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United States. Department of State
[s.l.]: [s.n.], 1945

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

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USAFIK, that he had received instructions from (his) Military Commander to enter into the [illegible] (of the Soviet delegation) and go back (to Pyongyang)." Since the term of the Soviet delegation to Pyongyang [illegible] the effective [illegible] current sine die of the Joint Commission.

LETTER CONCERNING

1e. [illegible] Commanding General, ~~American Commander~~ USAFIK ~~in Korea~~ [illegible] exchange of correspondence with the Soviet Commander [illegible], which ended in February 1947, to find a formula for the participation of Korean democratic parties in the Joint Commission. After lengthy exchanges of views, in November 1947, the Commanding General [illegible], proposed to the Commanding General of the Soviet Army:

"It is proposed to interpret paragraphs 4 and 5 of the declaration [illegible] of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission dated 1 April 1946, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organizations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

"In consideration of this interpretation of this declaration [illegible] Communique No. 5 of the Joint Commission dated 1 April 1946, both delegations agree that they will not oppose

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

consultation with any individual, political party or social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in Joint Communique No. 5."

4. In the event the Commanding General, Soviet Forces in South Korea, counters this proposal with the following proposal:

"1. The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow decision on Korea.

"2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

"3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

16. On December 24, 1946, the Commanding General of US-FIK replied:

"Proposal No. 1 would be interpreted as follows: Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to implementing fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

"Proposal No. 2. To withdraw the right of a declarant party or organization to represent the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for some reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may after mutual agreement require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

"Proposal No. 3. It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: 'Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to either of the [illegible] by [illegible] of the Peace Conference, [illegible] individuals, portions or [illegible] previously agreed upon during the discussions contained in the [illegible]. [illegible] to the [illegible] of the Allied [illegible] of the Peace Conference [illegible] of the Soviet [illegible] Conference."

11. The [illegible] of a [illegible] mutual agreement [illegible] the [illegible] followed by the [illegible] of the Joint Commission.

12. The [illegible] of the Soviet [illegible] of the Soviet [illegible], the Soviet Government [illegible] with proposals which in fact [illegible] the Soviets to their original position of 1946.

13. The [illegible] presented in the correspondence outlined above, while [illegible] narrowing the divergent viewpoints, resulted in no definite agreement [illegible] which the differences [illegible] of the Joint Commission could be resolved. The inability of the United States and Soviet Governments [illegible] to resolve the divergent viewpoints led to an effort initiated by the Secretary of State George C. Marshall to find a suitable formula on a governmental level.

14. As a result of exchange of correspondence in April

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

and May 1947 between the United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, proposals contained in the letter of the Soviet Forces in North Korea of 26 November 1946 as amended by the counter proposals contained in the letter of the Commanding General, USAFIK, of 24 December 1946, were finally accepted as a basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

1. In his letter of 15 April 1947 Mr. Molotov advocated "the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations." To this statement Mr. Marshall replied 2 May 1947 that "establishing a Korean Provisional Democratic Government on the basis of wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations has from the beginning been accepted by the United States Government as a basis to its policy of assisting in the establishment of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations." Moreover, Mr. Marshall pointed out that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Commission." Mr. Molotov did not take exception to this position.

22. The Commanding General, USAFIK, realized from the correspondence which he had exchanged with the Soviet Commander in North Korea that the difference in viewpoints between the Soviet and the American position had not been resolved. In a radio to the War Department ~~he~~ the Commanding General, USAFIK, recommended that the Secretary of State in his negotiation with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union obtain specific agreement which might serve as a practicable basis for the resumption of negotiations by the Joint Commission. The suggestion contained in this radiogram was not followed, and the proposal of the Commanding General, USAFIK, in his letter of 24 December 1946, which was not acceptable to the Soviet Commander in North Korea, became the basis for the resumption of negotiations by the Joint Commission.

CURRENT SESSION (1947)

23. Reconvening on 21 May 1947 in Seoul on the basis of the Marshall-Molotov agreement, the Joint Commission ~~re-convened~~ resumed its initial, assigned task of establishing a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

24. From 21 May 1947 until 21 August 1947 31 meetings of the Joint Commission were held.

25. Agreement on internal procedural matters and the program of work, largely on the basis of decisions reached in the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1946 sessions, was effected in the early meetings of the Commission.

26. In attempting to reach a Joint decision concerning consultation, early indications of the divergent positions of the two delegations, which later led to the impasse in the Joint Commission, were evident in Subcommission No. 1 and in the Joint Commission.

27. In Subcommission No. 1, which was charged with drafting a decision on consultation for the approval of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegate's first proposal prescribed the narrowing of consultation to about thirty organizations. The ~~United States~~ U. S. Delegate considered the Soviet proposal to be in violation of the principle of broad consultation discussed in the correspondence between the commanders and specifically proposed by Mr. Molotov and agreed to by Mr. Marshall. Furthermore, attempts made by the ~~United States~~ U. S. delegate in Subcommission #1 to arrive at definitions of "social organizations" and political party." and to establish criteria which would eliminate local and small organizations from consultation, were refused by the Soviet Delegate as unnecessary. In addition, the Soviet Delegate contended that organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission must fully uphold the Moscow Agreement, including every paragraph. The ~~United States~~ U. S. Delegate, of course, could not accept this unilateral interpretation of the Moscow Agreement which returned the Soviet Delegation to its 1946 position and vitiated the Marshall-Molotov agreement. He also

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

pointed out in the second meeting of Subcommission 1 on 27 May 1947 that there could be no unilateral cancellation under the terms upon which the Joint Commission was reconvened.

29. Early disagreements in Subcommission No. 1 resulted in discussion in the Joint Commission of the terms of implementing consultation. The positions of both delegations were amplified by the respective Chief Spokesmen prior to agreement with the stands taken by the delegates to Subcommission No. 1. In order to determine at an early date the [illegible] of organizations [illegible] the United Delegation [illegible] communique to. [illegible] to publish at the [illegible] decision at the earliest possible moment which organizations might qualify for consultation. The ~~United States~~ U. S. Delegation rejected the proposal on the grounds that organizations which might desire consultation with the Joint Commission should be cognizant of all details of the implementation of consultation before they were requested to sign the declaration contained in Communique No. 5. Furthermore, the ~~United States~~ U. S. Delegation suspected that the Soviet Delegation's proposal may have been designed to obtain full knowledge of the number and nature of those organizations desiring consultation with the Joint Commission so that a decision concerning organizations to be consulted might be formulated by them in a manner favorable to the Soviet Delegation's political objectives.

29. In spite of the underlying divergence of opinion

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

regarding implementation of consultation outlined above, agreement was reached on Joint Commission Decision No. 12, "The Order of Consultation with Korean Democratic Parties and Social Organizations" on 7 June 1947. In agreeing to Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the Soviet delegation at the conclusion of the 51st meeting, 6 June 1947, unexpectedly receded from its position of narrow consultation and, by implication, agreed to broad consultation.

30. Publication of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 on 11 June 1947 resulted in the application of only 53 parties and organizations from 11 March to 11 June 1947. From 12 June to 23 June 1947, the deadline for application, 377 additional parties and organizations submitted their applications. The large influx of applications during the last two days, especially on the afternoon of June 23rd, was viewed with misgivings by the Soviet delegation. Its expressed concern coincided with an almost immediate change of tactics in the form of a retreat from the principle of broad consultation agreed to in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

regarding implementation of consultation outlined above, agreement was reached on Joint Commission Decision No. 12, "The Order of Consultation with Korean Democratic Parties and Social Organizations" on 7 June 1947. In agreeing to Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the Soviet Delegation at the conclusion of the 81st meeting, 6 June 1947, unexpectedly receded from its position of narrow oral consultation and, by implication statement, agreed to broad consultation.

30. Publication of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 on 12 June 1947 resulted in the application of only 53 parties and organizations and Pyongyang Branch by 20 June 1947 through 21 June 1947, the deadline for application, 377 additional parties and organizations submitted their applications. The Delegation's consultations during the last three days, especially on the afternoon of June 23rd, was viewed with misgivings by the Soviet Delegation. Its expressed concern coincided with an almost immediate change of tactics in the form of a retreat from the principle of broad consultation agreed to in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

31. The repudiation by the Soviet Delegation of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 first occurred in Subcom ission No. 1. The ~~United~~ U. States representative, in compliance with paragraph 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12, compiled a com lete list of all applicant parties and social organizations in South Korea applying for consultation with the Joint Commission which had signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5. The Soviet representative prepared a similar list of all applicants from North Korea. These two lists were exchanged, and the ~~United~~ U. States representative proposed that the Subcommission review the combined list of applicants to obtain agreement as to which parties should be excluded by mutual agreement and the standards of exclusion.

32. After studying the list of applicants from South Korea, the Soviet representative proposed that the following types of parties and organizations not be accepted for consultation: small local organizations without branches, and non-social organizations. After some days of discussion the Soviet representative stated categorically that he would not include in the list for consultation any party or social organization which was a member of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee because such did not fully uphold the Moscow Decision.

33. All these Soviet proposals had one thing in common. The wording was such that they eliminated a large number of rightist organizations and few or no organizations associated with the Democratic People's Front. This was in keeping with

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Soviet objective and tactics of 1946.

34. These proposals were all refused by the ~~United States~~ U. S. representative on the grounds that they were contrary to the agreement in Joint Commission Decision No. 12 promising the Korean people broad consultation.

35. At this point the Soviet representative made it quite clear that he considered no list for consultation existed and that a party or social organization could only be included on a new list if mutually agreed upon. This position meant that the Soviet representative exercised a veto power and could exclude from consultation all parties and social organizations which were suspicious to the Soviet Delegate.

36. At this stage and prior to discussion of the differences occurring in Subcommission No. 1, the Joint Commission, in compliance with Joint Commission Decision No. 12, held formal meetings with the representatives of organizations eligible for consultation, in Seoul on 25 June 1947 and in Pyongyang on 1 July 1947, and outlined the procedure for broad consultation. The Joint Commission took up the question not resolved by Subcommission No. 1 in the 37th meeting in Pyongyang on 2 July 1947. From that date until the conclusion of the 53d meeting, 12 August 1947, the Joint Commission was engaged in considering a series of proposals and continuous debate of the divergent views.

37. The position of the Soviet Delegation was as follows:

a. The fact that an organization is eligible for consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreements,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

as published in Joint Commission Decision No. 12, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

b. In order for an organization to be included on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both Delegations. In other words, the Soviet Delegation could exclude any organization from consultation unilaterally by failing to agree to its inclusion in the list.

c. Organizations falling, according to the dictates of the Soviet Delegation, within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation:

(1) "Non-social" organizations

(2) District and purely local organizations

(3) Organizations which do not intend to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations. Such organizations would be considered for consultation only if they publicly withdrew from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations.

The Soviet Delegation contended that signatures on the applications for consultation (Joint Communique No. 5) by member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee were not given in good faith and therefore were invalid because the organizations maintained

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

membership in a committee formed solely to "struggle against" the Moscow Agreement.

38. The strategy followed by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation throughout this debate was in full agreement with the objective announced by him in 1946.

39. The position of the ~~American~~ U.S. Delegation was as follows:

a. In accordance with point number 1 of the agreed proposal for reconvening the Joint Commission (Marshall-Molotov correspondence), "signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

b. Organizations signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 are automatically eligible for consultation and are automatically placed on the list for consultation as provded in paragraph No. 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12. Organizations may be excluded from the list for consultation only by mutual agreement of the two Delegations as provided in point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. Therefore the arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation"

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

nullifies the agreements reached by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov and by the Joint Commission and gives the Soviet Delegation the veto power over any applicant it dislikes.

c. The Moscow Agreement on Korea does not define "social organization" and because of the Soviet Delegation's refusal to define basic concepts, Joint Commission Decision No. 12 contains no definition of "social" - or any other term. However, the ~~American~~ U.S. Delegation was willing to exclude from consultation, by mutual agreement, any organization which could not be considered "social" within the definitions to be found in the dictionaries of the world.

d. District and purely local organizations are not barred from consultation by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov agreements, or Joint Commission Decision No. 12. However, to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, the ~~American~~ U.S. Delegation made several proposals which, if accepted by the Soviet Delegation, would have eliminated a large number of truly local organizations from consultation.

e. The ~~American~~ U.S. Delegation was willing to exclude from consultation, by mutual agreement, fraudulent organizations, provided that no such organization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

should be excluded where the sole claim of fraud was exaggeration of membership, a factor evident in some applications of both northern and southern Korean organizations.

f. Organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations are manifestly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreements if they have applied for consultation and have signed the required declaration. They remain eligible unless and until they are, by mutual agreement, excluded after indictment as provided by point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. Failure of the Soviet Delegation to bring charges, supported by adequate evidence, against member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations, while insisting arbitrarily on their exclusion, nullified the spirit and letter of point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation's attempt to deprive unilaterally organizations from the right to initial consultation by omitting them from a list of organizations to be admitted to consultation, constituted, in effect, an attempt to arrogate a veto power to itself. There is

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

no provision in any of the agreements binding upon the Joint Commission which provides such a veto power, while there are two specific agreements which state that exclusion shall be by mutual agreement.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

40. The specific results of the Soviet and United States positions above quoted become evident after consideration of:

a. Under the urging of their leaders Rhee, Syngman and Kim, Koo, the following four groups of extreme rightists with a total claimed membership of over 10,300,000 refused to apply for consultation with the Joint Commission: National Society for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, Independent Farmers and Laborers Party, Great Korean Youth League for Rapid Realization of Independence and Women's Nationalist Party. In addition, the Independence Party split on the subject of consultation, and a segment under the leadership of Kim, Koo, with a claimed membership of about 450,000, failed to apply.

b. Of four hundred sixty groups which applied for consultation, thirty-eight, all representing the Democratic People's Front, were from North Korea, while four hundred twenty-two, representing all shades of political views, were from South Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

f. These 460 groups can be roughly and approximately classified: People's Front - 136 groups, 27,266,000 claimed members, 42%; Moderate - 72 groups, 14,730,000 claimed members, 20%; Right - 252 groups, 24,917,000 claimed membership, 38%.

g. The Soviets submitted a list of 146 parties and organizations with membership in excess of 10,000 when they were willing to discuss as to their eligibility for consultation. This list failed to include 24 parties and organizations stated by the Soviets as members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. This list showed the following political alignment:

(1) People's Front - 75 groups, claimed membership - 32,316,000.

(2) Right - 71 groups, claimed membership - 19,394,000.

(3) Eliminated right - 24 groups, claimed membership - 15,200,000.

g. Adding the 15,200,000 claimed membership of the 24 rightist groups proposed for elimination by the Soviets to the 11,300,000 Kim Koo, Syngman Rhee faction which failed to apply, eliminated rightist parties and organizations with claimed membership of 26,500,000 or approximately 40% of total claimed membership of all Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

f. Acceptance by the ~~United States~~ U.S. Delegation of the Soviet proposals would have driven from consultation and further support of the Joint Commission the majority of the rightist groups with claimed membership of 3,344,000. There would remain only Democratic Party; Progressive Party to form the government.

g. If the Soviet proposals were accepted the Democratic Party and the Progressive Party, two elements of support by the American Delegation with their proposal would have resulted in a total loss of significant support to the Joint Commission and complete dependence by this Commission on the Communist-dominated Democratic People's Front for the formation of the provisional government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

41. The following general results, contrary to the international commitments, with respect to Korea, would eventuate should the ~~United States~~ U.S. Delegation accept the contentions of the Soviet Delegation:

a. Direct violation of specific agreements binding upon the Joint Commission.

b. Negation of the broad consultation principle embodied in the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Marshall-Molotov Agreements and Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

c. Denial of freedom of expression to representatives of political parties and social organizations.

d. Unjust discrimination between major political factions in Korea, depriving nearly every influential nationalistic group of the Rightist and Centrist persuasion which had applied for consultation from its rightful place in the formation of their first democratic government; by the same token, instituting, contrary to the wishes of the Korean people, a complete domination of such a government by leftist groups led by Soviet-oriented Communists.

e. Recognition, in effect of paramount influence of the USSR in Korea in detriment to both the national interests of Korea and those of the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

other signatory powers to the Moscow Agreement.

4. [illegible] of the ~~United States~~ U.S. Delegation's position [illegible] would have brought about the following [illegible]:

a. [illegible] of a unified administration [illegible] Joint Commission.

b. Broadest [illegible] participation [illegible] Moscow decision, the Joint Commission [illegible] Agreement, and Joint Commission Decision No. 1.

c. [illegible] matters of [illegible] eligible for consultation of their right to freedom of expression in accordance with the above agreement.

d. Just, proportional representation in the formation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government of the widest possible basis of Korean opinion.

e. Proper fulfillment of the guarantees of the Moscow Agreement.

5. It is the opinion of the ~~United States~~ U.S. Delegation that the objectives of the Soviet Delegation's positions were:

a. To insure a Democratic People's Front control of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government similar to that established in North Korea.

b. To establish a Communist controlled satellite state on the border of the USSR which, in the words of the Soviet Chief Commissioner, at the opening meeting in March 1946, "will not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union," and which will outflank & help defend Communist Manchuria.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

44. To effect the realization of its objectives, the Soviet Delegation relied upon the following:

a. Supression of all opposition to the Democratic People's Front in North Korea through Soviet occupational policies with the result that only Democratic People's Front organizations could apply for consultation.

b. Exclusion from consultation of major non-Democratic People's Front organizations in North Korea.

c. Strategic aid to communist-dominated groups in Southern Korea. (Fifth Column Tactics)

U.S. ~~United States~~ delegation attempted to find a basis for resumption of the work of the Joint Commission in the following proposals submitted as stated:

a. At the 49th meeting, held 29 July 1947:
"That the Soviet Delegation conduct consultation with those political parties and social organizations of North Korea and the American Delegation consult with those political parties and social organizations of South Korea."

b. At the 50th meeting, held 1 August 1947:
"That consultation be jointly conducted north and south of the 38th parallel with those parties which the Soviet Delegation is willing to hear,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

and that the American Delegation conduct unilateral consultation south of the 38th with those parties they claim are suspicious to them. Such consultation by the American Delegation will be considered consultation with the Joint Commission."

c. At the 53rd meeting, held 12 August 1947:

"The American Delegation, mindful of the solemn obligations of its government under the Moscow Agreement and conscious of its duty to the Korean people to establish as early as possible a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, makes the following proposals to overcome the present impasse regarding consultation:

"(1) Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

"(2) Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

"(3) The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election shall be held with free electioneering, secret and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Subcommission no. 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter.

"(4) That Subcommission No. 2 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of representative personnel for the provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea.

"By making this proposal the American Delegation feels that the opinion of the Korean people which cannot be obtained through oral consultation on a broad basis can be expressed through the medium of a general election where a clear and free election under international supervision is guaranteed."

46. The ~~United States~~ U.S. Delegation concludes:

a. The Soviet objective was announced by the Soviet Chief Commissioner to the Joint Commission in March 1946. This objective is:

(1) To create the Provisional Korean Democratic Government by a wide unification of all "democratic parties and organizations

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs;"

(2) through such a government, to eliminate "reactionary, pro-Japanese, anti-democratic elements" and "to carry out radical reforms of economic and political reform;"

(3) to establish a force friendly to the Soviet Union so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union."

b. The Soviet government and its agents have followed the Soviet objectives as announced during:

(1) The 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission;

(2) The exchange of correspondence between the commanders;

(3) The 1947 session of the Joint Commission.

c. The Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, and Joint Commission Decision No. 1 constitute adequate and detailed terms for conducting consultation and for the implementation of the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

d. The Soviet Delegation to the 1947 sessions of the Joint Commission shows no intention of divergence from the objectives announced by the then and present Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation at the opening session of the Joint Commission in 1946.

e. Unless and until the Soviet government directs

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission to follow policies other than those announced by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation in 1946 as the Soviet objective, it will be impossible to draft any agreement with the Soviet government which will lead to successful evolvement of Korean independence through the medium of the Joint Commission,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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POSITION OF AMERICAN DELEGATION	POSITION OF SOVIET DELEGATION
In accordance with point No. 1 of the agreed proposal for reconvening the Joint Commission (Marshall-Molotov correspondence), "signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."	
Political parties and social organizations signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 are automatically eligible for consultation and constitute the list for consultation provided in paragraph No. 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12. They may be removed from this list and excluded from consultation only for just cause, and by mutual agreement of the two Delegations.	As regards the question of compilation of the list, the Soviet Delegation declares that whereas Subcommission No. 1 had not submitted an agreed list of parties and organizations, it devolves upon the Joint Commission to decide which parties and organizations which had filed application must be included into a list for initial oral consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision and Joint Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission. It will be possible to exclude from the list only when there will be available a list approved by the Commission. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the position of the American Delegation regarding this question

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

tends to make the Joint Commission consult with all parties and/organizations which had filed application and signed the declaration which either Delegation deems it necessary to invite for consultation.

The distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation" is an effort of the Soviet Delegation to obtain the power to exclude unilaterally any party or social organization to which it is opposed. This position is a violation of the agreement reached by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov and in effect would give to the Soviet Delegation a veto power.

The US Delegation repeatedly tried to obtain agreement on the definition of political parties and social organizations. Due to opposition of the Soviet Delegation, the Joint Commission was unable to agree upon definitions of terms undefined in the Moscow Agreement, such as "social organization", and no such definitions could therefore be included in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

Among the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which had filed applications for participation in consultation, there were organizations which are not social - mercantile and industrial companies, administrative institutions, schools, etc., whereas the Moscow Decision on Korea stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include into the list

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

However, subsequent to registration the US Delegation stated its willingness to exclude from consultation by mutual agreement any organization whose "social" character could be questioned under common dictionary definition.

District and purely local organizations are not barred from consultation by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, or by Joint Commission Decision No. 12. The US Delegation made several proposals which would have eliminated from consultation a large number of organizations claimed to be purely local by the Soviet Delegation.

for consultation those organizations which are not social.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that among those filing applications for participation in consultation from South Korea there were branches of central organizations, narrowly local insignificant organizations of non-zonal character. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include these organizations into the list for consultation, declaring that in its opinion, the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of zonal scale. At the same time the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations of both Northern and Southern Korea is very great and that if the Joint Commission would consult with all local insignificant organizations, its work could be greatly delayed and confused.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Fraudulent organizations could be excluded from consultation by mutual agreement provided that no such organizations be excluded where the sole claim of fraud was exaggeration of membership, a fact evident in some applications of both North and South Korea organizations.

Upon analyzing the preliminary list of parties and organizations of Southern Korea submitted to Subcommission No. 1 by the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation noted the total membership of these parties and organizations expressed by figures of 70,000,000 individuals while the entire population of Southern Korea consists of approximately 20,300,000 people. This signifies that every adult Korean, whether a man or woman, maintains membership in 8 organizations, which is remote from the actuality. Such a contention could not fail to arouse doubts regarding the correctness of the information submitted by some of the parties and organizations, especially so since soon thereafter the facts of submission of false information had been established in Subcommission No. 1. Furthermore, even in the course of the preliminary study of the South Korean list, non-existent organizations has been disclosed. In this connection, the Soviet Delegation proposed to check the organizations whose existence or whose membership arouses doubts.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Organizations which are or have been members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization are eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreement if they have applied for consultation and have signed the required declaration; they remain eligible unless and until they are by mutual agreement excluded after indictment for "fomenting and inciting active opposition" as provided by Point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence.

The Soviet Delegation declared that in accordance with the Agreement reached between the foreign minister of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the U.S., George C. Marshall, during April - May 1947, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea and which after signing the declaration do not incite active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission or against one of the Allied Powers or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

On the basis of this, the Soviet Delegation introduced a proposal stating that parties and social organizations which had filed applications for participation in consultation which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation only provided they withdraw from that committee and cease struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Adequate evidence to support an indictment justifying the exclusion from consultation of organizations which are or have been members of the Anti-Trusteehip Committee has not been submitted to the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation has made persistent and continuous efforts to exclude 24 rightist parties and organizations which they claim are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee from the list of organizations to be consulted. This is an arbitrary unilateral exercise of veto power in violation of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, which specifies that exclusion shall be by mutual agreement only.

The Soviet Delegation has challenged no political party or social organization under point 3 of the agreed proposals for reconvening the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation submitted a list of 146 parties and organizations of both North and South Korea with a membership in excess of 10,000 whose eligibility for consultation they were willing to discuss. This list failed to include 24 parties and organizations stated by the

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that after the reconvention of the Commission and even following the publication of the decisions of the Joint Commission on the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had not only failed to discontinue, but, as is shown by numerous and widely known facts presented by the Soviet Delegation at the sessions of the Joint Commission, actually intensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, striving to frustrate its work on the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until and unless the parties and organizations which /are affiliated with that Committee state that they withdraw from that Committee, they continue to bear responsibility for its activities. The Soviet Delegation further indicated that parties and organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, thus undertook the obligation to fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time, while continuing their membership in that Committee, the aforementioned parties and

 SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Soviet Delegation to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, but no acceptable evidence or indictment was presented. Evidence available to the U.S. Delegation shows that only 9 of the 24 parties were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and no further reasons for excluding the remaining organizations were presented to the Joint Commission.

organizations retained their signature under the program of the Committee which contains the obligation to struggle against the Moscow Decision and they continue actually to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. The one is not compatible with the other.

Whereas the discussion regarding the list was delaying the beginning of the oral consultation, the Soviet Delegation in order to expedite the work of the Commission, had many times proposed to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations with which there were no objections on either the Soviet or the American Delegation without awaiting for the compilation of the final list. This proposal was declined.

The Soviet Delegation likewise frequently proposed to charge Subcommission No. 1 with examining specifically the objections or remarks regarding each organization separately, but the American Delegation declined these proposals.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

While the Soviet Delegation stated that the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee would be considered for consultation with the Joint Commission if they publicly withdrew from that organization, the U.S. Delegation refused to demand any such act by these parties and organizations on the basis that it was tantamount to a refusal of the Joint Commission to accept their signatures in good faith. In spite of this, the 9 organizations which were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, together with other members of the United Council, submitted a letter to the Joint Commission, which was published in the press, stating that they intended to cooperate fully with the Joint Commission and that they only reserved the right to express an honest difference of opinion with respect to aid and assistance (trusteeship) in a form which would greatly limit the sovereignty of the Korean Government.

The Soviet Delegation has frequently proposed to summon to the sessions of Subcommission No. 1 or to sessions of the Joint Commission the representatives of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee in order to more fully define their position regarding the Moscow Decision and the work of Joint Commission. The American Delegation declined these proposals.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

While the Soviet Delegation insisted that its actions to exclude a large group of rightist parties were not politically motivated, an analysis of the above proposal of the Soviet Delegation indicates that acceptance of this proposal would in fact give parties and organizations affiliated with the Democratic Peoples Front an overwhelming majority in consultation. The figures supporting this statement are as follows:

(1) Of 460 groups which applied for consultation (excluding three applicants both Delegations agreed to exclude forfraud), 38, all members of the Democratic People's Front, were from North Korea, while 422, representing all shades of political views, were from South Korea.

The Soviet Delegation declined the assertion of the American Delegation claiming that the inclusion of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee into the list for the consultation is indispensable in order to preserve the definite and allegedly firmly established correlation in the political life of Korea between the parties of the rightist and leftist orientation in proportion to three to two. Pointing out that it is impossible to conduct the work of the Joint Commission upon party basis, the Soviet Delegation declared this Joint Commission must be predicated on as regards the question of consultation with Korean parties and organizations upon the attitude of those latter toward the Moscow Decision and not upon their belonging to this or that political orientation.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

6. The Soviet objections to the U. S. Delegation's statement of its position were, in brief, as follows (the numbers below refer to correspondingly numbered subparagraphs of paragraph 7, exhibit):

(2) The word "automatically" is not included in paragraph 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 (exhibit). No list exists until one has been approved by the Joint Commission.

(3) "Eligibility" and "admission" have never been discussed. The Soviet Delegation has not attempted to use a veto power.

(4) The Soviet Delegation will not use the dictionary definition of the word "social." The Soviets have indicated that they will express their opinion as to whether an organization is social or not when discussing a list of organizations to be consulted.

(5) The words "claimed to be purely local by the Soviet Delegation" should be deleted so that the rest of the paragraph will state the American position.

(6) Exaggeration of membership was not evident in the applications of North Korea organizations; their figures "correspond to reality" in that the population of North Korea is 11,000,000, whereas the total claimed membership of the applicant parties is only 13,000,000.

(8) The paragraph is an argument, not a position; the Soviet Delegation has presented facts to support its accusations; the Soviet Delegation did not insist on excluding 24 of the parties, but only that they withdraw from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee before being consulted.

(9) The paragraph is an argument, not a position.

(10) The paragraph is an argument, not a position; the U. S. Delegation is interpreting the Soviet position; due to the opposition of the U.S. Delegation, the Soviet

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Delegation has not been able to obtain answers from the signatories concerning questions which arose in the Soviet Delegation and has not been able to determine the authenticity of the letter.

(11) The figures have not been checked by anyone.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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SUPPLEMENT

New paragraph No.3

3. In the 54th meeting (20 August 1947) of the Joint Commission, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation objected to the arrests of Leftists in South Korea, and to alleged persecution of the Leftist Press and Leftist organizations in South Korea (exhibit _____). The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation pointed out, before a full answer could be given, that the Joint Commission had no responsibility at this time for governing Korea, and that it appeared that the Soviet Delegation was attempting to interfere with the Government of South Korea. When the Soviet Delegation, without waiting for a full reply, issued its statement as presented in the 54th meeting to the press on 22 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation presented a fuller answer in the 55th meeting (25 August 1947) of the Joint Commission in which he cautioned the Soviet Delegation to avoid entanglement in Korean politics and dismissed as absurd the Soviet contention that fulfillment of the Moscow Decision was being impeded by the arrest of a few individuals. He offered to join with the Soviet Delegation in requesting the release of any individual desired for consultation, and pointed out that unless member groups of the Democratic People's Front would cease their hostile actions in embarrassing and undermining the governmental functions in the U.S. zone, their leaders must accept the responsibility for the illegal acts of their parties and organizations. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation presented a counter reply in his statement to the press of 28 August 1947 (exhibit _____).

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT

9 September 1947

SUPPLEMENT TO U.S.DELEGATION'S REPORT OF 20 AUGUST 1947

INTRODUCTION

1. The following report is submitted as a supplement to the U.S. Delegation Report of 20 August 1947.

2. From 20 August 1947 through 5 September 1947, the Joint Commission held its 54th through 59th meetings. Discussion centered upon the Soviet Delegation's objections to arrests of Leftists in South Korea and alleged persecution of the Leftist Press and Leftist organizations in South Korea; a proposal of the Soviet Delegation concerning consultation with political parties and social organizations, and the drafting of the Joint Report requested by Secretary of State Marshall whose request was agreed to by Foreign Minister Mr. Molotov.

THE ISSUE OF ARRESTS OF LEFTISTS IN SOUTH KOREA AND ALLEGED PERSECUTION OF THE LEFTIST PRESS & LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA

3. In the 54th meeting (20 August 1947) of the Joint Commission, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation objected to the arrests of Leftists in South Korea, and to alleged persecution of the Leftist Press and Leftist organizations in South Korea (exhibit _____). The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation replied to the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation in the 55th meeting (25 August 1947) of the Joint Commission (exhibit _____). The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation presented a counter reply in his statement to the press of 28 August 1947 (exhibit ____).

SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 26 AUGUST 1947 COUNTERING U.S. PROPOSAL OF 12 AUGUST 1947

4. In the 56th meeting (26 August 1947) of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation presented a counter proposal to the U.S. Delegation's proposal of 12 August 1947 (see pages _____ of U.S.Delegation Report, 20 August 1947). The proposal was rejected by the U.S.Delegation in the 57th meeting (3 September 1947) of the Joint Commission (exhibit ____) because it did not change the basic position of the Soviet Delegation regarding consultation..

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

JOINT REPORT

5. In his letter to Foreign Minister Molotov of 12 August 1947, Secretary of State Marshall requested that the Joint Commission be directed to prepare and submit to the two governments a joint report concerning the "status of its deliberations". (exhibit _____). Replying to Mr.Marshall on 22 August 1947, Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government had no objection to the submission of a Joint Report. (exhibit _____).

6. As the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation announced in the 55th meeting (25 August 1947) of the Joint Commission that the Soviet Delegation had received a copy of the Molotov letter of 22 August 1947, the Joint Commission was then able to initiate work upon a joint report. In the same meeting, the Joint Commission charged Subcommission No.1 with drafting an outline plan for the preparation of a joint report (exhibit _____).

7. In the 15th meeting (26 August 1947) of Subcommission No.1, only the U.S. Delegate presented a draft outline (exhibit _____). The two Delegates were unable to reach an agreement regarding a proposed outline of the report, in Subcommission No.1. Discussion of the outline was continued by the Joint Commission in its 56th meeting (26 August 1947) wherein the Soviet Delegation presented its proposed outline. (exhibit _____). It was decided in that Joint Commission meeting that each Delegate in Subcommission No.1 should prepare a draft joint report on the basis of his outline. The two outlines were essentially the same with the exception that the U.S. Delegation's outline included provisions for a review of the Joint Commission's work in 1946 as well as in 1947. The U.S. Delegation proposed to begin the report with a review of the 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission, in order to indicate fully the development of the substantive disagreement, resulting in the current impasse in the work of the Joint Commission, by tracing the fundamental causes for the disagreement from their inception in 1946, ~~when they resulted in the sine die adjournment of the Joint Commission~~, and through their re-emergence during the 1947 sessions. However, the Soviet Delegation objected to the inclusion of any reference to the 1946 meetings on the grounds that it would be unnecessary and accordingly did not include a provision for such a review in its outline. In the opinion of the U.S. Delegation the Soviet Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

opposed the inclusion of a review of the 1946 meetings because of a fear that this would greatly strengthen the U.S. position by more clearly indicating the Soviet avowed intention of setting up in Korea a Leftist-dominated state "loyal to the Soviet Union".

8. The two Delegates drafted proposed joint reports and exchanged them in the 16th meeting (30 August 1947) of Subcommission No.1 (exhibits _____).

9. In the 17th meeting (1 September 1947) of Subcommission No.1, the Soviet Delegate stated that the U.S. draft was not acceptable and the U.S. Delegate stated that the Soviet draft was not acceptable. The differences of opinion centered largely in the statements of positions of the two Delegations regarding consultation with political parties and social organizations. In view of the apparently irreconciliable differences of opinion the U.S.Delegate made the following proposals:

(a) That both reports be sent to the two governments together with a covering letter, signed by the Chief Commissioners, stating that the U.S. Delegation's report was not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation and that the Soviet Delegation's report was not acceptable to the U.S.Delegation.

(b) That the U.S.Delegation would accept the Soviet Delegation's position as presented by the Soviet Delegation if the Soviet Delegation would accept the U.S.Delegation's position as presented by the U.S.Delegation; both positions to be plainly labelled, and included in the body of a joint report.

10. Neither of the two proposals was acceptable to the Soviet Delegation, on the grounds that they did not constitute a genuinely "joint" report as purportedly stipulated in the instructions of the Foreign Ministers.

11. In the same meeting of Subcommission No.1, the U.S. Delegate agreed to delete the review of the 1946 meetings contained in the U.S. draft.

12. Both Delegates agreed to revise their draft joint reports in the 18th meeting (1 September 1947) of Subcommission No.1 and to attempt to meet the objection of the other Delegate.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

13. Re-drafts of the joint report were exchanged in the 19th meeting (3 September 1947) of Subcommission No.1. After a detailed discussion of disagreements, it was more apparent than ever that agreement on a Joint Report was extremely unlikely practically unobtainable. The U.S. Delegate reiterated his proposals outlined in (a) and (b) of paragraph 9 above and they were again refused by the Soviet Delegate. Further, the Soviet Delegate insisted that the statement of the U.S. position should not refer to or be critical of the Soviet position; that it be "objective" to the extent of being acceptable to the Soviet Delegate as a true statement of fact; that it be non-argumentative in wording.

14. In the 20th meeting (4 September 1947) of Subcommission No.1, the U.S. Delegate submitted a second re-draft of the statement of the U.S. position regarding consultation which was not acceptable to the Soviet Delegate. Discussion of the differences of opinion continued through the 21st meeting (4 September 1947) of Subcommission No.1, with the U.S. Delegate again presenting the proposals outlined in (a) and (b) of paragraph 9 above, which were again rejected by the Soviet Delegate. The issue of the Joint Report was then submitted to the Joint Commission.

15. During the discussion of the final drafts of the report, in the 58th and 59th meetings (4 & 5 September 1947) of the Joint Commission, it was apparent, as it had been in Subcommission No.1, that agreement might be reached on part No.1 of the Joint Report, (introduction and a statement of Joint Commission Decisions) and on Part No.3 (statement of proposals and counter-proposals of both Delegations to the time of the joint report, beginning with U.S. proposal of 29 July 1947). However, it was significant that the Soviet Delegation was evidently objecting to the injection of any reference to the issue of freedom of expression, when it refused to include the following paragraph appearing in the introductory section of the U.S. draft:

> "... Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall specifically agreed to widescale participation of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations in the formation of a Provisional Government. Moreover, Mr. Marshall pointed out in his letter of 2 May 1947 that Korean representatives

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." Mr. Molotov did not take exception to this position."

16. The disagreements regarding the respective statements of each Delegation's position (Part No.2 of the final drafts) which arose in the course of detailed discussions in Subcommission No.1, were continued without change in the 58th and 59th meetings of the Joint Commission, and it became increasingly unlikely that agreement could be reached unless the U.S. Delegation was prepared completely to emasculate the statement of its own position.

17. The specific objections of the Soviet Delegation to the U.S. statement of the position in its final draft were as follows:

(a) Subparagraph (2) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. Delegation's draft ~~reads as follows~~:

"Political parties and social organizations signing the declaration contained in Communique No.5 are automatically eligible for consultation and constitute the list for consultation provided in paragraph No.5 of Joint Commission Decision No.12. They may be removed from this list and excluded from consultation only for just cause and by mutual agreement of the two Delegations."

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation contended that the above was not a "statement of fact" in that the word "automatically" was not included in paragraph No.5 of Joint Commission Decision No.12 and that no list for consultation existed until one had been approved by the Joint Commission. To the Soviet Delegation's objection, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation pointed out that, in fact, "signing the declaration in Communique No.5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and <u>will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation</u>" (point 1 of Marshall-Molotov agreement). The Chief Commissioner of the U.S.Delegation also pointed out that according to paragraph 5 of Joint Commission

 SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Decision No.12, a list of organizations signing the declaration had been compiled and, therefore, those organizations on the list were eligible for consultation unless excluded in accordance with the procedure ~~provided~~ stipulated in point 3 of the Marshall-Molotov Agreement.

(b) Sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. Delegation's final draft ~~reads as follows~~:

"The distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility" for consultation" and "admission for consultation" is an effort of the Soviet Delegation to obtain the power to exclude unilaterally any party or social organization to which it is opposed. This position is a violation of the agreement reached by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov and, in effect, would give to the Soviet Delegation a veto power."

In objecting to the above, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation claimed that the question of "eligibility" and "admission" had never been discussed, and denied that the Soviet Delegation had violated the Marshall-Molotov Agreement or attempted to use a veto power. The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation declared that the matter of "eligibility" and "admission" had been clearly pointed out before and quoted from the transcript of Subcommission No.1 and the Joint Commission in support of his thesis. In addition, he showed that the Soviet distinction between eligibility for consultation and admission to consultation constituted, in effect, arrogation of a veto power to the Soviet Delegation, in that it would grant that Delegation the prerogative, inconsistent with the agreed procedure stipulating mutual agreement, of unilaterally excluding any organization from consultation by the simple expedient of withholding its inclusion on a list.

(c) Sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. final draft ~~reads as follows~~:

"The U.S.Delegation repeatedly tried to obtain agreement on the definition of political parties and social organizations. Due to opposition of the Soviet Delegation the Joint Commission was unable to agree upon definitions of terms undefined in the Moscow Agreement,

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

such as 'social organization', and no such definitions could therefore be included in Joint Commission Decision No.12. However, subsequent to registration the U.S.Delegation stated its willingness to exclude from consultation by mutual agreement any organization whose "social" character could be questioned under common dictionary definition."

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation objected to the inclusion of "Due to the opposition of the Soviet Delegation the Joint Commission was unable to agree upon definitions of terms undefined in the Moscow Agreement, such as 'social organization', and no such definitions could therefore be included in Joint Commission Decision No.12." He based his opposition to the above on the stand that the Soviet Delegation had indicated in the past that it would express its opinion as to whether an organization is social or not when discussing a list of organizations. He also indicated that the meaning of the expression "social organization" was universally understood, and that dictionary definitions were not binding on the Soviet Delegation. Quoting from the record, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation reviewed the attempts of the U.S. Delegation to secure definitions and criteria - all of which were rejected by the Soviet Delegation, which offered no alternative suggestions but agreed not to limit in any way the number of parties and social organizations applying for consultation.

(d) Sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph No.7 of the U.S. draft ~~reads as follows:~~

"District and purely local organizations are not barred from consultation by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, or by Joint Commission Decision No.12. The U.S. Delegation made several proposals which would have eliminated from consultation a large number of organizations claimed to be purely local by the Soviet Delegation."

The Soviet Delegation insisted upon the elimination of the words "claimed to be purely local by the Soviet Delegation", but the U.S. Delegation refused to do so on the ground that the sentence containing those words was correctly stated.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(e) Sub-paragraph (6) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. final draft ~~reads as~~ follows:

"Fraudulent organizations could be excluded from consultation by mutual agreement provided that no such organization be excluded where the sole claim of fraud was exaggeration of membership, a fact evident in some applications of both North and South Korea organizations."

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation objected to reference to North Korean organizations, stating that it corresponds to reality when North Korea has a population of 11,000,000 and the total number of members of the North Korean organizations applying for consultation is 13,000,000. (The Chief Commissioner of the U.S.Delegation jokingly replied that "It is a real figure (13,000,000) providing you include about 9 million people not yet old enough to hold a franchise and about 4½ million not yet born")

(f) Sub-paragraph (8) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. final draft ~~reads as~~ follows:

"Adequate evidence to support an indictment justifying the exclusion from consultation of organizations which are or have been members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee has not been submitted to the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation has made persistent and continuous efforts to exclude 24 Rightist parties and organizations which they claim are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee from the list of organizations to be consulted. This is an arbitrary unilateral exercise of veto power in violation of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, which specified that exclusion shall be by mutual agreement only."

Soviet objections to the above were as follows:

(1) The whole paragraph is not a position but an argument to defend the position of the U.S. Delegation.

(2) The Soviet Delegation has presented "facts" which showed the struggle of parties and organizations which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee against the Moscow Agreement and the Joint Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(3) The Soviet Delegation did not insist upon the exclusion of 24 parties. It only pointed out that they should not be included unless they would withdraw and ~~close~~ cease their struggle against the Moscow Decision.

(4) The reference of the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Delegation's exercise of a veto power is an argument, not a position.

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation stated that he had frequently pointed out to the Soviet Delegation that the Foreign Ministers had foreseen the possibility that it might be necessary to challenge a political party or social organization which fomented or incited active opposition against the Moscow Agreement and established the proper ... and only ... procedure, in point 3 of the agreement, whereby either Delegation could indict and recommend for elimination such a party or social organization for cause and by mutual agreement. In addition, he pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not used that method because ~~they~~ it knew that ~~they~~ it did not have the evidence which would justify the exclusion of any of these parties or organizations by the due process stipulated in the agreement reached by the Ministers; ~~so~~ thus that Soviet Delegation attempted to arbitrarily exclude them by unilateral exclusion from the list.

(g) Sub-paragraph (9) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. final draft ~~reads~~ as ~~follows~~:

"The Soviet Delegation has challenged no political party or social organization under point 3 of the agreed proposals for reconvening the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation submitted a list of 146 parties and organizations of both North and South Korea with a membership in excess of 10,000 whose eligibility for consultation they were willing to discuss. This list failed to include 24 parties and organizations stated by the Soviet Delegation to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee but no acceptable evidence or indictment was presented. Evidence available to the U.S. Delegation shows that only 9 of the 24 parties were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and no further reasons for excluding the remaining organizations were presented to the Joint Commission."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In objecting to the above, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation asserted that it was "argument" not a statement of position. The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation replied that the paragraph not only presents the position of the U.S. Delegation but also shows the incorrectness of Soviet proposals.

(h) Sub-paragraph(10)of paragraph 7 of the U.S. final draft: ~~is as follows~~:

"While the Soviet Delegation stated that the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee would be considered for consultation with the Joint Commission if they publicly withdrew from that organization, the U.S. Delegation refused to demand any such act by these parties and organizations on the basis that it was tantamount to a refusal of the Joint Commission to accept their signatures in good faith. In spite of this the 9 organizations which were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, together with other members of the United Council, submitted a letter to the Joint Commission, which was published in the press, stating that they intended to cooperate fully with the Joint Commission and that they only reserved the right to express an honest difference of opinion with respect to aid and assistance (trusteeship) in a form which would greatly limit the sovereignty of the Korean Government."

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation objected to the above on the following grounds:

(1) It is an argumentative statement.

(2) The U.S. Delegation should interpret only its position and not ~~the position~~ that of the Soviet Delegation.

(3) ~~Inasmuch as~~ whereas the U.S. Delegation refused to have the organizations signing the above mentioned letter summoned to a Joint Commission meeting, the Soviet Delegation had not been able to ~~clarify~~ obtain proper clarifications regarding the questions posed by the letter nor had it established the letter's authenticity.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(4) ~~There is~~ A suspicion arises that the letter was composed with the assistance of the U.S. Delegation.

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation replied as follows:

(1) It is essential to a proper understanding that the paragraph and the reference to the letter be included.

(2) Instead of withdrawing their support from the Joint Commission and refusing to have anything further to do with those who question their honesty, these parties and organizations informed the Joint Commission that the accusations against them were not well-founded and pledged themselves to support the Joint Commission as they had agreed to do in their signed declarations.

(3) The letter is more creditable than any evidence offered by the Soviet Delegation upon which they base the right to exclude these parties and social organizations. It bears the "chops" of individuals known to the U.S. Delegation,

(4) The Soviet Delegation's allegation that the U.S. Delegation wrote the letter is totally unfounded and is denied by the U.S.Delegation.

(i) Sub-paragraph (11) of paragraph 7 of the U.S. final draft: ~~is as~~ ~~follows:~~

"While the Soviet Delegation insisted that its actions to exclude a large group of Rightist parties were not politically motivated, an analysis of the above proposal of the Soviet Delegation indicates that acceptance of this proposal would in fact give parties and organizations affiliated with the Democratic People's Front an overwhelming majority in consultation. The figures supporting this statement are as follows:

(1) of 460 groups which applied for consultation (excluding three applicants both Delegations agreed to exclude for fraud), 38, all members of the Democratic People's Front, were from North Korea, while 422, representing all shades of political views, were from South Korea.

(2) These 460 groups can be roughly and approximately classified: People's Front - 136 groups, 27,296,000 claimed members,

 SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

41% of total claimed membership; Moderates - 72 groups, 14,785,000 claimed members, 22%; Right - 252 groups, 24,920,000 claimed members 37%.

(3) Acceptance of the Soviet list would give the following political alignment for all Korea:

(a) People's Front and other Leftists - 75 groups, claimed membership 32,417,000.

(b) Right and Moderate - 71 groups, claimed membership - 18,581,000.

(c) Eliminated Right and Moderate Right - 24 groups, claimed membership - 15,286,000.

(d) Eliminated Left - none."

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation objected to the above, asserting that it was an arbitrary argument and an arithmetical calculation which had not been checked by anybody. The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation replied that the figures quoted in the above paragraph were correctly stated and the implication was properly pointed and essential to the position of the U.S. Delegation as stated.

18. The specific objections of the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Delegation's statement of its position in its final draft were as follows:

(a) Paragraph 1 of the Soviet Delegation's Statement of its position: ~~as follows~~:

"Among the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which had filed applications for participation in consultation, there were organizations which are not social-mercantile and industrial companies, administrative institutions, schools, etc., whereas the Moscow Decision on Korea stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include into the list for consultation those organizations which are not social."

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S.Delegation pointed out that, judging from the types of organizations classified as non-social by the Soviet Delegation, there were "non-social" organizations included on the list of 38 organizations applying for consultation in North Korea. He also declared that the Soviet

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Delegation ~~branded~~ characterized some organizations as "non-social" which come within dictionary definition of "social". When the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation replied that the statement in the paragraph above corresponds with the position of the Soviet Delegation, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation agreed and stated that the U.S. Delegation accepts it as such.

(b) Paragraph 2 of the Soviet Delegation's statement of its position ~~is as follows:~~

"The Soviet Delegation pointed out that among those filing applications for participation in consultation from South Korea there were branches of central organizations narrowly local insignificant organizations of non-zonal character. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include these organizations into the list for consultation, declaring that in its opinion, the Decision No.12 of the Joint Commission stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of zonal scale. At the same time the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations of both Northern and Southern Korea is very great and that if the Joint Commission would consult with all local insignificant organizations, its work could be greatly delayed and confused."

Regarding the Soviet Delegations contention concerning organizations "non-zonal" ~~issue~~ in nature, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation pointed out that paragraph No.3 of Joint Decision No.12 which the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation attempted to use to substantiate the above, concerns only the submission of application and it is not a stipulation that the Joint Commission ~~can~~ must consult with organizations of zonal scale only. He also stressed that the U.S. Delegation had submitted a plan whereby consultation with all organizations applying for consultation would have been completed in two weeks - thus speeding up the work of the Joint Commission. In spite of his objections, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation was willing to accept the above as a statement of the Soviet Delegation's position.

(c) Paragraph 3 of the Soviet Delegation's statement of its position: ~~is as follows:~~

"The Soviet Delegation declared that in accordance with the agreement reached between the foreign minister of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Secretary of State of the U.S., George C. Marshall, during April-May 1947, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea and which after signing the declaration do not incite active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission or against one of the Allied Powers or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

" On the basis of this, the Soviet Delegation introduced a proposal stating that parties and social organizations which had filed applications for participation in consultation which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation only provided they withdraw from that Committee and cease to struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

" The Soviet Delegation pointed out that after the reconvention of the Commission and even following the publication of the decisions of the Joint Commission on the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had not only failed to discontinue, but as is shown by numerous and widely known facts presented by the Soviet Delegation at the sessions of the Joint Commission actually intensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, striving to frustrate its work on the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until and unless the parties and organizations are affiliated with that Committee state that they withdraw from that Committee, they continue to bear responsibility for its activities. The Soviet Delegation further indicated that parties and organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, thus undertook the obligation to fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time, while continuing their membership in that Committee, the aforementioned parties and organizations retained their signature under the program of the Committee which contains the obligation to struggle against the Moscow Decision and they continue actually to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. The one is not compatible with the other."

 SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The objections of the Chief Commissioner of the U.S.Delegation to the above were as follows:

(1) The first paragraph is not a correct statement of fact as it quotes none of the three agreed proposals of the Foreign Ministers.

(2) The second paragraph is based on a false assumption and an incorrect statement, and the Soviet Delegation has not established the "fact" that any party or organization has actually been struggling against the Moscow Agreement.

(3) Regarding the third paragraph, ample proof was submitted before the Joint Commission showing that the contentions of the Soviet Delegation regarding alleged members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee were not correct. It was pointed out that organizations signing the declaration did not pledge themselves to uphold fully (every paragraph, sentence, clause, word and punctuation mark) the Moscow Agreement. In fact, they pledged themselves to cooperate with the Joint Commission in working out the terms of the Moscow Agreement.

In reference to paragraph 3 of the Soviet Delegation's final draft, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation asserted that it was a correct statement of facts, that the Soviet Delegation had presented numerous facts supporting its contention regarding the member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and that the statements correspond to the conditions of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence.

(d) Paragraph No.4 of the Soviet Delegation's ~~final draft is as follows:~~ statement of its position.

"The Soviet Delegation has frequently proposed to summon to the sessions of Subcommission No.1 or to sessions of the Joint Commission the representatives of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee in order to more fully define their position regarding the Moscow Decision and the work of Joint Commission. The U.S. Delegation declined these proposals."

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Concerning the above, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation declared that the statement that the U.S. Delegation declined these proposals is correct, but that the Soviet Delegation should also state that the U.S. Delegation insisted that the Soviet Delegation challenge such organizations under point No.3 of the agreement between the two Ministers and not eliminate them arbitrarily. (He ~~implied~~ intimated it was his understanding that the Soviet Delegation realized that it could not make use of point 3 because it called for exclusion by mutual agreement for cause - ~~and~~ but that it had not presented a justifiable cause, nor could it accept exclusion by mutual agreement and still obtain its political objectives.) The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation replied that the Soviet Delegation considered and still considers that it had the right to invite any party or organization to a session of the Joint Commission and to clarify any questions they had concerning such parties and organizations. He asserted that the U.S. Delegation would not comply with the Soviet Delegations wish because it "allegedly" contradicted the Marshall-Molotov Agreement. In fact, he said the U.S. Delegation would not invite such parties and organizations to a session of the Joint Commission because this would not be profitable to the U.S. Delegation.

(e) Paragraph 5 of the Soviet Delegation's final draftof its statement of its position is as follows:

"The Soviet Delegation declined the assertion of the U.S.Delegation claiming that the inclusion of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee into the list for the consultation is indispensable in order to preserve the definite and allegedly firmly established correlation in the political life of Korea between the parties of the rightist and leftist orientation in proportion of three to two. Pointing out that it is impossible to conduct the work of the Joint Commission upon party basis, the Soviet Delegation declared this Joint Commission must be predicated on as regards the question of consultation with Korean parties and organizations upon the attitude of those latter toward the Moscow Decision and not upon their belonging to this or that political orientation."

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation declared that there is nothing in the Moscow Agreement that supports the contention that the question of consultation with Korean parties and organizations must be predicated upon the attitude of parties and organizations toward the Moscow Agreement. He added that the Moscow Agreement clearly (and only) provides that consultation will be with political parties and social organizations. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation asserted that the statement in paragraph 5 of the Soviet Delegation's final draft was made in conformity with agreements binding upon the Joint Commission.

(f) Paragraph No.6 of the Soviet Delegation's ~~final draft of its~~ statement of position: ~~is as follows~~:

"Analysing the preliminary list of parties and organizations of Southern Korea submitted to Subcommission No.1 by the U.S.Delegation, the Soviet Delegation noted the total membership of these parties and organizations was expressed by figures of ~~56,000,000~~ 70,000,000 individuals while the entire population of Southern Korea consists of approximately ~~20,300,000~~ 18,000,000 people. This signifies that every adult Korean whether a man or woman maintains membership in 3 organizations which is remote from the actuality. Such a contention could not fail to arouse doubts regarding the correctness of the information submitted by some of the parties and organizations especially so since soon thereafter the facts of submission of false information has been established in Subcommission No.1. Furthermore, even in the course of the preliminary study of the South Korean list, non-existent organizations has been disclosed. In this connection, the Soviet Delegation proposed to check the organizations whose existence or whose membership arouses doubts."

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation asserted that the figure 70,000,000 should be 56,000,000, and the figure 18,000,000 should be 20,300,000, The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation ~~asserted~~ declared that the Soviet Delegation's statistics were correct.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(g) Paragraph No.7 of the Soviet Delegation's ~~final draft of its~~ statement of its position: ~~is as follows:~~

"Whereas the discussion regarding the list was delaying the beginning of the oral consultation, the Soviet Delegation in order to expedite the work of the Commission, had many times proposed to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding consultation with which there were no objections on either the Soviet or the U.S. Delegation without waiting for the compilation of the final list. This proposal was declined."

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation pointed out that the above-mentioned proposal had been declined by the U.S. Delegation because the only objection came from the Soviet Delegation and it objected to parties and organizations which were not members of the Democratic People's Front. He also stated that the U.S. Delegation could not agree to commence consultation until the Soviet Delegation agreed to conduct consultation on a wide basis as provided in the agreement between the two Ministers and as agreed to in Joint Commission Decision No.12. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation denied that the Soviet Delegation was willing to consult only with parties and organizations affiliated with thenDemocratic People's Front.

(h) Paragraph No.8 of the Soviet Delegation's ~~final draft of its~~ statement of its position: ~~is as follows:~~

"The Soviet Delegation likewise frequently proposed to charge Subcommission No.1 with examining specifically the objections or remarks regarding each organization separately but the U.S. Delegation declined these proposals."

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation objected to the above as follows:

(1) The statement does not mention the fact that the U.S.Delegation submitted at least 7 proposals which would have put Subcommission No.1 to work and would have enabled the Joint Commission to complete much of its work.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(2) The Soviet Delegation did not submit a proposal in the terms which it stated in paragraph 8 of its final draft of its statement of position. A correct statement would be as follows: "The Soviet Delegation likewise frequently proposed to charge Subcommission No.1 with examining specifically the parties and organizations which had applied for consultation and to prepare by mutual agreement a list composed of those parties and organizations which both Delegations were willing to accept for consultation."

(3) When the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation declared that the Soviet Delegation was referring to its proposal of 10 July 1947 to examine a list submitted by the Soviet Delegation, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation pointed out that the list did not include 24 of the major rightist parties and organizations and included only parties and organizations with a membership in excess of 10,000. Thus, the Soviet Delegation was reserving to itself the right of unilateral exclusion - a violation of agreements binding upon the Joint Commission.

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation insisted that paragraph No.8 of the final draft of the Soviet Delegation's position was correct.

(i) Paragraph No.9 of the Soviet Delegation's ~~final draft of its~~ its statement of position: ~~is as follows~~:

"As regards the question of compilation of the list the Soviet Delegation declares that whereas Subcommission No.1 had not submitted an agreed list of parties and organizations, it devolves upon the Joint Commission to decide which parties and organizations which had filed application must be included into a list for initial oral consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision and Joint Decision No.12 of the Joint Commission. It will be possible to exclude from the list only when there will be available a list approved by the Commission. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the position of the U.S. Delegation regarding this question tends

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"to make the Joint Commission consult with all parties and organizations which had filed application~~s and signed the declaration~~ which the U.S. Delegation deems it necessary to invite for consultation."

The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation suggested that the words "Moscow Decision and Joint Commission Decision No.12 of the Joint Commission"should be deleted and replaced by "the principle of mutual agreement for inclusion enunciated by the Soviet Delegation." Also, after the word "application" should be inserted the words "and signed declaration"~~.~~ and "U.S." in the last line should be changed to "either". The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation declared that with these changes the statement would be almost correct. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation stated that the paragraph corresponds to the Soviet Delegation's position.

19. Failing agreement on the wording of a Joint Report, the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation made the following proposals:

(a) That the full report of each Delegation be transmitted to the two Governments concerned with a covering letter signed by the two Chief Commissioners stating that neither side agreed fully with the contents of the other's report.

(b) That the section of the two reports dealing with the positions of the two Delegations be extracted from the full reports and transmitted to the Governments concerned with a covering letter of the nature indicated in (a) above.

20. Both proposals were declined by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation who asserted that ~~they~~ neither would ~~not provide~~ constitute a "joint" report. When the Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation inquired of the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation what suggestions he had for resolving the difficulties, he replied that he had no proposals to make. The Chief Commissioner of the U.S. Delegation then proposed, as the only other alternative, that each Delegation report to its Government that no agreement could be reached on a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation accepted this proposal.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

21. In the discussions regarding the Joint Report it became quite clear that the Soviet Delegation wished to prepare a joint report which would obscure the basic disagreements regarding consultation. The Soviet Delegation attempted to remove from the U.S. statement of its position all factual statements which accurately portrayed the U.S. position and explained essential points of difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions. In its statement of position, the Soviet Delegation continued its distortion of agreements binding upon the Joint Commission.

