumably Dr. Lleras) to work out measures which they consider adequate to deal with the problem of coordination "at the governmental level".

The U.S. Delegation did not feel too dissatisfied with the above result for the following reasons among others:

1. The resolution adopted does face the problem of coordination at a governmental level and it is hoped that Messrs. Prebisch and Lleras may come forth with a realistic solution since both are fully conscious of the nature of the problem; and can be expected to attack it in good faith.
2. The Delegation was much impressed with the work of ECLA and of its Secretariat, and particularly with Dr. Prebisch himself. The Delegation felt that ECLA is building up a body of Latin American thought in the fields of economic development and trade which is essentially realistic and useful. As is pointed out in the last few pages of the Delegation's report which was circulated to Embassies in the region, it was felt that Dr. Prebisch is in a position to bring home to Latin American officials economic truths which they would not accept on the basis of any statement made by U.S. representatives.

The present policy of the Department is set forth in the following statement by the U.S. Delegation to the Fourth Session of ECLA at Mexico City:

"The Delegation of the United States declares that the Government of the United States is profoundly impressed with the high quality of the work being carried out by ECLA; that it wishes to see this work continued; and that it will give it its sincere and strong support.

"My Government, of course, will continue to maintain its interest in the coordination of the work of ECLA and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at all levels but it will await the report of the Committee, which it is proposed to create, before supporting any specific method for realizing that coordination."

At the Second Extraordinary Meeting of IA–ECOSOC held at Panama in August 1951, the Council took note of the resolution passed by ECLA and (1) agreed to accept ECLA's invitation to form a coordinating committee composed of the Executive Secretaries and other officials of ECLA and IA–ECOSOC and (2) agreed to designate an OAS official to study, jointly with the UN officer referred to in the ECLA resolution, the measures necessary and appropriate for coordination on government level and to submit their decisions to subsequent meetings of ECLA and IA–ECOSOC.

The Department feels that a basis will be worked out for avoiding any important duplication of work between the two organs. This may be based upon an understanding under which ECLA would assume responsibility in the field of long-term studies while IA–ECOSOC would concern itself principally with short-term matters. In this connection it will be noted that Dr. Prebisch has already suggested to UN–ECOSOC that the next plenary session of ECLA be postponed until the Spring of 1953, and has stated that he would prefer to have the Commission meet only every other year. It will be noted that, since the first year of ECLA existence, cases of actual duplication between the two Secretariats have been rare.

Finally, the UN Economic and Social Council has just voted with strong Latin American support to continue ECLA indefinitely with essentially its present terms of reference.

WEBB

ARA/REA Files, Lot 57 D 597 [1]

Memorandum by the Acting Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration (Bingham) to the Assistant to the Director of Mutual Security (Ohly) [2]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1951.

Subject: Bureau of Budget Marking for Economic Aid for Latin America in Fiscal Year 1953

IIAA and ARA have recommended that the Bureau of the Budget marking for economic aid for Latin America for fiscal year 1953 be appealed. I concur, since I share their belief that the reduction made by the Bureau is too drastic and that the Bureau should be asked to agree to a figure of $30 million for the bilateral program and the United States contribution to the OAS technical cooperation program together.

The Bureau states that the amount approved by it would provide for an expansion in the bilateral program of approximately 85 per cent above present rate of obligation. The Bureau also makes the general comment relative to Titles II, III and IV that the "agency projection for 1952 took no account of July–October experience, but instead copied the estimates made last spring". The present rate of obligation is, of course, the result of the lateness of the 1952 appropriation. The rate of obligation during the July–October period was determined not by the judgment of any of the agencies as to what was desirable but by a resolution of Congress limiting expenditures to the

[1] Records relating to the mutual security program in Latin America for the period 1951–1956, as maintained by the Office of Inter-American Regional Affairs.

[2] Drafted by Mr. Edward G. Cale, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs.

rate of the previous year. The April–June rate, increased by a factor to permit the growth of existing programs and the addition of desirable new programs, would undoubtedly be a much fairer standard for judging the size of the 1953 program. The agencies which formulated the 1953 program considered it reasonable and feasible.

IIAA assures me that by the end of fiscal year 1952 it expects to have executed susbtantially all of the 1952 bilateral program and to have spent or obligated the entire $18 million authorized for the program. As you know, IIAA has recently requested the transfer of $2 million to the 1952 IIAA program from the amounts authorized for other areas.

The Bureau's reduction appears to have been based to a considerable extent on its belief (1) that there will be a shortage of technicians for the 1953 technical cooperation program generally and (2) that the funds for Latin America should be curtailed in order that a larger number of technicians may be available for other areas. I believe that these views are subject to serious question on both counts. The problem of recruiting competent personnel is difficult but IIAA has found that an adequate number of competent technicians can be obtained through an active recruitment program. Furthermore, as you will recall, representatives of IIAA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Security Agency expressed the view at the hearings before the Bureau that with an active recruitment program the technicians required for the program recommended for 1953 can be found.

The suggestion that the Latin American program be curtailed in order that more technicians may be provided for other areas overlooks the following considerations:

1. Some of the principal qualifications for a technician working in Latin America are familiarity with one or more of the languages spoken in Latin America and with customs and habits of the people. Because of such qualification some personnel would be willing to work in Latin America but not elsewhere.

2. Because of the well established nature of the Latin America program the number of new technicians required in relation to the number already employed is less than for other areas.

3. It is not safe to assume, under present international conditions, that there are any "non-crisis" areas. Latin America because of such factors as its proximity to the United States and its raw materials is of extreme importance to us. As Mr. Miller indicated during the hearings before the Bureau, placing Latin America in an inferior status in such matters as foreign aid has already made the task of obtaining Latin American support for United States objectives more difficult.[3] The

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[3] In a memorandum to Mr. John P. Hoover, of the Office of South American Affairs, and Mr. Sayre, dated July 26, 1951, Mr. Miller had stated in part the following:

"In preparing our revised program for fiscal year 1953, I believe that we should review carefully our proposals in relation to the programs of other

extent of Communist influence in Guatemala and attempts now being made to extend that influence to such vital areas as Panama and several recent examples of Latin American non-support of the United States, such as the vote of a considerable number of the Latin American countries for Byelorussia, rather than Greece for a seat on the Security Council,[4] indicate that we cannot continue to take Latin American support for granted.

The programs in the other American republics have demonstrated that these governments need the technical assistance of the United States and want to work with the United States on the solution of basic economic and social problems which confront them and which directly and indirectly affect the United States. They respond by channelling substantial sums of money into the cooperative programs and into related activities with the effect that programs are not only assisting in the improvement of economic conditions but the Latin American governments are assuming ever greater responsibility. The United States assistance has been so small in the past to permit only cooperative programs on a spotty basis. The proposed program will permit a more balanced activity and greatly stimulate the activities of the Latin American governments. A $30 million program is only one and half million average per country.

The amount requested for a United States contribution to the technical cooperation program of the Organization of American States was $1,500,000. The Bureau of the Budget, considering carry-over, has allowed $1,000,000 or the same contribution as in calendar years 1951 and 1952.

While the present payment record of the other American republics to the Program does not appear to warrant raising our contribution there are strong indications that when the United States contribution is actually offered in November or December 1952, an increased contribution would be justified. Our inability to offer an increased contribution at that time, if expectations as to the size of the total OAS program and the payment record of other countries prove correct, would have a more damaging effect on the program than our original offer of only $1,000,000 in 1950 to a program which we knew at the time would cost a total of over $3,000,000. The contribution to the OAS program should be a part of the total program for Latin America with the understanding that the amount to be used for the OAS would

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areas from the standpoint of assuring ourselves that Latin America is not being discriminated against. From indications that I have seen, I am increasingly concerned that we are applying one standard to Latin America and a different standard to all other areas of the world. While I do not necessarily at this stage wish to suggest any diversion from the policy which we have pursued of opposing grant aid to Latin America for capital investment projects, I nevertheless believe that the possibility of discrimination as between areas is sufficiently great so as to warrant a careful review of it by us in conjunction with Ambassador [Walter] Thurston [of the Policy Planning Staff]." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

[4] Documentation on this subject may be found on pp. 78 ff.

probably not be less than $1,000,000 and if the payment record at the time warranted, it might go as high as $1,500,000. In any case the amount offered by the United States would be covered by a percentage proviso.

I believe that the $30 million program for Latin America is both realistic and desirable, especially when it is considered that our contribution to the OAS technical cooperation program will also come from this figure.

ARGENTINA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA[1]

611.35/2–1351

The Chargé in Argentina (Mallory) to the Department of State

SECRET BUENOS AIRES, February 13, 1951.

No. 1184

Subject: Discussions between President Perón[2] and Former Ambassador George S. Messersmith.[3]

In connection with the general condition of United States-Argentine relations and with special reference to the positions to be taken by the two countries at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics,[4] to be held in Washington beginning March 26, 1951, it was considered desirable by Assistant Secretary Miller[5] to convey certain thoughts and considerations to President Juan Perón. Inasmuch as former Ambassador Messersmith, a person who has had a sympathetic and understanding attitude towards Argentina's problems, who has had a long and cordial friendship with President Perón and who has spoken and can speak to the President with great frankness, was proceeding to Argentina, Mr. Miller requested him to approach the President. In the letters referred to, Mr. Miller provided certain background information in addition to discussions held in Washington.

Mr. Messersmith arrived in Buenos Aires on January 29, 1951.[6] Arrangements were completed for him to see the President. He has prepared full memoranda of his conversations, which are enclosed. Inasmuch as the memoranda themselves are the important source of infor-

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 691 ff.

[2] Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.

[3] Mr. Messersmith had served as Ambassador to Argentina, 1946–1947. Shortly after his retirement from the Foreign Service in August 1947, he had accepted a position as Chairman of the Board, Mexico Power and Light Company, an affiliate of a large public utility in Buenos Aires known as CADE (Compañía Argentina de Electricidad).

[4] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held in Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951; documentation on the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.

[5] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[6] Mr. Messersmith was in Buenos Aires from January 29 to March 2. During that time he had several conversations with President Perón. Extensive memoranda of his discussions with the President were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of this despatch, and also despatch 1320, from Buenos Aires, March 6, 1951 (611.35/3–651).

mation, no attempt will be made in this despatch to summarize them. It may be pointed out, in explanation, that three memoranda are enclosed,[7] of which Enclosure No. 3 not only constitutes a statement of what Mr. Messersmith considered he could say on behalf of the Department of State but was so prepared that it could be translated and given to President Perón following his request.

The reporting officer, in connection with this matter and the three enclosures, observes that the attitudes and comments made by President Perón are, by and large, quite favorable to an understanding of the position of the United States. This reported attitude is not reflected in other facets of Argentine life, including the Administration press, the attitude and statements of his ministers and advisers. A condition previously noted still exists, namely, that it is difficult to determine whether to believe the President, who speaks in private, or to judge from the acts of the press and the government, which speak and act in public. His apparent unwillingness to face up in public or to condition the people of Argentina to realities is of paramount importance. It is believed that following this introduction by Mr. Messersmith Assistant Secretary Miller, during his projected visit the first days of March 1951, will find it desirable to endeavor to obtain precise and categoric definitions of President Perón's stand.

L. D. MALLORY

Enclosure 3

MEMORANDUM

FEBRUARY 10, 1951.

During a conversation which I had the privilege of having with President Perón on Friday afternoon, February 9, I conveyed to him the following thoughts and observations which Assistant Secretary of State Miller had asked me to convey to the President with respect to the attitudes of the State Department on the Conference to be held in March of the Foreign Ministers of the American States.[8] I said that naturally the thinking of the State Department was still in a preliminary stage as it was preparing for the Conference in collaboration with other Departments and Agencies of the United States Government, and that final conclusions on many points would only be formulated in the period before the Conference began. Assistant Secretary of State Miller, however, felt that it might be interesting to President Perón to have the thoughts of the Department as formulated so far.

[7] Enclosures 1 and 2 are not printed.

[8] Mr. Messersmith's conversation with President Perón on February 9, which took place at the President's home in Olivos and is reported in enclosure 2, covered a wide range of topics in addition to the Foreign Ministers Conference, including Argentina's economic problems and the necessity for the nations of the Western Hemisphere to collaborate in the interests of hemisphere defense.

1. The United States Government intends firmly to pursue its policy of friendship towards Argentina. There are obstacles and sources of friction on each side, but the United States Government is of the firm opinion that through patience and mutual understanding such obstacles and sources of friction can be minimized and eventually overcome.

2. The United States Government does not intend in any way to use the forthcoming Conference of Foreign Ministers to place Argentina in any embarrassing position but, on the contrary, hopes to facilitate in the ways within its power the most complete cooperation on the part of the Argentine government.

3. The United States Government strongly hopes that each delegation at the Conference will be able to understand the problems and views of the other delegations so as to reduce the possibilities of misunderstanding which may be inherent in the situation.

4. To facilitate the long-term approximation between the two governments and countries, the United States Government realizes that it will be necessary on its part to keep working on the elimination of the historic prejudices and misconceptions which exist against Argentina in the United States, and that conversely it realizes that its success in this effort will depend so largely on a similar attitude and action on the part of the Argentine government in eliminating such prejudices and misconceptions in the Argentine against the United States. The increasing disposition of the American press to meet Argentina half way is shown by the favorable reaction in the American press to such conciliatory gestures as the release of Balbin.[9]

5. The United States Government is keeping the people of the United States fully informed on all phases of its policy with respect to the extremely critical world situation in which it and we all find ourselves, and has made and is making every possible effort to make the fundamental facts of the world situation and their significance for the United States and the Western world completely clear so that public opinion is prepared for and ready to support the acts of the Government. The United States Government hopes that President Perón and the Argentine government will take more definite steps to align themselves publicly and unequivocally with the Western Powers in the present conflict, and prepare public opinion in the Argentine for such definite and unequivocal attitudes on the part of the Argentine government. References to the Third Position [10] are not understood in the United States and lead to confusion there as to the real

[9] Ricardo Balbín, a political opponent of President Perón, had been arrested while campaigning as a candidate for the governorship of Buenos Aires during the provincial elections in March 1950, subsequently sentenced to 5 years in prison, but pardoned and released in early January 1951.

[10] For the Department of State's view of President Perón's doctrine of the Third Position, see the Policy Statement for Argentina, p. 1112.

attitude of President Perón and the Argentine government and tend towards alienating public opinion in the United States. With the position of President Perón and of the Argentine government so strong internally as it now undoubtedly is, it is difficult to understand why a more unequivocal stand should not be taken and why Argentine public opinion should not be more adequately prepared.

6. As concerns the Conference of Foreign Ministers, the United States Government is aware that Argentina has difficult internal political and constitutional problems with regard to the question of military cooperation outside of the hemisphere, and in this respect the United States Government has full understanding and is prepared to ease as much as possible Argentina's share at the Conference.

7. The United States Government does not have presently in mind discussing at the Conference or raising in any way for discussion at the Conference, anything which will add to the commitments which the various countries of the Americas have already solemnly assumed under the Rio Treaty [11] and the United Nations Charter.[12] What the United States believes should and must be considered is the implementation of the commitments already solemnly undertaken by all the governments concerned. Because of the overwhelming importance of the situation which we all have to face, and of the issues which are at stake, and of the Conference taking clearly defined decisions, we hope that everyone will understand in all of the American countries the necessity of having the Conference do more than speech making or passing equivocal half-hearted or inadequate resolutions or measures. Public opinion throughout the free world will not be impressed if the Conference produces merely empty phrases and does not show a solid determination on the part of all of the American states to resist Communist aggression.

8. The United States Government is of the opinion that the Conference will make it clear that the armed forces of each country can be committed outside of its national territory only in accordance with the constitution and laws of each sovereign country. Every country has this same problem and the discussions in the United States Congress and in the press of the United States indicate how fully and clearly it is understood and is being examined. It is nevertheless obvious, in view of the world crisis, that it is important to take as positive positions in advance of actual aggression as the constitutional processes of the various American states permit.

9. In connection with the political and military parts of the agenda of the Conference, the United States hopes that the Conference would,

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[11] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[12] For text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 993, or 59 Stat. 1031.

first of all, adopt a declaration reaffirming the solidarity of the hemisphere and the declaration to resist aggression, and to take cooperative measures towards this end. Such declaration must be strong, unequivocal and adequate.

10. One of the objectives the United States will seek at the Conference will be that the Ministers give broad policy directives to the Inter-American Defense Board to undertake plans to implement our treaty commitments and those of all the American states with regard to hemisphere defense. These directives of the Inter-American Defense Board would, of course, be subject to the approval of the respective governments. In this respect the United States Government is of the opinion that hemisphere defense is not merely a passive concept, but includes defense measures outside of the hemisphere. The action of each government will depend on its constitutional processes.

11. With respect to the second item of the agenda of the Conference, the United States plans for its part to place emphasis on the control of subversive activities rather than endeavoring to propose legal concepts which would be difficult for some countries to comply with. Specifically, the United States Government has no intention at this time of proposing to or asking other countries to sever diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia or to outlaw the Communist Party as neither of these programs are in effect in the United States. The points on which the United States Government believes it should concentrate in its proposals will be such matters as control of travel by subversive elements, protection of strategic installations and such similar measures. The United States Government believes that the Conference will discuss the exchange of information, and on this point the planning of the United States has not progressed very far at this date. It is not, however, the present opinion of the United States that a replica of the Committee for Political Defense [13] which met in Montevideo during the war should be recreated, and its present thinking is that any multilateral consultation which may be deemed necessary may probably be done within the framework of the COAS. In this latter respect, however, the thinking of the Department of State has not progressed adequately and the matter is receiving consideration.

12. With regard to the items on economic matters on the agenda of the Conference, the United States has not been able to formulate and conclude its planning. In view of the critical world situation, the responsibilities which this situation places on the United States and its economy and production, new agencies having to do with wartime economic activities, have, as is well known, been recently established. These agencies are proceeding with their organization studies, planning and action. The Department of State in its determination of its attitudes on economic items which may arise during the Conference

[13] For previous documentation on this subject see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 95–100.

and which can or should be discussed in the interest of all, must coordinate its planning with that of existing and new agencies having primary responsibilities in these matters. By the time that the Conference meets, or beforehand, it will have been possible for the State Department to more clearly define the position of the United States Government.

13. The United States Government believes that one objective under the economic points of the agenda should be to provide for the maximizing of the utilization and the most effective distribution for the defense effort of critical materials. With regard to price policies, it is hoped that whatever price control policy is worked out within the United States Government will take into account the need of consideration of the views of other countries in trying to operate on the basis of agreement. The United States Government has in mind very much the procedures during the last war and certain frictions and wishes to avoid such unnecessary frictions.

14. In the economic aspects of the agenda a point of special interest to us as to the other American countries will be the administration of the allocations and priorities programs in the United States, which necessarily have to be set up to meet the imperative needs of defense effort and production. In planning for the Conference in this respect, the United States Government and the Department of State have very much in mind the experience and the problems of the last world war. It is a hope of the United States Government to be able to work out a fair and equitable administration of our allocations and priorities programs and to have its allocations programs so administered as to recognize the need, not only for maintaining a fair level of economic activity in the American states, but also so far as the imperative exigencies of the situation permit, a reasonable level of economic expansion.

I informed President Perón that I considered it a privilege on the part of the Department of State and Assistant Secretary of State Miller to convey the foregoing to him. It would be appreciated by him that these were preliminary thoughts of the Department of State and that its final plans for the meeting had not yet been made, as this was obviously impossible because of the time-consuming nature of the consideration and discussions which had to take place within the Government in order to prepare for this important meeting. I said that I believed, however, that the foregoing represented the thinking of the Department of State at this time. I said that Assistant Secretary of State Miller, as he knew, was planning to make a short visit to several of the American countries before the meeting, and around the end of February, and that he would undoubtedly, when he arrived in Buenos Aires, and where the President had been so kind as to indicate he would be glad to see him, be able to elucidate on the foregoing

points and to discuss with the President further thinking of the United States Government and the Department of State with respect to the Conference, as it had developed in the interval.

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH

Editorial Note

By an exchange of notes, dated March 2 and March 27, 1951, at Washington, the United States and Argentina agreed to extend for a period of one year from its date of expiration the Military Aviation Mission Agreement of June 29, 1940, which, after several extensions, had expired on June 29, 1950. Copies of the notes are filed under decimal numbers 735.58/3–251 and 735.58/3–1651. For the text of the 1940 agreement, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 175, or 54 Stat. 2320.

On October 12, the Argentine Embassy informed the Department of State by note that the Argentine government had decided to dispense with the Military Aviation Mission (735.58/10–1151); on December 17 the Department of State received a confirmatory note, dated December 12, to that effect (735.58/12–1251).

735.00/3–651

The First Secretary of Embassy in Argentina (Pool) to the Department of State

SECRET BUENOS AIRES, March 6, 1951.

No. 1319

Subject: Developments During Mr. Miller's Visit.[1]

[1] Assistant Secretary Miller visited Buenos Aires March 2–5, as part of a tour of five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay) during the latter part of February and early March. He was invited to Argentina ostensibly to attend the Pan American Games, but the actual purpose of his visit was to engage in preliminary discussions with Argentine officials concerning the forthcoming Meeting of Consultation and current problems in United States-Argentine relations. Mr. Miller's memorandum describing the discussions, dated March 4–5, was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 1321, dated March 6, 1951 (110.15–Mi/3–651). In the covering despatch, Chargé Mallory stated in part the following:

"Perhaps the principal value of the visit will be the realization by the Argentines that Mr. Miller made no requests and offered no help except in general international cooperation. The tactic of causing Argentina to realize that she cannot bargain with us using civil liberties or anything else as a pawn, and that she needs us and our close allies more than we need her, should bear good fruit, providing that the several agencies of our Government maintain a united front in policy and practice. The Embassy most strongly supports the views of the Assistant Secretary in this matter. It recommends that no overt action be taken which could cause offense to Argentina, or provide the basis for reaction on her part. It recommends that we follow a policy of quiet watchful waiting, of doing as little for her as possible, allow her to become deeply concerned over supplies and materials which she needs; in short, to follow a policy of masterly inaction which will place us in a dominant position to the end that Argentina can realize that her own best interests are to quickly become our partner in the divided world of today."

Mr. Miller's visit produced some unexpected developments, the evaluation of which the Embassy has not yet completed.

During the whole time Mr. Miller was here, he never once saw Peron alone.[2] The Embassy was informed that Friday afternoon, March 2, would be reserved for his talks with the President, and that Miller and Paz [3] would proceed to the Pink House after Mr. Miller's call on the Foreign Minister at 3:30. Nothing happened on Friday, however, or on Saturday either. Mr. Miller finally was invited to luncheon at the President's Town House on Sunday and spent about two hours with him then, but always in company of the others present—the members of the Economic Council, and Mrs. Peron.[4] It was quite clear that it had been decided Peron was not to see Miller alone. It is not known whether this idea originated with the President or with his advisers. All of this is in sharp contrast to Mr. Miller's visit last year,[5] when he and the President sat down in a friendly spirit and talked things out over the table. This time Cereijo [6] and Evita did the talking.

While Mr. Miller was in Peron's company, no specific matters whatever were touched upon, the conversation being confined entirely to generalities. Peron stated that Argentina was fully committed to supporting the United States in the coming conflict, and he recognized that Argentina must soon define its position. Instead of attempting to bring up specific matters for discussion, he went out of his way to talk of other matters—such as the secret scientific experiments in Bariloche [7]—which are not on the agenda. When Mr. Miller said goodbye to Peron on Monday morning, March 5, Peron made a half-hearted effort to explain away his attitude, which explanation Mr. Miller took to be a feeble apology.

The thought has been expressed that the President is too harassed to have taken on the kind of discussion which would doubtless have ensued in a private conversation with the Assistant Secretary. It is fairly

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[2] In a letter to Chargé Mallory, dated February 5, 1951, Mr. Miller had stated in part the following: "Regardless of the visit and regardless of the ground covered by George Messersmith, I sincerely hope that I will have an opportunity to talk with Perón alone. The deterioration in U.S.-Argentine relations during the last three weeks is most discouraging to us, as I assume it is to you, and I would like to go over with Perón some of the choicer morsels which his press has been serving up recently and compare them to some of the letters which he sent me last spring and summer." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

[3] Hipólito Jesús Paz, Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations.

[4] María Eva Duarte de Perón.

[5] For documentation on Mr. Miller's visit to Buenos Aires, February 19–24, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 691 ff.

[6] Ramón Antonio Cereijo, Argentine Minister of the Treasury and President of the National Economic Council.

[7] Reference is to the experiments with atomic energy conducted for the Argentine Government by Dr. Ronald Richter. On March 24, 1951, President Perón announced that Dr. Richter's experiments had resulted in the discovery of an improved method for producing atomic energy, but the announcement ultimately proved frivolous. Documents pertaining to this subject are in Department of State decimal files 835.2546 and 935.7137.

clear that he is not a very happy man these days. From several different sources, word was pointedly got to the Chargé d'Affaires and to Mr. Miller that above all Mr. Miller should say nothing whatever to Peron about the *Prensa* matter.[8] From this it is gathered that the situation was too touchy for him, that it had gotten out of hand, and that Peron had a bull by the tail and did not know what to do with it. And too, from the conversations with the Perons, it appeared that they were really concerned about local developments and the outcome of the next election.

Foreign Minister Paz and Remorino[9] appeared to understand far better than anyone else the United States position vis-à-vis Argentina. Both strongly indicated their intention of working to bring about the improvement necessary. Paz went so far as to say that he would resign if Argentina did not embark on a program of collaboration with the United States for he would not wish to be in office if things went the other way. Paz stated that he foresaw no difficulties in the political or military sphere at the coming meeting of Foreign Ministers.

Cereijo was the official who did most of the talking, and he professed to be speaking for Peron. He told Mr. Miller that Peron was ready to do what he wanted, and desired to know exactly what was wanted so that he could go on from there. (Such a statement should more properly come from the Foreign Minister.) Mr. Miller pointed out to Cereijo (and to Evita) the great effect on American public opinion which recent developments in the field of civil liberties in Argentina had had. Neither Cereijo nor Evita appeared to appreciate the situation, but agreed with the necessity for Argentina's going along with the United States in the economic field, Cereijo saying flatly that Argentina was in accord with the economic ideas which the United States would develop at the meeting, and that he had heard Peron order Paz to lend the United States full support. Cereijo made light of *Democracia's* attacks on the United States, saying this was election year and such things should be expected. Just before Mr. Miller left for the airport, Cereijo said that *Democracia* would immediately be changing its line.

Evita emerged as the great and good friend of the United States. This was quite different from last year, when during the whole course of Mr. Miller's visit she had no word of praise whatever for us. She now professed to be a great admirer of the United States—particularly for the stand it has taken in defense of freedom. She indicated her belief in the necessity for Argentina to cooperate with the United

[8] *La Prensa*, the independent Argentine newspaper, was forced to cease publication on January 26, 1951, because of a boycott of the paper by the Argentine newsvendors' union, an affiliate of the government-sponsored Central Confederation of Labor (*Confederación General del Trabajo*-CGT); on April 13 the newspaper was expropriated by the Argentine Government.

[9] Jerónimo Remorino, Argentine Ambassador to the United States.

States. She again expressed her desire to visit our country, but realized it would be politically inadvisable for her to go now. She expressed the hope that some day when she was again a private citizen, she would be able to make the trip. Evita showed no understanding whatever of the *Prensa* problem and said that the matter could be settled very simply by the *Prensa* giving in to the news boys.[10] She heatedly claimed that labor was free in Argentina. As to the possibility of there being created a Third International Labor Organization in the western hemisphere, she indicated that it could be postponed.

That Evita and Cereijo did the talking is considered significant. It would appear that she is in the saddle more than ever, and, of course, Cereijo is her man. (It is somewhat amusing that at one point in the conversation with Mr. Miller, Evita told Cereijo to "shut up".) The thought has been expressed that Peron may be losing his grip, and that he is an extremely worried man. If the word ever gets around that he is in reality leaving more to her these days, trouble will most likely come, for the army will not accept her.

[Here follows a personal reference.]

The Embassy has not as yet decided what to make of all this. Its thinking at the moment is still confused—even somewhat baffled. It is not disposed to take anything at its face value, for there is a wide discrepancy between words and actions. If, however, the Argentine Government really intends to play ball with us, it should certainly be starting soon, for it is only two weeks from today that the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Remorino, and the other members of the delegation to Washington will be leaving for the Conference. In any event, the Embassy officers are still hoping that before long they will be able to add up two and two and get four. In the meantime, fingers are crossed.

JOHN C. POOL

[10] In a letter to Chargé Mallory, dated March 13, 1951, Assistant Secretary Miller stated in part the following: "I am, of course, bitterly disappointed that instead of easing up on *La Prensa* since I left, the attitude seems more hostile than ever. It seems to me that unless some solution is found of the *La Prensa* case, we are going to be in for extremely hard sledding in connection with any constructive program towards Argentina." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

OAS Files, Lot 60 D 665[1]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State[2]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1951.
IAM D–10

[Here follow a covering sheet and a Negotiating Brief on the *La Prensa* problem.]

POSITION PAPER—"LA PRENSA" PROBLEM

Problem—What should the position of the US be if the closing of the Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* is interjected in any way into the Meeting of Foreign Ministers?

Recommendations—

1. The US should not take any initiative to bring up the *La Prensa* matter either with a view toward putting it on the agenda or toward introducing a resolution under an item already on the agenda.

2. The US should not support any move by another republic to place the *La Prensa* matter on the agenda either in general or specific terms.

3. The US should support a general resolution introduced by another Latin American republic favoring freedom of the press.

4. The US should not support any resolution by another country which specifically attacks the Peron regime and its attitude in the *La Prensa* dispute.

5. In discussions with other Foreign Ministers outside of the Meeting, the US should if the subject is brought up express its concern over the *La Prensa* situation. The US should point out that while the difficulties of *La Prensa* are an internal Argentine problem to be resolved in Argentina, comments on the *La Prensa* situation throughout the hemisphere clearly show that the problem has international aspects. We should state that when free institutions are attacked, the suppression of any part of them becomes a matter of concern to all who are fighting for their preservation. It would also be appropriate to refer to the detrimental effects of this affair on US-Argentine relations.

Discussion—On January 26, 1951, the independent Argentine news paper *La Prensa* was forced to cease publication owing to a boycott of the paper by the newsvenders' union, an affiliate of the Government-sponsored Central Confederation of Labor of Argentina (CGT). The

[1] Basic collection of records of meetings of the Organization of American States (OAS), other major inter-American governmental organizations, and inter-American conferences, together with related subject files for the years 1939–1962, as maintained and retired by the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs.

[2] Drafted by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Office of South American Affairs in preparation for the forthcoming Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

venders gave as the reason for the boycott that *La Prensa* had refused their demands, among which were that 20% of the paper's revenue from classified advertising be given to the union for social aid and that the union be the sole distributor of the paper. The Department suspects that the action of the newsvenders was inspired by the Peron Government and in fact this is widely believed among those who have expressed themselves on the subject. The Peron Government has always been hostile towards *La Prensa* for the latter's critical stand towards the Government and its policies.

There has been widespread criticism of the Peron Government throughout the hemisphere because of its attitude towards *La Prensa.* Although that Government has stated that the issue is solely a labor matter and is not one in which Executive intervention would be justified, editorial opinion in the US and the other American republics has made abundantly clear that it believes Peron is taking advantage of the situation to silence his most powerful and vocal critic. The issue has therefor become one of freedom of the press.

Indignation toward the Peron regime appears to have reached its height following February 27 on which day one *La Prensa* employee was killed and several others wounded by unidentified persons who attempted to prevent *La Prensa* workers from entering the printing plant. The unidentified persons are generally believed to have been acting on behalf of the Government though proof of this is lacking.

At the present time the Argentine police have taken over the *La Prensa* plant and it has been announced that Dr. Alberto Gainza Paz, the publisher of the paper, is to be charged with violation of a 1945 decree regarding the security of the state. Gainza Paz, however, still has not been formally charged and is at liberty. A general meeting of the Government sponsored CGT on March 9, resolved in favor of complete support of the newsvenders' boycott and a boycott of *La Prensa* by all CGT affiliates.

The *La Prensa* question may arise in the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in a number of ways. An attempt to place it on the agenda is regarded to be the least likely approach since a unanimous vote is required for this purpose and Argentina would certainly not give its assent. Another possibility is that the problem will be introduced as a resolution under one of the items now on the agenda. The resolution could be either of a general nature on freedom of the press or could relate specifically to the situation in Argentina. The US would not wish to take any initiative at the Meeting to bring up the *La Prensa* matter. To do so would in all probability strain US-Argentine relations to an extent which might wreck the whole Meeting and make hemispheric solidarity on security objectives impossible. Furthermore, it would be unwise for the US to support a move by another republic to place the *La Prensa* matter on the agenda as a separate item. This is

because every effort has been made to limit the agenda to its present terms and it is believed that the *La Prensa* matter does not fall within the objectives of the Meeting. On the other hand, if another American republic should introduce a general resolution on freedom of the press under an item already on the agenda the US should support this since it would neither be desirable nor politically expedient for the US to refrain from supporting a resolution which all the world knows we believe in so firmly. The US should not, however, support any resolution which specifically attacks the Peron regime since such an action might also wreck the conference and put an end to hemispheric solidarity. Action on the *La Prensa* matter during the meeting may be limited to cloak room discussion by the Foreign Ministers. In this case the US should express itself along the lines of recommendation 5.

611.35/3–2151

The Attaché in Argentina (Martin)[1] *to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)*

SECRET PERSONAL BUENOS AIRES, March 21, 1951.

DEAR TOM: Seldom do I express opinions without being asked, but the spirit moves and I do not resist. Jack Pool's policy despatches, particularly no. 1262 of February 26,[2] have aroused a great deal of discussion in the Embassy. While I can hardly believe that we are going to reverse at this critical time a policy of collaboration which has been so fruitful, Birgie[3] writes that Jack's despatches have rung the bell, and Mr. Miller's remarks of March 12 concerning *La Prensa*[4] suggest that he may have heard it. With Jack's knowledge, I should like to impose upon you long enough to present a few considerations on the other side, albeit hastily and in an informal fashion—to you who know so well the background from which I write. Although I hope to be as brief as possible, I must enter into some detail to avoid the appearance of dogmatism.

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[1] T. R. Martin was the Attaché responsible for matters relating to technical assistance, Argentine trade with the Communist bloc nations, and the importation into Argentina of motion pictures produced in the United States.

[2] In this despatch Mr. Pool had suggested, *inter alia*, that the United States should demonstrate a "little indifference" toward Argentina, and that relations between the two countries should proceed "purely on a *quid-pro-quo* basis." (635.00/2–2651)

[3] Clarence E. Birgfeld, Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs.

[4] In a press conference on March 12, Assistant Secretary Miller had made the following statement:

"In my speech before the Inter-American Press Congress in New York last October, I expressed what I believed to be the views of every American on the subject of freedom of expression. It follows from what I then said that I, like every believer in a free press and as a true friend of Argentina, must feel deeply concerned over the situation of *La Prensa* and its employees."

A memorandum of the press conference is in the Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26. Mr. Miller's statement appeared in the *New York Times*, March 13, 1951, p. 25.

[Here follows a personal reference.]

Jack's thesis is cogently expressed in the subject caption which he has given to despatch no. 1262: "If a hot war comes, Argentina will have to collaborate with the western powers." Jack argues that he was speaking in his despatches only of a possible war-time policy, but at least his last two paragraphs were misunderstood here and may have been misunderstood in the Department. I do not agree with his thesis, but even if it should be accepted as correct, it does not seem to be a reason for a change in present policy. War may not come and our policy should be designed to ensure Argentine collaboration whatever the event. To me the eventual achievement of Argentine collaboration is one of the most constructive accomplishments possible in our inter-American relations. To Jack it means considerably less.

What do we want from Argentina as we revert to a defense economy and face the prospect of war? You and I pondered this question many an hour several years ago, and I do not see that the answer has changed. We want Argentine collaboration on three different planes or of three different types which might be described as general collaboration, specific collaboration and the supply of goods.

Considering these types of collaboration in reverse order, Jack effectively demonstrates that we can probably get goods anyway. Economic laws will certainly direct the trade in our direction. This was the conclusion reached by you and Mr. Braden [5] in 1946, and I have little quarrel with it as now presented by Jack. But Jack again is speaking in terms of open hostilities and ignores, I think, that even in relation to the supply of goods, we may want more in peace or war than the economic laws will deliver. We may soon be unable to supply Argentina with goods in the quantities in which she can purchase them. To persuade Argentina, merely in order to accumulate credits in the United States, to increase production, to ration domestic consumption, or perhaps ultimately to sell at all to a country facing national extinction—to persuade Argentina to do these things, we might well need the maximum of collaboration.

Equally important from the point of view of policy, we need Argentina's collaboration in specific undertakings. The extent to which we get it will depend on Argentine interest, on the climate of our relations, and on what we can offer in the way of *quid pro quo's*. Where there is an Argentine interest, as in the control of local communistic activities, collaboration should come without too much effort, provided that the general climate is not adverse. We should continue to try to extend, however, the ground where Argentine and U.S. interests are mutual, through the long and dreary and discouraging process of

[5] Spruille Braden was Ambassador to Argentina from May to August 1945, and Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs from August 1945 to June 1947.

cultivation and education. If the general climate should be adverse, we are not likely to get more in the way of specific collaboration, such as control of trade with Russian satellites, etc., than selfish national interest demands. Even in a favorable climate of relations, Argentina can be expected to request *quid pro quo's* in some instances, and in fact has already requested them. This should not surprise us. Even the British ask for *quid pro quo's*, and we in the same position would be obliged to seek them. In a favorable climate it should not be too difficult to bargain satisfactorily. Argentina herself has not suggested *quid pro quo's* for normal exports but only for commodities of an especially strategic character. Reciprocally, supplying her with her minimum needs on a nondiscriminatory basis, we might bargain with the special favors which she is likely to need and request. We should certainly yield no special favor without something in return and we should always bargain with a smile. The only objection to bargaining, as I see it, is that we might permit ourselves to resort to coercion.

To me coercion means in the circumstances a threat of being deprived of minimum quantities of essential goods or of being made the subject of discrimination. What coercion means to Argentina and to other Hispanic-American countries was clearly stated at Bogotá:[6] "No State may apply or encourage coercive measures of an economic and political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and to obtain from the latter advantages of any nature."[7] That Argentina would regard denial of minimum quantities of essential goods as coercion is already indicated by press interpretations of Mr. Miller's statement of March 12.

If we succeed in achieving collaboration in the supply of goods and in specific undertakings, general collaboration should come easily. I have in mind, for example, support of U.S. positions in the United Nations and in the councils of the OAS. George Kennan emphasized when here how important support in the United Nations is, and we know how important Argentine support in the OAS might be. Our present programs and policies are certain to cause dissention and contention between ourselves and the other American republics. If Argentina should be collaborating with us, the dissidents will be without leadership and the dissention will come to nothing. If, on the other hand, Argentina should have to bargain with us for every considera-

[6] Reference is to the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948. For documentation on the conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 1 ff.

[7] This is not the precise language of Article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogotá Charter), which reads as follows: "No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." For text of the Charter, which was signed at Bogotá April 30, 1948, and entered into force for the United States on December 13, 1951, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2 (pt. 2), p. 2394.

tion and the spirit of collaboration should not prevail, she will be eager to comfort other dissidents and, ostensibly or in the background, encourage them and guide them, and the hemisphere will be divided.

Although much more can and should be said by way of demonstration concerning the three types of collaboration and our need for them, I do not want to burden you further. Let me close with just a few personal observations:

1) Jack Pool has spoken of Argentina's need for the United States. Quite properly he did not attempt to assess the U.S. need for Argentina but, after all, it is the latter which must determine our policy. Not Argentina but the United States faces war. Not Argentina but the United States may soon be fighting for national existence. If Argentine collaboration was important in 1947, it must be important now, for the situation cannot be said to have improved. I do not pretend to foresee that continued cultivation of Argentina will realize all our hopes, but I am hesitant to risk losing in a moment of national crisis the gains of the last two years won at such a sacrifice of high moral and political principles by both the nation and individuals. The policy of cultivation seems to ensure the minimum that Jack promises in event of war, and in addition offers the possibility of securing somewhat more, come what may—of all of which we may shortly stand in dire need.

2) Our policy of cultivation of the Argentine Government, despite the aberration of ECA in 1948 and 1949,[8] has been eminently successful, particularly under Mr. Miller. He has accomplished much that was believed to be impossible. Where we have failed the Argentine Government has been unwilling or has found it impossible to change public policy. We ourselves have not been able to change public policy in order to meet Argentine requests.

3) When a totalitarian Government suppresses the press, there is occasion for sympathy and whatever assistance can practicably and properly be rendered, but there need be no surprise. When our Government decided in 1947 to welcome Perón into its bed, it deliberately accepted the possibility of certain consequences. As I recall, you personally outlined these consequences for Secretary Marshall.[9]

[Here follows a personal reference.]

4) And what of the difficulties which Perón faces in following a policy of collaboration with us? To many of his followers we are as contemptible as he is to us. Their personal interests and public policies are frequently opposed to ours. And the Opposition? Within a week I have attended two public meetings of the Radicals, the only organized opposition party with any appreciable strength. Attacks upon the United States in general, upon foreign capital, upon the Rio Treaty, upon Perón's momentary thought of sending Argentine soldiers to Korea aroused the loudest applause. Leaders of the Radical Party stated as firm principles that the Party is neutral in the present world situation. There was not a single reference to Communism or Russia in the first meeting where attacks on the United States were so bitter

[8] For documentation on the activities of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) with respect to Argentina in 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 473 ff.

[9] George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 1947–1949.

as to embarrass the Argentines whom I had accompanied. When one of their most prominent leaders, Frondizi,[10] accused Perón of having obligated Argentina at Rio to send Argentine boys overseas, the applause was general and the loudest of the evening. The people as a whole, individualistic, proud, and stubborn, seem determined upon neutrality, much like the people of the United States from 1914 to 1917 and from 1939 to 1941. If, as Jack states, "thinking Argentines" doubtless realize that a victorious Russia would present a threat to their sovereignty, whereas they know that no such danger is inherent in victory by the West, there appear to be very few "thinking Argentines". Many may well prefer a balance between East and West of which they might take advantage. The East is still further away, and many are none too certain that victory of the West would present no threat. In fact the way in which we deal with Argentina in the present circumstances and during a war might well be taken as indicative of what a victory of the West would mean. Despite all of the ridiculous talk of Argentine independence, she is certainly independent at least in one respect: She thinks independently. The amazing thing is that Perón has gone as far as he has; and on one occasion, when there was thought of sending troops to Korea, he went too far for his own good but may have demonstrated his way of thinking.

5) Words in the press worry us. This is natural, for the press is controlled by the Government and we can assume that the words are approved by the Government in advance. I don't like the words of course, but in 1939 and 1940 Roosevelt himself backtracked many a time and played to the public. Perón may be doing the same. What concerns me is action and not words, and the action seems to be generally in our favor. You will recall that we went through the same thing with Spain during the last war. The Spanish press was filled with attacks upon the Allies and catered to the Nazi information office, but we got the action. All during the period of the bitter press attacks Spain released British and American aviators so that they might fight again, permitted transit of more than 25,000 volunteers for Allied armed forces, limited the amount of wolfram going to the enemy, supplied Britain with vital goods, and performed many other significant favors. Let us seek first the action, and later worry about the words. Maybe after the elections of 1952, even words will change.

6) You observed to me in 1947, I believe, that the great danger in the pursuit of policy toward Argentina by the United States was not that we would follow a policy of coercion or a policy of collaboration but that we would follow neither. To change the metaphor, you anticipated that we might fall between the two chairs, that is, by mixing coercion with collaboration, destroy the effect of either. In 1948 and 1949 ECA knocked us between the chairs. Resorting to rhetoric, let's not speak of comparative need but of mutual assistance, let's not speak of depriving one another but of supplying one another; let's not suggest a change to a policy known as anathema in Argentina, but affirm continuance of a policy which has already won Argentine favor; let's not risk our gains, but conserve them; let's not coerce by denying essentials to one another, but let's bargain for special favors. If our actual needs are not urgent, let's feign indifference to strengthen our bargaining position, but let's not adopt indifference as a basis of policy. Above

[10] Arturo Frondizi, a member of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies.

all let's be patient as long as we get results and cultivate friendly relations with this difficult and impossible people, a policy which is so fundamentally inter-American that we need feel no shame if results invariably fall short of desires.

Well, that's it. If I'm merely reiterating arguments already considered and discounted, I can have only the satisfaction of getting them off my chest and apologize for troubling you with them. If I can only cause a moment's pause before we risk so much, your time spent in reading them may not have been wasted. The length of this letter must surely recall other letters of similar vein which you used to receive regularly from Buenos Aires. I am of course showing this letter to Jack, Joe,[11] and Les,[12] and they will no doubt comment in any manner that the arguments seem to require.

Best regards, T. R.

[11] Joe D. Walstrom, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs.
[12] Lester D. Mallory.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs (Birgfeld) to the Chargé in Argentina (Mallory)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 4, 1951.

OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

DEAR LES: I am taking an hour out from conference work this morning to write you on a few points which you might like to know about prior to the return to Buenos Aires of the Argentine delegation to the IAM. Please tell Joe Walstrom and Jack Pool that I am well aware that I owe them letters, but there is nothing I can do about it until the conference closes.

At the risk of encountering the fate which overtakes nearly all who endeavor to prognosticate, it now appears that the conference might close within the allotted two weeks. Final sessions have been scheduled for April 6 and 7 and invitations for the closing reception by the Foreign Ministers have been sent for the 7th also. Most of the log jams, principally on economic matters, apparently were broken yesterday.

Argentine policy at the conference apparently has been conducted on the basis of the same "masterly inaction" policy which has been ours for the last several weeks. The Argentines have avoided getting too deep into any of the economic debates in the subcommittees, but Paz did second in a plenary session a resolution on civil rights. Also, the Argentines joined in the approval by acclamation of the Declaration of Washington.[1]

[1] For text, see Pan American Union, *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Held in Washington, D.C. March 26–April 7, 1951: Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), pp. 236–237.

Despite fears and forebodings on our part, and numerous reports that the Argentines planned to sabotage the conference, they have not done so yet. Until the last curtain goes down anything could happen but I will stick my neck out by saying it has been my impression and belief since the conference began, barring some unexpected flareup, that the Argentines will cooperate within certain limits. Following the first plenary session on Tuesday, March 27 Vittone [2] remarked that we were all in the groove and would stay together throughout the conference. This alone might or might not have meant anything, and the two alternatives are still open, but his remark would fit in with a long luncheon conversation I had on March 26 with two of the Economic Counselors to the Embassy here in Washington and with a half hour conversation I had alone with Paz on Sunday, April 1 (even though April Fools Day).

Excepting for the above-mentioned March 26 luncheon with the Argentine Economic Counselors and also excepting the statements made by Paz and Vittone, the remainder of the Argentine delegation, both those from Buenos Aires and those attached to the Embassy here, has been considerably cooler than usual. For a week now such personal friends and acquaintances as Campos, Pelliza, Bunge, Schiopetto, Quirós, Cafiero, Biritos,[3] etc., have carefully refrained from any corridor conversation on substantive points and in general are considerably less cordial than they were two weeks ago. Since I know some of these people real well I cannot help but have the impression that they are following a deliberate policy. Vittone's favorite topic of conversation in recent days has been the need to extend the conference on some minor procedural points so that they will have time to visit various parts of the United States and Cafiero's (Financial Attaché) attitude seems to be reflected in his characterization of the conference as "este loquero".

Our policy vis-à-vis Argentina has been well established now for some three weeks, and is one of strict correctness in all matters. We are engaging in all of the customary social amenities and routine business relationships. However, we are avoiding where possible making any requests of Argentina, although we are pleased to consider on their merits any requests of us by the Argentines. Within this framework, for example, we are dragging our feet on any action regarding Williams' request for credit to finance tungsten and sulphur

[2] José Carlos Vittone, Director of the Political Department, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[3] The Argentine officials named here are identified as follows: Eusebio Campos, Under Secretary of Economy; Oscar Luis Pelliza, Under Secretary of Industry and Commerce; César Augusto Bunge y Alvarez Calderón, Economic Counselor, Argentine Embassy; Ovidio V. Schiopetto, Economic Counselor, Argentine Embassy; Carlos A. Quirós, Argentine Chargé; Antonio Francisco Cafiero, Financial Attaché; Eduardo Biritos Guevara, Economic Counselor, Argentine Embassy.

mining,[4] we have refrained from asking the Argentine delegation for its opinion regarding our reservation to the Bogota Charter, but we did casually inform the Argentine Embassy of its invitation to participate on the International Pulp and Paper Committee.[5]

All of us here, from Ed Miller down are watching the Argentine situation very closely and discussing developments or lack of developments daily. Incidentally there is no one here endeavoring or with any inclination to attempt to carry on his own shoulders all of the weight of this problem. In this connection, I think you can be assured that we did understand what Jack Pool meant in his despatch [6] which I spoke of so highly a few weeks ago and, with respect to TR's letter [7] to Tom Mann and Tom's reply thereto,[8] I deliberately limit myself to saying that TR's fears are and were unfounded.

Returning again to the conference, continued vehement denunciations by the US press could reach such a stage that the Argentines would feel it impossible to overlook them. Press comment has been constant, daily, and reasonably widespread. Most of the Washington papers have something on the subject of Peronismo or *La Prensa* [9] or dictatorship in Argentina, etc., nearly every day. The National Press Club of Washington has now called for a day of mourning on Friday, April 6 to commemorate the passing of *La Prensa* and this morning's *Washington Post* editorialized on the distinct possibility that Perón will conspire with the Soviets, since there is little distinction between leftist and rightist totalitarianism. This subject of press attacks on Argentina was one of those which I discussed with Paz alone last Sunday. Paz referred of course to similar attacks which he would

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[4] Thomas J. Williams, a United States citizen with extensive business interests in Argentina, had applied through Minerales y Metales, S. A. (MINMET) to the Export-Import Bank for a loan of $5,000,000 on behalf of Sociedad Minera, S. A. (SOMINAR), a firm in which he was a majority owner, in order to finance the purchase of equipment in the United States for the production of tungsten and sulphur in Argentina. Documents relating to the loan application are in decimal files 103–XMB, 835.14, and 835.2546.

[5] The Pulp and Paper Committee was one of six commodity committees established through the initiative of the United States, Great Britain, and France early in 1951. These committees collectively constituted the International Materials Conference (IMC); they were charged with reviewing the international supply position for scarce raw materials, and with recommending to governments measures to insure equitable distribution. For further information on the origin and development of the IMC, see Willis C. Armstrong (Acting Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy), "The International Materials Conference," Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1951, pp. 23–30.

[6] Reference uncertain.

[7] T. R. Martin's letter of March 21, *supra*.

[8] Not printed.

[9] In a memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Sargeant), dated March 28, 1951, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Public Liaison (Patterson) had attributed severe press criticism of the Department of State's position regarding *La Prensa* to Under Secretary of State James E. Webb's public statement that the closing of *La Prensa* was an internal Argentine matter and to the action of the United States delegation to the Twelfth Session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, held at Santiago, Chile, February 20–March 21, 1951, in voting not to raise this issue (953.61/3–2851).

receive from the press in Buenos Aires. Paz' entire attitude supported what you have reported to the effect that he wishes to work with us. I could not help but believe him sincere, and only hope that he can survive the press attacks during the remainder of the conference and whatever might be awaiting for him when he gets back to Buenos Aires.

With kind personal regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours, CLARENCE E. BIRGFELD

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137 [1]

Minutes of Meeting No. 174 of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Held at Washington, April 26, 1951

SECRET

[Here follow a list of those persons present (20) and a discussion of a proposed settlement of United States Government postwar claims against West Germany.]

2. *Proposed Export-Import Bank Loan to the Sociedad Minera Argentine, S.A.*

Mr. Glendinning [2] said that the proposal covered a $5 million loan, not more than $2 million of which would be for sulphur and the remainder for tungsten. The loan would be to a private Argentine company without a government guarantee and would be supported by an appropriate contract with GSA for the acquisition of tungsten. The contract would cover at least 10,000 metric tons, and possibly 16,000 metric tons, of concentrates. The major question was that of the attitude of the Argentine Government with respect to that aspect of the problem. The proposed terms were that the credit be for 7 years at an interest rate of 5 percent (NAC Document No. 1130).[3]

Mr. Thorp [4] said that the key international problem here, assuming the technical operations were feasible, was making certain Argentina would allow the tungsten to be exported. The State Department was asking Mr. Williams, the promoter, to undertake to get a commitment from the Argentine Government. The State Department had felt that in all probability this would be adequate, since Argentina had a fairly good record of living up to commitments it has put on paper. In order to provide additional assurance the Department proposed that at some

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[1] Master file of documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (NAC) for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs at the Department of State and subsequently preserved as item 70 of Federal Records Center accession 71 A 6682.

[2] C. Dillon Glendinning, Secretary of the National Advisory Council (NAC).

[3] Not printed.

[4] Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

appropriate point, after an agreement had been reached between Mr. Williams and the Argentine Government, there would be a confirmation of that agreement through the United States Embassy in Argentina. This Government would then be in a position to insist that the tungsten be made available.

The Chairman [5] observed that this was fundamental to the credit. Mr. Gaston [6] said that there were certain reasons why the United States Government should not initially approach the Argentine Government on this point, since for example, the question of how much would be paid for the tungsten might arise. He added that the Export–Import Bank would have no liens on anything and no guarantee. Their guarantee would lie in the self-interest of Mr. Williams and of the Argentine Government. The Argentine Government would gain dollar exchange and Mr. Williams would have a profitable contract. Furthermore, he had a good reputation as a competent businessman.

The Chairman said he assumed that before the Bank started extending cash advances there would be assurances the United States would get the product. Mr. Gaston said that Mr. Williams had agreed on his own account to produce the necessary export licenses and any other papers that were necessary.

Without further discussion the recommended action was unanimously approved.

Action. The following action was taken (Action No. 464):

> The National Advisory Council approves consideration by the Export–Import Bank of a 5 percent 7-year credit to the Sociedad Minera Argentine, S.A. (Sominar), an Argentine corporation, in the amount of approximately $5 million to finance the dollar costs of machinery, equipment and supplies for the production of tungsten and sulphur, of which not more than $2 million would be for sulphur production.

[5] John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the NAC.
[6] Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Export–Import Bank.

735.00/7–951

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1951

Subject: Call of Argentine Foreign Minister Remorino.

Minister Remorino came in to see me today, accompanied by Mr. Quiros, and stayed for nearly an hour. The conversation was very pleasant and was more specific than I had expected. He said that it was his purpose in accepting what he knew would be a thankless job to

continue to work for improved relations with the United States. He said that despite everything he thought a great deal had been accomplished in the last two years and that he intended to continue the same policy. He also said that with his knowledge of the United States he intended to speak up with the President in favor of the United States on every possible occasion and he assured me that he was a person who would speak his mind and would quit when unnecessary obstacles were put in his path.

I made no comment except to assure Remorino that we understood that he was a sincere friend of this country. For my part, I said that he knew where I stood and I also said that Ambassador Bunker [1] had commented favorably on his reception in the capital and on his trip to the provinces.

Remorino said that he would have to reorganize the Foreign Office although he did not specify how. He was going to get a person with political background as the No. 2 man to replace Vittone who is temporarily in office.

He left with me the attached memoranda [2] having to do with the proposed Eximbank loan for the steel mill and the purchase of certain equipment for the armed forces. I said that I would look into it.

He then mentioned Argentina's great desire to be elected to the Economic and Social Council.[3] He said that while he would not tell this to anyone else the real reason for Argentina's aspiration is that the ECOSOC is the council with least possibility of causing embarrassments or trouble for Argentina. They want to get out of the Trusteeship Council because of the difficulties which membership in that group produces internally in view of the large "Turco" groups in Argentina which cause trouble in connection with the Arab States and Libya; the large Jewish population which is interested in Palestine; the large Catholic population which worries about Jerusalem; and the problem of the Falkland Islands which harasses their relations with Great Britain. On the other hand, the ECOSOC had never accomplished anything and this seemed to be the best recommendation for desiring membership on it. The stress which Argentina lays upon getting membership in this group is shown by Remorino's statement to me that he would go to the General Assembly in Paris next fall only if they are assured of election beforehand. Otherwise Paz will head the delegation.

Remorino indicated that as a *quid pro quo* for our support in getting them into the ECOSOC, Argentina would back us for the presidency of the COAS. I told him that we had certain reservations as to whether we should accept that job and that we certainly were not going to

[1] Ellsworth Bunker was appointed Ambassador to Argentina on March 13, 1951; he arrived in Buenos Aires April 24, and he assumed charge of the Embassy May 8, the date he also presented his credentials.
[2] Not found with the source text.
[3] Of the United Nations.

campaign for it. This attitude seemed to be a novel one and he was frankly surprised. I told him that it was our practice to accept the designation of the Latin American caucus but he pressed me for some more positive statement which I declined to give. On the contrary, I told him that Argentina's nonparticipation in specialized agencies of the UN might raise questions as to the suitability of Argentina for membership in a group whose primary function is to supervise the work of the specialized agencies.

Remorino made numerous very favorable references to Ambassador Bunker and said that he was the ideal man for the job in Argentina. He also spoke with unfeigned appreciation of the cooperation which he had always received from the Department.

I accompanied the Ambassador to his car and engaged in the customary violent abrazo. Throughout the conference Memorino made numerous favorable references to Ambassador Paz and said that it would be easy for him to work with Paz. He also made a few very unpleasant references to Cereijo.

511.00/8–251 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 2, 1951—12 : 25 p. m.

FOL IS INFO POLICY GUIDANCE ON ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN ARGENTINA

Background:

The principal opposition party of Argentina, the Union Cívica Radical, will reportedly select its slate for the Presidential elections (set for Sunday, November 11) at a convention on August 4. The Peronista Party convention is expected to follow on or about August 22, resulting in the nomination of President Perón for a second term. Plans of the Conservative, Socialist, and minor—including Communist—parties are as yet unknown.

The following factors are foreseen as likely to produce a large amount of international publicity and to make the conduct of U.S.-Argentine relations unusually difficult during the period of the campaign:

1. The Government-controlled papers and news agencies of Argentina will probably maintain and even increase their current efforts to convict the U.S. of interference in Argentine domestic affairs, to dis-

[1] Sent to all missions in the American Republics; sent also to the Consulates at São Paulo, Recife, and Porto Alegre, Brazil; Monterrey and Guadalajara, Mexico; and Guayaquil, Ecuador.

parage the U.S. Government, and to vilify its leadership. To this end, close scrutiny will be turned upon our informational activities, particularly in the field of radio: it is a matter of record that in Argentine official circles VOA broadcasts are interpreted as having diplomatic significance.

2. The Argentine government may take official actions in the international field calculated to reaffirm Argentine sovereignty in the face of U.S. regulations which they consider presumptious—for instance, the Kem Amendment.[2] Unfavorable U.S. public opinion reaction will naturally follow.

3. The Radicals' choice of Deputy Ricardo Balbín, if confirmed, will indicate that that Party plans to conduct its campaign as much for the purpose of affecting foreign opinion as for winning Argentine votes. (Balbín, pardoned on January 2 after 10 months of imprisonment, is at present under charge of violating the "disrespect" law on more than a score of occasions; he is distinguished mainly for his oratory.)

4. Argentine exiles and self-exiled persons in other countries, chiefly Uruguay and the U.S., can be expected to carry on the opposition campaign abroad and may go to considerable lengths in attempting to damage the relations of the Peron Govt with others of the American republics.

5. The Peronista campaign will predictably receive an abnormal amount of attention, much of it unfriendly, from the U.S. press.

U.S. Position:

In the absence of unforeseen developments, the Peronistas are expected to win the elections, regardless of in what manner the campaign may be conducted.

It is obviously to the interest of the United States, with reference to 1) the long-term objectives of U.S.-Argentine relations, 2) the development of Continental strength and security, and 3) the maintenance of Western Hemisphere support at the Sixth General Assembly of the U.N., to exercise restraint during this period of strain.

The United States, therefore, acting within the leeway afforded by its long-range Argentine policy, is currently expressing an attitude of strict "correctness" towards Argentina, applying this tactic in every phase of relations. It is essential that this attitude of "correctness" be projected in terms of the public affairs program and that it be kept uncompromised during the months of the presidential campaign. There should not be even the appearance of justification for any Argentine claim that the U.S. Government is abetting Administration opponents or showing partisanship in the political contest. Although it is not the determining consideration, the fact should be borne in mind that a departure from this policy might very possibly lead to

[2] The Kem Amendment (Section 1302 of Public Law 45, Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, approved June 2, 1951), so-named after Senator James P. Kem of Missouri, directed that all economic and financial assistance must be withheld from any country which exported strategic materials to Communist-bloc nations. For text of the amendment, see 65 Stat. 63.

curtailment by the Argentines of USIE activities in their country, which are continuing with a proven degree of effectiveness.

Treatment:

1. In order that treatment may accord with that customarily given to political contests in the Latin American republics, coverage of the Argentine campaign should be held to a minimum of factual reporting.

2. The elections themselves and their results should have brief routine handling.

3. In the absence of specific guidance, avoid statements related to the elections which may be made in this country by Argentine exiles or expatriates.

ACHESON

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Bunker)

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1951.

DEAR ELLSWORTH: Your letter of August 6 [1] expressed your concern over our position regarding Argentine membership in the Pulp and Paper Committee.[2] In this letter you expressed the fear that we have deviated from our "correct" position and expressed the view that you are unable to see how denial of membership in the Committee gains any real objective.

In reply, all that I can say is that we are not denying Argentina membership since membership is not ours to deny. In any event, even if we are changing our position since the original invitation was issued,[3] we are doing this not in order to penalize Argentina but rather to save the Pulp and Paper Committee. The whole work of the Committee depends upon the voluntary cooperation of Canadian producers

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[1] Not printed.

[2] This subject had been discussed in a conversation at the Department of State, July 18, 1951, between Mr. Miller, Mr. Mann, Director of the Office of South American Affairs Fletcher Warren, Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs Archibald R. Randolph, and Mr. Dearborn. The memorandum of that conversation, by Mr. Randolph, dated July 18, reads as follows:

"The policy of ARA with respect to Argentina's acceptance of the invitation extended by the United States to participate in the Paper and Pulp Committee will be (1) The United States if requested to act as sponsor for Argentina's membership will decline with the explanation to the Argentines that the ill treatment accorded the press in Argentina makes it impossible for the United States to acquiesce. It should be stated frankly to the Argentines if the situation arises why the United States cannot sponsor Argentine membership for the Paper and Pulp Committee. (2) In the event that a vote is called in the Committee to vote on Argentina's membership the United States will abstain." (398.392/7–1851)

[3] The invitation had been extended during the Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington, but the Argentine Government had delayed its acceptance until mid-July.

of newsprint and American newspaper publishers with whom we are trying to work out a program of voluntary reduction of consumption. Any chance of success would be totally undermined by the admission of Argentina to the group. It is perfectly arguable that the invitation should never have been issued to Argentina in the first place. However, even if a mistake were made at that time, this is no excuse for committing a bigger one by our insisting on Argentine membership and torpedoing the Committee's work at this delicate stage. The Central Group of the IMC today ruled that the invitations originally issued by the tripartite group had lapsed and that Argentine membership in the Wool and Paper Committees was for the determination of these committees and not of the Central Group since the committees are now set up and functioning. After talking to Alberto Lleras,[4] Win Brown [5] and the people in ARA, I decided to take the bull by the horns and I went out to see Paz today to have a frank discussion of the situation with him. I told him that in principle we favored Argentine participation in the work of the IMC and that Argentina would be welcomed with open arms in the Wool Committee. I said, however, that if Argentina should press for membership in the Pulp Committee there was no doubt that in view of the *La Prensa* case there would be opposition on the part of some of the countries to Argentine participation in that Committee. I specifically ducked what our attitude would be merely stressing that there would be opposition. I went so far as to make clear that I was not predicting one way or the other how the issue would be decided but I said that I assumed that he wished me as a personal friend to warn him (prevenir) of a possibly embarrassing situation. I said that it seemed to me the wisest course to follow would be for Argentina, once the Central Group advised it that membership in the two committees was a matter which would be determined by those committees, should make application only to the Wool Committee. I said that we would also look with sympathy to Argentine membership in other committees and I mentioned specifically tungsten.

Paz expressed himself deeply appreciative of my frankness and said that my advice seemed entirely wise to him. I discussed at some length with complete frankness the attitude of the American newspaper publishers and the Canadian newsprint producers. I also emphasized the long period of time that had elapsed since the extension of the invitations to Argentina and their decision to accept them, the reconstitution in the meantime of the Central Group and the progress that had been made in the Paper Committee towards the voluntary plan. I also suggested that a perfectly acceptable solution to Argentina's newsprint problem lay in the fact that possibly the Scandinavians will have stocks in 1951 which they might be willing to sell to Argentina.

[4] Alberto Lleras Camargo, Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

[5] Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Director, Office of International Materials Policy.

I don't know what the reaction will be in Buenos Aires to the foregoing. I suppose to some extent it depends upon how Paz puts it up to his own Government. At least as of now I think that we have followed the best course in this difficult dilemma.

Most of the hour's meeting with Paz this morning was spent in very frank and open discussion by him of the internal political situation in Argentina and of the determination of himself and Remorino to work together in complete harmony towards improving relations with the United States. I will try to write you a complete account of this from Panama but since I am leaving the office in half an hour I must cut off now.

With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

Miller Files, Lot 56 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Bunker)

SECRET
OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1951.

DEAR ELLSWORTH: I spent Friday night having a long talk with Les Mallory during the course of which we discussed some of the problems you had talked over with him. I think that Les and I, and consequently you and I, see eye to eye about the problems in Argentina, and Les has undertaken to write you fully about his consultation here including his talk with me. I prefer that he do it himself rather than have me do it since there are undoubtedly nuances which he will want to take up with you on some of the problems in recent months. However, there are a few points which I might comment on here.

In the first place, I am glad that Les can get away for a substantial leave. I was also glad of the opportunity of spending a full evening with him—he is a fine person. I was delighted to know that he is extremely happy in his assignment with you, as I expected that he would be. Also, I gather that the feeling is mutual. He was quite impressed over your unprecedented generosity in having gone to the airport to see Eleanor and him off.

At one point during the evening, Les mentioned that you sensed a hardening attitude on the part of Washington toward Argentina. To the extent which you have detected such a trend, I am probably responsible for it in my letters, particularly my letters about the Descartes translation [1] and the pulp and paper matter.[2] All that I can

[1] Reference to the letter concerning the Descartes translation is uncertain. "Descartes" was the pseudonym of an individual, suspected by some in the Department of State to be President Perón, who wrote articles critical of the United States for the government-controlled press in Argentina, particularly *Democracia*.

[2] See the letter of August 16, *supra*.

say is that it is extremely difficult for us to take this continual pounding which the Argentine press is handing out without reacting in some way along the lines of a stiffening in attitude. This does not mean that there has been any change in our policy with Argentina which remains the same. Furthermore, an example of the way our policy pays off, such as Argentine cooperation in San Francisco,[3] is proof that our policy is the only one. Nevertheless, Argentina is a unique case in hemispheric relations since it (and possibly Guatemala) is the only place in the hemisphere where the government, while cooperating with us in multilateral organizations, works against us both at home and elsewhere in the hemisphere. They work against us through buying newspapers, such as *El Mundo* in Rio, and individual newspapermen and radio stations such as two we listened to in Panama. The result of the attacks on us is probably not great but it tends to work against our objectives during this critical point in history. Even in international organizations their support is not constant and during the IA ECOSOC meeting in Panama,[4] from which I returned last week, the Argentines were not as cooperative as they might have been. While this to some extent was due to the especially offensive personality of Schiopetto, the fact that the performance is still perfectly Argentine is shown by the issue of the Argentine Information Bulletin which includes an entirely gratuitous and unnecessary crack at me. It is only natural that the result of all this should be to make us here in Washington less tolerant of Argentina and to put us in the mood to be harder bargainers in specific negotiations. At the same time, as I told Les the other night, we are getting to be in an increasingly hardboiled mood toward South America as a whole, because of their miserable performance in making any concrete contribution in Korea. I am having luncheon in a few minutes today with the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces, General Goes Monteiro,[5] who is going to tell me that Brazil's willingness to cooperate with us in the military field will be conditioned to a large extent on the success of the Brazilian Minister of Finance, Lafer,[6] who is asking for a 100 million dollar loan. I propose to tell Goes Monteiro that Lafer's visit will be facilitated by a greater display of willingness on the part of the Brazilian people as a whole, and the armed forces in particular, to do their part in the collective security effort, and that any effort to link the economic and

[3] Apparent reference to the Japanese Peace Conference, which met in San Francisco, September 4–8, 1951. For documentation on the conference, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

[4] Reference is to the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA–ECOSOC), held in Panama City, August 20–30, 1951. For information on the meeting, see the editorial note on p. 1065.

[5] Pedro Aurélio Góes Monteiro.

[6] Horácio Lafer.

military negotiations will only have adverse repercussions toward Brazil.[7]

Since I have been in this job, I have felt that it was part of my responsibility to try to bring home to these people that they need us at least as much, if not more, than we need them. In this effort, I have run against the feeling of overconfidence which was instilled in the Latin Americans before and during World War II that like the figures on Keats' Grecian Urn the United States would always be pursuing and the Latin Americans would always play the role of the flirtatious maidens, always beckoning and never giving in.

As to our tactics in the immediate future, I believe that we should continue to play our role of correctness and fairness which seems to be paying dividends. Any positive efforts in specific negotiations would seem to be out of the question for the next two months. We can send the ball back when they serve it up, but let it go at that. On the other hand, I believe that we can work on personal relations, you with Remorino at your end and I with Paz at this end, since I believe both of these men are worthwhile. I suggested to Les that in my opinion it would be fruitless for you to try to establish close personal relations with Peron. I believe it would be more effective if you tried to arrange it so as to deal primarily with Remorino and also to see him as much as you think appropriate on a personal basis. This might arouse the curiosity of both the President and other characters such as Cereijo, although we must be careful that in cultivating Remorino and Paz we do not injure their standing with their own people. I have seen Paz on three occasions since he has been here and our relations are most intimate and cordial. He cannot conceal his complete bliss in being out of Buenos Aires and out of the Ministry[8] at this time. He has explained to me with remarkable frankness his reasons for being glad to leave which include primarily that he has never been close to Evita. He considers her renunciation of the vice-presidency to be a major blow to her and he has no doubt, on the basis of a conversation which he had with her before he left, that she was most anxious to be nominated. His interpretation of the sequence of events is that she ran her luck out as far as it would go and when she saw that Mercante[9] and the Army had the cards stacked against her she pulled out of the game. However, he feels that she may not have pulled out of it for good and believes that Quintano will not be the final candidate for the vice-presidency.

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[7] For documentation on the negotiations between the United States and Brazil concerning military and economic matters, see pp. 1184 ff.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Relations. Ambassador Paz had served as Minister of Foreign Relations prior to his appointment as Ambassador to the United States.

[9] Domingo A. Mercante, Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires.

I am giving a dinner in honor of Paz and the new Panamanian Ambassador, Roberto Heurtematte, who was in Yale with me, on September 27 which also happens to be my 40th birthday. This should go very well to solidify (or else liquify) relations.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

P.S.—The *Epoca* editorial which Jack Pool sent me with his letter of August 31 [10] is not inconsistent with the other cracks that this and other journals have been taking at us in BA recently. The coincidence between the line in this editorial and that in the Argentine Embassy propaganda bulletin enclosed herewith [11] is so striking (for example, in the emphasis upon the fact that my presence at the meeting in Panama was of secondary importance to other duties of mine) that it leaves no doubt that this is all part of a concerted officially-inspired attack. Furthermore, the line was set down before the end of the IA ECOSOC session since the head of the Argentine Delegation after being voted down ignominiously in the closing plenary on a last-minute resolution with reference to farm wages, explained lamely that he had been caught short by the last-minute decision of the conference to hold a plenary on Thursday night instead of Friday as originally scheduled. The meaning of his remarks was clear to anybody since the last plenary was called because of my impending departure which had been announced to everyone when I arrived.

[10] Not printed in this volume.
[11] No enclosure was found with the source text.

Editorial Note

On September 28, 1951, several Argentine army officers attempted an abortive coup against President Perón. In a letter to Assistant Secretary Miller, dated September 29, Ambassador Bunker commented in part as follows: "The whole show was pretty inept, and the government seems to have been well prepared for it. If this was to be the big event, then I should say that its collapse was quite complete and that it would be hard to pick up the pieces from here. If there is something more important afoot, such as . . . reported to me, then, of course, there may be further developments at some later date. I have a definite feeling however that if further changes come, they will come because of pressure or disaffection within the Peronista Party itself and in conjunction with the army. I also feel that in this connection the Army would prefer to move in a more legalistic and constitutional way and that a change would be brought about quietly and not through a coup. With the black economic picture ahead for the next year it is difficult

to see why anyone should want to take over now. If nothing happens militarily or politically, I believe the course of economic events is more apt to force a change of policy and/or government than anything else." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26) Additional pertinent documents relating to the attempted coup are in decimal files 735.00 and 735.00 (W).

735.5-MAP/10-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld of the Office of the Director of International Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1951.

Subject: Possible Military Grant Aid to Argentina

Participants: OSD/OMA—Col. J. D. Alger
OSA—Mr. Henry Dearborn
ARA—Mr. Duncan Mackay
AR—Mr. E. A. Jamison [1]
S/ISA—Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld

Colonel J. D. Alger stated that he desired to consult officers in the Department of State informally about the possible inclusion of the Argentine Republic in a first priority list of Latin American countries to be approached in connection with grant military assistance under the FY 1952 Mutual Security Program.[2] He said that from the military point of view, the Department of Defense considered Argentina to be among the three or four Latin American Republics most capable militarily of making a positive contribution to the Defense of the Western Hemisphere.[3] Since the Argentine also had considerable quantities of the United States equipment, it would be in the interest of Hemisphere Defense plans to give that country grant military assistance in order to make the military contribution of which Argentina is capable. A letter was being drafted from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State setting forth a priority list of Latin American governments possibly to be recipients of grant military aid and to be approached in the negotiations presently planned when funds become available under the Mutual Security Act of 1951.[4] It was felt in the Department of Defense, however, that in view of political considerations involved in the case of Argentina that country should not be included in the proposed priority list without some previous consultation with the Department of State.

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[1] Edward A. Jamison, Officer in Charge, Special Political Problems.
[2] For documentation on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.
[3] For documentation on United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.
[4] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373.

Mr. Schoenfeld said that S/ISA would be guided in its attitude towards this question by the views of ARA. Mr. Jamison and Mr. Dearborn described the current internal political situation in the Argentine, including the traditional emphasis in that country on neutralism and particularly the use that has been made by Peron of his "Third Position" doctrine with its anti-American overtones. These Argentine attitudes, in the opinion of ARA, made it quite certain that any intimation by the United States at the present time regarding possible grant military assistance to Argentina in connection with that country's assumption of reciprocal obligations for Hemisphere Defense would be used for internal political purposes in the current Presidential campaign in Argentina. Moreover, since the decision last winter to develop a program of grant military aid to Latin American countries, it had been the consistent position of the Department of Defense and of the Department of State in presenting the Mutual Security Program to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Congress, that there was no present intention of giving the Argentine grant military assistance. For these reasons, the Department of State would probably be unable to support grant military assistance to Argentina at this time. Mr. Jamison and Mr. Dearborn said that, on the other hand, the present obscurity of the political situation in the Argentine and the possibility that at a future time, perhaps not distant, that situation might change and it might become desirable from the political standpoint to use possible negotiations with Argentina on this subject with a prospect of advantage to the United States, the possibility of such aid to Argentina should be kept open.

It was suggested by Mr. Schoenfeld that, if the Department of Defense decides to include Argentina in the proposed priority list, the letter from that Department should record explicitly the fact that the Department of Defense and the Department of State have excluded Argentina from current consideration for military grant aid, but should also leave the matter open for renewed considerations when the political situation makes it desirable to reconsider. This suggestion was concurred in by all present.

Col. Alger indicated that the proposed letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State covering the priority list would refer to the present situation along the above lines, leaving open for future consideration, as circumstances may require, the possibility of approaching the Argentine Government as to its undertaking a Defense Task and receiving military grant aid for the purpose.

611.35/10–2651

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1951.

ARGENTINA

A. OBJECTIVES

US objectives in relations with Argentina are: 1) realization by Argentina that its traditional neutralism is not feasible in the world of today and that in US-Argentine relations Argentina needs the US more than the US needs Argentina; 2) Argentine collaboration in the maintenance of international security, especially in the western hemisphere; 3) Argentine adoption of policies which will strengthen those forces striving for peace and a democratic way of life; 4) creation and maintenance of a favorable climate of opinion among the Argentine people toward the US and its policies; and 5) encouragement of healthy bilateral economic relations and protection of US enterprise carrying on Argentine operations.

B. POLICIES

Argentina's aspirations to be the dominant power in South America, its intense national pride, its competition with the US for agricultural markets, and its current interpretation of the functions of the state, all combine to bring it into conflict with the US on a number of basic issues. Furthermore, Argentina traditionally has preferred to lead or to play a lone hand in international relations, an attitude caused in large part by its ambition and pride and manifested in its lack of enthusiasm for inter-American and world organizations when they are likely to limit in some way its own freedom of action. Argentina's characteristic tendency toward neutrality is yet another obstacle to closer harmony with the US and will probably prevent it from rendering military assistance against Communist aggression outside the hemisphere. On the other hand, Argentina has participated actively in the work of the UN and in the last few years has shown an interest in the political activities of the Organization of American States. Argentina's desire for imports from and exports to the US is also a linking force. The opposition of both Governments to Communism serves as a basis for common action in various respects, especially in UN and OAS political activities. The general US policy believed best fitted to cope with the special problems of US-Argentine relations is that now being followed—namely carrying on friendly but firm and frank relations. Within the scope of this broad policy we allow ourselves leeway between a liberally friendly approach and an approach which may be

[1] Drafted by Mr. Dearborn.

described as "correct", depending on the temper of relations in general. As this Statement is written the US is limiting itself to being "correct", among other lesser factors, because of the strain put upon our relations by the Argentine Government's expropriation of the independent newspaper *La Prensa*, by severe attacks on the US by Argentine officials and the Peronista press, and by US press and labor attacks on Argentina. While it seems likely that the conflicting forces named will continue in varying degrees into the foreseeable future, and will prevent the two countries from achieving a close friendship, it also seems likely that mutual interests will cause them to remain on moderately-friendly-to-cool terms and to work together in practical ways.

Internal Political Background. The internal political situation in Argentina has an important bearing on US–Argentine relations, and we cannot carry on these relations with hope of success without taking cognizance of that situation. During the Peron administration the Peronista Party has completely controlled the political life of Argentina. It has won all elections and has 100 per cent representation in the Senate and more than a two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It also has controlled the provincial governorships and legislatures. The cohesive force which has held the party together has been the combined personalities of President Peron and his wife. While Peron is unquestionably the most powerful man in Argentina, he is not an absolute dictator and we would be mistaken if we should conduct our relations on that erroneous concept. He was put into office by labor, which continues to constitute his strongest following. To keep this support he must favor policies popular with labor and this is both a limitation on his power (as well as the source of it) and a possible explanation of why many of his public acts and speeches do not coincide with his privately expressed opinions. Another limitation on his power is the extreme nationalist group within his own party which regards him as too internationalist minded and too friendly with the US. Still another is the still-to-be-reckoned-with autonomous sentiment of the provinces.

Since he became President, Peron has been rather more favorable to cooperation with the US than many of his followers and often more favorable than the Radical Party which constitutes his principal opposition. The Peronista nationalists and the Radicals favor nationalization of the petroleum industry, but Peron, supported by more moderate Peronistas, has not expanded the nationally-owned petroleum organization to exclude private interests. The Radical Party strongly opposed the ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which Argentina signed at Rio de Janeiro on Peron's direction and later ratified as a result of his initiative. Industrialization, mechanization of agriculture and economic development are of prime importance in Peron's program and he is believed to feel that these

objectives can most readily be achieved if the US, with its industrial exports and its technical knowledge, cooperates. He is known to have in mind the difficulties Argentina encountered in two world wars in obtaining essential supplies abroad and to desire ultimately to make Argentina as free from dependence on foreign sources of supply as possible.

A unique phenomenon in Argentine politics is Mrs. Peron. She holds no political office but so closely approaches her husband in political power that there is serious discussion as to whether she has less, the same or more than he. The importance of Mrs. Peron's views to US-Argentine relations is therefore obvious. While a year ago she was believed to be bitterly anti-US, more recently she has privately expressed herself in a conciliatory manner. Mrs. Peron's emotional attitudes on small matters are likely to be reflected in Government decisions on important issues. Her vindictiveness has been manifested on numerous occasions and her retaliatory measures have reflected both ruthlessness and a long memory.

Argentine Neutralism. By a judicious amount of inaction and by a minimum amount of special consideration, we are attempting to bring home to Argentina the realization that extreme nationalist policies are not in its interest and that, far from being independent, it is in fact quite dependent upon the free world, especially on the US. It is important to disabuse Argentina of its false sense of self-sufficiency because this attitude stands in the way of the realization of our other objectives. US tactics at present, therefore, are to make the minimum number of requests possible of Argentina for collaboration in international action. We have withheld a number of requests for Argentine cooperation in international organizations, for example, in order to puncture the inflated Argentine sense of indispensability. On the rare occasions when we do attempt to induce that Government to act, it is our intention to base our reason on Argentina's own interests and obligations rather than on aspects which might suggest any US need for Argentine cooperation. On the other hand, our operations in allocating scarce materials are making Argentina's dependence upon the US more and more obvious. The Department is receiving an increasing number of requests from the Argentine Embassy for assistance in obtaining articles in short supply. While normal attention is being given to these requests, no special consideration is being accorded. We have not permitted our tactics of inaction to stand in the way of US representations on behalf of US business, though in these representations we have emphasized Argentine obligations and interests rather than any favorable results for the US. This was our position during our recent assistance to US shipping firms in their negotiations with the Argentine Government.

Collaboration in Hemisphere Defense. Argentina is politically, economically and militarily one of the most powerful of the American Republics. It is strategically situated with respect to South Atlantic shipping routes and the Straits of Magellan and would be in wartime a much needed supplier of food and raw materials to the US and its allies. It would be, therefore, in the US interest to have Argentina on our side in case of an outside attack on the other American republics or on ourselves. Our policies to achieve this objective are principally to encourage Argentine participation in hemisphere defense arrangements, to foster good relations between the armed services of our two countries, to obtain Argentine cooperation against Communist penetration, and to obtain Argentine economic collaboration in the present emergency.

In June 1950 Argentina took the most important step it has ever taken toward collaboration in hemisphere defense when it ratified the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This was an encouraging development since it represented a radical departure from traditional Argentine policy and since its accomplishment required the Peron Government to proceed against strong opposition both within and outside the Peronista Party. It is likely that Peron's decision was influenced in large measure by his desire to qualify for US military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 [2] and that he believed the outbreak of war in Korea gave him a strategic moment for action.

In the implementation of its arms policy, the US has permitted the export to Argentina of reasonable amounts of arms. Reasonable amounts have been interpreted to mean quantities not in excess of Argentina's normal defense requirements and not exceeding those exported to Latin American republics of comparable size. These arms have been obtained partly from commercial sources and partly from US Government stocks. The most recent significant US Government sale to Argentina was two cruisers [3] similar to those offered simultaneously to Brazil and Chile under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. A condition of sale was that the vessels would be used to further the policies and purposes of the Act and especially in support of the obligations undertaken in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Argentina found it necessary in August 1950 to turn down one sizeable offer of US Army equipment owing to lack of dollars, and financial limitations on Argentine arms purchases are still operating. The US is not at present considering Argentina for grant military aid but would reconsider if US-Argentine relations

[2] For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949, see 63 Stat. 714.

[3] Documents relating to the refitting of these cruisers are in decimal files 735.56 and 735.5621 for 1951. For previous documentation on the negotiations leading to the sale of the cruisers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 599 ff.

should improve and if Argentina by its actions and attitude shows itself to be politically in step with the concept of collective defense of the hemisphere and will agree to undertake those military tasks which we consider it capable of performing. At present the US will not permit the exportation to Argentina of any military equipment which is considered above Argentina's minimum requirements for maintaining internal order and self-defense.

In fostering collaboration between the armed services, the US has encouraged the exchange of visits by high-ranking personnel and by the naval vessels. Another implementation of this policy is found in our furnishing naval and military ground advisers to Argentina.

Argentina has shown itself disposed to collaborate against Communist penetration in the hemisphere. Though the Communist Party is legal, it finds even more difficulty than other opposition parties in expressing itself due to the obstacles set up by the Government. Having between 35,000 and 50,000 members and having polled only approximately 80,000 votes in the most recent national election, the Party's numerical strength is not threatening. The Government has in the past found it a convenient scapegoat. In recent months, however, there has been evidence that the Communists actually contributed clandestinely to the unrest in some labor circles brought about in the first instance by economic grievances. The Argentine Communists are not sufficiently strong to create much unrest by themselves but it may be assumed that they will continue to take advantage of strife derived from other causes. The more fertile the ground for discontent, the more readily their seeds of dissension will take root. In general, labor has supported the Perons because it believes they are its champions. While this is still true, recent indications of labor unrest, of which the most outstanding example is a series of strikes and incidents among railway workers, point to what may become a serious weakening of this support. If the Perons or their successors should be unable to keep the now politically conscious Argentine worker reasonably satisfied, it is a possibility that this worker, with his new-found power, might turn to a Communist leader, always provided that that leader were shrewd enough not to promote international communism at the expense of Argentine nationalism. It will be well for the US to remember, in case of a war with the USSR, that there is a large Slav colony in Argentina numbering between 500,000 and 600,000. It is considered that the USSR might receive substantial support from this group in a crisis. Communists and sympathizers among them are at present estimated at perhaps 90,000. Anti-American propaganda is in general favorably received in Argentina and rapidly gains popular support. Communists appreciate its value and utilize it to the fullest extent.

In October 1948 Peron informally recommended to our Ambassador a secret inter-American conference to stamp out Communism in the

western hemisphere. He repeated the suggestion in December 1949, saying he thought commonly agreed objectives and a program against Communism would be desirable and mentioning the possibility of some sort of meeting among the most interested countries to lay out objectives and agreements. The US did not encourage him either time. While Peron indicates he would like to sponsor an international step against Communism and while Argentina went along with the resolution directed against international Communism voted by the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1951), he apparently feels that Argentina itself can take care of the home front. The inconsistency between Peron's proposals to the US and his famous "third position" is obvious.

Argentina and World Peace. Our basic policy in attempting to induce Argentina to support our objectives of peace and democracy is to carry on friendly relations with its Government. This policy was not followed during the last war when the Argentine Government did not support the US cause. From the time we entered the war until 1947 we attempted to obtain our objectives by moderately forceful rather than friendly measures and we purposefully discriminated against Argentina in various ways. With President Truman's decision in June 1947 that Argentina had substantially complied with its inter-American commitments, the US returned to its former basic policy.

The Peron Government since its inauguration has been independently active in promoting peace and it is general knowledge that Peron covets the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1947 he attempted a peace offensive which received wide attention. While no one knows whether Argentina has, as Peron says, effected a controlled liberation of atomic energy "on a technical scale", the stress which he placed in his announcement on his intention to use atomic power solely for peaceful purposes has its importance. Such a policy would be entirely consistent with the "third position" which is advertised by Peron as a force for peace. The US, however, does not look upon this "third position" as a force for permanent peace. When first publicized in mid-1947, the concept appeared to be an indication that Argentina did not wish to follow in the wake of either the capitalistic US or the communistic USSR in world affairs but preferred an independent course. Other nations were invited to join Argentina in a third group which would strive for peace and counteract the trend toward war between the other two camps. President Peron, however, subsequently assured us that the "third position" was a peacetime policy and a "political device" which would have no effect if the US and the USSR went to war, in which case Argentina would declare war immediately on the side of the US. Whatever President Peron's intention, Argentine propagandists for the "third position" have injured US-Argentine relations and to a minor extent have embarrassed the US in its relations with the other American Republics.

At home and abroad they have vilified Moscow and its international influence; but they have with equal and perhaps more severity attacked "Yankee imperialism" and "Wall Street" for various alleged activities in the western hemisphere. It is our policy to counteract this propaganda whenever possible. Through diplomatic channels we point out to Peron and his representatives that if the Argentine Government is sincere in its professed desire to collaborate with the US against Communism, it should cease to weaken the cause of the democracies by attacking the US.

Argentina has in many respects played an active and constructive role in the affairs of the UN, the Organization of American States and related organizations. Its policy in these organizations has, however, tended to be somewhat individualistic, and heavily dependent upon the personalities of its representatives at any given time. It is US policy to encourage Argentine participation in those spheres of UN and OAS activities where it is now playing a constructive role. In the present state of US-Argentine relations, however, US tactics are neither to play a leading role in proposing Argentina for slates on international bodies nor in urging Argentina to take any given action. At the same time we are friendly to the Argentines at international meetings, give them our opinion when asked and vote for their candidates when they are the obvious choice of those voting or of the Latin American caucus.

Argentine delegates to UN meetings are as a rule cooperative and friendly with our delegates, even withdrawing their own proposals at times in deference to our policies. Ex-Foreign Minister Bramuglia,[4] as president of the Security Council in the fall of 1948, guided it through the difficult days of the Berlin crisis in an able and intelligent manner. Argentine delegations to the ICAO Council have attained high prestige and this has been recognized by the members. Despite the obvious inconsistency with its "third position", Argentina has supported the US on the questions of seating the Chinese Communists in the UN and of declaring Communist China an aggressor. At the Cairo meeting of the Universal Postal Union in January 1951,[5] Argentine collaboration with the US was so outstanding on the issue of seating the Chinese Communists [6] that we instructed our Embassy in Buenos Aires formally to express our appreciation.

The matter of Argentine collaboration with the UN in Korea against Communist aggression requires some explanation. Immediately following the attack on Korea in June 1950, Argentina sent a message

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[4] Juan Atilio Bramuglia.

[5] A joint meeting of the Executive Committee of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) took place in Cairo, January 22–February 5, 1951.

[6] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to this issue, see pp. 209 ff.

to the UN in support of the UN resolutions pertaining to the conflict. Peron showed indications of planning to play a more active role in the implementation of the resolutions than he ultimately did. Following a particularly severe popular reaction at home against Argentine involvement, and especially against any contribution of troops, Peron withdrew closer to the line of traditional Argentine policy and ever since he has been intermittently reassuring the Argentine public that no troops will be sent abroad unless the people are consulted. Peron's "third position" propaganda over the previous three years had doubtless made even more firm their resolve to resist any such radical departure from neutralism as sending troops abroad. Peron has himself to blame if it was suspected by some that he welcomed and secretly abetted public resistance so that he might hold it responsible before the free nations for withholding substantial assistance to the UN in Korea. The extent of Argentine collaboration in Korea since its message of support of the UN in June 1950 has been an offer, accepted by the Unified Command, of 14,000 cases of canned meat for Korean relief.

While the Argentine Government opposes Communism as a doctrine, and tends to vote with the US on important international political issues, somewhat to its embarrassment its own attitude on civil liberties causes it on occasion to vote with the USSR in conferences having to do with these matters. In world labor conferences Argentina has been embarrassed by the heckling of nations which object to its domestic control of organized labor and to the assumption by its delegates that Argentine labor conditions are utopian.

Argentina has for many years had an active interest in increasing its population through the admission of selected immigrants and maintains a permanent commission in Europe for selection and promotion purposes. Immigrants now number about 200,000 annually. While Argentina has since 1947 accepted over 30,000 persons classified by the International Refugee Organization as displaced persons it has shown a preference for handling its immigration problems independently rather than in cooperation with the IRO. Argentina encourages Italian and Spanish immigration more than any other.

An illustration of Argentine action to promote peace is that country's effort to maintain calm in the Antarctic region by signing an agreement with the UK and Chile not to send warships to the area except for routine purposes. It has been US policy to issue a statement when this agreement is renewed annually to the effect that the US does not contemplate sending warships to the area.[7]

Argentina has not for the most part favored US objectives in the multilateral economic sphere. This is explained principally by Argentina's traditional aversion to multilateral economic agreements as

[7] For documentation on United States policy with regard to the Antarctic in 1951, see vol. I, pp. 1715 ff.

derogations of its sovereignty, by the prevalent feeling in Argentina that the present world crisis is ours, not hers, and by that Government's desire to derive as much economic advantage as possible from the world situation. It is our policy to attempt by tactics already described to convince Argentina that this is its fight as much as ours and that the cooperation of all free nations is essential if the principles which we have both espoused in the UN and OAS are to prevail.

Argentina has held back on a number of UN or affiliated economic activities. Specific examples are its failure to associate itself with the International Bank for Reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In the light of Argentina's historical position on these matters, it was somewhat surprising and encouraging when, after several years of urging by the US, it recently applied for membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization. With specific reference to the present emergency, Argentina has after long delay accepted an invitation to participate in the work of the international materials committees which have been set up to represent major consuming and producing countries in considering problems of world shortages. She is now a member of the Wool Committee and desires membership in others. Argentina probably made this decision to participate after observing that non-participation was working against its interests. On the other hand she has shown no interest in cooperating with us in cutting off trade with the Soviet bloc. While Argentina has not refused to furnish us with strategic materials such as beryl and tungsten, it has indicated that it expects in return assistance in securing mining machinery and other scarce goods. We have yet to obtain any beryl and unless Argentina is granted at least a part of what it wants, we shall probably not get any. US policy is still in a formative stage regarding prospective action on this matter.

Historically Argentina has been the most reluctant member of the inter-American system. This has been a matter of serious concern to the US because of the importance of this system in US foreign policy. We have therefore welcomed the indications occurring during the past four years that Argentina is adopting a more active and cooperative inter-American attitude. At the major conferences at Rio de Janeiro in September 1947,[8] at Bogota in April 1948 and at Washington in the spring of 1951 Argentina was generally cooperative rather than obstructive. As in the UN Argentina has often been slow to incur multilateral economic commitments in the OAS. It has also been quick to oppose any assumption of political powers by the COAS.

During Peron's presidency there have been numerous charges from other American republics of Argentine Government support of at-

[8] Reference is to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security (Rio Conference), held at Quitandinha, State of Rio de Janeiro, August 15–September 2, 1947. For documentation on the conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 1 ff.

tempts to overthrow their existing regimes. Peron has reiterated again and again that Argentine policy is non-intervention in the affairs of other states. It is US policy to encourage Argentina's adherence to this principle. We remind that Government on appropriate occasions that the US is vitally concerned in the maintenance of the non-intervention principle [9] and we show ourselves to be constantly vigilant to detect any intervention. Despite many charges of interference leveled against the Peron Government, there has not been any substantial confirmation of them. It is US policy not to point an accusing finger at Argentina or any other American republic as long as substantial evidence is lacking.

Argentina claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands which have been held and administered by the British since 1833. The question of determining to whom the islands legally belong is at best a difficult one. The US is in no way a party to this dispute. However, we have used our influence to prevent the problem from being made an issue which would create friction on the question of European possessions in the western hemisphere at a time when solidarity among the world's anti-communist forces is sorely needed. When the Argentine Foreign Minister asked the US to support the Argentine claim at the Bogota conference of 1948, we informed him that the US did not support either the British or the Argentine claims and that in the opinion of the US the dispute should be settled by peaceful means under the recognized procedures of international law. While Argentina did bring up the Falklands at Bogota in connection with its support of a general resolution regarding colonies and occupied territories, it is believed that Argentina made less of an issue of the question at Bogota as a result of our pre-conference talks with the Foreign Minister.

Argentine, British, Chilean and potential US claims in the Antarctic are in conflict. In an effort to prevent that continent from becoming a sore spot in world politics, the US in 1948 presented a proposal to these nations and to others with official claims there suggesting that all agree to solve the territorial problem by establishing a condominium.[10] Few of the claimants showed enthusiasm for the idea, and Argentina flatly refused to accept it even as a basis for discussion. The US considers that the most promising approach at present is a modified version of a counter-proposal offered by Chile—namely the freezing of the legal status for a period of five or more years. Though the US has not discussed this plan, except informally with Chile and the UK, it will be our policy if it is put forward formally to endeavor through diplomatic channels to obtain Argentina's support on the basis

[9] For a statement of the non-intervention principle, see the Department of State's instruction 131, dated February 19, 1947, in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 629–631.

[10] For documentation on United States policy with respect to the Antarctic in 1948, see *ibid.*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 962 ff.

that it would be an Argentine contribution to peaceful settlement. Before entering into the proposed arrangement, the US would announce its own Antarctic claims. By the timing of the announcement in relation to the signing of the modus vivendi and the political situation, we would seek to minimize the inevitable Argentine criticism and to ward off a major demonstration of anti-US feeling.

Attitude Toward Democratic Institutions. No objective in our relations with Argentina is more difficult, more frustrating to implement, than the adoption in Argentina of policies which will strengthen democratic institutions. The Peron Government has in one way or another almost completely stifled criticism of itself by the press, and there is little doubt but that it intends eventually to permit no criticism. Radio in Argentina is without exception subservient to the Government. The right to free expression is further curtailed by a law establishing a prison sentence for writing or speaking disrespectfully of Government officials and by severe limitations on the right of assembly. While elections have remained free at the polls, the opposition finds it almost impossible to reach an audience of any size and there are legal restrictions making it difficult to form new political parties. Organized labor is for the most part under the thrumb of the Peronista party through Peronista control of the leadership of the General Confederation of Labor and its affiliates. The few labor groups which have attempted to guard their independence have been arbitrarily and forcefully dealt with. The judiciary and the educational life of the nation have been made instruments of Peronismo. Letters passing through the Argentine mail system are likely to be opened, telegrams and cables are monitored and telephone lines are tapped.

The Argentine Government's attitude toward civil liberties is of concern to the US, not only because of our desire to strengthen democratic institutions in the world, but also because it is unlikely that there can ever be any warm friendship between the two countries as long as this attitude persists. While it is our policy to attempt in every appropriate way to persuade the Argentine Government to abandon its restrictions on civil liberties, the measures which the US can take to achieve these purposes are limited by the fact that Argentina is a sovereign country which, as shown by experience, reacts in exactly the opposite way to any suggestions from the outside as to how it should conduct its affairs. Through diplomatic channels we have attempted to point out to Peron the detrimental effect of his press restrictions on US–Argentine relations and we have sought to convince him of the advantages of a free press. Our arguments have not deterred him in his course. Nothing could have proved this more conclusively than the expropriation in April 1951 of the celebrated Argentine independent newspaper *La Prensa*, which the Argentine Government pushed through in the face of the severest criticism throughout the western hemisphere and west-

ern Europe. Nothing could have confirmed more conclusively the determination of the Peron regime to make all major Argentine institutions subservient to its purposes. The *La Prensa* affair was the hardest blow dealt to US-Argentine relations since World War II and the fact that the Argentine Government went ahead with expropriation in spite of US sentiments is significant. The vindictiveness of Mrs. Peron against *La Prensa's* editor is believed to have been an important factor in the Government's decision to stop the independent paper, and the incident furnishes an outstanding example of her importance in US-Argentine affairs. The US has protested several instances of Argentine censorship of despatches prepared by American press correspondents and has taken immediate and successful action to have American correspondents released from jail when arrested while performing their normal reporting activities [11] but it has never received assurances that there would be no recurrences. The US has also protested the inability of its radio correspondents to broadcast from Argentina. In reply we have been informed that radio in Argentina is under private control and that the Government cannot interfere in questions of allotments of time on the air. Another incident in the general field of civil liberties which perturbed US-Argentine relations was the failure of the Argentine CGT to obtain admission to the ICFTU at its meeting in Mexico City in January 1951. The US delegation to the conference, composed of leaders of the CIO and AFofL, took a leading role in the refusal of the conference to seat the Argentines, their position being based upon the fact that the Argentine labor movement was not free but controlled by the Government. Efforts of the Argentines to save face naturally resulted in violent attacks on the US in the Peronista press.

Climate of Argentine Opinion Toward the US. It is our policy to attempt to create and maintain a favorable climate of opinion among the Argentine people toward the United States so that we may realize our foremost objectives: the end of Argentine neutralism, and encouragement of hemisphere defense, peace and democracy. This is a formidable task. Argentina's close commercial and cultural ties with Europe have tended to prevent the diffusion of accurate knowledge about the US among Argentines. This situation has created a fertile field of ignorance in which extreme nationalism and demagoguery have easily been able to plant anti-US seeds. The Argentine people have traditionally resented US leadership when it extends to South America, seeing it as an obstruction to their own. In addition many Argentines have long tended to think of the US as a materialistic, money-grubbing, imperialistic nation with little appreciation of cultural values. Exclusion of Argentine meat from the US and other economic measures regarded by Argentina as discriminatory have tended to

[11] Documents pertaining to this subject are in several decimal files, principally 935.61, 935.63, and 935.64.

strengthen this unsympathetic attitude. These impressions have been modified somewhat through normal trade relations, tourist travel, and our USIE programs. In recent years some notable changes have been effected in the attitudes of high-ranking Argentines during official visits to the US and they have returned to their country with pro-US views. Nevertheless the dominant Argentine feeling about the US is still critical and suspicious. The USIE programs are a principal weapon with which to counteract these views, but their effectiveness is dulled and often rendered useless by the Argentine limitations on freedom of expression and, in fact, by the official Argentine policy of playing upon anti-US sentiments for the Government's own ends. US policy is to diffuse throughout Argentina as much information as possible about the US and the principles for which it stands but to proceed with sufficient caution not to provoke the Argentine Government into prohibiting our operations. At present this is a serious limitation. We are following a foot-in-the-door policy ready to seize upon any relaxation of Argentine restrictions as a sign to enter into full-scale informational and cultural programs.

We should continue our already beneficial policy of inviting influential Argentines to the US when the opportunity offers itself, but at present, while we are following our "correct" tactics, persons of cabinet rank should not be invited to make courtesy visits. The question of inviting the Perons constitutes a special public relations problem even when relations are better. Mrs. Peron is known to have attempted to inspire invitations and it is reliably reported that President Peron was personally offended by President Truman's invitation to the Chilean Chief Executive.[12] Our policy is not to invite the Argentine President nor his wife as long as there is the present amount of ill feeling in the US toward the Perons. The press, organized labor, various intellectual groups and many other vocal elements could be expected to give either or both of them such an inhospitable reception that it might take US-Argentine relations years to recover from the repercussions. We would, if necessary, officially explain the lack of an invitation on this basis.

US-Argentine Economic Relations. The US endeavors to encourage healthy bilateral economic relations with Argentina. One purpose is to improve our overall relations with that country. Another goal, which is especially significant at this time, is to maintain a practical friendly situation in the economic field which will serve to mitigate periods of strain in other fields for the sake of hemisphere security. The hard work devoted to economic matters during the past two years and the friendly frank personal contacts established between repre-

[12] Gabriel González Videla. President González Videla had visited the United States during April and May 1950. For information concerning his visit and his discussions with President Truman, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 785.

sentatives of the two Governments in the process have helped to sustain the shock to relations from the lack of harmony on civil liberties matters.

During 1950 we engaged in extended conversations with Argentine officials which looked toward an improvement in US Argentine trade and financial relations, and which included talks on a supplement to the US-Argentine Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1853,[13] a double taxation treaty,[14] a bilateral air transport agreement, and encouragement of tourism. Within this same framework we supported an Export–Import Bank credit of $125,000,000 to enable Argentina to pay US creditors amounts overdue on commercial shipments faster than it had been able to pay on its own account. It was believed that this would improve Argentina's position in relation to US traders and that restored confidence would stimulate commerce. Among the favorable developments following these steps were an increase in US-Argentine trade, the liquidation of most of Argentina's commercial dollar arrears and Argentine relaxation of restrictions on tourism. On the other hand Argentina has yet to show any serious effort to liquidate its financial dollar debt. The supplementary trade treaty lies inactive with the next move up to Argentina. We do not plan to urge action on it at this time. The US is holding up action on the double taxation treaty. Talks in 1950 concerning a route annex to the bilateral air transport agreement of 1947 [15] failed to materialize owing to a legitimate difference of opinion which could not be reconciled.

The US and Argentina have a bilateral Trade Agreement signed in 1941.[16] The one clear Argentine violation of this Agreement lies in the failure of the Argentine Government to put into effect reduced duty rates on certain concession articles. These lower rates were to become effective when total Argentine customs revenues should exceed 270 million paper pesos and this occurred in 1947. Two US notes of protest, one in 1948 and another in 1949, have not been definitively answered and consideration is being given to what further steps should be taken to obtain observation of the Agreement.

Another subject in connection with the Agreement on which it may soon be necessary to approach Argentina is that of bringing the "escape clause" into conformity with the pertinent provisions of the

[13] For text of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, signed at San José, July 27, 1853, and entered into force December 20, 1854, see TS No. 4, or 10 Stat. 1005.

[14] For documentation relating to United States policy with respect to the negotiation of double taxation treaties, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 688 ff.

[15] An air transport agreement was signed on May 1, 1947, but it never entered into force. For documentation, see *ibid.*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 238 ff.

[16] For text of the agreement and related exchanges of notes, signed at Buenos Aires, October 14, 1941, and which entered into force definitively January 8, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 277, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1685.

Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951.[17] The latter requires the President to take "escape clause action" on any Trade Agreement concession which is causing or threatens serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. While Argentine adherence to the GATT,[18] which contains a more satisfactory "escape clause", would be a solution, that country has shown no interest in acceding to the GATT. An approach to Argentina now concerning the "escape clause" might jeopardize the bilateral Trade Agreement by precipitating an Argentine request for a general revision and should therefore only be taken after thorough consideration. It is US policy to negotiate or revise trade agreements only within the framework of the GATT.

We have formally acquainted Argentina with our Point IV program and the procedure by which that country could participate but have never received more than individual expressions of interest from a limited number of Argentine officials. If Argentina should desire to participate, we would consider its requests in the light of relations at the time. Under present conditions we shall not make another approach on the matter. Being fully aware of the Argentine propensity to capitalize to the fullest any advantages which "terms of trade" may give it, it is our policy to avoid, insofar as possible, engaging in specific *quid pro quo* conversations or negotiations. Accordingly, we successfully opposed the Argentine desire to discuss specific *quid pro quos* in the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers. This policy would not prevent us, however, from bargaining with the Argentines on a specific matter of vital interest to the US if we were certain that we could pay off. In conformity with the "correct" tactics we are now employing toward Argentina we have not supported its desires to obtain additional government credits and we are opposed to Argentina being allowed to utilize for other purposes any unused portion of the Export-Import Bank credit.

Having in mind the difficulties encountered in the conduct of certain private US enterprises in Argentina, it is a US objective to defend the legitimate rights of US firms doing business in or with that country. In the past eighteen months we have made successful representations in connection with international airline rate structures, permission for Braniff Airlines to fly into Argentina, remittance of 1949 blocked airline pesos at pre-devaluation rates, reciprocal exemption of transport companies from income taxes, transfer of the headquarters of Swift International to the US and the reentry of US

[17] For text of the Trade Agreements Extension Act (Public Law 50), approved June 16, 1951, see 65 Stat. 72.

[18] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5–6).

motion pictures into Argentina.[19] Our representations are continuing with some hope of success with respect to the petroleum companies' efforts to sign a long-term importation and distribution agreement with Argentina [20] and the American and Foreign Power Company's efforts to sell out to the Argentine Government on reasonable terms. There seems to be little or no likelihood that the Argentine Government will resolve the problem of discriminations against US shipping companies in favor of the latter in view of its firm intention to favor Argentine lines as a means toward building up a large modern merchant fleet.[21] The US intermittently discusses the problems of the US meatpackers with Argentine officials with a view to ensuring their continued operation on a reasonably profitable basis.[22] Our current tactics in making representations on behalf of US business include emphasizing the damage which Argentina does to its credit by pursuing nationalistic economic policies which discourage new capital from entering the country and cause foreign enterprise now in the country to operate on a frightened wait-and-see basis.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

Argentina's relations with neighboring states, while friendly on the surface, are ruffled by an undercurrent of distrust on the part of the

[19] An agreement between the Argentine Government and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) had been reached in January 1951; it essentially pledged the Argentine Government to implement the so-called Cereijo–Johnston Agreement, signed May 12, 1950, which provided for the unrestricted entry of United States films into Argentina and confidentially for minimum remittances up to 1.1 million dollars per year of earnings on United States films already circulating in Argentina. The terms of the new agreement, not fully incorporated into any written document, are described in despatches 1116, from Buenos Aires, February 1, 1951, not printed (835.452/2–151), and 1219, from Buenos Aires, February 16, 1951, not printed (835.452/2–1651). In telegram 37, from Buenos Aires, July 16, 1951, not printed, Ambassador Bunker had informed the Secretary of State that the Argentine Government had issued permits to the signatories of the Cereijo–Johnston Agreement, allowing them to import films from the United States (835.452/7–1651). For previous documentation with regard to the extended negotiations between representatives of the Argentine Government and the MPAA, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 691 ff.

[20] Documents relating to the efforts of the petroleum companies to negotiate a long-term petroleum agreement with the Argentine Government are in decimal files 811.05135 and 835.2553. No such agreement was reached in 1951. For previous documentation on this subject, see *ibid.*

[21] During 1951 intermittent and inconclusive discussions took place in Buenos Aires between representatives of the Argentine Government and United States shipping companies, concerning, *inter alia*, the alleged Argentine practice of granting prior exchange permits for merchandise designated for import in Argentine ships, and the requirement that imports and exports by official Argentine entities be carried by Argentine vessels. Pertinent documents are in decimal files 102.7971, 811.05135, and 935.537.

[22] United States meatpackers in Argentina contended that as a consequence of competition from rapidly proliferating government-owned packing houses, onerous controls on foreign packers, and the termination of the government's subsidy program in August 1950, they were operating on a loss basis. In despatch 108, from Buenos Aires, July 20, 1951, not printed, the Embassy had informed the Department of State that the Argentine Government, by a decree dated July 13, had authorized the Ministry of Economy to compensate United States meatpackers for losses incurred between September 1, 1950, and June 30, 1951 (835.311/7–2051). For previous documentation on the problems of the meatpackers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 691 ff.

latter because of what they suspect may be Argentina's political and economic ambitions. While we believe that much of this distrust is voiced to the US to prevent it from becoming too friendly with Argentina and in order too gain for themselves further considerations from the US, especially in arms matters, we also believe that there is sincere apprehension as to Argentine intentions.

Peron's relations with the present Government of Bolivia have been continuous but troubled. The latter feels certain that Bolivian revolutionaries in Argentina are plotting to overthrow it and from time to time it has believed that they were receiving assistance from Peron. It is true that individual Argentines have aided the Bolivian revolutionaries, but we have no evidence to substantiate that the Peron Government was involved. Argentina and Bolivia have a long, common border, difficult to patrol, and a certain amount of illicit activity must be expected from private parties and venal officials.

Brazil and Argentina are jealous of each other's prestige in the western hemisphere and in the world. US–Brazilian relations have traditionally been more friendly than US–Argentine relations and Brazil tends to resent any manifestation of closer collaboration between the US and Argentina. US policy is to endeavor so to conduct its relations with the two countries that feelings of rivalry will be kept at a minimum.

A basic policy of both Argentina and Chile is believed to be friendship toward each other. As a result, the minor unfriendly incidents which occur from time to time reach reasonably quick conciliations. The present Chilean Government distrusts the Peron regime, feels it to be inherently dangerous, and has so informed us. The US has indicated to Chile that it has received no convincing evidence supporting the rumors concerning Argentine aggressive designs and Chile has not offered this substantiation. General Ibañez [23] not long ago announced in Argentina his candidacy for the Chilean presidency and prophesied that he and President Peron would be elected in 1952. The Department is following closely reports that Peron has offered or has contributed funds for the Ibañez campaign.

The US is interested in Argentine-Paraguayan relations primarily because they are a potential sore spot in the western hemisphere. Argentina's preferred geographic and historical position in relation to Paraguay might under certain conditions lead to an attempt at political domination. This, combined with Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for influence in Paraguay, might lead to serious friction between Brazil and Argentina. Finally, the tendency of Paraguayan political factions to take advantage of this rivalry for their own immediate ends tends to draw in the neighboring countries, willing or not. At present none of these potentially disturbing forces is believed to be seriously

[23] Carlos Ibáñez del Campo.

threatening. US policy is to mitigate them whenever possible and appropriate.

Argentine-Uruguayan relations are of special interest to the US because of the frequently expressed fear of the Uruguayan Government that Peron is attempting to infiltrate and dominate Uruguay. The US has felt that these fears are exaggerated. The obvious incompatibility between the Argentine and Uruguayan concepts of democracy and the friendly attitude toward Peron of the principal opposition party in Uruguay exacerbates the underlying distrust of Argentina which Uruguay has in common with all of Argentina's neighbors. US policy is to calm Uruguayan fears since we believe them unjustified and to remind that Government that the US stands fully behind the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in case Argentine aggression does occur. A likely source of embarrassment in Argentine-Uruguayan relations, especially prior to the November 1951 Argentine elections, will be the free Uruguayan press and radio. The Peron Government, as it restricts ever further Argentine outlets of public expression, will be increasingly angered by the free Uruguayan radio which Argentines can hear and the free Uruguayan press which they will probably see clandestinely. The US would be gravely concerned if Argentina were able to exert pressure to curb freedom of expression in Uruguay.

Argentina and the United Kingdom have for many years maintained a business relationship under the aegis of which British influence has also penetrated Argentina in cultural and other ways. There are developments, however, that indicate Argentine economic dependence on the UK may be declining. Argentine purchases of British public utilities in Argentina have wiped out the sterling debt attached to those utilities. Furthermore, Argentina is consuming more beef at home and is finding other markets for its exports, circumstances which have been hastened by stubborn British reluctance to pay what the Argentine, and many British, believe a fair price for beef. If Anglo-Argentine trade continues to decline, British prestige and influence may be expected to suffer. A consequence of this might be that the substantial US meat packing interests in Argentina which profit from a healthy Anglo-Argentine trade would suffer. There are significant unknowns in the picture. The effect of the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.[24] upon UK–Argentina trade relations is still too early to judge. US policy is to play no direct part in Anglo-Argentine trade negotiations, though we must follow the situation closely because of its possible discriminatory or other effect on US

[24] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to Iran, see volume v.

interests in Argentina and its effect on our overall interest in world petroleum and food conditions.[25]

Argentina maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR and its satellites but political relations are not particularly good. Argentine diplomats have been treated poorly in Moscow and Russian diplomats are treated coolly in Buenos Aires. Having trade agreements with a number of the satellites, Argentina maintains that it must sell a small amount of its production to them in order to obtain goods which it vitally needs. It remains to be seen how this trade can be reconciled if at all with present US views and laws regarding commerce with iron curtain countries.

D. EVALUATION

It is not believed that any general policy toward Argentina would obtain better results in achieving US objectives than the present one of carrying on friendly, firm and frank relations. Less friendliness or more aggressive tactics on the part of the US would result in a resentment in Argentina which would make the conduct of relations more difficult and would stop the degree of collaboration we are now obtaining from that country. On some matters of great importance we receive no collaboration at all, but on some others we receive a considerable degree. It is believed that through our present policy we shall obtain at the very least a benevolent neutrality from Argentina if there should be another world war and this would be far better than the situation in the last war when Argentina was benevolently neutral toward our enemies.

While we are making progress in some respects in obtaining Argentine collaboration in hemisphere defense and toward world peace, in other ways we are not. Argentina has always taken its UN responsibilities seriously. In meetings of UN bodies Argentina has tended to vote with us and has not in practice adhered strictly to its "third position". Argentine cooperation in the OAS has been good on paper but we have yet to see how that country will carry out the resolutions of the 1951 Fourth Inter-American Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers and other recent obligations. As in all spheres of our Argentine relations, we have never obtained what we wanted by critical or aggressive tactics. It is a certainty that Argentina would never have ratified the Rio Pact if we had employed such tactics on that subject.

President and Mrs. Peron, ex-Foreign Minister Bramuglia, and Minister of Defense Sosa Molina [26] have all stated on various occasions that Argentina would immediately declare war on the side of the US in case of war with the USSR. This is a stronger expression of soli-

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[25] Documents relating to United States interest in the negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain during 1951 concerning meat purchases and trade are in decimal files 435.4131 and 835.311.

[26] José Humberto Sosa Molina.

darity than the US has received in the past from high-ranking Argentines and Argentine action in the UN and OAS lend it weight. How much Peron would contribute to our cause in the event of armed conflict with the USSR will in all probability vary in direct proportion to the degree to which the Argentine homeland is in danger and it is highly doubtful that any Argentine Government would in the foreseeable future any more than in the past offer troops unless that nation itself were threatened. This probably means that Argentina will not send troops outside the Western Hemisphere in the implementation of UN action, but it may well assist the UN in other ways and we should not jeopardize non-military assistance unless the cost is beyond reason.

A successful operation of our present policy was evidenced in March and April 1951 at the Fourth Inter-American Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers. We now know that the Argentines came to the Meeting in an extremely sensitive mood and that on their arrival the tension was such that the principal determination to be made by the Argentine Government was whether it should walk out or stay and sabotage the meeting. The friendly attitude which Secretary Acheson and his staff showed the Argentine Foreign Minister and the courteous correct treatment accorded the Argentines from the start brought about a visible change in them. They were cooperative at the Meeting and were not obstructionist even in matters where we might have expected them to be. If we had had a critical or aggressive policy toward Argentina, that delegation would, we believe, have acted on its initial instructions and have walked out or resorted to sabotage. As in many prior instances, friendly personal contacts with high Argentine officials proved highly important to us and it should be our policy to continue to use this effective medium. Argentina's application for membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization may possibly be credited to US diplomacy. At least it was an action which we had for a long time urged Argentina to take and was a remarkable decision for Argentina in view of its past practice in the field of multilateral economic cooperation.

The US objective looking toward the strengthening of democratic institutions in Argentina has not been realized. Our policies to achieve this have been ineffective. It is believed that the US cannot immediately realize this objective without either running counter to its policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state or with its policy of conducting relations with Argentina in a friendly, firm and frank manner. We should not abandon our friendly policy since we would then jeopardize such cooperation as we are receiving from Argentina and any chance of improving our present relations. It has been fairly conclusively proven that democracy cannot be exported and it is a safe assumption that democracy will come to Argentina principally as a result of the efforts of the Argentine people. The

farthest we should go unilaterally is to point out on appropriate occasions that the Argentine Government's attitude on civil liberties is a main deterrent to real US friendship and cooperation.

It is most difficult to know to what degree our objective of creating and maintaining a favorable climate of opinion in Argentina toward the US and its policies is being realized. This is principally because of the limitation on freedom of expression and because newspapers, radios and orators speaking the Government line follow the anti-US pattern that has been laid down. We know high level government officials who would lose their jobs if their anti-Peron and pro-US views were reported. How many hold such views whom we do not know? One cannot assume that only persons of anti-US sentiments will vote for Peron since we know Peronistas who are pro-US. There is substantial demand for USIE material and services in Argentina and this in itself is of some signficance. Furthermore we are aware that most Argentines who visit the US return favorably impressed. Many of these show themselves individually and on their own initiative most sympathetic to the US. Our cultural centers are active and there is a continuing demand for US artists and lecturers.

The USIE program functions under obvious limitations in the face of adverse propaganda inspired by the Argentine Government, but it has so far been able to operate through all media of information with the toleration, and in some instances effective cooperation, of the authorities. It is in fact remarkable that under present conditions our press and radio operations have been interfered with so little. We should not be surprised if as the fever increases prior to the November 11, 1951 election our USIE activities are curbed or perhaps even stopped altogether by the authorities. This would probably be done on the ground that the program is intervening in Argentine internal affairs or that it is misleading the Argentine people. There would not need to be any evidence for such charges. Under present circumstances the most promising and feasible policies are to continue our USIE activities at the highest level likely to be allowed by the Argentine Government but within that difficult limitation to so gauge the program that it will be as influential as possible especially among Peronistas.

There has been some improvement in economic relations between the US and Argentina in the last two years. As a result of the work of the Joint US-Argentine Committee on Commercial Studies (September–December, 1949),[27] Argentine commercial practices were liberalized in certain respects and its trade balance with the US improved because of this and also because of higher commodity prices which have obtained since June 1950. Certain specific objectives have been attained

[27] For documentation on the formation and activities of the Joint Committee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 473 ff.

in regard to the treatment of US investments in Argentina although the record is far from being all that we desire. Most of the progress was obtained during the early part of 1950 when negotiations were going on for an Export-Import Bank credit. However, there has been no appreciable change in the fundamental attitude of Argentina toward foreign investment, this attitude being to subordinate all to domestic political expediency. Under present circumstances the outlook for improvement in the economic field is not bright.

We can point to little success in the field of Argentine multilateral economic cooperation and it is probable that this situation will continue. Argentina has not associated itself with the International Bank for Reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or with the endeavor to cease trade with the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, after long delay Argentina has begun to participate in the committees set up to consider materials shortages resulting from the emergency. Argentina has its heart set on becoming a member of the UN Economic and Social Council at the next General Assembly and it may be that it will deviate from its usual aloofness from multilateral economic matters as a step in its ECOSOC election campaign. During the period that we continue to employ correct tactics toward Argentina, we shall not urge it to cooperate with our objectives in international economic bodies.

835.10/12–1351

Memorandum by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1951.

Subject: Argentine Financial Arrears

The National Foreign Trade Council[2] proposes to issue a press release (attached as Tab A)[3] expressing the view that the Argentine Government should be strongly urged to take immediate steps to approve the transfer of at least a portion of Argentine financial arrears and to establish a definite formula to clear the entire backlog. Four hundred million pesos in unremitted profits were worth $82,000,000 at the end of 1948 but are worth only $29,000,000 at the current rate of exchange according to the release.

The number 1 objective of the NFTC in connection with this matter is undoubtedly to achieve payment by Argentina of the arrears at the

[1] Addressed also to Mr. Mann, Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs Rollin S. Atwood, and Mr. Randolph.

[2] A private organization representing United States corporations engaged in international trade.

[3] Not printed.

most favorable possible rate. We are, I am sure, ready to help in any way we can to gain this objective. However, given the present state of the Argentine economy and the present attitude toward foreign capital of the Peron Government, it is doubted that the desired objective can be reached either by sending a collector to pound on the door or by publicizing the debt.

The proposed NFTC release in effect charges that Argentina, by not settling its financial arrearages is not honoring a commitment to the Eximbank. This charge puts Argentina on the defensive by appearing to brand her as a welcher. Such an inference, if made, should be true beyond any argument. It is not likely, however, that Argentina considers she has failed to honor a commitment. She has recognized the debt and has agreed to pay it—not on any given date, however, but rather "when the status of the balance of payments so permits it". Argentina has, to be sure, sufficient dollar balances to pay these arrears at once, but if she feels that her balance of payments situation does not permit payment now, her position has some substance. Owing to Argentina's dismal crop outlook for 1952 and her depleted European balances, her balances in the US are, in a way, a nest egg for hard times. It is not therefore clear that Argentina has failed to live up to a commitment. If it is not clear the case of US creditors may be harmed if they so charge.

The disadvantageous situation in which the US creditors find themselves in the face of the depreciation of the peso is naturally a cause of real concern to them. It seems highly unlikely, however, that Argentina will recognize, as desired by the NFTC, a responsibility to remit earnings at an exchange rate approximating that in existence at the time remittances were blocked. Since Argentina is under no obligation to recognize such a responsibility, her only motives in adopting such a course would be in order to encourage, or at least not to discourage, foreign investment. Unfortunately the past actions of Peron's Government have been such as to show clearly that Peron wants foreign investment only on his own terms. It is well known that his terms have not been liberal and it would be most surprising if they included remittance of profits at higher than the current rate of exchange.

There can be little doubt but that the Peron Government will regard any effort to collect financial arrears at this time, when Argentina finds herself in severe economic difficulties, as an attempt to kick her when she is "down." We are not in a good psychological position. Despite Argentina's reserves, we are not even in a good bargaining position outside the psychological realm if it is true that Argentina is going to rely on a program of austerity instead of foreign aid to pull her through 1952.

What action should be taken?

I see no reason why an inquiry should not be made by our Embassy of Cereijo or Gomez Morales [4] whether Argentina has any immediate plans for implementing the latter's stated intention to pay her financial arrears when her "balance of payments so permits it." The Embassy might add that in the opinion of the creditors Argentina's dollar balance seems to be more than enough to justify at least the formulation of a plan for payment and some initial action by way of implementation of the plan. We should not, however, put on any pressure through the Foreign Office at this time. It is my view that a press statement by the NFTC would not hasten payment and might, in fact, retard the Argentine willingness to cooperate by creating an even more hostile attitude in Argentina toward US capital.[5]

Attached as Tab B is a memorandum [6] giving a chronology of significant steps since March 1950 pertaining to Argentine financial dollar arrears.

Tab B

CONFIDENTIAL

Chronology of Significant Steps since March 1950 Regarding Argentine Financial Arrears.

[Here follow those sections of the chronology pertaining to the period from March to December 1950.]

5. A despatch from our Embassy in Buenos Aires of January 29, 1951, inquired whether the Argentine Government should be approached regarding the resumption of financial remittances. About a month later Dr. Cereijo told Assistant Secretary Miller that he (Cereijo) had completely fulfilled his agreement with the Export–Import Bank regarding financial arrears. As for current remittances, Cereijo referred to Argentina's remittance of 5 percent on current earnings and appeared to think that was satisfactory. We have not taken the arrearage problem up with Argentina since Mr. Miller's talk with Cereijo. Relations between the two countries became increasingly difficult as the November 11 elections approached. "Wall Street" was one of the principal targets of the Peron Government's anti-US propaganda and it was realized that any approach on this problem would be turned to the disadvantage of the US, and would probably

[4] Alfredo Gómez Morales, Argentine Minister of Finance.

[5] A memorandum from Assistant Secretary Miller to Mr. Dearborn, dated December 18, 1951, and attached to the source text, reads as follows: "I have talked with both [William S.] Swingle [Executive President and member of the Board of Directors, NFTC] and John Akin [Executive Officer in charge of Western Hemisphere matters, NFTC] about the attached matter in the last few days and they have indicated that they are going along with my suggestion that in the first instance the Council confine itself to writing a letter to us which we could in turn pass on to our Embassy at BA for any action that they might think appropriate." (835.10/12–1351)

[6] Printed below.

make a satisfactory settlement less likely by making the question more a political than an economic one.

6. On September 27, 1951, Messers Akin, Jacob [7] and Emerson [8] of the National Foreign Trade Council called at the Department to request the Department's opinion as to the advisability of issuing a press release on the subject of Argentina's financial arrears.[9] They were advised that such a release prior to the Argentine presidential elections might be detrimental to the achievement of their principal objectives. They agreed with the Department after hearing its reasoning. The latter recommended that the problem be discussed again following the elections and that a course of action be developed in the light of the situation at that time.

7. On November 20, 1951, Mr. Akin wrote to Mr. Miller suggesting that he and Mr. Gray [10] would like to go over the problem with him at an early date. Mr. Miller replied that he would be glad to do this at their earliest convenience.

8. The following conversation took place on November 30, 1951 between Mr. Multer [11] of the House Banking and Currency Committee, President Peron and the Argentine Minister of Finance:

Congressman Multer:

I am sure that when there is confidence in the United States that Argentina will allow the re-export of earnings as readily as she allows the importation of materials, this situation (strict terms of payment for Argentina in US) will find its solution.

Minister of Finance:

But there is no payment pending.

Congressman Multer:

What happens is that, although they know there is no payment pending, today it is not possible to re-export the earnings from North American investments in the country and that has there its repercussion.

The President:

Gentlemen, I do not discount the importance which this minor and circumstancial matter has in international relations, particularly commercial ones, between the United States and Argentina, but as a statesman, I view the problem from a more elevated

[7] Leonard Jacob, II, Vice President, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation; member of the Board of Directors, NFTC.

[8] Earl A. Emerson, President, ARMCO International Corporation; member of the Board of Directors, NFTC.

[9] The discussion which took place at the Department of State on September 27 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation of the same date, by Mr. Dearborn, not printed (835.10/9–2751).

[10] W. Latimer Gray, Senior Vice President, First National Bank of Boston; member of the Board of Directors, NFTC.

[11] Abraham J. Multer (D–N.Y.).

place, a higher one, because I do not believe that an entire economic policy can be based on an insignificant matter such as this.

I analyze, since I have been the head of the government, what the conduct of the United States has been in the interchange between Argentina and that country. I see a very unfavorable circumstance for us when, during five years they owed us thousands of millions of dollars and we said not a single word, while in great contrast, when we have a small debt they wish to take us to the scaffold for it. . . .[12] We have not had reciprocity from the United States.

[12] Omission in the source text.

735.5–MSP/12–2251 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 22, 1951.

A–186. The purpose of this airgram is to furnish the Embassy with the separate instructions referred to in the penultimate paragraph of the Department's circular airgram of December 18, 1951,[1] relating to implementation of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This message should be made available to U.S. Service Attachés and the Chief of U.S. Army Mission for their information.

In presenting plans for implementation of the military grant aid program for Latin America to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense indicated that, primarily for military reasons, Argentina had been included in the list of countries with which specific programs of grant aid should be initiated, but suggested that the Secretary of State might wish to delay negotiations with that country until a more appropriate time. The latter agreed that negotiations with Argentina should be delayed until a more appropriate time.

The specific program contemplated for Argentina, subject to the conditions described above and to the negotiation of the Bilateral Mutual Assistance Agreement required by the Act, would involve US assistance in the preparation of Army units for missions important to hemisphere defense. Furthermore, in the event that satisfactory agreements cannot be concluded with one or more of the nations now tentatively scheduled to be approached for Air Force contributions, the Secretary of Defense recommended that a program in this category be attempted with Argentina.

It is not possible to state when a "more appropriate time" for an approach to Argentina might be. Argentine foreign policy and the state of Argentine–US relations must be primary considerations. At present, the unsatisfactory status of US–Argentine relations make

[1] Not printed (720.5–MSP/12–1851).

quite impossible any US approach to Argentina leading to US military grant aid to that country. Furthermore Peron's policies appear to indicate clearly that his Government will not enter into any undertakings requiring the use of Argentine forces outside of Argentina.

If you are asked by responsible inquirers why the US is not offering to enter into negotiations to reach a Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement with Argentina, you may in your discretion use appropriate parts of the information included in the seven numbered paragraphs of the Department's circular airgram of December 18. It will be obvious that based purely on military criteria Argentina might be expected to be approached in this program. If called upon to explain why this was not done you may wish to state frankly that Argentina's antagonistic attitude toward US and US objectives has created a situation among the US public and in the US Government which would make any grant military assistance impossible at this time. You might also mention that Peronista pronouncements about sending no Argentine military contingents outside the national territory, particularly where these emanate from a country possessing Argentina's potential for a contribution to collective defense, can only be interpreted as contrary to the objectives of the program.

You are requested to keep the Department fully informed with regard to developments which may indicate changes in Argentine policies and attitudes which in turn would justify an approach to the Argentine Government with a view to entering into negotiations for a Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement.

ACHESON

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Bunker)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 28, 1951.

DEAR ELLSWORTH: I think your letter of December 13 [1] presents us with a lot of problems that deserve considerable thought. In particular, I am concerned over your worry that we should not close the door, or give them the impression that the door is closed, to an improvement of relations between our two countries. In this connection you will be interested in reading the enclosed study [2] of the handling of U.S.-

[1] In his letter, Ambassador Bunker stated in part:

"The overriding impression that I have received during these last few weeks is that there is a desire on the part of Perón to try to improve relations with the United States, and that he also feels that, in view of his handsome victory at the polls (an outstanding example of purity in elections), we should be inclined to take a more favorable, less antagonistic view of his administration." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

[2] Not found with the source text.

Argentine relations in recent years prepared by Louis J. Halle, Jr., who was formerly policy planning adviser in ARA and who is now at the War College. I find that this study is helpful and timely even though I think that in parts it is a little naive in dealing with the formulation of American foreign policy as if it were a task that could be executed without reference to the state of domestic public opinion in this country. However, the thing that struck me most forcefully in reading this paper just after having read your letter was the very penetrating analysis on how two countries can get themselves into an inflexible situation like this. In a sense I cannot help but feel that it would help if I shuffled off the scene since I expressed my views on the Perons when I made the statement that Halle refers to in the *La Prensa* case. However, I am not going to leave (the Secretary only yesterday having insisted that I stay on until the end of the current Presidential term), and it is idle for me to speculate if I would have been better off not having said anything about the *La Prensa* case.

Having agreed with you, however, as to the fact that we should not close the door—and I have done everything in my power to keep good relations with Paz and Remorino and not to let the Aloe–Apold–Colom [3] diatribes suck us into a dog fight—I have to express skepticism as to what is going to come through that door if it is kept open. The reason for my doubts is that I am afraid that what Peron really wants from us is something that is not within our power to give him—because I feel that what is really important to Peron and to his wife to receive from this country is not so much loans or even military equipment but rather something much more intangible and impossible for us to deliver, namely, our official approval of them personally and of their regime coming from both our Government and our press. That is what my talks with Peron really came down to in February 1950 when he talked about "arreglando mi situación con los Estados Unidos" and what is fundamentally, in my opinion, at the root of all of this press campaign against us down there. In this connection, I think that one of Halle's shrewdest observations in the enclosed study is that although Peron attacks us to attract attention to himself he is also particularly eager to be accepted as one of the boys. This bears out precisely the impression I got when I lunched with Peron when I was in Argentina this last February.[4] As he expatiated about the virtues of Eisenhower, Marshall, Bradley and Ridgway,[5] one almost felt that he considered

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[3] Eduardo Colom, a Peronista member of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies; Raúl A. Apold, Sub-Secretary of Information; Carlos Vicente Aloé, Governor-elect of the province of Buenos Aires.

[4] Mr. Miller had met with President Perón in early March.

[5] General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General of the Army George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense until September 12, 1951; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander, Far East Command.

himself as being part of that great group even though only half an hour earlier he had been exculpating himself for Argentina's non-participation in Korea on the ground of internal political expediency.

I do hope that you can come up to Washington at your earliest convenience for a number of reasons; provided that it would not be embarrassing for you to come.

[Here follow personal references.]

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

BOLIVIA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BOLIVIA[1]

Editorial Note

On March 14, 1951, the United States and Bolivia signed at La Paz a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date. A copy of the agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 809, from La Paz, March 14 (824.00–TA/3–1451). For the text of the agreement, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2, p. 671, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 3033. For the Department's press release concerning the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1951, page 501.

[1] For previous documentation concerning United States relations with Bolivia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 744 ff.

824.00/4–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William P. Hudson of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: Bolivian Request for Further Economic Assistance

Participants: Pedro Zilveti Arce, Foreign Minister of Bolivia
Ricardo Martinez Vargas, Ambassador of Bolivia
Jose Romero Loza, Member of Bolivian Delegation to IAM
ARA—Mr. Miller [1]
OSA—Mr. Atwood [2]
OSA—Mr. Hudson

Sr. Zilveti Arce began the conversation by pointing out that Bolivia had cooperated in the "spiritual" aspects of the IAM conference [3]

[1] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
[2] Rollin S. Atwood, Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs.
[3] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, which met at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951; documentation relating to the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.

without getting much in return in the way of satisfaction of her material needs. For the psychological effect in Bolivia he planned to remain in the United States for a week or so after the conclusion of the conference, and he hoped that at the end of that time he would have something to take home to show his people that consideration was being given to Bolivia's economic problems.[4]

He outlined these problems as follows:

(1) *The Banco Minero.* In order to increase tin production and thus increase reserves of foreign exchange needed to finance economic development projects, it was desirable to expand the capital and activities of this Government-owned bank. If the Bank could give more effective assistance to small and medium miners, the bases of production could be broadened, and dependence on the large mining companies could be reduced. The Government was thinking of converting the Bank into a mixed society, with participation by private capital.

(2) *Agricultural Development.* The Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway would soon be completed, but little provision was being made for utilizing the regions to which it would provide access. The whole purpose of the highway would be defeated unless such provision were made.

(3) *Petroleum Production.* Sr. Zilveti Arce felt that Bolivia's oil reserves had a strategic importance because of their location in the heart of the South American continent; Bolivian oil could be supplied to all of Bolivia's neighbors which needed it. He referred to his statement in the April 2 plenary session of IAM* and said that this announcement had been made with the full concurrence of the Bolivian Cabinet. Bolivia's immediate need, he said, was to increase YPFB production sufficiently to operate the new refineries and satisfy domestic requirements.

(4) *Military Needs.* Bolivia proposed to create two Army divisions of war strength (14,800 men each), one for internal security (to protect against sabotage of mining and related installations, put down strikes, etc.) and one for use in the common defense effort either within the Western Hemisphere or outside it. However, the Bolivian Army has for some time been very low on weapons, and would hope that the United States would equip these divisions.

Mr. Miller responded that the Department of State was in many respects only a switchboard operator; its power to assist the Bolivians in attacking their economic problems was limited, since many of the means for doing this rested in the hands of other Government agencies or even of private agencies. As examples he cited the tin price and the

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[4] The Bolivian Government described its economic needs in greater detail in a memorandum dated April 13, 1951, which was delivered to the Department of State on the same date. The original copy of the memorandum could not be located in Department of State files, but a translation is attached to a memorandum dated April 25 (824.00/4–2551).

*["Retaining the autonomous agency which now has charge of the management of this industry, our Government plans to issue dispositions which will liberally open the door to the foreign investor. New recently discovered petroleum horizons make it possible to surpass the most optimistic calculations."] [Footnote in the source text.]

general problem of tin production, the latter of which was to a large degree dependent on private companies.

Mr. Miller spoke at length of United States petroleum policy. The Export–Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development both had policies prohibiting loans to State agencies for petroleum development. He could think of only two or three deviations from this policy, including the case of Bolivia, where the deviation occurred under very special circumstances. Actual practice formed the foundation of this policy: all countries where State agencies were charged with petroleum production were net importers of petroleum products, and all in which production was in private hands were net exporters. He suggested that Guillermo Mariaca, the general manager of YPFB, who is now in the United States trying to solve YPFB's production problem, be sent to look for a private company to operate YPFB.

Mr. Miller recalled having flown over the Santa Cruz region and said that he had personal knowledge both of its potential richness and of the difficulties of exploiting it. We were trying to help overcome these difficulties.

With regard to Bolivia's military problem, Mr. Miller thought that the policy of the Department of Defense was to supply weapons only for specific purposes or operations, but he asked Mr. Atwood to talk with Mr. White [5] (AR), who would talk with our military people about this problem, in preparation for talks with Bolivian representatives. The latter, he felt, should include one civilian.

Concluding his response to Sr. Zilveti's statement, Mr. Miller agreed that discussion of Bolivian economic problems as a unit or "package" should take place, and he asked Mr. Atwood to arrange this. He pointed out that nothing concrete could be expected to emerge promptly, but he felt that some general announcement might be made within the time which Sr. Zilveti had indicated to be desirable.[6]

Ambassador Martinez Vargas brought the discussion back to the petroleum problem, saying that Bolivia very urgently needed a small amount of money (US $3,500,000 if his memory served) in order to do the drilling and repairing of wells required to bring YPFB production up immediately. He pointed out the urgency of this problem in relation to the construction of the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway and the servicing of Eximbank loans. He said that some discussion of an addi-

[5] Ivan B. White, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs.

[6] On April 23, 1951, the Department of State announced the formation of a United States-Bolivian Joint Economic Committee to study economic problems of mutual interest to the two governments. The first round of meetings took place during late April and May, another series began in October. Documents pertaining to the work of the committee are in Department of State decimal files 824.00, 824.00–TA, 824.10, and 824.2553. For the press release announcing the formation of the committee, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1951, p. 748.

tional loan to YPFB had already taken place with Eximbank officials,[7] and that their reaction had been favorable. Such a loan, he contended, would not be a violation of general U.S. petroleum policy because it would be merely an extension of assistance already given to develop Camiri and exploit its production. The new loan would merely be used to complete the original program.

Mr. Miller agreed with this contention and said that the Department of State would not oppose such a new loan on policy grounds.

Speaking of the tin price, Ambassador Martinez Vargas pointed out that previous Bolivian contracts with the RFC had been based on the New York price. Now, however, since RFC was controlling the latter price, Bolivia could not accept a contract based on it.[8]

Mr. Atwood suggested that the Bolivians approach the RFC on the subject again.

Mr. Miller said that he strongly shared the Bolivian hope that the contract could be signed at an early date.

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[7] Reference is to Bolivia's application to the Export–Import Bank for a $3,000,000 credit to finance the cost of machinery, equipment, and services purchased in the United States for drilling additional wells in the Camiri oilfield. In a memorandum dated August 7, 1951, Mr. Jerome J. Stenger, Department of State liaison officer with the Export–Import Bank, stated in part that "ARA is most anxious to have this loan approved to compensate [Bolivia] for the low price of tin", but "the Bank is not convinced that there is enough petroleum to support this extended drilling program." (103–XMB/8–751) Although the loan application remained under consideration by the bank until mid-1952, it was not approved.

[8] A long-term contract for the purchase of tin concentrates by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) which was signed with Bolivian producers in mid-June 1950, terminated on December 31, 1950. At the request of the Bolivian Government, it was extended for an additional 2 months, pending the conclusion of a new long-term contract. Intermittent negotiations between Bolivian representatives and the RFC took place during late February and early March, but disagreement over price prevented early signature of a new contract. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 824.2544.

824.2544/4–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William P. Hudson of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1951.

Subject: Bolivian Request for Political Support for Foreign Minister Zilveti Arce

Participants: Sr. Ricardo Martinez Vargas, Ambassador of Bolivia
Mr. Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary—ARA
Mr. Rollin S. Atwood—OSA
Mr. William P. Hudson—OSA

Ambassador Martinez Vargas first talked with Mr. Atwood and Mr. Hudson, reiterating the political urgency of Bolivia's obtaining

a long-term tin contract with RFC. (See memorandum of conversation with him on April 10.[1])

Mr. Atwood explained that the Department was still doing its best to arrange for a long-term contract, but that the prospects did not appear good.

Such being the case, Ambassador Martinez said that he had concluded it was desirable for the Bolivian producers to sign the short-term contract offered by the RFC,[2] provided the Department of State could at the same time issue a press release referring to the eventual prospect of a long-term contract and to the impending reexamination of Bolivian economic problems. (See memorandum of conversation of April 5 between Assistant Secretary Miller and the Bolivian Foreign Minister.) The Ambassador said that when our statement was issued he would simultaneously release a statement to the effect that the Bolivian Government would take the necessary internal measures to increase the production of strategic materials.

Mr. Atwood expressed the opinion that the Ambassador's proposal could probably be carried out;[3] meanwhile, he said, the Department would continue its efforts to arrange a long-term tin contract.

Emphasizing once more the importance of providing some support for the Foreign Minister upon his return to Bolivia, the Ambassador said that he did not wish to take up the time of Secretary Acheson or President Truman, although he would do so if necessary, but that he did want to explain the situation personally to Mr. Mann.

The meeting having been moved to Mr. Mann's office, the Ambassador repeated what he had told Mr. Atwood and Mr. Hudson and also referred to the conversation which Mr. Miller had had with the Bolivian Foreign Minister on April 5.

Mr. Mann assured the Ambassador that we appreciated what the Bolivian Foreign Minister had done in Washington and what he planned to do upon his return to Bolivia, and that the Department would do what it could about the problems which the Ambassador had presented. Referring to protests in La Paz against the Foreign Minister's statement that Bolivia would supply troops for Korea, Mr. Mann suggested that the Ambassador remind Sr. Zilveti Arce that if

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[1] In that memorandum, which was drafted by Mr. Hudson, Ambassador Martínez Vargas was reported to have stated, in part, "that signature of the tin contract was an absolute political necessity," that a "long-term contract with a clause providing for periodic [price] adjustments might serve the purpose if signed immediately", and that "the tin contract problem must be considered quite apart from the 'package' examination of Bolivia's other problems." (824.2544/4–1051)

[2] On April 23, 1951, Bolivian producers and the RFC signed an interim contract covering deliveries of tin concentrates to the United States government-owned smelter at Texas City, Texas, between March 1 and May 31, with the price based on the average Singapore price of tin for the period from April 10 to May 31, 1951.

[3] The Department issued a press release along the lines desired by Ambassador Martínez Vargas on April 23. For its text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1951, p. 748.

the Bolivians were complaining about spilling their blood for the Yankees, a lot of Yankees were also complaining about American blood already being spilled in Korea for Bolivia and other countries of this hemisphere.

[Here follows an exchange between Mr. Hudson and Ambassador Martínez Vargas concerning the rumored resignation of Foreign Minister Zilveti Arce.]

824.00-TA/4-2751

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs (Atwood) to the Director of That Office (Warren)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1951.

Subject: Considerations Bearing on Further Assistance to Bolivia

The Bolivian request for further financial and technical assistance must be considered in relation to the following factors, among others:

(1) The pattern of Bolivia's present economic development program and our present assistance in that program;
(2) The capacity of the Bolivian economy to service further loans;
(3) Steps which must be taken by the Bolivian Government to complement measures taken by us for the attainment of common objectives;
(4) The relation between additional assistance to Bolivia and the recommendations of a United Nations mission which surveyed the Bolivian economy last year;
(5) Dangers inherent in increasing the resources of Bolivian Governmental agencies.

1. *Present Development Program*

Those aspects of Bolivia's present economic development program which are logical and integrated are based on the report made in 1942 by the Bohan Mission,[2] which had been sent to Bolivia by the United States Government. This Mission recommended, in brief, that Bolivian dependence on mineral exports should be greatly reduced by the development of her agricultural and petroleum resources.

Agricultural and forest production were to be increased particularly in the Santa Cruz area, and to this end a highway was to be constructed between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz and the Bolivian Development Corporation was to undertake the establishment of pilot projects for

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[1] Addressed also to Mr. Merwin L. Bohan, United States Representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and Mr. Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Director of the Office of International Materials Policy. Mr. Warren, Mr. Bohan, and Mr. Brown represented the United States on the recently formed United States-Bolivian Joint Economic Committee. The memorandum was drafted by Mr. Hudson.

[2] For documentation on the United States Economic Mission to Bolivia (popularly known as the Bohan Mission, for the Chief of the Mission, Merwin L. Bohan), see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. v, pp. 592 ff.

the production of meat, rice, sugar, and lumber. The highway has been under construction for several years. The Eximbank has already lent $10,350,000 for this purpose, and has established an additional line of credit of up to $16,000,000. The Bolivian Government has spent about $8,000,000 and is committed to spend an additional $8,000,000 or whatever more may be required to complete the road. Construction should be finished in 1953 or early 1954.

The agricultural projects of the Bolivian Development Corporation have not flourished, largely because insufficient investment has been made, and little private capital is now flowing into Santa Cruz. Unless a substantial investment program is undertaken in the Santa Cruz area promptly, little production potential will have been developed by the time the highway is concluded.

Some technical assistance for development of the Santa Cruz area is being supplied by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It is hoped to increase this aid under the 1952 Point IV program.

The Bolivian petroleum program has consisted principally of increasing crude production at Camiri, building refineries at Cochabamba and Sucre, and constructing a pipeline from Camiri to the refineries. The Eximbank has lent $8,500,000 for this program, and the Bolivians have invested about $14,000,000. They have now applied for a new loan of $3,000,000 for a drilling program to bring Camiri production up sufficiently to supply domestic requirements.

The Bolivian Government has tended to dissipate its very limited developmental resources rather than concentrating them on the integrated program described above. Considerable sums of money are spent annually on the construction of two railroads (La Paz-Beni and Cochabamba-Santa Cruz) which are not at present economically practicable. Large debts to Brazil and Argentina are being incurred for the construction of two other railroads and a highway which are of doubtful immediate economic value. The Bolivians would like to borrow $20,000,000 for immediate investment in irrigation projects in areas outside the Santa Cruz region—although they have insufficient resources to develop the latter region (which does not require irrigation).

For some years to come, minerals production must supply most of the foreign exchange which Bolivia will need to finance her development program. Current high prices and full demand for her minerals afford an opportunity to build up reserves for this purpose. Maximum production of minerals is thus an essential part of her development program, quite aside from the interest which both Bolivia and the United States have in making maximum quantities of strategic materials available for defense use.

Except for one small technical assistance project (which it is hoped to expand under Point IV) we are not now giving Bolivia any assistance in the minerals production aspect of her development program. However, there has recently been considerable exploration of possibilities for such assistance, including loans to producers, long-term contracts, extensive technical assistance, and export priority rating for mining equipment.

2. *Capacity to Service Further Loans*

Such incomplete studies as have been made and such data as are available suggest that Bolivia's middle-term balance of payments prospects are exceedingly gloomy. There is a very serious question as to whether, when the present boom in minerals prices has ended, Bolivia will be able to service even the obligations which she has already incurred or has already committed herself to incur. Careful and professional study of her international payments prospects is therefore needed in connection with consideration of her requests for further loans. Such study might also throw valuable light on the question of the most suitable terms for any additional loans; for example, it might be desirable to schedule amortization of such loans over the short period during which minerals prices may be expected to remain high, and thus force the employment of bonanza earnings in development projects rather than in increased imports.

Aside from the balance of payments question there is also serious doubt about the ability of the Bolivian Government to raise revenues sufficient to cover financing of additional loans.

3. *Complementary Bolivian Measures*

Our defense agencies consider it essential that Bolivian production of tungsten for sale to the United States be sharply increased—an objective which is also in the interest of Bolivia. Various agencies of the United States Government are in position to render substantial assistance toward such an increase, probably including assistance to the Bolivian Government's Banco Minero. The Bolivian Government, however, must modify its exchange controls relating to tungsten in such a way as to make an increase in production profitable and attractive to the private companies which control the most important tungsten properties.

Our defense agencies also require a continuing high level of production of Bolivian tin ores for the Texas City smelter. Such production can be maintained only if the producers can expect a reasonable degree of stability in Bolivian Governmental exchange controls and tax measures. A high level of tin exports is also of course in the interests of Bolivia and of the Bolivian economic development program.

Steps to increase minerals production are the Bolivian measures of greatest immediate interest to the United States. However, there are

many other measures which the Bolivian Government ought ideally to take if United States long-term economic assistance is to be fully effective. In fact, there is some doubt as to whether piecemeal assistance to Bolivia, in the absence of complementary Bolivian efforts at self-help, may not be largely useless and actually harmful in the sense of increasing a debt burden which Bolivia will not be able to carry unless she undertakes certain reforms. If the Committee plans to give serious consideration to the desirability of advocating further large loans to Bolivia, it may also wish to study the possibility of persuading the Bolivians to adopt some or all of the needed reforms. Examples of measures which the Bolivian Government should take are as follows:

(*a*) Tax reform, including some immediate measures to effect substantial increases in revenues;

(*b*) Reform of other aspects of the fiscal system, including its administration;

(*c*) An effective campaign against inflation, including the above and other measures;

(*d*) An effective program to build up foreign exchange reserves during the present bonanza period;

(*e*) Progress, in consultation with the International Monetary Fund, toward reform of the exchange rate system;

(*f*) Concentration of resources on an integrated and practicable economic development program;

(*g*) Perhaps an attempt to settle the basically important conflict between the Government and private minerals exporters over the foreign exchange needs of the latter through a thorough investigation by a foreign accounting firm acceptable to the two parties.

4. *The United Nations Problem*

In 1950, at the invitation of the Bolivian Government, a technical mission of the United Nations surveyed the Bolivian economy and prepared a report recommending a program of action which it felt offered the only possible solution for Bolivia's basic economic problems. In anticipation that it might be "necessary . . . to force Bolivian compliance with the details of the program," Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, the chief of the U.N. mission, called at the Department twice during the fall of 1950. On his first visit he expressed the hope "that the United States will make it clear to Bolivia that it cannot back out of the perhaps onerous reforms needed and trust the United States to come to its assistance again." Assistant Secretary Miller told him that "provided the UN program was in harmony with US objectives and policies and met with our approval, we would make it most clear to Bolivia that we would not continue 'handouts' if it decided the recommended reforms were too unpalatable." On his second visit Dr. Keenleyside hinted at a hope that "the State Department would not undermine the work of the mission by offering to solve Bolivia's problems for them if they do not accept the report." Assistant Secretary Miller replied that "we had no intention of doing so."

5. *Dangers in Assistance to Bolivian Government Agencies*

In requesting financial assistance the Bolivians are apparently thinking exclusively of loans to Bolivian Government agencies. Some consideration must be given to three dangers inherent in such loans.

First there is the question of the efficiency of Bolivian Government agencies as opposed to private companies which would invest their own capital along with United States loans. Other things being equal, the records of such Bolivian agencies as YPFB, the Bancos Minero and Agricola, and the Bolivian Development Corporation indicate that private companies would be more efficient.

Second there is the question of conflict between such loans and our general policy of favoring private enterprise. There exists in Bolivia today a strong tendency toward excessive State control of the means of production. In the absence of other overruling considerations we of course do not wish to encourage this tendency.

Finally, it must be realized that Bolivian domestic private capital would probably flow into privately-controlled enterprises which had the promise of loans from us, whereas there is little possibility of substantial private capital participation in enterprises controlled by Bolivian Government agencies. This is an important consideration because the presently untapped resources of Bolivian private capital are vitally needed in the economic development program. Some foreign private capital might also participate in projects controlled by private enterprise.

For various reasons the foregoing considerations concerning private capital do not apply very strongly in the case of the pending YPFB loan application, but they are particularly pertinent to the problem of the best method of financing food-processing projects like sugar and rice mills.

611.24/6–151

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 30, 1951.

Subject: Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Bolivia

In the Bolivian Presidential election of May 6 the Administration candidate [1] came in second in a field of six, and the largest number of votes (43%) was obtained by an opposite party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR),[2] which had a long record of undemocratic practices and principles and which was supported by Bolivia's

[1] Gabriel Gosálvez.

[2] The MNR's candidate was Victor Paz Estenssoro, who was then in political exile.

small Communist party. The vote for the MNR was not sufficient for outright victory under the Bolivian Constitution, but that party declared its intention to seize power by force if denied it by Constitutional procedures for resolving such electoral deadlocks.[3]

On May 15–16 the Constitutional President of Bolivia [4] voluntarily resigned and turned his power over to the Bolivian Army, which designated a Junta of Army officers [5] to assume the executive functions of the government. The President stated that he had taken this step to preserve democracy in Bolivia from those who would have made a mockery of it (by which he meant the MNR). The Junta announced that it would seek to keep the peace in Bolivia and preserve her democratic institutions, and it promised that its stay in power would be brief.

From appearances to date the Junta has met the criteria which the United States has applied in other recent cases involving the recognition of Latin American governments which have come to power through irregular procedures. It has established its authority over Bolivian territory, with the substantial acquiescence of the people, it has declared its intent to honor Bolivia's international obligations, and its assumption of power has not been due to any external influences. A resumption of US-Bolivian diplomatic relations would therefore be consistent with our policy, and I believe that it is desirable from the viewpoint of our national interests.

It will be important to time our action so that we shall not be among the last Western Hemisphere countries to resume relations. The Junta has already been recognized by Colombia, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Mexico, and Spain. Brazilian recognition is expected soon. In conformance with recent practice it is planned to give the other American republics and certain European countries advance notice of our intentions, and it is believed that most of those which have not recognized the new Junta by the time we do so will shortly follow our example.

Inasmuch as timing is an important factor, I recommend that you authorize me to announce resumption of relations with Bolivia at such early date as may be appropriate.[6]

DEAN ACHESON

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[3] Under the Bolivian constitution, in order to become president a candidate had to win a majority of the votes cast in the presidential election. If no candidate received the required majority, the constitution provided for the selection of a president by the Bolivian congress from among those candidates receiving the highest percentages of the vote.

[4] Mamerto Urriolagoitia.

[5] General Hugo Ballivián assumed leadership of the Junta.

[6] Marginal notation on source text: "Approved 6/1/51 Harry S. Truman." As reported in despatch 1010, from La Paz, June 7, the United States officially resumed diplomatic relations with the government of Bolivia on June 7, 1951 (611.24/6–751).

824.2544/6–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1951.

Subject: Problem of Bolivian Tin Prices

Participants: W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, National Security Resources Board [1]
ARA: OSA—Mr. Warren [2]
ARA: OSA—Mr. Atwood
ARA—Mr. Mann

Mr. Mann opened the conversation by stating that he, Ambassador Warren and Mr. Atwood were all from the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and that their interest in the problem of tin prices was limited to its Bolivian aspects. Mr. Mann said that it appeared to the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs that Mr. Symington had done a very good thing in bringing down tin prices from the abnormally high levels which they had reached; [3] that there was no desire on the part of the Bureau to interfere with Mr. Symington's program but rather to cooperate with it; and that one purpose of the visit was to explain the situation which exists in Bolivia.

Mr. Mann then referred to the fact that Bolivia is a one-economy country with the Government dependent upon the mining industry, and particularly the tin industry, for a very large part of its tax revenues and virtually all of its foreign exchange. He recalled the income of the average Bolivian is about one-fortieth of the income of the average U.S. citizen and there abounds in Bolivia not only economic misery but social strife which makes Bolivia one of the most unstable countries in the hemisphere both politically and economically. Reference was also made to recent political developments, including the role of Paz Estenssoro and the recent elections.

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[1] Mr. Symington was appointed Administrator of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on May 7, 1951.

[2] Fletcher Warren, Director, Office of South American Affairs.

[3] A sharp increase in the worldwide demand for tin after the outbreak of the Korean conflict in late June 1950, had driven the price of that metal upward until it had reached an all-time high of almost $2.00 per pound in February 1951. The following month, in an effort to reduce the world market price of tin, the United States Government initiated a program which included the temporary suspension of all purchases for the tin stockpile, prohibition of the private importation of tin, and the designation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as the sole importer and seller of tin in the United States. Thereafter, the RFC steadily lowered its selling price, and partly as a result of this policy the world market price of tin declined. Although government restrictions relative to the purchase of tin affected only tin metal, the RFC had to purchase tin concentrates in order to keep the government-owned smelter in Texas operating. Documents pertaining to the international tin question are in several decimal files, principally 398.2544 and 811.2544. For further information on this subject, see U.S. Senate, Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, *Tin 1951*, Sixth Report, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

Mr. Mann then said that the sudden decline in the price of tin and the cessation of the U.S. purchasing program threatened to bring about a crisis in Bolivia and that this threat was of concern to the Department for the following reasons:

a) A principal aim of our foreign programs is to build up strength rather than weakness in the free world. In Bolivia we have accordingly helped through loans in the building of the Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway which will connect the highlands with the potentially productive lowlands. This will make it possible to develop agriculturally the lowlands and to transport food to the centers of population in the highlands. If the mining industry operations should be greatly reduced, this would prejudice the efforts being made to promote stability and create a situation which could be exploited by anti-United States elements.

b) Some of the Bolivian tin mines are marginal and others are not. If the price of tin should drop below a certain point, marginal mines would cease to produce and the total amount of production of tin would thus be decreased. This is related to our procurement of tin as a strategic material since the ores which the U.S. buys for smelting at Texas City are low-grade ores.

c) Nationalization of the mining industry in Bolivia is a continuing possibility and an economic collapse in that country might lead to nationalization or other radical steps which, if they occurred, would set an undesirable precedent in other Latin American countries where we are trying to keep business in private rather than government hands.

d) The Latin Americans have a common bond in their belief that they are exploited as "economic colonies" through procurement by industrial powers of their raw materials at what the Latinos consider to be unfair prices. There is, therefore, a risk that other Latin American countries may side with Bolivia in the event a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached, to the detriment of our ability to procure strategic materials on a fair basis throughout the hemisphere. We would be particularly vulnerable in respect of the price of tin since we do not have a world price established under normal competitive conditions but rather a situation where the U.K. and the U.S. are such large consumers and buyers of tin that they have the power to fix prices by their buying and selling programs.

Mr. Mann then stated that he was not prepared to say what a fair price would be for Bolivian tin and that in as much as there appeared to be no possibility of an early agreement between the Bolivian Government and the RFC on the price question, it might be well to send to Bolivia representatives of both the RFC and the Department to make an on-the-ground assessment of the situation and to obtain data which would enable the RFC and the Department to come to a precise judgment. Such a mission could serve as a means of consulting with the Bolivians in accordance with our commitments and, by indicating an interest on the part of our Government in reaching a solution of the impasse, might serve as a convenient stopgap pending the reaching of

a mutually satisfactory agreement. (The Interior Department already has an official in Bolivia who could participate in the study.)

Mr. Symington indicated his agreement with this suggestion [4] and explained that he had already made an offer to the Bolivians—which the Bolivian Ambassador refused to transmit to his Government—of a $1.03 price. He explained that the price of $1.83 was abnormally high and a result of cartel-type practices on the part of the principal producers of Bolivian tin and their counterparts in other tin-producing countries. He explained he considered it his duty to bring the price down to a fair level and, in this connection, that he considered the price of $1.03 to be fair since it represented a 30 percent increase over the price of 75 cents which prevailed shortly before the outbreak of the Korean war. He stated that while he recognized that the cost of producing a portion of the Bolivian tin from the marginal-type mines was higher than it was in other countries, he thought the question of preventing a collapse of the Bolivian economy should be met by grants from Congress if they were needed rather than by subsidizing the economy through artifically high tin prices. In this connection, he explained that in his view the American taxpayer was already very heavily burdened and that neither the taxpayer nor the American Congress could be expected to tolerate waste.

Mr. Mann expressed agreement with these statements in principle and observed that it was, however, not in our overall national interest to permit the price of tin to drop below a certain point. He said that he hoped the data which would be obtained by the survey team would serve to indicate what this point was.

Mr. Mann then inquired whether, as a stopgap measure pending the completion of the survey and a final decision on the price question, it would be feasible from the RFC standpoint to sign an open-end contract with Bolivia for the purchase of tin at the current Singapore price of $1.11. This contract could be subject to termination on short notice by either party. In the alternative, would it be feasible from the RFC point of view to enter into a short-term contract of say two months explaining publicly at the same time that the contract was devised to enable Bolivia to resume sales of tin ores and concentrates to the U.S. pending the report of the survey mission? In both of these cases the price to be paid for Bolivian tin would drop as the Singapore price declined. As another alternative, would it be possible from the RFC standpoint to resume tin purchases at the Singapore price without a contract?

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[4] A joint mission representing the State Department, Interior Department, and the RFC was formed shortly thereafter. Its members spent the last week of June and the first week of July in Bolivia gathering information about tin production costs and their relationship to the Bolivian economy. Pertinent documents are in decmial files 103–RFC and 824.2544.

Mr. Symington indicated that all of these alternatives would impede the program to drive the price of tin down still farther. He added that if the price should drop below the $1.03 figure offered to the Bolivians, it would be very difficult to repeat the offer.

In the course of the conversation Mr. Symington indicated that he did not believe it would be in our interests to pay a different price for Bolivian tin than is paid for tin from other producing countries and he also indicated that his plan was to make separate contracts with each country which might or might not maintain a uniform price level.

398.00-TA/6-2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William P. Hudson of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1951.

Subject: Departmental Policy on Recommendations of United Nations Technical Mission [1]

Participants: Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, Director General of UN Technical Assistance Administration
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs
Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Administrator of TCA
Assistant Secretary Miller—ARA
Miss Eleanor Dennison—UNE
Mr. Benjamin Hardy—TCA
Mr. William P. Hudson—OSA

Referring to a letter [2] in which Dr. Keeneyside had asked for a meeting to exchange views about technical assistance to Bolivia, with particular regard to the report of the United Nations technical mission,[3] Mr. Hickerson said that the Department agreed with many of the recommendations of the Keenleyside mission but that, as Dr. Keenleyside had himself realized, the Department could not give any blanket endorsement to them. In fact, while the Department would certainly not oppose Bolivian acceptance of the mission's recommendations, it could not put any pressure on the Bolivians to accept them. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Hickerson said, felt that the proposal to place UN administrative assistants in Bolivian Gov-

[1] A position paper on this subject, dated June 25, 1951, drafted by Mr. Hudson in preparation for the meeting which is reported in the instant memorandum, is attached to a memorandum by Mr. Hudson to Mr. Miller, dated June 25, 1951, not printed (365.4/6-2251).

[2] Not printed.

[3] For the mission's report, see United Nations, *Report of the Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia* (New York, 1951).

ernment Ministries was particularly significant, and he wondered if Dr. Keenleyside would elaborate on this aspect of the mission's plan.

Dr. Keenleyside said that every effort had been made to work out the administrative assistance aspect of the UN plan in a way which would make it fully acceptable to Bolivia. The plan called for placing one UN technical expert in each Ministry at the Under Secretary (*Oficial Mayor*) level. This officer would work with the Bolivian Under Secretary of that Ministry and with the Minister himself within a framework of action and policy outlined in advance in the contract between the United Nations and Bolivia. The UN expert would not receive orders from the United Nations or even be in communication with the United Nations under ordinary circumstances except once a year, when an annual report would be made to the UN. However, if the UN expert felt that any case of disagreement between himself and his Bolivian colleagues involved a breach of the original contract, he could refer the case to the chief of the UN party in Bolivia, who would be known as the Coordinator and would be a special assistant to the President. (Although Dr. Keenleyside did not further elaborate on this point, it is understood that such cases, if not settled by the Coordinator and the President, would be referred to the United Nations, which might then terminate the contract with Bolivia if it saw fit.) The salaries of the UN experts would be paid in part by Bolivia and in part indirectly by the United Nations, which would supply the Bolivian Government with foreign currency for this purpose. Asked about the nationalities of the UN experts, Dr. Keenleyside replied that they would be picked from various countries but that the Coordinator would not be American, British, or Canadian, nor could he be a citizen of any country bordering on Bolivia; he would probably be a Scandinavian.

The proposal regarding administrative assistance, Dr. Keenleyside said, was the keystone of the program recommended by the UN technical mission. He felt that this program offered the only possible solution for Bolivia's difficulties, and said that he hoped to receive United States support in his attempts to persuade the Bolivians to accept the program. Mr. Hickerson reiterated that the United States must remain neutral on this issue.

Dr. Keenleyside then asked whether the United States would continue to bail Bolivia out of her recurrent crises by large loans. Mr. Miller replied that the United States had never done this, but that in any event the United States would not apply economic sanctions to make the Bolivians accept the recommendations of the Keenleyside mission.

Dr. Keenleyside then took up the question of technical assistance, stating that he was concerned lest a major expansion in the U.S. Point IV program might not be seized upon by the Bolivians as an excuse

for rejecting the less palatable but more fundamental program proposed by the United Nations. Dr. Bennett and others assured him that the United States would continue to try to make its technical assistance program fit so far as possible into the recommendations of the Keenleyside mission.

Mr. Miller made it clear to Dr. Keenleyside that the United States would not use either financial or technical assistance to Bolivia in such a way as to impede Bolivian acceptance of the UN recommendations.

Dr. Keenleyside said that he understood that Ambassador Florman had told the Bolivian Government in effect that Bolivia did not need to worry about the recommendations of the UN mission because the United States would take care of Bolivia. Mr. Miller expressed surprise at this statement, but said that he would write a letter [4] to the Embassy to make it quite clear that Embassy officials should in no way oppose Bolivian acceptance of the UN recommendations.[5]

[Here follow remarks by Dr. Keenleyside concerning the current status of negotiations between the UN and Bolivia.]

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[4] No copy of Mr. Miller's letter could be found in the Department of State files. However, a letter to Mr. Miller dated July 6, 1951, from the Chargé in Bolivia (Maleady), reads in part as follows:

"You may be assured that, as directed in your letter of June 29th, officers of the Embassy will be instructed to maintain strict neutrality on the question of whether the Bolivian Government should accept the recommendations of the UN Technical Mission." (398.00/7–651)

[5] On October 1, 1951, the Bolivian Government signed an agreement with the United Nations providing for the implementation of the technical assistance recommendations of the so-called "Keenleyside report."

824.2544/7–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of International Materials Policy (Brown)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1951.

Subject: Bolivian Tin Situation

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Symington, Administrator, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Mr. McKinnon and Mr. Allen—RFC
ARA—Mr. Miller
OMP—Mr. Brown

Mr. Symington said he wished to discuss the Bolivian tin situation with me, as the mission which had been sent down to Bolivia reported rather explosive conditions there and he wished to cooperate with the Department in every way.

Mr. Symington then reviewed the history of tin prices since Korea and said that the increase in price had been very costly to the American taxpayer. He said he felt the problem of buying tin and the problem of preserving the Bolivian economy ought to be treated separately, although he realized that there was a real political problem and would be prepared to cooperate as much as he could.

Mr. Symington said that if the State Department would tell him what price it thought he ought to pay to Bolivia to get things moving, he would pay it.

Mr. Symington said that the mission's proposal had been suggested by Mr. Atwood, and Mr. Weaver had felt it should be supported.[1] Mr. Symington felt, however, that there was a technical obstacle in that the waiver of smelting charges would result in larger quantities of low-grade ore coming to the smelter, which would mean the smelter would operate at a loss.

I said I agreed that we could not determine tin prices just on political considerations, but we could not ignore political considerations either. My desire was to get something moving. I asked whether some middle ground could not be found between the proposal of the mission and the proposal of $1.03, with retroactive adjustment based on the results of the current cost study, which had been Mr. Symington's offer to the Bolivian Ambassador. Mr. McKinnon said that the mission's proposal would have the effect of a price of about $1.20, that being the average smelting charge on Bolivian ores. Mr. Brown said that mathematically the mid-point between $1.20 and $1.03 would be about $1.12. Mr. Symington said he would buy that price and would make the Bolivian Ambassador an offer based on it right away. He said that the Johnson Committee[2] was of the opinion that $1.10 might be about the right price for Bolivian tin.

Mr. Symington said he was very anxious to get away from the Singapore price, which he believed to be a manipulated price. Mr. Brown stated that the Department also saw merit in making a contract at a definite price rather than a contract tied to a market price.

Mr. Miller said he thought the Bolivian Ambassador might be willing to consider $1.12 and that he had pressed the Ambassador not to adopt an arbitrary and adamant attitude.

Mr. Symington then said he would call the Bolivian Ambassador at once and make him an offer of a contract at $1.12, with the price to be adjusted retroactively based upon the results of the cost study. He asked whether the Department would have any objection if he speci-

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[1] The joint State Department–Interior Department–RFC mission recommended that the Bolivians be offered an interim contract at the price of $1.03 and that smelting charges be waived, which would have had the effect of raising the net price offered for Bolivian tin concentrates to $1.20 per pound.

[2] Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Lyndon B. Johnson was Chairman of the subcommittee, which was popularly known as the Johnson Committee.

fied that the adjustment should be either up or down. Mr. Miller said he was confident that it would not come out as a downward adjustment, but he saw no reason for not trying that out on the Ambassador.

824.2544/7–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William P. Hudson of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1951.

Subject: RFC Tin Contract Offer

Participants: Sr. Ricardo Martinez Vargas, Ambassador of Bolivia
OSA—Mr. Warren
OSA—Mr. Krieg [1]
OSA—Mr. Hudson

Ambassador Warren said that the officers of the Department had been glad to hear yesterday the good news that the RFC had made a new tin contract offer to Bolivia. He would like to hear from the Ambassador the full details of this offer.

Mr. Symington had informed him, Ambassador Martinez said, that he realized that a price of $1.03 per pound was too low for the high-cost Bolivian producers. In order to save time while necessary further consideration was being given to the question of a price which would be fair to both parties, Mr. Symington had proposed the immediate signing of a contract on the following terms. Bolivia would receive a price of $1.12 per pound pending further negotiation of the price question on the basis of the study now being made by the RFC. If a different price were later mutually agreed upon it would be applied retroactively to cover all shipments previously made under the contract. The period of the contract would be June 1, 1951 through May 31, 1952. This one-year contract would be extended for an additional year at a price to be determined by further study at the appropriate time. Ambassador Martinez had inquired whether the price would be related to the export prices of United States goods. Mr. Symington had replied that this was too complicated a question to be discussed at present. Mr. Symington had told him that he was aware of Bolivia's need for assistance but that such assistance did not fall within his jurisdiction.

[Here follows an exchange concerning the possibility of an increase in the production of Bolivian tungsten.]

Mr. Warren said that the Department of State would of course continue to think hard and sympathetically about Bolivian problems. However, the United States also had an obligation to try to relate its

[1] William L. Krieg, Officer in Charge, North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs.

evaluation of Bolivian problems to United States aims throughout the world. At this moment the United States was thinking in the broadest terms of its history. It was under attack throughout the world in defense of ideals common to the western hemisphere. Recognizing the special difficulties in Bolivia, the highest officers of the American Government had studied the Bolivian tin problem and had formulated the RFC offer in the light of world-wide U.S. obligations. The Department realized that the Bolivians did not find the offer completely satisfactory, but the Department considered it generous under all the circumstances, especially as it evidenced willingness on the part of the United States to continue studying the problem. Mr. Warren hoped that Ambassador Martinez would point out to his Government that the contract offered by RFC represented a beginning and would recommend that his Government make the best of the present difficult situation by accepting the offer.

Ambassador Martinez said that he had already pointed out to his Government that the offer was of a provisional nature and designed to serve as a stopgap in the present emergency. In his cable transmitting the offer, he had reported that Assistant Secretary Miller had told him that he thought it was worthy of very serious consideration. He was afraid, however, that the Government and the Bolivian producers might not feel that the offer was sufficient even as a stopgap measure, since the $1.12 price would not cover the costs of many Bolivian producers.

Mr. Warren inquired what measures the Bolivian Government might take to make the $1.12 tin price economically feasible to the high-cost producers. The RFC offer at that price had been made, he said, after the very highest officials of the United States Government had given considerable time and thought to determining the maximum degree of assistance which the United States could give to Bolivia under the present circumstances. The price arrived at was about halfway between what the RFC wanted and what conservative tin interests in Bolivia considered an acceptable minimum. The offer made by the RFC afforded the possibility of a later price readjustment on the basis of further sympathetic consideration. While he realized that the $1.12 price was not fully satisfactory to the Bolivians, he wondered whether the Bolivian Government might not take steps to make this price practicable in the interim until full consideration could be given to the possibility of a readjustment. [Ambassador Martinez made a special note of this idea.] [2]

Ambassador Martinez estimated that the United States must require 100,000 tons of tin a year, including its stockpile acquisitions. Since Bolivia provides only 18,000 to 20,000 tons of this total, a price increase would not amount to much if applied to Bolivian tin alone, but would

[2] Brackets in the source text.

be costly if it had to be applied to all United States imports of tin. He thus felt that, in view of Bolivia's position as the only western hemisphere producer, Bolivia should receive preferential price treatment.

Ambassador Martinez was not sure what his Government might be able to do for the high-cost producers, although he supposed it might give them relief through differential exchange rates. He wondered if the Departmental officials had any suggestions.

Mr. Warren replied that he had nothing specific in mind; he was convinced, however, that the Bolivian Government must do something because the offer made by RFC represented the farthest point to which the United States could go at this time.

824.2544/11-251

Position Paper Prepared by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of International Materials Policy (Evans)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1951.

DEPARTMENT POSITION ON BOLIVIAN TIN NEGOTIATIONS

PROBLEM

Mr. Symington has asked Mr. Webb [1] whether the Department believes the United States should subsidize the Bolivian economy through the price of tin. Mr. Webb, of course, replied that the answer to the question in that form is "no", but that the question as asked did not bring out the complicated nature of the problem.[2] The Department, therefore, should formulate any views on the subject of these negotiations for Mr. Webb to give to Mr. Symington.

RECOMMENDATION

That Mr. Webb make the following points:

1. The United States Government should not subsidize the Bolivian economy through the price of tin. If a commercial price for tin should not be sufficient to maintain Bolivia's economy, and aid from the United States should be desirable, such aid should be labeled as such and should not be based on funds provided by Congress for a different purpose.

2. By a commercial price we mean a price at which the Bolivians can be induced to sell and we are willing to buy because of our own

[1] James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State.

[2] Mr. Symington had raised this question in a conversation with Mr. Webb at the Department on October 25, 1951. The exchange between them was recorded in a memorandum of that date, by Mr. Winthrop G. Brown (824.2544/10-2551).

needs. The United States needs Bolivia's tin ore and Bolivia needs our dollars. Under these circumstances, it should be possible for the two parties to reach agreement with no thought of subsidy.

On the other hand, we must consider the fact that Bolivia is almost entirely dependent upon the sale of tin. Our relations with Bolivia and the other countries of the hemisphere would be seriously damaged if through arbitrary action on the part of the United States Government we were to deprive Bolivia of a market for their exports. So long as the United States Government is prohibiting the private importation of tin and thereby affecting an important section of the total world demand there is a danger that this might happen. Therefore, if agreement cannot be reached with Bolivia on a reasonable basis by US Government negotiators it may be necessary to consider some other way of permitting US civilian demand to become effective.

3. The price the United States should pay should take into consideration not only our current needs but the price which will maintain a level of production in Bolivia corresponding to our future requirements. The cost study is helpful here. It cannot, however, be the sole determinant of a price acceptable to both sides and should be considered in the light of normal commercial practice.

We understand that the RFC in its negotiations with the Bolivians has argued that the price should be based on the average cost of production in Bolivia. In order to keep the mines operating on this basis it would be necessary for the Bolivian Government to control all tin revenues and to distribute them to individual producers so that the cost of each would be met. This is a very dangerous proposal to make to a foreign government. The United States is engaged in trying to protect the interests of American investors in underdeveloped countries against the strong desire of those countries to expropriate and nationalize. If other countries were to learn that the United States Government were proposing such action in the case of Bolivia it would be very difficult for us to protect the American owners of low cost mining properties in other countries. It would be an open invitation to the Chilean Government, for example, to redistribute to locally owned copper mines the profits of Anaconda and Kennecott.

If the RFC cost study shows that the production of some Bolivian mines would have to cease at the price the RFC is willing to pay it of course has the right to reduce the quantity it is prepared to buy, but it should not suggest to the Bolivian Government the confiscation and redistribution by it of the earnings of the lower cost mines.

4. The State Department does not know whether the increase in Bolivian taxes is justified or whether that increase has been greater than the increase in taxes in the United States. We should recognize however that the fact that the Bolivian Government can alter costs through tax action reduces the value of cost as a basis for determining the price we are prepared to pay. We should make this clear to the Bolivians.

5. In commenting on the suggestion that we should draw on the stockpile, we should make it clear that we are assuming the maintenance of the present stockpile objective. Any decision to reduce the amount of tin in the stockpile should be based on a change in the objective which in turn should be based on a study of the security im-

plications. We should firmly oppose any other withdrawal from the stockpile on the following grounds:

(*a*) To do so would be a perversion of the purpose of the stockpile. It is designed to protect our security. It is not designed as a price manipulating instrument.

(*b*) Even if we should so use it, we should not start drawing from the stockpile unless we are prepared to continue doing so for some time. Otherwise, it would be too easy to call our bluff.

(*c*) The political situation in the Far East is so serious that we cannot rely on continued supplies and should not materially reduce our stockpile, which is only two thirds full. On the contrary, we should be building it up.

(*d*) Such action would slow down our whole stockpile program by making producers less willing to produce extra amounts for it, since their fears that we will use the stockpile as a commercial weapon against them will be confirmed.

DISCUSSION

The following additional comments relate to the specific recommendations given above.

Recommendation 2. Some amplification of the statement that the United States would have some responsibility if Bolivia should not sell her ore may be needed. It is true that the government monopoly of tin purchases does not directly affect Bolivia's ability to sell ore to other than the Texas City smelter, as American private buyers do not purchase ore. However by keeping American private buyers out of the market for tin metal we have reduced the effective world demand for tin. This in turn reduces Bolivia's chance of selling ore to European smelters.

Mr. Symington has suggested that he may obtain the ore he needs from Indonesia and thus be independent of Bolivian ores for the smelter. We do not believe he is likely to succeed. He now obtains approximately half the Indonesian production for the smelter. To replace the Bolivian ores for the smelter he would need to purchase virtually the entire Indonesian production. If he were to try to do this he would probably find himself competing at a high price level with the Dutch smelters that are dependent on Indonesian ore. However if this estimate should be wrong and Mr. Symington should contract for Indonesian ores and then refuse to purchase from Bolivia on the ground that his requirements were met, the position suggested above would permit the Department to insist that the United States civilian demand for tin be filled, possibly by a resumption of commercial imports. This would increase Bolivia's opportunity to sell her ore somewhere.

Recommendation 3. The RFC proposal to average costs does not, of course, accord with the normal method of determining price in a capitalist economy. Our objection to this proposal, even under conditions of emergency controls, is not inconsistent with our suggestion

that premium prices might be paid for the production of individual mines, as was done during World War II. Under our domestic premium price plan there was no averaging of all costs. A basic price was established and a premium price paid only to those high cost producers whom the United States Government decided should be subsidized. A similar system was used by us abroad, and premium prices were paid to certain higher cost producers in order to obtain the additional production. These determinations, however, were made by the United States Government.

Recommendation 5. We understand from the Munitions Board that they are opposed either to withdrawal of tin from the stockpile or a lowering of the stockpile objective. The arguments in this recommendation, of course, stand on their own feet even if the stockpile objective should be lowered, but our present appraisal is that such a reduction is unlikely.

824.2544/11–951

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Chargé in Bolivia (Maleady)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 9, 1951.

OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

DEAR TOM: I have read with interest your letter to Bill Hudson of October 29, 1951 regarding Bolivia's reaction on the tin contract.[1] I sympathize fully with your position on this matter and feel that I owe you some personal explanation of our role (or lack thereof) in these negotiations.

After the installation of the Military Junta last August, the Department was so concerned over the situation in Bolivia that at the risk of incurring severe congressional criticism, we intervened with the RFC and Secretary Acheson himself personally pulled out of the air the figure of $1.12 for an interim contract. The reason for doing this was that we wanted to find some temporary break in the impasse with which we were then faced and we were motivated by the apprehensions which had been expressed by various Bolivians that their economy was on the verge of collapse. We were somewhat surprised thereafter when the Bolivians dragged their heels on accepting the offer even on an

[1] In his letter, Mr. Maleady had assessed the degree of Bolivian resentment over the impasse in the negotiations for a long-term tin contract. He had stated that he could not "stress too greatly how badly people feel here," and he had noted his concern that the situation might generate undesirable political repercussions (824.2544/10–2951).

interim basis [2] and especially when Ormachea [3] told me in October that they had accepted the offer as a favor to the United States.

The discussions between the Bolivians and the RFC were resumed in December [4] during the pendency of the interim contract and the Department felt that it should not get in between the Bolivian negotiators (who, after all, have been representatives of private producing interests) and the RFC. At least we felt that a bona fide effort should be made on both sides to reach an agreement on economic grounds without injecting political considerations into the discussions. I felt it important that we be scrupulous about this, not only because of the tendency of the RFC to engage in demagogic maneuvers against us with Senator Johnson,[5] but because I was seriously alarmed when both Guachalla [6] and Ormachea called on me after their arrival here and asked me virtually the same question, namely, what would the State Department do for Bolivia if the RFC did not treat them justly. I felt it important from the outset to make it clear that the Department was not going to act as advocate for Bolivia and I hoped by making our position clear at the outset to make the Bolivians negotiate in good faith. I also felt it important that we discourage any idea on the part of the Bolivians that they could play us off against the RFC regardless of what action we might take vis-à-vis the RFC, if and when the time would come for us to take a position.

Two months have passed and there is no progress to date. I agree with you that the RFC has acted as if there were only commercial considerations involved and with little, if any, regard for the sensibilities of the Bolivians or for the strategic considerations involved. On the other hand, the Bolivian producers have not been helpful either in sticking to the impossible figure of $1.50 or intending to fight Symington through the press.[7]

Nevertheless, I have now reached the conclusion that it would be best for the Department to try to cut through this new impasse.[8] Yes-

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[2] On September 5, 1951, a 30-day interim contract between Bolivian tin producers and the RFC was signed, providing for the payment of $1.12 per pound for tin concentrates, with smelter charges as specified in the 1950 contract.

[3] Hector Ormachea Zalles, Bolivian Special Ambassador to the United States.

[4] These discussions had been resumed on September 24, and suspended on October 25, 1951 (824.2544/10–2951).

[5] Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman of the Johnson Committee.

[6] Luis Fernando Guachalla, Bolivian Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States.

[7] In a memorandum dated October 23, 1951, Mr. Brown stated, in part, that the Bolivians "are in no hurry [to sign a tin contract] since they are shipping their tin to [other] ports and getting substantial loans on it." (824.2544/10–2351)

[8] In a memorandum dated November 2, 1951, Mr. Hudson stated, in part: "We have been assuming in ARA that the deadlock in the Bolivian tin negotiations would be broken soon by the approaching exhaustion of our supplies of tin for commercial consumption, which will occur within two or three months. However, E is now certain that the RFC is counting on being able to go into the tin stockpile to take care of commercial requirements." (711.6/11–251)

terday at the Under Secretary's meeting[9] I raised with Webb and Thorp[10] the desirability of our making a move, and we all agreed that it would be bad if we should do it as the State Department alone in view of our greater vulnerability. Mr. Webb and Thorp thought the time had come for us to take some action and Mr. Thorp was requested to approach Defense and Agriculture as well as Interior for the purpose of trying to come to a governmental position on what would be a fair solution to the present tin dilemma. It is not an easy case at all and Mr. Symington is perfectly right in his contention that we simply cannot accept the right of Bolivia to impose a constant series of new taxes on the tin industry and to require us to treat those taxes as legitimate cost items. This is the point on which the Bolivians have been least successful in their discussions.

I do not know where we will end up on this or what the time element may be. One ray of hope is that in a telephone conversation Monday Mr. Symington volunteered that he would be willing to "shade the price" of $1.12 with the possibility of some escalator feature, provided, however, that we give him a directive. Now perhaps some such idea may form the basis for the discussions which Mr. Thorp is to have.

In any case we will keep you informed of developments and keep up the great work you have been doing in a tough situation. We all have you in mind constantly and you have our complete confidence.[11]

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

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[9] The Under Secretary's meeting met weekly; it was customarily attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and office directors. The meetings were held at the Department of State, and Under Secretary of State Webb presided. A copy of the minutes of the meeting referred to by Mr. Miller, held November 7, 1951, is in Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250.

[10] Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

[11] Despite the efforts of the Department, which included bringing the Bolivian tin situation to the attention of President Truman and opposing any use of the tin stockpile as an economic weapon in tin negotiations, no agreement on a long-term tin contract between the Bolivians and the RFC proved possible during 1951 or 1952. Pertinent documents are in decimal files 398.2544, 711.63, and 824.2544.

611.24/12–1951

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1951.

BOLIVIA

A. OBJECTIVES

The basic immediate objectives of the United States in Bolivia are: (1) to promote sufficient economic and political stability to prevent that country from becoming the subject of penetration by its neigh-

bors, a focal point of international rivalry, or the victim of communist inroads which would constitute threats to Bolivian sovereignty and the peace and security of the hemisphere, and (2) to insure in time of international emergency maximum Bolivian production of strategic materials, especially tin, tungsten and antimony and continued access to these materials. In so doing, the US wishes to promote conditions in Bolivia favorable to US private capital, the maintenance of law and order, and fair and equitable treatment for foreigners. A secondary US objective is to retain the cooperation of Bolivia in support of our hemispheric and world policies.

We hope that, in the long run, the attainment of our basic immediate objectives will raise the standard of living of the Bolivian populace and pave the way towards the establishment of a stable and effective democracy in that country.

B. POLICIES

General Background. Bolivia, a country of 420,000 square miles with a population of only 3,019,000, some 80% of whom are illiterate, is a remote, land-locked country of great contrasts. There are vast areas of great potential which are underpopulated and undeveloped, while the majority of the population and the nation's economic life are concentrated on the harsh and barren *altiplano*, some 13,000 feet above the sea. There the Indian, apathetic to the point of numbness, lives much as did his ancestors, scraping a subsistence from exhausted fields by primitive methods and contributing little to internal trade. The 30 percent of mixed blood and the less than 15 percent who are white live for the most part in the principal cities, controlling the political and economic life of the country.

Traditionally Bolivia has been a mining country, dependent upon its export of minerals, especially tin, for its receipts of foreign exchange and government revenue and using large proportions of its foreign exchange receipts for the import of foodstuffs and other materials which could be produced domestically. Between 1940 and 1948, over 94 percent of all exports by value were minerals, with tin alone representing about 70 percent of the total. Although the industry indirectly employs only a small part of the population, a large part of the country's economic activity can be traced directly or indirectly to mining.

Obviously, changes in world conditions have a tremendous impact on such an unbalanced economy. Bolivian producers of tin cannot, on the whole, compete with Far Eastern producers because of their higher costs, remote locations, and poorer deposits. So long as world tensions continue and US consumption and stockpiling of tin help keep demand in line with supply, Bolivia is relatively prosperous. However, since the Bolivian mines are generally marginal high-cost producers, they must curtail their production when the price of tin falls, as it did in late 1949 and early 1950, while Far Eastern producers can still operate at

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a profit. When the tin price is depressed, the country as a whole suffers severe economic hardship—reduced foreign exchange receipts, lower government revenues, decreased employment and national income, and general economic stagnation.

Equally ominous is the fact that known Bolivian reserves of tin ores which can be worked economically by present methods and within the price ranges of recent years are nearing exhaustion.

The development of other resources to complement and perhaps eventually replace mining as the basis of the national economy has been severely hampered by many factors and is proceeding too slowly. The rich agricultural lands and forests of Bolivia's eastern tropical regions cannot be exploited adequately until economical transport facilities are available, substantial migration or immigration has taken place, and problems of health, agricultural techniques, land tenure patterns, etc., have been solved. Prior to recent Bolivian legislation and Government announcements which opened certain areas to oil development by private enterprise, development of petroleum resources for export purposes had been blocked by a nationalistic policy which since 1936 had kept foreign oil capital out of Bolivia, and in the brief interval since the recent change in petroleum policy foreign capital has shown almost no interest in Bolivian investments.

Bolivia's history has been one of cruel tyrannies, bloody revolutions, and violent upheavals, often put down with unspeakable brutality, with only brief periods of relative tranquility and constitutional administration. Governments generally have been composed of venal and selfish administrators, lacking the education, experience, and background of responsibility needed for efficient administration.

Between 1936 and 1946, Bolivia was ruled by a succession of Army officers who, with one exception, took office as a result of *coups d'état.* In December 1943, following a coup engineered by a minority group of young army officers and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), a national socialist party closely allied with Nazism and the "Colonels' Clique" in Argentina, Major Gualberto Villarroel was installed as President. This administration was nationalistic, authoritarian, and antagonistic to vested interests, and it used labor, especially mine labor, as a political tool and weapon. It maintained itself in power by exercising a virtual reign of terror in which its opponents were kidnapped, imprisoned, assaulted, and assassinated without any pretense of legal proceedings. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and other civil liberties were seldom known. Although many members of this administration were definitely anti-US in sympathy, they realized that Bolivia had no other recourse but to take its place on the side of the democratic nations. Consequently, strategic materials such as rubber, quinine, tin, and tungsten were provided for the allied war effort and periodic lip service was paid to democratic principles. Tired

of the excesses of this regime, the Bolivian populace revolted in July 1946 and, in a bloody and vengeful uprising, ejected Villarroel and his followers, substituting for them a temporary junta of outstanding citizens which organized free elections. President Enrique Hertzog was inaugurated in March 1947 as the first nonmilitary chief of state since 1936.

The Junta and Hertzog administrations restored civil liberties, maintained the social gains of the people, reorganized the army to take it out of politics, held honest and free elections, and attempted to rule according to constitutional and democratic principles and socialist philosophies. Hertzog, however, was soon under attack from both the right and the left and beset by labor difficulties, and he was forced to devote his energies to staying in office. On the one hand, the government faced the remnants of the MNR, aided by exiles residing in neighboring countries. On the other hand, it found itself under increasing pressure from the left as represented by the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR), a leftist radical political party which in January 1951 came out wholly for the communist line. Hertzog turned to the US for support and assistance. The US responded by giving its sympathetic attention to Bolivian problems, extending economic assistance, offering appropriate counsel, and facilitating where possible the acquisition of arms and equipment needed to maintain internal order. However, Hertzog, tired, sick, disillusioned by the failure of his administration, faced with the necessity of adopting non-democratic methods to control the subversive opposition, and unable to cope with political pressures which blocked effective economic measures, resigned and was replaced constitutionally in October 1949 by the elected Vice President, Mamerto Urriolagoitia.

The new president attempted to follow the policies of Hertzog but, plagued by economic deterioration for which both administrations were largely responsible, had even less success in bringing stability to the country. His administration worried less about deviations from constitutional principles in its efforts to put down revolts and uprisings, being more prepared to meet force with force. Several bloody clashes between the armed forces and rebellious groups occurred during his tenure. The army regained much of its prestige and political power. Inflation, shortages of commodities, cutbacks in productive enterprises, the basic economic ills of the country, and the normal unhappy lot of the Bolivian masses resulted in growing social unrest which demagogues, agitators, and revolutionaries were quick to exploit. The Bolivian masses, largely unaware of the implications, again opposed the army and the government. Under these conditions the presidential election of May 6, 1951 (in which the polling was on the whole honestly supervised) resulted in a stunning defeat for Urriolagoitia's party. Faced by five opposition candidates, the administra-

tion's nominee obtained only about 32% of the total vote; and his chief opponent, MNR leader Paz Estenssoro, even though still in exile, obtained about 43%. Since no candidate received an absolute majority, the election should then constitutionally have been referred to the new Congress, scheduled to convene August 6. However, on May 16, President Urriolagoitia resigned and handed the government over to a junta of anti-MNR army officers headed by General Hugo Ballivian; and the junta later decreed the annulment of the May 6 election and the cancellation of the mandates of all members of Congress. Thus Bolivia's latest experiment with representative government appears to have failed and come full cycle back to military dictatorship. Further, the prospects of stability even under military rule are poor.

Economic Policy. Because of the complete dependence of Bolivia's economy on mineral exports, and US interest in maximum production of and secure access to Bolivian strategic minerals, the principal immediate economic problems between the two countries concern minerals, especially tin.

During and after World War II, Bolivia failed to take advantage of the relatively high prices of tin and other metals to stabilize its economy on a sound basis. When the inevitable post-war slump in mineral prices came at the end of 1949 and lasted until the unexpected outbreak of the Korean war, Bolivia had failed to prepare itself and expected the US to come to its assistance, professing that because of its contributions during World War II, its recent efforts to have a democratic administration, the importance to US security of its tin, and the aid given in the post-war period by the US to other competing countries, the US was obligated to render some form of special assistance to its tin industry, not so much to help the producers as to support the basic economy of Bolivia and in so doing to strengthen the political position of the administration. The US has continued in the post-war period to purchase tin concentrates from Bolivia for processing at the Texas City smelter, which was built during the war to process Bolivian and other foreign concentrates and which is operated by the RFC, but no special assistance to the Bolivian tin industry has been extended. Although during the recent war we relied heavily on imports of tin concentrates from Bolivia, the only source of this strategic material in commercial quantities in the hemisphere, US authorities charged with the responsibility of protecting US interests in strategic commodities have indicated an unwillingness to give any special consideration to Bolivia, feeling that the stockpile would provide ample protection in the event of emergency and would allow time for reopening of Bolivian mines were they forced to close prior to an emergency for economic reasons. In times of world crisis, of course, when the tin price tends to be very high, the question is not whether we will give special assistance to prevent Bolivian mines from closing but whether

we are willing to pay the high free-market price which Bolivia demands as one condition of contracts with our purchasing agencies. From the viewpoint of US-Bolivian relations alone, it would obviously be desirable to meet the free-market price and thus negate the Bolivian charge that we take full advantage of free-market conditions in times of depression but unjustly and inconsistently seek to impose controls on the tin price in boom times. However, our price policy toward Bolivia is only one aspect of our world tin price policy, which in turn in times of emergency like the present becomes part of an elaborate anti-inflationary mechanism. Recent experience has shown that conditions of world political emergency are likely to produce a conflict between the desirability of treating Bolivia generously and stimulating maximum Bolivian tin production, on the one hand, and the objective of driving the inflated world tin price down, on the other. The situation as of this writing is illustrative: price disagreement has prevented the signature of a long-term contract for sale of Bolivian concentrates to the RFC.

Under the Point IV program the Bureau of Mines is attempting to aid Bolivia through the development of processes to reduce the cost of recovery of tin and improve the characteristics of Bolivian exports of tin concentrates. In the latter connection, the Department's policy is to support a plan to erect a tin ore benefication plant in Bolivia, provided a workable and technically sound project can be developed.

For years the Bolivian Government and the larger mining companies have been in conflict over the amount of foreign exchange earnings which the latter should be required to sell to the Government. The issue is of basic economic importance, and it creates high political passions. One party or the other, but usually the industry, attempts periodically to drag the US into the controversy. However, experience has shown that our intervention, no matter how well motivated, is too dangerous to be worth while, and present US policy is to stay clear of all negotiations on the subject. This position is particularly correct in view of the fact that none of the tin-producing enterprises, and only two of the other mining companies, are controlled by American capital.

The basic outline of US economic policy with respect to Bolivia was established by the US Economic Mission to Bolivia which surveyed that country's economy and potentialities in 1941–42 and through an exchange of notes with Bolivia at the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers in January 1942. The report of the mission, known as the Bohan Report, was adopted by the two governments as the basis for US economic assistance and mutual collaboration. The pattern of this plan, which is still valid today, provided for the development of internal communications in Bolivia and the diversification of that country's economy through development of the agricultural and petroleum potentialities of the eastern lowlands to produce supplies

for domestic consumption and export. Such development would tend to raise living standards and correct the unfavorable balance of payments position of the country, lessening its dependence on tin exports. In this program, priority was given to construction of a highway connecting Cochabamba with Santa Cruz at the foot of the Andes, which is the gateway to the region selected for agricultural development. The US committed itself to considerable financial assistance to Bolivia during the period of development.

The history of the highway project, on which active construction was begun in 1945, was marked on both sides by errors, inefficiency, misunderstandings, and delays, all to the detriment of the Bolivian economy and US prestige. At times, these difficulties created serious political problems. These were resolved recently, however, through the extension of an additional Export-Import Bank credit to assist in completion of the road. American construction, engineering, and auditing firms have been engaged by the Bolivian Government, and it is hoped that the project can be brought to successful completion some time in 1954. US policy is to continue rendering such assistance as is appropriate to insure that the highway is completed.

The agricultural phase of the Bohan Plan has not been initiated except on a very small scale because of the long delay in completing the highway and Bolivian refusal to concentrate available resources on the development program. With the completion of the highway itself now apparently assured, the major problem in implementing the Bohan Report has become the necessity for rapid progress in preparations for exploitation of the Santa Cruz area. Bolivia has already indicated its desire to obtain loans from the Export-Import Bank for agricultural development as provided for in the Bohan Plan. Requests for financial assistance will be considered by US agencies on the criteria of economic justification and the availability of private capital. It is US policy to encourage the use of private capital for this and other development programs in Bolivia. Already some private capital, mostly domestic, has been invested in the Santa Cruz area. The US emphasizes the need for Bolivian assurances of just and nondiscriminatory treatment and the creation of conditions conducive to the investment of foreign private capital in the country. On the technical side a vigorous US contribution to the agricultural development of Bolivia is being made under the Point IV program through an agricultural mission operated in that country by the Department of Agriculture to develop suitable crops and methods for extensive production once the transportation problem is solved.

Another phase of the Bohan Plan contemplated the development of Bolivian petroleum reserves to offset in part diminishing returns from the tin industry and to lessen the pressure on the nation's foreign exchange availabilities for the importation of petroleum products. As

an exception to general petroleum loan policy, the US Government in 1945 permitted the use of Export-Import Bank funds, authorized in March 1942 for the economic development of Bolivia, to assist in financing further development of the petroleum industry by YPFB, a government monopoly which has controlled the Bolivian petroleum industry since expropriation of the Standard Oil Company holdings in 1937. An increase in the original allocation was authorized in 1947. Bolivia has carried out an overly-ambitious development program costing about $22,000,000 on a basis which has differed in important respects from the recommendations of the Bohan Mission. A pipe line from the Camiri field to Cochabamba with a spur line running to Sucre has been completed. A 5,000 B/D refinery has been erected at Cochabamba, and units of 1,000 B/D and 3,000 B/D at Sucre. Unfortunately, development of crude production in the Camiri field has not been carried out efficiently or as rapidly as required by the over-built refinery program, and an application has been made for additional Export-Import Bank funds for use in development drilling in the Camiri field.

The Department does not consider that there are any policy objections to consideration by the Export-Import Bank of a further small loan for petroleum development in the Camiri field, provided it can be determined that such a loan would be technically sound from an oil standpoint, and that the development would be managed efficiently, although it would be preferable for such development to be carried out either directly by private capital or by a satisfactory contractual arrangement between YPFB and private capital.

Bolivian petroleum legislation has recently been passed opening certain areas of the country to oil development by private enterprise or to joint operations with YPFB, and the Bolivian Government has announced that it is willing to enter into lease contracts for the exploitation of other areas where oil prospects are better. However, estimates of Bolivia's oil resources and the political atmosphere within the country have not to date seemed sufficiently attractive to foreign oil companies to interest them in sizeable investment for Bolivian petroleum exploration and development.

One of the basic handicaps of the Bolivian economy is the deficiency of the Government's health and education programs. For a number of years the Institute of Inter-American affairs has maintained missions in Bolivia which have made progress toward remedying this deficiency. It is US policy to continue this assistance under the Point IV program, expanding it in accordance with Bolivian ability and willingness to make matching financial contributions.

It is expected that, in the long run, the economic development of Bolivia under the diversification program will assist the country to

overcome its balance of payments difficulties, allowing it to relax its restrictive import controls, put a stop to its practice of resorting to barter agreements, and abolish its complex multiple exchange rate structure. The US seeks the eventual establishment of a single exchange rate in conformity with International Monetary Fund policies and, through its representation in the latter, has encouraged Bolivia to take the necessary measures to this end. While opposed on principle to Bolivian exchange and import controls, the US recognizes, however, that many of them cannot be eliminated without general economic improvement.

The US hopes that Bolivia will remedy its unsatisfactory economic and fiscal practices. In view of our obligation to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of other countries, however, we hesitate to make direct efforts to rectify such internal conditions, although we do, through our representation in the UN, the IMF, and the IBRD, work toward this end. A UN economic mission which surveyed the Bolivian economy in 1950 recommended to the Bolivian Government at the end of that year a novel but fundamental program of administrative and fiscal reform. The mission's report has been accepted in principle, and technical assistance agreements to implement most of its recommendations were signed October 1, 1951. While recognizing that ideally the UN's recommendations might offer a solution to Bolivia's basic governmental ills, which are also perhaps its most important economic and political ills, the US remains doubtful about the long-run acceptability of the UN proposals to the Bolivian people; and US policy has been neither to oppose Bolivian acceptance of the report nor to attempt to influence the Bolivians to adopt its recommendations.

The climate in Bolivia today is definitely not conducive to the investment of foreign private capital. Political instability and economic deterioration are two factors which make the country unattractive for investment. We hope that the success of our efforts to further political stability and economic diversification will help create conditions conducive to the investment of US private capital in Bolivia. Another deterrent is a traditional nationalism which causes foreign investment to be suspected of imperialistic motives. The US attempts to counter this sentiment whenever possible through the rendering of appropriate counsel, the demonstration of its good faith by its acts, and the educational publicity campaign of the USIE program in that country. Potential investors, however, are aware of the history of the Bolivian Government dealing with foreign private capital and are not convinced that there has been any real change in the attitude of Bolivian officials.

A problem in this connection, which affects any development program or investments requiring the residence of US citizens in Bolivia,

arises from Bolivia's failure on numerous occasions to accord effective protection to foreigners, especially those residing in the isolated mining districts. The US has made repeated representations in this connection and, although privately recognizing the practical difficulties faced by the Bolivian Government in exercising its authority in remote regions, has insisted on recognition of the obligation of that Government to take the necessary measures to provide effective protection. Since the brutal slaying of two Americans in a mining camp during a labor disturbance in 1949,[1] the US has followed closely the process of apprehension and trial of the perpetrators of the crimes, frequently reminding the Bolivian Government that we expect that justice will be done. US policy is to press this matter appropriately.

A bilateral air transport agreement of the Bermuda type was signed with Bolivia in 1948, but it has not yet been considered by the Bolivian Congress. It is US policy to press for ratification of this agreement as soon as possible. Meanwhile, two American carriers continue serving Bolivia, touching at La Paz, which is an intermediate point under the route pattern established for Latin America by the Civil Aeronautics Board. It is US policy to insure that American carriers continue adequate service to Bolivia. A CAA technical mission is rendering assistance to Bolivia to improve domestic and international aviation services and facilities. A US Air Force mission assists the Bolivian Air Force in its training, operating, and organizational programs.

Since 1931 Bolivia has been in default on its external debt of some $60 million in principal plus accrued interest. An agreement providing for resumption of service on this obligation was signed on the initiative of the Government of Bolivia with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council in 1948, and was ratified by the Bolivian Congress in 1950. The US has consistently kept the Bolivian Government aware of its interest in this agreement, and it is the hope that Bolivian compliance with it will be satisfactory. Initial payments under the agreement were due in 1951, but the tin contract crisis caused the Bolivian Government to suspend plans for its implementation.[2]

An item of Bolivian debt owed directly to the United States Government is a World War II lend-lease account now amounting to about

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[1] Reference is to the so-called "Catavi massacre", which had taken place in late May 1949. For further information on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, p. 525; *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, p. 746.

[2] In despatch 28, from La Paz, July 18, 1951, the Commercial Attaché (de Lima) had written in part the following: "Unless a long term RFC tin sales contract to Bolivia's liking is entered into, it appears problematical that any future action will be taken with regard to the implementation of this agreement. Since Bolivia does not enjoy a commercial credit standing that could be jeopardized, it would otherwise appear that a determination as to what further action is to be taken with regard to the 1948 agreement . . . will be made in the light of the degree of likelihood that Bolivia estimates she has of obtaining a sizeable World Bank loan as a direct consequence of honoring this obligation". (824.10/7–1851)

US$494,000. It is US policy to press for early settlement of this obligation.[3]

Political Policy. During World War II, Bolivia turned from its traditional orientation towards Europe to the US. Although the US and Bolivia were not on the best of terms during the Villarroel administration, relations between the two countries have been generally good, especially since the fall of the Villarroel regime in mid-1946. The US has attempted to cooperate with and aid Bolivia to the maximum appropriate extent. This policy has been implemented largely through economic and financial assistance, technical aid, grants to enable Bolivian educators, students, and professional men to visit this country, military ground and air missions maintained by the Department of National Defense, and cooperation in the United Nations and the Organization of American States and their respective organs and specialized agencies. A regular cultural and information section operates in the US Embassy at La Paz to publicize the US and to expose communism for what it is.

This policy has resulted in general Bolivian support for US objectives in the OAS and the UN.

Among political problems between the US and Bolivia, one arises from Bolivia's insistence that international communism is operating with special intensity in that country, causing strife and chaos in order eventually to obtain in Bolivia a pro-communist base of operations against the southern part of the continent, and even entering into pacts with the MNR for political domination of the country. The Bolivians have used their claim that they are a special object of Moscow's attentions for every purpose from requests for financial assistance to attempts to entangle us in their domestic politics. While the US remains alert to the possibility of dangerous communist penetration of Bolivia, it also remains to be convinced that the problem is of the immediately serious proportions represented by the Bolivians, and it has refused to be drawn into Bolivian domestic affairs, or to take certain other steps suggested by Bolivian officials, on the basis of this pretext alone.

Although there has been some discussion of Bolivian participation in the Korean action, the Bolivian armed forces are not expected to make any appreciable contribution to the defense of the continent [4] in the event of armed attack. Their principal role would be that of preserving internal order in Bolivia and protecting the country from a communist coup which might create a diversionary disturbance and

[3] On January 26, 1951, the Bolivian Government had completed its obligations under the terms of the Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement of 1947. This arrangement, however, had not included so-called contingent lend-lease accounts, covering cash-reimbursable transactions amounting to $494,399.25. The Department's efforts to negotiate a settlement of this amount proved abortive during 1951, primarily because of the financial exigencies confronting the Bolivian Government. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 724.56.

[4] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

threaten US access to strategic materials. US air and ground military missions collaborate with Bolivia in order to create a pro-US orientation and to increase the efficiency and capabilities of the Bolivian armed forces, without, however, instigating desires for expensive and unwarranted amounts of modern military equipment. US policy has been to extend to Bolivia only the same assistance in purchasing arms and military equipment as is extended to other countries entitled to MDAP aid.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

Claiming to have lost territory to each of its five neighbors, Bolivia is naturally suspicious and distrustful of others, and it is somewhat surprising that its relations with its neighbors are as good as they are. This is true especially in the case of Chile, Bolivia's traditional enemy since the loss of its littoral in the War of the Pacific, and of Paraguay, its most recent enemy in armed conflict. Although there is little contact between Bolivia and Paraguay, the bitterness of the Chaco War seems to have faded and Bolivians in general accept their defeat and the loss of the Chaco.

The dream of eventual access to the sea has motivated much of Bolivia's foreign policy and has kept alive the resentment against Chile. Nevertheless, the relations between the two today are very good. They have for some years professed a common interest as democracies surrounded by military dictatorships and subjected to Argentine pressure and interference. Both Bolivia and Chile have from time to time claimed that the Peron [5] Government is determined to achieve the overthrow of their democratic institutions and replace them with administrations of the Argentine type. This common fear of Argentina has overshadowed the traditional difficulties stemming from the port question. It can be expected, however, that Bolivia will continue to keep alive the issue of access to the sea. Although we have expressed our sympathy with the Bolivian aspiration and our interest in the economic problems which have been related to it, it is our policy to view this as a matter which must be resolved through friendly negotiations among the interested parties, and we are in no sense committed to the grand-scale Titicaca irrigation and hydroelectric scheme which has been advanced hypothetically as compensation to Chile and Peru for Bolivian access to the coast near Arica. The President of Chile [6] not long ago expressed, informally, a willingness to consider the cession of a strip of territory along the Peruvian border which would enable Bolivia to control most of the Arica–La Paz railroad, a financial liability to Chile, and develop a small port just north of Arica. A solution of the port question through the cession of Chilean territory

[5] Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.
[6] Gabriel González Videla.

along its northern border cannot be accomplished without the consent of Peru, according to the 1929 settlement of the Tacna–Arica dispute.[7] Peruvian consent to the proposal of the Chilean President may prove difficult to obtain, although there are no special problems today between Bolivia and Peru and relations are generally good.

Bolivia's most troublesome international problems arise from its proximity to Argentina and, until recently, its dependence on that country as a major source of supply, especially of foodstuffs. Following the overthrow of Villarroel, the Peron administration gave a number of clear indications that it preferred that totalitarian government to the more democratic administrations which succeeded it. Bolivian political exiles on occasion organized revolts from across the Argentine border. The Bolivian Government took these incidents and Argentine economic pressure as indicating that the official policy of the Argentine Government is to promote a successful revolution in Bolivia. US policy is to consider these incidents as possibly indicative of the sentiments of individual Argentine officials but, in the absence of more concrete evidence, not necessarily as proof of official Argentine policy. On the contrary, in more recent incidents, the Argentine Government took appropriate and correct measures, albeit at times belatedly, to control the movement and activities of the Bolivian exiles. Indications of the current Argentine attitude afforded by the May 1951 election and subsequent events have been inconclusive as regards Argentine support for any particular Bolivian faction, but there is no question of a lively continuing Argentine interest in Bolivian affairs, and the possibility of active Argentine intervention always exists.

Bolivia also fears Argentine interest and penetration in the eastern plains south of Santa Cruz, the petroleum region of Bolivia, where Argentina has agreed to invest over two hundred million Argentine pesos in the construction of railroads and highways. The Yacuiba-Santa Cruz railroad, on which slow progress is being made, cuts through the heart of this petroleum zone. The US considers that the Argentine-financed transportation projects cannot be justified economically and will add more dead weight to Bolivia's staggering future debt burden; but the US has not attempted to persuade Bolivia to this view.

A comprehensive economic agreement was signed by Bolivia and Argentina in 1947 which, although not implemented to date, provides for preferential customs arrangements, extensive interchange of specified commodities, and large Argentine credits for public works, industrial development, and stabilization. There is a vociferous group in Bolivia which favors full implementation of this agreement and closer economic and political ties with Argentina in view of what it

[7] For documentation on the settlement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 720 ff.

considers a lack of progress under the existing policy of cooperation with the US. Since this agreement would if implemented tend to strengthen inter-American economic ties and encourage the expansion of trade and mutual economic development, the US does not oppose it so long as the arrangements are non-discriminatory, do not infringe on Bolivian political or economic sovereignty, and permit free access to Bolivian markets and products.

Brazil has economic interest in the same regions of Bolivia which appeal to Argentina, especially the Santa Cruz area. It is rapidly completing the Corumba–Santa Cruz railroad, which skirts the Bolivian petroleum zone. Many Bolivians fear this penetration, but the majority do not consider Brazil a serious threat, and relations between the two countries have been generally good. Bolivia tends to look to Brazil as a counter-balance to Argentine penetration of its eastern zone. There is a danger, however, that the interests of these two powerful neighbors may clash, since their respective zones of activity, as delineated in agreements with Bolivia, overlap. Furthermore, there is little national sentiment in the eastern zone, which has practically no economic ties with the rest of the country, and separatist, pro-Argentina or pro-Brazil movements might easily be instigated. The US does not oppose Brazilian interest so long as it conforms to the same conditions established for Argentine activities. The US attempts to lessen the possibility of a separatist movement and/or a clash between Argentina and Brazil in eastern Bolivia by assisting Bolivia to strengthen the economic and political interdependence of the various regions of the country, orienting the eastern area toward the highland centers. The Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway project and the agricultural and petroleum development programs are instruments of this policy.

Official relations between Bolivia and the USSR are non-existent for all intents and purposes; diplomatic representatives have not been exchanged in spite of mutual diplomatic recognition, communist activities in Bolivia were outlawed in April 1950,* and trade with the Soviet orbit is insignificant. Bolivia has evinced willingness to cooperate fully in the embargo of strategic materials to the USSR and its satellites.

While the United States has refused to give full credence to Bolivian Government claims of communist plotting for immediate access to power in that country, the United States does appreciate that communism has probably made some inroads in Bolivia recently. Such inroads are to be expected among a population so backward, poverty-stricken, and illiterate, especially in view of the social unrest created by recent economic difficulties and the weak, vacillating economic policy of the Hertzog–Urriolagoitia administrations. It is US policy

*A more stringent and detailed decree outlawing communist activities was issued by the Busch government in 1938. [Footnote in the source text].

to view the communist problem in Bolivia as essentially a long-term one, and US countermeasures consist principally of assistance to the Bolivian economic development program, attacks on basic health problems and ignorance through the IIAA Health and Education Missions, and a vigorous USIE program.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

Progress toward attaining the basic US policy objectives outlined at the beginning of this statement is slow and uneven. Until Bolivia becomes a more stable political entity with a viable economy, the danger of penetration by its neighbors and a possible clash of their respective interests in Bolivia will continue, as will Bolivian vulnerability to the spread of communist or other totalitarian doctrines. The principal measure of the success of U.S. policy must therefore be the extent to which the political and economic structures of Bolivia have been strengthened.

With regard to political stability, the movement during the past year has actually been retrograde. The Urriolagoitia regime failed to carry the country successfully through the strains of national elections, and a *de facto* military government took over. The ability of the latter government to restore a measure of harmony in the Bolivian political family is problematical, and prospects for an early return to constitutional rule are indefinite.

Economically, there have been some bright spots. An American contracting company has renewed construction of the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway. A large part of the US Point IV program is being concentrated on development of the Santa Cruz region, and there are prospects of early substantial investments in that area. Increased international tension has created boom prices in world mineral markets. On the whole, however, progress toward economic stability has been unsatisfactorily slow.

The primary responsibility for Bolivia's disappointing political and economic situation does not rest on the US, to be sure. Were the Bolivian Government to take measures within its power to eliminate inefficiency and corruption from public administration, revise the country's tax and fiscal systems and general economic practices, and concentrate its efforts and resources on sensible, economically sound development projects, eliminating those carried on for purely political and regional purposes, much would be done to rectify the basic ills, both political and economic.

However, there has been some measure of US responsibility in that US implementation of policy has often vacillated between close and full cooperation and refusal to do anything at all. Thus, in 1949–50 the US granted the Bolivian request for an additional loan for the Cochabamba–Santa Cruz highway but at the same time was unable to

give any special assistance to the Bolivian tin industry, then in critical straits; and again in 1951, while preparing an expanded Bolivian Point IV program and giving sympathetic consideration to other Bolivian requests for additional economic development assistance, the US has not yet signed a long-term contract to buy Bolivian tin—a basic necessity for a certain measure of economic stability in that country. Thus too, US policy toward full-scale implementation of the Bohan Plan is ill-defined. The US has already contributed or promised for the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway far more than the entire amount originally estimated to be needed for the Bohan Plan, Bolivia's fulfillment of her own obligations under the Plan has been questionable, and there is serious doubt as to her ability to assume further debt burdens. On the other hand, some further US Government investment in the Plan will probably be necessary to insure its success and make Bolivian repayment even theoretically possible. US attitudes on this problem vary from time to time, but Bolivia continually hopes that something will occur to loosen the purse strings of the US Treasury.

The lack of coordinated implementation of US policy in Bolivia stems from administrative and statutory obstacles within the US Government and from conflicts with other policies, rather than from any lack of good will, but it contributes to the shortcomings of policy implementation. At the same time, the piece-meal approach to the problems of Bolivia encourages that country to rely on the US to solve its problems as they arise rather than to take effective local remedial measures within its power.

The US probably could count on access to Bolivian strategic materials and political support, at least from the present Bolivian administration, in the event of another world war. Again, however, a higher degree of political and economic stability and well-being would make such cooperation more certain and more effective, since domestic difficulties might well have an adverse effect on Bolivian production of strategic materials and since a successful revolution, a distinct possibility in view of the present situation of that country, conceivably might bring to office a government inclined to cooperate only grudgingly with the US. The attainment of maximum production of Bolivian strategic materials in time of emergency depends in part on US price policies and US willingness to enter into long-term contracts. Other objectives besides the stimulation of maximum Bolivian production, however, enter into the determination of the price and contract factors, and are sometimes, as at the present writing, in conflict with the production objective. Such conflict can, as at present, interfere with US policy toward Bolivian strategic materials by discouraging Bolivian plans for increased minerals production and even by posing some threat to the security of US access to Bolivian minerals.

The US has been more successful in other aspects of policy with respect to Bolivia, such as enlisting that country's support and cooperation in world affairs. The US practices of offering technical assistance, travel grants for study, an information program, political counsel, and general economic cooperation have been instrumental in increasing the bonds of friendship and understanding between the two countries. The USIE program has been successful in causing certain segments of the Bolivian population to look to the US as a cultured, progressive, benign, and cooperative friend without ulterior motives.

The US should continue its policy of aid to Bolivia, especially through the technical assistance program. The Point IV program in Bolivia should be expanded up to the maximum of Bolivia's capacity for absorption. (In this respect, however, a major difficulty is Bolivia's inability to undertake additional financial obligations, even for cooperative programs which would be of great benefit.) Bolivia's requests for additional financial assistance for her economic development program should continue to be examined sympathetically on their own merits, but the major emphasis should be on the participation of private capital in Bolivia's development. To this end the Bolivian Government should be encouraged to take measures, such as regular payments on the new bond settlement agreement, to restore the country's international credit and make conditions within Bolivia more attractive to private investment.

An experiment in democracy has failed in Bolivia because of the lack of developed natural resources on which to base a sound and diversified economy, the poverty and ignorance of the masses, the weaknesses of Bolivian administrators, and traditions of political violence. The Bolivian experience should prove to us that we cannot export the US type of democracy to be superimposed on a backward country. Rather we must help Bolivia to create within that country economic conditions and educational levels which will allow the gradual development of democratic principles, traditions, and institutions under the leadership of capable and trained administrators. In the long run, this may occur in Bolivia. This is the ultimate objective of the US in Bolivia—to help create a healthy, prosperous, and stable democracy with satisfactory levels of living, education, and culture for the Bolivian people.

Editorial Note

During 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized $1,000,000 credits to two Bolivian mining companies to finance the cost of machinery, supplies, and equipment in the United States for the expansion of tungsten production. The first credit, ap-

proved November 1, was to Mauricio Hochschild, S. A. M. I. (824.10/11–251), and the second, approved December 19, was to the Bolivian Tin & Tungsten Mines Corporation (824.10/12–2051). For further information, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951* (Washington, 1952), pages 10–11.

BRAZIL

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL[1]

832.00/1–1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL RIO DE JANEIRO, January 15, 1951—7 p. m.

915. There follows complete text Vargas document[2] referred to Embtel 914, January 15.[3]

"1. Sr. Getulio Vargas, President-elect of Brazil,[4] appreciated the courtesy of the Government of The United States of America, in submitting to him, in a confidential manner, the topics which will be debated at the Washington conference, to take place next March.

"2. The topics referred to appear to him, in general interesting and opportune. In his new period of government Sr. Getulio Vargas will be animated by the desire to continue the policy of cooperation and loyalty which he previously carried out with the US and other nations of this hemisphere, and which was translated into an intimate and sincere collaboration, both in the economic and military spheres, during the difficult emergency of the second war. The political events which followed the termination of that war, and which continued to develop, filling with apprehension those who have responsibilities of government, have made it imperative to strengthen the bonds among the American countries.

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[1] For previous documentation concerning United States relations with Brazil, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 757 ff.

[2] The so-called "Vargas document" was a confidential memorandum by Brazilian President-elect Getúlio Dornelles Vargas, delivered to Ambassador Johnson on January 13, 1951, by Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs João Neves da Fontoura, under cover of an informal note dated January 11, 1951. The memorandum was in response to an unsigned and undated paper discussing the forthcoming Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States which Ambassador Johnson had handed to Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura on December 29, 1950. Copies of these documents, including the Portuguese text of President-elect Vargas' memorandum, were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 1085, from Rio de Janeiro, dated January 24, 1951, not printed (363/1–2451).

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States was held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. For documentation, see pp. 925 ff.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Getúlio Vargas was elected President of Brazil on October 3, 1950, and he assumed office on January 31, 1951. He had previously served as President, 1930–1945.

"Brazil expects to give to the US at the Washington conference—as in other pronouncements and programs—its cooperation, but considers it indispensable that the government of the US understand that this cooperation, besides imposing all types of sacrifices, requires an effective understanding so that the economic life of the country which gives it will not be disturbed to the point of having its immediate and future possibilities of development and production substantially reduced.

"3. The Brazilian Government, in its internal policy, will exert all efforts to see that the reestablishment of a war economy in the US will not have on the internal economy of our country only the effect of a passing prosperity, and will collaborate with the Government of the US in appropriate measures to offset the inflation stimulated by war.

"In this sense, the Brazilian Government requires the positive support of the North American Government so that orders of materials needed for the establishment of basic industries and the execution of public works will move forward quickly and have priority of delivery and that requests for credits from such establishments as the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank related to these orders will be granted and processed with rapidity. Instead of accumulating a balance of dollars, resulting from the growth of exports, for subsequent utilization, the Brazilian Government desires to utilize it immediately in payment of orders and in servicing loans granted.

"4. It is not inopportune to recall that direct North American investments in Brazil in the past decade have corresponded to the confidence and expectations of investors. The atmosphere of general progress and juridical security does not justify a withdrawal, such as that which followed the great depression of 1929 not only in relation to Brazil but with respect to all Latin America. The value of Brazilian cooperation and the earning power of our establishments justifies the conclusion that North American investment at the moment is excessively timid. To intensify the flow of private capital it is necessary that the Government of the US give it official stimulus and not discriminate against Brazil in measures of cooperation which have been adopted in relations to other parts of the world.

"5. The goodwill of the Brazilian Government towards contributing national raw materials for the emergency economy of the US should have its counterpart in the goodwill of the Government of North America towards conceding priority of manufacture and medium and long term bank credits for the immediate execution of a rational program of industrialization and public works to which the principle efforts of the Brazilian administration will be devoted.

"6. The Brazilian Government finds it equally necessary that artificial restrictions on the present level of prices of Brazilian exports, and especially coffee, shall not be imposed.

"No foreign financing will contribute to the intensive development of our country if we do not have domestic capital to support and absorb aid coming from abroad. In recent years coffee has been the principal factor not only in rebalancing our accounts with the US, but in creating internal availabilities which have formed new capital and developed initiatives. Any policy which does not respect real prices, such as that coffee has attained in a free market economy, would be contrary to the development of the country.

"7. The Government of the US is not unaware that many North American initiatives in Brazil have been frustrated by legal and fiscal obstacles which upset the collaboration of the two countries. The Brazilian Government is ready to adopt in its internal policy measures which will favor and stimulate the spontaneous flow of American capital into Brazil; but the US, having attained the greatest degree of economic expansion known in history, must recognize that it does not need a protection in policy, unfavorable to the establishment of manufacturing industries in the places which are sources of foreign raw materials, nor does it need to continue overloading by taxes the income of its emigrated capital.

"8. The Brazilian Government wishes to conclude with the US a policy of economic reciprocity which will make available national raw materials of strategic value to the other country. It believes however, that at the same time it is indispensable that the US adopt positive measures which will translate themselves into a policy of positive aid in the development of our economy for the rationalization of agriculture, and for industrialization.

"This policy should be part of the general principles affirmed at the conference next March but its perfect definition and realization must result from bilateral negotiations which the Brazilian Government wishes to initiate early in February.

"Through these bilateral negotiations, the Brazilian Government will make known its immediate plans of economic development and of legislative and administrative measures through which it intends to assume them.

"The Brazilian Government views with special sympathy the creation of an American-Brazilian organism, of easy functioning and reduced bureaucracy, charged with coordinating, on the technical-financial level, a policy of cooperation between the two countries.

"9. With respect to Brazilian initiative, this policy does not contemplate only government enterprises and services. On the contrary, so far as possible, it will try to encourage private initiative, give aid to enterprises of integrity the action of which would be included in the general

program, and coordinate, in accordance with the public interest, the objectives of the administration and of business.

"10. Within the general program of developing basic sectors of continental economy, the Brazilian Government expects, then, from North America, direct and indirect support for effective measures which will contribute to the progress of Brazil and the well-being of its people.

"Thus, there will be requested, in the bilateral negotiations referred to above, supplies with priority and long and medium term financing for the following undertakings:

"I. Construction of hydroelectric plants in the upper Sao Francisco, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, in accordance with plans approved by the Federal Government and by the state governments.

"II. Works of economic utility in the Sao Francisco valley, notably in the Paulo Afonso region, including transportation, urbanization and sanitation.

"III. Construction and installation of petroleum refineries with a capacity of 10,000 to 30,000 barrels, for Brazilian private or state organizations.

"IV. Construction and installation of two synthetic nitrate plants destine for private or state organizations for installation in zones of the lower Sao Francisco and in Minas Gerais.

"V. Construction and installation of new installations for expanding the Volta Redonda steel mill, with the immediate utilization of the credit already granted by the Export-Import Bank;[5] and, later, the construction and installation of a second steel mill with a capacity of 1,000 tons daily, in Minas Gerais, in the Rio Doce zone, which possesses railway transport and port installations which will assure an outlet for the production.

"VI. Dredging, construction and permanent equipment of maritime ports and acquisition of vessels for renovating the merchant fleet, with a view to assuring the expansion and regularization of cabotage.

"VII. Equipment and execution of a plan for the rational utilization of Brazilian coal, including the operations of mining, beneficiation and transportation.

"VIII. Financial and technical cooperation in the improvement, reequipment and electrification of railways.

"IX. Financing the transportation and establishment of European immigrants, principally Italians, so as to assure the integration of imported manpower in the national economy, permitting the execution of an immigration program on a large scale.

"X. Establishment in Brazil of industries for the treatment of national raw materials, with mixed capital, in order to make possible the exportation of manufactured products instead of the raw materials themselves.

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[5] On July 20, 1950, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank had authorized a credit of $25,000,000 to the Republic of Brazil to finance the purchase of equipment necessary for expanding steel production at the Volta Redonda mill. Extension of the credit, however, was pending the Brazilian Government's full compliance with the provisions of the loan agreement.

"XI. Creation of one or more mixed American-Brazilian companies for the study of the raw materials of the country, the exploration for and exploitation of mineral deposits.

"XII. The construction and installation of a factory at Cabo Frío for the production of alkalis, [6] and cooperation in studies for a second factory in the northern part of the country.

"XIII. Equipment and execution, through private or state organizations, of the plan for storing, transporting and conserving foodstuffs including the construction of silos for cereals, treating and fumigating plants, warehouses, and refrigerated vessels.

"XIV. Supplying of equipment and indispensable parts for the regular maintenance of Brazilian aviation.

"11. These points, listed as examples in this note, represent in synthesis the cooperation that the government of *Brazil expects from the US for the realization of an unpostponable economic development program.* It is evident that they cannot be included in the agenda of the international meeting. They should be the object of bilateral negotiations which, however, will be embodied in the spirit and the principles of the meeting, of consultation, which the Government of Brazil will attend animated by the most sincere aim of continental cooperation, ready to offer its contribution to the common effort."

JOHNSON

[6] In the latter part of 1950, the Cia. Nacional de Alcalis had applied to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for a credit to finance the foreign exchange costs of a 100,000-ton alkali plant at Cabo Frío. The IBRD had the application under consideration during 1951.

Editorial Note

On January 18, 1951, the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved an additional credit of $15,000,000 to the Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (832.10/1–1751), which augmented a previous credit of $75,000,000 to finance most of the foreign exchange costs of a program for expanding hydroelectric generating and transmitting facilities in the Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo areas. For further information on these loans, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Sixth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1950–1951* (Washington, 1951), page 32.

On February 8, 1951, the National Advisory Council approved consideration by the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of a credit up to $30,000,000 to the Sociedade Brasiliera de Mineracao Ltda. (Sobramil), a Brazilian company jointly owned by six Brazilian citizens (Chamma brothers) and the United States Steel Corporation, to finance the acquisition and installation of the equipment and facilities required to mine and to deliver to an ocean port 3,000,000

tons of Urucum manganese ore over a period of 12 years (Department of State National Advisory Council Documents, Document No. 88, Action No. 452, February 8, 1951, Lot 60 D 137, Box 369). The Bank did not regard a guaranty by the Brazilian Government as necessary, but it required a statement from the government indicating that there were no objections to the proposed loan or to the execution of the project as planned. The Brazilian Government withheld its approval, however, and the loan did not become effective during 1951. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal files 103–XMB and 832.10.

On December 5, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized a line of credit not to exceed $5,000,000 in favor of Cia. Brasiliera de Ligantes Hidraulicos to assist in financing the purchase of materials and equipment in the United States for construction of a cement plant in Brazil. For information on this loan, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951* (Washington, 1952), pages 13, 34.

832.00/1–2551

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1951.

Subject: Brazil

Some time ago you talked to the President about the problem of economic development in Brazil, and you and I later talked to Secretary Snyder [1] and Bill Martin [2] about the proposal of the International Bank to announce a $250,000,000 investment program in Brazil, provided that there be a limitation of the Export-Import Bank's lending activities in Brazil. Nothing has come of this proposal because of (1) the failure within the government to resolve the jurisdictional problem between the two Banks,[3] and (2) the feeling in Treasury that we should make no long-term commitments about development because of actual or pending shortages of materials in this country.

Mr. Thorp [4] and Mr. Harriman [5] have commenced a series of meetings with Mr. Martin, of the Treasury, and Mr. Black,[6] of the Inter-

[1] John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury.
[2] William McChesney Martin, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
[3] For documentation on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 1573 ff.; documentation on the problem as it related to Brazil in 1950 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 757 ff.
[4] Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
[5] W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President.
[6] Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

national Bank, in an effort to resolve some of these problems. A solution of the problems under discussion by this group could be expedited if the President would take a direct interest in the matter. Furthermore, the entire problem has taken on new importance and urgency because of the desire of President Vargas to work out broad programs of economic and political cooperation between Brazil and the United States, as expressed in a recent series of telegrams between Embassy Río and the Department. These telegrams are referred to in the attached draft of memorandum from you to the President.

It is imperative for the future of our relations with Brazil that we give a positive response to the proposals of President Vargas, even though the realization of the entire program is obviously not a short-term possibility, especially in view of materials shortages. Accordingly, we should express a willingness to begin to lay plans for the ultimate realization of the program and to proceed immediately with the highest priority items.

President Vargas and the Brazilian Foreign Minister have expressed a desire for negotiations to begin in February about the whole problem of cooperation between Brazil and the United States. In accordance with this, I intend to proceed to Río about February 17. It is highly desirable that I be in a position to talk concretely by the time I get there.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.[7]

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[7] The draft memorandum contained a recommendation requesting the President to "issue instructions to the members of the National Advisory Council and the Office of Defense Mobilization to jointly prepare a United States Government position in regard to the maximum possible implementation of the Vargas program within the limitations imposed by the emergency and, in cases where financial cooperation is required, to determine which of the two lending institutions should deal with given projects." In a memorandum to the Secretary, dated January 26, 1951, Mr. Thorp expressed his disagreement with this recommendation, stating in part the following reasons: That assistance requirements for Brazil must be considered within a global context; that we "have no assurance that Brazil is the most urgent case at the moment"; that the United States had barely initiated an effort to solve the raw materials allocation problem; and that the jurisdictional problem between the IBRD and the Export-Import Bank was of "greater importance to the Department" and should be resolved before any action on the Brazilian question (832.00/1–2651). Department of State files contain no evidence indicating that Mr. Miller's draft memorandum was sent forward to President Truman. The jurisdictional dispute between the two banks was not resolved prior to Mr. Miller's departure for Rio de Janeiro on February 17.

832.00/2–651

Memorandum by the Economic and Finance Adviser of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (White)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1951.

Subject: Suggested Comments to be made in Mr. Miller's Talk with President Vargas in Pursuance of Vargas' communication of January 15, 1951

The following comments are arranged in the same chronological order as that used by Vargas in his message. In practice, Mr. Miller may desire to discuss the economic topics first, following with the political and military subjects.

1. Mr. Miller should first deliver to him a personal, written message from President Truman, together with a Portuguese translation. This message should be short and concentrated on four key points:

a) President Truman is delighted at Vargas' message of cooperation and looks forward to the maintenance of the same close personal relationship which existed between Vargas and Roosevelt and which proved so fruitful for both countries.

b) President Truman is quite aware of Brazil's potentialities and needs for economic expansion. In his recent budget message to Congress, he emphasized the need to pursue vigorously economic development and technical cooperation programs. The maintenance of close economic cooperation between Brazil and the U.S. is very important.

c) Collaboration in the military sphere between the two countries is of key importance. Immediate implementation of this collaboration could have important effects in demonstrating to the world that a situation of such strength exists as to give the Soviet Imperialists pause in their planning of future aggression.

d) Assistant Secretary Miller has discussed Vargas' message with the responsible members of Truman's administration and will discuss its various aspects with Vargas in a spirit of complete cooperation and mutual confidence.

2. Mr. Miller should say that President Vargas' expression of desire to continue political and military cooperation is deeply appreciated. It is most timely because the moment for concrete action has arrived if peace is to be preserved or, failing that, to establish basis for defeat of Soviet aggressors' attempt to enslave the free world.[1]

a) Political collaboration means continuation of Brazil–U.S. united front in active support of the principles of the United Nations and Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.[2]

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[1] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to the Korean "emergency" in early 1951, see volume VII; for related documentation dealing with United States national security policy, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[2] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

b) In vital military sphere, designation by Brazil of a ground force of one division to participate in United Nations action in Korea would be most helpful.

c) In the event Brazil decides it can make such a contribution, its announcement at time of the Meeting of the Consultation of Foreign Ministers would have a most important effect and might prove a great influence on the future course of world events.

d) In the event Brazil makes such a decision, the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in making available training equipment and logistical support necessary to make Brazilian troop participation most effective.

e) The Government of the United States will be prepared in the near future to enter into discussions with the Government of Brazil regarding additional joint military measures which might be taken to mobilize against the possibility of an outbreak of general hostilities.

3. The Government of the United States agrees with the Brazilian Government that appropriate measures should be adopted to arrest inflation and has already taken vigorous fiscal and other measures to deal with this problem. In the case of Brazil, the report of the Joint Technical Commission [3] made certain recommendations regarding this matter. The U.S. is prepared, through the instrumentality of the Joint Economic Development Commission,[4] to provide such technical experts as the Brazilian Government might find useful in dealing with this problem. After consultation with other government agencies in Washington, I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the U.S. is prepared to follow the following basic principles in dealing with Brazil's materials problem: (There should follow at this point a summary of the U.S. Government position on economic items on the agenda for the emergency Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American republics, rephrased in terms of U.S.-Brazilian economic relations.)

4. It is agreed that American private investment in Brazil has over the long run been treated equitably and the American business community in Brazil is an enthusiastic supporter of the Brazilian people and of the prospects for the economic growth of Brazil. The Government of the U.S. is prepared, through the instrumentality of the Joint

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[3] The Joint Brazil–United States Technical Commission had been established in 1948. The commission's report, popularly referred to as the "Abbink Report" (after the chairman of the United States section, John Abbink), was issued on March 24, 1949, as Department of State publication 3487. For previous documentation on the commission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 364–375.

[4] The Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission had been established by a formal exchange of notes on December 19, 1950; its activities were initiated on July 19, 1951. For documentation on the establishment of the commission, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 757 ff. For Department of State press releases during 1951 concerning the commission, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, p. 814; *ibid.*, July 23, 1951, p. 156; *ibid.*, October 8, 1951, p. 581; *ibid.*, October 22, 1951, pp. 654–655. For the commission's final report, see Institute of Inter-American Affairs, *The Development of Brazil: Report of the Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission* (Washington, 1954).

Economic Development Commission to consider measures which, if adopted, would result in a satisfactory flow of private investment to Brazil within the limitations of the mobilization period. It is most doubtful, however, whether the U.S. Congress or the American people would support tax incentive devices at a time when the American public and corporations at home are being called upon for progressively higher taxes.

5. The Government of the U.S. is making every effort to integrate its lending and materials policies so that they may go hand in hand in the field of the economic development of Brazil. The principal problem is one of deciding, within the framework of Brazil's long-term requirements, which projects are of the most essential character and best adapted to meet the requirements of the joint defense effort.

6. The Government of the U.S. has had very much in mind the importance of coffee to the Brazilian economy in the formulation of its price control policies. It will be noted that price ceilings, as now applied in the U.S., are at a level for coffee approximately five times pre-war as compared with a coefficient of approximately two times pre-war for the U.S. manufactured goods which Brazil traditionally purchases from the U.S. This reveals an extraordinary improvement in the terms of trade for Brazil, an improvement which is also apparent in the case of a number of other key Brazilian exports such as cacao. The maintenance of this basically favorable situation will depend in part on the success of Brazilian anti-inflationary measures in preventing the excess domestic purchasing power being created in Brazil by these commodity prices from reflecting itself in general price and wage rises in Brazil. The U.S. is cognizant of the fact that these commodity prices are resulting in an internal source of capital for Brazil. It is important that this capital be channeled into essential sectors of the economy.

7. Reference is made to the observations contained in Paragraph 5 above.

8. The Government of the U.S. has studied the Note [5] of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regard to the establishment of a Joint Economic Development Commission and has assumed that the policy of economic reciprocity between the two countries should be based on the basic premise set forth in that Note; namely, that the primary areas in the Brazilian economy requiring the most active financial and economic cooperation between Brazil and the U.S. are: (*a*) inland transportation, (*b*) agricultural development, (*c*) power development, and (*d*) development of mineral resources. This analysis coincides with the thesis of the report of the Joint Technical Commission which pointed out that the rate of economic growth in private

[5] Not printed.

industries in the past decade had been much greater than these basic sectors of the economy, and that future economic growth in Brazil, including the growth of private industry, was dependent on a solution to the problems in these basic sectors.

The Government of the U.S. has assumed that the Joint Economic Development Commission would operate under the terms of reference of the Note from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

9. The Government of the U.S. agrees that private initiative should be encouraged.

10. In accordance with the views expressed above, the Government of the U.S. believes that the activities of the Joint Economic Development Commission and the lending activities of the Eximbank and the International Bank should be concentrated on these four basic sectors. This does not exclude the possibility that in certain special cases such as the expansion of the National Steel Mill and the construction of the alkali plant, these lending institutions would be actively interested. It is believed, however, that the essential requirements of the basic sectors of the Brazilian economy are so large that, when taken together with the sensible desire of the Brazilian Government not to so over-burden its external debt position as to threaten its future stability, private investment, Brazilian and American, should be looked to as the source of financing for individual industrial expansion and future development of Brazil's petroleum industry.

In defining the respective roles of the two lending institutions, it is believed that consideration might be given to the following *ad hoc* arrangement; it being understood that each project will have to be considered in the light of its individual merit and essentiality:

a) *Eximbank:* In view of its long history of credit operations in Brazilian railroad and shipping activities, it is believed that the Eximbank would be disposed to undertake active working relationships with the Brazilian Government and with the Joint Economic Development Commission in essential projects dealing with railroad rehabilitation and development, port works, aviation and any other essential transportation investment.

b) *International Bank:* It is believed that the International Bank, of which both the U.S. and Brazil are members, should be approached with a view to obtaining its active cooperation with the Brazilian Government and with the Joint Economic Development Commission in the development and execution of the essential projects in the field of agricultural production and energy production.

c) Both lending institutions have an interest in the field of mineral development, as demonstrated in the current Amapa and Urucum projects, and it is hoped that this interest will be continued.

Both institutions agree that proper management is a key element in economic development.

There is attached a memorandum [6] dealing with the fourteen specific economic development projects and programs set forth in the Vargas communication.

[6] Not attached to the source text. A draft copy of the memorandum in question, however, was found in the Department of State files under file number 832.00/1–3151.

Editorial Note

Between February 18–23, 1951, Assistant Secretary Miller visited Rio de Janeiro, as part of a five-country tour of South America. He had been invited by the Brazilian Government to undertake exploratory conversations with Brazilian officials concerning economic cooperation between Brazil and the United States. These discussions covered numerous topics, including Brazil's desire to negotiate a "supply agreement" to ensure an adequate flow of scarce products from the United States, the strategic materials requirements of the United States, the role of the IBRD in financing the economic development of Brazil, and the possible participation of Brazilian troops in Korea. Memoranda of the discussions are enclosed with a letter from the Counselor of Embassy in Brazil (Mills) to the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs (Kidder) in the Department of State, dated March 6, 1951 (832.00/3–651).

A second round of talks took place in Washington during the latter part of March and April. A report summarizing these talks, together with related memoranda, is enclosed with a letter from Mr. Kidder to Ambassador Johnson, dated April 24, 1951 (Rio de Janeiro Embassy Files, Lot 61 F 30, Box 123, Folder 320). None of these discussions proved conclusive or final, but it was agreed to establish at Rio de Janeiro a Joint Group on Emergency Supply Problems to determine Brazilian needs for scarce equipment and material from the United States and to consult on measures for facilitating the export of raw materials from Brazil to the United States. The agreement to set up the Joint Group was effected by an exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro, July 24, 1951, and it entered into force on the same date; for text, see TIAS No. 2301, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 2 (pt. 2), page 1594.

611.32/3–2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET RIO DE JANEIRO, March 20, 1951—2 p. m.

1206. FonMin Neves da Fontoura has given me confidentially copy ltr addressed to the Pres by Pres Vargas, original of which he will

deliver during IAM meeting. Amb Nabuco has copy which he will also give in advance to Dept on arrival Washington. Fol is translation made in Emb of copy given me by FonMin:

"Mr. President: I consider it augurs well that at the very beginning of my govt the mtg of the Mins of Fon Relations of the American Republics takes to Washington my Minister of Foreign Relations, in his first offical trip to a foreign country, who will thus be able to transmit my salutations and these brief words to Your Excellency viva voce.

At the outset, I want to tell you of the satisfaction I had in receiving Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as Your Excellency's representative during my inauguration ceremonies; this satisfaction was so great because, besides his role as Special Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Rockefeller brought the credentials of his untiring effort to strengthen inter-American relations, he being, therefore, doubly welcome among us.

The Ambassador of Brazil in Washington, in turn, told me of the friendly feelings toward Brazil which Your Excellency nourishes, and how much Your Excellency has done to facilitate his mission. I want to thank you warmly for this constant good will, understanding and help, and I dare hope that your personal interest, and that of your government, in the prosperity and well-being of Brazil will not be abated, but on the contrary, will be intensified during my administration.

As Your Excellency knows, the serious problems of maintaining political and social stability within the molds of democracy are wholly connected, in any country, with its economic development; therefore our effort, intense and resolute as it might be, cannot forego the effective application of that international cooperation which finds such a noble expression in Point IV of the program of action outlined by Your Excellency, nor the action of organizations able to facilitate our development through judicious investment of capital. It is my strong desire that there may be initiated without further delay, on the plane of concrete accomplishments, a collaboration which can only be productive and good for the future of both our countries.

On the other hand, I have given assurances to Amb Herschel Johnson that, within the limits of her possibilities, Brazil will not spare efforts or supplies which may contribute to the success of the defense program of the hemisphere.

As Your Excellency knows, it fell upon me to direct Brazilian policy during the last war when military forces of our two countries fought side by side on land, in the air and on the sea. I need add nothing to express my confidence in the future development of the relations between Brazil and the United States of America; and this confidence, far from being shaken, is fortified by the fact that certain problems of reciprocal interest are about to draw the studied attention of our govts, for I am sure that such problems will be examined on both sides in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and good will.

With high respect and best personal wishes, Most sincerely, Getulio Vargas."

JOHNSON

611.32/4–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1951—2 p. m.

744. Pres Truman recd Fon Min Fontoura Apr 9, presenting him with personal ltr to Vargas.

Ltr reciprocates greetings and assures Vargas US interest well being, prosperity Braz; states appreciation Vargas' views on importance Econ development for maintenance polit and social stability and states discussions with Braz Reps all aspects Econ problem as it concerns US–Braz relations currently being held here; re Vargas' desire initiation immediate coop, ltr assures him Pres's sincere hope Jt Comm will prod concrete accomplishments he wishes and states belief Comm will make positive constructive contribution Braz Econ development; re defense program, ltr expresses special pleasure for assurances given to Amb Johnson and says

"As you presumably already have been informed, Secy of State Acheson, acting on behalf of the Unified Command, in a recent talk with Your Excellency's Min of FonAffs explained the great assistance which cld be rendered to the United Nations effort in Korea shld it prove possible for Brazil to send an Infantry Division to participate in the combined mil effort in that area. Many Amer troops have been engaged in bitter combat against the aggressors in Korea for the past nine months and are badly in need of rest, which can become possible only as adequate replacements are made available. May I take this occasion, therefore, to urge your consideration of this matter."

Text of ltr air mailed.

ACHESON

795B.5/5–1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 10, 1951—5 p. m.

846. (For eyes of Amb only from Miller) Dept of Defense informs tel recd from Gen Ridgway [1] stating he wld welcome visit Braz Mission, Dept's 835 and 837, May 7.[2]

In informing Neves de Fontoura foregoing, you shd emphasize representations which we made to Defense that, in Dept's judgment, Braz Govt was sincere its desire send sizeable ground force Korea and that primary purpose Mission was to prepare public opinion for this move. It appears therefore inherent in situation that failure of Braz

[1] Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, in Japan; U.S. Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, in Korea.

[2] Neither printed.

to take such action subsequent visit of Mission wld have most unfav repercussions. In my judgment, therefore, Mission shd only be sent if Vargas Admin intends to make every effort obtain public and Congress support. You shd also remind Neves my understanding that it will be made clear that Braz Mission wld not be fact-finding body and wld be announced as having been formed for purpose of study various ways in which Braz cld contribute to support UN operations Korea.

In view importance Braz participation Korea,[3] for both material and psychological reasons, and if you believe it wld be helpful, you may desire raise with Neves question whether both of you shd at proper moment discuss matter with Vargas personally.

Believe receipt by you of Vargas personal assurances this matter important and that Pres Truman's direct communication Vargas this subj provides you logical basis this suggestion. [Miller.]

ACHESON

[3] In a memorandum to the Consultant to the Secretary (Pawley), dated May 31, 1951, commenting on Mr. Pawley's suggestion that a special commission be despatched to Latin America for the purpose of stimulating offers of ground forces for Korea, Mr. Miller stated in part the following: "In my opinion, the key to the question in South America is Brazil and I believe that if Brazil contributes troops, the chances are that one or more of the other countries will follow suit." (795B.5/5–3151)

Rio de Janeiro Embassy Files, Lot 61 F 30, Folder 523.1

The Counselor of Embassy in Brazil (Mills) to the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs (Kidder)

TOP SECRET RIO DE JANEIRO, May 21, 1951.

OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

DEAR RANDY: I received this morning your Confidential letter of May 15, 1951,[1] enclosing Ed Moline's memorandum of May 3 to Ivan White on "Brazil's Proposed Petroleum Development Program" and a memorandum of the same date entitled "Brazil's Petroleum Demand and Program for Petroleum Development" prepared by Ortiz of PED.

Without doubt you have seen the Ambassador's Top Secret telegram 1503 of May 21[2] for the attention of Assistant Secretary Miller. It stresses the political importance which the Brazilians attach to receiving from us the equipment for both prospecting and refining which they have on order.

No one in the Department needs to be told of the nationalistic fervor surrounding the petroleum problem in almost every country which has hopes of developing self sufficiency in this field. Brazil, as you well know, is no exception.

[1] Neither the letter nor its enclosures are printed.
[2] Not printed.

I make this well known observation merely as a reminder that many things of great importance to us may be influenced greatly by the way in which we handle the Brazilian request for assistance in purchasing petroleum equipment with their own resources. It is not unlikely that there are persons both inside and outside the Department arguing with sincerity that we should insist that Brazil accept the participation of private capital in both refining and exploration on the terms which such private capital has to date been willing to offer and to force such acceptance we should ration equipment releases.

From the Ortiz memorandum I judge that PED can make a case for the equipment either way on defense grounds. The nub of the matter as we see it, however, lies in the last sentence which reads as follows:

"To encourage the continuance and intensification of this alliance sympathetic consideration should be given to Brazil's economic development programs, particularly in so far as they can be integrated into the over-all Western Hemisphere defense effort."

The program which is dearest to the Brazilian heart is the petroleum program, both refining and exploration. If we do not wish the alliance to go sour in other fields, we should be slow to use the screws of "short supply" to prevent Brazil from obtaining equipment.

I think you are the one person in the Department who, because of your fairly recent residence here, fully realizes the emotional dynamite in this question and what damage could be done to the overall relationship if the Brazilians become convinced we are "welshing" on what they undoubtedly consider a commitment to help them buy petroleum equipment with their own money.[3]

Sincerely, SHELDON T. MILLS

[3] In a letter to Ambassador Johnson, dated July 5, 1951, Mr. Kidder stated in part the following: "Procuring petroleum equipment for the Brazilians is a tough, uphill fight in which we so far have the support and the good will of people in the Petroleum Policy Staff, in the Petroleum Administration for Defense, and in the Office of International Trade. The three-man group studying petroleum refinery equipment is working hard and is in close touch with the representatives in New York of the National Petroleum Council and with the American firms working for the Council. Progress is being made but it is impossible to come out with a flat approval of all of Brazil's requests for equipment. The situation is becoming increasingly tighter . . . and refinery equipment must go to places where it will produce optimum results. Brazil's case can be argued on several grounds but, when analyzed alongside other requirements for petroleum equipment, its case boils down to the paramount political considerations about which you and Shelly have written. We have made the strongest possible case based on those considerations." (832.2547/6–2551)

795B.5/5–2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 28, 1951—6 p. m.

900. For Amb from Miller. If import FonMin comments re proposed trip to US Góes Monteiro [1] is that decision and public announcement Braz troops Korea would be delayed until after trip,[2] suggest you emphasize to Fontoura fol considerations:

(1) Almost two months already elapsed since question first raised with Braz del here;

(2) Several months will necessarily elapse after any decision sent troops before their actual participation Korea due to equipping, training and transport requirements;

(3) US public, press, and Congress becoming increasingly critical disproportionate US share total UN responsibility in Korea. Specific ref made LA and it is anticipated this question will be raised in Congressional Comtes examining proposed Pt IV and mil aid proposals for LA in few weeks time;

(4) In view foregoing, highly desirable this matter expedited fullest extent possible,[3] and it is hoped recent UN successes Korea will improve atmosphere in Braz;

(5) Not clear your communications that Vargas has adopted definite position this matter, and it is hoped therefore that you will have opportunity discuss matter with him personally.

[Miller]
ACHESON

[1] Gen. Pedro Aurélio Góes Monteiro, Chief of the General Staff, Brazilian Armed Forces.

[2] In telegram 1526, from Rio de Janeiro, May 24, 1951, Ambassador Johnson had reported that President Vargas had approved a trip to the United States by General Góes Monteiro, and that Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura had "intimated main purpose Monteiro's visit US wld be discuss 'with Gen Marshall' and high mil auths extent, nature and time Braz mil participation." (795B.5/5–2451)

[3] In telegram 1558, from Rio de Janeiro, May 31, 1951, Ambassador Johnson stated in part the following: "I think it in our interest go slowly for short time, giving Fontoura full opportunity make his case with Pres in conjunction mil authorities, who already, according FonMin's statements, support his thesis subject to prior assurance Braz's internal security. . . . We have powerful leverages particularly in econ field which cld be called into play but wld be greatly our advantage for Vargas admin come to decision without any appearance pressure from US." (795B.5/5–3151). In telegram 916, to Rio de Janeiro, June 1, 1951, the Secretary indicated that the Department agreed with the Ambassador's views (795B.5/5–3151).

832.2546/6–1351

The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Neves da Fontoura)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL RIO DE JANEIRO, June 11, 1951.
No. 493

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has accepted the recommendations set forth in the attached *aide-mémoire* in reference to the purchase of monazite and products derived from monazite which are produced in Brazil. The text of this *aide-mémoire* was prepared in Washington and sent to the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro by the Department of State.

Upon receipt of a note from Your Excellency indicating that the Government of the United States of Brazil also accepts the recommendations to supply the quantities of monazite and products of monazite specified in the accompanying *aide-mémoire*, the Government of the United States of America will undertake to negotiate a purchase contract for the cited materials.

Please accept [etc.] HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

[Enclosure]

The United States Embassy in Brazil to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

Aide-mémoire of conversations

held April 2nd, 4th, 5th and 10th, 1951 [2] between representatives of Brazil and the United States regarding procurement by the United States of monazite and monazite products from Brazil for the emergency needs of the defense effort.

The representatives of both countries gave careful consideration in these conversations not only to the urgent needs of the defense effort, but also in particular to Brazil's future needs and to the importance of developing in Brazil a Brazilian industry for increased processing of crude monazite into its various components as part of the program for the industrialization of Brazil.

As a result of these conversations the representatives agreed to recommend to their respective governments for consideration the following proposals:

a. The Government of the United States and the Government of Brazil would enter into an agreement, for a term of three years from

[1] Enclosure to despatch 1854, from Rio de Janeiro, June 13, 1951, which is not printed (832.2546/6–1351).

[2] These conversations took place in Washington.

its inception, under which Brazil would sell and the United States would buy monazite and monazite products produced and processed in Brazil in accordance with prices, specifications and schedules of shipment to be set forth in such agreement.

b. In order to further the policy of Brazil of encouraging industrialization, the United States would during the term of this agreement purchase from Brazil all of its output of thorium salts and from Brazilian industry all of its output of rare earth chlorides up to an annual amount of 2,500 tons; it being understood that if Brazilian industry is able to produce additional monazite products the United States will purchase such additional products produced during the period of the agreement to the extent that such products are necessary to the defense effort and meet the specifications of the United States; it being also understood that if Brazilian industry is able to produce more than 2,500 tons of rare earth chlorides during any year of such agreement the United States will purchase such additional output to the extent that it is necessary for the defense effort.

c. In order to meet the urgent needs of the defense effort Brazil will use its best efforts, and the United States will use its best efforts to assist Brazil, to increase the production of crude monazite so as to make available the raw material required by the processing industry of Brazil and in addition to supply to the United States for the emergency needs of defense during each of the three years of the agreement up to 2,500 tons of crude monazite; it being understood that Brazil will sell to the United States 2,500 tons of crude monazite during each of the three years of the agreement subject only to Brazil's inability, with the full assistance of the United States, to produce that quantity of crude monazite over and above the requirements of Brazil's industry for processing under the agreement.

d. The United States and Brazil will promptly explore ways in which production of crude monazite in Brazil and the processing of monazite by Brazilian industry may be increased with the assistance of the United States in order to promote the industrialization of Brazil, aid in the defense effort and carry out the purposes of the agreement.

e. If an agreement setting forth these proposals is acceptable to Brazil, negotiation of its terms in detail and its execution by the respective governments will be concluded without delay.[3]

APRIL 10, 1951.

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[3] In a memorandum to Ambassador Johnson, dated June 19, 1951, the Chief of the Economic and Consular Department of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Bueno do Prado) stated in part that the proposals contained in the *aide-mémoire* were acceptable in principle to Brazil, and he requested the United States to indicate in detail the type of assistance it was prepared to give to increase production of raw monazite and to develop the industrial processing of this product in Brazil, This memorandum is enclosure No. 1 to despatch 1932, from Rio de Janeiro, June 22, 1951, not printed (832.2546/6-2251).

795B.5/7–551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY RIO DE JANEIRO, July 5, 1951—8 p. m.

27. Embtel 1750, June 29, 8 p. m.[1] I had talk yesterday with Pres Vargas. He extended warm congratulations and good wishes for US and Amer people on Independence Day. I thanked him and expressed satisfaction declaration his Govt made June 30, Embtel 1, July 2.[1] I said further I knew he fully conversant with various talks I had had with FonMin Neves Fontoura re mil situation Korea and importance my govt attached to Brazilian support and participation UN effort. I did not recapitulate my talks with FonMin but referred to close collaboration Brazil in two world wars and long history friendship and understanding as background our feeling this precious collaboration of Brazil was something very much needed now. I had impression Pres reaction these comments entirely friendly and understanding. He made reference to past collaboration between two countries and said Brazil had every desire support and stand by US in present emergency, and to implement fully her obligations to UN. He referred to note [2] to be sent Secy Gen Lie [3] in reply latter's appeal for mil support Korea and commented note contained reaffirmation Brazil's determination fulfill obligations she has assumed. Gen Góes Monteiro going US discuss manner Brazilian implementation those obligations.

Pres spoke of polit realities in Brazil, of necessity preparing and leading public opinion accept and support Brazilian mil participation abroad; moment not arrived when polit practicable make public declaration re Brazilian mil contingents overseas. He referred to internal conditions, particularly to insidious Commie propaganda and subversive activities and said they were causing him concern, that it is of primary importance govt have this situation under control and insure internal security of country. Gist his remarks this connection was internal security country wld have to come ahead of fon commitments. Pres not emphatic in speaking of any these matters but seemed to me his meaning was entirely clear.

I then told Pres of our concern re supply certain raw materials from Brazil and thanked him for his action our request re beryllium.[4] Pres reaffirmed promises previously made that he wld do everything possible meet US defense needs raw materials. I mentioned urucum

[1] Not printed.

[2] A copy of this note, dated July 3, 1951, is enclosed with despatch 43, from Rio de Janeiro, July 9, 1951, not printed (795B.5/7–951).

[3] Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

[4] In telegram 5, from Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1951, Ambassador Johnson informed the Secretary that the Brazilian Government had agreed to issue the necessary export licenses permitting the export of beryllium to the United States up to the 1,500 tons previously authorized by President Vargas, but not exported during the first six months of 1951. (411.329/7–351)

manganese matter without going into details, for I knew he familiar with it, he stated delays were due to causes "of an internal character" relating to legal validity concessions made by state Matto Grosso which in all probability he said shld be by fed govt. He hoped have matter satisfactorily settled in about "two weeks".

Re sobramil contract manganese urucum FonMin Neves Fontoura has told me in strict confidence that although legal impediment is reality, real core long delay is Pres Vargas objection to Chama Brothers. Their participation this undertaking not liked by Pres nor, according FonMin, by Brazilian mil and FonMin believes Chama Brothers will be put out. Pres Vargas made no mention this. Our opinion in Emb FonMin correct re Chama Brothers being source trouble. Not clear why this shld be if they have acquired legal right. That however as we see it here is entirely internal Brazilian matter no concern ours. FonMin sees no question any quarter as to Brazilian govt's desire for US obtain this manganese nor any objection to US Steel as working agent.

No suggestion in Pres attitude nor in anything he said during interview that there anything but sympathetic understanding US, position Korean situation. He concerned mainly with what are polit and practical possibilities as he sees them for Brazilian action. His whole attitude was frank, friendly and interested in US. He seems preoccupied with two things: (1) econ development Brazil. He mentioned joint Brazilian US econ comm two or three times and said he extremely impatient for it get to work soonest. (2) Internal security country. Spread Commie propaganda and insidious activity its agents and leaders is increasing and causing him serious concern. He not satisfied with quality Brazilian police nor present measures to combat and contain Commie activity. Although he gave no impression being alarmed he apparently shares known concern of mil authorities re this situation.

JOHNSON

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26[1]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Burrows)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1951.[2]

Subject: Korean and Uniting for Peace Aid From Brazil

Participants: S—The Secretary
General Goes Monteiro, Chief of the General Staff of Brazilian Armed Forces

[1] Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953.

[2] Department of State files indicate that this conversation took place on August 2.

Mr. Mauricio Nabuco, Brazilian Ambassador
AR—Mr. Burrows

General Goes Monteiro presented his compliments and said that in connection with the business which brought him to Washington [3] he was making his first formal call at the Department of State. He handed me a letter [4] from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, João Neves da Fontoura. I told General Goes Monteiro that on behalf of my Government I was happy to extend him a welcome to Washington.

General Goes Monteiro explained his mission as being in direct connection with his country's interest in and desire to comply with its United Nations commitments and said that he was here to discuss with the proper authorities of the UN and of the Unified Command not only Brazil's interest in compliance with Secretary General Trygve Lie's June 22 request for additional troops in Korea and the Uniting for Peace Resolution,[5] but also the best way in which Brazil might so strengthen her economic and military position as to make that help effective. I then mentioned to General Goes Monteiro my conversation with his Foreign Minister last April during the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States with reference to the possibility of Brazil making troops available to the Unified Command in Korea. I said that when I had spoken to Dr. Neves da Fontoura at that time the fighting war in Korea was in a phase of great activity, that there had been some change in the status of the Korean situation since then and that there was now some possibility (but only a possibility) of an armistice, but there was still a need for troops and would be a continuing need whether or not an armistice was actually signed.

General Goes Monteiro discussed in some detail the Brazilian desire from the beginning to cooperate with the UN forces in the Korean affair, but described the difficulties which his country had faced in making such cooperation effective in terms of the contribution of fighting forces by reference to Brazil's difficulties in transportation and communications facilities, as well as basic economic factors. He stressed in this the advantage which had been taken of these difficulties by the Communists and said that their propaganda had been a continuing factor which Brazil had been unable to ignore at any time. Now however, the General said, Brazil was ready to discuss with the UN and the Unified Command in Korea how best she could help, how

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[3] Gen. Góes Monteiro was in the United States from late July to late October 1951.

[4] Not printed.

[5] For text, see Resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly, November 30, 1950, in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20* (A/1775), pp. 10–12. For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 371 ff.

the obstacles still remaining in the path of effective Brazilian cooperation could best be overcome. He said that naturally in approaching this problem Brazil was anxious to talk first with her good friend and ally, the United States.

I responded by recalling that Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura, in his conversation with me last April, had spoken of the difficulties presented by the domestic situation of Brazil and by Communist propaganda there and I said that the present situation in Korea, with the possibility for an armistice, has undoubtedly changed the circumstances in terms of Brazil's domestic situation and has also undoubtedly made action of this kind (the sending of troops) less difficult to accomplish in the face of opposing propaganda. I also said that when I spoke to Dr. Neves da Fontoura I had been able to call to his attention the possibility of aid in terms of equipment and training which could be given Brazilian troops for Korea. I said that this was still true and that as a matter of fact, legislation now pending may soon make possible military aid of another kind. I said that we were gratified by the terms of General Goes Monteiro's mission and that we would be only too happy to facilitate in any way the General's conversations and mission here.

General Goes Monteiro asked whom he should see and I suggested that he might first see Assistant Secretary Miller,[6] then General Bolté,[7] Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, and perhaps Mr. Cabot [8] of ISA. General Goes Monteiro said that he would follow my suggestion and would discuss his business with these gentlemen in all the detail necessary and desirable. I ended the conversation by speaking of my satisfaction that Brazil now has a great opportunity to continue the leadership in Latin America which it has always exercised and said that by a happy circumstance Brazil is in a position now to achieve at least three advantages by one action; she can increase her prestige, she can obtain special and very valuable training for some of her troops, and she has an opportunity to obtain some military equipment. I said that the United States would consider it a privilege to be able to cooperate with Brazil in achieving these ends.

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[6] A memorandum of conversation between Mr. Miller, Gen. Góes Monteiro, and others, by Mr. Burrows, dated August 2, 1951, is filed under Department of State decimal file number 732.551/8–251.

[7] Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté; a memorandum of conversation between Gen. Bolté, Gen. Góes Monteiro, and others, by Lt. Daniel F. Resendes, dated August 6, 1951, is filed under decimal file number 732.5/8–951.

[8] Thomas D. Cabot, Director, International Security Affairs; a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Cabot, General Góes Monteiro, and others, by Mr. Kidder, dated August 13, 1951, is filed under decimal file number 732.00/8–1351.

832.2546/6–2251 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 9, 1951.

A–87. Reference is made to Embassy's despatch 1932 of June 22, 1951,[1] and the Department's telegram No. 26 of July 6, 1951.[1] While regretting the delay thus entailed, it was felt that careful consideration was required for the suggestion contained in enclosure No. 1 of the cited despatch, that the US state precisely the kind of aid it is disposed to lend to Brazil in line with the commitments undertaken in the *aide-mémoire* of April 10.[2]

Generally, the US is prepared to consider any reasonable request directly related to assisting Brazil to meet its commitments. These involve primarily (1) the ability of Brazil to produce sufficient crude monazite to meet domestic requirements in Brazil and to ship to the US 2500 tons during each of the three years of the Agreement; (2) the ability of Brazil to process sufficient monazite to produce 2500 tons of rare earth chlorides annually during the three year period.

While the US Government is prepared to implement its commitments under paragraphs C and D of the *aide-mémoire*, it is difficult if not impossible for the US to indicate in any detail the nature of the aid it is prepared to give, since there is no information at hand to indicate what may be needed by Brazil to carry out the commitments it has undertaken in the *aide-mémoire*.

It is suggested, therefore, that the Embassy, utilizing personnel presently available, explore with appropriate Brazilian officials the question of required assistance in an effort to define the general areas in which help will be needed. If desirable, specific questions may be referred to the Department for appropriate handling. Where the situation requires it, consideration will be given to sending to Brazil a technician well qualified to deal with the particular problem presented.

It is suggested that the first point of attack on the problem in Brazil might well be the production of adequate quantities of the raw monazite, which will form the basis for the processing in Brazil and at the same time permit a start to be made on the shipments of monazite to the US. It may be added that the US Government is prepared now to enter into discussions with appropriate Brazilian authorities, looking to the prompt purchase by the US of all thorium residues which may be available in Brazil.

For Embassy's information only, while the US is prepared to carry out its obligation under the *aide-mémoire* to assist Brazil in expanding its monazite processing facilities, and to purchase annually for a

[1] Not printed.

[2] See the enclosure with Ambassador Johnson's note to Brazilian Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura, June 11, 1951, p. 1201.

period of three years, 2500 tons of rare earth chlorides produced in Brazil, some thought has been given to the possibility that in meeting this demand, Brazilian processing facilities may be built up above a level which could be economically sustained after the expiration of the US purchase commitment. If, as now seems likely, the US requirement for rare earths can in a matter of two years be met entirely from raw materials produced in the US, the Brazilian market for this product will be considerably diminished after the US purchase obligation expires. In this connection, if it seems helpful to the Brazilian authorities, the US would undoubtedly be prepared, while purchasing the raw monazite on schedule, to consider extending beyond the contemplated three years, the period during which it will purchase from Brazil the total of 7500 tons of rare earth chlorides now planned to be delivered within three years.

If, in its preliminary determination of the kind of assistance needed from the US, a loan appears likely, it would be of some significance to know whether such a loan would probably be made to or guaranteed by the Brazilian Government.[3]

ACHESON

[3] The substance of this airgram was incorporated into note No. 97, dated August 21, 1951, and handed to Minister Bueno do Prado on the same date by Mr. Mills at the Embassy in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro Embassy Files, Lot 61 F 30, Box 127, Folder 523.5). The Department of State files indicate that the Brazilian Government did not formally respond to this note.

832.00-TA/8-951

The United States Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Bohan)[1] to the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs (Kidder)

CONFIDENTIAL RIO DE JANEIRO, August 9, 1951.

DEAR RANDY: I am enclosing copy of a letter dated June 15, 1951, from Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, to Mr. Truslow. I am sending you this copy, as you were not sure whether it was in the files in Washington, and also because it gives me a chance to give you a bit of background on a problem that may become quite serious.

You will recall that you felt that the bark of this letter was probably worse than its bite, and I am inclined to believe, from reading the files, that Mr. Truslow also felt this way about it. I cannot be as optimistic.

[1] Mr. Bohan had been appointed interim United States Commissioner on the Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission after the death of the original Commissioner, Francis Adams Truslow, on July 8, 1951, and he served in that capacity until the appointment of J. Burke Knapp as Commissioner on September 28, 1951.

One of the principal reasons for my having become so frustrated that I asked for retirement at the tender age of fifty was the general attitude of the Export Import Bank vis-à-vis Mexico. As the Economic Counselor of the American Embassy in Mexico City, I was called upon to try to get for the United States practically eighty percent of what it wanted from Mexico, and yet the Embassy was most effectively short-circuited when it came to what Mexico wanted from the United States, i.e. credits from the Export-Import Bank.

As I read over Mr. Gaston's letter, I cannot help but be struck by the difference in the attitude he takes from that of the International Bank. I am very sure that the International Bank has not given the Joint Commission the power of veto. I am equally sure that the International Bank has a "deep and continuing interest in the welfare of Brazil and—concern that the prosperity of that country shall not be endangered by its entering prematurely into undertakings which may be more attractive than timely." In other words, my opinion is that the International Bank reserves the same rights that the Export-Import Bank does with this difference. Mr. Gaston takes the position that it is his bank and not the combined judgment of the United States Government and the Joint Commission that is to make policy; in other words, the Export-Import Bank is a government within a government.

You know that I have the kindest feelings towards Mr. Gaston, but I think that the Export-Import Bank has forgotten that it is only part of a whole and not the whole. I realize that the problem must be solved, not with a shillaly [*shillelagh?*] but with diplomacy, I certainly hope that matters can be worked out so that the overall policies of the United States towards the Joint Commission can be carried out by Mr. Knapp and that the prestige of the Commission will not be as adversely affected in Brazil as the American Embassy in Mexico City was affected by the lack of cooperation on the part of the Export-Import Bank.

Sincerely yours,

MERWIN L. BOHAN

[Enclosure]

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1951.

DEAR MR. TRUSLOW: If I thought an agreement formalizing relations between the Export-Import Bank and the U.S. Brazilian Commission to be necessary or advisable I should have several reservations to make to what you propose in your letter of June 8. But I don't see any real point to such an agreement. I am ignorant of the provisions of your agreement with the International Bank, nor do I know anything about the negotiations between that institution and the Brazilian Government which preceded that agreement. In any event the situa-

tions of the two institutions are not quite comparable since this Bank is an agency of the United States.

However, it is quite easy to outline what seems to be the reasonable course for this Bank to pursue, having in mind the existence of the Joint Commission and its general objectives as set forth in Section 410 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950.

In its operations in International Bank member countries this Bank will be guided by the advices of the National Advisory Council, which define generally the scope of this Bank and the International Bank and stipulate that neither Bank shall establish a monopoly of lending in any country. We should not feel ourselves warranted in subscribing to any understanding or agreement which would have the effect of modifying or evading the Council's action or the responsibilities of the Directors under the provisions of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 or any other legislation affecting the Bank.

We shall be happy, of course, to cooperate as fully as we can with the Commission under the limitations I have mentioned. We do not intend to keep any secrets from the Commission as to our operations in Brazil. We should expect to use what seems to us to be the normal channel of communications; that is, the State Department, but are disposed to take special steps to see that the State Department supplies to you all information which may be helpful, including summaries of any applications and action taken on them.

As I mentioned to you in our conversation at lunch the other day, this would include information on loan applications not eligible for International Bank financing because a National Government guaranty is not offered or is not found to be requisite. It would include also projects in which the United States has a special interest, such as strategic materials projects, as well as proposed exporter credits for machinery or materials where there is substantial participation by the supplier, and also supplemental credits for projects to which large commitments have already been made by this Bank.

We should welcome the views of the Commission on any of these matters, but we could not under any circumstances concede a veto power to the Commission on any proposed loan. We should expect that the Commission, where it has strong contrary views, would present them to the National Advisory Council directly or through the medium of the State Department. We shall ourselves be willing to consider such objections carefully and give great weight to them and if we are not convinced we should be willing ourselves to forward the Commission's objections to the National Advisory Council.

I make these observations because of our deep and continuing interest in the welfare of Brazil and our concern that the prosperity of that country shall not be endangered by its entering prematurely into undertakings which may be more attractive than timely. We cannot

fail also to note that this Bank is the custodian of obligations to the United States to the extent of more than $96,000,000 out of credits to the amount of more than $203,000,000 extended for Brazilian development beginning in 1939.

In view of this record it would seem appropriate that we be supplied with information as to projects undertaken and contemplated through the advice of the Joint Commission and we should be grateful also for any new information the Commission may feel free to supply to us on Brazilian balance of payments and budget conditions and prospects.

One of the salient features of recent Brazilian economic history has been the long-continued dollar shortage, only very recently overcome, which caused officers of the Brazilian Government two years ago to discuss with us the prospects of an exchange loan to cover accumulated arrearages in dollar payments for merchandise, and we cannot ignore the fact that budget shortages continuing up to the present have seriously embarrassed at least one project toward which we had made large loan commitments in dollars.

We expect to continue our own studies of these matters to guide us in our Brazilian loan policy. But we should be grateful for any help that the Joint Commission feels warranted in extending to us.

Sincerely, HERBERT E. GASTON

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951.

DEAR MATT: I feel that I owe you some explanation for having caused General Bolté to telegraph you some time ago about the proposed Brazilian mission to Korea about which you have heard no more. All of us here have been disappointed in recent weeks as it has been increasingly apparent to us that the Brazilian Government is not going to take decisive action in this matter.

During the Foreign Ministers Conference which was held in Washington in March and April, Secretary Acheson and General Bolté had a very frank and apparently successful discussion with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Neves da Fontoura, and his principal military advisers about the need of their sending a division to Korea. The Foreign Minister's response and that of his military advisers was apparently most favorable and our hopes were aroused that we would get some definite action from Brazil. Subsequently, the Foreign Minister broached to me his idea of a Brazilian mission to Korea along the lines which General Bolté telegraphed you about, the purpose of which

was to pave the way, through arousing public opinion, for an effective military contribution by Brazil. The Foreign Minister was very pleased when we were able to notify him just before his return to Rio in May that SCAFE was agreeable to the idea of a mission. Immediately upon the Minister's arrival in Rio he began what seemed to us to be a determined campaign to bring about a prompt decision and he had a number of enthusiastic conversations with Ambassador Johnson. His efforts were apparently aided by the return of General Estillac Leal, the Brazilian War Minister, to Rio after a very successful official visit to the United States [1] who also seemed to favor in principle sending troops to Korea. At some point thereafter, for reasons unknown to us, the proposed mission to Korea ceased to be mentioned. Possibly the reason may have been that when the Foreign Minister had made some equivocal public statements about troops to Korea after his return from the Conference, I wired Ambassador Johnson to tell the Brazilians in no uncertain terms that they should not send the mission to Korea unless there was a bona fide intention in the first instance to send the troops. It did not seem to me wise to bother you with junketeers or to institute the precedent of sending missions as sort of trial balloons to test public sentiment.

In any event, instead of the mission to Korea we have your old friend General Goes Monteiro now visiting Washington for the alleged purpose of conducting discussions with the American military authorities as to Brazilian military cooperation, etc. The purpose of his trip is extremely vague and, although the General speaks in terms of Brazil's implementing its international commitments and arousing public opinion in support of this objective, he spent the greater part of his talks with General Bolté and me recently in rehashing the familiar Brazilian complaints against the United States. All of this could be a prelude simply to an eventual request for military equipment which, of course, would be very difficult to comply with so that there is grave danger that General Goes Monteiro will return from what appears to be an ill-advised venture with his hands empty, thus setting back rather than forward our chances of real military cooperation from Brazil.

I have wanted you to have the full story as to why you did not hear more about the proposed military mission to Korea. I doubt that you will hear about it again, at least for the time being. However, we will keep after the matter.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

[1] Maj. Gen. Estillac Leal visited the United States in May; documents pertaining to his visit are in decimal file 033.3211.

732.5811/8–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs (Kidder)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1951.

Subject: Discussion with General Goes Monteiro on His Mission to U.S.

Participants: Brazilians:
General Goes Monteiro, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces; Colonel Sardenberg,[1] Aide to General Goes Monteiro; Colonel Coelho [2]
Americans:
General Sibert,[3] Inter-American Defense Board; Mr. William Sanders, UNA; Mr. Kidder, OSA

This morning at 10 o'clock General Sibert and Messrs. Sanders and Kidder called on General Goes Monteiro at his home in Bethesda. The meeting had been arranged on our initiative. General Goes was assisted by the two Colonels listed above.

The first third of the conversation was of a general nature. General Goes reiterated some of the statements which he had made in earlier conversations during his visit and discussed his activities on the Political Defense Committee [4] in Montevideo, where he and Mr. Sanders were colleagues. General Sibert brought the conversation around to the business which we wished to discuss. He informed General Goes that we were fully authorized to discuss with the General matters which had brought him to the United States. He said that he would like to explain our position from the military point of view and that either Mr. Sanders or Mr. Kidder could discuss any political or economic aspects of matters relating to General Goes' mission.

Goes Monteiro produced a lengthy document, apparently his written instructions received from President Vargas. He read to us an 8-point resume of the instructions included in the body of the document. He is instructed as follows:

1. To make clear that Brazil's first priority is the securing of its internal stability. Until Brazil's internal security is assured, it would not be possible to send troops to Korea.

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[1] Idalio Sardenberg.
[2] Lt. Col. Mario Perdigão Coelho, Brazilian Air Force.
[3] Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board.
[4] Reference is to the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, established by Resolution XVII of the Third Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, which met at Rio de Janeiro, January 15–28, 1942; for text of the resolution, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 7, 1942, p. 128. For documentation on the Third Meeting of Consultation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. v, pp. 6 ff. For documentation on the Committee for Political Defense, see *ibid.*, pp. 74 ff. and 2 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1944, vol. VII, pp. 1 ff.

2. Brazil's second priority is its economic development. Brazil must develop itself industrially and problems of transportation and power must be solved. Solving of these problems is of direct interest to the United States as regards the supplying by Brazil of scarce strategic minerals.

3. This point in its first section merely amplified the need for development of transportation and power. A second section related to the need on the military side of the improvement of air and naval bases.

4. The General was to make clear that Brazilian assistance in Korea and in defense of the free world if a third world war should break out would depend upon the amount and speed of the economic and military assistance received from the United States. The greater the help received from the United States, the sooner Brazil could act. As of the moment, the Brazilian Government is unable to determine the date when it can carry out its obligations to the United Nations as that date will depend upon the speed of its preparations.

5. The General was to emphasize that failure to secure Brazil's internal situation (i.e., control Communism) and to build up its industrial strength would jeopardize not only Brazil but the security of the whole continent.

6. In case of war Brazil could, if given assistance as of now, defend itself and its coastline.

7. The General was to demand for Brazil the right to be charged with the full defense of its own coastline. (He expressed the personal view that if war should break out within a year Brazil, even with help, could not take responsibility for the defense of its coast and of lines of communication in the South Atlantic. This is particularly true because Brazil has no details as to the capacity of the enemy in, for example, submarine warfare. He believes that Soviet strength in submarines will be at least as great as that of Germany during the last war.)

8. The above points are to be stressed so as to show that President Vargas' primary interest is to guarantee the internal situation of the country. That is his first consideration which must be met before he can meet external obligations. Nevertheless, Brazil intends to meet its UN obligations and will bend every effort in that direction.

General Sibert thanked Goes Monteiro for his extreme frankness and for his clear exposition of his instructions. He said he would like to speak every bit as frankly in an effort to make clear the reaction both of the U.S. Government and of U.S. public opinion. He then outlined the military priorities assigned by Defense to the principal geographic areas of the world: (1) Korea; (2) Europe; (3) Far East and Southeast Asia; (4) Middle East; (5) Northern part of the Western Hemisphere; (6) Latin America: (*a*) Caribbean area and (*b*) the rest of Latin America. Goes Monteiro said he fully understood the reasons for the assignment of the priorities and, in fact, could himself make a good argument in support of them.

General Sibert then made the following points:

(1) We can do a great deal to assist Brazil through the provision of equipment to strengthen its potential for police action to guarantee its internal security.

(2) We cannot, however, provide the crucial weapons of modern war which are already in such short supply that we do not have enough to meet the needs of the first three categories under our priority setup.

(3) Brazilian participation in Korea would lift Brazil from category 6 to category 1.

(4) The United States hopes that Brazil will be able to provide troops, preferably a division, for Korea. We will be able to supply a division with everything that it needs and to provide technical assistance and training. We would provide transportation to pick the troops up at Brazilian ports and would provide fully for their care until they should be returned to Brazil. We would provide everything except replacement of personnel, which Brazil would have to organize in such a way that there would be a constant flow of replacements from Brazil to keep the division at full strength. We would provide for the return of the wounded and disabled to Brazil.

(5) Our help would be on the basis of a loan to be negotiated for future payment. Terms for that loan would have to be realistic.

(6) The $40,000,000 which we are asking from Congress for military aid to Latin America [5] is not in any way related to participation in Korea but only to continental defense. Whether or not $40,000,000 is granted is a matter which is entirely up to Congress. If we do receive that sum, it will be the only military aid at our disposal which is not related to Korea. The distribution of the $40,000,000 will be in the hands of the Defense Department. Even so, public opinion must influence the distribution of those funds. General Sibert added that he need not point out the effect that Brazilian participation in Korea would have on public opinion.

Following the above points, General Sibert said he would like to make a few general observations about public opinion. He pointed out that there are large segments of public opinion in the United States which are opposed to our continued involvment in Korea. The Korean war is becoming increasingly unpopular with those persons and another winter campaign will increase impatience. Participation by other nations would have a valuable psychological effect and as well would enable us to follow a system of rotation which would have a favorable effect on American public opinion. The General added that our resources are limited and that we are near the bottom of the barrel.

Immediately before adjourning the meeting, General Sibert said that an immediate offer of participation by Brazil would have an important psychological effect upon the United States, but he added that we would understand if the Brazilians felt it necessary to keep any preparations or agreements secret. General Goes Monteiro replied that, for various reasons which he had mentioned during his conversation, particularly the formation of favorable public opinion in Brazil, it would be necessary for any arrangements to be kept completely secret for not less than six months.

[5] For documentation pertaining to the military grant aid program for Latin America, see pp. 985 ff.

The meeting concluded with agreement to meet again at 10 o'clock on Monday, August 20.

732.5/8–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1951.

191. At mtg Goes Monteiro, Gen Sibert, Sanders, and Kidder Aug 20,[1] Goes outlined Braz order mil priorities within which we might be able find solution problem Braz's desire meet UN commitments and send troops Korea. Order priorities is (1) internal security; (2) hemisphere defense; and (3) preparation mil unit meet other international obligations and be at disposal UN.

Goes proposed immed recommend to his Govt that it (1) approve Inter-Amer Defense Bd plan;[2] (2) consider revitalization JBUSMC and JBUS Defense Bd with functions expanded along lines those in effect during war; (3) consider joint mtg reps of two Comms, including reps State and FonOff, to work on details implementation any plans agreed upon; and (4) immed commence formation mil unit which cld fight anywhere outside continent. According to Goes, any publicity re formation mil unit wld necessarily picture it as for hemisphere defense but secret plan wld envisage use outside continent at disposal UN. Depending on conclusions reached at current talks, unit wld be up to one Div and cld include air and navy elements. Goes suggested Sibert meet with three mil Attaches Braz Emb and with his aide, Col Sardenberg, work out details. Meeting sched Aug 24.[3]

Sibert told Goes that US cld not equip proposed Braz mil unit unless Braz moved to top category our defense priority scheme; that to effect this we must have agreement (1) stating unit being prepared for Korea and (2) setting forth size of unit and time limit on period preparation. Goes replied agreement wld have to be secret, that unit wld be up to a Div, and preparation wld require minimum six months.

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[1] A memorandum of this conversation, by Mr. Kidder, dated August 20, 1951, not printed, is filed under Department of State decimal file number 732.5811/8–2051.

[2] Apparent reference to the Inter-American Common Defense Scheme, approved by the Inter-American Defense Board, October 27, 1950, and by the Department of State, January 15, 1951; for information, see Secretary Marshall's letter to Secretary Acheson, December 16, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 679.

[3] During late August and September, General Sibert met frequently with Brazilian military representatives to draft a military understanding between the United States and Brazil, which would include provision for a Brazilian contribution of armed forces for service in Korea. Mr. Edward A. Jamison, Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs, attended these meetings. Documents pertaining to the negotiations are in several Department of State decimal files, principally 732.5, 732.5–MSP, 732.5811, and 795B.5.

He plans make further recommendations his Govt as soon as informal agreement reached Wash.

Balance 2½ hr talk devoted largely full, clear exposition by Goes of reasons for Braz's system priorities, including frank statement Vargas' need consolidate position. Goes states, although realizing problem is mil, and econ aid matters presently being centered in Jt Comm Rio, there are complementary remarks re econ aid he wishes make as econ factors basic; this is to subj third meeting Aug 22.

Urtels 257 and 263 [4] extremely useful.

ACHESON

[4] Neither printed.

732.5/8–2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 23, 1951—8 p. m.

203. In talks 22nd [1] Goes emphasized need Brazil develop econ and industrial strength as essential support mil program. Seemed satisfied however our explanation re activities Joint Comm Econ Development and its role helping obtain financing from lending institutions in US. Stated he is not thinking in terms another agreement econ assistance and any mil agreement wld not include econ and financial aspects. In spite this assurance there is possibility he will return later to questions econ or industrial development aid. He desires list advantages to accrue Brazil through mil participation Korea explaining he wants present concrete advantages to his Govt which needs all propaganda ammunition possible to use in influencing public opinion.

Goes also suggested possible secret agreement similar basically 1942 Agreement [2] but brought up to date.

Goes now leaving talks up to mil group mentioned in second para Deptel 191 Aug 21.[3] Brazil mil Attaché Col. Queiroz will be responsible Brazil side discussions. Goes holding himself available. Not planning return Brazil until Sept.

ACHESON

[1] A memorandum of this conversation between General Sibert, General Góes Monteiro, and others, by Mr. Kidder, dated August 22, 1951, is filed under decimal file number 732.5811/8–2251.

[2] For information on the negotiation of the political-military agreement between the United States and Brazil, which had been entered into by an exchange of notes dated May 23 and May 27, 1942, at Rio de Janeiro, see Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, 1960), pp. 317–319, in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere.*

[3] *Supra.*

398.14/8–2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 28, 1951—7 p. m.

217. For Bohan from Mann. *Verbatim text message.*

AIDE MEMOIRE

INTERNATL BANK AND BRAZ

1. The Management of the Bank has based its policy towards Braz on the three Fol fundamental considerations:

(*a*) The Joint Braz–US Econ Development Comm wld review the whole problem of Braz developmental needs and possibilities and pass upon the appropriateness and priority of the various projects making up that program.

(*b*) The Internatl Bank wld be prepared to participate in the financing of Braz development up to a very substantial amt over the next four or five years.

(*c*) The Bank's financing wld be related to the For exchange costs of those projects which were sponsored by the Joint Comm and approved by the Bank.

2. It has been the understanding of the Management of the Bank that the above approach was acceptable to the US Govt, to the Braz Govt and to the Joint Comm itself.

3. It was agreed between the Bank and the Joint Braz–US Comm that, at this stage, the only project which had the sponsorship of the Joint Comm was power development in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. A Bank Mission has just returned from Braz after studying the power situation in the State of Rio Grande do Sul and there is every reason to hope that it will be possible for the Bank to work out financing of the expansion of power development there.

4. As far back as Jan 1950 the Bank expressed the view that transportation was a high priority in Braz development needs. The Bank was asked, informally, by the Braz authorities if it wld be willing to sponsor a transportation survey. The Bank indicated its willingness, in principle, to consider such a survey, but after the appointment of the Joint Comm, it was understood that the Joint Comm, itself wld wish to review the need for such a survey and the form that it shld take.

5. It is not possible for the Bank to commit itself to a gen line of credit for railway and port development in Braz before the Bank has had the opportunity of considering properly worked out projects upon which it wld be proposed to use the proceeds of the line of credit. The Bank's policy with respect to gen lines of credit has been clearly explained to the Braz authorities and was apparently understood by them.

6. It is impossible for the Pres or the Vice Pres of the Bank to visit Braz at this time in view of the forthcoming Annual mtg of the Bank. It is Mr. Black's present intention, however, to visit Braz soonest after the Annual mtg. The Management wld, however, be glad to receive the MinFin in Wash either at the time of the Annual mtg, or earlier, if that is convenient to the Min, and to discuss with him all aspects of the Bank's relations with Braz.

7. If Bohan wld wish to come to Wash now, or at any time in the near future, for consultation with the Bank, the Management will be glad to receive him. [Mann.]

ACHESON

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

RIO DE JANEIRO, August 31, 1951.

DEAR ED: Horacio Lafer [1] called to see me by special appointment late yesterday afternoon. He first informed me that he had definitely decided to attend the meeting of the International Monetary Fund which takes place early in September in Washington.[2] He will leave here on September 5 by air and will be in the United States about ten days. Accompanying him will be his wife, Dr. Eugenio Gudin, Walter Moreira Sales [3] and Valentim Boucas.[4] I do not yet know whether the wives of the three latter will be going along or not.

Lafer told me that he assumed I was familiar with the suggestion he had put up to Bohan and which was the subject of Bohan's telegram to you at Panama of August 26.[5] Lafer made it clear, and was quite frank about it, that he was appealing for my support for their request. He said that he was speaking on behalf of the President as well as himself in urging that the International Bank give serious consideration to an announcement which would earmark approximately $100,000,000 for Brazilian port development and for certain emergency purchases for the railroads. He said that they were not asking for the money, but for an announcement which could carry conviction to the Brazilian masses that the Joint Commission is doing something which will be of real and direct benefit to the people.

[1] Brazilian Minister of Finance.
[2] Reference is to the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund held in Washington, September 10–14, 1951.
[3] Director, Currency and Credit Administration, Bank of Brazil.
[4] Valentim Fernandes Boucas, President, Brazilian Technical Council of Economics and Finance, and Financial Adviser to the Brazilian section, Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission.
[5] Not printed.