22. In view of the restatement of differences of opinion evolving from the discussion of a joint report, it is clear to the U.S. Delegation that the discussion and conclusions in the report of 20 August 1947 have not only been further verified, but have been strengthened.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT

JOINT REPORT 29 August 1947

INTRODUCTION

1. In his letter of 12 August 1947 to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed that the US - USSR Joint Commission submit a report concerning "the status of its deliberations" to the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. Replying to Mr. Marshall on 22 August 1947, Mr. Molotov stated, in reference to the report proposed by Mr. Marshall, that the Soviet Government "does not object to your proposal". Therefore, in accordance with the agreement of the Foreign Ministers, the US-USSR Joint Commission presents the following report which covers the background and progress of the Joint Commission through the _____ meeting held _____.

2. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 participated in by the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, pledged independence to Korea in due course. This pledge was reaffirmed at Potsdam on 26 July 1945 and subscribed to by the U.S.S.R. upon its declaration of war on Japan.

3. The agreement of the Allied Powers to permit American and Soviet troops to enter Korea for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces, caused an arbitrary division of Korea.

4. On 27 December 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom announced the Moscow Agreement, Section III of which was designed to implement the declarations made at Cairo and at Potsdam providing for Korea's independence. The Moscow Agreement on Korea was subsequently subscribed to by China.

5. The Moscow Agreement provided for the establishment of the US - USSR Joint Commission which was charged with the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state free from domination of any foreign country, the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and elaborating methods of aiding and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

6. For the purpose of establishing a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, the Moscow Agreement provided that the Joint Commission consult with the representatives of Korean democratic political parties and social organizations. Detailed methods of evolving a Provisional Government were not defined.

7. Methods to be followed in evolving measures of aid and assistance (trusteeship) were to be elaborated by the Joint Commission with the participation of the Korean Provisional Government and of the Korean democratic organizations.

8. With the Moscow Decision as the only term of reference, the US - USSR Joint Commission convened in Seoul on 20 March 1946. Ensuing difficulties, which led to adjournment sine die of the Joint Commission on 8 May 1946, are apparent in the positions taken by the two Delegations:

9. The Soviet Delegation contended that those organizations and individuals who oppose the Moscow Agreement in any way are not "democratic" and, therefore, could not be included in participation in the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Specifically, the Soviet Delegation desired to exclude from consultation all political parties and social organizations and their leaders who voiced opposition to the "trusteeship" provided for in the Moscow Agreement.

10. The U.S. Delegation maintained: that the word "democratic" could be applied only as in common usage throughout the world; that there is no provision in the Moscow Agreement which requires parties and organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission to support the Moscow Agreement blindly and without reservation; that Koreans may freely express their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government, including their opposition to an as yet undefined "trusteeship".

11. In an effort to resolve the differences between the positions of the two Delegations, an agreement was reached on

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

17 April 1946 and published as Joint Communique No. 5 which included a declaration to be signed by applicants for consultation, guaranteeing that they would:

a. Uphold the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea as stated in paragraph No. 1 of that agreement;

b. Abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph No. 2 of the Moscow Agreement; and

c. Cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph No. 3.

12. However, in working out the detailed application of Joint Communique No. 5, difficulties arose regarding the composition of the list of signatory parties and organizations to be consulted.

13. The Soviet Delegation attempted to revise the U.S. list of signatory organizations in such a way as to substitute member organizations of the Democratic People's Front for various large and influential organizations suggested by the U.S. Delegation.

14. The Soviet list for North Korea contained only member organizations of the Democratic People's Front and, therefore, in the opinion of the ~~American~~ U.S. Delegation, was not a representative list.

15. Because of a statement that Communique No. 5 did not preclude the right of an organization to express opposition to trusteeship, made by the Acting Chairman of the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea, a body composed entirely of the principal Rightist parties and organizations, the Soviet representative in Subcommission No. 1 insisted that member organizations of the Council should not be accepted for consultation with the Joint Commission. This contention was supported by the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission.

16. The U.S. Delegation considered the position of the Soviet Delegation to be a repudiation of the agreement regarding Communique No. 5.

17. Failing agreement on the formation of a Provisional Government, the U.S. Delegation in the meeting of 6 May 1946, attempted to initiate discussion concerning the unification of the two zones of occupation. The Soviet Delegation refused to discuss the matter until the issue of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

consultation had been clarified. In the same meeting (6 May 1946) the U.S. Delegation proposed that the Joint Commission adjourn pending clarification of consultation. Two days later (8 May 1946), the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation informed the Commanding General, USAFIK, that he had been ordered by his Commander to terminate the work of the Soviet Delegation and return to Pyongyang. The return of the Soviet Delegation to Pyongyang on 9 May 1946 marked the effective adjournment sine die of the Joint Commission.

18. On the same day, 9 May 1946, the Commanding General, USAFIK, initiated an exchange of correspondence with the Soviet Commander in Korea in an attempt, which continued to 28 February 1947, to find a formula for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. The views presented by the two Commanders, while apparently narrowing the divergent viewpoints, resulted in no definite agreement through which the differences causing adjournment of the Joint Commission could be resolved. The inability of the Commanders to resolve the divergent viewpoints led to an effort initiated by Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, to find a suitable formula on a governmental level.

19. As a result of exchange of correspondence in April and May 1947 between Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, V.M. Molotov, proposals contained in the 26 November 1946 letter of the Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, as amended by the counter proposals contained in the letter of the Commanding General, USAFIK, of 24 December 1946, were finally accepted as a basis for reconvening the Joint Commission. The proposals and amendments thereto were as follows:

(The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, 1946, advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission)

"1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

"2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by active opposition to the Moscow Decision.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"3. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not actively oppose nor will they incite others to actively oppose the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission."

(The American Commander in his letter of 24 December 1946 agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basig for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:)

"Proposal Number 1 to be interpreted as follows:

"Signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

"Proposal Number 2. I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision.

"However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

"Proposal Number 3. It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declarati contained in Communique Number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

"Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

20. In addition to the above agreements, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall specifically agreed to widescale participation of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations in the formation of a Provisional Government. Moreover, Mr. Marshall pointed out in his letter of 2 May 1947 that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." Mr. Molotov did not take exception to this position.

CURRENT SESSION - (1947)

21. Reconvening on 21 May 1947 in Seoul on the basis of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, the Joint Commission resumed its initial, assigned task of establishing a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. From 21 May 1947 until_____, _____meetings of the Joint Commission were held.

22. Agreement on internal procedural matters and the program of work, primarily on the basis of decisions reached in the 1946 sessions, was largely effected in the early meetings of the Commission.

23. In attempting to prepare a Joint Decision concerning consultation, early indications of the divergent positions of the two Delegations, which later led to the impasse in the Joint Commission, were evident in Subcommission No. 1 and in the Joint Commission.

24. In Subcommission No. 1, which was charged with drafting the text of a Joint Decision on consultation for the approval of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegate's first proposal prescribed the narrowing of consultation to about 30 organizations. The U.S. delegate considered the Soviet proposal to be in violation of the principle of broad consultation discussed in the correspondence between the Commanders and specifically proposed by Mr. Molotov and agreed to by Mr. Marshall. Attempts made by the U.S. Delegate in Subcommission No. 1 to arrive at definitions of "social organization" and "political party", and to

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

establish criteria as a basis for the elimination of local and small organizations from consultation, were refused by the Soviet Delegation as unnecessary. In addition, the Soviet Delegate contended that organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission must fully uphold the Moscow Agreement, including every paragraph. The U. S. Delegate considered this position to be based on a unilateral interpretation of the Moscow Agreement to which the U. S. Delegation could not agree. Moreover, he contended that the Soviet Delegation had returned to its 1946 position and, thereby, had vitiated the Marshall-Molotov agreement. The U. S. Delegate also pointed out that there could be no unilateral exclusion under the terms upon which the Joint Commission was reconvened.

25. Early disagreements in Subcommission No. 1 resulted in discussion in the Joint Commission of the means of implementing consultation. The positions of both Delegations were amplified by the respective Chief Commissioners in accordance with the stands taken by the Delegates in Subcommission No. 1.

26. In spite of an underlying divergence of opinion regarding implementation of consultation evident in sessions of Subcommission No. 1, and in sessions of the Joint Commission, agreement was reached on Joint Commission Decision No. 12, "The Order of Consultation with Korean Democratic Parties and Social Organizations" on 7 June 1947. Joint Decision No. 12, which embodied the Marshall-Molotov agreement, provided for the broadest consultation possible. In agreeing to the principles under which Joint Commission Decision No. 12 was prepared, the Soviet Delegation receded from its position of narrow oral consultation and, by specific statement, agreed to broad consultation. Joint Decision No. 12 was published, along with two questionnaires, one concerning the Provisional Charter for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and one regarding the Political Platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, on 12 June 1947.

27. Publication of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 resulted in the application for consultation of 425 political parties and social organizations in South Korea and 38 in North Korea. In compliance with Joint Commission Decision No. 12, formal meetings with the representatives of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

organizations eligible for consultation were held in Seoul on 25 June ~~July~~ 1947, and in Pyongyang on 1 July 1947. In these meetings, the procedure for bread consultation was outlined.

28. In Subcommission No. 1, lists of organizations applying for consultation were exchanged and the U.S. Representative proposed that the Subcommission review the combined list of applicants to obtain agreement as to which parties should be excluded by mutual agreement and the standards of exclusion. As a diversity of opinion soon arose in Subcommission No. 1 concerning the implementation of initial oral consultation provided for in

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the Joint Commission concerned itself with the problem in the 37th meeting in Pyongyang on 2 July 1947. From that date until_____ the Joint Commission has been engaged in considering a series of proposals and in continuous debate of the divergent views.

29. The position of the Soviet Delegation was as follows:

a. The fact that an organization is eligible for consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreements, as published in Joint Commission Decision No. 12, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

b. In order for an organization to be included on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both Delegations.

c. Organizations falling within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation:

(1) "Non-social" organizations.

(2) District and purely local organizations.

(3) Organizations which do not intend to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations. Such organizations would be considered for consultation only if they publicly withdraw from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations.

d. ignatures on the applications for consultation by member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee were not given in good faith and therefore were invalid because the organizations maintained membership in a committee formed solely to "struggle against" the Moscow Agreement.

30. The position of the U.S. Delegation was as follows:

a. In accordance with point No. 1 of the agreed proposal for reconvening the Joint Commission (Marshall-Molotov correspondence), "signing the Declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation;

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

b. Organizations signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 are automatically eligible for consultation and are automatically placed on the list for consultation as provided in paragraph No. 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12. Organizations may be excluded from the list for consultation only by mutual agreement of the two Delegations as provided in point number 3 of the Marshall-Molotov agreement. Therefore, the line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation" nullifies the agreements reached by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov and by the Joint Commission, and gives the Soviet Delegation the veto power over any applicant it dislikes.

c. The Moscow Agreement does not define "social organization" and because of the Soviet Delegation's refusal to define basic concepts, Joint Commission Decision No. 12 contains no definition of "social" or any other term. However, the U.S. Delegation was willing to exclude from consultation, by mutual agreement, any organization which could not be be considered "social" within the definitions to be found in the dictionaries of the world.

d. District and purely local organizations are not barred from consultation by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov agreements, or Joint Commission Decision No. 12. However, the U.S. Delegation made several proposals which, if accepted by the Soviet Delegation, would have eliminated a large number of truly local organizations from consultation.

e. The U.S. Delegation was willing to exclude from consultation, by mutual agreement, fraudulent organizations, provided that no such organization should be excluded where the sole claim of fraud was exaggeration of membership, a factor evident in some applications of both North and South Korean organizations.

f. Organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Committee and similar organizations are manifestly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreements if they have applied for consultation and have signed the required declaration. They remain eligible unless and until they are, by mutual agreement, excluded after indictment as provided by point number 3 of the Marshall-Molotov agreement. Failure of the Soviet Delegation to bring charges, supported by adequate evidence, against member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations, while insisting arbitrarily on their exclusion, nullified the spirit and letter of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation's attempt unilaterally to deprive organizations of the right to initial consultation by omitting them from a list of organizations to be consulted constituted, in effect, an attempt to arrogate a veto power to itself. There is no provision in any of the agreements binding upon the Joint Commission which provides such a veto power, while there are two specific agreements which state that exclusion shall be by mutual agreement.

g. By insisting upon the unilateral exclusion of various organizations the Soviet Delegation was nullifying the principle of broad consultation agreed to by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov. Moreover, it was the opinion of the U.S. Delegation that the Soviet Delegation's exclusion policies, which specifically aimed at the exclusion of major Rightist organizations, were designed to insure a Democratic People's Front control of Korea.

The U.S. Delegation based its opinion on the following:

(1) Of 460 groups which applied for consultation (excluding three applicants both delegations agreed to exclude for fraud), 38, all members of the Democratic People's Front, were from North Korea, while 422, representing all shades of political views, were from South Korea.

(2) These 460 groups can be roughly and approximately classified:

People's Front - 136 groups, 27,296,000 claimed members,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

41% of total claimed membership; Moderates - 72 groups, 14,785,000 claimed members, 22%; Right - 252 groups, 24,920,000 claimed members 37%.

(3) The Soviet Delegation submitted a list of 146 parties and organizations of both North and South Korea with memberships in excess of 10,000 whose eligibility for consultation they were willing to discuss. This list failed to include 24 parties and organizations stated by the Soviet Delegation to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Acceptance of this list would give the following political alignment:

(a) People's Front and other Leftists - 75 groups, claimed membership 32,417,000.

(b) Right and Moderate - 71 groups, claimed membership-18,581,000.

(c) Eliminated Right and Moderate Right - 24 groups, claimed membership - 15,286,000.

(d) Eliminated Left - none.

FURTHER PROPOSALS

31. Failing agreement concerning initial consultation, the U.S. Delegation attempted to find a basis for the progress of the work of the Joint Commission in the following proposal made in the 48th meeting, held 29 July, 1947:

"That the Soviet Delegation conduct consultation with those political parties and social organizations of North Korea and the American Delegation consult with those political parties and social organizations of South Korea."

32. The Soviet Delegation rejected the above proposal on the ground that it was not a "serious" one.

33. In the 50th meeting, held 1 August 1947, the U.S. Delegation proposed the following:

"That consultation be jointly conducted north and south of the 38th (parallel) with those parties which the Soviet Delegation is willing to hear, and that the American Delegation conduct unilateral consultation south of the 38th with those parties

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

they (the Soviet Delegation) claim are suspicious to them. Such consultation by the U.S. Delegation will be considered consultation with the Joint Commission."

The Soviet Delegation rejected the above proposal on the ground that it was contrary to Joint Commission Decision No. 12 and No. 16 and to common sense. Furthermore, it was the contention of the Soviet Delegation that acceptance of the proposal would have led to the Joint Commission consulting with any party or organization which applied for consultation which the U.S. Delegation found desirable to invite for consultation.

35. At the 51st meeting, held 5 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation made the following proposal:

"(1) To start elaboration of proposals on the question of structure and principles of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of government (Provisional Charter), political platform for this government and also personnel composition of Provisional Government, procedure for assumption of power by Provisional Government selection of personnel.

"(a) In compliance with and in connection with this aim-in compliance with point 8 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12, to direct Subcommission No. 2 to refer to Subcommission No. 2, those considerations which were received from Korean democratic parties and social organizations both in South and North Korea, and also the proposals for a study and elaboration of agreed suggestions.

"(b) To entrust to Subcommission 2 and 3 in five days to submit for approval by the Joint Commission plans of their work.

"(c) To direct Subcommission No. 2 and 3 to submit their proposals on the creation of subcommittees.

"(2) To entrust both head commissioners together with Subcommission No. 1:

"(a) To continue discussion of question of compilation of list of democratic parties and social organizations to be invited for oral consultation, with a view to achieving agreement.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"(b) To prepare a list of representatives of parties and social organizations for oral consultation.

"(c) To elaborate proposals on point 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12."

36. The U.S. Delegation rejected the above proposal on the basis that it did not change the Soviet position regarding exclusion. In the 52nd meeting, held 7 August 1947, the U. S. Delegation proposed that paragraph 2 of the above proposal be amended to read:

"To direct the Chief Commissioner of both Delegations to meet with the Chairman of Subcommission No. 1 and discuss and resolve the consultation issue."

In addition, the U.S. Delegation agreed to consider paragraphs 1a, b, c, and paragraph 2c as soon as the consultation issue was resolved. This was rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

37. The U.S. Delegation made the following proposal in the 53rd meeting held 12 August 1947:

"The American Delegation, mindful of the solemn obligations of its government under the Moscow Agreement and conscious of its duty to the Korean people to establish as early as possible a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, makes the following proposals to overcome the present impasse regarding consultation:

"1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

"2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"3. The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election shall be held with free electioneering, secret and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Subcommission No. 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter.

"4. That Subcommission No. 3 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea.

"By making this proposal the American Delegation feels that the opinion of the Korean people which cannot be obtained through oral consultation on a broad basis can be expressed through the medium of a general election where a clear and free election under international supervision is guaranteed."

38. The Soviet Delegation countered the above proposal in the 56th meeting, held 26 August 1947, with the following proposal:

"1. To instruct:

a. Subcommission No. 2 to immediately commence study of the written proposal presented to the Joint Commission of the democratic parties and social organizations on the questionnaires which have been sent out by the Joint Commission and to submit to the Joint Commission a draft of the structure of the provisional democratic

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

government and local organs of power (provisional charter) and political platform.

b. Subcommission No. 3 to present to the Joint Commission proposal concerning the personnel composition of the provisional government and on the procedure of assumption of governmental power.

"2. To create a consultative power - Provisional Korean People's Assembly of the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations. Provisional Korean People's Assembly to perform the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation with a membership of 10,000 or more and those who fully uphold the Moscow Decision and also do not act against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers - do not oppose the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers. The number of representatives into the Provisional Korean People's Assembly should be equal from the North as well as from the South. Representation of various parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission will establish this representation in compliance with the number of members and taking into consideration as much as possible their influence.

"3. The Joint Commission directs the Provisional Korean People's Assembly for elaboration of proposal on the question of structure and principles of organizations of provisional democratic government and local organs of power (provisional charter) political platform and personnel of the Korean Democratic Government and the order of assumption of power and other questions. The provisional charter should envisage the creation of a legislative body, elections which should be carried out all over Korea

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

on the basis of general direct equal electoral right, secret ballot. The Soviet Delegation understands that the Korean people are impatiently awaiting the creation of a Provisional Korean democratic Government which would unite Korea and realizes these democratic reforms which the Korean people wish. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation clearly states that there should be created a consultative body, Provisional Korean People's Assembly, of the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations. This Provisional Korean People's assembly, consisting of Koreans themselves, and representing the views ☞

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of different populations will take part -- immediate part, in the elaboration of all questions connected with the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the program of its activities. The Soviet proposal also includes an education on the necessity to envisage in the provisional charter and creation of the legislative body, elections which should be carried out all over Korea on the basis of a general direct equal electoral right by secret balloting. During these elections, all democratic parties and social organizations should have equal opportunity to designate their candidates and equal opportunity to freely agitate for them and for their program."

39. (U.S. Delegation's reply).

40. The Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, and Joint Commission Decision No. 12 constitute adequate and detailed terms for conducting consultation and for the implementation of the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. However, it is the opinion of the U.S. Delegation that consultation cannot be conducted nor can the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government be implemented until the Soviet Delegation abandons its position that either delegation has the right to unilaterally exclude any applicant democratic party or organization from consultation with the Joint Commission and from participation in the Korean Provisional Democratic Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT TRANSLATION

The Soviet Draft
of the Joint Report

30 August 1947

REPORT

OF THE WORK OF THE US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

ON KOREA

for the period from 21 May to 1 September 1947

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Soviet Draft
of the Joint Report

30 August 1947

REPORT

OF THE WORK OF THE US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION ON KOREA

for the period from 21 May to 1 September 1947

The USSR-US Joint Commission on Korea, established in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and the United Kingdom on December 1945, resumed its work on 21 May 1947 in accordance with the agreement, reached in the course of correspondence between the Foreign Minister of the USSR V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the U.S.A. G. Marshall in April-May 1947, with the purpose of fulfilling this Decision.

In accordance with this agreement, the proposals of the Soviet Commanding General in North Korea, stated in his letter of 26 November 1946, with corrections, proposed by the U.S. Commanding General in South Korea in his letter of 24 December 1946 were accepted as the basis for the resumption of work of the Joint Commission. These conditions were presented verbatim in the letter of the Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov of 7 May 1947 and were accepted by the Secretary of State of the U.S.A. Mr. G. Marshall in the letter of 13 May 1947, as follows:

"...The Soviet Commanding General in his letter of 26 November put forth the following proposals as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

"1. The Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea.

"2. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"3. Parties and social organizations, invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission."

The American Commander in his letter of December 24, 1946, agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

"Proposal Number 1 to be interpreted as follows:

"Signing the declaration in Communique will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for signing consultation.

"Proposal Number 2. I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representatives which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

"Proposal Number 3. It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.

"With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander..."

In the meeting of the Joint Commission 22 May 1947 it was decided that there shall be two stages of the Commission's activities:

The first stage - the fulfillment of paragraph 2, Moscow Decision on Korea.

The second stage - the fulfillment of paragraph 3, Moscow Decision on Korea.

According to this decision (Number 8), the first stage of the Commission's activities shall concern itself with the following matter:

"1. Conditions for and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations.

2. Elaboration of recommendations for the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the local organs of authority (Provisional Charter).

3. The preliminary elaboration of a political platform and other appropriate measures for a future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

4. Elaboration of recommendations for the personnel of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

5. The procedure of the assumption of powers by the Provisional Government of Korea, and, the procedure of the selection of the personnel for the Provisional Democratic Government in Korea."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In accordance with the accepted order of the work, the Joint Commission, first of all, devoted itself to the matters pertaining to the conditions and the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

This question was the subject of the prolonged discussion during the work of the Joint Commission in 1946.

At that time the decision No. 4, concerning "conditions for an order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations" was accepted, according to which approximately 30 of the most important Korean democratic parties and social organizations, representing different political trends in North as well as in South Korea should participate in consultation with the Joint Commission, taking into consideration the total membership and, as much as possible the influence of these parties and organizations. The remaining parties and organizations which fulfill the requirements for consultation accepted by the Joint Commission, were given the opportunity to present to the Joint Commission their considerations on questions, pertaining to the establishment of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. In addition, representatives of these parties and organizations could have been invited, by mutual agreement of the Chiefs of both delegations, for consultation with the Joint Commission. Only paragraph 2 of Joint Commission Decision No. 4 was not agreed upon, and discussion of which has been postponed. The proposals on this paragraph presented by both delegations were as follows:

<u>The Soviet proposal</u>: "Following the approval of the list of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission officially notifies the central organs of these parties and social organizations that their party or organization is invited for consultation for which purpose they designate their representatives from the total number of members of such parties and organizations, who have not compromised themselves by active opposition against the Moscow

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Decision and against the Allies. Parties and social organizations bestow appropriate authority upon the representatives designated by them and officially notify the Joint Commission of the designated representative or representatives, submitting their last and first names, place and year of birth, and their position in the party or in the social organization."

The American proposal: "Following the approval of the list of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission officially notifies the central organs of these parties and social organizations that their party or organization is invited for consultation, for which purpose they designate their representatives. Parties and social organizations bestow appropriate authority upon the representatives designated by them, and officially notify the Joint Commission of the designated representative or representatives, submitting their last and first names, place and year of birth and their position in the party or in the social organization."

Inasmuch as in the course of the correspondence between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, an agreement was reached on the as yet unsolved questions concerning the consultation, the Soviet Delegation, in order not to resume discussions, proposed to use as a basis of the document on the order of consultation, last year's decision supplemented in accordance with the agreement on the question of consultation, reached between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall.

The American Delegation declined this proposal of the Soviet Delegation and demanded a complete review of the Joint Commission Decision No. 4. The American Delegation proposed to consult with any party or organization, which signed the declaration contained in Joint Commission Communique No. 5, if such party or organization has no less than 1,000 members and branches not less than in two provinces.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Soviet Delegation stated that the invitation for consultation of all types of minor groups and organizations would only complicate and cofuse the work of the Joint Commission, and present a distorted conception of the public opinion in Korea.

Further, the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the above mentioned proposal of the American Delegation places the large-scale political groups on an equal footing with various types of insignificant groups, which do not represent the interests of the wide strata of the Korean people. The acceptance of the American proposal could lead to the fact that minor, hastily formed organizations would drown out the voices of influential democratic organizations, and thus, the expression of the actual aspirations of the Korean people would be hampered, and the work of the Joint Commission would be artificially complicated. The Soviet Delegation insisted on securing a just representation of democratic parties and social organizations in proportion to their influence and to their membership.

The Soviet Delegation proposed to include in the documents the order of consultation, the three conditions of consultation upon which the two ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed. The American Delegation objected to it, stating that in its opinion, the three conditions should not be included in the document and, therefore, should not be taken as a guide since these conditions do not fully reflect the agreement reached by the two Ministers, and that it is necessary to be guided by the entire correspondence between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall. The Soviet Delegation insisted upon inclusion of the three conditions as they were stated in the letter of V. M. Molotov of 7 May 1947.

The Soviet Delegation in Subcommission No. 1 indicated that the absence of necessary information concerning the number of parties and organizations and their members prevents the speedy and correct solution of the question on consultation. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly offered to the American Delegation to exchange the lists of parties and organizations of corresponding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

zones prior to reaching a final agreement on the document on consultation. However, the American Delegation declined such an exchange.

On 31 May, the Soviet Delegation proposed the immediate publication of the two press-communiques: (1) containing an invitation to parties and organizations willing to participate in consultation, to sign the declaration; (2) containing questionnaires, approved by the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation indicated that the acceptance of this proposal will expedite the work of the Joint Commission, will give the Joint Commission an opportunity to determine which and how many parties and organizations are willing to consult with the Joint Commission, and also will ensure the speediest possible cooperation of Korean parties and organizations with the Joint Commission. The American Delegation did not consent to the publication of the above mentioned communique until the final coordination on the document concerning consultation would be reached.

On 7 June, the Joint Commission approved the document "on the order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of North and South Korea."(Joint Commission Doc. 19 attached)

The document concerning the order of consultation provided that the Joint Commission during consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations will be guided by the conditions stated in the letter of the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov of 7 May 1947, which were included in full in this document. Parties and organizations desiring to participate in consultation should have signed the declaration of supporting the Moscow Decision and should have submitted to the Joint Commission a corresponding declaration through their central zonal organs. These parties were also invited to present to the Joint Commission their suggestions on the questionnaires concerning the Provisional Charter and the political platform for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In addition to the preliminary oral consultation, Joint Commission Decision No. 12 provided that the leaders of political parties and social organizations, designated in accordance with their membership and with taking into consideration as much as possible their influence, will be invited for consultation and for rendering assistance to the Joint Commission during the working out of recommendations concerning the Provisional Charter and the political platform for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The document stated that democratic parties and social organizations in North Korea as well as in South Korea will have equal rights and privileges for consultation with the Joint Commission.

Simultaneously with the document concerning the order of consultation, the Joint Commission approved the questionnaires for written consultation (Decisions No. 10 and 13). At the same the questionnaire concerning the structure and principles of the organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) was accepted without changes in the wording which was approved in the 20th meeting of the Joint Commission on 27 April 1947

As pertains to the questionnaire concerning the political platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, although it also was coordinated last year, the American Delegation has in general spoken against a special questionnaire concerning a political platform, justifying it by the fact that the most important parts of the political platform are included in the Provisional Charter. The Soviet Delegation explained that these two documents cannot be combined into one, inasmuch as the political platform includes the program of the activity of a Provisional Government, whereas the Provisional Charter is a document of constitutional nature.

The American Delegation then proposed to introduce a series of amendments in the wording of the questionnaire on the political platform as it was last year. In particular, it proposed not

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

to include the question concerning the methods of eliminating the influence of pro-Japanese elements, and in the question: "How should the activities of the reactionary, anti-democratic elements desiring to undermine the Provisional Korean Democratic Government be prevented?", omit the words "activities of reactionary elements". The American Delegation justified its last proposal by the reason that it is still unknown against whom the Provisional Government will be struggling, whether it will struggle against the reactionary elements or against some other elements. These proposals were declined by the Soviet Delegation and the questionnaire accepted last year, concerning the political platform, was approved with minor changes in the wording.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission of 11 June, Decision No. 14, "concerning the order of distribution of the questionnaire and the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, to the democratic parties and social organizations and the receipt of their replies and recommendations", was adopted. The work pertaining to the fulfillment of this Decision was conducted by the Soviet and American Delegation respectively in North and South Korea precisely and simultaneously.

On 11 June, the Joint Commission adopted a decision according to which the preliminary study of structure and functions of executive, legislative and judicial bodies of North and South Korea, and their guding personnel, both delegations agreed to exchange written data as detailed as possible regarding the above stated questions, pertaining to the corresponding zones before 1 July 1947. (Decision Number 15) The Soviet representative in Subcommission Number 3 reminded the American representative in this Subcommission of the necessity of exchanging such information, but the American side, under various pretexts, postponed the presentation of such information, and Decision No. 15 remained unfulfilled.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

On 12 June 1947, the Joint Commission published a document pertaining to the order of consultation, as well as the questionnaires regarding the Provisional Charter and political platform. Applications for consultation were to be submitted on or before 23 June 1947, and written considerations regarding the questionnaires on or before 5 July 1947.

In accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6 of Joint Commission Decisions Number 12 and Number 16, each delegation in Subcommission Number 1 compiles the list of parties and organizations, which have submitted applications in their own zones, as well as the list of their designated representatives. This list is discussed in Subcommission Number 1 and following the reached agreement is submitted for approval of the Joint Commission.

The list of North Korea submitted by the Soviet side, included 38 democratic parties and social organizations with the total membership of 13,300,000.

The list of parties and organizations of South Korea which have filled applications for consultation, submitted by the American side to Subcommission Number 1, included 425 parties and organizations.

Written considerations regarding the questionnaires were received from 38 parties and organizations of North Korea and from 397 parties and organizations of South Korea.

Analyzing the preliminary list of parties and organizations of South Korea, submitted to Subcommission Number 1 by the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation noted that the total membership of these parties and organizations amounted to a fantastic figure of 70 million members, while the total population of South Korea is, approximately, 18 million. This means that every adult Korean, man, as well as woman, is a member of 8 organizations, which is far from actuality. Such a state of affairs could not help but raise doubt in the correctness of the information, given by certain parties and organizations, all the more since the American representative of Subcommission Number 1 himself noted that false statements have been submitted.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In addition to this, even during the preliminary study of the list from South Korea, non-existing organizations were discovered. In connection with this, the Soviet representative, in Subcommission No. 1, proposed to investigate those organizations, whose existence and membership aroused doubt.

In accordance with the agreement reached between the Chiefs of both delegations, the Joint Commission, not expecting a compilation of the list for consultation, held a joint meeting with the representatives of parties and organizations of South Korea in Seoul on 25 June 1947 and with the representatives of parties and organizations of North Korea in Pyongyang on 1 July 1947.

The beginning of oral consultation was scheduled for 7 July 1947. But, due to the differences of opinion between the two delegations on the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation, oral consultation did not begin.

The study of preliminary lists, submitted by both delegations, and the compilation of a coordinated list was included in the task of Subcommission No. 1. Yet, the American Delegation in Subcommission No. 1 refused to discuss the lists, and therefore, in spite of Joint Commission Decision No. 16, Subcommission No. 1 never did submit the coordinated list of parties and social organizations of the Joint Commission.

Beginning with 2 July, the discussion on the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations was conducted by the Joint Commission.

Below are presented the positions of the Soviet and American Delegation on the question of compilation of the list for consultation:

<u>The position of the Soviet Delegation</u>

1. Among parties and organizations of South Korea, which submitted applications for participation in consultation, there are organizations of non-social nature, such as commercial and industrial companies, administrative institutions, schools, etc. Inasmuch as the Moscow Decision on Korea provides for consulta-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

tion with democratic parties and social organisations, the Soviet Delegation proposed not to include in the list for consultation organizations of non-social natum.

2. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that among the applications for consultation from South Korea there were present branches of the central organizations and purely local minor organizations of non-zonal nature. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include these organizations in the list for consultation, stating that, in its opinion, the Joint Commission Decision No. 12 provides for consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of zonal scale. At the same time the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations of North as well as of South Korea is very great, and if the Joint Commission would consult with all local, minor organizations, it would greatly prolong and complicate its work.

3. The Soviet Delegation stated in accordance with the agreement reached between the U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and the US Secretary of State G. Marshall in April-May 1947, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea and which, after signing the declaration, do not incite to active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission, or against one of the Allied Powers, or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. As the result of this, the Soviet Delegation submitted a proposal that parties and social organizations, which have submitted applications for participation in consultation, and which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, may be admitted to consultation only in case they withdraw from this Committee and cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that after resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and even after t he publication of Joint Commission Decision on the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee not only ceased, but, on the contrary, in-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

tensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission, attempting to disrupt its work concerning the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until parties and organizations comprising this Committee declare their withdrawal from the Committee, they will continue to be held responsible for their activities.

Further, the Soviet Delegation pointed out that parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, have, thus undertaken responsibility to fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time remaining as members of this Committee, the said parties and organizations retain their signatures under the program of the Committee, containing an obligation--to struggle against the Moscow Decision and actually continue to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. One is not consistent with the other.

The Position of the American Delegation

The American Delegation declined the prosposal of the Soviet Delegation on the following grounds:

1. There are no reasons for excluding from consultation non-social organizations, insofar as the Moscow Decision and Joint Commission Decision No. 12 do not contain the definition of the term "social organizations".

2. Regional and other purely local organizations are not excluded from consultation neither by the Moscow Decision nor by the agreement reached by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, nor by Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

3. Parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations by mutual agreement of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall are eligible to participate in initial consultation if these parties have submitted the application and have signed the required declaration. They continue to be eligible for consultation if and until such time when accused on the basis of paragraph 3 of conditions of consultation agreed upon by the two ministers, these parties will be excluded by mutual agreement of the two delegations.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The American Delegation accused the Soviet Delegation of the inclination to exclude unilaterally from the list certain parties and organizations. In addition, the American Delegation stated that in its opinion, the Joint Commission already has the list of parties and social organizations, and that therefore at present the question concerns the exclusion from this list.

Inasmuch as the discussion of this question has delayed the beginning of the oral consultation, the Soviet Delegation, with a view of expediting the work of the Joint Commission, has repeatedly proposed not to wait until the compilation of the final list but to begin the consultation with democratic parties and social organizations, consultation with which does not raise objections neither on the part of the Soviet Delegation nor on the part of the American Delegation.

The Soviet Delegation also repeatedly proposed to direct Subcommission No. 1 to study thoroughly the objections or comments on every organization separately, but the American Delegation declined this proposal.

Concerning the question of compilation of the list, the Soviet Delegation stated that inasmuch as Subcommission No. 1 has not presented the coordinated list of parties and organizations, the Joint Commission is called upon to decide which parties and organizations, after submitting their applications, must be included in the list for initial oral consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision and Joint Commission Decision No. 12. Exclusion from the list would be possible only when there is a list, approved by the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the position of the American Delegation concerning this question consists in that the Joint Commission must consult with all parties and organizations which the American Delegation considers necessary to invite for consultation.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission 10 July 1947, the Soviet Delegation proposed to include in the list for consultation democratic parties and social organizations with declared membership over 10,000, and submitted the draft of such a list, in order to direct Subcommission

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

No. 1 to clarify this list. It was stated in the proposal that parties and social organizations, which are not included in the list but which would like to add something to the written suggestions, submitted by them, would have the opportunity to send their representatives for oral consultation following the termination of consultation with parties and social organizations included in the list. Furthermore, it was pointed out in the proposal that parties and social organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation provided they withdraw from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and cease their struggle against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission of 16 July, the American Delegation stated that it adopted the Soviet Delegation proposal with minor corrections with the exception of the item which concerns parties and organizations included in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

Following this, the question of admission for consultation of these parties and organizations remained as the only unsolved question preventing the conduction of oral consultation.

Regardless of its numerous and widely known facts of the hostile activity of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee against the Moscow Decision, which have been repeatedly pointed out by the Soviet Delegation, the American Delegation has insisted upon an unconditional admission to consultation of parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The Soviet Delegation, with the purpose of solving this question and expediting the work of the Joint Commission has repeatedly proposed to invite to the meeting of Subcommission No. 1 or to the meeting of the Joint Commission, the representatives of parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, in order to define more accurately their position in regard to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. The American Delegation declined these proposals.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Soviet Delegation has more than once pointed out that the position of the American Delegation regarding the question of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee has been marked by inconsistency and contradiction.

At the beginning of the discussion, the American Delegation ascerted, that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee has already ceased to exist. At the same time, the American Delegation has acknowledged the fact, that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is hostile toward the Moscow Decision and that the aims and the program of this Committee are not compatible with the position of parties and organizations which are engaged in the support of the Joint Commission. Thus for example, in the statement of the American Delegation of 10 July, concerning the results of the ~~study~~ study of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee activity it was noted, that this Committee was attempting "to unite all the rightist parties for the active struggle against Trusteeship". In this same statement the following was pointed out:

> "The parties, against which the Soviet Delegation is bringing its accusation, did not wish to retain their signatures under the aims of the above mentioned Committee, and insisted on supporting the work of the Joint Commission. The fact that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee has bedome inactive is explained by the position, still held by above mentioned parties which openly opposed the program of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and the support of the work of the Joint Commission."

In the meeting of 24 July, General Brown stated, that "the American Delegation has at its disposal authentic information which points out that parties and organizations which appear suspicious to the Soviet Delegation refuse to follow the Anti-Trusteeship Committee program and refuse the leadership of Kim, Koo". In the same meeting, General Brown stated that "by signing the declaration, the above mentioned parties and organizations discredited the leadership of Kim, Koo and Rhee Singman, who did not wish in any way to cooperate in the work of the Joint Commission at all.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

After parties and organizations which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, by their actions and statements have denounced the above stated ascertions of the American Delegation and confirmed that they continue to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, guided by Rhee, Signman and Kim, Koo, the American Delegation changed its argument and stated, that in its opinion, the membership of a political party or organization in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, is not an obstacle for its admission for consultation with the Joint Commission. Substantiating its position, the American Delegation asserted that this committee limits itself to the expression of opinion and does not reach the stage of fomenting or instigating active opposition against the Moscow Decision and against the work of the Joint Commission.

Striving to draw in for consultation parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the American Delegation stated that it is necessary for the preservation of a definite and supposedly established ratio of 3 to 2 between rightist and leftist parties in the political life of Korea. The American Delegation accused the Soviet Delegation in the attempt of breaking this ratio to the advantage of parties of the leftist trend.

The Soviet Delegation rejected such approach to the solution of the question, pointing out that the work of the Joint Commission cannot be conducted in a party basis. The Soviet Delegation stated that the Joint Commission, in the question of consultation with Korean parties and organizations, must be evolved from their attitude towards the Moscow Decision and not from their affiliation with one or an other political trend. This position of the Soviet Delegation in particular was expressed, in the list of parties and organizations with membership of over 10,000 on 10 July, which was submitted by the Soviet Delegation to Subcommission # 1 for consideration. This list included 147 parties and social organizations, among them there were 28 parties and organizations of North Korea and 119 parties and organizations of South Korea. From among the latter, theSoviet

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Delegation proposed to invite for oral consultation 74 rightist parties, 34 leftist parties and 11 parties of the center. Only 20 parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee were not included in the list; however, the Soviet Delegation was willing to admit even these parties and organizations for consultation, after they declare of their withdrawal from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

Because of difficulties which arose in the work of the Joint Commission as the result of what amounted to an actual refusal of the American Delegation to apply to the Marshall - Molotov agreement towards parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet Delegation, in order to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, on the 5th August introduced a proposal directing Subcommissions, along with the deliberations on compilation of the list, begin the study of written considerations presented by parties and social organizations, and to prepare proposals on the questions immediately connected with the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The American Delegation declined this proposal, stating that in it's opinion, it is useless to pass on to the study of other questions before the question of the list of parties and organizations is solved.

On 12 August the American Delegation has introduced the following proposal:

"1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow agreement.

2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission # 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

3. The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election be held

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

with free electioneering, secret, with several lists and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Subcommission # 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with one proposed charter.

4. That Subcommission # 3 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea."

In the Joint Commission meeting on 26 August, the Soviet Delegation has presented its answer on the proposal of the American Delegation. This proposal was declared to be unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

The basic task of the Joint Commission, ie, the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, is avoided and complicated in the American proposal while, the Korean peophe await, first of all, the solution of this question by the Joint Commission.

The American proposal does not mention consultation provided for in paragraph 9 of Joint Commission Decision # 12, but the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, replying to this question, explained that this consultation should be conducted. However, he did not introduce any proposals on the methods to be used in conducting this consultation.

The Soviet Delegation stated that it considers it self-evident, that the Provisional Charter should provide for the formation of the legislative organ, elected on the basis of general, direct and equal sufferage by secret ballot. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that it formed the impression that the 12 August proposal of the American Delegation was introduced with purely propagandistic intentions.

Having agreed with the proposal of dispensing with oral consultation, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Joint Commission Decision # 12, because of impossibility to reach an agreement on the list of parties and organizations, the Soviet Delegation has introduced the following proposal:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1. To charge:

(a) Subcommission No. 2 to begin immediately the study of the written proposals of democratic parties and social organizations submitted to the Joint Commission pertaining to the questionnaires which were distributed by the Joint Commission, and to submit the drafts for the structure of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) and of political platform to the Joint Commission.

(b) Subcommission No. 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel of a Provisional Government, and the order of acceptance of authority by the Government.

2. To create a consultative body, a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly, composed of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations.

A Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly should be formed from representatives of democratic parties and social organizations with a declared membership of over 10,000 which submitted applications to the Joint Commission for consultation and which fully support the Moscow Decision, and do not oppose the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

The number of representatives in a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly from North and from South Korea must be equal.

Representation from various parties and organizations will be determined by the Joint Commission in accordance with their membership, and with the taking into consideration, as much as possible, their influence.

3. The Joint Commission invites the Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly for the purpose of the working out of proposals regarding structure and principles for the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) for the formation of a political platform

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

and selection of personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and for the order of acceptance of authority by the Government as well as other matters.

The Provisional Charter should provide for the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage by secret ballot.

In these elections all democratic parties and social organizations must have equal rights to nominate their candidates and to conduct free campaigns for their candidates and for their programs.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 20 August, the Soviet Delegation drew attention of the American Delegation to the fact of severe expressions of the authorities of South Korea against those democratic parties and social organizations which actively support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation, in particulary, pointed out to an actual closing of democratic parties and social organizations of the left trend, mass arrest of their leaders, members and even representatives ~~nominated~~ for consultation with Joint Commission, pogroms of the leftist democratic newspapers, arrests of the workers of the leftist democratic press, and arrest of members of delegations who visited the Joint Commission in order to deliver their requests and wishes of the people, etc.

In confirmation of this the Soviet Delegation quoted a great number of facts.

The Soviet Delegation stated that the numberous arrests of leaders of democratic parties and organizations, many of whom are representatives of these parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission have created in South Korea a situation, which prevents the fulfilling of the Moscow Decision on Korea and the agreement reached between Mr. Molotove and Mr. Marshall. This situation is being created, apparently, with the purpose of disrupting the work of the Joint Commission. Having called the attention of the American Delegation to a serious consideration of these circumstances, the Soviet Delegation insisted on taking immediate measures for the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

restoration of the normal situation for the existence and activity of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea and of the suitable conditions for the work of the Joint Commission.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 August, the American Delegation replied in its statement in which it not only refuted the facts of the arrests and pogroms mentioned by the Soviet Delegation but actually confirmed them. The American Delegation reproached the Soviet Delegation that the Soviet Delegation, staying in South Korea as a guest of the authorities, attempts to interfere with the internal affairs of South Korea.

The Soviet Delegation answered that it is not simply a guest but a member of the International Commission provided by the Moscow Deicision of the Three Ministers on Korea which bears the responsibility for carrying out this decision. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation cannot remain indifferent towards the occurences under discussion.

The American Delegation in its statement expressed a particular interest in the consultation with certain persons, who at the present time are under arrest in North Korea.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the American Delegation has not named even one leader who was allegedly arrested by authorities in North Korea. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that in North Korea leaders of parties and organizations are not arrested, that parties and organizations are not persecuted, their establishments and newspapers are not closed, and from the moment of the liberation in North Korea there has never been such occurence that a newspaper of some party or organization was closed or a newspaper officer was wrecked or premises of any party or organization was closed. All parties having equal opportunities and cooperate among themselves and settle problems.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

SOVIET PROPOSAL - September 3, 1947

Below are stated the positions of both Delegations regarding the question of compilation of a list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission.

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

1. Among the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which had filed applications for participation in consultation, there were organizations which are not social—mercantile and industrial companies, administrative institutions, schools, etc., whereas the Moscow Decision on Korea stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include into the list for consultation those organizations which are not social.

2. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that among those filing applications for participation in consultation from South Korea there were branches of central organizations narrowly local insignificant organizations of non-social character. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include these organizations into the list for consultation, declaring that in its opinion, the Decision #12 of the Joint Commission stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of zonal scale. At the same time the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations of both Northern and Southern Korea is very great and that if the Joint Commission would consult with all local insignificant organizations, its work could be greatly delayed and confused.

3. The Soviet Delegation declared that in accordance with the Agreement reached between the foreign minister of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the U.S., George C. Marshall, during April-May 1947, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea and which after signing the declaration do not incite active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission or against one of the Allied Powers or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

On the basis of this, the Soviet Delegation introduced a proposal stating that parties and social organizations which had filed applications for participation in consultation which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation only provided they withdraw from that Committee and cease struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that after the reconvention of the Commission and even following the publication of the decisions of the Joint Commission on the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had not only failed to discontinue, but as is shown by numerous and widely known facts presented by the Soviet Delegation at the sessions of the Joint Commission actually intensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, striving to frustrate its work on the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until and unless the parties and organizations are affiliated with that Committe state that they withdraw from that Committee, they continue to bear responsibility for its activities. The Soviet Delegation further indicated that parties and organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, thus undertook the obligation to fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time, while continuing their membership in that Committee, the aforementioned parties and organizations retained their signature under the program of the Committee which contains the obligation to struggle against the Moscow Decision and they continue actually to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. The one is not compatible with the other.

4. The Soviet Delegation has frequently proposed to summon to the sessions of Subcommission No. 1 or to sessions of the Joint Commission the representatives of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee in order to more fully define their position regarding the Moscow Decision and the work of Joint Commission. The American Delegation declined these proposals.

5. The Soviet Delegation declined the assertion of the American Delegation claiming that the inclusion of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee into the list for the consultation is indispensable in order to preserve

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the definite and allegedly firmly established correlation in the political life of Korea between the parties of the rightist and leftist orientation in proportion of three to two. Pointing out that it is impossible to conduct the work of the Joint Commission upon party basis, the Soviet Delegation declared this Joint Commission must be predicated on as regards the question of consultation with Korean parties and organizations upon the attitude of those latter toward the Moscow Decision and not upon their belonging to this or that political orientation.

6. And listing the preliminary list of parties and organizations of Southern Korea submitted to Subcommission No. 1 by the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation noted the total membership of these parties and organizations expressed by figures of 56,000,000 individuals while the entire population of Southern Korea consists of approximately 20,300,000 people. This signifies that every adult Korean whether a man or woman maintains membership in 8 organizations which is remote from the actuality. Such a contention could not fail to arouse doubts regarding the correctness of the information submitted by some of the parties and organizations especially so since soon thereafter the facts of submission of false information had been established in Subcommission No. 1. Furthermore, even in the course of the preliminary study of the South Korean list, non-existent organizations has been disclosed. In this connection, the Soviet Delegation proposed to check the organizations whose existence or whose membership arouses doubts.

7. Whereas the discussion regarding the list was delaying the beginning of the oral consultation, the Soviet Delegation in order to expedite the work of the Commission, had many times proposed to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding consultation with which there were no objections on either the Soviet or the American Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

without waiting for the compilation of the final list. This proposal was declined.

8. The Soviet Delegation likewise frequently proposed to charge Subcommission No. 1 with examining specifically the objections or remarks regarding each organization separately but the American Delegation declined these proposals.

9. As regards the question of compilation of the list the Soviet Delegation declares that whereas Subcommission No. 1 had not submitted an agreed list of parties and organizations, it revolves upon the Joint Commission to decide which parties and organizations which had filed application must be included into a list for initial oral consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision and Joint Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission. It will be possible to exclude from the list only when there will be available a list approved by the Commission. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the position of the American Delegation regarding this question tends to make the Joint Commission consult with all parties and organizations which had filed application and signed the declaration which either Delegation deems it necessary to invite for consultation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOVIET DRAFT
JOINT REPORT
4 September 1947

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON KOREA.

for the period of 21 May to Sept. 1947.

The Joint Soviet American Commission on Korea, created in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, United States, and the United Kingdom of December 1945, in order to execute this decision, resumed its work on May 21, 1947, in accordance with the agreement reached in the course of correspondence between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR, V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the U. S., George C. Marshall, in April-May 1947.

In accordance with this agreement as a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals of the Soviet Commanding General in North Korea were accepted as propounded in his letter of 26 November 1946, with the amendments proposed by the American Commanding General in Southern Korea in his letter of 24 December 1946. The text of these conditions was included in the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov of 7 May 1947 and accepted by the Secretary of State of the U. S., George C. Marshall in his letter of 13 May 1947.

At the meeting of the Joint Commission of 22 May 1947, it was decided that the work of the Commission would consist of two stages:

First Stage - Execution of Paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Second Stage - Execution of Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

According to the same decision (No. 8) the first stage of the work of the Commission would consist of the following problems:

1. Conditions and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations.

2. Elaboration of recommendations regarding the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local bodies

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

of authority (Provisional Charter).

3. Preliminary elaboration of the political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

4. Elaboration of recommendation on the personnel composition of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

5. The order of assumption of authority by the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the order of selection of personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

In the course of its work, the Joint Commission adopted the following joint decisions:

a/ Joint Decision No. 7 (revision of the Joint Decision No. 1 of the sessions of 1946): "order of work of the commission."

b/ Joint Decision No. 8 (revision of the Joint Decision No. 3 of the Commission of the session of 1946):"Joint decision on the program of work."

c/ Joint Decision No. 9 (adoption by the Joint Commission of the Joint Decision No. 2 of the session of 1946): "issuing joint press communiques."

d/ Joint Decision No. 10 (adoption of the Joint Decision No. 5 of the session of 1946) "enumeration of questions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations of Northern and Southern Korea regarding a Provisional Charter for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government."

e/ Joint Decision No. 11 (revision of Joint Decision No. 2 and amended Joint Decisions No. 2 and No. 9): "issuing joint press communiques."

f/ Joint Decision No. 12 (revision of Joint Decision No. 4 of the sessions of 1946): "on the order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea."

g. Joint Decision No. 13 (revision of Joint Decision No. 6 of the session of 1946): "enumeration of questions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations regarding the political platform of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government."

h. Joint Decision No. 14:("on the order of distribution of the questionaire and declaration contained in Communique No. 5 that the democratic parties and social organizations and the receipt from them of answers and recommendations."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

i/ Joint Decision No. 15: "Preliminary investigation of the structure, functions, and leading personnel of the executive, legislative, and judiciary organs of authority, existing in northern and southern Korea."

j/ Joint Decision No. 16: "order of compilation of list of parties and organisations."

k/ Joint Decision No. 17 (revision of Joint Decision No. 7): "order of work of the Commission."

l/ Joint Decision No. 18: "preparation of joint report."

On 12 June 1947 the Joint Commission published a document on the order of consultation and also the questionaires regarding the Provisional Charter and the political platform. The applications for participation in the consultation had to be submitted by 25 June 1947 while the written views regarding the questionaires by 5 July 1947.

The list for Northern Korea submitted by the Soviet side included 38 democratic parties and social organizations with a total membership of 4,300,000.

The list of parties and organizations of Southern Korea which had filed applications for participation and consultation, submitted by the American side and Subcommission No. 1, included 425 parties and organizations.

The written views regarding the questionaires were received from 38 parties and organizations of Northern Korea and 397 parties and organizations of Southern Korea.

According to the decision of the Chief Commissioners of the Delegations, the Joint Commission, without waiting compilation of the list for consultation, conducted on 2 June in Seoul a joint meeting with the representatives of parties and organizations of Southern Korea and on 1 July 1947 in Pongyang with the representatives of parties and organizations of Northern Korea.

The beginning of the oral consultation was set for 7 July 1947, but because of the differences between the delegations regarding the compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation, the oral consultation had not been initiated.

Following a brief discussion in Sub Commission No. 1, the question regarding the compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation had been passed to the Joint Commission and beginning with 2 July 1947, the discussions regarding this question were carried on by the Joint Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Below are stated the positions of the Soviet and American Delegations regarding this question:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

cc: Edwards

In the Joint Commission session on 4 September, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation quoted statistics from the statement of the American position to show that the Democratic People's Front does not have a simple majority for consultation. As indicated in the American statement, the 460 groups applying for consultation in all Korea can be classified approximately as follows:

Right

252 groups ... 24,920,000 claimed members 37%

Moderate Right, Moderate, and Moderate Left

72 groups ... 14,785,00 claimed members 22%

People's Front

136 groups ... 27,296,000 claimed members 41%

What the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation failed to point out, however, was that the Soviets have persistently refused to accept for consultation a list which did not include an absolute Democratic People's Front majority. If successful, Soviet efforts to eliminate without just cause twenty-four Rightist groups, with a total membership of 15,286,000, would in effect give the Democratic People's Front an absolute majority for consultation. Under the Soviet Proposal of 10 July for consultation with certain groups of over 10,000 members, the Democratic People's Front and other Leftists would comprise seventy-five groups with a claimed membership of 32,417,000, while the Right, Moderate Right, and Moderate groups would comprise seventy-one groups with a claimed membership of 18,581,000.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOVIET

TO THE PROTOCOLS

At the 51st meeting of 5 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation introduced the following proposal which was rejected by the American Delegation:

"Taking into consideration that the Joint Commission, during an entire month could not attain any progress in the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations, in connection with which all the work of the Joint Commission is being delayed, the Soviet Delegation, with the object of expediting the work of the Commission, introduces the following proposal:

1. To commence the elaboration of the proposals concerning the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), the political platform for this government, and also questions of the executive personnel of a Provisional Government and the selection of personnel, for the purpose of which:

a. In accordance with paragraph 8 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 to transfer the considerations and proposals received from Korean democratic parties and social organizations of North, as well as of South Korea, to Subcommission No. 2 for study and elaboration of the coordinated proposals.

b. To direct Subcommission No. 2 and 3, to present the plans for their work to the Joint Commission, within a 5 day period.

c. To direct Subcommission No. 2 and 3 to present their considerations regarding the formation of Subcommittees.

2. To direct the Chief Commissioners of both Delegations, jointly with Subcommission No. 1 to:

a. To continue consideration of the question regarding the list of democratic parties and social organizations for oral consultation, with the purpose of reaching an agreement.

b. To prepare the list of representatives of parties and social organizations for oral consultation.

c. To elaborate the proposals according to point 9 of the Joint Commission Decision No. 12."

On the 12 August 1947, the American Delegation introduced the following proposal:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

"2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

"3. The Joint Commission shall in the Charter, proposed to the Four Powers, include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election shall be held with free electioneering, secret and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Subcommission No.2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter.

"4. That Subcommission No. 2 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea."

At the Joint Commission meeting of 26 August, the Soviet Delegation stated its answer to the proposal of the American Delegation. This proposal was considered by the Soviet Delegation to be unsatisfactory because of the following reasons:

The fundamental task of the Joint Commission--formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government--is by-passed and confused in the American proposal, while the Korean people are expecting from the Joing Commission, before everything else, the solution of that very problem.

The American proposal does not mention consultation stipulated in paragraphs nine of the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission; yet the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation when answering a question of the Soviet Delegation explained that such consultation must take place. Nevertheless, he has not introduced any proposals regarding the method of conducting these consultations.

The Soviet declaration declared that it considers it self-evident that the Provisional Charter should provide for the creation of a legislative body

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal franchise and by secret ballot. The Soviet Delegation noted that it was getting the impression that the proposal of the American Delegation of 12 August had been introduced for purely propagandistic purposes.

Having agreed with the proposal not to conduct the oral consultation stipulated in paragraph 7 of the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission, because of the impossibility of reaching an agreement regarding the list of parties and organizations, the Soviet Delegation introduced the following proposal:

1. To instruct:

a. Subcommission No. 2 to immediately commence study of the written proposal presented to the Joint Commission of the democratic parties and social organizations on the questionnaires which have been sent out by the Joint Commission and to submit to the Joint Commission a draft of the structure of the provisional democratic government and local organs of power (provisional charter) and political platform.

b. Subcommission No. 2 to present to the Joint Commission proposal concerning the personnel composition of the provisional government and on the procedure of assumption of governmental power.

2. To create a consultative power -- Provisional Korean People's Assembly of the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations. Provisional Korean People's Assembly to perform the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation with a membership of 10,000 or more and those who fully uphold the Moscow Decision and also do not act against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers -- do not oppose the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers. The number of representatives into the Provisional Korean People's Assembly should be equal from the North as well as from the South. Representation of various parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission will establish this representation in compliance with the number of members and taking into consideration as much as possible their influence.

3. The Joint Commission directs the Provisional Korean People's Assembly for elaboration of proposal on the question of structure and principles of organizations of provisional democratic government and local organs of power (provisional charter) political platform and personnel of the Korean Democratic Government and the order of assumption of power and other questions. The provisional charter should envisage the creation of a legislative body.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

elections which should be carried out all ofer Korea on the basis of general direct equal electoral right, secret ballot....During these elections, all democratic parties and social organizations should have equal opportunity to designate their candidates and equal opportunity to freely agitate for them and for their program."

At the Joint Commission meeting of 20 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation made a statement concerning thearrests inSouthern Korea in which it pointed out:

"The Korean people follow the work of the Joint Commission with anxiety and with understandable and legitimate impatience await the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

"And now, in this responsible and tense moment in the work of the Joint Commission, mass arrests of leaders and actual closing down of democratic parties and social organizations of the Leftist trend, pogroms of Leftist democratic newspapers, arrests of workers of the Leftist Democratic press, began in South Korea. Arrests are being carried out in Seoul, as well as in the provinces.

"It should be noted that the repression is carried out only against those democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, which actually support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

"Among those arrested, some are representatives of democratic parties and social organizations, designated for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission.

"I shall cite several instances which, nevertheless, vividly show the amplitude of repressions in South Korea, directed against the above mentioned democratic parties and social organizations."

An enumeration of facts follows:

".....The numerous arrests of the leaders of the democratic parties and organizations, many of whom are designated representatives of these parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission, created in South Korea conditions which impede the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea and the agreement reached between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall.

"Such an situation is being created, it seems with the aim of undermining the work of the Joint Commission.

"The Soviet Delegation draws the attention of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission toward serious consideration of these circumstan-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

and insists on taking of immediate measures for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea, and for appropriate conditions for work of the Joint Comission."

At the Joint Comission meeting of 25 August 1947, the American Delegation made a counter-statement in which it pointed out:

"_____

_____ _____ _____ _____

The Soviet Delegation answered that it is not merely a guest, but that it is a member of an international comission specified in the Moscow Decision of the Ministers on Korea, which carries responsibility for the execution of that Decision. Consequently, the Soviet Delegation could not regard indifferently the events which had been mentioned above.