The Vargas Administration is having difficulties. Communist infiltration throughout the country is on the increase, the cost of living is high, and the Administration by no means has Congress in its pocket. What Vargas would like to do is to make an announcement that with the cooperation of the United States and through the machinery of the Joint Commission his Administration intends to carry out plans for rectification of the bad conditions in Brazilian ports, and that they expect the work to be completed within three years. At the same time, it would be announced that $100,000,000 had been earmarked for this purpose and for the purpose of much-needed emergency equipment for the railroads, and that the Brazilian Government was making available an equivalent amount in cruzeiros for necessary financing of the project.

The question of cruzeiro financing has been a tough one for the Administration, as you know, and I gather from Lafer that it is his belief such an announcement along the lines of that outlined above would be of immense service to the Administration, and in particular to the Finance Ministry, in securing the necessary legislation and appropriations from Congress to implement the Brazilian side of the Joint Commission's work.

Lafer and Vargas do not expect the Bank actually to make money available except for completed and approved projects. What they want is an announcement that the Bank will earmark funds for the purposes described. The money, of course, will not be available until definite projects have been submitted to the Bank and received its approval. Such an announcement might also indirectly be very helpful in the Goes Monteiro talks now under way in Washington.

The statement telegraphed to Bohan from Tom Mann (Deptel 217, August 28, 7:00 p.m.) [6] contained an excellent statement from the International Bank regarding its policy toward Brazil. It is a reasonable statement and one with which Lafer would not take issue. He would admit that it is Brazil's fault that projects are not ready for immediate action by the Bank, but he and Vargas want help from us on an empirical basis and as a matter of high policy. Neves da Fontoura told me yesterday that he knew the Finance Minister was coming to see me, that he did not know in detail what he would take up, but that he knew in general terms, and that he fully supported the Finance Minister's request.

Incidentally Lafer mentioned that he thought Brazil should look to the Ex-Imbank for any foreign financing it requires for industrial development and to the International Bank for foreign financing requirements for public works.

I told Lafer that I understood his point of view and sympathized with him, and that he would have my support in principle. I told him,

[6] *Supra.*

however, that the Bank had an established policy in these matters and that I could not express a valid opinion as to what the possibilities are. I told him that I was glad he was going to Washington, and that I knew you would be delighted to see him. He will certainly call on you at the first opportunity, and probably before he attempts to make any contacts with the Bank officials.

As I see it our overall relationship with Brazil needs a fillip in the very near future. You, of course, are only too aware of the persistent references on the part of Goes Monteiro to economic help. He is not, in my opinion, thinking primarily of returning from Washington with something in his pocket. Rather he is thinking of the job of salesmanship which Vargas, the Foreign Minister and the Chief of Staff will have on their hands if they take the risks, domestically, we wish them to take.

The help the Brazilian Administration and Military need so much might take many forms none of which would commit us, or the International Bank, to anything new. The Bank already has told the Brazilians it considers $300 millions a reasonable target figure for Brazilian borrowing for economic development purposes over the next five years. The Bank, therefore, might find it possible to say, publicly, that it considers $100 millions a reasonable figure for the Joint Commission to use as its target in preparing projects in the railway and port field for the consideration of the Bank, particularly if the Brazilian Government is ready to take action to provide adequate funds in cruzeiros to cover local costs of the projects which will be developed. The Department and the Bank must have many people who are very skillful in drafting who could evolve a statement, indicating that if Brazil does its part re cruzeiro financing, it can have every reason to expect that the dollar financing side of economically justified projects in the port and railway fields should not present any difficulties.

Under cover of Bohan's letter to Tom Mann of August 28, 1951,[7] there was transmitted a memorandum of the Gibbs and Hill railway technician contracted by TCA, Mr. H. D. Barber.[8] I cannot speak for the technical side, but his opinion, I believe, should carry weight.

If you agree and consider it practicable, please see if the experts of the Bank cannot think up some sort of statement which they find they could make and have it ready to show to Finance Minister Lafer when he arrives.

I know your difficulties are great, and I do not know whether it is possible for the Bank to find some formula not too inconsistent with their policy which would help these people out. I sincerely hope that some way can be found. They need our help and support now, and if

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[7] Not printed.

[8] H. Dale Barber, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Railroads, Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission.

we can give it I am convinced it will be deeply appreciated by Vargas and Lafer and Neves Fontoura, and will not be forgotten. I am also confident that it would strengthen the hand of the Government in dealing with left-wing groups and their anti-American tools who are scattered through the Administration.

Sincerely, HERSCHEL JOHNSON

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson)

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 14, 1951.

DEAR HERSCHEL: I have 20 minutes in which to dictate a report giving you the highlights of Lafer's visit which will be signed by my secretary after she transcribes it. I am off for a brief trip to Venezuela to attend the National Petroleum Convention [1] for four days and will be back in my office on Thursday morning, the 20th.

Oakley Brooks [2] has undoubtedly filled you in on many of the details. In my opinion, Lafer's visit was well-timed and highly successful. He, Boucas and Moreira Salles appeared to be immensely pleased with the outcome of the trip. Even though they have obtained merely reaffirmations of what they previously had, the willingness of the Banks to go along with the public statement [3] about the financing of the foreign exchange costs of the transportation program is a definite step forward. It was very good to have Brooks here, and especially his presence in Washington the week before Lafer's arrival permitted us to lay the groundwork with key people such as Black, Martin and Thorp, as well as with Secretary Snyder through Martin.

It was extremely fortunate that Burke Knapp arrived here last Monday in time to play a decisive part in clearing the financing statement with both Banks. The almost unique situation which he enjoys in having the trust of Black and Garner [4] on the one hand and being favorably known to Thorp, Martin, Gaston, etc., on the other enabled him to do what few, if any other, people could have done. The Brazilians were tremendously impressed by his ability to jump right into the breach and he has already made a notable contribution in his future task. I cannot stress too strongly how much I myself have been im-

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[1] The Venezuelan National Petroleum Convention met at Caracas, September 8–18, 1951.

[2] Banking Adviser to the United States section, Joint Brazil–United States Commission for Economic Development.

[3] For the text of this statement, which was dated September 14 and released to the press by Minister Lafer upon his return to Rio de Janeiro, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, pp. 581–582.

[4] Robert L. Garner, Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

pressed by Knapp this week. I had been getting increasingly disturbed by a tendency on the part of a number of people in Rio to underestimate Knapp. I believe that his opportunity to work with Lafer and Boucas here has been most constructive. I do not intend in saying this to detract in the slightest to Merwin Bohan's tremendous job in holding the fort. He has certainly won in a short time a permanent place in the hearts of the Brazilians.

In addition to the financing problem, Lafer raised two other points:

1) Lafer dragged out again the old idea about a bilateral supply agreement which had been kicked around during the Foreign Ministers Conference ad nauseum and finally buried, I had thought, for good with the formation of the Joint Emergency Group on Scarce Materials. I explained to Lafer in detail why such an agreement was out of the question and he readily agreed indicating that he was really only going through the motions.

[Here follows a personal reference.]

The Minister asked me to take him off the hook with a simple letter [5] which I drafted up in consultation with him and had signed today by the Secretary.

2) Lafer also raised the old chestnut about our activities in ECA (more Campos, no doubt). He again indicated that he was going through the motions and that he simply wanted to be gotten off the hook. As of this writing I believe we have satisfied him with a memorandum [5] about TCA and ECA activities in underdeveloped areas other than Latin America which I have transmitted to him. I have told him that he could make public use of both this letter and the one from Secretary Acheson. My secretary will forward under separate cover copies of all three documents as soon as they are all in final form.

In addition we have discussed a number of other things at random with Lafer. We have talked to him about specific supply problems, including sulphur, and have put Boucas in touch with Courand. He has talked with Black about the caustic soda plant at Cabo Frio. We have explained to him our difficulties with the Treasury with regard to a double taxation treaty and he was to have discussed this with Secretary Snyder today. I have urged that, despite our inability to sign the type of tax treaty which Brazil wants, it would be in Brazil's own interest to sign a treaty of friendship, commerce and economic development. He expressed agreement. I have talked to him about petroleum and have given him a copy of an excellent speech made by Secretary Chapman [6] on Monday at the Petroleum Convention in Venezuela to which I am going tonight. I think the fact that I will go to Venezuela just for the convention has impressed him.

In the meantime we are continuing our conversations with General Goes Monteiro and I will ask Ed Jamison to send you an interim report next week. Last Monday, Lafer's first day in Washington, General Goes Monteiro gave a luncheon for General Marshall. Before the luncheon he took me aside and said that his success in getting Brazil to go

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[5] Not printed.

[6] Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior.

along with us on a program of military cooperation depended upon the success of Lafer's negotiations. I told him not to worry about Lafer's negotiations and my prediction has come true. Now we will see whether General Goes Monteiro will buckle down. Recently the conversations have been making much more sense and I am hopeful that the General will go back with something concrete in his pocket. Lafer is going to check with the General before he leaves Washington and will advise Randy [7] of his impressions.

Throughout his visit Lafer has been considerate of our position, reasonable in every way and a thoroughly satisfactory and effective person with whom to deal. His success here like that of Joao Neves—but more so in this case since Neves was handicapped by deafness—shows that if Brazil will send people of good will and energy who will apply themselves to the problem at hand and take our problems into account, they will get what they want in contrast to those whose approach is to browbeat us and spew forth their *queixis* about things that happened years ago. Incidentally, Lafer has not at any time called upon the Brazilian Embassy here for any assistance.

[Here follow personal references.]

The foregoing is a hasty outline of recent events but you will find Oakley Brooks' oral report most interesting, I am sure. Incidentally, I am delighted that Oakley is in this picture and am certain that he will be a tower of strength on the Commission,

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

[7] Randolph A. Kidder.

732.5/8–2751

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Department of the Army (Bolté), to the Chief of the Joint Staff, Brazilian Armed Forces (Góes Monteiro)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 27 September, 1951.

DEAR GENERAL GÓES: I am gratified to learn from General Sibert that considerable progress has been made toward a firm agreement which will assure the closer cooperation between our respective countries both in hemisphere defense [1] and in support of the United Nations' action in Korea.

The current attitude of the United States with respect to these two subjects is reflected in the memoranda which are attached. I recognize that Brazil may wish to offer some additional suggestions and sim-

[1] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense, see pp. 985 ff.

ilarly, after a more detailed study, my Government may wish to propose further suggestions or clarifications.

I understand that, if changes are desired by either Government, we are in agreement that these will be considered in Washington or in Rio de Janeiro by representatives to be designated by the two of us. After any such changes have been made, the documents can be put in final form for approval by the Governments.

I am happy that your visit has been so fruitful. It has been a privilege for me and the officers who have participated in the negotiations to have worked with you and your representatives. I wish you a pleasant journey home as well as continued progress in regaining your health.

Sincerely, CHARLES L. BOLTÉ

[Enclosure 1]

DRAFT

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ARTICLE I

a. Brazil undertakes to form, and upon approval by the Brazilian Congress, to offer to the Unified Command an infantry division for employment as part of the United Nations forces now serving in Korea. (Approval for employment in Korea is one of the basic assumptions of this memorandum.)

b. This division will be organized generally along the lines of a United States infantry division and will be twenty percent overstrength in personnel.

c. The special combat training of this division will be initiated without delay with the objective of having it prepared for overseas movement six months thereafter.

d. Upon the dispatch overseas of this Brazilian expeditionary force, Brazil will provide trained personnel replacements for this force at a rate to be determined by experience which for planning purposes is estimated at ten percent per month.

e. Such training equipment as may be furnished by the United States for the preparation of the expeditionary force will generally be retained in Brazil on a loan basis for purposes of training personnel replacements and will be returned to United States control when no longer needed in connection with the Korean operation.

ARTICLE II

a. Immediately after the acceptance by the Unified Command of the Brazilian offer set forth above, Brazil will undertake to provide a list

by item of training equipment necessary for the prompt and proper pre-combat training of the division referred to in Article I, above. This list will be based upon the maximum use being made of equipment now on hand in Brazil. The United States will provide such additional items of training equipment as are available. This additional equipment may be limited in some items to the barest essentials.

b. The United States will furnish the technical assistance required for the said pre-combat training of this division in terms of quotas for students in United States Army schools and in terms of instructors.

c. Upon the completion of the training of this Brazilian expeditionary division, the United States, in cooperation with Brazil, will transport said division from Brazil to the theater of war indicated in I. *a* and *c* above.

d. During the stay of said division in the theater of war, the United States will furnish the same logistic support to said division as it does to one of its own divisions, except for certain mutually agreed activities such as pay of personnel, supply of distinctive uniforms, etc.

e. The United States undertakes to return the personnel of said division to Brazil when the military posture of United Nations' forces in Korea permits. The disposition of equipment will be determined at the time of redeployment.

f. The Brazilian expeditionary force will proceed overseas using United States equipment then available to the maximum extent of its capabilities. Brazil will provide a list by item of deficiencies needed to complete a full division Table of Equipment. The United States will furnish the items contained in the deficiency list out of then existing stocks in the theater of war so that the Brazilian division will be equipped on the same scale and under the same standards used for the supply of United States comparable units.

g. Brazil agrees to reimburse the United States for assistance extended in II. *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, and *f*, above. Terms of reimbursement to be negotiated in the future. The principles applicable to such reimbursement will be consistent with those used in negotiations with other nations receiving logistical support for combat forces in Korea.

[Enclosure 2]

DRAFT

BRAZIL–UNITED STATES MILITARY COOPERATION

ARTICLE I

The U.S. and Brazil reaffirm their intent to honor their obligations to each other (as well as to other American States) under the Inter-

American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro of 1947 and as members of the Organization of American States.

ARTICLE II

It is understood that the defense of Brazil should be the responsibility of that country but that in case of aggression, before Brazilian rearmament is complete, the assistance of the U.S. may be required. Such assistance will preferably be in terms of arms and equipment for Brazilian units.

ARTICLE III

Provided the Mutual Security Act of 1951 is approved to include authorization of grant military aid for Latin America, and appropriations for this purpose are made, and further provided that Brazil enters into a bilateral agreement for defense of the hemisphere as required by that Act, the U.S. will assist Brazil in her development of a defense rearmament program consistent with hemisphere defense responsibilities assumed by Brazil. As a matter of policy, funds to assist the rearmament of Brazil will be included in amounts sought from Congress provided the world situation continues to justify this action.

The objective of this rearmament program will be to provide Brazil with the means necessary to discharge the responsibilities delineated in a later military agreement between the two governments to be negotiated in conformity with the objectives of the General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent, drawn up by the Staff of the Inter-American Defense Board. Such agreement will be prepared for presentation to the two governments by the Joint Brazil–U.S. Defense Commission.

ARTICLE IV

a. Brazil undertakes to cooperate to the maximum degree possible in the defense of the inter-American maritime routes in case of hostile attack.

b. Brazil undertakes to cooperate by making available an increased production in Brazil of raw, semi-finished, and finished material needed by the two contracting powers in furtherance of a common defense effort.

c. In the event of a general war, the United States shall do all it can to grant Brazil access to a reasonable quota of the fuels and lubricants required by the latter's war economy.

ARTICLE V

The U.S. will be favorably disposed to see the establishment in Brazil of a munitions and armament industry sufficient to support a level of military preparations adequate for Brazil's defense and inter-

national responsibilities. To that end the U.S. will assist with such development by granting appropriate export licenses to a degree consistent with its other obligations and consulting on technical assistance. The U.S. will sympathetically consider the placing of orders with such an industry provided in general that no excess capacity exists in the U.S. for the items in question.

ARTICLE VI

The U.S. will be favorably disposed to see the establishment in Brazil of aircraft and naval construction and repair facilities appropriate to Brazil's air and naval forces. To this end the U.S. will consult on the matter of technical aid and grant export licenses consistent with her other obligations.

ARTICLE VII

a. The improvement of air and naval basing facilities in Brazil required for the joint use of Brazil and the U.S., shall be carried out by Brazil. Operation of such bases shall be by Brazilian units under Brazilian command but with, where necessary, U.S. technical assistance.

b. The mutually agreed construction of air and naval basing facilities required for U.S. use shall be subject to negotiation.

ARTICLE VIII

The two governments concerned undertake to coordinate the projects described in V. and VI. above with the work of the Joint Brazil–U.S. Economic Development Commission.

732.56/10–1151

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 11, 1951.

No. 41

The Secretary of State desires to inform the Mission, for its guidance and records, that the second installment amounting to $500,000, due under the terms of Supplement I to the Brazilian Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement of April 15, 1948,[1] which was signed April 19, 1950,[2] has been fully paid in the following manner:

March 15, 1951	$209, 115. 41	from refund credits, accrued on interim arms program contracts, transferred to lease-lend account.

[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 383–388.

[2] For information on the supplementary agreement, which applied to certain contingent lend-lease accounts, see editorial note printed in *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, p. 759.

October 2, 1951	1, 526. 95	—ditto—
October 2, 1951	289, 357. 64	by check from Brazilian Treasury Delegation in New York on the Chase National Bank of New York.

After this payment, the balance due under this portion of Brazil's lend-lease settlement schedule is $1,000,000 payable in two equal installments on or before September 30 of 1952 and 1953.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 23, 1951.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—INFORMAL

DEAR HERSCHEL: I have delayed replying to your thoughtful and extremely helpful letter of September 21[2] pending the conclusion of the visit of General Goes Monteiro. Before commenting on the letter specifically, I should like to make some general comments on the visit.

General Goes Monteiro left on the 15th for New York to consult with Muñiz. He seemed reasonably satisfied with his visit although I think he may have been somewhat disappointed that he did not receive comments from Rio on the draft agreement which General Bolte gave him and that he won't know the reaction in Rio to this proposal until he gets back there.

I have to confess to you that I certainly misjudged General Goes Monteiro on the basis of my first conversation with him, after which I telegraphed you so frantically. Having then informed you that the General seemed to have lost some of his mental capacity, I must now say that he lost it just like a fox. He is a cagy and deliberate man who knows just what he wants and what his bargaining leeway is. He came up here under very difficult circumstances since he was, in fact, the sacrificial offering in lieu of the late-lamented mission to Korea. He also came up into a situation in Washington where our military leaders are being pulled from all directions with requests for military equipment of which we are terribly short. Furthermore, he was negotiating against a background in his own country where the situation is none too solid in terms of the government's ability to gain approval of a real contribution in Korea. Finally, the General must have felt a let-down in dealing in these negotiations with people of the rank of myself and lower in the Department of State and with a brigadier

[1] All of the deleted portions of this letter contain personal references, except as indicated in bracketed note, p. 1230.

[2] Not printed.

general in Defense, whereas when he had come up before World War 2 he had lunched alone with FDR twice. . . .

With all of these handicaps, General Goes Monteiro did extremely well and I have the feeling that he is going back in a relatively happy frame of mind. . . . I am convinced that Goes Monteiro wants to send a division to Korea and that he is going to go back to Brazil and make a fight. The Pentagon did a good job of sticking to its guns on this point and I have the impression that General Goes overruled some of his own military advisers up here. . . . I also believe, from everything that I have seen during the visits of Lafer and Goes—both of whom talked to me with complete frankness—that Neves da Fontoura, Lafer and Goes consider themselves a team which constitutes the vanguard of anti-Russian and pro-U.S. sentiment in Brazil. Both Lafer and Goes spoke about each other in terms of the highest admiration and both spoke in the same sense about Neves. It is extremely fortunate, I believe, that all three have been up here since the Vargas regime went in and that all three have returned apparently well satisfied. When Randy and I called on Goes last Saturday, he spoke with complete frankness about the communist menace in Brazil and the extent to which communist activities paralyze action on the part of the Brazilian Government. He referred over and over again to the need of the administration to consolidate itself internally and of the difficulties presented by the fact that there are 14 political parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies and 7 in the Senate. He spoke time and again about the Clube Militar problem, and on Saturday stated flatly that he had to go back to Brazil to prevail upon Vargas to remove Estillac Leal.

. . . . . .

To return to your letter of September 21. I appreciate your having written in such detail and keeping us posted. In the discussions with the General we have concentrated on the primary objective of obtaining as soon as possible a Brazilian offer of participation with an infantry division in Korea. This is the fundamental reason why we have felt that the present discussions should not be extended to cover more ground than necessary. [Here follows discussion, which was not declassified for publication, concerning possible revision of the 1942 military agreement between Brazil and the United States.]

You will by now have received a copy of my letter of October 12 [3] in reply to General Bolte on the question of expanding the activities of the JBUSMC and the JBUSDC and the establishment of a Joint Brazil–United States Defense Board. You state on page two of your letter that you know little of the activities of the JBUSDC in Washington. In point of fact the duties of that group have been practically

[3] Not printed.

nil. Under the proposal made to me by General Bolte the Defense Commission would have a job to do.

The proposal for a Joint Defense Board stems from the successful experience that Defense has had with similar boards involving Canada and Mexico. It has been suggested that the Defense Board would meet quarterly, meetings to alternate between the United States and Brazil. General Bolte and General Walsh have both emphasized their desire to have participation and close cooperation from State. They would like similar participation apparently on the Military Commission and the Defense Commission. The suggestion for participation on the Military Commission is a little ludicrous in view of your information that the Defense people up here have failed totally to keep their own people on the Military Commission in Rio informed of any of the pending developments, including the Goes Monteiro discussions. I am glad that you have been able to keep them up to date.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250 [1]

Notes of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Department of State, 9:30 a. m., October 31, 1951 [2]

SECRET

UM N–414

[Here follow a list of those present (20) and discussion of matters unrelated to Brazil.]

Joint U.S.–Brazil Economic Commission

9. Mr. Miller reviewed the difficulty in the appointment of a man to work on the Joint U.S.–Brazil Economic Commission and how Ambassador Bohan had quickly come to our rescue as its interim head. He emphasized that Brazil is especially adapted to this new type of commission technique.

10. Ambassador Bohan stated that he could be neither proud nor apologetic of the three-month work, because a great amount of work remains to be done. However, the Commission is organized and the many subsections have been planned and are beginning their work. Ambassador Bohan found Brazil a great nation of huge potential. Two primary problems face Brazil, and those are distribution and fuel. The

[1] Master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained and retired by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[2] The Under Secretary's meetings convened at the Department of State on a weekly basis; they were attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and office directors. Under Secretary of State James E. Webb presided at the meetings.

Economic Commission cannot help on the problem of distribution. The Commission will focus its main activity on the problem of distribution, since the Commission does not want to waste its efforts in dealing with too many matters. One of the main problems is improvement of the railroad system. Basically, the railroads need general rehabilitation, other than just physical. The main thing required is managerial rehabilitation, the solution of which involves many political headaches. Ambassador Bohan stated that unless the Commission could set up a good railroad management corporation, no amount of money would accomplish the results required to improve the railroad situation in Brazil. One great danger on this project involves requirements and a high priority is needed to get the necessary steel brake equipment, track-laying equipment, etc. Another important problem is improvement of ports. Operations and dredging are the main problems in connection with this project.

11. With respect to agriculture, Ambassador Bohan reported that Brazil has a large agricultural extension program, and that the Commission must act as a catalyst in bringing the local, state and federal parts of the government together. Some of the main problems in connection with agriculture are storage and credit. Agriculture lags far behind industrial development, and Brazil badly needs a better balance between these two. The problem is to get the government to use the resources at hand.

12. In reviewing the need of Brazil for requirements for railroad equipment, Mr. Thorp stated that the Department has machinery for handling these requirements, and that we must be assured of a good case before we attempt to bring it outside the Department. He felt that the steel situation would be better about a year from now. Ambassador Bohan pointed out that the steel would be needed during the first quarter of next year.

13. Ambassador Bohan explained that Mr. Truslow's successor on the joint Commission will be Mr. Knapp, and Mr. Miller added that Ambassador Bohan had agreed to backstop Mr. Knapp. Mr. Miller added that he is pleased to report that there has been a meeting of the minds with respect to the organizational location of the Point IV country director in our mission in Brazil. The Point IV director will be under Mr. Knapp.

14. Mr. Webb asked about the pressure in Brazil to build industrial facilities at such a pace that it is not in balance with agricultural facilities. Ambassador Bohan confirmed this and stated that there is a psychological problem in Brazil and elsewhere in that the government and the people feel that building a strong industrial machine means success. He hoped to have some success in improving the agricultural situation in Brazil by utilizing the existing organizations in that

area. He noted that it may be necessary to set up "servicios" [3] in Brazil.

15. When questioned on the duration of this commission experiment, Ambassador Bohan noted that this is a new technique and one which involves action and not merely study. The Commission should be of temporary use only and should not last much more than 18 to 24 months. It is hoped that the Commission will aid in the establishment of permanent institutions which will take over what the Commission has done. Two important institutions which must be established are a railroad authority and an investment finance corporations, the latter working on power, industry and mineral development.

[3] For documentation on the use of "servicios" in Latin America, see pp. 1038 ff.

832.00–TA/11–951

The United States Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Bohan) to the United States Commissioner, Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission (Knapp)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 9, 1951.

Subject: Relations with Export-Import Bank

DEAR BURKE: Leroy Stinebower [1] and I spent two hours with Mr. Gaston and his associates on November 5. I gave them a brief résumé of the Commission's work to date and, the atmosphere being propitious, then launched into a plea for close and understanding teamwork between the Bank and the Joint Commission. I told Mr. Gaston that the last thing in the world we wanted was a delegation of the Bank's authority as a clearcut separation of authority was the main protection of the Commission against political and other pressures in Brazil. On the other hand, I felt that if we both knew currently what the other was doing and thinking that our jobs would be much simplified and the objectives of American foreign policy more effectively implemented.

I used the Vale do Rio Doce as a concrete example and pointed out that we had only received a squib through Leroy that the Bank was considering an operation with them and yet we knew that there had been considerable correspondence back and forth ever since early in August. I pointed out that we can both work more efficiently if we were kept currently informed of the steps being taken by the Bank and if we also kept them currently informed of anything we might do in this field.

Mr. Gaston seemed to agree with these observations and he also came pretty close to accepting the idea that when technicians of the Bank

[1] Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy.

go to Brazil that they should work side by side with our own people. I took the liberty of stating that you would be delighted to have an Export-Import Bank official come down and spend some time with the Commission, getting to know the people connected with it and the problems confronting it. Bernie Bell broke in at this point to observe that the Bank had wanted to do this sometime ago but that its suggestion in this regard had been frowned upon. Mr. Gaston would not quite commit himself but I feel that if you cared to write a letter to Leroy showing enthusiasm for the idea that Mr. Gaston would probably approve of someone going down in the near future. Personally, I think that we should not let any grass grow under our feet because I think you can take the Export-Import Bank into camp if we can get some of its representatives down there and treat them in the same manner that we have dealt with Sidney Wheelock and other IBRD representatives.

Another thing that I think would be most helpful would be a letter from you to Leroy giving, in considerable detail, the work that Hassilev[2] has done with respect to the Minas power project, his work on the Electric Bond and Share program, and Dale Barber's conversations with the Vale do Rio Doce people. I really think it would go a long way towards getting the Bank to open up and work more closely with us.

Not to throw any flowers, but merely to keep you advised of the situation up here, I feel that your conversations with Mr. Gaston were more successful than you believe. On at least two occasions he mentioned you in a manner which indicated that he had revised some of his opinions regarding your dishonorable IBRD background, and I think that you should go out of your way to see that projects in which you know his Bank is interested are reported upon currently even though the information per se is not of any particular importance. Just the mere fact that he is hearing from you regarding such projects will go a long way towards getting him to respond to our overtures.

Assistant Secretary Thorp is giving a lot of thought to the question of what projects go to what banks and he has some ideas that may help to smooth out the rough path ahead of us. I won't go into this matter but I did want you to know that it was being given attention at the highest level.

Sincerely yours,

MERWIN L. BOHAN

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[2] Leonide Hassilev, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Power Development, United States Section, Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission.

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137 [1]

Memorandum by the Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for the United States (Southard) to the Secretary of the National Advisory Council (Glendinning)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1951.

Document No. 1232

Subject: Possible Brazilian Drawing on the Fund

1. Mr. Octavio Paranagua, Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for Brazil, has twice discussed with me (most recently on December 10, 1951) the possibility of a Brazilian drawing on the Fund primarily to cover the cost of unanticipated dollar wheat purchases made necessary by the failure of Argentine supplies.

2. Brazil's dollar imports have been running at a very high rate—those from the United States alone reportedly averaging about $70 million per month. This high level of imports has apparently been largely due to a deliberate relaxation of restrictions on the assumption that availabilities of dollar goods might be much less should war break out or United States defense preparations be intensified, although inflation in Brazil has undoubtedly played a role. Whatever the cause of the increased imports, the result has been to run down Brazilian reserves from a high of about $220 million at the end of March (Government and bank dollar balances) to about $92 million at the end of October (preliminary figure) and no doubt even less at the end of November. From Mr. Paranagua, and from other sources, it is understood that some measures are being taken to reintroduce restraints on imports. But they will presumably not operate without a lag.

3. In addition to the drain on reserves due to increased imports, Brazil faces two repurchase obligations (one as of April 30, 1950 and the other as of April 30, 1951) which Mr. Paranagua believes will total the entire $65 million which Brazil has drawn on the Fund. With respect to these two obligations, Mr. Paranagua intends to propose that the first one, which he thinks will run between $15 million and $20 million, be made very promptly, without waiting for all of the procedural delays. It might be completed before the end of this month. As to the second one, he proposes that Brazil will wait out the permitted delays which can run as much as 60 days.

4. Mr. Paranagua states that after the first repurchase has been completed—i.e., around the first of the year—Brazil wishes to draw on the Fund approximately $15 million per month for three months to

[1] Master file of the documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (NAC) for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs in the Department of State and preserved as item 70 of Federal Records Center Accession 71 A 6682.

cover the estimated monthly cost of the additional wheat imports. Meantime, he hopes that Brazil will take adequate measures to reverse the current drain on its dollar reserves.

5. On the whole, I am inclined to the view that the United States should be prepared to support such drawings by Brazil, on the understanding that Brazil would give a firm repurchase commitment. Mr. Paranagua has assured me that Brazil will give such a commitment if he recommends it, and that he is prepared to recommend it in terms of a maximum of three years, with the hope that Brazil would repurchase in less than that time. I should appreciate having the advice of the NAC Staff on this matter as promptly as possible.[2]

[2] On January 23, 1952, at meeting No. 188, the National Advisory Council unanimously approved Action No. 522, which reads as follows:

"The National Advisory Council offers no objection to consideration by the U.S. Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund of a Brazilian request for a Fund drawing of $37.5 million, to cover current wheat requirements, with the understanding that Brazil will assume a firm commitment to repurchase previous drawings during June, July and August, 1952, and that Brazil will undertake to repay half the proposed drawing in 12 months and the balance in 18 months." (NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137, Box 362)

Editorial Note

On December 21, 1951, Secretary Acheson wrote to Secretary of Defense Lovett suggesting that in view of the probable forthcoming discussions with Brazil aimed at reaching a bilateral military assistance agreement in conformity with the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373), it would be appropriate for the Departments of Defense and State to review the 1942 military agreement for possible revision, inasmuch as Brazil might raise that question during the discussions. There was enclosed with the Secretary's letter a detailed "Study on United States–Brazil Political-Military Relations", prepared in the Department of State. The letter and its enclosure, which were not declassified in time for publication, are filed under Department of State decimal number 732.5–MSP/12–2151.

In telegram 812, from Rio de Janeiro, dated December 27, 1951, Ambassador Johnson informed the Secretary that the Brazilian Government agreed to participate in conversations looking toward a bilateral military assistance agreement. (732.5–MSP/12–2751) The conversations began on January 2, 1952, without any agreement having been reached between the Departments of State and Defense concerning revision of the 1942 military agreement.

832.2546/12–2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET RIO DE JANEIRO, December 27, 1951—7 p. m.

813. For Assistant Secretary Miller. Mytel 811, Dec 26, 6 p. m.[1] FonMin told me this afternoon with great apparent satisfaction of action taken Dec 22 by Natl Security Council in authorizing negots with US Govt agreements re supply strategic materials. He said slowness with which action in particular (1) monazite, (2) manganese, and (3) uranium,[2] had progressed had been matter of great concern to him. Now he has been authorized by Pres to carry these negots to conclusion, he optimistic they may be entirely cleared up before end Jan. Final agreements will have be approved by Pres, but will not have again go through Security Council and bureaucratic machinery. Monazite he believes is capable particularly early action. He has already set up comite in FonOff to iron out remaining difficulties re urucum managanese contract and expects Gov Matto Grosso in Rio early next week. It probably state Matto Grosso's desire for larger royalties will be made at expense Chama brothers. Difficulties purely of internal order and FonMin stated no objection had been voiced in any quarter to US obtaining supplies manganese required. Prices all these commodities he indicated wld be matter for negot.

At mtg this afternoon FonMin again reiterated it was desire Pres Vargas himself and admin in gen to "go along" with US in all these questions. He deplored ponderous nature Braz bureaucracy and said he felt SAT's clearance for action by Security Council wld greatly facilitate progress. At Security Council mtg MinFin Lafer spoke in support his proposal.

JOHNSON

[1] Not printed.

[2] For documentation relating to the efforts of the United States to negotiate an agreement with Brazil concerning uranium, see vol. I, pp. 685 ff.

CHILE

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE[1]

Editorial Note

On January 16, 1951, the United States and Chile signed at Santiago the following Point IV technical assistance agreements:

1) General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, entered into force July 27, 1951. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 806, from Santiago, February 14, 1951, not printed (825.00–TA/2–1451). For text, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 3, page 390, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2403. For a press release dated January 16, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 5, 1951, page 219.

2) Technical Agreement for a Cooperative Program of Agriculture and Livestock, entered into force January 16, 1951. Minor editorial changes in the text required the re-signing of the agreement; it was transmitted to the Department of State also under cover of despatch 806. For text, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2630, or TIAS No. 2430.

3) Technical Agreement for a Cooperative Program in Education, which never entered into effect. Certain Catholic groups and political elements in Chile expressed vigorous opposition to the agreement, alleging in part that it would interfere with Chile's sovereign rights. By a note dated April 3, 1951, delivered to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 4, the United States abrogated the agreement in the manner specified therein. A copy of the note was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 1039, from Santiago, April 4, 1951, not printed (825.00–TA/4–451).

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 783 ff.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 261[1]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp)[2]

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1951.

Problem: To forestall a sharp price rise in Chilean copper and prevent diversion of Chilean copper for non-defense purposes.

Discussion:

The Chilean Government is presently confronted with a rising tide of opposition extremely critical of the Government's failure to obtain higher prices for copper and for its failure to carry out development programs long promised by the Government to increase production and raise standards of living in Chile. The attack on the Chilean Government is by extreme nationalists, leftwingers and communist sympathizers and has a strong anti-U.S. bias. In addition there has been a build up of considerable anti-U.S. feeling in conservative and middle class circles based primarily on the handling of the copper question. Most Chileans view the reimposition of the copper tax[3] as an unfriendly act on the part of the U.S. which had no economic justification. At the present time the position of the government coalition is precarious and it may be overthrown for failure to halt inflation and secure a higher price for copper which would help balance the budget and aid industrial development.

The Government of Chile has cooperated fully with the U.S. and with American copper companies in holding the price of copper at 24½ cents in spite of a general rise in other raw material prices during the last year. The Chilean Government has also cooperated in preventing copper from being diverted to countries behind the Iron Curtain. Increased pressure has developed during the last six months to allow Chilean copper to be sold to neighboring countries and certain western European companies at prices ranging from 30 to 40 cents per pound. With the price freeze now in effect in the U.S. the pressure to divert copper to markets paying higher prices will increase. Pressure to raise the ceiling price in the U.S. will also develop, although the Chilean Government has indicated that it appreciates the desire of U.S. to hold the line.

A fairly obvious way to stop diversion of Chilean copper and to obtain maximum quantities for the U.S. is to raise the price and enter

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[1] Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953.

[2] Source text is an unsigned copy; original not found in Department of State files.

[3] Reference is to the United States excise tax on imported copper. After having been suspended since 1947, the tax was reimposed on July 1, 1950. For further information, see the Policy Statement for Chile, *infra*.

into centralized government purchasing. There are, however, at least two convincing arguments against such action.

1. The cost of raising the price one cent per pound on Chilean copper imported into the U.S. is approximately eight million dollars per year. If the price on copper produced in the U.S. is also raised one cent per pound, the additional cost is approximately eighteen million dollars per year.

2. A modest rise in the price of copper (one to three cents per pound) will not of itself offset the attacks on the Chilean Government and hence will not facilitate all out cooperation with the U.S. which is essential in time of emergency.

The national interest of the U.S. requires that the price of Chilean copper be held to 24½ cents per pound or very close to it, and of greater importance, requires that every pound of copper that can be produced in Chile be utilized in the war effort. This means all out cooperation on the part of the Chilean Government to (1) facilitate production without interruption from strikes or disorders; (2) ensure full use of transportation facilities, port facilities and shipping space; (3) take security measures to protect copper production and transportation facilities from sabotage; (4) institute internal regulations to guarantee the most efficient use of copper by Chilean companies and to prevent diversions to the Soviet Area or to other countries for nonessential purposes.

In order to facilitate all out cooperation between Chile and the U.S. it is necessary to consider the overall problem facing the Chilean Government. This involves a careful analysis of the scope and objectives of the development program which the Chilean Government has been and is engaged upon. Briefly stated, the Chilean Government plans to break the country's previous dependence on two export commodities, nitrate and copper, whose fluctuating prices tended to produce either a feast or famine and both of these extremes led toward inflation. This dependence is to be broken by a diversification of industrial production and a growth in commercial transactions. One outstanding product of this new program is the recent opening of the steel mill in Huachipato whose entire estimated production for 1951 (over 200,000 tons) has already been sold. Another example designed to decrease dependence on imported materials, was the establishment of a staple fibre plant near San Antonio to help build up a Chilean textile industry.

Although the Chileans have made considerable progress in the past decade they are still far from a balanced economy and feel that it is essential for political and social reasons that they drive ahead with their program of economic development. If the Government were to accept a freeze on the price of copper without the right to divert considerable quantities to higher priced markets and at the same time abandon its development program it would probably lose effective support very quickly. This program cannot be accomplished without

the investment or loan of foreign capital. While the Chileans have had great success with the Eximbank, the essential projects before the IBRD for almost four years were not approved because of the Bank's feeling that Chile had failed to combat inflation effectively. The Chileans' reply is that they are painfully aware of the problem of inflation and have taken such measures as were considered possible but that the most effective solution is to be found in increased production and that loans are needed in order to achieve effective results rapidly. They also point out that Chile has not defaulted on debts, and because of continued prospects for dollar income, their balance of payments position will be relatively strong. Chile also feels and has stated that the development program is geared to dovetail as closely as possible with the U.S. defense mobilization program.

The attached annex[4] contains a detailed description of six of the projects included in the development program for which the Chilean Government requires financial assistance from outside sources. In addition to these projects the Chilean Government has carried on extensive development projects in the fields of agriculture, fishing and industry which have been financed without recourse to financial assistance from outside sources.

The development program for which Chile requires outside financial assistance includes the following major projects:

1. *Expansion of Steel Mill:* Purchase and installation of additional equipment, primarily a 750 ton Mixer, will eliminate production bottlenecks and enormously increase the capacity of the mill with an investment of about eight million dollars and 253,000,000 Chilean pesos.

2. *Modernization of Coal Mines:* To avoid huge coal deficits by 1956, Chile must start now to increase production in the Schwager and Lota coal mines and to seek additional deposits. Cost—about eleven million dollars and 1,068,000,000 Chilean pesos.

3. *Cellulose and Paper Plants:* Chile now imports cellulose and newsprint though it has excellent forest resources. It can set up a cellulose mill (Kraft pulp plant) and a newsprint paper mill which will make the country self-sufficient at a cost of eleven million dollars and 400,000,000 Chilean pesos.

4. *Irrigation:* Two particular irrigation projects are under study which would increase the total available arable land and improve other land now under cultivation. The Rio Elquf and Nilahue Valley projects can be begun with about three million dollars and eventually may require a total of thirteen million dollars, with peso costs of more than 600,000,000.

5. *Power:* Two new generating units at Los Cipreses and La Isla, 30,000 KW each, can be installed for approximately three and one-half million dollars and 234 million pesos. A power plant at Lake Calafquen can be built for the Temuco–Valdivia area, with ultimate capacity of 72,000 KW at a cost of U.S. $4.2 million and 144,000,000 pesos. A power house with a 10,000 KVA generator can be built on the

[4] Not found with the source text.

Mostazal River for $1,050,000 U.S. and 76,000,000 Chilean pesos. Total cost for all projects U.S. $8,750,000 and 454,000,000 Chilean pesos.

6. *Nitrates:* A request will probably be received within the next few months for a dollar loan to the nitrate industry to modernize production methods in the province of Tarapacá. This will enable Chile to increase production while decreasing costs, thus putting Chilean natural nitrates in a more favorable position to compete with synthetics in the world market. Estimated size of the loan, approximately fifteen million dolllars, but this figure is only approximate. The Chilean industries are now conducting lengthy, detailed studies of their needs.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the problem of holding the price on Chilean copper and preventing its diversion, in excess of the national needs of Chile, be discussed as an integral part of Chile's overall development problems.

Specifically it is recommended that:

1. The Eximbank give active consideration to (*a*) the extension of credit to Chile to cover the steel mill project,[5] the cellulose project and the coal mines project. These projects contemplate a loan totalling approximately thirty million dollars. (*b*) A "line of credit" of thirty million dollars be granted to Chile by the Eximbank under which she can present over a period of several years specific loan requests for hydroelectric projects, nitrate projects and irrigation and agricultural production projects.

2. Immediate consideration be given to arrangements fo a long term (five to eight years) contract to purchase Chilean copper at 24½ cents per pound and prevent diversion to the Soviet Area and for purposes not essential to the defense effort.

3. Action be continued to have the two cent duty on imported copper removed.

[5] See the editorial note, p. 1284.

611.25/2–2751

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1951.

CHILE

A. OBJECTIVES

The basic US objective in Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, is to obtain Chile's full and effective cooperation in our quest for freedom and international security. Chile's effective cooperation depends upon the maintenance of reasonable governmental stability and the continuance of Chile's present strong adherence to democratic principles. It is the objective of U.S. Government policy to strengthen

the idea both in the Chilean Government and among the Chilean people that the interests of the United States and Chile are fundamentally the same. We also strive to strengthen Chile's existing disposition towards friendship for the United States and to curb the influence of political forces inimical to our broad international policies.

In view of its demonstrated willingness to cooperate, we must strive to make Chile able to carry out its role in the defense of the Hemisphere, and to further our own defense effort by insuring the availability on an increasing scale of Chile's strategic natural resources, especially its copper.

It is also our objective to promote the economic development of the country and to foster conditions favorable to existing American interests as well as to the investment of additional capital.

B. POLICIES

Friendly US connections have been established since the beginning of Chilean independence. At the present time, good relations with the United States are a predominant tenet in Chilean foreign affairs. Nevertheless, we must never lose sight of the political value of an "anti-US" or "anti-Yankee-imperialist" stand in Latin America, nor of the desire of small countries to be assertive about their sovereignty occasionally.

Partly due to its geographical location, Chile has developed a certain independence in foreign relations which reflects the strong individuality of the national character. The constitution of 1925 calls for a "presidential system" of government. In practice, however, there is a multiplicity of parties and a tendency to follow the pattern, uncommon in Latin America, of parliamentary government similar to that of France. In the absence of majority parties in Congress, the executive governs with the support of usually unstable coalitions which form and reform, necessitating frequent cabinet changes.

The Administration's stand against Communism.

The present Administration in Chile has been zealous in its efforts to combat Communism. President Gabriel González Videla, early in his administration, broke with the Communists who had joined with his own powerful Radical Party and other left-of-center groups to support his election in 1946. After serious Communist-inspired strikes and disorders, he sponsored the outlawing of the Communist Party in Chile. In 1948, despite strong opposition from several non-Communist parties, the Government succeeded in enacting the "Defense of Democracy" law which drove the Communist Party underground, disenfranchised its members, and forbade their active participation in labor unions. As a result, direct Communist agitation has been considerably reduced and Communist influence, in general, has been weakened.

Nevertheless, the Communists have had some success in infiltrating other political parties and in regaining their influence in labor movements. They will attempt to exploit the prevailing labor dissatisfaction, strikes, and labor-exerted pressure on the government, which remain perennial features of the Chilean political scene.

The US has in no way inspired or instigated the Chilean Government's anti-Communist program. While we do not necessarily advocate the outlawing of the Communist Party as the most effective way of combating Communism, we have expressed a view to the Chileans that every government should meet this threat in the manner it deems most appropriate.

Anti-American Factors.

The fact that a large segment of Chile's industrial labor is employed by US-owned enterprises adds a degree of anti-US flavor to the ill will normally encountered as the cause or product of labor-management disputes. To counteract this, it is our policy in everyday diplomatic intercourse and through the Information and Education Program, to seek to dispel those latent complexes concerning "Yankee Imperialism" which are readily exploited by extremists of both Right and Left, as well as by the personal ambition of individual politicians.

Chile has two right-wing groups which occasionally become the subject of embarrassment to the government. Until the end of World War II the Nazi movement was very strong in Chile among the large German population of the South, in schools, military circles, the press and even the government. While this group is now dormant it may arise again some day as a very strong anti-American influence. There is also a right-wing pro-Perón movement which seems to be gaining supporters, although Chile is traditionally opposed to Argentina. A group of Congressmen paid homage to Perón during the celebration which took place in Buenos Aires in 1950. This group was censured by the Congress upon its return home and the leader of the unauthorized delegation, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, tendered his resignation as a result. However, General Carlos Ibañez,[1] former dictator-president of Chile, selected Buenos Aires to announce his candidacy for the presidency in the election of 1952, apparently with the backing of the Peróns.

In spite of the existence of the groups mentioned above, anti-US feeling is now at a low level. In the past year the US has taken specific steps to foster this friendly feeling through the invitation extended to President Gonzalez Videla for his highly successful visit to the United States,[2] by maintaining a sympathetic attitude on loans, when eco-

[1] Carlos Ibañez del Campo, President of Chile, 1927–1931.

[2] For information on President Gabriel González Videla's visit to the United States during April and May 1950, and his discussions with President Truman, see editorial note printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 785.

nomically sound, by supporting Chile's efforts to purchase a tanker in the US, and by our successful support of Chile's efforts to secure a place on the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [3] and to have the 1951 ECOSOC meeting take place in Santiago.[4]

Chilean Support for U.S. Global Policies.

We have encouraged Chile to participate actively in the United Nations and the Organization of American States. We consult with its representatives in formulating the tactics of our UN program and we urge its support for resolutions that we consider important. By voting our way, as it usually does, Chile contributes tangibly to the furtherance of our global foreign policy.

Hemisphere Defense.

For economic reasons the armed forces of Chile are small, but it is our policy to assist their development and training so that in time of war or emergency they can cooperate in hemispheric defense [5] by carrying out their appropriate duties. While the details are now being worked out by the Inter-American Defense Board, it is likely that Chile will be requested to maintain order and security, insure continued shipment of vital raw materials, prevent damage to vital ports and other installations, and offer some protection for the Straits of Magellan.

At the present time the US has an Air Mission in Santiago and a Naval Mission in Valparaiso [6] which seek to prepare the Chilean armed forces so that they can be integrated readily into joint plans for hemispheric defense. These Missions have been well received by the Chileans and the equipment and training of the armed forces are now oriented toward the US. Chile is anxious to modernize its military establishment, but its efforts in this direction have been hampered by a shortage of dollars for expenditures of this nature and by the scarcity of certain types of material in the United States, the preferred source of military supply. The Chilean Government is now negotiating to

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[3] For documentation on the establishment and work of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 731 ff.

[4] Reference is to the Twelfth Session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which met at Santiago, February 20–March 21, 1951.

[5] For documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

[6] On February 15, 1951, the United States and Chile had signed at Washington agreements providing for the establishment of a United States advisory air force mission in Santiago and for an advisory naval mission in Valparaiso; both agreements entered into force on February 15. For text of the Air Force Mission Agreement, see 2 UST 522, or TIAS No. 2201; for text of the Naval Mission Agreement, see 2 UST 535, or TIAS No. 2202. For an announcement concerning the agreements, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1951, p. 502.

procure two light cruisers from the US [7] under the Military [*Mutual*] Defense Assistance Act [8] as recently amended. These vessels, to be purchased at relatively low price, would considerably strengthen the Chilean fleet and the government has already set aside the dollars necessary to make payment. In 1950 Chile liquidated her outstanding indebtedness under the Lend-Lease agreement by a lump-sum payment of 15,000,000 pesos ($541,964).[9]

US-Chilean Financial Ties.

The Chilean economy is often said to be dependent on the US. This is so because of: 1) the considerable US private investments in Chilean mineral resources and industry; 2) the importance of the US market for Chilean exports; 3) Chile's need for US manufactures; and 4) the dependence of Chile's development program on loans granted or supported by the US Government. Consequently, economic matters are all important in Chile's relations with us and they help us to achieve political aims.

Copper.

The most important single factor in our economic relations with the country is the Chilean copper industry, the production of which is exported largely to the United States. Roughly 95% of Chilean output is produced by wholly-owned subsidiaries of two U.S. firms (Anaconda and Kennecott).

These companies have long been subject to heavy and complex taxation. When there is a fiscal deficit, Chile tends to look to copper as a source of additional revenue. One form of taxation is application to the companies of the special exchange rate of 19.37 pesos per dollar for that portion of foreign exchange proceeds from copper exports which must be returned to Chile as representing local cost of production whereas all other exports are accorded rates ranging from 49 up to the free rate of about 70 pesos per dollar. Another tax, payable in dollars, consists of 50 percent on that portion of the copper price in excess of 13½ cents per pound. Not only are these taxes important for the governmental budget but they also are of great significance in the country's annual foreign exchange budget.

The current acute copper shortage gives the Chilean Government an opportunity to seek increased revenues by additional taxes or by controlling the sale of copper in order to obtain increased profits from higher prices. Ministerial decrees already are required for exportation

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[7] Chile had taken possession of the cruisers on January 25, 1951 (725.5621/1–2551). For documentation on the negotiations leading to the sale of the cruisers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 599 ff.

[8] For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949, see 63 Stat. 714; for text of the act's amendment (Public Law 621), approved July 26, 1950, see 64 Stat. 373.

[9] For information on Chile's liquidation of its Lend-Lease indebtedness, see editorial note printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 783.

of copper sold on any other basis than US dollars and very little additional action by the government would be needed to impose complete control on sales. Recently the copper companies were approached by a Chilean government official to turn over 20 percent of production "voluntarily" for sale by a Chilean government corporation. We hope that the copper companies will be able to avoid this by direct negotiation with the Chilean Government without the intervention of the US.[10] Although it is our policy not to interfere in such matters unless national interests are threatened, the US Government may have to take a hand in this case if there is any likelihood that copper will thus be diverted from normal channels or if any action were taken by the Chilean Government which would result in reduced shipments to the US or other damage to our combined economic and defense efforts. Chile may try to use copper as a lever to obtain higher quotas of short materials such as cotton, the importation of which from the US is essential to the Chilean textile industry.

U.S. Excise Tax on Copper.

Of equal concern to the US-owned companies and the Chilean Government is the US excise tax on imported copper which was originally 4 cents per pound and was reduced by the GATT[11] in 1949 to 2 cents. The suspension of this tax since 1947 expired on July 1, 1950. Even if Congress provides for a further temporary suspension,[12] the presence of the tax in our legislation is a source of recurring uneasiness for Chile as a possible cause for eventual curtailment of copper exports with consequent decline in employment, dollar resources and tax revenues. Since this type of curtailment occurred after World War II, the psychological factor in Chile's attitude toward this tax is considerable. Imposition of the tax by the US is regarded as an unfriendly act and is constantly exploited by Communists and extremists of the right as a manifestation of US imperialistic selfishness.

The Executive branch of the US Government advocates continuation of the suspension of the tax, primarily because our domestic production of copper is insufficient for our needs. This position is also based on our

[10] In late January 1951, Mr. William H. Hoover, President of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, and Mr. Charles R. Cox, President of Kennecott Copper Corporation, met with President González Videla and other Chilean officials at Santiago to discuss current problems in the copper industry. These discussions proved inconclusive and were terminated on January 31. Shortly thereafter, the Chilean President announced that since most of the copper questions which concerned the companies and the government of Chile required a decision by the United States Government, he would name a commission to enter into conversations with United States representatives at Washington. Subsequently, he appointed Chilean Ambassador Félix Nieto del Río to head the so-called Chilean Copper Commission. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 825.2542.

[11] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

[12] H.R. 3336 provided for another suspension of the tax; it was approved as Public Law 38, May 22, 1951. For text, see 65 Stat. 44.

awareness of the political significance of the tax to US relations with Chile.

Sodium Nitrate.

Second only to the copper industry as a source of wealth is the older traditional mainstay and, also, the white elephant of Chilean economy, the production and exportation of natural sodium nitrate found in seemingly unlimited quantities in the desert of the North. This industry employs twice as many persons as the copper industry but provides a considerably smaller portion of foreign exchange and tax revenues. Over 65 percent of the output is owned by US interests (Guggenheim) but the marketing of nitrates is a monopoly of an agency of the Chilean Government which receives 25 percent of the profits.

This industry has long struggled with the competition of synthetic ammonia production which is again expanding all over the world. Notwithstanding the tremendous increase in world consumption of fertilizers during the last war, the Chilean product has maintained only its volume of sales, rather than its proportionate share of the US market and Chile now sells only 7½ percent of the world's nitrates whereas it once sold as much as 65 percent of the total supply.

During the war the United States built and operated Army ordnance plants for the production of nitrogen. The Chilean Government was apprehensive that operation of these plants or their disposal at low prices after the war would constitute a subsidy for the US nitrogen industry to the detriment of Chile's nitrate trade. In 1945, by an exchange of notes[13] at the time of the Chapultepec conference,[14] we promised Chile that the US Government would not continue to operate these plants beyond the period necessitated by the consequences of the war and further agreed to consult with Chile regarding the terms of disposal of these plants to private industry.[15] Most of the ordnance plants have now been transferred to private industry under sale or lease arrangements and in every case, the Chilean Government has claimed that the disposal price was far below the commercial value of the plant and created unfair competition. On the other hand, US officials, in accordance with our policy in this respect, have repeatedly asserted that the terms of disposal of these plants were based on fair and reasonable commercial standards.

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[13] The United States note, dated March 5, 1945, contains the agreement reached; it is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. IX, p. 795.

[14] Reference is to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Chapultepec Conference), held at Mexico City, February 21–March 8, 1945. For documentation on the conference, see *ibid.*, pp. 1 ff.

[15] In the fall of 1951, the Chilean Government was provided an opportunity to comment on the proposed lease worked out between the Department of the Army and the Mathieson Chemical Corporation for reactivation of the Morgantown Ordnance Works prior to the execution of the lease. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 825.2564.

The Chilean Government has also expressed its concern at US financing through ECA, of synthetic ammonia production in ERP countries and at reports of possible US financing of plants in other countries, such as Spain. It is our policy to reply to the Chileans that these projects are undertaken on the basis of their own intrinsic economic soundness after full consideration of all factors involved in the world fertilizer trade including our interest in the welfare of the Chilean industry.

The nitrate producers, with the backing of the government, have taken preliminary steps toward seeking a loan in the US to modernize production methods in the northernmost province of Tarapacá. They hope to introduce the Guggenheim system now in use in Antofagasta and to make other improvements in production methods which will virtually eliminate the antiquated and inhuman Shanks method. It is US policy to encourage this type of modernization which lowers production costs, improves living standards and puts Chile in a better competitive position in the world market.

Economic Diversification Program.

While agriculture is still the economic activity of a large part of the working population of Chile, the economic well-being of the country depends mostly upon the export of copper and nitrate. To counteract this, the Government has pursued intensive efforts at industrialization and economic diversification during the past decade, and has had considerable success as exemplified by the establishment of several new industries, including a steel mill and a producing oil field. It is our policy to foster industrialization and the use of modern machinery in Chile, while at the same time urging balanced production, stabilization of the currency and caution to avoid over-extension.

The industrial development of Chile is being promoted largely through the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, a government owned corporation established in 1939, with wide autonomous powers. The Corporation was created entirely upon Chilean initiative, originally to direct rehabilitation following the earthquake of 1939. It has since expanded its program to include general economic development.

The largest project thus far undertaken by Fomento is the $88,000,000 Huachipato steel mill at Concepción, financed by a $48 million Export-Import Bank credit for the purchase of equipment in the US.[16] Production is based on domestic supplies of iron ore, limestone and domestic and imported US coking coal. It is our policy to support Chile in this significant industrial achievement and we also point to this particular project as an outstanding example of the benefits derived from US financial aid for economic development.

[16] This credit was authorized on September 11, 1945.

Through the Fomento Corporation, Chile has developed its recently discovered oil deposits in Tierra del Fuego, and has become an oil producing country this year. Storage facilities and a 45-mile pipe line from the fields to a sheltered harbor have been built and the production of crude (over 2,000 barrels per day) is at present exported to Uruguay. The field and all facilities are owned and exploited by a Chilean Government entity, Empresa Nacional de Petróleo. The first steps are being taken for the construction of a stabilization plant at the oil fields. Plans for a refinery near Valparaiso are still far from realization. Since the Chilean Government is committed to a policy of public ownership of oil fields and installations, participation by the large oil companies in the construction of a refinery is precluded. Chile has not formally requested a loan for the projected construction of an oil refinery. Should other Latin American countries receive loans for oil development purposes, Chile will probably request similar assistance. Under our present policy financial assistance in the form of Export-Import Bank loans for petroleum development is precluded. Since 1942, marketing of petroleum products in Chile has been regulated by an agreement among the Esso Standard Oil Company, Shell-Mex and the Cia de Petroleos de Chile (Copec). This agreement, which is implemented under government auspices, terminates at the end of 1951 but is automatically extendable for an additional three years unless one of the parties signifies a desire for its termination. This step was taken by the Esso Standard Oil Co. at the end of 1950 and is currently under negotiation looking toward a return to competitive marketing of petroleum products. This government, in accordance with its foreign economic policy, supports efforts to obtain the elimination of this agreement and in general encourages the development of competitive petroleum marketing.

Through another subsidiary, ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad), Fomento has expanded power output, with Export-Import Bank and IBRD financial assistance, by constructing hydroelectric installations to serve the Concepción area where the steel mill is located and where Fomento plans to establish nearly 20 industrial plants, including factories for agricultural machinery; building materials and chemicals. A new 30,000 kilowatt plant owned by a subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company has further increased the electric power of the Santiago–Valparaiso region and it is likely that rationing in this area will have ended completely by 1951.

The Chilean development plans also include an irrigation project, establishment of a wood pulp and newsprint mill, modernization of lumber enterprises, further expansion of electric power, modernization of the principal coal mines and further improvement of the railroads. Realization of these plans is dependent on the ability of the Chilean Government and private firms to obtain sizeable foreign financing.

Chile's capacity to borrow in the US is now the subject of serious scrutiny because of the continued inflationary policies of the government and its failure to take corrective action leading to economic stabilization.

Growing Government Controls in the Economy.

In the last thorough reshuffle of the cabinet in March 1950, the Administration shifted from conservative economic policies to the more programmatic of the erstwhile opposition parties. The Government at present is committed to advanced social policies which make it prompt to respond to the clamors for wage increases, and reluctant to adopt effective anti-inflationary measures. Consequently, the demand for commodities, of which several basic ones are imported, continues to rise, while the industrialization program has as yet been unable to furnish a commensurate increase in national productivity adequate to satisfy either consumption at home or to meet trade imbalances abroad.

U.S. Concern Over Chile's Financial Policies.

We intend to take every opportunity, within the framework of our policy of non-interference, to impress on Chilean representatives our belief in the desirability of effective measures aimed at achieving economic stability and sound financial practices. Chilean officials fervently hope that the US Government will not adopt a pessimistic view of further expansion of the Chilean economy and look to the Department of State for initial support in procuring financial assistance. It is our present policy to support Chilean applications for sound development projects but to dispel undue optimism with respect to further financial assistance in the absence of effective measures for stabilization and caution to avoid overexpansion.

Since the early 19th century, foreign loans and investments, first European then American, have played a very important part in the Chilean economy. This inflow of foreign capital reached a peak during 1925–29, but in 1929–32 Chile suffered a sharper relative decline in foreign trade than any other country in the world and with the resulting inability to meet service payments, the external debt went into default. Chile sought to escape from this predicament partly by establishing exchange control in 1931. By 1950 this control system had become one of the most complicated in the world and tends to make the government a hidden partner in all international business transactions.

Foreign enterprises with investments in Chile are permitted to transfer earnings and capital, but only on the basis of an agreement with the exchange-control authority, which specifies the rate at which capital may be amortized and the exchange rate or rates applicable to this particular industry. The combination of an inflationary economy and exchange control has permitted Chile to count on exchange profits

as a source of government revenue but at the same time it has lessened Chile's chances of obtaining further financial commitments from abroad. The instability of the Chilean financial system is also aggravated by the fact that the budget and the economy in general are highly dependent on the export of its minerals which are subject to wide variations in price in the world market. The exchange rate is also manipulated by the government to increase or decrease the profits of a given industry or may be used as a form of subsidy. For example, in a recent effort to provide full employment in the northern provinces the President had the exchange rate for the nitrate industry raised from an average of less than 43 to 49.23 pesos to the dollar and thus provided greater profits and a better competitive position for the industry.

It is US policy to encourage Chile's adherence to its commitments of January 1948 to the International Monetary Fund, which encompass internal anti-inflationary fiscal policies and eventual simplification of the present multiple exchange-rate system in favor of a single rate at a realistic level.[17] The IMF conducted a financial study of Chile and submitted written recommendations to the government designed to halt the inflation and strengthen the financial structure. The US lends general support to these recommendations. Chile was one of the Geneva signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and has participated in the second and third rounds of tariff negotiations held at Annecy and Torquay, respectively. It is U.S. policy to encourage Chile's continued participation in the GATT, in line with the aspect of our economic foreign policy that is directed towards reducing artificial barriers to international trade.

Technical Assistance Programs.[18]

In addition to the general assistance to Chile in increasing its industrialization and diversifying its economy, the US has tried to help improve the standard of living of the country through technical assistance offered by the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) [19] and the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Co-

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[17] For documentation on the foreign exchange question in Chile in 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 783 ff.

[18] For documentation on the technical assistance policy of the United States toward the American Republics as a group, see pp. 1038 ff.

[19] The IIAA was established in March 1942, and became a United States Government corporation under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State in 1947. Its purpose was to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply; as of mid-1950 the IIAA operating in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the activities of the IIAA and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 679.

operation (SCC).[20] The health and sanitation program of the IIAA, which has been in continuous operation since 1943, has involved construction of three tuberculosis sanatoria, operation of three health centers, the installation of numerous sewage systems and a program of rural sanitation. Assistance was also given to nurse training and to a health-education campaign. Under the new Point IV program technical assistance to Chile will be broadened by two new IIAA programs in food supply and vocational education. Also under consideration are a program for mass-produced low-cost housing and assistance in general economic planning and research.

Shipping and Aviation Policy.

It is our policy to encourage Chile to permit the principles of free competition to operate in the conduct of transportation services. However, since the end of the war, Chile, in common with some of the other American Republics, has shown increasing inclination to build up its merchant fleet through a system of preferences and discriminations intended to channel trade to its flag carriers. This attitude became a fixed policy in 1950 in pursuance of which the Chilean Government has taken steps to guarantee that 50% of the freight destined to Chile is handled in its national shipping companies. The 50% is achieved through the mechanism for issuing import permits, whereby the Chilean National Foreign Trade Council determines what flag ships are to be employed in the movement of freight. Following our repeated protests that this policy and the measures used to carry it out were discriminatory against US shipping, an acceptable agreement was reached last fall among the Chilean and US shipping lines involved.[21] Other shipping lines have expressed apprehension over these arrangements and the Maritime Administration is holding hearings[22] to determine if the arrangements violate the terms of the 1916 Shipping Act.[23]

In order to prevent its capital city from being bypassed on international trunk air routes, Chile very early adopted a policy of prohibiting overflights of Chilean territory. Although the US-Chilean air transport agreement of 1947[24] contains a provision covering the

[20] This committee was officially in existence from May 1938 to October 1950; through it the Department of State sponsored certain assistance programs in Latin America related primarily to social services and health care.

[21] The shipping agreement signed October 30, 1950, at New York, consisted of pooling arrangements between Grace Line, Gulf and South American Steamship Company, and Compañía Sud Americana de Vapores (CSAV). For previous documentation on shipping matters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 793–798.

[22] On May 14, 1951, the United States Federal Maritime Board dismissed a complaint against the pooling arrangements by the West Coast Shipping Line (911.5325/2–951), and on July 6, the Board formally approved the arrangements (911.5325/7–951).

[23] For text of the Shipping Act (Public Law 260), approved September 7, 1916, see 39 Stat. 728.

[24] For text of the Air Transport Agreement, concluded by an exchange of notes at Santiago, May 10, 1947, and entered into force December 30, 1948, see TIAS No. 1905, or 63 Stat. 3755.

right of transit as well as the right to non-stop points in Chile, that government has consistently maintained that transit rights were not granted separately but only in connection with the right to make traffic stops in Chilean territory. In view of the difference in interpretation, the US formally reserved the right to set forth its position at a later date. We are now considering initiating action to obtain clarification of this point in view of the desire of a US carrier, which has no traffic rights in Chile, to overfly Chilean territory on its trunk route to Argentina.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

Chile has always played an important role in inter-American affairs. In recent years it has become one of the most active participants in inter-American organization, showing particular interest in international economic planning on behalf of underdeveloped countries. In general, in the Organization of American States Chile collaborates with the United States. Chile has ratified the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.[25]

Chile is also very active in United Nations affairs and belongs to most of the specialized agencies. The Chilean delegation has sided firmly with the Western powers on all important issues. It formulated the protest in the Security Council against the Communist *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia in 1948 [26] and actively opposed Soviet machinations in the General Assembly in 1950. The President strongly supports the US policy of containing Communism. It is our policy to encourage Chile to play an important role in the UN as one of the leading democracies of Latin America.

In Latin America Chile has served as a champion of democracy and has frequently expressed its opposition to authoritarian governments in the Western Hemisphere. Whenever a democratic government has been overthrown, Chile has shown its concern by postponing recognition of the new government. For example, it has endeavored to promote the growth of US and OAS sentiment against recognition of the governments established by force in Peru and Venezuela. The Chilean Government has openly criticized US application of Bogotá Resolution 35 [27] which proclaims the desirability of the continuity of diplo-

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[25] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[26] For documentation on United States policy with respect to the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IV, pp. 733 ff.; for documentation on the related subject of the United States attitude toward changes in the representation of Czechoslovakia at the United Nations, see *ibid.*, vol. I, Part 1, pp. 167 ff.

[27] For text of this resolution, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948, see the Final Act of the conference, printed in *Annals of the Organization of American States*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 135.

matic relations among the American states. Despite the US position that recognition does not mean approval, the Chileans believe that concerted action to show disapproval of a regime set up by force would do much to discourage ambitious military groups.

With respect to these views, it is our policy to explain to Chilean officials that while it is one of our basic long-term policies to foster adherence to democratic principles in Latin America we do not wish to encourage any policies which would tend to divide the American republics into antagonistic groups according to the political ideologies of the several governments in power.

Chile has not yet established diplomatic relations with the Junta Government of Venezuela. In 1950 the Chilean Government requested the US to represent her interests in Caracas. Pleading a shortage of personnel, we refused, but one of the items considered in the formulation of a negative reply was the US desire that Chile and Venezuela reestablish relations.

Chile's attitude toward Argentina is motivated by a conflict of interests. While feeling it advisable to maintain close economic relations with its eastern neighbor, Chileans resent Argentina's ambitions to become dominant in southern South America and fear Argentina's meddling in their internal affairs. In the opinion of many Chileans, President Perón of Argentina has long desired to acquire special economic advantages for Argentina in Chile and would encourage any group in Chile that might be willing to pursue a pro-Argentine policy. The US has tried to avoid entanglement in Chile-Argentine relations and has followed its policy of encouraging the growth of democracy both at home and abroad.

Bolivia and Peru find it difficult to forget that they lost extensive territories to Chile as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). Although Chile finds the military dictatorship in Peru distasteful, it has accorded recognition to the government and relations are correct though not cordial. In the case of Haya de la Torre[28] Chilean sympathies are completely with Colombia. After the election of a pro-democratic administration in Bolivia in 1947,[29] relations between Chile and Bolivia became most cordial and the President of Chile proclaimed his friendship for the Bolivian administration on the occasion of last year's revolt and civil war instigated by Bolivian radicals with the alleged support of President Perón of Argentina.

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[28] Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, principal leader of APRA in Peru, had taken political refuge in the Colombian Embassy in Lima in January, 1949. The Colombian Government's refusal to turn him over to Peruvian authorities generated a legal and diplomatic controversy between the two countries. For previous documentation on United States interest in the so-called Haya de la Torre case, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 772 ff. and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 994 ff.

[29] Reference is to the administration of Enrique Hertzog, President of Bolivia, 1947–1949.

The Government of Chile has unofficially indicated its willingness to cede to Bolivia a narrow strip of land adjacent to the Chile–Peru boundary, which would give Bolivia access to the sea. The cession would be combined with a three-nation irrigation and hydroelectric power development. Under the Chile–Peru boundary settlement of 1929, the consent of Peru to such a cession is required. Press announcements reporting high level discussion of this proposal have caused a good deal of debate and animosity in all three countries. Peruvian officials have indicated apprehension; a large segment of Chilean public opinion has expressed vehement opposition; and the Communists have denounced the project as an evil scheme of US imperialism, basing this propaganda on the fact that the President of Chile, during his visit to Washington in April 1950, had outlined the proposal to President Truman.

Chile established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1946 but broke them in 1947 when President González Videla alleged that international Communism was responsible for the Chilean coal strike. In November 1950 Chile reestablished diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia by means of an exchange of notes which took place in New York City between the delegates of the two countries to the UN. In connection with the current Communist aggression in Korea,[30] Chile has formally expressed her solidarity with the US and has declared to the UN that it recognizes its responsibility in upholding UN Charter[31] principles.

Traditionally, Chile has had relatively strong ties with Western European countries. The bonds of ancestry, language, and religion long furnished a strong base for Chilean-Spanish relations, but Radical Party administrations, in power since 1938, have shown little friendliness toward the Franco[32] Government.

For many years, the influence of French culture has been preeminent in Chilean higher education and cultural activities but, since World War II, US cultural influence has made considerable gains. For more than a hundred years close relations with Germany existed because of the achievements of German colonists in southern Chile, the influence of German technical assistance in the school system, and the training of the Chilean army by German officers. Ties with Italy have been close because of cultural affinities and also because of the Italian ancestry of certain prominent Chileans. A considerable number of British families settled in Chile and now form a bilingual Anglo-Chilean colony which exercises appreciable influence in the Santiago area through their schools and clubs, by participation in business, and

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[30] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume VII.

[31] For text of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, and entered into force for the United States, October 24, 1945, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) 993, or 59 Stat. 1031.

[32] Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Spain's Chief of State.

by their "way of life." This group has been successful in avoiding the growth of anti-British feeling.

Commercial exchange with Europe is slowly reviving. Chile has entered into several trade agreements with European countries, mostly providing for the exchange of sodium nitrate for particular commodities. More normal commercial relations were recently established with Germany by the conclusion of a trade agreement which thinly disguises a large-scale barter arrangement. At the present time a growth of trade with Europe represents no threat to American interests and indeed may fit well into US policies for other areas which are the recipients of ECA and technical assistance.

Chile claims a sector of the Antarctic continent which includes the Palmer Peninsula and overlaps the Argentine and British claims. The Chilean Government and public attach considerable importance to this Antarctic claim and believe the area may some day have great geopolitical importance as well as strategic military value. The US, reserving its rights to make territorial claims, seeks condominium for the Antarctic in agreement with seven other interested countries. Chile and the US are seeking a common approach to a solution of the Antarctic problem.[33]

D. EVALUATION

The US has successfully sought Chilean support for its general program in the UN and in the OAS. On almost all important issues the two governments consult in advance and support mutually satisfactory positions. At home the Chileans have shown a devotion to democratic principles and have contained the extremist forces of the left and right without sacrificing any of the basic freedoms.

Although Chile was sympathetic to the Nazis in World War II, we believe that maximum cooperation from Chile in the event of another war or emergency is now assured. Its armed forces are available for immediate use in a regional security framework and to ensure continued production and shipment of copper and other strategic materials. The Chilean Government is already participating in a voluntary inspection system to prevent shipment of semi-processed copper to countries which are our potential enemies. If the threat of war increases, the armed forces and the economic resources of Chile will be available for integration in the over-all war effort of the US.

In general, the government's development program has progressed satisfactorily but it has not yet reached the point where it has relieved the Chilean economy of its lopsided dependence on the prosperity of the copper and nitrate industries. Nor has industrialization reached the stage where it can effectively influence the constantly rising cost

[33] For documentation on United States policy with regard to the Polar Regions, see vol. I, pp. 1715 ff.

of living or the chronic unbalance of Chile's foreign-exchange budget. In future years the development of the economy will continue to be dependent on foreign capital although stabilization of the currency and sound financial practices may eventually diminish this dependency.

In cultural fields the USIE program has been successful. The three Cultural Institutes and the active radio and motion-picture programs have helped develop a disposition of friendliness and understanding toward the US. It would be well to extend these programs to reach an even greater segment of the laboring and white-collar groups which are the targets of Communist and other anti-US propaganda.

Perhaps the smallest gains were made in the field of raising standards of living for the inhabitants of Chile. In common with other countries, Chile is in the grip of a vicious inflationary spiral which wipes out increases in wages almost as soon as they are granted. This has prevented large-scale progress in improvement of housing, provision of an adequate diet and improvement of educational and health standards. The 1951 expansion of assistance under Point IV, to include technical aid in low-cost housing construction, education, and food production, should prove to be effective in helping to achieve some of our objectives in Chile.

825.2542/3–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund E. Getzin of the Economic Resources and Security Staff, Office of International Trade Policy

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1951.

Subject: Chilean Copper.

Participants: Mr. Fred Searles, Office Defense Mobilization
Mr. Richard Bissell,[1] Economic Cooperation Administration
Mr. Frank Hayes, National Production Authority
Mr. Brown[2]—ITP (State)
Mr. Atwood[3]—OSA
Mr. Knox[4]—ARA/E
Mr. Getzin—ER

Mr. Searles called the meeting to discuss certain proposals made by the Government of Chile with respect to copper. The substance of the Chilean proposals are:

[1] Deputy Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration.
[2] Winthrop G. Brown, Director, Office of International Trade Policy.
[3] Rollin S. Atwood, Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs.
[4] Charles F. Knox, Jr., Consul General, Curacao. Mr. Knox, who had served as adviser on American Republics economic development in 1945, was temporarily detailed to the Department of State from January 23 to April 27, 1951.

1. That production of copper in Chile be increased.
2. That Chile use a portion of the production for its own needs and for export to friendly countries other than the United States.
3. That the price of copper be adjusted upward.
4. That the United States eliminate the excise tax on imported copper.
5. That study be given to a formula which would maintain the price of copper at a parity with the prices of things Chile must import.

The Chilean proposals were the subject of a letter from Assistant Secretary Thorp to Mr. Edwin Gibson, Deputy Defense Production Administrator, dated February 19, 1951 [5] in which he asked for DPA to help formulate a U.S. position for discussion with the Chileans.

Mr. Searles began by saying that he was familiar with the proposals made by Chile, and that the Chileans should be told to submit their proposals to the International Materials Conference on Copper, Lead and Zinc.[6] He suggested that in a broader forum the weight of opinion of other countries could be brought to bear on the Chileans in an effort to get them to withdraw some of their demands. He also suggested that countries receiving ECA assistance might be induced to "gang up" on the Chileans, and added that pressure should be brought on Chile since that country has been selling copper to the Soviet and its satellites. In connection with the Chilean request for a "set aside" of copper to be sold at higher than market prices, the question was raised as to whether or not such diversion was of particular concern to the United States. Mr. Searles replied by saying that, at the present the U.S. needed all the copper it could get, but that he was not too concerned if part of the Chilean production was sold elsewhere since, in that event, greater supplies would be available from other sources. This view was questioned by Mr. Bissell in the light of large unfilled European demands for copper. The following reviews were also expressed by the others:

1. The United States could not refuse to talk to, nor could it refer to a multilateral conference, a mission appointed by the President of another country sent to the United States for the express purpose of talking bilaterally about matters of particular importance to that country.

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[5] Not printed.

[6] The Copper, Lead and Zinc Committee was one of the commodity committees established through the initiative of the United States, Great Britain, and France early in 1951. These committees collectively constituted the International Materials Conference (IMC); they were charged with reviewing the international supply position for scarce raw materials, and with recommending to governments measures for insuring equitable distribution. For additional information on the origins and development of the IMC, see Willis C. Armstrong (Acting Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy), "The International Materials Conference," Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1951, pp. 23–30.

2. That some points made by Chile, such as the copper tax and increased production by United States companies, are clearly appropriate for bilateral discussions.

3. The IMC has just got under way, and its activities will for sometime be confined to developing a statistical base for its deliberations. It would be difficult to interject specific problems on copper into the conference at this time. In the meanwhile, the Chilean Congress is to reconvene March 5 and has before it certain measures inimical to the interest of the United States copper companies. The opinion was also expressed that, if discussions with Chile were not carried out bilaterally and in good faith, Chile might well withdraw from the IMC.

4. There is no evidence that Chile has sold copper to the Iron Curtain countries or that she has any intention of doing so. As a matter of fact, Chile's record in preventing such shipments has been good.

Mr. Brown stressed the importance of intra United States discussions on the Chilean proposals before formal United States-Chilean talks, and pointed out the urgency of developing a United States position. Mr. Searles said Mr. Wilson [7] would tell Mr. Acheson [8] the U.S. position at the cabinet meeting. Mr. Brown reiterated his request for DPA representation to work with State and ECA to develop a U.S. position. Mr. Searles declined to designate someone. Mr. Searles then suggested that the Department representatives talk with the Chileans on the following day in an effort to find out exactly what they want. He intimated that his information on the proposals of the Chileans was at variance with that furnished to the Department. Mr. Brown then suggested that the information referred to be made available so that the Department's representatives have the benefit of such information in their talks with the Chilean officials. Mr. Searles declined to divulge his information. (Note: Mr. Searles apparently had obtained a copy of the instruction [9] from the President of Chile to Mr. Roberto Vergara. This paper has also been made available to the Department through Embassy Santiago.)

It was emphasized by State and agreed by ECA that regardless of where the Chilean proposals are discussed, it is essential that there be a unified United States position on each.

It was then agreed that the Department of State should talk to the Chileans on Friday, March 3 in an effort to ascertain their exact proposals. It was suggested that these proposals with the Department's recommendation on each, should then be submitted to Mr. Edwin Gibson for referral to the Executive Committee of the Committee on Foreign Supplies and Requirements. The Department officials reiterated the Department's request that representatives of the Defense

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[7] Charles Edward Wilson, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization.

[8] Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State.

[9] A copy of a memorandum containing instructions from President González Videla to Señor Vergara, a member of the Chilean Copper Commission, dated February 12, 1951, was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 843, from Santiago, February 21, 1951, not printed (825.2542/2–2151).

Production Administration and Economic Stabilization Agency be designated forthwith to develop the United States position prior to submission to the Executive Committee for approval. Representatives of DPA and ESA should also participate in formal discussions with the Chilean Mission.

In closing Mr. Searles said that the excise tax on imported copper was a block to maximum imports into the United States and stated that if this barrier did not have to be overcome, companies operating in Africa, with whom he is associated in private life, would be able to bring more copper to the United States. Why this was so was not explained since it is the current practice of importers to pass the tax on to the consumer. The latter now pay two cents over the domestic price for their supplies of foreign copper.

825.2542/3–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund E. Getzin of the Economic Resources and Security Staff, Office of International Trade Policy

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1951.

Subject: Chilean Copper.

Participants: Mr. Carl Lenz, Office of Price Stabilization
Mr. Leo Halpern, Office of Price Stabilization
Dr. John Morgan,[1] Defense Production Administration
Mr. Frank Hayes, National Production Administration
Mr. Rollin Atwood—OSA
Mr. John Evans [2]—ER
Mr. Edmund Getzin—ER

The Department was notified on March 8 that Mr. Edwin Gibson, Deputy Administrator, Defense Production Administration, had appointed Dr. Morgan and Mr. Hayes to develop a United States position on the Chilean copper question with representatives of ESA and Department of State. This was pursuant to Assistant Secretary Thorp's letter to Mr. Gibson, dated March 3.[3]

The participants met on March 9 and in general terms discussed the contents of the Chilean memorandum and recommendations so far made by State and ESA to meet the Chilean proposals. Mr. Hayes then referred to a conversation between Mr. Harrison [4] of DPA and

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[1] John D. Morgan, Jr., Director, Materials Review Division.
[2] John W. Evans, Chief, Economic Resources and Security Staff, Office of International Trade Policy.
[3] Not printed.
[4] Maj. Gen. William Henry Harrison, Administrator, Defense Production Administration.

Mr. Gibson, DPA with Messrs. Hoover of Anaconda and Cox of Kennecott. Following this conversation Mr. Gibson had listed five points representing DPA's views on subjects for discussion with the Chilean delegation. These five points are:

1. "The United States will discuss the question of an increase in the price of copper from Chile provided the Government will check or stop semi-manufacturing."
2. "Raw copper should assume its normal distribution—U.S. will agree to a maximum amount of copper to be retained by Chile for handling in cooperation with the producers in the manner customary in the trade—this maximum amount will be used by Chile to trade for those necessary supplies which the U.S. cannot provide."
3. "The U.S. will be willing to discuss the question of a moderate loan program for small mine development and production. This amount should not exceed four million and expenditures under it be subject to investigation by U.S. experts of individual projects."
4. "The U.S. will undertake to arrive at an understanding with regard to the materials the U.S. will supply."
5. "The agreement be limited to a one year period."

It was apparent that these points were hurriedly drafted and their exact meaning and scope would have to be clarified. Specifically, with regard to point 1, it was not known if stoppage of semi-manufacturing was a condition to be fulfilled prior to the discussion of price or whether it was to be a result of satisfactory discussions. It could not be determined if a general rise in the price of copper was to be considered or if the increase in the price was to be confined to Chilean copper. If the latter, there was some doubt as to its manner of accomplishment.

In point 2, the meaning of the phrase "its normal distribution" was in doubt and it was not clear whether the copper is to move at prices agreed to under point 1, or at some higher price relating to what Chile buys from other countries.

Under point 3 the question of whether or not the U.S. is to enter into purchase contracts at higher prices if necessary requires clarification.

Dr. Morgan and Mr. Hayes were asked to check back with Messrs. Harrison and Gibson and clarify the questions raised and report to the group as soon as possible. The representatives of OPS were in general agreement but reserved their position on point 1, pending further consideration in that agency of the inflationary effects of a possible increase in the price of copper.

It was suggested that Mr. Hayes represent DPA and Mr. Halpern ESA in subsequent discussions with the Chilean mission.

825.2542/3–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Milton Barall of the Office of South American Affairs [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1951.

Participants: Senor Felix Nieto del Rio, Chilean Ambassador
Senor Roberto Vergara, Chile
Senor Jorge Burr,[2] Chilean Embassy
Mr. G. Johnson, Economic Stabilization Agency
Mr. F. H. Hayes, Defense Production Administration
OMP—Mr. Brown
Mr. Getzin
OSA—Ambassador Warren [3]
Mr. Atwood
Mr. Barall

At the request of the Chilean Ambassador the first formal meeting on the copper question was held (this date) with the understanding that the US Government was not yet ready to discuss or negotiate with respect to any general increase in the price of copper.

It was agreed to be in the interest of both countries that production of copper in Chile should be increased. To increase production from the large mines of the Anaconda and Kennecott Companies, the Chilean Government will continue discussions with these companies in order to reach an acceptable basis under which the companies can accelerate current expansion programs and plan for additional investments leading to even greater production. It was agreed that with respect to the large mines no financial assistance would be sought from the US Government. After agreement between the Chilean Government and the American companies is reached, the US will assist by granting priorities for the production and export of essential equipment and supplies to carry out the plans, although no guarantees of delivery can be made at this time because the supply situation in these items will have to be examined in the light of other high priority needs at the time of delivery. With regard to smaller and medium sized mining properties, the US is prepared to assist in efforts to increase production by granting priorities for supplies and equipment in the same manner as for the larger mines. In addition, the US is willing to consider providing limited financial assistance on the basis of favorable reports submitted by competent engineers. The US Government is prepared to arrange immediately for engineers to go to Chile to help determine, together with operators and engineers in Chile, the feasi-

[1] Mr. Getzin was codrafter of this memorandum; it was drafted on March 19, 1951.
[2] Commercial Counselor, Chilean Embassy.
[3] Fletcher Warren, Director, Office of South American Affairs.

bility of increasing production by enlarging present operations and/or starting new ones. This can be done under Point Four or on other terms but only at the request of the Chilean Government. After this examination the US is willing to consider the appropriate method of financial assistance.

The US Government recognizes the desire and right of Chile to sell a portion of her copper production to countries other than the US. Because of the importance of copper to the economy of the US, especially at a time when US industry is geared to maximum defense production in an attempt to supply the free world with essential military and civilian goods, we expect that maximum quantities will continue to be shipped to the US and that only a minimum will go to other countries. By "minimum" we mean quantities sufficient to take care of the normal essential requirements of Chile and other countries, chiefly Latin America. The US also hopes that Chile's internal consumption will be held to essential requirements. The US considers that sales of unfabricated copper should be made in the form of refinery shapes and that the sale of "palanquillas" should cease. Chile agreed to this providing that the copper companies would abandon the use of one price for all exports. The Chileans asked that it be clearly understood that sales to other countries are not to be limited to Latin America alone and that sales to free countries in Europe or elsewhere may also be made.

The US representatives said they had understood that the principal reason why Chile wished to divert its copper from the United States was to finance requirements of needed products from other Latin American countries, and that the copper companies had built up a considerable market for Chilean copper in Europe which might be prejudiced by price increases. The Chileans agreed that this was substantially correct, but did not wish to be precluded from making sales outside of Latin America at a higher price if suitable occasion should arise. The US explained that the American companies had spent considerable time and effort in building up markets for Chilean copper in Europe and it was therefore desirable that all sales outside of Chile should be made through the established sales organizations of the copper companies. The Chileans stated that if satisfactory arrangements with the companies could be worked out it would not be necessary to set up a sales organization of their own.

It was recognized that the amount to be sold to countries other than the US was related to decisions that would be taken with respect to the change, if any, in the price of copper in the US and would be the subject of further discussion. It was also agreed that the price of copper that might be diverted and the way in which that increased price would be distributed between the companies and the Chilean Government was a matter for discussion between the companies and the

Chilean Government. It was agreed by Chile that no copper would be sold to iron curtain companies and that in sales to other countries care would be exercised to avoid the possibility of transshipment behind the iron curtain. It was also agreed that the distribution of copper would be subject to any obligation Chile undertook with respect to international allocation in the International Material Conference.

With respect to the excise tax on copper it was explained that three bills to suspend the tax had been introduced in the US Congress, two in the Senate and one in the House. Since this is a tax measure, action must first take place in the House. The Ways and Means Committee cannot reach the bill for discussion until work on the Internal Revenue bill now under consideration is completed. The US hopes for favorable action but it will be several weeks before the bill is even discussed in the Ways and Means Committee. Meanwhile, the Executive Branch has gone on record unanimously as favoring suspension and is doing everything in its power to see that this viewpoint is brought to the attention of individual members of the Congress.

It was explained to the Chileans that the US was unable to devise a formula which would guarantee to maintain the purchasing power of Chilean copper with respect to items imported into the country. It was explained that no such formula had seemed practicable of application for domestic prices let alone internationally. The US recognizes however the problems which Chile is facing and is willing to consult at any time with the Chilean Government in the event that there should be great inequity in the terms of trade.

In the general discussion of this point the US representatives pointed out that the US has instituted price controls and that these controls apply to the goods which the US imports as well as to the goods the US exports. Therefore to the extent that Chile imports from the US she is receiving the benefit of our price control. Moreover it is the general US policy that the essential needs of friendly countries from the US should be met, but a specific formula for implementing this policy in terms of specific commodities or needs could not be devised. The US could not give any assurance at this time as to how long our price controls would be effective.

The subject of a general increase in the price of copper was discussed from several angles but it was again made clear to the Chileans that the US has not yet taken a position on whether it can consider the establishment of a ceiling price higher than 24½ cents. Ambassador Nieto pointed out that while Chile's long term problems would likely be resolved by diversification of her industry, a solution to her short term problems could only be achieved through an increase in the price of copper. He asked if the US was willing to consider an increase in price and added that if the price were not increased the result might be

less copper for the US. Efforts were made to elicit from the Chilean Mission some idea of the amount of price increase they thought necessary to solve this problem. In reply they indicated an estimated gap of 30 to 35 million in the price of items imported by Chile over the price of its exports and suggested that an increase of 10 cents would be required to close the gap. (There is some question as to the validity of the figures presented and whether the entire deficit in foreign exchange should be charged to copper but these points were not developed at this meeting.) The Chilean Ambassador stated with some vehemence that Chile would not accept a policy similar to that in effect during the last war under which a low price was paid for copper and this price continued unchanged, until after the war. He felt that there should be an immediate increase in the current price and assurance given that any price would not necessarily be firm for the duration of the emergency. Sufficient elasticity should prevail so that Chile's needs can be met.

The Chileans were assured that the question of price was being considered at the highest levels in the US Government. Since there was agreement on all points except the US price, it was decided that the next meeting would be held after a US position on that point is established.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1951.

Subject: Need for immediate solution of the copper problem with Chile.

Background:

The Chilean Government is faced with increasing opposition from its Congress and from the opposition parties in Chile (aided and abetted by the communists) in regard to the Government's handling of copper production and sales problems. Bills have been introduced to nationalize the copper industry, set up a Chilean copper sales corporation and divert sales of copper to countries other than the U.S. in order to obtain prices 10–15 cents higher than the U.S. price.

President Gonzalez has adjourned the Congress and sent a special mission here to discuss the copper problem and seek a solution which will prevent precipitate action by the Chilean Congress. The Department has had long discussions with the Chilean mission and rep-

[1] Source text is an unsigned copy; original not found in Department of State files.

resentatives of ESA (Griffith Johnson)[2] and DPA (Mr. Hayes) have been present during the formal talks.

All of the problems presented by the Chileans including increased production in Chile and Chilean sales to other friendly countries have been settled in a manner satisfactory to both governments. The remaining point, upon which the success of the entire discussion rests, has not been settled and hinges on a decision by the ODM as to whether or not the U.S. is willing to increase moderately the price paid for Chilean copper. Word from Chile emphasizes that the pressure on the Chilean President is increasing and an immediate solution is necessary.

General Harrison has indicated that a moderate rise in price (up to 4 cents) would not be objectionable.

Mr. DiSalle[3] has sent word to Eric Johnston[4] that they would go along with a moderate increase in price to Chile but not a general rise for all producers. This means U.S. Government purchase paying a subsidy to Chile and reselling at 24½ cents in the U.S.

It is understood Harrison will not go along with subsidies to Chile and not to U.S. producers.

A meeting between Eric Johnston and General Harrison is scheduled for Thursday, March 22.

Mr. Foster[5] is entirely familiar with the problem and is pushing for a solution. Mr. Thorpe will ask Foster to talk to Eric Johnston early on March 21. Mr. Linder[6] talked to Foster on Friday, March 16.

Recommendation:

That you speak to Mr. Charles Wilson pointing out that a solution of this problem is considered politically essential prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Conference[7] on March 26.[8]

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[2] G. Griffith Johnson, Advisor, Economic Policy Office.

[3] Michael V. DiSalle, Director, Office of Price Stabilization, Economic Stabilization Agency.

[4] Administrator, Economic Stabilization Agency.

[5] William C. Foster, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration.

[6] Harold F. Linder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

[7] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. For documentation on the meeting, see pp. 925 ff.

[8] No record of Secretary Acheson's response to Mr. Miller's recommendation or of a conversation between the Secretary and Mr. Wilson has been found in Department of State files, but see footnote 4, p. 1273.

825.2542/4–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Milton Barall of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1951.

Subject: Discussion of copper problems with Chilean representatives

Participants: Horacio Walker,[1] Foreign Minister, Chile
Ambassador Felix Nieto del Rio, Chile
Senator Tomic,[2] Chile
Senor Vergara, Chile
Senor Garnham, Ministry of Economy, Chile
Senor Jorge Burr, Economic Counselor, Chilean Embassy
G. Johnson, Economic Stabilization Agency
F. Hayes, Defense Production Administration
OMP—Mr. Evans
Mr. Getzin
OSA—Mr. Warren
Mr. Atwood
Mr. Barall

This meeting to discuss the copper question was opened with a thorough review of what had been accomplished prior to this date, based on Memorandum of Conversation of March 15, 1951,[3] which outlined those agreements in principle which had already been achieved. Mr. Atwood also amplified certain of the ideas expressed at previous meetings and added that since the last meeting the United States had reached agreement to discuss a moderate increase in the price of Chilean copper.

The Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction with the talks as they had proceeded to that point and stated that he was glad to see that the United States understands the Chilean problem from both the political and economic points of view. Since copper represents 65 percent of Chilean exports and is therefore vital to the economic life of the country, it was necessary to consider public opinion on this subject. In the last war copper was sold at the frozen price of 11½ cents while all manufactured items were later imported at higher prices after ceilings had been removed, causing an estimated loss to Chile of $500,000,000. Public opinion was strongly oriented to avoid repetition of this. The Foreign Minister explained that, to date, the Government had avoided passage of a law controlling copper sales in the belief that the problem should be solved by inter-Government agreement.

[1] Horacio Walker Larrain.
[2] Radomiro Tomic Romero.
[3] *Ante*, p. 1263.

However, he had already seen price increases in some of the items imported by Chile and he was concerned with the trend. He stated that it was not Chile's intention to sell copper indiscriminately but only to friendly countries such as Brazil and Argentina in exchange for exports which they shipped to Chile. He recognized the fact that Chile must also make sacrifices in this emergency, as in the last war, but in his view an increase in price granted by the United States represents a lesser sacrifice than that made by Chile. He stated that internal economic stability was necessary to maintain copper production at a high level and for other defense purposes.

He agreed, for Chile, to the sale of copper produced by the United States companies being effected entirely through those companies which in turn would follow the sales instructions of the Chilean Government. Chile also agreed that sales would be made for the essential needs of friendly governments only. He then asked if he correctly understood a statement made by Mr. Miller to the effect that, if the American companies did not make money available for the expansion of copper production, loans from the United States might be possible. He explained that in exchange for higher prices, increased production, and an allocation of copper for sale by Chile, the Chilean Government proposes to modify the tax laws to provide more favorable treatment to the American companies and that a proposed law for such equitable treatment would be sent to Congress. The only important problem left unsolved was the settlement of the price. The political and economic situation in Chile required an increase in price and Chile was willing to discuss such a moderate increase at the present time. In his opinion an increase of 4 cents per pound would be moderate. Also, a quota of copper production under the control of Chile, was necessary for the essential needs of the country and for export to friendly nations. The Foreign Minister stated that Chile is willing to prohibit the resale of such copper and to give assurance that none would be sold to iron-curtain countries and, under such conditions, he estimated that they should receive up to 20 percent of the total production (a reduction from the original request for 25 percent). He added that this also made possible a downward revision on the basis of equity and good faith. The Foreign Minister stated that he would have to report to the President and the Cabinet upon his return and was seeking a decision prior to his departure so as to be able to cite specific figures arrived at in the discussions. With respect to increased production he wanted to be in a position to tell the copper companies that if they did not have sufficient funds for the necessary expansion the United States Government would lend the money. He would assure the copper companies that if they proceeded with the expansion it would be under better conditions than they had enjoyed in the past.

Mr. Atwood replied that the United States Government's position with respect to the larger mines is that if they need assistance the United States is willing to discuss this directly with the companies since this type of loan is within the scope and purpose of the Eximbank. While the State Department could not speak for the Bank it was noted that it was within the Bank's policy to make this kind of loan. On the question of the quota of copper for sale by Chile, the United States was glad to hear that it was Chile's intention to sell only in terms of the essential internal needs of friendly countries; that no sales would be made behind the iron curtain; and that re-export would be prohibited. At the same time the United States felt no specific quota was necessary since any export sales made in the above framework or domestic sales considered by Chile as essential to its internal needs, or for essential uses of other friendly nations, would be acceptable. The United States would like to reserve the right of consultation on this matter in the event that the diversions were sufficient to interfere with the United States defense effort.

Mr. Vergara questioned what was meant by "essential needs". For example, would this include manufacturing in Chile, even the manufacture of items which were destined for export? Mr. Atwood replied that Chile's use of copper to manufacture items for sale abroad to other countries was considered to be within the meaning of "essential needs". At the same time Mr. Atwood made it clear that it was expected that Chile would use this criterion intelligently and reasonably.

Senator Tomic pointed out that an allocation of 20 percent of Chilean copper for sale by his country did not mean that this entire amount would necessarily be required for essential uses and foreign markets. If the entire 20 percent, or approximately 80,000 tons, could not be used legitimately for these purposes the unused balance would revert to the copper companies for normal sales in the United States. Thus Chile would have the right to control this amount of copper and also the right to sell it to friendly countries in Europe such as France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland or Sweden which have bought copper from Chile in the past. Mr. Atwood replied that we could reach an agreement on this basis, with Chile exercising the proper precautions to see that sales were made only within the terms agreed to.

The Foreign Minister explained that fixing a definite quota would be advantageous to the United States in that it could then calculate in advance the amount of Chilean copper which would be available for export to the United States. For example, if Chile takes 20 percent, the United States may then count on 80 percent for its needs. Mr. Atwood stated that he believed agreement could be reached on this matter and asked that it be made of record that this quota was not being imposed by the United States. The Foreign Minister stated that this quota

would be recommended by the Chilean Government as a limitation on its own recognized absolute right to dispose of its copper as it wished. This would be done to assure the United States of continued copper shipments for its defense efforts. Senator Tomic stated that in his opinion the United States would probably receive more than 80 percent of total production by following this formula.

Mr. Evans asked if the Chilean Government would be willing to consult with the United States on the export of copper so that the United States and Chile would not both be selling in the same market, thus causing a given third country to receive too much copper and possibly enable it to exceed such quotas as may be agreed upon through International Commodity Committee procedures. The Foreign Minister agreed to consultation and the exchange of information to avoid exceeding quotas set for other countries. Mr. Atwood stated that if Chile estimated that it should control up to 20 percent of production, the United States was willing to accept this figure with the assurances already advanced by Chile.

Mr. Getzin asked if the 20 percent included concentrates and applied to all types of copper in Chile. Mr. Vergara replied "no". Mr. Hayes specified that the 20 percent was applicable to refined copper and that Chile could dispose of this amount within the limitations agreed to, this quota being acceptable for perhaps the next 12 months. The Chileans stated that they would be willing to discuss revision whenever deemed desirable by the United States and Mr. Garnham pointed out that after this system is put into effect it will be possible to determine whether Chile can sell this amount properly. After some experience a revision could be anticipated. Mr. Hayes then suggested that a quarterly discussion of the quota might provide the basis for continuous discussions. He also specified that "palanquillas" would not be included in the 20 percent. The Chileans (Vergara) agreed that there would be no more "palanquillas" manufactured but that this restriction did not apply to legitimate processing such as the manufacture of light wire, etc., and that (Tomic) distribution would be made with the least disruption to normal marketing procedures.

Mr. Atwood stated that the price of copper sold to other countries could be set by the Chilean Government and that the actual distribution would be made by the companies which had worked hard building up interest in Chilean copper. Senator Tomic said that Chile had considered the possibility of making sales through their own companies, Fomento, or Madeco which was 30 percent owned by the Government, or Famae which was 50 percent owned by the Government, and he wanted it made clear that Madeco and Famae are not out of business. He suggested that perhaps Fomento should be the sales agency so that this company could get, in exchange for Chilean copper, the

essential items needed for the Chilean manufacturing industry. However, he did not insist on this point and the Chileans agreed firmly that copper in refined shapes will be sold through the American companies.

The Foreign Minister then raised the question of the price of Chilean copper. Mr. Atwood reviewed the price problem, emphasizing the possible dire consequences to the United States economy of any rise in the price of copper, and then stated that the United States considered an increase of 2 cents per pound as moderate and justifiable. Mr. Vergara referred to the price squeeze faced by Chile and stated that 2 cents would be highly unsatisfactory. He pointed to the failure of the wheat and potato crops in Chile this year and the fact that Argentina was already squeezing Chile on the price of the wheat which might be made available. Also, freight rates were going up because of the failure of the United States Government to include these in price control regulations while diverting shipping to Europe, India and elsewhere. The 2 cents offered would not be enough to solve Chile's current problems and would only force the Government to seek a higher export quota or to increase taxes on the American companies, and thus prevent attainment of United States objectives. Mr. Atwood replied that a final United States position could not be taken today since further discussion with ODM would be necessary. The question of how a price change could be brought about was under consideration in the United States and the Chilean point of view would be made known to United States Defense Agencies. The Chileans pointed out that in their opinion a 4 cents increase was considered a minimum, with Senator Tomic stating that the price of copper should be about 30 cents per pound. He indicated that part of the desired 4 cents minimum increase would be passed on to the copper companies, either in the form of price increase or as tax exemptions or relief. Messrs. Atwood and Hayes pointed out that an increase of 4 cents in Chile, if spread between the companies and the Government at 2 cents each, would force up the price of US-produced copper by 2 cents a pound to keep pace with Chilean copper.

Mr. Getzin asked if Chile would be willing to accept 2 cents per pound and give nothing to the copper companies. The Foreign Minister replied in the negative stating that the price increase would not go directly to the companies, since Chile would require the additional funds and would pass on some part of it to the companies, probably in the form of a more favorable tax plan or a more favorable exchange rate. Chile would negotiate this directly with the companies but a 50–50 division would certainly not prevail. Mr. Hayes stated that a 4 cent increase instead of 2 cents would exert tremendous inflationary pressure on the United States' economy and that this amount was "staggering". Mr. Johnson pointed out that ESA had agreed to discuss the

price increase only because of Chile's acute foreign exchange problem, since the present price was adequate in the US, and was not prepared to consider any increase being granted to companies in the United States as their present profits were considered adequate. The Foreign Minister replied that some concession to the companies was required to induce them to increase production but that Chile was willing to accept a price increase in the form of a subsidy such as that paid for Bolivian tin in the last war. The method of increase in the price would be left to the United States Government.

Senator Tomic asked for definite information on what could be done in the way of additional investments in Chile to increase production to keep pace with other copper-producing areas such as the United States, Africa and Canada, where the production rate was increasing, whereas, in Chile, it was now lower than the level of 25 years ago. Mr. Atwood replied that the United States was aware of Chile's problems but was thinking more along the lines of long-range development of the country's economy rather than maintaining emphasis on one commodity. The Foreign Minister stated that he appreciated the efforts the United States is making in Chile's behalf and requested that a meeting be called as soon as possible to settle the question of price. Ambassador Warren assured him that this would be done.[4]

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[4] A memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Secretary of State, dated April 12, 1951, reads in part as follows:

"Mr. Edwin Gibson of DPA, reporting an agreement reached by Messrs. Wilson, Harrison and Eric Johnston, notified the Department that a price rise of three cents on Chilean copper was justified if the Department could obtain agreement from Chile on all the other points raised in the discussions which had been held.

"On Monday morning, April 9, the Chilean Foreign Minister indicated his agreement on all the points including a price rise of three cents.

"After a meeting of Departmental representatives with Mr. Gibson on Monday at noon the Chilean Foreign Minister was advised informally that afternoon that the U.S. considered a price rise of three cents on Chilean copper to be reasonable and that a note covering the points agreed upon would be prepared and delivered to the Chilean Ambassador prior to the Foreign Minister's departure from the U.S. on Saturday, April 14." (825.2542/4–1251)

795.00/4–751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Milton Barall of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1951.

Subject: Request for assignment of Chilean Troops to Korea

Participants: Horacio Walker, Foreign Minister, Chile
Ambassador Nieto, Chile
Admiral Holger,[1] Chief, Naval Mission, Chile
Commander Contreras,[2] Air Attaché, Chile
Lt. General Bolte,[3] Inter-American Defense Board
Brig. General Sibert,[4] Inter-American Defense Board
ARA—Mr. Miller
ARA—Mr. White
OSA—Mr. Barall

Mr. Miller opened the discussion by referring to President Gonzalez's strong interest in the international situation and then stated that at the request of General Marshall[5] the State Department was seeking the participation of ground troops of additional friendly nations in the Korean fighting and that, because of its urgency, this matter was now being taken up with Chile despite the delicate political situation of the Chilean president.[6]

Mr. Miller explained that in this matter he was not acting for the United States but rather for the United Nations, which have had some of their troops in the line for nine months, without rest or relief, and which have suffered heavy casualties, including the wounding of the two sons of General Bolte. In this serious position, the United Nations were seeking additional ground forces. Help of any kind would not be refused but the primary need was for ground troops.

While recognizing the political difficulties of the Chilean Government, and of other countries, Mr. Miller nevertheless felt that he had to explain our point of view and to seek aid—not just nominal aid, but effective aid. Though there would be political difficulties, there would also be political advantages to be derived from positive action and collaboration with the United States and the United Nations. The armed forces of Chile would benefit considerably by the valuable combat

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[1] Vice Adm. Immanuel Holger.
[2] Lt. Col. Humberto Contreras.
[3] Charles L. Bolté, Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board.
[4] Edwin L. Sibert, Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board.
[5] George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense.
[6] In a memorandum to the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (White), dated April 6, 1951, Mr. Warren had stated in part that he and Mr. Atwood had doubts about the advisability of exerting pressure on the Chilean Government to furnish troops for use in Korea "at this time", since there was "real opposition in Chile to sending Chilean troops abroad," and that if President González Videla was forced to make an effort to do so "it may mean the fall of the González Government." (725.5/4–651)

training they would receive. This had been turned to political advantage in Colombia.

Mr. Miller explained that under the present laws equipment could be made available only on the basis of prepayment in dollars but that a request had been submitted to President Truman to have this law amended to allow wider latitude. At any rate, given the scarcity of materiel, any equipment furnished would have to be used for a specific purpose, i.e. training for action. In Korea itself, a different procedure is in effect and the United Nations forces could make up any deficiencies in the equipment of Chilean troops. The United States is offering to train the troops in their own countries, furnish transportation and maintain them in Korea. In principle, this would all be paid for by the Chilean Government but this is in principle only and the actual payment would be the subject of negotiations much later.

The Foreign Minister stated that he had followed with interest Mr. Miller's objective and clear explanation and that he would report on the situation to President González Videla, who is, of course, very much interested in hemispheric solidarity and in the United Nations efforts to combat communism. The political climate was not yet prepared for Chile to go ahead but he recognized the necessity for greater efforts. The Foreign Minister explained that Chile had its long coast line to defend and had to continue the fight against communism to assure the flow of strategic materials such as copper, nitrates and coal. The Communists were making continuous efforts, sometimes successfully, to disrupt production. Chile doesn't have large land forces but had tried unsuccessfully to send a naval vessel or an Air Force unit to Korea. Favorable public opinion has still to be built up and if more powerful South American countries such as Brazil would take the first step this would help Chile convince its people of the necessity for active participation in the Korean fighting. The Communists in Chile had been conducting a strong campaign against participation in Korea as well as against production of strategic materials. The Government had taken steps to combat this campaign but in a democratic country it could not be put down so easily as in some of the other countries with regimes based on force. The Foreign Minister explained that the Chilean ground forces were weak and that it would be much harder to send ground troops than to convince the people to send a naval vessel, but a campaign has to be made to change the mentality of the press and public and to win them over to the necessity for action by the armed forces.

The Foreign Minister stated that he recognized the necessity for Chile to make its sacrifices and, with the best of good will, would transmit Mr. Miller's request to the President and study, with him, the possibility of taking action. However, he again made the point that other countries, which were not facing Chile's difficult present internal

situation, should take the lead, for their action would have a very beneficial effect on Chile. He stated that a reply to Mr. Miller would be transmitted through Ambassador Nieto.

Mr. Miller stated that he appreciated the Foreign Minister's remarks with respect to other countries like Brazil and that this matter had been taken up with the Brazilian Foreign Minister,[7] whose approach to the problem was very sympathetic and he hoped that there would be a favorable outcome. Mr. Miller thanked the Foreign Minister for his frank exposition of the Chilean point of view and stated that he looked forward to a reply on what could be done. In response to a question by the Ambassador with respect to the names of other countries from whom assistance was being sought, Mr. Miller replied that this had been discussed with those South American countries which were considered to be most capable of helping.

The Foreign Minister said that this was a problem affecting all the democratic nations and western civilization and that it would receive serious consideration.[8]

[7] João Neves da Fontoura.

[8] The Chilean Government did not furnish troops for use in Korea in 1951.

398.254/2-2451

The Secretary of State to the Chilean Ambassador to the United States (Nieto del Río)[1]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Chile and has the honor to refer to his note No. 230/46 of February 24, 1951[2] which stated that the Chilean Ambassador had been designated to carry on conversations respecting problems concerning copper, and to the memorandum furnished by the Embassy under the date of February 1, 1951,[2] which sets forth the position of the Chilean Government.

Pursuant to the conversations which took place during the period from February 27 to April 9 between representatives of the United States Government and representatives of the Chilean Government,[3] the position of the United States Government with respect to the questions raised by Chile has been presented and the enclosed memorandum contains a statement of the understanding of the United States Government with regard to agreements reached by the two governments respecting problems concerning copper.

[1] Department of State files do not indicate on which date the instant note and memorandum were handed to the Chilean Ambassador.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For text of the Department of State's press release concerning the negotiations which took place in Washington, dated May 7, 1951, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, pp. 819–820.

It would be appreciated if the Chilean Government would inform the United States Government if the attached memorandum accurately reflects the understanding of the Chilean Government with respect to the problems discussed.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1951.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

The United States Government concurs in the view expressed by the Chilean Government that the maintenance and increase of copper production in Chile is of primary importance. It is recognized that increased production can be achieved by expanded operations by the two large American companies and by enlarging the operations of existing smaller mines or by opening up certain mining properties not now in operation.

With regard to expansion of the operation of the larger companies it is understood that the Chilean Government will continue discussions with the Anaconda and Kennecott companies in order to reach an acceptable basis under which these companies can accelerate expansion programs and plan for additional investments leading to increased production. The United States Government is pleased with the reports that the discussions are progressing rapidly and that mutually satisfactory arrangements may be expected in the near future. Following agreement by the Chilean Government and the American companies the United States Government will assist to the fullest extent that the emergency permits in the export of essential equipment and supplies to carry out these plans. It is noted that the mining companies state that they do not contemplate the need for public financial assistance for carrying out their expansion programs.

With regard to smaller and medium-size mining properties in Chile, the United States is prepared to assist in efforts for sound increases in production by facilitating deliveries, within the general defense needs, of supplies and equipment or by considering the granting of loans to increase production, provided that such requests are based on reports submitted by competent engineers. The United States Government is prepared to provide engineers to help determine, together with operators and engineers in Chile, the feasibility of increasing production by enlarging present operations or by starting new ones.

The United States Government appreciates the Chilean Government's natural desire to utilize reasonable quantities of copper produced by the American companies in Chile for export directly to countries other than the United States and for the manufacture in Chile of semi-finished and finished products both for domestic use and

for export. It is understood that in export sales of copper the Chilean Government does not propose to export copper in the form known as "palanquillas." In regard to the quantity of copper to be utilized for the above mentioned purposes it is understood that the Chilean Government will impose a limit of not higher than 20 percent of the production of the Anaconda and Kennecott companies thus assuring to the United States continuous shipment of Chilean copper in quantities no lower than 80 percent of the production of said companies. It is also understood that the distribution of copper would be subject to any obligation Chile undertakes with respect to international allocation in the International Materials Conference. The Chilean Government appreciates the importance of copper to the economy of the United States, which at the present time is being geared to maximum defense production in effort to supply the free world with essential military and civilian goods. The Chilean Government stated its intention that the copper not shipped to the United States will be used by Chile or sold to other friendly countries only for their essential needs; that the Chilean Government will take the necessary measures to assure that such copper will not be re-exported; and that no sales will be made to countries which are potential enemies or satellites of potential enemies. The United States also was pleased to learn that Chile agreed to exchange information on the amount of copper which should be sold to other countries, particularly in the event that the diversion should be sufficient to interfere with the United States defense effort, and also to exchange information with the United States on the export of copper to third countries to facilitate the supply of essential requirements to such countries in the most expeditious manner.

The Chilean Government stated that it must receive additional dollars from the sale of copper in order to maintain economic stability and support its own efforts for participation in hemispheric defense. The United States Government therefore, in the light of the agreements reached with the Chilean Government and the latter Government's continuing discussion with the copper companies regarding increased production and sale of Chilean copper, considers reasonable an increase of three cents per pound in the price of all Chilean copper sold to the United States, and understands that the announcement of such an increase will be arranged by the Chilean Government at such time as it determines. It is understood that prices to third countries will not be lower than the price for Chilean copper sold to the United States.

In the course of conversations between the representatives of the two governments it was brought out that a mutually satisfactory solution of the copper problem was related to Chile's overall plans for continued economic development. The representatives of Chile described Chile's immediate program of loans now being sought from the

Export-Import Bank for the purpose of bringing the production of the Huachipato steel mill up to full present capacity, and from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the purpose of increasing the agricultural potential of the country through irrigation, land clearance and the purchase of agricultural machinery and increasing hydroelectric power, providing new and increased coal production, and establishing a wood-pulp and newsprint industry. The satisfactory execution of the Chilean plans for economic development should be of value in helping to bring about greater economic stability in Chile and diversification of industry and production. Within the framework of its world-wide commitments, the United States will continue to manifest its interest in the economic development of Chile and will continue to cooperate with the Government by maintaining a friendly attitude toward requests for technical assistance such as those received in the past for assistance in economic planning, low cost housing, health and sanitation and increased food supply.

While the Government of the United States feels that it is not practicable to seek a bilateral formula which will permit dollars obtained by Chile through the sale of copper to the United States to maintain a constant purchasing power in the United States, it is pointed out that the United States has instituted price controls and that these apply to goods exported from the United States to Chile. Under the principles agreed to in the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, this Government believes there is ample provision for continued cooperation by the two Governments to help maintain and improve the Chilean economy and that, through consultation, problems of mutual interest may be fully discussed in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

The agreement with respect to the distribution of Chilean copper produced by the American companies and the price of Chilean copper to the United States as provided above may be subject to periodic review upon the initiative of either Government.[4]

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1951.

[4] This memorandum was amended in a note from the Secretary of State to the Chilean Ambassador, dated May 1, 1951, which reads in part as follows: "In addition to the items already agreed to, it is understood that with respect to non-fabricated Chilean copper produced by the American companies and sold to countries other than the United States such sales will be made through the facilities of the producing companies and that arrangements for such sales will be worked out by the Chilean Government with the producing companies." (825.2542/5–151) The Chilean Government indicated its approval of the memorandum and the amendment in two notes dated May 7, 1951 (398.254/5–751).

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1951.

DEAR AMBASSADOR BOWERS: I am very concerned over the attitude of President González Videla towards the Compañía Chilena de Electricidad.[1] I had a visit this morning from Grant Hylander[2] and he filled me in on some of the details of their unhappy predicament.[3] I know that you are equally concerned and the company is grateful for your sympathetic cooperation with them.

The thing that disturbes me is the harm that Chile does to its own long-range interests by this type of performance on the part of the President, especially since it comes so soon after his unfortunate statements about copper shipments to Russia and the International Bank just before my arrival in March.[4] For a country with which we have so much sympathy as Chile and with whose government we have cooperated so closely, it is undeniable that Chile does not stand very high with our financial community and that undoubtedly is one reason why they have so much difficulty with the International Bank. Of the major U.S. interests having investments in Chile the only ones which are pro-Chilean and have received good treatment over the years are the nitrate companies. The copper companies are much more sympathetic now than they have been and this is due in large part to the statesmanship which has been displayed by Cox since he took over management of Kennecott. However, the attitude of the copper companies is now in the balance depending upon what Chile does in regard to taxes and exchange rate for them. As for the IT&T, their experience has been so unhappy that it was definitely reflected in the attitude which General Harrison assumed in the copper negotiations in his capacity as Defense Production Administrator during the early stages of the negotiations when he evidenced considerable hostility to increased production of copper in Chile. The point I am making is that from

[1] A Chilean subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company.

[2] Vice-President, American and Foreign Power Company.

[3] In 1951 the Chilean Electric Company experienced difficulties in its efforts, *inter alia*, to obtain rate increases. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 825.2614.

[4] During the latter part of February and early March, Mr. Miller visited five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. He traveled to Chile ostensibly to observe several meetings of the twelfth session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), held at Santiago, February 20–March 21, 1951, but the actual purpose of his visit was to engage in preliminary discussions with Chilean officials about matters relating to the forthcoming Fourth Meeting of Consultation and current problems in United States relations with Chile. For excerpts from Mr. Miller's address on United States-Chilean problems of economic development, delivered to the delegates to the twelfth session of ECOSOC on March 6, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 19, 1951, pp. 454–457.

Chile's own standpoint their tendency towards shortsightedness in dealing with important American investors is bound to have adverse repercussions in regard to their credit standing in this country. It certainly will affect their ability to attract any additional private investment over the years. Perhaps they don't want any more private investment, but I don't see how they are going to realize their maximum economic potential without it. These are just random thoughts which you might want to pass along in a friendly way either to the President or the Foreign Minister or Ben Claro [5] if you see fit—or if you don't, just file them.

I have just received your letter of May 3.[6] The prospect of Ibáñez' victory is definitely not encouraging, particularly following upon the unhappy turn of events in Bolivia yesterday,[7] and I might add that the turn of events is not any too happy in this country. I feel exactly as you do about the situation here and think the furore which has been raised over the return of our conquering hero must necessarily encourage tin-horn generals of the type of Ibáñez. We are making a very sad spectacle of ourselves indeed and there is no possible way to minimize it. In short, I am disgusted.

Trusting that you are the same, I remain

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

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[5] Benjamín Claro Velasco, Chilean Minister of Economy and Commerce.
[6] Not printed.
[7] Reference is to the electoral victory of Victor Paz Estenssoro in the Bolivian presidential election of May 6. Documentation on the subject may be found on pp. 1141 ff.

825.2564/5-1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Milton Barall of the Office of South American Affairs

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1951.

Subject: Increased shipping cost for Chilean nitrate

Participants: Señor Felix Nieto del Río, Chilean Ambassador
Señor Mario Rodríguez, Minister Counselor, Chilean Embassy
Mr. Doetsch, President, Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation
Mr. Miller, Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Barall, Chile Desk Officer

The Chileans discussed the nitrate industry in general terms as outlined in memorandum of April 25 which was sent from the Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corporation of Chile to the Chilean Nitrate Sales

Corporation located at 120 Broadway, New York City. The Chileans raised the problem of an increase in the cost of ocean transportation which may make it impossible for Chilean nitrate to be sold at the ceiling price in the United States market or to compete with synthetics if the ceiling price should be raised. They claim that the present conference rate of $8.50 per ton to Atlantic and Gulf ports which is applicable to 40 percent of Chilean nitrate shipments, combined with the time and rate charters which carry the remaining 60 percent at lower rates, bring the average transportation per long ton to $7.80 for 1950–51. These terms expire June 30, 1951 and, because of a current shortage of available shipping, tramp steamers, generally not under United States registry and not subject to any United States control, are increasing their freight rates to about $15.00 per ton. If no action is taken to solve this problem the effect on the Chilean economy would be ruinous and a shortage of fertilizer in the United States would probably occur before synthetic production could be increased.

Mr. Miller explained that any sharp increase in price was imposed by tramp vessels not under the control of the United States and therefore this was not a problem which could be easily solved by this government. However, the United States would examine any concrete proposal made by the Chileans to help the nitrate industry solve the problem. Mr. Doetsch stated that he thought it was possible that some arrangement could be worked out through the National Shipping Authority whereby vessels could be made available for operation under the NSA to carry Chilean nitrate at reasonable rates. He stated that he had no details on how this could be done although he understood that certain commodities were already being shipped under similar arrangements.

Mr. Miller stated that the Department would look into the situation to see if something could be done through the NSA to help the Chileans.

Action Taken:

After investigation, a letter[1] from Mr. Radius[2] to Admiral Cochrane[3] was prepared requesting investigation of the possibility of allocating shipping space for the transportation of nitrate from Chile to the United States under arrangements similar to those now in effect whereby certain ships under the NSA transport coal and grain under "general agency" agreements.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Walter A. Radius, Deputy Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy.

[3] Edward L. Cochrane, Chairman, Federal Maritime Board.

825.2542/8–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs (Randolph)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1951.

Subject: US-Chilean Copper Agreement

Participants: Mr. Charles R. Cox, President of Kennecott Copper Company
Ambassador Fletcher Warren (OSA)
Mr. Archibald R. Randolph (OSA)

Mr. Miller was absent from his office on other official business at the time set for Mr. Cox's appointment. Ambassador Warren received Mr. Cox. Mr. Cox opened the interview by declaring that the United States copper producers in Chile are irked at the Department for "not having kept the companies informed at all stages of the negotiations which led to the United States-Chile copper agreement". He said that the agreement provides for a tax of three cents applicable to shipments subsequent to May 8. The agreement did not stipulate the effective date nor provide the machinery for determining the application of this tax. It was therefore wide open. The Chilean President after the signing of the agreement in a public statement said that the tax was applicable to "shipments" effected after May 8. Mr. Cox asked "Why did not the United States Government step in and say this was not correct?" His company had firm contracts concluded prior to May 8. The Chilean President's statement because it was "uncontested by the State Department" has had the effect of committing the Chilean Government in an interpretation of the copper agreement. The practical effect of the Chilean President's statement has been to obligate the Kennecott Copper Company to pay $700,000 representing taxes accessible against copper "shipments" after May 8 but covered by delivery contracts concluded prior to that date. It is understood that the tonnage involved covers 4500 tons in the New York free zone area destined for United States stockpile.

Ambassador Warren emphasized that ARA holds that the American copper companies were at all times kept thoroughly informed and had been consulted throughout the period of the negotiations. This point was made perfectly clear. Mr. Cox declared that he knew "nothing about the terms of the agreement until it was made". He wants the American companies to be consulted prior to any other proposed contract. The American companies were not present when the Chileans called at the Department to discuss the present agreement, in spite of the fact that Messrs. Cox and Hoover were designated as advisers to the Chilean Commission by the Chilean Government. Mr. Cox considers that had he and Mr. Hoover been kept abreast of the negotia-

tions which terminated in the current agreement that he would not now be faced with an out-of-pocket assessment by the Chilean Government in the sum of $700,000.

Ambassador Warren reiterated that it is his belief that the American copper companies had been consulted all along the line. He said that he hoped Mr. Cox and Mr. Hoover could discuss their problems with Mr. Atwood who would be in the office tomorrow. Mr. Atwood had expended a great deal of time and devoted scrupulous attention to these problems. Mr. Cox said that at the present time Mr. Hoover is on vacation in the Northwest. As soon as Mr. Hoover returns the two of them will be pleased to call on Mr. Atwood to discuss this matter further.[1]

Mr. Cox said that the American companies are now prepared to increase their investments to expand production. The Kennecott Company will invest five million dollars which will provide an approximate increase in production of 2500 tons per month. The Anaconda Company has promised President Gonzalez to invest twenty million dollars which will provide an increase of 80 to 90 million pounds, a production increase of approximately 46%.

[1] Department of State files contain no evidence that Messrs. Cox and Hoover pursued this matter with Mr. Atwood.

Editorial Note

On August 9, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized two credits in favor of the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Chilean Development Corporation) totaling $11,150,000. The first was an additional credit of $10,000,000 to assist in financing the purchase in the United States of the equipment, materials, and services necessary to expand the productive capacity of the Huachipato steel mill (Cia. de Acero del Pacifico, S. A.), for which the Bank had previously granted credits aggregating $48,000,000. The second credit was to finance the purchase in the United States of the materials and services required for expanding the production of the ferro-manganese plant of Fabrica Nacional de Carburo y Metalurgica, S. A. (CARBURO) (103–XMB/8–951). For further information on these credits, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951* (Washington, 1952), pages 11, 13–14.

On September 19, 1951, the National Advisory Council recommended consideration by the Board of Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a $1,300,000 loan to the Chilean Development Corporation to finance the dollar costs of exploration for ground water in the Río Elqui Valley, and the

partial development of such water for irrigation purposes (Department of State National Advisory Council Documents, Document No. 88, Action No. 490, September 19, 1951, Lot 60 D 137, Box 369). The loan was let on October 10. For additional information see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Seventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1951–1952* (Washington, 1952), pages 28–29.

398.254/9–751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Milton Barall of the Office of South American Affairs

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1951.

Subject: Chile's position in the IMC—Copper, Lead and Zinc Committee

Participants: Manuel Trucco, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Chile
Walter Muller, Chilean Representative, IMC
Mario Rodríguez, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Chile
Mr. Miller, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Willis Armstrong, OMP
Mr. Edmund Getzin, OMP
Mr. Barall, OSA

Señor Trucco stated that the purpose of his visit was to explain in advance, to the United States, the position Chile would take in the Copper, Lead and Zinc Committee of the IMC. He then handed Mr. Miller a copy of the paper [1] which Chile had sent to the Chairman of the Committee and which presented the Chilean point of view as follows:

1. Copper is of greater importance to Chile than to other countries since it is her principal means for making international payments, providing 65 percent of the total value of exports and being almost the sole source of dollars.
2. In the last World War Chile lost tremendous revenue because it consented to fixed prices for copper.
3. Despite this, Chile has already agreed to "freeze" 80 percent of her copper, which is shipped to the United States at low price.
4. The 20 percent reserved for Chile is the only means available to the country to pay for imports whose price has been going up very rapidly.
5. Under the proposed allocation the ceiling assigned to some of the nations to whom Chile now sells copper is much too small and in certain cases there is no quota at all.

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[1] Not printed.

6. Chile reiterates its objection to fixed quotas and prices of some raw materials while other raw materials, machinery, agricultural products, etc., rise in a free market to high levels.

The statement ended by indicating that Chile could not participate in any international allocation of copper which would place in jeopardy her control of 20 percent of the production of the American companies.

Mr. Miller replied that the arguments advanced by Chile with respect to the importance of copper to the Chilean economy were well known to the United States and, indeed, were a paramount consideration in negotiating the copper agreement in the spring of this year. He explained that the United States felt Chile could participate in the proposal for allocation of copper for the fourth quarter of 1951 without losing any of the benefits of the copper agreement.

Mr. Miller and the others on the US side made the following observations:

1. The allocation was for the fourth quarter only and in no way prejudiced any country's position as to principles, methods or amounts in succeeding quarters.
2. There was no obligation on the part of a supplying country to sell to a particular consuming country. Supplying countries would be obligated only to limit shipments to the ceiling established for the recipient country.
3. The allocation placed no limit on the price which Chile might obtain for her copper. In the event seller and buyer could not agree on price and copper remained unsold the committee would reallocate any unsold portion.
4. Chile had participated in the negotiation of this allocation for nearly six months and, although the basic principles were well known to the Chilean delegate, at no time had he raised any objection or reservation. This 11th hour change in position was particularly awkward since all countries had appeared to be in agreement and, if allocation for the fourth quarter were to be feasible, arrangements must be completed no later than September 15. Time did not permit a complete renegotiation.
5. The United States placed great significance on a successful copper allocation because the material was so important to mutual defense and security that success or failure in this material might well determine the possibilities of success of the whole IMC concept.

Mr. Miller emphasized the temporary, experimental, nature of the present proposal and stated his belief that the difficulties which Chile anticipated could be ironed out within the IMC Committee, citing as an example the fact that Argentina had already indicated its intention of going before the Committee to seek a higher quota and that a means could be found to continue Chile's lucrative sales to Argentina, Brazil and other countries within the allocation framework.

In reply to Mr. Miller's query on the degree to which Chile had contracted to oversell to Argentina during the fourth quarter, Señor

Muller stated that deliveries to Argentina would exceed 8,000 tons for the fourth quarter, more than four times the ceiling on consumption allowed for that country, and that if Argentina wanted even more copper she could obtain it under the barter system worked out by the two countries, under which Chile obtained necessary meat and foodstuffs essential for the health and well-being of its people. Mr. Armstrong questioned Argentina's using this copper and quoted from the copper agreement: "The Chilean Government stated its intention that the copper not shipped to the United States will be used by Chile or sold to other friendly countries only for their essential needs". Señor Muller quickly changed the subject.

After further discussion of all the above, it became apparent that there was no possibility of reconciling the Chilean and US points of view at this time. Trucco even went so far as to argue that the US would render inoperative the copper agreement by urging Chile to give up control of its 20 percent, this despite the sentence contained in the agreement, "It is also understood that the distribution of copper would be subject to any obligation Chile undertakes with respect to international allocation in the International Materials Conference", which was quoted to show him that international allocations had been provided for in that instrument. The Chilean representatives also argued that, while no price control was indicated in the present proposal, this item was already on the agenda for future discussion and, in any event, an allocation system always strengthened the position of the buyer and in the long run, would make it impossible for Chile to get $1200 a ton for the copper over which it exercised control. Without this extra income from copper, Chile's economic situation would be extremely bad and she would have no way to defend herself against the constantly rising prices of imports.

Mr. Armstrong informed the Chileans that in US opinion the failure to achieve international control over copper would probably have serious repercussions for other commodities and that the entire IMC might now fail. In this event, world opinion would hold Chile responsible. The Chileans seemed rather surprised at the firm stand taken by US representatives at the meeting and made inquiries as to the final date for reaching a definite decision in the committee. They were informed that the committee had to complete its arrangements by the 15th of September at the latest.

In conclusion, the US pointed out that it could in no way agree with the position taken by Chile. Chile was again urged to seek a formula by which its needs for foreign exchange, recognized by the United States, could be reconciled to the allocation proposal. A trial period for one quarter was suggested.

825.2542/9–1251 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 2, 1951.

A–92. With respect to Embassy despatch No. 325, September 12, 1951,[1] the Department approves the strong protests registered by the Embassy against the possible sale of copper to countries in the Soviet sphere. The Embassy is authorized to continue to make representations to the Chilean Government, if such action is necessary, to secure compliance with the commitment it accepted in the copper agreement of May 1951 with respect to its 20 percent of the production of the American companies, to wit: "that the copper not shipped to the US will be used by Chile or sold to other friendly countries only for their essential needs; that the Chilean Government will take all the necessary measures to assure that such copper will not be re-exported; and that no sales will be made to countries which are potential enemies or satellites of potential enemies". Nevertheless, it is hoped that this particular problem is no longer acute and that the intervention of President González, as reported in Embtel 158, September 18,[1] and in letter from Ambassador Bowers to Asst. Secretary Miller, September 21,[1] has already been effective in blocking possible sales to countries under Soviet domination. The Embassy could then turn its efforts to the establishment of proper means of screening shipments and coordinating the efforts of the two governments to assure that the eventual consumption of copper produced in Chile will not benefit the iron-curtain countries.

A very real problem exists with respect to Chile's disposal of her 20 percent within authorized channels. At present, in addition to the backlog produced by its failure to establish procedures for the export of the full 20 percent of the production of the American companies since May 8, the Chileans have claimed, in the International Materials Conference, the right to dispose of 27,000 additional tons for which it says decrees had been issued prior to the effective date of the copper agreement. The Embassy is requested to obtain accurate data on the production of the American companies between May 8 and August 31 (or later, if possible); the amount shipped by Chile as part of its 20 percent; and the balance still due Chile to complete its 20 percent. Verification of Chile's claim to 27,000 tons is also requested. Withdrawal in a short period of time of such large amounts from the normal shipments to the US would have a serious effect on the US rearmament effort and jeopardize the continued acceptance of the agreement by the U.S. Upon receipt of the above information from the Embassy, the

[1] Not printed.

Department will make an effort to space the shipment of Chile's quota of copper so as not to interfere with the overall plans of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

WEBB

725.5–MSP/12–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Milton Barall of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Participants: Mario Rodríguez, Minister Counselor, Chilean Embassy
Mr. Bernbaum, Officer in Charge, NWC, OSA
Mr. Barall, Chile Desk Office, OSA

Mr. Bernbaum explained that certain Latin American nations were being invited to negotiate bilaterally with the United States, under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 [1] which allotted $38 millions for furthering hemispheric defense. He pointed out that while other countries were also being approached, their names were still secret and that the Ambassadors had not been called in since the visit of a series of Ambassadors would have aroused undesirable speculative interest in this matter. Mr. Bernbaum stated that the actual approach to the Chilean Government would be made through our Embassy in Santiago and that the purpose of this conversation was to keep the Chilean Embassy in Washington abreast of developments. Upon receipt of a favorable reply from the Chilean Government, the American Ambassador in Chile would be ready to begin negotiations immediately. He would be assisted by a general or flag officer, and other officers of the armed forces, who could be dispatched from the United States immediately. At such time as it was agreed to negotiate, public announcement could be made.

Mr. Rodriguez expressed pleasure at being informed of developments and stated that his government had been wondering how the Mutual Security Act would be implemented. He mentioned the fact that the Chilean Constitution required Congressional approval before sending troops abroad or before permitting foreign troops to be stationed on Chilean soil. Therefore, he was of the opinion that any agreement reached would have to be submitted to the Chilean legislature for ratification. He also pointed out that the Chileans very firmly regard the Straits of Magellan as national waters and that if the United States contemplated joint protection of the Straits by Chile and Argentina this would certainly meet with a great deal of opposi-

[1] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373.

tion in Chile. Mr. Rodríguez said he would inform his government that the approach would be made through the Foreign Office.[2]

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[2] In telegram 319, from Santiago, December 22, 1951, not printed, Ambassador Bowers informed the Department of State that he had left an *aide-mémoire* with the Chilean Foreign Minister inquiring whether the Chilean Government wished to enter into bilateral negotiations for a mutual security agreement (725.5–MSP/12–2251). The Chilean Government accepted the invitation, and the negotiations began on January 21, 1952 (725.5–MSP/1–2152).

COLOMBIA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA[1]

Editorial Note

On January 11, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank had authorized a credit of $1,503,000 to the National Railways of Colombia to finance the purchase of five Diesel electric locomotives and spare parts in the United States (821.10/1–1851). For further information, see Export–Import Bank of Washington. *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1951* (Washington, 1951), pages 11–12, 36.

On November 1, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank established a line of credit up to $20,000,000 in favor of the Colombian Bank of the Republic or such commercial banks as it might designate to finance the purchase and shipment of raw cotton from the United States to Colombia (821.10/11–151). For further information of this loan, see Export–Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951* (Washington, 1952), pages 14, 36. For a Department of State notice concerning the loan, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1951, page 828.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 802 ff.

821.2612/2–151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Albert H. Gerberich of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1951.

Subject: Colombian application for International Bank Highway Construction Credit.

Participants: Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Angel
Minister-Counselor Diego Suarez[1]
Minister of Public Works Jorge Leyva[2]

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[1] Diego Suarez Costa.
[2] Jorge Leyva Urdaneta.

Mr. William McChesney Martin, Asst. Secy. of Treasury
Mr. John S. DeBeers (Treasury)
Mr. Atwood,[3] Mr. Gerberich (OSA)

The Minister of Public Works said that he wished to outline the difficulty he has been having in presenting an application for a credit to the International Bank to defray dollar expenses in the Colombian highway construction program. He said the condition of the Colombian roads is incredibly bad—so bad, that the average life of a truck on them is not more than 12 to 14 months. The Minister referred to the Currie Report,[4] which indicates that improvement of transportation facilities is one of Colombia's chief needs. He said he had discarded his original highway plan to make it conform to the Currie recommendations, and then discussed it with officials of the International Bank. They have been studying this revised plan for four or five months now, but have not shown any receptiveness to a formal application. Instead they have kept informing him that the project requires more study, and have sent engineers, lawyers, etc., to advise with the Colombians from time to time. The Colombians cannot wait longer, and the Minister hoped Mr. Martin could inquire into the subject and help them if he can.

Mr. Martin said he would be glad to do what he could. He asked how much the total amount would be. The Minister said that the entire project would be 165,000,000 pesos, and dollars would have to be obtained for 30% of this, about $26,000,000 in all. The term of the loan would be four years.

The Minister also brought up the arrangements that had been made with a Belgian firm for a 6-year credit to purchase rolling stock for the National Railways. The International Bank officials had suggested that action on this be deferred until they could study it, and perhaps the credit could be furnished through the Bank. This project is still under study, and the Minister is minded to transfer it to the Export-Import Bank, but didn't want to make a false step, as he is not aware of the line of demarcation between the jurisdictions of the two Banks.

Mr. Martin said he was not in a position to speak for the Export-Import Bank, but he wanted to explain that originally the plan was to have that Bank in the course of time restrict itself to short-term credits while the International Bank should handle long-term, more

[3] Rollin S. Atwood, Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs.

[4] A nine-man mission headed by Mr. Lauchlin Currie (popularly known as the Currie Mission) had been sent to Colombia in July 1949, by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), for the purpose of assessing the country's economic potentialities and recommending an integrated program for economic development. For the mission's report, see IBRD, *The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia. Report of a Mission headed by Lauchlin Currie and sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with the Government of Colombia* (Washington, 1950).

comprehensive development credits.[5] He said he would inquire about the railway credit at the same time that he inquires about the highway credit application.[6]

[5] For documentation concerning the establishment of the IBRD, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1384 ff.; for information on the Export–Import Bank, see United States Senate, *Legislative History of the Export–Import Bank of Washington*, Senate Document No. 85, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1954). For documentation relating to the status of the jurisdictional issue between the two banks in 1951, see vol. I, pp. 1573 ff.

[6] On April 10, 1951, the Board of Directors of the IBRD approved a loan of $16,000,000 to the Republic of Colombia to finance the reconstruction of portions of Colombia's highway network, and the loan became effective on July 6 (398.14/7–3151). In a letter dated May 5, 1951, to the Secretary of the Treasury, John W. Snyder, commenting on the loan, the President of the IBRD, Eugene R. Black, pointed out that only slightly more than two months had elapsed between Colombia's request and the conclusion of the loan (Department of State National Advisory Council Documents, Document No. 1150, June 5, 1951, Lot 60 D 137, Box 367).

611.214/3–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles H. Sullivan of the Commercial Policy Staff

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Adjustment of FCN Treaty[1] with Colombia to Special Tax Situation of Flota Gran Colombiana.[2]

Participants:

Shipping Lines:	*Department:*	*Commerce (OIT):*
Mr. E. Russell Lutz, Grace Line	OSA—Mr. Krieg[3]	Mr. Koushnareff[7]
Mr. R. Harlow, United Fruit Co.	—Mr. Gerberich	
Mr. Matthew Ahearn, United Fruit Co.	ARA—Mr. Nolan[4]	*Federal Maritime Board:*
Mr. Thomas Bartle, Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.	SD—Mr. Falck[5]	Mr. Spencer[8]
	CP—Mr. Setser[6]	
	—Mr. Sullivan	

This meeting was held in order to explain to representatives of shipping enterprises interested in Colombian traffic the problem occasioned

[1] The draft of a proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation was presented to the Colombian Government in October 1948. A copy of the draft was enclosed with the Department of State's instruction 177, to Bogotá, dated October 16, 1948 (711.212/9–248). For documentation on the subsequent negotiations between the United States and Colombia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 611 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 802 ff.

[2] Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana, a shipping line jointly owned by Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador.

[3] William L. Krieg, Officer in Charge, North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs.

[4] Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs.

[5] L. James Falck, Assistant Chief, Shipping Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy.

[6] Vernon G. Setser, Assistant Chief, Commercial Policy Staff, Office of International Trade Policy.

[7] Serge G. Koushnareff.

[8] William A. Spencer.

in connection with the treaty negotiations by Colombian Law 10 of 1946 which exempts the Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana from income taxation, and to apprize them of the course of action which the Department and the other interested agencies plan to adopt in this connection.

It was explained that Colombia insisted on maintaining the Flota exemption, which was deemed to be inconsistent with Article XI of the proposed treaty. Article XI provides, *inter alia*, for national treatment in matters of taxation. It was further explained that the Department had tried to solve this problem by incorporating in the treaty a provision for reciprocal exemption of the income of shipping enterprises from double taxation [9] but that Colombia had refused to accept a provision to this effect within the context of the FCN treaty, claiming: (1) that the treaty did not afford Colombia advantages which would compensate it for its loss of revenue under such a provision; and (2) that the Flota exemption was in effect a subsidy to national shipping within the meaning of Article 35 of the Economic Agreement of Bogota.[10] In view of the circumstances of the negotiation and of the availability of other media for obtaining relief from double income taxation for U.S. shipping enterprises operating to Colombia, it was proposed to provide specifically through a Protocol provision or an exchange of notes accompanying the treaty, that the establishment of rules to govern the income taxation of shipping enterprises shall not be dealt with in the treaty but shall be left to an appropriate agreement on double taxation. It was pointed out in the latter connection that the matter could be dealt with either within the framework of a convention for the avoidance of double taxation or through an executive agreement relating exclusively to the income taxation of transportation enterprises.

Mr. Lutz stated that the representatives of the shipping companies would explain the problem of the Flota exemption to their principals, who would probably communicate to the Department whatever reaction they might have to the proposed removal of the matter from the treaty to an agreement on double taxation.

It was emphasized during the discussion that Colombia had accepted the standard navigation provisions without modification, and the limited scope of the Protocol provision referring to governmental

[9] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to double taxation treaties, see vol. I, pp. 1233 ff.

[10] This agreement, approved by the Ninth International Conference of American States, had not gone into effect. For documentation on the conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 1 ff. For text of the agreement, see Department of State Publication No. 3263, *Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Columbia, March 30–May 2, 1948: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America with Related Documents* (Washington, 1948), pp. 201 ff., or *Annals of the Organization of American States: 1949* (Washington, 1949), vol. 1, pp. 99 ff.

shipping assistance (with indirect mention of Article 1(b) of IMCO [11] and Article 35 of the Bogota Agreement) also was explained.

Mr. Lutz observed that at the present time the principal difficulties the shipping companies encounter in their Colombian operations result from:

(1) Discriminatory exchange control practices which divert cargo to Flota ships. (In this connection, paragraph 4 of the new exchange control article recently given to the Colombians was read to Mr. Lutz who appeared of the opinion that it would afford a substantial degree of protection in matters of this kind.)

(2) Practices of Colombian Government entities who are routing their foreign purchases almost entirely in Flota ships.

(3) Practices of port authorities, particularly where ports are Government-operated, who give preferential treatment to national ships in berthing and like matters. (After some discussion, however, the general understanding was that these practices were not of particular importance with respect to Colombia and that in any event the standard navigation article would assure nondiscriminatory treatment.)

Mr. Lutz indicated that there were no other problems likely to have a measurably detrimental effect on their Colombian operations.

[11] The convention establishing the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) was signed at Geneva, March 6, 1948, but it did not enter into force for the United States until March 17, 1958. For text, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 9, p. 621, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 4044.

Editorial Note

By an exchange of notes signed at Bogotá on March 5 and March 9, 1951, the United States and Colombia concluded a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the latter date. Copies of the notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 1069, from Bogotá, March 8 (821.00–TA/3–951). For text of the agreement, see 2 UST 799, or TIAS No. 2231. For the Department's press release dated March 9, 1951, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1951, page 501.

547-842—79——83

611.214/3–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles H. Sullivan of the Commercial Policy Staff

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: Views of Shipping Lines on Proposed Adjustment of FCN Treaty with Colombia to Special Tax Situation of Flota Gran Colombiana.

Participants:	*Shipping Lines:*	*Department:*
	Mr. E. Russell Lutz, Grace Line.	OSA—Mr. Krieg
		—Mr. Gerberich
	Mr. Thomas Bartle, Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.	ARA—Mr. Nolan
		—Mr. Russell
	Mr. Henry Giardina, Gulf and South American Steamship Co.	SD—Mr. Falck
		CP—Mr. Setser
		—Mr. Sullivan

This meeting was held in order that representatives of the interested shipping enterprises might communicate to the Department the views of their principals regarding: (1) the Department's proposed solution (previously explained in a meeting on March 5)[1] of the problem occasioned in connection with the treaty negotiations by Colombian insistence on maintaining the existing exemption of the Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana from income taxation; (2) treaty coverage of consular fees and charges; and (3) exchange restrictions as they affected navigation enterprises.

(1) The shipping representatives indicated that they thoroughly understood the Department's problem in connection with the treaty negotiations and felt that it should proceed, as proposed, on the basis of stipulating specifically in the treaty that the income taxation of shipping enterprises should not be dealt with in the treaty itself but should be left to an appropriate agreement for the avoidance of double taxation. They indicated that their principals were strongly interested in the conclusion of an agreement with Colombia that would afford United States shipping enterprises relief from Colombian income taxation and expressed the belief that this interest would be brought to the attention of the Treasury Department, particularly in connection with the long-pending double tax convention. They expressed the view that Flota was not heavily taxed by the United States and stated that their tax experts found it difficult to understand why, under the existing tax regulations, Flota was not required to pay more than appeared to be the case.

(2) The shipping representatives expressed preference for the insertion in the standard FCN navigation provisions of a specific reference to consular fees and charges. The Department representatives indicated that it was the intent to cover consular fees in this provision and they

[1] See the memorandum dated March 5, 1951, p. 1293.

believed that the present language adequately did so. Moreover, the inclusion in new treaties of a specific reference to consular fees might cause doubts as to whether such fees are covered in existing treaties, such as that with Uruguay, which contain the standard navigation provisions. The shipping representatives explained that consular fees did not constitute a problem with respect to Colombia but were a serious matter in the case of Ecuador; and they hoped that in any negotiation with Ecuador the Department would strongly maintain its present position of insisting on national treatment in this matter.

(3) The shipping representatives expressed gratification with that feature of the Department's recent FCN proposals to Colombia on exchange controls which was designed to assure transport enterprises of protection from the application of exchange restrictions in a manner detrimental to their interests or to their competitive position. They were inclined to attach special importance to the latter point; and urged that the Department do its utmost to obtain Colombian acceptance of this particular assurance, and of the new provision in its entirety.

(The shipping representatives indicated that, although they could not speak with authority in this connection, they believed that the United Fruit Company shared their views on these matters.)

611.21/5–2251

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

[Extracts] [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1951.

COLOMBIA

A. OBJECTIVES

In its relations with Colombia the United States seeks to retain and perfect Colombian cooperation in our plans for western hemisphere defense; [2] to persuade Colombia, within the framework of our basic policy of non-intervention, to strengthen her democratic institutions; and by furnishing economic and technical assistance,[3] to help Colombia keep its traditional place as a stable, friendly democracy.

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[1] The portions omitted from this policy statement duplicate material in the policy statement for Colombia for the previous year, which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 817.

[2] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

[3] For documentation concerning the technical assistance policy of the United States toward the other American Republics as a group, see pp. 1038 ff.

B. BACKGROUND

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We are still disturbed about the widespread civil strife and religious persecution in Colombia, which seems to have become worse in 1951 instead of better. The country continues to be governed under a state of siege and Congress has not been permitted to meet since 1949. The restrictions on public gatherings, press and radio have been somewhat relaxed, but censorship of the press in particular continues to cause widespread dissatisfaction, both at home and abroad. The administration continues to be a one-party government, with no likelihood that the Liberals will agree to collaborate or even recognize the government as functioning legally.

Internal Political Situation.

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The Liberals have made it clear that they do not recognize the validity of President Gomez' election.[4] Economically the position of Colombia has improved since he took office. However, the situation is unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous, for the Liberal majority considers itself held in subjection by a Conservative dictatorship supported by the Church and maintained by force of arms.

Our policy in the present situation is to steer a careful neutral course, striving on the one hand to avoid giving substance to Liberal accusations that the US is aiding the present administration to set up a dictatorship of a minority party in Colombia, and on the other hand pursuing our traditional policy of cooperating with the constituted government of the country and abstaining from intervention in domestic political affairs.

Communism and Labor.

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Organized labor in Colombia is affiliated almost entirely with one or the other of two large federations, the Colombian Federation of Labor (CTC) or the Union of Colombian Workmen (UTC). The latter federation has appeared on the scene only in recent years and has gained ground rapidly because of the approval given it by the Church and the strong support received from the government. In 1949 the UTC was given official recognition in place of the CTC, which fell into disfavor because of the activity of Communist elements within its directive board. The CTC in 1950 split into two factions, one Liberal-controlled and the other Communist-controlled, the former being the stronger in point of numbers. The actual strength of the Communist branch is not known, but is not believed to be great. The UTC has been

[4] Laureano Gómez, unopposed Conservative Party candidate, was elected President of Colombia in November 1949, and he assumed office in early 1950.

gaining in numbers by defection of subordinate unions from the rival groups, and its numerical strength is probably equal to that of the two wings of the older Federation today, if it does not actually exceed it. This is a critical period in the development of the Colombian labor movement, and current events will doubtless have considerable effect on the state of affairs for some years to come.

Collaboration in Hemisphere Defense. Colombia is of great potential importance in any system of hemisphere defense because of its strategic proximity to the Panama Canal and its frontage on both the Caribbean and the Pacific, although at present we do not envisage asking for any bases in Colombian territory for the permanent defense of the Panama Canal. During 1948 and 1949, at the initiative of the Secretary of the Army,[5] a preliminary ground survey was made with Colombian collaboration to determine the possibility of constructing a second interocean canal across the Darien Isthmus. It is a policy of the United States to insure that no potential enemy gains a foothold on Colombian territory as a base for operations.

The US has sought to further Colombian military collaboration by permitting the export to Colombia of reasonable amounts of military equipment considered necessary for its internal security,[6] and to enable the Colombian Government to carry out its role in hemisphere defense. In addition, an effort will be made to provide Colombia on somewhat easier terms than hitherto with the arms that will be needed for this purpose and for assisting the UN efforts to combat aggression. Colombia was the first among the other American republics to furnish a frigate to serve with our naval forces in the Korean theater and a battalion of troops for the land operations there.

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Attitude Toward Democratic Institutions. We have been much disturbed by recent developments in Colombian political and religious life. Colombia has been under a state of siege since November 9, 1949. During that period the national Congress has not been permitted to meet, nor have any departmental and municipal bodies been allowed to assemble except where the Conservative governors have considered it safe for the party's interests for them to do so. The Council of State and the Supreme Court, both of which until recently had Liberal majorities, have been brought under control by what the government calls constitutional means. The highest ranking military officers have in many cases been superseded by others of whose pro-Conservative sympathies there can be no doubt. The Liberals charge that throughout the civil service their members have been discharged wholesale and the

[5] Kenneth C. Royall.

[6] Documents pertaining to Colombia's efforts to purchase arms from the United States during 1951 are in Department of State decimal files 721.56 and 721.5621 for that year.

jobs given to Conservatives; they also charge that coercive measures have been employed everywhere to repress Liberals or bring them into line, and that the police have been handpicked for expressly this purpose. Present indications are that an all-Conservative Congress will be elected in June, since the Liberal Party has refused to go to the polls. Since this would remove the danger that Congress might impeach the President or repeal the extraordinary legislation issued by executive decree during the emergency, it is probable that the state of siege will then be lifted.

Civil violence during the past year has been more widespread than at any time since the Conservatives came into power in 1946. For some months the whole Llanos region was in rebellion, and this has not yet been completely overcome in some areas. There has been banditry throughout the central Andes, from Cauca on the south to Bolívar on the north. Piracy on the Magdalena River has forced vessels to tie up at river ports overnight where they can be protected. A large national police force has been organized under the supervision of a British mission. Severe repressive measures seem thus far only to have aggravated the situation and fanned the flames of partisan and religious hatred.

The persecution of Protestants,[7] which is closely linked to the political violence, since most Protestants are Liberals, continues to be a blot on Colombia's record, and the Conservative Party, the Government, and the Church cannot escape a share of the responsibility for it. Missionaries from the United States have been among the victims of these outbreaks of religious intolerance, some have been beaten and jailed and their property destroyed, and one has lost his life. There is reason to believe that the Government desires to give adequate protection and prevent the recurrence of these incidents, but that it is unable to enforce its decrees in the more remote rural areas. It also appears to have adopted the definite policy of refusing visas to missionaries planning to enter Colombia.[8]

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[7] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 816 ff.

[8] In a letter to United States Senator Irving M. Ives (R–N.Y.), dated August 16, 1951, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr. stated in part the following:

"The Department of State has been fully conscious of the plight of Protestant missionaries and has from time to time instructed the Embassy in Bogota to give all justifiable aid to those American citizens who have been injured in their persons or properties. The Embassy has taken up numerous cases of this nature with the Colombian Government and in some of them the Embassy has been able to obtain punishment of the guilty parties or to have other corrective measures applied. In other cases, the Embassy has not been successful in promptly obtaining what we consider to be adequate redress.

At the same time, the Department has urged American Protestant missionaries to be most circumspect in their actions, to refrain from any political activity, and to report promptly to the Embassy and to the Colombian authorities any incidents in which they may have been aggrieved." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26).

In general, our policy is to persuade the Colombian Government to relax its present restrictions upon democratic institutions and urge it to avoid drifting into a dictatorship of the right. We endeavor to orient our public affairs program so as to obtain more adherents for democratic ideals. In any of our actions seeking changes in internal Colombian affairs we are guided and limited by our strict observance of the principle of non-intervention.

Economic Relations. In encouraging economic development in Colombia it is our policy to place emphasis on the improvement of agricultural production and of transportation. Approximately $300,000 has been authorized for projects for fiscal 1951 under the Point Four Program. Technical assistance is now rendered in a number of fields of activity, including agricultural research, rubber experimentation, combating plant diseases and insect pests, irrigation and power projects, health and sanitation, railway and highway development, the coal industry, civil administration reform, and banking reform. In the financing of development projects, investment of private US capital is encouraged.

In line with our general policy of assuring throughout the world more favorable conditions for economic development and, more broadly, of furthering liberal principles of trade and economic relations in general, we have sought since 1940 to enter into negotiations with Colombia for a comprehensive modern treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation.[9] The 1846 Treaty,[10] while not the weakest of treaties of that period, is nevertheless outmoded, and US business interests have held the view that its replacement by an up-to-date treaty would be desirable.

These efforts culminated in the signature on April 26th of a comprehensive FCN treaty,[11] which we are inclined to consider in most respects as the most satisfactory treaty of the kind to be concluded since World War II. The treaty is based squarely upon our standard draft, and its establishment provisions are deemed to be particularly satisfactory. Colombia agreed to strong provisions on most matters of interest to US investors and, in a matter of particular importance, accepted an expropriation provision which should amply protect US interests against that feature of the Colombian Constitution which

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[9] For documentation concerning the general policy of the United States with respect to the modernization of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, see vol. I, pp. 1233 ff.

[10] Reference is to the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, signed at Bogotá, December 12, 1846, and entered into force, June 10, 1848; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 54, or 9 Stat. 881.

[11] The draft treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, signed at Washington, had not gone into effect. Soon after it was signed, the Colombian Government raised questions concerning the interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause in Article III with respect to religious matters, and discussion of this matter extended beyond 1951. The draft treaty was not ratified by Colombia, however, and it was withdrawn from the United States Senate on June 30, 1953. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal file 611.214.

gives the Congress authority to take property without compensation in certain circumstances. Colombia also accepted our standard proposals on exchange controls, commercial arbitration and navigation; and, although it was not possible to develop provisions on territorial preferences and on the tax treatment of shipping enterprises which meet the optimum standards of US policy in those fields, reasonably satisfactory formulae were worked out.

With respect to requests for assistance from government agencies in financing economic development projects, it is our policy to favor consideration according to the criteria of economic justification and availability of private capital. We have recognized, however, that emergency requirements such as those that arose from the events of April 1948 deserve unusually sympathetic consideration. At the same time it is US policy to urge Colombia to finance concomitant local currency costs for reconstruction through non-inflationary means, in order among other things to avoid further pressure on the exchange rate by an increase of the circulating medium. In collaboration with the IMF Colombia very recently eliminated its certificate system [12] and all of its import control with the exception of a prohibited list. It also eliminated all exchange taxes except the National Stamp Tax and depreciated its exchange rate to 2.50 pesos per dollar for all transactions except coffee exports, to which a mixed rate of 2.0875 pesos per dollar applies.

Protectionist sentiment has increased in Colombia in recent years, inspired by expansion in domestic industries. Post-war price rises that impaired the revenue value of the peso, plus the protectionist motivation, furnished the impetus to the Colombian objective of general upward adjustment in customs duties. However, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1936 [13] bound rates on many products against increase, and Colombia as a signatory of the ITO Charter [14] was committed to seek tariff reductions. After GATT [15] tariff negotiations broke down, the Trade Agreement was jointly terminated on December 1, 1949,[16] giving Colombia freedom of action, and in July 1950, the new Colom-

[12] The certificate system represented one of the two principal types of exchange in Colombia. It was based on so-called Certificates of Exchange, which were issued by the Bank of the Republic, and used to pay for gold produced in the country, all of which had to be sold to the Bank. The certificates could be exchanged for dollars received in payment for certain selected imports, and they could also be sold freely on the Stock Exchange to importers for use in payment of specified imports.

[13] For text of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement signed at Washington, September 13, 1935, effective May 20, 1936, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 89, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3875.

[14] For information on matters relating to the International Trade Organization (ITO), see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 779 ff.

[15] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5–6).

[16] For the exchange of notes signed at Washington, October 12, 1949, effective the same date, which terminated the existing reciprocal trade agreement, see TIAS No. 2207, or 2 UST 569.

bian tariff went into effect. It is hoped Colombia may still adhere to GATT principles and join that organization.

Colombia's lend lease responsibility has reached a satisfactory conclusion through a dollar lend lease settlement arrangement signed April 13, 1950.[17] Payments thereunder have satisfactorily been met and only one payment remains to fully liquidate all lend lease accounts.[18] Surplus property indebtedness is gradually being paid off, and there are no arrearages.

On August 15, 1951 the de Mares Concession of the Tropical Oil Company will revert to the Government. In anticipation of this, a National Petroleum Enterprise has been formed by the Government, and it has entered into two agreements with the Tropical Oil Company covering technical assistance and administration of the future exploitation of the concession, as well as the financing, enlargement and administration of the Barrancabermeja refinery. The trend in legislation which had resulted in restricting foreign company operations was reversed in 1950 by a series of decree-laws which were designed to create a favorable atmosphere for foreign investment in petroleum development, and as a result activity by foreign companies in petroleum exploration and exploitation has been reactivated. Labor conditions in the oil industry have been relatively stable due in large measure to increased salaries and other financial benefits obtained by labor under negotiated contracts. Labor's previous insistence for a greater scope in company management and for compulsory arbitration on all issues has subsided.

Our policy continues to be, on the one hand, to avoid intervening in internal Colombian labor affairs, and on the other hand to see to it that US oil interests receive fair treatment as long as their concessions are in force and that adequate payment is provided in the event of expropriation. We desire that Colombia's petroleum potential be increased and that it be adequately secured and controlled in friendly hands so that it may be available in increased quantity when needed for Western hemisphere defense.

Negotiations are now being conducted for a Bilateral Civil Aviation Agreement,[19] which is intended to replace the Olaya-Kellogg Air Pact of 1929,[20] concluded in the days when international air operations were

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[17] For information on the Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, footnote 3, p. 816.

[18] In a note to the Colombian Embassy dated July 19, 1951, the Department of State acknowledged receipt of a check from the Colombian Government in the amount of $42,398.41, which completed Colombia's obligations to the United States under the terms of the Settlement Arrangement (721.56/6–2851).

[19] An air transport agreement with Colombia was not signed until 1956. A memorandum of March 3, 1952, by John L. Hill of the Aviation Policy Staff contains a detailed review of the negotiations from 1945 to its date (611.2194/3–352).

[20] For the exchange of notes signed at Washington, February 23, 1929, effective the same date, which constituted the air pact, see Charles I. Bevans (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949* (Washington, 1968–1972), vol. 6, p. 906.

limited to flying boat service which is now obsolete and should be superseded by a new pact based on the "Bermuda" principles.

While we do not wish to obstruct the creation and development of merchant fleets by any foreign country and recognize the right of nations to subsidize their merchant shipping, we do object to the strengthening of their merchant fleets through discriminatory practices against US shipping. In the past year the Colombian Government adopted certain practices of this nature in order to protect and develop the Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, owned jointly by Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. These practices, such as the use of exchange controls to arbitrarily divert commercial cargo to Colombian flag vessels and the exertion of influence on exporters to ship coffee on Grancolombiana vessels, were protested by this Government, and a satisfactory solution was reached. In addition, a serious situation resulted because of the acceptance by the Flota Grancolombiana of southbound freight in pesos, contrary to Shipping Conference rules. This was settled by an agreement between the Conference and the Flota,[21] with the very active assistance of the Department and the Embassy. One major problem still remains: Colombian Law No. 10 of 1946, exempting the Flota from the payment of income, excess profits and patrimony taxes, which all other shipping lines operating to Colombian ports are required to pay. Various attempts to adjust this problem have been made. Two additional avenues remain for reaching a solution on this subject: a special treaty on double taxation which is under study by the US Government, or an executive agreement providing for the reciprocal exemption from income taxes of transportation companies. With respect to the previous objection of the Colombian Government to the US requirement that goods shipped to Colombia and financed by Export–Import Bank loans be carried exclusively in US ships, this was amicably removed through a waiver by this Government of the above requirement and permitting the shipment of 50% of such goods on Colombian flag vessels.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

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D. POLICY EVALUATION

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In the economic field our activities have yielded mixed results: we have recently signed a new commercial treaty with Colombia; we have been successful in protecting certain American commercial interests, such as the shipping lines, but we have not succeeded in inducing the Colombian Government to modify its system of economic controls so

[21] Reference is to an agreement signed October 17, 1949, which forms part of an enclosure to despatch 457, from Bogotá, April 21, 1950 (911.5321/4–2150).

as to create an atmosphere favorable to the free inflow of American private capital. Neither have we been successful in persuading Colombia of the folly of a high tariff system and the need for reducing tariff barriers. Loans by the Eximbank and International Bank have enabled Colombia to shore up its economy at points of crucial weakness: road and rail transport, electric power, and agricultural production. However, the Banks cannot be expected to extend loans in such volume as to carry the major portion of Colombia's capital requirements for economic development. The Colombian Government and private capital must make the largest contribution, with the Bank providing supplemental assistance. This calls for a continuance of our patient efforts to improve the conditions under which private investment operates in Colombia.

We should make every effort to guarantee that Colombian support of US objectives is more effective by establishing an identity of democratic purposes, using more fully all of our present methods, such as: technical assistance, including the training of technicians and students in the US; Eximbank and International Bank loans for sound projects, while encouraging conditions that will be attractive to private developmental capital; and direct military collaboration. These methods would serve to strengthen Colombia as a component country of the hemisphere for common security and prosperous economic and cultural interchange, as well as to obtain more unqualified short-term political cooperation from Colombia.

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795B.5/6–2751 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 27, 1951—12 : 15 p. m.

UNTRUE RUMORS REGARDING DESERTIONS FROM BATALLÓN COLOMBIA

The Department is informed that false and defamatory rumors are being circulated in Colombia concerning the *Batallon Colombia*, which embarked from the port of Buenaventura on May 21 and is now in Korea. Current stories are to the effect that more than half of the battalion deserted en route from Bogotá to Buenaventura, only about 300 men having actually embarked. It is probable that Communist propaganda throughout the Continent will seek to spread this and

[1] Sent to all missions in the American Republics, except Bogotá; sent to Bogotá for information only; sent also to the Consulates at Recife, São Paulo, and Porto Alegre, Brazil; Monterrey and Guadalajara, Mexico; and Guayaquil, Ecuador

other destructive reports designed to detract from the effect of Colombia's cooperation with the UN in combatting Communist aggression in Korea by 1) indicating determined popular resistance in Colombia to participation in the Korean war; 2) creating the impression that Colombian troops in Korea are the reluctant victims of "Yankee imperialism"; 3) undermining public respect for the *Batallon Colombia.*

The following facts, supplied by Embassy Bogota, are for guidance and discretionary use in correcting false impressions on this subject:

1. The *Batallon Colombia* left Buenaventura for Korea with a total of 1045 men. Authorized strength was 1083. The battalion sailed below authorized strength (by 38 men) not because of any lack of volunteers but because of bureaucratic difficulties and delays. For example, a number of soldiers who were actually in hospitals were retained on its rolls, and were not ready for duty in time for the departure date. Soldiers and civilians continued to volunteer for service in Korea until the very day the battalion left Buenaventura; most of them, of course, could not be accepted.

2. *FYI.* There were some desertions from the battalion, as there are from all Colombian military units. These were due principally to 1) extremely cramped and poor living conditions in Bogota; 2) the fact that some unit commanders throughout the country, instead of sending the soldiers who volunteered for Korea, retained them and sent men of whom they wished to rid their units. *End FYI.*

3. The combat units of the battalion were up to full strength when it sailed.

4. As an index of the enthusiasm of the troops, during the crossing of the Quindio Pass, one truck in the military convoy slid off the road. Eleven soldiers sustained injuries including broken ribs, cuts, a broken collar bone, etc., requiring 24-hour hospitalization. All of the eleven insisted on sailing with the battalion and did sail.

5. The unit had more men by the time it reached Buenaventura than when it left Bogota. Several who had deserted decided to rejoin as the convoy passed through their home towns; two soldiers stationed in garrisons en route requested transfer to the *Batallon Colombia* and were accepted; also accepted were two civilians who volunteered as one of the trains passed through Cali.

In combating derogatory rumors, the fact that Communist propagandists are even willing to impugn the honor, courage, and devotion to freedom of Latin American soldiers should be pointed out as evidence of their denationalized, perverse state of mind.

The Department is arranging special coverage of the *Batallon Colombia* at the front. While avoiding any appearance of officious proprietary interest, USIE should use local facilities, where available, to disseminate the resultant material with a view to encouraging constructive interest in Colombia's representation in the UN forces.

ACHESON

795B.5/7–2751

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1951.

Subject: Department of Defense Proposal to Bill Colombia Currently for Battalion in Korea.

The Department of Defense has informally proposed that the Department of State begin negotiations with the Government of Colombia with regard to the cost of equipping, training, transporting, and logistically maintaining the battalion of troops which the Colombian Government has sent to Korea. I understand that the E area of the Department supports this position. The reason given is that in its note of November 14, 1950 the Government of Colombia recognized "that there will be an obligation to reimburse the United States Government for the training, logistical support and other services which this battalion will have to receive, the details to be arranged later between the Government of Colombia and the Government of the United States".

Furthermore, the Department of Defense pointed out that discussions with regard to reimbursement to the United States for similar services have been commenced with all other Governments having troops in Korea except Ethiopia. Finally the Department of Defense pointed out that in his letter to you of September 30, 1950,[2] the Secretary of Defense [3] stated that: "I should like to observe that the Department of Defense attaches great importance to preserving this principle of reimbursement. In my opinion, the precedent which we are now establishing in the case of Korea will set the pattern for future collective military action by the United Nations. In a larger sense, this Government is acting as executive agent for the United Nations, and it would appear undesirable to establish any general principle that U.S. military supplies, services or equipment will be donated without creating any obligation on the part of their recipients. This is indeed an uncharted area in international affairs, and I therefore do not consider that we should be bound by such precedents as Lend-Lease, which was conceived and executed before the establishment of the United Nations".

ARA is opposed to beginning negotiations at this stage with the Government of Colombia. I understand this view is shared by NEA and UNA and it is also shared by General Bolté.[4] Our position is

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[1] Sent through the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State, H. Freeman Matthews.

[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 666.

[3] George C. Marshall.

[4] Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army, and Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board.

based primarily upon the fact that to begin negotiations now will not be consonant with the quoted part of the Colombian Government's note of November 14, 1950 which states that details with regard to reimbursement will be arranged *later*. The entire import of our arrangement with Colombia is that the amount and form (i.e., currency) of payment will be negotiated later, i.e., when the full amount of the cost of our services rendered can be measured in the light of Colombia's capacity to pay. Capacity to pay can be measured only in the light of the total sum subject to reimbursement and any effort to discuss capacity to pay in relation to sums falling due periodically would be futile.

It is clear that there exists a split of opinion in the Pentagon between those charged with the responsibility for fiscal matters and those in charge of operations. It is the latter who have participated in the actual negotiations with other Governments in which we have endeavored to obtain offers of troops for Korea. You will recall that in the discussion with the Brazilian Foreign Minister [5] in which General Bolté was present, it was made very clear to the Brazilians that all in which we were interested was a recognition of an eventual responsibility for some kind of reimbursement. In all of the discussions which have taken place with goverments of countries in our area in which high officials of the Pentagon have been present, emphasis has been placed upon the same point, namely, that the obligation to repay was a remote one which would be left to future diplomatic discussions. In other words, the main objective has been to get troops and to worry about payment later in the light of the country's capacity to pay in relation to the total obligation incurred.

I am fearful that if, in the light of the informal discussions which were held by General Ridgway [6] and General Bolté with the Colombians last fall, the Colombians should now be presented with a formal bill for current expenses, such action would have an adverse repercussion upon our ability to obtain any further troop offers for Korea from other countries in Latin America. Nor do I see that any useful purpose would be served, even from a fiscal standpoint, in beginning these negotiations now since even those who advocate such action admit that if the Colombians plead inability to pay, no payment will in fact be exacted at this stage.

Consequently, it is my recommendation that you either direct UNA to prepare a letter for your signature to Secretary Marshall requesting the deferment of the negotiations with Colombia or that Mr. Matthews be requested to take this up through some other channel with the Department of Defense.

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[5] João Neves da Fontoura.

[6] Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway was Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, U.S. Army, during 1950.

795B.5/7–951

Memorandum by the Special Assistant for Economic Affairs (Schaetzel) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1951.

Subject: Reimbursement for Logistical Support to Foreign Troops in Korea

Problem

Whether the United States should initiate negotiations for reimbursement with all countries to whom the United States is currently providing logistical support.

This issue is posed sharply in the case of Colombia. It becomes a matter of general concern in that an exception in the case of Colombia will affect the dozen or so negotiations with other countries now in process.

Background

This memorandum will not go over material on this subject contained in Mr. Thorp's memorandum to the Secretary of July 9, 1951 (Tab A).[2] In considering this paper, the Secretary inquired, "Could we devise some method of current settlement?" The present policy of seeking arrangements for settlement concurrently with the accruing of obligations is consistent with the Secretary's query, Mr. Harriman's earlier inquiry, and is the policy that has been pursued with all other countries. It should also be stated that the issue here is not immediate reimbursement in dollars or local currency, nor even a settlement schedule for future implementation; the point of dispute is whether negotiations should be initiated.

It is evident from a review of the considerations pro and con on the Colombia case that there is a conflict between two policies which requires a decision by G or the Secretary.

Proposal that the initiation of negotiations with Colombia be postponed for an indefinite period, or at least until the totality of Colombia's obligations can be determined.

This proposal is based on a conviction that if negotiations for settlement are initiated now with Colombia, the most likely result will be to lessen their enthusiasm for maintaining their battalion in Korea and, more importantly, may imperil our chances of persuading the Brazilians to despatch a division to Korea. ARA argues that in the State–Defense negotiations with the Colombians which preceded their agreement to make available a battalion to the United Nations forces, and with respect to more current negotiations with the Brazilians, there is no question but that an impression was left with the Latin

[1] Addressed also to Mr. Matthews.
[2] Not printed.

Americans that a financial settlement for logistical support was not a matter of immediate concern to us. With respect to this issue, our negotiators had had as their principal objective getting Colombia to accept the principle of repayment. The arguments in support of this position are developed more fully in Mr. Miller's memorandum of July 27 to the Secretary (Tab B).[3]

This position, in summary, is that the primary interest of the United States at this time is to see that more Latin American troops are despatched to and maintained in Korea; financial reimbursement, and in this instance the initiation of negotiations, is a distinctly secondary consideration.

Position that negotiation should be initiated at once with all countries to whom we are providing logistical support.

While the government's policy appears to be absolutely clear that negotiations for settlement should be undertaken at approximately the same time that troops are made available to the United Nations and obligations are incurred, this policy can, of course, be reversed if the considerations stated above do in fact contain the dominant U.S. interest. In other words, the fact that a policy exists is less important than the reasons which led to its adoption.

To recapitulate some of these reasons: We agree with the consideration stated in a letter from the Secretary of Defense that the principle of reimbursement establishes a precedent "which will set the pattern for future collective military action by the United Nations." This is not a point which rests on fiscal or budgetary considerations but, rather, on the undesirability of establishing "any general principle that U.S. military supplies, services or equipment will be donated (to carry out a United Nations program) without creating any obligation on the part of the recipients."

If an exception is made in the case of Colombia, it will be almost impossible to hold intact the present pattern of negotiations, and it is not unlikely that the net effect will be to put off all negotiations until the Korean engagement is finished.

Experience with lend-lease settlements points up the advantages of beginning negotiations with the objective of putting the settlement on a current basis while obligations are being incurred. Certainly the atmosphere most conducive to negotiations on this subject would seem to be while the battle goes on and the troops are in the field.

It has been argued that arrangements for reimbursement cannot be worked out until the final accounting is rendered. However, it should be possible to arrange a schedule of payments which would be realistic in view of the financial situation of the contributing country. Again, the internal budgetary arrangements for troop support, worked out

[3] Not attached to source text as Tab B, but see *supra*.

within a country while its nationals are in battle, is an infinitely more favorable atmosphere than after the troops have returned and the engagement is a matter of history.

Conclusion

Various of the considerations set forth above are peripheral to the basic issue. That issue would seem to be:

(1) whether the principle of reimbursement is a matter of sufficient national importance so that at least negotiations to this end should be undertaken at once; or

(2) whether our major objective is to see that foreign troops, and in this case Latin American troops, are despatched in maximum number forthwith to Korea and that even the proposal to negotiate a settlement might stand in the way of achieving this objective.[4]

[4] In a note dated August 15, 1951, to Mr. Schaetzel and Mr. Miller, Deputy Under Secretary Matthews stated the following:

"I have given some thought to the question of approaching Colombia to initiate negotiations for reimbursement for logistical support of troops in Korea. I believe on balance that the approach should be delayed sixty days and reexamined in the light of conditions at that time." (795B.5/7–951) Department of State files indicate that negotiations were not undertaken during the remainder of 1951.

398.13/11–251: Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Colombia

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 2, 1951.

A–125. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund met on Sunday, October 28, to consider an exchange proposal by the Colombian Government involving immediate devaluation of the buying rate for coffee exchange from pesos 2.0875 to 2.17 per dollar and progressively thereafter until after a period of forty months the rate for coffee exchange would be unified at the buying rate of pesos 2.50 per dollar which now applies to all other exchange proceeds.

The Fund Executive Board took the following decision:

1. Since the authorities of Colombia desire to proceed with the unification of the buying rates of exchange, and considering the not unfavorable exchange prospects of Colombia, the Fund makes no objection to a change in its multiple currency system by an immediate devaluation of the coffee buying rate of exchange from Ps $2.0875 to Ps $2.17 per US dollar, and progressive devaluations by Ps $0.00825 per US dollar every month for forty months until that rate is completely unified with the buying rate of Ps $2.50 which already applies to all other exchange proceeds.

2. It is understood that the authorities of Colombia will consult with the Fund if for any reason they should contemplate departing from any projected rate adjustment. If conditions should change in Colombia, the Fund can at any time suggest that the projected devaluation be modified or postponed.

3. To minimize the risks of inflation and exchange speculation attending the proposed devaluation of the coffee buying rate, the Fund recommends:

a. That the authorities of Colombia continue as long as possible the participation of the Government in the exchange profits, and either substitute other sources of fiscal revenue for the exchange profits once they have disappeared in the process of exchange rate unification, or reduce public expenditures accordingly; and that the authorities of Colombia continue to take other appropriate anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary measures.

b. That the authorities of Colombia retain, and if necessary strengthen, the regulations governing the surrender of the exchange proceeds from coffee exports, particularly a high minimum surrender price and a short surrender period.

While the Fund issued a press release on October 29,[1] the release included only paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2 of the decision quoted above and all of paragraph No. 3 remains confidential. The Fund understands that the exchange rate plan was announced in Colombia on October 29.

WEBB

[1] Not printed.

720.5/12–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Albert H. Gerberich of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Military Aid Program for Colombia

Participants: Mr. Bernbaum,[1] ARA: OSA
Dr. Jorge Mejia Palacio, Minister Counselor, Colombian Emb.
Mr. Gerberich, ARA: OSA

Mr. Bernbaum informed Dr. Mejia that the United States has decided to allot thirty-eight million dollars under the military aid program for grant-aid to Latin America.[2] He explained that only certain of the republics would share in this, and those would be allotted funds in the order of their importance to hemisphere defense. One of these countries will be Colombia.

Our Embassy will take up shortly with the Colombian Government the desirability of making a certain amount available for military grant-aid, and if the Colombian Government expresses an interest in

[1] Maurice M. Bernbaum, Officer in Charge, North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs.

[2] For documentation on the military grant aid program for Latin America, see pp. 985 ff.

receiving a share, a negotiation team will leave Washington to implement our offer through talks at Bogotá. The present conversation had as its objective a wish to keep the Colombian Embassy in Washington fully informed of these developments.

Dr. Mejia said he assumed that the talks in Bogotá were directly connected with the *aide mémoire* [3] which the Colombian Embassy received last week from the Department. Mr. Bernbaum explained that that was another subject, and had to do with economic, financial and military assistance conditioned upon non-export of contraband materials to the Soviet Union and its satellites, but that the two matters are related, and that our team would doubtless discuss both while it is in Bogotá.

Mr. Bernbaum told Dr. Mejia that we will continue to keep the Embassy fully informed of any developments, especially the progress of any negotiations that may develop.

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[3] Not printed.

COSTA RICA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND COSTA RICA[1]

Editorial Note

On January 11, 1951, the United States and Costa Rica signed at San José a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 544, from San José, January 11, 1951, not printed (818.00–TA/1–1151). For text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2186, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 2, page 431. For a press release dated January 11 concerning the agreement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1951, page 151.

[1] For information concerning United States relations with Costa Rica in 1950, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 842.

611.18/3–151

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 3, 1951.

COSTA RICA

A. OBJECTIVES

Our specific objectives in Costa Rica are to: 1) encourage the adoption and practice of policies which will preserve the democratic tradition of that country; 2) cooperate in the development of sound economic and fiscal policies as a basis for democratic progress; 3) obtain full Costa Rican cooperation in the Inter-American System for hemispheric security [1] and solidarity; 4) seek Costa Rican understanding of and support for US policy on extra-continental matters and in the United Nations; and 5) promote friendship and cultural collaboration between the people and the Governments of the United States and Costa Rica.

[1] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

B. POLICIES

General Background Information

For 300 years the Spanish colonists and their descendants lived a simple and isolated existence on the Central Plateau of Costa Rica. Their economy was virtually non-monetary, based upon barter exchange, and no families of great wealth or political domination were created. The Spanish culture and predominantly European blood-strain, with but a relatively slight mixture of indigenous blood, was retained to a large degree. As a result, there is less social stratification in Costa Rica than there is elsewhere in Latin America, the literacy rate is high, and the standard of living is higher generally than in any other Central American republic.

Costa Rica has a long tradition of political democracy, as the outgrowth of these unique and favorable conditions. It has never maintained an army, except during the times of national emergency, and has relied upon a small police force to maintain law and order. The introduction of coffee and bananas during the past century brought about a profound transformation in the economic and social life of the country. A monetary economy was evolved and the population of the Central Plateau greatly increased, so that nearly 75 percent of the entire population is concentrated in this area. Most of the domestic economic and social problems of Costa Rica today have their roots in this heavy population concentration in a limited area, and in the monetary and fiscal problems which grow out of an unbalanced economy.

In 1948, a successful popular revolution was waged against a corrupt and discredited regime[2] which, with Communist support, had attempted illegally to perpetuate itself.[3] On November 7, 1949, after being ruled by a Provisional Junta for 18 months, Costa Rica returned to a constitutional form of government. Six weeks of civil war intensified the fiscal and monetary problems which today remain unsolved in spite of energetic efforts of the new government.

We have believed the form of Government in Costa Rica to be exemplary in Latin America, and it was our policy, while recognizing the Provisional Junta which governed after the civil war, to encourage its early relinquishment of power in favor of a truly constitutional government. It remains our policy to support Costa Rica's efforts to adhere to these democratic traditions and to assist by all practical means in the establishment of a solid political, economic, and social basis upon which this tradition may survive and flourish.

Recognizing that a sound economic structure is an essential element of political democracy, it is our policy to provide, when requested, and

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[2] Reference is to the regime of President Teodoro Picado Michalski.

[3] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 488 ff.

usually on an expense-sharing basis, technical assistance and advice for the attainment of worth-while objectives. To implement this policy we are cooperating directly with Costa Rica in educational, health and sanitation programs, and in various agricultural projects to stimulate the production of food, rubber, coffee, and abacá.[4] We support and participate in the cost of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences at Turrialba, and, in order to provide the communication network necessary for economic progress, we have supervised the construction of the Inter-American Highway, making major contributions to its over-all cost and granting substantial loans to Costa Rica for this purpose.

It is also our policy to support and encourage the investment of private US capital in Costa Rica. We have endeavored to point out to Costa Rica the advantages of such investment and of encouraging and maintaining an atmosphere in the country which will be conducive to this activity. It is also our policy to encourage the adoption and practice of policies by US firms operating there which recognize the changing economic, social and political ideas of the economically less advanced areas. Where necessary, we advocate the renegotiation and modernization of existing contracts in conformity with enlightened, modern practice. This is considered to be essential to the continuation of harmonious foreign operations in the face of a growing sense of nationalism, expanding labor organizations, and the like.

A continuous unfavorable balance of payments since 1944, chronic unbalance in the Government's budget, and dislocations arising from the civil war of 1948, have brought the country's finances to a virtually chaotic state. It is our policy to encourage the present Government of Costa Rica to take determined measures to put the Costa Rican financial house in order, and to reestablish its international credit on a satisfactory basis at an early date.

It is our policy to encourage Costa Rica to participate fully in the Organization of American States, to promote the growth of the Inter-American System, and to adhere to the principles of hemispheric peace, solidarity, and security. To this end we recognize and respect Costa Rica as an equal with full sovereignty, consult with her representatives on matters affecting the Western Hemisphere internally, encourage the solution of problems with neighbor states by lawful and peaceful means, and seek Costa Rican support in presenting a solid Inter-American front in extra-continental matters.

Costa Rica's support of US global foreign policy has a particular moral value despite that country's small size. It is our policy, therefore, to consult with Costa Rican officials on extra-continental questions of mutual interest, to acquaint them with our point of view, and to seek their support generally and in the United Nations.

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[4] A plant yielding fiber for the production of manila hemp.

Costa Rica's democratic characteristics have made possible a truly genuine friendship with the United States. It is our policy to cultivate this friendship as a means of strengthening that country and the example it provides of what may be achieved through the democratic system. To this end, we support a full cultural and information program, including an educational mission and a Cultural Institute. We also support the exchange of professors and provide grants for the specialized training of Costa Ricans in the United States.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

At the conclusion of the civil war in 1948, leaders of the deposed regime escaped into Nicaragua taking with them certain aircraft and arms. To date, the Nicaraguan Government has refused to return this materiel to Costa Rica and, as a result, the relationships between these two countries have been strained. While it is our policy to seek a direct, bilateral, and peaceful solution of this problem, we have informally counseled, when asked, that the materiel be returned or that Nicaragua make a fair compensation therefor.

As a result of assistance given to the revolutionary leader Figueres [5] in 1948, Costa Rica, with other countries, was for a time utilized by elements of the erstwhile Caribbean Legion [6] as a base of operations. This added to the strained relations with Nicaragua, since the strong man of that country, Somoza [7] (then chief of the National Guard) was a consistent target of the Legion. At one point, Nicaragua was accused of violating the territory of Costa Rica with the result that the Organization of American States was called upon to intercede to maintain the peace of the Hemisphere.[8] It is our policy to watch carefully the activities of all free-booting international groups, to encourage the exchange of accurate information regarding their activities while discouraging the dissemination of irresponsible rumor, and to seek to have Costa Rica, as all nations in the area, disassociate itself from them entirely and prevent the use of its territory for concentration of their men and materiel. The present administration in Costa Rica has, from its inception, avoided any dealings wth the Caribbean Legion or other similar groups.

Recently there have been disturbing reports to the effect that, with the knowledge and support of President Somoza of Nicaragua, ex-President Picado of Costa Rica is preparing in southern Nicaragua for an armed adventure against his homeland. Although these reports are

[5] José Figueres Ferrer.

[6] A group of political exiles and military men from countries in the Caribbean region, with the alleged aim of overthrowing certain dictatorial regimes in the area. For documentation on the activities of the Caribbean Legion, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 437 ff.

[7] Anastasio Somoza García.

[8] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 488–542, *passim*, and the editorial note in *ibid.*, 1949, vol. II, p. 436.

largely discredited, we are carefully watching possible developments and are prepared to take feasible action in favor of a peaceful solution, if necessary. There are also similarly disturbing but unsubstantiated reports that ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica is forming an armed group on his farm in northern Costa Rica for military action. Presumably such activity would be directed against Nicaragua and might be utilized by Somoza as a pretext for "defensive"action.

Costa Rica officially and its citizens individually have paid less lip service to the aim of Central American Union than have other nations in the area. It is our policy not to encourage or impede efforts to arrive at a satisfactory formula for Central American economic or political union. We recognize that such a union can and should come about only upon the initiative and by the agreement of the interested states.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

On November 7, 1949 Costa Rica returned, with the inauguration of President Ulate,[9] to a truly democratic and constitutional form of Government. During the first year of President Ulate's administration much has been done toward the restoration of stability in the Government, and steps have been taken, such as disbandment of the Army, to insure continued adherence to democratic forms. Whether due in large or small measure to the efforts of this Government, there has occurred a transformation which is in conformity with our policy toward Costa Rica. Costa Rica's opposition to Communism appears to be genuine and sincere. The Communist party has been outlawed in Costa Rica and the Government has given every indication of being alert to the threat of infiltration by the agents of international Communism, although it is not well equipped to cope with a real threat.

The desire of Costa Rica to take sound economic steps in an effort to strengthen its basis for political democracy has had our full approval. Our various cooperative missions are functioning to the satisfaction of both parties, and they are soon to be expanded under the Point IV program. We have obtained enabling legislation [10] and a new appropriation which will permit the resumption in 1951 of limited work on the Inter-American Highway, a large part of which will occur in Costa Rica. The abacá program conducted under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation may also soon be expanded and, while contributing to the strength of the Costa Rican economy, is also helping to provide the United States with a source of supply for a fiber of great strategic value. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, re-

[9] Otilio Ulate Blanco.

[10] Reference to the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act (Public Law 911), approved January 6, 1951; for text, see 64 Stat. 1223. The act authorized an appropriation of $4,000,000 to continue survey and construction of the Inter-American Highway.

cently established by the Governments of the United States and Costa Rica,[11] represents a step towards increasing the food supply of that country and of the United States through the properly regulated exploitation of a valuable resource in Costa Rican and surrounding waters.

We have successfully conducted negotiations for a final settlement of Costa Rica's Lend-Lease obligation [12] to the United States and have concluded an agreement, subject to legislative approval in Costa Rica, to reamortize the Export–Import Bank debt of that country on a mutually satisfactory basis. We have also received indications that Costa Rica will shortly take up with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council the matter of resuming service on its outstanding publicly-floated bonds which have long been in default.[13] After consultation with the International Monetary Fund, Costa Rica has resorted temporarily to stringent exchange controls and multiple exchange surcharges as a method of dealing with its pressing balance of payments problem. The situation has improved to the point where foreign exchange is available currently for essential imports and also has been provided for settlement of a considerable part of the formerly frozen backlog of commercial obligations arising from past imports. It is hoped that Costa Rica will soon take steps in collaboration with the Fund to simplify its complex exchange rate system. The above-mentioned exchange surcharges, however, constituted a violation of our trade agreement [14] with Costa Rica. To assist in the solution of the problem, the United States agreed to a one-year waiver of certain provisions of the agreement. No permanent solution to the problem has yet been achieved, and it may be necessary for us to agree to a termination of the agreement [15] or to an extension of the waiver.

There have been no serious problems resulting from US capital investment in Costa Rica, and the minor ones which have recently arisen,

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[11] The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission was established by a convention signed at Washington, May 31, 1949, and entered into force March 3, 1950. For text, see TIAS No. 2044, or 1 UST 230.

[12] For information on the conclusion of a Lend-Lease settlement arrangement with Costa Rica, see the editorial note printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 842.

[13] During the fall of 1951, Costa Rican officials met several times with representatives of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (FBPC), but no specific bond settlement plan was agreed upon.

[14] Reference to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica, signed at San José, November 28, 1936, and entered into force, August 2, 1937; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 102, or 50 Stat. 1582.

[15] By an exchange of notes at Washington dated April 3, 1951, and entered into force on the same date, the United States and Costa Rica agreed to joint termination, effective June 1, 1951, of the trade agreement between the two governments which had been signed on November 28, 1936. For text of the notes, see TIAS No. 2237, or 2 UST 841; they are also printed, along with a press release dated April 4, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 23, 1951, p. 662.

particularly with respect to labor relations, have been satisfactorily solved. It may be anticipated, however, that expansion of the labor movement in Costa Rica will lead to a more noticeable conflict between labor and management interests which may call for the reexamination of policies followed by some firms in an effort to achieve a more liberal and modern approach to the problem of their operation in foreign countries. In 1949, the largest US firm [16] in Costa Rica paved the way for better relationships by renegotiating and modernizing its contract with the Government. The new agreement enables Costa Rica to benefit directly from the successful operation of the firm through a form of profit sharing. This company has also made more recent concessions to labor and to the Government of Costa Rica.

Costa Rica has continually assumed its full role in the Inter-American organizations, bringing to them a commendable spirit of democratic practice. It is believed the present Government will continue to support the ideals of continental solidarity and hemispheric security, since it has recently contributed to the maintenance of peace in the Hemisphere by eschewing association with the Caribbean Legion and other such organizations. Because of its long anti-military tradition, Costa Rica does not maintain a standing army, relying for its internal security on a national police force. The role of Costa Rica in hemispheric defense, therefore, would be a minor one as regards manpower. Costa Rica's participation in the Inter-American System, however, is more likely to insure valuable moral cooperation and support and to make possible the use of Costa Rican territory for air and naval bases in the event of a threat from an extra-continental power.

Costa Rica has been a consistent supporter of US foreign policy and its objectives and strategy in the United Nations. Costa Rica's offer of military bases to the Unified Command for use in the defense against aggression in Korea was accepted, and the Government has declared its willingness to offer several companies of National Guardsmen for military police duty in Korea under the Unified Command.

We have been successful in preserving friendship between the United States and Costa Rica, which is based fundamentally on an identity of democratic tradition, and our cultural, educational, informational, and technical cooperation in other fields should contribute to its continued growth. Costa Rica, although a very small country by comparison, is recognized and treated as an equal by the United States. This fact, as well as our scrupulous avoidance of any encroachment on Costa Rican sovereignty is warmly acknowledged and appreciated.

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[16] Apparent reference to the United Fruit Company.

718.5/5–2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs (Jamison)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1951.

[Subject:] Military Equipment for Costa Rica.

[Participants:] Dr. Alberto Oreamuno, Vice President—Costa Rica
Señor Don J. Rafael Oreamuno, Ambassador—Costa Rica
Colonel Radnor[2]—G–3—Latin American Branch
Ambassador Nufer[3]—MID
Mr. Schoenfeld[4]—S/ISA
Mr. Shaw[5]—MD
Mr. Siracusa[6]—MID
Mr. Heins—MID
Mr. Jamison[7]—AR

The Vice President of Costa Rica and his brother, Ambassador Oreamuno, called to explore further the question of replacement of arms of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica with U.S. type equipment. This matter had been gone into in a preliminary way at a meeting in the Pentagon with Assistant Secretary Bendetsen[8] of the Department of the Army, during which a general disposition to give sympathetic consideration to the Costa Rican proposition was expressed. This proposition is based upon a recommendation made by the head of the U.S. Army Mission in San Jose, Colonel Alexander,[9] to the President of Costa Rica.

With regard to availabilities and pricing of the materials needed for standardization of Costa Rican arms, Colonel Radnor said that certain preliminary surveys had indicated that many types of material called for are probably available and that, as a rough estimate, the total cost would be around $500,000.

The principal problem resulted from what the Costa Rican Vice President said was a suggestion of Colonel Alexander that the varied types of arms now held by the Guardia Civil might be traded for, or at least be used as a basis for a credit upon, purchases by the Costa Ricans of new equipment. It was pointed out to Dr. Oreamuno and the

[1] The source text is an unsigned copy of the original; it is attached to a letter from Mr. Fred G. Heins of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Chargé in Costa Rica (Williams), May 23, 1951, not printed (718.5/5–2351).
[2] Jess C. Radnor.
[3] Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs.
[4] H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld.
[5] Robert W. Shaw.
[6] Ernest V. Siracusa, Assistant Officer in Charge, Central America and Panama Affairs.
[7] Edward A. Jamison.
[8] Karl R. Bendetsen.
[9] William Alexander.

Ambassador that existing legislation requires payment in cash prior to the transfer of equipment, and that there is no way known to those present in which such a trade would be authorized under existing law or regulations. The only possible path that might be explored would be for the Costa Rican Government to arrange for sale of its present equipment to some private purchaser in the U.S., and use whatever funds it might obtain therefrom to help pay for new equipment. It was indicated that, if this proved at all feasible, it would have to be a completely separate transaction, but that the Department would look into the question of whether there are non-government buyers who might be interested in such purchases.

In the face of the obvious problem created for Costa Rica by the heavy costs which would be involved, the suggestion was made that in presenting the request through the formal channels required, the Costa Rican Government might indicate priorities in categories for contemplated gradual replacement of existing equipment in separate stages. Although disappointed at the unfavorable prospect of their being able to go through with the full program, Dr. Oreamuno indicated that a list of equipment on this basis would be prepared and that Ambassador Oreamuno would present it to the Department for consideration in accordance with existing Mutual Defense Assistance Act [10] provisions.

During the conversation Dr. Oreamuno made it clear that a principal reason for his government's interest in this matter was the desire to render ineffective, through control of supply of ammunition, significant amounts of materiel which have gotten out of the Government's hands and, presumably, into the hands of real or potential revolutionaries.

[10] For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949, see 63 Stat. 714.

718.56/6–1251

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs (Jamison) to the Director of That Office (White)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1951.

At the time of the visit of Vice President Oreamuno of Costa Rica in connection with a plan for standardizing the armament of the Guardia Civil, Mr. Miller [1] expressed interest in the possibility that legislative authority might be sought for permitting governments which receive equipment from the U.S. to turn in equipment in their possession and

[1] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

receive credit on the purchase of the new materiel. You will recall that the Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in San Jose had included, in his plan for standardization of Costa Rican arms, the suggestion that old equipment be turned in for credit, and that it was necessary to tell the Costa Ricans that no legislative authority for such a transaction exists.

Although, as you know, our friends in G–3 were reluctant to discuss the idea that legislative authority along the above lines be sought, I have probed into the question in the files and in conversations with various people with the following results:

The Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill which was first proposed in 1946 shortly after termination of World War II hostilities, but which did not progress further than the House of Representatives, contained a stipulation that the benefit to the U.S. which was required might be ". . . payment or repayment in kind or property or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President may determine to be adequate and satisfactory." It provided further ". . . that in arranging the terms and conditions for the transfer of any arms, ammunition, and implement of war, as defined by the President's Proclamation Numbered 2717, of February 14, 1947,[2] or any superseding proclamation, first consideration shall be given to requiring the transfer by the foreign government to the United States of any similar articles, weapons, aircraft, or vessels not adapted to tables or organization and equipment of the armed forces of the United States. The value of such equipment received from the foreign government shall be computed on the same basis as the value of similar equipment disposed of, under existing laws and regulations, by the armed forces of the United States as surplus to their needs, and may be included as part of any compensation required.

It is my understanding that it was expected that large amounts of excess materiel would be transferred article for article under this provision since there were then large amounts of excess which would not have been otherwise valuable except for salvage. I have not been able to find in the files any detailed explanation of the actual procedures contemplated, and no indication of the manner in which other practical problems—such as meeting the cost of our acquiring the materiel turned over to us—would be dealt with.

It appears from the record that the plans for exchange of standard for non-standard materiel provided for under the above bill were contingent upon the existence of considerable amounts of surplus, and that it was deemed that whatever practicable basis may have existed for carrying out such a program disappeared with the disappearance of such excess materiel. It is doubtful that, at present costs, the ma-

[2] For text, see 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1051.

teriel we would receive in return for standard equipment could actually be used to produce credit to be applied on the cost of new materiel. The expenses involved in our acquiring it would be heavy and might in fact be greater than any value which might be obtained from it. If the primary purpose, therefore, were to be to increase the ability of a recipient government, such as Costa Rica, to pay for equipment obtained from us, it does not appear that this result would be achieved and it would probably be unwise to encourage any such expectation.

While it seems to me that there would be certain political advantages to requiring a trade-in of old non-U.S. type equipment—such as the assurance that it would be kept out of hands in which it would be misused and the furtherance of the objective of standardization, I question whether the innumerable practical difficulties are not too great in present circumstances to warrant the effort to convince the Department of Defense and perhaps other geographic Bureaus of the Department that the legislation now proposed should be amended to make this possible.[3]

[3] At the end of the text of this memorandum appears the following handwritten note initialed by Mr. Heins: "Asst. Sec. Bendetsen offered orally to be of any help possible in connection with new legislation to authorize the U.S. to take old equipment as partial payment."

718.5/6–2151

The Chargé in Costa Rica (Williams) to Mr. Fred G. Heins of the Office of Middle American Affairs

SECRET San José, June 21, 1951.

OFFICIAL—INFORMAL

Dear Fred: With further reference to Costa Rica's desire to obtain military equipment and your memorandum of conversation on June 14,[1] I had lunch with Dr. Oreamuno yesterday. During the course of this luncheon he brought up his visit to Washington and the fact that he had had a letter from his brother reporting on the above conversation and the note [2] presented. Although the doctor seemed to be still hoping and looking for some way for Costa Rica to get these arms without paying for them, or paying for them on time, he seemed resigned to the fact that this was out of the question and they would have to find the cash.

[1] Not printed (718.56/6–1451).

[2] Reference to Costa Rican note No. SD/0–34, addressed to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, dated June 13, 1951, indicating that Costa Rica wished to dispose of, by sale or transfer, its present military equipment and to acquire new equipment from the United States; a copy of the note is attached to 718.5–MAP/7–2651.

Repeatedly he emphasized the need for the Government to have these arms and have them quickly. I am writing you in another letter about his views on Figueres, but he expressed his belief, in the strongest terms, that Figueres intended to be the next President. If Figueres won the elections fairly, Ulate would turn the government over to him and that would be that. On the other hand, if the voting went against Figueres, the doctor was sure that Don Pepe would cause trouble and forcibly try to take over. The doctor repeated several times that the only possible way to avoid this trouble was for this Administration to have the new military equipment in its possession. He emphasized that the Government had no decent arms—none had been left it. On the other hand, by apparent mistake, it did have control of 80% of the ammunition for the arms that had disappeared. If it got the new equipment, it could protect itself and the Figueristas would be unable to get this ammunition without which a successful revolt would be impossible. He looked upon obtaining the new equipment from the States as preventive medicine.

The doctor stated that it was urgent for him to receive a reply from his brother on the cost and availability of the arms. Once he had this information he stated he would be able to discuss the matter more thoroughly with President Ulate and in one way or another they would obtain the cash to purchase some, if not all, of the material. With information on availability and how long it would take to obtain delivery on various types of equipment, they would be able to draw up a priority schedule. If the terms of purchase have to be cash, he wants to be told so; although as I said earlier he hopes some way can be worked out for a down payment to be made when the arms are delivered and the balance due paid over a period of time. He asked me to write to you informally in the hope that you might be able to speed up the reply to the Costa Rican note as he feels the matter is so urgent every day counts.[3]

Sincerely yours, PHIL

[3] In a letter to Assistant Secretary of the Army Bendetsen, dated July 26, 1951, not printed, Mr. Miller requested the Department of the Army to take expeditious action in completing the pricing and availability survey in connection with the list of arms submitted by Costa Rica (718.5–MAP/7–2651).

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26 [1]

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred G. Heins of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Oreamuno

Participants: Ambassador Oreamuno
ARA—Mr. Miller
MID—Mr. Heins

Mr. Miller said to the Ambassador that President Truman this morning had approved a proposal that Mr. Miller stop in San José to award President Ulate the Legion of Merit. He said he would prefer no announcement at this time of the proposed decoration, but suggested that the Ambassador inquire of President Ulate whether August 26 would be an appropriate time to make the award. Mr. Miller said he would fly from Panama to San José and return to Panama the same day.

The Ambassador said he was delighted at the news and felt certain that August 26 would be satisfactory. He said he would check with President Ulate and let Mr. Miller know. He said the purpose of his call was to invite Mr. Miller to visit Costa Rica after the Conference in Panama.[2]

The Ambassador said he had just received a letter from President Ulate expressing his concern because nothing was being done on the Inter-American Highway since the agreement between the United States and Costa Rica had been concluded in January.[3] (After checking with Mr. James [4] of the Bureau of Public Roads, the Ambassador was informed by telephone that the Bureau's Resident Engineer in Costa Rica had informed the Bureau last week that he is now dismantling a rock crusher and other equipment in southern Costa Rica and moving it to the new project in northern Costa Rica, that he is preparing and moving lumber to the project, and that everything is being done to begin actual road construction as soon as the dry season begins.)

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[1] Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953.

[2] Reference is to the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, held at Panama, August 20–30, 1951. Mr. Miller served as Chairman of the United States Delegation. For additional information, see the editorial note on p. 1065.

[3] Apparent reference to the exchange of notes signed at Washington, January 13 and 17, 1951, and entered into force on the latter date, by which the United States and Costa Rica agreed to amend and to extend the Inter-American Highway Agreement of January 16, 1942, between the two countries. For text of the notes, see TIAS No. 2319, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 1844. For text of the original agreement, see EAS No. 293, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1840.

[4] Edwin W. James, Chief, Inter-American Regional Office, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce.

The Ambassador said his brother (Vice President Oreamuno) had been requested to prepare a new inventory of all the ammunition and military equipment now in the hands of the Costa Rican Government. He said they are complying with this request even though it should not be necessary because the U.S. Military Mission had made an inventory only a few months ago and copies had been furnished to the Department in June. Mr. Spalding [5] checked into this matter, and was informed that a complete new inventory is not desired, but only certain additional information with respect to condition, etc.

The Ambassador was informed that a re-distribution of the presently available Inter-American Highway funds had just been agreed upon between the Department and the Bureau of Public Roads. After checking with the Bureau of Public Roads, the Ambassador was informed that Mr. Miller would advise President Ulate on August 26 that the U.S. would contribute $1,000,000 provided Costa Rica would contribute $200,000. This should be sufficient to complete an all-weather road from San José to Liberia. If Mr. Miller thinks it desirable, he may also advise President Ulate that up to $300,000 or $400,000 additional U.S. funds might be allotted to Costa Rica later from a reserve, if it is found that additional projects can be undertaken in Costa Rica and if Costa Rica is able to contribute necessary matching funds. Mr. Miller indicated, and Mr. James later concurred by telephone, that there would be no objection to President Ulate making a public announcement of these proposed allocations. It was made clear that these figures included the $400,000 U.S. funds already allotted to Costa Rica.

Ambassador Oreamuno said he might possibly leave this week for a few days' visit in Costa Rica and, if possible, would try to remain in Costa Rica until August 26.

Ambassador Oreamuno was informed that three additional Point IV consultants had been selected for Costa Rica and should arrive there within a few weeks. Mr. Pietri Vigna is ready to leave Washington as soon as Costa Rica informs us that he is acceptable. He is an airport engineer. Dr. H. Mallory from Florida has been selected to coordinate all the Point IV agricultural projects in Costa Rica, Mr. Irwin R. Vaughn is from the National Office of Vital Statistics. Ambassador Oreamuno expressed his appreciation, and it was agreed that, if possible, these men would be put in touch with him before they leave Washington.

[5] Hobart A. Spalding, Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

547-842—79——85

718.5/12–2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred G. Heins of the Office of Middle American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1951.

Subject: Arms and Ammunition

Participants: Ambassador Oreamuno, Embassy of San Jose.
MID—Mr. Fred G. Heins

In connection with Ambassador Oreamuno's call at the Department on another matter, I told him we had ascertained as a result of his inquiry of Mr. Mann [1] on December 14, that someone would soon be in touch with him, probably early in January, to work out the details for disposing of Costa Rica's old arms and equipment. I told him it was presently contemplated that an advance payment of $50,000 could probably be made to Costa Rica shortly after January 1st, against title to all of the arms and ammunition now in the hands of the Costa Rican Government.

The Ambassador was pleased with this proposed arrangement and said it would enable Costa Rica to purchase a considerable portion of the new equipment required, because he understands there is already available from other sources, in Costa Rica a total of approximately $110,000 in cash to be used for this purpose. I told him we had been informed by the Army that during the past two months certain of the new equipment for Costa Rica was being received at warehouses, and that the Army was anxious to make deliveries whenever Costa Rica was ready to pay for them.

I told the Ambassador that this whole matter was being handled on a very confidential basis and I understood it was presently hoped, that after all of the old Costa Rican material is received in the U.S. and sold, the total net amount to be paid to Costa Rica from the sale of these materials would be nearly $100,000. The Ambassador said this was in line with previous estimates.

F[RED] G. H[EINS]

[1] Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

CUBA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA[1]

Editorial Note

On January 16, 1951, the General Services Administration announced in a press release that agreements had been reached with several parties for the rehabilitation and reactivation of the idle United States-owned Nicaro Nickel Plant in Oriente Province, Cuba. Under the agreements, Frederick A. Snare Corporation of New York received the construction contract, and Mining Equipment Corporation of New York, a subsidiary of N. V. Billiton Maatschappij of The Hague, Netherlands, was selected to operate the plant upon the completion of reconstruction work. The Department of State approved of the choice of the Billiton firm, and also endorsed the idea of private Cuban participation in the ownership and management of the renovated plant, which became a subject for negotiation between Billiton and interested Cuban investors. Work on the Nicaro plant continued through 1951, and the plant began to operate early in 1952. A chronology of the principal developments regarding Nicaro, covering the period from October 1950 to March 1951, and a memorandum concerning the question of Cuban participation, are attached to a memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, to the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb, dated April 4, 1951 (837.2537/4–451). Additional pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal files 836.06 and 837.19.

[1] For previous documentation concerning United States relations with Cuba, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 843 ff.

710.5/2–1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harvey R. Wellman of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1951.

Participants: Cuban Ambassador [1] and Military, Air and Naval Attachés [2]
Assistant Secretary Miller [3]
Mr. Mackay [4]—AR
Mr. Wellman—MID

Ambassador Machado stated that the Cuban Government had studied the defense survey and recommendations [5] made by the survey team from the United States armed services and accepts the recommendations in their entirety. He said that the Cuban Government is now interested in obtaining military and naval missions on a basis similar to that of the recent air mission agreement.[6] The Cuban President [7] had also instructed him to state that the Cuban Government is interested in carrying out the recommendation regarding new equipment and supplies needed by the three branches of the Cuban armed forces. The President believes, however, he stated, that the United States should make this equipment and supplies available to Cuba on the same basis as sales have recently been made to other Latin American countries, namely, 10 percent plus cost of rehabilitation. Ambassador Machado expressed the desire to have action initiated on both these matters before the arrival on February 21 of the Cuban Chief of

[1] Luis Machado.
[2] Lt. Col. Ramón M. Barquin, Cuban Military Attaché; Lt. Cmdr. Oscar Rivery, Cuban Naval Attaché.
[3] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
[4] Duncan A. D. Mackay.
[5] This survey had been conducted between October 26 and November 7, 1950; a subsequent report containing recommendations was transmitted to the Cuban Government in January 1951.
[6] Reference is to the Agreement providing for the services of a United States Air Force Mission to Cuba, signed at Washington, December 22, 1950, and entered into force on the same date; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2166, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 1, p. 887.
[7] Carlos Prío Socarrás.

Staff, General Cabrera,[8] as an official guest of the United States Government.

Mr. Mackay agreed to consult Mr. Anderson,[9] IAD, regarding the Cuban desire to enter into military and naval mission agreements. Ambassador Machado stated that there should be no objection by either Government to agreements embodying substantially the same provisions as the recent air mission agreement. Mr. Mackay stated that there would be the question of availability of naval and military personnel. Ambassador Machado said that the Cubans are thinking of a small mission of no more than three or four officers in each case.[10]

Mr. Mackay pointed out that only excess, surplus equipment can be acquired upon the payment of 10 percent plus the cost of rehabilitation. Any equipment or supplies which must come out of new procurement would have to be paid for at the price which the United States Government has had to pay. At present the army and air force have very little surplus equipment but the navy does have some.

Mr. Mackay agreed to arrange for the appropriate officers in the United States Army, Navy and Air Force to communicate with the Military, Naval and Air Attachés at the Cuban Embassy to discuss the cost and availability of the particular items which the Cuban defense survey recommended be acquired.

Ambassador Machado observed that the United States must recognize the necessity of giving financial assistance to the other American Republics to enable them to put their armed forces into shape for the defense of the hemisphere.

Assistant Secretary Miller was not able to remain throughout the conversation. While present he inquired of Ambassador Machado regarding the offer of President Prio to raise the Cuban unit for Korea from company to battalion size. Ambassador Machado stated that this proposal is being presented for approval to the special session of Congress which, according to his information, has not yet been convened.

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[8] Maj. Gen. Ruperto Cabrera y Rodriguez.

[9] Kenneth Anderson, Special Assistant to the Chief, Division of Acquisition and Distribution, Office of Libraries and Intelligence-Acquisition.

[10] On August 28, 1951, the United States and Cuba signed two agreements providing for the establishment of a United States Army Mission in Cuba and a United States Naval Mission in Cuba, both of which entered into force on August 28. For text of the Army Mission Agreement, see TIAS No. 2309, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 1677; for text of the Naval Mission Agreement, see TIAS No. 2310, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 1689.

394.31/3–2751

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1951.

Subject: Cuban Foreign Minister [2] Intends to Mention GATT [3] Sugar Negotiations during Courtesy Call

Discussion:

Minister of State Dihigo has indicated that during his conversation with you at 5:30 pm on March 27,[4] he may refer to our sugar negotiations under GATT with Cuba at Torquay.[5]

The Cubans have rejected our sugar offer and have requested that negotiations on this matter with them be transferred to Washington or Habana. We have replied that we must continue to rely on our delegation at Torquay to carry on these negotiations and that we cannot agree to having them transferred elsewhere.

The negotiations in question involve not only Cuba but also the Dominican Republic [6] and Peru, and the negotiations with all three countries are interdependent from our point of view, a fact of which the Cubans are fully aware. Consequently, it would be impracticable to transfer part of these negotiations from Torquay and to do so would undoubtedly provoke serious and justifiable objections on the part of the Dominican Republic and Peru. The Dominican delegation particularly has been waiting in Torquay since last September for the opportunity of participating in these sugar negotiations.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you tell Dr. Dihigo that since this matter is now under discussion at Torquay, the United States prefers to have the matter worked out by our delegations there.

Further Background:

The following background information may be helpful in the event that Dr. Dihigo insists on discussing the matter in greater detail.

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[1] Drafted by the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, Albert F. Nufer, the Deputy Director of the Office, Edward G. Cale, and Mr. Wellman.

[2] Ernesto Dihigo y Lopez Trigo.

[3] Reference is to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948; for text, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

[4] A memorandum of the conversation between Secretary Acheson and Cuban Foreign Minister Dihigo, drafted by Mr. Wellman and dated March 27, is filed under Department of State decimal file number 837.2351/3–2751.

[5] The third round of tariff negotiations under GATT took place at Torquay, England, from September 28, 1950, to April 21, 1951. For documentation on the negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 791 ff., and vol. I, pp. 1245 ff.

[6] For documentation on the interest of the Dominican Republic in an increased sugar quota in the United States, see pp. 1367 ff.

As you may recall, it was largely because of disagreement over sugar that the Cuban delegation withdrew from the Tariff Negotiations under GATT at Annecy.[7] The present United States duty on sugar is 50 cents per hundred pounds when imported from Cuba and 68–¾ cents per hundred pounds when imported from other countries. At Annecy we offered to reduce the rate on Dominican sugar to 60 cents, but withdrew this offer after the Cuban delegation withdrew from the negotiations.

Prior to the beginning of the Tariff Negotiations at Torquay we had agreed with Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Peru to negotiate on sugar with all three at once with a view to reducing both the Cuban and the full-duty rates. It was understood that the reduction in the Cuban rate would probably be somewhat less than the reduction in the full-duty rate so that the margin of preference on Cuban sugar would be reduced. We had, furthermore, reached an informal understanding with the Cubans that if sugar negotiations were successfully concluded with all three countries the margin of tariff preference remaining to Cuba would not be less than the 20 percent established in the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902.[8] That Treaty is now in suspense.

Our delegation at Torquay has been authorized to offer a reduction in the rate on Dominican and Peruvian sugar to 55 cents per hundred pounds and on Cuban sugar to 44 cents per hundred pounds. We are prepared, if necessary, to go as low as 50 cents on Dominican and Peruvian sugar and 40 cents on Cuban sugar. Any reduction is made contingent on the incorporation of a "snap back" provision under which the rates of duty might be raised to $1.875 on full-duty and $1.6875 on Cuban sugar if current legislation[9] providing for domestic sugar quotas should expire before or without being replaced by comparable new legislation. (The former rate is the full-duty rate in effect prior to the first reduction under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934[10] and the latter is that full-duty rate less the present absolute margin of Cuban preference on sugar.)

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[7] The second round of tariff negotiations under the GATT took place at Annecy, France, from April 8 to August 27, 1949; relevant documentation is included in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, pp. 651 ff. There is considerable unpublished documentation on the Cuban sugar preference question in Department of State decimal file 560 AL, and in International Trade Files, Lot 57 D 284, Boxes 108–109, and 128–132 (the 1949 GATT meetings at Annecy, France).

[8] Reference is to the Convention of Commercial Reciprocity, signed at Habana, December 11, 1902, and entered into force December 27, 1903; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 427, or 33 Stat. (pt. 2) 2136.

[9] Reference is to the Sugar Act of 1948 (Public Law 388), approved August 8, 1947; for text, see 61 Stat. 922. For documentation on matters relating to the enactment of the Sugar Act of 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 604 ff.

[10] For text of the Trade Agreements Act (Public Law 316), approved June 12, 1934, see 48 Stat. 943; for text of the United States-Cuban Reciprocal Trade Agreement, signed at Washington, August 24, 1934, and entered into force September 3, 1934, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 67, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3559.

The principal purpose and effect of this snap back provision is to place the sugar-supplying countries on notice, and to obtain their approval, in advance, of action which the United States would be forced to take in any event if sugar quota legislation were ever allowed to lapse. In the absence of the snap back provision, the action increasing sugar duties would have to be taken under the provisions of the escape clause of GATT. The Department of Agriculture is very insistent upon the snap back provision, however, because of the added assurance it would give to the domestic sugar industry. The Department of Agriculture maintains that it had the State Department's commitment to incorporate such a provision into GATT the last time rates of duty on sugar were reduced and will not agree to further reductions without it.

Cuba's rejection of our sugar proposal at Torquay is apparently based principally on dissatisfaction with the snap back provision, rather than with the rates of duty we have offered. They have pointed out that the snap back would give us freedom of action regarding rates of duty on sugar, whereas they would continue to be bound by commitments made to us on products imported from us. There is some validity in this objection, even though Cuba in this event would be free to invoke the nullification and impairment clause of GATT and to withdraw equivalent concessions from us.

The Cubans undoubtedly know that it is highly probable that United States sugar quota controls will be continued indefinitely and that if these controls were removed, we would be forced to increase the rates of duty on sugar sufficiently to afford protection to our industry. Nevertheless, for political reasons they do not wish to go on record as approving our increase of sugar duties in such a contingency, at least without obtaining something in return. The solution of the problem may lie in incorporating language in the snap back provision which would give the Cubans the basis for prompt withdrawal of concessions from us in the event we make use of the snap back provision on sugar. We believe, however, that the place to resolve this problem is Torquay.

In the meantime, we have instructed our delegation at Torquay to point out to the Cubans: (1) that the pre-Torquay understanding which we had arrived at with Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Peru leaves us free to continue negotiating with the other countries in the event we are unable to reach agreement with Cuba and that any reduction in rate which we agree to with them, in the absence of a reduction in the preferential rate to Cuba, will automatically operate to reduce the Cuban margin of preference; (2) that even in the absence of the snap back provision we would not be precluded from raising our tariff to an adequate protective level, but that there would be no basis for retaining the present 18–¾ cents per one hundred pounds preference for Cuba; (3) that the snap back contemplates the estab-

lishment of a tariff quota for Cuba, but that in the absence of a snap back Cuba would be without any claim for tariff quota protection.

It is believed that our negotiating position vis-à-vis Cuba is strong and that we should not weaken it by agreeing to negotiate with them outside the Torquay framework.[11]

[11] At Torquay the tariff rate on Cuban sugar adopted at Geneva in 1947 was bound for another three years. For further information on United States-Cuban negotiations, see Department of State Publication 4209 (Commercial Policy Series 135), *Analysis of Torquay Protocol of Accession, Schedules, and Related Documents* (Washington, 1951), pp. 232 ff.

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137 [1]

Minutes of Meeting No. 171 of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Held at Washington, March 28, 1951

SECRET

[Here follow a list of those persons present (22) and a table of contents.]

1. *Proposed Export–Import Bank Loan to Cuban Electric Company*

Mr. Glendinning [2] recalled that in June 1950 the Council had advised the Export–Import Bank that it perceived no objection to the Bank's advising the American and Foreign Power Company that the Bank would consider on their merits loan applications for financing Latin American subsidiaries of American and Foreign Power (NAC Action No. 406.) [3] This was the first case under the ensuing Export–Import Bank negotiations with American and Foreign Power. It called for a 12-million dollar loan to the Cuban Electric Company which would provide part of the financing for a total program of about $33 million. In considering the problem the Staff Committee was satisfied the power was required in Cuba and would make a contribution to the development of the Cuban economy in this period.

Allocating machinery had not been set up with respect to this type of equipment, although it was in process of being established. Approval of consideration of the credit would carry no commitment with respect to making equipment available should the allocating authority later conclude other programs had priority.

The interest rate would be approximately 4½ percent and maturity of the loan 20 years (NAC Document No. 1115).[3]

[1] Master file of the documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (NAC) for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, and preserved as item 70 of Federal Records Center Accession 71 A 6682.

[2] C. Dillon Glendinning, Secretary, National Advisory Council.

[3] Not printed.

Mr. Szymczak [4] said that he had no objection to the loan and thought it was a good one. He was, however, concerned with the problem of coordination of development financing. He recalled that there had been meetings of the Staff Committee, of the International Bank, and of the Export–Import Bank, on this problem but so far as he knew nothing as yet had come out of these meetings. His question related to the overall issue of coordination of development financing as between the Export–Import Bank and the International Bank.

Mr. Gaston [5] commented that so far as this particular loan was concerned it was one the International Bank could not make since it was a private loan and not guaranteed.

Mr. Martin [6] observed that papers on the other problem had been distributed to the Council (NAC Document No. 1107).[7] It was contemplated there would be a meeting of the principals and Mr. Harriman's [8] office in the near future to discuss this general matter and get something up to the NAC for action. He added that it was not an easy problem and that ECA also was concerned with the general problem of lending operations.

Mr. Szymczak inquired whether the International Bank had sent the Truslow Mission [9] to Cuba. Mr. Hasenoehrl [10] said that the Mission had been made up at the request of the Cuban Government. So far it had made no report other than on the railroad situation.

Mr. Szymczak observed that the International Bank was not in the Cuban picture as yet since it had loaned nothing to that country. He understood, however, that the Export–Import Bank had made some loans to Cuba. Mr. Hasenoehrl said that these loans had been paid off.

Mr. Szymczak commented that this loan appeared to be the kind of loan that would pay for itself. Mr. Gaston said that it was a profitable company and that the only thing that disturbed him was that rates were rather high, and the cost of operations high due to a high wage and salary schedule and the fact that much of the equipment was outmoded. The proposed loan would take care of part of this prob-

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[4] M. S. Szymczak, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.

[5] Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman, Board of Directors, Export–Import Bank of Washington, and Acting Chairman, National Advisory Council.

[6] William McChesney Martin, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

[7] Not printed.

[8] W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President.

[9] This mission (so-called after its chairman, Francis Adams Truslow) had been organized in mid-1950 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Cuban Government for the purpose of making a comprehensive survey of the Cuban economy and recommending specific proposals for the country's development. For further information, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Sixth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1950–1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 35 ff. For the mission's final report, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Report on Cuba: Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950* (Washington, 1951).

[10] Victor F. Hasenoehrl.

lem. However, the company had a large proportion of small services that did not pay their costs. Mr. Szymczak observed that if prices continued to go up in the United States the company might find it could not buy all of the necessary equipment and would have to ask for a further loan. Mr. Gaston commented that that was their problem.

[Here follows discussion of matters relating to general problems of foreign lending and the availability of materials and resources.]

Action. The following action was taken (Action No. 457):

The National Advisory Council advises the Export-Import Bank that it approves consideration by the Bank of a credit not in excess of $12 million to the Cuban Electric Company to aid in financing the dollar costs of its construction program. It is understood that the interest rate will be approximately 4½ percent, that the credit will be repayable within 20 years, and that the funds advanced will be secured by collateral in excess of 100 percent of the amount of the loan.[11]

[Here follows additional discussion and action on matters unrelated to Cuba.]

[11] On March 29, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank approved a credit of $12,000,000 in favor of the Cuban Electric Company, Inc., to assist the company in financing a construction program in Cuba. For further information, see Export–Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 12–13, 36.

837.2351/3–1351 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 3, 1951.

A–120. Reference is made to the Embassy's despatch 579 of March 13 [2] regarding Cuban discussions with the British Government concerning an increased market for Cuban sugar in Great Britain in connection with possible tariff concessions by Cuba to Great Britain which would have the effect of reducing or eliminating tariff preferences now being granted by Cuba to corresponding imports from the United States.

This Government's understanding with the Cuban Government, with regard to Cuba's desire to offer concessions to European countries involving reductions in certain United States preference margins in return for compensating concessions from those countries on Cuban products, is set forth in the confidential *aide-mémoire* of June 27, 1950 entitled "Results of Discussions between the Delegations of Cuba and the United States",[3] which was prepared at the conclusion of discussions held in Washington May 23 to June 27, 1950 between representa-

[1] Drafted by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Office of Middle American Affairs.
[2] Not printed.
[3] Not printed (411.37/6–2850).

tives of the Governments of Cuba and the United States. It is believed a copy of this *aide-mémoire* was sent to the Embassy for its information and files.

It should be mentioned that neither in the *aide-mémoire*, nor in any negotiations between Cuba and European countries of which the Department is aware, was it contemplated that tariff preferences would be accorded products of European countries by Cuba. Such action would be clearly contrary to GATT. Rather, the *aide-mémoire* and the negotiations envisaged a reduction or elimination of preferences now accorded imports into Cuba from the United States in respect of products of which European countries are, or are likely to become, important suppliers of the Cuban market. It was understood (numbered point 4 on page 9 of the *aide-mémoire*) that Cuba and the United States would continue to consult with each other in the event that either proposed to reduce or eliminate existing margins of preference. In accordance with this understanding, the Cuban Government informed this Government of offers it proposed to make to European countries which would have the effect of eliminating or reducing the United States preference on the products involved and obtained the United States views in each instance.

With respect to the possibility mentioned in the Embassy's despatch that in return for tariff concessions by Cuba to Great Britain, the latter country might grant Cuba a fixed sugar quota for the next 3 years in the British market, the Dominican and other Governments directly affected by any such British action would obviously have the most immediate and primary interest, and as such could be expected to take the initiative in discussing the matter with the British or taking it up under GATT. At the same time, it will be observed that in numbered paragraph 2 on page 5 of the United States-Cuban *aide-mémoire*, the United States set forth its understanding that in any Cuban negotiations with European countries, the approach would be kept consistent with GATT and the Habana ITO charter.[4] For your own confidential information only, it has very recently been reported to the Department by an adviser on sugar matters to the Cuba Torquay delegation that Cuba has not requested and does not intend to request the British Government for a fixed quota for Cuban sugar in the British market, but rather sought a British commitment not to reduce British purchases of sugar in the world market below 1,500,000 tons during a 3 year period.

[4] Reference is to the Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) signed at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment held at Habana, Cuba, November 7, 1947–March 24, 1948; for documentation on the formulation of the Charter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 802 ff. For text of the Charter, see United Nations Doc. ICITO/1/4 (a document of the Interim Committee of the International Trade Organization established by the Final Act of the Habana Conference), or Department of State Publication 3117 (Commercial Policy Series 113), *Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization and Related Documents* (Washington, 1948).

The Department has sent copies of your despatch 579 to the United States delegation at Torquay and the Embassy at Habana, and has forwarded to you and the Embassy at Habana copies of a memorandum of conversation of March 1 [5] between a member of our delegation at Torquay and Ambassador J. M. Troncoso, the head of the Dominican delegation, on this subject.

ACHESON

[5] Not printed.

737.56/5–151

The Acting Chief of the Lend-Lease and Surplus Property Staff (Meigs) to the Chief of the Division of Investments, Bureau of Accounts, Treasury Department (Barnes)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 1, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. BARNES: There are being transmitted to the Treasury Department, Division of Investments, by this Department, two remittances aggregating $335,329.46 for credit to the Cuban lend-lease accounts on your books. One of these is a draft on the National City Bank of New York by its Habana branch, payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the sum of $214,988.04; [1] the other, in the sum of $120,341.42, represents a transfer of a credit accruing to Cuba as the result of the completion of accounting on certain interim arms program contracts.

The total residual lend-lease indebtedness of Cuba is $335,329.46 as follows:

Balance due under "treaty" terms	$300,767.23
Balance due on "cash" account	34,562.23

Therefore, the completion of these credit transactions will fully liquidate the monetary responsibility of the Government of Cuba under the Lend-Lease Agreement of November 7, 1941.[2]

Your confirmation will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

CARROLL M. MEIGS

[1] A check to this amount from the Cuban Government was delivered by Ambassador Machado to Secretary Acheson at the Department of State on April 27 (737.56/4–2751).

[2] For text of the United States–Cuba Lend-Lease Agreement, signed at Washington, November 7, 1941, and entered into force on the same date, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. VII, p. 122.

394.31/5-351

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy (Leddy) to the Assistant to the President (Steelman)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1951.

[Subject]: Negotiations at Torquay on Cuban Textiles.

It is understood that in their interview with you the representatives of exporters of textiles to Cuba will make the following points regarding United States action at Torquay in regard to Cuban textile rates:

1) We have permitted Cuba to increase her textile rates, especially on rayons, to new and excessive levels, notwithstanding commitments contained in the agreement we reached with Cuba in Geneva in 1947.
2) No real compensation was or could be obtained, especially not for textile exporters.
3) Instead of trying to obtain compensatory concessions from Cuba the United States should have withdrawn concessions we had granted to Cuba, such as those on sugar or tobacco.
4) The Cuban action was contrary to the principles of the Trade Agreements Act [1] and the President should therefore suspend concessions granted to Cuba.

In reply, it is recommended that you say nothing beyond the following:

1) The Torquay negotiations have been completed and the results will be made public on May 9.[2]
2) It was agreed by the plenary committee of the conference that no details concerning the results would be made public before May 9.
3) Apart from our international commitment, it would obviously be unfair to give advance information to one group and not to others.

To go beyond statements to this effect would risk the possibility of a flood of textile imports into Cuba with pressure from Cuba for permission to give immediate effect to increased rates.

The following background material is for your confidential information.

1. At the Annecy conference in 1949 Cuba claimed that a crisis in its domestic textile industry required extensive modification in the rayon and cotton textile rates it had agreed at Geneva to maintain on imports from the United States. The United States agreed at Annecy to undertake renegotiation of these rates. At Torquay, Cuba submitted the modified rates which it desired to substitute, and negotiations took place regarding the proposed new rates and compensation for our agreement to these changes. Negotiations regarding the cotton textile rates were successful, both as to new cotton rates to be

[1] Reference is to the Trade Agreements Act (Public Law 316), approved June 12, 1934, as extended and amended; for text of the act, see 48 Stat. 943.

[2] The Department of State issued press release No. 365 on May 7, 1951, which contained a summary of the results of the tariff negotiations at Torquay.

set and as to compensatory new concessions. Long negotiations failed, however, to secure the offer of rayon textile rates to which we could agree, although even the modified rates are substantially under current U.S. duty levels.

2. Cuba thereupon decided to make the modifications it desired in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVIII. Under this Article, any party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was permitted, at the time at which Cuba took the action, to withdraw or modify concessions granted at Geneva (as these were) at any time after January 1, 1951 subject only to the commitment to negotiate and if possible agree with the other substantially interested parties. The Article provides that, in such negotiations, there shall be an effort to maintain a level of concessions not less favorable to trade than that provided for by the original concessions. If, but only if, agreement cannot be reached, the country with which the concession was initially negotiated is free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions originally negotiated with the party taking the initiative under Article XXVIII.

3. Since there was no restriction on the unilateral right of a country to withdraw or modify concessions under Article XXVIII other than the procedural requirements just cited, Cuba was entirely within her rights in notifying the rayon textile modifications under Article XXVIII and could, in fact, have withdrawn rates from the Agreement entirely had she so desired. The problem which faced the United States was therefore to negotiate agreement with Cuba for compensatory adjustment, in accordance with Article XXVIII. Such negotiations took place and resulted in the offer of concessions which the United States believes provide satisfactory alternatives for the development of United States trade. Although we never agreed to the modifications in rayon rates which Cuba made, we accepted compensation, full details of which will be made public on May 9. Only if the compensation offered had been judged inadequate and had been refused would there have been any justification for the more drastic step of withdrawing concessions granted to Cuba in retaliation.

4. In judging whether or not to recommend acceptance of the compensation offered, the United States considered the volume of trade to be benefited as compared with the volume affected by the increases, the amount of duty reductions offered, the resulting level of protection, and the possibilities for trade expansion under the new concessions. Weight was also given to the consideration that if the compensation were rejected and we chose instead to retaliate, we should forfeit all compensatory concessions and would in addition have to bear the responsibility for starting what might develop into a series of retaliatory withdrawals which would seriously disturb relations with Cuba for years to come and might well lead to similar action by other coun-

tries and a general unraveling of the tariff reductions which we and other countries have negotiated. Moreover, it had to be borne in mind that if we took the initiative in such drastic action, Cuba might take the entire case before the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement under Article XXIII as an action nullifying or impairing the attainment of the objective of the Agreement. A very convincing case against the United States might have been made by laying before the other countries the extent of compensatory concessions which had been offered to us and rejected.

5. There is one other important element involved. The United States cannot make the GATT program or the Reciprocal Trade Agreement program a strait jacket for preventing the establishment or expansion of industry in the other American republics. The United States is committed to the promotion of sound industry in the other American republics. This policy is in our own long-term interests since it has been demonstrated that sound industry can and will raise living standards and increase both the volume and value of international trade. The necessity for reasonable protection of new industries in Latin America is not open to serious contradiction and our efforts, under the GATT and Trade Agreements program, should be to discourage excessive protection—which leads to hot house rather than sound industry—and only to discourage those industries which clearly cannot be established on an economic basis. The Cuban textile industry is, by and large, a sound industry and is an important part of the whole diversification program in Cuba which we have encouraged in many ways. The fact that increased rates will affect American textile exports to Cuba is unfortunate but inevitable. We have been losing Latin American textile markets for many years and this trend will continue.

In the light of all these considerations it was decided to accept the compensation, even though we did not accept the modified rayon rates.

6. With reference to the further charge that regardless of what happened at Torquay the President should suspend the application of trade-agreement rates to products of Cuba because of Cuba's discriminatory treatment of American commerce or because of other acts which tend to defeat the purposes of the Trade Agreements Act, under Section 350 (a) (2) of the Act, it should be emphasized that the Cuban textile case does not come within the provisions of this section. Cuba is not discriminating against United States goods. The rayon and cotton textile rates in question are preferential rates more favorable than those enjoyed by other countries. In a case of discrimination the reverse would be true, i.e. Cuba would have to charge rates higher than those accorded to the most-favored-nation to create discrimination against the United States. Further, it cannot be said that Cuba is performing acts contrary to the purposes of the Trade Agreements Act while acting in strict conformity with the provisions of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an agreement which the United States entered into partly under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act.

398.235/6–1451

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1951.

Subject: Appointment With Ambassador Machado of Cuba

Final agreement was reached yesterday among the Executive departments on the draft sugar legislation. This is the matter which Ambassador Machado wishes to discuss with you during his conversation this morning.[1]

The principal changes in the legislation as compared with the 1948 Sugar Act are:

1. The increase in the quota of Puerto Rico from 910,000 tons to 1,080,000 tons.
2. The increase in the quota for the so-called full duty countries from 1.36 percent of the amount by which consumption in the United States exceeds the fixed quotas of the domestic areas and the Philippines to 4 percent.
3. The modification of section 202(*d*), under which Cuba was guaranteed a minimum participation in this market, in a way that is slightly less favorable to Cuba.
4. The omission of section 202(*e*) which contained authority under which retaliatory action against Cuba might have been taken by reducing the amount of Cuban sugar permitted entry in the United States in the event of discrimination by the Cuban Government against United States trade or industry.

The basic structure of the draft act is the same as that of the 1948 Act with fixed quotas for domestic areas and with Cuba being the principal beneficiary of increases in consumption.

Cuba opposes the increase in the quotas for Puerto Rico and the full-duty countries. It is the belief of the Executive departments, however, that the increase in the Puerto Rican quota is justified by the need to help improve economic conditions in Puerto Rico. The increase in the quota of the full-duty countries, which is shared by Peru, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Haiti and other countries, will enable these countries to re-establish the position in this market which they had during the pre-war years 1937–1941 under the 1937 Act.[2] We have been under strong pressure from these countries ever

[1] No memorandum of the conversation between President Truman and Ambassador Machado on June 14 was found in the Department of State files.

[2] For text of the Sugar Act (Public Law 414), approved September 1, 1937, see 50 Stat. 903.

since the passage of the 1948 Act which was less favorable to them than the 1937 Act.

The Executive departments considered continuing the minimum guarantee to Cuba in the form contained in section 202(*d*) of the 1948 Act but were finally convinced that this would be strongly opposed by domestic sugar interests and would undoubtedly lead to efforts to modify the legislation after it is sent to Congress. Since the domestic areas, other than Puerto Rico, were receiving no increases in their fixed quotas there was some basis for their view that Cuba, as the principal residual claimant under the Sugar Act of 1948 and under the proposed legislation, should bear the entire burden of the increased quotas provided by the legislation for other areas.

Section 202(*e*) had its origin in failure of the Cuban Government to pay certain claims to United States citizens and in discrimination by the Cuban Government against United States industry and commerce. Its incorporation in the 1948 Act evoked such resentment in Cuba that the Cuban Government was virtually assured that it would not be used. Its omission from the present legislation should be well received in Cuba.

It is suggested that you may wish to hand Ambassador Machado the attached memorandum [3] which explains the reasons for the changes provided for in the proposed legislation and which, it is hoped, may lead the Cuban Government to give attention to some of the problems in our relations with Cuba which have been neglected by the Cuban Government.[4]

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

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[3] Not printed.

[4] In a memorandum of conversation with the Director of the Sugar Branch, Department of Agriculture (Myers), dated June 14, 1951, Mr. Cale stated in part that it had been reported that President Truman had not given the memorandum to Ambassador Machado because "the President preferred not to become involved in the details of the sugar legislation" during his conversation with the Cuban Ambassador. Mr. Cale stated further that he understood that when Ambassador Machado had handed the President a memorandum containing the Cuban Government's views on the proposed legislation, the President "had merely commented that it was obviously impossible to satisfy everyone in a situation involving conflicting interests . . . but that he would ask the Executive departments to study the memorandum." (811.235/5–951)

837.2351/6–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Nufer)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1951.

Subject: Cuban Reaction to Proposed Sugar Legislation

Participants: Ambassador Machado
Dr. Arturo Mañas,[1] Dr. Oscar Diaz Albertini,[2]
Sr. Miquol and Sr. Ramirez
Mr. Mann, ARA
Mr. Cale, MID
Amb. Nufer, MID

Ambassador Machado and representatives of the Cuban sugar industry called at noon today to give us their reaction to the proposed sugar legislation of which a copy of the latest draft bill had been handed them earlier today by Secretary of Agriculture Brannan.[3] The draft bill is the one containing the compromise formula for section 202(*d*) agreed upon in a meeting[4] between Mr. Larry Meyers of the Department of Agriculture and Messrs. Cale and Nufer on June 13.

The Cubans brought with them copies of yesterday's editions of the Habana newspapers *El Mundo* and *Diario de la Marina* which contained AP dispatches with a June 13 Washington dateline, summarizing the proposed sugar legislation fairly accurately. The Cubans expressed surprise that this information had become known to the press before it had been given to them. We were unable to explain how this information had leaked but assured the Cubans that it had not been obtained from anyone in the Department of State. The clippings from the two newspapers mentioned are attached.[5]

Ambassador Machado and Dr. Mañas (who acted as spokesmen for the Cuban group) launched into a strong criticism of the draft bill. Although they repeatedly expressed their displeasure over the increases contemplated at Cuba's expense in the quotas of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the full-duty countries, it was more or less apparent that they have come to accept these changes as inevitable. Their main attack was against the proposed wording of section 202(*d*). They maintained that any impairment of the minimum guarantee provision in the 1948 Act was wholly unacceptable to Cuba. They said that they considered the retention of that provision as vital to Cuba, not only because of the immediate effect the proposed change would have in

[1] President, Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute, and Secretary, Cuban Sugar Mill Owners Association.
[2] Financial Counselor, Cuban Embassy.
[3] Charles F. Brannan.
[4] A memorandum of this meeting, dated June 13, by Mr. Cale, is filed under decimal file number 811.235/5–951.
[5] Not printed.

Cuba economically and politically, but because it opened the door to further drains on Cuba's share of the U.S. sugar market when the proposed Act expires in 1956.

Mr. Mann and Mr. Cale went to great lengths to explain the realities of the situation to the Cubans and to point out that while the proposed legislation was somewhat less favorable to Cuba than the 1948 Act, it was a very substantial improvement over the 1937 Act. Mr. Cale gave the Cubans statistical data which he had prepared showing what Cuba's participation in the U.S. sugar market would be at given consumption levels under the 1948 Act and under the proposed legislation. He also gave them statistics showing how Cuba's percentage participation in the U.S. sugar market had increased since 1937 over most of the other supplying areas. It was also pointed out to the Cubans that the Department considered the draft bill which they received from the Secretary of Agriculture an equitable solution of a difficult problem; that it had agreed to go along with the draft bill; and that a bill on sugar will doubtless be introduced at this session of Congress [6] regardless of the Department's agreement, and possibly in that event in a less acceptable form to Cuba.

While the Cubans agreed that the proposed legislation was substantially more favorable to Cuba than the 1937 Act, they appeared utterly unreconciled to the compromise formula proposed for section 202(d). The adverse reaction in Cuba would, they claimed, be far-reaching when it became known that Cuba had not only been forced to give up some 240,000 tons of its quota to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the full-duty countries,[7] but had also suffered a substantial impairment of the 1948 minimum guarantee provision.

Ambassador Machado was especially acrimonious in his criticism of the proposed change and repeatedly said that he was unable to understand why the Department agreed to the proposed change after he had been assured by Mr. Cale and Mr. Nufer that it would fight for the maintenance of the minimum guarantee provision. He said that he failed to see how the Cuban Government could accept the proposed

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[6] On June 18, 1951, Senator Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) introduced Senate bill 1694, providing for the amendment and extension of the Sugar Act of 1948; its companion bill in the House of Representatives was numbered H.R. 4521. On September 1 Congress approved Public Law 140, entitled "An act to amend and extend the Sugar Act of 1948, and for other purposes", which was based largely on the so-called "Ellender bill"; for text of the act, see 65 Stat. 318.

[7] In a memorandum to the Secretary of State concerning the problem of determining the extent to which the Department of State could support the Department of Interior's recommendation for a large increase in Puerto Rico's sugar quota in view of the Department of State's obligation to the full-duty countries and Cuba, dated May 23, 1951, Ambassador Nufer had recommended in part the following: "That the Department make its support for any increase in Puerto Rico's quota of more than 125,000 tons contingent on a corresponding reduction in the quotas of domestic producers, since Cuba's share should not be reduced by more than 200,000 to 225,000 tons, and we must ask for an increase in the quota of full-duty countries." (398.235/3-2451)

legislation and he went so far as to say that if the bill were introduced in its present form he might be obliged to "stump the country" in order to present Cuba's side of the case, although he said that he would not like to do this. (It seems hardly likely that the Ambassador would carry out this threat which he doubtless used merely to try to emphasize his point.) As usual, Ambassador Machado said that the proposed legislation might have adverse effects on our rice market in Cuba, thereby intimating that Cuba might be forced to take retaliatory measures directed against the U.S. rice industry.

Although the meeting lasted for almost two hours, the Cubans showed no willingness to recede from their point of view and they repeatedly emphasized that nothing short of a minimum guarantee provision similar to that contained in the 1948 Act would be acceptable to Cuba. They clearly intimated that they felt that the Department had let them down and that it had not opposed strongly enough the domestic beet interests which were responsible for the compromise formula. Ambassador Machado said that he had reason to believe that if the Department had held out the 1948 minimum guarantee provision would have been retained.

In view of the attitude taken by the Cubans at today's meeting, it seems possible that they will fight the proposed legislation if introduced in its present form. Ambassador Machado said, in this connection, that he had not yet discussed the matter with anyone in Congress but intimated that he might have to do so.

Editorial Note

On June 20, 1951, the United States and Cuba signed at Habana a Point IV General Agreement, which entered into force on the same date. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 2532, from Habana, dated June 25, 1951, not printed (837.00–TA/6–2551). For text, see TIAS No. 2272, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 1231.

795B.5/6–2551

The Chargé in Cuba (Elbrick) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL HABANA, June 25, 1951.

No. 2535

Subject: Campaign To Register Cuban Volunteers for Service With United Nations Forces

The Embassy has for some time viewed with concern the failure of the Cuban Congress to act favorably on the Executive message trans-

mitted by President Prio requesting authorization to send Cuban troops outside of the country for service with the United Nations forces. The session of Congress to which the message was sent terminated in the last days of May with little indication that the issue would be brought up at any time in the near future. The Embassy, therefore, has considered ways and means of encouraging the Government to take action to implement its support in the United Nations of the decision to resist the Communist aggression in Korea.

It was decided that possibly the most effective means of encouraging Government action in the matter would be to assist Cuban patriotic organizations in carrying out a register of volunteers for service with the United Nations forces. This matter was followed up by the Embassy's Information Officer, Mr. R. C. Salvatierra,[1] who arranged with the Cuban Veterans of World War II and the *Comité Nacional de la Acera del Louvre* to sponsor their conduct of the campaign with the cooperation of the friendly Cuban press.

A memorandum[2] prepared by Mr. Salvatierra on the subject is enclosed.

It was decided that publicity for the campaign would be inaugurated June 22 and that the actual registration would be started in a downtown headquarters especially rented for the purpose on June 25, anniversary of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. The initial announcement coincided with General Ridgway's[3] appeal to the United Nations for more volunteers to fight Communist aggression in Korea. Announcement of the campaign appeared in a majority of Habana newspapers on June 22. The greatest publicity was given by *Prensa Libre* which announced the campaign in multi-colored streamer headlines at the top of page 1. These headlines were as follows: "Cuban Volunteers—to fight against the Communists—register opens in Habana on June 25."

June 29

Since writing the above, information has been received to the effect that the campaign has gone very well so far (June 28). It is reported that over 500 volunteers have already registered and the drive has received increasing publicity in the press, on the radio, and in the movies since its inception. The Minister of Defense, Ruben de Leon,[4] has sent a telegram to the organizations sponsoring the drive, congratulating them on their efforts, which would indicate that the Cuban Government is in complete accord with the drive's objective, namely, to force appropriate action in the Cuban legislature to provide the

[1] Richard C. Salvatierra.
[2] Dated June 20, not printed.
[3] Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, in Japan; U.S. Commander in Chief, Far East; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command in Korea.
[4] Rubén de León y García.

troops which the Cuban Government had previously offered to the United Nations.

In assisting the organizations in question in preparing the drive, the Embassy has, of course, been extremely careful to avoid any possible implication on its own part which might have been seized upon by political opposition leaders to discredit the United States. The Embassy took a calculated risk in this case, and believes that the results already achieved have justified that risk. The fact that the Cuban Government in the person of the Minister of Defense is now openly supporting the drive should serve further to divert any possible suspicion of Embassy involvement in this matter.[5]

Press clippings are being assembled and will be submitted in a later despatch.[6]

C. BURKE ELBRICK

[5] Airgram 25, to Habana, dated July 17, 1951, reads in part: "Dept commends Embassy upon its imagination, initiative, and resourcefulness in suggesting and stimulating campaign . . . for registration of Cuban volunteers for service with United Nations Forces, with practical objective of encouraging Cuban Government to implement its support in United Nations of decision to resist aggression in Korea by following through with its proposal to offer battalion of troops to Unified Command." (795B.5/6–2551)

[6] Not printed.

837.2351/6–2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Nufer)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1951.

Subject: Note from Cuban Government on Proposed Modification of the 1948 Sugar Act

Participants: Ambassador Luis Machado of Cuba
Ambassador Nufer—MID

The Cuban Ambassador, Dr. Luis Machado, called yesterday at his request to hand me a note with regard to the proposed modification of the 1948 Sugar Act. A copy of the Cuban note is attached.[1]

The purpose of the note is to request the United States Government to make every possible effort to protect Cuba's position in the United States sugar market by preventing, if possible, any modification of section 202(*d*) of the present Act detrimental to Cuba's interests and any decrease in Cuba's present share in our market.

The note expresses concern over the possibility that Cuba may receive less favorable treatment under the proposed legislation than under the 1948 Act, and calls attention to the exchange of notes of December 23, 1941 annexed to the supplementary trade agreement be-

[1] Not printed.

tween Cuba and the United States.[2] Cuba also maintains that the pertinent provisions of the GATT agreement signed at Geneva on October 30, 1947, justify the maintenance by the United States of the treatment accorded Cuba as a supplier of sugar to this market under the 1948 Sugar Act.

In discussing the proposed sugar legislation, Ambassador Machado admitted rather reluctantly that it would not have too serious an impact on Cuba's economy. He said, however, that politically the effects of the proposed legislation would be extremely bad and that the opposition was already endeavoring to capitalize on the fact that Cuba would be called upon to give up some 240,000 tons of its U.S. sugar quota to Puerto Rico and the full-duty countries. He added that the Government was already under severe attack in the opposition press and that the sugar bill would probably become a leading issue in the Presidential campaign. His own position, he said, had become very difficult and he felt that he might find it necessary to resign after the bill is enacted. His and his Government's position might, Ambassador Machado said, be improved if, once the bill is passed, an exchange of notes between the two Governments could be arranged containing some reference to our recognition of the importance of sugar to Cuba's economy and of the fact that in connection with the new legislation the Executive Branch of the Government had taken fully into account the exchange of notes of December 23, 1941.

The Ambassador said that fortunately the provisions of the Sugar Act were so involved that the average Cuban citizen was unable to grasp their full import. An exchange of notes such as he suggested would therefore have a very reassuring effect on the Cuban people.

I told the Ambassador that offhand it seemed doubtful to me whether an exchange of notes such as he had in mind could take place. I said that I was certain that we would not be able to agree to an exchange of notes which could in any way be construed as a commitment on our part similar to the exchange of notes of December 23, 1941. I suggested to Ambassador Machado, however, that he might wish to give the Department an informal and unofficial memorandum setting forth his views on the subject which we would consider carefully with a view toward determining on what basis, if any, an exchange of notes such as he had in mind might be possible.

In the course of the conversation Ambassador Machado expressed concern over reports that Ambassador Thomen [3] of the Dominican Re-

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[2] Reference is to the Second Supplementary Trade Agreement and exchange of notes between the United States and Cuba signed at Habana, December 23, 1941, and entered into force, January 5, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 229, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1449. For documentation on the negotiations leading to the signature of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. VII, pp. 196 ff.

[3] Luis Francisco Thomen.

public intended to appear before Congress in connection with the proposed legislation. He expressed the hope that these reports were not true because if Ambassador Thomen appeared before Congress in connection with the bill he would be forced to do likewise. So far he said he had not even discussed this legislation informally with his friends on the Hill and taken special pains to take no action which might lend itself to criticism or misinterpretation. Neither had the Embassy, he said, given out any press statements on the subject although he did intend to give the press a short prepared statement upon leaving my office.

837.2317/7–1151

The Chargé in Cuba (Elbrick) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL HABANA, July 11, 1951.

No. 50

Subject: Presentation of Memorandum to Cuban Ministry of State Regarding Rice Negotiations

During the past two weeks the Embassy has been increasingly concerned regarding the apparent lack of progress being made by the special Cuban commission which was established by the Council of Ministers to draw up a final position in connection with the rice negotiations between the two countries.[1] In an effort to clarify the U.S. position, the Embassy proposed the text of a possible memorandum in its telegram No. 3 of July 2 [2] to the Department. The Department subsequently revised the text of the memorandum in telegram No. 15 of July 3.[2]

While several informal inquiries have been made recently as to what progress was being realized, it has become increasingly clear to the Embassy that the urgency with which the Cubans at one time considered these negotiations has largely disappeared. It is a matter of debate as to whether or not this attitude reflects a feeling among certain local Government officials that it would be poor tactics to proceed with these rice negotiations until the Cuban position vis-à-vis the new sugar legislation has been clarified. The obvious fact is that these negotiations have been given little or no attention for some time, and

[1] A series of discussions between Cuban and United States representatives regarding the interpretation of the rice quota provision in the GATT took place in Habana during the spring and summer of 1951, but they lapsed without any agreement being reached. Copies of the minutes of meetings held on May 29, 31, and June 4, are filed under Department of State decimal file number 837.2317/10–3151.

[2] Not printed.

with the idea of again concentrating attention upon their importance and in an effort to conclude the negotiations at an early date, if this is possible, the Embassy decided upon the presentation of a memorandum embracing the text outlined in Deptel 15 of July 3. A copy of the memorandum as presented is attached to this report.

Upon the presentation of the memorandum there was very brief discussion. Although it was hurriedly read by several of the Cuban officials, it was suggested that the memorandum and its content might be subject of a further meeting as soon as it has been translated into Spanish and has been studied by the appropriate officials. This position was agreed to by the Embassy representatives but it was again emphasized that the time for these negotiations actually has now exceeded the limit of July 1 set under the terms of the Torquay resolution and that while a reasonable extension of this period would probably be tolerated by the contracting parties, it was extremely important in the view of the United States Government that every effort be made to conclude these negotiations at as early a date as possible. The Cuban representatives concurred and pointed out that shortly after July 1 the Cuban Government had telegraphed the GATT Secretariat at Geneva stating that the rice negotiations had not been concluded and that they were being continued. This was the first notification that the Embassy had received that the Cuban Government had taken this action.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:
DuWayne G. Clark
Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

During the various conversations which have been held so far between the Cuban and the United States delegations at Habana, concerning the problems arising out of the operation of the GATT rice concessions made by Cuba to the United States at Geneva in 1947, as outlined in the memorandum dated March 15, 1951,[3] from the U.S. delegation at Torquay to the Cuban delegation at Torquay, the Cuban representatives have been informed that the American Government would be willing to agree to give Cuba a free hand as regards the duty to be charged on over-quota rice imported into Cuba in order that Cuba may achieve its objectives, provided Cuba is willing to guarantee to the United States for each year after 1951–52 a minimum import quota of 5.5 million quintals of rice. In offering Cuba a free hand to

[3] Not printed.

increase the over-quota rice duty there was never any intention that the U.S. delegation would negotiate with the Cuban delegation as to the determination of the particular level to which the over-quota duty might be raised. On the contrary, it was intended that the Cuban Government would be free to set that duty at the rate which might be necessary in any particular year to accomplish the objectives expressed by the Cuban delegation.

In making this offer to agree to the unbinding of the over-quota rate in return for a guarantee to the United States of a minimum import quota, it was understood that the Cuban delegation and the U.S. delegation were in agreement that the understanding at Geneva was that the Cuban Government intended to apply a margin of preference, both within the quota and on over-quota imports, equal to the pre-Geneva margin of preference and that this is still the Cuban intention.

The U.S. delegation is taking the liberty of submitting this memorandum to the Cuban delegation in the hope that it may clarify the position of the U.S. Government as regards the particular point under discussion. It is thought that this clarification may be of help inasmuch as the question of whether or not the over-quota duty rate on rice will be increased is understood by the U.S. delegation to be under discussion in the special Cuban commission established to arrive at a policy position prior to the resumption of the rice negotiations between the two countries.

As an alternative to the position described in the preceding paragraphs, and assuming that there is to be no modification in the GATT rates on rice imports into Cuba, the Government of the United States would be agreeable to the shifting of the quota year to April 1 and to release Cuba from any claim of violation of the terms of the 1947 GATT rice concessions provided Cuba undertakes the declaration of a realistic import quota and establishes a formula which will assure for the future a continuation of such quota. Under this alternative, while the United States would not press for a change in the original minimum import quota figure, it would naturally expect that the formula would embrace the announcement of one or several supplementary quotas which would bring the total of the quota to a realistic aggregate.

HABANA, July 11, 1951.

394.31/7–1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mrs. Amelia H. Hood of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1951.

Subject: Cuban-United States Rice Discussions

Participants: Dr. Zaglits [1]—Agriculture
Mr. Skartvedt [2]—Commerce
Mr. Corse,[3] CP—State
Mr. Phelps,[4] CP—State
Mrs. Hood, MID—State

A meeting was held in the Department of State, at which the persons listed above were present, to determine what reply should be made to telegram no. 33 of July 16, 1951 [5] from our Embassy at Habana. The telegram stated that present indications were that the discussions with regard to rice would be delayed by the Cubans until the Cuban position in the United States sugar legislation could be determined. The Embassy therefore suggested that, if by July 20 the Cubans had not reached a decision with regard to their position in the rice matter and resumed discussions, they be told that the negotiations were terminated and that the United States intended to bring before the Contracting Parties at the Sixth Session of GATT in September the matter of the Cuban contravention of the provisions of the rice note in the Cuban Schedule of GATT.

Dr. Zaglits said that in the opinion of Agriculture, now was not an opportune time to press for resumption of the negotiations. He said that some of the Cuban sugar people, including Dr. Mañas, had seen Senator Ellender some time ago. Senator Ellender told them that rice and sugar had to be kept separate, but that if Cuba did not live up to her commitments on rice, she might get a sugar Act much less favorable to Cuba than the proposed legislation. Dr. Zaglits said Agriculture felt it should be made plain to the Cubans that we did not intend to pay Cuba for living up to concessions granted us at Geneva.

Dr. Zaglits said further that the rice matter could be settled without requiring a re-write of the rice note in the Cuban Schedule of GATT. He felt that one way to settle the matter would be for the Cuban Government (1) to accept in writing one interpretation of the note, namely that it provides for a realistic quota and (2) to agree to an understanding that Cuba would retain the margin of preference on both quota and over-quota rice at the level in effect at the time of the

[1] Oscar Zaglits, Head of the Foreign Agricultural Trade and Policies Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations.
[2] Enoch Skartvedt, Office of International Trade.
[3] Carl D. Corse, Chief, Commercial Policy Staff.
[4] Vernon L. Phelps, Assistant Chief, Commercial Policy Staff.
[5] Not printed (400.379/7–1651).

Geneva negotiations. If this clarification and understanding were obtained, we would not complain about the unilateral change by Cuba from January to July for the announcement of the preliminary quota. However, if possible we should get the Cubans to change the announcement of the preliminary quota from July 1 to April 1. Dr. Zaglits continued that he could appreciate the difficulties which Cuba would have in announcing a quota on January 1 since that was about the time the Cuban rice begins to be marketed. In the case of July 1, there would also be difficulty because if a large initial quota were announced, the quota would not be filled by the time the Cuban crop was ready for the market. Therefore, April 1 would be the best date. It would enable the United States rice to be moved off the Cuban market by the time the Cuban rice is ready.

Dr. Zaglits said he considered this alternative of no change in the rice note, together with the clarification and understanding, would be preferable to a change in the note which would involve the spelling out of an increased quota and an unbinding of the over-quota rates such as had been proposed. He said he understood that Dr. Guerra and the Cuban Ministry of Finance were in favor of this alternative plan since the latter was afraid that increasing the over-quota rates would make rice much more expensive for the Cuban consumer.

Mr. Corse agreed that we do not want to "pressure" the Cubans to finish the rice negotiations and said he felt we should be ready to accept either (1) the alternative plan outlined by Dr. Zaglits or (2) what has already been proposed, that is, a new note in the Cuban Schedule which would set a quota of 5,500,000 quintals with the over-quota rates unbound, even if the latter plan meant that discussions went beyond the deadline for the completion of the Article XXVIII negotiations. He suggested that Mrs. Hood consult Mr. Hollis[6] (L/E) as to what the final deadline actually is. If there was not time to complete the discussions as Article XXVIII negotiations, then some other way could be found for getting any necessary approval of the Contracting Parties, for example as in the "potato case". All present agreed with Mr. Corse's suggestion that either alternative would be acceptable.

Mrs. Hood remarked that she had noticed in a cable[7] that went out to the Embassy that the 5,500,000 quintal figure was referred to as a United States quota. She asked whether that meant that it would be an allocated quota for the United States or was it really meant to be a global quota in which any country could share. Dr. Zaglits replied that it was intended as a global quota.

It was agreed by all present that the matter of the Cuban contravention of the terms of the rice note should not be brought before

[6] Walter Hollis, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs.
[7] Reference uncertain.

the Contracting Parties because while there had been contravention in the past, there might not be during this quota year since Cuba had already announced for 1951–52 a combined basic and preliminary supplementary quota of 4,500,000 quintals and had promised to announce another supplementary quota in November or December.[8]

It was also agreed (1) that a telegram [9] should be sent asking the Embassy not to suggest to the Cubans any deadline for the termination of the rice negotiations and giving the Embassy the reason why the matter should not be brought before the Contracting Parties at this time; and (2) that an airgram or instruction [10] should be sent the Embassy outlining the present thinking on the rice situation as expressed in the meeting.[11]

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[8] No additional supplementary rice quota was announced by the Cuban Government in 1951.

[9] Telegram 58, to Habana, July 19, 1951 (400.379/7–1651).

[10] Sent as Instruction No. 20, to the Embassy in Habana, August 10, 1951 (400.379/7–1651).

[11] There is no indication in the Department of State files that the suspended rice negotiations between the United States and Cuba were resumed during the remaining months of 1951.

795B.5/8–1451

The Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs in Cuba (Clark) to Mr. Harvey R. Wellman of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL HABANA, August 14, 1951.

DEAR HARVEY: Your letter of August 9th [1] regarding Ambassador Guell's [2] suggestion that the Cuban Government might make a small air contingent available to the Korean effort in lieu of a battalion of ground troops, reached me yesterday. I did not have an opportunity to explore it until this morning, as yesterday was a local holiday, informal variety in commemoration, I believe, of the overthrow of the Machado [3] regime. In any event I got Guell this morning and while the result of the conversation was not particularly satisfactory I want to pass along to you the reflection of our talk for what that may be worth.

I explained to Guell that I was afraid that there was considerable disappointment that the Cuban Government seemed to feel that it is inexpedient to make further plans for sending a battalion of ground troops to Korea. In reply, Guell repeated again the decision which apparently was reached in the Council of Ministers that for political reasons stemming principally from next year's elections it had been decided that it would not be politic to send Cuban troops to Korea.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Gonzalo Güell, Special Consultant, Cuban Ministry of State.

[3] Gerardo Machado, President of Cuba, 1925–1933.

Unfortunately, the campaign for volunteers for such service seems to have been a source of considerable embarrassment to the Cuban Army, the implication being that the Army is unable to perform its responsibilities and that the volunteer campaign is a natural outgrowth of a basic desire of some Cubans to participate in the Korea effort. In any event I got the very definite impression that ground troops from Cuba for Korea, volunteer or from Army Forces, is now and will be during the coming year pretty much out of the question.

We then discussed the suggestion of the contribution of a few fighter or pursuit planes by Cuba and I think that Guell was rather amazed when he realized that a squadron would consist of no less than 9 planes with a supporting flying and ground personnel of something like 200 men. This is far beyond what they had been thinking of and Guell confessed that the maximum contemplated was about 3 pursuit planes and possibly 30 or 40 men who could be drawn, not from the Army but, from other sources. He was, of course, thinking in terms of Cuba supplying funds for the purpose of aircraft in the United States and when I pointed out that the problem is not one of funds but of material and equipment which should be drawn from Cuban sources, he seemed completely stymied.

I advanced to Ambassador Guell as a purely potential suggestion which he might care to explore with the Ministry, the Pentagon suggestion [4] that Cuba might be able to send to Korea 3 or 4 of the C–47 Douglas planes which are now in the possession of the Cuban Army Air Force. I mentioned that such a transport unit would constitute a token contribution by Cuba to the Korean effort, that the equipment would draw from Cuban supplies and that the personnel required to fly and maintain these transport planes would probably be considerably reduced as compared with that for the pursuit units.

Guell seemed to be relieved and pleased with the idea of the contribution of the transport planes and he told me he would discuss it immediately with the Foreign Minister. I suspect that the Minister will then feel out the Cuban Aviation people who may not be too enthusiastic about giving up 3 or 4 of their C–47's. In any event Guell promised to let me know of any developments as soon as he could. If and when there are any I will certainly pass the word along to you without delay.

Sincerely, WAYNE

[4] At this point the margin of the source text bears an asterisk, and after the signature appears the following handwritten notation, evidently by Mr. Clark: "I told Guell this is my idea. I did not mention its having originated in the Pentagon."

398.2351/7–2551

Memorandum by Mr. Harvey R. Wellman of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1951.

Subject: Request of Cuba for exchange of notes on sugar legislation.

The Cuban Foreign Office has requested an exchange of notes in which the United States would agree to make every appropriate and possible effort to safeguard the position of Cuba in the United States market at least under the same conditions as the Sugar Act of 1948 as it is to be amended, provides. Such an exchange of notes is requested avowedly for internal political reasons in order to neutralize if possible the criticism the Cuban Government has suffered as a result of the sacrifices required of Cuba in the new sugar legislation.

Recommendations:

It is recommended

(1) that no exchange of notes embodying such a commitment as is requested be entered into for the reasons given in Mr. Cale's memo of August 2, 1951, which is attached;[2]

(2) that after the bill amending and extending the Sugar Act of 1948 shall have become law, we deliver to the Cubans a note in response to the Cuban memorandum and note protesting certain provisions of the legislation and stating Cuba's case. In this note we would do the following:

(*a*) explain the reasons for our recommending adoption of the amendments to the 1948 Act;

(*b*) emphasize those provisions of the new legislation favorable to Cuba, and

(*c*) assure Cuba that the Department had fully considered Cuba's views and had taken full account of the position of Cuba as our principal foreign supplier of sugar, our reliance upon Cuban sugar especially in emergencies, and the relation of a high level of United States imports of Cuban sugar to the maintenance of reciprocally beneficial economic relations which exist between the United States and Cuba.

(3) that such a note contain no commitments with respect to the future but only explanations and assurances regarding the amendments to the Sugar Act of 1948.

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[1] Addressed also to Mr. Mann, Ambassador Nufer, and the Officer in Charge of Caribbean Affairs, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

[2] In his memorandum, addressed to Mr. Wellman and not printed, Mr. Cale had stated that he believed it was unwise to accede to the Cuban request for an exchange of notes because, *inter alia*, the Executive branch could not properly make such a commitment, Cuba was not sustaining any real injury, and it might lead to future misunderstanding (398.2351/7–2551).

(4) that we consider the advisability of giving even the type of assurances outlined in 2 above, if the Cuban Government does not take steps promptly to satisfy certain obligations to the United States, principally the settlement of the private claims [3] and the removal of discriminatory taxes. If when the legislation shall have become law, Cuba has not taken satisfactory action with respect to these outstanding obligations, we will then have to decide whether it is desirable for other reasons to deliver a note as recommended in 2 above or to send a formal acknowledgement only of the Cuban memorandum and note together with a copy of the new legislation.

In the meantime we contemplate formally requesting the Cuban Government for an indication of when it will make the promised payment on the private claims and of the amount of the payment. We shall also continue to press for elimination of discriminatory taxes which are in contravention of GATT.

If you concur in this position, please initial this memorandum as evidence of your approval.[4]

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[3] In 1951 these claims totaled an estimated $9,136,475.37, of which $1,060,238.76 had been adjudicated by the Cuban courts.

[4] The source text bears the initials of each of the recipients, except Mr. Miller. In late August 1951, the United States agreed to discuss the Cuban Government's request for an exchange of notes regarding Cuba's position in the United States sugar market vis-à-vis the new sugar legislation. Draft versions of a United States note were discussed by the two governments during the remaining months of 1951 and early 1952. On February 1, 1952, the text of a final note was prepared by the Department of State for presentation to the Cuban Government, but by that time Cuban officials lost interest in the matter, in part because they could not obtain a note worded strongly enough, and in part because hostilities in Korea had increased the world-wide demand for sugar. Consequently, no exchange of notes took place. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal files 398.235, 398.2351, 811.235, 837.235, and 837.2351.

737.13/9–751

Memorandum from Mr. Harvey R. Wellman of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1951.

Subject: Projected visit of Minister of State Gans [2] to Department

The new Cuban Minister of State, Oscar Gans, has informed our Chargé in Habana that he expects to return from the San Francisco

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[1] Addressed also to Mr. Mann and Mr. Bennett; the source text bears the initials of each of the recipients.

[2] Oscar Gans y Martínez assumed office as Cuban Minister of State on August 30, 1951; on October 1, he was appointed Prime Minister of Cuba.

Conference [3] via Washington in order to have three or four days in Washington to consult Department officials.[4] The Embassy speculates reasonably enough that the visit probably concerns the proposed exchange of notes on the new sugar legislation and states that this matter is becoming increasingly important to the Cuban Government.

Recommendation

It is recommended that after the New Foreign Minister has had ample opportunity to present the views of his Government and to consider what the United States Government is prepared to offer in the way of a note, the Department officers receiving him then inform the Foreign Minister that they would like to bring to his attention several situations which are unsatisfactory and the rectification of which is of great interest and importance to the United States Government. It is recommended that he be asked what measures the Cuban Government will commit itself to take to remedy the following situations:

1. *Uncollected American private claims*

Foreign Minister Suarez Fernandez [5] gave informal assurances that the adjudicated claims would be paid.[6] Our position is that the Cuban Government should make a substantial payment on these long-standing obligations and should arrange for the orderly liquidation of all the claims, including those adjudicated by Cuban courts, those acknowledged by agencies of the Cuban Government and presumably not subject to question, and all other legitimate claims not evidenced by court decision or administrative acknowledgement.

2. *Discriminatory taxation of American imports*

Cuba has been taxing, contrary to Article III of GATT, some imports at a higher rate than the same domestic products. American exporters and their Congressmen have been complaining most about the discriminatory gross sales tax on imported lumber. Minister Suarez Fernandez promised to have this discrimination removed, but the Ministry of Finance has informed the Embassy that it is no longer interested in this matter now that Suarez Fernandez has resigned.

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[3] Reference is to the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, held in San Francisco, September 4–8, 1951. For documentation on the conference, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

[4] Minister Gans visited the Department of State on September 11, accompanied by Ambassador Machado. In a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Miller, Minister Gans, and Ambassador Machado, dated September 11, 1951, Mr. Nufer stated that the participants discussed the exchange of notes concerning sugar recently proposed by the Cuban Government and the question of claims held by United States nationals against the Cuban Government, and that in reference to the latter Minister Gans made the statement that his government had set aside a sum of money which it intended to use to liquidate a portion of the claims (237.1141/9–1151).

[5] In despatch 2407, from Habana, June 5, 1951, Chargé Elbrick had reported that Minister Suarez Fernandez had stated that he would first try to obtain his government's consent to the payment of the adjudicated claims, and then attempt to find a way to pay the remainder of the claims (611.37/6–551).

[6] The Cuban Government made no payments on outstanding claims owed to United States citizens during 1951.

3. *Foreign Accountants*

The Cuban Government has not replied to our memorandum of March 8, 1951 [7] setting forth a basis for settlement satisfactory to the American accountants involved. We supplied the Ministry of State in July at its request, information showing that Cubans are permitted to practice accounting in most American states and in all the important financial areas, thus giving the Cuban Government a basis in international reciprocity to rectify this situation. Criminal prosecutions for illegal practice are still pending against representatves in Cuba of American accounting firms.

It would seem plausible that the Cubans, having been disabused of their belief that they have a fixed position for all time in the United States sugar market, would clean up these situations as soon as possible and remove this source of ill will. It is more likely, however, now that the new sugar legislation is approved, that when they are able to obtain from us the most satisfactory note from their point of view that we are willing to give, they will give little attention to these situations on the ground that the question of sugar has been resolved until 1956. This is an opportunistic position but one characteristic of the Cuban Government in recent years.

Therefore if, as the Embassy states, the obtaining of a note regarding sugar legislation is becoming increasingly important to the Cuban Government, for internal political reasons, it behooves us to make use of every bit of leverage which the immediate situation provides.

[7] Not printed.

795B.5/11–2951

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 29, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. FOSTER: As you are aware, the Republic of Cuba desires to make a contribution to the effort of the United Nations in Korea, and it has advanced on an informal basis an offer of three C–47 transport aircraft with the condition that Cuba be given an opportunity at an early date to purchase aircraft which would replace the three planes contributed for Korean service.

Because the Department of Defense believes that the unavailability of C–47 aircraft for replacement purposes would make infeasible the consideration of this informal Cuban offer, it has advanced the suggestion that the Cuban Government might wish to consider making an offer of three C–46 aircraft with Cuban crews. These aircraft, instead

[1] Drafted by Mr. Cedric C. Phillip of the Office of Middle American Affairs; cleared with the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and the Office of Regional American Affairs.

of being sent to Cuba to replace Cuban C–47's, would be sent to Korea for integration with the United States Air Force. I am informed that the Department of Defense recently asked for the views of General Ridgway's headquarters on a Cuban offer on this basis and that it received a reply which recommended that such an offer be rejected, unless overriding political considerations were perceived, because of the minor scale of such a contribution and because of difficulties in integration.

It is my considered opinion that there are overriding political considerations that clearly indicate that it would be in the best interests of both the United States and the United Nations that Cuba make an offer that could be accepted, and that would enable Cuba to join with the other free nations of the world in the struggle now being waged in Korea against communist aggression. A Cuban contribution, even though limited in scope, would serve to broaden the United Nations character of the collective effort. With regard to Cuba itself, acceptance of the offer outlined herein could serve to encourage that country to make a further contribution at a later date, if possible, in the form of troops. Rejection of the offer, on the other hand, might have the effect of discouraging all further Cuban efforts to contribute to the United Nations effort in Korea and might impair the spirit of cooperation with the United States which Cuba has manifested in the United Nations.

A Cuban offer for which the Department of State would recommend favorable consideration would be an offer of three C–46 transport aircraft for integration with the United States Air Force units in Korea, and of Cuban crews to operate these planes. The crews would have appropriate transport experience, and would be capable of integration with the United States Air Force with a minimum of further training and orientation by virtue of their experience, orientation in the United States, and the knowledge of at least two members of each plane crew of the English language.

If the Department of Defense concurs that an offer from the Cuban Government of three C–46 aircraft and crews might be assured favorable consideration, I believe that the appropriate procedure which might then be followed would be for the American Embassy at Habana to inquire of the Cuban Government whether it would be prepared to modify its initial informal offer in the manner indicated above. Upon receipt of a favorable reply, negotiations to complete the offer and acceptance could be initiated. At such time, it would, in my opinion, be desirable to remind the Cuban Government of its earlier offer of ground troops, that the primary need in Korea continues to be for ground troops, and that an offer of transport aircraft would not be considered a substitute.

Since it would be desirable that our two Departments reach agreement on the acceptability of a Cuban offer along the lines suggested above before a reply is made to the Cuban Government regarding its initial informal offer, I would appreciate an expression of the views of the Department of Defense on this matter. There have been numerous indications from the Cuban Government that it desires to be informed promptly of United States reaction to its initial informal offer. I hope, therefore, that I may have the benefit of the views of your Department at an early date.[2]

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.
Assistant Secretary

[2] In a memorandum of conversation between Lt. Col. Roderic O'Connor of the Department of Defense and Mr. Philipp, dated December 13, 1951, Lt. Col. O'Connor is reported to have stated that he expected a letter from Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett recommending affirmative action on Cuba's offer to reach the Department of State "on December 21 or immediately after the Christmas vacation." (795B.5/12–1351) No such letter was found, however, in the Department of State files.

737.34/12–451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Cuba (Beaulac)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL HABANA, December 4, 1951.

Participants: President Prío
The Ambassador

I told the President that the State Department was getting a lot of inquiries from people at home who were worried about the provision, in a Senate-approved bill, for setting up a government buying and selling agency in Cuba. I asked him whether the Government supported the provision.

The President said that he would like an agency of that kind to use in defense of the people's interests. What he is particularly interested in is an agency which could be used to keep down the price of meat. Cattle growers withhold meat from the public during certain seasons (I think he meant during the dry seasons). He would like some device to force meat into the markets in order to keep prices down. This will be a problem just prior to next year's elections.

[1] Enclosed with despatch 914, from Habana, December 4, 1951. Willard L. Beaulac was appointed Ambassador to Cuba on June 20, 1951; he arrived in Habana and assumed charge of the Embassy on September 6; and presented his credentials on September 20. Ambassador Beaulac succeeded Ambassador Robert Butler, whose mission terminated on February 10, 1951.

His Government has no intention of abusing the power it would have. It would not interfere with ordinary trade, either retail trade or importing and exporting.

The interests have distorted the nature of the bill and the dangers contained in it. They have said that while President Prío might not abuse the power the bill would give him, succeeding presidents might do so. He is willing to answer this argument by limiting the effectiveness of the provision to one year or two years. (I take it he is particularly interested in having it in effect during the electoral period.)

The President said that he did not insist on the provision and he was prepared to consent to its being taken out of the bill. However, he did not want to oppose the provision publicly because he wanted to reserve the right, during the electoral period, when meat prices go up, of saying, "I told you so. I tried to get congressional authority to keep prices down, but I was unable to."

I told the President that I would speak to him with the same frankness that he had spoken to me. I said that, as a friend of Cuba, I was seriously concerned over the implications of the bill. I said that one of the great advantages that Cuba had over most other countries was the relative freedom to trade which Cubans enjoyed. You could still take a dollar into a bank in Habana and get a peso for it, and take a peso into a bank and get a dollar for it. That freedom, of course, was subject to abuse and was being abused. But the answer was not, in my opinion, government intervention or the setting up of government corporations.

I had just come from Colombia. President Gómez, with all his defects, had been doing a yeoman job in getting rid of the numerous and complicated government controls over Colombia's economy, which had been one of the principal causes of the recent failure in Colombia's democracy. It was disappointing to see that Cuba, with its precious freedoms still intact, was thinking in terms of limiting those freedoms.

The President said that he did not intend to do this; that his Government was on the side of liberalism in economic as well as political matters.

I told the President that, as he had suggested, I had read carefully his speech before the Auténtico Congress in which he had recommended an extension of economic activity in Cuba to permit employment of the chronic unemployed. I said that I assumed that there was no intention of compelling companies to take on more workers than they needed but that the idea was to provide work for additional persons by increasing production. The President confirmed that this was the case.

The President said that, as an indication of his desire that private capital intensify its work in Cuba, he was preparing to recommend

legislation which would provide lower taxes on income that was reinvested in Cuba. This he thought would be good for capital and good for Cuba.

I said that this was a most interesting idea. I said that it appeared to run counter to one of the recent acts of the Congress which declared undistributed reserves to be subject to a special tax. I said that I had been informed that the effect of this action of the Congress had been to require certain companies to sell a part of their properties in order to pay the tax. Several sugar mills had been sold or were being sold as a result of the tax, I had been informed. The reason sales were necessary was that the undistributed surplus, in the cases referred to, was not in the form of cash or liquid assets but had been reinvested in lands, buildings, irrigation, etc.—in other words, in just the sort of thing the President wanted to encourage.

The President said that there was a lot of deception in connection with the matter that I had referred to. American stockholders or potential stockholders in Cuban corporations had become disillusioned as far as the possibility of receiving dividends was concerned. The corporation device had been greatly weakened in Cuba, and this important instrument was not as valuable or as useful to Cuba's economy as it used to be. The President said that investment of the kind I mentioned was not affected by the Congress' action. I said that that appeared to be just the point, that it was affected.

The President said that tax evasion was a chronic and accepted thing in Cuba. Nobody ever went to jail for not paying taxes. All the wealthy families have their wealth tied up in non-taxable corporations. They were practically tax-free. All companies, particularly the Cuban companies, resorted to all sorts of devices to conceal profits and to control taxes.

Editorial Note

By an exchange of notes dated December 10 and 18, at Habana, the United States and Cuba concluded an agreement providing for the control of electromagnetic radiations in the event of an attack by a third party upon either of the two countries, which entered into force on the latter date. The notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 1016, from Habana, dated December 21, 1951, not printed (710.5/12–2151). For text, see TIAS No. 2459, or 3 UST (pt. 2) 2860.

737.5–MSP/12–2751

The Ambassador in Cuba (Beaulac) to the Department of State

SECRET HABANA, December 27, 1951.

No. 1037

Subject: Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement

I have the honor to enclose a copy of the *aide-mémoire* [1] that I left with the Minister of State [2] this morning when I asked him whether the Cuban Government wished to enter into diplomatic-military conversations aimed at reaching a bilateral military assistance agreement under the terms of the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951,[3] Section 401, as well as a separate military plan relative to the preparation of a unit or units of the Cuban Air Force for hemisphere defense purposes, and relative to the provision of grant aid by the Government of the United States in order to assist in such preparation.

As the Department has already been informed, the Minister of State said that he would take the matter up with the President but that he could anticipate a favorable response. He said that both he and the President held the view that Cuba should prepare itself to fight anywhere, within the hemisphere and outside the hemisphere, since it was clear that Cuba could not defend itself on its own doorstep.

The Minister said that he would take steps to see that two committees were formed, a civilian committee with military advisors to work on the military assistance agreement, and a military committee to work on the military plan.[4]

WILLARD L. BEAULAC

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Aureliano Sánchez Arango; he was appointed to the office on October 1, 1951.

[3] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373.

[4] In telegram 477, from Habana, January 7, 1952, not printed, Ambassador Beaulac informed the Secretary of State that the Cuban Government agreed to initiate diplomatic-military discussions on whatever date the United States desired (737.5–MSP/1–751). The discussions began on January 30, 1952.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC[1]

711.56339/4–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Office of Middle American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Agreement With the Dominican Republic on Long Range Proving Ground for Guided Missiles[2]

Participants: His Excellency Virgilio Diaz Ordonez, Dominican Foreign Minister
His Excellency Sr. Dr. Luis Francisco Thomen, Dominican Ambassador
His Excellency Julio Ortega Frier, Ambassador on Special Mission (Dom.Rep.)
Ambassador Albert Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs
Mr. Charles C. Hauch, Office of Middle American Affairs
Mr. Gerald Russell, Office of Regional American Affairs
Colonel Carl Swyter, Guided Missiles Branch, Department of the Air Force
Lt. Col. R. H. Clinkscales, Military Air Rights Section, U.S.A.F.

This meeting was arranged as a result of the initiative taken by the Dominican Foreign Minister in stating that if we had any particular

[1] For previous information concerning United States relations with the Dominican Republic, see editorial note printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 854.

[2] In telegram 111, from Ciudad Trujillo, November 11, 1950, not printed, the First Secretary of the Embassy (Belton) had informed the Secretary of State that the Dominican Government agreed to discuss with representatives of the Department of State and the United States Air Force the acquisition of sites in the Dominican Republic in connection with the operation of a Long Range Proving Ground (LRPG) for guided missiles (711.56341B/11–1150); a draft of a proposed agreement was sent to the Embassy for presentation to the Dominican Government under cover of instruction 67, February 9, 1951, not printed (711.56341B/12–2950).

comments on the Dominican counter draft [3] of the Long Range Proving Ground Agreement, submitted to our Embassy by the Dominican Foreign Office, he was at our disposal to hear our views while he was in Washington. At the outset of the meeting, an informal written statement outlining in general terms our preliminary thinking on the Dominican counter draft was given the Dominican representatives. A copy of this statement is attached.[4] This statement indicates general concurrence with the form and approach proposed by the Dominican Government for the Agreement, but contains certain broad suggestions regarding desired changes in some of the Agreement's Articles. The ensuing discussion was carried on in a spirit of friendly cooperation, with the Foreign Minister stating that his Government was happy to cooperate with us in this project. At one point Ambassador Ortega Frier stated that when the request for Dominican cooperation was received, his Government was "tickled to death" at the opportunity thus afforded to participate in a joint defense project.

After looking over the draft of our views handed them, the Dominican representatives, with Ambassador Ortega Frier doing most of the talking, mentioned the following points:

1. Ambassador Ortega Frier inquired whether it was intended to use the sites and rights granted by the Agreement for general defense purposes in the event of hostilities. He said that if there was any possibility that this might be done it would be better to include it now than to conclude a supplementary agreement at a later date. Ambassador Ortega Frier was apparently desirous, for prestige reasons, that such an addition be made to the Agreement. The Air Force representatives stated that it was not now intended to use the sites and privileges cited for purposes other than those stipulated in the draft already submitted to the Dominican Government. The Dominicans were told that consideration would be given to the point raised by Ambassador Ortega Frier.

2. Some apprehension was expressed by the Dominicans with respect to the extent of the range area and possible danger which might result should the missiles flown over the area get off course. They inquired whether it was possible that these missiles might fly outside the range area. The Air Force representatives said that while this is a possibility, they feel that very little danger will result therefrom, since the movement of the missiles can be controlled from the ground and the missiles can be destroyed if there is any reason to believe their continued flight would be dangerous.

[3] The Dominican counterproposal for an LRPG agreement, dated March 16, 1951, was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 2 under cover of despatch 589, from Ciudad Trujillo, March 16, 1951, not printed (711.56341B/3–1651). In the covering despatch, Ambassador Ackerman stated in part that most of the concessions sought by the United States in the original draft had been retained in the Dominican draft, and that the only substantive changes were an explicit statement that the Dominican Republic did not cede sovereignty over the area specified as the testing ground, provision for the establishment of a mixed commission to determine jurisdiction over crimes by United States personnel in and outside of the area, and a reduction of the duration of the agreement from 25 to 5 years.

[4] Not printed.

3. The Dominicans inquired whether the missiles might carry atomic weapons or materials. They were told that this might be a possibility.

4. In general the Dominicans wished to know how much dangerous material would be carried in the missiles over the testing range. The answer to this question was that normally very little will be carried, i.e., only sufficient explosive material to destroy the missile in the event its continued flight is undersirable. It was clearly pointed out that the missile is a means of transporting explosives and is not an explosive itself, so that in testing the flight of missiles over the range the principal "cargo" carried by the missile will be non-explosive ballast material.

5. The Dominicans inquired whether it was intended to establish other proving grounds or to make agreements with other countries of the type proposed between the United States and Dominican Governments. The reply to this question was that this is the only LRPG contemplated by the Air Force and that it is not now planned to extend it beyond Puerto Rico. The Dominicans were told that the only other agreements negotiated or under negotiation are with the Government of the United Kingdom, with reference to the use of the territory of the Bahamas and other British islands on the route of the LRPG. It was pointed out that the testing of guided missiles over the LRPG is a joint United States-British project, and that the agreements with the British provide for the way in which British controlled territory shall be used in this project.

6. Some discussion ensued on the proposal of the Air Force for a 25-year period for the life of the Agreement and the Dominican counter proposal for a 5-year period. Ambassador Ortega Frier stated that it would be difficult to explain to the Dominican people, particularly those whose property rights would be affected by the need for sites, rights of way, etc., why they must give up the use of their property for 25 years. He felt it would be better to present the matter to those Dominicans whose property rights would be so affected as a 5-year proposal, since this would appear to be of a much more temporary nature than a 25-year period. He said that the Agreement could be extended as needed beyond the 5-year period.

The Air Force representatives stated that the 5-year period would just give them time to get well under way and that it would be difficult for them to explain the project to the Congress of the United States and to obtain the necessary funds for the heavy long run investment needed if assurances could not be given in advance that the Air Force would continue to reap the benefits of the investment put into the project. No conclusive result was reached between the United States and Dominican representatives as to the length of the Agreement.

No comments were made by the Dominican representatives regarding the general remarks in the United States informal statement with respect to the Dominican Government's counter draft on the matter of jurisdiction.

It was agreed that we would prepare precise alternative language on those Articles in the Dominican draft which we wish to have

revised, and would submit these proposed revisions to the Dominican Government through our Embassy at Ciudad Trujillo, in accordance with the already agreed on plan to have the agreement negotiated and signed there.

After the Dominicans had left, the United States Government representatives tentatively agreed to suggest to the Dominicans a 12 or 15-year period, and to accede to a 10-year period if necessary. If it is decided to present this alternative to the Dominican Government it will be included in the Department's suggested modifications of the Dominican draft for presentation by our Embassy to the Dominican Government.[5]

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[5] The several drafts and counterdrafts of the proposed LRPG agreement exchanged by the United States and the Dominican Republic between May and November, 1951, are in Department of State decimal files 711.56341B and 711.56339.

On November 26, 1951, the United States and the Dominican Republic signed at Ciudad Trujillo an agreement, with an accompanying exchange of notes of the same date, providing for the extension through a portion of Dominican territory of the flight-test range for guided missiles of the United States Air Force Missile Test Center at Cocoa, Florida. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 327, from Ciudad Trujillo, November 29, 1951, not printed (711.56339/11-2951). For text of the agreement and notes, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2425, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 3 (pt. 2), p. 2569.

795B.5/7-951

The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic (Ackerman) to the Department of State

SECRET

CIUDAD TRUJILLO, July 9, 1951.

No. 14

Subject: Conversation with President and Foreign Secretary Regarding Dominican Troops for UN [1]

In my conversation today with President Trujillo [2] and Foreign Secretary Díaz Ordóñez (this is the first time he has had Secretary Díaz Ordóñez present at our interviews) concerning the position of the Dominican Republic in the Korean campaign and the contribution of armed forces for the UN, reported in my telegram 8, of July 9, 1951,[3] the President repeated to me substantially the views he had expressed to General Watson [4] in the conversation reported in my despatch 848, June 27, 1951.[5]

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[1] For additional documentation concerning United States efforts to secure from Latin American governments offers of troop participation in Korea, see pp. 985 ff.

[2] Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Lt. Gen. Thomas E. Watson (ret.).

[5] Not printed (795B.5/6-2751).

I pointed out to him the advantages to this country of having a battalion thoroughly trained and equipped for modern warfare as his best insurance against any invasion attempts, although I did not believe there would be any further incidents of that nature in view of the actions taken by the OAS. In emphasizing this remark I pointed out that the reason we had been interested in a battalion rather than a group of smaller size, such as one or two companies, was because the battalion is a self-sustaining unit, if a Marine battalion is taken as a model, equipped, in addition to rifles and machine guns, with tanks, bazookas and possibly such light artillery as howitzers, and flame throwing equipment. The firing power, therefore, of a modern battalion is substantially above that of much larger units under former standards. The streamlining and training of such a force would provide valuable experience to men and especially officers, and by its greater effectiveness might permit him to reduce his present military forces. Therefore, there were advantages to the country apart from the primary objective supporting this attempt to discourage the Soviet from embarking on a Third World War, which seemed to me to merit his reconsideration of his previous decision. I stressed the importance of the countries of Latin America making a show of strength vis-à-vis the Soviet, and mentioned that Brazil was one of the latest of the South American countries to signify intention to join our forces in Korea.[6] He interpolated that he had heard rumors that Nicaragua may send a contingent to Korea, to which I replied that while I believed this matter is under active consideration in Nicaragua, as in several other countries, I could not state for certain that such is the case.

The President listened attentively to my presentation and when I had concluded, he remarked that there could be no question in the minds of anyone anywhere as to his opposition to Communism; that he had taken a strong stand against it long before the U.S. had decided that relations with Russia could not be effective until they were backed up with force. He wished to recall to me that the groups in this area who were desirous of destroying his government were not adverse to using Communists or any other element they could get to support them in such attempts, for among those mixed up in the Cayo Confites affair there were Cuban Communists, some of whom have since shown their true colors by visits to Russia or the satellite states. At that time he sought aid from the U.S. in the form of military equipment and received little understanding and on this as on other occasions in the past he has not found the U.S. very sympathetic to him. He has had to govern this country in a manner designed to improve it in all fundamentals. He has given it a national pride and made it sufficiently

[6] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1184 ff.

strong that it is now respected among nations. The improvements under his direction are here for all to see. I pointed out that in the affairs of all nations there are times when misunderstandings arise, but that I felt he could not complain in any way against the treatment accorded him during the last three years for we had endeavored to understand his problems and to be of assistance to him in many ways. This he acknowledged to be true. He then said that the financial problem was one that had him somewhat concerned for he had spent a great deal of money in building up his armed forces to insure security from interventionists abroad, and in equipping and supplying those forces. Aside from heavy expenditures made in Brazil, he had also built up an arms factory [7] so as to relieve himself of dependence on foreign sources in an emergency, and this arms factory had been costly. He has always taken pride in avoiding the assumption of obligations beyond the capacity of the country to pay and when he assumed such obligations to live up to them without quibbling or further discussion. The UN has been a financial drain, for apart from the contributions it has been costly to send representatives to its meetings. He feels that the Dominican Republic is in less favorable position to send troops to Korea or prepare for integration of a contingent in the forces of the UN than are a number of the more wealthy of the Latin American countries who have not signified an intention to contribute.

He then inquired as to whether I knew the present status of the security program legislation and in the event it were approved by Congress, whether these funds would be made available to the countries of Latin America.

The third point he raised was the Constitutional provision against sending troops outside of the country, and he facetiously remarked that when he had sought extraordinary powers sometime ago to counteract the plottings of his enemies, adverse criticism emanated from "your friends".