The Soviet Delegation noted that the American Delegation had not named a single leader which had been arrested by the authorities in Northern Korea. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that in Northern Korea leaders of parties and organizations are not arrested, parties and organizations are not persecuted, their presses and newspapers are not padlocked, and from the moment of liberation there have been no facts in Northern Korea of supression of newspapers of any parties or organizations of of wrecking of newspaper offices or of closing of the headquarters of this or that party or organization. All parties cooperate among themselves and solve problems having equal opportunities and equal rights.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Summary		iv
I.	The Korea-Manchuria Frontier	1
	A. Historical Background	1
	B. Geographical Considerations	2
	C. Resources	2
	D. Industry and Commerce	4
II.	The Suiho Hydroelectric Development	5
	A. Construction Program	6
	B. Division and Distribution of Power	6
	C. Post-War Operation	6
III.	The Northeastern Korean Ports in Hamgyoung-pukto Province	8
	A. Korea's Northeastern Province of Hamgyoung-pukto	8
	1. Geographical Characteristics	8
	2. Resources and Industry	9
	3. Transportation and Port Development	10
	B. The USSR's Interests in This Area	11
	C. Post-War Economic and Strategic Position of Korea's Northeastern Ports	12
IV.	Potential Post-War Rail Traffic between Korea and Manchuria	13
	A. Through Rail Connections between Korea and Manchuria	13
	B. Estimate of Post-War Korean-Manchurian Rail Traffic	15
	C. Railroad Operating Costs	16

APPENDICES

Appendix A.	Detailed Description of the Suiho Hydroelectric Plant	17
	I. Location	17
	II. Installations	17
	A. Capacity	17
	B. Suiho Dam and Reservoir	17
	C. Plant Buildings	17
	D. Plant Installations	18

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
NND 750120
By BR NARS, Date 11/29/76

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Appendix B. Detailed Description of Northeastern Korean Ports .. 19

I. Unggi (Yuki) 19

A. General Location and Importance 19

B. Harbor 19

C. Port Facilities 19

D. Ship Supplies 20

E. The Town 20

F. Industries 20

G. Public Utilities 20

II. Najin (Rashin) 21

A. General Location and Importance 21

B. Harbor 21

C. Port Facilities 21

D. Ship Supplies 22

E. The Town 22

F. Industries 23

G. Public Utilities 23

III. Ch'ongjin (Seishin) 23

A. General Location and Importance 23

B. Harbor 23

C. Port Facilities 24

D. Ship Supplies 25

E. The City 26

F. Industries 26

G. Public Utilities 26

MAPS

1. Korea-Manchuria: Important Mineral and Industrial Concentrations (ORI 8316).

2. Plan of An-tung-Sinuiju (Shingishu) (Navy No. X-646.1).

3. Plan of Unggi (Yuki) (Navy No. X-646.3).

4. Plan of Najin (Rashin) (AMS 340545).

5. Plan of Ch'ongjin (Seishin) (Navy No. X-646.4).

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUMMARY

Japanese control of both Korea and Manchuria in the years before the war practically eliminated the international significance of the Korean-Manchurian boundary. For political reasons, Japan maintained a division between Chosen (Korea) and Manchoukou, but this had little effect on the economy in these two countries. With the defeat of Japan, Manchuria again will become an integrated part of China and the reestablished international boundary will pose immediate economic problems.

1. The Suiho hydroelectric plant on the Ya-lu River is astride the actual boundary line. Post-war operation of this important plant, which was built under Japanese control, poses the question of plant operation and power distribution. Both countries have legitimate rights to the plant and to a share of the power output. Under Japanese control, the division of power was made on a 40/60 basis: 40 percent to Korean industry and 60 percent to Manchurian.

Two alternate plans for post-war operation appear possible:

(a). Operation by a joint Korean-Manchurian commission, with the division of power adjusted to the economic needs of the two countries.

(b). Operation of the plant, on a lease basis, by one of the countries, with provisions for sale of power to the other on an agreed basis.

The former plant would seem to raise fewer problems.

2. The post-war position of the northeastern ports of Unggi (Yuki), Najin (Rashin), and Ch'ongjin (Seishin) poses a second problem. These ports were developed by Japan primarily for use in transit trade with Manchuria and as military bases counterbalancing the USSR's position in Vladivostok.

The southern most of these ports, Ch'ongjin, will be important to the Korean post-war economy because of its industrial development. The two northern ports, Najin and Unggi, however will be more valuable as outlets for Manchurian foreign trade, because of their geographic location and lack of industrial development. The port of Najin has an excellent harbor and could play an important role in the passage of Manchurian foreign trade. However, operation of this port as a purely Korean port with attendant custom duties, etc., might stifle all transit trade and Korea would gain little or nothing.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

3. A third and important problem to Korea is the profitable post-war operation of the three through rail lines to Manchuria. These Japanese-built railroads played an important role in Japan's war economy, but their profitable operation in peacetime will depend to a large extent on the volume of trade between Korea and Manchuria. A reasonable estimate of the volume of rail traffic cannot now be made. However, it may be assumed that the post-war volume of trade between these two countries will be considerably less than the volume as reported under Japanese control.

(a). The double-tracked line through Sinuiju and An-tung is the most important rail connection between Korea and Manchuria. It might be assumed that the Korean section of this line, north of Pyoungyang (Heijo), could be operated profitably with an annual total of from three to four million net tons of through freight, which approximates the traffic carried by the Japanese in 1939.

(b). There are some possibilities for profitable operation of the single-tracked line through Manhochin and Chi-an, providing the Chinese permit the shipment of large quanities of iron ore and coal from the Tung-pien-tao mines to Korea.

(c). It would seem that approximately two to three million tons of traffic annually would be required for profitable operation of the east-coast Korean line north from Wŏsan. However, this volume of traffic probably must come from shipment of Korean raw materials, such as Musan iron ore and T'u-men coal, and from industrial production in Ch'ongjin and Songjin, rather than from Manchurian trade.

(d). Profitable operation of the one hundred-mile branch line from Najin to T'u-men will depend, for the most part, on the volume of Manchurian foreign trade through the ports of Najin and Unggi. If custom restriotions materially reduce this volume, the rail line probably can not pay operating expenses.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE KOREA-MANCHURIA FRONTIER ZONE

I. THE KOREA-MANCHURIA FRONTIER

The independence of Korea, which has been guaranteed by the major powers, will require the reestablishment of an international boundary between that country and Chinese Manchuria. As there is no apparent dispute between the two countries over the delineation of this boundary, it can be assumed that it will follow the same line as was recognized prior to the Japanese expansion. However, the creation of an international boundary poses immediate economic problems in the Korean-Manchurian frontier zone.

A. Historical Background

The ancient Korean Kingdom of Ko-ku-rye (37 B.C. to 668 A.D.) maintained some jurisdiction over territory extending north of Vladivostok, but was forced to relinquish its territorial rights above the Ya-lu and T'u-men Rivers during the Chinese T'ang Dynasties (618 to 906 A.D.). During the following years, until the late nineteenth century, Chinese colonization of southeastern Manchuria was discouraged by the Manchu rulers, but few if any restrictions were placed on the infiltration of Korean settlers. The Koreans adapted themselves so successfully to the subsistence economy of the border regions that later Chinese settlers found it difficult to compete with them.[1]

Frontier problems between Korea and China developed during the eighteenth and nineteeth centuries, because of Korean claims on territory north of the T'u-men River. These claims apparently were based on the predominance of Korean settlers in the Chien-tao region of Manchuria as well as on historical grounds. Until about 1864, the number of permanent Korean settlers on Chinese territory was relatively small; only about one hundred thousand had settled along the Ya-lu and T'u-men, with the largest percentage in the latter valley. Since that date, their numbers have increased rapidly, being augmented by a flood of political exiles during the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1910.[2]

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1. McCune, Evelyn and Shannon. "The Tumen Corridor," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, no. 12.

2. Ibid.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In 1920, the Japanese estimated that there were about 450,000 Koreans in Manchuria. The 1940 estimates placed their number at 1,450,000 of which close to 600,000 had settled in the Chien-tao region, outnumbering other inhabitants in that area by about four to one. Unofficial estimates for 1945 indicate an increase in the Korean population to about two million.[1]

B. Geographical Considerations

The international boundary between Korea and Manchuria (China) is about 1,375 kilometers long. Starting on the west from the Yellow Sea, the boundary follows the center of the Ya-lu River northeastward to its source, a distance of about 790 kilometers; thence north a distance of about 20 kilometers to the summit of the extinct volcano Pai-t'ou-shan, the highest peak of the Ch'ang-nai-shan range of mountains; thence east about 40 kilometers to the headwaters of the T'u-men River; thence downstream along the center of this river for a distance of about 521 kilometers to its mouth in the Sea of Japan.[2]

The lower valleys of the Ya-lu and T'u-men Rivers are well developed agriculturally, with a few large cities and a number of small towns and settlements. The upper valleys of these rivers are mountainous and sparsely inhabited; they are also heavily forested in many sections.

C. Resources

The areas adjacent to both the Ya-lu and T'u-men Rivers are rich in mineral resources, the most important of which are the Tung-pien-tao iron and coal deposits on the Manchurian side of the Ya-lu; the Musan iron ore deposits on the Korean side of the T'u-men River, and the bituminous brown coal deposits in the lower T'u-men Valley.[3]

Other minerals, such as lead, copper, tungsten, cobalt, asbestos, alunite, and graphite, are found along both sides of the border, but the mining of these minerals has not been as extensively developed as that of coal and iron.

Intensive lumbering by the Japanese has seriously depleted the forests of the middle and lower valleys, but the more inaccessible regions of the

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1. JANIS 74, Ch. X.

2. River lengths from the Orient Year Book 1942. Other distances scaled from I.M.W. 1:1,000,000 map.

3. JANIS 74 and 75, Ch. IX.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

upper valleys probably still have considerable areas of standing timber. Both the Ya-lu and T'u-men Rivers are used in rafting logs down to the sawmilling centers in the lower valleys.[1]

The agricultural development along the border is generally confined to the lower valley areas. Because of the relatively abundant precipitation, corn and rice are the most favored crops. Among secondary crops are millet, kaoliang, and soya beans. Considerable amounts of Irish and sweet potatoes are raised in the Chien-tao region of the T'u-men Valley.[2]

One of the largest hydroelectric developments in the Far East is the Suido plant on the Ya-lu River at Supung-dong, about forty miles upstream from An-tung. Power from this plant was furnished to Korean industrial plants as far south as Pyongyang (Heijo), and to south Manchurian plants via An-tung and An-shan.[3]

It was reported that construction of a second large hydroelectric plant was started in 1942 at I-chou (Gishu), about ten miles up the Ya-lu from An-tung. The planned capacity for this project was 173,000 kw, and the construction schedule called for partial operation in 1945 and completion in 1946. There is no definite information of the progress of this work and, in fact, there is some doubt as to whether the work was ever started.

The Japanese also had planned the construction of five additional hydroelectric plants on the main course of the Ya-lu. The location of the proposed plants was as follows:

Location	Coordinates	Effective Head (in meters)	Estimated capacity (in kw)
Wei-yuan (Igen)	40-53 N 126-03 E	43.5	184,000
Manhochin (Man-p'u-chen)	41-09 N 126-18 E	75.5	234,000
Tz'u-ch'eng (Jijo)	41-27 N 126-37 E	40.0	104,000
Chung-chiang-chen (Chukochin)	41-47 N 126-53 E	45.0	95,000
Hou-ch'ang (Kosho)	41-24 N 127-04 E	74.9	155,000

However, there is no record that construction was actually started on any of these projects.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. Civil Affairs Handbook, Manchuria:Agriculture.
3. JANIS 74, Ch. IX.
4. From OSS preliminary Study on Electric Power in Manchuria.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

D. Industry and Commerce

In the west, the Manchurian city of An-tung, (population 316,750 in 1944) and the Korean city of Sinuiju (Shingishu - population 61,143 in 1940) on the opposite bank of the Ya-lu River, are the most important commercial centers. The double-tracked railroad from Pusan (Fusan) through Kyongsong (Keijo) to Shen-yang (Mukden) crosses the Ya-lu between these two cities on a 3,100 foot steel bridge. The An-tung--Mukden section of this line was first built by the Japanese in 1904 as a light military railroad. The line was rebuilt into a standard gauge railroad in 1911 and has since served as the main rail outlet from southern Manchuria to Korea.

The importance of these two cities has been increased by a considerable sea-borne traffic. Smaller vessels up to 1,500 tons and 3,000-ton lighters can come up the river and dock against the river quays in about nine feet of water. Transshipment to larger vessels is generally made at the Korean port of Dasado (Tashito), some twenty miles downstream on the Yellow Sea.

An-tung has large marshalling yards for rail traffic, an air field, and a considerable number of local industries. Among the latter are a pulp and paper mill, several sawmills, bean mills, and textile mills, a mine explosive factory, an aluminum plant, a truck manufacturing plant, and several ship-building yards.

The smaller city of Sinuiju also has a number of manufacturing plants, including two alcohol plants, two aluminum plants, a magnesium plant, a dye and explosive plant, a pulp and paper mill, numerous small textile and bean mills, and several large sawmills.

A second railroad (single-track), from Pyongyang (Heijo) via Tung-hua to Ssu-ping-chieh, corsses the Ya-lu at Chi-an which had a population of 2,500 in 1937. The Korean town of Manhochin (Man-p'u-chin) on the opposite side of the river had a population of 8,500 in 1937. The population and importance of both these towns has probably increased since the completion of the railroad in 1939.

A third single track railroad crosses the Ya-lu at Supong-dong (Suiho-do). The tracks cross on the Suiho Dam, and the line probably was built to aid in

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the construction of the Suiho hydroelectric plant. Since this railroad apparently has no through connections into Manchuria, it is of value at present only in servicing the small area along its route.

The town of Lin-chiang (Rinko), some sixty miles up stream from Chi-an, at the most northern bend of the Ya-lu, had a population of 18,500 in 1937. The Tung-pien-tao iron and coal deposits are located in this area, and the Japanese have recently connected this town, by railroad to Tung-hua, on the Pyongyang to Ssu-ping-chieh line. The population and importance of Lin-chiang probably has increased materally since the completion of this branch railroad in 1940.

In the eastern zone, the city of T'u-men (population 48,000 in 1940) is the only important commercial center on the actual border. The railroads from central and eastern Manchuria converge here and cross the T'u-men River on a large steel bridge, to connect with the east-coast Korean railroad. A branch rail line leads to Unggi (Yuki) and Najin (Rashin), and the main line to Ch'ongjin (Seishin), Wŏnsan, and Kyongsong. The Japanese completed this rail outlet from eastern Manchuria to the sea of Japan in 1933 and have since used it as one of the main military supply and transit trade routes. Rail traffic through T'u-men in 1939 amounted to over three million metric tons.[1]

A short alternate rail route has been built in the area southwest of T'u-men. This line leaves the Yung-chi--T'u-men line at Chao-yang-ch'uan and crosses the T'u-men River at Sangsambong (Kamisambo) to connect with the T'u-men--Ch'ongjin railroad.

II. THE SUIHO HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT

The Japanese-built Suiho hydroelectric plant (40-27 N; 124-57 E) at Supong-dong (Suiho-do) on the Ya-lu River (about forty miles above An-tung) is reported to be the largest hydroelectric plant in the Far East. Apparently it is the only major industrial development located directly on the international boundary, with its 350-feet high dam spanning the Ya-lu, whose center line is the accepted boundary.

The construction of a second large hydroelectric plant on the Ya-lu at I-chou (Gishu), about ten miles above An-tung, was reported to have started in 1942. No information is available on the progress of this work, which was planned for completion in 1946. If a start on construction was made in 1942, it is very probable that the war materially delayed, if not stopped.

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1. OSS CID 121652, March 1945

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the work.[1]

A. Construction Program

Construction was started on the Suiho Dam in September 1937, and the first two generating units were put in operation on 25 August 1941. Two additional units of the same capacity were in operation by the end of 1942. In December 1943, the Japanese announced that all seven of the planned generating units had been installed and that the plant would be in full operation by March 1944. There is some doubt that all seven units were actually installed, but it is known that at least five units were operating in 1944.

The Suiho plant was jointly owned by two companies: the Manchuria Ya-lu River Hydroelectric Company and the Chosen Ya-lu River Hydroelectric Company. However, all electric power companies in Manchuria were controlled by a central agency, the Manchuria Electric Industrial Corporation (Manshu Dengyo KK). In Korea, similar control of most of the power companies was exercised by the Chosen Chisso Hiryo KK.[2]

B. Division and Distribution of Power

The Japanese are reported to have allotted 40 percent of the plant's capacity (180,000 kw) to Korean industries, and the remaining 60 percent (270,000 kw) to Manchurian industries. Approximately the same percentage of distribution was planned for the full capacity of the plant, which would have allowed about 270,000 kw to Korea and 360,000 kw to Manchuria.

High tension transmission systems systems in both countries were fairly well developed, and power from the Suiho plant was distributed over a wide area. Transmission of power from Suiho to the industrial area around Pyongyang was started in September 1941, reportedly over a 154,000-volt line. Service to An-shan (Manchuria) over a 220,000-volt line started on 26 August 1941, and connections to Dairen were completed by late 1942. Service to the Shenyang--Fu-shun area began in August 1943.[3]

C. Post-War Operation

The physical position of the Suiho plant and its use of water collected by run-off from the territory of two independent countries will

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1. JANIS 74 Ch. IX.

2. From OSS preliminary study on electric power in Manchuria.

3. Ibid.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

pose many operating and distribution problems. Capital investment rights of Korean or Manchurian origin may also be involved, even though the plant was built under Japanese control.

Two alternate plans for post-war operation of the plant appear possible:

a. Operation by a joint Korean-Chinese commission.

b. Operation of the plant, on a lease basis, by one of the interested countries.

The first of these two plans would seem to raise fewer problems, as the power output since 1941 has been approtioned on a 40/60 basis and many industries in both countries probably are dependent on this service. If the second plan were adopted, the lessee might absorb all surplus power to the detriment of the industrial development of the other country.

A joint commission, with equal representation from each country, might be set up to control the operation of the plant and distribution of power. At the start, and for a reasonable period of time to allow for the change from a war time to a peacetime economy, it might be decided to continue the same distribution of power that was current under Japanese control (e.g., 40/60). During this period, maintenance costs might be borne by each country in these same proportions.

At the end of this period, the commission might review the problem of power distribution as related to the economic need of each country. It might be empowered to adjust the division of power, if necessary, either for another stated period of time, or for a final apportionment.

There is no direct information as to why the Japanese originally set up the 40/60 division of Suiho power. Probably the greater demands of the An-shan--Shenyang--Fu-shun industrial areas had considerable influence in this division. However, another important factor also might have influenced the decision. It is curious to note that of the total area of 46,378 square kilometers in the Ya-lu River Basin, 27,228 square kilometers are in Manchuria and 19,150 square kilometers are in Korea.[1] These areas closely approximate in percentage the 40/60 figures used in dividing the power. Furthermore, it is presumed that the run-off area behind the Suiho Dam approximates this percentage of territorial division, and that such division probably will have considerable bearing on the future allotment of power.

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1. OSS CID 110435, 13 September 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

If the plant were operated on a lease basis by one of the interested countries, the lessee would operate the plant and probably would assume all maintenance costs. The quantity and price of power to be sold to the other country might be fixed by previous agreement. However, the adoption of the second plan would pose several special problems of river use. Nationals of both countries use the river in navigating small vessels and lumber rafts. Leasing of the plant and control of the reservoir area might limit, or possibly preclude, the use of this area by nationals of the other country. The problem of passing timber rafts downstream to the large sawmills in An-tung and Sinuiju might become complicated. Again, the Suiho plant is not fully developed. If the lessee should complete the development, a problem of disposition of surplus power over the present plant capacity would arise. The lessee might claim this excess power because he had paid for the additional installations, but the lessor's territorial rights in the run-off basin may have to be considered.

The above discussion of post-war plans for operating the Suiho hydroelectric plant presupposes that the USSR has not dismantled and removed the generating equipment. If it has, the problem of reequipping the plant must be considered. In addit on to this contingency, it has been reported that the USSR has requested joint Sino-USSR operation of all hydroelectric power plants in Manchuria. If this is true and is accepted by China, there still seem no major problems arising from a joint Suiho operating commission. The normal Chinese delegation could be so constituted as to give the USSR proper representation.

III. THE NORTHEASTERN KOREAN PORTS IN HAMGYOUNG-PUKTO PROVINCE.

A. Korea's Northeastern Province of Hamgyoung-pukto.

1. Geographical Characteristics. Korea's three northeastern ports--Unggi (Yuki), Najin (Rashin), and Ch'ongjin (Seishin)--are in the province of Hamgyoung-pukto, whose northern boundary is the T'u-men River. This river, from its headwaters to a point about eleven miles from its mouth, forms part of the international boundary between Korea and Manchuria. The lower eleven miles eleven miles of the river delineates the frontier between Korea and the USSR. The area along the T'u-men River, for a distance of well over one hundred miles from the sea, has been called the "T'u-men Corridor" and for many years has been the gateway for Korean migration northward into

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Chinese and Russian territory.[1] The T'u-men coastal area is covered with extensive marshes and lakes and is sparsely settled. Most of the population is distributed in the interior along the broad alluvial valley bottoms. The winter climate is dry and cold, with an average January temperature of 9 degrees F. in the interior and 16.5 degrees on the coast. The yearly rainfall average is about thirty inches, with more than half falling in the three summer months.[2]

2. Resources and Industry. The mineral resources of Hamgyoung-pukto are important industrially to the Korean economy. The iron ore deposits at Musan, some forty-five miles northwest of Ch'ongjin on the Manchurian border, are estimated to contain a reserve of several billion tons of low grade and highly siliceous magnetite ores (averaging about 35 percent iron content). In 1944, the Musan mines were estimated to have produced over four million metric tons, or about four-fifths of the total Korean iron ore production. The Musan ores were reduced at the mines to about two million tons of concentrates (65 percent iron), which was shipped by rail to Ch'ongjin.[3] A considerable quantity of these ores was used by three local iron and steel plants--two at Ch'ongjin and one at Songjin--and the rest probably was shipped by boat to Japan.

The major part of Korea's estimated reserves of four hundred million tons of bituminous and lignite coal is found in Hamgyoung-pukto. In 1936, six mine fields in this province produced over one million tons of coal, or about 75 percent of the total Korean bituminous production. About 80 percent of this was from the low-grade brown coal deposits along the lower T'u-men River. There is some question as to the post-war value of this low-grade coal,[4] but since production from other Korean bituminous fields cannot possibly meet local consumption demands, it is very probable that Korea will continue extensive exploitation of the Hamgyoung-pukto fields.

During the war the Japanese used about 30 percent of this coal in the production of synthetic petroleum at two nearby liquefaction plants; the largest at Aoiji-dong (Agochi) had an estimated annual production of about

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1. McCune, Evelyn and Shannon. "The Tumen Corridor," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, no. 12.

2. Ibid.

3. JANIS 75, ch. IX.

4. McCune, Evelyn and Shannon. "The Tumen Corridor," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, no. 12.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

320,000 barrels of petroleum products, and the second plant at Yongan (Eian) about 80,000 barrels. Post-war operation of these two plants would furnish a part of Korea's petroleum needs, providing operating costs were not to high.[1]

Other minerals found in Hamgyoung-pukto, while not abundant, will nevertheless be important to the Korean economy. Large magnesite deposits are reported in the southern part of the province, near Paegan (Hakugan), and magnesium reduction plants are reported at Ch'ongjin and Songjin. Some cobalt, mica, and graphite are also mined in the province.

Hydorelectric power has been developed by the Japanese near Puryong (Funei), where three installations have a total estimaed capacity of 27,600 kw. Steam electric power plants were in operation at Aoli-dong (5,000 kw), Musan (2,000 kw), at Ch'ongjin (16,000 kw), at Hanam (2,000 kw), and at Myongch'on (6,000 kw).[2]

Other industries of some importance are brick and tile facrories at Unggi and Hoeryong (Kainei); a refractory brick plan at Songjin; and a cement plant at Komusan which has an annual capacity of about 142,000 metric tons. Several important sawmills are located along the T'u-wen River near Hoeryong.[3]

In agricultural production, Hamgyoung-pukto is probably the least important Korean province. Grain production (including rice) amounts to only about 2.2 percent of the total for Korea. Sweet and Irish potatoes amount to about 6.5 percent of the total, while soya bean products amount to about 9.3 percent. However, the fishery industry in the northeastern ports is much more important, producing about 18.3 percent of the country's total.[4]

3. Transportation and Port Development. Even before gaining possession of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in 1935, the Japanese were busy expanding Manchurian railroads. The line from Ch'ang-ch'un via Yung-chi and Tun-hua, to T'u-men was completed and in operation by September 1933, thus establishing a direct connection with Korean railroads south to the port of Ch'ongjin. Since that date, the Japanese have used the T'u-men Corridor as a transit zone for exports and imports to northern and eastern Manchuria.

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1. IANIS 75, Ch. IX.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

The port of Ch'ongjin was first developed by the Japanese as a strategic counterbalance against Vladivostok. The commercial importance of this port, developed primarily by the Manchurian transit traffic, has been considerably increased by production from local industries. (See Appendix B). However, limited deep-water harbor facilities led the Japanese to develop the two more northerly ports of Najin and Unggi.

Najin was developed into an excellent deep-water harbor, with a shipping capacity about four times as large as that of Ch'ongjin. From about 1933 to 1943, the volume of transit trade and military supplies through Najin was probably greater than that through both Ch'ongjin and Unggi. (See Appendix B.).

In 1938, about 2,150,000 metric tons of freight were hauled by the railroads to the three ports. In 1939 the flow of freight had increased to 3,134,000 tons.[1] During 1944-45, the shortage of large oceangoing vessels probably diverted a considerable amount of this transit traffic southward by rail to Pusan, where it was transshipped by ferry to Japan.

The port of Unggi, due to its close proximity to the Soviet frontier, was primarily a military and naval base. However, some commercial trade probably passed through this port, though it is believed that the majority of this class of trade was handled through the other two ports. (See Appendix B.).

B. USSR's Interests in Northeastern Korea

The Imperial Russian Government's main interests in Manchuria and areas adjacent to Korea were in mineral and forest resources, and in the development of transportation outlets for these products. Korean colonists in Russian territory became solidly intrenched. However, there have been persistent reports in late years that the Soviet authorities have moved the Koreans out of the border areas for military reasons.[2]

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria and their development of transit trade through the T'u-men Corridor materially affected the Soviet's strategic and commercial position in Vladivostok. After the Japanese seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, Vladivostok's commercial importance decreased rapidly. Both countries continually strengthened their malitary defenses

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1. OSS CID 121652, March 1945.

2. McCune, Evelyn and Shannon, "The Tumen Corridor", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, no. 12.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

along the T'u-men Corridor, since a land attack on either Vladivostok or the Korean ports would necessarily take place through this corridor.

The Manchurian-Russian boundary from the T'u-men north to the Ussuri River was fixed by the Treaty of Peking in 1860, and is still accepted by both China and the USSR. During the period of Japanese expansion, however, numerous border troubles developed between the Japanese and the USSR; these troubles culminated in the "Changkufeng Incident" of 1938, in which a large number of troops from each side were engaged in pitched battle. There were no further major incidents in the T'u-men region until the Soviet's declaration of war in 1945.

C. Post-War Economic and Strategic Position of Korea's Northeastern Ports

In the development of these three ports, the Japanese had two primary objects in view: (a) to provide a more direct trade outlet with eastern Manchuria, and (b) to secure strategic bases as a counterbalance against the USSR's position in Vladivostok. Ch'ongjin's recent industrial development, due to the discovery of the rich Musan iron ore deposits, now sets this city apart from Najin and Unggi.

The city of Ch'ongjin should play an important role in the post-war development of Korean economy. Easy access to rich mineral deposits will permit expansion of local industries. Through railroad connections to southern and western Korea, in addition to extensive harbor developments, should provide a sound basis not only for supplying Korean industrial needs, but also for the exportation of surplus Korean products. Critical materials, such as coking coal for the local iron and steel plants, can be imported either by rail from eastern Manchuria or from overseas.

The more northerly ports of Najin and Unggi, because of their geographic position and lack of local industries, will have a much less prominent position in Korean industrial and economic development. Although Najin has the best harbor in northeast Korea, direct railroad connections with southern Korea are lacking. There is an unconfirmed report of the construction of a coastal railroad to Ch'ongjin which would increase Najin's importance, but it is doubtful if this port could compete with Ch'ongjin's industrial position.

The post-war value of Najin and Unggi seems to remain somewhat similar

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to that conceived by the Japanese. From the economic point of view, they will be exceedingly valuable as outlets for Manchurian foreign trade. However, their strategic value has been greatly deflated by the collapse of the Japanese Empire. It is hardly conceivable that Korea will compete seriously with the USSR's strategic position at Vladivostok.

Korea's territorial rights in Najin and Unggi cannot be disputed. However, the operation of these ports as purely Korean ports might stifle all transit trade from eastern and central Manchuria. High Korean custom duties and port charges would probably force Manchurian industry to use Dairen and other southern Manchurian ports.

One possible solution would be to create a free port zone at Najin, thus permitting uninterrupted flow of foreign trade with Manchuria. Under such an arrangement, Korea would benefit from port charges and rail traffic. The position of both China and the USSR in Manchuria for the next thirty years of joint railroad and industrial operation would be benefited by this move. The short rail haul from eastern, and even central, Manchuria to Najin, as compared with the longer haul to Dairen, plus the saving of one thousand or more miles on trans-Pacific sea routes, would certainly attract the majority of foreign trade from these sections of Manchuria. The following table gives a comparison of distances between central Manchurian points and sea ports.

Changchun (Hsinking)	- Dairen	437 miles
"	Najin	427 "
"	Ch'ongjin	431 "
Pin-chiang (Harbin)	Dairen	586 "
"	Najin	466 "
"	Ch'ongjin	470 "
Yung-chi (Kirin)	Dairen	515 "
"	Najin	359 "

IV. POTENTIAL POST-WAR RAIL TRAFFIC BETWEEN KOREA AND MANCHURIA

A. Through Rail Connections between Korea and Manchuria

Three main routes are available for rail traffic between Korea and Manchuria:

1. The main west-coast Korean line from Pusan (Fusan), via Kyongsong

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(Keijo) and Pyongyang (Heijo), to Sinuiju and An-tung, and thence over Manchurian lines to Shenyang (Mukden) on the South Manchurian Railroad.

2. An alternate rail route to central Manchuria from Pyongyang, via Manhochin and Chi-an, to Ssu-ping-chieh on the South Manchurian Railroad.

3. The main east coast-coast Korean line from Kyongsong, via Wŏsan and Ch'ongjin, to T'u-men (Manchuria), and thence over Manchurian lines to Ch'ang-chun (Hsinking), Pin-chiang (Harbin), and Mu-tan-chiang.

Route 1: The main west-coast Korean railroad, from Pusan to An-tung, is 590 miles long. All, or nearly all, of this line is double-tracked, well built, and capable of handling heavy traffic. The capacity of this line is about equal to that of the South Manchurian Railroad from Pin-chiang to Darien, estimated at from thirteen to fifteen million net tons annually. The Manchurian section, from An-tung to Shenyang, is 163 miles long, and is double-tracked as far as Pen-ch'i-hu. From this latter place, two separate lines connect to the South Manchurian Railroad, in effect giving double-tracked service over the whole line. However, the Manchurian section traverses rugged country throughout most of its route, and its traffic capacity is much lower than that of either the South Manchurian or west-coast Korean main lines; capacity has been estimated at about 5,750,000 net tons annually.[1]

Route 2: The alternate route from Pyongyang to Ssu-ping-chieh is some 476 miles long. The line is single-tracked, traversing rugged country, with many grades, sharp curves, and tunnels. Such conditions limit its traffic capacity, which has been estimated at about 1,300,000 net tons annually.[2]

Route 3: The main east-coast Korean line, from Kyongsong to T'u-men, is about 595 miles long. On the Manchurian lines, the distance from T'u-men to Pin-chiang is about 354 miles; to Ch'ang-ch'un about 315 miles; and to Mu-tan-chiang about 249 miles. This line is all single-tracked, and the Korean section, built along the rugged east coast, has numerous tunnels, bridges, and sharp curves. Traffic capacity on the section from Kyongsong to Wŏnsan has been estimaed at about five million net tons annually. Northward, from Wŏnsan

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1. JANIS 74 and 75, Ch. VI.

2. Ibid.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to T'u-men, traffic capacity is only about three million tons annually. The branch line from T'u-men to the port of Najin is 101 miles long, and has an annual traffic capacity of about three million tons.[1]

B. Estimate of Post-War Korean-Manchurian Rail Traffic

It seems impossible to give a reasonable estimate of the probable volume of future rail traffic between Korea and Manchuria. The traffic capacity of the main rail lines, as they existed under Japanese control, would indicate the possibility of handling about ten million net tons annually: about six million tons through the entry ports of An-tung and Simuiju; another million tons through Chi-an and Manhochin; and about three million tons through T'u-men. However, these figures cannot be taken as a measure of post-war rail traffic, since many uncertain factors, rather than potential line capacity, will actually determine the volume of this trade.

Among these uncertain factors are:

1. Korea's needs for Manchurian products, either raw materials or finished goods.

2. China's post-war program which envisages the absorption of all that Manchuria can produce in raw materials, food, and industrial products. However, some Manchurian production may be diverted to export trade in order to obtain foreign credits.

3. The joint USSR-China operation of Manchurian railroads and industrial plants, which will give the former country high priority in the disposal of industrial products from the jointly managed factories.

Korea probably will be primarily interested in importing from Manchuria certain raw materials, such as iron ore and coking coal, and also various kinds of manufactured goods. Of secondary consideration, though probably important to an increase in living standards, would be the importation of agricultural products such as soya beans and cereals. However, these are the products most desired by China, which naturally will have first call on them. Rice would be the principal commodity which Korea could export, either to China or Manchuria, in payment for imports.

A post-war estimate based on the volume of freight carried under Japanese control would also be misleading. First, much of this traffic was

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1. JANIS 74 and 75 Ch. VI.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

in the form of transit traffic between Manchuria and Japan. Secondly, its wartime character gave a greater volume than the ordinary demands of peacetime. Again, Japanese statistics are complete only to 1939, and even these are probably greatly camouflaged.

Rail traffic flow through the entry ports of An-tung and Sinuiju in 1935 totaled 1,007,580 metric tons, and increased to 3,134,734 tons in 1939.[1] There are no records available for traffic through the entry ports of Chi-an and Manhochin, but there are reports that a considerable quanity of raw materials from the Tung-pien-tao iron ore and coal fields were shipped through Korea to Japan. Rail traffic through T'u-men in 1938 totaled 2,150,000 metric tons, and increased to 3,134,000 tons in 1939.[2] However, except for coking coal and other raw materials used locally in Ch'ongjin, the major portion of this tonnage probably moved through the northeastern ports, to and from Japan.

Even approximate estimates of post-war traffic must wait until both the Chinese and Russian programs in Manchuria have been developed more specifically, and until plans have been prepared for the economic development of a free Korea.

C. Railroad Operating Costs

Operating costs on the main connecting railroads are difficult to estimate. The Japanese have never published any such detailed information for these lines. However, it is believed that the following assumptions can be made:

1. The main west-coast Korean railroad, north of Pyoungyang, could be operated profitably with an annual total of from three to four million tons of through freight.

2. The alternate rail line through Chi-an and Manhochin will pay operating costs only if large quanities of iron ore and coal are shipped from the Tung-pien-tao fields to Korea.

3. The east-coast Korean line, south of Ch'ongjin, probably must obtain most of its revenues from local raw materials and industrial products shipped from Ch'ongjin and Songjin to central and southern Korea. It might be assumed that from two to three million net tons of traffic annually would be required for profitable operation of this line.

4. Profitable operation of the T'u-men Najin line will depend on the volume of Manchurian foreign trade.

1. OSS CID 121652, March 1945

2. Ibid.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

APPENDIX A

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE SUIHO HYDROELECTRIC PLANT[1]

I. LOCATION

The Suiho hydroelectric plant is located at Supong-dong (Suiho-do, Korea), on the Ya-lu River about forty miles upstream from An-tung. The small settlement of Chieh-tzu-kou is on the north (Manchurian) side of the river. A single-tracked branch railroad from Chongju, Korea, serves the plant and adjacent areas. The railroad tracks have been extended across the Suiho Dam for a short distance into Manchuria.

II. INSTALLATIONS

A. Capacity.

The Japanese planned to install seven generating units, with a total capacity of 630,000 kw. However, records indicate that only five of these units have been installed, producing a total of 450,000 kw. Of this latter total, about 180,000 kw was alloted to Korean industries, and the remaining 270,000 kw was supplied to Manchurian industries -- a 40/60 division of power.

B. The Suiho Dam and Reservoir

The dam is a gravity type concrete structure, with the following dimensions:

Height	350 feet
Length	3,940 feet
Top width	26 feet

The effective water head behind the dam is 252.6 feet. There are 7 penstocks, 16.4 feet in diameter, leading through the dam to the power house, which is built at the base of the dam on the southern (Korean) end. There are 27 overflow gates along the top of the dam, north of the power house section; each gate is 21.3 feet high by 39.4 feet wide.

The dam creates a reservoir which extends up the Ya-lu about 112 miles, and up the tributary Hun-chiang about 30 miles. The surface area of the reservoir is approximately 133 square miles, and the storage volume has been estimated at 7,600,000,000 cubic meters.

C. Plant Buildings

The power house, housing turbines and generators, is built at the foot of the dam, and is a reinforced concrete structure measuring 75.5 feet wide,

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1. Detailed information obtained from OSS preliminary study of electric power in Manchuria.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

by 571 feet long, by 81.4 feet high above general ground level (151 feet high above foundation).

An auxiliary building, housing offices, cable rooms, and switch-rooms, is on Korean soil, adjacent to the power house. It is a 3-story building 56 feet wide, by 147.6 feet long, by 62.3 feet high.

The outdoor transformer yard is adjacent to the auxiliary building. It is 267 feet in width and extends about 1,115 feet downstream.

D. Plant Installations

It was planned to install seven reaction type, vertical shaft, butterfly valve, Dengyosha-make turbines, each of a 105,000-kw capacity. Five of these turbines are known to be in operation, but, though the other two may have been installed, it is believed they are not in operation.

Of the seven generators planned, apparently only five have been installed. Three of these units are Shibaura make, 100,000 kva, 3 phase, 125 rpm, 50 cycle, 15,600 volts. One unit probably is a Siemens-Schukert make, 100,000 kva, 3 phase, 150 rpm, 50 cycle, 15,600 volt. The other unit is reported to have been manufactured by the Hitachi Company (Japan), but no specifications are available.

It was reported that the two remaining units were being manufactured by the Hitachi Company, but here is no record that these units were ever installed.

Original plans called for eight transformers, each 100,000 kv, water-cooled, 50/60 cycle, 15.6 / 230-240 kv. Records show that at least two Shibaura-make transformers were installed by September 1941; one was used for transmission, via a 220-kv aluminum-steal line, to An-shan in Manchuria, and the toher for transmission, via a 154-kv line, to Pyongyang in Korea. It appears that the originally planned installations were changed, in part, to allow for transmission to Pyongyang on a lower voltage.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

APPENDIX B

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF NORTHEASTERN KOREAN PORTS[1]

I. UNGGI (YUKI) 42°20' N; 130°24' E

A. General Location and Importance

The port of Unggi (Yuki) is about fifteen miles west of the nouth of the T'u-men River, which marks the Korean-Soviet frontier. (See map.) Although developed primarily by the Japanese as a strategic base in opposition to the Soviet's position at Vladvistok, the port, together with Najin (Rashin) and Ch'ongjin (Seishin), has shared in the considerable transit Japanese-Manchurian traffic. A good single track railroad from Najin passes through Unggi and extends northward to Namyang-dong (Nanyo-dō) on the Manchurian frontier, where it corsses the T'u-men River and connects with Manchurian railroads leading to Ch'ang-ch'un, Pin-chiang, and Mu-tan-chiang.

B. Harbor

The harbor is at the head of a small bay in the northwest corner of Chosen-man (Zōsan-wan), a larger bay west of the T'umen River. The bay is well protected from the strong northerly to westerly cyclonic winds common during the winter in this region, but is open to heavy southeast squalls during the summer. Fogs prevail from May through July, generally occuring with southerly winds and lasting from a few hours to as long as three or four days. The harbor provides good anchorage in from fifteen to sixty feet of water for a limited number of vessels; additional anchorage is available in adjacent areas. During the winter months, shore fast and skim ice are frequently in the harbor, but it is reported that a local ice breaker keeps the harbor clear.

C. Port Facilities

On the southern side of the harbor, opposite the town, there is a 1500-foot concrete quay with depths of 24 feet alongside which can berth four 4500-ton vessels. There are three 250-by-50-foot warehouses on the quay, with smaller storage houses in the rear, all having good road and rail service. At least one 10-ton crane is available for handling cargo.

A small craft basin on the town (northeastern) side of the harbor, protected by stone rubble and concrete jetties, provides shelter for lighters and small

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1. JANIS 75, Ch. VI, VIII and IX.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

coastal vessels up to 400-500 tons. The basin has an area of about 106,000 square yards with water depths from 6 to 15 feet, but, during winter months it is frozen solid. About 2,600 feet of quayage is available, with good rail and road service. One large 250-by-50-foot warehouse and several smaller storage buildings are on or near the quay, and a 10-ton crane is reported as available for cargo handling. A total of some 45,000 square feet of storage space is available on the two quays.

The daily unloading capacity of the port has been estimated at 6,500 long tons, of which 1,500 tons can be handled from deep draft vessels direct to the south quay, the remainder being handled by lighters in the small craft basin.

D. Ship Supplies

Water is obtained from a water barge equipped with hand pumps which serves ships in the harbor at a rate of ninety tons in ten hours. However, the water is considered unsafe for drinking and should be treated before using. In 1931, three petroleum godowns were reported and there were facilities for storing three thousand tons of coal. There is no later reliable information on these supplies, but it may be presumed that the Japanese have developed additional supply facilities since that date.

E. The Town

The population in 1939 was estimated at 22,085. The main portion of the town lays in the flat valley on the northern side of the harbor, with hills several hundreds of feet high rising behind the town. The main streets are reasonably wide but unpaved, and the buildings are mostly of one and two stories, apparently well built to withstand the rigorous climate.

F. Industries

Very little industrial development has taken place. A small fish-processing factory is reported to operate only during the summer months, and a small shipyard has been turning out wooden cutters of from seventy to eighty feet in length.

G. Public Utilities

Water is obtained from a reservoir in the hills west of the harbor and is conveyed by pipe line to a storage tank near the railroad and from there into the town. A small steam power house generates about four hundred horsepower for the town; additional power is also obtained from the steam plant at Aoji-dong (Agochi-do).

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

II. NAJIN (RASHIN) 42° 13' N; 130° 18' E[1] (See Map)

A. General Location and Importance

The port of Najin (Rashin) is about 120 miles southwest of Vladivostok and some 10 miles south of Unggi (Yuki). (See map.). The port was originally a small fishing village, but the Japanese developed it into a major military and commercial port for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria and for the export of eastern Manchurian industrial products and raw materials to Japan. A good single track railroad runs northward via Unggi to T'u-men on the Manchurian frontier, where it connects with the Manchurian system of railroads leading to Ch'ang-ch'un and Pin-chiang. The Japanese regarded this port with its rail connections as one of the main arteries of military and economic supply between the home islands and Manchuria.

B. Harbor

The deep natural harbor at the head of Najin-man is well protected from the west, north, and east by high hills. Two islands at the mouth of the bay give protection from southerly storms and divide the approaches into the southwestern and southeastern entrance channels. The Japanese were reported to be planning the construction of a breakwater to close the southeastern entrance, but it is not believed that the project was carried out. The harbor area covers about thirteen square miles and is considered ice free, though floating ice and some freezing may occur in December and January. The harbor and bay provide deep anchorage for about 124 vessels; there are 76 first-, 21 second-, and 27 third-class berths. Tidal currents within the bay are not strong, but heavy swells are reported during and after southerly storms. Southeasterly winds prevail from May to September, and foggy conditions occur during the spring and early summer.

C. Port Facilities

The Japanese plans for developing the port contemplated the handling of some 9,000,000 tons of cargo by 1948, and included plans for the construction of 7 or 8 major piers as well as extensive quayage paralleling the shore line. Construction started in 1933, and in 1937 facilities were available to handle about 900,000 tons of cargo, the fifth largest port tonnage in Korea for that year.

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1. JANIS 75, Ch. VI, VIII, and IX.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Available reports on the progress of the original construction program differ, but 1943 Japanese charts, partially corroborated by poor quality aerial photographic coverage, indicate that three piers and extensive quayage were completed. It is estimated that there is berthing space at the three concrete piers for about 47 vessels, including nine 500-foot ships (10,000 tons each) and four 450-foot ships (7,500 tons). Depths at piers and quay-sides range from 31 feet to 10½ feet. Good rail and road service is available on all piers, and quay and dock area warehousing accommodations in June 1938 were estimated at 40,000 tons, with open storage available for another 40,000 tons. Scattered warehouses were reported near the old village of Najin-dong. Information on mechanical handling facilities is contradictory; one report states there is a large traveling crane on each pier, while another says that only one 25-ton land crane and two floating cranes of 30 and 50 tons are available. In 1938, there was an estimated total of 1,000 tons of lighters, one small and one large 800 hp. tug, and two 50-foot launches. The total unloading capacity of the port was estimated at 25,100 long tons per day; of this total, 10,100 tons were discharged directly to the piers and deep water quays, and 15,000 tons were handled by lighters.

D. Ship Supplies

Fresh water is reported available at the main terminals, or can be supplied to anchored ships by a 40-ton-capacity water barge. The water is considered unsafe for drinking and should be treated before using. Oil storage tanks in the vicinity of the cavalry remount depot were used for military purposes; number and capacity of these tanks is unknown. No figures are available on storage of coal. Two marine railways for the repairs of small boats are reported.

E. The Town

The population of Najin in 1940 was reported as 38,319. The civilian portion of the town lies east of the Rashin river, while the main port and military areas are west of the river. Modern buildings of brick and wood in bungalow style are common; the modern Yamato Hotel, owned by the railroad company, was completed in 1939. An extensive military camp is located west of the railroad yards, and a cavalry remount depot is further north. The municipal hospital has a capacity of twenty beds and the military hospital has one hundred beds.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

F. Industries

There is no information on local industrial development other than the two small marine railways and a small railroad repair shop. Apparently the Japanese used the port primarily for military and transit trade between Manchuria and Japan.

G. Public Utilities

The municipal water supply is obtained from a small river about twenty miles to the south and is forwarded to the town through a five-inch pipe line which parallels the highway from Ch'ongjin. There is no information on purification or distribution in the town. In 1939 there were 39.1 miles of sewer lines draining an area of about 1.2 square miles, with discharge into the Rashin River. Most of the electric power supply is received from the Puryong (Funei) hydroelectric plants, northwest of Ch'ongjin, but reports indicate that some current is received from the Aoji-dong (Agochi-dō) steam plant. The municipal electric company is owned and operated by the Unggi (Yuki) Electric Company.

III. CH'ONGJIN (SEISHIN) 41° 46' N; 129° 49' E.[1]

A. General Location and Importance

The port of Ch'ongjin (Seishin) is on the Kyong-son-man, a large open bay about forty miles south of Najin. (See map). This port shared with Najin and Unggi in the military and commercial traffic between Japan and Manchuria. However, Ch'ongjin's share of this transit traffic was considerably increased by products from local industries. The city has an important iron and steel industry and is the major outlet for the hearby Musan iron mines, which produce about 80 percent of all Korean iron ores. Rail connections to the east-coast Korean railroad permit traffic with the Manchurian railway system northward through T'u-men and with central Korea southward through Wonsan and Kyongsong.

B. Harbor

The harbor area is well protected from northwesterly to northeasterly winds which prevail during winter, but is open to southerly winds during summer and is subject to occasional heavy swells. A small tidal current, varying in rate from one-half to three knots, sets inshore toward the river mouth and is usually strongest during southeasterly winds in summer. Foggy weater is

1. JANIS 75, Ch. VI, VIII, and IX.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

encountered from April to early August and, at times, may interrupt navigation for several days. The river freezes solid during the winter, but ice is rarely a navigation problem in the harbor area.

The port has three harbors, well protected by breakwaters. The commercial harbor (see C on map), the only one that can accomodate deep-draft vessels, is in the northeasterly corner of the bay directly in front of the city. The other two shallow-depth harbors (see A and B on map) lie to the southwest of the city in the industrial area.

C. Port Facilities

The commercial harbor (C) is protected on the south by a long two-section breakwater, and is divided into an outer and inner harbor by the 900-foot-long Coastal Trading Mole. The inner harbor for small vessels is from 10 to 20 feet deep and covers a water area of about 50,000 square yards. The outer harbor for deep-sea vessels is from 26 to 55 feet deep and covers an area of about 434,000 square yards. Berth space is available for about 10 vessels in depths from 20 to 31 feet of water. Additional anchorage for four 8,000-ton vessels is available inside the breakwater, and the general port area can provide 35 first-, 7 second-, and 8 third-class anchorage berths in from 33 to 114 feet of water, with mud and sand bottom. The principal storage facilities of the port are concentrated around the commercial harbor; they consist of one- and two-story wooden and brick warehouses with a total ground area of about 215,000 square feet. In addition, there is about 150,000 square feet of open storage. Most of the warehouses and open storage areas have adequate rail and road service. In 1931, two cranes -- a 10-ton and a 1½-ton -- were reported available for handling cargo. Additional unloading equipment probably has been obtained since then.

Industrial harbor B is on the western side of the bay, between the old and new mouth of the Susŏng River. The industrial development fronting this harbor is on reclaimed land. The outer section of the harbor, with depths from 7 to 16 feet of water, covers an area of about 224,000 square yards and is protected by a 2,750-foot breakwater. The inner harbor, with a dredged depth of 11½ feet of water, covers an area of about 121,000 square yards. This harbor was originally intended to service the large fish-products industry, and its 9,500 feet of quayage is lined with warehouses and canneries. However,

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the adjacent Mitsubishi Iron Works now probably uses some of the inner harbor facilities for handling iron and steel products. While there is no information on either mechanical loading facilities or storage space in this harbor, there probably is considerable covered and open storage space available.

Industrial harbor A, which lies to the south of the Susŏng River, was still under construction in 1945. Its outer harbor, protected by two breakwaters, covers a water area of about 730,000 square yards and provides anchorage for a number of small vessels. The inner harbor, still uncompleted, covers an area of about 300,000 square yards. Depths in this harbor are unknown, but aerial photos taken in early 1945 show only small coastal vessels and lighters present. This harbor probably was designed to service the adjacent Japanese Iron Works plant. In December 1944, an estimated 6,500 feet of quayage were completed and in operation. Two traveling cranes, probably used in handling coal, were in operation on the eastern quay. Aerial photographs show large dumps of coal and ore inland from the quays, but do not show any warehouse construction.

The estimated unloading capacity of all three of the Ch'ongjin harbors is 19,400 long tons per day; 4,400 tons are discharged directly to piers and quays in the commercial harbor, and about 15,000 tons are handled by lighters. In 1938, 819 vessels, totaling 1,245,000 gross tons, called at Ch'ongjin.

D. Ship Supplies

Water is furnished by the municipal waterworks, and hydrant service is available on the quays in the commercial harbor. In addition, two waterbarges, of twenty and thirty tons respectively, and a motor boat equipped with pumps are available for anchored vessels.

Coal is plentiful from nearby mines and aerial photographs show large stockpiles of what apparently is coal in the industrial harbor A area.

A 1941 report listed fuel oil storage capacity as more than five hundred thousand tons. Location of storage tanks is undetermined, but large oil stores on the western quays of industrial harbor A have been identified from aerial photographs.

A marine railway is located on the eastern shore of the bay south of the commercial harbor, but data on its shore installations are lacking.

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E. The City

In 1940 the population of Ch'ongjin was reported as 197,918. The commercial section of the city fronts the commercial harbor, and the two residential sections extend to the east and west, backed by high hills on the north. The industrial area lies along the western shore of the bay, where the Japanese have built new harbors and large railroad facilities.

F. Industries

The Japan Iron Works and the Mitsubishi Iron Works are the most important manufacturing plants in the city. In 1944, these two plants and a smaller one at Songjin (Jōshin) were estimated to have produced 545,000 metric tons of pig iron, 213,000 tons of steel ingots, and 37,000 tons of plates and bars; respectively 55 percent, 44 percent, and 17 percent of the total production for Korea. During the same year about 1,400,000 tons of Musan's iron ore concentrates were shipped to Japan. Coking coal for plant operations was probably imported from the Mishan area of Manchuria.

The fish-products industry is concentrated in the industrial harbor B area. No figures are available on production capacity, but Ch'ongjin is considered to be one of the important fish-products centers in Korea.

The Chōsen Fat Oil Company and the Kyodo Fat and Oil Company produce soaps and lubricants. The North Korean Oil Refinery produces synthetic petroleum, but the capacity of the plant is unknown. The Japanese Rayon Company operates a plant in Ch'ongjin, and other plants producing carbide, magnesium and synthetic oils have been reported to be in operation. Large railroad repair shops, a round house, and extensive rail switching and storage yards are available.

G. Public Utilities

The municipal waterworks had a capacity of 910,000 gallons of water daily in 1939, but there is no information on purification or distribution. In 1939, there were 4.3 miles of sewage trunk lines which drained about 3 square miles of the city area and discharged directly into the bay. The city had a twenty-bed mission hospital, in addition to its seventy-five-bed municipal hospital.

Electric power was obtained from the three Puryong (Fūnei) hydroelectric plants, whose capacity totals 27,500 kw. Additional current is obtained from a 16,000 kw steam plant at the calcium carbide plant in the city.

A 10,000-watt radio broadcasting station is on the prominent hill at the west end of the commercial harbor area, and radio, telephone, and telegraph service is available to ships and airplanes.

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PROVISIONAL EDITION

RESTRICTED

U. S. S. R.

MONGOLIAN PEOPLES REPUBLIC

MANCHURIA

JEHOL

U. S. S. R.

RELIABILITY OF DATA			
DATA	QUAN.	QUAL.	LOC.
MINERALS		GR	OA
HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS			OA
INDUSTRIES		GR	OA
RAILROADS	GR		NE

Quantitative & Qualitative Data
R - Reliable
GR - Generally Reliable
U - Unreliable
Coverage of Data
C - Complete
I - Incomplete
Location of Data
A - Accurate
NE - Not Entirely Accurate
OA - Only Approx. Accurate

QUANTITATIVE DATA The letters R, GR, and U are an estimate of the reliability of the map's quantitative data, the data which are measurable, including economic or population statistics, hypsometric data, the width of roads, gauges of railroads, etc.

QUALITATIVE DATA The letters R, GR, and U are an estimate of the reliability of the map's qualitative data which shows the types of road surfaces, character of beaches, types of terrain, etc.

COVERAGE The letters C and I in combination with R, GR, or U are an estimate of the degree of completeness of quantitative and qualitative data.

LOCATIONAL DATA The letters A, NE, and OA are estimates of the plotted accuracy of data within the limits of scale and width of line.

PRE-1931 CHINESE PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY OF MANCHURIA

MANCHURIAN BOUNDARY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

112° 114° 116° 118° 120° 122° 124° 126° 128° 130° 132° 134° 136°

54° 52° 50° 48° 46° 44° 42°

Vitim
Shilka
Amur River
Zeya
Selemdzha
Ingoda
To Irkutsk
CHITA
Onon
Argun River
Bureya
HEI-HO
LU-PIN (MANCHOULI)
HU-LUN
Hailar
HU-LUN CH'IH
Chiang
Nen
LUNG-CHIANG (TSITSIHAR)
HAI-LUN
KHABAROVSK
Amur River
Ussuri River
PIN-CHIANG (HARBIN)
Sung-hua
Sung-hua Chiang
CH'ANG-CH'UN (HSIN-CHING)
KUNG-CHI (KIRIN)
SUI-FEN-HO
VLADIVOSTOK
MUSAN (Mozan)
Lao-ha Ho
CH'IH-FENG
Luan Ho
CHENG-TE
SHEN-YANG (MUKDEN)
Liao

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

KOREA AND MANCHURIA
IMPORTANT MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATIONS

- COAL
- IRON ORE
- NON-FERROUS METAL ORES
- HYDROELECTRIC PLANT(S)
- HEAVY INDUSTRY
- LIGHT INDUSTRY

0 50 100 150 200 250 300
STATUTE MILES

0 50 100 150 200 250 300
KILOMETERS

- SELECTED RAILROAD (5' Gauge in U.S.S.R., 4 8½' elsewhere)
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

GLOSSARY

Chiang; Ho; -kang; -kō . . . . river
Chih . . . . . lake

NOTE: *Japanese forms of Korean names are shown in parentheses.*

NO. 8316—R & A, IRIS
10 DECEMBER 1945

RESTRICTED

LITHOGRAPHED AT [illegible] PRODUCTION BRANCH SSU

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

AN-TUNG — SINŬIJU

BASED ON UNCONTROLLED MOSAIC AND PHOTOGRAPHS FROM SORTIES: 462 BG/4MR-31/13 DEC. 1944 AND 444 BG/5MF-23/5 FEB. 1945. INSET BASED ON AMS MAPS NUMBERS 115834 AND 115835.

SOUNDINGS IN FEET

1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

SCALE IN FEET

NORTH



SOY BEAN PLANTS

CHINESE SETTLEMENT

JAPANESE SETTLEMENT

AN-TUNG

5 EMPTY D-3

D-1 12 4

D-2 4 EMPTY

D-7 4 ALTERNATE OR DUMMY

D-6 6

ROUND HOUSE

ANTUNG AIR STATION

GAS PLANT

YALU LUMBER CO.

NIKKA SPINNING MILL

LOG POND

CHŌSEN PAPER MILL

FENGHUANG CHENG

YALU KIANG

40° 07' N

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By _____ NARS, Date _____



PREPARED BY:
PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER
AND FAR EASTERN THEATER DNI

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. X—646.1

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



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REPORTED WATER RESERVOIR

WAREHOUSES

UNGGI MAN

42°19' N

KIN DAN

KURUUN DAN

PIPA SOMU

130° 25' E

UNGGI (YŪKI), KOREA

BASED ON JAP. H.O. 310 AND
SORTIE 468 BG/4 MR DEC. 21, 1944

0 5 10 Cables

SOUNDINGS IN FEET

OP-16-FE FEB. 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO. X—646.3

NND DECLASSIFIED 760090
By NARS, Date

NAJIN (RASHIN)
HAMGYONG-PUKTO
(KANKYO-HOKUDO), KOREA

Scale 1: 20,000

2 0 1 Miles
500 0 500 Meters
500 0 500 Yards

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

RELIEF SHOWN BY FORM LINES

Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Washington, D. C.
Compiled for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Force, under the direction of the Aeronautical Chart Service by the Lake Survey Branch, Army Map Service, Detroit, Michigan. January, 1945.

Compiled from:
1. United States Hydrographic Chart 5464, 1:45,000 (1939) (trigonometric survey - base map)
2. Japanese Hydrographic Chart 310, 1:66,000 (1937 cor. '43) and Inset: Yuki-ko 1:15,000 (1942 cor. '43)(trigonometric survey - added streets and place names)
3. Japanese Hydrographic Chart 315, 1:15,000 (1934) (trigonometric survey - added detail)
4. Korea 1:50,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Uggi, Najin (1926) (Reconnaissance survey - vegetation, added place names)
5. Intelligence data: (1944) (Railroad gauge and other detail)

Korean names transcribed according to the McCune-Reischauer system. Japanese forms of Korean names (shown in parentheses) transcribed according to the Modified Hepburn (Romaji) system.

LEGEND

- Depth of Water
- Police Station
- Built-up Area
- Roads
- Track or Trail
- 4'8½" Gauge Single Track Railroad
- Grassland
- Rice

INDEX TO SOURCES



GLOSSARY

KOREAN	JAPANESE	ENGLISH
-am	-iwa, -gan	rock
-dan	-tan	cape
-bong	-hō	peak
-to, -do	-tō	island
-man	-wan	bay
-dong	-dō	village, precinct

HEIGHTS IN METERS, DEPTHS IN FATHOMS AT NEARLY LOWEST LOW WATER

42°17' 130°14' 15' 16' 17' 18' 19' 20' 130°21' 42°17'
16' 15' 14'

561.1 545 416.9 402 434.9 277.9 317.9 592.6

Cavalry Remount Depot
REPORTED OIL TANKS
P'igae-dong (Hikaidō)
(Chōsen) Elementary School
Town Office
PARK
AREA
WATCH TOWER
PARK
Najin (Rashin) Station
BUILT UP
City Hall
Hanŭi-p'yŏng
Wonbong
Koundigoue
Kuduhilso
HANGAR REPORTED IN THIS AREA
I-dong (Ri-dō)
Kanŭi-dong (Kanibei)
SINAN-DONG (SHINAN-DŌ) (SŌKEI)
REPORTED BARRACKS
Sŏnbaek-hilso
KAN-DONG (KAN-DŌ)
Ch'ŏsŏp'yŏng
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
REPORTED OIL TANKS
Sinp'o-hangp'o
STANDARD WATER LEVEL ROCK

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

FOR USE WITH AAF AIR OBJECTIVE FOLDER SEISHIN 84.1

NOTE: Officers using this chart will mark hereon corrections and additions which come to their attention and mail direct to "AERONAUTICAL CHART SERVICE, HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON, D.C."

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U.S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 340545
JANUARY 1945
1-46

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

CH'ŎNGJIN (SEISHIN), KOREA

BASED ON JAPANESE H.O. CHART NUMBER 321, CORRECTED TO 1941, AND ON PHOTOGRAPHS: SORTIE 468 BG/4MR44/ DEC. 21 1944. QUALITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS VERY POOR.

SOUNDINGS IN FEET

1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
SCALE IN FEET



SYMBOLS
- BUILDING
- RAILROAD
- MARINE RAILROAD
- ROAD, PRIMARY
- ROAD, SECONDARY
- TRAIL
- COAL STORAGE
- LOOSE STORES
- CRANE

ROAD AND RAILROAD TO SUSŎNG (YŬJO)
RAILWAY WORKSHOP
R.R. TURN-TABLE
BARRACKS AREA
R.R. YARD
R.R. STATION
QUAY NO. 3
QUAY NO. 2
QUAY NO. 1
CUSTOMS OFFICE
ARMY STORES
R.R. TO INDUSTRIAL PLANT
PROBABLE SITE OF MITSUBISHI IRON WORKS
DRAIN
INDUSTRIAL AREA
INNER HARBOR
OUTER HARBOR
PRISON
MARITIME COMMISSION
KOMALSAN (KOMATSU SAN) ELEVATION 640 FT.
KOMALSAN-SAN
MARINE R.R.
LIGHTHOUSE
41° 47' N
41° 46' N
41° 45' N
R.R. YARD
SUSŎNG-GYŎN (YŬJO SEN)
FLOOD EMBANKMENT
FLOOD EMBANKMENT
RAILROAD TO SUSŎNG (YŬJO)
JAPAN IRON WORKS
PROBABLE COAL STORES
RAILROAD AND ROAD TO NANAM (RANAN)
BARRACKS AREA
129° 45' E
129° 46' E
129° 47' E
129° 48' E
129° 49' E
129° 50' E
129° 51' E

0161

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

0012

FROM: G-2 XXIV CORPS.

SUBJECT: Celebration of Joining the World Federation of Labor. Held at Seoul Stadium on 28 July, 1946.

1. Attendance: 35,000 - 40,000.

2. General LERCH was represented by Brig. General HOCKMELING. The General gave a short address in which he urged the cooperation of all the Korean people in the establishment of a free and prosperous KOREA.

3. Lt. Col. L.A. SPAR representing the Labour Department of Military Government explained the function and the responsibility of that department.

4. Opening Address - by PAK, Hai Hawn, Vice- Chairman of All Korea Labour and Farmers Union; in part.

"The recognition of all Korea Labour and Farmers Union at the conference of PACIFIC, by the World Federation of Labour, is the recognition of KOREA".

"Since 1924 Korean Labours Unions has been fighting against the capitalism and the Japanese Imperialism and Fascism, in secret, under the iron rule of JAPAN. Because of this hard fight we have such a day as to day".

"Since 1924 the Korean Communist Party guided us, cooperated with us and supported us in all our efforts of our movements. It is with the help of the Communist Party that we could join the World Federation of Labour this year. Admittance of Korean Labour and Farmers Union to the World Federation of Labour is the result of deligently following the instruction of Karl Marx, 100 years ago. He said that all labourers must be united. Today, the instruction of Marx is even more important than ever".

"We, the labours should join the movements of those of World Federation of Labour. We denounce the Franco Overnment and Fascism. We should be united in opposing the Korean reactionary elements which follow the foot steps of Franco of SPAIN".

"The farmers in N KOREA have been emancipated by the decree of redistribution of land. The women have been elevated to the rank of men by the act of claiming the quality of women with men. We do not have such blessings as these in S KOREA. We do not know what is stored in the future for us but what we should do now is to unite ourselves in requesting more progressive labour laws than those of N KOREA, and the same claim of the equality of men and women just as it is in N KOREA. In case we cannot succeed in obtaining this goal, we, 1,200,000 labourers should be united in fighting to obtain this goal to the last minute".

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"The Korean pro-Japanese, the Korean reactionaries and profiteers have been supporting the Korean Provisional Government but we should make every effort to have the Soviet-American Joint Committee reconvened in the earliest possible date, and have the Interim Government organized".

In the remainder of his address Mr. PAK stated, in brief, the history of how the All Korean Labourers and Farmers Union recognized by the World Federation of Labour. Toward the end of June 1946, Mr. PAK said that the All Korea Labourers and Farmers Union has been recognized. It is the special record in the history of Korean labour.

5. The following is some of the points which were made in the congratulatory messages from The General Reps of the Korean Labour Union:

a. We should unite ourselves.
b. Crush and kick out all the profiteers.
c. Absolute opposition to closing factories.
d. Guarantee the livelihood of the labourers.
e. Demand rations to the labourers first.
f. Turn the land to the farmers who are working.
g. Freedom in the educational system.
h. Crush reactionary political figures and establish Interim Government.
i. Crush Fascist Franco.
j. Guarantee the freedom of speech, gathering, press.
k. Long live Democracy, Emancipation of weak nations, Korean Labour Union.

6. Mr. KO, Awn of the Korean People's Front, in his congratulatory speech, said the following in part:

It is a remarkable progress that the Korean Labour and Farmers Union has been recognized by the World Federation of Labour and it is worthwhile to celebrate this occasion. We could not do this kind of thing under the Japanese rule for many many years but we now have the freedom of joining the world organization and it should be congratulated. Now, we can forbid the weak women's work in factory, and that of boys and girls under 14 years of age. The coal miners working time can be shortened and many other things.

It is the labourer who could curb the production of implements of war and supply of war by joining the world organization.

Reconstruction of KOREA should be done by the labourers, by uniting ourselves.

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7. LEE, Yawng Sawn of the Korean Communist Party, said the following in part:

We congratulate the 8 million labourers union. You should be the responsible men in organizing the Democratic KOREA. The labourers have been oppressed by the Japanese imperialists and the Korean Police, but we are oppressed now, by the traitors to the Korean Nation and pro-Japanese.

There is nothing to fear in the world by the united world labourers. To them the atomic bomb gives no fear because the labourers can stop the production of it.

In N KOREA the right of sovereignty is vested in the hands of common people, but in S KOREA the condition is all most the same as that of the Japanese imperialistic system.

Our Moto is:

a. Turn the right of governing KOREA over to the People's Committee.
b. Remove the reactionary elements from government position.
c. Give 3 Hob a day ration to the labourers.
d. Eight hour work a day, and set up the minimum wage for the labourers.
e. Guarantee the freedom of speech, gathering and press.
f. Long live ! Democratic People's Front, Stalin, PAK, Heun Young, and the laborers of the world.

8. HA, Young Choo, of The Korean Women's Union, said in part:

If there is no recognition of the women's union there is no sense in sheding the precious blood of young men in the war.

Sea, land and field belong to us, therefore these things should be returned to us.

We should get back what we are entitled to have.

The labourers should own the factories, farm lands and other business with them.

The labourers should have things to eat, should be clad, although others could not have them.

A wealthy and strong country is the country which has wealthy and strong labourers.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

9. In addition to the above, one officer of this Headquarters was circulating around in the crowd throughout the entire time the meeting was in progress, and the following information was obtained by him.

a. The Communist Party had a number of propaganda agents working and lecturing to small groups of people. These agents were trying to arouse sympathy for the defendants in the Counterfeit Case that is to open in SEOUL on 29 July, and the following is a speech that was overheard by this officer.

"The Korean Communist Party never produced Counterfeit currency. This case was brought on the stage by Reactionary elements. At 0900 tomorrow morning the court for the counterfeit case will be opened. Let us all go there and back those men involved. Don't you think that our only friend is RUSSIA, who has helped us from the beginning.

10. This crowd was very orderly and the meeting seemed to be well organized and at no time was there any disturbance what so ever.

D.J.S.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

(To be read on 29 July 1946 at the opening meeting of the Committee for Arrangements, 15 August 1946 Joint Korean-American Celebration)

15 August 1946 is the first anniversary of a day that will always remain bright in the memories of both Americans and Koreans. This day a year ago marked the end of the long conflict with Japan and the beginning of a new era for Korea. During the past year the imprint of Japanese imperialism has been erased from Korean life. In addition, a foundation has been laid for the establishment of a democratic self-governing Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations. It is my sincere hope that the 15 August celebration will be participated in jointly and with full cooperation by all political and social organizations in Korea as an indication to the world that the people of Korea stand ready to overlook minor differences and work for the good of the nation as a whole.

This day of all should not be marred by untoward incidents fomented by irresponsible ~~hoodlums~~ persons but should stand as a clearly defined signpost indicating the real cooperation among political groups that will the more quickly enable Korea to take its proper place among the nations of the world.

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THE COURSES FOR THE PARADE WHICH WILL
TAKE PLACE ON 15 AUGUST 1946

1. Total numbers. It is eatimated about 50,000 persons.

    1. American Army.
    2. Korean Coast Guard and Army.
    3. Korean Boy Scout and Girl Scouts.
    4. College Students.
    5. Employees of M. G.
    6. Employees of Kyung-Gi Gov't.
    7. Employees of City and other Gov't agencies.
    8. Representatives of each Block Associations.
    9. Employees of a few factorys.
    10. Members of Political parties, and other organizations.

2. Courses.

    1. Starts from Seoul Station.
    2. March to City Hall where American army will receive the review by Gen. Hodge.
    3. Will make right turn to Whang Keum Jung.
    4. Will make left turn to Chong No.
       The Liberation bell will be heard at this place.
    5. Will make left turn to Kwang Wha Moon, the main road again.
    6. Will make right turn to Capital Building where the master celebration will be held.

3. First Aid stations.

    3 first aid stations will be established by the Seoul Doctors' Assocation, and will receive free treatments.

    Doctors and nurses will follow up the parade.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Program of the celebration of the World Peace and Liberation of Korea on 15 August 1946

1. Remarks ..... Mr. S. C. Oh
2. Prelude ..... Korea Symphony Orchestra
3. National Anthem .....

4. National Anthems of U. S. A., England, U. S. S. R., and China.

5. Adresses

✓ Lt. General J. R. Hodge Notified T.N. Col. Beck
(Interpretation, Dr. M. M. Lee)

✓ Major General A. V. Arnold Notified J.N.
(Interpretation, Dr. H. H. Underwood)

Major General A. L. Lerch, The Military Governor
(Interpretation, Dr. Y. H. Chyung)

Dr. Rhee Seung Man.

Mr. Kim Koo

Dr. Kim Keu Sik

Mr. Lyuh Woon Hyung

Mr. Hu Hyun

~~Mr. Ahn Chai Hong~~

A lady from the political party.

6. Presentation of flowers
7. Liberation Song ..... The grand women's Glee Club
8. Reading the Messeage to Allied nations ... Mr. U. K. Yu
9. Mansei ..... Lead by Dr. P. O. Chough

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

THE ARCHES WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT THE FOLLOWING PLACES BY THE CITIZENS

1. Military Government front gate.
2. Kwang-wha-moon Tong.
3. Chong-no Rotary.
4. Chong-no 4 Jung Mook Rotary.
5. Whang Keum Jung Entrance.
6. Chosen Bank Rotary.
7. Seoul Station Ground.
8. Run Peyng Chang.
9. Shin Shul Jung 4 Jung Mook Rotary
10. A-hyun
11. Young Deung Po Bridge.

THE TOWERS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT THE FOLLOWING PLACES BY THE CITIZENS

1. City Hall Ground.
2. Duk Soo Palace Ground.
3. Chong-no.
4. Chosen Bank Rotary.
5. West-gate Rotary.
6. Shin Shul Jung.
7. Whang Keum Jung 6 Jung Mook Rotary.

ELETRIC ILUMINATION

1. South Gate.
2. East Gate.
3. Intendependence gate.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

LIST OF INVISATION

1. Political Leaders

Dr. Rhee Seung Man
Kim Koo
Dr. Kim Keu Sik
Lee Sei Young
Leyu Un Hyung
Hu Hyun
Pak Hyun Young
Hong Chin

2. Education

Choy Kyu Dong
Mrs. Cha Mirisa
Kim Sung Soo

3. Religions

Bishop Roo (Catholic)
Lee Un Young (Methodist)
Kim Young Ju (Presbyterian)
Pak Han Young (Budhist)
Kim Chang Sook (Con

4. Literature

Hong Myung Hi
Chung Yin P
Kim Tai Jun

5. Scitentist

Dr. Lee Tai Kyu
Dr. Youn Yil Sun
Dr. Lee Won Chul

6. Artist and Musician

Ko Yi Dong
Miss Kim Mary

7. Technician

Lew Chun
Lee Kang Hyun

8. Head of Political Organizations

Oh Ha Young	Ham Tai Young
Won Sai Hyun	~~Chin Yik Hi~~
Lew Lim	Paik Nam Won
Cho So Ahng	Choy Dong O
Kim Boong Jun	Paik Kwan Soo
Yim Young Shin	Kim Lyu Sick

An Chai Hong

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

9. News Paper men

Lee Chong Young
Bang Eung Mo
Yum Hang Sup
Han Yil Dai
Sul Yi Sik
Ha Kyung Duk
Chung Chin Suk
Kim Young Soo

10. Leaders of lady's society

Mrs. Shin Albert
Mrs. Yu Kak Kyung
Mrs. Kim Sung Sil

President (Women's Nat'l Party)
2 RDC Delegates

11. Social Welfare

Lee Suk Koo
Oh Keung Sun
Cho Dong Sun

12. Missionaries

Dr. Becker
Dr. Eletcher
Dr. Underwood

13. Foreigners

English Laison officer
Russian Laision officer
Chinese Laison officer
Chinese Merchants club

14. Korean M. G. Leaders

Lee Hoon Koo
Oh Choong Soo
Lew Dong Yul
Rhee Won Chul
Chyung Yil Hyung
Kim Pyung No
Kim Hyung Min
Yu U. K.
Kil Mon Pong
Min Hi Sik
Choygh P. O.
Lee M. M.
Koo Ja Oak

15. Business men

Kim Dong Won
Pai Nak Seung
Lew Yil Han
Lee Dong Sun
Lew Chai Seung

16. ~~Lawers~~ Judicial

Lee Yin
Kim Jun Pyung

Chief Justice
Kim Yong Moo

President Supreme Court

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

17. Committee Members

Oh Sai Chang	Min Kyu Sik
Pai Nam Hoon	Su Jung Hi
Lee Joong Wha	Pak Won Sik
Kim Shin Suk	Chang Ki Chang
Hong Chun	Kim Sung Whan
Kim Seung Sik	Pyun Sung Oak
Oh Han Young	Pak Jung Kun
Koo Yong Su	Paik George

U.S. Red Cross

International

UNRRA

Miss Langdon

Dr. Bunce

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CITIZENS COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS
FOR PEACE AND LIBERATION DAY
15 August, 1946

OH, Seh Chang, Chairman

1. Representatives of the General Public

WON, Seh Hung

AN, Chai Hong

[redacted] KIM, Kwang Soo

LEE, Yuh Sung (absent) or TOH, Yu Ho (Present)

2. Representatives of the Local Government

Governor KU of Kyonggi-do (KOO, Jha Ok)

Mayor KIM of city of Seoul (KIM, Hyung Min)

Chairman of Seoul Ward Head's Council (absent) (LEE, Chong Ha)

3. Representatives of National Military Government

CHO, Pyung Ok

YU, Uck Kyum

CHYUNG, Il Hyung

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CITIZENS COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS
FOR PEACE AND LIBERATION DAY
15 AUGUST, 1946

The meeting was convened at 1530 on July 30, 1946.

Those present included:

1. General Hodge's Representatives:

   Brigadier-General John Weckerling
   Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Coolidge
   Major C.E. Weems, Jr.
   Dr. H.H. Underwood (Interpreter)

2. Representatives of the General Public

   Oh, Seh Chang
   Won, Soh Hung
   An, Chai Hong
   Kim, Kwang So
   Toh, Yu Ho

3. Representatives of Local Government

   Koo, Jha Ok
   Kim, Kyung Hin
   Lee, Chong Ha

4. Representatives of Military Government

   Cho, Pyung Ok
   Yu, Uek Kyun
   Chyung, Il Kyung

GENERAL WECKERLING: Gentlemen, as you know, we are meeting here to organize a Joint Committee, a Joint United States-Korean Committee, to supervise the joint celebration of the first anniversary of the liberation of Korea on 15 August.

Is that the consensus of the committee?

I understand that Mr. Oh, Seh Chang is the agreed chairman of the representatives of the general public, which consists of Mr. Won, Soh Hung, Mr. An, Chai Hong, Mr. Kim, Kwang-So, and Mr. Toh, Yu-Ho.

MAJOR WEEMS: I might say, Sir, that there has been no formal election, but there might be a question as to whether or not it has been agreed upon.

KIM, KWANG SO: We have come today as observers to learn what opinions are expressed here rather than as official delegations, and we would rather not participate in any official action that we can go back and report to our parties and get their official views as to what we ought to do. We, therefore, do not want to be on the record as taking part in any election.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

GEN. WECKERLING: Perhaps I had better read a general statement from General Hodge, which I think will give you some idea as to the purpose of this celebration:

> 15 August 1946 is the First Anniversary of a day that will always remain bright in the memories of both Americans and Koreans. This day a year ago marked the end of the long conflict with Japan and the beginning of a new era for Korea. During the past year the imprint of Japanese imperialism has been erased from Korean life. In addition, a foundation has been laid for the establishment of a democratic self-governing Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations. It is my sincere hope that the 15 August celebration will be participated in jointly and with full cooperation by all political and social organizations in Korea as an indication to the world that the people of Korea stand ready to overlook minor differences and work for the good of the nation as a whole.
>
> This day of all should not be marred by untoward incidents fomented by irresponsible persons but should stand as a clearly defined signpost indicating the real cooperation among political groups that will the more quickly enable Korea to take its proper place among the nations of the world.

GEN. WECKERLING: General Hodge appointed me, Col. Coolidge, and Major Weems as representatives of the American side of the Joint Committee.

Gen. Hodge's idea was to have American troops such as participated in the Fourth of July celebration, stage a parade similar to that parade to be followed by the Korean section, to consist of such elements as the Korean Committee here decides.

He also wanted to arrange athletic contests in the afternoon between the Korean teams on one side and U.S. on the other—largely baseball and track events.

That would constitute the joing celebration that would be made that day. Other than that, he felt that the Koreans, you Koreans, could get together and arrange your own program.

Two of the representatives of the general public arrangements committee here are unable to decide as yet, before reporting to their superiors. Therefore, what we have said here is the general program of the day. Does anybody have any questions or suggestions?

AN, CHAI HONG: (Interpreted by Dr. Underwood) Mr. An says, as nearly as I can understand, that the two suggestions that have been made are very good, but while everybody is happy about liberation, still there is in the minds of Koreans that they have not yet achieved independence as yet, and it is their hope that there might be a place sometime during the day where they can express their own national spirit at whatever time it might be. They would like to have some time when they could have greater expression of their own national spirit, rather than as there would be in the joint meeting.

GEN. WECKERLING: Yes, well as I said before, other than the joint affairs we think it is up to the Koreans to arrange their part of the program for themselves.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MR. CHAI HONG: (Interpreted by Dr. Underwood) He says that there might be points in that which should have been discussed with the American authorities. As far as such a meeting would be concerned, he would be happy to discuss with them such things. Such a meeting would be desirable.

GEN. [illegible]: That is a meeting he wants--purely Korean--he wants no U.S. participation at all?

MR. CHAI HONG: (Interpreted by Dr. Underwood) It is his idea that the meeting would be carried on under the auspices of Koreans, but that they might want to ask such persons as Gen. Hodge or Gen. Lerch to participate in such a meeting. His idea is that it be carried on by Koreans.

GEN. [illegible]: Mr. Kim, could you comment on that informally, without committing yourself or your party officially?

MR. [illegible]: (Interpreted by Major Beems) (See correction following) We of the National Front have the greatest desire to cooperate with American forces, and are glad to appear jointly with them in any kind of public celebration on the fifteenth of August, but if it comes to a matter of a purely Korean celebration we do not feel our people who are on the Left can meet with many of the people who are attached to the Right. First, those who were persecuting our people, throwing them in jail, and perpetrating other forms of persecution under the Japanese regime; and, second, those who opposed the fundamental principles of democracy and seem to treat people in an autocratic manner at present. Although the fifteenth of August marks the first anniversary of the day which theoretically means freedom and liberty for the Korean people, we still find that there are innumerable basic problems that have not been solved, and we find all around us these people who were close collaborationists with the Japanese in positions of authority. We cannot participate in joyful celebration with these people as such. We, therefore, feel no joint mass meeting would be practicable nor could we support such a plan.

MAJOR [illegible]: (Correction of above speech) Mr. Kim did not use the terms "Right" or "Left"--I merely inferred this.

CHO [illegible] YUNG UK, Representative of Military Government (no interpreter--sketchy): The purpose of this meeting to be held August 15 is to arouse the Korean people to be grateful to our Allies and also we want to be grateful for our liberation, although the liberation has been realized not as..... ....so that we can build up quickly the true free and independent nation, forgetting and forgiving all of those minor differences. This kind of committee should not be conducted as a court trial where we are claiming prisoners as children of God. It is far from that. I know we have got to be humble because... No organization has the right to condemn any of our people as pro-Japanese traitors. It can't be done. It has to be proved legally. If any people in Korea today try to set up a trial court, my wishes will have them forgetting who are the traitors ....There may be some pro-Japanese in Korea now....The purpose of this meeting--

GEN. [illegible]: Gentlemen, let's keep this discussion on the basis of the joint arrangements for this parade. I think we are getting a little out of line.

MAJOR [illegible]: There are two things I would like to say. One is that this discussion now in regard to the advisability or inadvisability of a joint meeting as the discussion is going outside the scope of the program which Gen. Weckerling has just outlined. The General and Gen. Hodge have just said we are

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

interested in having a parade and an afternoon of athletic contests. There has been general agreement in all our preliminary agreements with members of the National Front as well as other persons present here on the general idea of those events, with some participation from Military Government and the Americans. The question of whether we have joint meeting or not is one for this committee to decide. It is not something that has been recommended. I think the whole question of whether we should have a joint assembly of all elements is not anything Gen. Hodge or the American Command is trying to force on anybody. The question of meetings in the evening during the evening hours after the parade and afternoon exercises, after athletic events have been held, will be a question for the decision of the regular police authorities. The decisions are being cleared through my office as a matter of convenience. Those conferences will be held on these allegations (or applications) tomorrow at the convenience of the people, and those questions will be decided individually. If there is any desire to have a meeting, it could be done, but there is no reason for anyone here to try to force the idea of a joint meeting.

[illegible], Han Hung. (Interpreted by Dr. Underwood) He came here by invitation and he and all the rest have heard Gen. Hodge's message but there may be differences in the way of interpreting our thinking about the fifteenth of August. On the other hand, there are two things that stand out--that the surrender of the Japanese in Korea and the end of the conflict...and the other is the beginning of liberation of Korea. From these two points of view it seems all Koreans want to be able to take part in the celebration. Gen. Hodge has pointed out this is the first anniversary of liberation. We are in preparation for independence which all Koreans look forward to, and this is the idea which can be celebrated. We can think of it as preparation for independence. He regrets very much that the celebration could not be participated in by Soviet Forces, as the 38th Parallel is not abolished. It is necessary to get along without the Soviets, desireble though it would be to have the Soviets here to celebrate with us too. He realizes liberation is not yet complete. We are liberated from the oppression of Japan but are still under the domination of different foreign countries, and in regard to the remarks Mr. An Chai Hong in regard to the celebration for Korean spirit, he is in accord. Some of the people here today are here as members of the group and others are not. He wonders if we are all on the same plane in regard to discussion of the plans and if those who say they are not qualified to be members should have freedom of speech that the others have. He had hoped the celebration would be a united celebration and not like the first of March. There are different ideas and plans and people who discuss the program today should be people who belong to the group and who are grateful toward the allies, happy about the end of the War, and who appreciate the preparation for independence--who have similar feeling. Other people should not be able to take part in the discussion. We must have, everyone should be able to take part in the program outlined on the basis of gratitude for ending of War and gratitude to our Allies.

MAJOR WEEKS: There is the committee of arrangements of 33. This committee, which is Rightist, has stepped aside and said that since the joint committee is being organized its various members would make themselves available to serve under this committee rather than have their own program. It was hoped

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

that similar attitude of tolerance would be shown by the two representatives of the National Front.

GEN. ECKELBERG: This has been a very preliminary meeting. I want to thank you all for coming here to attend this meeting. I think we are all agreed on the desirability of the joint celebration as expressed in Gen. Hodge's letter of greeting to this meeting--that this day marks the end of the conflict with the Japanese and the beginning of a new era for the Koreans.

At the next meeting at some time that is convenient to everybody here, I would like to have from the various representatives a statement as to whether we are in agreement on the points that I have brought out. That is, do we agree to participate in joint Korean-U.S. celebration on the 15th of August in a program which I have outlined?--that is, a parade of United States soldiers such as participated on the fourth of July, and a section of Korean units and groups, plus the athletic contests that Gen. Hodge has proposed for the afternoon? That is a question that I would like to put before the Committee.

[illegible]: There might be various definitions of pro-Japanese, that practically all Koreans might be accused of being...as this is a program suggestion by Allies and there are certain elements in which we can all rejoice and we can meet and carry on happily for joint celebration of this program. There are differences of opinion, of course, but the thing to do here is not to raise objections as to pro-Japanese inclinations, but that we might all get together and that everybody make a good report to their parties...

GENERAL ECKELBERG: May I have an answer to the question I just asked?

[illegible]: Yes, they will all do that.

MR. KIL, KWANG SO: (Interpreted by Dr. Underwood) He gives many thanks. He feels much impressed with the desire for unity and as far as the program for celebration is concerned, he doesn't see much difficulty. But on the other hand, there are certain difficulties. There are people who hoped Military Government would remove pro-Japanese and in any joint celebration there will be difficulties, and there are certain individuals probably who would feel that even participation in such a meeting where individuals are whom they suspect would be having part would be very difficult. He is not in a position to speak officially for the parties he represents.

GEN. ECKELBERG: I would like to again emphasize Gen. Hodge's suggestions for the 15th of August celebration. He proposed that we have a joint celebration in which the U.S. forces would cooperate with the Koreans in the features which I mentioned, that is, the parade and athletic and baseball events. Outside of that he believes the Koreans should get together on a joint program. I feel sure that if you will get together in any kind of a unified meeting, and I sincerely hope you do, that Gen. Hodge will be present if you ask him, and also any other American officers you want to be present. He will certainly come and will be overjoyed if you will have this joint mass meeting. And I would like

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to leave the meeting on that note. We have agreed on fundamental propositions and we can come back at the next meeting and have some further discussion on what I have just said.

We offer this room or some other room in the palace as a meeting place if you so desire. Anyone of us from the American delegation will be present if they so want us to be present.

I am told there is some question as to separate meetings. Any separate meetings are not part of this discussion at all. They would be under whatever laws that govern and would be a separate matter altogether.

Then shall we adjourn? Would you like to fix a date for the next meeting?

DR. [illegible]: Yes, they think it would be a good idea to fix a time and hour of the next meeting.

MR. [illegible]: The difficulty about trying to fix an hour is that there was some meeting scheduled for yesterday and was delayed. This afternoon we came at two and certain parties are not present. Therefore, in order to avoid our vainly waiting and if these gentlemen could find out from various parties when and if they are coming, then we could fix a date when all would be present and there would be no further delay.

GEN. [illegible]: Is that agreeable to you, Mr. [illegible], that you will notify us of the exact date?

Anytime will be all right for the American side. We will be here anytime, any day you agree upon.

MAJ. [illegible]: They will come and see and get in touch with me sometime tomorrow before two o'clock. I asked them if they would be able to have all various representatives here at two o'clock and they are not sure about that.

YU: We will sent word tomorrow before two as to whether he can or cannot come. Under the circumstances, why not set the meeting for Thursday and let them get word in regard to Thursday in before two O'clock?

GEN. [illegible]: Under the circumstances, then, we had better wait until we get an answer from Mr. Kim. I would like to close the meeting with a few words from Mr. Oh, Seh Chang, Co-chairman.

MAJ. [illegible]: He says he hasn't anything particularly to say as yet.

GEN. [illegible]: Well, we will adjourn the meeting...

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

INFORMAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN BRIG. GEN. JOHN WECKERLING AND MR. KIM, KWANG SOO OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL FRONT
(Also in attendance: Lt. Col. Joseph B. Coolidge and Maj. Clarence N. Weems, Jr., who also served as interpreter)

TUK SOO PALACE, Seoul, Korea
1 August 1946.

KIM, Kwang Soo, who was one of the two National Front officials attending the informal meeting of 30th July, came to General Weckerling's office at 2 p.m. on 1st August to convey the reactions of the National Front to the suggestions made at that earlier meeting. Discussion on 1st August between General Weckerling and Mr. KIM is presented here in condensed form.

MR. KIM: From the beginning of American occupation of Southern Korea I have been interested in bringing all Korean groups together in support of a sound Korean government. Shortly after he became Military Governor last fall, I was asked to visit General Arnold at his office. The general asked me to give him my suggestions regarding disposition which should be made of Japanese residing in Korea and also those Koreans who have been branded as collaborators. My answer was that, while the great majority of Japanese should be returned to Japan, as soon as possible, a substantial number of industrial technicians and medical men should be retained in Korea because of our own lack of specialists. I also suggested that a careful distinction should be made between those Koreans who had been forced to give lip service to the Japanese program in the interest of their personal safety, on the one hand, and, on the other, those who had prostituted their characters and patriotism for personal gain. When, therefore, I say to you that the National Front cannot appear in the same public gathering with collaborators to celebrate peace and liberation day, August 15, I speak as one who has made careful distinctions in regard to the basic character and purposes of the people concerned. The National Front objects to any hypocritical demonstration of harmony with men who are now trying to play the role of outspoken patriots, but who no less than a year ago were menial servants

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of Japanese imperialism. I speak especially of Mr. LEE, Chang Hyung who caused hundreds of Koreans to be killed while he was serving Japanese interests and who is now serving as the Director of Public Information for the Rightist "Korean Association for the Hastening of Independence". The members of that association and similar Rightist bodies are carrying on acts of terror against our Leftist people throughout the provinces. I believe, therefore, that the General can well understand our refusal to app ar in the joint celebration with the leaders who are sponsoring such activities. At the same time I want to emphasize our desire to coopera te with the American Command in connection with the August 15th celebration.

GENERAL WECKERLING: I realize that the problem of collaboration with the enemy is a serious one, not only in Korea but in many other countries. It would appear, however, that the guilt of any Korean is a matter to be decided at some future time through orderly process of a free Korean government, and this is not a matter which should enter into decisions made with respect to our celebration of peace and liberation day. The significance of this day has two principal phases. For Koreans it signifies particularly their release from slavery to the Japanese. For Koreans, Americans and all other peace loving people it symbolizes the termination of four years of war against the three great Fascistic powers. Just as republicans and democrats in the United States join whole-heartedly in celebration of the 4th of July, General Hodge has felt that all Koreans can join successfully in celebration of peace and liberation day. He hopes that they can lay aside differences in political programs and also the question of possible collaboration, and celebrate this happy day together.

MR. KIM: I am personally in favor of the whole movement of unification. If you should ask Mr. AN, Chai Hong and Mr. WON, Soh Hung, you would find that they would confirm the fact that I have shown

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

this interest throughtout the past year. As far as I am personally concerned, I should like to follow the plan of joint celebration suggested by you. The severe treatment which our people are receiving at the hands of members of other political groups, among which are found many real former collaborators, makes it extremely difficult for the leaders of the National Front to propose to their people that they should enter into a joint celebration on this important day with the people who support these undemocratic and narrow-minded leaders.

GENERAL WECKERLING: What kind of celebration does the National Front propose?

MR. KIM: We suggest that there should be two parts to the celebration. During the morning hours there should be a comparatively small gathering of representatives from all political and social groups, both Right and Left, at the Capital Building or some other suitable location. At this meeting it would be desirable if the American Commanding General or the Military Governor could be present. At this time the representative of each participating organization would express his party's congratulations upon the victory of the United Nations and the freeing of Korea. The flags of all the major United Nations would be displayed at this meeting, and the whole gathering would emphasize the unity of purpose of all the United Nations, including Korea. The second part of the celebration would consist of parades and meetings held by various parties and other organizations, subject only to the normal police regulations. In this way we would have an expression of unanimity in the matter of peace and liberation without attempting to force together the entire membership of Korean groups which are separated by serious differences at this time. After such a joint celebration it would seem that the spirit of joint celebration would be compromised by allowing individual organizations to have further meetings according to their own plans.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

GENERAL WECKERLING: Are you prepared to go into the meeting which is to consider the whole celebration problem this afternoon and present these views which you have just described?

MR. KIM: I will be glad to be present at this meeting and present these views, but I will be doing so as an individual and not as an official representative of the National Front.

GENERAL WECKERLING: That arrangement is perfectly satisfactory. I might say, for your own information, that General Hodge has definitely taken the position that all celebrations on the 15th of August, other than the actual parading of American troops, should be planned by Koreans and that Americans should be guests rather than directors of these activities. He is equally firm, however, in his desire that such Korean planning should come from a genuinely representative committee and should not degenerate into separate demonstrations by rival organizations. It is not his desire that any separate meetings or parades should be held on this particular day.

MR. KIM: As I have already explained, it is very difficult for representatives of the National Front to take part in a joint planning committee such as you propose because of the basic differences between the parties represented. We would much prefer that, since the effort at unification is still in its preliminary stages, it would be much better not to place this added burden on AM, Chai Heng, WON, Seh Hung, myself and others, and that it would be desirable to disband this committee entirely. We would recommend that the Military Government issue invitations to all Korean units to participate along the lines mentioned above, and we feel that such invitations will be well received because of his position as head of the existing government of South Korea.

GENERAL WECKERLING: It is now getting rather late and it may not be necessary to have a meeting this afternoon. In preparation for a further discussion in the next day or two, would you be good enough to refer back to your people the results of our discussion

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

this afternoon and see if some way can be found to work with a group of this kind so that the principal demonstrations of the day will be genuinely Korean in nature and will be the result of joint planning.

MR. KIM: I appreciate very much the sincerity of your attitude and I will present your views in the best possible light to the National Front people, and I will report our attitude back to Major Weems.

(Just as the informal conference between General Weckerling and Mr. KIM ended, both Mr. OH, Sey Chang, and Mr. WON, Seh Hung arrived at Tuk Soo Palace. Mr. WON had come in an effort to get something accomplished at this meeting, in spite of the fact that he was suffering from a fever and had been confined at home. Mr. AN, Chai Hong had already come at the appointed hour. When Mr. KIM, Kwang Soo found that WON, Seh Hung had come, he voluntarily expressed a desire to discuss the whole problem of joint planning of the celebration with Mr. WON. These two men spoke briefly with Major Weems, indicating that they would like to try to arrive at a genuine basis of agreement between the Rightist and Leftist elements, and that as soon as such an understanding could be reached they would jointly suggest a new meeting time for the whole planning group.)

* * * * *

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WECKERLING AND MR. AN, CHAI HONG

TUK SOO PALACE, Seoul, Korea
2 August 1946.

General Weckerling met Mr. AN, Chai Hong at 2;45, 2 August, with Dr. Underwood interpreting.

General Weckerling asked Mr. AN to give a frank expression of opinion as to the desirability of holding the Liberation Day celebration under the auspices of General Hodge, invitations to be sent to various political parties and to the general public to participate in the celebration. It was suggested that the celebration might consist of three parts:

1. A large mass meeting in front of the Capital, platform to be erected on which representatives of the parties, social organizations and distinguished Koreans, as well as American officials, should have seats, with speeches to be made by representatives of the different parties and other groups.
2. A parade in which U. S. troops, Constabulary, police, units of the U.N.G., and Korean organizations would participate.
3. Athletic events consisting of a double-header baseball game and track meet to be held in the afternoon.

General Weckerling emphasized the fact that the celebration would be held under the auspices of General Hodge and that General Hodge's only objective was to aid in the united and happy celebration of an event in which all nations rejoiced.

Mr. AN in reply stated that while some celebration to be directly under the auspices of a joint committee of Americans and Korean political organizations might have been better than this, it now appeared doubtful if such a plan was practical. He expressed himself, therefore, as being in full accord with the plan suggested by General Weckerling and in feeling that it was almost the only practical way at this late date to insure a satisfactory celebration. He went on, however, to state that though a united Korean celebration might be difficult, that it was the desire of many groups among the Koreans to hold a purely

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Korean celebration of the event where they might express not only their gratitude of liberation, but their hopes in regard to rapid progress towards independence. He hoped very much that it might be possible to grant permission for such celebrations. He stated that in his mind it would be perfectly possible and satisfactory to hold these Korean celebrations on the 16th, 17th, or even as late as the 18th, if it was felt that it was desirable to reserve the whole of the 15th for the American sponsored celebration.

General Weckerling promised to present Mr. AN's ideas to General Hodge and, after thanking Mr. AN for his presence and cooperation, the conference closed a few minutes after 3 o'clock.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Conference on Liberation Celebration
(General Weckerling and Mr. Kim Kwan Su)
Toksu Palace 11:45 a.m. August 3, 1946

General Weckerling conveyed to Mr. Kim General Hodge's regret and disappointment that the plan for a united celebration of the first Anniversary of Liberation could not be carried out. He stated that the Americans had no desire to monopolize this celebration or make it especially an American celebration. General Hodge felt that it was a day in which all parties in liberated Korea and all people of the United Nations should share.

General Weckerling then outlined the following suggestion for the celebration of the day:

1. A large, open mass meeting to be held in front of the Capitol building, with leading citizens and representatives of the larger parties to be invited to sit on the platform, and representatives of both rightist and leftist groups to be among those to make speeches.

2. Athletic events, consisting of a double-header baseball game and track meet, to be held in the afternoon at the Seoul Municipal grounds.

The official celebration of the day would be confined to these two events, thus leaving the balance of the day open for celebrations to be held by various Korean groups, should they so desire.

Mr. Kim expressed his satisfaction with these arrangements, which followed to a certain extent suggestions which he had made some days previously. He re-emphasized the desirability of allowing different groups of Koreans to hold their own celebrations, and urged that they be allowed to parade, stating that he was sure that the parades would be orderly and that as far as the Democratic People's Front was concerned he could guarantee that there would be no disorder. He further asked for permission to use the Seoul Municipal grounds for the meeting place for such a parade.

General Weckerling asked Mr. Kim if in expressing his approval of the plans outlined Mr. Kim was speaking only for himself or for the People's Front. Mr. Kim replied that in this matter he could speak for the Front. He went on to say that one of the objectives of such a celebration would be to show the complete impartiality of General Hodge and of Military Government toward both Right and Left. He felt, therefore, that rather than allow either side to feel that they had been slighted in the number invited to speak, it would be best to have only one or two each from Right and Left

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

and, in any case, to exercise great care that there be no discrimination.

General Weckerling assured Mr. Kim that General Hodge was aware of the need for care in the above matter. He further reminded Mr. Kim that the plans under discussion were as yet only suggestions, and that they must receive official approval before they could be announced or regarded as official. He promised to take up the question as to Korean celebrations, parades, and the use of the Seoul Grounds for such purposes. He stated that in a few days, perhaps on Monday, he would hope to meet Mr. Kim again to discuss definite details if the general plan was approved.

The conference closed at 12:10 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The following is the short summary of the conversation between General Weckerling and Mr. An, Chai Hong, representative of the rightist groups, held at Duk Soo Palace beginning at 1630, August 5, 1946.

GENERAL WECKERLING:

I had invited you, Mr. An, to discuss plans for the parade and mass meeting of the August 15th celebration. What is your reaction to the following tentative program? The platform of the celebration will be built in front of the Capitol. The parade will start about at 9 o'clock with the U.S. Army in front followed by the constabulary, police, Coast Guard and groups from various organizations. Everybody is welcome to participate in the parade. This will be followed by a review of the parade from the platform and after the last units have cleared, the congratulatory speeches by the honor guests on the platform will begin. It is proposed that the political parties be represented by two from each general group or a total of four in all. You are perfectly welcome to have your own celebration if you do not want to have one large joint celebration. You will recall that you made a special request along this line at the last meeting.

MR. AN:

There is absolutely no objection on our part to the celebration outlined to us by General Hodge through you. In the past, leftists have had only a very few followers when they had their celebration separately so I am of the opinion that they may not be in position to stage a celebration alone. We want to have a joint Korean celebration of the day with all political groups participating and to that end are consulting with the leftists. If, however, the leftists do not want to hold a joint celebration, then we will like to have the first chance of having the celebration by ourselves after the general celebration will be finished. We will want to have the afternoon of August 15th, but if it isn't convenient, we will be satisfied with the 16th.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WECKERLING AND MR. KIM, KWAN SOO.

Tuk Soo Palace, 5 August 1946.

General Weckerling outlined to Mr. KIM the latest plans for the celebration of Liberation Day, stating that they now envisaged:

(1) A parade in which units of American troops, Korean police, Korean constabulary, Coast Guard, Military Government, and any other organizations or groups who wished to participate would take part. This parade would start possibly from somewhere near the Seoul Railroad station, march to and past the Capitol Building where there would be a a reviewing stand and speakers' platform,

(2) After the passage of the parade, there would be a mass meeting with the people gathered both inside and outside of the Capitol building grounds, public address facilities being installed so as to reach the crowd outside. At this meetingprobably two representatives of the Left and two of the Right would be invited to speak,

(3) In the afternoon there would be a double-header baseball game and a track meet between Americans and Koreans.

In addition to the above program, which would constitute the official celebration of the day, political parties and other groups would be allowed to meet and hold their own celebrations. However, it was not considered desirable that there should be any other parades than the official one.

Mr. KIM expressed some surprise at the parade feature as outlined in General Weckerling's description. He expressed himself as feeling that a better plan would be for the official celebration to be confined to the mass meeting and speeches and that thereafter on this day of liberation and freedom, Korean organizations be given full freedom to parade and meet as they might desire. Mr. KIM also strongly expressed the desire that they be allowed to use the Seoul Grounds, since in his opinion there was no other place in the city where such numbers as were to be expected on this day could be accommodated. Mr. KIM stated that

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

on August 15th, 1945, although Japanese troops were still here and still armed, the entire city broke into a spontaneous and unrestrained celebration of liberation. He felt, therefore, that especially when we celebrate liberation it would be unfortunate to place any special restrictions upon the people. He stated that on such occasions as the 1st of March and other holidays, Koreans had been allowed to parade, and he said that he feared the prohibition of parades on this special day would have a very unfortunate effect on the thinking of the people. He went on to say that under the Japanese they had been accustomed to official parades which they were required to attend, and that he greatly feared that certain elements might even compare this official "American" parade to such Japanese affairs.

General Weckerling replied by restating the American position: First, Liberation Day and the end of the war are being celebrated all over the world. President Truman has declared a special holiday for Americans in Korea as well as Americans in other parts of the world who wish to celebrate the victorious conclusion of the war which cost America some 400,000 lives. Second, on the other hand, General Hodge had no desire to inflict a parade on anyone or enforce attendance at a parade. Americans themselves do not care a great deal for parades. However, it was General Hodge's opinion that, since many Koreans rejoiced in liberation as we rejoiced in the conclusion of the war, the program as outlined would give the greatest opportunity for a united celebration for all those who wish to attend, no one being in any way compelled to do so. It was General Hodge's feeling that separate parades by organizations and parties would tend if anything to mar the unity of the day. General Weckerling further stated that as the Seoul Grounds would have to be prepared for the athletic events of the afternoon and as Military Government had decided sometime ago that the use of these grounds would be confined hereafter to athletic events, he thought it improbable that permission could be secured for use for such a celebration. General Weckerling also pointed out that if the Leftist

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

groups decided to have a parade and meeting, we must plan on extending equal facilities and permission to the groups on the Right.

Mr. KIM replied by still further emphasizing the desirability of a free celebration by the Koreans on this day. He stated that he was motivated by the desire to see American-Korean relations improve and the fear that restrictions on this day would cause misunderstandings which would be extremely harmful to Korean-American relations. He urged General Weckerling to do everything in his power:

(1) to secure permission for the use of the Seoul Grounds, even if it meant the cancelling or the postponement of the proposed athletic events, and

(2) to equally do his best to secure permission for parades. He stated that the various groups of the Left, young people, women and other organizations had been looking forward to their celebration of this day with great anticipation, and he feared that the restrictions suggested would bring great disappointment and resentment.

General Weckerling inquired as to what their plans would be, and Mr. KIM replied that they would expect to gather at the Seoul Grounds and have a parade which would come down the Chong-No Street, past the traffic light below the Capitol Building, out over the West Gate, here circling around to the South Gate where the parade would break up. If the official celebration were confined to the mass meeting in the morning they would like to gather for their parade as early as possible. If, on the other hand, the official celebration was to include the parade as outlined by General Weckerling, it would probably be impossible to gather there for their own parade earlier than 12 o'clock or 1 o'clock.

General Weckerling stated that the decision in these matters was not in his hands, and that he would have to consult further before he could give Mr. KIM a positive answer on these points. It was arranged that Mr. KIM should call at the Palace on Tuesday at 11 a.m. to hear the decision and to further discuss the question.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WECKERLING AND MR. KIM, KWAN SOO

1130 Hours, 6 August 1946.

General Weckerling stated to Mr. KIM the present ideas for the celebration of Liberation Day, these plans having been formulated to meet the expressed desire of the Koreans for an opportunity to have their own celebrations of the day in addition to the official celebration sponsored by the American forces.

General Weckerling stated that it was the present thought to allow one group to use the Seoul Grounds (The Football Field) for a meeting and for the starting point of a parade at approximately 8 o'clock, the Military Government parade and mass meeting to be scheduled for 1300 hours, and another group of Koreans to be allowed to have similar use of the same grounds at 1500 hours. The General explained that in order to make room for these various celebrations and for the possibility of three different parades, careful timing and routing would be necessary to solve the traffic problem involved. Mr. KIM expressed satisfaction with the general idea and stated that the leftists would prefer the morning rather than the afternoon hour for their meeting and parade.

General Weckerling asked as to the time estimated for the meeting and parade as planned and for their probable route. After some discussion as to possible routes and the probable time involved, it was tentatively agreed that the leftist party should endeavor to begin their meeting at 8 a.m. and that their parade should proceed from the Seoul Grounds to the East Gate, thence down the main street to the Great Bell where they would turn left and follow the South Gate street to the Seoul Station where the parade would break up. Their line of parade would in this way not touch the line of march of the official parade until the two streets converged at the South Gate. Mr. KIM guaranteed that their parade would be completely over by 1300 hours.

General Weckerling inquired if any of the units of their parade would expect to attend the M.G. meeting in a body. Mr. KIM replied that there would be no such attendance by whole units, though he

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

expected that a large number of the people participating in their parade would also attend the M.G. mass meeting in front of the Capitol Grounds.

General Weckerling made it plain that these plans as yet were tentative, but assured Mr. KIM that he would communicate with him as soon as the plans were definitely confirmed. General Weckerling again pointed out to Mr. KIM the unfortunate results which would ensue from any conflict between the two parades and urged upon him that the time schedule should be strictly adhered to. This Mr. KIM promised to do, and the conference closed at 12 o'clock.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WECKERLING AND MR. AN, CHAI HONG

1300 HOURS, 6 August 1946.

General Weckerling outlined to Mr. AN the plans for the celebration of Liberation Day in their latest phase, and asked Mr. AN to state briefly and in general the wishes and plans of the rightist groups for their share in the celebration of the day.

Mr. AN expressed general satisfaction with the plans as outlined and stated that the rightist groups would like to have the use of the Seoul Grounds from 1300 until sundown. He asked that the adjacent baseball field be not given to any other organization for celebration as he felt that two different organizations meeting in such close quarters might cause unfortunate incidents. General Weckerling assured him that the baseball grounds would be used that afternoon only for the double-header baseball game, and Mr. AN saw no objection to its use in this way.

General Weckerling inquired as to whether there would be any parade or parades, either to the grounds before 1300 or after the gathering at that hour. Mr. AN replied that in the main the people attending the meeting would make their way to the grounds individually, though it was possible that certain schools, groups of factory workers, etc., might go there in a body. He stated that his own feeling was against any parade in such hot weather, and that he thought it probable that they would confine themselves to a meeting on the grounds.

He further stated that inasmuch as after the lapse of a year independence had not been achieved, the Korean parties had not become unified and living conditions had become if anything more difficult, expression would be given to these feelings at their meetings, and he hoped that it would be understood that these were not in the form of carping criticism but speakers would be selected with care who would express merely the sincere hopes and wishes of the Korean people.

General Weckerling stated that he felt that with this understanding with Mr. AN, the plans might almost be considered as definite,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

but that they were still actually in a tentative form and that he would communicate with Mr. AN as soon as these plans were officially approved. He further explained that while he thought it probable that Mr. AN's request for the use of the grounds could be granted, it might be necessary to make this permission from 1400 until sundown rather than from 1300.

Mr. AN expressed his gratification and thanks for the plans arranged, and the conference closed at approximately 4 o'clock.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WECKERLING AND MR. KIM KWANG SOO, AT 1200 HOURS 7 AUGUST 1946.

General Weckerling:

The general arrangements for the August 15th celebration have been decided tentatively very much along the line about which we talked yesterday. Mr. Kim, we feel that the program as arranged is not truly representative of the spirit of the day we are trying to celebrate. The parades and mass meetings planned by the political groups are totally partisan in character and nothing has been arranged for their participation in a joint celebration. What is needed to round out this celebration is participation by all groups in honor of the liberation of Korea and the victory over the Axis. The opportunity to express this feeling lies in the parade which will be staged by military units, police, Coast Guard, constabulary and civilian organizations and groups generally along the wide street leading to the Capitol. Your organization should, as Koreans, in order to demonstrate your joy over being liberated, send a representative group to take part in the parade. Banners and placards in the spirit of the day may be carried. We intend to invite other political groups, civic organizations, schools, industries, labor, etc. to take a similar part in the parade. This is entirely voluntary. This is an invitation for you to join likewise. You should celebrate as Koreans the liberation of Korea; as Americans we rejoice in victory over the Germans and Japanese which I am sure you also share.

Mr. Kim, Kwang Soo: (as interpreted by Mr. Herbert Kim)

After a considerable delay to check replies and translators, the following is believed to represent a fair summary of Mr. Kim's statements: In my opinion, there will be no difficulty in arranging a picked group of 500 or more to join

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the military parade. I agree to follow in everything according to the proposed schedule but a more detailed plan about the parade will be worked out with Col. Wilson of the City of Seoul Military Administration. We will have our group gathered near the stadium at 8 o'clock A.M. By 10 A.M. we will have the last of our parade leave that place of assembly and move toward the railway station where our picked group of 500 or more will join the military parade. By 12 o'clock or at least 1 o'clock the parade may be over and all units dispensed.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Dr. Clough:

Gen. Hodge has passed everything in the hands of General Weckerling.

Your note is most interesting, but I have no power to affirm it

Q E D

4/9/48

ROBERT L. LERCH
Major General, U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7 August 1946

Subject: Celebrating the First Anniversary of Peace and Liberation Day

To: Major General Lerch, Military Governor

With regard to the subject matter, may I be privileged to make the following report:

The central idea [illegible] in mind that a celebration of a National Character should be carried out by the citizens [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(2)

by a selected party of leaders, there was held, under your permission, a preparatory meeting of citizens of Seoul. About 70 people attended the meeting and they represented the following groups:

1. Schools & Colleges
2. Pusan Chamber of Commerce
3. Seoul Chamber of Commerce
4. Wards of the city of Seoul
5. Religious bodies (Christian, Buddhist, Chun-do-kyo and Confucian)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(3)

6. Yuga and Yuga
7. Kyung-Keui Government
8. Municipal Government of Seoul
9. Military Government.

Some decisions made at this meeting are as follows.

1. It was unanimously adopted that the Celebration of the first Anniversary of Peace and Celebration day be carried out a joint affair on part of both

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Commander-in-Chief and the Korean people. Further that all the plans be carried out by the citizens of Seoul.

2. The following major programs were adopted:

a. Mass meeting (for about 50,000) to be held in front of Capitol building at about 5:00 P.M. on 15 August 1946. Where Generals Hodge and Lerch and their Korean staff will speak and, as a special

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

5-6-0 Female Choir will sing the Liberation Song.

b. Solo International Parade, & be participated.

by 24 Girls
Students of all grade
wards
Schools and Colleges
Girls and Metric
Religious bodies
Boys & Girl Scouts

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Patriotic & Social organizations
Police, Constabulary & Sea-
Coast Guards.

c. Inter-national games between
American Army teams and Korean
teams, Baseball, Basketball
and Athletic.

3. For carrying out the above pro-
grams, the following officers
were elected, & appointed to com-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Mutters were constituted, a special attention being paid that the Constituency of the Officials staff and the Committees is to be marked not as official but Citizenry.

Honorary Chairman Edmund Hodgson

Chairman Ah See Chang

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

9. Sub-Committees were elected

a. Liaison + Publicity (7)
b. Grounds (50)
c. Material Preparation (60)
d. Mass-Meeting Program (5)
e. Parade (130)
f. Reception (30)
g. Games (10)
h. Music (5)
i. Finance (9)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

4. The nature and scope of decoration and structural field data, be referred to an appropriate Committee

5. Expenses of Common Purpose Art to be met by special contributions from the Citizens of Seoul.

6 Headquarters is to be established at Seoul Fine Arts College and is to begin its functions from 15 Aug. 1946

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7. In order to facilitate movements of this organization, it may be located & lodge a certain number of Motor-Vehicle.

8. With a view of making this purpose effective & reliable, this organization should be separated functionally & located & lodged in the afforestation zones.

These are the resume of the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

proceedings that took place at to-
days meeting. Should these Plans
meet your approval, I would like
kindly get in touch with the 24th
Corps so that a Joint Committee
of American Army and Korean
Citizens may be constituted, who
function will be to coordinate
and carry out the above plans.

Time is immediate. Awa-
iting for your earliest possible

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

13

order, Superintendent to Early Court
of Common Pleas.

P. D. Leach

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Police
Seoul, Korea

8 August 1946

MEMORANDUM:

TO : General Wefkerling

Initial report of chairman committee on traffic, Police and arrangements for 15 August celebration.

Traffic

Civil police will control vehicular traffic and pedestrian traffic along line of march. Cross traffic at intersections and along line of march will be discontimued at specified time before start of parade.

Civil police will control traffic along route of march of Lefts parade.

Police

Civil police both Uniformed and Detective will control spectators and be alert for any disorder at both parades, along line of march, at assembly points, and at dispersal points.

Civil police with Military Police will control and direct spectators at the mass meeting at Capital.

Arrangements

Subcommittees on facilities at mass meeting at Capital grounds are completing their arrangements.

Survey completed on platform. Platform will be erected to accommodate speakers and invited guests. Lists now not available.

Publicity

Arrangements for motion pictures and stills of parade and mass meeting completed.

Arrangements for loud speakers and public address systems for mass meeting at Capital completed.

W. H. MAGLIN
Col, CMP
~~Director~~
Chairman

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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秘故延着

1948

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Hulc 800 Palace
Office of ~~the~~ Coordinatin Between leftists and
rightists.

Relying upon the conscience of true
national spirit, discarding the stupidity
of each and every individual, unify
and coordinate in the quickest possible
time.

August 15 Liberation Commemoratin
Sai Tai In
Town Peoples' General Meeting

Initial
1
2
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6

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Name: **Industrial Exhibit**

Location: Chang Duk Palace. The Exhibition is scattered over nine buildings on the Palace grounds, many of the buildings having been built especially for this purpose. Each building houses a major industry, i.e., textiles, machinery, electrical, mines, etc.

Sponsorship: The Korean Engineering Association and the Industrial News. The Koreans emphasize that this is strictly a Korean undertaking, conceived by them and staged by them.

Purpose: To dramatize to the Korean people the importance of industry to the Korean economy and to demonstrate its importance in raising the standard of living. This is done by emphasizing not so much the finished product as the processes by which the finished product is made.

Cost: ¥5,000,000.

Duration: for forty days, opening date: 19th October

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Oct. 1946

Dear Gen. Hodge:

Thank you to your kindness for held the Exhibition of Independent Industry.

It is a very poor Exhibition, because we have not enough times and no materials for this Exhibition.

But we are going to perform our duty with all our best to exhibite not only present goods with minimum but mining and technical plans in future and also to show the engineering lines.

We are going to held the opening of this Exhibition at 9:30 o'clock 19 Oct. 1946, so I send to you the invitation of this Exhibition that I desire to you to attend at this meeting, and make a inspection [illegible]

[illegible]
Director
Independent Industry Exhibition.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1

INDEPENDENT INDUSTRY EXHIBITION'S
PROGRAM OF OPENING CEREMONY

1.	Chairmanship. ----------	Mr. Yu Doo Chan Chief Clerk of Exhibition.
2.	Opening. ----------	
3.	Fly up Flag. ----------	
4.	Bow down to Flag. ----------	
5.	Sing a Patriotic song. ----------	
6.	Opening Speech. ----------	Mr. Lee Jun Yeol Director of Exhibition.
7.	Greeting. ----------	Mr. Chung Soo Honorary Director of Exhibition.
8.	Report of Progress. ----------	Mr. Kim Bai Kim Chief of Planning- Bureau of Exhibition.
9.	Congratulatory Speech. ----------	Gen Hodge Commanding Gen. USAFIK
10.	Industrial Song. ----------	
11.	Closing Speech. ----------	Mr. Kim Sung Soo Deputy Director of Exhibition.
12.	3 times cheer up for Independent. ----------	

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

001.C

[illegible] STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
[illegible] INTELLIGENCE CORPS
CHUNCHON DISTRICT OFFICE
APO 235

FROM: SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: CHUNCHON (23/1070-1683) Leftist Anniversary Celebration.