I expressed my understanding of his preoccupation with the financial burden imposed on this country for maintaining the various agencies of the UN and especially for its many meetings which caused a great outlay for small countries and also remarked that the State Department and the U.S. Government were appreciative of the strong support we had always received from the Dominican delegates to these bodies on matters of concern to us and to the Dominican Republic. I remarked that the U.S. has been well aware of the fact that the Dominican Republic has met its obligations to the UN and its affiliates promptly and willingly and that possibly this in part was the reason we felt that he would not treat lightly the request for armed support. I emphasized that this is a common effort and that we too are making

[7] Apparent reference to the Dominican Government's armament plant at San Cristobal.

heavy sacrifices and would probably have to continue to do so until such time as the Soviet, which apparently only recognizes force, came to realize that warfare is unprofitable to all.

The objection to sending forces to Korea by reason of the Constitutional proscription was cogent and one which I could not argue against except to point out that under present world conditions a new request for special Presidential authority would be justified. However, as regards the cost of a contingent for the use of the UN, these forces, as I understand it, are to be held in readiness for use after they have been trained and equipped. If the cease-fire in Korea is a prelude to the withdrawal of troops from that area it is unlikely that the UN will call for these contingents immediately and when such call is made the special Presidential authority required could then be raised before the Dominican Congress.

As regards the appropriations under the security program it seems reasonable to suppose, although I pointed out that this was my idea wholly and not based on information obtained from Washington, that the U.S. Government would utilize that to assist those countries in Latin America which show an intention to support the actions of the UN with armed forces. This should not be interpreted to mean that the U.S. plans to supply equipment and materials as a gift but presumably the authority in that legislation would permit the U.S. to make such equipment available at cost or below cost and also to assist in the training of such troops as might be requested by Latin American governments so that they would be ready for immediate integration into an over-all army. I mentioned further that the arms factory might now become a source of income to this government and especially a worthwhile contribution to the UN or the Atlantic Pact countries in the event that the discussions now being conducted in Washington by Brig. General Clark (Ret) with the War Department were to result in contracting for materiel manufactured to our specifications. Probably the use of such arms by the Dominican armed forces would reduce considerably the amount of equipment it would require from outside.

At this point the Foreign Secretary remarked that while he agreed with the President with regard to sending troops to Korea because of the Constitutional restrictions he did not think that these objections could be applied to the commitment which had been undertaken by this government in the GA and in Washington for making available armed forces for integration into an army for the UN, inasmuch as such troops would not be required immediately and they were merely being trained for later call if an emergency arises in the future. He expressed the view that probably a contingent smaller than a battalion could be made available, but I repeated the arguments given previously supporting a contingent of battalion strength.

The President then handed certain documents to the Foreign Secretary, which apparently had been drawn up by other advisers with regard to these questions, and requested the Foreign Secretary to redraft them along the lines of making available armed forces for the future use of the UN in accordance with the commitments of this government under article 8 of the GA resolution "Uniting for Peace".[8] He asked that the Foreign Minister prepare this in draft form which he could study carefully.

Several times during the exchange of views, the Foreign Minister interjected a few words in my support and I feel certain that these were effective in the President's reversal of his previous decision.

As soon as I receive more definite information from the President or Foreign Secretary concerning this decision, I shall seek from the Department its views as to training, and equipping such contingent to make it available for immediate integration into a larger force.[9]

RALPH H. ACKERMAN

[8] Reference to Resolution No. 377 (V) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 3, 1950. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 10–12.

[9] In despatch 14, from Ciudad Trujillo, dated July 12, 1951, Ambassador Ackerman stated in part: "It is quite obvious from my conversation with the President and the Foreign Minister, as well as from inspired articles which have occurred in the press, that this government will not make available troops for Korea." (795B.5/7–1251)

839.10/8–151

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1951.

Subject: 1. Participation of the Secretary in ceremony of exchange of notes with Dominican Ambassador recognizing termination of Financial Convention of 1940.[1]

2. Comment by Secretary on negotiations with Dominican Republic for military bases.

Discussion:

1. Agreement has been reached on the text of an exchange of notes recognizing the termination of the Financial Convention of 1940. The Dominican Ambassador has requested that you sign the United States note at a brief ceremony at your office. For the Dominicans this event

[1] For text of the Financial Convention and accompanying exchanges of notes signed by the United States and the Dominican Republic at Washington, September 24, 1940, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 965, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1104.

will be of historic importance since it will constitute United States recognition of their complete financial independence.

The Dominican Republic came under United States military administration in 1916. At this time its customs had been under United States management for eleven years. In 1924 the United States Marines were withdrawn but American control of Dominican customs continued until 1940. In that year the Financial Convention was signed, returning financial controls to the Dominican Government, but pledging that Government to make certain bond and interest payments.

On July 4, 1951 the Dominican Government paid the last outstanding private claim. Except for a small balance on its Export-Import Bank loan which is being paid off regularly, the Dominican Government has now extinguished all foreign debts. Considering the past history of Santo Domingo, this accomplishment represents a genuine achievement.

2. On request of the United States Air Force, negotiations are under way with the Dominican Government for the use of certain areas and facilities in Dominican territory in connection with a Long Range Proving Ground for experiments with guided missiles. These negotiations were apparently proceeding smoothly until the Dominican Government recently decided to submit a counter draft. This counter draft proposes several substantive changes, some of which are unacceptable to the Army.

Ambassador Ackerman reports from Ciudad Trujillo that some of the Dominican proposals are motivated by an impression that the Proving Ground, while of vital importance in Dominican minds, is viewed in the United States as a routine military matter of small importance to the Department of State. Ambassador Thomen is reportedly the one who conveyed this impression to President Trujillo.

Recommendation:

1. That you participate in the ceremony to be scheduled at your earliest convenience.[2]

2. I believe that during the ceremony an informal statement by you to the Ambassador that the Department is greatly interested in the early conclusion of these negotiations in view of the importance of the Long Range Proving Ground to hemisphere defense would have a salutary effect.

[2] On August 9, 1951, Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Thomen signed an exchange of notes at Washington whereby the United States and the Dominican Republic recognized the termination of the Financial Convention the two countries had signed in 1940. For text of the notes, see TIAS No. 2365. For a press release dated August 9, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 20, 1951, p. 299.

611.39/10–951

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1951.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A. OBJECTIVES

Our objectives with particular reference to the Dominican Republic are: 1) to obtain the support of the Dominican Government and people in efforts to promote inter-American and world-wide peace and prosperity; 2) to build in the Dominican Republic an appreciation of the institutions and practices of representative government; 3) the economic development of the Dominican Republic and the promotion and protection of legitimate US business interests; 4) to promote mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the Dominican Republic and the United States; and 5) the improvement of relations between the Dominican Republic and its neighbors.

B. POLICIES

US policies toward the Dominican Republic are of particular importance because they exemplify our attitude towards dictatorial governments in a nearby area of political and strategic significance to us. Since 1930 the Dominican Republic has been under the complete control of one of the most efficient and ruthless dictators to be found in the other American republics, Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, under whose rule the Dominican Republic has nevertheless made very substantial progress economically and in public health and instruction. Trujillo and his favorites have, however, a stranglehold on the political and economic life of the country, except for public utilities and the sugar industry, which is principally American-owned and provides through taxation the main source of the government's revenues.

US-Dominican relations are colored by the long history of Dominican financial and political tutelage under the US, as well as by our policy at various times during Trujillo's rule—the most recent being the period 1944–47—of making known our disapproval of his regime. In 1905 under the so-called Theodore Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the US began the collection of Dominican customs to service the Dominican foreign debt and thus meet a potential threat of intervention by some other power. Customs control was followed in 1916 by military occupation, and for the next eight years the Dominican Republic was under a US military government. Although political sovereignty was restored in 1924, complete financial independence was not regained until 1947 with the liquidation of the remaining privately held Dominican foreign debt.

The period of US control aroused in the Dominicans an ardent desire to become and remain free from dependence on foreign governments. While Dominican opinion did not become permanently hostile to the US as a result of our intervention, and the Dominican Government fully cooperated with us in the recent war, it has been reluctant to ask our help even in undertakings which might be of benefit to it. This reluctance was intensified during and as a result of the 1944–47 period when our official relations with the Trujillo Government were on a "correct but cool" basis, and when we therefore rejected certain Dominican requests.

In seeking to achieve our first objective it is our policy to make known to the Dominican Government our international objectives and our views on specific international problems. The Dominican Government has usually made a point of cooperating with us in the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations. At the same time it has occasionally taken an aggressive stand on matters that are of particular interest to it, such as the Spanish question, how to deal with international communism, the creation of an effective inter-American organization (now achieved in the OAS), and the use of OAS machinery to curb threats of aggressive and interventionist international action against the Dominican Republic. In this last regard Dominican policy is in line with our policy of strong support for the OAS as a regional security system within the United Nations.

Efforts to achieve our first objective also play a leading role in determining our policy towards Dominican arms requests, both from the point of view of the effect which a possible refusal on our part to license arms shipments to the Dominican Republic would have on that Government's general attitude toward us, and from the point of view of the result of such shipments on the ability of the Dominican Republic to contribute to world and Hemisphere defense against aggression. The Dominican Government has for a number of years been strengthening its armed forces, principally on the grounds that this is necessary to meet threats to Trujillo's regime from Dominican exiles and their allies abroad. Under our 1944–47 policy of official disapproval of Trujillo's regime as dictatorial, the Dominican Government was barred from obtaining export licenses for arms in the United States, although it would have preferred to obtain equipment here. Consequently, it obtained substantial quantities of arms elsewhere, while in turn exhibiting a cool attitude towards us. It has been our policy since the middle of 1947 to license the export of reasonable quantities of arms, aircraft, and vessels to the Dominican Republic from commercial sources. The views of the Dominican Government as to what is reasonable have not, however, always coincided with ours, but not to the extent of raising

any serious barrier to basically friendly relations. We made available a small amount of ground and naval equipment from US surplus stocks in accordance with the "interim" program formulated on the basis of the 1945 military staff conversations with the other American republics, and are willing within the limitations of available supplies to consider Dominican requests under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.[1] The Dominican Republic is now the best armed of the Caribbean and Central American republics.

The achievement of our second objective—the development of an appreciation of representative government—poses an extremely difficult problem, in view of our policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other friendly countries and the impossibility in any case of imposing democracy from the outside. As a matter of fact, the Dominican Republic offers a classic example of the truth of the latter proposition. From 1916 to 1924 while we were in complete control of the Dominican Republic, we endeavored to pave the way for the Dominicans themselves to establish genuine representative and democratic government in the Dominican Republic. The ostensibly democratic government which assumed power through a free election upon the withdrawal of the US Marine occupation force lasted only six years before Trujillo seized power in 1930.

Policies which we are following to achieve our second objective include: 1) an effort, through the USIE program's portrayal of life in the United States, to bring to the Dominican people an understanding of what the democratic way of life can mean; 2) cooperation in projects for the improvement of economic, health, and educational conditions, in order to provide a foundation on which effective democracy can be based; and 3) our efforts to promote international stability and thereby to remove any basis for the claim that a "strong man" is necessary to keep the Dominican Republic safe from outside attack. We do not permit the fact that the Dominican Government is an absolute dictatorship to prevent us from maintaining normal relations with it and treating it in basically the same general manner as we do all the other American republics. Nevertheless, we refrain from positive steps which would be widely interpreted as a demonstration of warm friendship for Trujillo and his regime, such as, for example, an official invitation to him to visit the US.

In an effort to promote the economic development of the Dominican Republic it is our policy to encourage the Dominican Government to provide a favorable climate for foreign private investment, and to encourage private US investors to give full consideration to the Dominican Republic as a field for investment. At the same time we are

[1] For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949, see 63 Stat. 714.

prepared to discuss frankly and confidentially with potential private investors the political and other circumstances affecting the security of investments in the Dominican Republic. The present value of private US investments approximates $120 million. We are not averse to the investment of non-US private foreign capital in the Dominican Republic on an equal footing with US capital. Requests to US Government agencies for financial assistance will be considered according to the criteria of economic justification and the availability of private capital.

It is also our policy to give sympathetic consideration, within the framework of the Point IV program and the expanded UN Technical Assistance program to requests of the Dominican Republic for technical assistance[2] in justifiable fields of activity. The Dominican Republic has not been the recipient of as much technical and financial assistance from the US Government as have many other American republics. While it would undoubtedly benefit from such assistance, its government has preferred to develop the country through a policy of vigorous economic self-improvement and the investment of private foreign capital on a contract or concession rather than a loan basis. Save for the small unpaid balance of an Export–Import Bank loan of $3 million granted in 1940 for construction purposes, and being liquidated with regular payments, the Dominican Government has no foreign debt. It tends to regard foreign loans and large scale technical assistance programs as implying a kind of economic inferiority and vassalage. Its views in this connection are conditioned by the Republic's unfortunate experience with foreign loans, which resulted in the establishment of the previously mentioned US Government restrictions on Dominican financial sovereignty from 1905–1947.

A further factor in this independent policy of economic development has been relatively favorable conditions in the Dominican Republic in comparison with other Caribbean island areas with respect to such matters as density of population and continued availability of agricultural resources in this basically agricultural country. The Dominican Republic has not, therefore, presented us with a chronic economic problem as have certain other countries and regions in this area of primary interest to us. Aside from the already mentioned $3 million Export–Import Bank loan of 1940, US Government assistance in recent years has been limited to the assignment of a relatively few US technical experts to the Dominican Republic and the training of a similar number of Dominican technicians in the United States, and to small health and education programs conducted by the Institute of

[2] For documentation concerning United States technical assistance policy toward the American Republics as a group, see pp. 1038 ff.

Inter-American Affairs.[3] The former program terminated in 1947, and the latter in 1948, although it has recently been revived as a vocational training program. It is anticipated, however, that US technical cooperation will be expanded under the Point IV program, in which the Dominican Government has evinced an interest, and to this end we have signed a Point IV General Agreement with the Dominican Government.[4]

It is our policy to cooperate with the Dominican Government in all possible ways to encourage and increase trade between the United States and the Dominican Republic. We encouraged the Dominican Republic to become a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)[5] and to this end were one of several countries which conducted trade negotiations with her at Annecy in 1949[6] resulting in her accession to GATT in 1950. Limited negotiations were also carried out at Torquay in 1950–51[7] with the Dominican Republic.

The principal Dominican interest in its economic relations with the United States is a large scale opening of the US market to Dominican sugar, the country's largest export. The preferential tariff treatment granted Cuba has since 1902 operated to the distinct disadvantage of the Dominican sugar industry. When the sugar import quota system was established by the Congress in the Sugar Act of 1934,[8] imports of sugar from the Dominican Republic and other "full-duty" countries were virtually barred. Cuba's preferential position was maintained in

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[3] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was established in 1942 and became a United States Government corporation in 1947. Its purpose was to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply; as of mid-1950 the IIAA operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the activities of the IIAA and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 679.

[4] By an exchange of notes dated February 20, 1951, at Ciudad Trujillo, the United States and the Dominican Republic had concluded a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date. The notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 532, from Ciudad Trujillo, February 21, 1951, not printed (839.00–TA/2–2151). For text, see TIAS No. 2226, or 2 UST 709.

[5] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva on October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

[6] For documentation on trade negotiations under the GATT at Annecy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, pp. 651 ff.

[7] For documentation on trade negotiations under the GATT at Torquay, England, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 791 ff.

[8] Reference is to Public Law 213, approved May 9, 1934, which amended the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933 (Public Law 10) to include sugar beets and sugar cane as basic agricultural commodities and to establish import quotas for these products. For text of P.L. 213, see 48 Stat. 670; for text of P.L. 10, see 48 Stat. 31.

the Sugar Act of 1937 [9] and increased in the Sugar Act of 1948.[10] For the foregoing reasons, Dominican sugar has traditionally found a market in Great Britain and, because the war stimulated a boom in world demand for sugar, the Dominican sugar export situation has been favorable in recent years. However, with the increasing production of sugar in the British Commonwealth and the growing uncertainty regarding the continued availability of dollars for British or other European purchases of Dominican sugar exports, as well as with the Dominican realization of dependence on the United States as the supplier of approximately 75% of Dominican imports and the consequent need for dollar exchange, there has recently been a concerted effort on the part of Dominicans to obtain a fundamental change in our sugar policy, so that the Dominican Republic will ultimately be able to dispose of a good share of its sugar output in the US market. In accordance with our policy looking toward eventual elimination of tariff preferences in world trade the United States has reduced somewhat the margin of tariff preference enjoyed by Cuba on sugar [11] while the preferences on a number of other products (mostly, however, unimportant ones) have been eliminated entirely.

With respect to an increase in the quota for Dominican sugar, we have been sympathetic to the Dominican problem in this connection, and with the Department of Agriculture recommended to the Congress an approximate 300% increase in the small quota for all full duty countries, including the Dominican Republic, when new sugar legislation was under consideration in the summer of 1951. Although enacted into law,[12] this change, which beginning in 1953 would increase the basic Dominican quota from 5,468 tons to 29,469 tons at the present level of US consumption, does not satisfy the Dominican authorities, who asked for a quota of 250,000 tons.[13]

In efforts to achieve our objective of promoting mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the Dominican Republic and the United States, we pursue the policy of informing the Dominican people about the United States and its people through our program of International Information and Educational Exchange. This entails an active press, radio, and motion picture program. In

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[9] For text of the Sugar Act (Public Law 414), approved September 1, 1937, see 50 Stat. 903.

[10] For text of the Sugar Act (Public Law 388), approved August 8, 1947, see 61 Stat. 922.

[11] For documentation on the negotiations in 1951 between the United States and Cuba concerning sugar, see pp. 1329 ff.

[12] Reference is to Public Law 140, approved September 1, 1951, which amended and extended the Sugar Act of 1948; for text of P.L. 140, see 65 Stat. 318.

[13] Documents pertaining to Dominican interest in an increased sugar quota are contained in Department of State decimal file 839.235.

There is considerable unpublished documentation on the Cuban sugar preference question and its ramifications in United States trade relations in decimal file 560 AL, and in International Trade Files, Lot 57 D 284, boxes 108–109, and 128–132 (the 1949 GATT meetings at Annecy, France).

view of the strong *de facto* censorship existing in the Dominican Republic with respect to matters distasteful to the Government, our information program there is directed to themes which we feel will not arouse the opposition of the Government (as, for example, might a direct portrayal of the advantages of democracy over dictatorship) and perhaps result in difficulties for USIE activities in the Dominican Republic. We sponsor, with the Dominican Government, a Dominican-US Cultural Center in Ciudad Trujillo, which is actively supported both by Dominican cultural and official leaders and by American citizens resident in Ciudad Trujillo. The Center provides a meeting place for Dominicans and Americans interested in learning more of each other's culture through lectures, extensive library facilities, the teaching of English, and various other means. We have from time to time sent US professors and lecturers to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of teaching their specialties or imparting to Dominicans information about the United States. Many Dominican students, intellectual leaders, and technicians have also visited the United States to pursue their studies and specialties, some of them under our student exchange and travel grant program.

Our fifth objective—the improvement of relations between the Dominican Republic and its neighbors—is given particular import by virtue of the fact that during the past several years the Dominican Republic has been directly involved, both as an intended victim and as a participant, in a series of plots and counter plots directed against various governments of the Caribbean area by political exiles and adventurers, with the support at times of other governments in the area in violation of international obligations. The result was a mounting international tension and deterioration of relations between certain countries, including relations between the Dominican Republic on the one hand, and Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, and at times Venezuela and Costa Rica on the other. It is our policy in the achievement of this objective to endeavor, both through appropriate direct representations and through our membership on OAS bodies dealing with these matters, to encourage these countries to work towards this end; through the latter means we also expect to prevent and punish possible violations of international obligations in connection with such conspiracies and thereby to diminish international tension in the area.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

As already indicated, among the foreign relations of major concern to the Dominican Republic are those with certain of its neighbors. The state of these relations is determined primarily by the attitudes and activities of other governments toward the Trujillo regime, and vice versa, or by Trujillo's beliefs concerning these attitudes and activities. He has believed at various times, with some reason, that certain ele-

ments, if not government officials, in Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico have been allied with Dominican exiles in the latter's unceasing propaganda campaign against him, as well as in the organization of two armed expeditions to unseat him. On the other hand, certain Dominican officials have participated in the past few years in similar movements directed against other countries in the Caribbean area.

Relations with Haiti have historically presented the greatest difficulties for the Dominican Republic. There is a constant underlying strain on these relations owing to historical and racial factors and to population pressure from Haiti on the much less densely settled Dominican Republic. In 1937 the Dominican authorities perpetrated a wholesale massacre of Haitian peasants who had infiltrated into the Dominican Republic.[14] Early in 1950 certain Dominican officials were found by a special investigating committee of the OAS to have been involved several months before in a plot to overthrow the Haitian Government.[15] On the other hand, a basic Dominican fear has been that Haitian territory will be used as a base of operations for revolutionary activities against it. Although the same OAS Investigating Committee was unable to confirm any factual basis for such Dominican fears in the several immediately preceding years, there were later reports tending to confirm to a certain degree Dominican apprehensions at that time. Since the overthrow of the Estimé [16] regime in Haiti in May 1950,[17] Trujillo has felt much less apprehension on this score, and there has been a gradual improvement of relations, including a meeting between Presidents Trujillo and Magloire [18] and their joint declaration that they would work towards agreements on several matters of common interest and a strengthening of economic and cultural ties between the two countries.

Dominican relations with Cuba and Guatemala have been particularly strained in recent years owing to the organization within their respective territories of two military expeditions by Dominican exiles and other anti-Trujillo elements, as confirmed by the aforementioned report of the OAS Caribbean Investigating Committee early in 1950. The expedition, organized in Cuba in 1947, had the active support of certain high Cuban Government officials and was tolerated for several months by the Cuban Government, in violation of Cuba's international

[14] For documentation on the tender of good offices by the United States, Cuba, and Mexico to conciliate differences between the Dominican Republic and Haiti arising from this incident, see *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. v, pp. 133–141.

[15] For documentation concerning United States support of inter-American collective action for peaceful settlement of disputes, with particular reference to the Caribbean area, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 641 ff.

[16] Dumarsais Estimé, President of Haiti, 1946–1950.

[17] For documentation on this subject and the recognition of the new government in Haiti, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 932 ff.

[18] Paul E. Magloire, President of Haiti.

obligations. Although the expedition was eventually broken up by the Cuban armed forces, and the OAS in April 1950 condemned Cuba's part in it, relations between the two countries have continued to be strained owing to: 1) the Dominican Government's feeling that the Cuban Government has failed to give complete satisfaction for Dominican grievances arising out of Cuban toleration of the expedition; 2) the Cuban Government's apparent sympathy for the objectives of Trujillo's enemies and the Dominican Government's belief that the Cuban Government is actively cooperating with anti-Trujillo elements to undermine Trujillo's position; 3) continued anti-Trujillo propaganda and other activities in Cuba short of actual organization of another military expedition; 4) a vociferous and manifest public hostility to the Dominican Government in Cuba; 5) alleged threats to the physical safety of the personnel of the Dominican diplomatic mission in Habana; and 6) rivalry between the two countries over their respective shares of the US sugar quota.

Relations with Guatemala have likewise continued strained since the June 1949 organization in that country of an air expedition against the Dominican Republic, one plane of which actually arrived in and attacked Dominican territory. Despite the failure of the expedition, the Guatemalan Government has continued its policy of open hostility towards the Trujillo regime and friendship for its foes. The Guatemalan Government, and the Costa Rican Government as well, have not maintained diplomatic relations with the Dominican Government for a number of years because of their openly stated enmity to dictatorship of the Trujillo type. In large part because of their common enmity towards Guatemala and lack of friendship for Costa Rica, Trujillo and President Somoza[19] of Nicaragua, both dictators, feel a natural affinity and have long maintained friendly relations.

Diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic were resumed after the ousting in 1948 of Venezuela President Betancourt,[20] who Trujillo thought was cooperating in plotting against him, and there has been a cessation of Dominican charges that the Venezuelan Government was aiding and abetting Dominican exiles in revolutionary activities. Such charges continue to be made from time to time against the exiled leaders of the Betancourt Acción Democrática Party.

Relations with the UK have been of significance because the UK is the traditional market for Dominican sugar and the British Government for several years has purchased virtually all Dominican sugar exports, more recently with ECA financing. During the years 1946–49, the UK was the source of a number of military aircraft and warships obtained by the Dominican Government. Such military transactions

[19] Anastasio Somoza García.
[20] Rómulo Betancourt.

were of particular significance to us as a source of dollars for Great Britain, but on the other hand ran counter to the objective of standardization of western hemisphere armament with US equipment.

Trujillo feels a personal and ideological affinity with General Franco [21] of Spain, and strongly opposed the UN 1946 resolution [22] on Spain. In the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly in 1950, the Dominican Republic was one of the governments sponsoring the resolution which modified the 1946 action.[23] The United States voted for this resolution. Shortly after the close of the Spanish Civil War, in an effort to impress world opinion that the Dominican Republic was willing to receive the oppressed, as well as to encourage white immigration, Trujillo had offered haven to a considerable number of Spanish Republican refugees, most of whom were later glad to leave the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Republic has no relations with the USSR and is outspokenly anti-Communist. Trujillo regards himself as a hemisphere leader against Communism, and refers to all his enemies, Communists and non-Communists alike, as Communists. The Dominican Government has from time to time indicated its willingness to support the United States and the United Nations in anti-Communist measures.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

US policy with respect to the Dominican Republic can be considered to be successful in view of the almost unqualified Dominican Government support for our international objectives, and its willingness to cooperate with us in practically any matter in which we request its cooperation. One notable exception to date has been the Dominican Government's failure to contribute to UN military forces, allegedly because of the need to maintain all its forces at home for defense against a possible attack from outside by the forces of "international communism" (i.e., anti-Trujillo Dominican exiles and their sympathizers). In addition, there are certain factors which, while not preventing basic Dominican support of our international objectives, irk the Dominican Government and cause it some chagrin. One of these factors is anti-Trujillo publicity in the United States. Another is the movement of anti-Trujillo Dominicans in and out of the United States. The Dominican Government believes we should prevent both of these

[21] Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Spain's Chief of State.

[22] Reference is to Resolution No. 39 (I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, dated December 12, 1946. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the Second Part of its First Session From 23 October to 15 December 1946*, pp. 63–64.

[23] Reference is to Resolution No. 386 (V), dated November 4, 1950. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 16–17.

types of activity in the interest of good US–Dominican relations. We have told the Dominican Government that while we are prepared to and will enforce US statutes which forbid activities against the security of foreign governments or activities which in their operation might have an adverse effect on such governments, we cannot undertake to limit the free activities or movements of anti-Dominican Government individuals, whether US citizens or aliens, which are not in violation of US law.

Another factor which has affected the Dominican Government's general attitude towards us has been its dissatisfaction at times with our refusal to approve certain arms exports, or with what it regards as delay in the issuance of export licenses. At the same time we are frequently attacked by liberals and anti-Trujillo elements for permitting the export of armament to the Dominican Government. There are admittedly arguments on both sides with regard to the desirability of permitting arms to go to the Dominican Republic from the United States but on balance our present policy of licensing the export of reasonable quantities of arms from commercial sources and of according the Dominican Government opportunity to share in available supplies of military equipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act is justifiable if we are to maintain officially friendly relations with the Dominican Government and secure its cooperation in matters of interest to us. Our efforts to persuade the Dominican Government to rely primarily on the OAS and the United Nations for the military defense of the Dominican Republic against aggression have met with only limited success. We have pointed out in this connection that the Dominican Government could more profitably use its resources for the material development of the country than for armaments. The Dominican Government, while agreeing with us in principle and recently stabilizing or even reducing its rate of expenditures for this purpose, feels that it must have adequate means to defend itself against possible further expeditions which may be organized against it abroad.

With respect to our second objective it is obvious that no observable progress has been made towards the democratization of the Dominican Republic. There is no evidence so far of the Dominican Republics' turning from dictatorship while Trujillo maintains control, and he is firmly in the saddle with apparently excellent health. On the other hand, democracy is the Dominican ideal, and even Trujillo portrays himself as a democratic leader and his country as one where full civil and political rights prevail. We are under constant attack by liberals in this and other countries and by Dominican political exiles for maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Trujillo. However, unless we are prepared forcibly to remove Trujillo—and such a step would be clearly contrary to our non-intervention commitments—a policy of other than normal relations would merely antagonize him, as has been

the case in past efforts to apply such a policy, without removing him or advancing the cause of democracy in the Dominican Republic. In certain cases where a policy of discrimination against Trujillo would involve a withholding of concrete benefits to the Dominican Republic, such discrimination would injure the Dominican people in equal if not greater degree.

With respect to our third objective, the Dominican Government regards our policy towards its desire for a larger share of the US sugar market as the basic yardstick for measuring our willingness to take positive steps to cooperate with it in economic matters. Regardless of how much technical assistance we may be willing to make available to the Dominican Republic under Point IV, the Dominican Government will undoubtedly feel in increasing degree that unless we make a more substantial gesture in this direction than we have to date, we are discriminating against it in a matter of prime economic importance to it, and its general attitude towards us will be affected accordingly.

Despite the progress made by the Dominican Republic in economic development, health, and education in the past 20 years, there remains much to be done to bring it up to the economic levels of the more developed of the other American republics. A principal factor in achieving this objective will continue to be the investment of private foreign (i.e., mainly US) capital in worthwhile lines of endeavor. In connection with our objective of promoting and protecting legitimate US business and investments in the Dominican Republic we have been successful in the main in preventing discrimination against American interests; there is, in fact, a tendency for the Dominican Government to accord American interests better treatment than that accorded Dominican or other foreign nationals, precisely because we have been zealous in guarding our citizens' interests. Threats to the security of foreign investment in the Dominican Republic arise primarily not from discriminatory treatment against foreigners but from abuses which are suffered by the entire populace—Dominicans and foreigners alike—with the exception of the privileged few. The basic fact is that economic activity in the Dominican Republic must adjust itself to the existence of an officially sponsored system of tribute and favoritism, which is used to further the business interests of those having official blessing and to injure those not having such blessing.

With reference to our fourth objective it is difficult to judge the extent to which mutual understanding and friendship between the US and Dominican peoples has been achieved. In particular it is difficult to know to what extent the masses of the population are aware of and friendly to the US. One reason for this is that in the absence of a free press, free expression of opinion, and free elections, there is no way of measuring their attitude. Nevertheless, it seems likely that

among Dominican intellectual, business, and professional leaders, many of whom have visited the US or have come into frequent contact with US citizens in the Dominican Republic, the sentiment towards the US is predominantly friendly. However, inasmuch as certain Dominicans have been subjected to segregation practices in the US because of their color, they and other Dominicans of the same color have become unfriendly towards us. Anti-Trujillo Dominicans, including individuals within the country who are willing to speak freely with Embassy representatives and other trusted US citizens, as well as exiles outside the country, usually exhibit varying degrees of impatience with, or even hostility to, the US because they think we are remiss in not ridding the Dominican Republic of Trujillo or at least in not instituting a partial or thorough boycott of his regime.

The achievement of our fifth objective must be measured in both short and long run terms. With respect to efforts to ameliorate the international tension of the past five years in the Caribbean and to improve relations between the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean and Central American republics, real progress has been made in that this tension has abated and there is no real evidence of a renewal of government assistance to or toleration of military activities directed towards the overthrow of other governments in the area. Not only has such positive governmental support of anti-Trujillo elements apparently ceased, but Dominican Government officials do not appear to be sponsoring plots or conspiracies against other governments. On the other hand, mutual antipathies continue to exist as between the Dominican Government and the governments of Cuba and Guatemala, and it does not appear that there can be friendship between their respective regimes in view of the severe ideological differences between them (i.e., "dictatorship" versus "democracy") and the sympathy of the Cuban and Guatemalan regimes for Trujillo's enemies.

With specific reference to Dominican-Haitian relations, any basic improvement is a long run matter, although from time to time relations may improve temporarily. The Dominican Government and people have a tendency to feel that they should have our support in what they regard as their defense of Christian civilization against engulfment by the African barbarism and paganism of Haiti. They view our efforts to maintain an objective and unbiased attitude towards Dominican-Haitian relations as favoritism towards Haiti.

Nonetheless, despite the difficulties which prevent full achievement of our objectives vis-à-vis the Dominican Republic, and make impossible perfect US-Dominican harmony, there is no doubt that under its present government the Dominican Republic will be found on our side in most important international issues and in any basic world controversy.

739.5–MSP/12–2151

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 21, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to Acting Secretary Webb's letter to you of November 9, 1951[2] in which he expressed the approval of this Department of the list of Latin American countries to be submitted to the President for the negotiation of military grant aid agreements pursuant to section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.[3]

Although the Dominican Republic is included in the program as a second alternate for preparation of an air force unit, it is not included in the list of countries to be approached initially concerning military grant aid agreements, despite the Department of State's understanding that the Dominican Republic is regarded by the Department of Defense to have military potential to contribute to hemisphere defense. It is anticipated that this omission, if not counteracted in timely fashion, will be regarded by the Dominican Republic as an act of discrimination against it, particularly since Cuba, with which country the Dominican Republic's relations are currently strained, is one of those countries with which it is contemplated that such an agreement will be negotiated in the first instance. Such an adverse reaction on the part of the Dominican Republic might diminish its willingness to cooperate with us in activities of mutual defense and, specifically, in implementation of the recently signed agreement with regard to the use of Dominican territory for testing guided missiles.

It is accordingly suggested that the Department of Defense, without altering the determination regarding the negotiations with prospective Latin American recipients of military grant aid during fiscal year 1952, give consideration to the possibility of negotiating in the first instance rather than alternatively with the Dominican Republic regarding participation in any program for military grant aid in furtherance of hemisphere defense during fiscal year 1953 and subsequent years.

Furthermore, it is believed that immediate attention should be given to the desirability of making a general approach regarding military

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[1] This letter was originally drafted on December 11, 1951, by the Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs (Jamison) and Mr. Hauch; it was redrafted on December 18, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) and the Acting Officer in Charge of Caribbean Affairs, Office of Middle American Affairs (Wellman). Assistant Secretary Miller concurred in the redraft.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1027.

[3] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165) approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373.

cooperation for hemisphere defense to the Dominican Republic at approximately the same time that negotiations for military grant aid are being initiated with other Latin American countries. To this end, I believe it would be helpful for Ambassador Ackerman to be authorized to discuss this matter with appropriate Dominican officials along the following lines:

1. The Dominican Republic constitutes in our view an important potential element in hemisphere defense, and we are giving careful consideration to the contribution which it might be requested to agree to make in accordance with common defense plans.

2. Since the United States has in recent years had no armed service mission in the Dominican Republic, it has not been in the same advantageous position to survey and assess the value of Dominican armed forces and facilities as in the case of those countries with which negotiations are now being conducted for military grant aid agreements. The United States Government would welcome any suggestions from the Dominican Government as to the best way to make this survey and assessment.

3. In the meantime, an effort will be made, within the existing critical supply situation and to the extent compatible with United States defense requirements, to comply with requests of the Dominican Republic for the purchase of equipment or material which would help to put the Dominican armed forces in readiness for a role in hemisphere defense.

4. Consideration is being given to possible ways in which Dominican arms production facilities might be used in a collective defense effort.

The Department would like to point out that discussions by Ambassador Ackerman along the foregoing line should facilitate any negotiations which it might subsequently be desired to undertake with the Dominican Government in connection with the military grant-aid program, and the failure to hold discussions of this general nature with the Dominican Government while initiating negotiations with other countries, particularly Cuba, would probably be prejudicial to the success of any subsequent approach to the Dominican Government for negotiation of a Military Assistance Agreement.

The Department would appreciate receiving the views of the Department of Defense at the earliest opportunity [4] in order that appropriate instructions may be sent to Ambassador Ackerman.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
H. Freeman Matthews
Deputy Under Secretary

[4] No response was received from the Department of Defense in 1951.

103-XMB/12-2651

Memorandum by Mr. Phil R. Atterberry of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Director of That Office (Stinebower)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1951.

Subject: Agenda for Meeting of Board of Directors, Eximbank, December 27, 1951.

1. Minutes of Regular Meeting of December 19, 1951. To be received.
2. Minutes of Regular Meeting of December 14, 1951. To be approved.

For Action

[Here follows discussion of a matter unrelated to the Dominican Republic.]

4. *Dominican Republic—Textile Mill.* Textilera Dominicana, C por A, a privately-owned corporation, organized under the laws of the Dominican Republic, has submitted a request for Eximbank participation with Conferation Life Association, Toronto, Canada, for a credit of $900,000 to finance the expansion and modernization of the applicant's cotton mill located in Ciudad Trujillo. The insurance company is willing to participate in this project on a 50–50 basis with the Eximbank. The total cost of the pending program is estimated at $1,330,000. Capital required in addition to the requested loan is to be raised by the sale of stock to the present stock holders.

The Eximbank staff committee recommends that the application be denied inasmuch as the project appears to be uneconomic in the absence of protective duties.

The Department is divided in its position on this question. ARA holds that an application for Eximbank assistance in financing the expansion of an industry should not be denied on the grounds that the industry cannot be operated at a profit without a protective tariff. That is to say, the denial of Eximbank funds to beneficiary of protective duties would seriously interfere with U.S. assistance in the promotion of industrial development in Latin America.[1]

On the other hand, ED believes that if an industrial enterprise cannot produce profitably without excessive tariff protection after the modernization program is completed, its expansion should not be encouraged. The Dominican Republic import duties on cotton textiles,

[1] In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Thorp, drafted by the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., and Mr. Wellman, dated December 18, 1951, Assistant Secretary Miller stated that ARA had no objections on political grounds to the Export–Import Bank's consideration of the loan application, and that rejection of the loan might have an unwanted effect on the Dominican Government's attitude toward compliance with its part of the LRPG Agreement (103-XMB/12-1851).

which are reported to average more than 75% of the cost of the foreign product, appear excessive in comparison with, for example, Cuban duties of 25 to 40% and U.S. average of 25%. ED believes that the extent of protection needed, after the modernization program is completed, should be clearly established before action is taken on this application.

Recommendation: Although this is listed for action, the Department has not yet received a report of the Eximbank staff committee's review of the protective tariff question, which the members of the Board requested at last week's meeting.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

103-XMB/12-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Investment and Economic Development Staff (Gorlitz)

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1951.

Subject: Eximbank Loan Application of Textilera Dominicana

Participants: Messrs. Rowntree, Jordan and Walker, Eximbank
ARA—Messrs. Hoover [1] and Hauch, Mrs. Hood [2]
ED—Mr. Gorlitz

At the Eximbank Board meeting of December 27, it was decided to have the staffs of the Bank and the Department discuss a revision of the Bank staff's memorandum [3] on the loan application of Textilera Dominicana. In accordance with that decision, the above group met to exchange views.

The Department representatives indicated that, as Mr. Thorp has said at the last Board meeting, that the Department was not pressing for either approval or denial of this application. Rather it was interested in having the record show clearly the reasons for either approval or denial. There was a general feeling that the latest version of the Bank staff's memorandum did not hang together internally and that its conclusions were not supported by the factual data in the memorandum.

The Bank representatives admitted that the memorandum left much to be desired. They asked, however, for specific suggestions from the Department.

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[1] John P. Hoover.
[2] Amelia H. Hood, Office of Middle American Affairs.
[3] Not found in Department of State files.

Mrs. Hood of MID, then pointed out several misinterpretations of fact and errors in the text. For example, she mentioned that the tariff had not been increased in 1949. She also questioned whether an average ad valorem equivalent of the Dominican tariff could easily be figured out, whether judging by the table of U.S. and Dominican prices the tariff average could be as high as 75 percent. In addition, she mentioned that the temporary closing of Textilera Dominicana was not simply because of its inability to compete with imported textiles. Also involved were its large unsold inventories of cotton goods, large stocks held by drygoods' merchants and increasing unemployment and depressed state of business in general. She also indicated that many textile mills in the U.S. shut down in 1949 because of large inventories and consumer resistance to high prices. The Bank representatives were glad to receive these and several other points Mrs. Hood raised and said that they would take them into account when revising their memorandum.

In discussing further the reasons which lay behind the recommendation to turn down this application, it developed that the inability of Textilera Dominicana to compete with imported textiles without some degree of tariff protection was only a subsidiary argument. Even the argument that private capital was available as shown by the establishment of two other textile plants in the Dominican Republic did not appear to be the central one. The Bank representatives felt rather that the Board's opposition to the granting of this credit was based upon its general belief that the textile industry, especially in Latin America, was one eminently suited for exploitation by private capital and that only in special instances was it justifiable to invest U.S. Government funds in such enterprise.

The group then agreed that that general argument appeared to be the most defensible basis for denial of the credit if the Bank intended to turn it down. Everyone agreed that the staff memorandum should be completely revised to stress the policy reasons for the Bank action, while mentioning briefly subsidiary arguments such as the probable availability of private capital, the need for tariff protection and Bank suspicion of manipulation of cost and profit data by the applicant to show the most favorable prospect.

There was no misunderstanding of the position of the Department representatives in discussing this matter with the Bank staff. They were simply discussing the Bank staff memorandum and were not committing the Department to support any position the memorandum might recommend.[4]

[4] On January 10, 1952, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank denied the loan application of Textilera Dominicana (103–XMB/1–1252).

ECUADOR

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ECUADOR[1]

Editorial Note

On May 3, 1951, the United States and Ecuador signed at Quito a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date. A copy of the agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 818, from Quito, May 4, 1951 (822.00–TA/5–451). For text, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 2, page 955, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2249. For a press release concerning the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, page 823.

[1] For previous documentation concerning United States relations with Ecuador, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 855 ff.

722.11/5–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Official Visit of President Galo Plaza [1] to the US

Participants: Ambassador Penaherrera [2]—Ecuadoran Embassy
Dr. Moscoso, Counselor [3]—Ecuadoran Embassy
Assistant Secretary Miller [4]
Mr. McGinnis, Jr.—OSA

The Ecuadoran Ambassador told Mr. Miller that he had requested this appointment to discuss the proposed official visit of President Plaza to the United States and particularly whether this Government could accede to Dr. Ponce's [5] request that the President be invited to the US during the latter part of June or early July.

[1] Galo Plaza Lasso.
[2] Luis Antonio Peñaherrera.
[3] Alfonso Moscoso Cárdenas.
[4] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
[5] L. Neftalí Ponce Miranda, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador.

Mr. Miller replied that a decision had been made to invite President Plaza to the US for an official visit and that it would be convenient for President Truman to have the Ecuadoran President stay in Washington from June 20 to June 23 and, in accordance with custom, to have him as his guest at Blair House the first night and at Prospect House the remainder of his stay. Mr. Miller added that it was planned that Ambassador Daniels,[6] who is now en route to Ecuador, would present the official invitation to President Plaza after the presentation of his credentials. He said that a telegram [7] would be sent to our Embassy in Quito today to have our Chargé d'Affaires [8] inform President Plaza confidentially of the invitation and to ascertain his reaction thereto. Ambassador Penaherrera was told that it was our intention to keep this matter confidential until Ambassador Daniels had had the opportunity of presenting the invitation.

Mr. Miller mentioned that he had been informed that neither Mrs. Truman nor Miss Truman would be in Washington during the period of the visit since the President's wife would have to be with her mother who is ill in Missouri and Miss Truman is expected to be in Europe during the period of the proposed visit. He observed that, of course, this did not mean that President Plaza's wife would not be included in the invitation. Mr. Miller said that this Government was pleased to extend the invitation to President Plaza in view of the achievements of his democratic administration in Ecuador and the example it would set of the faith of the US Government in the strength and vitality of the democratic way of life. He said that, while he would be glad to collaborate with the Embassy in working out a plan for substantive accomplishments which might result from the President's visit here, he felt that the visit of itself would be of sufficient moral and spiritual value and influence to render unnecessary any elaborate program of other achievements.

Both the Ambassador and Dr. Moscoso indicated that they heartily agreed with what Mr. Miller had said and the Ambassador added that he was most grateful for this information and was certain that President Plaza would be highly pleased to accept the invitation. Dr. Moscoso said that he was in full accord with Mr. Miller's observations that the spiritual and moral value of the visit was the principal benefit which would result from the President's trip, but added that, of course, it would be necessary to develop some substantive accomplishments which could be pointed to as having resulted from the trip.

Mr. Miller observed that Mr. Daniels would arrive in Quito May 20 and that the period would, therefore, be brief between the acceptance of his credentials and the time the President would depart for the US.

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[6] Paul C. Daniels was appointed Ambassador to Ecuador on April 19, 1951.
[7] Telegram 245, not printed.
[8] John N. Hamlin.

He, therefore, suggested that it would be advisable for the Foreign Ministry to expedite as much as possible the acceptance of Ambassador Daniels' credentials and his first meeting with the President. The Ambassador indicated that he would be glad to suggest to the Foreign Office that this be done.[9]

[9] Ambassador Daniels presented his credentials and the invitation from President Truman to President Galo Plaza on May 25 (722.11/5–2551), and President Galo Plaza accepted the invitation on May 28 (722.11/5–2951).

722.11/6–1551

Memorandum by Mr. Edward L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1951.

Things We Want From President Plaza

1) *Bases on Galapagos.* To obtain his agreement to open early negotiations for US military bases in the Galapagos. We want the base agreement to be finalized now so that it will come immediately into effect in the event of war.

2) *Shipping Discrimination.* We want to get his support to end Ecuador's discrimination against US shipping. Shipments on Gran Colombian [1] vessels pay 3½% consular fees (on value of goods) while shipments on other lines pay 7%. We have repeatedly tried to have Ecuador remove this discrimination, pointing out that it reduces their revenues. We would have no objection if Ecuador chose to grant a direct subsidy to the Gran Colombian line in lieu of the present discriminatory practice.

3) *Communism.* We should try to convince him that membership of the Ecuadoran National Labor Federation (CTE) in the CTAL aids communism. We could point out that the CTE is the only Latin American labor group, not completely dominated by communists, that is affiliated with CTAL. The two US labor confederations, as well as many free Latin American labor unions, belong to the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (OIRT).

Things President Plaza Wants From US

1) *Loans—Earthquake.* Under the unexpired earthquake credit,[2] he wishes loans for grain storage, waterworks in Ambato and about nine small towns, hydroelectric power development at Rio Verde, and hous-

[1] Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana, S. A., a shipping line jointly owned by Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.

[2] Reference is to the $7,000,000 credit (popularly known as the Earthquake Rehabilitation Loan) which the Export-Import Bank had approved on December 14, 1949, to finance reconstruction work in the area damaged by the earthquake of August 1949.

ing construction materials. The Bank has granted the Ambato loan (to be announced later)[3] and will sympathetically consider waterworks for the additional towns and the grain storage program. It will also consider the Rio Verde project provided it is sealed down. The Bank is opposed to any housing materials project that does not provide for realistic housing costs in Ecuador.

2) *Loans Outside the Earthquake Credit.* Plaza wishes loans for airport development at Quito and Guayaquil, highway construction and improvement, and development of a deep water port at Guayaquil. The Export-Import Bank will sympathetically consider the airports project and may possibly approve it next week. The other development projects should be submitted to the IBRD[4] instead of the Export-Import Bank under present Departmental policy.

3) *Abaca*[5] *Program.* Plaza desires the RFC to establish an abaca program in Ecuador. Under US legislation to encourage Western Hemisphere production of abaca,[6] the RFC has been surveying the possibility of establishing a large plantation in Ecuador. No commitment can be made to Plaza on this since RFC surveys are not completed. However, preliminary studies indicate that conditions are favorable in Ecuador for the production of abaca. If other conditions are satisfactory, the RFC will require the construction of a road from Camarones to Quevedo (about twenty-five miles).[7]

4) *Destroyer Escorts.* Although we have told the Embassy here that destroyer escorts are not available, Plaza may request the sale of two such vessels to his Government. In seeking legislative approval for the sale of DE's to Peru and other countries, the Navy Department has told us that they absolutely cannot release further DE's for sale to any country.

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[3] On June 14, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank had approved a credit of $500,000 under the Earthquake Rehabilitation Loan to assist Ecuador in financing the cost of rehabilitating and improving the water supply system in the city of Ambato, but the credit was not announced until June 22. For further information, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 16–17. For the Export-Import Bank's press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 71.

[4] In a memorandum of conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Corbett), dated June 13, 1951, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Black) was reported to have stated, in part, that "the IBRD would be willing to start studying any projects that the Ecuadorean President might have in mind but could in no way give a commitment to finance these projects in the absence of some settlement on the foreign debt [of Ecuador] mutually satisfactory to both Ecuador and the bondholders." (398.14/6–1351)

[5] Manila hemp.

[6] Reference is to the Abacá Production Act (Public Law 683), approved August 10, 1950; for text, see 64 Stat. 435.

[7] Negotiations between the Government of Ecuador and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation toward an agreement for the production of abacá continued intermittently throughout 1951, but no agreement was reached. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal file 822.2327.

5) *Boundary Dispute.* Plaza may ask our support in Ecuador's boundary dispute with Peru. We should, of course, maintain a strictly neutral attitude but indicate that we are always prepared to meet with the other Guarantors of the Rio Protocol [8] (Brazil, Argentina, and Chile) to assist the two countries to solve their dispute.

6) *Earthquake Grant.* Plaza may inquire regarding the fate of the legislation proposed in the House of Representatives in 1949 to appropriate $5,000,000 for earthquake rehabilitation in Ecuador.[9] Despite the Department's endorsement, this legislation never got out of committee. Its prospects at present are nil.

7) *Supply Problems.* The President might request our assistance in obtaining scarce supplies and equipment in the US. We should offer sympathetically to examine any specific requests, pointing out that the civilian consumption of many items has been severely restricted in the United States.

8) *Point IV Economic Commission.* The President already knows that we have agreed to establish a Joint Economic Development Commission under Point IV. In any case, he should be informed that we are willing at any time to sign such an agreement.[10]

9) *Point IV Assistance.* Plaza may request individual technicians for various projects, including a survey of the irrigation possibilities on the Santa Elena Peninsula. I understand that TCA is prepared to grant any reasonable request.

In addition to the foregoing, we have already informally agreed with Ecuador to announce that the two countries will shortly enter into negotiations for the signature of a cultural convention. We also expect to announce the granting by the CAB, with the approval of President Truman, of a foreign air carrier permit to AREA. This Ecuadoran airline applied about six months ago, under the US-Ecuadoran bilateral air transport agreement,[11] for a route from Ecuador via Panama to Miami.[12]

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[8] For the text of the protocol between Ecuador and Peru regarding peace, friendship, and boundaries, signed at Rio de Janeiro, January 29, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 288, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1818.

[9] H.R. 355, 80th Congress.

[10] The proposed commission was discussed intermittently by the two governments during 1951, but primarily because of inability to agree on the commission's composition, jurisdiction, and funding the discussions were suspended in October. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 822.00–TA.

[11] Reference is to the Commercial Air Transport Agreement signed at Quito, January 8, 1947, and entered into force on October 27, 1947; for text, see TIAS No. 1774, or 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 4013.

[12] For the press release dated June 25, 1951 announcing the awarding of a route to Aerovias Ecuatorianas, S. A. (AREA), see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 70.

Editorial Note

President Galo Plaza arrived in the United States on June 20, 1951. For President Truman's remarks of welcome at the Washington Na-

tional Airport, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (Washington, 1965), pages 342–343. For the text of an address by President Galo Plaza delivered on June 21 to the United States Congress, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, pages 68–70. For a joint statement by President Truman and President Galo Plaza released to the press on June 25, see *ibid.*, page 68. After spending three days in Washington, President Galo Plaza traveled to New York and then to California, departing from the United States on June 29.

822.10/6–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1951.

Subject: General Discussion of Ecuadoran Loan Projects

Participants: Senor Galo Plaza—President of Ecuador
Senor Luis Antonio Penaherrera—Ecuadoran Ambassador

Export-Import Bank Representatives [1]

Mr. Gaston—President
Mr. Arey
Mr. Stambaugh
Mr. Gauss
Mr. Sauer
Mr. Whittemore
Mr. Sherwood
Mr. Townsend
Mr. Chase
Mr. Jordan

Department of State Representatives

Mr. Daniels—US Ambassador to Ecuador
Mr. Krieg [2]—OSA
Mr. McGinnis—OSA
Mr. Stenger [3]—ED

President Plaza remarked that Ecuador had been slow in developing projects under the Earthquake Rehabilitation Loan of 1949, largely due to technical difficulties. He observed that geological studies had to be made; building codes examined and adopted; and detailed data on construction needs gathered. He remarked that three loans had already been approved under the earthquake credit providing for railway and highway improvement and rehabilitation and for the IBEC rice culti-

[1] The representatives of the Export-Import Bank are identified as follows: Herbert E. Gaston, Hawthorne Arey, Lynn U. Stambaugh, Clarence E. Gauss, Walter C. Sauer, W. D. Whittemore, Sidney Sherwood, Wilson L. Townsend, and Elmer E. Chase.

[2] William L. Krieg, Officer in Charge, North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs.

[3] Jerome J. Stenger, Assistant Chief Departmental Liaison with Eximbank, NAC, IMF, IBRD.

vation project on the coast. He said that, while these loans would indirectly benefit the area affected by the earthquake, he was hopeful that future loans from the undisbursed portion of the credit would be made for projects more directly associated with the needs of the devastated areas.

In this connection President Plaza said that he was hopeful that there could shortly be approved credits for the waterworks systems in Ambato and nine other Ecuadoran towns under the earthquake loan. He mentioned that local authorities were receiving valuable aid from the Health and Sanitation Servicio [4] in the preparation of the necessary plans. He also referred to his Government's desire to obtain a credit of $800,000 for building materials for housing construction in the earthquake zone to be granted under the same loan.

Mr. Gaston replied that the Board of Directors had approved the Ambato loan application and would proceed to consider credits for waterworks systems in the other Ecuadoran towns mentioned by the President as soon as the necessary technical information was received from Ecuador. With reference to the building materials application, Mr. Gaston indicated that the information so far received from Ecuador gave him the impression that the housing contemplated was perhaps beyond the financial reach of the people for whom it was intended. President Plaza replied that Mr. Cornwell [5] and his colleagues of the Pan American Union was now making further studies of this situation and would shortly furnish the Bank with detailed information on building materials requirements for a modest building program. The President said that the type of housing constructed would be tailored to local requirements and would be very modestly priced.

President Plaza then referred to the pending Ecuadoran application for a $1,000,000 loan for airport improvement at Guayaquil and Quito. He said that it was his understanding that this loan would be approved by the Bank in the near future. Mr. Gaston said that the Bank had the matter under consideration and that certain additional technical data, to be furnished by Panagra, was required before final action could be taken. He indicated that the Bank was favorably disposed toward this project. Mr. Gaston also asserted that, before the loan were granted, the Bank would require assurances that these airports would be available to all airlines on a free and non-discriminatory basis. The President observed that relations between Ecuador and Panagra had always been satisfactory and that he did not anticipate that there would be any difficulty in meeting the Bank's wishes in this regard, which coincided with his own.[6]

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[4] For documentation on the use of servicios in Latin America, see pp. 1038 ff.

[5] Warren H. Cornwell, a member of the OAS Advisory Commission on Housing.

[6] On July 19, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank approved a $1,000,000 credit for Ecuador to assist in financing the cost of improving and expanding the airports at Quito and Guayaquil (822.10/7–1951).

President Plaza then referred to an Ecuadoran project to develop hydroelectric power facilities to Rio Verde and said that studies were going forward by qualified engineers so that it could be presented in project form to the Bank at a later date. The President asserted that he doubted whether sufficient monies would remain under the earthquake loan to finance this project since it was estimated that it would cost $5,000,000. The five million dollar figure, the President explained, included sucre costs of the project. The President went on to say that he would prefer that the Bank make some public announcement of the fact that it was favorably disposed toward this project since it would be helpful to him in Ecuador. Mr. Gaston made a non-committal reply to both of these suggestions of the President. (Mention was made of the Rio Verde project in the Export-Import Bank's press release of June 23.)

Mr. Gaston then asked the President what progress was being made on the grain storage program in Ecuador. The President said that FAO experts had been studying the problem and had assembled technical data on the requirements for grain storage facilities. The President observed that such facilities would be very useful in preventing speculation and added that grain prices now fluctuate violently between harvests. President Plaza said that he expected that sufficient information upon which to base a loan application would be available shortly and that he would see that it were placed in the hands of the Bank. Mr. Gaston observed that the financing of this project could be taken from the undisbursed portion of the earthquake loan.

The President then said that he had received disquieting information respecting the construction activities of the Nathan A. Moore Company in their building of the Quevedo–Manta Highway.[7] He said that apparently the Company did not have the administrative ability properly to perform the work, but added that the Company had subcontracted a portion of the work to the Inca Construction Company. The latter company, he said, was a reliable local firm and had been doing a good job. Mr. Gaston said that he had heard reports confirming what the President had said respecting the Nathan A. Moore Company, and he added that it appeared to the Bank that the Company had not been constructing the road bed in accordance with specifications. Mr. Gaston observed that the construction of the highway had so far been performed solely with Ecuadoran funds but that the Bank wanted to be certain that the Nathan A. Moore Company could do a good job before it authorized disbursement from the credit established by the Bank for this purpose. Mr. Gaston said that the Bank was not only anxious to assure that loan funds were spent wisely but also that Ecuadoran monies were not wasted. He said he thought it might be a

[7] For previous documentation on highway development in Ecuador, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, p. 585.

good thing to have an engineer of the Bank visit Ecuador and examine the situation and report thereon to the Bank and to the Government of Ecuador. President Plaza readily agreed to this suggestion.

After an exchange of courtesies, the President departed with Ambassador Penaherrera.

822.00–TA/6–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1951.

Subject: President Plaza's Requests for Point IV and Financial Aid

Participants: Senor Galo Plaza—President of Ecuador
Dr. Neftali Ponce—Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador
Senor Colon Serrano—Minister of Economy of Ecuador
Senor Salazar Gomez [1]—Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations of the Chamber of Deputies of Ecuador
Mr. Mann [2]—ARA
Mr. Warren [3]—OSA
Mr. Krieg—OSA
Mr. McGinnis—OSA

Following the discussion of certain Ecuadoran loan projects that had been submitted to the Export-Import Bank, the President enumerated to Mr. Mann three matters in which he was particularly interested and which pertained to the economic development of Ecuador.

The President referred to General Wilby's [4] recent visit to Ecuador and his report upon the survey of the Batignolles Company respecting the dredging and maintenance of a deep water port at Guayaquil. He said that General Wilby had been sent to Ecuador under Point IV and that his recommendations had included a suggestion that further engineering surveys be made to ascertain the feasibility and approximate cost of this project. President Plaza said that he was hopeful that the United States Government could make available under Point IV other technical experts to complete the studies recommended by General Wilby.

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[1] Eduardo Salazar Gómez.
[2] Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
[3] Fletcher Warren, Director, Office of South American Affairs.
[4] Francis B. Wilby.

President Plaza next referred to his desire to go forward with the Rio Verde hydroelectric power project as soon as engineering studies had been completed. The President estimated that these studies would be available by November 1. He referred to the fact that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Gaston, President of the Export-Import Bank, and was hopeful that, if the cost of the project exceeded the unused portion of the earthquake credit, the Export-Import Bank would be able favorably to consider the extension of an additional loan.

President Plaza mentioned that his Government would request additional Point IV aid for technical studies of the irrigation possibilities in the coastal areas, particularly in Guayas Province. He explained that this area was a very rich agricultural region that, with the proper development, could be made to produce tremendous quantities of rice and tropical products.

Mr. Mann said that, in so far as Point IV assistance was concerned, this Government was very desirous of aiding Ecuador in planning further agricultural development. He said, however, that the present would be an inopportune time publicly to mention further specific technical assistance projects because the US Congress would shortly consider appropriations for Point IV purposes. Mr. Mann said that, assuming favorable action by Congress, he would, however, soon be in a position to discuss with Dr. Bennett [5] the suggestions made by the President and was hopeful that a program along these lines could be worked out.

President Plaza indicated his agreement and expressed the hope that this could be done soon.

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[5] Henry G. Bennett, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA).

933.532/6-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1951.

Subject: Ecuadoran Shipping Discrimination

Participants: Senor Galo Plaza—President of Ecuador
Dr. Neftali Ponce—Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador
Senor Colon Serrano—Minister of Economy of Ecuador
Senor Salazar Gomez—Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations of the Chamber of Deputies of Ecuador
Mr. Mann—ARA
Mr. Warren—OSA
Mr. Krieg—OSA
Mr. McGinnis—OSA

Following the discussion with President Plaza of other matters (which are covered by separate memoranda), Mr. Mann mentioned to the President that this Government was concerned over the matter of Ecuador's discrimination against American steamship lines in favor of the Gran Colombia Merchant Fleet. Mr. Mann said that it was his understanding that Ecuador granted preferential treatment to shipments on vessels of the Gran Colombia Merchant Fleet in the payment of consular invoice fees. Mr. Mann added that it appeared that Ecuadoran revenues were reduced by this practice and that the Ecuadoran Government might wish to give consideration to granting a direct subsidy to the Gran Colombia line in lieu of this present discriminatory practice.

The President replied that he had talked with President Truman concerning this question.[1] President Plaza said that he had told President Truman that the Grace Line had had a virtual monopoly of international shipping in Ecuador and that the Ecuadoran Government had accordingly supported the efforts of the Gran Colombia Merchant Fleet to provide competition to the Grace Line since it was felt that this virtual monopoly arrangement was not healthy either for Ecuador or for American shipping interests. President Plaza went on to say that the matter of Ecuadoran support for the Gran Colombian Fleet was an extremely delicate issue in Ecuador. He further observed that the substitution of a direct subsidy in lieu of other official support of the Flota would involve action by Congress, but said that he had had this matter in mind and was still hopeful that some satisfactory arrangement could be effected.

[1] No memorandum of this conversation was found in Department of State files.

722.001/6-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1951.

Subject: Communist Orientation of the Ecuadoran National Labor Confederation

Participants: Senor Galo Plaza—President of Ecuador
Dr. Neftali Ponce—Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador
Senor Colon Serrano—Minister of Economy of Ecuador
Senor Salazar Gomez—Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations of the Chamber of Deputies of Ecuador
Mr. Mann—ARA
Mr. Warren—OSA
Mr. Krieg—OSA
Mr. McGinnis—OSA

After the discussion of certain other matters with President Plaza (which have been made the subjects of separate memoranda), Mr. Mann observed that it appeared unfortunate that the Ecuadoran National Labor Confederation (CTE) retained membership in the CTAL. He said that apparently the CTE was the only labor group in Latin America, not completely dominated by the communists, that is affiliated with the Communist Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL). Mr. Mann mentioned the fact that the two United States labor confederations, as well as many free Latin American labor organizations, belonged to the democratically oriented Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT).

President Plaza replied that he was not unmindful of this matter, but said that there was a great deal of ideological confusion within the ranks of labor in Ecuador. He said that he hoped that some of this confusion, particularly within the Socialist Party, would be corrected during the forthcoming presidential campaign. He referred to the progressive front which it was hoped to work out between the MCDN,[1] the Liberals, and the Socialists whereby the latter could be weaned away from communist influences. The President indicated that the affiliation between the CTE and the CTAL was a matter in which he could not take direct action. He said, however, that he was hopeful that some of the communist influence in the labor ranks and the orientation of some socialist groups toward the CTAL could be eliminated in the long run. He said he hoped that this matter would be resolved following the next presidential elections.

[1] Movimiento Cívico Democrática Nacional.

611.22/9-1551

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

[Extracts] [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1951.

ECUADOR

A. OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of the United States with respect to Ecuador are to maintain and to strengthen the cooperation of the Republic of Ecuador towards hemisphere security; to continue Ecuadoran support for United States regional and world policies; to encourage the establishment of more stable, democratic and responsible government in that country; and to further Ecuadoran economic development along lines compatible with United States economic and commercial policies.

B. POLICIES

Hemisphere Security. In view of Ecuador's extremely weak military potential, it does not appear that she is in a position to take any direct military action herself toward hemisphere security. It is possible, however, for Ecuador to contribute toward the security of the Western Hemisphere by furnishing military bases for use in the collective defense of the hemisphere [2] in the event of an emergency; maintaining a military establishment sufficient to keep internal order and to prevent sabotage; and through participation in regional defense arrangements and organizations to maintain peace and friendly relations with other states.

During World War II the Government of Ecuador permitted the establishment of United States naval and air bases in the Galapagos Islands and on the mainland at Salinas. These bases were important to United States military plans since Ecuador is within five hundred miles of the Panama Canal. The bases were evacuated by the US after the termination of the war and returned to the Ecuadoran Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has cited the need for a new agreement with Ecuador which would, in the event of war, afford the US armed forces military rights to occupy and operate a base on the Galapagos Islands. President Plaza has assured our Embassy at Quito that his Government is willing to reach a satisfactory agreement on the military use of these islands and publicly stated, on an official visit to the US in June 1951, that Ecuador would furnish military bases to

[1] The portions omitted from this policy statement duplicate material in the policy statement for Ecuador for the previous year, which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 855.

[2] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

the US in the event of a future emergency.[3] While it is therefore believed that we can rely upon the friendly cooperation of the Ecuadoran Government in working out renewed base arrangements, opposition to such arrangements based on nationalistic considerations will doubtless arise when negotiations are undertaken. A measure of the popular attitude is reflected by the fact that President Plaza found it necessary to inform the Ecuadoran people that he had made no formal commitment to the United States during his state visit here respecting military bases in the Galapagos Islands.

In order to reduce the possibility of friction, our view is that any agreement which may be concluded should be based upon the mutual obligation of both governments to cooperate in the defense of the hemisphere and provide for concrete contributions on the part of each toward the establishment of military facilities in the Galapagos adequate for common defense needs.

Before undertaking negotiations with Ecuador, the Department is awaiting the views of the Joint Chiefs to Staff as to the conditions which they would want to include in such an agreement.

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Encouragement of Stable Democratic Government. The Republic of Ecuador is one of the most politically unstable countries of South America. It has been traditionally governed under a constitutional system very similar to our own which guarantees the rights of the individual which we consider to be basic. While it is too early to detect a trend, it is encouraging that the present chief executive, Galo Plaza Lasso, was elected President in an unusually free election (June 1948). He was educated in the United States and is considered to be capable and enlightened. A cardinal point of President Plaza's policy has been scrupulously to follow constitutional procedures in governmental administration and to permit the utmost freedom of discussion and opinion on all public issues. In short, he has been making sincere efforts to guide Ecuador toward more democratic government.

In recognition of President Plaza's leadership in Ecuador's progress toward a more democratic and stable political regime, President Plaza was invited by President Truman to make an official visit to the US. The visit, which took place in June 1951, emphasized the importance we attach to the maintenance of representative government and democratic procedures in Latin America. It also stressed the community of interests of the US and Ecuador, and by implication all of Latin America, in the common cause of the free countries of the world in meeting the communist menace. It is believed that the prestige that

[3] President Galo Plaza's statement concerning military bases on the Galapagos Islands was part of a toast to President Truman at a state dinner given by President Galo Plaza in honor of President Truman at the Statler Hilton Hotel in Washington, June 22, 1951; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pp. 355–356.

President Plaza gained from this state visit increased his popularity in Ecuador and thereby served the cause of democracy in the Americas.

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. . . We have also proposed an FCED Treaty to Ecuador in order to establish a sound basis for the attraction of private US capital for local economic development. While Ecuador has shown some interest in this treaty, the Ecuadoran Government has as yet been slow to begin definitive negotiations. While we wish to obtain a satisfactory treaty with Ecuador, we have not vigorously pressed for action because we wish to avoid the impression that its advantages would largely accrue to the US and because careful advance exploration of the probable Ecuadoran position on the treaty provisions on expropriation, commercial policy and navigation appear necessary in order to determine whether a suitable basis for negotiation exists. Ecuador's protectionism in commercial and shipping matters, its special favors to other Gran Colombiana countries and possible unwillingness to accept the principle of just compensation in the event of expropriation raise questions as to whether formal negotiations should be pressed at the present time.

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Our commercial and trade relations with Ecuador are largely governed by the Trade Agreement of August 6, 1938 as modified by an exchange of notes of March 2, 1942.[4] Under the exchange of notes, the United States waived its rights under the Trade Agreement to protest projected increases in customs duties by Ecuador on certain products included in Schedule I of the Trade Agreement designed to meet a financial emergency arising from curtailed exports due to the war. While the waiver had no specific time limitation, Ecuador agreed to reduce and finally to eliminate the duty increases as improvement in its fiscal situation might permit.

Since 1947, Ecuador has maintained in effect a system of graduated taxes upon foreign exchange transactions. Since we consider that these taxes constitute a contravention of the Trade Agreement in that they serve to increase import charges upon certain US exports to Ecuador that are covered by the Agreement, we have formally discussed this matter with the Ecuadoran Government. Ecuador, however, takes the position that these exchange taxes cannot be classed as customs duties and that in any case they are permitted by the 1942 exchange of notes which Ecuador considers gave it full liberty to increase duties on items listed in the Trade Agreement.

While we cannot yield to the Ecuadoran position, careful consideration is being given to the problem since it is possible that Ecuador

[4] For text of the agreement and the exchange of notes, see 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1951.

would prefer to let the Trade Agreement lapse rather than to permit modification of its control over foreign exchange transactions. The problem is complicated by the fact that the exchange taxes form part of an Ecuadoran program to protect foreign exchange reserves and to increase revenues for the purpose of economic development.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

A long standing boundary dispute with Peru, which resulted in open military conflict in 1941, is in the process of solution under terms of settlement outlined in the Rio Protocol of 1942. The execution of this Protocol, which sets forth the main geographic features of the new boundary, is under the guaranty of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States. Demarcation of the boundary has proceeded slowly but satisfactorily except for differences of opinion respecting two sectors of the border. One involves the Santiago-Zamora area in the southeast and the other the Lagartococha region in the extreme northern part of the boundary. The latter dispute was the subject of an Arbitral Award in 1945 to which Ecuador and Peru give differing interpretations. Various unsuccessful attempts have been made by the guarantors to assist the disputants to resolve this disagreement. While we have proposed that the question of law involved should be submitted to an international judicial body such as the ICJ for adjudication, this suggestion was not adopted by the other guarantors since some believe that the question was not susceptible of adjudication, that the guarantors had no authority to impose their viewpoint (Peru opposed submission of the dispute to the ICJ) and because they believed that the matter should be settled within the inter-American system.

The Santiago–Zamora dispute arose in 1948 because of Ecuador's insistence that it was impossible to fix the boundary in that area as provided in the Protocol because subsequent investigation disclosed the existence of an extensive river system which created a doubt as to the location of the boundary in that region. Peru maintains that the boundary in the area was fixed by the findings of a Brazilian arbitrator in 1945 and that the river system in question has no bearing on the location of the boundary. This dispute has been complicated by the fact that Ecuador has announced that it cannot accept any final settlement that will not accord her "substantial access to the Maranon (river)" which would provide an outlet to the Amazon. The implication is that, regardless of the Protocol, Ecuador intends to insist upon an outlet to the Amazon in the area in dispute. With like disregard for what a study of the facts and geographical realities in the area might disclose, Peru has publicly stated that it will never agree to granting Ecuador access to the Maranon.

As the result of tension created by these disagreements, border incidents have occurred from time to time between the armed forces of the two countries further embittering relations.

Following a border incident in August 1951, both countries requested the aid of the guarantors to fix the responsibility for this latest incident and to assist in the solution of the two unresolved boundary questions. The guarantors are currently meeting in Rio de Janeiro to consider means to assist the disputants to reach a definitive settlement of these issues. The Brazilian Foreign Office has been charged by the guarantors to consult with Peru and Ecuador regarding the possibilities of a direct agreement between them or as to recourse to any other method for solution of their difficulties.

Relations have been particularly friendly with Colombia although the unsettled political situation there has caused some anxiety in Ecuadoran Government circles lest Colombian dissidents involve the local government in their internal conflicts. The basically friendly attitude of Colombia toward Ecuador is reflected in open sympathy for Ecuador in its boundary dispute with Peru and in its desire to join with Ecuador in the formal establishment of closer economic and cultural ties as provided in the Quito Charter.

A special relationship exists among the four former Gran Colombiana countries: Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela. This feeling of kinship, which is perhaps stronger in Ecuador than in any of the other three nations, took concrete form in the adoption by these countries of the Quito Charter in 1948. This Charter, as yet unratified by Venezuela and Panama, provides for the creation of closer economic and cultural ties among the signatories. It envisages the establishment of a Gran Colombiana economic council, an eventual customs union, cultural exchanges, and close cooperation in the fields of science, industry, communications and finance. While a provisional economic council was established in Caracas in 1950, no action has as yet been taken along the lines laid down in the Charter, and it is doubtful at this stage whether this embryonic organization will produce any concrete results in the reasonably near future. Nevertheless, there is a strong sentiment in Ecuadoran Government circles that closer economic and cultural relations among these countries would result in accelerated economic progress and place the members of the group in a stronger diplomatic position vis-à-vis their Latin American neighbors, as well as other foreign countries. The creation of the Gran Colombiana Merchant Fleet in 1946 by Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela was a forerunner of these broader efforts toward economic integration. Its success in competing with well established foreign shipping lines provided a stimulus to economic collaboration among these countries. Our policy is not to oppose closer economic integra-

tion of the Gran Colombiana countries provided that it does not result in commercial discrimination against the US.

Ecuador has no formal diplomatic relations with the USSR or Soviet satellite states except Czechoslovakia and Poland. Trade with these countries has been insignificant and Ecuador readily agreed to the certification required by the Kem Amendment. A small but active Communist party has important influence in the labor movement as well as in Ecuadoran cultural and educational institutions and groups. The local Communist party, which has legal status in Ecuador, maintains intercourse with several local political factions and leaders. There is evidence that this party maintains contact with communist groups in other Latin American countries and with the communist officials in the USSR and satellite countries. There is sufficient communist strength within the relatively weak CTE (Confederation of Workers of Ecuador) to maintain the organization's affiliation with the communist-dominated CTAL. The CTE is the sole remaining national labor federation, not entirely and clearly dominated by communists, which retains this connection.

The objectives of the local Communist party appear to be to foster anti-US sentiment, create unrest and discontent in Ecuador when opportunity offers, and to be in a position to prevent Ecuador from providing assistance to the US in the event of war with Russia. To combat this communist threat, we continue to expose the true nature of the objectives of world communism with the aid of our information programs and through regular diplomatic channels.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

Our policies have in general produced favorable results. There is little doubt that the Ecuadoran Government and people are basically friendly and cooperative. Ecuador supported the cause of the United Nations during the war, providing important military bases to the US and scarce materials for the war economy. More recently Ecuador has consistently supported the US in its fight against communism carried forward in the UN and other international agencies. It is believed that, in the event of the involvement of the US in war, Ecuador would again cooperate in the establishment of any needed military bases, furnish war materials, and render other assistance within the limits of its resources.

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There is some belief within the Government of Ecuador that US commercial policy does not fully recognize the economic problems faced by an underdeveloped country. Ecuador gives lip service to the principle that reduction of tariffs and elimination of other trade barriers is desirable, but evidently believes that the principle should be modified to permit tariff and other protection for local industries, trade pref-

erences to encourage trade with neighboring states, and freedom to exclude or reduce selected imports both for protective purposes and for reasons of economic development through the regulation of foreign exchange. Moreover, the belief is held that tariff policy should be subordinated to fiscal needs since a considerable portion of governmental revenues are derived from import and export duties and charges.

While we recognize that Ecuadoran fiscal needs must be taken into consideration by Ecuador in the establishment of import duties, we have been reluctant to waive, except in an emergency, our right to Ecuadoran duty concessions exchanged for substantial tariff concessions on our part. We recognize also that Ecuador may require exchange controls for the purpose of protecting its monetary reserves, but believe that such controls should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner against US imports.

Since Ecuador has indicated that it regards any suggestions on our part for the reduction of charges on US exports as interference with its fiscal and financial policies, it will continue to be difficult for the US to obtain full compliance with the existing Trade Agreement and to obtain Ecuadoran conformity with the principles which the US subscribes to in GATT [5] and which it is advocating for general adoption by countries not members of GATT.[6]

[5] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5–6).

[6] Ecuador was not a member of GATT.

722.5–MSP/12–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Negotiations with Ecuador for Participation in Common Defense Plan as provided by the Mutual Security Act [1]

Participants: Dr. Alfonso Moscoso—Minister-Counselor, Ecuadoran Embassy
Mr. Bernbaum [2]—OSA
Mr. McGinnis—OSA

Mr. Bernbaum said that he had called Dr. Moscoso in to tell him that the American Ambassador at Quito had been instructed to discuss with the Ecuadoran Foreign Office the possible negotiation of a bi-

[1] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373.

[2] Maurice M. Bernbaum, Officer in Charge, North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs.

lateral military assistance agreement involving the preparation of Ecuadoran armed units for hemisphere defense missions with the assistance of grant aid from the US under the Mutual Security Act. He said that, if Ecuador expressed a willingness to negotiate with the US respecting specific detailed arrangements, a military negotiating team would be sent from this country to Ecuador to assist Ambassador Daniels in negotiations with the Ecuadoran Government. Mr. Bernbaum said that a general bilateral agreement between the two countries was contemplated which would provide for the cooperation of the two countries in carrying out the defense tasks assigned in the Common Defense Scheme [3] and the General Military Plan [4] worked out by the Inter-American Defense Board. He added that these plans are closely tied to the provisions of the Rio Treaty.[5] The monies provided by the Mutual Security Act would be employed by the US in assisting certain Latin American countries, including Ecuador, to put their military forces on a basis upon which they could make a contribution to the common defense.[6]

Dr. Moscoso thanked Mr. Bernbaum for this information and said that the idea sounded desirable to him and that the Embassy would shortly forward a communication to the Foreign Office in the matter. The Minister-Counselor asserted that his own conception of the best plan for the defense of the Americas was the formation of a continental army. He stated that, while there were many political obstacles to the formation of a continental army, he believed that in the long run it would be possible and cited efforts being made in Europe along the same lines. As an example of the political difficulties in working out

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[3] Reference is to the Common Defense Scheme for the American Continent, approved by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), October 27, 1950, and the Department of State, January 15, 1951; for information, see Secretary of Defense Marshall's letter to Secretary Acheson, December 16, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 679.

[4] Reference is to the General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent, approved by the Inter-American Defense Board, November 15, 1951; for information, see the editorial note, p. 1028.

[5] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[6] In despatch 940, from Quito, dated June 7, 1951, Ambassador Daniels stated in part the following:

"The desire on the part of the United States that the military establishment of Ecuador be developed primarily with a view to performing definite missions falling within a general defense plan and deemed vital to the collective defense of the Hemisphere is most logical. At the same time, it must be recognized realistically that the mentality of the Ecuadoran public at large, as well as the army, navy and air forces, has been conditioned over the years by the recurrent threat or fear of Peruvian aggression. Armaments in Ecuador are thought of as primarily a protection against Peru, which can hardly be considered an objective falling within the broader policies advocated by the Department. Accordingly it is important that everything possible be done to minimize this suspicion and latent hostility between the governments and peoples of Ecuador and Peru, if the Military Security Program is to proceed on an efficient basis consistent with U.S. policy." (722.5/6–751)

such arrangements, he mentioned the historical differences between Peru and Ecuador and Chile and Argentina.

Mr. Bernbaum said in conclusion that the information he had imparted was confidential, but that once the military team reaches Ecuador it will probably be necessary to make some kind of public announcement and that in the long run the bilateral agreement would become public.[7]

[7] In telegram 234, from Quito, December 18, 1951, Ambassador Daniels informed the Secretary of State that Ecuador desired to enter into conversations aimed at reaching a bilateral military assistance agreement (722.5–MSP/12–1851), and the Ecuadoran Foreign Minister (Neftalí Ponce) confirmed this acceptance in a letter to Ambassador Daniels dated December 22, 1951 (722.5–MSP/12–2751). The proposed conversations were scheduled for mid-January.

GUATEMALA

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALA, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN GUATEMALA[1]

611.14/5–251

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1951.

GUATEMALA

A. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the U.S. policy with relation to Guatemala are:

1. To bring the Guatemalan Government to recognize the danger involved in the present substantial influence of the Communists in the Guatemalan Government and in other important fields of national life and effectively to oppose it.
2. To bring about the establishment in Guatemala of favorable conditions for the conduct of business by U.S. interests on mutually advantageous terms.
3. To obtain Guatemalan understanding of and support for U.S. policy objectives in the hemisphere and throughout the world, so as to assure every form of cooperation, including when necessary, permission to construct and use air and military bases in Guatemala.
4. To assist Guatemala, when and as appropriate, in her efforts to strengthen and expand her economy and raise the standard of living of her people.
5. To secure access to and to maintain and expand the production and flow of raw materials which are strategically necessary for our defense and that of the hemisphere.
6. To assist in the training and equipping, as a source of supply, of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, so that they will be able to oppose the spread of Communist influence in Guatemala and to assume their proper role in hemispheric defense.[2]

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

For several years there has been developing in Guatemala a situation which the Department has viewed with concern. Excessive nationalism, manifested by a hostile attitude toward private U.S. companies, the proclivity of an enigmatic and crusading President and others for

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 865 ff.

[2] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

fuzzy economic and political philosophies and a serious penetration by international Communism, which has taken full advantage of the first two factors, have combined to create this situation.

Historically, Guatemalan politics has been turbulent and unstable. Since its independence in 1821, the Republic has almost always been ruled by dictators, some of them notorious for their cruelty and ruthless repression. The social system inherited from the Spaniards has for centuries been nearly feudal. The small propertied class, perhaps 5 percent of the population, has regarded the Indians, who comprise roughly two-thirds of the population, as vastly inferior beings and has treated them accordingly, excluding them from the political life of the nation. In between these extremes is the *Ladino* class (mixed Indian and European blood) which, unlike the Indian group, is generally landless and comprises the bulk of labor for hire in Guatemala. It is within this group that the revolutionary parties have secured their support and that the Communists, through the labor unions, have been able to make most effective progress.

The wide cleavage in the command of wealth and resources in Guatemala has been reflected in low standards of living and social rights for the masses. Foreign companies, which comprise the largest economic entities, have in the past realistically suited their policies to conditions as they found them, made favorable arrangements with the dictators in power, and thus secured large concessions and special privileges. Accordingly, foreign companies are identified with oppressive governments and the propertied class as exploiters of the people.

In 1944 one of the most ruthless of all Guatemalan dictators [3] was overthrown by an uprising supported by all segments of the population. Juan José Arévalo,[4] a seemingly liberal and progressive ex-teacher, returned from long exile in Argentina and was elected President by an overwhelming popular vote.

Shortly thereafter Guatemala embarked on a social, economic, and political program which in general terms aimed at achieving freedom and democracy for the people, protecting them from the abuses of the old feudal system and improving their standard of living.

This program appeared at its outset to be commendable. By and large, there was freedom of speech and of the press. The first mid-term Congressional elections were conducted fairly, the opposition won seats and there were few political exiles. The Government instituted a system of social security which was efficiently and honestly run and it undertook to provide the people with better educational and health opportunities. In order to further the cause of the workers it enacted labor legislation and sponsored the formation of labor unions.

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[3] Reference is to Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, who held power in Guatemala from 1931 to 1944.

[4] Juan José Arévalo Bermejo.

Soon, however, the Government's excessively zealous approach resulted in a biased, pro-labor attitude. This, together with increasing nationalism and chauvinism brought it into direct conflict with large domestic and U.S. interests. The conflict was further aggravated as the Communists gained strength within the Government and the unions from which they could exploit the issues. The U.S. firms (against which there already existed a deep-seated mistrust and resentment on the part of many Guatemalans because of their privileges, past policies, size, prosperity, and foreign ownership) became typified as the arch enemies of Guatemala's "democracy" and the revolution. They were charged with being in conspiracy with the so-called "reactionary" elements to oppose the democratic privileges which Guatemalans were told they were so bitterly winning. The U.S. Government, because of its support of U.S. interests seeking fair treatment under Guatemalan law, and because of the Communist seizure of the situation to air their "imperialistic" charges, also became in the eyes of many Guatemalans a bitter enemy of the Revolution.

Penetration of Guatemala by agents of international Communism has not been confined to the growth of their influence within the labor movement alone. The Government, by ignorance of the danger or by design (and perhaps by a mixture of both) has, as the self-styled model of Latin American liberalism, welcomed within its borders political exiles of leftist inclination, radicals, and avowed Communists. It has, furthermore, given positions of influence within the Government to many people of open Communist sentiment or reputation. While the Arévalo Government cannot be said to be Communist or controlled by Communists, it nonetheless holds a strong sympathy for Communism. The considerable influence of this doctrine on the Government of Guatemala is reflected in its actions and policies and must not be underestimated.

Within Guatemala itself a great many people, not only the wealthy class, became resentful of the Arévalo regime. They feared the excesses of the regime, especially its pro-labor bias and its exploitation by Communism.

They also feared and resented large-scale graft which was previously almost unknown, the growth of a large and expensive bureaucracy, and the Government's dissipation of the largest budgets in Guatemala's history on unproductive and wasteful projects. For example, the Government constructed an olympic stadium, the cost of which approximated one-fourth of an annual budget while the roads of the country were rapidly deteriorating.

Internal dissatisfaction has been so great that the Government itself admits (even with some pride) to having put down twenty-nine separate revolutionary attempts against it.

In the view of many Guatemalans the tragedy of the last few years lies in the fact that the early aims of the Revolution have largely failed of substantial achievement. They attribute this to their leaders' failure to take advantage of a golden opportunity for constructive work made possible by Guatemala's most prosperous era and the utilization of power to advance the interests of the revolutionary groups, including personal enrichment of the leaders without regard for the overriding interests of the people. The revolutionary aims were distorted through their confusion with Communist jingoism in the domestic and international fields. Furthermore, the Government resorted to strong-arm police state methods as a means of keeping itself in power after the first two factors had created such revulsion that overt attempts to unseat it were made.

As a result of these developments, our relations with Guatemala have gradually deteriorated over the past several years. We would have been concerned with any tendency toward excessive nationalism in Guatemala as being contrary to the best interests of both that country and the United States, but we are the more deeply concerned because the Communists have been able to distort this spirit to serve their own ends. A low point was reached in March 1950 when the Guatemalan Government requested the recall of our Ambassador, the Honorable Richard C. Patterson, Jr., on the charge—which the Department categorically rejected—that he had intervened in Guatemala's internal affairs.[5]

Since that time, during which we have been without an Ambassador in Guatemala, national elections have been conducted. Colonel Jacobo Arbenz,[6] one of the three leaders who engineered the revolution of 1944 and who served throughout most of the intervening years as Minister of National Defense, was elected as the candidate of the Government.[7] The manner in which the election was conducted permitted no result other than Arbenz' overwhelming majority. As the Government's candidate, Arbenz was backed by all those who support the current Government, including the most radical political parties, the Communist-dominated labor unions and the Communists and pro-Communist groups. During the course of the campaign Arbenz, probably as a matter of strategy, appeared to disembarrass himself of the most vociferous avowed Communists who then formed their own political party. (Political organization of an International or Foreign

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[5] For documentation on the efforts of the Guatemalan Government to have Ambassador Patterson recalled, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 869–877. Ambassador Patterson's mission was terminated on April 24, 1951, when his successor, Ambassador Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, presented his credentials. Ambassador Schoenfeld had been appointed on March 13, 1951, but he did not arrive in Guatemala City until April 14.

[6] Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.

[7] President Arbenz had been elected in mid-November 1950, and he assumed office on March 15, 1951.

character is outlawed by the Guatemalan Constitution, Article 32). This group was more a front than an actual party and for practical purposes, Arbenz was elected with their backing and is essentially committed to continue the policies of the present regime.

In the campaign and pre-inauguration period, there has been much speculation as to what Arbenz would do once in power. It is recognized that he, unlike President Arévalo, has no deeply engrained political or social convictions. He is considered by most to be an opportunist who will mold his activities in such a way as to best suit and provide for the continuity in power of himself and his adherents. Whether his judgment of the situation will call for a mild or drastic modification of the Arévalo policies, or whether it will call for continuation along present lines cannot now be forecast with accuracy. Arbenz has not definitely committed himeself one way or the other, but the consensus of most observers is that he will steer a more nearly middle course than Arévalo, partly because world conditions and Guatemala's geographic position would seem to demand such a course, regardless of whether it is to his liking. The fact that he appears to have full control of the Army (resulting from the purge of a pro-Arana [8] officer group after the latter's assassination) would seem to give him the means to oppose the Communists if he so desires. The future of U.S.–Guatemala relations, however, depends upon Arbenz' actions on this question and the extent to which the influence of the United States may properly be brought to bear on the formulation of his decision.

B. POLICIES

1. In order to bring about a recognition of the menace contained in Communist influence and to induce possible counter-measures, we have employed frank and open discussion of the Communist problem with appropriate Guatemalan officials both in Washington and in Guatemala. In these discussions we have endeavored to expose the methods by which the agents of international Communism attempt falsely to establish an identity of purpose with domestic Communists, leftists, radicals, ultra-nationalists, and other dissident groups. It has been our aim to isolate the Communists and to destroy their power by making non-Communists aware of the real danger which they represent to legitimate Guatemalan liberal aspirations, and the harm they do to Guatemala's relationships with the United States and others of her close neighbors. We have endeavored to maintain an atmosphere conducive to the continuation of these frank exchanges of opinion with Guatemalan officials by displaying a genuinely sympathetic interest in the problems incident to the revolutionary experience of that country. As set forth below, we have utilized certain forms of influence where

[8] Reference is to the followers of Col. Francisco Javier Arana, Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, who was assassinated on July 18, 1949.

we could properly do so. However, we have avoided any official acknowledgement of the existence of strain in U.S.-Guatemalan relationships, public expressions of censure for occurrences in Guatemala, and other acts which might have been construed as exerting improper influence or direct or implied intervention such as economic pressure, sanctions, or direct military action. Our attitude of patience in dealing with Guatemala has been, in part, motivated by a recognition of the fact that in an election year it would be politically difficult for the more moderate elements to assert their position in regard to the radicals and the United States. We believed that our objective of exposing the Communists would be abetted by their need to maneuver for power within the heterogeneous revolutionary parties, and to reveal their doctrine in direct appeals to the electorate. From time to time and when deemed appropriate to the circumstance, we have indicated whom we believe to be the most obvious and active agents of international Communism, particularly those who held key or influential positions within the Government. We also have endeavored to convince Guatemalans that the restriction and control of Communists, as a means of self-preservation, is not inconsistent with the ideals, the aims, and the institutions of democracy.

2. In order to secure the establishment of favorable conditions for U.S. enterprise, it is our policy to impress upon Guatemalan officials the desirability of employing, to mutual advantage, private U.S. capital for the development of their resources. We have endeavored to secure conditions which would not only lead to expanded investment by existing firms, but which would also prove attractive to new capital. We have in this connection counseled the need for impartial access to the courts, equitable and fair administration of Guatemalan laws as they concern foreign individuals and interests, equitable taxation laws, realistic attitudes toward the employment of foreign officials and technicians, provision for the repatriation of a fair amount of earnings, impartial administration and interpretation of labor laws, and, in general, practical and realistic basic laws to govern the exploitation of natural resources which, while adequately protecting the national interest, would permit foreign companies to undertake long-term investment under satisfactory conditions and proper safeguards. We have endeavored to soften and to refute the erroneous and harmful doctrine of excessive economic nationalism and misguided patriotism. At the same time, we have been diligent in endeavoring to secure from U.S. interests an appreciation and understanding of the revolutionary era through which Guatemala is passing as a reflection, in fact, of the wave of liberalism which has followed the Second World War and as a reaction against the continued existence there of an outmoded semi-feudalistic economic, social, and political system. We have therefore counseled their exercise of patience and flexibility in meeting day-to-

day problems in the face of the obstructionist attitude of the Government, and the need for a review and modification of their general policy and *modus operandi* to meet the new and changing requirements of the day. This has been considered by the Department to be a prime necessity for the continuation, in an atmosphere of good will, of their operation in the territory of another sovereign country and for reducing the possibility of expropriation. We have counseled the necessity for an absolutely apolitical attitude on the part of the companies and their officials and, at the same time, the need for good public relations programs as a means of convincing the Guatemalan people and Government of the many benefits which their operations provide.

As a corollary to these efforts it has also been necessary to employ our influence for the protection of U.S. interests in the face of excesses on the part of the Government and the labor unions.

We endeavored to encourage Guatemala to accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)[9] in order to create a more favorable atmosphere for United States enterprise than exists under the present bilateral trade agreement.[10] In this we were unsuccessful since Guatemala decided at the last minute not to participate in the Torquay tariff negotiations and has evidenced no interest in the GATT since then.

One of the avowed aims of President Arévalo and the leaders of the 1944 revolution was the fostering of a labor movement which, during President Ubico's regime (1931–44), was suppressed. A Labor Code was drawn up and labor unions were formed. The principal targets for the demands of these labor unions were U.S.-owned companies, which were the largest and the most important in Guatemala's economy. Singled out particularly were the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company and the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), which the former is believed, for all practical purposes, to control. Pan American Airways, the *Empresa Eléctrica* (American and Foreign Power Co.), and several U.S. petroleum marketing companies experienced similar but less important difficulties.

Labor troubles experienced by U.S. firms—principally the United Fruit Company and the IRCA, were of two kinds:

a. A direct controversy between the Government and the United Fruit Company over a provision of the Labor Code classifying agricultural enterprises employing over 500 persons as industries for purpose of the application of certain provisions of the Code which the Company alleged were discriminatory against it. It has been now fairly well established that the United Fruit Company is not the only agricultural enterprise employing over 500 persons. It is clear,

[9] For text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5–6).

[10] Apparent reference to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement signed at Guatemala, April 24, 1936, which entered into force June 15, 1936. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 92, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3989.

however, that in effect this provision is applied only against the Fruit Company; furthermore, legislative debate at the time the Code was adopted indicates that the disputed provision was specifically aimed at the Fruit Company and at no other enterprise.

b. Direct controversy between the labor unions and U.S. firms over the problem of wages and conditions of work. The most important disputes were of this kind. They were complicated by the fact that the Government, through its administrative officials and through the Courts, demonstrated a biased attitude and championed labor's position to the extent of ignoring the provisions of the Labor Code and of the law. Acts of the Government in these and in other disputes involving U.S. companies included deliberate agitation against the Fruit Company, attempts to influence the Courts, threats—direct and implied—of expropriation, and a general attitude of disregard for management's legitimate rights in equity and in law.

It has been our policy with regard to Labor Code discrimination, to make representations to Guatemalan officials, both in Washington and in the field, with a view to impressing upon them the existence of discrimination and the need to eliminate it. We have endeavored not only to explain the harmful effects which this discrimination would have upon the expansion of existing U.S. interests in Guatemala, but also on the attraction of capital for new enterprises.

As regards labor conflicts, it has been our policy to make informal and formal representations with a view to preventing their spread and securing for U.S. firms what we regard as just and equitable treatment under the law. One of our principal objectives was to avoid the development of so serious a situation that we would be asked by the U.S. firms involved to take up their cases as a direct denial of justice.

3. It is the policy of the U.S. to cultivate the respect and friendship of Guatemala so as to insure her support for our policies in the Hemisphere and throughout the world. We endeavor to preserve an atmosphere of equality and correctness in offical dealings with Guatemala, avoiding infringement of the sovereignty of that nation. We also endeavor to inculcate in Americans and American interests engaged in travel or business there an appreciation of the need for similar respect.

Effective support for U.S. policy, however, demands that the Guatemalan Government and people should have a full understanding of that policy, and a realization of the manner in which their own direct interests are best served by supporting it. For this reason we consult with Guatemalan officials when feasible and desirable with respect to the formulation and implementation of policy, especially when their interests might be immediately affected by it, and maintain in Guatemala information and cultural programs aimed at cultivating among the people a knowledge of the U.S. as well as an understanding of our policies and activities on the domestic and international scenes. The Instituto Guatemalteco-Americano is supported

jointly by the U.S. and by Guatemala as a cultural center. Its activities include courses in English and Spanish, a lending library of books and records, traveling exhibits, special lectures, motion picture programs, and frequent social functions. Its operations are principally aimed at the middle classes and it is most successful among Government civil servants and commercial clerks.

The USIE program seeks to explain and give prominent publicity to U.S. policy and culture through the media of the press, radio, motion picture, visual exhibits, and by cooperation with Guatemalan officials and teachers in the educational field. This program has a great mass appeal, particularly through its public motion picture programs.

It is hoped by these means to emphasize the identity of U.S.-Guatemalan interests and provide a firm basis for Guatemalan friendship and cooperation in peacetime as well as their cooperation in the event of war, including the use of Guatemalan territory if needed by our armed forces for the common defense of the Hemisphere. Effective cooperation in the extreme test of war must not be cooperation based exclusively upon necessity growing out of geographic location and economic dependence upon the United States. It must grow out of a sincere friendship and willing acceptance of the union of our interests which these programs are aimed at cultivating.

As a means of preserving the peace and of achieving solidarity within the Hemisphere, it has been our policy to encourage Guatemala to participate fully in the OAS and in the United Nations, and to respect her commitments incurred by her membership in these organizations. We have made every effort to keep ourselves fully and correctly informed with respect to any developments or movements likely to disturb the peace of the Hemisphere. We have exchanged information with interested states when it appeared to be advisable to do so and we have, by informal representation, counseled restraint and endeavored to discourage the use of territory and facilities for illegal acts against friendly states. Upon the commission of acts of intervention or the development of situations of extreme tension we have encouraged and fully supported investigational action by the OAS. In general, and on appropriate occasions, we have by public statement counseled that democracy must be achieved through the process of internal growth and development and that it cannot be imposed by outside force.

4. Consistent with the general policy of the United States, to increase its own strength by enhancing the strength of its friendly neighbors, we have in Guatemala, as in other countries, engaged in a program of cooperative projects involving technical assistance for economic development. Through the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations we have, in

cooperation with Guatemala, maintained the Instituto Agropecuario Nacional which engages in agricultural research, experimentation, and extension to a limited degree. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs [11] has supplied project funds and technical direction for the construction of the Roosevelt Hospital near Guatemala City and for the construction of health centers, clinics, drinking water and sewage systems. The United States has contributed funds for construction of the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala, and the Bureau of Public Roads maintains a resident engineer and staff there for the technical direction of this project. Until recently we have had an IIAA education mission in Guatemala which worked jointly with the Ministry of Education and directly in the public school system. The mission was forced to withdraw when the Guatemalan Government allowed the contract to expire allegedly because of lack of funds but actually due to pressure from anti-U.S. sources. Also, we support a staff for rubber experimentation under the Department of Agriculture, a project in Guatemala in connection with the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, military missions attached to the Guatemalan Army and Air Force, a cultural institute, training grants for study in the United States, and from time to time, the assignment of various technicians in such fields as vital statistics, social security actuarial problems, banking and financial legislation, census problems, etc. During 1949 the total U.S. contribution for this type of assistance, exclusive of $1,518,000 contributed by the Bureau of Public Roads to the Inter-American Highway, was approximately $589,000. This figure represents the cost of going projects in Guatemala and does not take into account various experts and technicians who were sent there for brief missions.

In view of the growing strain in U.S.-Guatemalan relationships, it became a matter for decision in the Department whether we would maintain or discontinue these programs, or expand them as has been recently done in other areas, particularly under the Point IV program. Recognizing long-term benefits to be expected from these programs, and the fact that the political difficulties in Guatemala may well prove to be transitory, it has been decided neither to discontinue nor to expand or otherwise enlarge upon the level of U.S. cooperative activities there. Consistent with this decision our Embassy has been instructed

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[11] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was established in 1942 and became a United States Government corporation in 1947. Its purpose was to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply; as of mid-1950 it operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the activities of the IIAA and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II. p. 679. For documentation on the IIAA for 1951, see pp. 1038 ff.

specifically not to negotiate a general Point IV Umbrella Agreement [12] with Guatemala. It has been our view that such expansion under the Point IV program could not be justified in a country whose Government has demonstrated itself to be greatly uncooperative in return, which has failed to meet squarely the important issue of Communist infiltration at a time when U.S. blood and treasure are being expended in defense against Communist aggression, and which has in other respects demonstrated itself to be hostile to local and general U.S. interests.

Should developments in the next few months fail to show convincingly that the new administration in Guatemala is prepared forcefully to meet the Communist issue, to treat legitimate U.S. interests in a manner fair to both parties, and to cooperate with the United States against a common enemy in the international field, we should be prepared to consider the withdrawal from Guatemala of the present cooperative programs. It should then become a matter for final determination whether or not the long-term U.S. interests would best be served by continuation of the programs or whether the possible coercive effect of such withdrawal, in conjunction with the application of other policies appropriate to the circumstance, would beneficially affect our immediate objective to eliminate Communist influence there. If, however, the new administration demonstrates a positive desire to cooperate with the U.S. in the defense of free-world principles, and if this desire is backed up by specific action to contain Communist elements and respect U.S. interests, we should then consider bringing Guatemala within the full scope of the Point IV program.

Notwithstanding this policy, however, we should maintain flexibility and be prepared to undertake or enlarge upon any form of cooperative program which Guatemala may request and which gives promise of resulting in immediate or direct benefit to the United States; such as, for example, a program which would develop or increase the supply of strategic materials.

Consistent with the above-mentioned decisions, it is our policy to discourage the Export-Import Bank and other official agencies from making developmental loans to Guatemala.[13] As with cooperative projects, flexibility should be maintained, so that loans might be encouraged when they directly benefit the United States. In the implementation of this policy we have informally advised the Eximbank that the Department would prefer its deferring action on the formal application now

[12] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to the negotiation of general Point IV agreements, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 846 ff.

[13] No loans were approved for Guatemala by the Export-Import Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development during 1951. The Department of State interposed no objection to a request made by the Bank of Guatemala for a short-term loan of $5,000,000 from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which was to be guaranteed with gold on deposit with the Federal Reserve Bank (814.10/10–251).

pending for a loan for electric power development. Even though a U.S. company was involved in this case, it was considered that the Guatemalan Government would derive important political benefits if such a loan were made. Alternatively, in the matter of a projected loan for construction of a road to a lead and zinc mine operated by a U.S. firm, we have considered that although the Guatemalan Government would benefit, a controlling factor in any final decision in addition to normal economic criteria, should be the strategic interest of the United States in gaining access to increased supplies of these critical minerals which are in short supply. Consideration by U.S. agencies of any loan requests arising from the recent IBRD Economic Surveys [14] will be governed by this policy. As in the case of the Point IV program, should the Guatemalan Government in future demonstrate a sincere desire backed up by action to cooperate fully with the U.S. we should then give consideration to a revision of this policy.

5. Guatemala is an actual or potential source of supply for the following strategic materials:

Abacá [15]
Lead
Zinc
Essential oils
Rubber
Cinchona bark
Chrome
Mahogany and other hard wood
Loofa sponges
Derris root,[16] and possibly
Petroleum

It is probable that other minerals and agricultural products of strategic value could, like some of the above, be exploited under the pressure of wartime conditions and necessity.

The RFC is now financing, under contract with the United Fruit Company, a 5,000 acre abacá plantation and decorticating mill in Guatemala. This project may soon be expanded to 7,500 acres and is the best producer in Central America. The Department of Agriculture maintains a staff in Guatemala to conduct investigations for natural rubber development, particularly in the field of hybridization of rubber trees to secure disease-resistant strains. The aim is to meet Guatemala's need for natural rubber and to provide the United States with an additional source of supply in this Hemisphere. A U.S. project

[14] The IBRD Economic Survey Mission, under Dr. George E. Britnell, had visited Guatemala during the summer of 1950 in order to conduct studies of the country's economy. For the mission's report, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Guatemala: Report of a Mission Sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration With the Government of Guatemala* (Washington, 1951).

[15] A plant yielding fiber for the manufacture of manila hemp.

[16] A root used in the manufacture of certain insecticides and fish poisons.

operated during the last war by the FEA and later by the RFC, in connection with a cinchona plantation in Guatemala, was abandoned some years ago as being commercially unfeasible in peacetime. Provision was made at that time, however, to prevent the plantation's coming into the hands of the Netherlands monopoly.

It has been our policy to cooperate fully with U.S. agencies engaged in programs for the production of these strategic materials. Also, our efforts to bring about favorable investment conditions in Guatemala have been motivated in part by the need for attracting U.S. firms to invest in the development of strategic materials.

The existence of commercially exploitable deposits of petroleum in Guatemala has never been conclusively established by successful drilling. Surface geological evidences are, however, favorable and several large U.S. firms have undertaken rather extensive geophysical exploration work in the post-war years. Their findings were such as to warrant their seeking exploitation contracts involving the firm commitment to drill exploratory wells in the Petén province. This involved a decision to risk a relatively large investment, since the Petén is inaccessible for all practical purposes except by air. Negotiations which would have led to the signing of such contracts, under the Petroleum Law promulgated in January 1948, came near to successful conclusion; they were halted, however, when a new ultra-nationalistic petroleum law was promulgated early in 1949. This law contained such restrictive provisions that none of the companies could foresee the possibility of advantageous operations and they withdrew immediately. Angel Hurtado Mendoza, who was Petroleum Advisor to the Guatemalan Government during the critical 1948–49 period and who for practical purposes is responsible for the present Petroleum Law, is an Argentine national who is known to be anti-American and almost certainly is pro-Communist. The Director General of Mining, Jose Mendez Zebadua, and his Associate Chief, Humberto Veliz Gonzalez, are both pro-Communists. They also occupy, respectively, the positions of Director and Sub-Director of the National Petroleum Institute.

Assuming that it is in the interest of the United States and of the Hemisphere to develop all possible sources of petroleum in readily accessible areas, efforts should be made to seek the modification of the restrictive attitude which Guatemala has thus far demonstrated with respect to proving its petroleum potential, and, if such exists, permitting its exploitation. It is therefore the policy of this Government to seek the modification of these restrictions in a manner which will permit advantageous exploration for and exploitation of petroleum in Guatemala by foreign capital, including all legitimate safeguards for the national interests of Guatemala.

Notwithstanding the present policy of withholding cooperative assistance from the Government of Guatemala, it is to be repeated that we

should favor loans to either U.S. or Guatemalan companies which will have the direct effect of increasing the source of supply of strategic materials.

6. The key to power in Guatemala, as elsewhere in the volatile political scene of Latin America, rests in control of the Army. So long as the Army remains united, that government and factions which it supports can remain in or achieve political power. Armies in Latin America are traditionally conservative and that of Guatemala, while more liberal, does not deviate sharply from the general character. It has supported the Arévalo regime, in spite of its Communist influence, in an effort to establish and preserve a tradition of constitutionality and legality. There have, however, been signs of dissatisfaction on the part of the Army with the policies of the civilian government and no definite signs of the Army's having been infiltrated with Communist doctrine. So long as the present situation prevails in Guatemala, U.S. policy does not contemplate the extension of any form of military cooperation or aid which would permit the substantial expansion of the Guatemalan Armed Forces beyond their present levels of strength, except for the maintenance, for the time being, of our military (Air and Ground) missions. This does not mean that an inflexible embargo of arms shipments to Guatemala is to be observed.* On the contrary, none should be imposed so long as it may be considered that the Guatemalan Army represents the most effective bulwark in that country against the spread of Communist influence. This policy has a two-fold aim:

a. To permit the maintenance of the Guatemalan Army at a level of strength which would allow it, if united, to oppose effectively any conceivable armed threat which Communist elements might be able to make against it.

b. To induce the Army, by the persuasive effect of restraints on the shipment of arms to Guatemala, to oppose the Communist movement there.

It is acknowledged that this policy could result in a military force in Guatemala of an inferior potential fully to assume its assigned role in hemispheric defense. However, the role of Guatemala in relation to the overall plan of hemispheric defense would be relatively small, and it is therefore considered not to be so vital as the immediate and local problem of opposing the Communist threat. Furthermore, the effectiveness with which an army of any strength could assume such a role would depend upon the attitude of the Guatemalan Government and people toward the Communist issue.

As soon as there may be a substantial and favorable change in the situation in Guatemala on the issues in question with this country, and

*Until Guatemalan ratification of the Rio Treaty is complete she is ineligible to purchase munitions from official sources although she may purchase from commercial sources subject to export control. [Footnote in the source text.]

subject to the determination of Guatemalan eligibility, the U.S., acting through its Military and Air Missions, through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act,[17] and through any other form of military grant or aid programs which may be established, should extend to Guatemala assistance and cooperation consistent with enabling it to meet in full its role in hemispheric defense, and if feasible, to contribute military forces for the fight against aggression overseas.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

During the Arévalo regime Guatemalan relationships with a number of nations, particularly in the Caribbean areas, became strained. Today, Guatemala has either severed relationships with or refuses to recognize *de jure* the governments of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Peru. Furthermore, relationships have at one time or another been strained between Guatemala and Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras.

Responsibility for this situation results largely from the revolutionary zeal of the present Guatemalan administration which considers itself to be a model of liberalism and democracy. It, therefore, tends to deplore and in some cases actively to oppose, openly or covertly, those governments which it considers to be "imperialistic", "reactionary", or "dictatorial". This attitude has found expression in Guatemalan support of the Caribbean Legion [18] and other dissident elements plotting against the alleged oppressors in other countries, the severance of diplomatic relationships, and the harboring of political exiles, usually of the leftist stripe and including avowed Communists. During the past year and a half there has been vitrually no evidence that Guatemala has continued actively to support the Caribbean Legion, apparently as a result of the application of the Rio Treaty [19] machinery by the OAS. In its report [20] on the attempted invasion of the Dominican Republic at Luperon in June 1949, the OAS Investigatory Committee, appointed under the Rio Treaty procedures, made clear to some extent the degree of Guatemalan connivance and direct participation in this and in earlier incidents, including the blessing of officials at the highest level and the use of elements of the Guatemalan Armed Forces.[21]

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[17] For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949, see 63 Stat. 714.

[18] A group of political exiles and military men from countries in the Caribbean region with the alleged aim of overthrowing certain dictatorial regimes in the area.

[19] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[20] For text, see Organization of American States, Investigating Committee of the Organ of Consultation, *Results of Its Labors*, Document C–I–67–E, March 13, 1950 (Washington, 1950).

[21] For previous documentation on the attitude on the United States toward the investigation conducted by the Organization of American States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 641 ff.

The severance of relationships between Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Peru has originated in ideological differences fanned by Guatemala's crusading "sense of mission". In the case of Nicaragua, the situation has been aggravated by the long-standing contest between Somoza [22] and Arévalo, and the deep personal animosity and odium for each other which has resulted therefrom.

As a result of its tolerance and support of interventionist activities and its pious attitude, Guatemala stands today virtually without a single sincere and undisturbed friend among her immediate neighbors of comparable size, with the exception of Cuba. In the past year or two El Salvador has become fearful of the penetration of Communist influence from Guatemala. As a measure of self protection, El Salvador has recently asked this Government for a full exchange of information on Communism and Communist activities within her borders. Although relations with Honduras were temporarily improved at the outset of the Galvez [23] regime, that country has become less confident as a result of recent developments in Guatemala and the fear that leftist agitators, operating from Guatemala, will penetrate into Honduras and create dissension there.

Guatemala's relationships with Mexico in this period have been cordially correct. Guatemala, however, maintains close contact with and is greatly influenced by the more radical elements in Mexico, inside and outside of government, particularly and most importantly Lombardo Toledano and the CTAL (Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina). At the present time Mexican leftists and radicals appear to be effectively represented in Guatemala by Mexican Ambassador Luis Rodriguez, an associate of ex-President Cardenas [24] who has closely identified himself with the activities of admitted Communist groups and individuals in Guatemala.

With respect to Guatemala's long standing controversy with Great Britain over British Honduras (Belize), it has been our policy to encourage a peaceful solution by bilateral negotiation of the disputant parties or by judicial procedures.[25] Guatemala has utilized this issue as a means of diverting attention, when convenient, from domestic problems and has also rallied to her cause, with some success, the moral support of some of the other American Republics. Her championing of this issue has placed Guatemala in the forefront of the anti-colonialism movement in the Hemisphere, which has included tacit support for the Puerto Rican independence movement.

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[22] Anastasio Somoza García, President of Nicaragua.
[23] Juan Manuel Galvez, President of Honduras.
[24] Lázaro Cárdenas, President of Mexico from 1934 to 1940.
[25] For previous documentation on the policy of the United States toward the Guatemala–United Kingdom controversy with respect to Belize, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 81 ff.

Directly as a result of Guatemalan maneuvering with respect to Belize, complete Inter-American ratification of the Rio Treaty has been jeopardized. In presenting its instrument of ratification of this Treaty, Guatemala filed a reservation, the acceptance of which, without satisfactory modification by Guatemala, has been considered to be unacceptable by the United States and certain other American states which have thus far responded. As written, the reservation preserves for Guatemala the right to endeavor to "solve" the Belize controversy by whatever means she may see fit, including, presumably, the use of force, and to invoke the Treaty at any time on this issue. Accordingly other parties to the Rio Treaty might be called upon to support Guatemala's actions on this issue with resultant involvement with Great Britain and danger to the peace of the Hemisphere.

Guatemala recognizes but does not exchange diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union. The contact, if any, of the Guatemalan Government with the Soviet Union, and of Guatemalan Communists with the Soviet Union, is therefore not direct but devious; probably through the Soviet Embassy in Mexico or other channels.

Guatemala recognizes the Spanish Republican Government in exile and has maintained an attitude toward Franco which parallels her attitude toward other countries she considers to be dictatorial. Guatemala opposed the UN resolution to return ambassadors to Spain.

The principle of Central American Union receives the oral support of Guatemalan officials and is written into the Guatemalan constitution as an objective. Pursuant to this objective, Guatemala concedes citizenship to persons who are citizens of other Central American countries and has certain preferential tariff arrangements with them. It has been the policy of the United States neither to support nor oppose efforts to bring about a Central American Union. We recognize that, while it might contribute to economic and political stability in the area, it can come about only upon the initiative and by the agreement of the interested states.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

1. In general there is little evidence that the Guatemalan Government has recognized the danger which exists in Communist penetration and there has been little definitive action or demonstration of desire by it to contain Communism. It has, nonetheless, taken certain steps which either reflect uneasiness on the Communist issue or a recognition of the need, on occasion, to appease domestic and international public opinion. If these steps did in fact signify uneasiness, they possibly did not receive greater expression because of election necessities. Outside the Government definite and growing elements of the population have become increasingly preoccupied in these matters, and reflect their concern in stronger opposition to the Government.

Evidences of Government uneasiness have been limited to the following acts:

(*a*) Dismissal of the editor of the official Guatemalan Government newspaper and of the chief of propaganda of the government radio station when they exposed themselves by association with the Communist newspaper *Octubre*.

(*b*) Dismissal of a minor Foreign Office official after we pointed out that he had supported Communist opposition to the Government-sponsored ratification of the Rio Treaty.

(*c*) A short-period closing of the Communist newspaper *Octubre* and the "labor" school "Jacobo Sánchez." This was apparently a trial balloon, which was hastily hauled down by dismissal of the Minister responsible, Colonel Elfego H. Monzón,[26] who, seemingly sincere, was sacrificed to political exigencies.

Public preoccupation was most strikingly expressed in the bloody "minute of silence" demonstrations in July 1950. These, carried out on the pretext of commemorating Arana's assassination, were really expressions of popular opposition to Government policies. This opposition was also expressed to some extent by the largest and most important labor union, the SAMF, when it took steps several months ago to divest itself of Communist leadership—notably Manuel Pinto Usaga—and withdrew from the Communist-led FSG labor federation, which is affiliated with the WFTU.

These limited evidences, however, do not constitute effective acknowledgment of the threat of Communism or action to contain it. The Communist newspaper *Octubre* is still openly published and distributed; the Communist "labor" school "Jacobo Sánchez" is still functioning; the two labor federations, CTG and FSG, as well as the National Committee for Syndical Unity (CNUS) are still controlled by Communists; Guatemala continues to welcome and harbor foreign Communists and known Communists remain in Government positions; for example, the head of the Secretariat of the Presidency, Hugo Salguero,[27] and the head of the President's Publicity Office, Humberto Alvarado. Furthermore, ex-President Arévalo recently appointed two persons, one an avowed Communist and the other a suspected Communist, as Government directors of the semi-autonomous Social Security Institute; the Government's radio station and official newspaper continue to reflect the *Pravda*-line; Government officials continue to associate themselves with such public demonstrations as the Communist-organized celebration of the Russian Revolution, beneath blown-up portraits of Lenin and Stalin and huge red banners prominently displaying the hammer and sickle; and, in spite of the constitutional provision for it, no action has been taken to disband the recently-formed Communist Party.

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[26] Col. Monzón had been Minister of Interior.

[27] Alvaro Hugo Salguero.

The ground work, however, has at least been laid for recognizing and eliminating the Communists since they have come into the open to some degree, and their methods of exploiting nationalistic causes have become evident. How much of this is due to our policies to isolate and expose the Communists, and how much is due to circumstances beyond our control cannot clearly be evaluated. It would be an error to assume that our policies have been more important than (or even as important as) other factors which have influenced this situation; for example, the international situation resulting from the Communist invasion of South Korea,[28] election-year politics, the effect within Guatemala of the increasingly bad press in the United States, etc.

This does not mean, however, that our policies were not correct. They were appropriate to the conditions prevailing in the last year and, furthermore, they properly recognized the need to encourage and permit Guatemala to work out her own problem so long as this did not pose an immediate or direct threat to the security of the United States or neighboring countries. Nothing would have harmed the overall U.S. interests more than the premature adoption of an overly aggressive policy. It would have furnished the Communist world with a valuable propaganda weapon, and would have done great harm to the Inter-American System, reviving mistrust of the United States and a fear of "dollar" and "big stick" diplomacy. In the next few months, however, should there be no concrete actions and evidence to substantiate the hope that the new administration will take steps to contain Communist influence, our policies should be reevaluated with a view to the adoption of a more positive approach.

2. We have not been successful in bringing about in Guatemala conditions which are favorable for the investment of U.S. capital. In spite of Guatemalan protestations to the contrary, the fact remains that their actions in regard to foreign capital do not bear out their words. There still remains an attitude of distrust on the part of U.S. interests already there, and a lack of interest in Guatemala by potential new investors. Examples are the United Fruit Company's abandonment of a proposed ten-million-dollar expansion program, and the withdrawal from Guatemala of all U.S. oil exploration companies.

So long as the Government of Guatemala remains influenced to a large degree by Communists and ultra-nationalists, favorable conditions for U.S. business will be virtually impossible of attainment. Our hope of long-run success lies in preventing a complete evacuation of U.S. interests by proper application of protection policies, and of inducing U.S. firms, by their own policies, to discredit the extremists and overcome the popular mistrust of their activities.

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[28] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 125 ff.

With respect to the protection of U.S. interests, it is believed that our representations have materially contributed to curbing the logical end of Communist and ultra-nationalist influence, i.e. the expropriation of U.S. interests or the carrying of unfair practices to such extremes as would have further impaired our relations with Guatemala by presenting this Government with a case of a denial of justice.

Our corollary policy of encouraging U.S. interests to adapt their operations to conditions in Guatemala, as a practical necessity for staying in business there, may have contributed to their proven willingness to meet the Guatemalan labor unions and the Government more than half way in seeking solutions to their problems. As an example of this willingness, the United Fruit Company has informed us that it plans to open negotiations with the new Government for a revision of their contract on terms which should be far more attractive to Guatemala. It also plans to initiate an extensive and modernly conceived public relations program.

3. Although it is often unenthusiastic, Guatemala generally supports the U.S. position in the UN. Also, the President and the Foreign Minister [29] have given public assurance that Guatemala would be on the side of the United States in the event of war. However, Guatemala does not have a genuine understanding of U.S. policy and its statements and acts of support do not stem from an ideological community of interest. They stem rather, in the most practical sense, from a recognition of Guatemala's geographic, economic, and power position in relation to the United States.

We believe, therefore, that in the event of war Guatemala would feel compelled to offer to the United States such use of her territory, including bases, as may be necessary in the free world defense. Should the influence of Communism proceed unchecked, however, it is not inconceivable that Guatemala might assert her sovereignty to preserve a neutral position. Such a position could well serve Communist ends especially if it provoked U.S. impatience and intervention.

Our programs to promote an appreciation of American life and an understanding of our policies among the people of Guatemala are popular and should have long-term beneficial results. However, there is little evidence that they have had much effect on Government policy and their good effects on the populace are generally limited and countered by anti-U.S. Communist propaganda.

On the positive side, Guatemala maintains full participation in the UN, in general association with the free world position, and she is an active member of the OAS. With respect to the OAS, however, Guatemala is the only state which, because of her reservation, has not completed ratification of the Rio Treaty. Guatemala remains therefore as

[29] Manuel Galich.

the only Republic in the Hemisphere which has not fully entered with the United States in this collective defense and regional arrangement.

Our policies, aimed at curbing unrest in the Caribbean, have been successful with respect to Guatemala. As a result of the OAS investigation, and the consequent action of the Organ of Consultation, Guatemala appears to have desisted for all practical purposes from supporting the Caribbean Legion or ancillary revolutionary and interventionist activities. The Legion has virtually ceased to exist as a force in being for lack of support by Guatemala and other countries, although members of the Legion continue to find haven in Guatemala and are continuing their scheming and propaganda against so-called tropical dictatorships.

4. Except in the long run, results obtainable from cooperative programs aimed at raising the standards of living, of health, education, etc., cannot accurately be evaluated. The most which can now be said is that such programs seem to be performing measurable good work. Likewise it is too early to assess the impact, if any, of our policy of not expanding cooperation under the Point IV program for the time being. In this connection it is worth noting that the effect which this policy might have on Guatemala is countered to some extent by her ability to obtain technical assistance from international organizations which are largely financed by the United States. The policy itself, however, is considered to be correct for the circumstances prevailing, so long as the recommended degree of flexibility is maintained, and so long as we continue efforts to reach the people through other available means.

5. Because of natural limitations, there has been little of a positive nature which our policies could contribute toward improving Guatemala as a source of supply of strategic materials. We should, however, press with greater vigor our desire to have Guatemala establish conditions which would be conducive to exploration and possible subsequent exploitation of petroleum and strategic minerals. Our success in this endeavor again will be largely determined by the extent to which Communists and ultra-nationalists are able to continue their influence within the Government.

6. Partly as a result of U.S. policy and legislative restrictions and partly as a result of the actual non-availability of materiel in the United States, the Guatemalan Army has not been able to achieve the strength in arms which it currently desires. It is, nonetheless, sufficiently well armed and equipped at this time to oppose effectively any threat which Communist-led elements in Guatemala could pit against it. There is reason, furthermore, to believe that the Guatemalan Army, more than civilian elements of the Government, is aware of the threat implied in Communist penetration, and of U.S. preoccupation with this threat.

To date, the ability of Guatemala to play its part in hemispheric defense has not been materially altered by this policy.

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250[1]

Paper Prepared for the Under Secretary's Meeting[2]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1951.

UM D–101/1

CURRENT RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA[3]

PROBLEM

To assess our current relations with Guatemala.

DISCUSSION

This paper follows a review of the United States relations with the Republic of Guatemala which was presented at the Under Secretary's meeting on May 29, 1950 (UM D–101)[4] and other papers and memoranda prepared periodically in ARA concerning the infiltration of communist elements into positions of power and influence in Guatemala. This paper is concerned with developments since the change of administration in Guatemala on March 15 of this year and does not attempt to retrace ground covered in previous studies, such as the gradual taking over of control of organized labor by the communists.

The three-month period since the inauguration of Jacobo Arbenz as President of Guatemala provides few indications to bear out hopes that the new President would take prompt action to reduce the influence on the Government and life of Guatemala of known communists and leftist extremists. On the contrary, communist elements appear, if anything, to have stepped up the pace of their efforts to consolidate the bases of their political and economic position in Guatemala and to be reaching out for more and more power.

It was always recognized that the infiltration of communist elements in Guatemalan life had reached sufficiently serious proportions as to compel the new Chief Executive to proceed cautiously, even assuming

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[1] Master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[2] The Under Secretary's meeting convened weekly; it was customarily attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and certain office directors. Under Secretary of State James E. Webb presided at these meetings.

[3] Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs; a detailed background, study, entitled "A Review of Communist Influence in Guatemala," dated May 31, 1951, is attached to the source text as Tab A, but not printed.

[4] Reference document, entitled "Current Relations With Guatemala." is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 897.

the best intentions on his part to clear up the situation. It must be admitted, however, that in Guatemala since March 15 of this year the ascending curve of communist influence has not even tended to level off, but has rather continued upward on an accelerated incline.

Although President Arbenz has made no public statements to indicate a pro-communist or extremist policy, he has made numerous appointments of communists and extreme leftists to important and strategic positions in the Government. The Foreign Minister and the Minister of Education [5] are far left in their views and have consistently cooperated with the communists since taking office. Both, together with a third member of the cabinet and the President of the National Congress,[6] are reported recently to have signed the communist "peace" manifesto.

The National Electoral Board is now controlled by communist elements, with active pro-communists having been appointed to two of its three seats. The labor unions are now firmly in the grip of communist and extremist leadership; and the important Guatemalan Institute of Social Security has been practically taken over, the Administrator [7] being one of the most dangerous communists in the country.

The volume of communist propaganda has grown markedly during the past years. Its effectiveness is increased by the enthusiastic support it receives from the Government radio station and the official and semi-official newspapers. Communist-line editorials and campaigns on the Korean situation and on political and economic issues of local, continental, and world application are featured regularly in public opinion media financed wholly or in part by Government funds.

Since April of this year the Communist Party of Guatemala has operated openly despite the provision by the constitution which prohibits the formation of a political organization of "international or foreign character".

Communists of international importance are welcomed in Guatemala, and the pro-Government press delights in pointing out that, while they are denied visas to many other countries, they are free to come and go in Guatemala as they like. Louis Saillant, Secretary General of the WFTU, came from France in May for a Latin American transport workers' conference which was attended by communist labor leaders from all over the hemisphere. Communist political and economic themes were featured throughout the meeting. Four Guatemalan cabinet ministers sat on the platform at the opening session, which was held in an auditorium made available by the Government.

American interests in Guatemala are being hard pressed by extremist labor demands, sparked by communist leaders and by the open parti-

[5] Héctor Morgan García.
[6] Roberto Alvarado Fuentes.
[7] Alfonso Solórzano Fernández.

sanship of the Government, which goes so far as to ignore the labor code and laws when necessary and to support the union position even in such extreme cases as illegal strikes. International Railways of Central America (IRCA) appears to be in imminent danger of expropriation. The United Fruit Company is continually being subjected to harassing work stoppages and extreme demands and threats backed by Government pressure.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In recent months, due to the increasing influence of communist elements in Guatemala and the continued failure of the Guatemalan Government to face the issue squarely, we have been in the process of adapting our policies towards more direct counter-action of leftist trends. In this connection, we have had to bear constantly in mind that Guatemalan political history and social development requires us to move with great care in an effort to expose and isolate communists there and destroy their power. Nothing would harm overall interests of the United States in Guatemala more than the premature employment of overly agressive measures with respect to Guatemalan internal matters. The communists would be furnished with a valuable weapon throughout Latin America and would be able to do great harm to the inter-American system through a revival of mistrust in the United States and fears of a return to the days of unilateral intervention and "big-stick" diplomacy. In the light of these conditions the followed [*following?*] policies are recommended:

1. Under present policy this Government will refrain from supplying aid to Guatemala which it is not under positive obligation to furnish. No Point IV Umbrella Agreement is being signed with Guatemala, and Guatemala has been deleted from the list of countries being proposed to Congress for increased technical assistance aid. It is not contemplated that Guatemala will be the recipient of any military grant funds that may be made available by Congress, and it is not proposed that Guatemala be assigned a defense role by the Inter-American Defense Board.

2. With respect to technical missions already operating in the country, the agricultural mission is being maintained at present strength; proposed plans for its expansion have been postponed. Technical personnel furnished by IIAA to the large Roosevelt Hospital project under an agreement dating from 1942 has been substantially reduced in view of the dilatory tactics of the Guatemalans in making further funds available for completion of the hospital. Since the United States investment in this project amounts to more than $2 million, we do not wish to withdraw entirely before completion if that can be avoided.

3. No change is proposed in the status of our military ground and air missions in Guatemala in the belief that they constitute a valuable link between the United States and Guatemalan military establishments, the latter being considered predominantly anti-communist. For some months now Guatemalan requests for arms and munitions have

been denied, and we are currently engaged in an effort to prevent the sale to Guatemala by Italy of surplus airplanes. The only exception to this policy on arms would be in instances where the request is for a nominal quantity and where favorable action would seem necessary for the continuance of the status of our military missions.

4. The Department will oppose any Export-Import Bank or World Bank loans to Guatemala unless the loan is related to the production or transportation of strategic materials which would directly serve United States interests. In this connection the extension of financial and technical assistance by international agencies which the United States does not unilaterally control represents a real problem. For instance, UNESCO has now signed a contract with Guatemala to provide educational assistance of the type being given by our IIAA mission when it was forced to withdraw. There are other examples in this field. This problem is now under consideration.

5. We have withdrawn plans for allocating for work in Guatemala $2.4 million of the current $4 million appropriation for the Inter-American Highway. This allocation, which is connected with the construction of an important 20-mile gap to connect Guatemala with the Mexican highway system, will be reviewed later in the year.

6. We hope to avoid signing a new agreement with Guatemala at this time for the continuation of the rubber development project there. Plans for expanding abacá production (the Guatemalan project is production-wise perhaps the most successful in Central America) are being postponed for the present. Decisions on these projects can be delayed until the end of the year without harm to future development.

7. With respect to the growing list of items being placed under export control, we are now considering with the Department of Commerce the possibilities of setting quotas and allocations for Guatemala at levels relatively lower than those for other countries in the area and at the lowest point justifiable on an historical trade pattern.

It is not contemplated that there will be any announcement of the above policies. Since candid tactics in seeking to convince Guatemalan officials of the danger of communism to Guatemala and the Hemisphere have been shown to be ineffective, it is considered important that we refrain from stating officially or privately that our actions are related to internal conditions in Guatemala. Whenever it becomes necessary to explain our inability to accede to some official request, we should plead technical reasons. Delays in shipments of needed materials would be blamed on the critical world situation and other reasons connected with the defense of democracy. Guatemalans should be left to make their own deductions, and we would attempt to insure that at no time would Guatemalan officials have any tangible grounds on which to accuse the United States of discriminating against Guatemala for political reasons or of attempting to intervene in her internal affairs.

It is believed that the United States Government should avoid any final or rigid position at this time. It is important to maintain sufficient flexibility in our policies to permit adjustments as changing conditions may dictate. We shall have greater opportunity to influence the situa-

tion in Guatemala if the Guatemalans feel they have something to hope for and, alternatively, something to forfeit.

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250

Notes of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Department of State, 10:15 a. m., June 15, 1951

SECRET

UM N–357

[Here follow a list of those persons present (21) and discussion of a matter unrelated to Guatemala.]

Current Relations with Guatemala (UM D–101/1)

5. Mr. Mann [1] reviewed the document and gave a background summary on conditions and developments in Guatemala. He pointed out that Latin America is in the throes of a social revolution. He noted that the communists in Guatemala are small in number, but they control strong anti-U.S. elements and nationalist groups. The army is the key to the situation in Guatemala and it is divided. The army is held together by a desire to avoid a dictatorship and some elements are worried about the communists. Within the last 30 days, ARA has decided that it is advisable to apply certain economic pressures. They have started by shifting the work on the Inter-American Highway from Guatemala, and they have reduced the work on a hospital in that country. They have talked to Commerce about reducing the exports to Guatemala. Mr. Mann felt that economic pressures would be effective since 85 percent of Guatemala's exports are sold in this country and 85 percent of their imports come from the United States. He emphasized that we should proceed quietly since this proposed policy is, in effect, a violation of the Non-intervention Agreement [2] to which we are a party. He pointed out that this policy has a risk involved, because the Non-intervention Agreement is a corner-stone of our Latin-American foreign policy. If it became obvious that we were violating this agreement, other Latin American governments would rally to the support of Guatemala. This would strengthen the hands of the nationalists and communists in that country. He pointed out that these proposed actions would be the first of its kind since the establishment of the Good Neighbor policy. He emphasized again that these steps should be handled quietly, and that each one should be justified on technical grounds.

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[1] Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[2] For a pertinent statement concerning the principle of non-intervention in Latin America, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 629–630.

6. Mr. Thurston [3] said that he deplored the use of coercive measures, but he believed that the conditions in Guatemala called for corrective policies. He felt that ARA's proposals were not intemperate and might be effective. He suggested that it might be wise later to obtain support of other Latin American countries.

7. Mr. Matthews [4] asked whether Latin America was more alive to the danger of U.S. intervention than communism. Mr. Mann agreed that this was true and said that this represented one of the dangers in the policy proposed. He pointed out that we have talked to people on the Hill, and Congressman McCormack [5] states that he would back us on our policy toward Guatemala.

8. Mr. Martin [6] pointed out that when we were faced with the same problem in Italy we tried to reduce unemployment. It appeared to him that we were proposing an increase of unemployment in Guatemala in handling the same problem. Mr. Webb asked whether the government would change after some of these economic pressures are applied. Mr. Mann felt that the situation in Guatemala would get worse instead of better and that the communists would fight in order to retain their power. They are in a position to do this because they are well organized and have arms. We hope, however, that the center and right elements in Guatemala will see that it is necessary to get together and clean their own house. Their pocketbooks will be affected by our moves and this may stimulate action against the communists.

9. Mr. MacKnight [7] pointed out an inconsistency which disturbed him from a propaganda point of view. He noted that on page 6 of D–101/1 [8] it is suggested that we should explain our inability to meet official requests on technical grounds. Later, it is noted that we should influence Guatemala so that the people feel that they have something to hope for. He felt that it would be difficult to give them a spark of hope when we were denying them so many things. He pointed out that this was a difficult propaganda position. Mr. Mann pointed out that the right and center elements in Guatemala feel that we have supported the communists and when it becomes apparent that we are not doing so they will come to our side. Mr. MacKnight suggested that the apparent inconsistency which he noted on page 6 should be clarified.

10. Mr. McGhee [9] felt that the ARA proposal was a good one. He believed that we should withhold favors to a country which is man-

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[3] Walter Thurston, Policy Planning Staff.
[4] H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State.
[5] Representative John W. McCormack (D–Mass.), House Majority Leader.
[6] Edwin M. Martin, Director, Office of Regional European Affairs.
[7] Jessie M. MacKnight, Special Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
[8] *Supra.*
[9] George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

aged by the communists. It would show the Guatemalans, as well as other peoples, that we are standing up for things in which we believe. Mr. McGhee felt the only criterion was whether it would work. He also suggested that the Kem Amendment [10] might be of value in this case as well as many others.

11. Mr. Hickerson [11] agreed with ARA's proposal that we should use UN organizations and measures wherever possible to support our policies. He said that he was working with ARA in this regard. However, he asked whether ARA planned to use independent organizations to assist us in Guatemala. He pointed out that we used trade unions, labor representatives, and organizations of other governments in our campaign against communism in Italy and France. He also suggested that church groups could be used effectively to help us on our policy. Specifically, he pointed out that it is planned to send an ILO team to Guatemala. He suggested that instead of dragging our feet on this proposal we should back it, provided the right people are included on the delegation. He felt that if good, anti-communist individuals were included on the team they would be able to get in touch with the right and center groups in Guatemala and do us a lot of good. Mr. Mann pointed out that the people who control the labor unions in Guatemala are communists. Mr. Hickerson recognized this fact, but felt that leaders from outside Guatemala could influence important groups in Guatemala who are anti-communist. Mr. Webb felt that Mr. Hickerson's suggestion was a good one and Mr. Mann agreed to work on this idea.

12. Mr. Hickerson was afraid that the approach proposed by ARA might harden public opinion unless it were handled very carefully. Mr. Webb agreed and asked whether we could do something in the propaganda field but still avoid the appearance of intervention. Mr. Mann pointed out that we have been working with the AP and UP to get them to cable factual information on events in Guatemala. Mr. Webb pointed out that it was necessary to combine the political, economic, and psychological forces in order to accomplish our objectives in any country, including Guatemala.

13. Mr. Mann stated that the suggestions made were good ones and would be taken into account by ARA.

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[10] The Kem Amendment (Section 1302 of Public Law 45, Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, approved June 2, 1951), so-named after Senator James P. Kem of Missouri, directed that all economic and financial assistance must be withheld from any country which exported strategic materials to Communist-bloc nations. For text of the amendment, see 65 Stat. 63.

[11] John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

611.14/7–3051

The Secretary of State to the Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce (Macy)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 30, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. MACY: As you may be aware, the Department has for some time been seriously concerned with the infiltration of communist elements into positions of power and influence in the Republic of Guatemala. In recent months, their activity has been markedly increased. The new Administration of Colonel Arbenz, which in its pre-inauguration period gave some promise of exercising a moderate influence, has so far been unwilling or unable to act against the communists. Consequently, the Department recently saw fit to review its policy towards Guatemala and, as a result, adopted certain measures designed to persuade that government that its best interests do not lie in the perpetuation of its present attitudes.

The measures covered in this policy include the withholding from Guatemala of those types of assistance which the United States is not obliged to render, the suspension of United States investment on the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala, no expansion of technical assistance under the Point IV Program, a selective curtailment on the selling of United States arms and ammunition to the Guatemalan Armed Forces, opposition to any loans to Guatemala by the United States or international lending agencies, and the application of economic pressure on Guatemala through this Government's controls on the allocation and export of scarce materials. Implementation of this last-mentioned phase would of course require the cooperation of the Department of Commerce. Conversations held with Mr. George Wythe [1] have revealed definite practical possibilities for action.

Procedurally, the Department envisages the establishment of quotas and allocations for Guatemala, from the growing list of commodities subject to export controls, at levels relatively lower than those for comparable countries in the area and at the lowest point justifiable on an historic trade and/or consumption basis. This action should result in initial pressure, forcing Guatemala to return with special requests for quota enlargement, priority assistance, etc. Failure to meet such requests as well as delays in the shipment of approved materials will be attributed on our part to the critical world situation and other technical and procedural reasons better known to the experts in your Department. The Guatemalans will be left to draw their own deductions, and we will attempt to insure that at no time will their officials have any tangible grounds on which to accuse the United States of discriminating against Guatemala for political reasons or of attempting to

[1] Director, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.

intervene in her internal affairs. To achieve this purpose it will be necessary, from time to time, to give partial or full satisfaction to certain requests. This will prevent Guatemala from being able, by comparison with other countries, to document a case proving that the United States is applying economic sanctions against it. It must be accepted that United States interests in Guatemala, such as the United Fruit Company, the railroad, etc., will, to a certain extent, suffer a pinch on their needs about equivalent to that suffered by the Guatemalan economy in general.

I know that you will agree that it is of the utmost importance that this policy be made effective in the strictest secrecy; as, were it to become known to Guatemala, the repercussions would be far-reaching and might well prejudice the best interests of this country and its relations with other nations. The Department, therefore, believes that the necessary information of what this policy consists of should be restricted to the several key officers in the Department of Commerce who would be entrusted with its implementation.

I hope that the Department of Commerce will agree to lend its cooperation in this matter and would appreciate receiving your views and recommendations. A resumé of the procedure to be followed with reference to the allocation and export of controlled materials to Guatemala would be most helpful to officers in the Department who will have liaison with the appropriate officials of the Office of International Trade.[2]

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.[3]
Assistant Secretary

[2] No reply to this letter was found in the files of the Department of State or the Department of Commerce, but see the memorandum of conversation, by Edward W. Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs, dated December 18, 1951, p. 1448.

[3] Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250

Notes of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Department of State, 9:30 a.m., October 3, 1951

SECRET

UM N–402

[Here follow a list of those persons present (20) and discussion of matters unrelated to Guatemala.]

Situation in Guatemala

3. Ambassador Schoenfeld reviewed the current political and economic situation in Guatemala. He reported that the political situation is obscure and inconsistent. There is a latent antagonism towards the

U.S. The new President is leftist in labor matters but is not a Communist. He is not as antagonistic towards the U.S. as others might have been. However, he is surrounded by many leaders who are basically antagonistic towards the U.S. The Communists and extreme leftists are in key positions and occupy positions of strength in the labor movement. Very few of these leaders understand communism, but they have adapted themselves to communist discipline.

4. The church is a potential ally of the U.S. but its power has been shattered. The army is also a potential ally but the Ambassador has not seen great political acumen in the military organization. The substantial classes in Guatemala take no interest in politics.

5. Ambassador Schoenfeld reported that if the problem with the United Fruit Company is not settled properly, the present Guatemalan administration, as well as the entire country, would be wrecked. Our greatest problem in Guatemala is our own psychological adjustment of playing an intermediate role. We must do things invisibly and this requires great experience. At the present time, however, our staff in Guatemala is very new and has not built up the necessary experience in that country. We must attempt to take apart the communist core in Guatemala without affecting the present administration and our general Latin American policy.

6. The problem with the United Fruit Company began as a wage problem, when the company stated that they were unable to increase the wages of the workers. Before the wage contract expired, the workers asked for a wage increase, but the labor court suggested that they continue to use the present contract. Recent disastrous storms have ruined the United Fruit banana farms which has made a wage increase impossible. About the same time the dock workers asked for more money. The question now facing the United Fruit Company is whether they should attempt to rehabilitate the area, or whether it is economically sound for them to continue to operate in Guatemala. Unless this problem is handled with great care, the country will go to pieces. The country at the present time is in serious financial difficulties with Standard Oil and others. Nationalization of the banana farms is a possibility because of the peculiar economic theories which are expounded by some of the leaders in Guatemala. Ambassador Schoenfeld felt that it would be disastrous for Guatemala, as well as for US-Guatemalan relations, if the United Fruit Company left. This is especially true in Guatemala, but also what is done in Guatemala will affect the surrounding countries. The Ambassador emphasized that any visible interference by the U.S. would bring the latent antagonism against the U.S. to the surface.

[Here follows discussion of Guatemala's signature of the Japanese peace treaty and another matter unrelated to Guatemala.]

814.20/11–1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward W. Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1951.

Subject: United Fruit Company Negotiations With the Guatemalan Government.

Participants: ARA—Mr. Miller
Mr. Mann
MID—Ambassador Nufer,[1] Mr. Clark
Representatives of the United Fruit Company:
Mr. Jefferson Coolidge
Mr. Montgomery
Mr. McGovern
Mr. Robert LaFollette

Mr. Coolidge said that the situation with regard to the Fruit Company's negotiations with the Guatemalan Government had changed since they had made the appointment to call on Mr. Miller. He said that on November 10 the Minister of Economy and Labor [2] had replied to the Company's letter of October 18 and had set forth the minimum conditions under which the Guatemalan Government would negotiate with the Company. Mr. Coolidge said that while the answer had been reasonably satisfactory from the point of view of the Company's request for assistance in labor matters, in all other respects it failed to give the guarantees deemed necessary by the Company. On the following day, therefore, Mr. Coolidge said, the Company had addressed a letter to the Minister informing him that since the Government's ideas and those of the Company concerning the possible settlement of difficulties were obviously so far apart, the Company saw no useful purpose that could be served in continuing negotiations. He said that it was at this point, when it seemed that there was no longer any possibility of reaching agreement with the Guatemalan Government, that they had made the appointment with Mr. Miller.

Mr. Coolidge then went on to say that in the meantime there had been a new and important development. He said that when President Arbenz was informed of the Company's letter, he called in his Minister of Economy and demanded to know what had happened and why the Company thought the Government's position was too extreme. He ordered the Minister of Economy to find out from the Company what objections they had to the Guatemalan Government's proposals. Mr. Coolidge said that the President's quick action had come as a surprise to the Company, which nevertheless interpreted it as an encouraging sign. He said the Company was presently drawing up a letter which

[1] Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs.
[2] Manuel Noriega Morales.

would set forth in specific terms what its objections were to the Government's proposals. He said that it was, of course, too early to tell what the results of this new development would be but they at least today saw some possibility of making progress with the Government whereas yesterday it had seemed that negotiations had broken down completely.

Mr. Miller inquired in what way the Government's proposals fell short of meeting the Company's requirements. Mr. Coolidge stated that the Guatemalan proposals had not offered any guarantee against exchange control measures and had not given guarantees that Guatemala would not pass any laws during the next three years which would further increase the Company's production costs. Mr. Miller asked if the currency in Guatemala was not freely exchangeable with the dollar. Mr. Coolidge admitted that it was but said that this was a standard clause which the Company had in all its contracts with other Central American countries except Panama. Ambassador Nufer asked if the Company's position that it could not stand any raise in costs was rigid. Mr. Coolidge replied that probably the Company could stand an increase of up to ten per cent without too much harm.

Mr. Mann asked if insisting that Guatemala bind itself not to pass any laws which would affect the Company's operations did not conflict with the Government's sovereign rights. Mr. Montgomery said that this did not necessarily follow, declaring that in his opinion it would be possible for the Government to make such a guarantee without impairing its sovereignty.

Mr. Coolidge said that the disagreement between the Company and the Puerto Barrios dock workers was rapidly reaching a crisis and that early next week a compulsory arbitration award by the labor court in Puerto Barrios unfavorable to the Company was expected. If this were to happen it would be bound to have an adverse effect on the present negotiations with the Government. Mr. Clark asked if President Arbenz' apparent concern with the trend the negotiations were taking might not have an effect on the outcome of the Puerto Barrios dispute. Mr. Coolidge said that this was an interesting point which would bear watching.

Ambassador Nufer said that it seemed to him that much depended, especially at this particular time, on how the negotiations were conducted by the Company. He agreed that President Arbenz' quick action seemed to be an encouraging sign but thought the Company would be well advised to answer to the Minister's request in a spirit of friendly cooperation. The language of the Company's reply might be equally as important as the content. Mr. Coolidge and the other Company officials said they were in full agreement with this view.

Mr. Mann asked whether if the Government signed an agreement with the Company similar to those in Honduras and Costa Rica, the

Company would then publish financial figures on the Company's operations in Guatemala. Mr. Coolidge said that the Company would not be obliged to do so but he personally favored the idea. Mr. Mann remarked that the apparent reluctance of the Company to publish its financial figures made a bad impression since it led people to the assumption that the Company was making so much money that the release of the figures would be embarrassing. This in turn permitted demagogues to claim that the Company was making one hundred per cent per year on its investment and the Guatemalan people were prepared to believe it. Mr. Mann then discussed the operations of the oil companies in Venezuela where by cutting the Government in for a 50–50 share of the net profits, they insured that the Government would be vitally interested in the success of the Company's operations. He suggested that some such similar arrangement, which would tend to make the company's and the Government's interests mutual, might well be considered by the Company.

Mr. Mann asked if the Company wished to have the Department's comments on the letter which the Company was now drafting to the Minister of Economy. Mr. Coolidge said that he would be pleased to let the Department have a look at the letter before it was signed.[3]

[3] Negotiations concerning wage disputes and other labor problems between the United Fruit Company and the Guatemalan Government continued intermittently into 1952. Pertinent documents are in Department of State files 814.053, 814.06, and 814.20.

814.2614/12–1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward W. Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1951.

Subject: Priority Assistance for Ebasco [1] in Guatemala

Participants: Mr. Koppelmann, Vice President of Ebasco
ARA—Mr. Mann
MID—Mr. Siracusa [2]
Mr. Clark

Mr. Koppelmann explained his Company's plans for expansion of its power plant facilities in Guatemala. He said they had given up the idea of obtaining a loan from the Export–Import Bank since they had been unsuccessful in getting the Guatemalan Government to guarantee such a loan. They had instead raised the necessary capital from private sources in the United States and in Guatemala. He said that the power facilities of the Company were greatly over taxed and that the plant was operating at a maximum capacity at all times.

[1] Ebasco International Corporation.
[2] Ernest V. Siracusa, Officer in Charge, Central America and Panama Affairs.

This was dangerous and expanded facilities were therefore necessary. Some time ago the Company had placed an order with the General Electric Company for a large power generator, a hydraulic turbin, and other needed equipment but there had been indications recently that the order was being held up by the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce. Mr. Koppelmann stated that the purpose of his visit was to try to find out what the exact status was of the equipment on order as far as the United States Government was concerned.

Mr. Mann, after reviewing the situation in Guatemala regarding communist penetration and the attitude of the Guatemalan Government toward the United States, especially toward United States business interests, outlined in general terms what the United States Government was endeavoring to do to cope with this problem. He stressed that the cooperation of private business was necessary if our policy was to be successful. In the long run, he said, it was the hope of the Department that, if the experiment in Guatemala should be successful, it would have a salutary effect on the way in which all countries in Latin America, not only Guatemala, treated United States business interests. He said that some or all United States companies doing business in Guatemala might have to suffer somewhat because of our present policy but he said that it was the Department's belief that in the long run United States interests in Latin America generally would benefit.

With regard to the specific matter at hand, i.e., the equipment which Mr. Koppelmann's company needed for expansion, a defense order, which in effect meant priority assistance, was necessary. The Department's opinion had been asked by the OIT and, because of the prevailing situation in Guatemala, the needs of the defense effort and those of countries more friendly to the United States, the Department had not been able to recommend to the OIT that priority assistance be granted for expansion of power facilities in Guatemala. Mr. Mann said that he realized that while this might make it difficult for the company, it would also have an adverse effect on Guatemala and the Guatemalan economy.

Mr. Koppelmann stated that he understood the position of the Department and of the United States Government but of course regretted that his company's plans for expansion had to suffer. He said it would be helpful, in the probable event that the Company were attacked if there were power failures, to have some sort of a letter from the Department which would indicate that the company had tried to obtain the necessary equipment but had not been able to get it because of the defense effort. Mr. Mann said that the authority for approving or denying applications for priority assistance lay with the OIT and the National Production Authority and not with the Department but

he thought that one or the other of these organizations could issue such a letter. He asked Mr. Clark to look into this matter.

The need for treating the information given Mr. Koppelmann regarding United States policy toward Guatemala on a strictly confidential basis was emphasized. Mr. Koppelmann stated that he understood the necessity for this and his cooperation and that of his company could be depended upon.

Note: Mr. Wythe of the OIT has agreed to send an appropriately worded letter [3] to Ebasco per Mr. Koppelmann's request.

[3] No copy of such a letter was found in the Department of State files.

814.00–TA/12–3151 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Guatemala

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 31, 1951.

A–103. The Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165—82nd Congress) approved by the Congress on October 10, 1951,[1] contains two provisions which the Director [2] of the Mutual Security Program [3] has determined apply to the technical cooperation program in the other American republics.[4]

These two provisions are as follows:

"Section 511(b) No economic or technical assistance shall be supplied to any other nation unless the President finds that the supplying of such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace, and unless the recipient country has agreed to join in promoting international understanding and good will, and in maintaining world peace, and to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension.

"Section 515 All countries participating in any United States aid program or in any international organization receiving United States aid shall be required to so deposit, segregate, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any program so that the same shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization, or government when in the opinion of the Director any such action would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of this Act."

Another section of the Act requires that the recipient countries must agree to the provisions of Section 511(b) within ninety days after passage of the Act (i.e. on or before January 8, 1952) or the assistance must be terminated.

[1] For text, see 65 Stat. 373.
[2] W. Averell Harriman.
[3] For documentation on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.
[4] For documentation on the technical assistance policy of the United States toward the Latin American Republics as a group, see pp. 1038 ff.

As you are aware the Point IV Agricultural Mission has been operating in Guatemala without an agreement for a year and a half—the Rubber Development Program for approximately six months. Continuation of the programs in this manner was agreed to as a temporary expedient by the administrator of the technical cooperation program even though it did not strictly conform to general procedure established pursuant to the Point IV legislation passed by Congress. As you will recall, the Department had a dual motive in adopting this procedure. On the one hand it did not wish to extend to Guatemala the full measure of cooperation that it was offering to more friendly nations; and, on the other hand, the existing state of affairs in Guatemala was recognized as being fluid and the Department did not deem it wise to terminate long-range programs which were doing good work (one of them on a commodity of strategic value to the United States) and which might be utilized to good purpose in its efforts to influence developments in Guatemala. Nevertheless a limitation was placed on technical cooperation in Guatemala to the effect that no new programs would be introduced and no existing programs would be expanded.

Because of the continuing atmosphere of hostility in Guatemala toward the United States and United States interests, the Department has increasingly over the last several months come to doubt that the interests of the United States are being served by the continuation of our programs in Guatemala. No final decision on their withdrawal has been taken, however, as you are aware. Nevertheless, pending a final decision, the Department now feels that the programs in Guatemala must be placed on the same footing as those in other countries with the Government of Guatemala formally undertaking to meet the requirements stipulated in all applicable technical assistance legislation.

In view of the foregoing, if the existing technical assistance programs are to be continued, it will be necessary to negotiate and conclude in the immediate future agreements covering the Agriculture and Rubber Programs. While the January 8, 1952 deadline referred to above is not to be considered inflexible and may be extended, the agreements will nevertheless have to be concluded as soon as possible. These agreements must embody the conditions required by Congress in legislation relating to technical assistance, which are those set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed draft of a note regarding the Rubber Development Program which was forwarded to you under cover of instruction No. 18 of October 4, 1951 [5] and the two provisions of the MSA quoted above.

With regard to the two provisions of the MSA it is suggested that Section 511(b) be incorporated in the agreements in the form of a preamble as follows:

[5] Not printed.

PREAMBLE

"Considering that the peoples of the United States and of Guatemala have a common interest in economic and social progress and that their cooperative efforts to exchange technical knowledge and skills will assist in achieving that objective, and

"Considering that the interchange of technical knowledge and skills will strengthen the mutual security of both peoples, and develop their resources in the interest of maintaining their security and independence, and

"Considering that the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Guatemala have agreed to join in promoting international understanding and good will and in maintaining world peace, and to undertake such action as they may mutually agree upon to eliminate causes for international tension."

The Embassy will note that the language used to comply with the requirements of Section 511(b) is similar, and in some cases almost word for word, to language embodying commitments which Latin American countries have made from time to time in such treaties and agreements as the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States,[6] and most recently in resolutions at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[7] The Department suggests, therefore, that the Embassy may want to approach the Guatemalan Government on the basis that these provisions are simply a restatement of existing commitments.

As noted above, Section 515 of the Mutual Security Act requires all countries receiving assistance to give assurances regarding garnishment, attachment, seizure, etc. This section was enacted out of concern by Congress over the type of situation which arose when funds intended for assistance to Greece were attached in Belgium in the course of the past year. It is recognized that in certain situations attachments are possible on United States foreign aid funds wherever there is an assistance program of any kind in any area. Thus, it is deemed necessary to ask all the countries to agree to the anti-attachment provision which is considered the minimum step which must be taken now in order to comply with the statute. It is suggested that Section 515 be incorporated in the agreements as an article as follows:

ARTICLE

"The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Guatemala will so deposit, segregate, or assure title to all

[6] For text of the Charter, signed at Bogotá, Colombia, April 30, 1948, and entered into force for the United States, December 13, 1951, see TIAS No. 2361, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2, (pt. 2), p. 2394.

[7] For documentation concerning the Fourth Meeting of Consultation, held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951, see pp. 925 ff.; for text of the Final Act of the meeting, containing resolutions adopted, see Pan American Union, *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Held in Washington, D.C. March 26–April 7, 1951: Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), pp. 234–268.

funds allocated to or derived from any program of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government when the Government of Guatemala is advised by the Government of the United States that such legal process would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the program of assistance."

The Department recognizes that the language suggested above may be too stylized in the event you should consider it appropriate or necessary to keep the negotiations on a more informal plane. The Department is therefore prepared to give sympathetic consideration to such changes in language as you may suggest, provided that they do not alter the sense of the MSA provisions in question.

If in your opinion negotiation of these agreements is not feasible at this time and you believe it would be harmful to over-all United States policy toward Guatemala to endeavor so to negotiate, there will be no other alternative than to inform the Guatemalan Government that present technical assistance missions will have to be terminated in the near future. The Department would prefer, however, and hopes that this procedure will be possible, that an attempt at negotiation be made in order that, should the negotiations be unsuccessful, the onus for termination of the programs should rest on the Guatemalan Government because it was unable or unwilling to accept conditions which have been agreed to by most other countries in the world.

As agreed while you [8] were recently in the Department on consultation (reference memoranda of conversation dated October 10 and 11, 1951 [9] regarding the Agricultural and Rubber programs, respectively), the decision regarding which Ministry to negotiate with (Foreign Office, Agriculture, INFOP [10]) and by what instrument (agreement, exchange of notes, exchange of letters) will be left to your discretion. The timing, however, can now be discretionary only within the limits described above.

It will also be necessary to negotiate with the Guatemalan Government to amend by appropriate means the existing IIAA Roosevelt Hospital Agreements to include the new MSA requirements. It is considered that the other assurances required by legislation pertaining to technical assistance are adequately provided for in the existing Roosevelt Hospital agreements.

Please keep the Department informed of the status of any negotiations you may undertake as a result of this instruction.

ACHESON

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[8] Ambassador Schoenfeld.
[9] Neither printed.
[10] Institute de Fomento de la Producción (Production Development Institute).

HAITI

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI[1]

611.38/4–1651

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1951.

HAITI

A. OBJECTIVES

Our objectives with particular reference to Haiti are: 1) to obtain the Haitian Government's support in efforts to promote inter-American and worldwide peace and prosperity; 2) to encourage developments in Haitian national life and internal affairs which will contribute to Haiti's becoming a more stable and effective democracy; 3) to raise living standards and improve economic conditions in Haiti, where such conditions are particularly bad; 4) to encourage the maintenance of internal order and the ability of Haiti to contribute to Caribbean defense in a future military emergency; 5) to promote mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of Haiti and the United States in, the light of the history of United States military intervention in Haiti and racial attitudes in the United States; and 6) to improve relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

B. POLICIES

United States relations with Haiti have special significance because United States intervention in Haiti was more prolonged that in any other country, because Haiti is the only Negro republic in the hemisphere, and because Haiti has probably the poorest economy and the lowest living standards of any of the American republics. Haiti was one of the Caribbean countries whose weakness and political immaturity prompted United States' "benevolent intervention", with Marine occupation from 1915 to 1934, to prevent irresponsible financial management, disorder, and violence which might have impelled some other power to intervene on behalf of its nationals. The United States' attitudes and policies toward Haiti are therefore peculiarly susceptible

[1] For previous documentation concerning United States relations with Haiti, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 932 ff.

of being construed as a test of our adherence to democratic ideals and to the principle of juridical equality of states.

With a density of population not exceeded elsewhere in the other American republics, mountainous terrain, eroded and leached soil, a retarded economy and culture, and a history of chronic political instability, the prospects for notable progress and improvement in Haiti are not very encouraging. These conditions afford a potential opportunity for a communist minority to create chaotic conditions or a diversionary disturbance in a possible future emergency.

Almost twenty years of tutelage left Haitians with the feeling that Haiti's problems should be of special interest and concern to the United States and that we should feel a moral responsibility for their solution. Haitian authorities have frequently criticized the United States for not giving more financial and technical aid to Haiti, but when financial aid has been given they have on occasion alleged that its results have been ineffective, if not harmful to Haiti. The tendency of most Haitian administrations has been to endeavor to modify or nullify commitments made by their predecessors, and the Haitian Government has at times requested that Haiti be relieved of all or part of the financial obligations incurred in connection with United States assistance. While the United States has arranged substantial debt moratoria or extensions for Haiti, we have felt that consideration of exceptional measures for cancellation or reduction of debts should be resisted in principle in order gradually to encourage development of Haitian national responsibility.

The problem of development of reasonably responsible self-government in the Negro republic is complicated, paradoxically, by an always present and at times intense social and political hatred between the mulatto minority, which is the traditional economic and cultural elite, and the black majority, which has recently developed an elite of its own. There are racial complications in US-Haitian relations. Many black and mulatto Haitians of the elite groups regard United States Negroes as inferiors because Haitians have a traditional inheritance of French culture and because they won independence for themselves instead of being liberated by others.

In endeavoring to achieve the first stated of our objectives vis-à-vis Haiti, it is our policy to make known to the Haitian Government our international objectives and our views on specific international problems demanding action. Haiti has in general collaborated with the United States in the Organization of American States, as well as in the United Nations. In the latter organization, Haiti has displayed particular interest in questions involving human rights and dependent areas. The views of Haiti with respect to problems affecting dependent areas are similar to those of other Latin American countries who have extreme anti-imperialistic views on colonial matters. Liaison between

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the Foreign Office and delegations to the General Assembly has at times been bad, resulting in conflict between the views of the Haitian Government, and the position taken by the Haitian delegation. However, some improvement has been effected recently, and the attitude of the Government of Haiti on major international problems ordinarily coincides with that of the United States.

At the request of the Haitian Government, a United Nations Economic Mission visited Haiti in 1948 to study its over-all economic situation and make recommendations. While we were interested in this project and its findings, particularly in connection with Point Four activities in Haiti, we refrained from sponsoring or in any way becoming actively associated with it. Haiti has since demonstrated an active interest in obtaining technical assistance from the UN and there is a UN resident commissioner for technical assistance in Haiti. UNESCO has also undertaken a pilot project in fundamental education in Haiti, in the success of which we are interested, despite the great difficulties which have impeded its progress to date. It is our policy to refrain from endeavoring to enter those fields of technical assistance in which Haiti prefers to have such assistance from the UN, and to avoid duplication and overlapping of functions.

Haiti has on several occasions contributed to a testing and strengthening of OAS peace machinery, by referring to it disputes with the Dominican Republic, with resultant positive action by OAS peace agencies. Haiti's action and policy in this connection is in line with our objective of strongly supporting the OAS as a regional security system within the UN.

To encourage the development of democratic practices and institutions in Haiti—our second objective—it is our policy: 1) to make informal efforts to encourage the Haitian Government to respect constitutional practices, democratic principles, and human rights; 2) to bring to the Haitian people an understanding of the democratic way of life through the program of International Information and Educational Exchange; and 3) to cooperate in projects for the improvement of economic and educational conditions, in order to provide a foundation on which effective democracy can be based.

One of our policies in the effort to promote the economic development of Haiti—our third objective—is to encourage the Haitian Government to provide a favorable climate for foreign private investment. There has been a tendency in recent years for the Haitian Government to enact legislation which if fully implemented would bring about active and direct participation of the Government in the production and distribution of certain commodities. To date, laws affecting coffee, bananas, and tobacco have been enacted. It is our policy to encourage private enterprise as distinguished from state control in the production and distribution of Haitian staple products. All appropriate pro-

tection is given legitimate American business interests when the enactment or application of such legislation would adversely affect them.

In accordance with the same general objective, it is our policy to encourage private United States investors to give full consideration to Haiti as a field for investment, but at the same time to provide frank information on a confidential basis to potential investors on the circumstances affecting the security of investments in Haiti. We are not averse to the investment of non-United States private foreign capital in Haiti. The present value of United States private investments approximates $50,000,000.

It is also our policy to encourage the Export–Import Bank within its regulations and general loan policy to consider sympathetically those of Haiti's requests to the Bank which appear economically sound and likely to enhance the long-run economic development of the country. In accordance with this policy, the Bank has over the past 12 years approved three loans to the Haitian Government totalling $14,500,000 for development purposes, two of which have been entirely disbursed and are being repaid. No disbursements on the third have as yet been made, pending completion of plans for the project it is to finance—a large scale land reclamation, irrigation, and drainage project in the Artibonite River valley.[2] The Haitian Government has at times expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the two previous Export-Import Bank loans and has requested a scaling down of the principal amounts outstanding. Although the $5,500,000 so-called J. G. White public works loan of 1938 has now been almost entirely liquidated, the question of repayment of the balance of almost $4,000,000 due on the 1941 $5,000,000 development loan to the Société Haïtiano-Américaine de Development Agricole (SHADA), a Haitian Government corporation, might again be raised by the Haitian Government. Payments on both interest and principal are now being made regularly. The view of the Export-Import Bank and the Department has been that no justification exists for canceling any portion of the unpaid principal on this loan.

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[2] On April 9, 1951, the National Advisory Council (NAC) had approved consideration by the Export-Import Bank of a credit amounting to $14,000,000 to Haiti to assist in financing the purchase in the United States of the equipment, materials, and services required for the development of the Artibonite Valley (Department of State National Advisory Council Documents, Document No. 88, Action No. 451, April 9, 1951, Lot 60 D 137, Box 369). The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized the credit, which superseded a previous credit of $4,000,000 approved December 29, 1948, at its meeting of April 19. For additional information about this loan, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 13–14. Pertinent documents relating to the interest of the United States in the Artibonite Valley project are in Department of State decimal files 838.10, 838.20, and 838.2614.

In implementation of another policy directed towards our third objective, field parties of the IIAA [3] have been cooperating with the Haitian Government for a number of years in developing basic food production and improving health conditions. A three-year program conducted by the same agency in basic education terminated in 1947. At the request of the Haitian Government and apart from their official duties, the agricultural and health parties have acted as de facto technical advisers to the Haitian Government in their respective fields. In addition, under the program of the former Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation [4] and the present TCA, numerous technical experts in various fields concerned with improvement of living standards and economic conditions have been made available to Haiti over the past 13 years, and numerous Haitians have received training in the same fields in the United States.

We encouraged Haiti to become a party to GATT [5] and to this end conducted trade negotiations with her, resulting in her accession to GATT in January 1950. It is our policy to cooperate with Haiti in all appropriate ways to increase her exports and trade between the two countries.

Haiti desires an increased quota for entry of Haitian sugar into the United States, particularly since it is expected that production will be expanded. Under existing US sugar legislation and US legislative policy, there is little likelihood of Haiti's desire being fulfilled to any appreciable extent. It is our long-run policy, however, to eliminate tariff preferences on sugar and other commodities, and thereby put Haiti and all other foreign producers of these commodities on an equal footing. Some progress has already been made in this regard with respect to Haitian products.

With respect to our fourth objective, the Haitian armed forces have proved to be a deciding factor in domestic political upheavals, and they would be essential to the maintenance of stability in the event of an internal communist attempt to create a diversionary disturbance or gain a strategic foothold. The army of Haiti, which embraces also

[3] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was established in 1942 and became a United States Government corporation in 1947. Its purpose was to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply; as of mid-1950 it operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the activities of the IIAA and its relationship with TCA, see the editorial note printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 679. For additional documentation, see pp. 1038 ff.

[4] The Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (SCC) was in existence officially from May 1938 to October 1950.

[5] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

police and naval functions, was organized under direction of the Marines during the occupation, and is a fairly efficient, compact force. We wish to see that Haiti is provided with a moderate amount of military equipment for maintenance of internal security. It is our general policy, therefore, to be guided by this consideration in responding to Haitian requests for purchase of arms from US Government stocks, or for approval of shipments from commercial sources.

A policy problem which may have to be faced shortly is the extent to which Haitian requests under MDAP, assuming physical availability of requested materials in NME stocks, should be met. No clear-cut program has yet been formulated to enable feeble Haiti to make a contribution to Caribbean and hemisphere defense, and the extent to which we should assist in supplying Haiti with arms to this end has not been decided by the Department and the NME. We have from time to time attempted to dissuade the Haitian Government from a substantial increase in armament, in order that its limited financial resources may be used for purposes of economic development, health, and education. At the same time we have acceded to Haitian requests for establishment of small air and naval training missions. Such establishment is in line with the general pattern for hemisphere defense, but in the case of Haiti resulted largely from the Haitian Government's desire to demonstrate the close friendship of the US and from our willingness to accede to the Haitian request as a manifestation of our cooperating where feasible in meeting Haitian wishes. It should be noted that the small Haitian air force and coast guard should, as a result of the training they are receiving, better be able to contribute in a future military emergency to patrolling the Windward Passage, which separates Haiti from Cuba and is the channel for most shipping between the Panama Canal and eastern US ports.

In efforts to achieve our objective of promoting mutual Haitian-US understanding and friendship, we have pursued, in addition to policies already described, the policy of informing the Haitian people and Government about the United States and its people, through our program of International Information and Educational Exchange. This entails an active press, radio and motion picture program in Haiti. We also sponsor, with the Haitian Government, a Haitian-American Cultural Center in Port-au-Prince, which provides a meeting place for Haitians and Americans interested in learning more of each other's culture through lectures, extensive library facilities, the teaching of English, and various other means. Our participation in the exhibits of the Port-au-Prince Bicentennial Exposition during the first half of 1950 also afforded us an opportunity to tell the US story. We have from time to time sent US professors and lecturers, some of them of the Negro race, to Haiti for the purpose of teaching their specialties and imparting to Haitians information about the US. Many Haitian

students, professors, and intellectual leaders have also been brought to the US to pursue their studies and specialties, and while here they have naturally become better informed about the US.

In conformity with our objective of improving relations between Haiti and its closest neighbor, the Dominican Republic, who have a long history of mutual suspicion, fear, and hatred, it is our policy to encourage the two countries to work towards such improvement. We have strongly supported such efforts by OAS bodies, and have also made direct bilateral approaches to the two countries for this purpose.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

The foreign relations which present the greatest difficulty to Haiti are those with the Dominican Republic. These relations are perpetually strained due to historical and racial factors and population pressure from Haiti on the much less densely settled Dominican border areas. An additional strain since Trujillo's [6] advent to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930 stems from what the Haitians have frequently believed to be his hostile and aggressive attitude towards Haiti and Haitian governments. Trujillo, on the other hand, asserts that all he wants is a friendly government in Haiti, which many Haitians interpret to mean a subservient government. One of Trujillo's principal motives in this connection has been his fear that an unfriendly government in Haiti would permit Haitian territory to be used by his enemies abroad as a base of operations for revolutionary activities against him. In 1937, the Dominican authorities perpetrated a wholesale massacre of Haitians who had settled in the Dominican Republic along the border.[7] Early in 1950 Dominican officials were found by a special Investigating Committee of the Organization of American States to have been involved several months before in a plot to overthrow the then Haitian Government, which Trujillo believed to be unfriendly to him.[8] The same OAS Investigating Committee was unable to confirm any factual basis for Trujillo's fears that the Estimé [9] Government was conniving with his enemies to permit Haitian territory to be used for a base for military operations against him. Following the overthrow of Estimé in May, 1950, from purely internal causes, there has been gradual bettering of relations, including meeting between Presidents Trujillo and Magloire [10] and their joint declaration that they would work towards agreements on several

[6] Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, President of the Dominican Republic.

[7] For documentation on the tender of good offices by the United States, Cuba, and Mexico to conciliate differences between the Dominican Republic and Haiti arising from this incident, see *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. v, pp. 133–141.

[8] For documentation on this subject, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 437 ff. and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 641 ff.

[9] Dumarsais Estimé, President of Haiti, 1946–1950.

[10] Paul E. Magloire, President of the Republic of Haiti.

matters of common interest and a strengthening of economic and cultural ties between the two countries.

Haitian relations with Cuba are particularly friendly; a substantial factor in this friendship has often been their common antipathy towards the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. Haiti has traditionally had close relations with Venezuela, also strengthened at times in recent years by their common hostility to Trujillo. While the maintenance of friendly relations between Haiti and other countries is naturally desirable, it is our policy, in promoting Caribbean peace and encouraging observance of international obligations in the event of civil strife, to discourage the formation of blocs as well as any collaboration by Caribbean Governments, including Haiti, in revolutionary activities against one another.

French cultural influence has always been of special significance in Haiti. Many Haitians have been educated in France and there is a natural feeling of affinity by Haitians towards the former mother country. A kind of friendly cultural rivalry, without direct political significance, exists between the US and France in Haiti. Should France go Communist, French influence would undoubtedly be used as a wedge for enhancing the USSR's position in Haiti.

Although Haiti has nominal diplomatic relations with the USSR, there has been no exchange of diplomatic representatives. Communist activities have been outlawed, and the relatively unimportant communist line parties and their press mouthpieces have been suppressed.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

US policy with respect to Haiti has been successful from the viewpoint of Haitian governmental support for our international objectives. Moreover, this support has been voluntary, without damage to our reputation in other countries, because it was achieved without use of "big stick" tactics in Haiti, and because it was achieved with full adherence to the policy of respect for the juridical equality of states. The policy has also been a success in the sense that Haiti has been gradually developing more responsible self-government without becoming involved in any serious international difficulties other than those which have arisen from mutual Haitian-Dominican antipathies. US financial and technical assistance has been a substantial factor in this situation.

At the same time, with particular reference to our interest in the development of democratic institutions and practices in Haiti, it must be stated that their achievement is not uninterrupted. Repressive measures, graft and corruption, and presidential efforts to remain in office beyond the term prescribed in the constitution have led to two overturns of the Government by force in the last four years. On the other hand, the achievement of orderly democracy remains the Haitian ideal,

and the temporary open military domination of the Government in both 1946 and 1950 took place on the grounds that it was necessary in order to restore constitutional and civilian government. Such restoration was effected, at least in name, on both occasions.

With respect to our economic objective, our efforts to assist in the improvement and development of the economy and living conditions have achieved some success in meeting the basic Haitian problem posed by an increasing population dependent for existence on shrinking resources. However, although the Haitian Government and people realize that we are cooperating with them to this end, the tendency of Haitians and Haitian governments to feel that the US has a special obligation to solve Haiti's economic problems and to accede to most if not all of Haiti's requests in this connection at times complicates US-Haitian relations. Obviously, we cannot undertake to supply the financial and technical wherewithal for the complete economic rehabilitation and development of Haiti; yet Haiti's exaggerated expectations color Haitian views of the US and its government. It is not always apparent, moreover, that Haiti has done all she can to help herself in this regard. During the four years ending in May 1950 Haitian Government revenues, although reaching record heights, were in considerable degree dissipated in graft and uneconomic projects, such as the Port-au-Prince Bicentennial Exposition. Largely as a result of political factors, the banana export business, once a lucrative enterprise, has been severely injured. Furthermore, Haiti's treatment of private US investors has in some cases been discouraging. Despite our efforts to encourage the Haitian Government to create a favorable climate for foreign investment, graft and bribery and a disregard of contractual obligations and business ethics have not been uncommon in business arrangements undertaken by the Government or influential Government officials with private US investors.

With reference to our arms policy, the Haitian Government has frequently felt that we have exhibited insufficient interest in assisting it to acquire what it regards as necessary armament. It has persistently believed that, as evidence of our friendship and in view of Haiti's limited financial resources, we should supply Haiti with arms from US Government stocks at bargain prices, and that we have a moral obligation to do so in view of the long and intimate association of the US Military with Haiti during the occupation and the fact that present Haitian armament, now asserted to be worn out, was supplied largely by the US at that time. We have consistently explained to the Haitian Government that it is not legally possible for this Government to supply Haiti with arms at bargain prices and have informed them of the procedure to be followed by the OAR under MDAP.

At the same time our efforts to persuade the Haitian Government, pending a clarification of Haiti's role in Caribbean and hemisphere

defense, to limit its attempts to acquire arms to what is necessary for police purposes and maintenance of internal security, have not been well received. Previous Haitian Governments have expressed the view that if Haiti had more armament, the Dominican Government would be deterred from what Haiti has regarded at times as a truculent and belligerent attitude. We have pointed out that Haiti cannot hope to compete with the more affluent Dominican Republic in this regard and that Haiti would, in any event, be absolutely dependent upon outside military assistance in the event of an outside attack.

With particular reference to our objective of promoting mutual US-Haitian understanding and friendship, one stumbling block has been the realization by the Haitian Government and people of attitudes towards the Negro race in the US, and the consequent feeling in certain Haitian quarters that despite our official friendship and the absence of racial discrimination in official relations with Haiti and Haitians, certain segments of American public opinion cannot have real friendship for a Negro republic. This feeling is aggravated when Haitians traveling in the US in official or unofficial capacities are on occasion subjected to segregation practices; in extreme cases this has made the Haitians involved inimical toward the US and has adversely affected Haitian opinion. Another factor which has stood in the way of Haitian understanding of the US—albeit in diminishing degree in recent years—has been the traditional favor felt for French culture and an accompanying disdain for US cultural achievements. Our program of International Information and Educational Exchange has achieved considerable success in overcoming the results of both of these impediments.

A further factor which occasionally gives rise to Haitian-US misunderstanding is the long-standing disagreement between Haiti and the US regarding sovereignty over Navassa, a guano island off the southern peninsula of Haiti. We formally asserted US sovereignty over Navassa in 1916 under the authority of the so-called Guano Act of Congress of 1856 [11] and a further Act of Congress of 1913 [12] appropriating funds for construction of a lighthouse there. Since we are in actual possession of Navassa and the Haitian Government does not press its claim, the matter is usually quiescent.

With reference to our objective vis-à-vis Haitian-Dominican relations, they are more favorable than they have been for some time and are probably as good as can reasonably be expected for some time to come. Given their usual normal state of tension, it remains to be seen whether the recent *rapprochement* will be more than temporary. The Haitian Government and people have historically felt that they should

[11] For text of the Guano Act, approved August 18, 1856, see 11 Stat. 119.
[12] Reference to the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 32), approved October 22, 1913; for text, see 38 Stat. 208.

have our support in their relations with the Dominican Republic, and have a tendency to regard our efforts to maintain an objective attitude in this connection as favoritism towards the Dominican Republic. Some Haitians have felt that recent acquisitions of arms by the Dominican Republic is somehow our responsibility—even though most of this material was not secured in the US. To offset this feeling we have endeavored to bring the true facts to the attention of the Haitian Government.

Nonetheless, notwithstanding the various factors which prevent the full achievement of our objectives and at times impose stumbling blocks to perfect US-Haitian harmony, the Haitian people and Government look to the US for sympathetic understanding of Haiti's problems and active cooperation in meeting them.

Editorial Note

By an exchange of notes dated May 2, 1951, at Port-au-Prince, the United States and Haiti concluded a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date. The notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 555, from Port-au-Prince, May 2, 1951, not printed (838.00–TA/5–251). For text, see TIAS No. 2414, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 3, page 545. For a press release concerning the agreement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, page 824.

HONDURAS

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND HONDURAS

Editorial Note

On January 26, 1951, the United States and Honduras signed at Tegucigalpa a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 472, from Tegucigalpa, January 29, 1951, not printed (820.00–TA/1–2951). For text of the agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2192, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 2, page 467.

On January 30, 1951, the United States and Honduras signed at Tegucigalpa an agreement providing for a cooperative program in agriculture, which entered into force on the same date. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 490, from Tegucigalpa, February 1, 1951, not printed (103–IIAA/2–151). For text, see TIAS No. 2209, or 2 UST 577.

611.15/2–651

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1951.

HONDURAS

A. OBJECTIVES

The major objectives of US policy in Honduras are: 1) to assist and encourage the evolution of representative, democratic institutions; 2) to seek Honduran understanding and support of our foreign economic and political policies; 3) to advance the security of the United States and the hemisphere;[1] 4) to support the adoption by Honduras of sound economic policies and institutions; and 5) to foster and protect legitimate US commercial and investment interests in Honduras.

[1] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

B. POLICIES

Despite geographic proximity to and economic dependence on the United States, Hondurans do not look to this country for guidance and assistance, especially on purely domestic procedural matters of government, to the same extent as do some of our other Latin American neighbors. We have made it our policy to encourage this spirit of self-reliance and to make clear that it is appreciated by us.

The United States has been gratified to note the earnest and effective steps taken by the administration of Señor Juan Manuel Galvez, who became President of Honduras on January 1, 1949, to increase the degree of personal liberty beyond that enjoyed by the Honduran people during the previous 17 years. The United States engages in positive cooperation in the economic, technical, educational and cultural fields in order to encourage and support this trend toward the evolution of democratic ideas and processes, to provide a firmer foundation upon which it may grow, and to point out a way by which the Honduran people may help themselves.

The newly-enjoyed freedoms of speech, of assembly and of the press have, however, opened the doors to nationalistic fervor which often approaches anti-Americanism. To a large extent, this development may be viewed as the growing pains of democracy which in time can be overcome by truly effective collaboration and by democratic progress itself. To overcome this nascent nationalism, as well as to advance the security of the United States and the hemisphere, it is important that the Honduran people understand what our political and economic foreign policy objectives are and that they realize that Honduran interests as well as our own are served by cooperation. Our policy is to facilitate this popular understanding and support of mutually advantageous foreign policy objectives, through a program of information and education.

President Galvez is a consistent supporter of US foreign policy, as was his predecessor General Tiburcio Carias Andino. We are endeavoring to encourage the continuation of this attitude by recognizing and supporting, where feasible, legitimate Honduran interests and aspirations and by consulting with the Government of Honduras regarding our foreign policy objectives.

While encouraging the Honduran spirit of self-reliance, we stand ready at their request to assist in the solution of broad social, economic and political problems that are of concern to the Government and people of Honduras. As in the case of other small Central American governments with low incomes, the cost of maintaining their military establishment might result in the diversion of funds from more productive economic and social projects. It would be impossible for Hon-

duras, in any event, to assure its own security with any conceivable level of expenditures on a military establishment. Accordingly, our policy is to discourage the purchase by Honduras of excessive quantities of armaments and to encourage its reliance upon collective security arrangements, particularly inter-American commitments and the procedures of the Organization of American States for keeping the peace. A US air mission and army mission are, however, operating in Honduras with a view to assisting in the development of an efficient air force, an engineer battalion, and a presidential guard as aids in providing for the minimum defense requirements of Honduras and assisting it to perform its appropriate role in hemispheric defense.

It is our policy neither to encourage nor impede efforts to arrive at a satisfactory formula for Central American economic or political union, but to recognize that it can come about only upon the initiative and by the agreement of the interested states. Such a union might, of course, contribute to Central American economic and political stability.

As is the case with other relatively underdeveloped countries, economic problems are of major concern in Honduras. The Honduran economy is predominantly agricultural, and its chief exports in 1949 were bananas (38%), lumber (14%), gold and silver (12%), and coffee (6%). Approximately 73% of all exports are sold in the United States. Since increased income from agriculture offers the best hope of an immediate improvement of the low living standards of the people, it is our policy to give special encouragement to the further development and diversification of agriculture. To this end, negotiations will shortly be undertaken to conclude an agreement with the Honduran Government for cooperative agricultural work with the aim of substantially increasing agricultural production, establishing modern grain storage facilities and initiating soil conservation work.

The lack of adequate transportation facilities is one of the major impediments to Honduran economic growth, and it is our policy to aid in the development of such facilities by continuing to participate in the construction of the Inter-American Highway and by providing technical assistance on other road building projects. The Government of Honduras has, by legislation, entered into a long-term road building program on which it has requested our technical assistance, and it is anticipated that highway engineers will soon be made available to Honduras for this work.

A difficult problem in our present relations with Honduras involves the application of our Mediterranean fruit fly quarantine. American-owned fruit companies and one Honduran company, all operating in Honduras, wish to export citrus fruit to the United States during the months of July to November. US Department of Agriculture tech-

nicians admit that the Mediterranean fruit fly is not known to exist in Honduras, but no relaxation of the quarantine regulations has been granted due to the opposition of fruit growers in the United States. Current regulations require a 16-day cooling period before entry into this country. Honduras has requested that this period be shortened to the 7-day sailing time from Honduras to New York and is becoming more insistent that action be taken on the problem. It is our policy to uphold the regulations as now constituted, but to request the US Department of Agriculture to consider their relaxation to a point where the citrus trade may be expanded successfully, providing a further survey should support the alleged freedom of the area from the fruit fly.

US companies, particularly the United Fruit Company, have provided a large part of the capital and technical personnel which have been utilized in the economic development of Honduras. US relations with Honduras must take into account the activities of such companies and the attitude of the Government and people of Honduras toward them. It is our policy, while scrupulously avoiding the taint of interventionism, to foster cordial relations and mutual understanding and respect between Honduras and these companies to the end that the legitimate interests of the companies may be protected.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

At the outset of the Galvez Administration the previous strained relations between Honduras and Guatemala were temporarily improved. However, relations between the two countries have been deteriorating for the past year, as a result of Honduran preoccupation with the leftist government of Guatemala, of Guatemala's propaganda campaign against Honduras and its tacit support of border forays by Honduran emigres, as well as Guatemalan aid in the establishment of leftist labor unions in Honduras. The resulting mistrust has impaired the former profitable, commercial intercourse between the two Republics.

Honduras, a consistent Central American supporter of the nonintervention commitments of the Organization of American States, has cordial relations with all of its other neighbors and enjoys exceptionally close economic ties with El Salvador as a consequence of a "Free Trade Area" Agreement now in its thirty-second year of existence. Very few, if any, individual Hondurans have ever been involved in Caribbean revolutionary groups and the Honduran Government has never been known to give its support, actual or tacit, to such groups.

Honduras has never recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

As indicated, the growth of democratic institutions and procedures in Honduras under the Galvez administration has been gratifying. Furthermore, our objective of obtaining the support of the Galvez Government for our foreign economic and political policies has been achieved. Few Latin American states are more consistently cooperative, particularly in respect to issues in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other international organizations. Only limited progress has been made toward creating among the people of Honduras a genuine understanding and support of our objectives with respect to Honduras, which is due in large measure to the lack of education, technical skills, and adequate capital, to low health and living standards, and to the venality and inefficiency of Honduran office holders. We should anticipate slow but steady progress in obtaining popular understanding and support of our policies.

Honduran cooperation with the United States in the economic field has likewise been close. American investments in and trade with Honduras have been adequately safeguarded. The United Fruit Company and the Government of Honduras have signed a revised tax contract to the benefit of Honduras which has been approved by the Congress of Honduras, and relations between the Company and the Government appear to be satisfactory. The country would welcome additional foreign investments.

MEXICO

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO[1]

611.1231/1–2251

Memorandum by Mr. Harold C. Herrick, Jr., of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs (Rubottom)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1951.

Subject: Notes relating to the Chamizal for your use in talking with Vicente Sanchez Gavito.[2]

1. You might tell Sanchez Gavito the following points:

a. We wish very much to obtain a solution of the Chamizal. We hope that Mexico likewise desires to find a solution. If so we feel sure that an answer can be found at this time to this problem.

b. However, we believe that the two Commissioners[3] must actively continue their conversations to work out the details of the agreement within the framework of the conversations which we have had with Sanchez Gavito.

c. We are quite willing to work out a new water treaty to increase the benefits for the farmers in the Juarez Valley but we consider that this and the Chamizal should be handled concurrently.

2. Things we are willing to offer to Mexico:

a. Recognition of the Chamizal award.[4]

We continue to hold that the 1864 river line cannot be determined. Therefore, a percentage division of the Chamizal must be obtained. (We are willing, if necessary, to give Mexico 420 acres of land, which is what she claims of the 630 acres in the Chamizal. However, the 420 acres cannot be given to Mexico within the area of the Chamizal.)

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 936 ff.

[2] Informal conversations between Sánchez Gavito, Director General of the Mexican Diplomatic Service, and officials of the Department of State concerning the Chamizal question were held intermittently during 1950 and early 1951. Pertinent documents are contained in decimal file 611.1231.

For background information on the Chamizal problem, see U.S. Senate, *Convention With Mexico for Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963.

[3] Lawrence M. Lawson and David Herrera Jordán, the Commissioners of the United States and Mexico, respectively, on the International Boundary and Water Commission—United States and Mexico.

[4] Reference is to the Lafleur award of June 15, 1911, by which the 630-acre Chamizal tract had been divided between the United States and Mexico. For documentation on the award, see *Foreign Relations*, 1911, pp. 565–605.

b. More water to Mexico by modification of the 1906 Treaty.[5]
We are willing: (1) To modify the stipulated schedule of deliveries of water, which in effect will give Mexico an additional more than 13.5% (Mexico has requested this, this Government has been agreeing on a year to year basis and, therefore, there is agreement on this point), and (2) To give Mexico 50% of the water in the Rio Grande below San Elizario Island.

3. Things which Mexico desires to which we cannot agree:

a. Agreement on a water treaty before there is agreement on the Chamizal.
b. All of the water in the Rio Grande below San Elizario Island down to Fort Quitman cannot be given to Mexico in exchange for a like amount of water some place down river. The reason for this is that farmers in the United States depend on the waste and drain waters reaching the Rio Grande below San Elizario and, therefore, the most we can offer to Mexico is 50% of the flow in this stretch of the river.
c. There is no disagreement regarding Mexico's desire to modify the schedule of water deliveries, although such modification will give to Mexico more than 13.5% additional water.

4. Our ideas of what would seem to be a reasonable settlement of the Chamizal:

a. This country recognize the award.
b. The two Commissioners reach agreement on what percentage of the Chamizal, as an acreage or percentage figure, is Mexican (We would be willing to go to a maximum of 420 acres).
c. The Commissioners agree on the location of a modified channel of the river which will cut the maximum amount of land to Mexico in the Chamizal—Cordova Island area, which is engineeringly feasible and which is believed to be politically acceptable both in the United States and in Mexico. We do not believe that the entire Cordova Island could be compensated for in the area, although we are willing to consider any Mexican suggestions in this regard.
d. Assuming that part of Cordova Island would remain in the United States, uncompensated for by the rectification of the river at that location, the two Governments would, at a later date, enter into a separate convention for the elimination of detached areas along the Rio Grande which would include the remainder of Cordova, Horcon Tract and Beaver Island.

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[5] For text of the Convention for Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande, signed at Washington, May 21, 1906, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 455, or 34 Stat. (pt. 3) 2953.

547-842—79——94

611.1231/2-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1951.

Subject: Boundary and Water Problems

Participants: Licenciado Vicente Sánchez Gavito,
Director General of Diplomatic Service
Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-America Affairs

After the discussion of claims problems, which is reported in a separate memorandum,[1] I raised the question of the Chamizal and water problems.

I started off by saying that Lic. Sánchez Gavito would recall that this problem was first broached by me some months ago in Washington in view of the very strong feeling which existed in Mexico that the U.S. had not lived up to its obligations under the Chamizal award.

I said that since the award involved only 420 acres under the Mexican contention it would have been a relatively easy problem to settle in 1911 but that with each passing year the problem had become more difficult of solution because (*a*) of increasing land values of the Chamizal area, (*b*) the growth of the business district of El Paso immediately adjoining the area and the possibility of the business area gradually encroaching into the Chamizal and, (*c*) the growing possibility that a settlement of the Chamizal might not only relate to land values of the disputed area itself but might also affect values of important property outside of and adjoining the area. I said that if Mexico was genuinely interested in a settlement it seemed to me that this problem should be given preferred attention.

I went on to say that I hoped he would understand that the settlement which had been proposed would result in the following benefits to Mexico: (*a*) recovery of the possession of approximately 420 acres of land which, irrespective of title, was now actually in the possession of the U.S., (*b*) United States recognition of the award (with safeguards not necessary to repeat here) which would represent a juridical victory for Mexico and, (*c*) the acquisition of more water than Mexico is presently entitled to under the 1906 Water and Boundary Treaty. I said that on the other hand the United States would be required to institute eminent domain proceedings at a probable cost of several million dollars and, in addition to losing possession of the land and making concessions in water, would derive no benefits except having a river boundary between Mexico and the United States and the rather intangible benefit of presumably creating a better atmosphere and better relations.

[1] Not printed.

I said that it was important that he understand that while a settlement might present political difficulties for the government of Mexico it would also present very difficult political problems for the government of the United States and that while we were willing to make an effort to right what Mexico considered to be a historical wrong we considered that it was essential that Mexico also be willing to undertake to make the same effort and assume the same onus that we were willing to do.

Lic. Sánchez Gavito then said that the concessions that we were making with respect to the water were not sufficient in as much as Mexico was already receiving water under a revised schedule and had been doing so for many years; also that 50% of the water below El Paso which had been offered had already been used by the United States. I said that I did not agree since it could not be assumed that as water became more scarce in that area with an increased population that we would always be willing ex gratia to agree to a revised schedule of deliveries and that furthermore while the water below the city of El Paso may have previously been used it was still valuable for irrigation purposes and could easily be used again on the American side of the river in the event the Mexicans did not consider it valuable. He quickly said he did not mean to imply that Mexico was not interested in the concessions that had been offered.

Sánchez Gavito then said that the principal obstacle to a settlement had been Mr. Lawson's suggestions that about 200 acres of Cordoba Island be left north of the proposed change in the river bed, and that this would not be acceptable to Mexico.

I said that there were two possible ways to get around this: (*a*) the 200 acres north of the new channel might be given to the United States in exchange for an equal amount of land of a similar agricultural value below El Paso, possibly as a part of a general settlement of the detached area question, (*b*) the 200 acres might be left to Mexico with an agreement that the exchange would be made at a later and more politically feasible date. With respect to the suggestion (*b*) he indicated that Mexico would not be willing to make a firm commitment to this effect and with respect to (*a*) that this would not be politically possible at this time particularly since the building of the only bridge had complicated the situation and since the city of Juarez planned to build a large stadium on Cordoba Island rather than use it for agricultural purposes. I said that these were all questions which would have to be explored further and that I hoped he would agree that it was important to have a common river boundary between the United States and Mexico in this area and that for engineering reasons and in order to maintain the minimum drop in the river at this point in order to keep the channel open there are limits to the size of the bend which could be made in the river at this point.

Lic. Sánchez Gavito then suggested that we look at a map of the area and attempt to agree on a line which he said he wished to be as near the western boundary of Chamizal as possible. I said that I did not think it would be useful to attempt to draw lines in as much as presumably Mr. Lawson and Mr. Herrera had already drawn some and also because we could not hope to draw a good line without actually looking at the situation on the ground. I said that in this connection I thought it would be impractical to agree to any line in which Mr. Lawson did not fully concur. In conclusion I said that I would be willing at some mutually agreeable time after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers [2] to meet with him in El Paso where we could go over the ground and talk directly with the two Commissioners. I said that this meeting could be held secretly and that I thought we would be able to tell within a very short time whether there was any possibility of reaching agreement. If we decided there was no possibility I said that the best thing would be to forget about the whole problem and move on to more constructive things. If, on the other hand, we could agree then it seemed to me that there was an excellent chance of getting this very troublesome problem out of the way.

In the course of the conversation Lic. Sánchez Gavito said that some people in the Foreign Office thought it would be well to have some publicity in order to have a trial balloon. I said that publicity before we had agreed upon a line would be very bad from our viewpoint because it would arouse unnecessary fears about what we would yield to Mexico. I said that after there had been a meeting of the minds we would have no objection to a trial balloon since it had been understood from the beginning that either the Mexican Foreign Office or the State Department might find it politically impossible to get their respective Congresses to go along and that I hoped that if this happened neither country would feel offended. I said that I looked at the whole procedure as nothing but a good faith effort on the part of the Foreign Offices to reach a satisfactory settlement and that no one could be certain that such a thing is possible.

T[HOMAS] C. M[ANN]

[2] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American States held at Washington, March 29–April 7, 1951. Documentation on the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.

712.56/2–2651

Memorandum by Mr. Charles W. Kempter of the Office of Lend-Lease and Surplus Property

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 26, 1951.

For the confidential information and guidance of interested United States Government officials and offices there are transmitted herewith

copies and/or translations of certain notes exchanged between the American Ambassador in Mexico City [1] and the Acting Minister for Foreign Relations of the Government of the United Mexican States [2] by means of which there was consummated and made effective The Mexican Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement of February 24, 1951,[3] providing for the re-scheduling of the repayment responsibility of the Government of Mexico, in order that there might be reached a final settlement of those defense aid obligations arising from the general terms of the basic Mexican Lend-Lease Agreement of March 18, 1943.[4]

Under the terms of this Settlement Arrangement, Mexico assumes the payment to the United States of $12 million over a ten year period. Amortization payments of $1 million each are scheduled for the first three years and of $750,000 each for the following three years. The balance thereafter, in the amount of $6,750,000, becomes payable in four equal installments covering the final four year period.

The terms of reference require payment in United States dollars but give this Government the option of drawing Mexican pesos in lieu of any scheduled dollar payment in order to meet United States foreign currency requirements in Mexico. To that end, an Embassy note,[5] addressed to the Foreign Office of Mexico following the signing of the Settlement Arrangement, informed the Mexican Government of the United States decision to exercise its option and receive Mexican pesos in settlement of the first six scheduled payments.

This Settlement Arrangement further provides for the suspension, by Mexico, of payments after five years if, by that time, there have not been reached final settlement terms concerned with an outstanding Mexican claim [6] which already has been accepted by this Government.

Also included and made a part of the Settlement are the customary provisions covering exchange rates guarantees, restrictions on lend-

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[1] William O'Dwyer.

[2] Manuel Tello.

[3] The Mexican Government's notes of December 18, 1950, and February 24, 1951, and a copy of the United States note of the latter date were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 2141, February 26, 1951, from Mexico City (none printed, all filed under Department of State decimal file number 712.56/2–2651).

[4] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. VI, pp. 397–400.

[5] Note no. 743, dated February 24, 1951, not printed (712.56/2–2651).

[6] Reference is to the so-called Railroad Retirement Fund Claim, which arose as a result of the deductions made by the Railroad Retirement Board from the wages of Mexican workers who came to the United States to work on the railroads between 1943 and 1945. The Mexican Government at the time objected to the 3¼% tax deduction, but because of the wartime emergency allowed the workers to accept employment, with the understanding that an agreement would later be sought authorizing the refund of the amounts deducted. In an exchange of notes with Mexico signed at Washington, November 15, 1946, the United States committed itself to try to obtain appropriate enabling legislation which would permit the refunds to be made. For text of the notes, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1684, or 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3575.

lease retransfers and the protection of the rights of American patents and trademarks owners.

[Here follows a list of attachments.]

795B.5/4–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

Subject: Mexican Participation in Korea

Participants: Secretary of State
Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte [1]
ARA:AR—Mr. Ivan White [2]
ARA—Mr. Thomas Mann
Foreign Minister Manuel Tello
Ambassador Rafael de la Colina
Brig. Gen. Alberto Salinas Carranza [3]

It was arranged that I would meet with Mr. Tello in my office at the Pan American Union Building to discuss the problem of Mexican participation in military action in Korea.

I commenced the conversation by referring to Mexico's support, in the deliberations of the United Nations, of the efforts of the free world to resist aggression in Korea and said that I hoped Mexico could, after due consideration, decide to contribute a division of troops. I recalled that in this connection the United States troops had now been fighting continuously for about nine months and that, because of the shortage of men in the United Nations lines, it had not been possible to put into effect the program of rotation which is desirable for several reasons. I said that there was a real need for Mexican troops and that I was confident, if the Mexican Government should find it possible to help, that Mexican troops would demonstrate their well-known fighting qualities.

I also said that Mexico was one of the nations in this hemisphere able to play an effective role in Korea with a minimum of additional training and equipment. In this connection, I explained that under existing United States law, military equipment could be made available only on the basis of payment in dollars and, furthermore, that it was necessary to use the limited amount of military equipment available in Korea and other danger zones. Concerning equipment of forces for action in Korea, a different situation prevails in that it is legally possible for the United States to make up deficiencies in military equip-

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[1] Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board, and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army.

[2] Director, Office of Regional American Affairs.

[3] Military Attaché, Mexican Embassy.

ment, assist in training troops, to transport contingents to Korea, and to maintain them while they are in the field there provided it is agreed that there will be reimbursement. I said that the terms and conditions of reimbursement could be negotiated later.

The Foreign Minister then referred in complimentary terms to the sacrifices being made by the U.S. in Korea and to the motives which prompt those sacrifices and said that he was, therefore, pained to have to say what he was about to say.

Mr. Tello then stressed that public opinion in Mexico was not prepared at this time to send Mexican troops outside of Mexican territory; and he spoke at some length concerning what he described as a similar state of U.S. public mind preceding the First World War and preceding Pearl Harbor in the Second World War. He denied that Mexican public opinion was greatly influenced by communists, saying that there were only "a handful" of communists and their opinions did not amount to much.

He then referred to the discussions with the American Ambassador [4] in Mexico City preceding the decision of the Mexican Government to vote in the United Nations in favor of resisting aggression in Korea. He said he made it plain to the American Ambassador at that time—and the American Ambassador agreed—that Mexico's action in the United Nations would not constitute an obligation on Mexico's part to furnish troops.

In the course of the conversation, the Foreign Minister also remarked that this is a pre-election period in Mexico and expressed his opinion that Mexico would be unable to bear the cost of maintaining a division in the field.

I agreed that Mexico's action in the United Nations did not create a legal obligation on Mexico's part to furnish troops. I said that the problem seemed to resolve itself into one of internal Mexican politics and that it seemed to me the question was one of preparing and leading Mexican public opinion.[5]

[4] Walter Thurston, Ambassador to Mexico from June 1946 to November 1950.

[5] In telegram 11, from Mexico City, dated July 6, 1951, Ambassador O'Dwyer stated in part the following: "Mexico's attitude toward collective security cooperation unchanged with no indication Mex intends contribute mil to fight aggression in Korea or elsewhere abroad." (795.00/7–651)

Editorial Note

On April 12, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank had authorized a credit of $1,875,000 to the Mexican Gulf Sulphur Company, a Delaware corporation which owned all of the capital stock of the Mexican Sulphur Company, S. A., a Mexican firm holding concessions to properties on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec reported to contain proven sulphur reserves, to finance the purchase of machinery

and equipment in the United States for the construction and operation of a new plant to produce elemental sulphur. (Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress*, pages 9–11) The approval of the loan request had been preceded by considerable internal discussion, primarily because the extent of the sulphur deposits could not be definitively determined until after the operation had begun, and because sulphur was under Mexican export control. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 103–XMB and Department of State NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137.

On May 31, the Board of Directors of the Bank had approved the application of Nacional Financiera on behalf of the Altos Hornos de Mexico, S. A., a steel company located at Monclava, for a credit of $5,000,000 also under the $150,000,000 line of credit, in order to finance plant expansion for the increase of steel production. (Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress*, pages 16, 18–19)

On August 2, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank approved the application of Nacional Financiera, S. A., on behalf of the National Railways of Mexico and the Ferrocarril Mexicano, for two credits amounting to $56,000,000 under the $150,000,000 line of credit which had been authorized by the Bank on August 31, 1950, to finance the purchase of material, supplies, and equipment in the United States for the rehabilitation of the two railroad systems. The National Railways was to receive $51,000,000 and the Ferrocarril Mexicano was to receive $5,000,000. (103–XMB/8–851) For a press release issued by the Export-Import Bank pertaining to the loan, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 24, 1951, page 499.

611.1231/4–2051

Mr. Harold C. Herrick, Jr., of the Office of Mexican Affairs to the Assistant Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs (Hughes), Temporarily in Mexico City

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 20, 1951.

DEAR RUTH: There have been some recent developments in the case of the Chamizal with which we believe you should be acquainted. I am sorry not to have written before this time, but various things have stacked up in the office.

As you may know, Tom Mann met in El Paso with Vicente Sanchez Gavito, Commissioner Lawson and Commissioner Herrera Jordan on March 23 and 24. I am enclosing a copy of the very informal memorandum [1] of the several points upon which they reached tentative agree-

[1] Not attached to the source text, but a copy of the referenced memorandum was found in the Department of State files, and it is printed below as an enclosure.

ment. They also are not too far apart in agreement on a rectified channel for the Rio Grande which would cut to Mexico 805 acres—420 of the Chamizal and 385 of Cordova Island. Mr. Lawson indicates hope that he will be able to reach agreement on a new river line. In general terms we would like to see more land cut to Mexico in and to the east of Cordova, whereas, the Mexicans would, of course, prefer to receive more land in the Chamizal area to the west of Cordova Island.

In the case of the Mexicans, the tentative agreement at El Paso is subject to the approval of at least Tello. Tom and I talked to de la Colina here while Tello was recently in Washington. However, Tello indicated that he did not want to give an answer until he arrived back in Mexico City, which should have been, I understand, last Saturday or Sunday. Presumably we will have some word from him in the near future.[2]

In our case, if and when we get a green light from Tello, Tom plans to send a memorandum[3] to the President outlining the history and present status of the controversy and recommending in substance that the President authorize: (1) the continuation of negotiations along the lines of the El Paso conversations, (2) discussion of the matter with Tom Connally[4] and Ken Regan[5] to solicit their support, and (3) the formation of a citizen's committee in El Paso to promote local support in El Paso of the proposed settlement.

You might pass this letter to Paul Culbertson[6] and any others that you might wish. We will keep you advised.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely yours, HAROLD C. HERRICK, JR.

[Enclosure]

1. This does not constitute an agreement on the part of either Government.

2. No publicity except by mutual agreement in advance.

3. Will agree later on wording regarding recognition of 1911 Award.

4. The Joint Commission will endeavor to agree upon a line for the relocation of the river northward so as to enclose 805 acres of land (420 acres Chamizal and 385 acres Cordova) between the present and proposed new channels. The proposed new channel will begin at a point on the present channel below the Stanton Street Bridge and end at a point on the present channel east of Cordova Island. The City sanitation disposal plant will be north of the proposed new channel.

[2] There is no indication in the Department of State files that the Mexican Government responded to this initiative by the United States during the remainder of 1951.

[3] Not printed; it was not sent forward to the President.

[4] Senator Tom Connally (D–Texas) was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

[5] Representative Kenneth M. Regan (D–Texas).

[6] Counselor of Embassy, Mexico City.

5. The 805 acres will be reduced by the amount of land, if any, that may be gained by moving the channel north within the existing levees west of the Stanton Street Bridge. It is estimated that perhaps 20 acres may be gained by Mexico in this area.

6. Rectification of the river from Monument No. 1.

7. Mexico will bear cost of delivering clear title to that part of Cordova Island north of proposed new boundary. United States will bear cost of delivering clear title to all territory south of proposed new boundary with the exception of lands within Cordova Island.

8. No agreement on sharing costs of proposed rectification.

398.14/4–2751

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs (Rubottom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1951.

Subject: Additional World Bank Credit for Mexico

The Department has known for several months that the World Bank took the position, following the announcement of the $150 million line of credit[2] extended by the Export-Import Bank to Mexico, that it would not grant additional credit to Mexico unless the Eximbank credit line was reduced by an amount equal to that lent by the World Bank. Lic. Carrillo Flores, President of Mexico's Nacional Financiera, has been assiduously working to change the World Bank's attitude, and it now appears that he has been successful.

Yesterday, at lunch with Alfonso Cortina, Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Mexican Embassy, and Mr. Paez Urquidi, Director of the Mexican Federal Electricity Commission, the latter two related the following to Mr. Ohmans[3] and me:

1. The World Bank has agreed that it will not insist on having the Eximbank line of credit reduced by the amount of any additional World Bank loans provided the joint technical commission[4] now readying to go to Mexico finds that Mexico's present borrowing capacity is in excess of $150 million.

2. The World Bank will consider an application for an additional $25 million (approx.) loan to the Federal Electricity Commission—no

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[1] Addressed also to Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 959 ff.

[3] John L. Ohmans, Office of Middle American Affairs.

[4] This commission, known as the Combined Mexican Working Party, had been formed in February 1951. It did not complete its study until October 1952. For its report, see The Combined Mexican Working Party, *The Economic Development of Mexico* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1953).

action to be taken respecting the effect of this loan on the existing Eximbank line of credit until the commission's study has been completed.[5]

3. Mr. Paez Urquidi was in telephone communication with Lic. Beteta [6] on Wednesday, and the latter agreed that Mexico would reduce the Eximbank credit line by $25 million if the joint study commission recommends that Mexico should not borrow more than the $150 million line of credit at this time. (It is quite clear that none of the officials concerned expect to have to reduce the credit.)

4. No discussions will be held with the Eximbank pending the completion of the technical commission's report.

For the time being, the Mexicans prefer to keep this whole matter on an informal basis, but eventually the Department and the Export-Import Bank will be formally notified of the understanding reached with the World Bank.

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[5] The IBRD actually approved a loan of $29,700,000 to the commission and Nacional Financiera on January 11, 1952 (398.14/1–252). In a memorandum dated January 10, 1952, the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Rubottom) stated in part that he understood that "the Eximbank and the Mexican Government arrived at a definite understanding that the $150,000,000 earmarking would be reduced, at least for the time being, by the above amount." (398.14/1–1052)

[6] Ramón Beteta, Mexican Minister of Finance.

712.5–MAP/4–3051

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Nufer) to the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (White)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1951.

Subject: Assistance to Mexico in Procurement of Materials for Military Project No. 1

Ambassador de la Colina has held several informal discussions with Messrs. Mann and Rubottom over the past several months in which he has requested that his Government be assisted by the Department in procuring machine tools and other materials, valued at approximately $600,000, for the completion of its shell-loading factory, hereafter called Military Project No. 1. General Beteta,[2] brother of Mexico's Finance Minister, and Colonel de la Colina, brother of the Mexican Ambassador, have also visited Washington to press for aid in the completion of this project.

The Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission has given detailed consideration to this project. At its meeting on December 7,

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Rubottom.

[2] Presumably Ignacio M. Beteta, Chief, Mexican Department of Military Industry.

1950, the Commission adopted a recommendation [3] endorsing a program for the development of the military industry of Mexico, including Project No. 1. Following that action, the Department of Defense formally notified the Secretary of State on December 29, 1950, of its "approval in principle of U.S. assistance in the development of the military industry of Mexico".

Subsequent to the informal discussions and recommendations referred to above, and on the specific suggestion of the Department, the Government of Mexico on February 26, in a formal note [4] to the Department, requested its assistance in the procurement of the material required.

It thus appears that the United States has rather firmly committed itself to assist the Mexican Government in this project. As you are aware, Military Project No. 1 was begun during World War II and was slightly more than half completed when that war ended and the project was abandoned. With the development of the present emergency situation, the Mexicans have again interested themselves in the completion of this shell-loading factory. They hoped, at first, to obtain the necessary materials through normal commercial channels but, in view of information furnished to Dave Clark [5] and others by the Department of Commerce, that avenue seems to be closed, and the Mexicans will have to turn to military channels under Section 408(*e*) of MDAA, as amended.[6]

I recognize that Mexico so far has provided little tangible support of the United Nations effort against aggression in Korea, although it did make a definite contribution of medical and food supplies which have been delivered. I am also aware of the position taken by Mexico at the IAM but feel that Foreign Minister Tello evinced a spirit of reasonableness and understanding which undoubtedly contributed to the eventual unanimity of the decisions reached at the meeting, especially with regard to the votes of Argentina and Guatemala. As far as troops for Korea are concerned, it must be admitted that Foreign Minister Tello felt that his instructions permitted him no latitude and caused him to give a definite negative answer to the

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[3] A copy of the recommendation is attached to a letter from Acting Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett to Secretary Acheson, December 29, 1950, not printed (712.5/12–2950).

[4] Not printed.

[5] David M. Clark, Office of South American Affairs.

[6] Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Amendments (Public Law 621), approved July 26, 1950; for text, see 64 Stat. 373.

In a note presented to Ambasasdor de la Colina, dated May 7, 1951, the Department of State indicated in part that the material requested by the Mexican Government in connection with the completion of a shell manufacturing plant was in critically short supply, and that even with priority assistance it would require two to three years to secure the items through the United States commercial market. The Department further indicated that should the Mexican Government wish to make a request for the materials under amended section 408 (*e*) of the MDAA, such a request would be submitted to the appropriate authorities (712.5/2–2651).

Secretary's request for Mexico's support of the UN in Korea. There has been no indication that President Aleman [7] will, for the time being, alter this position, but Ambassador O'Dwyer is now seeking an appropriate time, under instructions from the Department, to approach the President for a Mexican contribution of troops. All observers agree that the Mexican position is dictated largely by political considerations, i.e., the 1952 presidential election. Once the official Government party has agreed on a candidate, it is possible that President Aleman might undertake more positive leadership to prepare his people to assume their responsibilities in Korea and/or elsewhere.

Notwithstanding the above considerations, I believe that on balance the United States has more to gain by adhering to a cooperative line in its relations with Mexico, including assistance for Military Project No. 1, than by doing otherwise. No one questions Mexico's basic loyalty to the cause of democratic freedom nor its opposition to Communist tyranny. In helping Mexico, we are helping a friend and ally. We should, in making our help available, hammer away at every opportunity on the need for her help *now* rather than at some future date. Mexico, like Canada, has a peculiarly important position vis-à-vis the United States because of its 2400-mile common frontier with this country. Our basic economies are completely intertwined, with nearly 80 per cent of Mexico's trade being with the United States. Our demands on Mexico for zinc, lead, copper, antimony, mercury, cadmium, and other metals, as well as cotton, henequen, and other vital imports, need be only mentioned here. From a military standpoint, we also have much at stake in obtaining the maximum of Mexican cooperation. The Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission has just begun the preparation of a joint emergency defense plan.[8] We have recently requested Mexican cooperation in an important defense communications project. We need now to request Mexico's assistance in furnishing a high-speed aerial gunnery range for the Navy, and a number of other vital projects in which the Department of Defense is interested.

In summary, there is no escaping the preponderant role which the United States plays in Mexico's whole scheme of living, *but* we must also admit that Mexico is important to the United States. Acknowledging that Mexico's reaction so far to the UN effort against aggression has been disappointing, we should redouble our efforts to make the Mexican Government and people feel their responsibility in this fight for freedom. I am confident that the best way to gain Mexico's full and wholehearted collaboration is by continuing our policy of

[7] Miguel Alemán Valdes, President of Mexico.

[8] The minutes of the 60th Plenary Meeting of the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission held in Mexico City, September 14–15, 1951, not printed, indicate that this plan was approved on September 15, and submitted to the governments of both countries for consideration (712.5/2151).

full cooperation with it and that we should help it obtain the materials for Military Project No. 1, the delivery of which, even at best, may be indefinitely delayed.

611.1294/5–1651

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Radius) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1951.

Subject: Possible Bilateral Air Transport Agreement Negotiations with Mexico

Conclusion

That Assistant Secretary Thorp [1] and Under Secretary Webb should have knowledge of Mr. Rentzel's recent and proposed informal conversations with Mexican officials, and his proposal for formal negotiations.

Recommendations

That they confirm the Department's position that no informal commitments or formal negotiations should be undertaken until a firm CAB position on the revision of the Latin American Route Decision has been presented to the Department and has received the approval of the President, and approve the attached letter [2] asking for the CAB's position.

Background

The Mexican part of the Latin American Route Decision of 1946 [3] certificating 5 U.S. carriers on 6 routes into Mexico has never been put into effect through a bilateral air transport agreement because of Mexico's refusal to accept the U.S. concept of complete reciprocal competitive opportunity on all possible air routes. Last March Mr. Rentzel, (then Chairman of the CAB and now Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation), apparently with the knowledge and approval of the President, explored informally with President Aleman and top Mexican transportation officials the current possibilities of an agreement on the basis of modified U.S. route requests. Mr. Rentzel reported informally to the President and the Department that there was a reasonable chance for an agreement based upon an exchange of routes which would permit Mexican air carriers to operate the shorter trans-

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[1] Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

[2] For text of the decision of May 17, "Additional Service to Latin America", see *Civil Aeronautics Board Reports* (Washington, 1946), vol. 6, pp. 857–946.

[3] Not attached to source text, but see Secretary Acheson's letter, June 5, *infra*.

border routes, including New Orleans–Mexico City, on a monopoly basis, with U.S. carriers operating the longer routes between the major traffic points in the U.S. and Mexico.

Secretary of Commerce Sawyer [4] and Mr. Rentzel have informally requested the Mexican Minister of Communications and Director of Civil Aviation [5] to come to Washington for further informal exploratory talks within the next few weeks. In as much as the invitation has already been issued, the Department has taken the position that it has no objection to further informal exploratory talks. It was emphasized that it must be clearly understood by the Mexican officials that no formal agreement can be reached at this time. Embassy Mexico has been instructed [6] so to advise the Mexicans in order that hopes will not be unduly raised and misunderstandings result.[7]

On May 5 (Mr. Rentzel's last day as Chairman of the CAB), he requested interested Department officials to meet with the Board and stated that the Board has "reconsidered" the Latin American Route Decision and was prepared to agree to an exchange of routes substantially along the lines of the Mexican proposal. Department officers at the meeting emphasized to the Board that, in the Department's opinion, it would be inappropriate for the Department to negotiate an international agreement which would in effect constitute a revision of the Route Decision approved by the President without an explicit directive from the President. Mr. Rentzel suggested that it might be desirable to enter into formal negotiations even with the knowledge that agreement could be reached only on a basis which would in effect eliminate certain of the certificates issued to U.S. carriers with Presidential approval in 1946, expressing his belief that the necessary legal steps could be taken *after* the conclusion of the agreement.

It is conceivable that, in his new capacity as Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, Mr. Rentzel may continue his activities in this matter as a result of his understanding with the President and may, in his informal conversations with the Mexican officials, partially commit the U.S. Government to later formal negotiations, attempting then to get the Department's concurrence to such formal negotiations without having obtained the President's explicit directive as to the exact routes for which the U.S. would settle.

Section 802 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 [8] places on the negotiation by the Secretary of State of aviation agreements with foreign governments only the condition that the CAB be advised of,

[4] Charles Sawyer.
[5] Angel Martin Pérez.
[6] Department of State's telegram 1108, May 11, 1951, not printed (611.1294/5–1151).
[7] In the Department's telegram 1135, May 18, 1951, not printed, the Embassy in Mexico City was instructed to make clear to the Mexican Government that not even an informal understanding could be reached at this time (611.1294/5–1651).
[8] For text of the Civil Aeronautics Act (Public Law 706), approved June 23, 1938, see 52 Stat. 973.

and consulted concerning, such negotiations. Nevertheless there is serious question whether, in view of the responsibilities placed upon the CAB by the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Department can properly conclude an agreement which would entirely omit several routes contemplated by a previous CAB route decision, approved by the President, awarding certificates to United States air carriers. At best the Department would be placed in a difficult position vis-à-vis the United States carriers whose certificates would not be covered by the agreed routes unless the President had previously agreed to corresponding revisions of such decision.

Since the Latin American Route Decision of 1946, referred to above, contains routes which the Mexican Government is not prepared to agree to in an air transport agreement, the Department should have a written statement by the CAB, setting forth the manner in which it is prepared to amend that decision if necessary to achieve agreement with Mexico. Such a statement should set forth the minimum route requirements on which an agreement can be based as well as the CAB's evaluation of the relative importance of routes above that minimum which this Government may attempt to obtain in the course of negotiations. The proposed United States position based on such statement should be presented to the President by the CAB and the Department for his explicit agreement to the conclusion of an agreement in conformity with it.

WALTER A. RADIUS

611.1294/6–551

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Nyrop)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 5, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. NYROP: In view of the possibility of the negotiation of a successful air transport agreement between the United States and Mexico which is set forth in Mr. Rentzel's letter of March 19, 1951,[1] reporting to the President on his discussions with Mexican authorities in Mexico City, it is believed to be desirable to obtain as soon as possible a firm basis on which additional negotiations with the Mexican Government can be carried out. Were formal negotiations to be held with the Mexican authorities prior to the establishment of a United States position in this regard, the good that has been accomplished by recent discussions with the Mexicans could be lost and it

[1] Not printed. In the letter, Mr. Rentzel had stated in part his belief "that under no circumstances, will it be possible to execute or carry out the Latin American Decision of 1946 insofar as the certification of the three additional carriers to Mexico is concerned." (611.5212/3–1951)

is possible that the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement would be made even more difficult than heretofore.

With this in mind the Department, in its letter of April 3, 1951 [2] to Mr. Rentzel, pointed out that the Board might find it desirable to explore the implications of the possibility that the agreement which could be reached with Mexico would provide authorization for only a limited number of United States carriers currently holding permanent certificates for service between various points in the United States and Mexico under the Latin American Route Decision of 1946. Mr. Rentzel's reply, dated April 16, 1951 [2] enclosed a copy of his letter of March 19 to the President and a copy of the President's reply [2] giving general approval to the carrying through of additional negotiations with the Mexican Government, but did not give specific decisions by the Board concerning the routes that the Board considers indispensable in an agreement with Mexico.

Since the Board, pursuant to its responsibilities under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, in the Latin American Route Decision of 1946 granted certificates to certain United States air carriers to serve specified routes into Mexico and since that decision was approved by the President, it does not appear proper for this Department, under its responsibility for the negotiation of international air transport agreements, to undertake negotiations which would have the effect of modifying the Latin American Route Decision. It is recognized that the formal amendment of the Latin American Route Decision of 1946, including the revision of the certificates awarded to the various United States air carriers affected by that decision, would require lengthy proceedings on the part of the Board. Since it is believed that the time consumed by such lengthy proceedings could result in an undesirable deterioration in the aviation relations between the United States and Mexico, it is suggested that the Board advise this Department in writing of the minimum route requirements that it would be prepared to accept as the basis for an agreement with Mexico, together with an evaluation of the relative importance of routes over and above the minimum requirements which this Government should attempt to obtain in the negotiations with Mexico.

In view of the President's role in the approval of the decisions of the Board in connection with international air transportation, it is believed necessary to have the President's approval on the carrying out of negotiations which would have the effect of modifying a decision which he has previously approved and that when the Board's position is prepared it should be the subject of joint Department and Board discussions with the White House.

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[2] Not printed.

Since it is recognized that the decision of the Board with respect to the allocation of the routes obtained to United States air carriers is a function which can be exercised by the Board after the conclusion of the agreement, information on the Board's ideas relating to this portion of the modification of the Latin American Route Decision of 1946 is not believed to be essential at this time.

As soon as the Board can make available to the Department the information required for the negotiations with the Mexican Government, this Department will be able to take constructive action in this regard.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
WALTER A. RADIUS
Director
Office of Transport and Communications Policy

Editorial Note

On August 11, 1951, the United States and Mexico exchanged notes in Mexico City placing into effect a new agreement concerning the employment of Mexican agricultural workers in the United States. These notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 429, August 15, 1951, not pictured (811.06M/8–1551). For the text of the agreement, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 2 (pt. 2), page 1940. For the text of a press release on the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 27, 1951, page 336.

The new agreement replaced a previous one dated August 1, 1949 which had been discontinued as of July 15, 1951, at the request of the Mexican Government. For information on the earlier agreement, see editorial note printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, volume II, page 686. For text of that agreement, see 2 UST 1048. The Mexican note requesting discontinuance had been transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 1 from Mexico City, July 2, 1951, not printed (811.06M/7–251).

Negotiations leading to the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951 had been facilitated by President Truman's signature of Public Law 78 on July 12, 1951. For text of this law, which authorized the United States Government, *inter alia*, to guarantee the performance by employers of their employment contracts with Mexican workers, see 65 Stat. 119. For the President's special message to Congress, July 13, 1951, concerning the law, and also requesting legislation to prevent the illegal entry of migrant workers into the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1951, page 197. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 811.06M.

611.12/10–151

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1951.

MEXICO

A. OBJECTIVES

Objectives in our relations with Mexico are to enlist her support in efforts to promote Inter-American and world-wide peace, develop better political, economic and cultural relations, obtain more tangible support of the United Nations policy to resist aggression wherever it may arise, including the use of Mexican troops, assure maximum cooperation in case of total war, settle individual problems arising between United States and Mexican interests, as well as problems between the two Governments, and promote mutually advantageous economic development.

B. POLICIES

General. Our relations with Mexico derive special importance from the consideration that we must have in our near neighbor stable political and economic conditions and a sense of common purpose and direction between the two countries. Her large population, natural resources and strategic location make it vital to the defense of the hemisphere that our political relations be friendly at all times; our dealings, although firm, should be tolerant and understanding.

Relations between the US and Mexico in the past decade have been very friendly, in contrast to the generally turbulent relations between the two countries during the preceding century. Antipathy toward the US, which has existed ever since the Mexican-American War, has decreased steadily in recent years. Mexico is coming to realize that cooperation with the US is not only desirable but inevitable if Mexico is to maintain her progress and general well-being. During the first world war, Mexico maintained an attitude toward the US of "sullen neutrality," but she was an enthusiastic ally during the second. Many essential war materials were obtained in Mexico, and she permitted recruitment of several hundred thousand Mexicans for agricultural and railroad maintenance-of-way work in this country, thereby making an equal number of Americans available for military service. Furthermore, Mexico sent an air squadron to the Far East, and thousands of Mexican nationals served in the military services of the US.

Outstanding matters pending settlement in current US-Mexican relations include the refund to Mexico of monies paid into the Railroad Retirement Fund by Mexican railway workers (1943–46), the disputed Chamizal area on the Rio Grande at El Paso, bilateral air transport

agreement, a commercial fisheries treaty, more lenient travel regulations, the division of radio frequencies, and our various claims, including the Pious Fund, Sabalo, and agrarian claims.

Political. Although we do not accord Mexico unreasonable advantages in negotiations, we cannot attempt to impose our policies or overtly threaten to withhold advantages in order to obtain a better bargaining position in another field of negotiation. The Mexicans respect a demand for fair treatment when presented in a firm but friendly way; but even a vague indication of applying the "big stick" would make them withdraw from the particular negotiations and slowly stop cooperating in other fields. They are skilled at procrastination.

Our policy is furthermore to give every encouragement to a democratic system of government. We seek to convince the Mexicans of our complete respect for their sovereignty and of our lack of desire or intention to interfere in their domestic political problems, particularly in presidential elections.

It is important to show that the moral strength of the US is as great as its military and financial power. Mexicans have not forgotten that one hundred years ago their country lost almost half of its territory to the US. Our treatment of Mexico in the past, including armed intervention, political meddling and non-recognition, has created impressions that cannot be erased by the effects of less than two decades of the good neighbor policy. While more and more Mexicans each year come to believe that we sincerely intend to apply that policy permanently, many remain skeptical. We again demonstrated our good faith to Mexico during the meeting of the Joint Mexican-US Defense Commission in Mexico City, in September 1950, by returning her battle flags captured a century ago.

In order to further our political relations with Mexico, we seek to increase cultural interchange between the two countries. The American people have in the past decade become increasingly interested in the art and music of Mexico, the history of her long and bloody struggle for liberty, and in the opportunities for American business enterprise. On the other hand, the expropriations made under administrations from Madero to Cardenas are also remembered, and Catholic Americans have not forgotten the confiscation of church properties and the rigorous anti-clerical movement.

The already extensive public affairs (USIE) program in Mexico is being expanded in the effort to develop and strengthen the understanding and support there of the United States. This takes on strategic importance since Mexico's manpower and other resources will be essential to us in event of another major war. The purpose of the USIE program is to elicit Mexican support, both official and popular, of what we do. In addition, a program which is successful in Mexico will, due to

Mexico's influence throughout the hemisphere, have an important impact in the other American Republics.

The Communists have made more significant penetration of Mexico than their numbers, or the public activities of Communist diplomatic missions in Mexico, would indicate. This has been accomplished by aggressive tactics on the part of artists, writers, and school teachers who have great influence on the intellectual and cultural life of the country. Communists are also strongly entrenched in labor organizations.

Specific objectives of the USIE program are: 1) to combat the Communist threat to the US and the security of the hemisphere; 2) to clarify by statements and actions our friendly desire to cooperate with Mexico in cultural, political, and economic matters while strictly respecting Mexico's sovereignty; and 3) to show an accurate picture of the US, its policies and its people.

Because of Mexico's position as one of the large political units of the western hemisphere, we place importance on the effort to obtain her support on international questions, especially those affecting Latin America.

Without infringing upon the independence of unions, and in appropriate circumstances, we endeavor to foster closer relations between organized, non-Communist labor of both countries and to separate Mexican labor leaders from Communism. For example, twenty-three members of the Petroleum Workers' Union will spend five months in the US this year for the purpose of observing our petroleum operations and acquainting themselves with organized labor leaders here and their techniques. Although we are disappointed in the results of the ICFTU meeting in Mexico in January of this year,[1] we shall continue to strive for greater Mexican labor union participation in that organization. We also seek to diminish the prestige of Vicente Lombardo Toledano and other communistically-inclined Mexican labor leaders.

The incumbent President, Licenciado Miguel Alemán Valdes, will remain in office until December 1, 1952. He has frequently declared his friendship for the United States, and his Government has cooperated with the United States in most matters of major importance. Mexico has supported the United Nations resolutions regarding the aggression against South Korea, and high-ranking Mexican Government officials have made frequent pronouncements to the effect that Mexico will carry out her obligations in the United Nations. However, Mexico has not cooperated in the matter of sending troops to Korea and the President and other officials have stated that it is not politically possible for the administration to do so.

[1] The Mexican delegation had withdrawn from the meeting, and subsequently had joined with the Argentine delegates to consider a new federated labor organization. Pertinent documents are in file 800.062–ICFTU.

[Here follows a statement concerning United States support of the Alemán Government and the character of the President's subordinates.] Mexico has had two decades of increasing political stability, and at this time there seems to be little prospect of a change in government other than by constitutional process.

Presidential elections will take place in Mexico on the first Sunday in July in 1952. As yet the Administration party, the PRI, has given no indication as to who its candidate will be. There have been some indications that President Alemán himself may be a candidate for reelection, depending upon the state of world affairs at that time. Since the Mexican Constitution forbids reelection such a procedure would require legislative action to make it possible. Several persons have announced their candidacy on minor party tickets but it is not believed that any of them have much chance to be elected. Leading candidates for the PRI nomination include Ruiz Cortines, Secretary of Gobernación; Fernando Casas Alemán, Governor of the Federal District; Antonio Bermudez, Senator and Manager of Petroleos Mexicanos; Ramón Beteta, Secretary of the Treasury; and several State Governors.

The Alemán administration has maintained Mexico's high rate of industrial and agricultural growth; a vast program of public works is being carried forward; a courageous and far-sighted financial policy has stabilized the peso; and Mexico's international prestige has been maintained.

Economic. Our long-range economic policy toward Mexico is to encourage the development of a balanced and expanding Mexican economy, which will insure a growing market for US goods and services, and provide sound opportunities for American investment.

Mexico's strongly nationalistic and protectionist commercial policy serves as a deterrent to a steady expansion of the Mexican market for US products at the present time. This policy resulted in the termination of the 1943 trade agreement between the US and Mexico on December 31, 1950,[2] leaving the two countries without a contractual basis for their commercial relations. Quantitative restrictions on imports were removed, but tariffs were substantially increased on many products which enter the Mexican market from the US. Such action is contrary to the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,[3] but thus far Mexico has shown no interest in adherence to it. We hope that Mexico will perceive the advantages of participating with other trading nations in the General Agreement and that, as soon

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[2] For documentation on the termination of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 939 ff.

[3] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5–6).

as practicable, negotiations to that end may be undertaken. Meanwhile, under existing US policy, Mexico will continue to receive MFN treatment.

During the emergency period, the Department will be concerned with three major problems relating to materials of strategic importance: 1) The support of efforts to expand available supplies of Mexican metals, minerals, and other products and to obtain them for our use; 2) the maintenance of Mexico's cooperation in preventing shipments to Soviet bloc countries of items of primary strategic importance and other materials which should be controlled for strategic reasons; and 3) the support, within the established general policies and procedures, of Mexico's valid requests for assistance in obtaining supplies of essential materials which are in short world supply.

In view of the magnitude of the commercial and financial transactions between the United States and Mexico, it is important that Mexico maintain a realistic and stable peso-dollar rate. Mexico has been reasonably successful in doing this by following sound policies in correcting its post-war balance-of-payment difficulties. The existence of a US-Mexican Stabilization Agreement since 1941,[4] recently extended to July 1953,[5] has helped Mexico to stabilize its currency, to maintain a free exchange system, and to obtain relief from balance-of-payment stringencies. The stabilization fund was first established at $40 million (US), then raised to $50 million in 1947, and it has remained at that amount except for 12 months, 1949–1950, when it was temporarily increased to $62 million. The fund was utilized for the purchase of pesos to the extent of $37 million, all of which have been repurchased by Mexico. Finance Minister Beteta, a US-educated economist, has shown rare determination in maintaining a sound financial policy.

The economy of Mexico has strengthened considerably since the stabilization of the peso at its present par, 8.65 to 1, in June 1949. Following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the country's holdings of gold and foreign exchange sharply increased, due principally to the influx of flight capital. However, reserves began to level off during mid-1951. The Federal Government of Mexico has continued to meet its recognized foreign debt service payments regularly. However, because of the size of foreign debt, requests for loans out of the $150 million line of credit granted by the Eximbank on September 1, 1950, will be considered by the Department with special emphasis upon the degree of essentiality of the projects involved. A World Bank mission

[4] For text of a joint statement by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and the Secretary of the Mexican Treasury announcing the signature of the agreement on November 19, 1941, see U.S. Treasury Department, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1942* (Washington, 1943), p. 291.

[5] A Supplemental Agreement, extending the existing Stabilization Agreement until June 30, 1953, was signed on July 26, 1951 (812.131/7–2651).

is now making a study of Mexico's borrowing capacity in cooperation with the Mexican Government.

Since 1946, Mexico has sought a refund of the approximately $6 million paid by its workers into the US Railroad Retirement Fund during World War II. Although this amount would eventually be offset against Mexico's Lend-Lease debt to the US, in accordance with the terms of the Lend-Lease settlement agreement reached in February of this year, we are continuing to seek a more clean-cut basis for handling this claim.

It is also our policy to encourage Mexico's economic development through the diversification and increase of agricultural production. We believe Mexico should place at least equal emphasis on such a program rather than press so strongly for industrialization, although we realize the latter is looked upon by the Mexicans as the cure-all for their economic ills. Since agriculture is the occupation of nearly two-thirds of the Mexican people, improved commercial relations with Mexico depends on better conditions for these workers.

Mexico and the US have agreed upon a joint program of technical assistance [6] in accordance with the Point IV objectives, and the cooperative missions in operation and training programs are being continued. Moreover, serious consideration is being given to an expanded program in agriculture. We believe these programs of technical assistance should be continued and enlarged, always provided that the Mexican Government continues to display a desire to share in and profit from the effort, and that no conflict or duplication develops with UN, OAS, or private programs.

We encourage the use of private capital, both Mexican and foreign, in the financing of development projects, but the resources of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Eximbank have also been generously used, particularly in the fields of inland transportation, irrigation, electric power and steel production. Mexico often seeks loans from the Eximbank because of the lower interest rate and because of the traditional reluctance of Mexican capitalists to invest their money in Mexico, except in urban real estate. This tendency should be discouraged.

The Department should at every opportunity encourage the Mexican Government to permit the participation of experienced private foreign capital in the exploration and development of Mexico's petroleum resources, since it is believed that Mexico's full petroleum potential can be achieved only in this way. However, Mexican laws and Mexican

[6] A General Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the United States and Mexico was effected by an exchange of notes at Mexico City, June 27, 1951, which entered into force on the same date. The notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 3280, June 28, 1951, not printed (812.00–TA/6–2851). For a press release concerning the agreement, dated June 27, 1951, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1951, p. 67.

philosophy both are inimical to development of her oil resources by private capital. Since Mexico's petroleum resources are important to Western Hemisphere defense, every effort is being made to supply that industry with the materials and equipment necessary to support an active and balanced development program with a view towards increasing the amount of relatively secure petroleum supply which could be available to the allied and friendly nations in the event of hostilities.

With regard to other Mexican mineral resources, it is our policy to encourage their development by causing the Mexican Government and labor unions to realize that their present tax and labor union practices retard the incentive of new American capital to enter the mining industry. We hope to stimulate Mexican production of strategic ores [7] by assisting their experts in mining survey techniques and in offering the facilities of our laboratories for analysis of ores. This encouragement to production is carried on not only because increased development of Mexican resources is essential to the well-being and political stability of the country, but also to increase the supplies of strategic minerals which would be readily available to us in case of war.

We cooperate fully with the Mexican Government through a joint commission to control and eventually to eradicate foot-and-mouth disease [8] in Mexico, before it damages our cattle industry. The last outbreak occurred in August 1951, but it was quickly brought under control. Although the financial burden of the program should fall in large part on the Mexican Government, it is our policy, in view of the importance of keeping the disease out of the US, not to allow the matter of proportionate financial contributions, nor the disposal of Mexico's exportable meat surplus which is a result of the campaign, to jeopardize the continuation of present cooperative measures.

We have yet to solve our dispute with Mexico over commercial fishing rights and the extent of territorial waters, although this problem has been quiescent since mid-1950. A delicate balance, or *modus vivendi*, has been achieved and no US fishing boats have been molested due to Mexico's fear that a prohibitive tariff would be placed on the entry of Mexican shrimp and tuna into the US. We continue to refute the Mexican nine-mile territorial waters claim, although the whole question is complicated by our own continental shelf and high seas fishing areas policy. However, we hope eventually to settle these questions by international agreement.

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[7] In August 1951, representatives of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Mexican Government held discussions at Mexico City concerning a proposed joint uranium development program in Mexico. As a result of the discussions, a draft memorandum of understanding, dated August 20, 1951, was prepared by the Department of State with the approval of the Atomic Energy Commissioners and presented to the Mexican Government for consideration. No agreement was reached on the matter, however, in 1951. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 812.2546.

[8] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 811 ff.

We encourage and give appropriate assistance to the development of transportation facilities which connect the marketing and production centers of the US and Mexico. The Mexicans have been granted a $56 million loan under the Export-Import Bank credit to rehabilitate Mexican railroads. However, the Bank established several conditions for the loan through which it is hoped to improve the operating efficiency of the railroads.

We are preparing to discuss with the Mexican Government a bilateral agreement covering the reciprocal operation of bus and truck traffic between the two countries. These discussions, however, are not expected to begin until after the first of next year. It is hoped that eventually Mexico will assume the leadership in the conclusion of a multilateral convention covering commercial motor traffic over the Inter-American Highway.

To date we have been unable to negotiate a bilateral air transport agreement with Mexico, due to the Mexican Government's unwillingness to grant the routes embodied in CAB's Latin American route decision of 1946. At the present time, the entire matter is being reviewed to determine if there is any other approach which might be mutually acceptable to solve our outstanding aviation problems.

The attitude of the Mexican Government has been a stumbling block to the successful conclusion of a NARBA agreement.[9] The Mexican delegation walked out of the last NARBA conference. The US hopes that Mexico will eventually accede to the new convention, although it is expected that Mexico will request some concessions before it accepts this agreement.

A technical agreement has been reached for the assignment of television frequencies along the border for a range of 250 miles and this will soon be confirmed by an exchange of notes.[10] Discussions are also being held looking toward an agreement covering mobile transmitting equipment, and likewise the control of electro-magnetic radiation.

The Department of State relies on the Department of Labor for determination of the need for Mexican farm workers and seeks to facilitate orderly procedures whereby the needed Mexican workers are brought into the US for temporary periods in a legal manner and under terms satisfactory to both the US and Mexican Governments. Legislation enacted in July 1951 [11] authorized the US Government to recruit Mexican braceros in accordance with a governmental agree-

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[9] On November 15, 1950, a North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement was signed at Washington by the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic; the agreement entered into force for the United States, April 19, 1960. For text, see 11 UST 413, or TIAS No. 4460.

[10] The United States note, dated August 10, 1951, and the Mexican note, dated September 26, 1951, were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 1118, October 31, 1951, not printed (912.44/10–3151). The Department's press release of October 26, announcing the agreement is summarized in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 26, 1951, p. 865.

[11] Reference is to Public Law 78. See the editorial note on p. 1488.

ment with Mexico for employment on US farms. This new agreement entered into effect, following discussions in Mexico City, on August 11, 1951. The US guarantees the payment of wages and the costs of transportation of the Mexican workers and offers assurances that the terms of the individual contracts between the employer and the workers will be fulfilled.

As a result of the findings of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor [12] and following greater public awareness of the tremendous problem of the Mexican farm worker illegally in the US and not under contract, immigration officials are carrying out a vigorous policy aimed at returning these so-called "wetbacks" to Mexico. It is our policy to encourage this stringent campaign against the illegal entrants since their presence here flouts our laws, and exploitation of them by some US growers contributes to tensions in our relations with Mexico.

International Boundary. The Department, through the US Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, will continue to assure that the benefits to this country and the obligations of this Government contained in treaties and agreements with Mexico regarding the international boundary are fulfilled. These include: 1) a settlement of boundary, water and land controversies, such as the Chamizal, and 2) construction of joint dams and engineering projects, such as Falcón Dam, to utilize the water of the Rio Grande, and the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers for the benefit of both countries.

To the maximum extent possible, the Department will not become involved in US domestic problems arising from international boundary activities. Such domestic matters pertain to the determination of the agency to operate and maintain the Imperial Dam on the Colorado River and part of the All-American Canal in California which will be used to deliver water to Mexico and the distribution and use within the US of the US portion of the water and power to be made available by the international dams and power plants on the Rio Grande.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

Mexico has been for many years a strong adherent of the inter-American system and has in general been meticulous in carrying out her duties in this regard. She has developed an outstanding position among the other American republics, and has been helpful to the US in our relations with them. Mexico has a strong desire to be considered one of the political leaders of the hemisphere.

Mexico's publicly expressed general policy is to avoid meddling in Central American politics. However, she has traditionally looked upon

[12] For text of Executive Order 10129, dated June 3, 1950, which established the Commission, see 15 Federal Register 3499, or Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, p. 33. For the Commission's report, see *Migratory Labor in American Agriculture* (Washington, 1951).

that area as her sphere of political and social interest; she encourages political exiles from those countries to take refuge in Mexico, and Mexican diplomatic representatives sometimes become involved in the politics of the countries to which they are accredited. Guatemala especially has been influenced by the nationalistic philosophy underlying the Mexican Revolution and by Mexico's extreme leftist labor leaders.

Mexico follows closely the general course of South American politics but is cautious in adopting any partisan attitude in the rivalries among Argentina, Brazil and some of the other South American republics. We can in general count upon Mexican support in carrying out the terms of the Rio Treaty [13] and other international agreements.

Mexico never forgets her cultural relationship with Spain. She has consistently refused, however, to recognize the Franco regime and has recognized the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile. In the UN Mexico voted against resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Spain by member nations.

During World War II, and particularly at the time of Ambassador Oumansky's [14] assignment to Mexico, the Mexican Government had a generally friendly attitude towards Russia. This friendship has deteriorated, and although Communist propaganda is disseminated actively by the Russian satellite embassies in Mexico, there is no evidence of progress in promoting Communism or even of maintaining the position reached during the Oumansky period. A number of leftist or Communist-inspired conferences have been held in Mexican territory. The Mexican labor leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, claims not to be a member of the Communist Party, but his actions suggest that he is more than a fellow traveler. He is the recognized leader in communistic propaganda and activity against the US. Certain sectors of organized labor with leftist tendencies representing minority groups have shown a hostility to the US, but it is not believed that they carry much weight or present any threat to relations between the two countries.

Mexico has publicly announced a claim to part of Belize, but this has not been a cause of dissension with the United Kingdom. However, if British control of the territory should end, a lively dispute between Mexico and Guatemala might ensue.

Canada has made determined efforts in the past few years to increase trade with Mexico. While the volume of trade between those countries is still small as compared with US-Mexican trade, it is grow-

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[13] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[14] Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky had served as Soviet Ambassador to Mexico from June 1943 to January 1945.

ing rapidly and taking on importance. Closer relations of a political, economic or cultural nature between Mexico and Canada, even if established, would not create a problem since US-Canadian objectives are so similar.

Mexico has played an important role in the work of the United Nations since the organization was established, as well as in the OAS. Luis Padilla Nervo, Chairman of the Mexican Delegation to the UN, has won an enviable personal reputation as an effective and intelligent leader among UN representatives and has rendered outstanding service to the organization. Dr. Jaime Torres Bodet, Director-General of UNESCO, is another example of the wide scope and high competence of Mexico's participation.

Mexico's coldly formal support of the UN effort in Korea has been disappointing. In addition to the fact that her leaders have felt it politically inexpedient to do more in view of the presidential election in 1952, this can probably also be attributed to her feeling that the Korean affair is really between the US and the Soviet Union, to a combination of nationalistic and Communistic propaganda which has succeeded in making it seem to be politically unwise for the Mexican Government to support the US too openly, to her unjustified but strong belief that we have given insufficient recognition to the Mexican contribution in World War II, and to a fear that Mexico's armed forces are inadequately trained and equipped to perform creditably, this being attributed in part to her inability to obtain arms as needed from the US. However, Mexico offered some foodstuffs and medical supplies to the UN which were accepted.

In most major political matters Mexican representatives have collaborated with the United States, although serious differences of views have occurred in the UN in the fields of freedom of information and dependent areas.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

Our policy toward Mexico has been successful in its most important aspects. We have a friendly neighbor on our southern border and Mexico's actions in the UN and OAS are generally in accord with those of the US. The financial and technical assistance which the US has given to Mexico in recent years is productive of and conducive to continued cooperation by Mexico in the political, economic and cultural fields. Mexico remains a large market for our exports and furnishes us several strategic materials. Mexican labor is being provided on a legal contractual basis for US agricultural requirements and the flood of illegal labor has been slowed. Some progress is being made in clearing up outstanding problems, mostly in the economic field, but Mexican trade practices remain unsatisfactory from our point of view and agreement on aviation, telecommunications and fishing matters is yet to be reached. With the exception of the Chamizal question, there are

no boundary problems between the US and Mexico. An expanded information program is expected to help us counteract communist propaganda in Mexico.

We should continue to seek means of furthering better understanding between the Governments and the people of the two countries; and to seek solution of the economic and political problems arising from time to time. The only satisfactory means of doing so is through a policy of mutual respect and cooperation.

611.1294/10–1251

The Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Nyrop) to the Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Radius)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 12, 1951.

DEAR MR. RADIUS: Reference is made to your letter dated June 5, 1951,[1] relative to the negotiation of an air transport agreement with Mexico.

It appears that at the present time the attitude of the Mexican Government is more favorable than heretofore toward the conclusion of an air transport agreement with the United States, and there is reason to believe that a mutually satisfactory agreement may be effected. It is requested, therefore, that arrangements be made for an immediate meeting with the appropriate Mexican officials in Mexico City with a view to the negotiation of an agreement. The Board has designated as its representatives at this meeting the Chairman, Mr. Donald W. Nyrop, Mr. Gordon M. Bain, Director, Bureau of Air Operations and Mr. Edward A. Bolster, Chief, Foreign Air Division.

The Board has reviewed the various route proposals under consideration, and has determined that the following routes should be obtained for United States carriers:

1. New York–New Orleans–Mexico City. The Board is unwilling to grant reciprocal rights over the entire route, but has approved the grant of a Mexico City–New Orleans route. If the Mexicans insist upon a monopoly for a Mexican carrier on the New Orleans route, the Board would be agreeable to exclusive operations by a Mexican carrier for one year, during which time the U.S. carrier would operate between Mobile or Birmingham or Atlanta and Mexico. As a maximum concession, the Board would accept exclusive Mexican operations for two years.

2. Houston–Brownsville–Tampico–Mexico City–Tapachula and beyond.

3. New York–Washington–Fort Worth/Dallas–San Antonio–Monterrey–Mexico City. The Board will agree to the elimination of Mon-

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1486.

terrey from this route, despite the substantial investment of American Airlines at this point. In relinquishing this point, the United States should secure Mexican recognition of the obligation to reimburse American Airlines for such investment and a release to American Airlines from any future obligations under its Monterrey airport contract.

4. Los Angeles–El Paso–Mexico City. If the resistance of the Mexicans to the grant of this route is sufficiently strong to endanger the agreement, the request may be withdrawn.

5. Los Angeles–San Diego–La Paz–Mexico City. There should be a clear understanding with Mexico that the carrier operating this route will be permitted to terminate service either at La Paz or Mexico City.

6. San Antonio–Laredo–Monterrey–Mexico City. If the Mexicans are strongly opposed to the grant of this route, it may be abandoned. However, this route should not be relinquished prior to the relinquishment of the Los Angeles–El Paso–Mexico City route.

7. Houston/New Orleans–Merida and beyond.

8. Miami–Merida and beyond.

Any agreement reached must include the new Los Angeles and New Orleans routes as described above for U.S. carriers.

The Board is agreeable to the grant of the following routes to Mexico:

1. Mexico City – Guadalajara – Mazatlan – Hermosillo – Mexicali–Tijuana–Los Angeles.
2. Mexico City–New Orleans.
3. Mexico City–Miami and beyond.
4. Mexico City–Monterrey–Laredo–San Antonio.
5. Torreon–Monterrey–San Antonio.
6. Chihuahua–El Paso.

The Mexican request for a route, Nogales–San Diego, and for Houston as a co-terminal on route 5 should be refused.

It is further the opinion of the Board that the United States Government should have the authority to grant to each designated U.S. air carrier the right to operate schedules non-stop between any point in the United States on such route and any point in Mexico on such route and that this right should be specified in the agreement.

Sincerely yours, DONALD W. NYROP

911.5212/10–2551

The Acting Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Barringer) to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Nyrop)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 25, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. NYROP: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 12, 1951,[1] setting forth the Board's views relative to the

[1] *Supra.*

basis upon which this Government might again negotiate with Mexico for an air transport agreement.

Your letter was carefully studied by the several officers of the Department concerned. The Department concurs with the Board that the prospects for the conclusion of an air transport agreement appear to be somewhat more favorable now than they have been in the past; and shares the desire of the Board to proceed with negotiations as soon as possible. An analysis of the background and the past history of United States-Mexican civil aviation relations leads the Department to the conclusion that before arrangements are made for negotiations in Mexico, as requested in your letter, the following questions should be subjected to further consideration by the Board and by the Department.

(1) It appears to the Department that the basis suggested by the Board relative to the route exchange does not meet what Mexico has heretofore indicated to be its minimum requirements. Does the Board have information which would lead it to believe that this basis will possibly be acceptable to Mexico?

(2) The Department should like further to explore with the Board the policy implications of granting an even limited monopoly to a foreign carrier on a route or route segment. The Department is aware of the fact that from the economic point of view, the grant of a one or two year monopoly for a Mexican carrier to operate the Mexico City–New Orleans route would not be harmful to the interests of United States carriers because of the relatively low traffic between these points. Indeed, it could be argued persuasively that such an arrangement, even if acceptable to Mexico, would be advantageous to the United States since, in exchange for an exclusive right of doubtful economic value to Mexico, the United States is spared from granting to Mexico fully reciprocal long-haul routes from and to high-density traffic-generating points in the United States (New York, Washington, possibly Chicago). It could also be argued that the grant of an exclusive right, temporary or permanent, would not establish an undesirable precedent or involve a change of policy because of the unusual geographical situation, similar only to that existing with Canada, of a long contiguous border. The Department has serious doubts that this argument could be sustained with other nations, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere, especially when applied to the comparatively long over-water route contemplated between Mexico City and New Orleans. Should the United States be prepared to consider similar treatment for other countries, including Venezuela?

(3) The Department is concerned over the initiation of negotiations on the basis of a position which contemplates setting aside permanent certificates currently held by U.S. carriers, previously granted by the Board, with the President's approval, in the Latin American Route

Decision of 1946. As was indicated in our letter of June 5, 1951, the Department suggests that it would not be prudent to engage in negotiations with the Mexican Government until the President has indicated whether he approves of the proposed modification of the Latin American Route Decision. What procedures, if any, does the Board consider necessary to enable it to modify or cancel rights given certain American carriers under the Latin American Route Decision? [2]

Officers of the Department are prepared to discuss this problem with you at your convenience.

Sincerely yours, J. PAUL BARRINGER

[2] In a letter dated November 6, 1951, the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Nyrop) answered these queries by stating that because of the "generally more favorable atmosphere during recent months" the Board had concluded that a new effort to reach an agreement should be made, that the concession contemplated was necessary and the Board did not regard it as establishing a precedent, and that the President had recently requested that the negotiations be expedited. (611.1294/11–651)

611.1294/11–751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Barringer)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1951.

Subject: Negotiations with Mexico for a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement

Participants: Mr. Charles Murphy, Special Counsel to the President
Mr. Donald A. Hansen, Attorney-Adviser, White House Staff
Mr. Donald W. Nyrop, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
Mr. Thomas Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Mr. J. Paul Barringer, Acting Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State

At a meeting held in Mr. Murphy's office in the White House at 9:30 a. m. today, Chairman Nyrop and the Department's representatives outlined to Mr. Murphy and Mr. Hansen briefly the history of past negotiations with Mexico for a bilateral air transport agreement based upon the Latin American Route Decision of 1946, and the current basis for further negotiation recommended by the CAB in a letter dated October 12, 1951 to the State Department. Mr. Nyrop explained the effects of the recent change of position by a series of charts showing the routes authorized by the 1946 Decision, the routes currently operated by carriers of both countries under temporary permits, and the

effect of the changes now proposed by the CAB. These charts and a copy of the October 12 CAB letter were later left with Mr. Murphy.

In addition, the following points were made:

1. The Department and the CAB agree that the negotiating positions now recommended by the CAB be submitted to the President for his approval, inasmuch as the completion of a bilateral agreement incorporating the revised US route requests and proposed concessions would result in a *de facto* revocation and modification of certain routes and certificates granted US air carriers by Presidential directive in the 1946 Decision.

2. The conclusion of an agreement based upon the current CAB recommendations would involve a change in US policy to the extent that exclusive rights would be granted to Mexico for Mexican air carriers between points in Mexico and US points of secondary traffic importance. The Department's representatives expressed the view that both in regard to the change and the proposal for a 1–2 year exclusive on the Mexico City–New Orleans route, other Latin American states should receive equal treatment.

3. The Department and the CAB agreed that, while the current recommended basis for a new negotiation represented a substantial effort to meet previously stated Mexican positions, was a reasonable offer, and included the ultimate concessions that should be made, it was impossible to predict a favorable reaction from the Mexican Government. The President should be advised that the Department and CAB will make every possible effort to conclude an agreement if he approves the basis of negotiation, but neither is overly optimistic as to the chances of Mexican acceptance of the proposals.

4. It was suggested that a White House representative, preferably Mr. Murphy himself, accompany the US Delegation to Mexico City for the formal negotiations. The presence of such a direct and personal representative of the Preesident would strengthen the US position by indicating to the Mexican authorities that the US position was fair but final and that there would be no possibility of effective appeal to the President by the President of Mexico for further concessions.

Mr. Murphy appeared to agree that the problem required the President's personal attention and would undertake to advise Mr. Nyrop in the near future as to the time and manner in which it should be presented to the President. It was suggested that an early decision was desirable, and Mr. Nyrop said it would not be difficult for himself and the Department's representatives to visit the President in Florida [1] if necessary.

Mr. Murphy asked questions regarding the reactions of the various US air carriers concerned. Mr. Nyrop pointed out that American Airlines and Eastern Air Lines had agreed in writing to the modifications that would probably have to be made in their certificates, that from a practical point of view it was not probable that Braniff Airways would object so vigorously as to create serious difficulty. Mr. Mann

[1] President Truman spent the latter part of November and the early part of December at the Little White House in Key West, Florida.

expressed the opinion that Braniff might object vigorously. Mr. Murphy also asked whether Pan American's ownership in the Mexican airline, CMA, might possibly give rise to the intervention of the latter in opposition to an agreement which would involve loss of CMA's present exclusivity on the route Mexico City–Los Angeles. It was suggested that the Pan American management would be less likely to inspire such opposition at this time than previously. It was generally agreed that no hint of the over-all basis proposed should reach the interested airlines.

While waiting for the meeting with Mr. Murphy, Mr. Nyrop agreed with Messrs. Mann and Barringer that, should the President approve the basis, it would be most desirable to precede the formal negotiation by an informal exploration through appropriate Mexican authorities to ascertain whether or not there existed, in the opinion of the Mexican Government, an actual basis for negotiation. Mr. Nyrop did not feel that such an exploration with General Salinas was desirable, suggesting that a preliminary informal exploration might best be conducted by officials of the American Embassy at Mexico City.

811.06–M/11–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John L. Ohmans of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1951.

Subject: Mexican Migrant Labor Agreement

Participants: David H. Stowe, Presidential Assistant
Michael Galvin, Under Secretary of Labor
Edward Keenan, Assistant Director, Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor
Argyle Mackey, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Willard F. Kelly, Asst. Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Service
Edward Williams, Office of Attorney General, Dept. Justice
Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State, Inter-American Affairs
John L. Ohmans, MID, Department of State
Milton Turen, Bureau of the Budget
Bernard Schmid, Bureau of the Budget

The meeting was called by Mr. Stowe in order to review recent developments concerning the Mexican migrant laborers and to discuss strategy to be followed in the immediate months ahead, with respect to the agreement with Mexico.

Mr. Stowe recounted President Truman's decision to sign P.L. 78 in July 1951 thus paving the way for the negotiation of the Migrant Labor Agreement of August 11, 1951. The President's decision had been made then to limit the agreement to six months (President Aleman concurred) in order to grant time for Congressional action on the serious and growing "wetback" problem. But no positive action was taken by Congress in the session which ended in October and the agreement will end on February 11, 1952 unless further negotiations are undertaken with Mexico.

Congressional inaction on "anti-wetback" legislation was determined in part by considerable opposition among farmer groups to bills providing strong penalties for harboring and concealing "wetbacks", and granting INS officers permission to enter their farms in search of the aliens who had entered illegally.

In talks with farmer groups in California and in Arkansas and in Farm Labor Committee meetings in Washington Mr. Stowe found that there was misunderstanding regarding the bills. However, after explaining the nature of the bills he was assured of grower support, unfortunately not reflected in any subsequent Congressional action. Mr. Stowe distributed copies of letters he exchanged with Max Henderson, Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Agricultural Labor Users' Committee on the subject (attached [1]) which indicated that grower support of a bill along the lines of the Walters' bill [H.R. 4055] [2] could be expected. However, from a legislative point of view Mr. Stowe admitted that the Administration with its desire for some "wetback" curbs, batted zero.

Appropriation-wise, the INS and the USES fared a little better. INS received enough to pay for the expenses of the airlift, although this was not enough to put on extra men and continue the return by plane of the Mexican illegals. The USES received enough to meet their minimum expenses.

There was general discussion on the strategy that ought to be followed between November 15 and February 11. Mr. Stowe said he could not, of course, speak for President Truman, but if there were no prospect of legislation which would assist in controlling the "wetback" influx, he would recommend to the President that no negotiations be entered into to extend the agreement. For social, political, and for security reasons President Truman had to follow through with his program to seek curbs on wetbacks. Besides, the President had assured President Aleman that he would seek legislation on control of the wetbacks, and in reply President Aleman had expressed his sincere concern on the wetback problem.

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[1] None printed.
[2] Brackets in the source text.

Mr. Mackey expressed his agreement and volunteered the comment that the INS would not consider the admissability of Mexicans under any conditions not consistent with the law. Mr. Galvin considered that the legislative "posture" about February 11 could change the picture; i.e., if there was a possibility of legislation about that date, it might prove to be advisable to seek a 30 or 60-day extension to the agreement so that the proper legislation could be passed.

In response to questioning by Mr. Mann, Mr. Kelly admitted that his patrol officers could not, under present budgetary limitations, on border patrol personnel prevent the use of wetbacks in the border areas, particularly the lower Rio Grande Valley. Mr. Galvin pointed out the inherent difficulty in gaining "grass root" support for legislation in February, (so that the agreement would be extended) because at that time and up through May the farmers needing workers could get along without legal workers and "wetbacks" could be procured fairly easily. It would not be until May or June that the farmers in Arkansas, Mississippi, Colorado, and northern California would create any great demand for legal workers.

Mr. Stowe said that the problem was very important and that a foreign importation program was needed. He was convinced that a Mexican agreement was the answer.

Copies of the Bureau of the Budget study [3] (coordinating the Departmental views on the report of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor) were distributed. Mr. Galvin hoped that preliminary views of State and Justice could be exchanged with Labor in about ten days, while Mr. Stowe expressed a desire for the agencies' comments early in January.

The need for inter-agency coordination on the migrant labor problem, which was a recommendation of the Task Force study, received general agreement. Mr. Stowe said he would handle all specific inquiries concerning legislative action on a substitute for the Walters Bill (H.R. 4055); Mr. Galvin and his Labor Department officials would handle general inquiries on the operation of the agreement, and would seek greater support from the growers. The responsibility for pressure for legislation to control the wetbacks was delegated to INS. State promised to seek coordination of all Departmental actions and to make proper references to the other agencies.

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[3] Not found in Department of State files

611.1294/12–1751

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Department's Unnumbered Telegram of December 14 [1] to Mexico City.

Attached is a copy of a telegram [2] which I drafted on December 14 concerning the civil air negotiations with Mexico.[3] During the lunch hour on December 14 Mr. Deak [4] (AV) told me that the U.S. delegation had unanimously recommended giving a permanent exclusive to Mexico on the Mexico City–New Orleans route. His information was based on a telephone conversation with Mr. Barringer.

I told Mr. Deak that inasmuch as this was a departure from the agreed government position which had been cleared with President Truman,[5] it seemed to me it was a matter which should be taken up with the White House. In this connection I recalled that at the meeting in Mr. Murphy's office sometime ago I inquired of Mr. Nyrop what the maximum U.S. concession would be on Mexico's desire for a monopoly on the Mexico City–New Orleans route, and that Mr. Nyrop had replied in Mr. Murphy's presence that he would not agree to giving Mexico more than a three years' head start.

The second point I raised with Mr. Deak was that this would be a departure from long standing CAB policy, which would complicate our civil air relations with other Latin American states and that we would have to insist on equal treatment for other Latin American countries.

Mr. Deak telephoned again in a few minutes and said he had been in touch with Mexico City since our conversation and that Mr. Barringer had told him that Mr. Stowe had personally cleared the monopoly question with President Truman before his departure for Mexico City. Mr. Deak also said that he had learned that the CAB had already telegraphed its concurrence with the delegation's recom-

[1] Sent as telegram 734, not printed.

[2] Not attached to the source text.

[3] A delegation from the United States, led by Mr. Nyrop, who was designated chairman, and Mr. Stowe, conducted negotiations concerning an air transport agreement with Mexican representatives at Mexico City, December 10–19, 1951. A detailed report and documentary record of the negotiations is filed under decimal file number 611.1294/12–1951.

[4] Francis Deak, Chief, Aviation Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy.

[5] In a memorandum for the files, dated November 23, 1951, Mr. Barringer noted in part that he had been informed by Mr. Nyrop that the latter had received a telephone call from Mr. Murphy at Key West, Florida, "stating that the President had approved the basis of an exchange of air routes with Mexico as outlined in the Civil Aeronautics Board's letter to the State Department dated October 12." (611.1294/11–751)

mendation and that a reply from State was urgently required since they were about to go into another meeting with the Mexicans.

I told Mr. Deak that under these circumstances I would reluctantly interpose no objection, although I foresaw that this would create difficulties for us, including difficulties in our negotiations with the Colombians and Venezuelans. Mr. Deak then proposed that we send a telegram which in effect would state that we concurred in the delegation's recommendation, and I said that I would prefer that the record show exactly how this thing had developed, and thereupon drafted a telegram, a copy of which is attached.

This morning I called Mr. Deak to find out if he had any additional information, and he said that while there was no report from Mexico City, he had learned from Mr. Nyrop's secretary that Mr. Nyrop had reported that "the next forty-eight hours would be critical" which caused Mr. Deak to suppose that even with this concession the Mexicans might not be agreeable. Mr. Deak had also heard from the same source that there would be no other departures from the position which had been agreed upon, although he did not know whether the maximum or minimum concessions would be made. Apparently the delegation plans to return on Thursday, December 20. In the meantime I have asked Gerry to send down a telegram asking for a telegraphic report of what is going on in Mexico.

611.1294/12–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Mexico (O'Dwyer) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL MEXICO CITY, December 18, 1951—6 p. m.

815. From Barringer. Re Deptel 743, Dec 17.[1] Emb and del agreed current reports aviation negots prior today undesirable as entirely impossible give accurate complete picture any one time owing complex fluid nature conversations. Talks raised ministerial levels at noon after virtual breakdown on level Dir Civil Aviation. Min Communications Garcia Lopez partially admitting importance US concessions outlined three serious differences remaining:

1. Nonstop Los Angeles–Mex.
2. Mex desire exclusive San Antonio.
3. US request New York–New Orleans–Mex.

Latter solved by US offer drop back permanently Atlanta–Birmingham. During further mtgs Lopez yesterday withdrew request San Antonio but insisted on nonstop exclusive LA–Mex pleading US must appreciate and concede due serious difficult domestic Mex polit prob-

[1] Not printed.

lem involved. Martin Perez disclosed this decision followed three hour mtg with Aleman.

US del gave negative answer today stating own domestic and intl aviation problems insurmountable. Moreover, US now has similar most difficult problems in possibility of continuing indefinitely *de facto* monopoly extant in current exchange of permit outside over-all agreement. Lopez today suggested USDel return Wash and persuade US Govt accept final Mex proposal.

In order put ball in Mex court and give Stowe another opportunity see Aleman, USDel kept door open by suggesting Mex Govt reconsider. Lopez agreed another mtg tomorrow.

Follows routed scheds tentatively agreed. All with nonstop exception US route Nr. 1.

a. US routes:

1. Los Angeles–La Paz–Mex City.
2. Wash–Dallas–San Antonio–Mex City.
3. Houston–Brownsville–Tampico–Mex City–Tapachula and beyond.
5. Wash–Atlanta and/or Birmingham–Mex City.
6. Miami–Havana–Merida and beyond.

b. Mex routes:

1. Mex City–Guadalajara–Mazatlan–Hermosillo–Mexicali–Los Angeles.
2. Hermosillo–Nogales, Arizona.
3. Chihuahua–Cananea–Nogales, Arizona.
4. Casas Grandes–El Paso.
6. Torreon–Monterrey–Laredo, Texas–San Antonio.
7. Mex City–Monterrey–Laredo, Texas–San Antonio.
8. Monterrey–Brownsville.
9. Mex City–New Orleans.
10. Mex City–Miami and beyond.

Dept will note above routes within instrs as amended Deptel 734, Dec 14 [2] except Nrs. 2, 3 and 8 previously cleared with CAB by Chairman Nyrop. [Barringer.]

O'DWYER

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

611.1294/12-2851

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Barringer)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1952.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT FOR AN AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT DECEMBER 10 TO DECEMBER 19, 1951

Summary of the Activities of Mr. David Stowe and Ambassador O'Dwyer in Conjunction with the Negotiations

As a necessary supplement to the summaries of the various conferences between the United States Delegation and the Mexican Delegation which have been made the subject of summary reports, the following general account of the conversations held between Mr. Stowe and Ambassador O'Dwyer on one hand and President Aleman and the Foreign Minister on the other hand are recorded as they were summarized by Mr. Stowe and the Ambassador in later conversations with the US Delegation.

[Here follows a summary of the discussion Mr. Stowe and Ambassador O'Dwyer had with President Alemán on December 12.]

Following Conference IX held at 12 noon, December 18, Chairman Nyrop and Mr. Barringer felt that it would be desirable for Mr. Stowe to seek a second audience with President Aleman which Mr. Stowe was able to accomplish the following morning. During these conversations with President Aleman, he again repeated his appreciation of the major concessions made by the United States but placed new emphasis upon the importance to Mexican aviation of continuation of the exclusive rights enjoyed by CMA between Los Angeles and Mexico City. He repeated the arguments made by the Minister of Transportation and Public Works, Garcia Lopez, to the effect that protection of the Mexican carrier on this route was a matter of political essentiality to Mexico and an important consideration in the present and future of Mexican civil aviation. He stated he would be glad to have an American carrier operate from Los Angeles through El Paso to Mexico City or from Los Angeles through La Paz (with a required stop) to Mexico City but that he could not consider equal competitive opportunity on the nonstop operation between Los Angeles and Mexico City. Mr. Stowe explained to him that President Truman could not accept an arrangement of this sort as it not only violated principles to which the United States had unalterably adhered in its civil aviation relations with other countries but it was also politically impossible from the point of view of the domestic politics of the United States. In response to a suggestion by Mr. Stowe, President Aleman then stated that if the United States Delegation were to indicate to his Minister of Communications

that the United States would accept a route San Diego, La Paz, Mexico City (with non-stop rights) with the understanding that the governments would consult after a few years on the possibility of changing the point of departure from San Diego to Los Angeles, he would instruct his Minister to accept this proposal. As this was the only unresolved question between the Delegations, this suggestion, if accepted by the United States would result in the agreement that he and President Truman were so anxious to obtain.

Following this meeting with President Aleman, Mr. Stowe and Ambassador O'Dwyer urged the United States Delegation to make this proposal tentatively to Minister Garcia Lopez at the meeting held at 12:30 on December 19, emphasizing, of course, that approval of the United States Government would have to be obtained. Mr. Barringer suggested that this additional concession not be suggested even on an *ad referendum* basis unless it were coupled with withdrawal of the Mexico City–New Orleans exclusive concession previously made. This agreed tactic was followed as reported in the notes on Conference XII.

During Conference XII it became apparent that Minister Garcia Lopez had not received or was not acting on the instructions that President Aleman had given Foreign Minister Tello to pass on to Minister Lopez. When this was reported to Ambassador O'Dwyer and Mr. Stowe, the Ambassador attempted to get the Foreign Minister on the telephone and, failing to do so, waited on him at his office. During his conversation with the Foreign Minister, the latter entirely dissembled the conversation held earlier with President Aleman by indicating it was not his understanding that the President had made any suggestion involving a non-stop right for a US carrier from San Diego to Mexico City, that it was still the Mexican position that neither Los Angeles nor San Diego should be served by an American carrier on direct flights to Mexico City. It can only be assumed that President Aleman had made an offer which he regretted and was later persuaded to have his subordinates withdraw.

Following a further meeting between members of the Delegation, Mr. Stowe and the Ambassador, Mr. Stowe determined to obtain clearance for the additional concession from the White House and reported that President Truman would be willing to make the concession if the Civil Aeronautics Board concurred. Mr. Barringer undertook to obtain a clearance from the Department of State on the basis that he personally did not recommend the concession unless it were coupled with the withdrawal of the New Orleans concession. Chairman Nyrop then attempted to obtain clearance from the Civil Aeronautics Board. In view of the fact that the Civil Aeronautics Board did not concur, it was decided that Chairman Nyrop would call Minister Lopez at 7 o'clock as previously agreed and seek a final

audience with the Minister in order to terminate the negotiations. This final meeting is recorded as Conference XIII.[1]

[1] A copy of the record of Conference XIII, at which the United States and Mexican representatives agreed to suspend the negotiations, is attached to the source text, but it is not printed.

NICARAGUA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND NICARAGUA

611.17/4–1751

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1951.

NICARAGUA

A. OBJECTIVES

Our objectives in Nicaragua are:

1. To maintain and develop Nicaraguan support for United States foreign policies and for measures taken for the security of the United States and of the hemisphere; [1]

2. To seek more effective and continuing support by cultivating among the Nicaraguan people a genuine understanding of our policies and of the community of interests of Nicaragua and the United States;

3. To encourage in Nicaragua a spirit of self-reliance and self-help for the achievement of orderly democratic growth and of economic advancement;

4. To foster and protect legitimate United States interests in Nicaragua.

Background Information

By virtue of his position as Chief of the National Guard, and through his two terms in the presidency, General Anastasio Somoza has authoritatively ruled Nicaragua since 1936. During this period he has been able to render ineffectual all significant opposition and has treated the national domain as if it were his private estate. His régime has been characterized by consistent cooperation with the United States and support for our policies except those, in general, which, if put into practice in Nicaragua, might weaken his hold on the country. President Somoza, and Nicaraguans generally, have also demonstrated a proclivity to look to the United States for leadership in the solution of their social, economic, and political problems. This attitude of dependency seems to result in part from the past United States military

[1] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters, see pp. 985 ff.

occupation of Nicaragua, our past supervision of elections and the customs administration there, and from Nicaragua's geographic proximity to and economic dependence on the United States.

B. POLICIES

1. To maintain and further develop Nicaragua's support and friendship, it is our policy faithfully to respect the sovereignty of Nicaragua, to observe strictly our agreements with that country and to avoid intervention, direct or implied, into its purely domestic affairs. We consult with Nicaraguan officials when appropriate in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting the interests of both countries, and give full consideration to Nicaragua's legitimate interests in our day-to-day relations. We endeavor to develop Nicaraguan interest in the broader aspects of world and hemispheric affairs as well as a sense of international responsibility by encouraging her full participation in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States.

2. Effective and continued support of our policies by Nicaragua, however, will not be insured by the fact that the present incumbent, President Somoza, recognizes the community of interests which exists between our two countries. If we are to assure the cooperation of succeeding Nicaraguan regimes, the people of Nicaragua must come to understand what our policy objectives are and that their interests, as well as our own, may be best secured by Nicaraguan cooperation and support. It is our policy to seek this popular understanding through a program of information, education, and cultural exchange. To this end, we maintain a large library and a cultural institute in Nicaragua. Also, an information program is carried out by the Embassy's Public Affairs Section and a project for the exchange of students is sponsored.

3. A solid basis for continued satisfactory relations with Nicaragua, depending on a broad and popular understanding of and support for our policies, however, cannot be obtained so long as the country remains in a relatively primitive state of development with but a few people participating actively and fruitfully in the political and economic life of the country. There must, then, be political and social advancement through a democratic evolution suitable to the background and environmental conditions in Nicaragua as well as an economic program which will bring steady improvement in the standard of living of the majority of the people.

While many Nicaraguans profess a desire to see democracy practiced in their country, few have shown a genuine willingness to make personal efforts or sacrifices to bring this about. It is necessary, as a condition to democratic and economic achievement, to encourage in Nicaragua the development of a spirit of self-reliance on the part of the people who must be brought to recognize that the problems in-

volved are their own and that progress cannot be imposed upon them from the outside, but must be achieved through their own efforts.

While it is our policy to provide incentives, encouragement and assistance for political and economic progress in Nicaragua, we endeavor to do so without prejudice to the development there of an attitude of self-help. On every appropriate occasion we seek, while avoiding intervention into internal affairs, to make clear to Nicaragua that the United States not only practices representative government, but also preaches it. We, therefore, encourage Nicaragua to form and to give participation in government to opposition parties as well as to permit a free expression of opinion and to make a genuine effort to effect agreement on points at issue by democratic processes. Our policies with respect to the dissemination of information, the propagation of education and the promotion of cultural understanding are designed to be effective also in the execution of our policy and the promotion of democratic progress. Because of restrictions in Nicaragua on the freedom of access to information and because of the special need for education, these programs are of particular importance. The lending library which is supported in Nicaragua by the United States is used by a great number of people and is the only institution of its kind in the country.

Nicaragua's economy is basically agricultural and its chief exports are coffee (about 45%), gold (about 25%), cotton (about 8%), and forest products (about 4%). Approximately 75% of all exports are sold in the United States. Since agriculture offers the best hope of an immediate improvement in the low living standards of the people, it is our policy to give special encouragement to the further development and diversification of agriculture. The Nicaraguan Government has recently signed a General Technical Assistance Agreement [2] and technical experts are now operating in the country on a cooperative basis in a wide number of related fields.

The lack of adequate transportation facilities is an impediment to Nicaragua's economic growth. We have given financial and technical aid in construction work on the Rama Road in accordance with a commitment [3] made by President Roosevelt. We have helped in the construction of the Nicaraguan section of the Inter-American Highway. Subject to the necessary appropriations by Congress, our policy is to continue our assistance on these projects.

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[2] For text of the Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the United States and Nicaragua, signed at Managua, December 23, 1950, and entered into force on the same date, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2168, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 1, p. 906.

[3] The commitment was embodied in an exchange of notes at Washington dated April 8 and 18, 1942, which entered into force on the latter date; for text, see TIAS No. 2229, or 2 UST 722. For documentation on the United States commitment, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. VI, pp. 568–576, *passim*.

It is our policy to encourage the utilization of private United States capital on a non-discriminatory basis in the financing of development projects. Requests for financial assistance will be considered by United States agencies according to the criteria of economic justification and the availability of private capital.

Another impediment to Nicaragua's economic development is the lack of a more efficient and honest administration of national affairs. Nicaragua has a foreign debt in excess of $6,000,000 and an internal debt in excess of $8,000,000. It is sometimes tardy in servicing its debts. Nicaragua has also been confronted with an adverse balance of payments which has resulted in a shortage of dollar exchange and, consequently, in a backlog of pending dollar remittances to pay for imports. The country has attempted to meet this situation by adopting the exchange rate measures recommended by a mission of the International Monetary Fund in late 1950. The Government appears to be making an effort to administer the exchange rate measures fairly and effectively. It is our policy to encourage a sound approach to these problems and to support, in appropriate ways, Nicaraguan efforts to achieve administrative and financial stability.

Nicaragua is one of seven American Republics which have acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[4] We encourage the government to observe the provisions of that instrument in the conduct of its foreign commercial relations.

4. In order to foster and protect legitimate United States interests in Nicaragua, it is our policy to encourage the maintenance there of an atmosphere conducive to the investment of foreign capital on mutually advantageous terms. To this end, we have, in addition to offering protection in appropriate instances, initiated discussions looking toward the negotiation with Nicaragua of an interim Customs Agreement,[5] a Consular Convention, and a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Economic Development.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Due principally to propaganda attacks on General Somoza by the left-wing Guatemalan Government of ex-President Arevalo,[6] and Nicaragua's distrust of Guatemala's intentions, no diplomatic relations exist between these two countries. Nicaragua has to a lesser degree the same mistrust for the Cuban Government. Similar tension with the

[4] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

[5] By an exchange of notes at Washington dated December 3, 1951, and October 9, 1952, which entered into force on the latter date, the United States and Nicaragua concluded an Interim Agreement relating to customs exemptions of diplomatic and consular officials; for text, see TIAS No. 2708, or 3 UST (pt. 4) 5154.

[6] Juan José Arévalo Bermejo, President of Guatemala, 1945–1951.

Costa Rican Government has been dissipated to some extent as the result of Ulate's[7] replacement of Figueres[8] as head of the Costa Rican state, although the Costa Rican Government and its people still distrust Somoza. Should Figueres or some other individual of similar political views return to power in Costa Rica during the rule of Somoza, there would almost certainly be a deterioration of Nicaragua's relations with its southern neighbor.

Although General Somoza mistrusts Honduras' current Government and Panama's President Arias,[9] Nicaragua maintains friendly relations with these two countries, as well as with El Salvador. There has been some evidence of Nicaragua's desire to arrange a close political cooperation with the latter country.

It is our policy to promote friendly relations between Nicaragua and her neighbors in Middle America by counselling strict observance of all commitments undertaken by Nicaragua in connection with her membership in the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Furthermore, we endeavor to keep ourselves currently advised of developments so that, when necessary, we may bring our influence as well as that of the international organizations, to bear in time to prevent disturbances. It is also our policy with respect to the sale of arms to Nicaragua to discourage excessive purchases. By doing so, we hope to minimize economic problems resulting from the maintenance of excessive military establishments by small states as well as to preserve a political balance of power in the area and to discourage any spirit of aggression.

While Nicaragua recognized the U.S.S.R., it has never exchanged diplomatic representatives with that country and there is no immediate problem of local communism in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua and other Central American countries maintain separate national governments, separate military establishments, and separate tariff structures. As a result, the over-all cost to all governments is increased and funds needed for economic development are dissipated in this duplication. Accordingly it is our policy not to impede efforts to arrive at a satisfactory formula for Central American political or economic union, but to recognize that union can come only by agreement of the interested states, and that, like democracy, it cannot be imposed from without.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

We have achieved our immediate objective of enlisting and keeping the support of the Somoza régime for our foreign, economic, and

[7] Otilio Ulate Blanco, President of Costa Rica.
[8] José Figueres Ferrer.
[9] Arnulfo Arias Madrid.

political policies. The Nicaraguan Government has cooperated consistently in all efforts leading to hemispheric defense and few Latin American states are more inclined to our views, particularly in respect to issues in the United Nations, the Organization of American States and other International Organizations. Nicaragua has effectively supported the free world's resistance to aggression in Korea and has solidly aligned itself with the United States in demonstrating an awareness of the threat of international Communism and the necessity to resist it both internally and internationally.

Little progress has been made toward creating among the people of Nicaragua a genuine understanding of our policies or of achieving noteworthy advancement in the institution there of democratic practices or in the betterment of living standards. These are essentially long-term objectives, however, since they depend upon progress in education, the acquisition of technical skills, the formation of adequate capital, the improvement of health and sanitation, the development of initiative, the overcoming of venality by officeholders, and so forth. A good beginning has been made in the institution of our cooperative programs in the fields of health, agriculture, education and so forth, and the Nicaraguan Government has responded enthusiastically with monetary and material support. At this stage, the most that can be said is that the initial efforts have been made, and we have received evidences of small but measurable good work. Aside from these programs which should serve to provide a more satisfactory basis for democratic political development there is little of a positive nature which the United States can do toward hastening such development. In fact, it is necessary to guard against wishful endeavors too rapidly to emplant democracy where the ground is not yet fertile or to seek model institutions there after our own pattern. We have, however, and with some success, due to the prestige and moral stature of the United States, employed our influence in opposition to practices in Nicaragua which were repugnant to the concepts of human and individual dignity.

Problems with respect to United States investments in Nicaragua are rare, and our protection policies, when it has been necessary for us to express ourselves in matters affecting United States interests, have been successful. Nicaragua welcomes United States capital and provides favorable conditions for investment.

547-842—79——97

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137 [1]

Minutes of Meeting No. 177 of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Held at Washington, May 24, 1951

SECRET

[Here follows a list of those present (20).]

1. *Proposed Loans to Nicaragua*

Mr. Glendinning [2] said that both the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank had requested consideration of a $600,000 loan to Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Electrica, a government-owned corporation, to expand light and power facilities. The Export-Import Bank had been exploring this project with the Nicaraguans for some time. The International Bank had also expressed an interest in this particular project. In addition, the International Bank had requested the advice of the Council with respect to credits to Nicaragua of about $1 million for agricultural machinery, $3.5 million for highway construction, and $500,000 for grain storage facilities. On the technical side no questions were raised in the Staff Committee so far as capacity to repay or the character of the projects was concerned. The loans appeared to be good loans and well within the capacity of Nicaragua to service (NAC Document No. 1145).[3]

Mr. Glendinning added that the matter was being brought before the Council because of the question as to whether it would be more appropriate for the Export-Import Bank or the International Bank to make the electric power loan to Nicaragua in light of the general principles the Council had agreed upon with respect to the areas of operation of the two banks (See minutes of Meetings No. 172 and 173, and NAC Document No. 1122).[4]

Mr. Gaston [5] said that this application was made to the Export-Import Bank by the light and power company in September 1950, and the Bank had had it under consideration since then. There had been some delays in getting the necessary information from Nicaragua. The item had for several months appeared on the Bank's monthly list of pending applications, which goes to the International Bank, without protest or question. The item had been discussed with the staff of the International Bank by the staff of the Export-Import Bank, and the

[1] Master file of the documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs in the Department of State and preserved as item 70 of Federal Records Center Accession 71 A 6682.

[2] C. Dillon Glendinning, Secretary of the NAC.

[3] Not printed.

[4] For NAC Doc. 1122, April 12, 1951, see vol. I, p. 1596. For NAC Minutes No. 172, April 17, 1951, and No. 173, April 20, 1951, see *ibid.*, pp. 1599 and 1615.

[5] Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman, Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank of Washington.

International Bank representatives had stated that they were not interested. The International Bank had come into the picture only after the loan request had come to the NAC for consideration.

Mr. Gaston continued that this was the type of loan which was characteristically an Export-Import Bank type of credit. It involved financing the sale of a specific piece of American machinery, namely, a Diesel electric unit manufactured by the Nordberg Manufacturing Company, which had contracted with Nicaragua to provide this unit to enable it to carry out an expansion program. It was not a general improvement loan. It had never occurred to the Export-Import Bank that it would be considered as an International Bank loan. The International Bank had shifted its ground a couple of times. The IBRD had first raised the question that this loan would be in excess of Nicaragua's capacity to repay, taking into consideration the new loans the IBRD was contemplating making, which were worked up after the Export-Import Bank loan. The IBRD had later come to the conclusion the loan was within Nicaragua's capacity to repay, but that since Nicaragua was a member country it should be handled by the International Bank. Mr. Gaston concluded that he did not think the Council would want to make decisions which would completely debar the Export-Import Bank from making loans in IBRD member countries, from making loans in Latin America, or from carrying out its statutory function of assisting American interests in selling abroad.

Mr. Martin [6] said that the International Bank had no intention of seeking decisions of the type Mr. Gaston had mentioned. The purpose of the Council's discussion in the two previous meetings was to establish the point that the International Bank was a primary source of development lending, unless strategic reasons or special policy considerations would make it more appropriate for the Export-Import Bank, or the United States Government as such, to undertake the financing. The International Bank thought it had been agreed that such was the general policy. If that was not the policy the International Bank would like to raise it for further discussion in the Council.

Mr. Martin continued that on the historical ground that consideration of the loan had started before the Council's action was taken, and regardless of misunderstandings between the staffs of the Bank, the management of the International Bank was perfectly willing to withdraw its request. The reason for wanting the loan was that the International Bank did not feel this was a strategic matter, and since it was making a loan for three items and this could be related to them as a part of an over-all development program the IBRD felt it would be appropriate for this loan to be made by the International Bank. Unless

[6] William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.

someone wished some discussion of the strategic importance of this loan he was willing on behalf of the International Bank to withdraw the request.

Mr. Gaston commented that Mr. Martin's position was that the Export-Import Bank should not make loans abroad except those which had strategic implications. He did not interpret the Council's action as carrying such implication. The Export-Import Bank still had the function of making loans to promote the export and import trade of the United States, and he thought that the action of the NAC to the effect that in the case of development loans there should be primary recourse to the International Bank was not in conflict with that function.

Mr. Thorp [7] expressed the view that the basis on which the Director of the International Bank had stated his position was essentially one that the Council could accept. The Council had accepted the idea that the International Bank was the bank of first resort in development lending, and he gathered that that issue was not being raised here. The Executive Director was saying that in view of the history of this loan he would not want to challenge it on the basis of the general principle that the International Bank was the bank of first resort.

Mr. Thorp added that while he did not think it was necessary to consider strategic considerations in this instance, it was important to the United States Government that this loan be made. The strategic significance was that this electricity was needed to assure proper lighting of an airport and also in connection with the possible expansion of the use of the airport in connection with protection of the Canal Zone. He added that he did not think this needed to be given consideration in the context in which the Council was considering the matter, but it was an additional fact which had some bearing on the problem.

Mr. Gaston said he would not want to let the matter rest on strategic grounds. Mr. Thorp said he was not putting it on that basis.

Mr. Martin observed that Mr. Gaston apparently did not agree with what Mr. Martin believed to be the action of the Council on this matter. It was important, as the Administration approached Congress on the proposed legislation for fiscal 1952, that it be clearly understood what the position of the Council was and perhaps there should be another meeting on this question.

Mr. Gaston commented that if Export-Import Bank were limited to loans having strategic significance it would go a long way to nullify the Act of Congress [8] under which the Bank operated. He could not accept that concept.

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[7] Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

[8] Apparent reference to the Export-Import Bank Act (Public Law 173), approved July 31, 1945, as amended; for text, see 59 Stat. 527.

The Chairman stated that this was not the basis on which the Council was presently considering the loan. The International Bank had withdrawn its request. He understood that it was the sense of the Council that in the proposed action the reference to consideration of the Empresa loan by the U.S. Executive Director of the International Bank would be deleted. The Chairman then inquired what the sense of the meeting was with respect to paragraph 2 of the action concerning the three loans of about $5 million by the International Bank. No objection was expressed, and this item was approved.

The Chairman said that the Council would have an early meeting on this matter after careful review of the action taken in the past, and consultations with Council members.

Action:

The following action was taken (Action No. 469):

1. The National Advisory Council approves consideration by the Export-Import Bank of a credit of $600,000 to the Nicaraguan Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Electrica, S.A., for electric power equipment. It is understood that the credit would have a maturity of approximately ten years, and an interest rate of about 4 percent.[9]

2. The National Advisory Council advises the United States Executive Director of the International Bank that it approves his consideration, in the Board of Directors of the Bank, of loans to Nicaragua in the following approximate amounts: (*a*) $1 million for agricultural machinery (*b*) $3.5 million for highway construction and (*c*) $500,000 for grain storage facilities. It is understood that the loan for farm machinery would be for 7 years, and the other two loans for 10 years, and that the interest rate applicable to all three loans would be about 4 percent.[10]

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[9] On May 24, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized a credit of $600,000 to the Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Electrica to purchase materials, equipment, and services in the United States for the purpose of expanding its production of electricity. For further information, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress For the Period January–June 1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 15, 38.

[10] In 1951 the Board of Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved three loans for Nicaragua: (1) on June 7 the Board authorized a loan of $3,500,000 to the Nicaraguan Government to help finance the cost of importing equipment and materials for highway construction; (2) also on June 7 the Board authorized a loan of $1,200,000 to the Banco Nacional de Nicaragua for the purchase in the United States of agricultural machinery and spare parts; and (3) on October 29 the Board authorized a loan of $550,000 for the construction of grain storage facilities. For additional information on these loans, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Sixth Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1950–1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 38–39, and *Seventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1951–1952* (Washington, 1952), p. 33.

717.58/6–1951

The Ambassador in Nicaragua (Waynick) to the Department of State

SECRET MANAGUA, June 19, 1951.

No. 1092

Ref: Department's Instruction No. 67, June 5, 1951.[1]

Subject: The Embassy's Attitude Toward United States Military Mission.

In your communication above referred to, the views and recommendations of this Embassy were invited concerning a proposed U.S. Army Mission to Nicaragua. With the communication you sent me a copy of a memorandum [1] to the Department of State on this subject signed by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, GSC, Assistant Chief of Staff, in which a favorable attitude toward the Mission by the Department of the Army is indicated.

From time to time responsible officers in the military establishment here have indicated to our Attachés and to me an interest in the restoration of a U.S. Army Mission. On one occasion the President's son, Colonel Anastasio Somoza, Jr., was quoted as saying that a mission was not formally requested because the Nicaraguan military authorities did not desire to risk an embarrassing refusal.

About three months ago our Army Attaché located in El Salvador, Colonel Samuel P. Walker, in a report through channels, recommended re-establishment of a military mission in Nicaragua. Colonel Walker inquired at the time as to my position in the matter. I told him that I would concur in his recommendation, provided he would include in his report that in a choice between a military mission and a resident attaché for the Embassy, I would elect the latter. In 1950, when this Embassy was deprived of its resident Military Attaché, I protested on the theory that the Attaché was needed for contacts in Nicaragua. Col. Walker included this reference to my preference when he forwarded his recommendation.

Last night I asked President Somoza how he would feel about the restoration of a military mission here and he replied immediately that he would welcome it.

Measuring up to your request for the views and recommendations of the Embassy, I offer these observations:

The political opposition to Somoza in Nicaragua harps upon the charge that the United States created the Nicaraguan Army which, according to this opposition, is the force that has kept Somoza in power and continues to support him in power. Repeatedly oppositionists have called upon this Embassy to help break the chains which they claim we forged to bind them under Somoza domination. It is possible that restoration of a military mission would intensify this complaint

[1] Not printed.

and be interpreted as our lining up more strongly with the Somoza government for perpetuation of the alleged bondage. This is the sole political objection I see to restoration of the mission. I do not regard it as particularly important.

I have opened conversations with President Somoza with a view to encouraging him to offer a battalion of Nicaraguans to the United Nations through our Department of Defense for service in Korea. These conversations have just started, the President is deliberating the matter and has promised to indicate his course of action to me in a few days. I suggested to him that he would face Communist protests and possibly some unfavorable press reaction, but I suggested the value of being the first government in Central America to make an offer of military aid to the United Nations. We discussed the fact that a battalion of 1080 men from Nicaragua would be equal, populations considered, to about ten times the contribution Colombia is making. I took the position that nothing less than a battalion under a major would be a satisfactory unit.

The President is intrigued by the idea. He unquestionably would like to proceed with it and he informed me that he would discuss the matter with the leader of the opposition party and with some of his key officers with a view to decision. If he decides to make the offer, it probably will be submitted to the Nicaraguan Congress.[2] In the event of such an offer I believe that a military mission should be sent here immediately. In any event the net of my opinion is that the Department of the Army should be encouraged to assign the mission to Nicaragua.[3]

CAPUS M. WAYNICK

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[2] As of January 15, 1952, the Nicaraguan Government made no offer of ground forces for service in Korea to the United Nations; see United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951* (New York, 1952), p. 249.