Investigation was initiated at the request of the [illegible] Officer, 922 CIC Det., when this office received word that right wing organizations planned to attack the [illegible] celebration.

[illegible] confidential informant reported to this office that [illegible], who is (朴成河) head of the National [illegible] Realization of Korean Independence [illegible] County Young Men's Branch (also known locally Chuck Song [illegible] and December [illegible] the police permitted the leftist to hold [illegible] would be attacked by right wing members. He [illegible] was not because people were afraid of the [illegible], but [illegible].

[illegible] of this office visited Mr. C. H. [illegible] (崔主祚), and at the [illegible] of the National [illegible] Realization of Korean Independence, He [illegible] for us to see the leaflet of [illegible]. It had not [illegible] any attacks on the leftist. [illegible] he was in SEOUL [illegible], but Mr. [illegible] said that there [illegible] should not resort to [illegible] because [illegible] would surrender any organization that was responsible for it. Mr. [illegible] said he thought [illegible] made such a statement without thought and that he would [illegible] him. [illegible] Mr. CHOI was told that he and [illegible] would be held responsible if any violence were to take place at the meeting.

[illegible] December AGENTS of this office attended a meeting held by the Chief of the CHUNCHON police at which time all the chairmen of the Anniversary Celebration attended. The meeting was held so that the police would know what was to take place and could prepare for any disturbance. The chairmen explained the outline of the celebration to the police. At this time the police told the chairmen that if a disturbance occurred, they were to keep their members from joining in so that the police would be able to stop the trouble quickly. All were in accord at the end of the meeting.

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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SUBJECT: CHUNCHON (23/1070-1683) Leftist Anniversary Celebration.

AGENTS of this office toured CHUNCHON on the morning of the celebration and could locate no unusual gatherings. Numerous police were stationed at the meeting grounds and along the route of the parade. Two trucks, loaded with police and mounted with machine guns were patrolling the streets. The parade grounds had a few signs erected stating that farmers standards should be raised, Freedom for Korea, Down with Pro-Japanese, along with these were others with the usual Leftist themes. Behind the speakers platform were the American and Korean Flags. The people from the outlying Guns started to arrive at 1130 hrs., mostly farmers. At 1155 hrs., after a crowd of approximately 2,000 had gathered, the flag of our ally, Russia was erected. The chairman said that it had been overlooked till then.

The following persons addressed the gathering:

KANG, Chan Sik (姜 燦 植) 1st Vice Chairman of the Democratic People's Front (Minju Juie Minjock Chonson)
LEE, Hong Chai (李 洪 株) Chairman of the Farmer's Association (Nongmin Cho Happ)
CHOE, Sang Dong (崔 相 東) Worker's Association (Nodong Cho Happ)
LEE, Un Hee (李 雲 姬) Chairman of the Women's Alliance (Punyo Dong Mang)
PAK, Soon Chai (朴 淳 採) Member of the People's Party (In Min Dang)

The detectives covering the meeting said that speeches were the same as the news in the Leftist newspapers; merger of the Left Wing Groups, Joint Commission, giving their opinions to General Hodge and his staffand the TAEGU riots, except LEE, Hong Chai, who wanted to know why the rice quota of Kangwon Do had been raised from sixty thousand (60,000) to one hundred and twenty thousand (120,000) suk.
AGENT'S NOTES: This question had been answered by the M.G. in recent speeches throughout the province according to Maj. Cjeka, head of the Agricultural Dept., and Food Service, head.

CHANG, Yong Joo (張 永 周) student of the SEOUL Law College attempted to speak but was stopped because he was not listed on the program, according to the police

After the meeting the crowd paraded around the streets of CHUNCHON and at intervals shouting " Hurrah, hurrah for Korean Independence," distributing the attached handbills.

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SUBJECT: CHUNCHON (23/1070-1682) Leftist Anniversary Celebration.

Approved; [illegible]

Previous Distribution:
None

Distribution:
[illegible] 4
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(3)

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001e

Folo

2	27 Feb.	Gen. Wecker-ling	C/S, XXIV Corps.

It is recommended that the attached letter be signed and forwarded to Mr. LEE, President of the Patriotic Old Men's Society. It is recommended that Colonel L. J. Lincoln represent General Brown at this ceremony. There will probably be other similar invitations extended requiring the attendance of general officers.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Mail for Road March 2

Talk (as attached) delivered, about
50 present. Senior member 96 years old.

LJL

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

27 February 1947.

Mr. LEE, Pyung Kwan,
President,
The Patriotic Old Men's Society,
135 Nam Dai Moon, 2nd Ku,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. LEE:

Thank you for your kind invitation to attend a memorial service at 3 p.m. on March 1st commemorating the March 1st celebration.

I greatly regret that my official duties will not permit of my attendance on that day, but I have designated Colonel L. J. Lincoln to represent me at your memorial service.

Again many thanks for your thoughtfulness in asking that I be present.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Commanding.

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The Patriotic Old Men's Society
is sponsoring a Memorial Service
Commemorating the patriots of Korea

Time: 1500 1st March
Place: Hqs of the Society
No. 135 Nam Dai Moon 2nd Ka
Seoul.

Mr. Lee, Pyung Kwan, President
of the Society requests the honor
of your presence.

RSVP

2/26/47

Pls arrange working to attend
or to designate an officer to
attend to represent CG.
Reply

1203

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

昭和　年　月　日

敬啓

本會에서來三月一日紀念은契機로國恥以降國家獨立과民族再生을爲하야殺身殉國하신
先烈諸位의貫天炳日한忠魂義魄은永慕하고
追悼코자하야今日下午三時에市內南大門路二街一三五番地本會館內에서合同慰靈祭를奉行하고
니掃萬參列하여弃심을仰望하나이다

紀元四二八〇年二月十九日

憂國老人會長李炳觀

하ㅣ지中將　閣下

0225

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

135 Nam Dai Moon, 2nd Ku
Mr. Lee, Pyung kwan

REMARKS TO OLD MEN'S PATRIOTIC SOCIETY

It gives me great pleasure and I am greatly honored to represent General Brown at this memorial ceremony. Your society no doubt receives its name because of the time-tested patriotic wisdom of its members. However, I have observed in your members the appearance, the energy and the alertness of youth. From this fact you derive a great measure of strength and importance for Korea' future.

On this day, Korea commemorates its great effort on March 1, 1919 to gain freedom from the Japanese. After that brave day, those who worked for Korean independence must have indeed felt keenly disappointed and perhaps even discouraged.

Korea was a small nation oppressed by an imperialistic, greedy power. Its people were brave and willing to die, but independence did not come. Even by shedding its blood, Korea could not by itself throw off the yoke of the oppressor. Only the assistance of great and friendly powers have made Korea's freedom possible.

Now that the Japanese have been removed, Korea need no longer shed its blood for freedom. The great powers who shed the blood of their own people to destroy the oppressors have committed themselves to bring about Korea's complete independence. America is as impatient as you with the delays caused by the still confused and unsettled world conditions. America will strive for the detailed arrangements necessary to assure for Korea internal stability and external security.

In these arrangements Korea must play the most important role. Strife and violence were the only recourse in 1919. However, in 1947 strife is antagonistic to stability and, therefore, to freedom. In 1947 Korean patriots will progress toward independence by demonstrating that Koreans can rule themselves through peaceful, democratic methods.

0225

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In the inspiring words of the Kimi Declaration of Independence all Koreans should say, "Our task of today lies only in construction of ourselves and by no means in the destruction of others. We have only to march forward toward the great light brightening the road before us".

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001

Invitation to attend Theatrical Artists' Festival.

1	1 Mar. 1947	Gen. Weckerling, J.C.	C.G. XXIV Corps	It is recommended that the attached letter to Mr. LIM, Sun Kyoo (Union of Korean Theatres), and Mr. KIM, Yung Kun (General League of Korean Cultural Assns.) be signed and dispatched.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

- -

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

28 February 1947.

Mr. LIM, Sun Kyoo,
(Union of Korean Theatres),
Mr. KIM, Yung Kun,
(General League of Korean Cultural Assns.),
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Messrs. LIM and KIM:

I should like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the kind invitation extended by the Union of Korean Theatres and the General League of Korean Cultural Association to attend the Theatrical Artists' Festival between 26 February and 11 March 1947.

Due to the pressure of official business, I regret that I shall be unable to take advantage of your invitation at this time.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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001 Celebrations

circulate

1103

PROGRAM FOR LIBERATION DAY
August 15, 1947

Mr. Ro Keuk Sik, Chairman of Committee on Arrangements

Mr. So Sun Kyu, Program Announcer

1. Music by Korean Internal Security Band
2. Raising of National Flag
3. Korean National Anthem
   Music by Korean Internal Security Band
4. National Anthems of each of the Allied Powers
5. Opening Address by Mayor of Seoul, KIM, Hyung Min

   Lt.General Hodge

   Maj. General Lerch

   Dr. Philip Jaisohn
   Special Korean Counselor

   Dr. Wellington Lyuh
   Chinese Consular General

   Mr. Serge Foularde
   French Consular General

6. Memorial Speeches by:

   Mr. D. W. Kermode
   British Consular General

   Col. General Terenty Shtikov
   USSR

   Maj. General Albert E. Brown
   U.S.A.

   Dr. Rhee Syngman
   Chairman of Democratic Council

   Dr. Kimm Kuisic
   Chairman of Correlation Committee

   Mr. Ahn Chai Hong
   Civil Administrator, SKIG

7. Memorial Song by Group of High School Boys and Girls

8. Reading of Letter of Appreciation to Allied Nations
   by Dr. Chough Pyung Ok

9. Three Cheers by Kim Koo

10. Music by Korean Internal Security Band

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NT 835
Translation-The Minjung Ilbo

Hdqs. USAMGIK BPO
16 August 1947

MEMORIAL CEREMONY OF THE "8/15."

Our 30 million Korean people welcomed the second anniversary of the "8/15." Korea, although it was liberated from the Japanese oppression, is really divided by the border of the 38° parallel, and is occupied by the American Army in the South and the Russian Army in the North. In order to unite this divided Korea and to establish its provisional government, the US-USSR Joint Commission was held, but we cannot expect remarkable fruit from it.

Yesterday, the memorial ceremony of the "8/15" was held in the Seoul Grounds, where about 300,000 people assembled in the early morning. There were seen many many flags and placards, saying, "Strive for Independent Sovereignty," "Immediately withdraw the 38° parallel," or "Absolutely Against the Trusteeship."

The ceremony was presided by Mr. Oo Son Kiu. According to the ceremony program, the National flag was raised and the national song was sung. Then the Mayor of Seoul made an opening address, and General Hodge and other persons made congratulatory addresses.

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SCAP
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FILE

18-8-49

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NT
T lation-The Chosun Choong-Ang Ilbo Hdqs. KGIK GPO 15 August 1947

GENERAL SHTIKOV'S SPEECH AT THE "8/15" CEREMONIES

General Shtikov, Chief Delegate of the USSR, made the following congratulatory speech on the second "8/15" Ceremonies:

On the 15th of August 1947, the Korean people celebrate the second anniversary of [redacted] release from the colonial policies of Japan. On such a fine day, I, as the representative of the Soviet people and delegate of the USSR, am very glad to offer congratulations to the South Korean people. Just two years ago, as soon as Facist Germany was ruined, Japanese Imperialism was also ruined. In order to ruin this invader, the Soviet Army had marched into North Korea, defeated the Japanese Army in fierce battle, and consequently had a direct role in liberating Korea from the Japanese Colonial Oppression.

So we are proud of it, and we have only one aim -- to assist the Korean people in organizing complete independent nation. It is our hope that the Korean people may have a Korean democratic nation as quickly as possible, and this should be realized according to the Moscow Decision.

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20-8-99

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Translated by Mr. Roy C. Kim
Joint-Comm. Am. Delegation

TRANSLATION
OF
LETTER WRITTEN BY A KOREAN CHUNG SAM KANG
dated
April 23, 1947
***

The following are the excerpts of the letter:

"To His Excellency American Chief Commissioner:
"To His Excellency Soviet Chief Commissioner:

"Not only do we Koreans wish to extend our deepest appreciation to your Excellency for making every effort to give us freedom and independence, but we also anticipate some concrete results will come out of this Conference. It is a fact that all the world, the weaker nations, in particular, are focusing their eyes on this Conference; so, as an individual Korean, I sincerely hope that both of you will come into a closer understanding, each making concessions to the other, for fuller cooperation with view to obtaining the best results possible."

BREAKING OF LAST CONFERENCE WAS INEVITABLE

When last Conference was broken up without achieving any concrete results, the people of the world, as well as our own people, made all sorts of remarks about the Commission, but, personally, I believed it inevitable."

He gives his reasons thus: While the Soviets tried to guide along the newly born child (Korea) to the road that she thinks the best, the Americans tried it just the other way because she believes her own way is the better of the two roads. There is no power strive, nor any political nor any territorial ambition on Korea. On the other hand, the love for Korea by each side cannot go too extreme, for it will be the Koreans who will have to suffer with whatever outcome there may arise, so that, he requests that both sides should give a serious consideration on this very point.

SAVE US FROM PRESENT CONFUSION

"Our thirty million Koreans are only anticipating independence and freedom. We do not hope for a capitalistic state, nor a communistic state, nor do we want any monarchy, nor any dictatorial form of government, nor any fascistic form of government. On the other hand, we do not expect to set up in a few days an ideal, democratic government because we realise all the difficulties confronting us today. For this very reason, regardless of what form of government we may have in the distant future, we would prefer to be saved from the present confusion and suffering. This measure would have to be installed as an ideal, transitional step."

PEOPLES INTEREST SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRST

The writer states that at present all the Koreans are anticipating self-government wherein both the best points of capitalism and those of communism can work side by side. Above all, he maintains, the interest of the mass of people should be considered first, so that the whole of the people can enjoy the freedom and peace with co-existance and co-prosperity. Only such leaders should be recommended who will conscientiously endeavour for the good of the people with unbiased attitude towards the international peace. In not too distant future, the people will have received then the proper political training necessary for a true democratic form of government.

THE CRY IS SAME EVERYWHERE

"The voice of the people is the same everwhere, including the platforms of various political parties. The people both in the South and North cry for the same, and so are the various social organizations. Inspite of this situation, some of the

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so-called leaders are more or less instigated by some of the irresponsible groups, creating the so-called pro-Soviet faction and pro-American faction and ultimately bringing about the disintegration among the political groups."

IF THIS CONFERENCE FAILS

"The two great nations will have to shoulder the responsibility of a vital crime committed on our Korean race. Furthermore, they will be regarded the traitors to the righteousness of the entire humanity. Not only this, I should like to warn the representatives of both countries that they should be aware of the fact tha t there is a danger of receivin g a personal grudge."

PERSONAL SUGGESTIONS

Personality of the Writer: He is neither a capitalist, nor a communist although he is a member of the proletariat. He doesn't speak any English or Russian. He is a non-partisan, nor is he a member of any organization. He is just an ordinary, inconspicuous Korean individual. He swears that he has no political ambition whatsoever for he would gladly be a brush gatherer in mountains, a farmer, or even a factory hand after a formal inauguration of a government in Korea. He claims that since he does not belong to any political groups, he is absolutely impartial, and that he has great suggestions to offer, and which he hopes that the Commission will have an absolute faith in him. He hopes that no personal investigations will be made on him.

WANTS EVERYTHING DELEGATED TO HIM

"Including Soviet and the U.S.A., the four Allied Nations, (possibly only the three nations that participated in the Three Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow) may give him the entire power of attorney to the author of this letter in matters relating to the establishment of a Korean Independent Transitional Government." The author attaches a condition that his person shall be protected and that whatever results that he may produce shall unconditionally be accepted and that the powers concerned may assist him but shall in no way offer any objections. The form of government, the author assures, will, of course, be a democratic form of government.

CONDITIONS DEMANDED

1. The armies of Soviet and U.S.A. may remain in such numbers, at such places, for such period of time as it deems necessary for the maintenance of order in the country. The remaining portion of the armies shall evacuate within two months after the provisions of this letter becomes effective.

2. As for the placement, distribution, and movement of the respective armies, their commanders shall carry out orders in accordance with the opinion and demand of the author.

3. The personnel of the neither army shall in no way try to meddle in the affairs connected with the formation of the government so proposed, nor shall any instigation be made among the Korean populace.

.....

5. When the both armies evacuate, they shall leave, either with or without any compensation, as much weapons and other military equipment as possible, which shall be used by the Korean National Defence Guard.

6. All the foreign civilians, regardless of their nationality,

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3. LETTER FROM CHUNG SAM KANG

who entered the country after 15 August, 1945, shall accompany the first dispatch of the evacuating army.

.....

The reason for such demand of evacuating the civilians is that the Korean public is at a loss to understand just why ~~all~~ they are here ~~for~~. The question of entrance after the establishment of a formal government should be considered entirely differently.

6. Until the government is formally installed and foreign diplomatic relations are opened, all the foreign diplomatic organs, including those of consulates, shall leave the country.

9. The evacuation expenses shall be born by their respective countries; however, that portion of the army allowed to remain for the specified period shall no longer issue any army notes.

.....

12. "The power of attorney granted on me shall last five years counting from after the formation of the government so that I shall still be having the right to correct the party difficulties that may exist within the government functionaries."

SOME CONCRETE MEASURES

1. With the restationing of the armies and evacuation of the other portion, the 38 Line shall simultaneously be removed.

2. The Peoples Committee in Pyungyang and the American Military Government functions shall at once be discarded, and all the personnel questions shall be reconsidered with view to reemploying them, according to their qualifications, in the new government. All the provincial and district personnel shall unconditionally be left intact.

3. All the speech media shall be controlled for a while with view to eliminating elements that are detrimental to the construction of the new government.

.....

6. The formal government will be installed at ~~an~~ the earliest date ~~as~~ possible, possibly within three years, to be led only by such leaders ~~who~~ as will be considered ~~as~~ deserving, not just ~~by~~ locally but internationally, in view of their fair-minded stand and their personal capabilities.

7. "Although the Three Ministers' Decisions are welcome, ~~but~~ the so-called trusteeship question alone shall be delegated to me for a period of five years. Otherwise this question shall be determined by a plebiscite after the formal government is installed."

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4. LETTER FROM JUNG SAM KANG

The author implores that the representatives of both nations be more frank by revealing to the people of Korea the exact policies of their respective governments - whether they are territorially ambitious or politically ambitious or they are just interested in founding a true democratic form of government in Korea for the cause of humanity. If freedom and independence are to be denied, he declares, it is far better to compliment with thirty million shots, ~~a~~ bullet.

CHEERS TO THE DELEGATES

"Hurrha, Soviet Union and Soviet Delegates!
"Hurrha, United States of America and U.S. Delegates!
"Hurrha, Success to The U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission!
"Hurrha, Korean Self-Government!
"Hurrha, Our Allied Nations!"

HOW TO CONTACT WITH THE AUTHOR

If the plans as outlined above, the author states, are found to be practicable and a further interview with the author is deemed necessary, he suggests a newspaper ad to be inserted as follows:

"Require inter view with SAM KANG, ? date ? hour
Soviet - U.S. Joint Commission"

The author assures that he will appear in person, bringing with him one ~~triplicate~~ copies of this letter, which will sufficiently prove the fact that he is the real author of this letter.

Signed and sealed by

"A Korean, CHUNG, SAM KANG,

"aged 41"

****

- END -

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THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF KOREA

NAM TAI MOON TONG 2 CHUNG MOK 144
SEOUL, KOREA

CABLE ADDRESS:
"CHAMBER"
Code: Bentley's
and standard
Tel. 2- 127, 6583

May 16, 1947

Lt. General John R. Hodge
Commanding General, USAFIK

In fulfilment of the promise for Korean independence which was made by the United Nations at Cairo and Potsdam Conferences, you have made a ceaseless effort for reopening of the American-Soviet Joint Commission.

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Korea expresses its heartfelt gratitude to you for the same. We hope that the Commission will secure Korean people a complete freedom in expression of idea which is based on democratic principles.

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY OF KOREA

Tong Sun Ree

Tong Sun Ree, President

To Gen Brown

22-5-41

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

T12Ø1Ø PYONGYANG IN KOREAN TO KOREA, MAY 17, 1947, 7:ØØ AM

(TEXT) THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S COUNCIL SENT THE FOLLOWING CONGRATULATORY WIRE TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS:

"THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S COUNCIL EXTENDS CORDIAL THANKS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES FOR THEIR EFFORTS IN REACHING A DECISION TO RECONVENE THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES JOINT COMMISSION, WHOSE WORK WILL BE BASED ON THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECISIONS FOR KOREA.

"WE, REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN KOREA, HAVE THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES JOINT COMMISSION WILL SOLVE SATISFACTORALLY ALL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC KOREAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECISIONS IN MOSCOW REGARDING KOREA.

"WE PROMISE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES THAT WE WILL FAITHFULLY ASSIST THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES JOINT COMMISSION TO CONCLUDE ITS NEGOTIATIONS SUCCESSFULLY.

"(SIGNED) THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, MAY SIXTEEN, 1947."

KY 19Ø11 ØZ

Ford Braddock

NK Congratulary Msg to US

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RADIOGRAM
COMMUNICATIONS

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LT GEN JOHN R HODGE HQ 24 CORPS

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FOR [illegible] JOINT SESSION

[illegible]

Gen Brown -
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terpl. to Capt.
Logan.

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HEADQUARTERS
US - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

21 May 1947

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Messages

1. The following quoted messages have been received in the Joint Secretariat.

* * * * * * * * *

Honolulu

"American Soviet Joint Commission Seoul

We the Koreans in Hawaii hereby express our deepest gratitude for your resumption of efforts toward a determination of Koreans destiny. We trust that you will aid Korea in attaining a status of dignity honor and respect among the family of nations by an early solution of Koreas internal problems. We pray for every success in your endeavors.

UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE
D. W. CHOY, President "

* * * * * * * * *

Washington

"Chairman Joint American Soviet Commission Seoul

On behalf of the Korean Affairs Institute - a non-partisan and non-political organization whose sole purpose is to create understanding, good will and friendship between Korea and the nations of the world - I wish to extend the most cordial greetings to all members of the Joint Commission and to wish you every success in the prompt establishment of Korean independence. I firmly believe you are gathered together solely in the interest of Korea, I recognize that your task is not an easy one with the future of thirty million people depending on your wisdom, I know you are fully aware of the need for complete disregard to all differences which may exist between the two delegations that may be injurious to the welfare of Korea. The happiness or sorrow of these people is in your hands. You have the responsibility of deciding their destiny. They are at your mercy. They look to you hopefully. They are like your people. They love their liberty (their dear ones and their land). By respecting these peoples rights and desires your work will become easier. Undoubtedly you have in your minds that no nation can be happy and prosperous under a system imposed on it by a foreign power. Once again I sincerely wish you a harmonious and successful conference in order that you may fulfill your obligation in establishing an independent state of Korea in the shortest time possible, thus enabling the people of Korea to enjoy their freedom, their natural blessings and their pursuit of happiness. I am sure you will erect a monument of lasting good will and friendship in every Korean heart.

YONGJEUNG KIM PRESIDENT KOREAN AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE "

* * * * * * *

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
U. S, Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

ШТАБ АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ

21 мая 1947

Секретариат Совместной Комиссии получил следующее приветствие:

Гонолулу
Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии, Сеул.

Мы, корейское население Гавайских островов настоящим выражаем нашу глубочайшую благодарность за возобновление Ваших забот о судьбе корейского народа. Мы верим, что скорейшим разрешением корейских внутренних проблем, Вы поможете Корее достигнуть положения достоинства, чести и уважения в семье народов. Мы молимся за успех Вашего благого начинания.

Об'единенный Корейский Комитет
Д. В. Чой, председатель.

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Вашингтон
Председателю Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии

От имени института по корейским делам, безпартийной и вне-политической организации, единственной целью которой является укрепление благожелательства и дружбы между кореей и народами всего мира, я выражаю самое сердечное приветствие членам Совместной Комиссии и пожелание успеха в скорейшем восстановлении корейской независимости. Я уверен твердо, что вы собрались исключительно в интересах кореи; я сознаю, что ваша задача нелегкая, принимая во внимание, что будущее тридцати-миллионного народа зависит от вашей мудрости; я знаю, что вы отдаете себе отчет в том, что постараетесь превзойти возможные разногласия между делегациями, могущие быть во вред благополучию Кореи. Счастье и страдание этого народа в Ваших руках. На вас лежит ответственность решить его судьбу. Он в ваших руках. Он смотрит на вас с надеждой. Корейцы такие же люди, как и вы. Они любят свою свободу, своих близких и свою землю. Уважая их права и чаяния, вы сделаете свою работу легкой. Несомненно, вы сознаете, что никакой народ не будет счастливым и процветающим под чужеземной властью. Еще раз я искренно желаю вам гармоничной и успешной работы в конференции, чтобы вы могли выполнить свои обязательства в создании независимого положения Кореи в наикратчайшее время, дав таким образом народу Кореи наслаждаться своей свободой, ее естественным благосостоянием и стремлением к счастью. Я уверен, что вы воздвигнете памятник благожелательства и чувства вечной дружбы в сердце каждого корейца.

Ионг Джонг Ким,
председатель Института по
Корейским делам

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

FAST

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NLT SHANGHAI JOINT AMERICAN SOVIET COMMISSION SEOUL

MAY 20 1947 4 00 PM

ON BEHALF OF THE KOREA NEWSPAPERS INSTITUTE - A NON-FRATERNAL

AND NON-POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHOSE SOLE PURPOSE IS TO

PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING. GOOD WILL AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN

KOREA AND THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD - I WISH TO EXTEND THE

MOST CORDIAL GREETINGS TO.

Form 112 Z-TD 89

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

RADIOGRAM
RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

KE/KM SK102 GMH P2/51

MAY 20 AM 4 00 PM

ALL MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION AND TO WISH YOU EVERY
SUCCESS IN THE PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF KOREA N INDEPENDENCE
, I FIRMLY BELIEVE YOU ARE GATHERED TOGETHER SOLELY IN
THE INTEREST OF KOREA, I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU TASK IS NOT IN
ONLY ONE WITH THE FUTURE OF THIRTY MILLION PEOPLE.

Form 112 Z-TD 89

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FA5

RADIOGRAM

RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

K E/KM S'102/3 3/30

MAY 20 1947 4 00 PM

DEPENDING ON YOUR WISDOM, I KNOW YOU ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE NEED FOR COMPLETE DISREGARD TO ALL DIFFERENCES WHICH MAY EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS THAT MAY BE INJURIOUS TO THE WELFARE OF KOREA. THE HAPPINESS OR SORROW OF THESE PEOPLE IS IN YOUR HANDS. Y.C.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FAST

DIRECT

RCA

RADIOGRAM

RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC

K L/KM 3 NL 32 4/31

MAY 20 1947 4 01 PM

HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDING THEIR LIBERTY. THEY HAVE T
YOUR MERCY. THEY LOOK TO YOU HOPEFULLY. THEY HAVE LITTLE YOU
BE FREE. THEY LOVE THEIR LIBERTY (THEIR BELIEFS AND THEIR LAND)
BY RESPECTING THESE PEOPLES RIGHTS AND DESIRES (YOUR
WILL BECOME ENSLAVED).

Form 112 Z-TD 89

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FAST

RADIOGRAM

RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

K E/KA 5K102 CHA5/51 U

MAY 20 1947 4 01 PM

UNDOUBTEDLY YOU HAVE IN YOUR MINDS THAT NO NATION CAN BE HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS UNDER A SYSTEM IMPOSED ON IT BY A FOREIGN POWER. ONCE AGAIN I SINCERELY WISH YOU A HARMONIOUS AND SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY FULFILL YOUR OBLIGATION IN ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT STATE OF KOREA.

Form 112 Z-TD 89

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

FAST

RADIOGRAM

RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

SM102 3H 6/51

MAY 20 AM 4 01

IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE (THUS ENABLING THE PEOPLE OF
KOREA TO ENJOY THEIR FREEDOM. THEIR NATURAL BLESSINGS AND
THEIR PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. I AM SURE YOU WILL ERECT A MONUMENT
OF LASTING GOOD WILL AND FRIENDSHIP IN EVERY KOREAN HEART.

YONGJEUNG KIM PRESIDENT KOREAN AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE.

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Form 112 Z-TD 89

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RADIOGRAM
RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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COALITION COMMITTEE
345-6 Sam Chung Tong
Seoul, Korea

21 May 1947

To the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul, Korea

Dear Sirs:

On behalf of the Coalition Committee, which has been endeavoring since its inception in July last year to bring about cooperation and united efforts between the leftists and rightists in both north and south Korea, we, the undersigned, co-chairmen of the Committee, wish to extend our heartiest congratulations in the reconvening of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission.

As expressed in the seven principles announcing the formation of the Coalition Committee, the first and the main objective was stated to be the hope of early reconvening of the Joint Commission so that, in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the formation of a unified and democratic Korean provisional government could be accomplished as soon as possible.

We now feel assured that the august conference which has today reconvened will succeed in achieving its long-interrupted task; and we further assure the Joint Commission that all truly patriotic and sober-minded Koreans throughout the land will unstintingly cooperate with the Commission's work in trying to accomplish its great purpose of bringing complete freedom and independence to the Korean people.

In order to have the most effective and intelligent consultation and cooperation with the representatives of Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, and at the same time to save time and duplication of efforts, we would suggest that the Joint Commission allow a small number of representatives, say three to five, from each of the three groups, Right, Left and Center, and a similar number from the north. Considering that the north really has no center group, this would make the maximum number of the consultative body to be twenty-five persons---fifteen from the south and ten from the north. Of course, each group represented by a maximum of five persons would have, however, only one spokesman at each session, which will mean only five spokesmen for the whole Korean consultative body, vis-a-vis, five delegates each from the United States and Soviet Russia. While the Korean representatives should officially be known as observers, yet as the conference is

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to assist in the formation of the Korean provisional government, through their respective spokesmen, the Korean consultative group should have from time to time the privilege of the floor as well as being called upon for specific advice.

The Coalition Committee would also suggest that it be allowed to send at least two official representatives to the north to invite several of the Korean leaders there to come down to south Korea and consult with several leaders of the south as to how best our Korean constituencies can cooperate and coordinate their efforts with the Joint Commission.

Requesting the Joint Commission's careful and favorable consideration of these suggestions, and awaiting its earliest pleasure, we hereby offer our highest respects and most ardent hope for the complete success of the now reconvened conference.

Kiusic Kimm

Kiusic Kimm
Chairman,
Coalition Committee

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RADIOGRAM
COMMUNICATIONS

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DET?? ?? ???? ?? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ????
JOINT ?? ??????? ??????

?? CONFIDENTIAL TE?? ?? RESUMPTION OF JOINT COMMISSION MEETINGS
?TP ?E ?????? IN MEXICO PRIOR FOR EXPEDIENT ECT?BLISHMENT
OF UNITED DEMOCR?TIC ?????N GOVERNMENT

?????N DEMOCR?TIC FRONT IN

NORTH MEXICO ?????N INDEPENDENCE ??
LOSANGELES C?LIF?RNI?

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

hjl

C. Edwards

KOREAN INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENT CONSULTING ASSN.

Seoul, Korea.

May 30, 1947.

Doctor A C[illegible]nce,
Represent[illegible] USA,

USA-USSR JOINT COMMISSION,
Seoul, Korea.

MESSAGE.

Dear Sir:

Choicest greetings to you.

Our Assn is heartily appreciating and welcoming the reopening of the JOINT COMMISSION, which we expected for a long time.

Our Assn has a firm belief that the opening of the way of liberty and independence of our country is only depend upon the faithfully fulfilling the decisions made by the Big Three Representatives in Moscow.

We make our absolute doctrine with the object that this time the two Great Nations may reach to one harmonizing point, so, they can establish one democratic nation of Korea in unification.

And we are believing that the reopened JOINT COMMISSION must reap a good harvest because of the zealous motives, and ceaseless hard works of the representatives of the two Great Nations. At the same time the hopes and expectations of 30 million Koreans on them are very, very great.

Korea is now under the international promise of liberty and independence, but after the liberation of Korea she is under the controls of two great ideologies---one in the North and the other in the South---for about two years. Because of these ideologies the unification of the people is difficult and the country is divided into two, so, the circulation of commodities within the country is impossible. Therefore the livelihoods of Koreans are still more in trying condition after the weariness because of the squeezing policy of the Japanese regime in the past.

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Our Assn is trying hard to encourage the industries of the nation which is in such a critical situation. And at the same time we are aiming at the revival of the industrial economy for the nation to be established.

Our Assn since its establishment in last August is on the way of seeing a good result as we expected by overcoming the difficulties within and without the country and by harmonizing the two different ideologies within the country. That is to say the idea of our Assn is on the foundation of combined plan and economy with a motto of "PROFIT TO THE NATION, BLESS TO THE PEOPLE" we invited patriotical enterprisers, organizations of labour, and tecniques. And so now our Assn is the only one industrial organization, which has the heavy responsibility for the new Korean industrial establishments, because it has in possession of the ability for the practising of the trinity of capital, labour, and technique.

Now our Assn is praying that the [illegible], which is going to be a testing stone for the establishment of the world's peace, must succeed in making Korea a nation of liberty and independence, because we are firm, believing that there will appear a new dawn of democracy in Korea by seeing a completely democratized form of the principles of politics and economy of the two great nations in this land. And we are hoping that by such a new form of democracy, it will become an idealistic primitive which will become an example of blessing in the world's history of humanbeings. Also, we are avowing that we will cooperate to the extreme for such a good work.

Therefore, as the two nations are now on---representatives of the two great nations---Let us try hard to show your generosity each other, to harmonize each other, and cooperate each other, so, your actions of this time would not contradict to the earnest expectations of Koreans, and the hopes of the mankind all over the world.

Most sincerely yours,

Lee Chang Man
President,
Korean Industry Establishers
Consulting Association.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

멧세-지

오래동안待望하였든 共同委員會의 開催에 際하야 本會는 衷心으로 欣
幸하야 마지않습니다

우리나라 自主獨立의 길이 오즉 모스코바 三相決定을 忠實히 實踐함에 있음은
밀는 本會는 今番 美蘇兩國이 誠意있는 合意 를 보아 우리나라 民主主義統
一臨時政府樹立을 絶對條件으로하고 兩國代表의 熱心한 討議 를 通하야
에빚추어 續開共同委員會는 반듯이 成功의 美果 를 結할 것을 全
民族의 期待와 囑望은 여느때보다 더욱 간절합니다

回顧하건대 朝鮮은 日本帝國主義의 植民地로 世界
二大思想의 南北對立으로말미암아 民族의 運命은 國際的 物資의 國內交
流를 不能케하였음으로 民生은 極度로 困窮에 疲弊한 우에더욱 塗炭에 빠지고 있
本會는 이苦難期에 當하야 國內生産業을 作興하는 同時에 建國將來의 産業經濟再興을
目的하고 一九四六年 八月에 發足하야 國內國際의 客觀情勢의 許諾을 克服하야
한兩大思想의 相反한 点을 調和하여가면서 新朝鮮 를 建設하기 爲하여 全
理念은 國利民福을 모토로 한 綜合的 新思想經濟主義下에 各種의 産業家、技術家、勞働者
團体、經濟學者 等을 各層各界를 總網羅하야 實業、勞働、技術의 三位一体 를 基調로
實証을 獲得한 新朝鮮建設의 唯一한 産業團体입니다。

茲에 本會는 過去의 實績에 鑑하야 美蘇兩大政治及經濟原理가 이따에 完全調和
되여 世界人類史上에 가장 幸福된 理想的指導原理가 되는 新民主主義의 出現을 確信
하고 朝鮮自主獨立 이로因한 世界平和建設의 試金石이될 共同委員會의 必成功을 祈
願하면서 工事業에 積極的으로 協力할 것을 盟誓합니다。

이偉大한 聖業完遂를 祈願하고 協力하는 者 이에 本會에 限하였으리오。 三千萬朝鮮民族
은 擧族的熱情으로써 朝鮮解放 自主獨立 世界平和建設의 使徒인 共同委員會美蘇
兩國代表団에 對하야 感謝의 情을 禁치못할지오 積極協力을 애끼지 않음에 참절입니다。

美蘇兩国代表団諸位는 吾人의 衷情과 世界人類의 期待에 어그러짐이 없도록 加
一層 互讓合意 協調에 努力하여주시기를 바라마지 않는바입니다。

一九四七年 五月三〇日

朝鮮産業建設協議會
會長 李 鍾 萬

共同委員會 美側代表
第一分科委員長
A.C. 빈스 博士
貴下

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

June , 4th. 1947

Message :

To the Delegates of Joint-Commission of United -States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It is a great honour for us to have the opportunity of offering our hearty congratulation to the Delegates of Joint-Commission of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Every Korean, man and woman, knows well the humanity shown by United-Nations for liberating our people from the long servitude under the Japanese suppression.

We are eager to have our own National Government to be established as soon as possible in order that we might enjoy our economical prosperity and freedom. But such a great work cannot be done without your incessant support and guidance. In this sense, we sincerely hope that Joint-Commisssion will be successful this time in setting up our Provisional Government based on democratic principle.

Praying good health to the honourable delegates of both countries,

Yours Sincerely

Kim Kwang Ho, 김광호

Chairman of General Headquarters of Chundokyo

88, Keungwandong, Chongnoku, Seoul

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

美蘇共同委員會代表團에게

우리는 美蘇共同委員會代表團에 向하여 우리들의 衷心賀意를 表示할수있는 機會를 가진것을 無限한 光榮으로 생각합니다 모ㅣ든 朝鮮의 男女는 聯合國이 우리의 人民을 日帝의 壓迫밑에서 오랫동안 奴役生活을 하는것을 解放하여 주기爲하여 보여주신 同情을 잘 알고있음니다

우리들은 우리들 自身의 自主獨立政府를 最短期間內에 樹立함으로서 우리의 經濟的繁榮과 自由를 누릴수있을것을 熱望하고있음니다 그러나 이와 같은 巨大한 工作은 당신네들의 不斷한 協助와 指[illegible] 이러한 見地에서 우리는 이번 [illegible] 共同委員會[illegible]의 臨時政府를 樹立하는데 成功할것을 懇切히 希望하는바임니다

兩國의 光榮스러운 代表團諸位의 健康을 비나이다

一九四七年六月四日

一 서울市鍾路區慶雲洞八八番地

天道敎總本部事務委員長 金 光 [illegible]

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Capt. Miller 6/6/47

Lee, Chong Mau, chairman of the Korean Industrial Construction Association. He is a true Christian gentleman of high character, patriotic, and worthy minister of God. Has a fine reputation with the general public, a man of high character, patriotic, no personal ambitions against him, lives a very simple life and devoted to country. Formerly would be prejudice in social and political ideas but not communistic.

(Information given by Mr. Hah Ujun, translator for Joint Commission)

J. H. Fisher

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Mr. Lee Chong Mann is not a Communist, rather moderate in his views, tends to be an expediantist (this is common to all Koreans, however), well-to-do and more than average intelligence.

Korean Industrial Constructive Assoc. - a very small group, probably the man reflects party's proclivities.

Note: no information regarding above in P.A.C. files - perhaps G-2 can elucidate further.

Info. given to Allen Cy Lt. C. Bertsch.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

K-E Trans. No. 38
Translated by RCK
Edited by
Date Translated June 4, 1947

SUBJECT: A MESSAGE OF GREETING
TO MR. C.N. JOYNER, CHAIRMAN, SUB-COMMISSION NO. 3
AMERICAN SIDE OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

FROM : LEE, CHONG MAN, CHAIRMAN, CHOSUN SANUP GUNSOL HYUPEI HWEI
(KOREAN INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIVE ASSOC.)

Our Society sincerely welcomes the long anticipated reconvening of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission.

Our Society believes that the key to our self-governing independence lies only in the faithful execution of The Three Ministers Moscow Decisions. Viewing from the fact that The United States and Soviet Union have come to to definite agreement that through their joint efforts it is entirely possible to establish a unified provisional democratic government in Korea and that the representatives of both countries are showing their earnest efforts towards this goal, we are confident that The Joint Commission just reconvened will bring about fruitful results so much anticipated by thirty-million people of Korea.

It is almost two years since Korea has been liberated with the international agreement that she will be given a self-governing independence. But still she is divided into the North and South under the two different ideologies with the result that this demarkation is a manacing obstacle to our national unification and all internal economic traffic movements. The situation is such that the livelihood of the people is far worse than under the Jap exploitation.

Ever since its founding in August, 1946, our Society has been endeavoring not only to restore the home industries at present faced with many difficulties but also to revive our national industrial economy for the reconstruction of our country in the long run. In this mission, we have achieved considerable success through our efforts to harmonize the two different ideologies, which cause the present day difficulties at home and abroad. In other words, our Society is a unique industrial organization, the motto of which is to combine the three basic factors - capital, labor, and technique - selected from all walks of life and to put into work in the most efficient manner possible with the ultimate aim to help rebuild a new industrial Korea.

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 A MESSAGE TO MR. JOYNER FROM KOREAN INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIVE ASSOC.

Viewing from the past, our Society believes that it is entirely possible to introduce a new type of democracy into Korea through the closest cooperation and harmony of the two great political and economic powers, in whose hands lies the happiness of mankind. We pray for the successful outcome of the Commission for the self-governing independence in Korea will serve as a test in bringing about the world peace. With this pray, we should like to assure you of our complete cooperation in your Commission.

Surely, it will not be only our Society that is willing to cooperate with your Commission in this great cause of our country, for the entire thirty million people of Korea are only grateful, and willing to be cooperative with, to both delegates of the Commission, as they are the liberators of Korea, granter of Korean independence, and the builders of the world peace.

In conclusion, we sincerely hope that all the delegates of both countries will work together in the spirit of cooperation and harmony as the fruit of their efforts is so much anticipated by not only Koreans but also by the people of the world.

(Signed and sealed) LEE, CHONG MAN

CHAIRMAN
KOREAN INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIVE ASSOC.

Dated 30 May, 1947

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

K-2 No. 97
Translation checked +
Translation made [illegible]

7th JUNE 1947.

Request to U.S-Soviet Joint Commission Delegation:

We extend a hearty thankfulness to the distinguished members of the United States-Soviet Delegation who are carrying out the promises of great Powers to rebuild Korea as a sovereign and independent State.

Without the independence of Korea, the freedom of Orient cannot be hoped, it is needless to say. It is impossible to secure the freedom without keeping the promises both made by personally and nationally.

Betraying the international promises will cause the distress and disaster as you know.

We are quite for you who are going to build the peace of the world and rebuild the United independence of Korea in accordance with the promises of the Cairo and Potsdom Declaration.

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It is you who have, as great Powers, secured and liberated the weak nations and races.

We the race of 30,000,000 population, have the history and the liberty of 5000 years in spite of it's up-and-fall.

Regretted to say, we were under the pressure of Japanese for 36 years before the liberation of the allied powers.

In accordance of your liberation, Korea could be got out of Japanese domenation and now every person in Korea are hoping to reach the destination of freedom just as same as the new green growing up under the charity of the sun. On this point of view, it cannot be predicted to keep the peace of world without the peace of Korea Especially 38th Purallel has devided

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Koreans into two camps which has let to distress, Politically and economically.

The long awaited and joyous days of the united independence of Korea should be come for all the Korean people as soon as possible by the favorings and the efforts of you.

From.; Eul
~~Det~~ yu Oldmans Society
of Chong up Chilra Puk-to
Korea.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

C473

Mr. Sargent

July 2, 1947

file

Major Gen.Albert.E Brown
U.S-Soviet Joint Commission
Duksoo Palace,
Seoul.

Dear Sir:

In the occation of the U.S Independence Day, I , in behalf of my party members, once again express my gratitude to you and your country for the liberation of Korea.

U.S Independence Day is the symbol of freedom and independence of whole nations under any tyrany or aggression, especially to the weak peoples in the world.

I congratulate your Independence Day with my whole enthusiasm for the independence of Korea during the past 30 years. I hope your contineous assistance and guidance for the redonstruction of Korea.

Sincerely yours,

Doo San Lee

Chairman of the Korean Popular Party
and
President of the Oriental Culture
Promoting Society,Seoul.

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АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ, СЕУЛ

Члены Гавайского отделения Корейской Национальной Революционной Партии выражают искренние поздравления и глубокую признательность Американским и Советским членам Комиссии по поводу возобновления Совместной Комиссии для независимости Кореи. Мы молимся о Вашем единении и сотрудничестве в обсуждении установления Корейского Демократического Временного Правительства. Да будет с вами успех в выполнении вашей миссии - вывести тридцати-миллионный корейский народ к грядущей полной свободе.

Сон Хиун,
Главный секретарь
3573 Каймуни Авеню,
Гонолулу.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Вашингтон
Председателю Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии

От имени института по Корейским делам, беспартийной и вне-политической организации, единственной целью которой является укрепление благожелательства и дружбы между кореей и народами всего мира, я выражаю самое сердечное приветствие членам Совместной Комиссии и пожелание успеха в скорейшем восстановлении корейской независимости. Я уверен твердо, что вы собрались исключительно в интересах Кореи; я сознаю, что ваша задача нелегкая, принимая во внимание, что будущее тридцати-миллионного народа зависит от вашей мудрости; я знаю, что вы отдаете себе отчет в том, что постараетесь превзойти возможные разногласия между делегациями, могущие быть во вред благополучию Кореи. Счастье и страдание этого народа в Ваших руках. На вас лежит ответственность решить его судьбу. Он в ваших руках. Он смотрит на вас с надеждой. Корейцы такие же люди, как и вы. Они любят свою свободу, своих близких и свою землю. Уважая их права и чаяния, вы сделаете свою работу легкой. Несомненно, вы сознаете, что никакой народ не будет счастливым и процветающим под чужеземной властью. Еще раз я искренно желаю вам гармоничной и успешной работы в конференции, чтобы вы могли выполнить свои обязательства в создании независимого положения Кореи в наикратчайшее время, дав таким образом народу Кореи наслаждаться своей свободой, ее естественным благосостоянием и стремлением к счастью. Я уверен, что вы воздвигнете памятник благожелательства и чувства вечной дружбы в сердце каждого кореица.

Йонг Джонг Ким,
председатель Института по
Корейским делам

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

РЕШЕНИЕ РАССМАТРИВАЕТСЯ КАК УСТУПКА СО СТОРОНЫ СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА.

Рой Робертс.

Сеул, 24 мая,/ А.П. /--Американцы одержали частичную победу, об'явив заседания Совместной Комиссии открытыми для прессы, когда русские согласились представить возможность Главе американской Делегации Генерал-майору БРАУН " неофициально " информировать прессу по вопросам несекретного характера.

Генерал БРАУН сообщил об этом по окончании вчерашнего заседания на первой конференции с репортерами газет. Он сказал, что: "Совместная Комиссия пришла к заключению предоставить возможность Главе Американской Делегации встречаться неофициально с репортерами и информировать их по вопросам несекретного характера."

НЕКОТОРЫЕ ЗАСЕДАНИЯ ОСТАЮТСЯ ЗАКРЫТЫМИ.

Совместная Комиссия решила, что все заседания будут закрыты для прессы "за исключением тех случаев, когда обе стороны согласятся об'явить некоторые из заседаний открытыми," сказал Генерал БРАУН. Все заседания подкомиссий будут закрытыми.

Американцы предложили об'явить все заседания открытыми для репортеров газет. Между тем, принимая во внимание прошлогодний опыт / когда только семь пресс-коммюнике были опубликованы в течении семи недель /, сегоднешнее заявление является заметной уступкой со стороны русских.

Совместное коммюнике будет опубликовано сегодня, давший отчет о первых двух заседаниях Совместной Комиссии.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Приложение № 1.

З А Я В Л Е Н И Е
ПО ВОПРОСУ ИНФОРМАЦИИ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОСТИ О РАБОТЕ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ

Советская делегация прочитала в газете "Старс энд Страйпс" от 25 мая с. г. сообщение под заголовком: Американцы одержали частичную победу."

В этом сообщении Рой Робертса говорится, что Глава Американской Делегации Генерал-майор БРАУН провел пресс-конференцию, на которой заявил, что "Комиссия приняла решение представить Главе Американской Делегации право иметь неофициальные встречи с представителями печати и знакомить их с с вопросами, не имеющими секретного характера."

Далее в сообщении говорится, что Американская Делегация на заседании Совместной Комисси 23 мая с. г. якобы предлагала, чтобы все заседания Комиссии были открыты для корреспондентов.

Советска Делегация считает такое сообщение в печати необ'яктивным и не соответствующим действительности.

Для того, чтобы об'яктивным при информации прессы и общественности о работе Совместной Комиссии, Советская Делегация вносит предложение пересмотреть принятое на заседании 23 мая с.г. решение о порядке информации общественности о работе Совместной Комиссии и предлагает принять следующую редакцию этого решения:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1. Совместная Комиссия выпускает подробные совместные пресс-коммюнике о работе Комиссии после каждого своего заседания.

2. Главы соответствующих делегаций, по своему усмотрению, могут проводить пресс-конференции и информировать представителей прессы о работе Совместной Комиссии в рамках достигнутых согласованных решений и с тем, чтобы не разглашать материалов секретного характера.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СОВМЕСТНОЕ КОММЮНИКЕ № 4

На заседаниях Совместной Комиссии 2 и 3 июля в г.Инчьяне и 8, 9 и 10 июля в г.Сеуле обсуждался вопрос о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций, с которыми Совместная Комиссия будет консультироваться.

Советская делегация заявила, что среди партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших заявления на участие в консультации, имеются такие организации, которые не являются общественными, например, торговые и промышленные компании, административные учреждения и учебные заведения. Советская делегация предложила не включать в список для консультации такого рода организации. Советская делегация также отметила, что среди подавших заявления на участие в консультации имеются узко местные организации, не носящие зонального характера. По мнению Советской делегации допущение к консультации такого рода организаций не соответствовало бы Московскому решению и решению № 12 Совместной Комиссии. При этом, Советская делегация указала, что количество местных организаций как на севере, так и на юге Кореи, очень велико, и что, если бы Комиссия стала консультироваться со всеми местными организациями, то это могло бы только затянуть ее работу и создать неправильное представление о состоянии общественного мнения в Корее.

Советская делегация настаивала на недопущении к консультации партий и организаций, специально созданных для борьбы против Московского решения или входящих в организации, созданные для борьбы против Московского решения. Советская делегация ,в частности, настаивала на недопущении к консультации партий и общественных организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, указав, что такие партии и организации могут быть допущены к консультации в том случае, если они выйдут из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения.

Отметив, что среди партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших заявления на участие в консультации, обнаружены несуществующие организации, Советская делегация предложила проверить существование партий и общественных организаций, наличие которых вызывает сомнение. Советская делегация указала,далее, что общее количество членов партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

заявления - 70 миллионов человек, вызывает сомнение в правильности сведений о количестве членов, представленных различными партиями и организациями, в связи с чем Совместной Комиссии придется проверить количество членов некоторых партий и организаций, подавших заявления.

Советская делегация отметила, что, внося эти предложения, она руководствуется Московским решением и решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии.

Американская делегация отклонила эти предложения Советской делегации. При этом, Американская делегация указала, что, поскольку в Московском решении не указано какие организации считаются общественными, Комиссия должна консультироваться со всеми организациями, подавшими заявления на участие в консультации и подписавшими декларацию, в том числе и с необщественными организациями. Американская делегация высказалась за то, чтобы Комиссия консультировалась также с местными организациями, подавшими заявления на участие в консультации. В отношении партий и общественных организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, Американская делегация заявила, что она предпочла бы консультироваться также и с этими партиями и организациями, и что отстранение от консультации этих партий и общественных организаций противоречило бы свободе выражения мнения.

Американская делегация предложила начать консультацию со всеми партиями и общественными организациями, подавшими заявления, количество членов которых превышает 10 тысяч человек, с тем, чтобы вопрос о консультации с остальными партиями и общественными организациями, подавшими заявления, обсудить позднее.

Советская делегация согласилась принять это предложение при условии, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки и продолжающие вести работу, направленную против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, будут предупреждены о необходимости сделать заявление о своем выходе из Комитета борьбы против опеки, после чего они смогут участвовать в консультации как организации, искренне поддерживающие Московское решение.

Эта поправка не была принята Американской делегацией.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

После этого Советская делегация предложила вызвать 7 июля 1947 года во дворец ДУК-СУ руководителей партий и общественных организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, и уточнить их позицию по отношению к Московскому решению. Если они заявят о поддержке Московского решения, то их можно будет допустить к консультации.

Это предложение также оказалось неприемлемым для Американской делегации.

В процессе дальнейшего обсуждения Советская делегация продолжала настаивать на своем предложении, что партии и общественные организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации только после того, как они сделают заявления о своем выходе из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения.

Советская делегация предложила принять во внимание письменные соображения по вопросникам, представленные местными организациями. В предложении Советской делегации говорилось, что местные организации не будут включены в список для консультации, но после окончания консультации с партиями и общественными организациями, включенными в список, Совместная Комиссия объявит, что местные общественные организации, подавшие заявления на участие в консультации, если они имеют что-либо добавить к представленным ими письменным соображениям по вопросникам, могут прислать своих представителей для устной консультации. Советская делегация снова настаивала на том, чтобы начать консультации с партиями и общественными организациями, которые не вызвают возражений, а окончательный список рассмотреть и утвердить в ближайшие дни.

Американская делегация отклонила предложение Советской делегации, заявив, что торговые и промышленные организации, в частности, торгово-промышленные палаты, должны быть допущены к консультации; что если не допускать к консультации такие организации, то также не следует допускать к консультации и профсоюзные организации. В отношении партий и общественных организаций, состоящих в Комитете борьбы против опеки, Американская делегация заявила, что она считает недоказанными обвинения Советской делегации в том, что эти партии и организации продолжают вести борьбу против Московского

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

решения и Совместной Комиссии.

Со стороны Советской делегации было внесено предложение поручить подкомиссии № 1 представить список для консультации с Совместной Комиссией партий и общественных организаций с заявленным количеством членов свыше 10 тысяч человек, за исключением партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, а также рассмотреть вопрос и внести свои предложения по вопросу об организациях, насчитывающих менее 10 тысяч членов, и таких организаций, численность и сам факт существования которых вызывает сомнения. В отношении партий и общественных организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, Советская делегация подтвердила свою прежнюю позицию.

Американская делегация изложила на заседании Совместной Комиссии результаты изучения деятельности Комитета борьбы против опеки, которое было проведено Американской делегацией. В сообщении Американской делегации указывалось, что Комитет борьбы против опеки фактически перестал существовать, и партии и организации, входящие ранее в этот Комитет, подписав декларацию, прекратили участвовать в работе Комитета. В сообщении, далее говорилось, что ни одна из партий, подавших заявление, входивших ранее в состав Комитета или номинально числящихся в настоящее время в составе этого Комитета, не скомпрометировала себя каким-либо действием, дающим право на отстранение от консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

Советская делегация заявила, что имеющиеся в ее распоряжении данные свидетельствуют о том, что Комитет борьбы против опеки продолжает свою деятельность, направленную против Московского решения. В частности, он организовал 23 июня с.г. демонстрацию против Московского решения в Сеуле и аналогичные демонстрации в ряде других городов Южной Кореи. Совместная Комиссия получила 23 июня от Комитета борьбы против опеки петицию, в которой Комитет высказался решительно против работы Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация предложила - рекомендовать партиям и общественным организациям, подавшим заявления и входящим в Комитет борьбы против опеки, опубликовать заявления о том, что они вышли из этого Комитета, указав при этом, что без опубликования таких заявлений указанные партии продолжают нести ответственность за деятельность Комитета борьбы против опеки.

Американская делегация отклонила это предложение, заявив, что, поскольку партии и общественные организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, подписали декларацию, Совместная Комиссия не может требовать от них опубликования заявлений, предложенных Советской делегацией. После этого Советская делегация

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

предложила произвести совместное изучение деятельности партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, подписавших заявления, использовав при этом материали одностороннего изучения, произведенного Американской делегацией.

Американская делегация не согласилась с этим предложением.

В конце заседания 10 июля 1947 года Советская делегация передала Американской делегации список партий и организаций Южной и Северной Кореи с заявленным количеством членов свыше 10 тысяч человек, и предложила поручить подкомиссии № 1 рассмотреть этот список. В предложении Советской делегации говорилось, что подкомиссия № 1 должна установить какие организации, из числа включенных в список, являются общественными, а также проверить наличие партий и общественных организаций и количество членов партий и организаций существование или количество членов которых соответственно вызывает сомнение, и представить Совместной Комиссии свои соображения. Предлагалось не включать в список партии и общественные организации с заявленным количеством членов ниже 10 тысяч человек, но принять во внимание представленные ими письменные соображения по вопросникам. После окончания консультации с партиями и общественными организациями, включенными в список, об"явить, что партии и общественные организации, подавшие заявления, которые не включены в список, если они имеют что-либо добавить к представленным ими письменным соображениям по вопросникам, могут прислать своих представителей для устной консультации. В предложении ,далее , указывалось, что партии и общественные организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации в том случае, если они выйдут из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбы против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии.

Американская делегация заявила, что она внимательно изучит предложение Советской делегации.

Следующее заседание Совместной Комиссии назначено на 14 июля 1947 года.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ВСТУПИТЕЛЬНОЕ СЛОВО ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТА ДЖОН Р. ХОДЖ
НА ОТКРЫТИИ АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ

Лично от себя, от имени правительства Соединенных Штатов и Американского командования в Корее, я выражаю свое сердечное приветствие выдающимся представителям Советской делегации по поводу возобновления Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии. Мы собрались здесь, чтобы выполнить обещания великих держав восстановить Корею, как полновластное и независимое государство. Эти обещания были суммированы и точно оформлены в Московском Решении в декабре 1945 года, которое также создало пути для проведения их в жизнь. Было решено путем переписки между нашими государствами, что Совместная Комиссия выполнит пункты Московского Решения, основываясь на демократических принципах свободы мнения. Таковы были инструкции, полученные Американской делегацией, возглавляемой генералом Браун.

Самой первой и наиболее неотложной задачей Совместной Комиссии является установление Временного Правительства для всей Кореи. Взоры всего мира сосредоточены на этой Комиссии, и весь корейский народ с нетерпением ожидает установления этого правительства. Американское командование и наша страна надеются, что работа Совместной Комиссии может быть проведена быстро, успешно и в полном согласии, истекающим из взаимного понимания двух великих союзников. Мы также искренно надеемся, что результаты работы Совместной Комисси полностью удовлетворят нужды и чаяния корейской нации.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ВСТУПИТЕЛЬНАЯ РЕЧЬ ГЕНЕРАЛА БРАУН

Как Глава Американской делегации, я счастлив, лично и официально, выразить самое горячее приветствие делегации Советского Союза.

Корея была освобождена от японского ига героизмом и жертвенностью Союзных наций. Четыре великих союзника, включая Советскую Россию и Соединенные Штаты, решили на основании Московского Соглашения восстановить полную независимость Кореи. Мы собираемся вновь, чтобы продолжить задачу, начатую нами год тому назад.

Корейский народ с надеждой ожидает, что эта Комиссия выполнит удачно возложенное задание. На нас лежит большая ответственность. Много работы должно быть сделано. Много возникнет трудностей.

Мы собираемся в атмосфере надежд. С готовностью, необходимой нам всем для взаимно удовлетворительного разрешения наших проблем, мы должны действовать успешно и быстро для удачного завершения нашего первого задания - подготовления плана Кореи, об'единенной под Временным Правительством.