[3] In a memorandum dated July 13, 1951, not printed, enclosing a copy of the instant despatch, the Special Assistant to the Chief of the Acquisition and Distribution Division, Office of Intelligence Research (Anderson), informed the Chief of the Latin American Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army (Colonel Somerville), that the Department of State concurred with Ambassador Waynick's recommendations concerning the proposed United States Army Mission to Nicaragua (717.58/7–1351). No agreement for such a mission was concluded in 1951.

717.56/10–1151

The Chief of the Lend-Lease and Surplus Property Staff (Murphy) to the Chief of the Division of Investments, Bureau of Accounts, Treasury Department (Barnes)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 11, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. BARNES: Telegraphic information from the American Embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, states that the Nicaraguan

Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement has been formalized under date of September 26, 1951.[1]

As soon as the relevant documents have been received, the usual mimeographed copies will be prepared by this Department for limited official distribution. In the meantime, you may be informed that the settlement is for $516,000 which amount has been arrived at by reducing the amount of the "contingent account" balance of $4,768.78 by $528.94; therefore, and in order that the records of the Treasury Department may properly reflect this adjustment of the account, you are hereby authorized to charge off the sum of $528.94 against "contingent accounts receivable" and thereby reduce the balance due to $4,239.84 which, added to the residual balance due on the "treaty account", makes $516,000.

The settlement terms, which require payment in full in three years, permit the acceptance of Nicaraguan cordobas instead of dollars at the option of the United States. The first payment, due October 1, 1951, is for $114,200 with scheduled quarterly payments thereafter in the amount of about $33,483 each. The conversion rate is fixed at seven cordobas to the dollar, or better, in case of a fall in the cordoba rate.

Out of the first payment, when made, the "contingent account" first should be liquidated ($4,239.84) with the remainder credited to "treaty account", thus leaving the net balance due at $401,800 on the latter.

By virtue of the conclusion of this settlement, and dependent upon the early receipt of the initial installment, the Nicaraguan lend-lease position may be deemed "current". Hence this Department no longer will be interested in the withholding of any refunds or credits which either have accrued or may accrue to the benefit of the Government of Nicaragua insofar as the lend-lease interest is concerned.[2]

Sincerely yours, F[RANCIS] T. MURPHY

[1] The exchange of notes dated September 26, 1951, at Managua, which constituted the Nicaraguan Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement, were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 296, from Managua, October 13, 1951, not printed (717.56/10–1351).

[2] Documents in Department of State decimal file 717.56 through 1954 show that Nicaragua made all scheduled payments under the Lend-Lease Settlement Arrangement, and that the thirteenth and final payment was made on September 29, 1954.

Editorial Note

By an exchange of notes dated November 26 and December 12, 1951, at Managua, the United States and Nicaragua concluded an agreement, which entered into force on the latter date, providing for the free movement of military aircraft of each country through the airspace of the other. The notes were transmitted to the Department of

State under cover of despatch 450, from Managua, December 19, 1951, not printed (611.1794/12–1951). For text, see TIAS No. 2460, or 3 UST (pt. 2) 2863.

PANAMA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PANAMA[1]

719.5/2–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Panama (Wise)[2]

SECRET — PANAMÁ, February 23, 1951.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA

FEBRUARY 23, 1951

GENERAL

A few days ago President Arias[3] expressed a desire to see me[4] informally and without the observance of the usual procedures of protocol. The Foreign Office was aware of this, and had expressed its approval of my making the appointment directly with the Presidencia. Accordingly, I called on the President at 11:00 o'clock this morning.

From reports to the Department already made by the Embassy, it will be seen that my call followed by only a few hours the President's radio speech to the nation on the evening of February 21[5] and of the change on February 22 of three members of his Cabinet. Upon greeting the President, I made no reference whatsoever to domestic matters, but did refer to the international aspects of his speech. I stated that the Embassy had been pleased, and I believed that the Department of State would be too, by his public reaffirmation of Panamá's devotion to the democratic cause and Hemisphere solidarity and by his pledge of personal support and of that of his country to the preservation of the free world. I specifically congratulated him upon his resolve to cooperate with the other American republics in the defense of the hemisphere and with the United States in the defense of the Panama Canal, which he said in reality meant the defense of Panamá. I also congrat-

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 969 ff.

[2] Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 1, under cover of despatch 670, February 28, 1951, not printed (719.5/2–2851).

[3] Arnulfo Arias Madrid, President of Panamá.

[4] Monnett B. Davis had been Ambassador to Panamá, but he had relinquished his duties there on January 23, 1951, after having been appointed Ambassador to Israel.

[5] President Arias' speech had been reported to the Department in despatch 653, from Panamá, February 23, 1951, not printed (719.00/2–2351).

ulated the President on the strong position he had taken against Communism by expressing his unreserved determination to thwart the efforts and influence of the Communists.

COMMUNISM

The President stated that occasionally he liked to talk directly with the Chief of the United States Mission to Panamá rather than to receive from third parties information of major interest to him. He said that today he had various matters that he wished to discuss, and that one of them was Communism, to which I had just made reference. He recalled that he had said to me on a previous occasion that Panamá would appreciate receiving from the Embassy advance notice of any emergency measures of significance to Panamá which the United States might take at home or in the Canal Zone. He said that unfortunately Panamá had received the impression that the United States at home had declared a state of alert rather than a state of national emergency, and that at any rate no significant state of alert or emergency had to date been declared in the Canal Zone. This, he said, made it practically impossible for him and his Foreign Minister [6] to work with the Cabinet, the National Assembly, and the public toward the preparation and promulgation of important measures which he very much would like to institute. He added that Panamá would wish to take emergency measures similar to whatever was done in the Canal Zone, but that rather than follow Zone action, it would prefer to take simultaneous and parallel action, providing coordination was possible. As it has turned out, he indicated, Panamá had been unable to take simultaneous measures or even to follow Zone action since to date there had been no emergency declared in the Zone.

In the above respect, the President referred particularly to Communism, and implied that if the Zone had taken public action against Communism, he would have been in a good position to influence the National Assembly toward enacting the Administration's proposed anti-Communist bill which the Assembly failed to consider before adjournment.

I told the President that I readily understood his position, and that I would make every effort to inform him when possible in advance of any proposed emergency measures in the Canal Zone. I explained that action at the highest levels often had to be taken without advance notice to anyone since all or part of the effectiveness of such action might depend upon it. I also observed that while the President's declaration of a state of emergency was operative throughout all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States, including the Canal Zone, the primary reason for such a declaration was to confer automatically

[6] Carlos N. Brin.

upon the President powers he ordinarily did not possess and that it did not mean specific and defined measures by the United States would result or were mandatory.

CIVIL DEFENSE

The President stated that Panamá was quite anxious to prepare for the defense of its civilian population in case the international situation brought emergency of consequence to this area, and accordingly would appreciate guidance from us.

I explained that a civilian defense organization had been started in the Canal Zone (as I had previously informed the Foreign Minister) and that the Director of Civil Defense in the Canal Zone had made a special trip to Washington in order to obtain advice and instruction. I added that some weeks ago, a committee composed of representatives from the Canal, the Armed Forces, and the Embassy had met to consider civilian defense in this area and agreed to invite Panamá to name a representative to meet regularly as a member of a committee of four. I stated that this had been arranged with the Foreign Office. The President replied that his Government had named Antonio De Reuter, ex-Governor of the Province of Colón, as its civilian defense official representative. The President seemed to be unaware of the extent to which the joint civil defense committee had been organized, but said he would see that De Reuter attended the meetings. He expressed his gratitude to the Embassy for its interest and effectiveness in obtaining Panamanian representation on the civil defense committee and his pleasure over knowing that the committee has been meeting regularly to prepare actively for civilian defense.

CENSORSHIP

Dr. Arias mentioned the conversation which the Foreign Minister had had with him concerning our desire to negotiate an agreement covering censorship in case of an emergency, and asked if I would inform him of our interest in this regard.

I told the President that the United States Government had been greatly impressed with the cooperation which Panamá had extended to the United States in placing in effect important emergency measures immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. I stated that the effectiveness of this cooperation came as a result of planning and agreements reached formally or informally prior to Pearl Harbor. I explained that it was my understanding that the Governor [7] of The Panama Canal and the Foreign Minister [8] informally had agreed some months before Pearl Harbor as to just what cooperative measures would be taken regarding censorship should

[7] Brig. Gen. Glen E. Edgerton.
[8] Raúl de Roux.

such control become necessary. I added that, as he would recall, Ambassador Wilson [9] had also reached an agreement with the Foreign Minister through an exchange of notes for the arrest and detention of enemy aliens and others. This preplanning and agreement was so productive, I pointed out, that we were interested now in reaching certain understandings with the Government of Panamá about measures to be taken in case they became imperative. I told the President that I had left with the Foreign Minister the draft of a proposed memorandum of understanding on censorship, but that the Foreign Minister had some question about the existing authority of the Administration to enter into such an agreement. I said that the Embassy and the Canal Zone authorities were most anxious to reach now an understanding on censorship in order that on a minute's notice steps could be taken to impose adequate control. I emphasized that we were not particularly interested in negotiating a formal convention which would require legislative approval or registration with the United Nations, but rather a more or less informal memorandum of understanding on the subject under Article X of the 1936 Treaty.[10] At this point the President gave the impression that he would consider the United States proposal further with the Foreign Minister.[11]

MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURES AT RÍO HATO [12]

The President remarked that he would appreciate receiving any information which I might be able to obtain concerning United States interest in Río Hato. The Panamanian Government, he said, was having some difficulty in keeping the public from tearing down the last of the structures remaining at Río Hato, and that he was interested in taking steps to prevent further demolition and to preserve as much of Río Hato as possible in case there were to be any need for Río Hato for defense purposes in the future. (The President obviously was endeavoring to obtain a clarification concerning probable requests from the United States for airfields and defense sites. There have appeared notices in the press of rumors that the Coco Solo Naval Base is to be reactivated. (These have since been officially confirmed.) A few days ago the Foreign Minister mentioned the visit of General Eichelberger [13] to the Canal Zone as a houseguest of General Morris,[14] and stated

[9] Edwin C. Wilson.

[10] Reference is to the general treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Panamá, signed at Washington, March 2, 1936; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 945, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1807.

[11] A memorandum of understanding concerning the application of censorship controls during a state of emergency was signed at Panamá on July 11, 1951. A copy of the memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 31, dated July 12, 1951, not printed (611.199/7–1251).

[12] A former defense site utilized by the United States which was located in the province of Coclé.

[13] Lt. Gen. Robert Lawrence Eichelberger (ret.).

[14] Lt. Gen. William Henry Harrison Morris, Jr., Commander in Chief, Caribbean.

that he had heard that Eichelberger had come to direct the assignment of many thousands of troops to Panamá. I commented to the Foreign Minister on the occasion of his inquiry that I had been told that Eichelberger was here merely on vacation.) I told the President that I had received no instructions concerning his inquiry, and that furthermore, I had no official reports of any nature on which to base a statement to him. I said, however, that I had heard certain military authorities express their personal opinion that in case of another war steps to be taken for the defense of the Panama Canal would be quite different from those considered necessary during the past war, and that in all likelihood, the number of troops assigned to the Canal Zone would be much less than before. I made no comment as to what might or might not be needed in the way of defense installations in the Republic of Panamá, but confined myself entirely to the statement that I had received no instructions.

SCREENING OF NATURALIZATION PAPERS

President Arias stated that until now there had been very little which Panamá could do by way of defense measures, but that he did want me to know that all requests of aliens for Panamanian naturalization were being most carefully investigated. He said he wanted to assure the United States of the efforts being made by Panamá to control the activities of aliens. I expressed my appreciation for this statement and the position which his Government had taken.

SPECIAL EXPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR PANAMÁ

Dr. Arias stated that he and the Foreign Minister were very much concerned lest Panamá would not receive special consideration when the United States began a rigid control of exports. He felt that because of the uniqueness and closeness of United States–Panamá relations on the Isthmus, Panamá should be able to import from the United States on exactly the same conditions which are applied to the Canal Zone. It would help greatly, he explained, if Panamá could import many articles for resale to the Canal Zone, and promised that if Panamá were given special export consideration, there would be no exports or resale outside Panamá except to the Canal Zone. He inquired whether I had received any indication of exceptions which might be made to United States export regulations. I told the President that, as he would remember, during the last war the State Department had made every effort to obtain special consideration from the War Production Board, or its equivalent, for Panamá but that the representation for the most part had been most difficult and largely ineffective. I stated that in a crisis critical materials were in such short supply that very few exceptions to export regulations could be justified.

I added that I had recently seen in a circular instruction from the Department to our embassies that in case of dire emergency rigid controls without exception would necessarily have to be the policy on exports. I added that I would make his hopes for special consideration known to the State Department, which I was sure would be most sympathetic, but that I wanted to be realistic and would have to state that any special consideration for Panamá would at the best involve a great effort which I feared would be attended for the most part by unsuccessful results. The President said he could appreciate the situation, but would continue to reiterate his request for our most sympathetic understanding of Panamá's problems, particularly its economic difficulties.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL

Dr. Arias remarked that he had viewed with considerable concern the plans for the reorganization of the Panama Canal into a government corporation. He said that he did not wish to say much concerning it for in fact he was uninformed and lacked details about what the reorganization involved. He asked, however, that a study be made of the relation of the reorganization to existing treaty relationships, and hoped that in the process of turning the Panama Canal into a government corporation there would be no violations of the 1936 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. I told the President that I understood his concern, that it had been mentioned to me by the Foreign Minister, and that the treaty aspects of the proposed reorganization were being studied.

POINT IV PROGRAM

I reminded the President of various informal references he had made to me over the past year concerning his interest in knowing more about the possibility of organizing a development corporation in Panamá. The President's idea had been to form an organization in which the Panamanian Government and some financial institution in the United States could deposit funds to be made available as credits to local agriculture and industry in need.

I told President Arias that I had not forgotten his interest, and in fact had discussed it with Dr. Henry G. Bennett, the Administrator of the Point IV Program, and with Mr. David Rockefeller, Vice President of the Chase National Bank, both of whom, as he knew, had recently visited Panamá. I remarked that Dr. Bennett and Mr. Rockefeller had misgivings concerning the advisibility of trying to organize anything like a development corporation in a country of approximately 800,000 people. I commented on information which I had obtained concerning similar projects in Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, and

Puerto Rico, and stated that I had come to the conclusion after consultation with Dr. Bennett and Mr. Rockefeller that the best approach to Panamá's present difficulties appeared to be through the Point IV Program. I pointed out that before an effective program of development is to be undertaken, by whatever means, it should be preceded by thorough technical surveys and followed by the assignment for considerable periods of time to Panamá of technicians in various fields of agriculture, industry, and commerce and the training in Panamá and elsewhere of Panamanians to work in these specialties. This, I proposed, could best be obtained through the Point IV Program. I expressed my appreciation of Panamá's budgetary difficulties in participating to the fullest extent in the technical assistance program, but pointed out that in my opinion, Panamá would ultimately benefit greatly if it were to make a real sacrifice now, even to the point of carefully reviewing and rearranging its budget, if necessary, in order to take full advantage of United States cooperation under Point IV. I added that the completion of surveys and the assignment of technicians to Panamá and the training of Panamanians in technical fields in preparation for the scientific development of the country's economy should prepare the way for a determination of where sound economic opportunity exists in Panamá and thus finally encourage investment and more flexible lending of money from private or official financial institutions in foreign countries.

The President appeared to see more possibilities than he had previously recognized in the Point IV Program. However, in concluding my remarks on this phase of development in Panamá, I repeated a statement made by Dr. Bennett to the effect that Panamá might well work through Manuel Diez, its representative on the World Bank, to request that institution to send a representative, perhaps Orvis Smith, to Panamá for the purpose of discussing the pros and cons of the formation of a development corporation here.

In concluding my observations regarding the Point IV Program, I reviewed with the President some of the requests presented as probable Point IV projects. We mentioned that the basic agricultural agreement had been signed late in December,[15] and that the proposed health and sanitation agreement would be ready for signature early next week.[16] I took a few minutes to explain to the President that by way

[15] Reference is to the general agreement for technical cooperation between the United States and Panamá signed at Panamá on December 30, 1950. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 495, December 30, 1950, not printed (819.00-TA/12-3050). For text, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 1, p. 900, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2167.

[16] This agreement, which provided for the joint development of a health and sanitation project in Panamá, was signed at Panamá on February 26, 1951; for text, see 2 UST 655, or TIAS No. 2220. For a press release concerning the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1951, p. 502.

of cooperation on health and sanitation, we were prepared at the present time to contribute financially only on a one-to-one ratio, that we could contribute up to but not exceeding $83,000, but that in view of Panamá's statement that it had only $50,000 for this project, we would contribute a similar amount and that the balance between $83,000 and $50,000, which could have been available, would undoubtedly now be reallocated to use in some other area. The President thanked me for the explanation, said that he understood, and expressed his regret that Panamá could make only $50,000 available for the health and sanitation program.

PURCHASE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM PANAMÁ

I told Dr. Arias that he would be interested in learning that I had just received an encouraging statement from the Army to the effect that it had taken steps to cooperate further and more effectively in obtaining from Washington important exemptions from the Buy American Act,[17] and that this would increase purchases by the Army in Panamá. I commented also on information which I had just received from the Panama Canal concerning its decision to make a thorough survey of all possibilities for purchasing an even greater quantity of agricultural, dairy, and meat products in Panamá. The President appeared gratified and appreciative of this program which had been stimulated and encouraged by the Embassy.

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS [18]

I informed Dr. Arias of the importance which the United States Government was attaching to the approaching Conference of Foreign Ministers in Washington, and reviewed the proposed agenda with him. I stated that I had been instructed by the Department to invite the full interest of Panamá in this meeting and to obtain from its officials Panamá's attitude toward the Conference and its plans for it. The President stated that he personally was very much interested and had endeavored to choose an effective representation comprising Foreign Minister Brin, new Minister of Finance and Treasury Herbruger,[19] Minister of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industries Arias,[20] Panamanian Delegate to the United Nations Duncan,[21] and Deputy to the

[17] Legislation requiring United States Government agencies, when procuring supplies for domestic use, to purchase only domestic materials and supplies. For text of the basic law, see Title III of the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1933, in 47 Stat. 1520.

[18] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. For documentation on the conference, see pp. 925 ff.

[19] Rodolfo F. Herbruger.

[20] Ricardo Arias Espinosa.

[21] Jeptha B. Duncan.

National Assembly Zurita. The President expressed strong agreement with the agenda and the objectives of the Conference, and remarked that the delegates were preparing themselves in a serious way for participation in the discussions.

He added that these delegates while in Washington would endeavor to interview United States Government officials, particularly the Secretary of State and his assistants, in an effort to find solutions to many of Panamá's worrisome problems. He said these matters were being discussed and that he hoped a decision would be reached promptly concerning the suggestions which would be of greatest interest to Panamá at the Foreign Ministers Conference and for talks with United States authorities.

M[URRAY] M. WISE

819.053/3–1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Financial and Development Affairs (Cady)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1951.

Subject: Eximbank: Relations of Hotel Financing to Closing of Panama Trust Company.

Participants: OSA—Ambassador Nufer,[1] MID—Mr. Sowash,[2] ED—Mr. Bauer,[3] AR—Mr. Cady; Eximbank—Mr. Arey, Mr. Sauer and Mr. Redway.[4]

On Friday afternoon March 9, following an informal board meeting, Eximbank requested consultation with the Department concerning the possible repercussions on Eximbank financing of Hoteles Interamericanos arising from the closing of the Panama Trust Company and reported efforts on the part of high officials of the Panamanian Government to take over the hotel or acquire ownership interest in it.[5] The bank is not concerned with repayment difficulties since the obligation

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[1] Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs.

[2] William B. Sowash, Office of Middle American Affairs.

[3] Walter Bauer, Investment and Economic Development Staff.

[4] The Export-Import Bank representatives are identified as follows: Hawthorne Arey, Vice-Chairman, Board of Directors; Walter C. Sauer, Vice President; and Albert J. Redway.

[5] On July 21, 1948, the Export-Import Bank had authorized a credit of $2,500,000 to finance the construction of the hotel, also known as the Hotel El Panamá. Subsequently, the hotel had become indebted also to the Panama Trust Company, a private commercial bank, in which the Panamanian Government sometimes deposited funds. Between December 1950 and early March 1951, the bank experienced a crisis, in part because of overextension and in part because of other financial problems, and it was closed by court order on March 7, not to reopen for the remainder of the year. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal file 819.14.

is unconditionally guaranteed by the Republic of Panama [6] but would not be reluctant to use its good offices to help to prevent improper interference with the project.

The bank understood that FinMin Herbruger is coming to Washington and would call on the bank in connection with the hotel situation. It was not known by bank officials what proposals might be made but it was believed that a suggestion on the part of the Panamanians to set up a "watch-dog" committee might be anticipated. The bank feels that such action is uncalled for because the hotel corporation is under the management of a Board of Directors. Moreover, the corporation has contracted for operating management with an American firm. It is the intention of the bank to maintain a firm stand that the provisions of the loan contract should not be abrogated. One of the provisions stipulates that during the life of the loan the management must be satisfactory to the Eximbank. In this connection the bank understands the management company intends to stand by its contract. It is also the intention of the bank to discourage the formation of a "watch-dog" committee should the Panamanians broach the proposition and seek Eximbank cooperation therein.

Department officials assured the bank officials that it was their intention to keep in close touch with the bank regarding the situation and that they would support the position of the bank in insisting that the provisions of the loan contract be scrupulously observed.

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[6] On July 26, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized an additional loan of $1,500,000 to finance the unfunded obligations of the Hotel El Panamá. Pertinent documents are in decimal files 819.10 and 103–XMB. For further information on the loan, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951* (Washington, 1952), pp. 16, 40.

719.11/3–2951

The Chargé in Panama (Wise) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PANAMÁ, March 29, 1951.

Subject: The Second Administration of Dr. Arnulfo Arias M., November 1949–March 1951; an Appraisal

Background

The most colorful Panamanian figure of the past decade has been Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid, a physician and surgeon educated in the United States, current presidential incumbent and chief executive of Panamá for the second time since October 1940. A year after entering office, Arnulfo was deposed by a bloodless *coup d' état* in October 1941 when . . . he secretly left the country without authorization. . . .

Provisional presidents elected by the National Assembly headed the Panamanian Government from the time of Arnulfo's overthrow

in October 1941 until 1948 when popular elections were held. Arnulfo returned from exile in October 1945 and entered the 1948 presidential campaign. The unofficial count gave Arnulfo a majority of votes, but the official count disqualified twenty-seven hundred of the votes cast for him and gave the election to his opponent, Domingo Diaz Arosemena. In the early fall of 1949, an attempt by President Daniel Chanis, Jr., who had succeeded to the Presidency in August 1949 upon President Diaz' death, to remove Colonel Josẽ A. Remón, the Chief of Police, from his post prompted the National Police to a *coup d'état*. After the Supreme Court held that the succession of Second Vice President Roberto F. Chiari was illegal because Chanis resigned under police duress, Colonel Remón on November 24 placed Arnulfo in the Presidency to begin his second period in office.[1]

Political Problems of Arias' Current Administration

Although Arnulfo entered his present incumbency with widespread popular support, he also had at least one strike against him. The character of his former régime, his activities while in exile, and the manner of his return to office, all gave him an opposition of an intensity and virulence in excess of normal, and at no time since November 1949 has his position as President been secure.

The story of Arnulfo's return to the Presidency in November 1949 and the Embassy's evaluation of his Administration during his first five months in office are summarized in the enclosure, "The Current Political Situation", to Embassy despatch 374 of April 26, 1950 and in telegram 215 of March 30, 1950.[2] By this time it was already evident that Arnulfo's "honeymoon period" with his ministers and Colonel Remón, prolonged by the disorganization of his opposition, was over. But it still remained to be seen just how much authority the President would assume and whether he might return to the tactics and conduct of the Arnulfo of 1940–1941.

The intentions of Colonel Remón were also a matter of speculation. Remón, previously a bitter enemy of Arias, had suddenly put him into the Presidency. Arnulfo clearly was chosen by Remón in order that the Police could clothe their November 1949 *coup d'état* with some semblance of legality based on the unofficial count of votes which had given Arnulfo a majority in the 1948 election. By then it was public knowledge that Arnulfo's defeat was a result of dishonesty in the electoral jury.

The peculiar power relationship between Arias and Remón created by Arnulfo's second installation was quickly interpreted as a marriage of convenience through which the two sought to acquire mutual

[1] For documentation relating to the attitude of the United States concerning these political events in Panama during the latter part of 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, pp. 761 ff.

[2] Neither printed.

political and financial advantages. Whether the arrangement could last and whether the two could operate an effective government could be determined only by time.

Arnulfo's second administration has been characterized by repeated periods of political tenseness with disclosures of various plans to overthrow him. At first Arnulfo appeared to be well advised and the consensus of observers was that, if shrewd, he would not make the mistakes of his previous presidency and could, through the use of good judgment and by improving his international and domestic policies, become a strong and effective president.

. . . There were a series of political blunders shortly after the National Assembly adjourned in February, 1950 which indicated not only a lack of sober judgment by the President but also a surprising disregard for the best interests of Panamá. This gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction and a feeling of economic and political insecurity while furnishing the opposition with material for a campaign to discredit Arnulfo's administration and to seek ways of causing his downfall. The Administration, however, weathered bitter criticism through August, 1950 and the working arrangement between the President and the Commandant of the National Police appeared still to be mutually advantageous. It continued in effect in spite of efforts by the Liberal Party, the Frente Patriótico and others to persuade Remón to oust the President. From August 1950 until the National Assembly adjourned in February 1951, the situation was quiet so far as threats to the Administration's stability were concerned but political opposition increased in the Assembly.

The activities of the opposition in building a more solid front against the Government have steadily developed throughout Arnulfo's present administration. The Liberal Party, the National Revolutionary Party and dissident elements of the Liberal Reform and Authentic Revolutionary Party worked hard to make the October 1950–February 1951 session of the National Assembly a real source of dissension and embarrassment for Arnulfo's Administration. The President, anticipating this, considered dissolving the Assembly and the Supreme Court before the Assembly met. Early in August the Embassy was reliably informed that Arnulfo was so anxious to declare a *de facto* government (Embassy telegram 86 of August 22)[3] that he had actually drafted the necessary decree. He made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade Remón to support him in establishing a government to operate by fiat.

Tension rose sharply following the adjournment of the National Assembly because of the President's speech of February 21, 1951 (Embassy despatch 653 of February 23),[3] in which the Assembly was severely criticized for lack of cooperation and in which the Minister of

[3] Not printed.

Government and Justice was reprimanded for actively seeking support for his own candidacy for the 1925 presidential elections. This led to a change of three ministers, reinforcing the President's personal strength within the Administration.

Next came the attempt on the part of the Government to gain a controlling hand in the Panamá Trust Company and the Hotel El Panamá (Embassy telegrams 388 and 394 of March 1 and 5, 1951).[4] In consequence the Panamá Trust Company was "temporarily" closed (Embassy telegram 403 of March 8) [5] and a political crisis resulted (Embtels 405, 408, and 411 of March 8, 9 and 13) [6] which for a few days could have become a serious threat to Arnulfo's incumbency. However, there was virtually no public response to a strong attempt by opposition leaders to make a major issue of this interference by the Government and Colonel Remón failed to act.

One major objective of the opposition in its campaign against the Administration was to win Remón fully to its cause. For a long period Remón seemed interested only in himself and his National Police. However, he has more recently given some evidence himself of aspirations for the Presidency in 1952. (Embassy despatch 623 of February 15).[5]

Administration Achievements

International

From the day Arnulfo took office in November 1949, he adopted a policy of close cooperation with other nations and especially with the United States in a strong bid for power and prestige. He has endeavored to build up his reputation internationally, in contrast to the record he left during the few months of his first administration. He has made numerous public statements strongly supporting the United States and democracy everywhere and has attacked communism and totalitarianism. He has firmly supported the United Nations and the United States in the United Nations. Unlike the immediately preceding Liberal régimes, Arnulfo's administration has not seriously interfered with civil liberties in spite of vitriolic press attacks on him and in spite of serious threats to his tenure of office.

[Here follows further description of the achievements and failings of the Arias administration.]

Conclusion

In initiating his second administration, it seems that Arnulfo was determined, through acts of international cooperation particularly with the United States, to dispel so far as possible the derogatory

[4] Neither printed.
[5] Not printed.
[6] None printed.

opinions of him that had become widespread during his previous presidency, and to ingratiate himself with the United States Government. He seems to have believed, perhaps as a result of his 1941 experience, that good relations with the United States would help assure his continuance in power.

The constant use of official position and power . . . has steadily brought Arnulfo loss of confidence and prestige at home and has encouraged his opponents on repeated occasion to seek his overthrow.

With a relatively large annual budget of some $30,000,000 there is much that the Administration could do on its own initiative and without outside assistance if there were any real concern for the commonweal.

That Arnulfo's second administration is any more corrupt than the régime that immediately preceded would be difficult to prove; that its economic problems are more acute and that accordingly, its activities whether for good or bad are more exposed to the public eye and have more serious consequences, is evident.

MURRAY M. WISE

611.19/3–3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William B. Sowash of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1951.

Subject: Matters of current importance in United States–Panama relations

Participants: Dr. Carlos N. Brin, Foreign Minister, Panama
Mr. Rodolfo Herbruger, Minister of Finance, Panama
Mr. Guillermo Endara, Panamanian Chargé d'Affaires
MID—Ambassador Nufer
MID—Mr. Sowash

Foreign Minister Brin, accompanied by Messrs. Herbruger and Endara, called at the State Department today by appointment to discuss nine matters of current interest in United States–Panama relations which Dr. Brin had indicated a desire to review while in Washington in an earlier conversation[1] with Assistant Secretary Miller.[2] In the course of the conversation, he stated that the discussion of these topics with Departmental officials has been one of the main purposes of his trip to Washington and that for this reason he

[1] Summarized in a memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Ernest V. Siracusa, of the Office of Middle American Affairs, dated March 22, 1951, not printed (819.2612/3–2251).

[2] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

had brought two other cabinet ministers with him. The following subjects were discussed:

1. *Inter-American Highway* [3]

Dr. Brin again stressed the current serious economic situation in Panama, importance of the highway to Panama, and the concern of his Government over the amount allocated to Panama from the current appropriation for the highway. These allocations and the reasons therefor were once again explained to the Foreign Minister. He was told that the allocation for Panama this year would probably be $600,000, that Panama and Costa Rica would receive the largest portion of the second $4,000,000 appropriation, when made, and that the Department is currently endeavoring to secure a much larger amount for the highway in Fiscal Year 1952. Our present goal in Panama was stated to be an all-weather road from Chiriqui to the Canal Zone and Dr. Brin emphasized such a road was a prerequisite if the Chiriqui area is to help supply the Canal Zone in times of emergency.

2. *Bridge or Tunnel at Pacific End of Panama Canal*

Dr. Brin remarked that this treaty commitment [4] on the part of the United States has existed since 1942 and that no steps were taken by the United States toward its fulfillment in the five year period between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean crisis. Dr. Brin was informed, as he had been on several previous occasions, that while the Department recognizes this commitment it is, nevertheless, not in a position to carry it out at the present time. It was pointed out that fulfillment of this obligation will cost the United States millions of dollars and that the Department had purposely not submitted enabling legislation to the preceeding session of Congress in order not to jeopardize Congressional action on appropriations for the Inter-American highway, which is deemed to be paramount in importance. With the outbreak of the Korean crisis a new emergency has been created which precludes any possibility of Congressional action on this commitment at this time. Moreover, Congressional appropriation of funds for this project is extremely unlikely until a decision has been made regarding future plans for the Panama Canal. Dr. Brin seemed resigned to the impossibility of obtaining United States action on this commitment at this time but remarked that, in his opinion, the uncertainty of future plans for the Canal ought not to constitute an obstacle since the proposed bridge or tunnel would be at Balboa and

[3] Documentation on this subject may be found on pp. 1038 ff.

[4] Reference is to the so-called Twelve Point Agreement effected by an exchange of notes signed at Washington, May 18, 1942. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 452, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1289. Under point four of the agreement, the United States was committed to the construction of a tunnel under or a bridge over the Canal at Balboa in order to improve transportation across the Canal.

therefore presumably would not be effected by construction work on the canal further inland.

3. *Loan to the Banco Agropecuario for Agricultural Development*

The Department's willingness to support a Panamanian loan application for any economically sound project was again indicated to the Panamanians. Dr. Brin stated that Panama has requested the International Bank to make a general economic survey and would probably call upon the Bank's technicians to assist in drawing up development plans and a loan application. He indicated that as an alternative, Panama may decide to request assistance under the Point IV program in drawing up the loan application. He was told that this Government would sympathetically consider such a request and it was agreed that a general economic survey would be helpful in planning future Point IV projects in Panama.

4. *Market in Canal Zone for Panamanian Products and Elimination of the 25 Percent Differential*

The Embassy's and Department's lively interest in this matter and their continuing efforts to expand Canal Zone purchases of Panamanian products were detailed to the Panamanians. It was explained that the requested elimination of the 25 percent differential would necessitate an approach to Congress, which is not deemed feasible in view of the domestic interests involved. Instead, the Department seeks exemptions for specific Panamanian products by Department heads under the "national interest" clause of the "Buy American Act". The Panamanians seemed somewhat surprised to learn that Canal Zone purchases from Panama now total about $2,000,000 a year. Further increases are expected in view of a recent report from the Embassy to the effect that the Armed Forces and the Panama Canal and Railroad now are anxious to expand their purchases of Panamanian products in order to develop a local source of supply. They were pleased to learn that the Caribbean Command has recently requested that chilled meats and clay products, among others, be placed on the exempt list. Dr. Brin argued strongly that cement also should be exempted and stressed the importance of this new industry to Panama and the current difficulties under which it labors. He was told that the Department would look into the possibility of doing this. Occasion was taken to point out that Panama itself could do a great deal toward increasing the sale of Panamanian products by organizing marketing cooperatives and by taking other steps to facilitate and ensure the delivery of Panamanian products in adequate quantities and quality on specified contract dates.

5. *Permission for Panamanian Trucking Interests to Pick up Cargo on the Wharves at Balboa and Cristobal*

It was explained to Dr. Brin that this matter has been referred to the Embassy in Panama for investigation and comment and that the

Embassy's report has not yet been received. The Foreign Minister was told that the Department would cable the Embassy today to expedite its report in order that this matter may be discussed with Dr. Brin before his departure from Washington.[5]

6. *Equality of Treatment for Panamanian Employees in the Canal Zone*

The Department's continuing efforts to ensure that Canal Zone labor practices accord with this Government's treaty commitments were outlined to the Panamanians. In view of the broad nature of this subject, Dr. Brin was asked to specify what practices he considers inconsistent with our treaty obligations. He referred to only two: the failure of United States agencies to give equal pay for equal work and the present inadequate retirement payments to Canal and Railroad employees. With regard to the first point, Dr. Brin was informed that the Canal and Railroad periodically review their job descriptions with a view to transferring to United States rate lists those local rate employees whose positions demand a degree of skill equal to that exercised by United States rate employees in similar positions and that a number of positions already have been so reclassified. It was explained that the nature of the problem makes progress necessarily slow but that the Department continues to support moves in this direction. With regard to retirement provisions, Dr. Brin was informed that this Government now has under consideration two plans for increasing retirement payments to employees of the Panama Railroad and Canal, and that both plans are generous and represent a very great improvement over the present admittedly inadequate payments. Early action on a retirement plan is expected. Dr. Brin pointed out that, despite rumors to the contrary, his Government not only does not oppose but actively favors payment of higher wages in the Canal Zone.

7. *Importation of Alcoholic Beverages into the Canal Zone*

Dr. Brin was informed that the Executive Order of 1935 [6] on this subject is still in effect and that it would be helpful to the Department in preventing the infractions of which he complains if he could supply the Department with specific information regarding these infractions. Dr. Brin said that he did not wish to register a formal complaint but that he has been informed that sizable quantities of liquor are being flown into Panama on military planes in direct contravention of the terms of the Executive Order. He was told that the Department would bring this matter to the attention of the appropriate Canal Zone authorities.

[5] Further discussion of this matter took place at a meeting at the Department of State on April 6, 1951; the meeting was summarized in a memorandum of conversation of the same date, by Mr. Sowash, not printed (611.19/4–651).

[6] Executive Order No. 6997, March 25, 1935, prohibited the direct importation of hard liquor into the Canal Zone; for text, see *Executive Orders Relating to the Canal Zone* (Canal Zone, 1922), Supplement No. 28, p. 477.

8. *Removal of the Railroad Station in Panama City*

Dr. Brin inquired regarding the present status of this matter. He was informed that the Department of Defense plans to submit enabling legislation on this project to the Budget Bureau this week for transmission to the Congress and that it was hoped, therefore, that this Government would very soon find itself in a position to proceed with the fulfillment of this commitment.[7] It was pointed out, however, that the commitment of the United States is conditioned by the stipulation that the Government of Panama shall provide free of cost a new site deemed suitable for terminal purposes by both Governments. In view of the cost to both Governments involved in preparing the proposed Curundu site, Dr. Brin continued to urge consideration of the use of the Balboa Station, the railroad withdrawing completely from Panama City. He pointed out that the Curundu site is very close to the Balboa station and that use of the Balboa station should not therefore appreciably reduce the revenues of the railroad. Furthermore, he argued, the hundred-year concession of the railroad will expire in 1965 or 1966 and he questioned the prudence of the United States spending $4,000,000 to build a new terminal in Panama City which might have to be abandoned in another 15 years. He was told that the Department would ascertain the feasibility of using the Balboa station and the hope was expressed that a site could soon be agreed upon since early and favorable action by the Congress is expected.

9. *Equality of Treatment for Panama and the Canal Zone in Regard to Allocations and Quotas of Scarce Commodities and Products*

Dr. Brin explained that Panama hopes that future allocations and quotas imposed on Panama in the exportation of scarce items and commodities will take into consideration purchases in Panama by Canal Zone residents. Dr. Brin was told that the Department recognizes the problems posed for Panama in this regard by unrestricted purchases of scarce items in Panama by residents of the Canal Zone and he was assured that the Department would bring this problem to the attention of the appropriate authorities. He was warned, however, that the Department had been unable to do much in this regard during the last war.

At the close of the discussion of these nine points, Dr. Brin was asked how the affairs of the Panama Trust Company and the new hotel are progressing. Dr. Brin said that he had had no report since arriving in Washington but that he hoped a satisfactory solution could be arrived at. It was suggested that Mr. Herbruger might wish to discuss this matter with the Export-Import Bank officials while he was in Washington. The hope was expressed that the solution to this prob-

[7] Under point ten of the Twelve Point Agreement, the United States had committed itself to the removal of the terminal facilities of the Panama Railroad from their present site.

lem would be such as would permit the continued fruitful development of the bank and hotel in order that the loan to the hotel might be merely the first of a series for developmental projects in Panama.

The exchange of views on these several problems is considered to have been very beneficial and the conversation was at all times cordial. The Panamanians left in what appeared to be a satisfied mood.

719.00/5–751

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Ernest V. Siracusa of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1951.

Subject: *Coup d'etat* in Panama

Participants: Murray M. Wise, Chargé in Panama
MID—Mr. Siracusa

Murray Wise phoned me from Panama at 11: 20 p. m. to report the following:

1. A large mass meeting before the Presidencia tonight (Monday, May 7) enthusiastically received Government announcement of the following:

(*a*) Abolition of the 1946 Constitution and restoration of the 1941 Constitution.
(*b*) Dissolving of National Assembly instituting *de facto* Government headed by Arias.
(*c*) Promise of elections in due course.
(*d*) Appointment of all public officers by the President. No change in the Supreme Court at this time, but some to occur later.
(*e*) All of the above with full support Remón and National Police.

This move has no doubt been planned for some time and it is known that Arias was desirous of assuming greater powers. It was precipitated by the Banking crisis [1] of the "Caja de Ahorros" in the last two days, which was brought about by opposition elements to embarrass the Government.

The meeting was addressed by José Pezet and the Minister of Government, Obaldía, who read the proclamation setting forth the above conditions. He said that the 1946 Constitution was inadequate and did not give the Government flexibility to control the economic and political situation in the best interests of the country. President Arias then made a radio address, stating that this would launch a promising new era for Panama. He said he would respect all international commitments and assured security and protection of all foreigners and prop-

[1] Telegrams reporting the development of this crisis and its domestic political ramifications are in Department of State decimal file 719.00.

erty. He said the move was a protection against Communism, but Mr. Wise tends to discount this.

Up to the time of his call no serious disturbances had occurred. Mr. Wise felt that the situation would clarify throughout the night and today, and he will report additional facts and interpretation soonest.

719.00/5–851

Memorandum by Mr. Ernest V. Siracusa of the Office of Middle American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1951.

Subject: Developments in Panama

We have not yet received reports from Panama except for Mr. Wise's telephone call to Mr. Siracusa last night. Our preliminary estimate of the situation is as follows:

Arias' move is the culmination of his long standing desire to consolidate his power and relieve himself of restraints from the National Assembly, the Supreme Court and the opposition parties. The opportunity was afforded by the opposition-inspired run on the Caja de Ahorros and public disturbances that resulted therefrom. The key to the situation continues to rest with Remón and the National Police. Present reports are that he fully supports Arias and no doubt Arias had this assurance before he acted. However, it would seem that Remón, rather than Arias, has improved in strength. Arias is farther out on a limb than he was before and more indebted to Remón. Presumably Remón can increase his price, whatever it may be, for cooperation with Arias. Also, depending upon how he judges reaction to Arias' move, Remón could step in as a benefactor and remove Arias on the ground that he had violated the liberty of the Panamanian people and assumed dictatorial powers. It seems significant that Remón may have endeavored not to identify himself with this move to retain such flexibility. The Secret Police, it is to be pointed out, and not the National Police, have been the only ones reported so far to have participated in the sporadic gun play and arrests.

We tend to discount Arias' statements that his move is really a counter to communist activities which threaten the security of Panama and the Canal Zone. It is true that the Supreme Court and the National Assembly denied him certain requested powers with respect to controlling communist activities. However the basic issues appear to be predominantly local and the communist aspect comes in only in

[1] Addressed also to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas C. Mann, and Ambassador Nufer.

so far as they have exploited the views of the nationalist hotheads and the Liberals who form the strong core of opposition to Arias. Real motivation seems to lie in the normal domestic political struggle for power fanned to some extent by the bitter personal animosities existent there, and the excesses and venality of the Arias regime. One of Arias' motives in wishing to discard the 1946 Constitution was to remove the legal limitation on his tenure in power. The 1941 Constitution which he has restored was tailor-made by him to fit his desires during his first incumbency and provides for a six-year Presidential term.

Our position vis-à-vis Panama would not seem to be affected except in so far as another Latin American Government has lost, at least temporarily, its semblance of democracy. No doubt communists will attack us and accuse us of inspiring it.

719.00/5–851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Panama

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 8, 1951—7 p. m.

359. Pan Chargé called instr Arias request Dept assure CZ facilities not be used give aid opposition to Govt. Dept reiterated position complete neutrality internal matters Pan and requests you bring this attn CZ civ and mil auths. As Emb and CZ auths of course aware important no expression opinion be given which cld be interpreted encouragement either side.[1]

ACHESON

[1] In telegram 508, from Panama City, May 9, 9 p. m., Chargé Wise reported in part the following: "Dept's instructions re non-interference internal matters Pan (Deptel 359, May 8) being strictly observed with full cooperation Gov Newcomer and Gen Morris with whom discussed." (719.00/5–951)

Editorial Note

During May 9–10 the effort of President Arias to assume complete control of the Government of Panamá collapsed, largely because Police Chief Remón withdrew his support from the President. On several occasions, President Arias or his subordinates attempted to elicit aid from or intervention by the United States, but the Department of State adhered to its policy of noninterference. After a brief gun battle at the Presidential Palace on the afternoon of the 10th, President Arias was taken into custody by the National Police. In the meantime, the National Assembly had impeached the President and installed Alcibiades Arosemena, First Vice President, as his successor. Documents pertaining to these events are in decimal file 719.00.

719.00/5–1151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Panama

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 11, 1951—12 noon.

PRIORITY

365. Dept believes question recognition shld not be raised and public statements on this issue shld be avoided if possible. When public order restored and in your judgment Arosemena position as Pres clear you are authorized continue normal contact.

For your info Dept bases position on fact Arosemena first Vice Pres Arias Govt and Supreme Court ruled legality his succession. Dept believes you shld take early opportunity make clear Arosemena US assumes full compliance by Pan Govt internal commitments, including claims settlement,[1] interrupted by disorders.

ACHESON

[1] On January 26, 1950, the United States and Panamá had signed at Panamá a claims convention providing for the settlement of certain long-standing mutual claims. The convention had entered into force on October 11, 1950. For text, see 1 UST 685, or TIAS No. 2129.

719.00/5–1451

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Central American and Panama Affairs (Bennett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1951.

Subject: New Administration in Panama

A cursory look at the Arosemena Cabinet would seem to provide little hope for any real stability in the Panamanian political scene beyond the immediate future. The Cabinet is a hodge-podge coalition ranging from extreme right to extreme left. It includes people who as late as last week were ardent supporters of Arnulfo Arias as well as at least one individual who has a record of communist sympathy. Some of the changes lend further credence to the charge made at the time of the 1949 revolution, that Panama is the double crossroads of the Hemisphere.

It should be borne in mind that extreme violence in Government changes in Panama is very rare. I cannot think offhand of any other revolution in recent years in which anyone got killed. The presence of the Canal Zone does not allow reinforcements to be brought into the capital from the interior. Also the tempering influence of the U.S. and the characteristics of the people in Government in Panama have traditionally resulted in palace revolutions in the political game of musical

[1] Addressed also to Mr. Mann, Ambassador Nufer, and Messrs. Siracusa and Sowash.

chairs indulged in by the upper classes. The blood letting of last week's fight has probably stunned the country, and we can look forward to a short period of quiet. However, it is too much to expect that a Cabinet as jerry-built as the one announced by Arosemena can long endure. It just isn't in the cards that all these people will suddenly have common interests. After a period of calm we can expect the jockeying to begin again with the various groups represented in the Cabinet looking out for their own interests rather than for the national good.

From our point of view, the Cabinet is decidedly unimpressive. The President himself has been completely chameleonic in his attitude toward the U.S. He has always been a devoted supporter of Arnulfo Arias and has followed all the shifts and turns of the checkered career of that individual. He opposed us in the vital Rio Hato Highway agreement during the war and in the Defense Sites Agreement of 1947.[2] As late as 1945, the office of the Legal Attaché at Panama described him as "always a strong Axis supporter". He has however an attractive personality, is personally wealthy (real estate and cattle), and will probably see the obvious necessity as Arnulfo did of getting along with us. It cannot be said that he is anti-U.S. at the present time although one of his sons, Rodrigo, is a member of the anti-U.S. Ultra Nationalist Patriotic Youth Front and an intimate friend of Ricardo Bermudez (see below).

Unless they have changed their spots entirely, several members of the Cabinet can be expected to play us for what we are worth.

Perhaps a majority of the Cabinet has strong nationalist feelings, tempered with opportunism. The new Minister of Government and Justice, Miguel Angel Ordoñez (ranking member of the Cabinet) was an Arnulfista Deputy and is said to be ultra-nationalist. Juan de Arco Galindo, Minister of Public Health (married to Julio Heurtematte's sister) and Varela [3] are all considered to be opportunists, and Navarro [4] has been something less than friendly to us in the past. Minister of Finance Victor Navas is also quite nationalistic and suffers from a racial complex. He is, however, quite independent in his views and had a good record as Governor of Colón. Molino,[5] the new Foreign Minister, and Samudio,[6] the Minister of Agriculture, are both friendly to us. Molino, who has worked very closely with us in the past, will be a great improvement over Brin. But, he is not particularly popular in Panama and has been the object of attacks by nationalist and leftist elements because of his pro-U.S. attitude and American wife.

The appointment of Ricardo Bermudez as Minister of Education is shocking. A leading member of the Patriotic Youth Front and always

[2] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 881 ff.
[3] José Manuel Varela, Secretary General of the Presidency.
[4] Norberto Navarro, Minister of Public Works.
[5] Ignacio Molino, Jr.
[6] David Samudio.

in the fore in anti-U.S. attacks and projects, Bermudez was described by our Embassy in 1949 as "extremely anti-American with bond of nationalist intellectual sympathy for communists because of their consistent enmity of U.S.". Although Bermudez has apparently never become a card-carrying communist, his record was such as to lead the Embassy to deny him a visa in 1949. This fact is known throughout Panama. In view of his intimacy with Arosemena's son, it is already apparent that he has ready access to the Presidential household. Since the line between him and the communists is so thin, it is not perhaps looking too far to see their hand in his choice of the Ministry of Education as his portfolio.

The assumption of power by the above group may bring, with respect to dealings with the U.S., some responsibility, or at least a recognition of the realities of life. The bite of Panamanian politicians is seldom as bad as their bark once they are actually in power. However, it is definitely not in the interests of the U.S. to have such men as Bermudez in the Cabinet of Panama.

493.009/6–451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Panama

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1951—8 p. m.

398. UNGA Res of May 18 [1] re embargo on shipments of strategic materials to Chi Commie and North Korean aggressors recommends that every state apply controls to give effect to embargo and prevent by all means within its jurisdiction circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other states pursuant to Res. We believe this language warrants application of appropriate controls by cooperating states on shipping under their flags, designed to prohibit carriage of items falling within embargo and destined for Chi Commies and North Koreans.

Pls sug to FonOff that it wld be most helpful if, in submitting first Pan report to UN AMC due June 18, Pan cld state that it had taken or wld take action to apply such controls over cargoes carried Pan registry ships. We understand Pans have withdrawn protection from Pan shipping engaging in prohibited operations. If penalties cld now be instituted (See U.S. T–1) these steps wld make excellent impression in US and UN; wld avoid unfavorable publicity re circumvention of UN embargo thru use Pan flag shipping; and, most important, wld tend to increase effectiveness of embargo thus con-

[1] For the text of Resolution No. 500 (V), entitled "Additional Measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea," see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the period from 16 December 1950 to 5 November 1951*, Supplement No. 20A, p. 2. For documentation on this subject, see volume VII.

tributing to UN effort to meet aggression in Korea. Having in mind generous offer Pan Govt make available Pan shipping for UN use in connection collective action Korea, Pan Govt may wish consider further step of advice to all ships flying Pan flag that registration will be withdrawn if calls made at Chi Commie or North Korean ports. While such action wld admittedly go beyond May 18 UNGA Res, it wld parallel action taken by Hond Govt on its own initiative last Dec respect its merchant marine. It wld also seem comparable US Govt action last Dec forbidding US registry ships call at Chi Commie and North Korean ports.

Pls consult FonOff and refer to Dept questions Pans may raise.

ACHESON

919.534/7–251 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 2, 1951—7 p. m.

4. Panama Govt authorizes you acting for it re shipping pick up papers and withhold sailing permit any vessel Pan registry destined North Korean or Chi commie ports. Pan Govt suggests you base action on need verify validity ship's registry. Interested local auths may be informed any action taken pursuant this auth.

Report cases with name of vessel, registry nr and call letters to Pan Govt through Amembassy Pan with info copy Dept and await instrs which will be sent by Pan Govt through Dept. Tokyo and HICOG shld advise appropriate Consulates their jurisdictions.

ACHESON

[1] Sent for action to Algiers, Karachi, Istanbul, Saigon, Tokyo, HICOG (Germany), Calcutta, and Belfast; sent for information to Hong Kong.

919.537/7–2351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Panama (Wise) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PANAMA CITY, July 23, 1951—6 p. m.

49. Spoke FonMin again noon today re Pan flag shipping saying we very appreciative prompt action being taken Pan Govt with respect individual ships found dealing in cargo for Commie China and North Korea adding strongly, however, that it would appear be in best interest Pan Govt to issue contemplated decree (see last para Embtel 29 July 14) [1] soonest.

[1] Not printed.

FonMin replied he doing everything within his power get Cab agreement, particularly Min Fin Treas on proposed decree which if promulgated as drafted will (1) demand payment fine on any Pan flagship which loads strategic cargo; (2) permit any ship proceed provided it unloads such cargo and (3) authorize cancellation registry if cargo not unloaded.

I explained to FonMin that Dept had just been successful in avoiding bad publicity on Pan flag shipping and that Cab might wish expedite action in hope avoiding adverse publicity which cannot be prevented indefinitely.

Min desires that Dept issue publicity deemed appropriate including names ships on which action and type action already taken and stating FonMin advises decree under consideration to be issued soon.

FonMin says Pan honorary Con Linares (Hong Kong telegram to Dept July 10) [2] has been relieved his duties and that Department may so publicize.

FonMin appears quite embarrassed delay issuance decree but unable yet work draft through Cab. Emb pressing matter urgently through channels other than FonOff. Will report further soonest.

WISE

[2] Not printed.

919.537/7–2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Panama

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 26, 1951—5 p. m.

48. Proposed terms decree (Emtel 49, Jul 23) place emphasis strategic cargo re control movement Pan ships commie ports. Deptel 398 Jun 4 sought outright ban visit Pan ships such ports as only effective means control traffic. DepCirtel those offices representing Pan re shipping quoted to you in Deptel 3 Jul 2 [1] and based urtel 672 Jun 30 [1] placed emphasis traffic commie ports irrespective strategic or non-strategic nature cargo. This position reaffirmed Emtel 17, Jul 9.[1] Does proposed decree contemplate penalty only when strategic cargo concerned? If so, what guidance will Pan give on what is strategic and what is not? Dept desires reiterate belief effective measures shld ban visits commie ports irrespective cargo.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed.

[2] In telegram 64, from Panama City, July 29, 1951, Ambassador John C. Wiley, who had been appointed Ambassador on June 20 and had arrived in Panamá on July 17, stated in part that he would "endeavor promptly obtain broadening of decree in line with Deptel 48 July 26". (919.537/7–2951)

919.537/8–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Panama (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PANAMA CITY, August 3, 1951—3 p. m.

95. FonMin told Wise this morning Pres has instructed him confer with MinFin and draft decree (Deptels 48, July 26 and 57 July 31 [1]) today along fol lines for possible issuance Saturday:

(1) Prohibit transportation aboard Pan flagships to Commie ports cargo all kinds irrespective strategic or non-strategic nature.
(2) Prohibit operation ships between Commie ports.
(3) Ships handling strategic cargo to be fined heavily and ordered unload before proceeding to non-Commie destination. Registry to be cancelled for non-compliance.
(4) Ships furnishing service between Commie ports to lose registry.

From reliable sources Emb has now learned hesitation (Embtel 71 July 30 [1]) Pan Govt in issuing decree banning visits ships Commie ports due to lack existing legal basis for such action by executive decree or by decree law. Emb informed that owners at least one vessel under Pan registry have protested violently recent instructions and threatened bring suit against Pan Govt.

Emb is certain Ricardo J. Alfaro was consulted upon arrival by both Pres and FonMin re decree and that he advised them least Pan could do by way of cooperation would be ban ships visiting Commie ports and that he sure legal basis could be found.

Wise did not find FonMin entirely clear in his statement. However, from foregoing it would appear that Pan flagships trading with Commie China in violation of Pan prohibition might not be subject to fines or penalties unless it was legally proved that ships had actually carried strategic cargo. It cld of course be difficult to establish case after the fact. Since this may afford loophole we shall press for clarification. Min has promised receive me before proposed decree is sent to President for signature.

WILEY

[1] Not printed.

919.537/8–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Panama (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PANAMÁ, August 6, 1951—7 p. m.

108. As Dept will note from Embtel 107,[1] proposed decree basing action on UN resolution May 18 prohibits (1) export or reexport war material from Panamanian ports to North Korea, Commie China,

[1] Not printed.

USSR and satellites, Hong Kong and Macao; (2) transport in Panamanian registered ships of all types of goods and war material toward these areas, (3) export and re-export war material to other areas except by permission Ministry Finance upon presentation certificate issued by authorities country destination and authenticated by Panamanian consul, containing official assurance materials will not be re-exported to these prohibited zones or will not be used for manufacture war material destined prohibited zones. In defining war materials, decree incorporates exact categories of US presidential proclamation 2776.[2]

Decree provides Panama will, after consular investigation, cancel registry ships transporting war material or goods of any type toward prohibited zones unless captains such ships discharges goods and war material in designated port and undertake not to continue to port destinations; if ship carries war material will also be fined $1,000 to $10,000 by consular official and registry cancelled if refuses discharge entire cargo. Panama will cancel registry any ship engaging coastal service between ports prohibited zones. Ship with registry cancelled under decree may reregister only by Panamanian executive resolution, if any UN state cancels registry its vessels on grounds analagous those above, their registry under Panamanian flag will not be permitted if other state adopts same provision.

Comment: Action taken so far to curb traffic by Panamanian flagships with Commie ports may have been successful largely because of element of surprise and effective measures taken locally by US consular reps.

To have situation clarified by a decree as now proposed by Panamanian Govt might worsen rather than help effective control. Such decree might even serve as blueprint for successful evasion of controls. For example, there is no prohibition of traffic per se with Commie ports. Penalties cited are certainly not forceful deterrents. I understand Article 5 Law 80 of 1934 is drafted in general terms only. (This will be checked when office opens.) The fines proposed in decree are insignificant.

Moreover, there are many ports where effective control is difficult under any circumstances. My own experience as Consul General at Antwerp during height of alcohol smuggling to US demonstrated that illicit shipping enjoys great facilities for by-passing obstacles.

That Panamanian law is definitely inadequate to give President Arosemena solid basis for going further is definite conclusion legal experts who have studied question carefully. Memorandum [3] from Bentz [4] general counsel, being air mailed.

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[2] This proclamation was dated March 26, 1948. For text, see 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1495.
[3] Not printed.
[4] Paul A. Bentz, General Counsel, Governor's Staff, Canal Zone.

Foreign Minister knows my views. Before discussing matter further with him would greatly appreciate Dept's guidance. Probably can arrange for President Arosemena postpone signature for two or three days.

WILEY

919.537/8–851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Panama

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951—8 p. m.

92. Dept appreciates efforts Pan Govt cooperate with UNGA Res May 18 concerning embargo on war materials to areas under control Chi Communists and North Koreans re Embtel 107 Aug 6 [1] and 116 Aug 8.[1] Dept believes Pan Govt as result Emb actions fully aware views this Govt on importance this issue and on need for effective measures. Dept has been hopeful Pan Govt could find way to take action in line Alfaro views urtel 95 Aug 3.[1] Apart from uncertain legal basis for action which cannot be fully appraised here Dept considers decision whether Pan Govt has authority to issue decree or must seek further authority from Natl Assembly is of course a matter which Pan officials must determine for themselves. In latter event, Pan Govt might consider it desirable continue meanwhile handling shipping controls on present individual basis until appropriate legal authority obtained.

Dept believes Emb shld avoid action beyond informally stressing our objectives and shld not be in position urging specific terms of decree.

ACHESON

[1] Not printed.

919.437/8–1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Panama (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PANAMA CITY, August 14, 1951—9 p. m.

137. In conversation with FonMin today I reiterated US views re importance ban on Pan ships (Deptel 91, Aug 10)[1] calling Commie ports. When FonMin requested my comment on text proposed decree (Embtel 107, Aug 6)[1] I said drafting of text matter Pan Govt only cld decide repeating my personal view was that decree in present form might actually serve as blueprint for evasion of controls and might offer new life to unethical and illicit trade. FonMin greatly

[1] Not printed.

interested and seemed fully sympathetic views US Govt re need for effective measures. He said present procedure Pan Govt entirely extra-legal and manifested concern. However, he seemed reassure himself with afterthought observation that Pan commitments to UN were after all pretty clearcut and comprehensive.

Re subject possible legislation I merely mentioned fact that Pan Natl Assembly scheduled convene Oct 1 a date very imminent, and that shld Pan Govt desire further legislation for authority to issue adequate decree, delay involved to introduce bill wld apparently not be excessive. I said while expediency and nature any legislation Pan Govt might seek from Natl Assembly was question Pan Govt alone cld determine it seemed to me that legislation cld be readily justified by realities of situation, namely, that Pan Govt obviously cld not set up effective world wide controls to prevent smuggling contraband Commie ports if Pan ships authorized legally enter such ports. I repeated existing penalties under Pan law inadequate to deter contraband running to Commie ports. I stated that legislation requiring previous authorization of Pan Govt in each instance for Pan vessel call at Commie port appeared as minimum step to meet its commitments. FonMin supplemented my statement by adding there might also be grave danger that Pan ships, without calling at Commie ports, wld transship on high seas to small vessels and thus evade all control. He thought law shld cover this point.

FonMin however expressed considerable concern over possibility adverse publicity in US if publication decree postponed. I replied US press wld closely analyse text any published decree and to promulgate inadequate decree also might have unfavorable repercussions. I suggested he hold matter in abeyance pending study by us both and that we shld have further discussion at very early date.

FonMin stated local agents SS *Marcar* (Deptel August 6 quoting tel 16 from Kobe)[2] made representations to him along lines reported by Kobe. I remarked it was lamentable that frequently reputable world shipping interest unable resist substantial profits illicit trade. However I expressed confidence Dept wld find means energetically to contact shipping firms involved. I said question Pan ships transporting wheat to India from Commie ports not a compelling reason to accept *bona fides* such traffic; that alleviation hunger in India might be merely subterfuge or means for propaganda. I pointed out if Commie world seriously interested plight India, Soviet cld easily have given much more substantial evidence. Moreover if Commies needed more vessels transport foodstuffs to India there were available hundreds US lend-lease ships stolen from US by Soviets.

In my conversation with FonMin nothing has been said to commit Dept or me in any way.

[2] Neither printed.

Pending receipt of Dept's further guidance and my next conversation with FonMin, present Pan procedures will presumably be continued. In view cooperative attitude FonMin I hope press can be encouraged show patient reticence.

WILEY

919.537/8–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Panama (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PANAMA CITY, August 19, 1951—2 p. m.

152. FonMin and Pres both informed me noon yesterday with satisfaction and evident pride proposed decree on Pan flagships had been redrafted (mytel 149, Aug 18) [1] and that text completely consonant our desires and with requirements situation.

Last night Emb received copy in Spanish which forwarded Dept airmail today. Although Pres does not expect sign decree until after seen by Asst Secy Miller,[2] text was printed in full in local morning papers.

On first perusal Emb finds proposed Pan action comprehensive and as adequate as could be hoped for.[3]

WILEY

[1] Not printed.

[2] In telegram 160, August 21, 1951, Ambassador Wiley reported that President Arosemena had actually signed the decree numbered 631 on August 18, and that his signature had been kept secret temporarily in order to test public reaction (919.537/8–2151).

[3] In a memorandum dated January 8, 1952, Mr. Nufer stated in part that "the Decree has been very effective in reducing the amount of Western flag shipping available for the China trade. Panama's cooperative effort, however, faces the danger of nullification through re-registration of Panamanian vessels under British and Portuguese flags". (919.537/1–752)

Editorial Note

During the period from late August to late October, Panamá was visited by three financial missions representing, respectively, the United States Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund. The purpose of the Export-Import Bank mission was to complete the details of the new $1.5 million loan for the Hotel El Panamá which had been authorized the previous July and of refinancing the original loan of $2.5 million to the hotel. The IBRD mission had been invited to come in order to determine what technical assistance might be of benefit to the country. The IMF mission came primarily to examine the general economic situation in the hopes of formulating economic and monetary policies which would allow for the improved utilization

of the country's resources. The activities of these missions are described in despatch 289, from Panamá, October 19, 1951, not printed (398.14/10–1951). Additional pertinent documents are in decimal files 103–XMB, 398.13, and 819.10.

819.10/10–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William B. Sowash of the Office of Middle American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1951.

Subject: Findings of IBRD Mission to Panama

Participants: Mr. Aldewereld, IBRD
MID—Ambassador Nufer
MID—Mr. Siracusa
MID—Mr. Sowash

Mr. Aldewereld having recently returned from his mission to Panama, Messrs. Nufer, Siracusa, and Sowash called on him today for an informal résumé of his findings.

Mr. Aldewereld began his summary by stating that Panama today, just as it has for centuries, depends for its livelihood upon transients and upon the inflow of money from abroad. He found that Panama's sole development plans consist of four projects: the recently built El Panama Hotel, the new racetrack now abuilding, the Colón Free Trade Zone, and the extension of the water supply and sewerage systems to the suburbs of Panama City. Of these four projects, the first three are based upon the traditional dependence upon transients and income from abroad. The result of this way of thinking has been a needless and costly neglect of Panama's own resources, particularly in the field of agriculture. Further, Panamanian capital is chiefly interested in the quick turnover that commerce provides and there is very little investment in the development of Panama's resources. Mr. Aldewereld asserted that Panama's greatest need is a change in this mentality.

Concomitantly, Panama needs a thorough cleansing of its present "rotten" political life and the institution of a civil service system in government employment. He described the amount of graft and corruption in the government as incredible. Panama's virtually complete lack of credit worthiness was stressed and the alarming rate of increase in the national debt, chiefly internal, was noted. An important contributing cause is the non-payment of income taxes by virtually everybody except employees of the government and foreign companies, whose taxes are withheld at the source.

Mr. Aldewereld believes the expansion and development of agriculture to be Panama's principal hope for economic salvation. This

program can best be directed by a development (Fomento) company. In many respects, the present Banco Agropecuario is suitable for this purpose. However, the Banco will continue to be ineffectual until it is taken completely out of politics. He opines that a broad economic survey would be helpful but unrealistic at this time in view of its probable cost and the probability that it would be shelved without action by the government.

The importance of improved transportation in Panama also was emphasized. Mr. Aldewereld believes that this must precede agricultural development.

Saying that Panama has great need of experts in many fields, Mr. Aldewereld concluded that, despite his discouraging findings, the Bank probably would send experts to Panama. He emphasized, however, that such aid should be contingent upon Panama's taking certain steps to help itself, including certain long needed internal reforms. Otherwise, the money expended to assist Panama will effect no lasting improvement, as Panama's past has proven.

811F.061/12–2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1951.

Subject: Alleged Discriminatory Employment Practices in the Canal Zone.

Participants: Mr. Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Mr. Donald Dawson,[1] White House
Col. Beasley
Mr. Edward G. Miller, Jr.

On Thursday, December 20, I had a meeting at the White House with Mr. Donald Dawson, Assistant Secretary of the Army Bendetsen and Col. Beasley, of Mr. Bendetsen's office. The meeting was called by Mr. Dawson to discuss allegations made to Mr. Dawson by representatives of the CIO with regard to discriminatory practices in the Canal Zone to the disadvantage of citizens of Panama.

Mr. Dawson said that according to his understanding wages paid to "local rate" employees of the Canal Zone were substantially lower than those paid to Americans and also that promotion opportunities for "local rate" employees were less than those for Americans.

Mr. Bendetsen made a long review of the employment practices in the Canal Zone and of the very serious fiscal problems that the Canal

[1] Administrative Assistant to the President, and Liaison Officer, Liaison Office for Personnel Management.

Zone administration has had to deal with since Congress placed the Canal Zone on a pay-as-you-go basis.

Mr. Bendetsen and Mr. Dawson reviewed in some detail the composition of the Panama Canal Company. While this review disproved the information which Mr. Dawson had received that the Board of Directors was composed of representatives of private business, it was the consensus that the Board should be gradually reconstituted primarily from the point of view of having representation on the Board which would take into account the interests of Panama.

I set forth at some length the political problems with the Republic of Panama resulting from the Canal Zone. I pointed out that our relations with Panama were in a sense an index of our relations with Latin America as a whole and that Latin Americans tended to judge our attitude to small countries by our treatment of Panama. I also said that we had a particular responsibility toward Panama since we were, in a sense, responsible for its status as an independent country and that Panama seemed to be becoming a second focus (after Guatemala) of communist activity and that this activity was made easier for the communists by any discrimination against the Panamanians. I said that when I visited successively Panama and Venezuela a few months ago I was struck by the parallel between the situations of our oil companies in Venezuela and the Panama Canal on the one hand and those of Anglo-Iranian and the Suez Canal on the other. I said that I felt that as between the oil companies in Venezuela and the Canal Zone administration the oil companies were doing a far better job of public relations with regard to the local population. I expressed agreement with Mr. Bendetsen to the effect that it was not necessarily an objective of our policy to equalize wage scales between Americans and "local rate" employees. However, I felt that we should work in this direction; that we should reduce recruitment of personnel in this country; and that we should give greater opportunities for promotion to Panamanians. I also said that we should immediately improve the situation of "local rate" employees in regard to retirement compensation. Finally I expressed the view that we should completely overhaul the relations between the Canal Zone administration and the Republic of Panama.

Mr. Bendetsen expressed general agreement with my point of view and said that he had become so concerned about the whole problem of the relations between Panama and the Canal that he had taken on Colonel Beasley as a full time consultant on Canal affairs. He also said that Colonel Beasley was leaving for Panama on December 26 and that Mr. Bendetsen himself would go to Panama about January 7. Mr. Bendetsen asked that I accompany him to Panama and also that I send an officer familiar with Panamanian matters to consult with

Col. Beasley during the latter's visit. I agreed to do that and subsequently asked that Mr. Sowash be in Panama by January 2 although I told him that I could not go. Mr. Bendetsen also said that he would begin immediately a reconstitution of the Board of the Company and that as a first step he would like to see me become a member of the Board and I agreed that I would serve if requested. Mr. Bendetsen also suggested the creation of an inter-departmental advisory group to the Secretary of the Army [2] in regard to Canal Zone matters not falling within the competence of the Board of the Company. I supported this proposal and I suggested as a basis for the proposed group's work, the McSherry Report of 1947.[3]

[2] Frank Pace, Jr.

[3] In January 1947, Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry (ret.) was appointed Special Advisor on labor relations to the Governor of the Canal Zone, in part for the purpose of conducting an investigation of labor conditions and practices in the Canal Zone; for documentation relating to the investigation and the subsequent report (known as the McSherry Report), see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 948 ff.

719.001/12–2651

The Ambassador in Panama (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PANAMÁ, December 26, 1951.

No. 452

Subject: Communist Progress in Panama

The Embassy reported at some length on the current political situation of Panama in Despatch No. 365, of November 23, 1951.[1]

Since then, Communist activities have become increasingly active and tangible while Communist leadership in the students' strike and civil disturbance has emerged visibly to the forefront.

The proximity of Guatemala, the visits to Panamá of ex-President Arévalo and the suspect activities in Panamá of Sr. Benitez Bone, the Guatemalan Minister, suggest a probable connection between the two countries in the coordination of Communist plans. This is supported in Panamá by the circumstance that every indication points to outside guidance. Indeed, it might be surmised that at least so far as Panamá is concerned Guatemala is the operational headquarters of the Communists and that Arévalo may be the chief of operations.

The Communists invariably aim at targets of strategic value. There are two in this area: 1) the International Railways in Guatemala which connect the Caribbean and the Pacific—Puerto Barrios to San José—and 2) the Panama Canal.

[1] Not printed.

The Communists already may have come close to scoring a fatal hit on the railway. Presumably the Canal comes next. To carry out Communist designs on the Canal, there are two principal techniques which may be employed. The first, of course, is sabotage. This, for obvious reasons, would be reserved for the culminating moment of a great emergency. The second would be to undermine the American position in the Republic of Panamá.

That the second is already being attempted is more than evident. Moreover, the means available for Communist machinations and the propitious conditions of leaderless confusion existing in the Republic itself suggest that this danger should be viewed most seriously.

The Communist Party in Panamá according to reliable information has only a membership of about 700, which is disarmingly small. It has shown no interest in obtaining recognition as a national party.

However, the Communist Party of Panamá may be compared to the Tudeh Party in Iran, and in spite of its diminutive size it may be regarded as a highly effective instrument. First of all, it is unique among the political parties of Panamá in being entirely cohesive and perfectly disciplined. It clearly follows with unquestioning obedience directives from abroad. Moreover, each of the 700 members is undoubtedly a trained agent; thus, the 700 represent leaders, not just rank and file. Viewed in this light, the *Partido del Pueblo* is far from a negligible factor.

In connection with the card-bearing membership of the Communist Party, it may be pointed out that the Embassy has no information on which to base a calculation of the overall strength of the Communist cadres. Estimates of crypto-Communists, candidates for membership and other neophytes, fellow-travelers, and members of Communist front organizations are not available. Moreover, there are many sympathizers among the economically-depressed, the pseudo-intellectuals, the exotically idealistic, and the anti-Americans. Last, but not least, there are leaders of the conventional political groups who either willingly or tacitly accept Communist collaboration.[2] This phenomenon notably characterizes the coalition of forces opposing the presidential candidacy of Colonel José Remon Cantera.[3] Clearly the illusion persists among them that one may use the Communists politically to one's own advantage.

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[2] In a memorandum dated July 20, 1951, the Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs (Siracusa) had stated in part the following: "The United States has no quarrel with Panamanian nationalism per se; the danger lies in the willingness of individuals of this type to cooperate with and lend themselves to the purposes of truly communistic elements, as past experience in Panama and elsewhere has shown". (719.001/7–2051)

[3] Police Chief Remón's decision to accept nomination for the presidency had touched off a political crisis in October. Pertinent documents are in decimal file 719.00.

The Communists, since the overthrow of President Arnulfo Arias, to which they contributed,[4] have consolidated their position and have assumed increasingly great authority in inspiring and leading popular manifestations. Their activities have become more overt and their penetration is deep over a broad and deep front.

Communist influences have penetrated the Presidential Palace, the Government, governmental agencies, the University, the entire school system of the Republic, the *Frente Patriótico* and the bourgeois press.

Indeed, Communist operations in Panamá have met for many months with almost unchallenged and unbroken success. The United States still has considerable influence with the present government; otherwise, the American position is weak and is deteriorating. There is no American counterweight to Communist penetration of the University or the schools, nor are there any champions of the United States among the organs of the press. In Panamá, the friends of the United States, though sincere, are for the most part platonic or helpless. The opponents, though, are active and the many who are either indifferent or neutral toward the United States may be only counted as liabilities unless they can be reached by propaganda.

The foregoing brief statement of the situation is pointed up when considered in the light of general conditions prevailing in the Republic. As matters now stand in Panamá, the conjuncture of circumstances could hardly be more favorable for Communist activities. There are simultaneously a grave and deepening economic crisis and a bitter, indeed, a vicious political struggle for the Presidency, involving political campaigns without program or platform. All of the economic weakness and the political evils of the structure of the nation have risen to the surface. They might easily erupt.

The economic problems of Panamá, the consequence of ancient and misguided trends, are well known to the Department. However, it now seems evident that while the Department studies or initiates long-range projects with a view to remedying the basic causes of Panamá's economic illness, immediate steps should be taken to alleviate its symptoms in the exigent interests of political expediency.

For example, Canal Zone purchases in the Republic should be increased and expedited in so far as possible and building projects already approved in the Canal Zone should be initiated at the earliest possible moment. This work should be undertaken on a basis of urgency, with maximum employment; there should be as much overtime as possible. Also, some way should be sought promptly to relieve

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[4] In despatch 50, from Panamá, July 20, 1951, Chargé Wise had stated in part that "despite the fact that the political and governmental confusion in Panamá during and following the overthrow of Arnulfo Arias presented what appeared to be a golden opportunity, the Communist Partido del Pueblo's lack of efficient organization prevented it from taking an active or important role in the change of Government". (719.00/7–2051)

the financial situation of the government in so far as public works are concerned.

The presidential elections will take place on May 11. The political campaigns are already in full swing, the country is still harassed by a students' strike, the government is worried by reports of gun-running by would-be revolutionary elements and, finally, all are agreed that there is a probability of serious popular disorders.

It is, therefore, important that any steps that may be contemplated be taken at once if any real advantage is to be gained from them. As the basic line of approach to the problem, I would suggest that emphasis be placed on any measure that would immediately stimulate employment and thus produce a flow of money into the pockets of the people. Such an approach would afford great relief to many, it would sterilize sections of the population ripe for Communist exploitation and it could have profound effect in general—if action were taken without delay.

It is indeed urgently desirable to bring economic alleviation to those strata of the Panamanian people that are particularly hard hit by the current depression. This is illustrated by the fact that it is to them that the present Communist drive is spearheaded. The *Partido del Pueblo* is now making a complete census of the unemployed, is seeking them out in their houses and proselytizing them in the streets. This is not only true in the terminal cities, but in the interior as well, where something like one-half of the Party membership is actively engaged. It may be added that in addition to the Chiriquí Land Company (United Fruit), special Communist attention is now being dedicated to the villages along the Trans-Isthmian Highway.

The acceleration of the building program in the Canal Zone is presumably an administrative matter susceptible to an immediate solution if the Secretary of the Army and Governor of the Canal Zone should concur. In connection with the financing of the Point Four Program and Panamanian public works, a credit, say, of $500,000 would suffice to give an instantaneous stimulus to reviving existing programs now precariously bogged down by the fiscal difficulties of the Government.

In this connection, it may be added that the new Minister for Public Works, Sr. César Guillen, has shown character, energy and considerable capacity for decision in the short time he has been in office. When he recently entered the Cabinet, he discovered that his predecessor, Sr. Norberto Navarro, had bequeathed him a budgetary deficit of $1,500,000. In consequence, he was obliged to suspend practically all the public works projects of his Ministry, thus precipitating additional unemployment. His decision was made necessary by Panamá's imminent obligation to meet its financial commitment in connection with the forthcoming construction of a sector of the Inter-American Highway.

How such a $500,000 credit or its equivalent could be found or made available is beyond the scope of conjecture of the Embassy. However, the amount is so small in comparison with the stakes involved that I deeply hope the Department can discover the necessary ways and means therefor. The aforesaid amount could prime the pump admirably for the short pre-election period. This is a country and a moment where small sums wisely spent could play an important role. Moreover, there is no substitute weapon at our disposition at this moment.

A purely political approach to the problems of Panamá is more difficult. As the Department will recall, the ex-Chief of Police, Colonel Remón, supported by a very effective political machine, is running for the presidency against Roberto Chiari, wealthy representative of the "collar and tie" class. Behind Chiari is a loose but powerful "anti-militarist" coalition, comprising disparate elements ranging incongruously from the ultra-conservative to the Communist.

Colonel Remón, opposed by the Communists, has long been their avowed enemy. The Communists in opposing him have found ready allies. These alliances have engendered great tolerance of Communist activities, even to the point where the Communists have been able to assume open and undisputed leadership of popular agitation.

The only identity of purpose or program that binds together the Chiari supporters is their common determination to prevent the election of Remón. Very reputable elements among them would not hesitate to provoke serious public disorders for the purpose, and there is no convincing reason to suppose that the Communists would not employ, if necessary, their decisive technique of political murder. The Department will recall the upheaval that followed the killing of Gaitan [5] in Colombia and how effective was the assassination of General Razmara in Iran.[6]

Colonel Remón is known to be friendly toward the United States and to favor close collaboration with the civil and military authorities of the Canal Zone. This alone would make him anathema in Communistic eyes. The possibility of his elimination by violence may not be altogether farfetched.

Were the elections to be held in an atmosphere of political tranquility, Colonel Remón would have a good chance of election. If he had the support of ex-President Arnulfo Arias, which is not impossible, his election would be a foregone conclusion. However, with the prospect of civil strife and Communist determination to prevent his

[5] Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, popular leader of the Liberal Party in Colombia, was assassinated on April 9, 1948; for documentation on his assassination and its impact on the Ninth International Conference of American States, which had convened at Bogotá, March 30, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 39 ff.

[6] For documentation relating to the assassination of Premier Ali Razmara, see volume V.

reaching the Palace, there can, I fear, be no assurance of his gaining the Presidency.

If Colonel Remón can be eliminated and Chiari elected, the latter, as President, would be in a weak position. He could count on no effective strength among his supporters were he to face only the normal opposition which usually confronts the Chief Executive in Panamá. In this connection, it may be noted that in turbulent Panamá only four out of 27 presidents of the Republic have ever completed their elected terms of office. On top of this, Chiari would find his erstwhile friends, the Communists, adroitly manipulating the situation in order to make his tenure of office impossible.

The purpose behind the Communist line in Panamá seems clear; it is to foment a crisis bordering on the chaotic wherein the Panamanian friends of Arévalo, either as a junta or otherwise, would take over the government. Thereupon, Panamá would fall into the pattern of Guatemala.[7]

What has happened in Guatemala affords a foretaste of what might be expected in Panamá. And, in the final analysis, all that would stand in the way of success, should Arevalistas dominate the Government of Panamá, would be the National Police. In such a crisis, the Police would not be pitting its strength against the hard core of 700 Communists alone, but against the "anti-militarist" elements. This would include the same mob that tasted blood in May. Even with Colonel Remón, the "strong man" of Panamá, back in control of the Police, the outcome of a head-on clash may not be too confidently forecast. Colonel Remón, in crisis, is known to have moments of great vacillation and indecision.

The political picture of Panamá affords very little consolation or reason for confidence. Moreover, there is very little that may be suggested in order better to meet the political exigencies of the situation.

The Embassy is prudently careful not to be involved in any way, directly or indirectly, in the current domestic political conflict. Nevertheless, the American eggs all seem to be in one basket, that of Colonel Remón, since he is the sole anti-Communist leader in the entire political panorama. Though the basket, as the Department is well aware, is far from commendable, Colonel Remón still remains an irreplaceable *faut de mieux*.

To meet the political situation, there seems to be very little that can be done outside of an immediate economic "shot in the arm" except to dedicate vigilant attention to developments and greatly to increase anti-Communist propaganda of all kinds. This difficulty emphasizes the essential importance of prompt economic aid as a purely political

[7] For documentation concerning United States policy toward Guatemala, see pp. 1415 ff.

measure. But, of course, economic aid by itself is not enough. Much attention should be given to intensifying propaganda efforts.[8]

If Panamá should fall into the orbit of Guatemala, the security of the Canal will become, of course, a matter of immediate preoccupation. It is certainly desirable that everything feasible and proper be done to forestall any such catastrophe. Pennies spent now could save dollars in the future; perhaps dollars spent too late.

JOHN C. WILEY

[8] This subject was discussed at a meeting at the Department of State on November 29, attended by the following officials of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs: Mr. Mann, Ambassador Nufer, Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs Edward G. Cale, Director of the Office of South American Affairs Fletcher Warren, Intelligence Adviser Hobart A. Spalding, and Public Affairs Adviser Ralph Hilton. In a memorandum to Mr. Thurman L. Barnard, General Manager of the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, dated December 5, 1951, Mr. Hilton described the meeting in part as follows: "The meeting agreed that the situation calls for a concerted effort by the U.S. to create deterrents to Panamanian tolerance of local Communism. Measures in the field of public opinion should, it was decided, include an informational campaign by USIE on themes designed to stimulate opposition to Communism and increase public awareness of Panama's mutuality of interest with the United States". (719.00/12–551)

PARAGUAY

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PARAGUAY

834.10/4–2651

The Ambassador in Paraguay (Tewksbury) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL — ASUNCIÓN, April 26, 1951.

No. 745

Subject: Proposed Credit for Paraguay.

In the latter part of 1950 a plan was developed in Paraguay directed particularly toward the increase of agricultural production in the country. Various Government offices contributed to the project, and officials of the Food Supply Division (STICA) of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs [1] also cooperated. As it developed, the plan contemplated seeking a credit for approximately $10,000,000, which was to be devoted primarily to the purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment. Part of the funds (approximately $654,000) was to be used for the purchase of road making and road maintenance equipment together with trucks and spare parts, and some other funds were to be used for the purchase of insecticides, veterinary supplies, et cetera. It was expected that the importation of this equipment and the utilization of the credit would cover a three year period.

While there was some discussion of the plan by Government officials during the succeeding months, it was not actively discussed and given general consideration by the Cabinet until early in April of the current year. At that time it was decided by the Government that a formal application for a credit of $10,000,000 would be made. It was also decided that Mr. Persio da Silva, formerly Sub-Secretary of Finance and recently named as Secretary to the Paraguayan Embassy in Wash-

[1] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was established in 1942 and it became a United States Government corporation in 1947. Its purpose was to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply; as of mid-1950 the IIAA operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in Latin America. For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the activities of the IIAA and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 679. For additional documentation on the subject, see pp. 1038 ff.

ington, and Mr. Victor A. Pane, a member of the Administrative Council of the Bank of Paraguay, should present the project to banking authorities in Washington. No decision was reached as to whether the loan application should be made to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or to the Export-Import Bank.

The fact that Paraguay has been in arrears in the payment of interest and amortization on the Export–Import Bank loans may have been a determining factor in delaying specific action on the new credit. Since the first of this year monthly payments averaging slightly over $200,000 have been made through April. The arrearage, which ran to something over $800,000, has thus been reduced as of April 1 to something in the neighborhood of $350,000. There has been some indication that an effort will be made on or before May 1 to bring this account up to date. Officials of the Government and the Bank of Paraguay realize the importance of clearing up existing arrearages if any new loan is to be obtained. The past difficulties have been due almost entirely to shortages of exchange, but the drastic restrictions imposed on imports during the last half of 1950 and during the current year have materially improved this situation.

The subject of the loan was not officially brought to the attention of Embassy officials until the meeting of the Joint Commission for Technical Assistance held on April 17. At that time the Minister of Finance (a member of the Joint Commission) stated that he desired to inform the Commission of the decision of the Government regarding the loan project. (The only members of the Joint Commission present at the meeting were the Minister of Finance [2] and his alternate, Mr. Victor A. Pane, and the American Ambassador and his alternate, Mr. John C. Shillock, Jr. Others attending this meeting included the Minister of Agriculture [3] and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Works,[4] Mr. Persio da Silva, and Mr. Antonio Saldivar, General Accountant of the Ministry of Finance.) The Minister of Finance explained that the purpose of the credit was to permit an expansion of agricultural production through a modernization and mechanization of agricultural methods in Paraguay. He also explained that part of the loan would be devoted to road making equipment for the maintenance of existing roads and for the construction of approximately one hundred kilometers per year of new roads to facilitate the transportation of products to market.

The Minister explained that Messrs. da Silva and Pane would visit Washington for the purpose of initiating the negotiations, and explained that they would be prepared to supply all information required to the banking entities with which the discussion will be held.

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[2] Ramón Mendez Paiva.
[3] Angel Florentin Peña.
[4] Tomás Romero Pereira.

A general discussion of the project then ensued, and it developed that the proposed loan covered exclusively the importation of equipment and materials for agriculture and highway use, and made no provision whatever for financing the farmers, for providing new storage facilities, for marketing the increased production nor for processing this. The Paraguayan Government expects to be able to undertake the guaraní financing of the farmers through agricultural credits or supervised credits, and Mr. da Silva estimated that there would be a thirty to fifty per cent increase in agricultural production under the proposed plan during the first year, and that there would be a gradual increase thereafter.

The Minister of Finance explained that Paraguay hoped to obtain generous terms in any loan arrangement, with repayments extending over a period of fifteen years and interest to commence in the third year. He suggested that the appointment of a joint United States-Paraguay commission to supervise the administration of the loan might make the project more acceptable to banking interests, and indicated that this would be agreeable to Paraguay.

President Federico Chaves, in an address on April 18 before the opening session of the First Congress of Commercial Entities, stressed the importance of improving agricultural methods in Paraguay in order to expand production. He said, "Without mechanization the increase in our production will never be in accordance with the requirements of our progress". He continued, ". . . the Government will be able to announce within a few weeks negotiations leading to the carrying out of a three year plan which will include the procurement of substantial quantities of implements and tools to supplement the individual efforts of the agriculturist for immediate returns and to further the training of rural workers through the preparation of an adequate Professional Institute, and the creation of ten experimental stations where they will receive practical instruction in the use of agricultural implements and better utilization of the land".

While specific reference was not made to loan negotiations, it is clear that the Government is definitely and publicly committed to some program for agricultural development. When the details of the project become public, as they inevitably will, the progress and results of the negotiations will be closely watched and will most certainly have an important influence in the local political situation.

Messrs. da Silva and Pane visited the Embassy on April 19, at which time there was a further discussion of the project. It was explained to them that whether the project was discussed with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or with the Export-Import Bank, full particulars would be desired regarding such subjects as ways and means of financing the farmers in Paraguay for the full utilization of the agricultural equipment, its distribution, and the

plans for servicing the loan and full particulars regarding the handling (transportation, storage, processing, marketing, et cetera) of the increased agricultural production. It was also explained that considerable time would be required to conclude any negotiations of this character, and that it might be desirable for the foreign banking institutions to assign a group of experts to study the entire needs of the country and determine whether the proposed loan met the essential requirements of the country for a sound economic development. Messrs. Pane and da Silva felt that they had adequate material at least to start discussions, and stated that they expected to arrive in Washington on or about May 5.

Messrs. Pane and da Silva offered to supply the Embassy with full details and supporting data for the project, but up to the present time this has not been received. The only information which the Embassy has regarding the project is contained in the "Plan of Expansion of the National Agricultural Production—1951–1953", which contains a general statement regarding the purposes of the credit and a number of tables indicating types of equipment, et cetera, to be obtained under the loan. It is believed that a copy of this report is available in the Department, and that it was prepared almost entirely by officials of STICA.

Preliminary Appraisal of Project

In my opinion it is unfortunate that the Paraguayan Government should decide to propose the negotiation of a credit of $10,000,000 on the basis of the present project. The project comprises only the estimated requirements of the country for the mechanization of its agricultural production with minor attention to highway development, plant disease control, et cetera. Agriculture and livestock combined comprise by far the most important factor in Paraguyan economy, but increased production in itself will not provide a balanced economic development for the country.

The failure of the project to consider and provide for other phases of agricultural development makes the project incomplete and possibly unsound. There are a number of vital problems in the distribution field which should be at least simultaneously considered and provided for. Facilities for storage and processing of agricultural products are entirely inadequate, and before any large scale project for increased agricultural production is undertaken, the over-all requirements of the country should be considered.

The Government proposes that the distribution and financing of equipment for the farmers would be handled through the agricultural credit (crop financing) and the Supervised Agricultural Credit Organization, both of which are departments in the Bank of Paraguay. The administration of the Supervised Agricultural Credit Organization is notoriously bad, and representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank now

in Paraguay have recommended that this Department be withdrawn from the Bank of Paraguay since it is not strictly a banking function. The Supervised Agricultural Credit Organization is a combination of agricultural extension work and financing for farmers and homesteaders. According to Messrs. Pane and da Silva, the distribution of agricultural implements and machinery obtained through the credit would be through the Bank of Paraguay. There would be many objections to a provision of this sort. The past record of the Bank of Paraguay in handling the distribution of machinery and parts has been extremely bad.

There is no question but that Paraguay needs outside financial assistance in order to carry out any type of economic development program. Some progress is being made in the solution of internal financial problems, which should provide a sounder basis for the extension of development credits. Although there are certain features of the present project which appear unsound, it is felt that after a full study of Paraguay's needs and capacity there might well be justification for acceptance of a modified plan. It is hoped that sympathetic consideration will be given to the proposals of Messrs. da Silva and Pane in order to assist Paraguay to adopt a sound program for economic development.[5]

HOWARD H. TEWKSBURY

[5] Representatives of the Paraguayan Government arrived in Washington in May to initiate discussions with officials of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) concerning a loan for agricultural development. A note dated May 28, 1951, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward G. Miller, Jr., to the Director of the Office of South American Affairs, Fletcher Warren, reads as follows:

"As agreed upon at the staff meeting this morning, I telephoned Mr. Black, President of the International Bank, and asked him to give prompt attention to the Paraguayan mission and to inform the mission promptly if it should develop that the Bank is not interested in working with Paraguay." (834.10/5–2851)

834.20/10–2651

The Ambassador in Paraguay (Tewksbury) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ASUNCIÓN, October 26, 1951.

No. 246

Subject: IBRD Loan for Agricultural Development in Paraguay.

A number of changes have occurred in Paraguay in the six month interval since submitting the Embassy's despatch No. 745 of April 26.[1] Some of these changes substantially alter the comments contained in the despatch referred to, and it is believed that the following may be of

[1] *Supra.*

value to the Department in any discussions which there may be of the proposed loan.[2]

At the time the despatch was submitted, the loan project was for $10,000,000 and the comments referred particularly to a loan of that magnitude. It is understood that after a detailed survey of the situation by experts of the IBRD[3] the proposed loan was reduced to $5,000,000. I believe that a program of this size, part of the funds being utilized for highway equipment, would provide a sound program for agricultural development. The expansion thereby provided in agricultural production would represent a more normal growth, and would present fewer problems in the way of transportation, processing, et cetera.

In despatch No. 745 reference was made to the very unsatisfactory situation existing with respect to the Supervised Agricultural Credit Organization. It is understood that this matter was discussed by Mr. Burland and his associates with officials of the Paraguayan Government. The Government has now a decree-law drafted which completely reorganizes the Supervised Agricultural Credit Organization and sets it up as a separate entity, completely dissociated from the Bank of Paraguay. The decree is understood to have the President's approval, and awaits only the necessary approval of the Council of State.

As mentioned in the despatch, it was suggested to the Minister of Finance that a study of the economic situation in Paraguay by a group of banking experts might be desirable. This was undertaken by Mr. Burland and his associates. We do not have available in the Embassy information regarding the findings of the IBRD Commission, but it is our understanding that all phases of the economic and financial situation were carefully studied and the IBRD group undoubtedly had access to much data which is not available to the Embassy.

While the project in its present size appears to be sound, the Embassy is of the opinion that there should be reasonably close supervision of the loan program. It is believed that the Paraguayan Government would be agreeable to control provisions in the loan agreement, and it is believed that this would provide a valuable safeguard for the future. As pointed out in despatch No. 745, the record of the Bank of Paraguay and the Supervised Agricultural Credit Organization, since the Civil War of 1947, has not been good in matters relating to the distribution of agricultural machinery, et cetera. If controls were established, provision could be made that the funds

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[2] In telegram 63, October 23, 1951, the Secretary had requested from Ambassador Tewksbury "current comments" concerning the loan proposal in part because "NAC agencies" were questioning the credit-worthiness of the Paraguayan Government (834.20/9–651).

[3] The Bank had sent a four-man mission headed by Mr. Elmer G. Burland, Financial Advisor to the Bank's Loan Director, to Paraguay in August, for the purpose of studying the country's economic position and reviewing the agricultural development program (398.14/8–1051).

would be utilized only as fast as implements and equipment are being efficiently distributed and utilized by agriculturists. If there is no control there would be the danger that equipment might be received in amounts greater than could be efficiently distributed. There have also been reports that Paraguayan imports of small agricultural implements have been clandestinely shipped to Argentina. A control on the part of the lending institution would assist in preventing this type of traffic. I believe that Mr. Burland and his associates are fully aware of the need for adequate controls in order to obtain the maximum benefits from a credit and to safeguard the interests of the IBRD.

It is believed that with reasonable safeguards a loan of $5,000,000 would be justified and would be sound. If there is to be any sound economic development in Paraguay, priority should be given to the development of agriculture.

HOWARD H. TEWKSBURY

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137 [1]

Memorandum by the National Advisory Council Staff Committee to the National Advisory Council

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1951.

Document No. 1226

Subject: Proposed International Bank Loan to Paraguay

Problem

The U.S. Executive Director [2] on the International Bank has requested NAC consideration of a proposed $5 million loan to the Government of Paraguay to finance the foreign exchange costs of an agricultural development program (NAC Document No. 1209 and NAC Staff Document No. 545).[3]

Discussion

1. *The loan application.* The proposed loan would finance the foreign costs of equipment, supplies, etc. for agricultural development to be used in about 1½–3 years; some items would be obtained and put to use very quickly, while others would serve Paraguay's needs over a longer period. The largest category, valued at about $3 million, includes chiefly hand utensils and animal-drawn equipment to be sold to individual farmers. The next largest, of $1.2 million, covers veterinary supplies, insecticides, fertilizers and fencing materials. Although these articles are usually viewed as goods used up in the process of produc-

[1] Master file of the documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (NAC) for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State and preserved as item 70 of Federal Records Center Accession 71 A 6682.

[2] William McChesney Martin, Jr.

[3] Neither printed.

tion rather than as capital equipment appropriate for long-term financing, in this case it is considered that they are essential to the over-all program. Other items include equipment for farm machinery pools, road building equipment, and a small fleet of trucks.

Interest on the loan would be at 4-⅜ percent. The 14 semiannual amortization payments would begin May 1, 1954, but the greater part of the amortization—$4.4 million—would occur in the years 1957–60. The International Bank is satisfied that private financing of the proposed program is not available.

2. *The program.* The farm equipment and supplies would be sold for cash or credit by the Credito Agricola de Habilitacion (CAH) or the Bank of Paraguay. To assure proper utilization of the goods, agricultural extension services would be furnished under a reorganized and expanded operation of the CAH. The IIAA and its local affiliate known as STICA, continuing the technical assistance furnished since 1942, would make available supervision on which the over-all success of the agricultural program will largely depend. The loan project was, in fact, prepared in collaboration with IIAA and STICA, which recommend its approval. The loan is also recommended by the U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay, who is co-chairman of the U.S.-Paraguayan Joint Commission for Economic Development.

The proposed agricultural program is expected to increase the land under crop cultivation from 302,000 hectares to 354,000 hectares, leading to greater production of manioc (cassava), cotton, corn, peanuts, peas, sugar cane, tobacco and other crops. The increased exportable cotton production would be about 5 million pounds at 1948–50 average yields and would be worth about $1.5 million at 30 cents a pound. Increased exports might also be expected of tobacco, vegetable oils and possibly other items.

3. *Economic development needs.* It appears that in a sound economic development program for Paraguay priority should be given to the development of agriculture. It may be noted, however, that transportation facilities (docks, barges, and the railroad) are considered to be inadequate, and loans in excess of $5 million may be sought for their improvement. In addition, power generation has been insufficient in the area around Asuncion, where a large part of the population is concentrated, and the area does not have an adequate water supply; foreign loans may be requested for these purposes within a few years.

4. *Debt service capacity.* As a point of departure, it may be noted that the NAC Working Group on debt service capacity of foreign countries suggested that Paraguay could service additional external dollar debt of about $4–6 million during the next four years. A recent IBRD staff report also concluded that Paraguay could assume some additional foreign debt service charges, although its creditworthiness in dollars is rather tight.

The largest element of service on outstanding debt is in cruzeiros on two Brazilian loans, one of which Paraguay hopes to settle for local currency without actual transfer of foreign exchange. Even if this is done, Paraguay's cruzeiro service requirements will be far greater than its 1949 or 1950 cruzeiro earnings. This service may require the use of dollars, therefore, unless Brazil, which in recent months has been short of sterling, would accept (with agreement on the part of the British) payment of part or all in pounds sterling. Total dollar and cruzeiro debt service in 1953–56 is expected to average from $1.47 to $2.25 million a year, equivalent to between 10 and 15.5 percent of Paraguay's 1950 dollar and cruzeiro exchange receipts, the upper figures including full service on both Brazilian loans and the lower figures excluding the loan which Paraguay is seeking to renegotiate. The service schedule for the proposed IBRD loan would raise this service requirement by about $.4 million a year in 1954–56, or to 13–18.5 percent of dollar and cruzeiro receipts in 1950. In 1957–60, when the major part of the proposed loan would be retired, the total annual debt service (all in dollars or cruzeiros) would average about $2 million. To the extent that the increased production resulting from the loan program could be sold abroad for dollars, there would be an improvement in Paraguay's ability to carry these relatively heavy debt service burdens.

Conceivably, of course, the dollar receipts of Paraguay might be in excess of its dollar requirements for imports and other purposes, in which case the more pertinent ratio might be the relatively low percentage between total debt service and total exchange receipts, rather than the high ratio in terms of dollars and cruzeiros. During 1950 and January–August 1951 Paraguay did in fact receive more dollars than it paid out. It should be noted, however, that this was possible only by means of stringency in exchange allocations, with a curtailment of dollar imports. It may be difficult for Paraguay to hold dollar imports to such a low level indefinitely. However, Paraguay's dollar situation is expected to be improved by some $600,000 a year as a result of increased U.S. expenditures in Paraguay in cooperative and technical aid program over the next four years.

After full or partial default during 1932–44, Paraguay resumed service on its sterling debt on an adjusted basis in 1945, and the bonds were recently quoted in London about 63, to yield 6.4 percent to maturity at the call price of 70. Service on the two Export–Import Bank credits was usually in arrears from August 1943, until a maximum of arrearages was reached of $950,000 in January, 1951. However, this sum was accumulated almost entirely over the period August 1949–January 1951. Even in this period token payments were continued. As a result of strenuous effort, this arrearage was liquidated and payments became current in July, 1951. Paraguay has a small ($34,000) lend-lease obligation on which no payment has been made since 1945.

5. *Paraguay's international economic position.* Paraguay's gold and foreign exchange holdings rose from $3.1 million at the end of 1949 to the equivalent of $12.5 million to the end of 1950 and the equivalent of $20.6 million at the end of September, 1951, reflecting chiefly an increased value of exports, a decline of imports and an accumulation of Argentine pesos through non-trade transactions. At the end of August, 1951, the indicated holdings of dollars were $7.3 million, sterling holdings were equivalent to $3.6 million and holdings of Argentine pesos were equivalent to $8.1 million. Paraguay's diversified exports of lumber, quebracho, cotton, meat, hides, tobacco, vegetable oils, etc., and the relative stability of the various items represent factors of strength in its balance of payments outlook. The present multiple rate system of Paraguay which was established in March, 1951, has produced better results than the previous system, although the domestic inflation may weaken the balance of payments if it is allowed to continue unchecked.

6. *Paraguay's domestic financial situation.* Inflation has been extreme in Paraguay, the cost of living index rising almost 500 percent during the last six years. The inflation can be attributed almost entirely to an expansion of bank credit, especially to the extension of credit by the Bank of Paraguay to the Government. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, the Government of Paraguay has budgeted revenues of Gs 140 million and expenditures of Gs 170 million, indicating an expected deficit of Gs 30 million. It is hoped, however, that with the assistance of technicians under the Point IV program [4] the Government will be able to reorganize the Finance Ministry, institute tax reforms and improve its control over expenditures. Success in these matters would materially improve the long-run outlook for the balance of payments and for the ability of Paraguay to service additional debt.

7. *Availability of U.S. materials.* NAC approval of the consideration of this loan application would carry with it no assurance that the U.S. materials for which financing is sought will be available.[5]

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[4] In Latin America Point IV technical assistance programs were administered by the IIAA.

[5] On December 4, 1951, the NAC advised the US Executive Director on the IBRD that it approved his consideration in the Board of Executive Directors a loan of $5,000,000 by the IBRD to Paraguay to finance the external costs of an agricultural development program; the Export-Import Bank concurred in the action, but expressed the view that the amount of the loan was excessive (Department of State NAC Files, Document No. 88, December 4, 1951, Lot 60 D 137, Box 369). The loan was publicly announced by the Board of Directors of the IBRD on December 7, 1951. Under the terms of the Loan Agreement, however, the loan could not become effective until the Crédito Agrícola de Habilitación, one of the agencies to receive IBRD-financed goods for resale to Paraguayan farmers, improved certain of its financial procedures. In September 1952, after a number of reforms had been accomplished, the IBRD declared the loan effective up to the amount of $1,900,000. For further information, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Eighth Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1952–1953* (Washington, 1953), p. 35.

PERU

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PERU[1]

723.5621/1–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Duncan A. D. Mackay of the Office of Regional American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1951.

Subject: Peruvian Request for Warships

Participants: Ambassador Berckemeyer[2]
Señor Don German Aramburu L.,
Peruvian Minister Plenipotentiary, Counselor
Commander Juan Manuel Castro, Naval Attache
OSA—Mr. Warren[3]
Mr. McGinnis[4]
AR—Mr. Mackay

Ambassador Berckemeyer stated that he had received urgent instructions from Lima to press for the sale to Peru of either a heavy cruiser of the "Wichita" class, or a light cruiser of either the "Brooklyn" or "San Diego" classes; and, in addition to one of these cruisers, three destroyer escorts mounted with three-inch guns. A note of the Peruvian Embassy in this sense, dated January 9, 1950,[5] was presented to Mr. Warren.

Ambassador Berckemeyer explained that, due to the wide publicity given in the Latin American press of the sale to Argentina, Brazil and Chile of two light cruisers apiece,[6] the Junta was under considerable pressure to explain to the public why no naval vessels had been offered for sale to Peru by the U.S. Government at this time.

Mr. Warren reminded Ambassador Berckemeyer that during the visit of Admiral Saldias[7] to the U.S. in August, the Admiral had shown a disinclination to purchase the three 3-inch destroyer escorts which the Navy proposed to offer for sale to Peru, and had remained

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 982 ff.
[2] Fernando Berkemeyer.
[3] Fletcher Warren, Director, Office of South American Affairs.
[4] Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr.
[5] The referenced note, not printed, is dated January 9, 1951.
[6] For documentation on the negotiations leading to the sale of cruisers to these countries, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 599 ff.
[7] Roque A. Saldías, Peruvian Minister of Marine.

adamant in his preference for 5-inch destroyer escorts, which he was informed were not available since there were none in excess of U.S. requirements. Mr. Warren recalled that both he and Assistant Secretary Miller [8] had gone to the highest levels of the Department of the Navy on the matter while Admiral Saldias was here and were given the same reply. Since then no change had been indicated in the Peruvian attitude in this regard.

Ambassador Berckemeyer stated that he understood this perfectly. He indicated that Commander Castro had informed Admiral Miles' [9] office [10] in Navy earlier in the day of the decision of the Peruvian Government to accept 3-inch destroyer escorts if they were offered to Peru, and had also emphasized the prior urgency which the Peruvians attached to the purchase of a cruiser at this time if at all possible.

Mr. Mackay stated that Admiral Miles had informed him just before this meeting that the Navy Department was prepared to enter into naval staff conferences with the Peruvian naval representatives to discuss the terms and conditions incident to the sale of the destroyer escorts, once the Peruvians could indicate who would represent them in these conversations. Further authorization, however, would have to be received within the U.S. Government for the Navy Department to discuss the sale of any other type of vessel to Peru at this time. In this connection he stated the Navy wished to emphasize that the Peruvian Government should not become unduly optimistic, nor at the same time unduly depressed. Mr. Warren stated that the Peruvian Embassy would receive a reply to its note in this sense early next week.

Ambassador Berckemeyer thanked Mr. Warren for this information, and requested that the urgency of this Peruvian request be stressed when the matter is taken up with the Defense Department. Mr. Warren stated that the Department would do all it could to see that sympathetic consideration is given the Peruvian Government in this matter.

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[8] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
[9] Rear Adm. Milton E. Miles, Director, Pan American Affairs and U.S. Naval Missions, Department of the Navy, and Senior Naval Delegate, Inter-American Defense Board.
[10] Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

Editorial Note

On January 25, 1951, representatives of the United States and Peru signed at Lima a Point IV General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on January 15, 1953. The agreement was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 773, from Lima, January 26, 1951, not printed (823.00–TA/1–2651). For text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2772, or *United States Treaties and Other*

International Agreements (UST), volume 4, page 132. For a press release, dated January 26, announcing the agreement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 5, 1951, pages 219–220.

723.5621/3–2251

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs (Krieg)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1951.

Subject: Destroyer Escorts for Peru

Participants: Ambassador Harold H. Tittmann,[1] Lima, Peru
William L. Krieg, Officer in Charge, North & West Coast Affairs

Ambassador Tittmann asked that the following message be transcribed:

"Admiral Saldias reports that he told Ambassador Berckemeyer by telephone this morning that unless Saldias received favorable views with respect to destroyer escorts by tomorrow Friday he will meet President Odria [2] Saturday morning and urge that Naval representatives to Foreign Ministers Conference [3] not accept and furthermore will recommend withdrawal Peruvian Naval Attachés from Washington. Unless he hears something favorable by tomorrow he will assume that no Naval aid will be forthcoming.

"Saldias feels it will be impossible to keep matter out of newspapers much longer and that whole affair will be known here by Saturday. In view of advanced stage of preparation for taking over destroyer escorts Saldias feels his position vis-à-vis his associates and the public will seem ridiculous.

"Contents of Foreign Minister's [4] call yesterday made known to Saldias especially admonition not to precipitate matter but later stated definitely he will proceed to above mentioned step on Saturday morning."

Mr. Krieg replied that he was sorry Admiral Saldias was taking such a high-handed attitude. He said that the Department, including Under Secretary Webb,[5] Deputy Under Secretary Matthews,[6] Mr. Miller and Mr. Warren had all taken a personal interest in this case and that Mr. Miller had gone to the Pentagon to discuss the matter with Admiral Sherman.[7] The present situation is that there appear to

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[1] Harold H. Tittmann, Jr.
[2] Manuel A. Odría.
[3] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, held at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. For documentation on the conference, see pp. 925 ff.
[4] Manuel C. Gallagher.
[5] James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State.
[6] H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State.
[7] Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

be excellent possibilities of a favorable outcome. The Peruvians should realize, Mr. Krieg continued, that this is not a matter which can be settled entirely within the executive branch of the Government and that it is necessary also to consult with certain important Congressional leaders. Very special efforts are being made to contact the necessary Congressmen, but there can be no guarantee that the consultations will be completed by tomorrow. We would consider it most unfortunate if the Peruvian Naval representatives were withdrawn since this Government does not like to negotiate under threat. Premature publicity in Lima might have the effect of disrupting the carefully laid plans which the Department has worked out in conjunction with the Naval authorities. Mr. Krieg therefore urged that Ambassador Tittmann counsel the Peruvians to "keep their shirts on" and not do anything rash at this time.

Ambassador Tittmann said that he was leaving in five minutes to confer with President Odria and would advise against precipitative action. He was particularly alarmed, however, because Admiral Saldias believes Ambassador Berckemeyer is in agreement with his proposed course of action. Ambassador Tittmann therefore suggested that the Department get in touch with Ambassador Berckemeyer at the earliest possible moment and explain to him as frankly as possible the present status of the affair and urge him also to advise his Government against rash measures.[8]

[8] A memorandum of a telephone conversation between Ambassador Tittmann and Mr. Krieg, dated March 23, 1951, reads in part as follows:

"Ambassador Tittmann telephoned and stated that the Peruvians are delighted with the information that they now have an excellent chance to obtain 3 destroyer escorts from the United States. He added that the Naval Advisers to the Foreign Ministers Meeting will leave Lima Saturday night and arrive in Washington Sunday in time to attend the opening session on Monday." (723. 5621/3–2351)

611.23/3–2251

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1951.

PERU

A. OBJECTIVES

The US seeks to maintain Peru's support for our objectives in this Hemisphere and throughout the world. We wish to obtain a fair contribution from Peru to hemisphere security[1] through its continued collaboration in the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and by its acceptance of the role assigned to Peru in an agreed

[1] Documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense and related matters may be found on pp. 985 ff.

inter-American defense plan. We seek to encourage stability in government and the growth of democratic political institutions. Through positive cooperation in the economic field we seek to contribute to the economic development and stability essential to the attainment of other objectives. We particularly wish that Peru might supply increasing quantities of strategic raw materials for the civil and military economy of the US.

B. POLICIES

Background. Our policies toward Peru have to take into account basic social and political conditions in that country. There has been bitter antagonism between the poverty-stricken mass of the population and the conservative propertied groups who have controlled the Government of Peru almost constantly since the achievement of Peruvian independence. This economic and social cleavage is aggravated to some extent by a racial issue, since the poor are largely of Indian and mixed blood, while the ruling group is largely of European stock.

The conservative groups, including the large landowners and the "commercial aristocracy", have generally resisted the demands for social reform and for the extension of political democracy. In this they have often been supported by, or have given their support to, military leaders who seize power by *coup d'etat.*

In 1945, Peru had its first extended experiment in political democracy. José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, a middle-of-the-road leader, was elected President with the support of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), the numerically strong anti-communist leftist party which professes to be the champion of democracy in Peru, and to speak for the Indian and *mestizo* masses. Divergence of objectives and the authoritarian pattern of APRA's party organization quickly cooled this political friendship, until Bustamante was forced to rely entirely on conservative support and the backing of Army leaders. One of the results of the persistent political tension was the boycott of Congress by the anti-APRA bloc, preventing the enactment of any legislation after February 1947.

In early October 1948 an unsuccessful revolt by naval units and civilians occurred. Charging that APRA was behind the attempt, Bustamante outlawed the party. Some of its leaders were imprisoned, while others went into hiding or into exile. Three weeks thereafter Bustamante was overthrown by a military revolt in Arequipa, with the probable financial support of the conservative civilian groups.

The resulting Military Junta, under General Manuel A. Odría, confirmed the interdict of APRA, and also outlawed the Communist Party. The Junta formally dissolved Congress, assumed legislative powers, and until July 28, 1950, governed as a dictatorship. Early in January 1950, the Junta issued a call for elections, which were held on

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July 2, with Odría the only candidate for the presidency. The Government's control of the electoral machinery ensured a pro-Odría Congressional majority, but some opposition candidates were elected. The new Congress was installed, and the new half-civilian cabinet sworn in, on July 28.

Policies. Our relations with Peru have traditionally been friendly. Peru has been generally cooperative with the US in the Organization of American States, and in most of our inter-American policies and problems. Similarly, in the United Nations, Peru has been generally cooperative and has been of real assistance in promoting United States objectives in the economic and social, non-self-governing territories, and political and security fields. Only where there was a distinct Peruvian interest or bias as in the questions of relations with Spain, status of Jerusalem, and disposition of the Italian colonies has Peru opposed us on issues of the moment.

During World War II, despite some pro-German and pro-Italian sentiment, Peru leased us the military bases we needed, helped in anti-submarine patrols, and cooperated satisfactorily in our various procurement programs. In return we provided Peru with war materiel under the lend-lease, surplus property, and interim arms program agreements, and we continue to assist in arms procurement under MDAP. The US maintains naval, military, and air missions in Lima; the work of those missions and our program of bringing military officers to the US for tours of study or inspection trips bore fruit during the period the military was in full control of the government. Due to the lack of a Congress until July 28, 1950, the Peruvian Government has only lately ratified the Rio Treaty.[2]

Various US groups, particularly labor unions, have charged that the Government of Peru has attempted to control trade union activities and has forcibly eliminated Apristas from open participation in the trade union movement. Our policy has been that such charges are best handled by the International Labor Organization and the UN Economic and Social Council. We have supported the efforts of those international organizations to establish machinery to investigate in any country such alleged violations of trade union liberties and, through publicity which would arouse world public opinion, to help ameliorate such conditions.

We have tried to encourage political and economic stability, the development of democratic principles, and a rising standard of living through various technical aid programs and our cultural and informa-

[2] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

tion programs. Under the Institute of Inter-American Affairs,[3] a Food Production Mission, a Health and Sanitation Mission, and an Education Mission are maintained in Peru. These cooperative services have been very successful in securing the financial and political support of all Peruvian administrations, and are generally highly regarded and well received by Peruvians. Technical aid in the fields of agriculture, civil aviation, geology, social anthropology, vital statistics, and census procedures has been granted by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation.[4] Individual specialists have visited Peru under our technical aid program in other fields. These programs will be expanded under present "Point IV" technical assistance legislation.

Peru has remained primarily a producer of raw materials, of which the most important are cotton, sugar, petroleum, and non-ferrous metals. There has been intermittent Peruvian Government interest in industrialization and economic development. Industrial development has been hindered by the conflicting interests of the controlling conservative groups, especially by the opposition of some of the large agriculturists. The Military Junta commendably determined to assess present problems and future development possibilities. In August 1949, it contracted for the services of a non-governmental group of US technicians headed by Dr. Julius Klein. The Klein Mission[5] studied and made recommendations on a wide variety of subjects, including monetary policy, foreign trade and balance of payments problems, tax structure, budget, customs, and the government administration generally. It also devoted considerable time to the possibilities of economic development. A large majority of the Mission's recommendations were in line with our policies and objectives, and fortunately the Peruvian Government has adopted many of the recommendations.

As a means of gaining tariff concessions for its major export products and to revise the 1942 United States-Peruvian trade agreement, Peru is negotiating with us and with other countries at Torquay for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[6]

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[3] The Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) was established in 1942 and became a United States Government corporation in 1947. Its purpose was to aid governments in the Western Hemisphere by promoting technical programs and projects for health, sanitation, and food supply. As of mid-1950 the IIAA operated in conjunction with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA). For background information on the IIAA, see the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, pp. 795–797. For information on the activities of the IIAA and its relationship with TCA in 1950, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 679; for documentation on the IIAA in 1951, see pp. 1038 ff.

[4] Officially in existence from 1938 to 1950.

[5] For information on the Klein Mission and its recommendations, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 996.

[6] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see TIAS No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

We are encouraging Peruvian accession to the GATT both in order to insure a new trade agreement more satisfactory to Peru than the 1942 agreement [7] and to widen the Latin American coverage of the GATT.

It is the policy of this Government to encourage the use of private US capital on a non-discriminatory basis in the financing of petroleum, mining and industrial development projects. This course offers the best means of ensuring the efficient production and continued accessibility of Peruvian strategic resources to the US. There is already considerable US capital invested in Peru, especially in petroleum, mining, textiles, sugar, and transportation. We have indicated our approval of the new mining code, based on the recommendations of the Klein Mission, which encourages the investment of foreign capital, and should promote the development of the mining industry.

Peru's petroleum reserves are important to its economy and potentially to hemisphere security. Their development has been retarded by lack of domestic capital and technical skills, and by the legal, administrative and financial obstacles placed in the way of new foreign investment. For several years we have urged the promulgation of a new petroleum law which would attract foreign capital. A bill is now before the Peruvian Congress, but various interests are making it difficult to pass it in a form satisfactory to US private investors.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

The present government of Peru has both real and imaginary difficulties in foreign affairs. Relations with Ecuador, long embittered by a perennial boundary dispute, tend to become tense periodically with reciprocal accusations of troop movements and bellicose preparations along the border, most of them based on unfounded rumors.

Peru's relations with Colombia are particularly strained at this time as a result of the asylum granted to the APRA leader Haya de la Torre [8] by the Colombian Embassy in Lima and the conflicting interpretations given to the judgment of the International Court [9] on this

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[7] For text of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States and Peru, signed at Washington, May 7, 1942, and entered into force July 29, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 256, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1509. The trade agreement was terminated October 7, 1951, when Peru became a contracting party to GATT; for text of the understanding effected by an exchange of notes signed at Lima, September 12 and 28, 1951, and entered into force on the latter date, see TIAS No. 2421, or 3 UST (pt. 2) 2548.

[8] Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre.

[9] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a series of decisions in late 1950 and 1951 concluded essentially that the asylum granted to Haya de la Torre must end, but that the Colombian Government was under no obligation to surrender him to the Peruvian authorities. Ultimately, the two governments reached agreement for a safe conduct to be followed by Haya de la Torre's expulsion from Peru, which occurred on April 6, 1954. For additional information, see Marjorie Whiteman, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, 1968), vol. 6, pp. 473–488.

matter by both countries. The Department vigorously urged both countries to settle their differences amicably and thereby to preserve hemispheric solidarity, so necessary in view of the present crisis.[10]

Relations with Chile are lacking somewhat in cordiality. While the loss of Peruvian territory to Chile following the War of the Pacific [11] is no longer an active issue, the Chilean Government's strongly pro-democratic stand in inter-American affairs has been an obstacle to close relations between the two countries ever since the overthrow of the democratically elected government of President Bustamante in Peru by General Odría in 1948. A factor in this situation is the presence in Chile of an active group of exiled APRA leaders.

Relations with Bolivia are occasionally clouded as a result of machinations of Bolivian military plotters receiving some support from military hotheads in Peru. In general, however, relations are cordial.

Neither Guatemala nor Costa Rica maintain diplomatic relations with the Odría Government because the latter assumed power by what those governments consider to be illegal methods. Peru broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1950 because the Cuban Embassy in Lima assisted certain APRA leaders to escape from Peru.

The Peruvian Government is on good terms with the Government of General Perón [12] of Argentina. Latin American liberals have even charged that there is more than a mere affinity of political inspiration between the Governments of Argentina and Peru. There is no evidence, however, of Argentine intervention in Peruvian politics.

The present Peruvian Government has often been attacked by liberal opinion all over the continent as a dictatorship serving reactionary interests. Irked by these repeated expressions of hostility, Peru has often demonstrated an intransigent and uncooperative attitude in the conduct of bilateral relations with its neighbors.

Relations with European countries have little more than commercial and cultural significance. Peruvian cotton and a few other products are exported to the United Kingdom, encouraging the consumption of British manufactures in Peru. The Peruvian wealthy classes maintain particularly strong cultural ties with Spain. This is true in most Latin American countries. However, in the case of Peru, in view of the fact that these classes are still predominant politically, this cultural and social influence of Spain may have somewhat greater significance than in other countries.

Peru does not maintain diplomatic relations with Russia or its satellites.

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[10] Documents pertaining to the interest of the United States in the case of Haya de la Torre in 1951 are in Department of State decimal file 723.00.

[11] 1879–1883.

[12] Juan Domingo Perón.

D. EVALUATION

In regard to our objective of maintaining Peruvian support of United States policies in world affairs, our policies with respect to Peru have been successful. Wide as may be the gap between US ideals of democratic government and the political philosophy of the government of Peru, Peru sides unequivocally with the US on the international issue resulting from the aggressions of Communist imperialism. This does not mean that Peruvians are fully aware of any responsibility on their part to share our military burdens. Failure to realize such responsibility, however, does not result from any design to stand aloof in the East-West struggle, but rather from implict confidence in US strength. On the whole, Peruvian diplomatic support of US opposition to Soviet Russia has been outstanding.

The USIE Program has been reasonably successful in acquainting the Peruvian Government and people with our views and obtaining support for our policies. However, both information and cultural activities should be intensified and extended, and an expanded program of in-service training grants in the fields of press and radio are desirable.

As regards our objective of economic development of Peru, our policies in this respect have been making slow progress. On the whole, the technical assistance furnished by the US Government, especially in the fields of health and agriculture, is achieving its purpose from a long-term viewpoint. Opportunities, however, for rapid expansion and multiplication of programs of technical assistance are not very many in Peru. This may be due to the fact that the Peruvian Government has not been sponsoring any consistent, national economic development program of its own and there has been little enthusiasm for industrialization under government planning. As to financial assistance for economic development, Peru has not received any considerable credits from the Export-Import Bank or the IBRD. This is due, in part, to the absence in Peru of any enthusiasm in favor of any over-all program of economic diversification or industrialization. Another cause of Peru's failure to obtain financial assistance is the Peruvian Government's rather poor record in the liquidation of its financial obligations. Economic development of Peru is more likely to be fostered by private capital investments, and our policy of encouraging the Peruvian Government to adopt policies favorable to such investments should be continued. The Klein Mission has been of considerable help to Peru in this field.

As regards encouraging the establishment of a stable and democratic government in Peru, this objective is far from realization. Charges have often been directed against our policy, frequently with small foundation in fact, to the effect that our cultivation of normal

friendly relations with governments established by force such as that of President Odría of Peru, and even our recognition of such governments, encourages military *coups d'etat* and dictatorships. This reasoning overlooks the fact that overriding considerations, such as the need for maintaining hemisphere solidarity in the face of world crisis, and the importance of maintaining the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs preclude our resorting to a policy of discrimination against non-democratic governments in this Hemisphere. Furthermore, our long-term policy objective of encouraging democratic stability is better served by continuing friendly relations with, and extending economic aid to, the people of a country like Peru, irrespective of whether their government meets our definition of democracy.

795B.5/4–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Jr., of the Office of South American Affairs [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

[Subject:] Need for Peruvian Troops for the Unified Command in Korea [2]

[Participants:] Dr. Gallagher—Peruvian Foreign Minister
Señor Berckemeyer—Peruvian Ambassador
General Morla Concha [3]—Chief of the General Staff of the Peruvian Army
Brigadier General Sibert [4]—IADB
Major General Walsh [5]—IADB
Mr. Miller—ARA
Mr. White—AR
Mr. McGinnis—OSA

Mr. Miller described the grave situation in Korea confronted by the Unified Command and the need for fresh ground troops to relieve those troops who have been in the lines since last summer. The Assistant Secretary told Dr. Gallagher that he had not intended to bring up this matter again since his visit to Lima early in March, but that General Marshall [6] had specially requested the Department to discuss

[1] Source text is unsigned copy attached to a memorandum from the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs, Ivan B. White, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant, April 12, 1951, not printed (795B.5/4–1251).

[2] For additional documentation on the efforts of the United States to secure offers from Latin American governments of troop participation in Korea, see pp. 985 ff.

[3] Manuel Morla Concha.

[4] Edwin L. Sibert, Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board.

[5] Robert L. Walsh, Chairman, Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission and member of the Inter-American Defense Board.

[6] George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense.

it with the Foreign Ministers of certain of the other American republics because of the very serious need for additional troops in Korea. Mr. Miller added that he realized the delicacy of this matter with respect to Peru and did not ask for any comments from Dr. Gallagher.

Mr. Miller said that naturally the question of quantities arose when a possible contribution of troops on the part of Peru was to be considered. He said that it appeared that a combat regiment (4,000 or 5,000 troops) might be in line with Peru's capabilities provided, of course, that that country felt that it were in a position to furnish troops. The Assistant Secretary added that the Unified Command was not in particular need of aircraft or naval contributions but that any offers of this type would nevertheless be considered. He emphasized the need for ground troops and said that the United States would supply any deficiencies in equipment for such troops. This would be done on a reimbursable basis, the amount as well as the terms of payment to be negotiated at some future time. The United States would also supply transportation, medical care, rations, etc.

Mr. Miller said that we were not in a position to furnish all of the equipment necessary and referred to the fact that our resources of military equipment were strained because of the drain to Indo China, Western Europe, for our own rearmament, etc.

Dr. Gallagher said that he was not surprised to hear Mr. Miller refer to this matter and that, while his Government was in agreement that Peru should contribute to the Unified Command in Korea, public opinion in Peru had to be prepared to accept the need of sending Peruvian troops outside the country. He indicated that he himself was convinced of the desirability as well as of the need of Peru to furnish military assistance to the Unified Command.

General Morla remarked that not only Peruvian public opinion but also opinion within the Peruvian military establishment would have to be "reoriented" in order to accept the idea of a Peruvian military contribution to the Unified Command. General Morla said that, since 1949, Peru had made a number of requests to purchase United States military equipment and that these requests had not yet been filled. While there were doubtless good reasons for this, the General said that it was difficult to convince Peruvian military leaders of the need for Peru to assist in Korea when the United States could not furnish basic training and other equipment to the Peruvian forces. The General emphasized the need for training equipment and referred to the fact that 46 percent of the Peruvian ground forces were Indians who required lengthy training and indoctrination.

Mr. Miller replied that the United States had doubtless made errors in the past but that we must look to the future. He said that present legislation only permitted us to make military equipment available against cash payments in advance. He said that he did not know what

legislation Congress might pass at this session respecting the sale of military equipment but that it was quite likely that it would require that the delivery of such equipment must be directly linked with the aid that a given country would be able to furnish in Korea.

General Sibert then said that he would be pleased to confer further with General Morla regarding the military aspects of this matter on Monday, and the two agreed to meet to discuss the matter on April 9.

In conclusion, Dr. Gallagher said that he would not return to Peru until April 20 but assured Mr. Miller that he would take up this matter with the President as soon as possible after his arrival there.

723.5/4–1851

Memorandum by Mr. Duncan A. D. Mackay of the Office of Regional American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1951.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Résumé of Conference held at Suggestion of General Morla to Discuss Peruvian Requests for U.S. Military Equipment.

1. The conference was held at the Department of State at 10 : 30 a. m.

2. Present: General Morla, Chief of Staff, Peruvian Army
Colonel Somerville,[1] Chief, Latin American Branch, G–3, Department of the Army, U.S.A.
Lt. Colonel Jones,[2] G–3, Department of the Army, U.S.A.
Mr. McGinnis, Peruvian Desk Officer, Department of State
Mr. Smith,[3] International Security Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Mackay, Regional American Affairs, Department of State.

3. General Morla referred to a comprehensive list of equipment, submitted by the Peruvian Embassy on April 16,[4] representing Peru's long range requirements for military equipment. It contained, among other items, a complete table of equipment for four infantry divisions. A second list, comprising approximately one-fourth of the items extracted from the comprehensive ("global") list was marked "urgent" requirements. General Morla requested consideration of the "urgent"

[1] Col. Duncan S. Somerville.
[2] Lt. Col. Argyle P. Jones.
[3] Paul Smith.
[4] The Peruvian Government's list of equipment was submitted to the Department of State under cover of a note from the Peruvian Embassy dated April 13, 1951, not printed (723.5–MAP/4–1351).

list, which also contains a number of items which Peru has already requested in previous actions, and asked whether it could be provided Peru and what period of time would be required. General Morla described at some length the desire of Peruvian authorities to furnish troops to the United Nations in Korea and the inability to do so because of the current psychological mood of Peruvian public opinion. He stated that if the U.S. could furnish the equipment for one infantry division, for example, Peru would then be able to furnish one regimental combat team, and that even the initiation of the flow of equipment to Peru would have a beneficial effect upon Peruvian public opinion. He stated that Peru could not afford to reduce her Army at this time by offering a substantial unit to the United Nations for Korea.

4. U.S. representatives assured General Morla that his position was thoroughly understood and that, while no answer could be given without detailed study of the new requests, they would receive the most careful and sympathetic consideration. He was informed that pricing and availability data on the pending requests would be forthcoming at an early date. He was informed that in determining the availability of military equipment for various purposes, there had to be established certain priorities, in which combat equipment for Korea and the strengthening of the NATO forces in Europe had high priorities. It was explained that under existing U.S. laws, military equipment which was available for other areas could be transferred only on the basis of payment in dollars. It was explained that different fiscal and priority terms applied with respect to equipment of forces for action in Korea. In cases where offers of military units for the United Nations in Korea are accepted by the Unified Command, it is legally possible for the U.S. Government to make up deficiencies in the military unit offered to Korea, to assist in training the troops, to transport the contingents to Korea and to maintain them in the field, provided it is agreed that there will be reimbursement to the U.S. The terms and conditions of this reimbursement of units for the United Nations in Korea, it was explained, can be negotiated later with the U.S. if the offering country is unable to pay the U.S. in full at the start. It was explained, however, that equipment for units for Korea was not shipped to the country making the offer, but was instead provided to the Theater Commander after arrival of the unit.

5. General Morla repeated several times that the possibility of a Peruvian offer for the United Nations in Korea would be greatly enhanced by the prior arrival of U.S. equipment for the Peruvian Armed Forces, and that it would be helpful in stimulating such an offer if such equipment could be delivered before the offer were made. The U.S. representatives stated that the Peruvian position was clear and understandable, but that those U.S. persons desiring to support the

Peruvian equipment requests would be in much better position to do so if a Peruvian offer for Korea were not delayed and made contingent upon the arrival of appreciable amounts of U.S. equipment. The U.S. representatives pointed out the risks being accepted by the U.S. in shipping a large portion of its continental forces to assist the United Nations in Korea. It was suggested that Peru, relying upon the Rio Treaty, might accept a temporary diminution in its internal forces for the sake of providing a unit to assist the United Nations in Korea.

6. General Morla requested that he be provided informally with a resume of the points which he raised and the replies which were given to him during this conversation.

795B.5/5–1651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Peru

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 16, 1951.

382. Although Dept anxious encourage in every appropriate way offers troops Korea, we are concerned re apparent Peru attitude tying Korea offer inflexibly to US mil asst in mtg Peru local needs (urtels 573, May 8; 579, May 9).[1] Our view is that Korean operation is mutual UN responsibility. Contributions shld not be regarded as being made to US, and as basis for *quid pro quo* arrangements, though cannot be denied employment Peru battalion in Korea wld strengthen bonds between our peoples and create favorable US public opinion. In discussing these matters Peru officials, therefore, you shld emphasize separation of two problems, and explain situation orally fol lines:

Re possible Korea offer, US believes Peru offer of battalion wld be widely recognized as highly significant demonstration that govt's awareness of UN responsibilities and determination contribute to collective security against communist aggression. Offer wld be given most sympathetic consideration through normal Unified Command channels. US wld do utmost make up deficiencies in training and equipment, which cannot be met by Peru Govt, on basis negot reimbursement outlined Gen'l Morla in Apr 18 conversations here.

Re Peru requests for mil equipment, these must be considered in relation to overall problem of strengthening defenses of free world, and availabilities within gen framework. At present requirements countries more immediately threatened by commie aggression have higher priority. Furthermore decisions on fulfilment LatAmer requests from stocks which may become available will be based increasingly upon clear evidence that govt's agreement that forces strengthened will be prepared and used if and when necessary in per-

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[1] Neither printed; both are filed under decimal number 795.00.

formance of roles or missions essential to collective defense of Continent. Peru requests are being considered with all these factors in mind, but it is doubtful that immed answer can be given.

FYI Peru requests appear far in excess of that country's needs and econ capacity to buy and maintain even if materiel were available, which it is not. As illustration cost to Peru under existing legis equipment one infantry div including reasonable supply ammunition wld be neighborhood $93,000,000. Consideration will be given however possibility mtg reasonable amounts if availability situation shld improve, but only on basis outlined above, and after higher priority demands have been met. Suggest that Peru re-analyze requirements and state them in items of equipment rather than in T.O. and E. units. Recommend Peru consult with US Army mission in this matter.

ACHESON

823.00/6–151

The Chargé in Peru (Barber) to the Department of State

SECRET LIMA, June 1, 1951.

No. 1270

Subject: Conference With Minister of Finance [1]

On May 31, 1951 Mr. Turkel [2] and Mr. Bridgett [3] called upon the Minister of Finance at their request to discuss outstanding economic problems. The conversation covered a wide range of subjects; they are listed below in the order of their interest in the Department rather than in the order in which they were discussed.

1. Troops for Korea.
2. Point IV.
3. Loan policy of the IBRD.
4. Peruvian requirements for scarce supplies.
5. Increase in copper ceiling price.
6. Payment of lend-lease obligations.
7. Payment of commercial debts.
8. Peruvian participation in GATT.

1. Troops for Korea

This subject arose owing to a discussion of the size of the expected budgetary surplus for 1951. The Minister of Finance stated that recently in a Cabinet meeting, when the subject of troops for Korea was being discussed, the President turned to Sr. Dasso and asked, "How much is all this going to cost me?" The Minister of Finance replied, "How should I know? You're a soldier. You ought to know." There-

[1] Andrés F. Dasso, Peruvian Minister of Finance.
[2] Harry R. Turkel, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs.
[3] W. Charles Bridgett, Assistant Attaché.

upon the President gave orders for the military member present to draw up a memorandum on the cost of the proposed troop contribution. The Minister of Finance stated that this study is now being made, but that the military experts will have to estimate what the attrition rate will be of the troops in Korea in order to calculate death benefits to families, hospitalization, etc. Mr. Turkel replied that he would request the Department for comparative data on casualties of military contingents of members of the United Nations in Korea.[4] The Minister went on to say that he felt that the proposal to send troops to Korea would not meet with popular favor. Korea is so far away; almost any other place would be better. Mr. Turkel responded that unfortunately Soviet aggression had to be contained where it was launched, and not on the ground of our own choice. In the foregoing conversation no mention was made, of course, of the substance of the Embassy's secret despatch No. 1251 of May 29, 1951.[5]

2. Point IV Operations

In a meeting about ten days earlier with the Minister of Finance, not hitherto reported to the Department, Mr. Turkel had shown the Minister of Finance a list of authorizations of Point IV projects in Peru dated April 17 with a view to overcoming the increasing Peruvian disappointment with respect to actual Point IV accomplishments. Mr. Turkel mentioned that when he was in the Department on May 21, 1951, Mr. Haldore Hanson [6] had shown him an up-to-date account of Point IV authorizations which brought the total for Peru to 1-⅓ million dollars. The Minister was pleased. Mr. Turkel then stated that he had made a considerable point of submitting to the Technical Cooperation Administration the application of the Minister of Fomento [7] in the amount of $250,000 for American engineering services to design dams in five areas in Peru. He had told the TCA authorities that this application was supported by a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Cruise of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and that he was fairly certain that if the engineering studies could be made, IBRD financing for these dams would follow. He felt that this was the key to expanding irrigation developments in Peru, and that all parties concerned must follow through on this project. Mr. Turkel had told Mr. Carlos Gibson [8] of the Peruvian Embassy of his conversations in the Department on this and other economic subjects.

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[4] Such information was furnished by the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru for transmission to the Peruvian Government in airgram 7, July 7, 1951, not printed (795B.5/6–1251).

[5] Not printed.

[6] Acting Assistant Deputy Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration.

[7] Carlos Salazar Southwell.

[8] Second Secretary, Peruvian Embassy.

3. Loan Policy of the IBRD

Mr. Turkel stated that the preceding day he had received a visit from Mr. Orvis A. Schmidt, Dr. Harold Larson, and two other officers of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He told the Minister of Finance in strictest confidence that he felt that this mission was beginning to become somewhat skeptical of the Peruvian application for 1.8 million dollars for port equipment to modernize the Port of Callao. The bank mission is not yet convinced that such equipment would actually facilitate the flow of strategic raw materials through the port. Adm. Stanley's report dealt only with general cargo, and not with bulk cargo such as ores and grain. Mr. Turkel had given them the facts concerning the ore in storage at the port, and the probable amounts of such ores in the future, whether or not these facts support his thesis that the loan ought to be made.

The Minister of Finance stated that the President was becoming considerably annoyed at the large number of missions coming to Peru without producing tangible results. Five eminent authorities have studied the Chimbote coal deposits and submitted favorable reports but without any present results. The Argentinians are talking of building a 400 ton blast furnace at Chimbote using coal as fuel. Mr. Fritz Mandl will return to Peru at the end of June. The Minister is not anxious to have the Argentinians in Peru, but the Peruvians will accept financing, especially private investment, wherever they can get it. Mr. Turkel concluded this phase of the conversation by saying that he felt that developments might shortly be expected in connection with large-scale financing, and that the Minister should not be disheartened because all such studies were necessarily slow.

4. Peruvian Requirements for Scarce Supplies

Mr. Turkel stated that he had spent nearly a day in trying to ascertain the reasons for possible delays in Washington which caused members of the Peruvian Mining Ministry to complain that they were not receiving equipment from the U.S. He told the Minister that the person responsible for U.S. export controls for Latin America is one of our best economic officers, Mr. Claude Courand,[9] of the Office of International Trade. Mr. Courand had said that D.O. ratings for the Peruvian mining industry were now being granted by his office within a period of ten days. Such D.O. ratings entitle the holder to receive, for the month of May, 1/12 of the amount of supplies shipped during 1950; that the D.O. rating will allow a similar amount to be shipped for the month of June; thereafter the Controlled Materials Plan takes over, and the situation should shortly be regularized and facilitated. Mr. Turkel stated that he had put the Purchasing Agent of the Cerro

[9] Claude W. Courand was detailed to the Department of Commerce, May 15, 1950, as Assistant Director, American Republics Division, Office of the Assistant Director for Export Supply, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

de Pasco Copper Corporation in touch with Mr. Courand in the hope of assisting that corporation. He concluded that the large Peruvian mining companies could pretty well take care of themselves because they have purchasing departments in New York, or representatives in Washington, but that the difficulty would be with the small and medium Peruvian producers. He suggested to the Finance Minister that the Director of Commerce, Dr. Jorge Guerinoni, keep in touch with the Commercial Counselor of the Peruvian Embassy, Sr. Carlos Donayre, who, in turn, would be in contact with Mr. Claude Courand. This procedure was suggested because the Embassy is so short of personnel that it is deeply in arrears in its requirements reporting, and while it is beginning to make progress in catching up, it is expected there will be substantial additions to the critical list, and, therefore, the Embassy ought not be appealed to except in cases of great necessity or urgency. The Minister was grateful for the suggestion.

5. Increase in Copper Ceiling Price

Mr. Turkel stated that he had spoken to Mr. Getzin of the Office of International Materials Policy in an effort to impress him with the absolute necessity of treating Peruvian copper on the same basis as Chilean copper,[10] as far as concerns price ceiling in the United States. Mr. Turkel stated that as a result of his conversation he felt sure that the final outcome would be that Canadian, Rhodesian and Peruvian copper would all be treated on the same basis as Chilean copper. The President of Cerro de Pasco[11] has stated to Mr. Turkel on May 30 that while copper was still quoted at 24-½¢ per pound on the New York commodity market, blister copper being brought in in bond for refining, and re-exported was quoted at 27-¼¢ per pound. This confused situation is expected to clear up in a week or so. The Minister stated that he was somewhat comforted by these remarks, and reiterated his profound concern for equal treatment for Peruvian copper.

6. Payment of Lend-Lease Obligations

Mr. Turkel stated that he then had to bring up the perennial question of the lend-lease debt, and to state that he had received another instruction[12] to seek early liquidation of this 3 million dollar debt. The lend-lease accounts in Latin America have been 97% settled, and Peru is one of three countries having small balances owing.[13]

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[10] For documentation on the understanding concerning copper reached between the United States and Chile in April–May 1951, see pp. 1238 ff.

[11] Robert P. Koenig, President, Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation.

[12] Apparent reference to instruction 140, May 24, 1951, not printed (723.56/5–2451).

[13] In a note to the Peruvian Embassy, dated May 24, 1951, not printed, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the amount of $2,970,742 remained unpaid on Peru's lend-lease debt, and indicated that the United States was still awaiting receipt from the Peruvian Government of a settlement proposal (723.56/5–2451). No such proposal was offered by the Peruvian Government in 1951.

The Finance Minister stated that he was anxious to improve the debt record of Peru, but in view of the budgetary demands for economic development, troops to Korea, commercial and other debts, and so forth, he could not see how he could meet all of these various demands. Mr. Turkel then recalled that the Klein Mission report of November 5th stated that the profits from the revaluation of the reserves of the Central Reserve Bank should be used for debt payment, and inquired what had happened to that money. The Minister stated that of some 45 million soles only 20 million had been utilized, and that the debts involved could not be satisfied from that source alone. Mr. Bridgett then mentioned the possibility of revaluing the "intangible" gold reserves of the Central Reserve Bank. The Minister grinned, and asked us to present a complete plan as to how he could pay all debts, and meet all obligations to the United States and Argentina with the resources at his command. Mr. Turkel stated that the time left before he sails for Greece is so short that he could not undertake such a study, but recommended that the Klein Mission be asked to make this study. The Finance Minister asked that Mr. Turkel get together with Dr. Klein to start the study. Sr. Dasso added that after the adjournment of the next regular session of the Peruvian Congress he hoped to put into effect a widescale plan for the liquidation of all outstanding debts utilizing profits from the revaluation of these "intangible" gold reserves, and possibly other resources.

7. Payment of Commercial Debts

Mr. Turkel stated that he was somewhat disappointed that the month of June had arrived, and no checks had yet been mailed to American exporters entitling them to the difference between the former official rate, and the rate of 14.20 for their registered commercial debts. The Minister of Finance concurred with Mr. Bridgett that while there were only some 400 checks to be mailed, the burden of calculating the percentages was very considerable, and since the Comptroller of the Republic was following a very tough policy, the checks were not mailed this month because of the lack of a few hundred thousand soles, but would certainly be mailed in the month of June.

8. Peruvian Participation in GATT

Mr. Turkel stated that the Department does not expect to accelerate the entry into force the U.S.-Peruvian schedules to the Torquay Agreement; [14] that 15 Contracting Parties to GATT have already approved the membership of Peru, and that it was quite certain that the remaining number necessary to make Peru an acceding Member would shortly be obtained. The Finance Minister was pleased to hear this, and stated

[14] For text of the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated at Torquay, April 12, 1951, and entered into force for the United States June 6, 1951, see TIAS No. 2420, or 3 UST 588.

that he would shortly meet with Dr. Jorge Guerinoni to discuss the Supreme Resolution to eliminate the existing 25% ad valorum luxury tax on automobiles.

In summary, the Minister of Finance again displayed his usual fine understanding and sympathy, but it seems clear that the Peruvians feel that they are receiving scant assistance from the United States in comparison with other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:
HARRY R. TURKEL
Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs

Editorial Note

On July 5, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized a line of credit amounting to $650,000 in favor of Fermin Malaga Santolalla e Hijos Negociación Agricola y Minera, S. A., of Lima, to assist in financing the purchase of equipment and services required for the expansion of facilities for the production of tungsten at the company's mines (Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951*, Washington, 1952, pages 16–17, 40).

Editorial Note

Beginning in the early summer of 1951, representatives of the Peruvian Government and the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (FBPC) held a series of discussions in New York concerning the possible resumption of payments on Peru's outstanding external debt, in default since 1931. In a letter to Ambassador Berckemeyer, dated July 12, not printed, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Eugene R. Black, stated in part that in anticipation of the Peruvian Government's new offer of a settlement to the FBPC, and providing that President Odría agreed to recommend approval to the Peruvian Congress of the agreement which would presumably be reached, the IBRD was willing to proceed immediately with consideration of the loan requested by Peru to cover the costs of improving port facilities at Callão (823.10/7–3151). From mid-August, the debt negotiations focused primarily on the question of accrued interest. With the solution of this problem, an agreement was signed on November 14, providing for the resumption of payments on the Peruvian debt. For a summary of the agreement and related documents, see Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, *Report, 1951 Through 1952* (New York, 1954), pages 201 ff. For previ-

ous documentation on the efforts of the FBPC to reach a debt settlement with the Peruvian Government, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, volume VIII, pages 998 ff. On January 23, 1952, the IBRD approved the so-called Callão port loan in the amount of $2,500,000; for further information on the loan, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Seventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1951–1952* (Washington, 1952), page 34.

Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26 [1]

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Peru (Tittmann)

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 5, 1951.

DEAR HAROLD: I had the good fortune of being in New York on other business Friday and called on Dr. Gallagher at his hotel. He was 45 minutes late for the appointment, having gone to New Jersey for lunch and having been detained by frightful weather on the way back. I remained at his suite for nearly an hour and had one of the best conversations with him that I have ever had.