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NND 760090
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Советская делегация
в Советско-Американской
Совместной Комиссии

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ НА ЗАСЕДАНИИ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ 7 ИЮЛЯ 1947 ГОДА.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 3 июля в Пхеньяне Глава Американской делегации сделал пространное заявление, в котором вторично изложил историю переписки по вопросу о консультации с момента прекращения работы Совместной Комиссии в 1946 году. Нельзя не отметить, что каждый раз, когда заходит вопрос о точном выполнении условий консультации, о которых договорились два Министра Иностранных Дел в процессе переписки по вопросу о Корее, Американская делегация возвращается к истории переписки по вопросу о консультации, и пытается обосновать свои позиции цитатами из различных писем, которыми обменялись Командующий советскими войсками и Командующий американскими войсками в Корее. Советская делегация усматривает в этом попытку вновь поднять вопросы, по которым было достигнуто соглашение между двумя Министрами, о том, чтобы отойти от тех конкретных условий консультации, о которых договорились Министры Иностранных Дел. Советская делегация считает, что если договоренность по вопросу о консультации, достигнутая между двумя Министрами Иностранных Дел, не нравится Американской делегации, то она должна заявить об этом, как выразился на прошлом заседании Комиссии генерал ЕРАУН, "откровенно, ясно и без задней мысли".

Я уже указал на заседании Совместной Комиссии 3 июля, что Советская делегация будет строго руководствоваться Московским решением, соглашением между двумя Министрами Иностранных Дел и решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии, но не будет руководствоваться прошлой перепиской по вопросу о консультации между советским и американским командующими в Корее.

Американская делегация пытается представить дело таким образом, что Комиссия уже имеет список партий и общественных организаций и дело идет об исключении из этого списка. Американская делегация обвинила Советскую делегацию в стремлении односторонне исключить из списка некоторые партии и организации. Такое утверждение является необоснованным. В соответствии с решением № 16 Совместной Комиссии, подкомиссия № 1 составляет список партий и организаций, поданных заявления на

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

участие в консультации, и отдельный список выделенных ими представителей. Эти списки обсуждаются подкомиссией № 1 и после согласования представляются на утверждение Совместной Комиссии. Как известно, подкомиссия № 1 не представила согласованного списка партий и общественных организаций. Поэтому речь идет сейчас о том, какие партии и организации, подавшие заявления, должны быть включены в список для первоначальной устной консультации, в соответствии с Московским решением и решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии, в которых зафиксирована договоренность по вопросу о консультации, достигнутая между двумя Министрами Иностранных Дел.

Список партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших заявления на участие в консультации, включает 425 партий и организаций. Как получился такой список ? Советской делегации известно, что Американская делегация положила немало труда для того, чтобы как можно больше организаций подали заявления на участие в консультации. В газетах Южной Кореи публиковались об"явления Американской делегации, в которых, без всяких об"яснений, все организации приглашались подать заявления на участие в консультации ; разбрасывались листовки о таких же приглашениях и т.д.

Американская делегация пыталась представить большое количество партий и организаций, подавших заявления в Южной Корее, как положительное явление. Но разве можно считать положительным такое явление, когда подало заявления большое количество организаций, не имеющих, в соответствии с принятыми решениями, права на участие в консультациях ? Это привело только к ненужной дискуссии и к задержке работы Комиссии.

Общее количество членов партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших заявления на участие в консультации с Совместной Комиссией, выражается фантастической цифрой 70 миллионов человек, в то время, как все население Южной Кореи составляет 17-18 миллионов человек. Если принять, что количество взрослого населения / свыше 18 лет / составляет 50% или 8,5 - 9 миллионов человек, то выходит , что в Южной Корее каждый взрослый кореец, как мужчина, так и женщина, состоит в среднем в 8-ми организациях. Разумеется, такое предположение далеко от действительности. Это не может не вызвать сомнения в правильности сведений о количестве членов, представленных различными партиями и организациями. Совместной Комиссии придется проверить

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

количество членов некоторых партий и организаций, подавших заявления.

Предварительный список партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших заявления, еще должным образом не изучен подкомиссией № 1 потому, что Американская делегация уклонилась от конкретного обсуждения этого списка. Однако, в списке уже обнаружены несуществующие организации. Так например, так называемый Союз строителей и ремонтных рабочих Кореи, числящийся в списке под № 19, указал количество членов 1 миллион 220 тысяч человек. Советский представитель в подкомиссии № 1 г-н ТУНКИН выразил сомнение по поводу численности этой организации, указав, что она не может иметь 1 млн.220 тысяч членов, так как во всей Корее имеется менее одного миллиона рабочих. Позднее американский представитель в подкомиссии № 1 г-н БАНС заявил, что проверкой установлено, что такой организации вообще не существует. Поскольку имеются факты подачи заявлений на участие в консультации несуществующими организациями, Совместной Комиссии необходимо проверить наличие ряда партий и организаций, в существовании которых имеется сомнение.

В соответствии с Московским решением, Совместная Комиссия при выработке своих предложений по вопросу об образовании Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства должна консультироваться с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями. Между тем, в числе организаций, подавших заявления на участие в консультации, имеется некоторое количество таких организаций, которые не являются общественными организациями. Имеются заявления от торговых и промышленных предприятий, учебных заведений и административных учреждений. Можно в качестве примера привести следующие : Корейское транспортное общество / № 43/, Союз по изготовлению брикетированного угля / № 119/, Об"единение корейских обществ по распределению товаров / № 144/, Корейское общество коневодства / № 337/, Корейский индустриальный медицинский институт / № 71/ и т.д.

Советская делегация считает, что подобные организации, поскольку они не являются общественными организациями, не должны быть допущены к консультации. Позиция Американской делегации, которая настаивает на включении в список организаций, не являющихся общественными, в частности, на включении торговых

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

и промышленных компаний, противоречит Московскому соглашению.

Советская делегация настаивает на том, чтобы в список партий и организаций не были включены те партии и общественные организации, которые созданы для борьбы против Московского решения или которые состоят в организациях, созданных для борьбы против этого решения. Подписание декларации этими партиями и организациями не может быть принято как выражение доброго намерения полностью поддерживать Московское решение, поскольку цели упомянутых партий и организаций несовместимы с содержащимся в декларации обязательством - полностью поддерживать Московское решение о Корее.

Советская делегация имеет в виду прежде всего и главным образом Комитет борьбы против опеки, который был создан специально для борьбы против Московского решения, и вел и ведет активную борьбу против этого решения.

После того, как 12 июня 1947 года в печати было опубликовано решение Совместной Комиссии о порядке консультации Совместной Комиссии с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, Комитет борьбы против опеки не только не прекратил своей борьбы против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии, а наоборот, усилил эту борьбу.

После длительной дискуссии в Комитете борьбы против опеки по вопросу об участии в консультации было принято решение о том, что партии и организации, входящие в состав Комитета, которые подадут заявления на участие в консультации, будут вести борьбу против Московского решения в ходе консультации Совместной Комиссии.

Вот что по этому поводу сообщала газета "Сеул Тайме" от 20 июня с.г. :

" 18 июня состоялось собрание Комитета борьбы против опеки. Заседание обсудило вопрос участия в работе Совместной Комиссии и приняло решение полностью поддержать курс, взятый ЛИ СЫН МАНОМ и КИМ ГУ, соответствующий духу борьбы против опеки.

Далее было решено, что все низовые партии, как правило, не примут участия в работе Совместной Комиссии. Те же, кто уже согласился участвовать, примут участие и будут бороться против опеки в дух-ду.

Комитет дал слово, во-первых, полностью отречься от опеки и, во-вторых, вообще не принимать участия в работе Совместной Комиссии, сотрудничать с прежними, уже включенными для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, в борьбе против опеки и тем самым достичь полной независимости".

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Правые партии, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, организовали во второй половине июня 1947 года специальный Комитет для борьбы против работы Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Газета " Сеул Тайме" от 20 июня с.г.сообщала об этом следующее :

" Для об"единения оппозиции организован Комитет противодействия Совместной Комиссии.

Согласно сообщению Агентства "Корейская Тихоокеанская пресса", всеми правыми политическими партиями и общественными организациями под руководством Корейской демократической партии организован Комитет противодействия созданию Совместной Комиссией Временного Правительства. На этом заседании, состоявшемся 19 июня в 10 часов утра в храме Тайко, присутствовало свыше 100 представителей политических и общественных организаций.

Этот Комитет волен решимости руководить об"единенной оппозицией против Совместной Комиссии".

23 июня 1947 года Комитет борьбы против опеки организовал в Сеуле демонстрацию/митинг против Московского решения. Как сообщает газета " Кадон Синмун" от 29 июня 1947 года, аналогичные митинги, направленные против Московского решения, состоялись в ряде городов и уездов Южной Кореи. Совместная Комиссия получила 23 июня 1947 года петицию от Комитета борьбы против опеки, в которой высказывалось требование об изменении Московского решения и указывалось, что Комитет ставит своей целью поддержать петицию путем всенародной стихийной демонстрации.Демонстрация получилась, правда, не только не "всенародной",а наоборот, совершенно незначительной. В этой петиции, подписанной председателем Комитета борьбы против опеки, в частности, говорилось, что "все лица, желающие подписать комментарии № 5, публично заявили о своем намерении выступать против опеки за столом конференции". Комитет высказался в этой петиции решительно против работы Совместной Комиссии, заявив,что " всякое коалиционное правительство, которое может создать Совместная Комиссия, не будет иметь успеха в силу классовых разногласий, которые будут раскалывать его изнутри".

Американская делегация почему-то считает должным сказать, что к демонстрации 23 июня Комитет борьбы против опеки не имеет никакого отношения, в то время, как ей должно быть хорошо известно, что именно этот Комитет был организатором демонстрации.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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Начальник Департамента полиции Южной Кореи

ЧЕ ПЕН ОК по поводу демонстрации 23 июня с.г. заявил следующее:

" Комитет против оккупации уже давно готовил эту демонстрацию на день национального праздника ДАНО. Полиция неоднократно предупреждала Комитет и принимала ряд мер. Но к нашему сожалению в Сеуле все-таки состоялась демонстрация под руководством корейской молодежной организации за независимость и федерацию учащихся всей Кореи".

/ Сеульская радиопередача за 26 июня 1947 г./

Из этого заявления ЧЕ ПЕН ОКА совершенно ясно видно, что именно Комитет борьбы против оккупации организовал демонстрацию 23 июня 1947 года.

Советская делегация удивлена тем, что Американская делегация ,вопреки бесспорным фактам, пытается доказать непричастность Комитета борьбы против оккупации к демонстрации 23 июня 1947 года.

Американская делегация не может оспаривать того, что партии и общественные организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против оккупации, подписав декларацию, тем самым взяли на себя обязательство - полностью поддерживать Московское решение о Корее. Вместо с тем, оставаясь членами этого Комитета, эти партии и общественные организации оставляют свою подпись под программой этого Комитета, содержащей обязательство - бороться против Московского решения, и продолжают фактически участвовать в борьбе против Московского решения. Одно с другим несовместимо.

Поэтому Советская делегация считает, что партии и общественные организации, подписавшие декларацию, которые входят в Комитет борьбы против оккупации, могут быть допущены к консультации только в том случае, если они выйдут из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения.

Позиция Американской делегации в этом вопросе не ясна. Американская делегация уклоняется от прямого ответа на вопрос, является-ли членство в Комитете борьбы против оккупации несовместимым с содержащимся в декларации обязательством - полностью поддерживать Московское решение. Глава Американской делегации заявил, что Американская делегация придерживается принципа, согласно которому лицо считается невиновным до тех пор, пока его виновность не доказана. Советская делегация

секретно

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

считает, что факт участия той или иной партии или общественной организации в Комитете борьбы против опеки свидетельствует о том, что эта партия или организация и после подписания декларации продолжает активную борьбу против выполнения Московского решения и,следовательно, в соответствии с п.3 условий консультации, согласованных между двумя Министрами Иностранных Дел, не может быть допущена к консультации. Указанный пункт, как известно, гласит :

" Лица, партии и общественные организации, приглашенные для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, не должны после подписания декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, разжигать или поддерживать активные выступления против работы Совместной Комиссии или против одной из союзных держав или против Московского решения. То лица, партии или общественные организации, которые после подписания декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, будут разжигать или поддерживать активные выступления против работы Совместной Комиссии или по отношению к одной из союзных держав или к выполнению Московского решения, будут исключены из дальнейшей консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

Решение относительно исключения таких лиц, партий и общественных организаций будет приниматься соглашением двух делегаций в Совместной Комиссии".

Американская делегация неоднократно ссылалась на этот пункт,но,повидимому, не желает применять его на практике, стремясь взять под защиту те партии и организации, которые после подписания декларации, продолжают выступать против Московского решения.

Советской делегации не понятно отношение Американской делегации к происходящим событиям. Так например, согласно сообщению газеты "Тэтон симбун", глава Американской делегации генерал ГРАУН принял 23 июня трех представителей участников состоявшейся в этот день демонстрации, которые вручили ему принятую на митинге резолюцию. Цитируя это сообщение :

" 5-й пункт резолюции : Мы полностью поддерживаем линию борьбы за создание независимости доктора ЛИ СИН МАНА и господина КИМ ГУ, являющихся руководителями 30 миллионов корейцев.

Ответ: Я приветствую их усилия.Боритесь изо всех сил ".

/ газета "Тэтон симбун" от 24.VI.47 г./

Как такой ответ главы Американской делегации может быть расценен корейской общественностью ?

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

В числе подавших заявления на участие в консультации имеется известное количество незначительных узко местных организаций, как например, Союз молодежи района Сунгдонг / № 6/, Союз христианской молодежи уезда Лесу / № 183/, Общество друзей района Пугак / № 229/, Автомобильное общество района Есангу / № 285/, Общество дружбы района Дыкян / № 306/, Молодежная организация улицы Анам в Сеуле / № 344/, Общество женщин церкви Чандон в Сеуле / № 404/.

Совершенно очевидно, что большинство местных общественных организаций, количество которых как на юге, так и на севере Кореи очень велико, руководствуясь решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии, которое было опубликовано для всеобщего сведения, не представило своих заявлений на участие в консультации. Если бы Комиссия стала консультироваться со всеми местными общественными организациями, то это невероятно затруднило и затянуло бы ее работу. Это противоречило бы решению № 12 Совместной Комиссии, где сказано, что демократические партии и общественные организации представляют заявления на участие в консультации через свои центральные органы зоны. Таким образом, в решении № 12 имеется в виду консультация с общественными организациями зонального масштаба, а не с узко местными мелкими организациями.

Советская делегация считает, что в список включается достаточно большое количество центральных зональных партий и общественных организаций, имеющих свои филиалы на периферии, для того, чтобы учесть местные интересы. Привлечение к консультации местных мелких и никому не известных групп и организаций может только отвлечь внимание Комиссии и дать извращенное представление о действительном характере общественного мнения в Корее. К тому же эти организации уже представили Комиссии свои письменные соображения в ответах на вопросники и этим самым изложили свои пожелания.

Исходя из этого, Советская делегация считает, что узко местные общественные организации не должны быть включены в список для участия в устной консультации.

Однако, учитывая настойчивое стремление Американской делегации допустить к консультации местные организации, подавшие заявления, Советская делегация вносит следующее предложение по

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

этому вопросу :

Совместная Комиссия примет во внимание письменные соображения, представленные местными общественными организациями. Местные организации, подавшие заявления, не включаются в список. После окончания консультации с партиями и общественными организациями, которые будут включены в список, Совместная Комиссия об"явит, что местные общественные организации, подавшие заявления на участие в консультации, если они имеют что-либо добавить к представленным или письменным соображениям по вопросникам, могут прислать своих представителей для устной консультации.

Американская делегация в своем заявлении на заседании Комиссии 5 июля снова затронула вопрос о свободе выражения мнения. При этом, Американская делегация выставила себя в роли защитника свободы выражения мнения, пытаясь, таким образом, создать впечатление, что Советская делегация выступает против свободы выражения мнения. Прежде всего, Советская делегация никогда не выступала против свободы выражения мнения, а во-вторых, Американская делегация вряд-ли [illegible] оснований для того, чтобы присвоивать себе роль защитника свободы выражения мнения. Советская делегация считает, что политика советского командования в Северной Корее с достаточной ясностью показала, что советская сторона, не на словах, а на деле, стоит на свободу выражения мнения. Как известно, советское командование в Северной Корее не препятствовало корейцам не только свободно выражать свои мнения, но и перестраивать свою жизнь на демократических началах и ликвидировать остатки длительного японского господства в Корее, в результате чего в Северной Корее достигнут значительный прогресс в области демократизации и развития национальной экономики и культуры.

В письме Министра Иностранных Дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВА Государственному Секретарю США Д.МАРШАЛЛУ от 19 апреля 1947 года по этому поводу было сказано следующее :

" Что же касается Северной Кореи, то за период проведений с момента капитуляции Японии, здесь достигнут значительный прогресс в области демократизации, а также в отношении возрождения национальной экономики и культуры. Проведены широкие демократические реформы, гарантирующие политические свободы и улучшение благосостояния населения. Я имею в виду, прежде всего, аграрную всеобщего избирательного права ; равноправие женщин ; создание на основе свободных демократи-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

чески выборов местных органов власти и Народного Комитета Северной Кореи ; земельную реформу, в результате которой 725 тысяч безземельных и малоземельных крестьянских хозяйств получили бесплатно более одного миллиона га земли, принадлежавшей ранее японским колонизаторам и их пособникам в Корее ; национализацию бывшей японской промышленности ; закон о 8-ми часовом рабочем дне, охране труда и социальном страховании ; реформу народного образования, в результате которой в школах восстановлен корейский язык, расширена школьная сеть, возросло количество учащихся и др. Однако, подобные широкие демократические реформы проведены только в Северной Корее, где проживает 2/3 населения Кореи".

Три условия консультации, о которых договорились Министры Иностранных Дел ,по мнению Советской делегации, не противоречат свободе выражения мнения. Советская делегация стремится к точному выполнению этих условий, и весьма странно, когда это пытаются истолковать как нарушение свободы выражения мнения.

В своем заявлении на заседании Совместной Комиссии 3 мая Глава Американской делегации указал, что в Корее существует две главные политические группировки, так называемые - правые и левые, и что,якобы, правые составляют большинство, примерно, в пропорции 4:2. При этом, глава Американской делегации пытался обвинить Советскую делегацию в стремлении устранить от консультации представителей правого крыла политических партий ради того, чтобы уничтожить, как он выразился, "справедливую пропорцию" между правыми и левыми. Главе Американской делегации, вместе с тем, дал ясно понять, что Американская делегация занимает правые партии и общественные организации.

Что касается соотношения сил между правыми и левыми в Корее, то я не намерен сейчас вступать в дискуссию по этому вопросу,но хотел бы только отметить, что в названной генералом БРАУН пропорции желаемое принимается им за действительное.

Советская делегация протестует заявление Американской делегации о том, что ни одна из делегаций в Совместной Комиссии не должна занимать позиции, которая предпочитает одну политическую группу в Корее в ущерб другой политической группе, так как это не способствовало бы работе Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация полностью согласна с этим и считает, что делегации должны на деле придерживаться указанного положения

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Секретно

при выполнении возложенной на Совместную Комиссию задачи, исходя, при этом, из того, что будущее Временное Корейское Демократическое Правительство должно отвечать желаниям корейского народа.

Политика Советского правительства в отношении Кореи была ясно изложена в письме Министра Иностранных дел В.М.МОЛОТОВА от 19 апреля 1947 года. Я цитирую это письмо :

" Советское Правительство ,строго придерживаясь в своей политике в отношении Кореи программы, намеченной Московским соглашением, считает первоочередными задачами следующие :

1. Создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства на основе широкого участия корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций, дабы ускорить политическое и экономическое об"единение Кореи как самостоятельного и независимого от иностранного вмешательства государства, что ликвидирует деление страны на две части.

2. Создание по всей Корее демократических органов власти путем свободных выборов на основе всеобщего и равного избирательного права.

3. Оказание помощи корейскому народу в возрождении Кореи как независимого демократического государства и в развитии национальной экономики и национальной культуры".

Советская делегация будет строго придерживаться этой политики.

Советская делегация рекомендует принять вышеизложенные предложения по вопросу составления списка партий и общественных организаций. Для того, чтобы не задерживать дольше начало устной консультации, Советская делегация предлагает немедленно начать консультацию с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, подавшими заявления, которые не вызывают возражений с тем, чтобы окончательный список был подготовлен подкомиссией № 1 в ближайшие дни и представлен на утверждение Совместной Комиссии.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Копия

Сеул, Корея
16 Мая 1947

Генерал-майору Альберту Е. Брауну
Совместная Комиссия в Корее
Сеул

Через

Отдел Информации и Связи
Штаб 24-го Корпуса
Армии Соединенных Штатов

Г. Г.:

Насколько нам известно, некоторые заседания Совместной Комиссии будут происходить в зоне Советской оккупации.

Для полной информации американского народа о работе Комиссии настоящим запрашивается, чтобы этот репортер и другие корреспонденты, покрывающие заседания Комиссии в Сеуле, были бы допущены сопровождать Комиссию в случае и во время поездок в Советскую зону для информации ее работ там.

Искренно Ваш,

Вильям Х. Ньютон
Газетная Корпорация
Скрипт-Ховард
через Отдел Информации и Связи
Главный Штаб 24-го Корпуса.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

РЕЧЬ НА ОБ"ЕДИНЕННОМ ЗАСЕДАНИИ КОМИССИИ С ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯМИ ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ И ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ.

Господин председатель,
господа,

От имени Совместной Совстско-Американской Комиссии приветствую Вас - представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной / Северной /Кореи.

Мы собрались здесь для того, чтобы приступить к новой стадии разрешения задачи восстановления корейской независимости. Нашей целью является так выполнить эту большую работу, чтобы мы могли создать сильное и уважаемое демократическое государство, которое явится достойным политическим организмом для народа этой древней и культурной страны.

Под тяжелым игом японского империализма корейский народ десятилетиями мечтал о том дне, когда он, наконец, обретет свободу и возможность самостоятельно управлять своей страной. Эта возможность открылась для него в результате победы союзных государств, которые в длительной и кровопролитной войне осущест вили решительный разгром агрессоров на Западе и на Востоке. Свободолюбивый корейский народ, долгие годы переносивший тяготы и унижения колониального рабства, навсегда освобожден от пут японского господства.

На Московском совещании Министров Иностранных Дел СССР, США и Великобритании в декабре 1945 года было достигнуто историческое решение, открывшее корейскому народу ясные перспективы его национального возрождения. Три союзных государства - СССР, США и Великобритания, к которым впоследствии присоединилась также Китайская Республика, наметили в этом решении программу восстановления Кореи как независимого государства, создания условий для развития страны на демократических началах и скорейшей ликвидации пагубных последствий длительного японского господства в Корее.

В качестве первоочередной задачи Московское решение предусматривает создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, которое могло бы принимать все необходимые меры для развития промышленности, транспорта и сельского

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

хозяйства Кореи и национальной культуры корейского народа. Создание такого Правительства на основе широкого участия корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций, как это предусматривается Московским решением, приведет к политическому и экономическому объединению Кореи и явится важнейшим шагом по пути к созданию самостоятельного и независимого от иностранного вмешательства демократического корейского государства.

Выполнению этой задачи посвящается данный этап работы Совместной Комиссии. После завершения этого первого этапа Совместная Комиссия должна приступить, с участием Временного Корейского Демократического правительства и с привлечением корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций, к разработке мер помощи и содействия политическому, экономическому и социальному прогрессу корейского народа, развитию демократического самоуправления и установлению государственной независимости Кореи.

Сегодняшнее заседание знаменует собой важнейший шаг в выполнении пункта второго Московского решения, который предусматривает каким образом должно быть создано Временное Правительство Кореи. Это совещание является первым официальным шагом к проведению устной консультации с руководителями корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций. Эта консультация будет проводиться в соответствии с лучшими демократическими традициями с тем, чтобы при создании Временного Правительства голосу народа могло быть уделено самое серьезное внимание. Поскольку народ выражает свои желания через партии и организации, важность и серьезность задачи, которая ложится на представителей партий и организаций, очень велики.

Совместная Комиссия ставит своей целью при помощи консультации определить, какое Правительство желает корейский народ и какое Правительство сможет наилучшим образом представлять его интересы для того, чтобы рекомендовать державам создать такое Временное Правительство, которое обеспечит проведение необходимых демократических преобразований, возрождение Кореи как независимого демократического государства и развитие национальной экономики и национальной культуры. Чтобы Совместная Комиссия имела успех в своей работе, она нуждается

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в искренней поддержке корейского народа и полном Вашем сотрудничестве, поскольку Вы будете предоставлять Совместной Комиссии взгляды Ваших партий и организаций.

Совершенно неизбежно, что политические партии, представленные здесь в большом количестве, будут иметь различные точки зрения по вопросу создания Временного Правительства. Наряду с общим желанием всех корейцев достичь независимости и провести демократические общественные и экономические реформы, которые дадут их стране возможность занять должное место в современном мире, имеются естественно разногласия в отношении политических мероприятий и средств, путем которых эти цели должны быть достигнуты. Однако, различие во мнениях не должно вести к отсутствию согласия или к нежеланию сотрудничать в работе Совместной Комиссии.

Для целей консультации Совместная Комиссия выработала и опубликовала вопросники относительно структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти, а также политической платформы для этого Правительства. Эти вопросники охватывают широкий круг проблем, имеющих жизненно важное значение для корейского народа.

Совместная Комиссия также разработала и опубликовала порядок консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями. Согласно этому порядку корейские демократические партии и общественные организации, подписавшие декларацию, приглашаются предоставить в письменной и устной форме свои соображения по вопросам, касающимся создания Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Принятый порядок консультации предусматривает также, что представители корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций, которые будут выделены позднее в соответствии с количеством членов этих партий и организаций и учитывая, насколько возможно, их влияние, будут приглашены для консультации и оказания помощи Совместной Комиссии при выработке ее рекомендаций.

В скором времени начнется устная консультация. Поскольку большое количество партий и организаций подало заявления о допущении к консультации, Совместная Комиссия в целом не будет иметь возможности консультироваться с каждым представителем

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

в отдельности. Однако, будут созданы подкомитеты, которые будут проводить эту работу согласно указаниям Совместной Комиссии и под ее наблюдением. Чтобы не затягивать беспричинно дальнейший ход подготовки рекомендаций относительно Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, устная консультация будет ограничиваться необходимыми объяснениями и дополнениями к представленным ответам на вопросы, содержащиеся в вопросниках. Консультация с отдельными представителями партий и организаций будет проводиться подкомитетами согласно плану, о котором будет объявлено. Представителям, приглашенным для устной консультации, будет сообщено о времени и месте консультации. Подкомиссии и Совместная Комиссия в ходе изучения результатов этих консультаций примут их соответствующим образом во внимание.

Совместная Комиссия призывает корейские демократические партии и общественные организации отнестись к этому делу с полным сознанием ответственности, широко разъяснить народу содержание вопросников и представить в Совместную Комиссию соображения, которые действительно отразили бы мнения и чаяния корейского народа. При выполнении этой важной задачи должны быть забыты личные желания. Интересы корейского народа должны стоять выше интересов отдельных партий и их лидеров.

Комиссия обращается также к представителям корейской печати, которая в эти исторические дни в жизни Кореи должна проделать большую работу по разъяснению корейскому народу решений Совместной Комиссии и организовать широкое освещение работы, которая проводится демократическими партиями и общественными организациями в связи с представлением в Совместную Комиссию своих соображений по вопросам, связанным с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Совместная Комиссия верит, что представленные здесь демократические партии и общественные организации, которые подписанием декларации выразили доброе намерение полностью поддерживать Московское решение, окажут Совместной Комиссии всяческую помощь в ее работе и тем самым выполнят свой долг перед корейским народом. Вашей почетной задачей является внести свой вклад в дело возрождения своей нации. Совместная

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NND 760090
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Комиссия верит,что Вы высоко оцените честь,оказанную Вам корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

Со своей стороны Совместная Советско-Американская Комиссия желает заверить Вас и корейский народ,что она приложит все усилия к выполнению Московского решения о Корее и,в первую очередь, к быстрейшему созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Это заседание является важнейшим и знаменательным событием.Совместная Комиссия надеется,что корейцы,русские и американцы,работая сообща и руководствуясь добрыми намерениями,смогут успешно разрешить сложные вопросы,связанные с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

ГЛАВА АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ- МАЙОР

А.Е.БРАУН.

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК

Т.Ф.ШТИКОВ.

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ГАБ АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ

21 мая 1947

Секретариат Совместной Комиссии получил следующее приветствие:

Гонолулу
Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии, Сеул.

Мы, корейское население Гавайских островов настоящим выражаем нашу глубочайшую благодарность за возобновление Ваших забот о судьбе корейского народа. Мы верим, что скорейшим разрешением корейских внутренних проблем, Вы поможете Корее достигнуть положения достоинства, чести и уважения в семье народов. Мы молимся за успех Вашего благого начинания.

Об'единенный Корейский Комитет
Д. В. Чой, председатель.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

РАДИОГРАММА

из Лос Анжелес, Калифорния, 21 Мая, 1947,

США-Советской Комиссии, Генерал-Лейтенанту Джон Р.Хаджу,

Штаб Американских войск в Корее, Сеул.

Мы молимся об успехе вновь созванной Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии, работающей теперь для восстановления демократического и об'единенного Корейского правительства. Существование нации и прогресс народа Кореи зависит от уничтожения 38-ой параллели, которая в данное время делит Корею на две части.

Мы искренне верим, что Комиссия твердо намерена достигнуть об'единения Кореи. Этим, обещание об'единенных держав Корейскому народу будет выполнено и вера тридцати миллионов корейцев не пропадет напрасно.

Об'единенный Корейский Комитет,

Сидай Хан, Председатель.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ШТАБ 24-го КОРПУСА
Канцелярия Командующего Генерала
п/п 235

ТФГСТ 620 21 Мая, 1947 г.

План расквартирования СШ-СССР Совместной Комиссии.

1. Письмо ТФГСТ 620, Штаба 24-го Корпуса, от 16-го Мая, 1947 года, относительно "Плана расквартирования Сш-СССР Совместной Комиссии" настоящим отменяется.

2. Нижеследующий план вступает в силу.

3. Цель этого плана заключается в предоставлении жилищных удобств Советским Делегатам, входящим в состав СШ-СССР Совместной Комиссии, собравшейся в Сеуле, Корея, 20-го Мая, 1947 года.

4. Настоящий план предусматривает, что будет присутствовать 75 человек представителей, мужчин и женщин, включая жен офицеров высшего ранга.

5. Ответственности:

a. Сеульский Квартирный Отдел ответственен за:

/1/ Расквартирование и предоставление столовых для Советской Делегации, пользуясь следующими помещениями:

/а/ Русское Консульство.

/б/ Русский Дом № 1.

/в/ Два помещения временного типа при Русском Доме № 1.

/г/ Русский Дом № 2.

/2/ Снабжение постельными и другими необходимыми принадлежностями.

/3/ Предоставление необходимого наблюдения за правильным использованием американского инвентаря в кухнях и столовых. /Советская Делегация предоставит необходимый персонал для обслуживания кухонь и столовых/.

/4/ Выдачу дневного рациона /1/ на каждого человека из Депо класс 1 в пункте снабжения, в здании Русского Консульства. Учет накладных производится в депо.

/5/ Приготовление ведомостей о выданном рационе и передача их для учета в Финансовый Отдел 24-го Корпуса.

/6/ Получение горючих и смазочных материалов из 3077-ой Тыловой Роты, и доставка таковых в Русское Консульство будет производиться по мере необходимости. Документы о выдаче материалов должны быть сданы в Сеульский Квартирный Отдел С-4 для Сеульского Подотдела, который будет присоединять их ко всем другим документам на припасы, выданные на условии возмещения, для подачи таковых в Финансовый Отдел 24-го Корпуса.

/7/ Получение конторских принадлежностей и материалов для химической чистки из Сеульского Подотдела и доставка таковых в Русское Консульство раз в месяц.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

/8/ Ведение точной записи пищевых продуктов и других расходов связанных с раскватированием Советской Делегации.

/9/ Выдачу прочих припасов по мере необходимости.

б. Командующий Генерал 7-ой Пехотной Дивизией предоставит:

/1/ Охрану членам Советской Делегации в течении всего времени их пребывания к югу от 38-ой параллели. План охраны квартир и военный эскорт будет производиться следующим порядком:

/а/ В Русском Доме № 1, с прилегающими к нему временными постройками, будут: один /1/ постоянный часовой у ворот, один /1/ постоянный часовой у отверстия в стене на соседнем участке, и два /2/ патрулирующих часовых вокруг помещений.

/б/ В Русском Консульстве будут: один /1/ постоянный часовой у ворот, и два /2/ патрулирующих по участку.

/в/ В Русском Доме № 2 будут: один /1/ почетный часовой у входа /этот часовой будет взят из охраны дворца/, один /1/ постоянный часовой у ворот, один /1/ постоянный часовой у Корейского дома, расположенного на участке, и один /1/ патрулирующий часовой в саду.

/г/ Часовые на постоянных постах в выше перечисленных параграфах /а/,/б/, и /в/ будут требовать что бы все корейцы расписывались при входе и выходе из ворот Русского Консульства и Русского Дома № 1 и № 2. Ни один кореец не сможет войти на участок пока он не будет опознан русским жильцом дома.

/д/ Предоставление двух /2/ джипов с вооруженным /2/ эскортом военной полиции по требованию Советской Делегации. Джипы и охрана находятся во Дворце Тук Су. Офицер связи, майор Кириллин, находящийся в помещении Дворца Тук Су, телефон Вашингтон 410, распорядится о времени от'езда эскорта и их местоназначении.

в. Штаб Коменданта 24-го Корпуса озаботится:

/1/ Снабжением необходимых средств передвижения из существующих авто-парков, дополнив их машинами из Артиллерийского Отдела Снабжения этого штаба.

/2/ Снабжением Сеульского Квартирного Отдела корейскими рабочими по мере необходимости.

/3/ Запросом главного командования о добавочных средствах передвижения в случаях крайней нужды.

г. Интендантский Подотдел поручит отделу С-4 Сеульского Квртирного Отдела выбирать необ[illegible]ие

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

пищевые продукты непосредственно из депо, как указано в параграфе 5а /4/. Накладные учитываются до выдачи продуктов.

д. Американский секретарь СШ-СССР Совместной Комиссии сзаботится тем, что все соответствующие приказы Командования американской армии в Корее и все другие сведения относительно жилищных условий, заключенных в настоящем плане, были бы доведены до сведения Советской Делегации.

6. Для неотложного выполнения настоящего плана создается непосредственная связь между всеми ответственными лицами. Таковые лица приложат все усилия для сказания самого широкого гостеприимства Советской Делегации.

ПО ПРИКАЗУ ГЕНЕРАЛА-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТА ХАДЖ

ЧАРЛЬЗ ЭННИС
Полковник
Ад'ютант

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

24 May 1947

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov
Chief Commissioner
Soviet Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Shtikov:

At the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 May 1947 I agreed to forward a translation of the condition under which the American Delegation accepted Joint Commission Decision No. 3 as amended to include the new para. 2.a.5.

This condition is quoted:

"The American Delegation will accept original Joint Commission Decision No. 3 as amended by the addition of a new sub-paragraph 5 under the heading "The first stage, etc." reading, 'The procedure of the assumption of power by the Korean Provisional Government and the procedure of the selection of the personnel for the Provisional Government in Korea', with the specific understanding that the wording of Joint Commission Decision No. 3 as accepted by the American Delegation does not in any way restrict the power of decision of the Subcommission of the Joint Commission, nor of the Joint Commission itself to further determination as to the method to be utilized in procuring any or all personnel of the Provisional Korean Government."

Sincerely yours,

Albert E. Brown
Major General U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner
American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

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NND 760090
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Американская Делегация
АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
п/п 235

24 Мая 1947

Генерал полк. Т. Ф. Штыков
Глава Советской Делегации
СШ-СССР Совместной Комиссии
Сеул, Корея

Уважаемый Генерал Штыков:

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 22-го Мая 1947 года я согласился препроводить перевод условия, при котором Американская Делегация приняла Решение № 3 Совместной Комиссии, измененного добавлением нового параграфа 2.а.5.

Это условие приводится ниже:

" Американская делагация примет первоначальное Решение № 3 Совместной Комиссии, измененное добавлением нового подпараграфа 5 под заглавием "Первый этап, и т.д.", гласящего, 'Процедура принятия власти Корейским Временным Правительством и процедура выборов личного состава Временного Правительства в Корее', с точным пониманием текста Решения № 3 Совместной Комиссии, принятого Американской Делегацией, каковое никоим образом не ограничивает силу решения ни Подкомиссий Совместной Комиссии, ни самой Совместной Комиссии в дальнейшем определении способа, который будет применен для набора состава Временного Корейского Правительства."

Уважающий Вас

Альберт Е. Браун
Генерал майор Армии С.Ш.
Глава Американской Делегации
Американско-Советской Совместной
Комиссии.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

I JSC1 (Trans)
26 May 1947

СЕКРЕТНО

ПРОЕКТ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ
ПРЕДЛОЖЕННЫХ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЕЙ

УСЛОВИЯ И ПОРЯДОК КОНСУЛЬТАЦИИ С ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИМИ ПАРТИЯМИ И ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫМИ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯМИ.
/Бывшее Решение Совместной Комиссии №4/

РЕШЕНИЕ:

1. Совместная Комиссия будет консультироваться с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые действительно демократичны в своих целях, методах и которые подпишут следующее заявление:

"Мы_____ заявляем, что мы будем поддерживать цели Московского Решения о Корее, как это изложено в параграфе № 1 этого решения, а именно:

"Восстановление Кореи как независимого государства,
Создание условий для развития страны на демократических началах и
Скорейшая ликвидация пагубных последствий длительного японского господства в Корее".

Далее, мы будем придерживаться решений Совместной Комиссии при выполнении ею параграфа 2 Московского Решения относительно образования Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.
Далее, мы будем содействовать Совместной Комиссии в разработке ею, с участием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, предложений относительно мер, предусмотренных параграфом 3 Московского Решения."

Подпись_____

Представляющий_____партию или организацию.

U.S. Proposed revision Previous
Joint Commission Decision No. 4

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NND 760090
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2. Комиссия предложит центральным органам всех демократических партий и общественных организаций Северной и Южной Кореи подать заявления о консультации с Совместной Комиссией при соблюдении ими следующих условий:

/1/ Наличие отделов в двух или более провинциях.

/2/ Наличие в настоящее время свыше 1000 членов.

Это сообщение должно быть опубликовано в Корейской прессе и передано по радио не позже чем_____ /дата/. Вслед за этим, заявления партий и организаций должны быть поданы до_____ /дата/ включительно в Сеуле или в Пхеньяне. Заявления партий и организаций должны включать дату их образования, примерное число членов на 20 мая, и имена предлагаемых представителя и его заместителя. Эти имена должны включать имя и фамилию в китайских иероглифах и в английской или русской транскрипции, место и дату рождения, и должность, занимаемую каждым лицом в партии или общественной организации. Это заявление должно сопровождаться экземпляром декларации, вышеупомянутой в параграфе № 1, с надлежащей подписью и печатью, а также и подписью назначенных представителей.

3. По получении заявлений Подкомиссия № 1 рассмотрит их, имея в виду вышеупомянутый критерий, и составит сводный список демократических партий и общественных организаций и их представителей для представления его Совместной Комиссии на окончательное одобрение.

4. После утверждения сводного списка корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций, Совместная Комиссия официальным письмом известит центральные органы этих партий и общественных организаций о приглашении их для консультации. Партии и общественные организации должны снабдить выделенных ими представителей надлежащими

U. S. Proposed Revision
Previous Joint Commission Decision #4

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

полномочиями, которые ими представляются в Совместную Комиссию к указанному сроку.

5. После проверки Комиссией полномочий представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций в Южной Корее, Комиссия созовет совместное заседание в Сеуле, на которое она пригласит вышеуказанных представителей. Глава Советской делегации будет председателем на этом заседании. Глава Американской делегации представит и раз'яснит вопросник /приложение А/*. На этом заседании представителям демократических партий и общественных организаций будут даны инструкции составить письменные ответы на вопросник, которые будут представлены в Совместную Комиссию в двух-недельный срок за подписью своих представителей.

6. После заседания в Сеуле Совместная Комиссия должна встретиться в Пхеньяне, где она повторит тот же процесс, указанный в пар. 5, в отношении представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций Северной Кореи. Председателем же на заседании в Пхеньяне будет Глава Американской делегации, а Глава Советской делегации представит и раз'яснит вопросник /приложение А/*

7. По возвращении Комиссии из Пхеньяна, каждому представителю политических партий и общественных организаций, упомянутому в пар. 4, будет предложено явиться перед Подкомиссией или соответствующими Подкомиссиями в назначенной время для представления ответов на вопросы, которые Подкомиссии могут найти нужным задать, или представления каких либо дополнительных соображений, относящихся к образованию Корейского Временного Правительства, которые их партии и организации сочтут уместными.

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*Решение Совместной Комиссии № 5

U.S.Proposed Revision
Previous Joint Commission Decision #4

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

8. В процессе изучения предложений корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций Северной и Южной Кореии, Совместная Комиссия и ее Подкомиссии могут, с общего согласия, опять пригласить на свои заседания в Сеуле, назначенных представителей партий и общественных организаций Северной и Южной Кореи, с которыми они могут найти нужным совещаться.

9. Совместная Комиссия, с одобрения Главы Комиссии каждой делегации, может пригласить других лиц по общему соглашению для совещания с Совместной Комиссией.

10. Совместная Комиссия представит соответствующим Подкомиссиям предложения и соображения корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций Северной и Южной Кореи для изучения и подготовки координированных ею предложений, для каковой цели должно быть создано необходимое число подкомитетов Подкомиссиями. Главы каждой делегации назначат советников, экспертов, технический персонал для работы в Подкомиссиях и подкомитетах.

11. Выработанные Подкомиссиями координированные предложения будут представлены на рассмотрение и одобрение Совместной Комиссии.

12. Демократические партии и общественные организации, как Северной так и Южной Кореи будут иметь равные права и возможности для консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

U.S. Proposed Revision
Previous Joint Commission Decision # 4

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

S E C R E T

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

JOINT COMMISSION DECISION NO. 4.

The Joint Commission established 20 March 1946 at Seoul, Korea, in accordance with Section III (Korea) of the Decision of the Communique of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, agreed upon the following points:

CONDITIONS FOR AND ORDER OF CONSULTATION WITH DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS.

1. The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declarations:

"We _____ declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow Decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely:

'The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state,
The creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and,
The earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.'

Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government;
Further, we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out by it with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision.

Signed _____

Representing the _____ Party or Organization"

2. In accordance with the decision of the Joint Soviet-American Commission concerning the conditions of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, Sub-Commission No. 1 will compile a composite list of approximately 30 of the most important Korean democratic parties and social organizations representative of the various schools of thought both of north and south Korea, taking into consideration their membership and insofar as possible the influence of these parties and organizations; and shall submit the list to the Joint Commission in Seoul for its approval.

For inclusion in the composite list, the following shall be submitted to the Commission: a list of democratic parties and social organizations, functioning in southern Korea, by the American Delegation; and a list of democratic parties and social organizations, functioning in northern Korea, by the Soviet Delegation.

3. Decision on paragraph 3 was suspended.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

4. Korean democratic parties and social organizations of north and south Korea, not included in the list indicated in paragraph 1, which fulfill the conditions for consultation published by the Commission, shall also be given the opportunity to present their views to the Joint Commission on the questions enumerated in paragraph 4.

The aforementioned parties and organizations shall direct their views to the headquarters of the Joint Commission in Seoul or in Pyongyang while the Commission is there. The letter containing their views shall be accompanied by a written declaration signed by the officials of the party or the organization in accordance with the conditions on consultation published by the Commission, as well as by a brief statement of the party's or organization's program and total number of members.

5. Following the verification by the Commission of the credentials of the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of south Korea, the Commission shall convene a joint meeting to which it shall invite such representatives. The head of the Soviet Delegation shall act as the chairman of this meeting in Seoul and the Chief of the American Delegation shall preside at an analogous meeting in Pyongyang. A communication worked out by, and in the name of the Commission, shall be presented at such a meeting by the Chief of the Delegation of the zone in which the meeting is taking place. The agenda for subsequent joint meetings of the Commission with the representatives of the parties and social organizations, shall be approved by the Commission.

a. Concerning the political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
b. Concerning the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the local organs of authority (Provisional Charter).

6. Following this, the Joint Commission shall depart for Pyongyang where it shall carry out with the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of north Korea all those steps listed in paragraph 4.

7. Having received the proposal of the Joint Commission, the democratic parties and social organizations of both south and north Korea shall discuss it in their central organs and with the representatives of their local organizations and shall conduct appropriate work among the population (mass meetings, session, etc.).

8. The suggestions and proposals worked out by each democratic party and social organization of north and south Korea shall be submitted to the Joint Commission in writing and under the signature of their representatives.

9; The Joint Commission shall transmit to the Subcommissions No. 2 and 3 the proposals and suggestions of the Korean democratic parties and social organizations of north and south Korea for study and preparation of coordinated proposals, for which purpose a necessary number of subcommittees shall be created by the subcommissions. The heads of the respective delegations shall appoint the advisors, experts, and technical personnel for the work in the subcommissions and subcommittees.

10. The Joint Commission shall consult individually with representatives of any Korean democratic party or social organization of north and south Korea from among those included in the list; and

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

will consult, at Seoul or Pyongyang, as it may see fit, and as mutually agreed by the heads of the delegations, with the representatives of any other democratic party or social organizations of north or south Korea which had submitted its suggestions to the Commission.

In the process of studying the proposals of the Korean democratic parties and social organizations and the working-out of their coordinated proposals for the Commission, the Subcommissions and Subcommittees may, subject to mutual agreement of the Chairmen of the corresponding subcommission, invite to their meetings representatives of parties and social organizations of north and south Korea with whom they may deem it necessary to converse or to elucidate some question of other.

11. The democratic parties and social organizations of north Korea shall send their representatives to Seoul to submit the elaborated proposals to the Commission. The Commission shall carry out analogous steps with respect to the proposals of the democratic parties and social organizations of north Korea in the same manner as with the proposals of the democratic parties and social organizations of south Korea.

12. The coordinated proposals worked out by the subcommission shall be submitted to the Joint Commission which shall examine these proposals and shall give its preliminary approval.

13. The Commission, at such time when it may see fit, shall convene one or several joint sessions with representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations of both south and north Korea and offer for discussion the questions enumerated in point 4, in a manner later to be established by the Commission.

14. Democratic parties and social organizations of both northern and southern Korea shall have equal rights and opportunities in consultation with the Joint Commission.

15. Following the discussion of proposals mentioned in paragraph 11 at the joint session, the Commission shall appoint a drafting committee which shall be given the necessary instructions concerning the compilation of the final text of the recommendations on the indicated questions. The text worked out by the drafting committee shall be approved by the Commission.

16. Following the approval of the texts of the recommendations submitted by the drafting committee, the Joint Commission shall proceed with the discussion of the questions pertaining to the composition of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Американская делегация
АМЕРИКАНСК -СОВЕТСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
Сеул, Корея

27 Мая 1947

Генералу Полковнику Т. . Штыкову
Главе Советской Делегации
Американско-Советской
СовместнойКомиссии
Сеул, Корея

Уважаемый Генерал Штыков:

Я прилагаю копию письма г-на Вильяма Х. Ньютона из газетной корпорации Скрипт-Ховард. Как вы видите из этого письма, американские корреспонденты желают сопровождать Американскую делегацию в поездках в Пхеньян для заседаний Совместной Комиссии для отчета в прессе тех новостей, связанных с заседаниями, которые будут разрешены для опубликования.

Я представляю это письмо вам с пожеланием вашего благоприятного рассмотрения. Ввиду того, что необходимо время для устройства поездки и других административных дел, ваш быстрый ответ очень желателен.

Примерно пятнадцать /15/ американских корреспондентов заинтересовано в таких поездках. Подробности, включая имена их и названия газет, будут представлены вам задолго до отправки в Пхеньян.

Искренно ваш,

Альберт Е. Браун
Генерал майор Армии С.Ш.
Глава Комиссии.

Копии: Архив Генерального Штаба
Г-ну Дж. Л. Стюарт, Отдел Общественной Информации
Г-ну Вильям Х. Ньютон, От. Общестенной Информации

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Председателю Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии

28 мая 1947

Поздравляем по поводу возобновления Совместной Комиссии. Мы верим, что Совместная Комиссия преуспеет в создании Об'единенного Демократического Корейского Правительства в согласии с Московским Решением.

Комитет Помощи Корейской Федерации Профсоюзов

Чун Хо Пенн
Вилльям Ли
Санг Рюп Пак
Лос Анжелес, Калифорния

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

13 June 1947.

Memorandum to: Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

SUBJECT : Work of the Joint Commission.

1. There are certain problems which must be solved by the Joint Commission irrespective of the type and composition of the provisional government established. These problems should be solved, at least in principle, at the earliest possible date. They include problems on which common agreement must be reached in order that the work of government now being performed by existing governments, North - South Korea, may be carried by the provisional government without loss of efficiency. Included are such problems as transportation, communications, finance, food collection and distribution, communications, etc. (See Enclosure 1 for clarification.)

2. In order that early and thorough consideration may be given to evolving plans pointing to solution of these problems, it is suggested that the Russian members of Sub-commission No. 3 meet with the American members and perfect an organization for and a method of proceeding to proper solutions of the problems listed and similar problems which may be involved in the overall consideration of the assumption by the provisional government of the work responsibility of the existing governments, North - South Korea.

3. It may be considered advantageous by you that these problems be discussed in a general manner by the Joint Commission prior to reference to Subcommission No. 3 for consideration. The American Delegation is prepared to assume the responsibility for proper performance of this task in such manner as you may suggest.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

Enclosure
(1) Suggested problems of government.

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SUGGESTED

PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED BY JOINT COMMISSION

I. TRANSPORTATION:
   1. Railways,
   2. Merchant Marine,
   3. Bus Lines.

II. COMMUNICATIONS:
   1. Telephone System,
   2. Telegraph,
   3. Postal Service.

III. FINANCE:
   1. Currency,
   2. Financial Institutions,
   3. Foreign Exchange.

IV. FOOD COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION.

V. COMMERCE:
   1. Price Levels.
      a. Price Controls,
      b. Relative supply levels in North and South.
   2. Customs Regulations,
   3. Import and Export Controls.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ
АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ.
Сеул, Корея.

13 Июня, 1947 г.

Памятная записка: Генерал-Полковнику Т. Ф. ШТЫКОВУ
Главе Советской Делегации
Американско-Советской Комиссии.
г. Сеул, Корея.

О : Работе Совместной Комиссии.

1. Имеются некоторые задачи, которые должны быть разрешены Совместной Комиссией в независимости от типа и состава создающегося Временного Правительства. Эти задачи должны быть разрешены, по крайней мере, в принципе, в возможно кратчайший срок. Они включают задачи, по которым обоюдное соглашение должно быть достигнуто, для того, чтобы работа правительства, которая в данный момент проводится существующими правительствами Северной и Южной Кореи, могла быть продолжена более продуктивно Временным Правительством. К эти задачи включены транспорт, связь, финансы, сбор и распределение пищевых продуктов, средства передвижения и сообщения и т. д. /Смотреть приложение № 1 для раз'яснения/.

2. Для того, чтобы скорейшее и полное внимание могло быть уделено развитию планов для разрешения этих задач, было предложено, чтобы русские члены Подкомиссии № 3 встретились бы с американскими членами и усовершенствовали бы организацию и метод работы для соответствующего решения перечисленных задач и подобных проблем, которые могут появиться при всестороннем изучении процесса принятия Временным Правительством от существующих Правительств Северной и Южной Кореи их ответственности и обязанностей.

3. Вы может быть сочтете желательным, чтобы эти задачи были обсуждены в общих чертах Совместной Комиссией до передачи их Подкомиссии № 3 для обсуждения. Американская Делегация готова принять ответственность за надлежащее выполнение этой задачи согласно Вашему предложению.

Альберт Н. Браун
Генерал-Майор
Американской Армии
Глава Американской Делегации

Приложение
/1/ Предложенные задачи правительства.

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ПРЕДЛОЖЕННЫЕ ЗАДАЧИ ДЛЯ РАССМОТРА СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИЕЙ.

ТРАНСПОРТ:

1. Железные дороги,
2. Торговый флот,
3. Автобусные линии.

СВЯЗЬ:

1. Телефонная система,
2. Телеграф,
3. Почта.

ФИНАНСЫ:

1. Денежная валюта,
2. Финансовые учреждения,
3. Иностранный денежный курс.

СБОР И РАСПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ПИЩЕВЫХ ПРОДУКТОВ.

ТОРГОВЛЯ:

1. Уровень цен.
   а. Контроль цен,
   б. Относительные уровни снабжения Севера и Юга.
2. Правила таможни,
3. Контроль импорта и экспорта.

Приложение /1/

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СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ
В СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ.

" 23" июня 1947 г.
г.Сеул.

ГЛАВЕ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
В СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ.
Генерал-майору Альберту Л.ГРЕЙН.

Уважаемый генерал ГРЕЙН !

Сегодня, в 10.30, недалеко от ворот бывшего Генконсульства СССР в Сеуле группа корейцев забросала камнями и землей автомашину, в которой ехал к месту работы во дворец ДУК СУ ответственный секретарь Советской делегации полковник ЛЕВЧЕНКО.

В 12.30 полковник ЛЕВЧЕНКО, возвращаясь из дворца ДУК СУ на территорию быв.Генконсульства СССР в Сеуле, вторично подверг[ся] нападению со стороны группы демонстрантов, которые бросали в автомашину камни и землю.

Примерно, в 11.40 автомашина, в которой ехали член Советской делегации ТИХОМИРОВ Г.М.и советник Советской делегации ЛЕВЧЕНКО А.А., при въезде со двора дворца ДУК СУ, была окружена группой пьяных демонстрантов, которые вели себя весьма враждебно и начали угрожать жизни ТИХОМИРОВА и ЛЕВЧЕНКО, безопасность которых была обеспечена только благодаря энергичным мерам, принятым американскими солдатами.

В 12.30, в 250 метрах от ворот быв.Генконсульства СССР в Сеуле, автомашина, в которой ехал переводчик Советской делегации К.К. ТИХ ОЛГ, также подверглась забрасыванию камнями со стороны группы корейских демонстрантов.

Считаю нужным добавить, что в местах, где были совершены упомянутые действия против сотрудников Советской делегации, при-

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существовала корейская полиция, которая не предприняла мер к предотвращению подобного рода безобразий, а, наоборот, корейские полицейские открыто смеялись и своим безучастным отношением к происходившему лишь подбодряли распоясавшихся реакционеров и хулиганов.

Заявляю протест по поводу провокационных выпадок по отношению к сотрудникам Советской делегации со стороны разнуздавшейся реакции и террористов.

Вместе с тем прошу Вас, генерал ПРАУТ, как главу американской делегации, довести о вышеизложенном до сведения американского военного командования с тем, чтобы были приняты необходимые меры к недопущению повторения подобных явлений в будущем.

Уважающий Вас

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
В СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ
Генерал-полковник

Т.Ф.ШТЫКОВ.

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 June 1947

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov
Chief Commissioner, Soviet Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Shtikov:

With regard to our conference of 23 June 1947, the American Delegation agrees to your proposals for the "Plan of Work in Pyongyang During the Period 30 June - 3 July 1947."

In connection with the proposed agenda for the meeting of 2 July 1947, the American members of Subcommission No. 1 will make every effort to complete their work in order that final action on the lists can be taken in Pyongyang. However, in the event this work is not completed, it is doubtful whether this matter can be agreed to at Pyongyang as the full American membership of Subcommission No. 1 and their records will not be available.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General U.S. Army
Chief Commissioner

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Американская Делегация
АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
Сеул, Корея

24 июня 1947

Генерал-полковнику Т. Ф. Штыкову
Главе Советской Делегации
Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии
Сеул, Корея.

Уважаемый генерал Штыков!

Ссылаясь на наше заседания 23 июня 1947 года, Американская делегация соглашается с Вашим предложением о "Плане работы в Пхеньяне в течение периода времени от 30 июня до 3 июля 1947 года".

В соответствии с предполагаемой повесткой дня для заседания 2 июля 1947 года, Американские члены Подкомиссии № 1 приложат все усилия к завершению своей работы, чтобы окончательные действия по спискам были бы предприняты в Пхеньяне. В том же случае, если эта работа не будет закончена, то мало вероятия, что соглашение по этому вопросу будет достигнуто в Пхеньяне, ввиду отсутствия там полного состава Американских членов Подкомиссии № 1 и их документов.

Альберт Е. Браун
Генерал майор Армии С. Ш.
Глава Американской Делегации.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

25 June 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief of the Soviet Delegation,
USSR - US Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 23rd June 1947 which confirms the expression of your indignation in connection with certain provocative action of irresponsible Korean youths which you made orally to me the afternoon of June 23rd, 1947. As I stated to you at that time, I regretted to hear of the discourteous conduct of these young hoodlums which you for the first time brought to my attention.

The information which you furnished me the afternoon of June 23rd, which in substance covers two of the three instances of molestation by stoning or threats against the occupants of automobiles bearing members or attaches of the Soviet Delegation, was promptly reported by me to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea. The Commanding General, USAFIK, took immediate positive action to avoid recurrence of similar disgraceful actions. He regrets as strongly as I do the discourtesy shown to you and the members of your staff.

Very truly yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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Американская Делегация
АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ
Сеул, Корея

25 июня 1947 г.

Генерал-полковнику Т. Ф. Штыкову
Главе Советской Делегации
Советско-Американской Совместной Комиссии
Сеул, Корея.

Уважаемый Генерал Штыков!

Подтверждаю получение Вашего письма от 23 июня 1947 г., выражающее Ваше возмущение по поводу некоторых провокационных актов безответственных корейских юношей, о которых Вы заявили мне устно после полудня 23 июня 1947 г. Как я заявил Вам в то время, мне было неприятно слышать о неблаговидном поведении молодых хулиганов, о котором Вы впервые довели до моего сведения.

Информация, переданная Вами мне после полудня 23 июня, относительно двух или трех случаев бросания камней и угроз по адресу находящихся в автомобилях представителей Советской Делегации, была немедленно препровождена мною Главнокомандующему Американскими Войсками в Корее. Главнокомандующий Войсками С.Ш. в Корее принял немедленные и решительные меры к пресечению повторения подобных неблаговидных действий. Он, также как и я, глубоко сожалеет о невежливости, проявленной в отношении Вас и членов Вашего Штаба.

Уважающий Вас,

АЛЬБЕРТ Е. БРАУН,
Генерал-майор Армии С. Ш.
Глава Американской Делегации

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By NARS, Date

Gen Shtikov's speech,
30 June 1947

Генерал КОРОТКОВ,

Генерал БРАУН,

Господа!

От имени Советской делегации я искренне приветствую генерал БРАУН и Американскую делегацию, прибывшую в Северную Корею для работы Совместной Комиссии в гор. Пхеньян.

Я передаю от имени Советской делегации сердечный привет народу Северной Кореи.

Пришел долгожданный день для народа Северной Кореи, которого он ждал с нетерпением. Совместная Комиссия начинает свою работу в гор. Пхеньяне.

Прошло немного больше месяца с момента возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии. За это время имеется определенный прогресс. Комиссия разработала и опубликовала ряд важнейших документов, на основе которых проходят подготовительные мероприятия к созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Сейчас работа Комиссии находится на такой стадии, когда корейский народ широко обсуждает опубликованные вопросники и вырабатывает по ним свои ответы и предложения о форме будущего Правительства, о правах и демократических свободах, о целях и задачах, над которыми должно будет работать будущее Временное Правительство.

Корейский народ, истомившийся за 36 лет от японской невыносимой эксплоатации, поирания его политических прав и свобод, сейчас, как никогда, проявляет политическую активность, инициативу и творческий энтузиазм в возрождении своего государства.

За время, прошедшее с момента освобождения Кореи союзными войсками, на севере Кореи корейским народом проделана большая работа по восстановлению своей государственности, своей национальной экономики и своей национальной культуры. Созданные на основе всеобщего, равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании, местные органы власти своей деятельностью показывают свою глубокую демократичность.

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Корейский народ с неослабным внимание следит за работой Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация может констатировать тот факт, что подавляющее большинство корейского населения как на севере, так и на юге Кореи, доброжелательно отчосится в Совместной Комиссии, желает успеха в ее работе и стремится оказать всяческую помощь. Ярким доказательством этой поддержки является подача демократическими партиями и общественными организациями декларации и заявления о желании консультировать Совместную Комиссию при выполнении ею Московского решения Трех Министров Иностранных Дел о Корее. Совместная Комиссия получает огромное количество писем и приветствий как от отдельных граждан Кореи, так и от демократических партий и общественных организаций. Правда, находятся еще такие партии и их деятели, которые до сих пор продолжают быть антагонистичными по отношению к выполнению Московского решения и продолжают активную борьбу против Московского решения. Мы уверены, что эти незначительные ракционные группы и их деятели не могут помешать осуществлению Московского решения и созданию, на его основе, подлинно демократического Правительства, ибо их желаниям противостоит желание абсолютного большинства корейского народа.

Московское решение предусматривает помощь и содействие Корее в ее национальном и государственном возрождении, развитие Кореи по демократическому пути и восстановление национальной экономики и национальной культуры корейского народа.

Московское решение, подписанное тремя великими союзниками - СССР, США, Великобританией, а впоследствии и Китайской Республикой, гарантирует Корее независимость и суверенитет.

Советская делегация в Совместной Комиссии заверяет народ Северной Кореи, что она приложит все усилия к тому, чтобы Московское решение о Корее было в точности осуществлено.

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Gen. Korotkov's speech 30 June

ГЕНЕРАЛ БРАУН,

Господа!

От имени советского командования и лично от себя я сердечно приветствую генерал-майора БРАУН и весь состав Американской делегации, прибывшей в Пхеньян.

Я с большим удовлетворением приветствую Совместную Советско-Американскую Комиссию, на которую возложена почетная и ответственная задача по выполнению исторических решений Московского совещания Трех Министров Иностранных Дел о Корее.

За время, прошедшее с момента возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии, сделан серьезный шаг на пути к образованию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Комиссия много и плодотворно потрудилась над выработкой вопросников по организации Временного Правительства и его политической платформы , а также порядка консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

Мне приятно отметить, что Совместная Комиссия после успешной работы в Сеуле, приступает к выполнению важнейшей задачи по проведению консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями Северной Кореи.

Свободолюбивый корейский народ, освобожденный союзниками от ига японского империализма, с нетерпением и великой надеждой ждет того торжественного и радостного для него дня, когда будет образовано Временное Корейское Демократическое Правительство. Этой первоочередной задаче - образованию Временного Правительства - должны быть подчинены усилия Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии. Корейский народ твердо верит, что Корея станет самостоятельным и независимым государством и войдет равноправным членом в семью свободолюбивых народов мира. Мировая общественность с неослабным вниманием следит за работой Совместной Комиссии по осуществлению Московского решения о Корее. Это налагает на Вас еще большую ответственность за всю проводимую Вами работу.

От всей души желаю Вам успеха в выполнении возложенных на Вас задач.

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Corrected trans ation
as delivered, Gen. Brown's
addres , 30 June

РЕЧЬ ГЕНЕРАЛА БРАУНА В ПХЕНЬЯНЕ

Генерал Коротков, генерал Штыков и господа!

Я очень рад приветствовать представителя нашего великого Советского союзника, генерала Короткова. Лично от себя, и от имени Американской делегации, выражаю Вам, генерал Коротков, как Командующему Советскими Войсками в Северной Корее, и генерал-полковнику Штыкову, как главе Советской делегации Совместной Комиссии, признательность Американской делегации за сердечный прием и гостеприимство, оказанные нам.

Американская делегация приветствует народ Северной Кореи. Мы давно ждали случая встретиться с вами. Мы прибыли в Северную Корею, чтобы в сотрудничестве с делегацией нашего великого Советского союзника осуществить первый шаг задания Совместной Комиссии на пути к выполнению обещания Великих Держав, что Корея будет свободна и независима. Американская делегация ~~счастлива~~, рада что Совместной Комиссии дана была возможность вновь начать свою работу в соответствии с решением министра Иностранных Дел Советского Союза г-на Молотова, и Государственного Секретаря Американского народа генерала Маршала. Согласно этому решению те, кто подписал заявление о консультации, ~~как было изложено~~ содержащееся в Совместном Коммюнике № 5 от 17 апр. 1946 года, имеют право на первоначальную консультацию с Совместной Комиссией. Решение, достигнутое министрами, ~~признает основное~~ признает принцип, что ~~права~~ каждый человек имеет право свободно выражать свои взгляды вне зависимости от того, расходятся они или нет со взглядами других. В Южной Корее Совместная Комиссия уже встретила ~~свыше~~ более четырехсот представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций, и ~~начертила~~ изъяснила им задание Совместной Комиссии, ее цели и порядок устной консультации.

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Эти четыреста представителей политических партий и общественных организаций выражают все оттенки и степени политической мысли в Южной Корее. Одно из главных затруднений, с которым встретится Совместная Комиссия при выполнении первой фазы своего задания, тоесть создание Временного Правительства, будет примирение различных точек зрения представителей политических партий и общественных организаций. Так как невозмсжно следовать политике 400 различных политических партий и организаций, то задачей Совместной Комиссии является слияние различных взглядов в одно общее политическое направление. ~~В то время, как~~ Хотя это является трудной задачей, есть большая надежда для будущего Кореи в самом факте, что многие партии и отдельные лица заинтересованы в будущем Кореи, как это видно из большого количества тех, которые выразили желание быть допущенными к консультации. Надо надеяться, что интерес проявленный корейцами в Северной Корее будет равняться по своей значительности интересу проявленному корейцами в Южной Корее. Существующие трудности Совместной Комиссии будут еще более увеличены, когда перед ней встанет значительный ряд других разнрречивых мнений. Однако, если полное и свободно выраженное мнение будет проявлено лидерами политических партий и общественных ~~партий~~ организаций Северной Кореи, и их взгляды будут присоединены ко взглядам представленными лидерами партий и организаций Южной Кореи, то в распоряжении Совместной Комиссии будут иметься исчерпывающие данные, на которых можно будет основать здоровое и ~~вечное~~ прочное правительство. Вот почему мы с большим удовольствием предвкушаем ~~подобную~~ такую-же встречу с лидерами демократических партий и общественных ~~партий~~ организаций Северной Кореи.

Корейский народ всей Кореи, освобожденный от японского ига усилиями союзных держав, будет теперь, согласно Московскому решению и ~~последнему~~ недавнему решению, достигнутому двумя министрами, иметь возможность свободного выражения своих взглядов Совместной Комиссии о желаемом ими будущем Временном Корейском Демократическом Правительстве и о будущем образе работы этого правительства.

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Несмотря на прогресс, достигнутый в выполнении условий Московского решения по настоящее время, многое еще остается быть сделанным. С помощью представителей Политических партий и организаций Северной и Южной Кореи, об'единенных своей решимостью работать с Совместной Комиссией, Комиссия будет в состоянии быстро и успешно продолжать выполнение первой фазы своей задачи, т. е. создание Временного Демократического Правительства для об'единенной Кореи.

Разрешите мне сейчас представить Вам членов Американской делегации:

Министра БАНС
Генерала ВЭКЕРЛИНГ
Г-на ОВЕН Т. ДЖОНС
Полковника ЛОРЕНСА Дж. ЛИНКОЛН
Г-на ДЖОЗЕФА ДЖЭЙКОБС
Г-на КЛАЙДА Б. САРДЖЕНТ

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By NARS, Date

ПЛАН РАБОТЫ В ПХЕНЬЯНЕ

на период с 30 июня по 3 июля 1947 года.

I. Прибытие Американской делегации в Пхеньян 30 июня в 10.00.

2. Торжественное открытие совещания 30 июня в 14.00.

П о р я д о к д н я :

I/ Приветствие Командующего советскими войсками в Северной Корее.

2/ Выступление главы Американской делегации генерал-майора БРАУНА.

3/ Выступление главы Советской делегации генерал-полковника ШТЫКОВА.

На заседании присутствуют:

I/ Состав Советской и Американской делегаций по утвержденному списку.

2/ Представители советского командования.

3/ Представители Президиума Народного Собрания и Народного Комитета Северной Кореи.

4/ Представители прессы.

3. Вечером 30 июня в 19.30 - концерт ансамбля песни и пляски Советской армии /по особой программе/.

4. I июля в 14.00 совещание Совместной Комиссии с представителями демократических партий и общественных организаций Северной Кореи.

П о в е с т к а д н я

I/ Заседание открывается исполнением трех государственных гимнов - корейский
советский
американский

2/ Генерал БРАУН открывает заседание и представляет генерала ШТЫКОВА.

3/ Речь генерала ШТЫКОВА - по-русски
по-корейски
по-английски

4/ Генерал БРАУН приглашает собравшихся представителей познакомиться с главами Советской и Американской делегаций.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

5/ В то время, как собравшиеся представители здоровкаются с главами Советской и Американской делегаций, медленно играет музыка.

5. 2 июля - заседание Совместной Комиссии.

Порядок дня:

1/ Утверждение списка партий и организаций, с которыми будет консультироваться Комиссия.

2/ Утверждение списка представителей для устной консультации.

3/ Утверждение порядка проведения устной консультации.

Вечером в 19.30 - концерт-показ корейского искусства /по особой программе/.

6. 3 июля делегации работают по своим планам.

7. Вопрос о возвращении делегаций в Сеул согласовывается между главами делегаций в Пхеньяне.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMENDED

11 июля 1947 г.

ПРЕСС-КОММЮНИКЕ ГЛАВЫ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ СОВЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ

40-ое заседание Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии состоялось в 1[illegible] часов, 10 июля 1947 года, во дворце ТукуСу, Сеул, Корея. Председательствовал Генерал Штыков.

Генерал-лейтенант Чарльз К. Гайднер, личный представитель г-на Премьер-министра Атли, присутствовал на 40-м заседании, состоявшимся после полудня 9 июля, в качестве гостя Совместной Комиссии.

Совместная Комиссия продолжала обсуждать разногласие, возникшее на 37-ом заседании и продолжавшееся на 38, 39, 40 и 41 заседаниях, по поводу списка партий и организаций, приглашаемых для первоначальной консультации, а именно:

I. Общая позиция Советской делегации:

1. Партии и организации, подходящие под ниже перечисленные категории, не должны быть включены в список для первоначальной консультации, а именно:

а. Те, которые не рассматриваются ею как общественные организации,

б. Районные и другие чисто местные организации, и

в. Те, которые по ее мнению не намериваются поддерживать полностью Московское Решение, в особенности члены Коми-

1. Общая позизия Американской делегации:

1. Предложения Советской делегации противоречат:

а. Параграфу 1-му трех принципов Министров Иностранных дел, на основании которых было достигнуто соглашение о возобновлении работы Совместной Комиссии: "Подписание Декларации в Коммюнике № 5 будет считаться как выражение доброго намерения и уважения в полной поддержке Московского Решения, и даст право подписавшимся партиям и организациям участие в предва-

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

тета по борьбе с опекой, и другие подобные организации.

2. Особые возражения Советской делегации:

1. Промышленные, коммерческие и производственные организации, вроде Коммерческой Палаты, Промышленного Медицинского Института, Юридического Исследовательского Института, Общества Счетоводов и обществ, организованных на предмет изучения политики и экономики, фактически не являются общественными организациями в том смысле, как слово "общественный" употребляется в Московском Решении.

рительной консультации."

5. Параграфу № 5 Решения Совместной Комиссии, опубликованному в Коммюнике № 11, обоюдно согласованному и подписанному Главой каждой делегации:

"Подкомиссия № 1, по получению заявлений для участия в консультации, составит список всех демократических партий и общественных организаций и их назначенных представителей Северной и Южной Кореи, подписавших декларацию..."

3. Особые возражения Американской делегации:

1. а. Московское Решение не уточняет термина "общественная организация".

б. Советская делегация отказала в просьбе Американской делегации об уточнении терминов в Решениях Совместных Комиссиях.

в. Американская делегация представила заявление Советской делегации до окончательного решения, что после совместного утверждения Решения № 1 Совместной Комиссии, Американская делегация не согласится внести изменения в решение после окончательного согласования по нему. Поэтому термин "общественная организация" должен переводиться так, как он определяется в словарях всего мира.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

. Партия или организация местного характера, не имеющая главного зонального отделения, не подлежит консультации.

2. Районные и другие чисто местные организации не исключаются ни какой оговоркой ни Московского Решения, ни соглашением Маршала - олотова, ни Решением Совместной Комиссии. ля того, чтобы исключить мелкие организации, Американская елегация несколько раз предлагала ограничить устную консультацию для партий и организаций с числом членов свыше 1,00 или с любой иной подходящей ци рой, предложенной Советской елегацией. то предложение, однако, не было принято Советской елегацией.

3. оброе намерение партии или организации, подписавшей декларацию и подавшей заявление для участия в консультации, обязуясь таким образом поддержать Московское Решение, оспаривается Советской елегацией, если таковая партия или организация продолжает состоять членом в омитете по борь-бе с опекой, или же в подобной организации. аковая партия или организация допускается к консультации, если она публично выходит из состава Комитета по борьбе с опекой или подобной организации.

5. а. Партии, состоящие членами омитета по борьбе с опекой или подобных организаций, определенно подлежат первоначальной консультации по соглашению Маршала- олотова, если они подали заявлени для уч стия в консультации и подписали требуемую декларацию.

б. Они продолжают иметь право на консультацию если и до тех пор, пока они не будут исключены по взаимному соглашению после обвинения их по пар. № 3 решения, достигнутого Министрами Иностранных ел, а именно - "лица, партии и общественные организации, приглашен-

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ные для участия в консультации с Совместной Комиссии, не должны, после подписания декларации, содержащейся в Коммюнике № 5, разжигать или подстрекать к активным выступлениям против работы Совместной Комиссии, или против одной из Союзных держав, или против выполнения Московского Решения. Те лица, партии и общественные организации, которые, после подписания декларации, содержащейся в Коммюнике № 5, будут разжигать или подстрекать к активным выступлениям против работы Совместной Комиссии, или против одной из Союзных держав, или против выполнения Московского Решения, будут исключены из дальнейшей консультации с Совместной Комиссии. Решение относительно исключения таковых лиц, партий и общественных организаций будет принято по соглашению Совместной Комиссией.'

4. Тот факт, что партия имеет право на консультацию в соответствии с Соглашением Министров, опубликованном в Решении Совместной Комиссии, еще не значит, что она будет допущена к консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

4. Произвольная линия различия, проведенная Советской делегацией между "правом на выбор для консультации" и "допуском к консультации", сводит на нет решения, достигнутые двумя Министрами /приведенные выше в пар. 1 а./ и Совместной Комиссией.

5. Для включения партии в список для участия в консультации, она должна быть приемлема

5. Первоначальное соглашение, принятое г-м Молотовым, и вписанное в Решения Совместной

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

обеим делегациям.

Комиссии, определенно указывает, что все партии и общественные организации, подписавшие заявления для участия в консультации, имеют право и должны быть допущены к консультации. Возражение Советской делегации является попыткой установить произвольную силу вето над консультацией, на что указывает желательный ныне способ работы Советской делегации. Ни одно согласованное решение не имеет условия, которое допускает подобную силу вето.

Разногласия, указанные выше, заключают в себе два основных положения:

Первое положение таково, что может ли одна делегация пользоваться односторонне властью вето и исключать из участия в консультации любую партию или организацию, не одобренную ею. Советская делегация желает пользоваться таковой властью вето. Американская делегация утверждает, что это является произвольной позицией и противоречит соглашению Министров Иностранных дел. Дальше, это является непрактичным для применения, так как может быть использовано для исключения партий и общественных организаций до такой степени, что консультация не явится справедливым показателем мнения корейского народа. Позиция Соединенных Штатов такова, что исключение из участия в консультации может быть только по взаимному соглашению, как особенно точно сказано в письмах Маршала - Молотова.

Американская делегация много раз предлагала систематически проверить целиком весь список заявителей и пересмотреть все возражения любой делегации по поводу различных партий и организаций с тем, чтобы выяснить, какие партии должны быть исключены по взаимному соглашению.

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The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly refused such proposals.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Второе положение касается принадлежности партии или организации к так называемому Комитету по борьбе с опекой или к другой подобной организации. Советская делегация не выставила определенных обвинений против какой либо партии в том, что она действительно разжигала или подстрекала к активной оппозиции по отношению к Совместной Комиссии или к Московскому Решению после подписания Декларации, но произвольно обвинила все входящие в его состав партии в дурных намерениях, и считает их всех виновными, даже прежде чем они были обвинены. Позиция Соединенных Штатов такова, что никакая партия или общественная организация не может быть признана виновной в дурных намерениях до тех пор, пока она не будет обвинена и найдена виновной в действиях, которые действительно подстрекают и разжигают активную оппозицию по отношению к Совместной Комиссии, Московскому Решению или любому из Союзников.

Совместная Комиссия продолжает заседать в попытке разрешить эти основные разногласия.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Проект
15 Июля.

СЕКРЕТНО

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

На заседаниях Совместной Комиссии в 1946 году Советская Делегация настаивала на том, что те корейцы, которые не поддерживают полностью Московское решение, не будут допущены к консультации с Совместной Комиссией. Она даже настаивала на том, что даже одно возражение против только одного слова Московского решения уже являлось полной не-поддержкой Московского решения. Командующий Советскими силами в Северной Корее следовал этому утверждению до своего письма от 28-го Февраля 1947 года в ответ на письмо командующего Американскими силами в Южной Корее от 24 декабря 1946 года. Во время обмена писем между командующими была сделана попытка выработать формулу которая определила бы и ограничила возражения против Московского решения, переступив которые, корейцы лишались бы права консультации с Совместной Комиссией. Командующий Советскими войсками в Северной Корее в своем письме от 26 ноября 1946 года выработал формулу для этого вопроса. Командующий войсками Соединенных Штатов в Южной Корее в своем письме от 24 декабря 1946 года предложил некоторые изменения к предложенной формуле. Этот вопрос разбирался двумя Министрами, и они согласились принять формулу, предложенную командующим войсками Соединенных Штатов в Южной Корее в его письме от 24 декабря 1946 года. Согласно этой формуле Корейский представитель политической партии или социальной организации, каковая партия или организация подписала заявление о консультации, может свободно выразить свое мнение публично или частным образом относительно Московского решения, будущему образованию его правительства, или любые слова, фразы или мысли касательно ним этого, принимая во внимание что не будет подстрекать или разжигать активную оппозицию против Московского решения или против любого из блюзников.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СЕКРЕТНО

Глава Советской Делегации в продолжении последних недель пытался последовательно вернуться к позиции прошлого года. Он,очевидно, не учел усилий двух командующих в Корее, приложенных для разрешения этого затруднения, как и решения, достигнутого двумя Министрами, которое, в сущности, разрешило это затруднение, если только ему следовать точно. В действительности жн, на заседании Совместной Подкомиссии № 1 28 мая 1947 года Советский представитель господин Тункин сделал заявление, что Советская Делегация не согласится на консультацию ни с одним корейцем, который не поддерживает полностью Московское решение и каждый параграф этого решения. Хотя это заявление и не идет так далеко, как намерение Советской Делегации быть против тех, кто не соглашается ни с одним словом, заключенным в Московском решении, оно все же идет так далеко назад от соглашения двух Министров, и фактически уничтожает ценность этого соглашения, возвращая Советскую Делегацию к ее первоначальной позиции, принятой в мае 1946 года.

Московское решение составлено таким образом, что решительно каждое условие,заключенное в нем, подлежит самой широкой интерпретации. Но есть одно слово, которому дано пристрастное определение - это слово "опека". Московское решение определяет опеку, как "помощь и поддержка". В дальнейшем она гарантирует корейскому народу независимость. Корейский народ - гордая раса. В течение сорока лет они находились под японским владычеством. Вполне естественно, что корейский народ [redacted] жаждет полной и окончательной независимости. Корейский народ естественно боится, что предлагая им помощ и поддержку, как обусловлено Московским решением, попытка будет сделана для контроля правительства страны и для задержания или уничтожения их независимости. Вероятно, что контроль будет необходим. Тем не менее Московское

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

решение ясно предначертало размер этого контроля, поскольку он требуется, чтобы провести и успешно нужную помощь и поддержку. Оказанная помощь и поддержка одинаково ограничена только до необходимости заверения, что Корея, в положении периода помощи и поддержки, вырастет полностью в свободную и независимую нацию. Вполне естественно, что так как точный размер помощи и содействия, которые будут оказаны, не может быть определен, что у корейцев имеются различные идеи по интерпретации этого пункта Московского решения. Имея эти идеи, естественно что они хотят выразить их. Также вполне естественно, что им желательно выразить свой протест против какого либо вмешательства в суверенитет их страны. На этом праве каждого свободного человека выражать свои мысли частным образом или в обществе, не боясь быть исключенным из консультации, Американское правительство настаивала неукоснительно, ведя свою работу с Советским правительством по поводу образования Временного Правительства для Кореи. Это тот принцип, на котором Советские власти согласились после почти целого года обмена мнений. Это тот принцип, который глава Советской Делегации и сама Советская Делегация стараются ныне уничтожить, отвергая таким образом соглашение, подписанное их Министром и их собственное подписанное соглашение в совместном решении № 12.

Американская Делегация не считает выражение оппозиции против "опеки", как разжигание и подстрекание активной оппозиции Московского решения. Московское решение является широким документом, который прямым заявлением или подразумеваемым покрывает все условия, нужные для создания и развития правительства над всей об'единенной Кореей. Как было сказано раньше каждый лояльный кореец жаждет независимости для своей страны. Корейский народ приветствует возможность закрепить эту независимость по Московскому решению. Они боятся и не верят только одной мысли этого решения - неизвестного смысла слова "опеки". Московское решение выражает смысл этого документа в параграфе 1-ом - т.е. " восстановить Корею как независимое государство; соз-

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

дать условия для развития страны на демократических принципах и возможно скорую ликвидацию пагубных результатов длительного японского господства в Корее". Нет сомнения, что те, кто писал это, не имели намерения, включением в параграф 3 слова "опека", нарушить условия всего документа. Как таким образом дискуссии и выражение мнений по поводу вымышленного или преувеличенного значения этого слова могут считаться, как оппозиция этому документу? Таковое утверждение не имеет никакой подкладки.

Американская Делегация не считает, что состояние политической партии или общественной организации в Комитете по Борьбе с Опекой или любой подобной организацией, является препятствием для ее допущения к консультации с Совместной Комиссией. Вполне естественно, что политические партии и общественные организации должны соединяться вместе в комитеты для разбора и обсуждения той помощи и поддержки, которая будет оказана их стране, и должны называть себя комитетами по борьбе с опекой или другими подобными именами. Постольку поскольку эти комитеты ограничивают свои действия свободным выражением мнения и не доходят до разжигания и подстрекания активной оппозиции, им разрешается выражение своей оппозиции по соглашению наших Министров.

Как известно, параграф 3 Московского решения предписывает Совместной Комиссии задание при участии Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и корейских демократических организаций выработать также мероприятия для помощи и поддержки /опека/ политического, экономического и общественного прогресса корейского народа, развитие демократического самоуправления и учреждения национальной независимости Кореи. Как может Совместная Комиссия ожидать, чтобы любой кореец оставался молчаливым в этом важном вопросе и явился какой либо помощью для Совместной Комиссии в это время когда она должна решить и разрешить свою ответственность в требовании параграфа 3-го Московского решения. Совместная Комиссия недавно разослала по всей Корее приглашения всем корейцам выразить свободно свои

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

мнения по поводу ■ образования своего правительства, его положения и платформы. Это приглашение корейскому народу подумать, обсудить и представить ■ свои взгляды на будущее Кореи. После того как будет образовано Временное правительство, одной из самых жизненных и важных тем обсуждений с точки зрения корейского народа является опека. Что пытается сделать Советская делегация? Загнать патриотических корейцев до точки фактического разжигания и подстрекания активной оппозиции, с тем, чтобы они были бы лишены консультации с этой комиссией, или они на самом деле идут в добром намерении в попытке восстановления Временного Правительства и корейской независимости по условию Московского решения? Собираются ли они следовать подписанному соглашению, достигнутому их Министрами?

Существуют различные формы опеки. Та, которая применяется Об'единенными Нациями, является формой известной по всему миру. До присоединения Кореи к Японии, последняя старалась сделать вид, что она применяет другую форму, теперь ненавидимую и которую боятся все лояльные корейцы. Опека, как она определяется Московским решением, неизвестна и не будет известна до тех пор, пока ее определение не будет выработано согласно Московскому решению. Когда корейцы говорят, что они протестуют против опеки, то они протестуют против воображаемого образа или против ненавистного японского образа, но не против действительного. Совместная Комиссия должна приложить все усилия, чтобы успокоить страхи корейцев, воспитать их и направить к правильному пониманию этого выражения и методам, которые будут использованы для применения его, а не вынести им приговор без выслушивания их и без лишения их должного участия в том, что является для них наиболее важным интересом их жизни - участия в свободном и независимом правительстве для своей страны.

Американская делегация приглашает Советскую Делегацию присоединиться с ней в искренней и честной усилии создать временное правительство над всей об'единенной Кореей, как предусмотрено Московским решением, и таким образом показать всему миру, что две великих державы могут бескорыстно работать вместе

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СЕКРЕТНО

в интересах маленькой, слабой и зависимой нации.

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СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЕ
23 Июля 1947

ПЛАН РАБОТЫ В ПХЕНЬЯНЕ В ПЕРИОД ВРЕМЕНИ ОТ 30 ИЮНЯ ПО 3 ИЮЛЯ, 1947.

1. Приезд Американской Делегации в Пхеньян в 10:00 часов, 30 Июня.
2. Торжественное открытие заседания в 14:00 часов, 30 Июня.

ПОВЕСТКА ДНЯ.

/1/ Приветствие Советским Главнокомандующим в Северной Корее.
/2/ Речь Главы Американской Делегации, Генерала-Майора Браун.
/3/ Речь Главы Советской Делегации, Генерала-Полковника Штыкова.

Следующие лица присутствуют на заседании:

/1/ Члены Американской и Советской Делегаций, согласно ранее утвержденному списку.
/2/ Представители Советского Командования.
/3/ Представители Президиума Народного Собрания и Народного Комитета Северной Кореи.
/4/ Представители Прессы.

3. Выступление певцов и танцоров Советской Армии, специальная программа, 19:30, 30 Июня.
4. Совместное заседание Совместной Комиссии с представителями демократических партий и общественных организаций Северной Кореи, 14:00, 1-го Июля.

ПОВЕСТКА ДНЯ.

/1/ Заседание открывается исполнением Национальных Гимнов: Корейского, Советсткого, Американского.
/2/ Генерал Браун открывает заседание и представляет Генерала Штыкова.
/3/ Речь Генерала Штыкова на Русском, Корейском и Английском языках.
/4/ Генерал Браун приглашает присутствующую группу представителей встретить Глав Советской и Американской Делегаций.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

/5/ Во время представления Главам Делегаций представителей, играет музыка.

5. 2 Июля, Заседание Совместной Комиссии.

ПОВЕСТКА ДНЯ.

/1/ Утверждение списка партий и организаций, с которыми Комиссия будет консультировать.

/2/ Утверждение списка представителей для устной консультации.

/3/ Утверждение порядка проведения устной консультации.

Концерт и выставка предметов Корейского искусства /Специальная Программа/, 19:30, 2-го Июля.

6. Работа Делегаций, согласно их собственных планов, 3 Июля.

7. Вопрос возвращения Делегаций в Сеул согласуется между Главами Делегаций в Пхеньяне.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Советская делегация
по советско-американской
Совместной Комиссии

СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ.

24 июля 1947 года.

В связи с тем, что точки зрения делегаций по вопросу составления списка партий и общественных организаций для участия в консультации, сблизились и остался неразрешенным только вопрос о партиях и организациях, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, составляющих количественно небольшую группу к общему числу партий и организаций, возявших желание консультировать Совместную Комиссию, Советская делегация считает, что дальнейшее откладывание консультации и дальнейшая задержка с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического правительства является недопустимой и вносит на рассмотрение Совместной Комиссии следующее предложение:

I. Поручить подкомиссии № I уточнить представленный Советской делегацией, на заседании 10 июля 1947 года, список партий и организаций, с заявленным количеством членов свыше 10 тыс.человек и представить его на утверждение Совместной Комиссии 28 июля 1947 г.

2. Поручить подкомиссии № I рассмотреть персональный состав представителей, выделенных партиями и организациями, вошедшими в список согласно пункту I настоящего решения.

Составить список этих представителей и представить его на утверждение Совместной Комиссии 28 июля 1947 года.

3. Рассмотреть представленный Советской делегацией в подкомиссию № I 23-го июля 1947 г. проект предложений о порядке проведения устной консультации и создания для этой цели необходимого количества подкомитетов.

4. Начать устную консультацию с представителями партий и организаций, вошедших в список, который будет утвержден Совместной Комиссией, 30 июля 1947 г. в г. Сеуле, а с представителями партий и организаций Северной Кореи - I-го августа 1947 г. в г. Пхеньяне.

5. Объявить от имени Комиссии, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки и подавшие заявления для участия в консультации, могут быть допущены к консультации с Совместной Комиссией после того, как они заявят о выходе из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения Совместной Комиссии.

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СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ В СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

НА ЗАСЕДАНИИ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ 22 ИЮЛЯ 1947 ГОДА

Советская делегация подробно ознакомилась с заявлением, сделанным Американской делегацией на заседании Совместной Комиссии 18 июля 1947 года.

Американская делегация в своем заявлении взяла под защиту деятельность Комитета борьбы против опеки, а также деятельность партий и организаций, входящих в этот Комитет, направленную против Московского решения о Корее.

Как известно, целью Московского решения является восстановление Кореи как независимого государства, создание условий для развития страны на демократических началах и скорейшая ликвидация пагубных последствий длительного японского господства в Корее. Для осуществления этой цели Московское решение предусматривает в первую очередь создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. В пункте 3 этого же решения, в котором упоминается слово "опека", Совместной Комиссии поручается, с участием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и с привлечением корейских демократических организаций, разработать меры помощи и содействия политическому, экономическому и социальному прогрессу корейского народа, развитию демократического самоуправления и установлению государственной независимости Кореи. Это не та опека, которая применяется некоторыми государствами с целью колониального угнетения народов. Опека, предусмотренная Московским решением, дает корейскому народу свое Правительство, гарантирует установление демократии и превращение бывшей колонии в самое короткое в истории сроки в демократическое независимое государство.

Заявление, что у корейцев имеются опасения в отношении пункта 3 Московского решения, Американская делегация отождествляет небольшую группу антидемократических организаций и их деятелей, выступающих против Московского решения, с корейским народом.

Спрашивается, почему же отдельные деятели и партии южной Кореи выступили против Московского решения? Потому ли

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

как утверждает Американская делегация, что они боятся установления такой формы опеки над Кореей, которая была применена Японией ? Но ведь в Московском решении Японии не участвует. Как известно, в этом решении участвует Америка, СССР, Англия и впоследствии к ним присоединился Китай. Следовательно, такой формы опеки, какая была установлена Японией, быть не может. Значит дело не в этом. Дело в другом. Мы знаем, что выступления против опеки организовали так называемые "вожди" некоторых партий и их соучастники, которые в Московском решении усмотрели провал их антидемократических намерений. Эти "вожди" без всяких оснований претендуют на власть в Корее. Конечно, им то и не понравилось решение союзников по Корее о том, что Корея будет демократическим государством, что в Корее народ будет принимать участие в управлении своим государством. " Вожди" этих партий и их сподвижники преднамеренно исказили существо Московского решения в своих корыстных целях. Они в прошлом году выступали против Московского решения и клеветали на союзников, подписавших его, они и в этом году до сих пор продолжают борьбу против Московского решения и против союзников.

Абсолютное большинство корейского народа стоит за точное выполнение Московского решения о Корее и с нетерпением ожидает, когда, в соответствии с этим решением, будет создано Демократическое Корейское Правительство, способное отстаивать интересы народа и провести демократические преобразования. Чего в действительности боится корейский народ ?. Корейский народ боится срыва выполнения Московского решения. Корейский народ знает, что если бы партии и организации, выступающие против Московского решения, удалось сорвать выполнение Московского решения и захватить власть в стране, то это означало бы, что к власти пришли те, кто сотрудничал с японцами, [illegible] те, кто отрекается захватить [illegible] власть в Корее ; те, которые хотят лишить корейский народ демократических реформ, преобразований и политической власти.

Американская делегация пыталась доказать, что деятельность Комитета борьбы против опеки ограничивается выражением мнения, и что этот Комитет, таким образом, якобы, представляет из себя нечто вроде дискуссионного клуба. Американская делегация в своем заявлении утверждает, что " поскольку эти партии ограничивают свои действия выражением мнения, и не доходят до развития и осуществления активной оппозиции, их разрешают

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

выражение своей оппозиции по согласованию наших Министров".
Советской делегации, также как и Американской делегации, известно, что Комитет борьбы против опеки занимался и занимается разжиганием и подстрекательством выступлений против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация уже приводила много фактов по этому вопросу, свидетельствующих об активных действиях Комитета борьбы против опеки, а значит и партий и организаций, входящих в этот Комитет. Не являются ли публикуемые изо дня в день на страницах некоторых газет Южной Кореи выступления и заявления Комитета борьбы против опеки, в которых указывается, что Комитет борьбы против опеки ведет борьбу против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии, а также организуемые этим Комитетом митинги и различные с"езды, где обсуждаются мероприятия, направленные против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии, - свидетельством того, что Комитет и входящие в него партии и организации ведут борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии ?
Советская делегация считает, что это и есть факты, подтверждающие ,что Комитет борьбы против опеки и входящие в него партии и организации разжигают и подстрекают к активным выступлениям против Московского решения и работы Совместной Комиссии.

Американская делегация пытается утверждать, что ,якобы, речь идет лишь о борьбе против слова " опека", а не о борьбе против Московского решения в целом. Это совсем наивное утверждение. Во-первых, нельзя разрывать Московское решение на части, а во-вторых, известно, что элементы, выступающие против Московского решения, лишь используют слово "опека" для прикрытия своей борьбы против Московского решения в целом.

Американская делегация вторично заявила, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, которые подали заявления на участие в консультации, практически вышли из состава Комитета. Однако, Американская делегация до сих пор не предоставила никаких фактов в доказательство этого своего утверждения. Сам Комитет заявляет, что указанные партии и организации не вышли из его состава и продолжают участвовать в его работе.

Почему Американская делегация не хочет уточнить позицию этих партий и организаций ?

Советская делегация считает, что до тех пор, пока партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, не заявят публично о своем выходе из состава Комитета, они несут ответственность за деятельность этого Комитета.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Американская делегация указывает, что Советская делегация, пред"являя требования, чтобы партии и общественные организации, которые будут консультировать Совместную Комиссию, полностью поддерживали Московское решение, якобы, этим нарушает соглашение, достигнутое между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ.

Является ли это в действительности нарушением указанного соглашения ? Пункт 1-й условий, согласованных между двумя Министрами, гласит :

> " Подписание декларации , содержащейся в коммюнике, № 5 будет рассматриваться, как заявление о добром намерении полностью поддерживать Московское решение и подписавшим ее партиям и организациям дает право быть выдвинутыми для первоначальной консультации".

Как видно из этого пункта , согласованного между Министрами, требования Советской делегации не только не противоречат, а наоборот, в точности соответствуют этому соглашению.

Что касается свободы выражения мнения, то Советская делегация дала ответ по этому вопросу в своем заявлении от [illegible] июля 1947 г. Советская делегация продолжает придерживаться мнения, что Американская делегация выставляя себя, без достаточных на то оснований, в роли защитника свободы выражения мнения, пытается, таким образом, создать впечатление, что Советская делегация выступает против свободы выражения мнения. Такие попытки обречены на неудачу. Если будет необходимость Советская делегация снова вернется к этому вопросу и покажет на примерах корейской действительности, как обстоит дело с применением принципа свободы выражения мнения в Корее. Советская делегация считает необходимым еще раз подчеркнуть, что три условия консультации, о которых договорились два министра Иностранных Дел, не противоречат свободе выражения мнения, и Американская делегация прибегает к ссылке на свободу выражения мнения, когда речь идет о применении конкретных условий консультации, повидимому, с целью отойти от этих условий.

Американская делегация заявила, что если принять советское предложение относительно партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, то это приведет к исключению из консультации большой группы правых политических партий. Как известно Американской делегации, на протяжении всей работы Совместной Комиссии Советская делегация предлагала, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации в том случае, если они заявят о

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

своем выходе из Комитета и прекратив борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии. Но Американская делегация отвергла это предложение Советской делегации, тем самым работа Совместной Комиссии затянулась и затянулась на неопределенный срок. Советская делегация еще раз предлагает приступить к консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение о работу Совместной Комиссии. Таких партий и организаций как юге, так и севере, большое количество.

Советская делегация считает, что у Совместной Комиссии нет основания из-за небольшой группы партий и организаций, выступающих против Московского решения о Совместной Комиссии, задерживать работу по созданию Временного Демократического Правительства.

Корейский народ полон решимости оказывать помощь в работе Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Правительства. Это можно подтвердить многочисленными предложениями, которые поступают в адрес Совместной Комиссии как по северу, так и по югу Кореи, и заседающим Совместной Комиссии делегациям от различных партий, организаций и населения, которые требуют, чтобы Совместная Комиссия успешно решила вопрос о создании Временного Правительства.

Советская делегация понимает чаяния и стремления корейского народа к об"единению Кореи под единой властью Временного Демократического Правительства, предусмотренного Московским решением. Народ никогда не простит Совместной Комиссии, если она из-за какой-то группы, выступающей против основных принципов борьбы против Московского решения, против Совместной Комиссии и против основателей, задержит работу по об"единению Кореи и созданию Временного Правительства.

Советская делегация призывает Американскую делегацию снова на путь точного выполнения Московского решения и создания между двумя Делегациями, и приложить искренние и честные усилия к быстрейшему созданию Временного Демократического Правительства и об"единению под его руководством всей Кореи, как это предусмотрено Московским решением.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Предполагаемое слово Генерал-майора Альберта Е. Браун, Главы Американской Делегации Американско-Советской Совместной Комиссии на митинге Демократического Народного Фронта 27 июля 1947 года.

Генерал-лейтенант Джон Р. Ходж, Командующий Войсками Соединенных Штатов в Корее, ~~просил~~ меня выступить от его имени и выразить вам свое приветствие и наилучшие пожелания.

Как Глава Американской Делегации, я хочу выразить вам, господин Председатель, и членам Демократического Народного Фронта признательность Американской Делегации за это большое и восторженное собрание для поддержки работы Совместной Комиссии. Американская Делегация хорошо знает, с каким жаром весь корейский народ ждет независимости. Я могу заверить вас, что Американская Делегация будет ревностно работать для достижения непосредственной цели Совместной Комиссии, т.е., образования временного правительства над всей об'единенной Кореей.

В своей работе Совместная Комиссия встречается с некоторыми затруднениями, вследствие ~~определенного~~ понятия, очевидно разделяемого некоторыми лицами, о том, что временное правительство должно быть образовано определенной партией или группой партий, и что некоторые другие партии и группы должны быть исключены из участия в правительстве. Американская Делегация руководствуется тем понятием о демократии, которое признает право каждого человека. Согласно этому понятию, правительство страны является слугой народа. Каждый гражданин имеет столько же права участвовать в правительстве, сколько любой другой гражданин. Согласно этому понятию, никакая политическая партия или группа не может иметь полный контроль над правительством, если таковой контроль не был дан народом при совершенно свободных выборах, включающих ~~многочисленные номинирования кандидатов~~ партиями. Для

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

получения нового мандата от народа должны проводиться периодические выборы.

Недавние пресс-коммюнике Главы Советской делегации и Главы Американской делегации поставили в известность корейский народ о том, что в течение нескольких недель обе делегации не были в состоянии согласиться относительно методов проведения устной консультации. Одним единственным несогласием, разделяющим в настоящее время Совместную Комиссию, как заявил недавно Глава Советской делегации, является вопрос о допущении к консультации с Совместной Комиссией партий и организаций, входящих в состав Комитета против Опеки. Советская делегация предложила исключить некоторые большие правые партии, с общим числом заявленного состава свыше 10 миллионов человек. Американская делегация не можнт согласиться на исключение этих партий, потому что: /1/ эти партии, подписав декларацию, выражающую их намерения сотрудничать с Совместной Комиссией, должны иметь несомненное право на предварительную консультацию; /2/ нет никаких доказательств, что эти партии виновны в разжигании и в подстрекательстве к активному выступлению в пределах смысла переписки Маршалла-Молотова; и /3/ результатом этого был бы отказ в представительстве для значительной части корейского мнения.

Как было сказано раньше, мнение Американской делегации таково что правительство принадлежит народу - т.е. всему народу и всем политическим партиям, организованным этим народом. Отказать большой группе народа и партиям, представляющим его, в праве участия в наиболее важном событии их жизни - т.е., в создании их собственного правительства - было бы несправедливостью, на которую Американская делегация никогда не может согласиться. Американская делегация надеется, что это различие во взглядах

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

с Советской делегацией может быть скоро преодолено, и что Совместная Комиссия будет следовать дальше по пути к удачному выполнению ~~самого насущного~~ настоятельного желания корейского народа - своего собственного правительства над об'единенной Кореей.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ НА ЗАСЕДАНИИ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ 29 ИЮЛЯ 1947 ГОДА.

Советская делегация внимательно изучила заявление и предложения Главы Американской делегации, сделанные на заседании Совместной Комиссии 25 июля 1947 года, и в связи с этим желает сделать следующие замечания.

В заявлении главы Американской делегации не содержится ничего нового по сравнению с тем, что высказывала Американская делегация в своих прежних заявлениях, и не делается каких-либо новых предложений, направленных на достижение прогресса в работе Совместной Комиссии.

Американская делегация в своем заявлении высказала ряд положений, которые не относятся непосредственно к обсуждаемому вопросу, в частности - оценка политического и экономического положения на севере Кореи.

В заявлении указывается, что: "Американская делегация еще раз повторяет о своей решимости выполнить Московское решение полностью и без задних мыслей, и создать Корейское Временное Демократическое Правительство в возможно короткий срок. После создания этого Правительства Американская делегация имеет твердое намерение, с участием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и корейских демократических организаций, разработать меры помощи и содействия /опека/, таким образом выполняя параграф 3 Московского решения о Корее".

Как известно, это положение высказывалось Американской делегацией еще во время работы Совместной Комиссии в 1946 году и после возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии в 1947 году. Советской делегации совершенно непонятно почему Американская делегация, утверждая на заседаниях Комиссии, что над Кореей необходима опека, в то же время при встречах с корейцами дает им понять, что она не настаивает на опеке. [redacted] Почему Американская делегация не возьмет под защиту Московское решение и не согласится заявить партиям и организациям, входящим в Комитет борьбы против опеки и продолжающим борьбу против Московского решения, о том, что они до тех пор, пока не откажутся от выступлений против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, не будут

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

допущены к участию в консультации с Совместной Комиссией. Советская делегация считает, что такой шаг Американской делегации был бы весьма полезен, вывел бы Комиссию из затруднительного положения и обеспечил бы прогресс в ее работе.

Советская делегация не может считать правильным предположение Американской делегации о том, что разногласия вызваны взаимным недопониманием позиций обеих делегаций. Если и есть подозрение у Советской делегации, как на это намекает Американская делегация в своем заявлении относительно попыток Американской делегации создать в Корее Временное Правительство, в котором преобладали бы правые элементы, то это могло бы исходить из того, что Американская делегация неоднократно на заседаниях Совместной Комиссии пыталась утверждать, что правый лагерь в Корее наиболее сильный, и что его поддерживает подавляющее большинство корейцев. Это соотношение Американская делегация назвала как 3:2 в пользу правых. Вряд ли такое утверждение Американской делегации может соответствовать действительности.

Американская делегация в последних своих заявлениях пытается разбить политические партии Южной Кореи на, так называемые, правые, умеренно правые, левые и умеренно левые, и доказать, что, якобы, Советская делегация желает исключить из консультации всех правых и даже умеренных правых. Советская делегация всегда руководствовалась отношением партий и организаций к Московскому решению, и независимо от того, является-ли она левой или правой, но если она полностью поддерживает Московское решение и работу Совместной Комиссии, - она может принимать участие в консультации. Те партии и организации, которые ведут борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, к какому бы они политическому направлению не принадлежали, в консультации участвовать не должны.

Американская делегация утверждает, что Советская делегация, якобы, для осуществления идей партий и организаций, входящих в Демократический Народный Фронт, хочет исключения из консультации правых партий, даже не входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки. Это является сложным маневром, направленным на то, чтобы ввести в заблуждение общественное мнение и любыми средствами и способами защитить партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки и продолжающие свою подрывную

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

работу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии.

Американская делегация в попытках объяснения потери авторитета правыми партиями и организациями перед главами корейского народа, в частности, партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, стала на путь утверждения, что, якобы, и левые организации Южной Кореи, т.е. партии и организации, входящие в Демократический Народный Фронт, тоже не пользуются авторитетом и поддержкой народа. Причем, для обоснования своего заявления о потере авторитета партиями и организациями, входящими в Демократический Народный Фронт, Американской делегации почему то понадобилось прибегнуть к весьма шатким и сомнительным доказательствам в виде того, что, якобы, на авторитет левого лагеря Южной Кореи повлиял приход одного миллиона корейцев с севера Кореи, которые принесли с собой обширный материал относительно плохих условий, которые существуют на севере Кореи.

Советская делегация соглашается с Американской делегацией в том, что правая группа не пользуется поддержкой большинства масс корейского народа. Причины вполне понятны. Одной из причин, по мнению Советской делегации, может быть то, что правые партии и в первую очередь партии, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, ведут борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, тем самым задерживая образование Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, предусмотренного Московским решением. А корейский народ желает успеха в работе Совместной Комиссии и с нетерпением ждет образования Временного Демократического Правительства в соответствии с Московским решением.

Что касается авторитета левого лагеря, то Советская делегация не может согласиться с утверждением Американской делегации о том, что их авторитет, якобы, пострадал от распространения слухов о тяжелых условиях жизни на севере Кореи. На юге Кореи народ знает о действительном положении в Северной Корее. Он также знает, что в результате реформ и демократических преобразований, проведенных на севере Кореи, народ севера живет значительно лучше, чем жил при японцах, и чем живет население Южной Кореи. Осталось, видимо, не информированной по этому вопросу только Американская делегация. Поэтому Советская делегация желает сообщить Американской делегации следующие факты

СЕКРЕТНО

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

о действительном положении дел на севере Кореи.

В Северной Корее с момента капитуляции японских войск проведены широкие демократические реформы, гарантирующие политические свободы и повышение благосостояния населения.

Народным Комитетом разработан и принят закон о всеобщем избирательном праве для граждан Северной Кореи. Этот закон предусматривает избрание всех местных органов власти на основе всеобщих равных и прямых выборов при тайном голосовании, и полную ответственность избранных органов перед своими избирателями, т.е. перед народом. На основе этого закона впервые в истории Кореи 3 ноября 1946 года были проведены подлинно демократические всенародные выборы провинциальных, городских и уездных Народных Комитетов ; 25 февраля - выборы сельских Народных Комитетов и 5 марта 1947 года - выборы волостных Народных Комитетов. Все граждане Северной Кореи, достигшие 20-ти летнего возраста, независимо от пола, имущественного положения , образования, оседлости и вероисповедания, получили право избирать и быть избранными в свои собственные органы народной власти. Избирательных прав были лишены, при выборах в провинциальные, городские и уездные комитеты : прояпонских элементов - 575 человек, лишенных избирательных прав по суду - 193 человек и умалишенных - 3614 человек, что составляет 0,1% к общему количеству избирателей. Все существующие демократические партии и общественные организации Северной Кореи имели одинаковые беспрепятственные права на выдвижение своих кандидатов в члены Народных Комитетов. Для проведения выборов из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций было образовано 2 центральные избирательные комиссии и 39.950 провинциальных, городских, уездных, волостных и сельских избирательных комиссий, с общим количеством членов 202.532 человека. В задачу комиссий входило : подготовить помещения для избирательных участков, избирательные бюллетени , и в день выборов обеспечить гражданам возможность осуществить свое избирательное право, и обеспечить для каждого избирателя тайное голосование. Для того, чтобы сохранить тайну голосования и создать для неграмотных наибольшие удобства при голосовании, избирательные комиссии подготовили избирательные билеты с печатью избирательной комиссии , и на каждого выставленного по округу кандидата по две избирательных урны - черную и белую. Избиратель путем опускания избирательного билета в белую урну голосовал за кандидата, а в черную урну - против кандидата./В выборах провинциальных, городских и уездных Народных Комитетов приняло участие 99,6% избира-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

телей и голосовало за кандидатов единого Демократического Народного Фронта - 97% избирателей. В выборах волостных и сельских народных Комитетов приняло участие 99,3% избирателей и голосовало за кандидатов 86,63% избирателей. В составе Народных Комитетов Северной Кореи представлены все демократические партии и общественные организации соответственно их численности и политическому влиянию в стране, а также все слои населения. Всего в Народные Комитеты избрано 70.454 человека, из них : крестьян - 32.456 человек, рабочих - 4.132 чел., служащих - 8.697 чел., интеллигенции - 819 чел., торговцев - 177 чел., промышленников и предпринимателей - 295 чел., священников - 211 чел., бывших почетников - 31, кустарей - 5 чел. В время этих выборов народные массы Северной Кореи еще раз продемонстрировали свое едиственное желание иметь органы местной власти в форме Народных Комитетов, которые зародились и были созданы самим народом сразу же после капитуляции Японии.

В феврале 1947 года на съезде Народных Комитетов Северной Кореи было избрано Народное Собрание в составе 237 человек. Народное Собрание является высшей народной властью в Северной Корее впредь до создания Временного Демократического Правительства Кореи. Вся законодательная власть в Северной Корее осуществляется Народным Собранием.

Насколько известно Советской делегации из печати, по рассказам беженцев из Южной Кореи и участников делегаций, посещающих Советскую делегацию в Совместной Комиссии, на юге Кореи тоже имеются Народные Комитеты, созданные еще в августе месяце 1945 года, как органы местной власти, но в настоящее время они не имеют ни политических, ни административных прав, и как органы местной народной власти американским военным командованием не признаны. В Южной Корее до сих пор нет избранных органов власти, а оставлена существовавшая при японцах и ненавистная народу система губернаторств. В Южной Корее существует так называемая Временная Законодательная Палата, которая не является представительным органом демократической власти, поскольку из 90 человек - 45 человек назначены и только 45 избраны. Как известно, в этой Законодательной Палате не принимают участия такие авторитетные и влиятельные в корейском народе организации, как Демократический Народный фронт.

Американская делегация, пользуясь, как она утверждает, слухами, которые "может быть и не совсем правильные", пытается

СОВ. СЕК.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

обвинить Народные Комитеты Северной Кореи в том, что по их вине на севере Кореи созданы плохие условия жизни для населения, особенно крестьянам, в результате непосильных налогов. Советская делегация сообщает для сведения Американской делегации некоторые фактические данные по этому вопросу.

В результате проведенных демократических реформ Народными Комитетами, в Северной Корее значительно улучшилось материальное положение и благосостояние народа. Проведена земельная реформа, в результате которой были ликвидированы феодальные отношения в деревне и навсегда уничтожена нищета крестьянства. 725 тысяч безземельных и малоземельных крестьян, что составляет 72% всех крестьянских хозяйств Северной Кореи, бесплатно получили свыше 1 млн. 300 тыс. гектар бывшей японской и помещичьей земли; отменен денежный налог за землю и установлен натуральный налог. В 1946 году размер натурального налога составлял 25% от урожая. В мае месяце 1947 года сессия Народного Собрания, идя навстречу пожеланиям крестьян, внесла изменение в закон о натуральном сельхозналоге. Размер налога за поливные рисовые земли установлен 27% от урожая, по суходольным зерновым и бобовым культурам - 23% от урожая, и крестьянам горных районов налог установлен - 10% от урожая. Крестьяне же, которые вновь осваивают целинные земли, совершенно освобождаются от налога сроком на 3 года. Материальное положение крестьянства Северной Кореи можно подтвердить хотя бы данными одного уезда-Кансе провинции Южный Пхеньян. По данным Народного Комитета, после проведения земельной реформы, крестьянами этого уезда выстроено новых и хорошо благоустроенных 1886 крестьянских домов, электрифицировано 2865 дворов, установлено 413 радиоточек, построено 3 народных клуба, 3 читальни, 36 подготовительных, 15 начальных и 5 средних школ, 3 школы для взрослых, и организовано 117 школ по ликвидации неграмотности. Таково положение крестьян в Северной Корее.

На севере Кореи значительно улучшилось материальное положение рабочих, служащих и интеллигенции. Принятый Народным Комитетом закон о труде устанавливает 8-ми часовой рабочий день для взрослых и 6-ти часовой рабочий день для подростков; еженедельный оплачиваемый день отдыха и 11 оплачиваемых праздничных дней в году; рабочие и служащие имеют ежегодно оплачиваемый двухнедельный отпуск и месячный отпуск для подростков; закон о труде устанавливает обязательное социальное страхование и охрану труда рабочих и служащих, оплату женского труда, приравненную к оплате труда мужчин.

СЕКРЕТНО

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Как известно, Северная Корея является богатым промышленным районом с большим количеством заводов, шахт, электростанций. Сельское хозяйство, по сравнению с Южной Кореей, на севере менее развито и до 1945 года Северная Корея в значительном количестве получала хлебные злаки из Южной Кореи. Однако, в результате принятых Народным Комитетом Северной Кореи мер, продовольственное положение на севере Кореи находится в удовлетворительном состоянии. Для населения Северной Кореи установлена твердая норма снабжения : для рабочих , занятых в тяжелой промышленности и инженерно-технического персонала - 700 грамм, для рабочих других отраслей промышленности - 600 грамм, для служащих - 500 грамм и для неработающих и иждивенцев - 300 грамм. Причем, свыше 60% нормы выдается рисом, остальное - другими зерновыми. Нормы выдачи с момента их утверждения не снижались, и отпускаются по твердым ценам. Стоимость месячного продовольственного пайка для одного человека составляет 150-170 иен.

На севере Кореи имеются трудности, особенно, если учесть, что из Южной в Северную Корею в 1946-47 г.г. возвратилось 700 тысяч человек, которые во время военных действий в августе 1945 года бежали в Южную Корею. Кроме того, в Северную Корею, спасаясь от преследования, террора и плохих условий, перешло из Южной Кореи до 400 тысяч человек. Приток такого большого количества людей, конечно, создавал дополнительные трудности, однако, благодаря принятым мерам , они были размещены, обеспечены продовольствием, причем установленные нормы снабжения для населения были сохранены.

Таковы условия жизни в Северной Корее.

Вместе с тем, Советской делегации известны, по рассказам беженцев а также делегаций, посетивших Комиссию, многочисленные факты из жизни народа Южной Кореи. Несмотря на требования народа, в Южной Корее, земельная реформа здесь не проведена и около 80% всех крестьян Южной Кореи являются или совершенно безземельными или же имеют незначительное количество земли, которое не обеспечивает даже пропитание семьи. Крестьянские делегации, посетившие Советскую делегацию, рассказывают о том, что они платят непосильные налоги. Налог официально установлен 30% , но так как урожай низкой в результате отсутствия удобрения, то крестьянам приходится отдавать до 60% урожая. На обращения крестьян в местные органы власти с жалобами на то, что им нечем выплатить налог, в связи с низким урожаем,- никто внимания не обращает, и в случае задержки сдачи в установленные сроки

СЕКРЕТНО

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация продолжает придерживаться своей точки зрения, что партии и общественные организации, которые состоят в так называемом Комитете борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации только в том случае, если они выйдут из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация при устной консультации будет выслушивать все те партии и их представителей, независимо от того, являются ли они левыми или правыми, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение и оказывают помощь и поддержку в работе Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация рассмотрела предложения Американской делегации и считает, что она ничего нового, по сравнению с теми предложениями, которые она делала ранее, не вносит. Наоборот, предложения Американской делегации, внесенные ею 25 июля, снова возвращают Совместную Комиссию к первоначальной стадии обсуждения списка и опровергают то, что ею достигнуто в процессе обсуждения.

Американская делегация в своих предложениях снова пытается доказать, что список существует, и что, якобы, из этого списка надо исключать партии и организации, тогда, как, согласно решению № 12 Совместной Комиссии, список должен быть составлен, а это означает, что обе делегации, только на основе взаимного согласия, будут включать в список партии и организации для консультации, и этот список должен быть утвержден Совместной Комиссией.

Предложения Американской делегации неприемлемы для Советской делегации, так как они тянут назад работу Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация настаивает на принятии предложения, внесенного Советской делегацией на заседании Совместной Комиссии 24 июля 1947 года.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

и установленного количества зерна, крестьяне подвергаются штрафу, аресту и заключению в тюрьмы. Все беженцы и посетившие Советскую делегацию крестьянские делегации обращались с просьбой ускорить работу по созданию Правительства с тем, чтобы это Правительство смогло бы провести земельную реформу и установить справедливые налоги.

Тяжелое положение крестьянства на юге Кореи.

Беженцы с юга Кореи и посетившие Советскую делегацию представители от различных рабочих организаций и служащих рассказывали о том, что никакого рабочего законодательства на юге Кореи нет. Установлен только 8-ми часовой рабочий день, но им приходится работать больше. Рабочий, который не может выйти на работу по состоянию здоровья, за день болезни зарплаты не получает. Рабочие демократически настроенные, не желающие состоять в правых профсоюзах, увольняются с работы. Корни продовольственного снабжения выдаются нерегулярно, и во многих случаях рис, который необходим для корейцев, заменяется другими мало подходящими продуктами. Корни продовольственных посевных фондов, под различными предлогами, снимались, причем, снижение продовольственных норм объясняется большим притоком беженцев из Северной Кореи. Один из участников делегаций, посетивших Советскую делегацию, заявил, что : " Если бы верить нашим южным газетам, как они сообщают, что народ бежит из Северной Кореи, то, наверное, на севере уже никого из населения не остается ". Далее, добавил : " Мы понимаем, что все это делается для того, чтобы оправдать тот недостаток в продовольствии, который имеется в Южной Корее".

Тяжелое положение с условиями жизни на юге Кореи.

Данные по Северной Корее Советская делегация получила у Народного Комитета, и привела в связи с заявлением Американской делегации от 25 июля 1947 года по вопросу о положении на севере Кореи.

Как известно, на юге Кореи имеется много партий, которые занимались и занимаются различными вымыслами и даже клеветой по адресу Советского Союза и Советского командования в Северной Корее. Но Советская делегация пока еще не предъявила обвинений этим партиям и организациям в нелояльном отношении к Советскому Союзу. Требование Советской делегации при устной консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями - это полная поддержка Московского решения и работы

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА НА ПРЕСС-КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ 2 АВГУСТА 1947 ГОДА

Советская делегация считает своим долгом информировать общественность о ходе работы и причинах задержки в работе Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии.