Dr. Gallagher immediately asked me whether we had talked to General Noriega about troops for Korea. I told him in detail about my conversation [2] with the General and of the General's apparent determination to send some troops. Dr. Gallagher seemed to be extremely pleased about this. He said that Noriega was the key man in the picture and that for some time Noriega had needed some special attention from the United States so that his latent pro-U.S. inclinations could be brought to the fore. Dr. Gallagher said that he would himself give his earnest attention to the troops question, although I understood him to say that he would not go to bat on this issue until Noriega had returned to Lima.

Since there have been so many instances in the last year where Peruvians have expressed the feeling that the U.S. is favoring other countries over them, I decided that I would hit this complaint as hard as I could. I told Dr. Gallagher that we had used two arguments with General Noriega in support of sending troops to Korea. The first argument was that all the military people in our own government realize that although we have had casualties in Korea, the net effect of the Korean operation has been greatly to strengthen our armed might. This is not

[1] Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the years 1949–1953.

[2] General Noriega was in the United States during October and November 1951 for the purpose of inspecting certain military installations; no memorandum of his conversation with Mr. Miller could be found in the Department of State files. In a letter to Ambassador Tittmann, dated October 29, 1951, commenting on General Noriega's visit, Mr. Miller had stated in part that much to his surprise the General had indicated "enthusiastic determination" to send Peruvian troops to Korea, and that he promised to work on the problem after his return to Lima (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26).

only because of the impetus that has been given to the rearmament effort but also because of the fact that we have now veteran troops seasoned under fire to feed into recruit divisions. I also pointed out to him that the result of our policy of fairness with all countries in Latin America on all issues had been in our opinion to ease international tensions such as those which had existed between Colombia and Peru, with the result that Colombia had sent a battalion to Korea. I said that this was in my opinion a good proof of Colombia's sincerity and that it had gained for Colombia great kudos in our government as well as contributing in the long run to the strengthening of Colombian armed forces. I said frankly that I thought Peru should have this lesson in mind in orienting its own course of action.

I then pointed out to Dr. Gallagher that we in the State Department had tried very hard to improve the climate for Peru in the United States. I expressed great satisfaction over the debt settlement which Ambassador Berckemeyer had negotiated with the Bondholders Council and said that even though as counsel for the Ministry of Finance of Peru in my private law practice I had felt that the original offer [3] was a fair one, nevertheless it was unquestionable that with the increase in Peru's financial position it was in their own national interest to settle this matter once and for all. I said that the International Bank had shown its good faith by proceeding with the Callao loan without awaiting the debt settlement and that now the International Bank would enter into a relationship with Peru which, in my opinion, would mark the beginning of a new era for Peru and in Peruvian-American relations—an era which would be a new day for Peru's economy.

I said that Peru had earned this cooperation by the wise and prudent fiscal policies pursued by General Odria and the importance which the Peruvian Government had attached to Dr. Klein's recommendations. I reverted to the matter of troops and pointed out that although we badly needed troops for Korea, we had not conditioned our cooperation in any other phase with Peru on this issue but had stimulated the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank to cooperate with Peru and had also worked very hard on getting the DE's. Dr. Gallagher said that he had frequently expressed to colleagues in Peru his deep appreciation of the fairness of our attitude in these matters.

I referred briefly to Colonel Mendoza's [4] visit and the stimulation of our Point Four activities. Dr. Gallagher said frankly that he had entered the Odria cabinet with misgivings about some of the military people in the cabinet but he had been most gratified with the performance of people like Mendoza and Noriega as well as Odria.

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[3] Apparent reference to the debt settlement proposal offered by the Peruvian Government in 1947, which was rejected by the FBPC.

[4] Col. Juan Mendoza, Peruvian Minister of Public Education.

I told Dr. Gallagher very frankly that I had been worried about the adverse impact of Galo Plaza's visit upon our relations with Peru but I told him what I had previously said to Ambassador Berckemeyer about our having warned Galo Plaza in advance not to use his visit [5] to stir up the boundary issue. I pointed out that, far from having done so, Plaza had acted not as an Ecuadoran primarily but as a Latin American during his visit and had helped us greatly with Congress in getting through our Point Four program. I also said that I would like to bring up President Odria but that for political reasons which he would appreciate it would be counter-productive to do so. He agreed fully on both points.

I brought up the tax on tuna fish and told him about our efforts to block this, but he did not seem to attribute much importance to the matter.

I told him that I was sorry that some of our liberal and press elements sometimes classified the Odria regime with that of Peron and said that I personally thought that there was nothing further from the truth. I referred to the derisive comments which Odria had made about the Perons at the luncheon which Odria had given for me in Lima in March. Dr. Gallagher said that it was absurd for anyone to compare Odria with Peron and thanked me for my efforts to clarify this matter with the press up here.

I referred to the ceremonies honoring Isabela La Católica and pointed out that I had arranged for Ambassador Berckemeyer to be on the platform with me. I said that the sole and only reason for my having put on the show was because of Gallagher's interest in the matter. He said he understood that and appreciated it deeply. I complimented him on his splendid performance in Spain and he also seemed to be glad about this.

We discussed briefly the situation in Bolivia and in Chile. I referred to my apprehensions over the inability of the moderate parties in Chile to get together on a single candidate and the possibility that this would let the election go to Ibañez [6] by default. While he agreed that Ibañez might be a demagog along the Peron type, he did not think he would follow the kind of go-it-alone, anti-U.S. policy that Peron stands for.

We did not get into the Haya de la Torre case or the Peruvian-Ecuadoran boundary dispute except in the most indirect way. He did at one point refer to my public statement on the Haya case when I called in Zuleta [7] and Berckemeyer last year as having been misunderstood in Peru as an anti-Peruvian act on our part, but he merely said this

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[5] Galo Plaza Lasso, President of Ecuador, made an official visit to the United States during the latter part of June. For documentation on his visit and his discussions with officials in the Department of State, see pp. 1394 ff.

[6] Carlos Ibañez del Campo, President of Chile, 1926–1931.

[7] Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Colombian Ambassador to the United States.

was water over the dam and indicated the situation was much less tense.

He brought up Belaunde's [8] candidacy for the General Assembly presidency in a very general way towards the end of our talk without, however, asking for my intervention. He did say that he assumed he was right in discrediting reports which had reached him that we were agitating for Padilla Nervo's [9] election. I told him that as usual we would stand by the deliberations of the Latin American caucus. He did say he hoped that the Latinos would not kick away their chance for the presidency by failing to get together between themselves in the caucus.

Dr. Gallagher volunteered assurance a workable petroleum law [10] would soon be forthcoming and I told him at some length about my participation in the National Petroleum Convention in Venezuela in September [11] and the favorable impression which had been made on foreign delegates (including those from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Mexico) by the state of affairs in the petroleum industry in Venezuela. I spoke highly of Ambassador Garland and praised his initiative in having arranged for a Venezuelan technical oil mission to go to Lima. I told him in some detail about what Herbert Hoover, Jr. had told me in Lima at luncheon in your house two years ago to the effect that every country in Latin America with proven oil resources which had permitted private companies to operate was now a net exporter of oil whereas every country with proven resources of oil which had a nationalized industry was a net importer. He seemed impressed by this and expressed surprise to learn that Mexico was now a net importer and that Argentina was now producing less than half of its petroleum requirements whereas once it had produced almost all.

Sincerely yours, EDWARD G. MILLER, JR.

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[8] Victor Andres Belaúnde, Chairman, Peruvian Delegation to the United Nations.

[9] Luis Padilla Nervo, Chairman of the Mexican Delegation to the United Nations, was elected President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 6, 1951.

[10] During 1951 the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies had under consideration several drafts of a proposed petroleum law, all of which provided for the tighter regulation of the industry and an increase in the government's share of profits. A detailed summary of the content and progress of the proposed legislation is attached to a letter from the Minerals Attaché in Lima (Bramson) to Mr. Dorr, January 3, 1952, not printed (823.2553/1-352).

[11] The Venezuelan National Petroleum Convention was held at Caracas, September 8–18, 1951; Mr. Miller was a member of the Observer Delegation sent by the United States.

723.5/8–1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert J. Dorr of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1951.

Subject: Peruvian Requests for Armaments [1]

Participants: Ambassador Berckemeyer, Peruvian Embassy
OSA—Ambassador Warren
Mr. Bernbaum
Mr. Dorr

Ambassador Berckemeyer called to advise regarding his recent discussions in Lima on Peruvian requests for armaments. He stated he discussed these with President Odria, General Noriega,[2] Admiral Saldías and others and that all were in general agreement Peruvian requests must be reviewed, scaled down and priority listing established.[3] The Ambassador said this was being done now in Lima and that revised requests would be submitted though the review period might be somewhat lengthy.

With respect to the two submarines Peru has on pending order with the Electric Boat Company, Ambassador Berckemeyer said they are strongly desired by Peru as replacements and that Peru wants construction started on them at once. He said Peru gives them top priority in its armaments request and urged that the Department give the necessary approval to the Electric Boat Company.

Ambassador Warren said that the Department would take action on this revised armaments request as soon as received from Peru though it was emphasized there would not only be delays in supplying the requested armaments but unquestionably some armaments may not be available for very long periods of time. Ambassador Berckemeyer said this aspect was known to and understood by Peruvian officials both here and in Lima.

With respect to the submarines, Ambassador Warren said action would be taken on the Peruvian note on the subject on which action has been delayed pending definite advice from Peru. He also suggested

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[1] Documents pertaining to Peruvian military requests are in Department of State decimal files 723.5 and 723.5–MAP.

[2] Gen. Zenón Noriega, Minister of War and President of the Peruvian Cabinet.

[3] On June 1, 1951, Mr. Warren, Mr. Jamison, Mr. William F. Gray, and Ambassador Berckemeyer had discussed Peruvian requests for military equipment at the Department of State. The memorandum of that conversation, by Mr. Jamison, dated June 1, reads in part as follows: "During the conversation the potential expense to the Peruvian Government involved in these various requests, the unavailability of many of the kinds of equipment requested, and the necessity that requests be reviewed in terms of the items most needed and most likely to be useful, were emphasized. It was suggested that he [Ambassador Berckemeyer] might wish to submit a new Note summarizing the items which Peru now wishes to request." (723.5–MAP/6–151)

Ambassador Berckemeyer inform Admiral Miles and the Electric Boat Company of Peru's continued desire for two submarines.

Ambassador Berckemeyer also stated Peru had definitely given up the idea of purchasing any jet aircraft but was determined to proceed with the purchase of 25 F–47 craft. Ambassador Warren thanked him for the information and said it would be communicated to the appropriate officer of the Department.

723.551/11–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert J. Dorr of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1951.

Subject: Courtesy Call by Admiral Saldías

Participants: Admiral Roque A. Saldías, Peruvian Minister of Marine
Minister Germán Aramburú, Peruvian Chargé
ARA—Mr. Miller
OSA—Mr. Dorr

Admiral Saldías called to pay his respects to Mr. Miller and to extend his personal and official thanks as well as the thanks of the Peruvian Navy for the Department's assistance in facilitating the transfer of three D–E's to Peru.[1] Saldías indicated the D–E's would be ready for formal transfer sometime in March as there is considerable rehabilitation to be accomplished as well as training of the crews.

Admiral Saldías said he will call on the Secretary of Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations tomorrow in the company of Admiral Miles. During these visits, he will inquire regarding the possibility of transferring a cruiser to Peru as Peru has funds earmarked for such a purchase which can be used for other unspecified purposes in case a cruiser is not available. The Admiral was appreciative of the information he had received from Ambassador Tittmann and believed his conversations tomorrow were the best means of finding out definitely.

Saldías said he would witness the signing today of the contract with the Electric Boat Co. for the construction of two submarines. Friday he departs for San Francisco to inspect an LST Peru has purchased, will return to Washington briefly and then visit the D–E's at Jacksonville with Admiral Miles before returning to Lima.

Mr. Miller spoke of the good relations between the two countries and mentioned the fine work Ambassador Berckemeyer was doing in obtaining a settlement of Peru's external debt, especially as such

[1] The United States Congress authorized the transfer of three destroyer escorts to Peru under Public Law 146, approved September 15, 1951; for text, see 65 Stat. 322.

settlement presaged considerable benefit to Peru from loans which will be available from the IBRD. Admiral Saldías remarked Peru officially recognized the need for re-establishing its credit rating and was confident the bond settlement would be ratified by Congress. Commenting on Pedro Beltrán's[2] attitude on this matter, Saldías was sure Beltrán recognized the need for such settlement in spite of his previous objection to further dealings with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. Saldías also said there had been little press or public comment in Peru on the announced settlement terms and what there had been was favorable.

Mr. Miller likewise introduced the subject of a proposed U.S. duty on tuna fish imports. He indicated the Department was seriously concerned with this proposal in spite of the Department's letter on the subject to the House Ways and Means Committee, which had not been cleared with the interested political sections of the Department. Admiral Saldías stated he had received many calls on this subject when his trip to the U.S. became known. He said the cotton and sugar producers in Peru were also financially interested in the exploitation of Peru's fantastically rich fishing resources and that considerable Peruvian capital was tied up in this nascent industry, which would be seriously affected if not killed by our imposition of a duty. The Admiral said he had received complaints that tuna fishing vessels of non-U.S. registry but with U.S. crews or ownership had been violating Peruvian fishing regulations frequently, though he had not ordered any patrol action by the Peruvian Navy as he did not wish to complicate the present situation by any action that might be considered hostile. He said Ecuador had requested Peru's cooperation in presenting a unified resistance front, along with other countries, but indicated Peru officially did not wish to do so at this time, again to avoid complicating the problem. He said Peru officially was remaining calm on the subject in the expectation this threat to its industry would not materialize, although he said the same was not true for those outside the administration. He referred to the verbal attack on Congressman McKinnon,[3] sponsor of the U.S. bill, by Peruvian fishing interests during the Congressman's recent visit to Lima and the proposed legislation introduced in the Peruvian Congress which would triple import duties on many articles imported from the U.S. to provide funds to assist the Peruvian fishing industry. Admiral Saldías indicated these methods were not sponsored nor approved of by the Peruvian Government.

Mr. Miller then turned the conversation to a discussion of possible Peruvian military participation in Korea, mentioning his previous

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[2] Editor and publisher of the Peruvian newspaper, *La Prensa;* he had served as Ambassador to the United States, 1944–1946.

[3] Clinton D. McKinnon (D–Calif.).

conversations on the subject with General Noriega [4] and Foreign Minister Gallagher.[5] Prefacing his comments by making a distinction between this subject and the probable future discussions with Peru on hemisphere defense under the Mutual Security Act,[6] Mr. Miller reviewed the financial aspects of a Peruvian contribution to Korea in order that this aspect be clearly understood by Peru. He said that any Peruvian contingent, whether military or naval, would be considered the same as an American unit and be equipped, trained, supplied and serviced the same as American units. While such support would be given only on a reimbursable basis, the matter of reimbursement would be the subject of future negotiations and arrangements. Admiral Saldías expressed his keen interest in this information as he initially had questions on the financial aspects in considering possible Peruvian naval participation. Admiral Saldías said he personally believed Peru should send units to Korea in order to comply with Peru's international obligations and fully agreed with Mr. Miller's opinion that service in Korea was highly desirable from a professional standpoint because of the experience gained by troops. Admiral Saldías stated he had always been in favor of sending naval units to Korea and had so informed President Odria. He spoke, rather vaguely, of one or two frigates, especially since the recent rehabilitation of two frigates and the future receipt of three D–E's will put the Peruvian Navy in a position where it can afford to release units for use in Korea.

The Admiral showed particular interest in Mr. Miller's brief mention of discussing the subject with General Noriega and specifically asked if Noriega had made any special comment on the proposal. When told Noriega had not made any specific comment, Admiral Saldías stated he could only speak for the Navy and not for the Army. His facial reaction reflected the apparent opinion that Noriega was not in favor of sending troops to Korea and that a Peruvian contribution was doubtful without Noriega's express approval. His manner and statements on this subject implied that Noriega was the key to Peruvian assistance and had not been in favor of the idea heretofore.[7]

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[4] See footnote 2, p. 1600.

[5] Apparent reference to Mr. Miller's conversation with the Foreign Minister, summarized in Mr. Miller's letter to Ambassador Tittmann, p. 1600.

[6] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373.

[7] In a letter to Assistant Secretary Miller, dated December 11, 1951, Ambassador Tittmann stated in part the following: "Regarding Peruvian troops for Korea, the outlook, I am sorry to say, is not too bright for the moment. After consulting with Gallagher, I went over to the Ministry of War on December 10 to have a talk with General Noriega in his office. His manner was not enthusiastic when I brought up the subject of the troops . . . . He said that he had promised you when he was in Washington that he would take the matter up with President Odría . . . . This he has done and he therefore considered that his promise to you had been fulfilled. He went on to say that Odría continued to feel that he (Odría) could not order Peruvian soldiers to serve outside of the country without the approval of Congress." (Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26)

Mr. Miller also inquired about the pending petroleum legislation, pointing up his remarks about the benefits to Peru of acceptable legislation by referring to the tremendous advantages Venezuela has obtained through its oil resources and their exploitation. Admiral Saldías expressed the opinion the proposed legislation would pass both the Chamber and the Senate during the present special session in spite of the large number of Deputies who are scheduled to speak on the subject. The Admiral felt many Deputies were trying to gain popularity by nationalistic remarks but believed the people would soon tire of the subject with a resultant rapid close to the debate and approval of the legislation. Saldías said President Odria inquired daily about the legislative debate and had many private conversations daily with interested individuals. The Minister of Public Works [8] is keeping a daily voting and speech record on the many Deputies, a record which Admiral Saldías implied would have an effect on the course of the debate and voting. Referring to "El Comercio's" strongly nationalistic editorial on the subject, Saldías said he had been unable prior to his departure to talk with Pedro Beltran and was not certain what his motivation was. However, the Admiral said "El Comercio" "no pesa ya" and that its nationalistic editorials were not important or influential.[9]

[8] Carlos Salazar Southwell.

[9] In telegram 307, from Lima, dated December 17, 1951, not printed, the Embassy notified the Department of State that the petroleum bill under consideration in the Chamber of Deputies was approved on December 15 (823.2553/12–1751); thereupon it went to the Peruvian Senate.

723.5–MSP/12–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert J. Dorr of the Office of South American Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Military Grant Aid Program [1]

Participants: Sr. Germán Aramburú, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Peru
OSA—Mr. Bernbaum
OSA—Mr. Dorr

At the request of Mr. Bernbaum, Minister Aramburú called this morning and was advised confidentially that Peru had been designated

[1] In telegram 314, from Lima, December 19, 1951, not printed, Ambassador Tittmann informed the Department of State that President Odría had orally approved the initiation of conversations looking toward the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement (723.5–MSP/12–1951); a confirmatory note from the Peruvian Government, dated December 19, not printed, was subsequently received by the Embassy (723.5–MSP/12–2251). The negotiations were scheduled to begin on January 7, 1952.

as one of the countries to obtain military grant aid under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Mr. Bernbaum stated that our Embassy in Lima had been instructed to inquire of the Peruvian Government whether it would be interested in receiving military grant aid and willing to enter preliminary discussions towards that end. Mr. Bernbaum pointed out that while this matter would be handled through our Embassy in Lima, the Department wished to keep the Peruvian Embassy here informed of this matter. Stress was also made of the fact that the negotiations and the designation of countries was a secret matter until such time as military representatives might be sent to participating countries and some joint announcement of their activities is made.

Minister Aramburú expressed his thanks for the information given him and said that it would be brought to the attention of Ambassador Berckemeyer.

723.5621/12-2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Duncan A. D. Mackay of the Office of Regional American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1951.

Subject: Peruvian Government Request for Cruiser

Participants: Señor don Germán Aramburú, Minister Counselor of the Peruvian Embassy
AR—Mr. Mackay

Mr. Aramburú called this afternoon to inquire whether we had received any information from the Department of Defense regarding any change in the status of the Peruvian Government's request for a heavy or light cruiser. He stated that he understood that the Navy was disposed to make "certain arrangements" in order to make such a cruiser available for transfer to the Peruvian Government, but were awaiting the favorable recommendation of the State Department. Mr. Aramburú inquired specifically whether there was any possibility that such a recommendation might be forthcoming.

I informed Mr. Aramburú that we had in the last few days received word from the Department of Defense that there was at present no change in the status of availability of a heavy or light cruiser for the Peruvian Government, and that we were prepared to make this reply in further response to the Peruvian note of November 14, 1951.[1] As for any recommendation, I informed Mr. Aramburú that none had been asked or appeared to be called for, in view of the absence of anything concrete at this time on which to make a recommendation. Mr. Aramburú stated that if this was to be the nature of the Department's reply,

[1] Not printed.

he would like to consult first with Ambassador Berckemeyer, in order to see whether he would prefer not to receive a reply to the note at this time. Mr. Aramburú stated that he would call back later on the result of his conversation with the Ambassador.

Mr. Aramburú then inquired whether, in the forthcoming bilateral military discussions on the military grant aid program it would be appropriate for Peru to raise the question of their desire to obtain a cruiser and the possibility that part of the amount intended for Peru under the Mutual Security Act could be applied for this purpose. I informed Mr. Aramburú that while the Peruvian negotiators might, of course, raise any subject they wished, it was my understanding that the limited amounts of equipment which would be furnished under this program would be to enable a recipient country to undertake an agreed task in hemisphere defense; and that any additional equipment which might be needed for other defense requirements or its own internal security would continue to be furnished that country on a reimbursable basis. Mr. Aramburú stated that he understood this distinction, but found it difficult to make in the case of large naval units, such as a cruiser, which conceivably could be used both in the general defense of the hemisphere as well as in the defense of the coastal areas of Peru.

URUGUAY

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND URUGUAY[1]

Editorial Note

On March 8, 1951, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized two credits totaling $2,859,540 in favor of the Republic of Uruguay to assist in the purchase of 26 Diesel electric locomotives and spare parts by the Ferrocarril Central del Uruguay. For additional information, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1951* (Washington, 1951), pages 15, 40.

[1] For previous documentation concerning United States relations with Uruguay, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1008 ff.

Editorial Note

By an exchange of notes dated March 14, 1951, the United States and Uruguay concluded at Montevideo a General Point IV Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which entered into force on the same date for those provisions not requiring legislative approval. The notes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 875, from Montevideo, March 21, 1951, not printed (833.20/3–2151). For a press release dated March 14 concerning the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1951, pages 501–502.

795B.5/4–751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John K. Havemeyer of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1951.

Subject: Request for Uruguayan Troops for UN Action in Korea [1]

Participants: Foreign Minister of Uruguay Alberto Dominguez Cámpora
Ambassador of Uruguay José A. Mora
Admiral Alfredo Aguiar Carrasco, Uruguayan Navy Chief of Staff
General Carlos Iríbar, Uruguayan Army Chief of Staff
Captain Eduardo Beraldo, NA, Uruguayan Embassy
Assistant Secretary Miller [2]
Major General R. L. Walsh [3]
Brig. General E. L. Sibert [4]
Ivan White [5]
John K. Havemeyer

Mr. Miller said that he wished to reopen the conversation [6] he had had in Montevideo with respect to Uruguay sending troops to assist in the UN action in Korea. He stated that he recognized that Uruguay had political opposition toward carrying out such action and likewise that the United States has the same problem.

At present the U.S. could only offer assistance to Uruguay under the following two arrangements:

One would assist Uruguay in purchasing military equipment. The other would permit the Uruguayans to obtain arms and equipment for the troops that Uruguay could not supply itself, including transportation, food and quarters in Korea, and hospital facilities, provided there was an agreement reached to reimburse the U.S. at a future date.

Mr. Miller said that the U.S. troops have been in Korea now for nine months, and we are strongly desirous of rotating the troops in Korea in order that some of those now fighting with the UN could be supplanted by fresh troops.

Foreign Minister Dominguez Cámpora replied that as Mr. Miller knew he strongly desired to furnish Uruguayan troops for the UN in Korea and that there were political obstacles in Uruguay which had prevented Uruguay from sending troops up until this time. Mr.

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[1] For additional documentation concerning United States efforts to secure from Latin American governments offers of troop participation in Korea, see pp. 985 ff.
[2] Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
[3] Robert L. Walsh, Chairman, Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission.
[4] Edwin L. Sibert, Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board.
[5] Ivan B. White, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs.
[6] No memorandum of this conversation was found in the Department of State files.

Dominguez Cámpora is scheduled to leave Washington at 11 a.m., April 11, and that he hopes he might have an answer from his Government prior to that time. He further indicated that he would continue to press his Government to take action with respect to sending troops to Korea. Such action, however, must be cleared through the Uruguayan Congress, and he hoped that action could be taken in the very near future.

795B.5/4–1251

Memorandum by the Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board (Sibert) to the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (White)

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1951.

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between General Carlos Iríbar Inspector General of the Uruguayan Army; Rear Admiral Alfredo Aguiar, Inspector General of the Uruguayan Navy, and Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board.

In compliance with oral instructions from General Bolté [1] I arranged for an informal interview between the Inspectors General of the Uruguayan armed forces and myself, on 10 April 1951, at 2600 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. I opened the conversation by outlining to General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar the legal position of the United States with regard to the furnishing of arms and military equipment to a foreign country. I also explained to them the relative priority enjoyed by Latin American countries in the present world situation. I told these gentlemen of our desire to have their country participate with the other United Nations forces in the present action in Korea, and suggested that a regimental combat team would be an appropriate size unit.

I also made clear to the Uruguayan representatives what the Department of Defense was prepared to do in the way of assistance, in case a unit were offered. I told them that we were prepared to complete the equipment of the unit in question, assist in its training, transport it to the theater of operations, supply and maintain it there, and return it to its home land upon the cessation of hostilities. General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar both stated that they were entirely in accord with the United States point of view and would do everything possible to produce an offer from their country for an RCT for service in Korea. They said that the principal obstacles were in the legislature, in public opinion, and, to a lesser extent, in the opinion of the armed

[1] Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army, and Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board.

forces. They outlined the general situation in Uruguay as set forth below.

The Uruguayan representatives pointed out that the armed forces of their country have no direct contact with the administrative and legislative branches of their Government, and do not have channels for affecting public opinion in Uruguay. The point was made that connection between the armed forces and the legislative branch, for example, was much more tenuous than in the United States where Congressional committees may call on any military leader. Most of the difficulty in Uruguay with respect to gaining support for the sending of an expeditionary force outside the country rests on the fact that this cannot be done without legislative approval. While the general climate of public opinion in Uruguay is definitely pro-United Nations and pro-United States, the internal political situation is such that it is difficult to give expression to this sentiment. There are two political parties in Uruguay, the Colorados and the Blancos. The differences between these parties are so slight as to be almost unnoticeable, except in the field of political competition. The Colorados have been in power, by a not too large majority, for 85 years. As a political move, and solely as such, the Blancos have appealed for the support of Peronista elements.[2] Since, vis-à-vis the international situation, the Peron Government of Argentina has adopted a "third position,"[3] the Blanco party, chiefly through the agency of only three or four leaders, finds itself formally committed to the "third position". This is less a sincere belief of the party membership than a political expedient. To state the matter in a different way, this attitude of the Blancos is more a result of politics than a motivation of politics. Indeed, the Uruguayan representatives said, if the position of the parties were reversed, it is likely that the same situation would obtain, but in reverse Uruguay has almost no problem of communism. Indeed the problem might be simplified if there were a real communist threat, since the country would be in large part opposed. As it stands now, however, the situation is one of political commitments, in a way that might be easily compared with the Republican-Democratic competition in the United States.

The Uruguayan representatives made it clear that while there was no question of armed intervention in Uruguay by Argentina, there was a very serious and troublesome economic or commercial connection—one that placed great difficulties in the way of Uruguay's operating freely in accordance with its real beliefs. Emphasizing that Uruguay had not come to the Meeting of Consultation[4] to ask for dollars, and did not wish to do so, the Uruguayan representatives

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[2] Reference is to the followers of Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.

[3] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1079 ff.

[4] Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, which met at Washington, March 26–April 7, 1951. Documentation on the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.

made the following explanation: Argentina and Uruguay have similar products, e. g., beef, grain, leather, etc. Since the Argentine production greatly outstrips the Uruguayan, it becomes obvious that the prices for these products are set by the Argentines. The result is that Uruguay finds itself "tied to the Argentine chariot" in the commercial field. The result is a constant, unwilling, dependence of Uruguay on Argentina, and a constant struggle to free itself from this situation.

It was also pointed out that Uruguay has always taken a pro-democratic and pro-cooperation stand in inter-American conferences, and Uruguayan leaders keenly feel the inconsistency in their not cooperating by sending forces outside the Hemisphere to resist aggression. Indeed, many urge the necessity of so doing, as a moral and practical commitment. Uruguay, especially the large segment of thought represented by General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar, clearly understands and sympathizes with the position of the United States. They interpret this to be a need for other democratic countries, and particularly those of Latin America, to support the United States in deed as well as in words. They understand how important this moral and practical support is to the United States in its struggle with Russia.

In summary, General Iríbar said that Uruguayan leaders and public opinion favor strong and practical support of the United States in the terms discussed above, but that the political situation as it is, and the economic situation, with its implications for the political situation, put very definite obstacles in the way. Concerning the provision of an RCT for Korea, General Iríbar stated that his position would be strengthened were we to offer equipment for a unit larger than the one to be provided, in order that a majority of this equipment could be devoted to national defense purposes. He made a suggestion very similar to the one made by General Morla [5] of Peru that if we were to supply arms, less critical items, for a division, the first RTC [*RCT*] of this division might possibly be offered for service abroad. He stated emphatically that this was an exploratory suggestion, and one with no official standing whatsoever, but that those terms might strengthen his position in urging the contribution in question, upon his return home.

With respect to the personal opinions of the Uruguayan participants in the conversation, it was stated that the Uruguayan Government favored sending an expeditionary force to Korea, but that the legislative majority was small enough that it would be too dangerous, for political reasons, to make this move.

In strictest confidence, General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar stated that they personally, as Chiefs of the armed forces, had sent a joint memorandum to the proper governmental authorities urging the moral necessity of Uruguay's contributing to the defense of democracy and

[5] Manuel Morla Concha, Chief of the General Staff of the Peruvian Army.

pointing out that if Uruguay, in the background of its stand on inter-American cooperation, could not, in the moment of danger, make a practical contribution, it could not in the future count on reciprocal action by free American countries in case of Uruguay's need. The officers also said that they had in mind to bring the full story of their visit to the United States, and of the present conversation to an Uruguayan senator, an ex-Minister of Defense. Indeed, Admiral Aguiar had already sent an appropriate letter. The purpose would be to urge this legislator to do everything possible to affect public opinion. It was also pointed out that one desirable, though obviously rather impossible, action would be to eliminate from the press the unfavorable stories originating in the United States—stories which gave the Uruguayan public a wrong impression of the climate of opinion in the United States. The problem in this respect obviously lies in the tendency of newspaper reporting to select the most sensational material. The Uruguayan representatives estimate that 80 percent of the press in Uruguay is favorable to the United States, where only some 20 percent is responsive to Russian propaganda.

The Uruguayan representatives stated that, in spite of the pessimistic tone of all the above, which they felt obliged to state honestly, they personally were optimistic as to the outcome of the situation. In addition, they stated they both were returning home with a much better and clearer impression of the United States, of why the latter has a moral need for practical support in the present situation, and of the firm determination of the United States to defend itself and other democratic countries.

With respect to the means of effecting what is wished by the United States, the Uruguayan representatives referred to the manner in which public opinion was swayed in the last war. This was accomplished chiefly through the Embassies of the free countries. It was suggested that the possible manner of swaying public opinion in the present case would be through the same channels, for example, the present Ambassador of the United States,[6] they said, is well thought of in Uruguay, and, more to the point, has very good contacts with elements in the Blanco party. If the Department of State of the United States would initiate a carefully planned campaign to sway Uruguayan public opinion through its Embassy, the prognosis would be very favorable.

In the economic and commercial aspect, Uruguay did not ask for dollars or "charity". However, if in some way the United States could help Uruguay to free itself from its commercial dependence and almost automatic link with the Argentine economy, it would greatly strengthen Uruguay's determination, and more important, enable it to act in accordance with its real ideals. General Iríbar used the phrase: "If there were some way to help us get out of this mud hole".

[6] Christian M. Ravndal.

At the conclusion of the discussion, it was agreed that if the various efforts to obtain approval in Uruguay for the sending of an expeditionary force should bear fruit, the official procedure should be as follows: To request, through diplomatic channels, equipment of such and such a type and such and such quantity, to be used in connection with an RCT for service in Korea.[7]

EDWIN L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, USA

[7] In telegram 115, from Montevideo, dated September 19, 1951, Ambassador Ravndal reported that the Uruguayan Cabinet "unanimously approved offering two destroyer escorts about to be purchased" from the United States for service in Korea, and also "unanimously approved organizing, equipping, training regimental combat team [of] ground troops for UN service". As of October 17, 1952, however, Uruguay made no formal offers of military or naval assistance to the United Nations Command for Korea; for further information, see United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952* (New York, 1953), pp. 214–215.

433.116/7–1751 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Uruguay

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 1, 1951.

A–18. A proposal to establish a temporary surcharge of pesos 0.55 per dollar on the sale of foreign exchange for automobile imports on a quota-free basis during a limited period was submitted to the IMF by Uruguay as reported in your telegram no. 29 of July 17.[1] Uruguay stated that the proposal was not connected with the country's balance of payments, which is favorable, but resulted from disequilibrium between receipts and sales of exchange at a particular level in the multiple rate structure. The Bank of the Republic has an excess of exchange from exports at the rate of pesos 2.35 per dollar and desired to dispose of part of it by sales for imports at the 1.90 rate but to offset the loss by the profit from sales of exchange at pesos 3.00 per dollar for automobile imports.

The Fund did not favor establishment of an additional exchange rate merely for the purpose of earning a profit in one segment of the multiple rate system, especially when the Uruguayan payments position is favorable. The Executive Board of the IMF, in a meeting on July 27, took the following action in which the proposal was not approved:

"The Fund views with satisfaction the general relaxation of import restrictions that the Uruguayan authorities have undertaken since mid-1950. The present proposal contemplates extending this relaxation temporarily to automobile imports, and the Fund does not wish to discourage a move in this direction. The Fund also appreciates the effort of the Uruguayan authorities to explain fully and precisely the reason for the proposed changes in the exchange system. However, in

[1] Not printed.

view of the greatly improved balance of payments position of Uruguay the Fund does not consider it appropriate to approve, even temporarily, the proposed increase in the number of rates in the Uruguayan multiple rate system or the proposed widening of the spread between the highest and lowest rates. The Fund considers it necessary to continue consultation looking toward the simplification and, ultimately, the unification of exchange rates."

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The United States Congress authorized the transfer of two destroyer escorts to Uruguay under Public Law 146, approved September 15, 1951; for text, see 65 Stat. 322. The sale of the ships was effected on November 15. Pertinent documents are in Department of State decimal file 733.5–MAP.

733.58/9–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Uruguay (Ravndal) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL MONTEVIDEO, September 19, 1951—5 p. m.

113. Depgam 9, July 14.[1] Emb considerably perturbed by continual delay concluding Air Force Mission contract which has been pending since early 1947. For most part delay has been caused by slowness Urug admin procedures and polit considerations. Urug Congressional approval obtained Oct 6, 1950 and Urug Emb Wash finally instructed July 6, 1951 negot contract. Almost three months have since expired and we unaware causes present delay. However, wish point out that initially US discreetly urged Urug request mission and since June 1947 have pressed Urug for prompt approval. Consequently any reluctance at this time on our part conclude mission contract or deviate from original offer could adversely affect our relations with Urug. We are continually urging Urug lend more effective aid UN forces Korea, ratify FCED Treaty,[2] Bogota Charter,[3] etc. They naturally question

[1] Not printed.

[2] The United States and Uruguay had signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Economic Development (FCED) on November 23, 1949; the United States Senate consented to ratification on August 9, 1950, but the Uruguayan Parliament had not approved the treaty. For further information, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. II, p. 794.

[3] Reference to the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá, April 30, 1948, which entered into force for the United States, December 13, 1951; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2361, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 2 (pt. 2), p. 2394. Uruguay did not ratify the Charter until August 17, 1955.

delay our part in matter we have constantly urged as vital our mutual interests hemispheric defense.[4]

RAVNDAL

[4] On December 4, 1951, the United States and Uruguay signed at Washington an agreement providing for the establishment of a United States Air Force Advisory Mission in Uruguay; the agreement entered into force on the same date. For text, see TIAS No. 2369, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 2517.

733.5/11-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs (Jamison)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1951.

Participants: Assistant Secretary Miller
Señor Dr. José A. Mora, Ambassador of Uruguay
AR—Mr. Jamison
OSA—Mr. Havemeyer (during part of the conversation)

Ambassador Mora said that he had called in order to see whether Mr. Miller could inform him with regard to the report obtained by him from the Uruguayan Naval Attaché that a high level U.S. military team would go soon to Montevideo to carry on conversations with Uruguayan military authorities. Mr. Miller said that the information regarding the visit of this team was given somewhat prematurely, since further steps in implementation of the military grant assistance program of the Mutual Security Act[2] require determination by the President, which has not yet been made, and that the Government concerned would, of course, be approached in order to determine whether it wished to engage in detailed negotiations in advance of the sending of any such team of military negotiators. Indicating to Ambassador Mora that he wished to speak frankly and on a confidential basis, Mr. Miller outlined certain of the procedures which are to be followed in initiating the program of military assistance, and stated that it is contemplated that the Uruguayan Government will be approached, should this be authorized by the Presidential determination, which should take place within a week or ten days. He pointed out the general concepts guiding the program, including its relationship to Resolution III[3] of the Foreign Ministers Meeting and to the planning

[1] Edward A. Jamison.

[2] For text of the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951, see 65 Stat. 373. For documentation concerning the development of the Mutual Security Program, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.; for documentation on aspects of the Mutual Security Program for Latin America, see pp. 1038 ff.

[3] For text of the resolutions of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation, see Pan American Union, *Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Held in Washington, D.C. March 26–April 7, 1951: Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), pp. 234–268.

of the Inter-American Defense Board. In response to Ambassador Mora's specific question as to whether the "plan" involved in the discussions will be the IADB plan [4] or that referred to in section 401 of the Mutual Security Act, Mr. Miller pointed out that the plan which would be discussed with the Uruguayan authorities, if they agree, is that called for in the Act, although it is entirely consistent with and would be directly related to the IADB plan in any negotiations carried on. Toward the end of the conversation, Ambassador Mora referred to a statement which he said General Goes Monteiro [5] was reported to have made to the effect that the U.S. and Brazil would share jointly the responsibility for defending the eastern coast line of South America, and Mr. Miller relieved any apprehension he may have had that this might be interpreted to mean that Brazil and the U.S. were planning jointly for the protection of an area which was obviously Uruguay's responsibility.

The conversation then turned to other matters, which are being reported on separately.[6]

[4] Apparent reference to the General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent, approved by the IADB, November 15, 1951; for information, see the editorial note, p. 1028.

[5] Pedro Aurelio Goés Monteiro, Chief of the General Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces.

[6] In telegram 345, from Montevideo, dated March 13, 1952, not printed, Ambassador Edward L. Roddan, who was appointed Ambassador to Uruguay, September 19, 1951, and assumed charge of the Embassy on December 27, informed the Secretary of State that the Uruguayan Government on March 7 had authorized the initiation of conversations with United States representatives concerning a bilateral military assistance agreement (720.5–MSP/3–1352). The conversations began on March 31, 1952.

611.33/12–751 : Telegram

The Chargé in Uruguay (Trueblood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET MONTEVIDEO, December 7, 1951—6 p. m.

240. For Asst Secy Miller (distribution as directed by him). As we have reported Dominguez Campora is extremely bitter over way US has in his opinion let him down on UN.[1] Last night at dinner in Emb he was very critical of our procedure in this case and also introduced subject of film festival,[2] stating he understood we will not attend this year. He took me aside to tell me that he had only taken Fon Ministry to advance cooperation with US. Since he now felt he had failed in this purpose he saw no reason to continue to sacrifice his personal interests and stated he would inform Pres today he wished to be relieved of his post.

[1] Reference is to the decision of the United States not to support the candidacy of Enrique C. Armand Ugon of Uruguay for a seat on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the elections held at the United Nations on December 6, 1951.

[2] Reference is to the annual Uruguayan International Film Festival.

Frankly it is hard for us here to understand why it was not possible to explain in advance either to Mora or through Emb here US decision support Rau [3] which might have mollified Dominguez to some extent. We are also in dark on US plans participation film festival but realize of course it is difficult to expect Hollywood to participate again in 52. Dominguez also advised me last night wool exports situation here was extremely critical view lack satisfactory offers from US and elsewhere which might oblige Urug accept good offers which had come in from Soviet and satellites not only for wool but also meat, etc. Said this matter now before cabinet and implied he would not oppose acceptance. Our Agri Att reporting on this Embdesp 514 Dec 7.[4]

These developments are prejudicing our traditionally friendly relations with Urug and I believe we should try to clear up situation before it goes any farther. While Dominguez may be dramatizing situation to some extent (and over nursing personal pique) I still feel we should consider any possible remedial action such as personal message from you to Dominguez or frank talk with Mora or both.

TRUEBLOOD

[3] Sir Benegal N. Rau, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations. Telegram 354, to Paris, December 5, 1951, drafted by Mr. Paul W. Jones, Jr. of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, and repeated as telegram 200 to Montevideo, reads as follows: "Amb Mora called to express strong disappointment re our ICJ position and fact that US had not held prior consultations with LAs before deciding vote for Rau. Dept frankly expressed regret prior consultations did not take place. Re Rau candidacy, Dept stated opinion it was desirable give recognition to belief in Asia and elsewhere that Asia underrepresented on Ct. Mora informed that US wld vote for Rau first ballot and afterwards reexamine position.

"Mora feared reduction LA seats ICJ wld create chain reaction to reduce LA representation other UN bodies. Dept strongly denied this result." (611.33/12–551)

Both Señor Armand Ugon and Sir Benegal were elected to the ICJ on the first ballot.

[4] Not printed.

611.33/12–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Uruguay

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 8, 1951—7 : 40 p. m.

202. From Miller. No distribution. I agree personnally that ICJ voting was badly handled on our part and that Urugs are entitled to explanation. Such explanation was given Mora fully by Hickerson [1] and me Weds [2] and I am prepared, if you see fit, write personal letter to Dominguez repeating explanation in full and expressing regret over any aspects of matter in which we have been at fault.

[1] John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

[2] No memorandum of the conversation between Mr. Miller, Mr. Hickerson, and Ambassador Mora was found in the Department of State files.

However, I have no patience whatever with childish blackmailing tactics of relating Urugs entire coop with us in such matters as wool shipments to USSR and backing Byelorussia for SC to what are essentially details such as our vote on ICJ and participation in film festival. Accordingly any letter I wld write Dominguez wld necessarily have to explain my disappointment that Urug has seen fit threaten US in this manner over such issues. I wld also point out that Soviet threat is aimed just as much at Urugs integrity as against ours and that their policy of opposition to USSR shld be based on this fact and not on any desire to gain approval or favor from us.

If you think letter along this line wld be helpful, which wld of course be written in friendly but firm manner, I will send it next week and you may tell Dominguez immediately that he will be receiving it. However, if in your opinion a letter wld be desirable only if it apologizes for ICJ problem and does not deal with the other much more basic issue which has been raised, I wld not propose to send any letter.[3] [Miller.]

WEBB

[3] In telegram 246, from Montevideo, December 10, 1951, Chargé Trueblood stated in part the following: "Since Mora was given full explanation ICJ voting and since Domínguez Cámpora has now been sharply rebuked by important sectors of local press . . . for tactics at Paris unworthy of Urug tradition believe best do nothing further." (611.33/12–1051)

VENEZUELA

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND VENEZUELA[1]

731.5-MAP/5-151

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Bainbridge C. Davis of the Office of South American Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1951.

Subject: Venezuelan Request for Arms and Equipment

Participants:

Department of Defense
Army Officers:
Col. D. S. Somerville, G-3, Latin American Branch
Col. L. S. Bork, G-4, Foreign Military
Col. J. C. Radnor, G-3
Lt. Col. A. P. Jones, G-3
Lt. Col. W. J. Bryde, G-3
Air Force
Captain L. G. Christerson
Office of Secretary of Defense
Mr. Jerome Wisniewski
American Embassy, Caracas
Mr. Edward J. Sparks, Counselor of Embassy
Department of State
S/ISA—Mr. Paul Smith
AR—Mr. Duncan Mackay
OSA—Mr. Bainbridge C. Davis

The meeting was called by Colonel Somerville in his office at the request of Mr. Davis of the State Department in order to discuss the status of the Venezuelan requests for arms and the relationship of these requests to the recent U.S.-Venezuelan military conversations in Panama[2] and to the proposed call of the Venezuelan Foreign Min-

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1019 ff.
[2] Reference is to the joint United States-Venezuela military planning talks held at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, March 19-23, 1951. For text of the agreement signed at the conclusion of the talks, see p. 1627.

ister [3] on Deputy Secretary for Defense Lovett.[4] Mr. Davis said that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister while in Washington recently had commented to him that there had been a good deal of delay in replying to Venezuela's requests for military equipment. Mr. Davis assumed that this referred primarily to the ten lists submitted with the Venezuelan Embassy's note of December 27, 1950 [5] as a result of the visit to the U.S. last fall of Lt. Col. Moreno [6] (Chief of Staff) and it was suggested that Mr. Lovett should be in a position to tell the Foreign Minister the exact status of the Venezuelan requests and if possible to give him whatever positive reply we could at this time. Mr. Sparks referred to the importance of giving prompt study to the lists of requirements included in the agreement signed at Panama by Lt. Gen. Morris [7] and Lt. Col. Moreno since there appeared to be at least an implied commitment on the part of the U.S. Government. Mr. Sparks suggested that delay on our part might be misinterpreted by the Venezuelans as bad faith in view of the initiative which we took in arranging the Panama conversations.

Colonel Somerville stated that the requirements mentioned in the Panama agreement were not intended to consititute a request by Venezuela until submitted in the usual manner, that they undoubtedly include some if not all of the items requested previously by Venezuela but not yet delivered. The agreement itself is to be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval as a basis for further bilateral surveys and talks.

A general discussion followed in which it was stated that much of the delay in replying to the Venezuelan requests for military equipment was due to the manner in which the Venezuelan Government and particularly the Venezuelan Air Attaché, Lt. Col. Calderón,[8] had presented these requests, involving considerable delay and duplication as well as Colonel Calderón's lack of authority to accept on behalf of his government the Defense Department's offer of materials. Furthermore the fluctuating conditions of price and availability as well as the complete unavailability of the more important type of military equipment requested made it extremely difficult to give prompt and satisfactory replies to the Venezuelan government. Perhaps largely because of these difficulties it appeared that there was a substantial amount of confusion and difference of opinion within the Department of Defense as to which requests were currently outstanding and what their precise status might be.

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[3] Luis Emilio Gómez Ruiz.
[4] Robert A. Lovett.
[5] Not printed.
[6] Félix Román Moreno.
[7] Lt. Gen. William Henry Harrison Morris, Jr., Commander in Chief, Caribbean.
[8] Luis A. Calderón.

Colonel Somerville described the current supply situation including the extreme shortage of supplies for Korea, the difficulty in meeting even a small part of our commitments for NATO and other countries and the fact that Latin America occupies the lowest priority position. He also referred to the present low military productive capacity of the U.S. and the substantial time-lag for reconversion. He emphasized the Top Secret nature of these remarks but the importance of understanding the background for our inability to comply with Venezuela's requests.

Mr. Sparks expressed appreciation for this important background information and made it clear that he had not come to plead for arms for Venezuela at the expense of military operations or high priority needs elsewhere. However, he understood that our Armed Forces looked upon Venezuelan oil as being of high military importance and he asked whether it was feasible to differentiate among the lower priority countries and in that way to give Venezuela an opportunity to secure equipment which would otherwise be unavailable. He said he believed that some of this was implicitly recognized in arranging the recent Panama talks. Colonel Somerville agreed that Venezuela does occupy a special position and said that G–3 would be willing to point this out to JCS. Colonel Bork agreed that upon receipt of such an indication of priority from the JCS, G–4 and the others concerned with meeting Venezuelan requirements would be guided accordingly and would be able to make more equipment available. Colonel Somerville added that it would, of course, be necessary for G–3 to indicate to JCS the "price" (i.e., in danger to our other military needs and objectives) of granting Venezuela high priority.

It was finally agreed that Colonel Bork would prepare a list of the items on which a definite reply could now be made to the Venezuelan government on the Army portion of the ten lists submitted December 27, 1950. It was agreed that an advance copy of this list would be given to Mr. Sparks on May 3 and that another advance copy would be given to Deputy Secretary Lovett to hand to the Foreign Minister if it appeared to the Departments of State and Defense that the items involved were sufficiently significant to the Venezuelan Government to make such a gesture desirable. The original of the reply would subsequently be delivered to Colonel Calderón through the usual military channels. (The purpose of giving this advance copy to the Foreign Minister would be in order to show our good faith to him and at the same time to give him something which he could take back to Caracas with him as one concrete accomplishment during his visit to the U.S. It was explained to those present that there were certain important problems affecting our relations with Venezuela on which the action desired by Venezuela could not be taken at this time and that there

were political reasons why it would be desirable to give the Foreign Minister any good news which we could present to him now.)*

*Mr. Phillip Barringer of Mr. Lovett's office decided later that it would not be desirable for Mr. Lovett to hand copies of these lists to the Foreign Minister and subsequently it also became necessary for Mr. Lovett to cancel his appointment with the Foreign Minister. However, with Mr. Barringer's concurrence, Assistant Secretary of State Miller did hand the lists prepared by Army as well as a list prepared by Air Force (all of which total approximately $504,000 in value) to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister on May 7. As none of these lists were available to the Department until late Friday afternoon of May 4 and only one copy was received, it was necessary to hand this set to the Foreign Minister and an additional copy will be obtained for Mr. Sparks. Due presumably to confusion the original of each list was handed to Colonel Calderón by a representative of Defense Department some hours before the "advance copy" was handed to the Foreign Minister. [Footnote in the source text.]

731.56/7–1351

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 13, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB) has forwarded an Agreement Document resulting from joint planning talks with the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, held at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, 19–23 March 1951 (Appendix "A").

It should be noted in the Agreement Document that the Venezuelan conferees pointed out that Venezuela is able and willing to pay for the equipment and urged that their requirements, submitted through diplomatic channels in late 1950 and early 1951, be made available with the least possible delay. The status of U.S. Government action on such equipment requests as of 25 June 1951 is summarized in Appendix "B". It is considered that further military conversations in Caracas and on-the-ground joint United States-Venezuelan survey of the entire security problem would permit an accurate assessment of the implications of the total Venezuelan requirements.

It should also be noted that Venezuelan conferees emphasized that Venezuela asks that the United States make no decisions or arrangements affecting the defense of Venezuela without previous consultation with that government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Agreement Document is acceptable as a basis for further close collaboration and planning with the Venezuelan military authorities, subject to the following revisions:

a. From subparagraph 2 *c* (1), delete the words "United Nations police action or".

b. In subparagraph 2 *g*, after the first sentence, insert a new sentence reading: "It is understood that where specific types and models of equipment are listed in subparagraphs 2 *g* (1), (2) and (3) below and

in Annexes "A", "B" and "C",[1] they are mentioned as examples only, and that any similar and equivalent types of equipment can be substituted as requirements."

In view of the fact that the Agreement Document recommends, in paragraph 3, that the points of agreement be submitted to the Governments of Venezuela and the United States for approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that, in further discussions with military representatives of Venezuela, CINCARIB inform them that the requirements enumerated under subparagraph 2 *g* of the Document should not be construed as a commitment by the United States Government to furnish such equipment and assistance. The purpose of this reservation is not to question the need for equipment assistance from the United States, but rather to point out the fact that the United States must balance Venezuelan equipment requests against the equipment demands for the Korean War,[2] for the expansion of the United States armed forces, and for other foreign commitments.

This Department is prepared to approve the Agreement Document, when modified as above, and after deletion of reference to the Organization for American States from paragraph 2(*c*), as an acceptable basis for further close collaboration and planning with the Venezuelan military authorities. Before any additional talks are held, however, I would appreciate receiving your advice as to whether recent developments with respect to the availability of Iranian oil[3] should be considered in determining the policy of this Government concerning the provision of military equipment for Venezuela.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Appendix "A"][4]

TOP SECRET 23 MARCH 1951.

RESULTS OF PLANNING TALKS BETWEEN THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF VENEZUELA AND THE UNITED STATES COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CARIBBEAN AT QUARRY HEIGHTS, CANAL ZONE—PERIOD 19–23 MARCH 1951

1. Included herein are the results of planning talks which were held between the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces and the

[1] None printed.

[2] For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to the Korean situation in 1951, see vol. VII, pp. 1 ff.

[3] For documentation relating to this subject, see volume V.

[4] The initial two pages of this enclosure, not printed, comprised a letter from the Commander in Chief, Carribean, to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, dated March 27, 1951, transmitting the enclosure and listing the participants in the planning talks.

United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, during the period 19–23 March 1951.

AGREEMENT

2. *Agreement.* The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, have reached mutual agreement on the following points as developed in their joint planning talks:

a. Purpose. The planning talks include:

(1) All the strategic military aspects of the security of the entire oil industry and other strategic materials in Venezuela, including external aggression and internal sabotage.

(2) The military requirements incidental to the security of the oil and the other strategic materials of Venezuela.

b. Key Terminology. For the purposes of this conference, the following definitions apply:

(1) *Internal Security.* Maintenance of law and order and the control of the civilian population within an area.

(2) *Local Defense.* Protection of a specific, limited area and/or installation(s) from the action of enemy armed forces or subversive elements.

(3) *Over-all Defense.* Protection of a large area, included installations and lines of communication, from action by enemy, or enemy-sponsored, forces. Over-all defense generally requires both offensive and defensive action by the defender.

c. Assumptions. All planning for the security of strategic materials in Venezuela herein included is based upon the following assumptions:

(1) In the event that either Venezuela or the United States is attacked, or participate in United Nations' police action or open warfare, the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance [5] and the Organization of American States will be effective.[6]

(2) The major threats to Venezuela are:

(*a*) Sabotage or subversion conducted by subversive elements.

(*b*) Overt enemy action to include:

1. Submarine attacks on sea lines of communication.
2. Sneak air or guided missile attacks.
3. Raiding action.

[5] For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.

[6] The Secretary of Defense on September 19, in advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he concurred in their view that the "agreement document" was acceptable as a basis for further joint planning with the Venezuelans, directed that subparagraph 2*c* (1) be amended to read as suggested by the Secretary of State in his letter of August 14, printed on p. 1647. Later, to facilitate talks with the Venezuelans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the informal concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, on November 9, deleted the entire subparagraph 2*c* (1) and renumbered the succeeding subparagraphs.

(3) The Venezuelan Government is capable of suppressing any domestic disorder which may arise in Venezuela.
(4) The fundamental problems included herein are applicable to the Venezuelan oil fields and installations, and in general to those related to other strategic materials.
(5) Without the augmentation of the military means now available to Venezuela, the security of the strategic material areas will be limited.

d. Vital Installations and Facilities. The vital installations and facilities related to the strategic materials of Venezuela are:

(1) Oil refineries
(2) Power plants
(3) Pipelines and pumping stations
(4) Loading terminals
(5) Water supply
(6) Maracaibo Bar
(7) Lagunillas Dyke
(8) Communications
(9) Replacement equipment and supplies
(10) Fields and installations related to other strategic materials

e. Security Measures. The implementation of the following measures is essential to the security of the strategic materials of Venezuela and their vital installations and facilities:

(1) Determination and detention of subversive elements.
(2) Efficient guard forces with adequate authority.
(3) Fire fighting teams organized and trained in modern techniques.
(4) Coordination of emergency plans for the combat of fire, disorder, civil disturbances, and sabotage.
(5) Effective communications between strategic areas to prevent *inter alia* the suppression of information relative to serious uprisings or civil disturbances in isolated strategic areas.
(6) An adequate and uniform employee identification system.

f. Defense Responsibilities. The responsibilities for defense and security of the strategic materials of Venezuela and their vital installations and facilities are as indicated below:

(1) *Internal Security.* The Venezuelan military authorities with the cooperation of the respective industries are responsible for the internal security of the areas and vital installations associated with the production of strategic materials.
(2) *Local Defense.* The Venezuelan military authorities are responsible for the local defense of Venezuelan territory to include the oil fields, vital installations, lines of communications, and all other installations, of military significance.
(3) *Over-all Defense.* The United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, will coordinate with the Venezuelan military authorities in the defense of the sea and air lines of communication adjacent to Venezuela to insure a coordinated effort in the protection of these lines of communication.

g. Need for Material Assistance. In accordance with the foregoing, there exists at the present time a requirement for the following equipment and assistance which is in addition to that currently available to Venezuela, in the areas of mutual interest and strategic importance.[7] Field surveys and further studies may indicate a need for additional material assistance. (See Enclosure)*

(1) *Army.* (For detailed discussion see Annex "A" to Enclosure)*

(*a*) Equipment for two Transportation Truck Companies.

(*b*) Additional transportation and communications equipment, gas masks, and riot type chemical ammunition.

(*c*) Equipment for one Engineer Combat Battalion.

(*d*) Prefabricated structures similar to the Quonset hut type (amount and capacity to be subsequently determined).

(*e*) Fire fighting equipment.

(*f*) A limited amount of antiaircraft equipment.

(*g*) Service support in the way of medical, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal equipment to support the program outlined above, and to facilitate the planned reorganization of Venezuela's regular military establishment.

(*h*) Retention of the U.S. Army Mission to Venezuela and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when required.

(2) *Navy.* (For detailed discussion see Annex "B" of enclosure)*

(*a*) Six coastal destroyers of about 320 tons.

(*b*) Six 80′ sub-chasers.

(*c*) Equipping of three corvettes with sonar and radar and installing armament presently available in Venezuela.

(*d*) Equipping of two 83′ patrol boats with engines (total of four engines).

(*e*) Two minesweepers, AMS type.

(*f*) Furnish two 400 HP engines for one cutter (R&D[*I?*]).

(*g*) One salvage tug completely equipped for fighting oil fires (maximum draft 9′).

(*h*) Six launches, Eureka type.

(*i*) Anti-torpedo net for protection of dock areas at Puerto La Cruz and Las Piedras.

(*j*) Effective mining of Boca del Dragon.

(*k*) Radars—Three Air-Search Radars.
Three Surface-Search Radars

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[7] On September 19, the Secretary of Defense concurred in the addition of a new sentence after the first sentence of subparagraph 2*g* as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see paragraph *b.* on p. 1626). To meet Venezuelan objections, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the informal concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, on November 9, amended the added sentence to read:

"It is understood that where specific types and models of equipment are listed in subparagraphs 2*g* (1), (2), and (3) below and in Annexes 'A', 'B', and 'C', they are mentioned as examples only, and that any similar and equivalent types and models of equipment requested by Venezuela can be substituted for other types and models at the discretion of the United States but with prior approval and agreement of Venezuela."

*Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]

(*l*) Sixteen short-range voice radio sets.

(*m*) Equipment for gunnery training center and technical assistance in its installation. (See paragraph VI, Annex "B") †

(*n*) Naval Base, including United States technical assistance in its planning.

(*o*) Solution of the problem of construction of six coastal destroyers and six 80′ sub-chasers shown as items (*a*) and (*b*) above. (See paragraph IV, 15. a., Annex "B") †

(*p*) Overhaul sonar equipment in two 83′ patrol boats.

(*q*) Retention of the U.S. Naval Mission to Venezuela and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when required.

(3) *Air.* (For detailed discussion see Annex "C" of Enclosure) †

(*a*) One Transport Squadron composed of twelve C–47s or Super DC–3s.

(*b*) One Patrol Squadron composed of twelve Neptune P2V aircraft or one squadron of twenty-four aircraft of a type suitable for coastal antisubmarine patrol.

(*c*) Four H–5 helicopters for Search and Rescue.

(*d*) Three squadrons of twenty-four jet interceptors each and three long-range early warning radar sets. AN/CPS–6 complete, or equivalent. With regard to the three interceptor squadrons, two alternatives are presented: [See *Note* following subparagraph *g*.] [8]

1. Two squadrons of U.S. jet interceptors plus seventeen more British Vampires.
2. Three squadrons of U.S. jet interceptors of twenty-four aircraft each.

(*e*) Completion of the military air bases at Palo Negro, El Jaguito, and Maturin; and establishment at the Maracay base (Palo Negro) of depot maintenance facilities and a one-year stock level of supplies and spare parts for aircraft to be provided.

(*f*) Each military base would require two 400-watt transmitters of the T4/FRC type with two Hammerlund Superpro receivers BC 779, four VHF BC 640 transmitters and BC 639 receivers, and one BC 329 transmitter.

(*g*) Retention of the U.S. Air Force Mission to Venezuela and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when required.

Note: Although three jet interceptor squadrons would be required to provide minimum air defense for the strategic areas of Venezuela, the probability of an air attack is considered slight at this time. Accordingly, it is recommended that interceptor aircraft and control radar facilities be allocated in conformance with established U.S. priorities. It is to be noted that should the first alternative be adopted, U.S. assistance in procurement from the British is necessary.

† Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]

[8] Brackets in the source text.

(*h*) *Additional measures.* In addition, the following measures should be mutually undertaken:

(1) Exchange of appropriate classified military intelligence between the Venezuelan military authorities and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean.
(2) Participation as required in a technical advisory capacity of the principal commercial companies engaged in the production of the strategic materials of Venezuela.
(3) Establishment of the means of communications between Venezuelan military authorities and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, in peacetime for utilization in time of emergency.
(4) Subsequent surveys by the Venezuelan Government with the assistance of the United States, if required, in order to assure the close coordination of military plans for security in areas of strategic materials industries.
(5) Designation of non-resident liaison personnel between Venezuelan military authorities and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, if desirable.
(6) Subsequent planning talks to develop close coordination in the military plans for the security of the strategic materials industries is desirable: It is recommended that the place of the next planning talks be Caracas.

(*i*) It is understood that the Venezuelan Government is prepared to reimburse the United States Government for provision by the latter of military assistance and equipment.

RECOMMENDATION

3. *Recommendation.* It is recommended that these points of agreement as set forth by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, be submitted to the Governments of Venezuela and the United States for approval.

W. H. H. MORRIS, JR.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
U.S. Commander in Chief,
Caribbean

FELIX R. MORENO
Tonel.Jefe
del Estado
Mayor General

Appendix "B"

STATUS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION ON VENEZUELAN EQUIPMENT REQUESTS TO DATE

1. Naval gunnery materiel, navigational equipment and certain survey and aiming instruments for 155 mm howitzer battery, approximating $50,000, has already been funded for and is in supply action.

2. Pricing and availability lists for engineer, chemical, signal, medical and quartermaster items for 1–105 mm Howitzer Battalion, 1 Engi-

neer Combat Battalion, 2 Truck Companies and 1 Medical Company, plus accessories and spare parts for F–47D aircraft, approximating $500,000, were presented to the Venezuelan representatives in Washington on 4 May 1951.

3. The Air Force is preparing to deliver approximately $419,000.00 worth of spares for B–25 and F–47D aircraft, including bombsight parts, to the government of Venezuela which has deposited with the Department of State the necessary funds to pay for purchase and delivery of the equipment.

4. Pricing and availability studies are currently under preparation with respect to Venezuelan requests for equipment for 1 Light Tank Battalion; ordnance and heavy items for 1–105 Howitzer Battalion, 1 Engineer Combat Battalion, 2 Truck Companies and 1 Medical Company; and parachute and aerial delivery equipment and supplies. It is estimated that the foregoing equipment will cost approximately $17,000,000. It is expected that these lists will be offered to the Venezuelans within the next 30–90 days.

611.31/8–1051

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State

[Extracts] [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1951.

VENEZUELA

A. OBJECTIVES

US objectives in Latin America are the security of the United States and of this Hemisphere, the maintenance of peace, the encouragement of democratic representative institutions, and positive cooperation in the economic field in order to help in the attainment of the first three objectives. Within this general framework our specific objectives in Venezuela are: to assure an adequate supply of petroleum, especially, in time of war, and to encourage the development of Venezuela's rich iron ore deposits to supplement US reserves; to foster the economic stability and development of Venezuela and the achievement of a more balanced economy; to contribute to better living conditions for the masses as a sound basis for the growth of democracy and the continuance of a system of free enterprise; and to strengthen the friendship of the Venezuelan people and Government toward the United States and to promote their political development along democratic lines, both as an aid in defending the strategic Caribbean–Canal Zone

[1] The portions omitted from this policy statement duplicate material in the policy statement for Venezuela for the previous year, which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, p. 1024.

area and as support for hemispheric cooperation, UN collective security efforts, and other basic US objectives.

B. POLICIES

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In view of the predominant position of petroleum in the economic life of Venezuela and its importance to relations with the US the fluctuating world petroleum supply and demand situation is of considerable importance. By the end of 1949 Venezuela had established a new record in production amounting to nearly 1½ million barrels per day. At the same time as a result of the shift from world shortage to world surplus of petroleum, Venezuela was concerned over the possible effect of several developments. With the rapid growth of low-cost petroleum production and of transportation facilities in the Near East it seems likely that Venezuela will largely lose its European markets unless of course developments in Iran should remove that source of supply from western markets; in any event it will face increasing competition elsewhere. For example, the discovery of oil in western Canada threatens eventually to limit seriously the North American market for Venezuelan oil. While the competitive situation between oil companies operating in various parts of the world is a matter primarily for adjustment by the private interests concerned, nevertheless it is US policy to safeguard the nearby Venezuelan resources as of greater strategic importance to us than those of the Near East. Finally the cut-back of oil production in the US in late 1949 and early 1950, particularly in Texas, led to a strong drive in the US Congress to impose quota restrictions or prohibitive taxes on the importation of oil.

During the latter half of 1950 and the first half of 1951 increased demand for oil has created a new situation. While the long-range threats from Near East and Canadian oil remain, Venezuelan production has risen to a new all-time high of 1,700,000 barrels daily production which is close to the maximum efficient rate of production from present producing wells. The cut-back of US oil production has been largely eliminated. At present the independent oil producers in the US are not pressing for restriction on oil imports but the coal interests which have felt increasing competition from both domestic and foreign oil continue to threaten legislative action against imports particularly of heavy fuel oil.

The US-Venezuelan trade agreement, in effect since 1939,[2] reduced the import tax from 21¢ to 10½¢ per barrel on petroleum imports not in excess of 5 percent of US domestic refinery runs in the preceding

[2] For text of the United States–Venezuela reciprocal trade agreement, signed at Caracas, November 6, 1939, and entered into force, December 14, 1940, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 180, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2375. For documentation relating to the negotiation of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. v, pp. 956 ff.

year. The US-Mexican trade agreement which went into effect in 1943 [3] extended this reduction to oil imports irrespective of quantity and Venezuela benefited by most-favored-nation treatment. Upon termination of the Mexican agreement, effective January 1, 1951, the tariff quota provisions of the Venezuelan agreement again entered into force. It is not anticipated that Venezuelan production or export to the US will be curtailed as a result of this development, although according to industry estimates it will cost the companies and the Venezuelan Government some millions of dollars annually. While the economic effect is not crushing, the psychological and the political aspects coupled with pressure from Venezuela industrialists for higher tariffs on items included in Schedule I of the trade agreement have been substantial. The Venezuelan Government has pressed strongly for renegotiation of the trade agreement or, failing this, its termination. With considerable effort we succeeded in persuading the Venezuelan Government that it would be politically inexpedient to announce trade agreement negotiations involving petroleum at a time when the Congress was considering the extension of the basic trade agreements authority. Immediately upon passage of the 1951 Trade Agreements Act,[4] the Venezuelan Government requested revision of the trade agreement and a joint announcement [5] was made by the two governments to be followed by the issuance of public notice [6] of intention to negotiate.

There is a further aspect of our petroleum policy in Venezuela concerned with the industry's physical security.[7] It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of a continuous supply of Venezuelan petroleum to this country in case of a national emergency. In addition to the problem of nationalization, threats to the availability of Venezuelan oil may come from communist sabotage, domestic riot and disorder, or foreign attack.

The Communist Party in Venezuela, which has been well organized and disciplined in comparison with other Venezuelan parties, has had an estimated membership of approximately 20,000; in the 1947 Congressional elections the party polled about 50,000 votes which represented 4.3% of the total vote. This party, sometimes called the Red Communist Party (because of the color of the card used to aid the

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[3] For text of the United States–Mexico reciprocal trade agreement, signed at Washington, December 23, 1942, and entered into force, January 30, 1943, see EAS No. 311, or 57 Stat. 833. For documentation on the termination of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 939 ff.

[4] For text of the Trade Agreements Extension Act (Public Law 50), approved June 16, 1951, see 65 Stat. 72.

[5] For text of the joint announcement, dated June 18, 1951, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1951, p. 17.

[6] For text of the public notice, dated August 29, 1951, and related press releases of the same date, see *ibid.*, September 10, 1951, pp. 433–436.

[7] Documents pertaining to security measures in the Venezuelan oil fields during 1951 are in Department of State decimal file 831.2553 for that year. For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1019 ff.

illiterate in voting), was declared dissolved by Government decree issued May 13, 1950, charging the party with subversive propaganda, promotion of illegal strikes, sabotage and armed attacks. Its leaders have either left the country, been arrested or gone into hiding. There is a much smaller dissident party, known as PRP [8] or the Black Communists, which has been relatively quiet and continues as a legal party. The power of the Red Communists as an underground organization has not yet had occasion to be tested.

The Communists had some success in organizing the labor movement. It has been estimated that from 10 to 25% of Venezuelan oil workers, some of them very strategically located, have joined Communist trade unions. In May 1950, a strike called primarily for political purposes by the Red Communists and the outlawed Acción Democrática (AD) elements practically paralyzed the Venezuelan oil industry for a few days. In reprisal the Government dissolved the Communist labor federation of oil workers and 20 of its component unions, as well as 24 AD unions all of which participated in this strike. A few Red Communist, AD and Black Communist unions which did not participate were not dissolved. While this strike was directed against the Military Junta rather than the US, it may serve as a reminder that in case of war between the US and the Soviet Union, the Communist leaders will make every effort, as they have publicly proclaimed, to prevent a single drop of oil reaching the United States or its allies. However, if the present Government is in power, it will probably make every effort to prevent sabotage.

After the revolution of November 1948,[9] the Military Junta outlawed the Acción Democrática political party which had supported the previous government,[10] and abolished the labor federations and confederations which had been organized by that party. The individual AD unions were not abolished, but their experienced leadership was largely removed. This gave the Communists an opportunity to infiltrate the non-Communist labor movement, and there were indications that, prior to the Government decree outlawing their party, the Communists somewhat increased their influence over the policies of the former AD petroleum workers' unions. The AD unions have successfully maintained their separate organizational identities, and the degree of Communist infiltration cannot be accurately determined. While the Government has made efforts to create labor unions with leadership acceptable to the Junta, it has been unsuccessful and when it became necessary to negotiate new contracts with the oil companies early in 1951, it was necessary to recognize a Unified Committee of

[8] Partido Revolucionario Proletario.

[9] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. IX, pp. 126 ff.

[10] Reference is to the government of Rómulo Gallegos, who was inaugurated as President of Venezuela in February 1948.

Petroleum Workers composed of labor representatives from the legal unions as well as the Red Communist and the AD elements. These negotiations ultimately broke down and new labor contracts were placed in effect by government decree but the negotiations indicated the necessity for acknowledging the labor union strength of the outlawed political groups.

The possibility of communist sabotage was considered to be sufficiently serious even in 1948 to warrant the sending of a special mission to Venezuela to make a survey of security factors in the petroleum industry in Venezuela and the adjacent Netherlands West Indies. This mission found that, because of the dispersed character of the industry it would be impossible to prevent isolated acts of sabotage, but it did suggest several concrete measures which the companies and the Venezuelan Government could take in order to minimize this danger. The Embassy in Caracas was instructed to consult with representatives of the oil companies and, when desirable, with the Venezuelan authorities in order to put into effect as many as possible of the recommendations. While the oil companies were slow to acknowledge the need for improving the security precautions, considerable progress has been made during the past year and an Industrial Security Council composed of representatives of the oil companies with an Embassy officer as an observer has been meeting at frequent intervals to consider methods of improving security conditions.

Since the control of the Communist union leaders over the rank and file has not been put to any severe test and may in practice be far from complete, we should not limit ourselves to purely precautionary measures. We have been trying through our USIE program to make clear to all Venezuelans that Communist leaders are serving as tools of foreign imperialist power.

The second source of danger to the security of our petroleum supply in Venezuela lies in domestic riot and disorder. Political conditions in Venezuela are not entirely stable and it is possible to envisage a situation where law and order might break down completely and the country be delivered over to anarchy for a brief period of time. In such a case, it is possible that the latent resentment of the ordinary Venezuelans against foreigners could be fanned into flames by agitators, possibly Communist-inspired, and directed into a destructive attack against strategic petroleum installations.

The danger also exists of foreign attack, possibly of the hit and run variety, against petroleum installations. To meet this possibility, as well as to provide for all the strategic military aspects of the security of the oil industry and other strategic materials in Venezuela, conversations were held at Quarry Heights, Panama in March 1951 between the Caribbean Defense Command and the Venezuelan Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and his advisers. A general agreement was

reached regarding the requirements for defense of this area, including Venezuelan needs for additional military equipment. After this draft agreement has been studied by both governments steps will be taken for a further survey of the security requirements. When the results of these conversations as well as of any subsequent survey are approved by the two governments the Venezuelan Armed Forces may be expected to assist in defending sea and air lines of communication adjacent to Venezuela and to be ready to repel raids against strategic installations. Prior to these talks agreement was reached by the Departments of Defense and State that no consideration would be given nor reference made to the possibility of securing Venezuelan permission to land US troops in case of emergency, for the maintenance of order in the oil fields, either in the event of internal disorder or even in the event of war. The Department of Defense in April 1948 recommended that the Department of State explore such a possibility but the Department of State has held it is impossible and will in the foreseeable future continue to be impossible to request such permission from the Venezuelans. The nationalistic sentiments of the Venezuelans would be so outraged by such a suggestion that its rejection would be a foregone conclusion, and, in addition, it would endanger the continuance of the friendly relations now existing. We must at least for the present accept the risk and content ourselves with whatever measures we can take within the framework of our non-intervention policy to increase stability in Venezuela. In the event of war, or immediate threat of war, it is possible, though far from probable, that Venezuela might be persuaded to accept military assistance from the US on Venezuelan territory. Such plans would, however, have to give due consideration to Venezuelan nationalism as was the case with the secret military agreement of 1942.[11]

While access to an adequate supply of petroleum is of outstanding importance to the US in its relations with Venezuela, the existence of tremendous iron ore reserves of unusual purity is potentially of strategic value to the US. The Iron Mines Company of Venezuela, a Bethlehem subsidiary, made its first shipment of ore to the US in March 1951 and expects to increase production to more than 2 million tons annually. The Orinoco Mining Company, a subsidiary of U.S. Steel, has obtained concessions which it hopes to have in production within the next four or five years after dredging the Orinoco River for ocean-going freighters and which would eventually yield 10 million tons annually. Other large US iron mining companies may also seek concessions. This important addition to the dwindling high-grade iron ore reserves in the US and the increase in US private investment in

[11] Reference is to the Staff Agreement drawn up at Caracas, January 15, 1942, not printed. The agreement was modified and put into effect by an exchange of notes at Caracas, January 28, 1943; for text of the notes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. VI, pp. 793–794.

Venezuela (which already approximates $1.5 billion) as well as the introduction of American personnel and methods into another section of Venezuela add to the importance of maintaining friendly relations. The development of this additional source of dollar exchange will likewise contribute to Venezuela's economic stability. It is US policy to encourage Venezuela to accelerate its economic development by maintaining its present policies which have attracted private direct investment from abroad, supplemented in appropriate cases by external public investment in the country. Investment from abroad should be regarded as ancillary to internal investment which should be the principal source of funds for economic development. In the granting of the iron-ore concessions the Venezuelan Government has given further indication of its desire to maintain a favorable climate for private foreign investment and to encourage free enterprise.

General Economic Policy.

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The US made an effort in 1950 to encourage Venezuela to accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [12] and to negotiate their tariff concessions under the terms of that agreement.[13] However, the Venezuelan Government felt that the only item of major importance in its export trade is oil, that the US is its principal customer and that even if it participated in a multilateral agreement its negotiations would be almost wholly bilateral. Therefore Venezuela hopes through revision of the US-Venezuelan trade agreement to obtain in its own right as our principal supplier of oil the concessions which Mexico had obtained from us in 1943. A further deterrent to Venezuelan participation in multilateral negotiations was the difficulty of offering concessions on Venezuelan import tariffs at a time when protectionist sentiment is strong. Therefore, while our basic commercial policy indicates the desirability of encouraging Venezuelan participation in GATT we recognize the practical necessity of dealing bilaterally with Venezuela at this time.

As a means of diversifying the economy of the country and developing additional sources of foreign exchange, as well as for reasons of national pride, the Venezuelan Government has encouraged the expansion of a Venezuelan merchant marine and civil air carriers. It is our policy to regard this development favorably provided the Venezuelan Government interposes no obstacles to free competition by American carriers for this international trade. In mid-1950 the in-

[12] For text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded at Geneva, October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States, January 1, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5–6).

[13] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1019 ff.

creasing amount of cargo carried by the Venezuelan Navigation Company and the Gran Colombian Merchant Fleet [14] and their policy of undercutting Grace Line and other Shipping Conference vessels brought a threat of a rate war. The US used its good offices to bring all of the shipping interests together, and an agreement was reached to permit non-conference shipping lines to compete on fair terms with the conference lines.[15] In December 1950 a circular letter [16] was addressed to Venezuelan importers by the Ministry of Fomento which was obviously intended to influence importers to use national merchant vessels. The US Government pointed out that this appeared to be a means of interfering with free competition and the Venezuelan authorities agreed not to send further communications of this type.

A bilateral Air Transport Agreement was signed by the US and Venezuela in May 1948 but never ratified by the Junta despite repeated US efforts. For approximately a year the Venezuelan Government has adopted measures which are considered to be discriminatory against US carriers. It is our policy to conclude a mutually satisfactory agreement, or failing this to establish conditions of reciprocity which do not presently exist.

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Encouragement of Democracy and Friendship for US.

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In November 1950 the President of the Military Junta, Lieutenant Colonel Delgado Chalbaud, was assassinated. A civilian successor, Dr. German Suarez Flamerich, was chosen as Junta President by the other two Lieutenant Colonels who comprised the Junta and the same group of military leaders who created the Military Junta in November 1948. At the same time the word "military" was dropped from the official title of the Junta. Despite the fact that the three-man Junta acts as a unit in issuing all decrees, it is generally felt that Lieutenant Colonel Pérez Jiménez,[17] Minister of National Defense, is the most powerful member of the Junta.

The Junta's declared intention to return as rapidly as possible to a democratic form of government has been tempered by its desire to maintain order and to prevent, by whatever means, the return to power of Acción Democrática or any group opposed to the present Government. In this connection it should be remembered that throughout Venezuelan history the armed forces have held almost uninterrupted power and they have no intention of again permitting a civilian gov-

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[14] Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana, S.A., a shipping line jointly owned by Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.

[15] For documentation relating to the shipping agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1019 ff.

[16] Not printed.

[17] Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

ernment to gain real control and so end their domination. On April 18, 1951 an electoral statute was promulgated which provides for election of a constituent assembly by a process which will require approximately 14 months. This assembly would decide upon a new constitution and would review the actions of the present government. It is anticipated that from three to six months later there would be an election of a president and a congress as well as municipal officials. Some of the constitutional guarantees have been restored and the elections will be carried out by compulsory voting by all those 18 years of age or over but barring participation by any leaders of Acción Democrática or the outlawed Communist Party. Thus the return toward political democracy is in progress.

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During World War II Venezuela acquired nearly $4 million worth of military equipment under Lend Lease and settlement of this account has practically been completed. Further arms were sold to Venezuela under the Interim Arms Program, but the lack of legislative authority for inaugurating an arms standardization plan and the relatively high cost of American arms were responsible for the fact that Venezuela during the post-war period acquired the greater part of its purchases of arms from European countries, principally Great Britain, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. Present re-armament efforts of European countries are increasingly preventing such sales. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act,[18] Venezuela is able to purchase arms and equipment from the US whenever our own military requirements and our arming of higher priority countries in other parts of the world will permit. Venezuela has indicated a desire to obtain a substantial amount of armament from the US and a portion of the equipment requested is being supplied. While Venezuela has expressed dissatisfaction with the length of time required for processing requests for equipment and our inability to supply certain types of armaments we have endeavored to assure the Venezuelan Government of our desire to meet that country's hemispheric defense requirements as rapidly as possible bearing in mind the higher priority needs created by such situations as the Korean conflict.

It is recognized that some of the Venezuelan requests are in excess of genuine hemispheric defense needs.[19] Accordingly, the US will seek to persuade Venezuela to minimize its military expenditures in time of peace by maintaining only those armed forces necessary to meet its obligations for collective defense. It is emphasized that military cooperation must be held within the limits of Venezuela's economic

[18] For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Public Law 329), approved October 6, 1949, see 63 Stat. 714.

[19] Documentation concerning United States policy with respect to hemisphere defense may be found on pp. 985 ff.

means and no training or equipment will be provided which is likely to be used for aggression or threat of aggression against any other American republic. Recognizing that Venezuela has never engaged in a foreign war and that despite certain minor points of international friction there is no indication of a current threat of aggression, it is nevertheless this Government's policy to discourage any armaments race between Venezuela and any neighboring countries. In matters of inter-American military cooperation for hemispheric defense our policy will continue to be guided by the overall policy set forth in the National Security Council's decision of May 18, 1950 [20] which provided for the creation of a Western Hemisphere Defense Scheme and for the closest coordination between the Departments of Defense and State in the implementation of this program at all stages as well as the timing of the individual steps.

Until such time as Venezuela's defense role has been specifically set forth and agreed upon by both countries, it is our policy to scrutinize with great care all applications for export of armaments to Venezuela and to avoid encouraging any significant increase in Venezuela's military forces and equipment not obviously required for hemispheric defense plans already approved or for commitments to the UN.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

No major friction has existed in recent years in Venezuela's relations with other states, with the exception of the Dominican Republic. This tension arose from the harboring of each other's exiles and reached its peak with a threat of possible hostilities under the Acción Democrática Government. It has nearly disappeared since the November 1948 revolution. Venezuelan resentment toward Cuba for permitting the Inter-American Conference for the Defense of Democracy to meet at Habana in May 1950 and for permitting a Cuban official to publish remarks insulting to the Venezuelan Junta caused a near-rupture in relations in mid-1950; ex-President Betancourt's [21] residence in Habana since August 1950 is another source of irritation. At present, relations with Cuba may be said to be neither strained nor cordial.

The present Venezuelan Government has held some fear of hostile action by a combination of AD exiles and the "Caribbean Legion" [22] possibly operating from Guatemala and conceivably aided by the Communist Party. The principal AD exiles are living in Cuba, Costa Rica, Mexico, and the US and have been active in disseminating propaganda against the government which overthrew them, and it may be assumed

[20] Reference is to the decision of the National Security Council (NSC) to adopt the NSC document entitled "United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration", designated NSC 56/2, and dated May 18, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 628.

[21] Rómulo Betancourt.

[22] A group of political exiles and military men from countries in the Caribbean with the alleged aim of overthrowing certain dictatorial governments in the area.

they are plotting its overthrow. However, the most careful investigations have failed to substantiate rumors that AD was attempting to procure arms for this purpose in the US. Despite frequent reports that the Caribbean Legion is planning armed attempts to overthrow the Venezuelan and other governments, no significant effort along these lines is at all likely. Our general policy in all these cases of friction has been to urge reliance upon established inter-American machinery for maintenance of hemispheric peace and solidarity, to oppose intervention by one state in the domestic affairs of another either directly or by aiding exiled groups and at the same time to make clear that we consider the denial of democratic rights by any country to its citizens inconsistent with the expressed ideals of the American republics.

The Guatemalan Government was very friendly toward the AD administration and has not resumed relations with Venezuela since the 1948 coup. Uruguay is the only other American republic with which the present Venezuelan Government has not yet resumed relations.

Venezuelan relations with Colombia and Ecuador have been traditionally friendly, although in the case of Colombia because of a variety of problems which have arisen in recent months relations are not perhaps as cordial as they normally have been. These three countries which once formed Gran Colombia have stressed their common cultural tradition and in recent years have endeavored to strengthen economic ties through such efforts as the Gran Colombia merchant fleet. Venezuela has been less enthusiastic than Colombia with respect to these efforts, but is a valued partner because of its large supplies of dollar exchange. The Quito Charter signed by Ecuador, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela in August 1948 envisages among other things a Customs and Economic Union. Only Colombia and Ecuador have ratified this Charter and the Venezuelan Foreign Minister has stated that while many useful steps may be taken by the newly organized Provisional Gran Colombia Economic Council, a customs union is not suitable between countries which lack complementary economies. It is our policy to favor developments which strengthen the economy of Venezuela, so long as they are not in conflict with our commercial policies and do not result in unfair discrimination against US enterprise.

Venezuela has maintained basically friendly, although not close, relations with its other large neighbor, Brazil. A recent affinity has developed with Perú as both military juntas came into power by *coups d'état*. In contrast, Venezuela's firm friendship with Haiti dates back to its struggle for independence when Bolívar received aid from Haiti.

Venezuela has, at times, desired the independence of the Netherlands West Indies from European rule but there has been no recent

agitation. In the past Curaçao and Aruba have been a meeting place for Venezuelan exiles plotting their return to power.

Relations with Great Britain, which have been generally friendly, are affected chiefly by the presence of British oil companies (Shell subsidiaries) producing about one-third of Venezuela's oil. Some passing resentment arose in 1950 from a British proposal to restrict imports of dollar oil from Venezuela, although the British foreign exchange situation which gave rise to the proposal improved sufficiently to eliminate the necessity for any restrictions. Venezuelan dissatisfaction with the 1899 award which settled the boundary dispute with British Guiana flared up again in the Venezuelan press at the beginning of 1951. While Venezuela would like a revision of this boundary and has also indicated that it would welcome the independence of all the European colonies in this hemisphere, it is not believed that this dispute will extend beyond the pages of the Venezuelan press. Reference to such issues is apt to be accompanied by expressions of gratitude for our historical role as a defender of Venezuela's sovereignty.

Venezuela maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR and Czechoslovakia, in the former case by Chargés d'Affaires at present. While many who sought to overthrow Dictator Gómez [23] were trained in Communist revolutionary methods, relatively few Venezuelans had, or have, the slightest interest in cooperating with the international objectives of the USSR. However, the principal Communist Party, until outlawed last year, exerted an influence in organized labor and certain other groups, and is continuing to function as an underground movement.

D. EVALUATION

US policies have been successful in encouraging friendly cooperation between the Venezuelan Government and American oil companies and have thus created a favorable atmosphere for the continuance of US private ownership of the oil industry and have prevented any widespread demand for nationalization by the Venezuelan Government. It is especially important at present that this Government continue to use its best efforts to this end. We should also continue to encourage the economic development of Venezuela along present lines as representative of the effective functioning of the free enterprise system. In this connection the success of our technical assistance programs, encouraging economic development and diversification of industry in Venezuela warrants not only their continuance but their expansion along the lines envisaged under the Point IV program.[24] In fact, Venezuela affords an excellent opportunity for the

[23] Juan Vicente Gómez held power in Venezuela from 1908 to 1935.

[24] For documentation relating to organizational and other aspects of the Point Four Program in 1951, see vol. I, pp. 1641 ff.; for documentation concerning the technical assistance policy of the United States toward the other American Republics as a group, see pp. 1038 ff.

effective use of Point IV. While it is certain that any technical assistance which strengthens the economic stability of Venezuela and increases its desire to cooperate with the US is of permanent and real value to our national security, it is important that we not confine our Point IV activities to those fields which make a direct contribution to US security under emergency conditions. We must bear in mind that our concern for the long range economic welfare and development of Venezuela will contribute substantially to the security of the US.

Our efforts to guide the commercial policy of Venezuela along the lines of reduced trade barriers have been successful only to the extent that they have moderated the trend toward protectionism. It now appears that the best interest of both countries will be served by modifying our trade agreement so as to permit Venezuela to effect tariff increases on a limited number of import items covered by the present agreement in exchange for certain compensatory concessions. At the same time Venezuela wishes to obtain in its own right the tariff concession on US imports of oil which was granted to Mexico in our trade agreement with that country. In view of the importance to both countries of avoiding high US tariff barriers against Venezuelan oil this Government must make an effort to work out a mutually acceptable modification of the trade agreement with Venezuela. Efforts should also be continued however to dissuade the Venezuelan Government from imposing high Venezuelan tariffs or restrictive quotas on imports of significance to US exporters.

We were successful, as a result of this Government's efforts in mid-1950, in avoiding a rate-war between Venezuelan and American shipping lines which would have been detrimental to the best commercial relations between the two countries and we have discouraged certain actions by the Venezuelan Government which would have violated the spirit of the agreement between the shipping lines. It is hoped that current efforts to resolve the conflict between US and Venezuelan aviation interests will be equally successful.

It is difficult to evaluate the results of our efforts to encourage restoration of a greater measure of democracy. The slow steps which Venezuela has taken in this direction were undoubtedly due primarily to other factors than the preference for a democratic form of government manifested by the US. Nevertheless, Venezuelans, whether in the Government, among the opposition or among the governed, are not unaware of the preference of the American press and public for civilian rule and democratic processes, and it can be assumed this fact has had some influence on the plans of the ruling clique.

Our efforts to maintain and strengthen Venezuelan friendship at the government and upper-class levels have met with reasonable success. On the other hand much remains to be done, particularly in the direc-

tion of greater appeal to the laboring masses and among the students and writers, especially in view of the appeal of Communist propaganda to these groups.

The US Army, Air and Naval Missions in Venezuela have achieved some success in improving the standards of the Venezuelan Armed Forces. The unavailability or high cost of US arms compared with those of European manufacture have militated against standardization of Venezuelan arms along US lines. Although the urgent requirements of the US and our commitments to higher priority non-hemispheric countries make it impossible to grant all of the arms requests received from Venezuela, even within the limits of those which would serve the hemispheric defense needs of that country, nevertheless Venezuela has recently been receiving a portion of the equipment which it has requested. The fact that the Venezuelan Government has sufficient exchange to meet the dollar cost of this equipment has placed it in a better position than most of the other American republics.

It is understood that the Department of Defense has now, in accordance with the stipulations of NSC 56/2, tentatively formulated a specific role which Venezuela should play in the defense of this hemisphere. This development, as well as the study by the Departments of Defense and State of the results of the bilateral military conversations at Panama, should furnish guidance in meeting Venezuela's requests for arms. The State Department has long felt that export of arms to Venezuela as to the other American republics should be limited to what is strictly essential to the performance by those countries of their role in defending the hemisphere from external aggression, in performing such police functions as are called for by the United Nations and in maintaining their internal security. It has felt that additional arms are an economic burden and a stimulant to competitive arming and therefore detrimental to the achievement of important US objectives.

While the changed situation with respect to the supply and demand for armaments has practically eliminated the likelihood of any effort to stimulate export of US armaments to Venezuela it is still essential that there be a clear understanding of the exact role which Venezeula (as well as the other American republics) is to play in hemispheric defense. Our inability to supply Venezuela with some of the arms useful for hemisphere defense may lead us to encourage Venezuela to substitute other military equipment, but there should be an effort to restrict this equipment to types which are genuinely useful to its role in the Western Hemisphere Defense Scheme. Our military missions and any contact between Venezuelan and US officials should be used to persuade Venezuela of the desirability of fitting its requirements to this mutually agreed upon defense scheme.

731.56/7–1351

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to Mr. Lovett's letter of July 13, 1951 to Secretary Acheson transmitting a copy of an "agreement document" resulting from Joint Planning Talks held at Quarry Heights from March 19 to 23, 1951 between the Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean and the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan armed forces.[1]

The Department of State believes that this document, subject to certain modifications, will provide a useful basis for further conversations between representatives of the Venezuelan and United States armed forces and that it will mark a significant step in the development of the program of inter-American military collaboration set forth in NSC 56/2. The following comments are offered in accordance with the desire of the Department of State to cooperate fully in accomplishing those purposes.

1. Although the modifications to sub-paragraph 2 *c* (1) suggested in your letter are desirable, for complete accuracy this paragraph should read as follows:

> "In the event that either Venezuela or the United States, or any other party to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, is subjected to an armed attack or other form of aggression the provisions of the Treaty will apply."

2. It is noted that the "agreement document" states a Venezuelan requirement for three squadrons of jet interceptors, and related equipment (page 8),[2] with two alternative methods for possible procurement, and that one of these alternatives contemplates U.S. assistance to Venezuela in procurement from British sources ("Note" page 9;[3] also "Note" page 20, annex C[4]). Apart from the question of procurement from NATO sources, which involves procedures not yet worked out, as well as the domestic political implications involved, this would appear to mark a reversal of previous policy regarding standardization on U.S. type equipment by Latin American countries.

3. This Department agrees that the clarification you suggest with respect to the meaning of "a requirement for the following equipment and assistance" (sub-paragraph 2 *g*) is important in order that the Venezuelan Government shall not gain the impression that we are agreeing to supply this equipment regardless of requirements in the United States and other areas. Recent developments in Iran do, however, emphasize the importance of Venezuelan oil, and make desirable a re-examination of the priorities given Venezuela in the allocation of military equipment. The assignment by the Department of Defense of priorities which would permit Venezuela to obtain such military

[1] *Ante*, p. 1627.
[2] Reference is to subparagraph 2 *g* (3) (*d*), p. 1631.
[3] Reference is to the Note following subparagraph 2 *g* (3) (*g*), *ibid.*
[4] Annex C to Mr. Lovett's letter of July 13 is not printed.

equipment more quickly than has heretofore been possible would meet with the approval of this Department.

This Department appreciates the close cooperation accorded by the Department of Defense in regard to the talks held at Quarry Heights, and will follow further developments with interest.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Deputy Under Secretary

611.31/9-2651

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Armour) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)

TOP SECRET

CARACAS, September 6, 1951.

DEAR TOM: As you know, we have all here been concerned over the past months at the delay in making available to the Venezuelan Government military material; some of it, as in the case of spare parts for American planes, has been contracted and already paid for, and even more serious, the long delay in approving and implementing the lists of materials agreed upon during the Panama talks last March. I covered this matter quite fully in two or three letters which I wrote to Ed Miller (dated July 26, 27, and two of July 31).[1] I recently received from Mr. Bernbaum [2] a letter [3] in reply to the above letters giving us some useful information and background on such progress as had been made to date. I think you will agree, however, the situation still remains unsatisfactory, and I do hope that everything possible will be done, both by our Department and the Defense Department, to hasten matters.

The other day I found that Captain James H. Davis, head of our Naval Mission, and Colonel William Greenfield, head of the Air Mission, were flying up to the United States on matters connected with their respective missions, and I decided on the spur of the moment that this was too good an opportunity to miss. I, therefore, wrote a letter to Mr. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense, a copy of which I enclose herewith, asking him to give Captain Davis and Colonel Greenfield an opportunity to present either to him or to other high officers in the Department of Defense an up-to-date report on the situation, in the hope that this might have some effect in bringing home to them the urgency, and even seriousness, of the situation.

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[1] None printed.
[2] Maurice M. Bernbaum, Officer in Charge, North and West Coast Affairs, Office of South American Affairs.
[3] Not printed.

It is true that, as the postscript in my letter to Lovett shows, some of the spare parts for the planes have now been handed over to the Venezuelan authorities in Washington for shipment here, but this is only a small fraction of the material involved, and does not, of course, touch the more important material dealt with in the Panama agreement.

In taking this action, I hope that you and Ed Miller and others in the Department will not feel that I have bypassed you or thrown any monkey wrench into the machinery, which is, of course, the last thing I would wish to do, or had any intention of doing. After all, what we are after, and I feel sure I may include you in this, is to convince the Venezuelan Government, particularly the higher Military authorities here, including Colonel Perez Jiménez and Colonel Félix Moreno, that we mean business, and that we are determined to carry out our promise to make available the material necessary to protect the flow of strategic materials, particularly from the oil fields.

When I told the Foreign Minister the other evening that I had entrusted this mission to Captain Davis and Colonel Greenfield, he seemed greatly relieved and added significantly: "I suppose there is no need to tell you what an unfortunate effect this delay in making this material available has had and is having on other phases of the work here." He undoubtedly had in mind the Bilateral Aviation Agreement, the Orinoco Mining problem, the freight rate question, and other matters requiring final approval of the Military Junta.

In other words, if the question of materials can be satisfactorily disposed of, or put on the road to settlement, this will create an "ambiente" in higher military circles that will facilitate our negotiations in these other apparently extraneous matters.

How much the Junta, and particularly Colonel Perez Jiménez, have this on their mind was brought home to me when Gómez Ruiz told me that the Junta had wished to have incorporated in the Venezuelan Government's reply to the UN Resolution "Uniting for Peace"[4] a statement to the effect that unfortunately the military material required to enable Venezuela to carry out the obligations they were undertaking in connection with this resolution had not to date been forthcoming, owing to failure of the United States Government to supply it. He very properly insisted that any such statement could not and should not be incorporated in a reply to an international organization, but was a matter to be taken up with our Government on a bilateral basis, which he then proceeded to do.

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[4] Reference is to Resolution No. 377 (V) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 3, 1950. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 10–12.

As to the Venezuelan Government's decision to go elsewhere for some of their material, I am enclosing a further memorandum prepared by the Naval Attaché, under date of August 24,[5] last, giving the latest on the purchase of three destroyers in England and negotiations now under way for construction of certain smaller craft in Italy. As I said in my letter to Mr. Lovett, it does look as though our standardization program for South America, or at any rate in so far as it applied to Venezuela, is rapidly evaporating into thin air.

Sincerely yours, NORMAN

[Enclosure]

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Armour) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET CARACAS, August 31, 1951.

DEAR BOB: I am taking advantage of the departure for Washington of Captain James H. Davis, head of our Naval Mission, and Colonel William D. Greenfield, head of the Air Mission, to give them this letter to you, in the hope that you may be able to spare them a few minutes of your busy time in order to explain a matter which has been giving all of us here considerable concern.

It has to do with the question of military material and equipment and the growing annoyance, fast approaching resentment, on the part of the Venezuelan military authorities over our failure to date to help them in meeting their requirements. Worse than that, we have thus far been unable to get any word from Washington on the supplies contracted and paid for months ago. This has to do with spare parts for the 12 F–47 planes we sold them some years ago which are now all grounded. There is also involved spare parts for some of our B–25s amounting to $259,000. Full payment, totalling about $400,000 was made by the Venezuelan Air Attaché, through the State Department I believe, over four months ago, and to date not only has nothing arrived, but, as I say, we are still without word from Washington where it is or when it may be expected.

In the meantime, quite naturally, since we appear to be unable to help them, the Venezuelans are going elsewhere to get their material and our standardization program, at least so far as Venezuela is concerned, appears rapidly to be fading into thin air. A year ago, the Venezuelans bought seven Vampire jet planes. Recently they were able to get the British to reverse their decision not to give them any more, and we have now been informed a contract is soon to be signed with the local De Havilland representative for at least five more Vampires, and this on a cash basis.

[5] Not printed.

As regards the Navy, things are just as bad or worse. Unable to interest our Government in helping them with ships and equipment, they have contracted for three destroyers to be built in England, the keels of two having been laid with appropriate ceremonies a month ago. They are also negotiating with Italy for certain types of smaller craft and equipment. As our Naval Attaché has reported, once the British ships are delivered, the Venezuelans may find it necessary for practical reasons to replace our Naval Mission by a British Mission. Furthermore, if they are forced to replace American planes by British,[6] a British Air Mission later might well seem indicated.

Finally, there is the question of the implementation of the agreement worked out at Panama. I have seen your correspondence with the State Department on this, and note that both Departments are in general agreement on the lists of equipment required by Venezuela, but that the next step planned appears to be another conference down here. Frankly, what the Venezuelans want is action not words, and I strongly recommend that, if it is decided to send a group down for further talks, those chosen be given a list of restricted materials we are prepared to supply now. After all, as the Foreign Minister said to me recently: "You proposed the Panama Conference, not ourselves"; which is entirely correct. Also it is not as if they were asking to be given this equipment; they are prepared to pay for everything they get: In fact, they insisted on including this stipulation in the Panama agreement.

Frankly, I am puzzled by our whole attitude toward Venezuela. We get worked up into a lather over the Iranian oil situation—quite naturally, I admit—but when you consider that Venezuela is the second largest oil producer in the world;—their production is now over 1,700,000 barrels of crude a day,—and the greatest oil exporter in the world; when you consider that their refining capacity taken in conjunction with Curacao and Aruba, which refine only Venezuelan oil, is now close to 1,000,000 barrels a day—about double of Abadan—it seems incredible to me why our people seem disposed to treat Venezuela in what is, in effect, a pretty cavalier manner.

With this tremendous flow of oil in which we are so vitally interested, and which must be protected against possible sabotage or attack in case of war, with the great iron deposits now soon to start moving to their destinations in the United States, surely it would seem that Venezuela merits a place on the priority list ahead of virtually any Latin American country, and, I would think, should not even follow Spain in order of importance. I am, therefore, most anxious that Captain Davis and Colonel Greenfield, while in Washington, should have an opportunity to discuss this matter of materials at a high

[6] For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the sale of jet aircraft to Venezuela, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 1019 ff.

level, and hope very much that you will be able to arrange this. Of course, if you could see them yourself, even for a few minutes, I know they would appreciate it, and it would furthermore enable them to bring you my greetings.

Sincerely yours, NORMAN ARMOUR

P.S. Since the above was written, Colonel Greenfield, head of our Air Mission, tells me he has just been informed by Colonel Felix Moreno, Chief of Staff, that out of the total of $419,000 in spare parts paid for, $259,000 worth in spare parts for the B–25s has now been turned over to the Venezuelan Military Attaché in Washington for shipment here (This was under Venezuelan Contract 8/4). They are still, however, without word of the replacements for the F–47s, totalling $157,000.

Caracas Embassy Files, Lot 64 F 14, "400–Defense Talks US & Ven, 1950–1952" [1]

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Armour)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951.

DEAR NORMAN: The Department of Defense is cognizant of the problems stated in your letter of 31 August 1951. The Departments of State and Defense have been endeavoring to clarify the issues and to make available for purchase by the Government of Venezuela, with earliest possible delivery, the military materiel essential to the security of that country. Your frank statement of the situation will certainly be helpful to me in the further development of military assistance to Venezuela.

The Republic of Venezuela has submitted a number of requests for procurement of various types of Army, Navy and Air Force equipment, under the reimbursable aid provisions of Section 408(*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. The status of these requests are outlined for you in the inclosure.[2]

Information concerning most of the materiel requested has been made available to the Venezuelan Government in various pricing and availability studies. The total value of the requests covered by these studies is approximately $10 million, including accessorial charges. Firm orders have been received from the Venezuelan Government for less than $0.5 million worth of materiel. The availability of the items concerned in these studies varies from ninety days after date of deposit of funds through Fiscal Year 1953.

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[1] Top secret central files of the Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, for the period 1948–1956, which are part of Federal Records Center Accession 68 A 5159.

[2] Not printed.

Contracts for spare parts for the F–47D and B–25 aircraft and the bomb-sight servicing equipment were signed 16–24 May 1951 by Colonel Calderon. Shipments began 25 August 1951. Consistent flow should follow with volume dependent upon status of spare parts, i.e., whether from stock or procurement. Original time estimates were for 90–120 days for stock items and longer for procurement.

Information in my office indicates that the three destroyers to be built in England are the result of negotiations begun almost two years ago. Full catalog price of new U.S. destroyer-type vessels varied at that time from $20,500,000 each for new types to $7,500,000 for the DE type built during the last war. The destroyers being built in Britain are estimated to be costing $5 million each. It would appear, therefore, that the matter of price was the controlling consideration in this case.

The agreement reached in conference at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone during the period 19–23 March 1951, with certain changes made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the basis for further close collaboration and planning with the Venezuelan military authorities. The requirements enumerated therein are not to be construed as a commitment by the United States Government to furnish such equipment and assistance. The purpose of this reservation does not question the need for equipment assistance from the United States, but rather points out the fact that the United States must balance Venezuelan equipment requests against the equipment demands for U.N. forces in Korea, the expansion of the United States Armed Forces, and other foreign commitments. It is considered that further military conversations in Caracas and an on-the-spot joint United States-Venezuelan survey of the entire security problem may be needed to permit an accurate assessment of the implications of the total Venezuelan requirement.

The following brief résumé shows the status of requests for the materiel indicated in the Panama Agreement Document under "Assistance Required from the U.S.":

(1) *Army*—

No formal requests for pricing and availability have been received from the Venezuelan Government for the additional transportation and communication equipment, gas masks and riot-type chemical ammunition; prefabricated structures similar to quonset huts, firefighting equipment and anti-aircraft equipment. Formal requests for pricing and availability have been received as indicated in the status report for Cases 8, 9 and 11.

(2) *Navy*—

The assistance required is couched in the broadest of terms. No requests have been received from the Venezuelan Government for any of the materiel listed. Specifications and details should be furnished. Assistance in the form of advice and planning aid is a continuing

process through the U.S. Naval Mission in Venezuela and can be expanded.

(3) *Air Force—*

No specific requests for pricing and availability have been received from the Venezuelan Government for the materiel listed.

Inasmuch as recent developments in Iran do emphasize the importance of Venezuelan oil, I consider it desirable to re-examine the priorities accorded Venezuela in the allocation of military equipment, and I am taking necessary steps to effect this re-examination.

The Venezuelan authorities should, however, submit firm orders and funds for materiel for which pricing and availability data have already been furnished, and should also submit requests for pricing and availability studies on other items desired, including those in the Agreement Document.

With best regards, I am

Very sincerely yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

731.00/9–1451

Memorandum by Mr. Bainbridge C. Davis of the Office of South American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Status of Venezuelan Problems

1. *Trade Agreement Negotiations.* Formal notice of intention to renegotiate the trade agreement was issued August 29. Briefs on Schedules I and II items are to be submitted to Committee for Reciprocity Information (CRI) by September 28 and (on Schedule II "Peril Point" items) to Tariff Commission by September 26. The Tariff Commission's oral hearings open October 2 and the CRI hearings on October 9. The Country Committee is studying the items Venezuela wishes to withdraw or modify in Schedule I and compensatory concessions we might request. Fairly strong opposition to Venezuelan withdrawal of several of these items is expected and the negotiations may be very difficult and protracted. There is a possibility that some labor unions will oppose U.S. concessions on petroleum items, and American organized labor as a whole may oppose the entire negotiations because of labor's dislike of the present Venezuelan Government.

2. *Aviation.* As a result of our firm stand on the necessity for restoring reciprocity between Venezuelan and United States air carriers the Foreign Minister put before the Junta on August 30 a formula for achieving reciprocity as a basis for negotiation of a United States-Venezuelan air transport agreement. A Foreign Office official reported that the Junta agreed in principle with the Foreign Minister's pro-

posal but withheld approval until technical details could be worked out. Ambassador Armour and Mr. Sparks told me on September 11 that there had been further delay due to the absence of the Foreign Minister and others. They felt that your discussion of these matters with the Foreign Minister next week would carry great weight and they urged that the CAB withhold any drastic action pending the result of these discussions. CAB has agreed to this. It would seem wise for you to emphasize CAB's pressure for a rapid solution so that the Venezuelan authorities understand the importance of the time element. (There is attached a memorandum by Mr. Russell [1] setting forth the aviation problem in greater detail.)

3. *Shipping—Freight Rates.* The Foreign Minister promised to expedite the Venezuelan Government's study of the freight rate situation as a basis for deciding whether the Venezuelan Navigation Company may be permitted to join the Conference Lines in raising freight rates at this time. (At the request of Andrés Boulton, Venezuelan Grace Line representative, Junta President Suárez [2] asked Dr. González Gorrondona [3] to prepare this study.) Dr. Otañez [4] undoubtedly informed his Government of your remarks to him on this subject.[5] You may wish to consider whether it would be productive to make the additional suggestion that CAVN be permitted to meet with the Conference Lines to exchange views on the freight rate problem while awaiting completion of the freight rate study.[6] (I understand you are taking with you the detailed information prepared by Mr. Russell.)

4. *Oil Concessions.* The Venezuelan Government is thinking of granting new oil concessions possibly by the end of this year. However, it is believed that it is planned to do nothing until the Iranian crisis is settled and our trade agreement negotiations are well advanced. The present Venezuelan plans are aimed at discovering additional oil reserves and permitting increased operation by several companies now operating unprofitably in small concession areas, in order to encourage these smaller operators to stay in Venezuela and so diversify oil production among a larger number of companies. (It

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[1] Gerald W. Russell, Office of Regional American Affairs.

[2] Germán Suárez Flamerich.

[3] J. J. González Gorrondona, Vice President of the Central Bank of Venezuela.

[4] Aureliano Otañez, Minister-Counselor, Venezuelan Embassy.

[5] In a memorandum of conversation by Mr. Davis, dated September 5, 1951, Mr. Miller is reported to have made it clear to Minister-Counselor Otañez that the United States Government "was not expressing an opinion with respect to the proper level of freight rates but that we were concerned lest the inability of the Conference lines to discuss this matter with CAVN might lead either to a rate war or to withdrawal of certain shipping services by American members of the Conference." (931.53/9–551)

[6] On November 7, 1951, the Venezuelan Government agreed to permit representatives of the CAVN to enter into discussions with representatives of American shipping lines (Grace, Alcoa, Lykes Brothers) concerning revisions in the freight rate structure. These discussions continued intermittently until January 18, 1952, when an agreement was reached. Pertinent documents are in Department of State files 911.53 and 911.5331.

is not expected that the granting of these new concessions to the smaller operating companies will result in substantially increased oil production within the next few years.) However, in a speech at the opening of the Petroleum Convention [7] Dr. Vera [8] reportedly said that Venezuela plans to increase oil production and to dedicate it to the cause of the West. We have no indication that the total oil production will be materially increased or that any of the new concessions will go to the larger companies which presumably could contribute more rapidly to increased oil production. You may have an opportunity to stress the importance to the free world of such action as Venezuela can take which will result in an actual substantial increase in its oil production.

5. *U.S. Steel Negotiations.* On June 11 the Foreign Minister told Mr. Sparks that the contract between the Venezuelan Government and the Orinoco Mining Company (U.S. Steel's subsidiary) was substantially settled and that there remained only the matter of phraseology. (U.S. Steel had been rapidly approaching a point where it would insist upon some decision and if that were unfavorable it would be prepared to suspend operations in Venezuela.) On August 17 the Government handed a draft contract to Mr. Lake who took it to New York to discuss with U.S. Steel. We have had no word from U.S. Steel or Caracas regarding signature of the contract. The Venezuelan Government has possibly been delaying U.S. Steel not only to obtain the best terms regarding iron ore and future assistance in establishing a steel industry, but also for bargaining purposes in connection with the other problems pending with the U.S. as they are doubtless aware of the importance we attach to expediting shipment of their iron ore.

On September 11 the Under Secretary of the Air Force [9] mentioned to Under Secretary Webb [10] that he understood that steel negotiations in Venezuela had bogged down and he pointed out that high grade iron ore is very important to us just now since it enables us to use blast furnaces which cannot handle lower grade ore. Mr. Webb phoned me for background. I explained the status of these negotiations to Mr. Webb and offered to cable Caracas for possible later information but

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[7] The Venezuelan National Petroleum Convention was held at Caracas, September 8–18, 1951. The United States sent an observer delegation, headed by Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum Administrator for Defense. Mr. Miller, also a member of the delegation, attended the closing sessions of the convention. For a Department of State notice concerning the convention, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 24, 1951, p. 516.

During Mr. Miller's brief stay in Caracas, he discussed with Foreign Minister Gómez Ruiz current problems in United States-Venezuelan relations; a memorandum of their conversation, by Ambassador Armour, dated September 18, 1951, is enclosed with despatch 461, from Caracas, September 25, 1951, not printed (110.15–Mi/9–2551).

[8] Santiago Vera Izquierdo, Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons.

[9] John A. McCone.

[10] James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State.

he said this would not be necessary. I reported this inquiry to Ambassador Armour by letter. The inquiry may have been related in some way to a rumor that the *Wall Street Journal* picked up regarding a hitch in these negotiations.[11]

6. *Delivery of Arms.* The Foreign Minister has recently indicated to Ambassador Armour that members of the Junta as well as the Chief of Staff have felt strongly that the U.S. was not delivering the military equipment requested by Venezuela and necessary for the performance of its role in hemispheric defense and cooperation with UN military efforts. He also indicated that, in addition to great delay even after contracts had been signed, the equipment delivered had been relatively unimportant items whereas those which were most needed were not forthcoming. Ambassador Armour took advantage of a visit to Washington by the heads of our Air and Naval Missions to Venezuela to send a letter to Mr. Lovett presenting this problem in relation to recent Panama talks, to the Iranian situation and to the importance of our relations with Venezuela. These Chiefs of Mission have taken back to Mr. Armour a report of their conversations and an explanation of the status of deliveries of military equipment. Venezuela has so far requested nearly $10 million of equipment of which not quite $500,000 has been obtained. (Of this latter amount, chiefly aircraft parts, about two-fifths has been shipped and the rest is being procured.) With regard to the remaining $9 million of requests, the Venezuelan Government has been informed of price and availability of all of these items or of substitutes where the requested items are not available in the near future. The major substitution is armored cars in place of light tanks, since the latter would not be available for two years and were considered less suitable for Venezuela's needs.

Mr. Lovett's reply to Ambassador Armour which is being sent today enclosed a detailed statement of the requests received from Venezuela for military equipment and the action taken on them. I am attaching our copy of that letter[12] and a memorandum (both top secret) by Mr. Mackay reporting his conversations in the Pentagon yesterday which indicate the present status of thinking regarding the availability of equipment for Venezuela. You may have an opportunity to make sure that there is not an important difference in the interpretation by the

[11] In despatch 837, from Caracas, November 27, 1951, the Second Secretary of the Embassy (Connett) reported as follows: "The [Venezuelan] Government officially announced the signing of a contract between the Orinoco Mining Co. (U.S. Steel subsidiary) and the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons for the dredging of the Orinoco river and the Macareo, following approximately ten months of negotiations. Although the major operating contract, covering such matters as taxes, exoneration of import duties, etc., has not yet been signed, it is generally believed that with the signing of the dredging contract the area of disagreement has been so narrowed that a satisfactory solution will be found to this major problem within a short time." (731.00–W/11–2751)

[12] Not printed as an attachment to the source text, but see *supra*.

Venezuelan and U.S. military authorities of the points covered in paragraph "b" of Mr. Mackay's memorandum.

7. *Steel for Sugar Refineries.* Venezuela is now seeking priority assistance for the construction of two sugar refineries (Cumanacoa and Motatán). These are two of the four which Eximbank refused to finance last Spring and which are now being constructed on short term credits obtained elsewhere. The present stumbling block is 970 tons of structural steel now in extremely short supply. We hope to be successful in supporting their request for priority rating, but final action has not yet been taken by the NPA.

8. *Eximbank Application.* Eugenio Mendoza, leading Venezuelan industrialist, has an application pending before the Eximbank for a $4 million credit for enlarging one of his cement mills. The Eximbank staff has prepared a favorable recommendation and the Board appears to be favorable to the credit which has been referred to NAC for approval.

9. *Invitation to Lt. Col. Pérez-Jiménez.* Defense is anxious to bring Lieutenant Colonel Pérez-Jiménez to the United States as a guest of the Army in his capacity as Minister of Defense rather than member of the Junta. Since American organized labor is highly critical of the present military government of Venezuela and opposes our negotiating the trade agreement with them, we suggested to Defense that they should defer the Pérez-Jiménez visit until after the October trade agreement hearings, and preferably for several months more until the negotiations were concluded. However, as Defense feels that there is some urgency, we have agreed to their tentative proposal to invite him for early November.

10. *Ambassador Armour's Plans.* The Department sent to the White House yesterday its request for approval of Ambassador Armour's resignation. We shall, of course, cable you as soon as a reply is received. You will recall that the Ambassador indicated during a phone conversation with me on September 11 that he thought it might be desirable to make his plans known shortly before his departure from Caracas but he wanted to discuss this with you during your visit. I understand that the President makes all announcements of this type and I assume that Mr. Armour had in mind that you and he would agree upon the best timing of such a White House announcement.[13]

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[13] President Truman accepted Ambassador Armour's resignation on September 14, 1951 (123 Armour, Norman), but the announcement was delayed until September 22. The Ambassador's letter of resignation, dated September 13, and the President's letter of acceptance, released to the press on September 22, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, pp. 597–598. Ambassador Armour was succeeded by Ambassador Fletcher Warren, who was appointed on October 3, arrived in Caracas on November 14, and presented his credentials on November 21.

[Annex 1]

Memorandum by Mr. Gerald W. Russell of the Office of Regional American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Aviation Problems in Venezuela.

To refresh your memory and for ready reference, the aviation difficulties between the U.S. and Venezuela are a result of the Venezuelan Government's refusal to permit Chicago and Southern to carry fifth freedom traffic [14] (traffic from Habana to Maiquetia) on all of its flights. It is restricted by the Venezuelan Government to carrying this traffic on only three of its seven flights. The Venezuelan Government also, on November 1, 1950, refused to permit Pan American World Airways to operate nonstop flights from New York to Caracas but are requiring Pan American to make a stop at Kingston on all of its flights to Caracas. The Venezuelan Government sent a delegation to Washington in June of this year to discuss these problems but we were unable to resolve any of them and the Venezuelan Government was informed that it might be necessary for the U.S. Government to take action under Section 402G of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 [15] to amend the LAV certificate to restore reciprocity in the U.S.-Venezuelan operations. After this information was formally presented to the Foreign Minister he indicated orally to Ambassador Armour that the Venezuelan Government would be willing to negotiate a new bilateral air transport agreement. They also indicated that they would remove the restrictions on the U.S. airlines while these negotiations were in progress. This proposal was based on the condition that (1) upon the coming into force of the bilateral, Pan American would agree to cancel its contracts with the Venezuelan Government and (2) that Pan American would drop some of the points it is serving on its east-west route from Panama to Trinidad.

After we received this informal indication from the Foreign Minister, we requested the CAB to withhold issuance of the show cause order pending clarification of the Venezuelan proposal which supposedly was being submitted to the Junta for approval. We have requested the Embassy in Caracas to determine from appropriate Venezuelan authorities answers to the following questions:

(1) Which contract or contracts does the Venezuelan Government wish to cancel?

(2) What are the "certain" stops it wishes Pan American to drop?

[14] For information on this subject, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1450.

[15] For text of the Civil Aeronautics Act (Public Law 706), approved June 23, 1938, see 52 Stat. 973.

(3) Would the Venezuelan Government want to cancel the contracts outright or to reach an agreement in principle to cancel these contracts upon coming into force of a bilateral?

It has been nearly a month and we have so far been unsuccessful in getting any clarification of the Venezuelan proposal or any more definite information from the Venezuelan Government. However, the Embassy has pointed out that the cabinet ministers have been absent from Caracas for the past two weeks.

The CAB wanted to issue the show cause order on September 14, 1951. However, the Department would not agree to this as it was our position that we must fully explore the Venezuelan proposal before taking any further action in this matter. However, it will be necessary for us to obtain, on an urgent basis, a definite proposal from Venezuela in order to continue to be successful in getting the CAB to defer its action.

It is suggested when discussing this matter with the Foreign Minister that you point out to him the urgency of getting the Venezuelan position.[16]

[Annex 2]

Memorandum by Mr. Duncan A. D. Mackay of the Office of Regional American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) [17]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Meeting in Defense to Discuss Venezuelan Requests for Military Equipment

Present: Col. Buford R. Nyquist, Office of Foreign Military Aid, OSD
Mr. Donald Horton, Office of Foreign Military Aid, OSD
Mr. Layton Cain, Office of Foreign Military Aid, OSD
Lt. Col. Craig C. Davis, Western Hemisphere Branch, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, OSD

Late yesterday afternoon, I met in the Pentagon with the above to discuss the reply which Defense proposes to send to Ambassador

[16] During the latter part of October at Caracas, and again in late November at Washington, representatives of the United States and Venezuela held informal discussions on aviation matters in order to explore the points of difference between the two countries. As a result of these discussions, it was decided to enter into formal negotiations, and the United States agreed not to take final action to implement the "show cause" order as long as the negotiations proceeded satisfactorily. Although it was hoped that the negotiations could begin on December 10, they did not actually get under way until January 1952. Pertinent documents are in Department of State file 611.3194.

[17] Addressed also to Ambassador Warren and Mr. Bernbaum.

Armour's letter of August 31, 1951 to Mr. Lovett on the subject of the Venezuelan requests for military equipment and to inquire what additional background information Mr. Miller should have for his trip today to Caracas on (1) the resumption of the bilateral military talks with Venezuela on the security of the oil fields and (2) our proposal to Defense regarding the possible increase in the priority allocation for Venezuela of military equipment, in view of the Iranian situation.

Following are the results of my discussions, as well as some observations which were made on (1) and (2) above:

[Here follow comments pertaining to Mr. Lovett's letter of September 13, 1951, page 1652.]

b. Col. Davis informed me that a letter has been sent in the last day or two by Defense to the Army directing CINCARIB to be authorized to resume the military discussions with the Venezuelans as soon as practicable, on the basis of the "agreement document".[18] The next step which apparently is envisaged is a "joint survey" in Venezuela to determine what use can be made of equipment which is on hand to do the job, and what (and in what relative order) are the items which will be needed in the way of additional equipment. The equipment listed in the "agreement document" as such has no status as a pending request from the Venezuelan Government, unless the items have been already made the subject of a request to the U.S. Government and this apparently was made clear to the Venezuelans in the Panama talks. The interpretation which Defense appears to place on the "agreement" is that the U.S. military representatives agree to accept the Venezuelan list as a basis for discussion and future determination, on the ground, of whether, in fact, this equipment is what is needed for the purpose, rather than agreement by the U.S. and Venezuelan military representatives that this is the equipment required to accomplish this specific task. From what little we know about this whole thing, I'm quite certain the Venezuelans not only accept the latter interpretation, but assume that the list of equipment in the "agreement" is regarded by the U.S. as an official Venezuelan request for equipment. This, it would seem to me, is an important point which should be clarified as soon as possible, if it is not already clear.

c. Col. Nyquist stated that the JCS have now under consideration the proposal for a higher priority for Venezuela in allocation of military equipment; and that, in this connection, each service has been

[18] The Secretary of Defense on September 19, advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he concurred in their view that the "agreement document" was acceptable as a basis for further joint planning with the Venezuelans subject to the following modifications: (1) subparagraph 2*c*(1) was to read as suggested by the Secretary of State in his letter of August 14 (printed on p. 1647), and (2) the new sentence proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to be added to subparagraph 2*g* (paragraph *b.* on p. 1626). Acting as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, furnished this guidance to the Commander in Chief, Caribbean.

asked for a recommendation on the feasibility of this in view of global U.S. commitments. The availability data which has been supplied the Venezuelans to date has been based on the priority enjoyed by all the Latin American governments. This, as you know, is the lowest after Korea, units assisting in Korea, NATO and domestic requirements.

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250 [1]

Notes of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Department of State, 10:15 a. m., October 10, 1951 [2]

SECRET

UM N–405

[Here follow a list of those present (28) and discussion of matters unrelated to Venezuela.]

Venezuelan Loan

4. Mr. Miller stated that ARA and E are sending a memorandum [3] to the Secretary asking that the Secretary call Secretary Sawyer [4] regarding the proposed loan to Venezuela. This matter is coming up before the NAC today. The issue involved is raised by Treasury in that they maintain that Venezuela is a rich country and therefore should not get a loan from the Bank. Private investors have been canvassed and they are unwilling to make the loan. Mr. Miller stated that Venezuela's dollar position should not affect the loan especially since they have not been the recipient of other Bank loans. Mr. Miller pointed out the inconsistency of Treasury's position in that they are recommending against the loan because Venezuela's financial situation is too stable, and, at the same time, they are recommending against loans for other countries because their financial position is too unstable.

5. Mr. Linder [5] stated that NAC probably will take favorable action on the loan but he still felt that the Secretary should make a call to Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Linder's information indicated that probably Treasury would recede from their present position. In response to a question by the Secretary, he added that it is very unlikely that Venezuela could get a commercial loan because insurance companies are the only

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[1] Master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained and retired by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[2] The Under Secretary's meeting convened on a weekly basis; it was customarily attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and office directors. Under Secretary Webb presided at these meetings.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce.

[5] Harold F. Linder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

source for such loans and he doubted that they would make this loan.[6]

[Here follows further discussion of matters unrelated to the Venezuelan loan request.]

[6] On October 10, the NAC considered the proposed credit of $4,000,000 by the Export-Import Bank in favor of C. A. Venezolana de Cementos to assist in financing the external costs of expanding its cement plant at Pertigalete. In the minutes of the NAC meeting, C. Dillon Glendinning, Secretary of the NAC, is recorded as having stated in part that although there was unanimous agreement in the Staff Committee that the loan was sound, "some Staff members" had questioned whether the search for private financing in both Venezuela and the United States had been adequate. Mr. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, is recorded to have remarked that alternative sources of funding had been sought, but none was found available. Thereupon, no further objections having been raised, the NAC recommended consideration of the credit by the Export-Import Bank (Department of State National Advisory Council Documents, Minutes of Meeting No. 183, October 10, 1951, Lot 60 D 137, Box 362). The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized the credit on October 11 (103–XMB/10–1251). For further information on this credit, see Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Thirteenth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period July–December 1951* (Washington, 1952), pp. 12, 17–18.

731.5–MSP/11–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs (Bernbaum)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1951.

Subject: Defense Concurrence in Informal Approach to Venezuela on Grant Aid Under the Mutual Security Act [1]

Participants: Major General R. L. Walsh,[2] USAF
Colonel P. C. Haines,[3] USA, OMA
Colonel B. R. Nyquist, USAF, OMA
Mr. D. F. Horton, OMA
Captain A. P. Calvert, USN, Cincarib
Lt. Col. R. G. Storey, USA, JCS
Col. J. H. Anderson, USA, JCS
Col. J. G. Hill, USA, JCS
Col. S. F. Crawford, USA, G–3
Col. W. M. Connor, USA, OFMA
Col. James D. Alger, USA, OMA
Mr. M. M. Bernbaum, Dept. of State

The principal topic of conversation was whether, and the manner in which, the Venezuelans might be given an opportunity to express themselves on military grant aid. Also discussed were: Venezuela's

[1] Reference is to the Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165), approved October 10, 1951; for text, see 65 Stat. 373.

[2] Robert L. Walsh, Chairman, United States delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

[3] Peter C. Haines, III, Deputy Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.

priority position for purchased military equipment; the status of the staff conversations which are tentatively to be continued in Caracas in December or January; and the pending visit in January of Lt. Col. Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Member of the Military Junta and Minister of Defense.

Venezuela and Grant Aid

It was decided that Ambassador Warren should be instructed by the Department to approach the Military Junta shortly before the issuance of publicity on the visits of military negotiating teams to the various Latin American countries on military grant aid.[4] Preferably basing his request to see the Military Junta on another matter, he would then inform the Junta of the grant aid program and congratulate the Venezuelan Government on its status as one of the very few countries in the world able and ready to pay its own way militarily. Ambassador Warren's conversation with the Junta would, in general, be based on the idea that we are by no means encouraging the Venezuelans to ask for grant aid, but are, by discussing the program with them, giving them an opportunity to request participation in it if they so desire.

The above procedure was worked out after a rather lengthy conversation in which Colonel Haines quoted General Olmsted[5] and Mr. Nash as supporting the Department's position while General Walsh was opposed to any approach to the Venezuelan Government at all. He was supported in this view by Colonel Hill who was of the opinion that the JCS directive on the matter prohibited an approach to the Venezuelans with a view to their eventual participation in the program. These objections were, however, withdrawn after I read to them paragraph three of the attached letter[6] to Ambassador Warren which met with General Walsh's approval, and which was considered by Colonel Hill as not contravening the JCS directive.

As regards the timing, General Walsh first advocated that the matter be held in abeyance until the arrival in Washington next January of Colonel Pérez Jiménez. I then expressed the opinion that the Department would prefer an earlier date on the ground that it would be far better to anticipate than to await a possible complaint from the Venezuelan Government over our failure to discuss the matter with it. I stated that although the Department would prefer the earliest date possible, it would go along with holding off the discussion until General Morris' visit to Caracas on or about December 17. It was then decided by all of the military present that regardless of whether General Morris would be able to visit Caracas, it would be preferable to

[4] For documentation on the development of a military grant aid program for Latin America, see pp. 985 ff.

[5] Maj. Gen. George H. Olmsted (USA), Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.

[6] Not attached to source text.

have the matter handled by Ambassador Warren. The feeling was that this was a political, rather than a military matter, and should be handled at the highest political levels. It was confirmed, prior to the termination of the meeting, that the foregoing represented the authorization of the Department of Defense for the Department to issue the necessary instructions to Ambassador Warren for implementation at the proper time.

Deliveries of Venezuelan Orders for Military Equipment

General Walsh stressed throughout the conference that the Venezuelan Government was interested far more in the expeditious delivery of the military equipment ordered by it than it was in grant aid. He added that Secretary Lovett had issued definite orders to the effect that all Venezuelan orders for military equipment should receive prompt and preferential attention. He went on to say that such orders had been received by the Air Force which has thus far been able to supply more than ninety-five percent of the Air Force equipment ordered by the Venezuelans.[7]

Colonels Hill and Alger remarked that they were not aware of such instructions from Secretary Lovett, and were under the impression that the JCS had denied a higher priority rating for Venezuela. (It was later confirmed by Colonel Nyquist that the JCS directive stated in effect that upon a decision of the criticality of Venezuelan petroleum that country should be furnished immediately with the equipment required for the protection of its petroleum installations. A higher priority would then be granted if necessary.) Although I was unable to confirm from the conversation whether Venezuela did, in fact, have the preferred position alleged by General Walsh, it was clear that it was actually at the top of the Latin American list.[8]

Captain Calvert made the interesting statement that although pending official requests from the Venezuelan Government for military equipment totalled only about sixteen and a half million dollars, the

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[7] The foregoing paragraph was subsequently revised at the request of General Walsh on December 10, 1951, to read as follows:

"General Walsh stressed throughout the conference that the Venezuelan Government appeared to be interested far more in the expeditious delivery of the military equipment ordered by it than it was in grant aid. He added that Secretary Lovett had talked with Lieutenant General O. R. Cook, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, and it appeared that all Venezuelan orders for Air Force equipment would receive prompt and preferential attention. He went on to say that such orders had been received by the Air Force which has thus far been able to supply more than ninety-five percent of the Air Force equipment ordered by the Venezuelans." (611.31/12–1151)

[8] In a memorandum dated December 18, 1951, the Deputy Director of the Office of Military Assistance (Haines) in the Department of Defense informed Mr. Bernbaum that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided not to upgrade the formal priority of military assistance to Venezuela, but that for the current period when Venezuela's oil resources were vital to United States needs, Venezuela's requests for the purchase of military equipment would be considered on a case by case basis, and if a higher priority was warranted it would be assigned (731.5–MSP/12–1851).

value of the equipment submitted by the Venezuelans during the Panama staff talks as constituting their minimum requirements would involve far more than one hundred million dollars.

Continuation of Staff Talks

Captain Calvert stated that General Morris had inquired of the Venezuelan General Staff through the Army Attaché in Caracas whether it would be suitable for the Staff Talks to be resumed in Caracas during December 17–21, 1951, or January 7–11, 1952. No indication has yet been received from the Venezuelan Government of its preference, or, for that matter. of its agreement that Staff Talks should be continued at this time. Captain Calvert added that Cincarib was still awaiting word from the Venezuelans of their reaction to the Department's explanation of the payment terms required on equipment purchased from the United States Government (Deptel 177 of November 2 to Caracas).[9]

He explained that staff talks to be held in Caracas on November 5 had been cancelled due to Venezuelan dissatisfaction with: (1) the wording of the agreement with regard to Venezuela's obligations under the Rio Treaty (considered a political rather than military matter); (2) the wording of a clause providing for substitutions on military equipment ordered by the Venezuelans (insistence upon Venezuelan, as against US, discretion in the determination of substitutions); and (3) payment terms involving payment long in advance of delivery (desire to make a 25% or even 50% down payment with the remainder to be paid upon delivery of the equipment to the port of export).

Although satisfied that the first two objections had been cleared up satisfactorily, Captain Calvert was doubtful whether the Departments explanation of how far we might go to meet Venezuelan desires would be satisfactory enough to permit continuation of the staff talks. I assured him that I would go into the matter with a view to expediting whatever action might be required in the Department and by the Embassy.

Visit of Lt. Colonel Pérez Jiménez

General Walsh stated that he was awaiting Lt. Colonel Pérez Jiménez' acceptance of the invitation extended him for January, and expected the "red carpet treatment" for him by the Air Force. Aside from General Walsh's nodded confirmation, there was no reaction to

[9] In telegram 177, Acting Secretary of State Webb explained that nations receiving military equipment under the terms of the Military Defense Assistance Act of 1949 would have to furnish the United States with a "dependable undertaking" to repay the full amount of the contract, and that dependable undertaking was being interpreted as consisting of either an irrevocable letter of credit or initial payment or a firm commitment by the interested nation's appropriate military attaché in the United States that his government accepted the terms of the contract regarding repayment (731.5/10–3151).

my query whether the invitation was firm or had, as the Department understood, been extended in a general manner permitting reconsideration in the event of unfavorable political developments.

411.3131/12-451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William F. Gray of the Office of South American Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1951.

Subject: Renegotiation of U.S.–Venezuela Trade Agreement

Participants: Dr. Aureliano Otañez, Minister Counselor, Venezuelan Embassy
Mr. Bernbaum—OSA
Mr. Davis—OSA
Mr. Gray—OSA
Mr. Solana [1]—CP

Mr. Otañez called at his request to discuss the matters set forth below relating to the above-captioned subject:

I. *U.S. Tentative Request List*

Mr. Otañez first expressed appreciation for our having gone to considerable trouble to meet Venezuela's request for a preliminary list of items. (On November 30, he was given a memorandum [2] from the Department enclosing a tentative list of products on which the United States may request tariff concessions from Venezuela.)

He made clear that, while he was not yet prepared to discuss the items in detail or to take any position regarding the tentative request list, he wished to give us his own general views. First, he had the impression that the list was quite extensive. On some items he felt his Government could grant bindings of existing duties— even duty reductions on some; but he was almost certain that on some others no concessions would be possible. He indicated that the textile group would, in his opinion, be particularly difficult, although concessions might be possible on a few classifications.

Mr. Gray emphasized the tentative character of the list that had been presented. He pointed out, for example, that all items on which the trade had made requests for Venezuelan tariff concessions to the Committee for Reciprocity Information were automatically included in the list; it is therefore likely that some of these items will be eliminated from the U.S. definitive request list. Mr. Solana added that the

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[1] Joseph R. Solana, Commercial Policy Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy.

[2] Not printed.

present list was of course not only subject to deletion but also to addition or other modification.

Mr. Otañez said that he fully understood the preliminary nature of the list but that he nevertheless gained the impression that the U.S. Government holds the view that the Schedules of concessions of the two countries should strike a mathematical balance. He called our attention again to the fact that the Venezuelan Government, since it had asked for revision of the 1939 trade agreement, takes the position that the 1939 agreement is out of balance in favor of the U.S. Consequently, his Government is of the view that in the forthcoming negotiations for a Supplementary Trade Agreement, Venezuela should receive more concessions than it gives. [Throughout the conversation the U.S. participants scrupulously refrained from any discussion as to what the basis for negotiations should be and hence did not attempt to argue this point with Otañez.] [3]

Mr. Bernbaum asked in what way does Venezuela consider the existing agreement out of balance. In reply, Otañez referred to the present tariff quota arrangement applicable to oil imports into the United States. He also pointed out that the U.S. remains the preponderant supplier of most exports to Venezuela whereas other countries, to some degree, have been displacing Venezuela as the dominant supplier of petroleum to the U.S. Without pursuing the subject, Mr. Solana and Mr. Gray briefly presented certain statistical information designed to show that it is, at least, a highly debatable question as to whether the existing trade agreement is in fact out of balance to the disadvantage of Venezuela.

Reverting to the tentative list of products, Mr. Otañez then pointed to several other items on which he felt his Government would have difficulty in granting concessions. These were: cotton, beer, cement (Portland), certain iron and steel products, pharmaceuticals and, again, the textile group. Mr. Gray stated that cotton and beer were among the CRI items previously referred to which were automatically included; while he could give no assurances, they might well be dropped from our definitive request list.

Mr. Otañez informed us that he was sending the U.S. memorandum and list today to Caracas; and that his Government would no doubt study the document immediately with a view to determining, and indicating to the U.S. later, the items on which concessions cannot be negotiated.

II. *Revision of General Provisions*

Mr. Otañez inquired as to our progress on work concerning the revision of the language of the general provisions of the 1939 trade agreement. He was informed that legal officers were actively engaged

[3] Brackets appear in source text.

in formulating the texts of the revisions which the U.S. intends to propose, and that their work was well-advanced. (Previously, Otañez was told in a general sort of way of the nature of the changes which we would probably want to request.) Mr. Otañez asked that he be notified as soon as we have developed the exact wording of the proposed changes.

III. *Allocation of 1952 Oil Tariff Quota*

Mr. Otañez then inquired about the allocation for 1952 of oil imports into the U.S. that would enter at the lower (10½¢ per bbl.) tariff quota rate. He hoped that the new country allocations would not result in a smaller percentage share for Venezuela than in 1951. Mr. Gray replied that this Government was now working on the problem and the prospects appeared good that the country quotas would remain the same as in 1951. Mr. Otañez expressed the hope that such would be the case and asked to be informed when the matter is decided. However, he hoped that a Supplementary Trade Agreement could be concluded that would obviate the need for applying such country allocations, a view concurred in by all present.

Caracas Embassy Files, Lot 64 F 14, "400–Defense Talks US & Ven, 1950–1952"

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Warren) to the Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs (Bernbaum)

TOP SECRET CARACAS, December 6, 1951.[1]

DEAR MAURIE: I refer to your letter of November 13, 1951,[2] concerning the Military Grant Aid Program under the Mutual Security Act. In conformity with the last paragraph of your letter; I have taken no action since you passed on this information to me as of possible assistance in the event that the Department of Defense concurred, in which case the Embassy would then be instructed to discuss it with the Venezuelan Government. A letter [2] just received from Tom Mann expresses his personal belief that our plans should be explained to the Venezuelans as soon as possible.

I consider that the timing of our approach to the Venezuelans on this subject is of paramount importance. As you are aware, there are three problems now pending: 1) The terms that we will impose for the payment of the military equipment and materiel which Venezuela wishes to purchase from the United States; 2) The date when General Morris will come to Caracas to continue the Panama talks; and 3) The visit of the Minister of Defense to the United States.

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[1] Source text originally dated December 5, but handcorrected to read December 6.

[2] Not printed.

It is difficult to predict what would be the reaction of the Venezuelans should we approach them now on the Military Grant Aid Program prior to the successful conclusion of the three problems enumerated. Certainly we could anticipate that they would be much more exigent regarding the terms for installment payments. They would expect that, if we are prepared to give grant aid to the other Latin American countries, we should be most generous in our terms of payment to Venezuela which will pay. On the other hand, were the installment payments problem satisfactorily disposed of, had General Morris successfully concluded his talks in Caracas, and had Colonel Perez Jimenez terminated a successful and informative visit to the United States, we might then expect that the suggested approach would be reluctantly accepted.

I say reluctantly because the Venezuelans must consider the cost of the equipment and materiel. Estimates run from over $25,000,000 to in excess of $100,000,000, in which case a contribution by the United States would undoubtedly be not only welcome but also needed. It is one thing for Venezuela to express a willingness to pay for military supplies when everybody else is required to do so. However, it would be an entirely different matter to persist in such willingness should the financial shoe pinch hard and were relief being granted to the other Latin American countries. In fact, it is this very financial question, we surmise, that is causing the Venezuelans to make haste slowly with respect to the proposed discussions with General Morris in Caracas. Actually, we believe that they do not wish to fix a date for those conversations until they have received from us definite information on the financial commitments that would be involved in the purchase of the equipment and materiel. In this connection it should be recalled that the statement included in the Panama Document was to the effect that it is understood that Venezuela would be prepared to reimburse the United States for the materiel requested. However, it is equally true that the latter document must be ratified by both governments, which step has not yet taken place. In the light of the development of grant aid to Latin America, the Venezuelan Government might appropriately wish to modify the language in the Panama Document.

Our thinking on timing is along the following lines. Eddie Sparks will endeavor to contact Colonel Moreno tomorrow or early next week and inform him of the payment terms as outlined in Bain Davis' letter of December 4,[3] stressing that they are only indications of what we are prepared to do and are subject to future negotiation on the individual items involved. Should Eddie be successful in convincing Colonel Moreno of our desire to cooperate and be helpful, as well as the reasonableness of the terms—which is the principal stumbling

[3] Not printed.

block to the proposed conversations of General Morris in Caracas—we could then go on to the next step which would be the invitation to Colonel Perez Jimenez to visit the United States in January. I would deliver this invitation in person to Colonel Perez Jimenez and, in the expectation that he would be gratified with this distinction, I could then explain to him our policy on Military Grant Aid to Latin America along the lines suggested in your letter of November 13, 1951. If we hold to this timing, we would then be somewhat hopeful that we might be able to discourage a request by Venezuela for inclusion in the Grant Aid Program.[4]

Sincerely yours, FLETCHER WARREN

[4] In a letter to Ambassador Warren, dated December 11, 1951, Mr. Bernbaum stated in part the following: "Although Venezuelan agreement to the resumption of staff talks would certainly be desirable prior to any conversation on military grant aid, I am wondering whether we can continue to wait for the period of time which may be necessary. I am, therefore, inclined to suggest that you take advantage of the opportunity offered by the extension of an invitation to Colonel Pérez Jiménez to visit the United States to bring up the subject of military grant aid. I understand that authorization to extend the invitation will be telegraphed by the Department of Defense on or about December 14." (Caracas Embassy Files, Lot 64 F 14, "400–Defense Talks US & Ven, 1950–1952")

731.56/12–1151

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Warren)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1951.

DEAR FLETCH: Maury will answer your letter to him of December 5 [1] and he will know more than I do about the strategy of the timing and manner of approaching the Venezuelans. This note is limited to one point:

As you say in your letter of December 6,[2] it is one thing for Venezuela to express a willingness to pay for military supplies when everybody else is required to do so, and quite another thing to persist in such willingness once they realize that they are the only country in Latin America which has a role to play in hemisphere defense which is not being offered military grant aid. This was precisely my concern and the reason for my suggestion that we inform the Venezuelans about our plans for disbursing military grant aid. We would hope that when the Venezuelans are apprised of all the facts they would continue to be willing to completely pay their own way.

On the other hand if there is to be an adverse reaction—if the Venezuelans show resentment and consider that they are being discriminated

[1] Not printed.

[2] *Supra.* Ambassador Warren had sent a copy of his letter of December 6 addressed to Mr. Bernbaum to Mr. Mann.

against—then my thought was that we should know this as soon as possible so as to go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it is too late and have some of the military grant funds allocated to them. I cannot predict whether the Joint Chiefs will agree with us, but given the strategic importance of our interests in Venezuela, I would assume they would consider it prejudicial to the national interest to carry through with their original plans. The fact that the Joint Chiefs have approved a paragraph concerning the Venezuelan problem would support this assumption.

Accordingly if, after advising the Venezuelans, in your opinion our failure to include them in the military grant program would be prejudicial to our overall interests, we would like to know this and attempt to get them included.

I wanted to emphasize this in view of an impression which I got from your letter that you understand our purpose to be to stand firm regardless of what the Venezuelan reaction is.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely, THOMAS C. MANN

731.5-MSP/1-152

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs (Bernbaum)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 1, 1952.

Subject: Invitation to Col. Pérez Jiménez, Venezuelan Chief of Defense and Member of the Military Junta to visit the United States; Venezuela's place in the Military Grant Aid Program

Participants: Honorable Fletcher Warren, Ambassador, Caracas
Maurice M. Bernbaum, Officer in Charge, NWC

Ambassador Warren telephoned me at home yesterday afternoon to state that he had thus far been unable to see Col. Pérez Jiménez in compliance with the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 243 of Dec. 14, 1951.[1] (He was then instructed to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by a Defense invitation to Col. Pérez Jiménez to visit the United States to discuss with him our military grant aid program in a general way.) Ambassador Warren stated that after repeated attempts during the past two weeks to arrange an appointment with Col. Pérez Jiménez he had finally requested the assistance of the Foreign Office which had informed him the day before that it would ascertain "whether and when" Col. Pérez Jiménez would be able to see him. An attempt to speak with Col. Pérez Jiménez this morning during the traditional New Year's reception was also unsuccessful.

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[1] Not printed.

Ambassador Warren stated that he had telephoned for the purpose of letting the Department of State and the Department of Defense know that the Embassy was continuing in its efforts to get in touch with Col. Pérez Jiménez and that he hoped for results within a few days.

The conversation was carried on in such a manner as to conceal its subject matter.

Comment

These difficulties experienced by Ambassador Warren in seeing Col. Pérez Jiménez follow previous indications of the reluctance of the Venezuelan military authorities to renew staff conversations with General Morris which had been initiated last March in Panama. They indicate the possibility of hitherto unrevealed Venezuelan reservations regarding a military relationship with the United States.

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