На заседаниях 22, 24, 25 и 29 июля Совместная Комиссия продолжала обсуждение вопроса о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций Кореи для участия в устной консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

В своем заявлении на пресс-конференции 21 июля Советская делегация указала, что в отношении составления списка партий и общественных организаций для устной консультации остался несогласованным только вопрос о допущении к консультации партий и общественных организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки.

На заседании Комиссии 22 июля Советская делегация, дабы не задерживать работу Совместной Комиссии, повторила свое прежнее предложение о том, чтобы Комиссия начала консультацию с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые не вызывают сомнения ни у Советской, ни у Американской делегаций. Список таких партий и организаций с заявленным количеством членов свыше 10 тысяч был представлен Советской делегацией по просьбе Американской делегации еще 10 июля. Этот список включал 147 партий и организаций, в том числе 28 от Северной Кореи и 119 от Южной Кореи, представляющих все политические течения и оттенки общественной жизни Кореи. В этот список не были включены только партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки.

Американская делегация отклонила предложение Советской делегации о начале консультации, указав, что Советская делегация, якобы, стремится не допустить к консультации все правые партии, а желает ограничить консультацию только партиями и организациями, входящими в Демократический Национальный Фронт. В своих заявлениях и сообщениях для печати Американская делегация

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

продолжает повторять это утверждение, вводя таким образом в заблуждение общественное мнение.

Советская делегация на заседаниях Совместной Комиссии неоднократно указывала Американской делегации на несостоятельность такого рода ее утверждений. Советская делегация при составлении списка партий и организаций руководствовалась и руководствуется Московским решением, соглашением МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА и решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии, а не тем, являются ли партии и организации левыми или правыми. Это видно из того списка, который представлен Советской делегацией. Из 119 партий и организаций Южной Кореи в списке, предложенном Советской делегацией, партий и организаций правого направления 74, левого 34 и центра 11.

По мнению Советской делегации, имеются все основания начать консультацию с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями. Советская делегация считала и считает, что 20 партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки и не желающих до сих пор отказаться от принципов борьбы против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, не должны являться причиной задержки работы Совместной Комиссии.

В отношении указанных партий и организаций Советская делегация продолжает придерживаться той точки зрения, что эти партии и организации могут быть допущены к консультации только в том случае, если они заявят о своем выходе из Комитета борьбы против опеки, о чем Советская делегация неоднократно предлагала поставить в известность упомянутые партии и организации. Однако, Американская делегация отвергала эти предложения.

Таким образом, работа Совместной Комиссии продолжает задерживаться из-за вопроса о партиях и организациях, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки. Американская делегация взяла под свое покровительство упомянутые партии и организации, упорно отказываясь применять к ним соглашение, достигнутое между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, согласно которому Совместная Комиссия консультируется только с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 24 июля Советская делегация внесла следующее предложение :

" В связи с тем, что точки зрения делегаций по вопросу составления списка партий и общественных организаций для участия в консультации, сблизились и остался неразрешенным только вопрос о партиях и организациях, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки , составляющих количественно небольшую группу к общему числу партий и организаций, изъявивших желание консультировать Совместную Комиссию, Советская делегация считает, что дальнейшее откладывание консультации и дальнейшая задержка с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства являются недопустимыми, и вносит на рассмотрение Совместной Комиссии следующие предложения :

1. Поручить подкомиссии № 1 уточнить представленный Советской делегацией на заседании 10 июля 1947 года список партий и организаций с заявленным количеством членов свыше 10 тысяч человек и представить его на утверждение Совместной Комиссии 28 июля 1947 года.

2. Поручить подкомиссии № 1 рассмотреть персональный состав представителей, выделенных партиями и организациями, вошедшими в список согласно пункту 1 настоящего решения.

Составить список этих представителей и представить его на утверждение Совместной Комиссии 28 июля 1947 года.

3. Рассмотреть представленный Советской делегацией в подкомиссию № 1 23 июня 1947 года проект предложений о порядке проведения устной консультации и создания для этой цели необходимого количества подкомитетов.

4. Начать устную консультацию с представителями партий и организаций, вошедших в список, который будет утвержден Совместной Комиссией, 30 июля 1947 года в г.Сеуле, а с представителями партий и организаций Северной Кореи - 1 августа 1947 года в г.Пхеньяне.

5. Объявить от имени Комиссии, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки и подавшие заявления для участия в консультации, могут быть допущены к консультации с Совместной Комиссией после того, как они заявят о выходе из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии".

Американская делегация отвергла это предложение а на заседании 25 июля внесла свое предложение. Существо американс-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

кого предложения сводилось к тому, чтобы подкомиссия № 1 возобновила свою работу на основе американской позиции и составила бы список всех партий и организаций, подавших заявления на участие в консультации, включая партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, а также фиктивные и необщественные организации. Принятие этого предложения привело бы к тому, что Совместная Комиссия должна была бы консультироваться с любой партией и организацией, подавшей заявление, которую Американская делегация считает желательным привлечь к консультации.

Таким образом, Американская делегация претендовала на право одностороннего включения в список для консультации партий и организаций, подавших заявления.

Порядок составления списка партий и организаций для консультации Совместной Комиссии определен решениями № 12 и № 16 Совместной Комиссии, в соответствии с которыми подкомиссия № 1 составляет согласованный список демократических партий и общественных организаций и представляет его на утверждение Совместной Комиссии.

Руководствуясь этими решениями Совместной Комиссии, Советская делегация настаивала и настаивает на том, чтобы подкомиссия № 1 возобновила свою работу и составила взаимно согласованный список для представления его на утверждение Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация неоднократно указывала, что подкомиссия № 1 должна, выслушать на своих заседаниях любые доводы и возражения обеих сторон, уточнить данные по каждой партии и организации, которая должна быть включена, или не включена в список для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, и представить свои соображения на рассмотрение Совместной Комиссии. В частности, такое предложение Советская делегация сделала еще на заседании Комиссии, 2 июля, когда впервые рассматривался вопрос о составлении списка. Тогда это предложение было отвергнуто Американской делегацией. С той поры в обсуждении вопроса по составлению списка был достигнут известный прогресс и оставался неразрешенным только вопрос о включении в список партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки.

В предложении Американской делегации от 25 июля игнорируется тот прогресс, который был достигнут Совместной

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Комиссией в вопросе о составлении списка, и работа Совместной Комиссии в этом отношении возвращается предложением Американской делегации к своей первоначальной стадии.

Это предложение осложняет работу Совместной Комиссии, поскольку оно вновь возвращает к рассмотрению вопросов, по которым уже была достигнута договоренность между делегациями. Это предложение, явилось, повидимому, следствием того, что Американская делегация, занявшись подсчетом соотношения количества правых и левых партий и организаций и их численности, пришла к выводу, что достигнутая договоренность не обеспечивает соотношения между правыми и левыми партиями и организациями при консультации и при формировании правительства как 3 : 2 в пользу правых, к чему, судя по ее неоднократным заявлениям на заседаниях Комиссии, стремится Американская делегация.

Советская делегация отвергла упомянутое предложение Американской делегации, подробно изложив на заседании Комиссии 29 июля причины, по которым она считает это предложение неприемлемым.

Советская делегация хорошо понимает, желание корейского народа иметь свое демократическое правительство. Она постоянно чувствует поддержку, которую оказывает корейский народ работе Совместной Комиссии по выполнению Московского решения.

Стремясь к быстрейшему созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства на основе точного выполнения Московского решения, Советская делегация продолжает поиски путей для преодоления трудностей, возникших в работе Совместной Комиссии.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

4 августа 41 г.

Совместная Комиссия уже больше месяца обсуждает вопрос о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, но пока еще не достигла соглашения.

Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить работу Совместной Комиссии, вносила ряд предложений с целью быстрейшего достижения соглашения по вопросу составления списка. В частности, Советская делегация неоднократно и настойчиво добивалась, чтобы подкомиссии № 1 было поручено пересмотреть все партии и организации, подавшие заявления, на предмет включения их в список для консультации. Однако, Американская делегация систематически отклоняла эти предложения Советской делегации.

Американская делегация, вопреки порядку составления списка, зафиксированному в решении № [illegible] и в решении № [illegible] Совместной Комиссии, предлагала приступить к рассмотрению заявлений не с точки зрения их включения в список для консультации, а с точки зрения исключения из списка, хотя, как известно, такого списка Совместная Комиссия еще не имеет. Для того, чтобы исключать из списка, необходимо иметь список, утвержденный Комиссией, а для утверждения списка необходимо, чтобы стороны пришли к соглашению по вопросу о том, какие партии и организации из числа подавших заявления, подлежат включению в список для консультации в соответствии с Московским решением, соглашением [illegible] - [illegible] и решением № [illegible] Совместной Комиссии.

Предложения Американской делегации по этому вопросу противоречат не только решениям № 12 и № 16 Совместной Комиссии, но и здравому смыслу. Принятие американского предложения привело бы к тому, что Совместная Комиссия должна была бы консультироваться с любой партией и организацией, подавшей заявление, которую Американская делегация считает желательным пригласить для консультации.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ 5 АВГУСТА 1947 г.

Принимая во внимание, что Совместная Комиссия в течение месяца не смогла достигнуть прогресса в вопросе составления списка демократических партий и общественных организаций, в связи с чем задерживается вся работа Комиссии, Советская делегация, в целях ускорения работы Комиссии, вносит следующие предложения:

1. Приступить к разработке предложений по вопросам структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное положение/, политической платформы для этого Правительства, а также по вопросам персонального состава Временного Правительства, порядка приема власти Временным Правительством и подбора аппарата, для чего:

а/ в соответствии с пунктом 3 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, передать подкомиссии № 2 полученные от корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций как Северной, так и Южной Кореи, соображения и предложения для изучения и выработки согласованных предложений;

б/ поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 в пятидневный срок представить на утверждение Совместной Комиссии планы своей работы;

в/ поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 представить свои соображения о созыве подкомитетов.

2. Поручить главам делегаций совместно с подкомиссией № 1:

а/ продолжить обсуждение вопроса о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для устной консультации с целью достижения соглашения;

б/ подготовить список представителей партий и общественных организаций для устной консультации;

в/ разработать предложения по пункту 9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Американская делегация неоднократно обвиняла Советскую делегацию в стремлении односторонним решением исключить из консультации отдельные партии и организации. В действительности дело обстоит как-раз наоборот. Требования Американской делегации сводятся к тому, чтобы односторонним решением включать партии и организации в список для консультации - на что Советская делегация, разумеется, не может согласиться.

В связи с тем, что Американская делегация, на заседании Совместной Комиссии 16 июля, заявила, что она принимает, с незначительными поправками, предложение Советской делегации от 10 июля, за исключением пункта, в котором говорится о партиях и организациях, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опозы, - вопрос об этих партиях и организациях остался единственным вопросом, касающимся составления списка для консультации, по которому между делегациями не было достигнуто договоренности.

Учитывая это обстоятельство, Советская делегация внесла 24 июля новое предложение, имевшее целью дать возможность Совместной Комиссии начать устную консультацию 30-го июля 1947 г. Это предложение было, однако, отвергнуто Американской делегацией.

Американская делегация не только отказывается применить соглашение ПОТСДАМА - МАРШАЛЛА к партиям и организациям, подавшим заявления на участие в консультации, которые входят в Комитет борьбы против опозы, но и упорно не желает уточнить позиции этих партий и организаций в отношении необходимого решения и участия в Комитете борьбы против опозы.

На заседании Комиссии 25 июля Американская делегация внесла предложение, которое значительно осложнило работу Совместной Комиссии, полностью игнорируя прогресс, достигнутый Комиссией в вопросе составления списка, и возвращая Комиссию к рассмотрению вопросов, по которым уже была достиг-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

пути договоренность между делегациями.

Это предложение Американской делегации является, по-видимому, не случайным. За время работы Совместной Комиссии в этом году Американская делегация дала достаточно примеров отхода от достигнутых соглашений и даже от решений, принятых Совместной Комиссией. Если итти по этому пути, то можно бесконечно затягивать работу Совместной Комиссии.

С момента возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии прошло [illegible] месяца. Между тем Совместная Комиссия еще не приступила к обсуждению вопросов, непосредственно связанных с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Дальнейшую задержку обсуждения этих вопросов Советская делегация считает недопустимой.

Советская делегация считает, что составление списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации Совместной Комиссии является важным вопросом, обсуждение которого следует продолжать с целью достижения соглашения. Однако, это не должно задерживать работу Комиссии над другими вопросами. Советская делегация считает, что обсуждение вопроса о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций можно поручить главам делегаций совместно с подкомиссией № I, в то время, как остальные члены делегаций смогут заняться другими важными вопросами, связанными с образованием Временного Правительства.

Корейские демократические партии и общественные организации уже представили в Совместную Комиссию свои соображения относительно структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное положение/, а также относительно политической платформы для Временного Правительства.

Советская делегация считает, что Совместной Комиссии следует, не откладывая, приступить, с учетом представленных демократическими партиями и общественными организациями письменных соображений, к разработке своих предложений

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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по вопросам структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/, политической платформы для этого Правительства, а также вопросов персонального состава Временного Правительства, порядка приема власти Временным Правительством и подбора аппарата.

Исходя из вышеизложенного, Советская делегация вносит следующее предложение.

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NND 760090
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ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА НА ПРЕСС-КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

9 августа 1947 года

Советская делегация желает информировать общественность о ходе работы Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 31 июля Американская делегация передала Советской делегации письмо, поступившее в адрес Комиссии от 15 партий и организаций так называемого Объединенного Совета и датированное 28 июля.

Партии и организации, подписавшие это письмо, выступают в защиту позиции Комитета борьбы против опеки и входящих в него партий и организаций. Аргументация, используемая в указанном письме в защиту этих партий и организаций, совпадает с заявлениями Американской делегации на последних заседаниях Комиссии.

При изучении письма, 15 партий и организаций у Советской делегации возник ряд вопросов. Поэтому на заседании Совместной Комиссии 5 августа Советская делегация внесла предложение пригласить представителей партий и организаций, подписавших письмо, которые входят в Комитет борьбы против опеки, на заседание Совместной Комиссии 7 августа 1947 года с тем, чтобы получить необходимые разъяснения по вопросам, возникающим в связи с изучением этого письма. При этом, Советская делегация указала, что вызов представителей этих партий и организаций на заседание Совместной Комиссии может разрешить тот неясный вопрос, на обсуждении которого Совместная Комиссия задерживается уже целый месяц.

Однако, Американская делегация отклонила предложение Советской делегации, заявив, что любые вопросы, которые пожелает задать представителям каких-либо партий или организаций одна из делегаций, могут быть заданы только тогда, когда эти представители явятся на устную консультацию.

Советская делегация удивлена настойчивостью, с которой Американская делегация отклоняет предложения Советской делегации о вызове на заседание Совместной Комиссии представителей партий

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

и организаций, состоящих в Комитете борьбы против опеки, которые подали заявления на участие в консультации. Предложение Советской делегации продиктовано стремлением разрешить, наконец, главный нерешенный вопрос, касающийся составления списка партий и организаций, и оно полностью соответствует практике международных совещаний. Создается впечатление, что Американская делегация определенно не желает допустить встречи Советской делегации с представителями вышеуказанных партий и организаций на заседании Совместной Комиссии, хотя Советской делегации не ясно, почему Американская делегация боится такой встречи.

Продолжая поиски путей для преодоления трудностей, возникших в работе Комиссии в результате фактического отказа Американской делегации применять соглашение МОЛОТОВА- МАРШАЛЛА к партиям и организациям, входящим в Комитет борьбы против опеки, которые подали заявления на участие в консультации, Советская делегация внесла на заседании Комиссии 5 августа следующее предложение :

" Принимая во внимание, что Совместная Комиссия в течение месяца не смогла достигнуть прогресса в вопросе составления списка демократических партий и общественных организаций, в связи с чем задерживается вся работа Комиссии, Советская делегация, в целях ускорения работы Комиссии, вносит следующее предложение :

1. Приступить к разработке предложений по вопросам структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение /, политической платформы для этого Правительства, а также по вопросам персонального состава Временного Правительства, порядка приема власти Временным Правительством и подбора аппарата, для чего ;

а/ в соответствии с пунктом 8 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, передать подкомиссии № 2 полученные от корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций как Северной, так и Южной Кореи, соображения и предложения для изучения и выработки согласованных предложений ;

б/ поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 в пятидневный срок представить на утверждение Совместной Комиссии планы своей работы ;

в/ поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 представить свои соображения о создании подкомитетов.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

2. Поручить главам делегаций совместно с подкомиссией № 1 :

а/ продолжить обсуждение вопроса о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для устной консультации с целью достижения соглашения ;

б/ подготовить список представителей партий и общественных организаций для устной консультации ;

в/ разработать предложения по пункту 9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии ".

Внося это предложение, Советская делегация исходила из того, что хотя составление списка партий и организаций является важным вопросом, обсуждение которого необходимо продолжить с целью достижения соглашения, однако, оно не должно задерживать разрешение Комиссией других вопросов.

В своем заявлении на заседании 5 августа Советская делегация указала, что хотя с момента возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии прошло 2,5 месяца, Комиссия еще не приступила к обсуждению вопросов, непосредственно связанных с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Советская делегация заявила, что дальнейшую задержку обсуждения этих вопросов она считает недопустимой. Указав, что корейские демократические партии и общественные организации уже представили в Совместную Комиссию свои соображения по вопросникам, Советская делегация предложила, не откладывая, приступить с учетом этих соображений, к разработке предложений по упомянутым вопросам.

Принятие советского предложения дало бы Комиссии возможность параллельно с обсуждением вопроса о списке партий и организаций для консультации начать работу подкомиссий № 2 и № 3 и приступить к обсуждению и подготовке предложений по вопросам, непосредственно связанным с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 7 августа Американская делегация отклонила советское предложение, совершенно неубедительно заявив, что якобы бесполезно переходить к обсуждению

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

других вопросов, пока не решен вопрос о списке партий и организаций для консультации.

Отклонение этого предложения Советской делегации, а также позиция, занятая Американской делегацией в вопросе о партиях и организациях, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, не могут не создать впечатления, что Американская делегация искусственно затягивает работу Совместной Комиссии.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ПРИВЕТСТВИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ КОРЕЙСКОМУ НАРОДУ

15 августа 1947 года корейский народ празднует вторую годовщину своего освобождения от колониального ига японского империализма. В этот торжественный день я, от имени Советской делегации в Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии и от себя лично шлю гражданам Южной Кореи сердечный привет и горячие поздравления.

Ровно два года назад, вслед за разгромом фашистской Германии была разбита империалистическая Япония. Советская армия, сыгравшая решающую роль в разгроме агрессоров, вступила в августе 1945 года на территорию Кореи, в жестоких боях разбила японскую армию, заставила ее капитулировать и тем самым внесла своей непосредственный вклад в освобождение корейского народа от японского колониального ига.

Советская делегация гордится этим и сейчас проникнута только одним стремлением - оказать корейскому народу дружескую помощь в создании суверенного корейского государства.

Советская делегация искренне желает и прилагает все усилия к тому, чтобы корейский народ как можно скорее имел свое собственное единое для всей Кореи демократическое правительство и, чтобы Корея в самое ближайшее время стала независимым демократическим государством, свободным от всякого иностранного вмешательства, как это предусмотрено Московским решением.

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ В СОВМЕСТНОЙ
СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК

Т. ШТЫКОВ

14 августа 1947 г.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ В СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА

14 августа 1947 года.

Глава Американской делегации 9 августа 1947 года вручил прессе свое заявление, которое было сделано Американской делегацией на 44-м заседании Совместной Комиссии, состоявшемся 18 июля 1947 года.

В целях правильного освещения истинного положения, вещей и изложения своей точки зрения на свободу выражения мнений, Советская делегация решила опубликовать нижеследующее свое заявление , сделанное на заседании Совместной Комиссии от 22 июля 1947 года, в ответ на заявление Американской делегации от 18 июля 1947 года.

" Американская делегация в своем заявлении взяла под защиту деятельность Комитета борьбы против опеки, а также деятельность партий и организаций, входящих в этот Комитет, направленную против Московского решения о Корее.

Как известно, целью Московского решения является восстановление Кореи как независимого государства, создание условий для развития страны на демократических началах и скорейшая ликвидация пагубных последствий длительного японского господства в Корее. Для осуществления этой цели Московское решение предусматривает в первую очередь создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. В пункте 3 этого же решения, в котором упоминается слово "опека", Совместной Комиссии поручается, с участием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и с привлечением корейских демократических организаций, разработать меры помощи и содействия политическому, экономическому и социальному прогрессу корейского народа, развитию демократического самоуправления и установлению государственной независимости Кореи. Это не та опека, которая применяется некоторыми государствами с целью колониального угнетения народов. Опека, предусмотренная Московским решением, дает корейскому народу свое Правительство, гарантирует установление демократи

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

и превращение бывшей колонии в самые короткие в истории сроки в демократическое независимое государство.

Заявляя, что у корейцев имеются опасения в отношении пункта 3 Московского решения, Американская делегация отождествляет небольшую группу антидемократических организаций и их деятелей, выступающих против Московского решения, с корейским народом.

Спрашивается, почему же отдельные деятели и партии Южной Кореи выступают против Московского решения ? Потому ли, как утверждает Американская делегация, что они боятся установления такой формы опеки над Кореей, которая была применена Японией ? Как известно, в этом решении участвуют Америка, СССР, Англия и впоследствии к ним присоединился Китай. Следовательно, такой формы опеки, какая была установлена Японией, быть не может. Значит дело не в этом. Дело в другом. Мы знаем, что выступления против опеки организовали так называемые "вожди" некоторых партий и их соучастники, которые в Московском решении усмотрели провал их антидемократических намерений. Эти "вожди" без всяких оснований претендуют на власть в Корее. Конечно, им то и не понравилось решение союзников по Корее о том, что Корея будет демократическим государством, что в Корее народ будет принимать участие в управлении своим государством. "Вожди" этих партий и их сподвижники преднамеренно, исказили существо Московского решения в своих корыстных целях. Они в прошлом году выступали против Московского решения и клеветали на союзников, подписавших его, они и в этом году до сих пор продолжают борьбу против Московского решения и против союзников.

Абсолютное большинство корейского народа стоит за точное выполнение Московского решения о Корее и с нетерпением ожидает, когда, в соответствии с этим решением, будет создано Демократическое Корейское Правительство, способное отстаивать интересы народа и провести демократические преобразования. Чего в действительности боится корейский народ ? Корейский народ боится срыва выполнения Московского решения. Корейский народ знает, что если бы, партиям и организациям, выступающим против Московского решения, удалось сорвать выполнение Московского решения и

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

захватить власть в стране, то это, означало бы, что к власти пришли те, кто сотрудничал с японцами, те, кто стремится захватить явочным порядком власть в Корее ; те, которые хотят лишить корейский народ демократических реформ, преобразований и политической власти.

Американская делегация пыталась доказать, что деятельность Комитета борьбы против опеки ограничивается выражением мнения, и что этот Комитет, таким образом, якобы, представляет из себя нечто вроде дискуссионного клуба. Американская делегация в своем заявлении утверждает, что "поскольку эти партии ограничивают свои действия выражением мнения и не доходят до разжигания и подстрекания активной оппозиции, им разрешается выражение своей оппозиции по соглашению наших Министров". Советской делегации, также как и Американской делегации, известно, что Комитет борьбы против опеки занимался и занимается разжиганием и подстреканием выступлений против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация уже приводила много фактов по этому вопросу, свидетельствующих об активных действиях Комитета борьбы против опеки, а значит и партий и организаций, входящих в этот Комитет. Не являются ли публикуемые изо дня в день на страницах некоторых газет Южной Кореи выступления и заявления Комитета борьбы против опеки, в которых указывается, что Комитет борьбы против опеки ведет борьбу против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии, а также организуемые этим Комитетом митинги и различные съезды, где обсуждаются мероприятия, направленные против Московского решения и против Совместной Комиссии, - свидетельством того, что Комитет и входящие в него партии и организации ведут борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии ? Советская делегация считает, что это и есть факты, подтверждающие, что Комитет борьбы против опеки и входящие в него партии и организации разжигают и подстрекают к активным выступлениям против Московского решения и работы Совместной Комиссии.

Американская делегация пытается утверждать, что, якобы, речь идет лишь о борьбе против слова "опека", а не о борьбе против Московского решения в целом. Это совсем наивное утверждение. Во-первых, нельзя разрывать Московское решение на части, а во-вторых, известно, что противники Московского решения, лишь используют

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

слово "опека" для прикрытия своей борьбы против Московского решения в целом.

Американская делегация вторично заявила, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, которые подали заявления на участие в консультации, практически вышли из состава Комитета. Однако, Американская делегация до сих пор не представила никаких фактов в доказательство этого своего утверждения. Сам Комитет заявляет, что указанные партии и организации не вышли из его состава и продолжают участвовать в его работе.

Почему Американская делегация не хочет уточнить позицию этих партий и организаций ?

Советская делегация считает, что до тех пор, пока партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, не заявят публично о своем выходе из состава Комитета, они несут ответственность за деятельность этого Комитета.

Американская делегация указывает, что Советская делегация, предъявляя требования, чтобы партии и общественные организации, которые будут консультировать Совместную Комиссию, полностью поддерживали Московское решение, якобы, этим, нарушает соглашение, достигнутое между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ.

Является ли это в действительности нарушением указанного соглашения ? Пункт I-й условий, согласованных между двумя Министрами, гласит :

> " Подписание декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, будет рассматриваться как заявление о добром намерении полностью поддерживать Московское решение и подписавшим ее партиям и организациям дает право быть выдвинутыми для первоначальной консультации ".

Как видно из этого пункта, согласованного между Министрами, требования Советской делегации не только не противоречат, а наоборот, в точности соответствуют этому соглашению.

Что касается свободы выражения мнения, то Советская делегация дала ответ по этому вопросу в своем заявлении от 8-го июля 1947 года. В этом заявлении говорится следующее : " Американская делегация в своем заявлении на заседании Комиссии 3 июля

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

снова затронула вопрос о свободе выражения мнения. Прежде всего, Советская делегация никогда не выступала против свободы выражения мнения, а во-вторых, Американская делегация вряд-ли имеет достаточно оснований для того, чтобы приписывать себе роль защитника свободы выражения мнения. Советская делегация считает, что политика советского командования в Северной Корее с достаточной ясностью показала, что советская сторона, не на словах, а на деле, стоит за свободу выражения мнения. Как известно, советское командование в Северной Корее не препятствовало корейцам не только свободно выражать свои мнения, но и перестраивать свою жизнь на демократических началах и ликвидировать остатки длительного японского господства в Корее, в результате чего в Северной Корее достигнут значительный прогресс в области демократизации и развития национальной экономики и культуры ".

В письме Министра Иностранных Дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВА Государственному Секретарю США Д.МАРШАЛЛУ от 19 апреля 1947 года по этому поводу было сказано следующее :

" Что же касается Северной Кореи, то за период , прошедший с момента капитуляции Японии, здесь достигнут значительный прогресс в области демократизации, а также в отношении возрождения национальной экономики и культуры. Проведены широкие демократические реформы, гарантирующие политические свободы и повышение благосостояния населения. Я имею в виду, прежде всего, введение всеобщего избирательного права ; закон о равноправии женщин ; создание на основе свободных демократических выборов местных органов власти и Народного Комитета Северной Кореи ; земельную реформу, в результате которой 725 тысяч безземельных и малоземельных крестьянских хозяйств получили бесплатно более одного миллиона га земли, принадлежавшей ранее японским колонизаторам и их пособникам в Корее ; национализацию бывшей японской промышленности ; закон о 8-ми часовом рабочем дне, охране труда и социальном страховании ; реформу народного образования, в результате которой в школах восстановлен корейский язык, расширена школьная сеть, возросло количество учащихся и др. Однако, подобные широкие демократические реформы проведены только в Северной Корее, где проживает 2/5 населения Кореи ".

Три условия консультации, о которых договорились Министры Иностранных Дел, по мнению Советской делегации, не противоречат свободе выражения мнения. Советская делегация стремится

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

к точному выполнению этих условий. Советская делегация продолжает, придерживаться мнения, что Американская делегация, выставляя себя, без достаточных на то оснований, в роли защитника свободы выражения мнения, пытается, таким образом, создать впечатление, что Советская делегация выступает против свободы выражения мнения. Такие попытки обречены на неудачу. Если будет необходимость, Советская делегация снова вернется к этому вопросу и покажет на примерах корейской действительности как обстоит дело с применением принципа свободы выражения мнения в Корее. Советская делегация считает необходимым еще раз подчеркнуть, что три условия, консультации, о которых договорились два Министра Иностранных Дел, не противоречат свободе выражения мнения, и, таким образом, ссылка Американской делегации на свободу выражения мнения не имеет никакого отношения к данному вопросу. Такая ссылка, повидимому, предназначена для того, чтобы прикрыть стремление отойти от этих условий.

Американская делегация заявила, что если принять советское предложение относительно партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, то это приведет к исключению из консультации большой группы правых политических партий. Как известно Американской делегации, на протяжении всей работы Совместной Комиссии Советская делегация предлагала, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации в том случае, если они заявят о своем выходе из Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии. Но Американская делегация отвергла это предложение Советской делегации и тем самым ответственность за последствия, вытекающие из такого отказа, а также за затяжку работы Комиссии должна целиком лежать на Американской делегации. Советская делегация еще раз предлагает приступить к консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение и работу Совместной Комиссии. Таких партий и организаций как левых, так и правых, большое количество.

Советская делегация считает, что у Совместной Комиссии нет оснований из-за небольшой группы партий и организаций, выступающих против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, задерживать работу по созданию Временного Демократического Правительства.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Корейский народ полон решимости оказывать помощь в работе Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Демократического Правительства. Это можно подтвердить многочисленными приветствиями, которые поступают в адрес Совместной Комиссии как по северу, так и по югу Кореи, и посещениями Совместной Комиссии делегациями от различных партий, организаций и населения, которые требуют, чтобы Совместная Комиссия успешно разрешила вопрос о создании центрального правительства.

Советская делегация понимает чаяния и стремления корейского народа к объединению Кореи под единой властью Временного Демократического Правительства, предусмотренного Московским решением. Корейский народ никогда не простит Совместной Комиссии, если она из-за какой-то группы ,нежелающей отказаться от своих принципов борьбы против Московского решения, против Совместной Комиссии и против союзников, задержит работу по объединению Кореи и созданию Временного Правительства.

Советская делегация признает Американскую делегацию стать на путь точного выполнения Московского решения и соглашения между двумя Министрами и приложить свои усилия к быстрейшему созданию Временного Демократического Правительства и объединению под его руководством всей Кореи, как это предусмотрено Московским решением ".

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 August 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 14 August 1947 in which you state that the Soviet Delegation has been informed about the letter addressed by the Secretary of State of the United States, General George C. Marshall, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. V. M. Molotov.

The previous Marshall-Molotov correspondence indicates their intention to request the Joint Commission to report to the two governments sometime in July or August on the progress of their work. The letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, George Marshall, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, dated 12 August 1947, requests that the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations by August 21, 1947. I think you will agree with me that there is very little time remaining for the completion of this rather comprehensive task, and I hope that it will be convenient for the Soviet Delegation to convene a meeting of the Joint Commission at the earliest possible date. I would suggest that this meeting take place tomorrow, Friday, 15 August, at 1330 hours. I do not think that we can delay our necessary preliminary discussions.

It is requested that you inform me as early as possible of your agreement to this proposal.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Американская Делегация
Американско-Советская Совместная Комиссия
Сеул, Корея.

14 Августа 1947 г.

Генерал-Полковнику Т.Ф.Штыкову,
Главе Советской Делегации,
Американско-Советской
Совместной Комиссии,
г.Сеул, Корея.

Дорогой Генерал Штыков:

Сим желаю засвидетельствовать получение Вашего письма от 14 Августа 1947 года, в котором Вы сообщаете, что Советская делегация была информирована относительно письма адресованного Государственным СекретаремСоединенных Штатов, генералом Джордж С. Маршаллом, Министру Иностранных Дел СССР, г-ну В.М. Молотову.

В предыдущей переписке между г-ом Маршаллом и г-ом Молотовым указывается об их намерении запросить Совместную Комиссию представить отчет двум правительствам в течение Июля или Августа месяцев о прогрессе своей работы. В своем письме, Государственный Секретарь Соединенных Штатов, г-н Джордж Маршалл, Министру Иностранных Дел СССР В.М. Молотову, от 12 Августа запрашивает, чтобы Совместная Комиссия представила отчет о своей работе к 21 Августа 1947 года. Я думаю, что Вы согласитесь со мной в том, что у нас осталось мало времени для завершения этой довольно сложной задачи и я надеюсь, что и для Советской делегации будет желательно созвать заседание Совместной Комиссии как можно скорее. Я предложил бы, чтобы собрание состоялось завтра, в Пятницу, 15 Августа, в 1330. Мне не кажется, что мы можем задерживать необходимые предварительные дискуссии.

Желательно чтобы Вы информировали меня возможно скорее о своем согласии с моим предложением.

Уважающий Вас

Альберт Е. Браун,
Генерал-Майор, Армия США
Глава Американской Делегации.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СЕКРЕТНО

Советская Делегация в
Советско-Американской
Совместной Комиссии

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

20 Августа 1947 года

Как известно, Совместная Советско-Американская Комиссия создана в соответствии с Московским решением "для оказания содействия образованию Временного Корейского Демократическо-го Правительства и для предваритнльной разработки соответствующих мероприятий". Согласно пункту 2-му Московского решения, Совместная Комиссия "должна при выработке своих предложений консультироваться с Корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями".

За время своей работы в этом году Совместная Комиссия приняла согласованное решение № 12 о порядке консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, разработала и утвердила вопросники о государственном устройстве Кореи и о политической платформе будущего Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, разослала эти вопросники всем корейским демократическим партиям и организациям, пожелавшим принять участие в консультации Совместной Комиссии.

Демократические партии и общественные организации как Северной, так и Южной Кореи подписали декларацию, содержащуюся в коммюнике № 5, подали заявления в Совместную Комиссию на участие в консультации, выделили своих представителей для участия в устной консультации Совместной Комиссии, а также представили свои соображения о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Полржение / и о политической платформе для Временного Правительства.

При обсуждении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций в Совместной Комиссии возникли существен-

СЕКРЕТНО

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ные разногласия и работа Комиссии на этом задержиается.

Корейский народ с напряженным вниманием следит за работой Совместной Комиссии и с понятным и законным нетерпением ждет образования Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

И вот в этот ответственный и напряженный момент в работе Совместной Комиссии, в Южной Корее начались массовые аресты руководителей и фактическое закрытие демократических партий и общественных организаций левого направления, погромы левых демократических газет, аресты работников левой демократической печати. Аресты производятся как в гор. Сеуле, так и в провинциях.

Нельзя не отметить, что репрессия направлена только против тех демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной Кореи, которые активно поддерживают Московское решение и работу Совместной Комиссии.

Среди арестованных некоторые являются представителями демократических партий и общественных организаций, выделенным для участия в устной консультации Совместной Комиссии.

Приведу лишь несколько фактов, которые, тем не менее, ярко показывают размах репрессий в Южной Корее, направленных против указанных демократических партий и общественных организаций.

Эти факты стали известны Советской делегации из бесед с многочисленными делегациями корейцев, а также из сообщений южно-корейской прессы.

Во время народного митинга 27 июля 1947 года в г. Сеуле, организованного ДНФ Южной Кореи в поддержку работы Совместной Комиссии, на котором, как известно, присутствовали главы обеих делегаций, корейская полиция в присутствии членов Совместной Комиссии арестовала представителя профсоюза и представителя Женского союза сразу после их выступления на этом митинге с призывом поддержать работу Совместной Комиссии.

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NND 760090
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Спустя несколько дней был арестован один из организаторов этого митинга КИМ КВАН СУ.

Арестован заместитель лидера Трудовой партии Южной Кореи ЛИ ГИ СОК и другие члены ЦК Трудовой партии.

12 августа в помещении ЦК ДНФ и в помещении издательства "Мун Хак" арестовано большое количество руководящих работников и рабочего персонала ЦК ДНФ и издательства. В течение 11 и 12 августа были арестованы в рабочих помещениях и на квартирах руководящие работники городского и районных комитетов ДНФ города Сеула.

В начале августа арестован председатель Крестьянского союза ПЭК ИОН ХИ, 12 августа арестованы заместитель председателя Крестьянского союза ЛИ ГУ ХУН, начальник общего отдела КИМ ГИ ИОН, начальник отдела пропаганды ХЙОН ДОН УК, член Президиума ЦОЙ ХАН ЧОЛЬ и много других работников Крестьянского союза.

Арестованы члены ЦК конфедерации профсоюзов МУН ЫН ЧОН и ПАК БОН У, а также много других руководящих работников.

Арестованы руководящие работники Демократического Женского союза, в том числе, председатель Женского союза Ю ЙОН ДЗЮН и заместитель председателя ЧОН ЧИЛЬ СОН.

Арестовано также руководство союза кооперации /председатель ПАК КЙОН СУ, член ЦК АН ХИ СЫН/, союза литераторов /начальник отдела пропаганды ПАК ЧАН МО/, член ЦК союза юристов ЮН ХАК КИ, работники газет "Токлип синбо" и "Норйок инмин" - ЧАН СУН ГАК, ЛИ СИН СИК, КИМ ХО ДЗИН и другие.

Кроме того арестовано руководство Партии трудового народа /ПЭК НАМ УН, ЛИ Е СОН, ХАН ИЛЬ ТЭ, СЫН ДОН ИЛЬ, ПАК ТАН ЧОЛЬ и много других/, а также руководство Партии молодых друзей /ПАК У ЧЕН, КИМ ВЕН ДЕ и другие/.

По распоряжению властей закрыты помещения ЦК ДНФ, ЦК Трудовой партии, ЦК Народно-республиканской партии, ЦК Всекорейской конфедерации профсоюзов и других демократических организаций.

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Многие из арестованных являются членами делегаций, посетивших Совместную Комиссию для передачи ей требований и пожеланий народа.

14 августа при выходе из дворца ДУК СУ была арестована группа корреспондентов демократических газет, которая посетила пресс-конференцию, устроенную Советской делегацией с целью информации прессы и общественного мнения о ходе работы Совместной Комиссии.

Многочисленные аресты руководителей демократических партий и организаций, многие из которых являются представителями этих партий и организаций для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, создали в Южной Корее обстановку, которая препятствует выполнению Московского решения о Корее и договоренности, достигнутой между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ.

Такая обстановка создается, повидимому, с целью сорвать работу Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация обращает серьозное внимание Американской делегации в Совместной Комиссии на эти обстоятельства и настаивает на принятии немедленных мер к восстановлению нормальной обстановки для существования и деятельности демократических партий и организаций Южной Кореи и надлежащих условий для работы Совместной Комиссии.

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ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ ДЛЯ ПЕЧАТИ 22 АВГУСТА 1947 г.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 20 августа 1947 года Советская делегация сделала заявление по поводу массовых арестов, имеющих место в Южной Корее.

Ниже приводится текст этого заявления:

"Как известно, Совместная Советско-Американская Комиссия создана в соответствии с Московским решением "для оказания содействия образованию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и для предварительной разработки соответствующих мероприятий". Согласно пункту 2-му Московского решения, Совместная Комиссия "должна при выработке своих предложений консультироваться с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями".

За время своей работы в этом году Совместная Комиссия приняла согласованное решение № 12 о порядке консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, разработала и утвердила вопросники о государственном устройстве Кореи и о политической платформе будущего Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, разослала эти вопросники всем корейским демократическим партиям и организациям, пожелавшим принять участие в консультации Совместной Комиссии.

Демократические партии и общественные организации как Северной, так и Южной Кореи подписали декларацию, содержащуюся в коммюнике № 5, подали заявления в Совместную Комиссию на участие в консультации, выделили своих представителей для участия в устной консультации Совместной Комиссии, а также представили свои соображения о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/ и о политической платформе для Временного Правительства.

При обсуждении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций в Совместной Комиссии возникли существенные разногласия и работа Комиссии на этом задерживается.

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Корейский народ с напряженным вниманием следит за работой Совместной Комиссии и с понятным и законным нетерпением ждет образования Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

И вот в этот ответственный и напряженный момент в работе Совместной Комиссии, в Южной Корее начались массовые аресты руководителей и фактическое закрытие демократических партий и общественных организаций левого направления, погромы левых демократических газет, аресты работников левой демократической печати. Аресты производятся как в г.Сеуле, так и в провинциях.

Нельзя не отметить, что репрессии направлены только против тех демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной Кореи, которые активно поддерживают Московское решение и работу Совместной Комиссии.

Среди арестованных некоторые являются представителями демократических партий и общественных организаций, выделенными для участия в устной консультации Совместной Комиссии.

Приведу лишь несколько фактов, которые, тем не менее ярко показывают размах репрессий в Южной Корее, направленных против указанных демократических партий и общественных организаций.

Эти факты стали известны Советской делегации из бесед с многочисленными делегациями корейцев, а также из сообщений южно-корейской прессы.

Во время народного митинга 27 июля 1947 года в г.Сеуле, организованного ДНФ Южной Кореи в поддержку работы Совместной Комиссии, на котором, как известно, присутствовали главы обеих делегаций, корейская полиция в присутствии членов Совместной Комиссии арестовала представителя профсовета и представителя женского совета сразу после их выступления на этом митинге с призывом поддержать работу Совместной Комиссии. Спустя несколько дней был арестован один из организаторов этого митинга КИМ КВАН СУ.

Арестован заместитель лидера Трудовой партии Южной Кореи

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ЛИ ГИ СОК и другие члены ЦК Трудовой партии.

12 августа в помещении ЦК ДНФ и в помещении издательства "ЧунХак" арестовано большое количество руководящих работников и рабочего персонала ЦК ДНФ и издательства. В течение 11 и 12 августа были арестованы в рабочих помещениях и на квартирах руководящие работники городского и районных комитетов ДНФ города Сеула.

В начале августа арестован председатель Крестьянского совза ПЭК ЮН ХИ, 12 августа арестованы заместитель председателя Крестьянского совза ЛИ ГУ ХУН, начальник общего отдела КИМ ГИ ЮН, начальник отдела пропаганды ЮН ДОН УК, член президиума ЦОН ХАН ЧОЛЬ и много других работников Крестьянского совза.

Арестованы члены ЦК Конфедерации профсоюзов МУН НИ ЧОН и ПАК ЮН У, а также много других руководящих работников.

Арестованы руководящие работники Демократического Женского совза, в том числе, председатель Женского совза Э ЮН ДЭЮН и заместитель председателя ЧОН ЧИЛЬ СОН.

Арестовано также руководство совза кооперации /председатель ПАК ЮН СУ, член ЦК АН ЛИ СЫН/, совза литераторов /начальник отдела пропаганды ПАК ЧАН МО/, член ЦК совза юристов ЮН ПАК КИ, работники газет "Тонгил синбо" и "Нодйок инмин" - ЧАН СУН ГАК, ЛИ СИН СИК, КИМ ХО ДЗИН и другие.

Кроме того, арестовано руководство партии трудового народа /ПЭК НАМ УН, ЛИ Е СОН, ХАН ИЛЬ ТЭ, СЫН ДОН ИЛЬ, ПАК ТАЕ ЧОЛЬ и много других/, а также руководство Партии молодых друзей /ПАК У ЧЕН, КИМ ЗЕН ДЕ и другие/.

По распоряжению властей закрыты помещения ЦК ДНФ, ЦК Трудовой партии, ЦК Народно-республиканской партии, ЦК Всекорейской конфедерации профсоюзов и других демократических организаций.

Многие из арестованных являются членами делегаций, посетивших Совместную Комиссию для передачи ей требований и

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пожеланий народа.

14 августа при выходе из дворца ВУК СУ была арестована группа корреспондентов демократических газет, которая посетила пресс-конференцию, устроенную Советской делегацией с целью информации прессы и общественного мнения о ходе работы Совместной Комиссии.

Многочисленные аресты руководителей демократических партий и организаций, многие из которых являются представителями этих партий и организаций для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, создали в Южной Корее обстановку, которая препятствует выполнению Московского решения о Корее и договоренности, достигнутой между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ.

Такая обстановка создается, повидимому, с целью сорвать работу Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация обращает серьезное внимание Американской делегации в Совместной Комиссии на эти обстоятельства и настаивает на принятии немедленных мер к восстановлению нормальной обстановки для существования и деятельности демократических партий и организаций Южной Кореи и надлежащих условий для работы Совместной Комиссии".

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ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА НА ПРЕСС-КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

25 августа 1947 года.

22 августа 1947 года Министр Иностранных Дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВ направил через Советского Посла в США следующий ответ на письмо Государственного Секретаря США Д.МАРШАЛЛА от 12 августа 1947 года по вопросу о Корее:

" Уважаемый господин МАРШАЛЛ,

Подтверждаю получение Вашего письма от 12.8.47 года по вопросу о работе Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии.

Как известно, работа Совместной Комиссии была возобновлена на основе трех условий консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, приведенных текстуально в моем письме от 7 мая 1947 г. и принятых Вами в письме от 13 мая. Советской делегации было дано указание в вопросах консультации руководствоваться именно этими условиями.

Согласно этим условиям, Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться с теми демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение о Корее.

Однако, для участия в консультации подали заявления также партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против Московского решения об опеке.

Советское правительство считает, что допуск таких партий и организаций к консультации мог бы иметь место лишь в том случае, если бы эти партии и организации официально порвали с указанным Комитетом, заявили о своем выходе из Комитета, без чего консультация с ними не должна проводиться.

Советское правительство, стоящее на позиции широкой консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и организациями, не считает, что Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться с такими организациями, которые в своих рядах имеют лишь десятки или сотни человек. Такие организации имеются в большом количестве и консультация с ними не была бы эффективна ввиду их неавторитетности; кроме того, консультация с такими небольшими группами затянула бы работу Совместной Комиссии на многие месяцы и повела бы к откладыванию на долгое время создание

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правительства Кореи.

Советское Правительство считает, что консультация может быть с такими партиями и организациями, количество членов которых превышает 10.000 человек.

Что касается Вашего упоминания, что при проведении консультации не должно быть никакого ограничения свободы слова и мнения, то это должно быть распространено прежде всего на партии и организации, способствующие реализации Московского решения.

Между тем, в последнее время партии и организации Южной Кореи, стоящие на позиции поддержки Московского решения, подвергаются со стороны американских властей в Южной Корее самым суровым ограничениям и жестоким преследованиям, что противоречит демократическим принципам и совершенно не соответствует решениям Московского Совещания. Помещения таких партий и организаций захватываются полицейскими властями, их руководители и члены арестовываются; органы печати закрываются.

Советское правительство считает такое положение ненормальным и недопустимым, исключающим возможности правильного выполнения решения Московского Совещания трех Министров о Корее, если эти преследования демократических организаций и деятелей Южной Кореи не будут немедленно и полностью отменены. Советское Правительство считает необходимым, чтобы делегация США в Совместной Комиссии получила соответствующие указания для выполнения достигнутого между Правительствами США и СССР соглашения в апреле сего года и не возражает против Вашего предложения, чтобы Совместная Комиссия доложила о состоянии работы с тем, чтобы каждое правительство смогло немедленно обсудить, какие шаги полезно было бы предпринять для выполнения целей Московского решения.

Советской делегации даны указания в соответствии с вышеизложенным.

Копии этого письма одновременно мною направляются Правительствам Великобритании и Китая.

Прошу Вас, господин Государственный Секретарь, принять уверения в моем весьма высоком уважении.

В.МОЛОТОВ ".

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Советская делегация
в Советско-Американской
Совместной Комиссии

СЕКРЕТНО

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

26 августа 1947 г.

Советская делегация внимательно изучила предложение, внесенное Американской делегацией на заседании Совместной Комиссии 12 августа. Это предложение представляется Советской делегации неудовлетворительным.

Прежде всего следует отметить, что в американском предложении по существу ничего определенного не говорится о создании Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. В предложении указывается только, что подкомиссия № 3 должна подготовить "план подбора назначаемого персонала Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства". Ясно, однако, что формирование Правительства и составление плана подбора персонала не одно и тоже. Когда на заседании Совместной Комиссии 12 августа Советская делегация задала вопрос с целью уточнить, как представляет себе Американская делегация формирование Временного Правительства, и когда и кем оно по американскому предложению будет формироваться, то Американская делегация уклонилась от ответа на этот вопрос.

Таким образом, основная задача Совместной Комиссии - создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства - в американском предложении обходится и запутывается, в то время, как корейский народ ждет от Совместной Комиссии, прежде всего, разрешения именно этого вопроса.

В американском предложении не говорится о консультации, предусмотренной в п.9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, но глава Американской делегации, отвечая на вопрос Советской делегации, разъяснил, что эта консультация должна иметь место. Но раз так, то Американской делегации, если она действительно желала практически двинуть вперед работу Комиссии, следовало бы указать в своем предложении, как она предполагает организовать устную консультацию в соответствии с п.9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии. Без этого, разговоры о том, какие принципы должны быть включены во Временное Положение, имеют мало смысла, поскольку не указывается практического пути для выработки этого

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By NARS, Date

Временного Полсжения.

Американское заявление на заседании Совместной Комиссии 12 августа и особенно пресс-коммюнике Американской делегации от 23 августа, не оставляют никаких сомнений в том, что предложение Американской делегации от 12 августа было внесено с чисто пропагандистской целью. В своем пресс-коммюнике Американская делегация склоняет слово "выборы" на все лады. Американская делегация в своем предложении предусмотрела как будто все вопросы, связанные с выборами, но Американская делегация "забыла" или сознательно упустила о роли и месте самих корейцев в проведении выборов в свой законодательный орган.

В американском предложении указывается, что во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание выборного законодательного органа. Советская делегация считает само собой разумеющимся, что во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание законодательного органа, избираемого на основе всеобщего, прямого и равного избирательного права ,при тайном голосовании.

Совместная Комиссия потратила почти два месяца на обсуждение вопроса о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации. Американская делегация фактически отказалась применять соглашение МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА согласно которому Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться с теми демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение.

Составление списка корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, из-за занятой Американской делегацией позиции, оказалось невозможным.

Для того, чтобы ускорить работу Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, Советская делегация готова согласиться с предложением Американской делегации от 12 августа 1947 года не проводить устной консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, предусмотренной в пункте 7 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии ,и вносит следующие предложения :

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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1. Поручить :

а/ подкомиссии № 2 немедленно приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссии письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, которые были разосланы Совместной Комиссией, и предоставить в Совместную Комиссию проекты структуры Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение/ и политической платформы, и

б/ подкомиссии № 3 представить в Совместную Комиссию предложения относительно персонального состава Временного Правительства и о порядке приема Правительством власти.

2. Создать консультативный орган - Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций.

Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание сформировать из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций, подавших заявления в Совместную Комиссию о консультации, с заявленным числом членов этих организаций свыше 10.000 ,и полностью поддерживающих Московское решение ,а также не выступающих против Совместной Комиссии и союзных держав.

Количество представителей во Временном Общекорейском Народном Собрании от Северной и Южной Кореи должно быть одинаково.

Представительство от различных партий и организаций установит Совместная Комиссия в соответствии с количеством их членов и учитывая, насколько возможно, их влияние.

3. Совместная Комиссия привлекает Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание к разработке предложений по вопросу структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение /, политической платформы и персонального состава Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и порядка приема власти Правительством и другим вопросам.

Во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание законодательного органа ,выборы в который должны быть проведены по всей Корее на основе всеобщего, прямого, равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СЕКРЕТНО

Советская делегация понимает, что корейский народ с нетерпением ждет создания Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, которое могло бы объединить Корею и осуществить те демократические преобразования, которых желает корейский народ.

В предложении Советской делегации ясно указывается, что должен быть создан консультативный орган - Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций. Это Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание ,состоящее из самих корейцев, представляющих взгляды самых различных слоев населения, будет принимать непосредственное участие в разработке всех вопросов, связанных с образованием Временного Правительства и программой его деятельности.

В советском предложении также имеется указание на необходимость предусмотреть во Временном Положении создание законодательного органа, выборы в который должны быть проведены по всей Корее на основе всеобщего, прямого, равного избирательного права ,при тайном голосовании. На этих выборах все демократические партии и общественные организации должны иметь равные возможности выставления своих кандидатов и свободной агитации за них и за свою программу.

СЕКРЕТНО

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ В СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА.

28 августа 1947 г.

Советская делегация настоящим заявлением желает информировать общественность о ходе работы Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии.

Как известно, 20 августа на заседании Совместной Комиссии Советская делегация сделала заявление по поводу массовых арестов деятелей демократических партий и организаций в Южной Корее.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 25 августа Американская делегация сделала ответное заявление, в котором не только не опровергла приведенных Советской делегацией фактов арестов и погромов, но фактически подтвердила их. Американская делегация упрекнула Советскую делегацию в том, что Советская делегация, находясь в Южной Корее в качестве гостя американских властей, пытается якобы вмешиваться во внутренние дела Южной Кореи.

Советская делегация ответила, что она является не просто гостем, а членом международной комиссии, предусмотренной Московским решением Трех Министров о Корее, которая несет ответственность за выполнение этого решения. Поэтому Советская делегация не может относиться безразлично к событиям, о которых идет речь.

Американская делегация в своем заявлении также указала, что она надеется на то, что Советская делегация со своей стороны не откажется вызвать для консультации определенных лиц, содержащихся в настоящее время под арестом в Северной Корее, с которыми Американская делегация весьма желает консультироваться.

Советская делегация заявила, что Американская делегация не назвала ни одного деятеля, который был бы арестован властями на севере Кореи. Советская делегация указала, что на севере Кореи лидеры партий и организаций не арестовываются, партии и организации не преследуются, их учреждения и газеты не закрываются, и с момента освобождения в Северной Корее не было таких фактов, чтобы была закрыта газета какой-нибудь партии или организации, или разгромлена редакция, или закрыто учреждение

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

той или иной партии или организации. Все партии сотрудничают между собой и решают вопросы, имея равные возможности и одинаковые права.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 26 августа Советская делегация сделала заявление, в котором изложила свой ответ на предложение Американской делегации от 12 августа. Советская делегация внесла на этом заседании новое предложение, имеющее целью ускорить работу Совместной Комиссии. Ниже приводится текст этого заявления и предложения:

"Советская делегация внимательно изучила предложение, внесенное Американской делегацией на заседании Совместной Комиссии 12 августа. Это предложение представляется Советской делегации неудовлетворительным.

Прежде всего следует отметить, что в американском предложении по существу ничего определенного не говорится о создании Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. В предложении указывается только, что подкомиссия № 3 должна подготовить "план подбора назначаемого персонала Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства". Ясно, однако, что формирование Правительства и составление плана подбора персонала не одно и то же. Когда на заседании Совместной Комиссии 12 августа Советская делегация задала вопрос с целью уточнить, как представляет себе Американская делегация формирование Временного Правительства, и когда и кем оно по американскому предложению будет формироваться, то Американская делегация уклонилась от ответа на этот вопрос.

Таким образом, основная задача Совместной Комиссии - создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства - в американском предложении обходится и запутывается, в то время, как корейский народ ждет от Совместной Комиссии, прежде всего, разрешения именно этого вопроса.

В американском предложении не говорится о консультации, предусмотренной в п.9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, но глава Американской делегации, отвечая на вопрос Советской делегации, разъяснил, что эта консультация должна иметь место. Но раз так, то Американской делегации, если она действительно желала практически дви-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

нуть вперед работу Комиссии, следовало бы указать в своем предложении, как она предполагает организовать устную консультацию в соответствии с п.9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии. Без этого, разговоры о том, какие принципы должны быть включены во Временное Положение, имеют мало смысла, поскольку не указывается практического пути для выработки этого Временного Положения.

Американское заявление на заседании Совместной Комиссии 12 августа и особенно пресс-коммюнике Американской делегации от 23 августа, не оставляют никаких сомнений в том, что предложение Американской делегации от 12 августа было внесено с чисто пропагандистской целью. В своем пресс-коммюнике Американская делегация склоняет слово "выборы" на все лады. Американская делегация в своем предложении предусматривала как будто все вопросы, связанные с выборами, но Американская делегация "забыла" или сознательно упустила сказать о роли и месте самих корейцев в проведении выборов в свой законодательный орган.

В американском предложении указывается, что во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание выборного законодательного органа. Советская делегация считает само собой разумеющимся, что во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание законодательного органа, избираемого на основе всеобщего, прямого и равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании.

Совместная Комиссия потратила почти два месяца на обсуждение вопроса о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации. Американская делегация фактически отказалась применять соглашение МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА, согласно которому Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться с теми демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение.

Составление списка корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, из-за занятой Американской делегацией позиции, оказалось невозможным.

Для того, чтобы ускорить работу Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Советская делегация готова согласиться с предложением Американской делегации от 12 августа 1947 года не проводить устной консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, предусмотренной в пункте 7 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, и вносит следующие предложения:

1. Поручить:

а/ подкомиссии № 2 немедленно приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, которые были разосланы Совместной Комиссией, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты структуры Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/ и политической платформы, и

б/ подкомиссии № 3 представить в Совместную Комиссию предложения относительно персонального состава Временного Правительства и о порядке приема Правительством власти.

2. Создать консультативный орган - Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций.

Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание сформировать из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций, подавших заявления в Совместную Комиссию о консультации, с заявленным числом членов этих организаций свыше 10.000, и полностью поддерживающих Московское решение, а также не выступающих против Совместной Комиссии и союзных держав.

Количество представителей во Временном Общекорейском Народном Собрании от Северной и Южной Кореи должно быть одинаково.

Представительство от различных партий и организаций установит Совместная Комиссия в соответствии с количеством их членов и учитывая, насколько возможно, их влияние.

3. Совместная Комиссия привлекает Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание к разработке предложений по вопросу структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/, политической платформы и персонального со-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

става Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и порядка приема власти Правительством и другим вопросам.

Во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание законодательного органа, выборы в который должны быть проведены по всей Корее на основе всеобщего, прямого, равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании.

Советская делегация понимает, что корейский народ с нетерпением ждет создания Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, которое могло бы объединить Корею и осуществить те демократические преобразования, которых желает корейский народ.

В предложении Советской делегации ясно указывается, что должен быть создан консультативный орган - Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций. Это Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание, состоящее из самих корейцев, представляющих взгляды самых различных слоев населения, будет принимать непосредственное участие в разработке всех вопросов, связанных с образованием Временного Правительства и программой его деятельности.

В советском предложении также имеется указание на необходимость предусмотреть во Временном Положении создание законодательного органа, выборы в который должны быть проведены по всей Корее на основе всеобщего, прямого, равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании. На этих выборах все демократические партии и общественные организации должны иметь равные возможности выставления своих кандидатов и свободной агитации за них и за свою программу".

25 августа Советская делегация вручила Американской делегации текст ответного письма Министра Иностранных Дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВА от 22 августа Государственному Секретарю США Д.МАРШАЛЛУ.

Совместная Комиссия приняла решение поручить составление доклада о работе Совместной Комиссии председателям подкомиссии № I г-ну ТУНКИНУ и г-ну ЗАНС.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Советский проект
Совместного доклада

30 августа 1947 года

Д О К Л А Д

О РАБОТЕ СОВЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ ПО КОРЕЕ

ЗА ПЕРИОД С 21 МАЯ ПО 1 СЕНТЯБРЯ 1947 г.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Советский проект
Совместного доклада

30 августа 1947 года

Д О К Л А Д

О РАБОТЕ СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ ПО КОРЕЕ

за период с 21 мая по 1 сентября 1947 г.

Совместная Советско-Американская Комиссия по Корее, созданная в соответствии с решением Московского Совещания Министров Иностранных Дел СССР, США и Соединенного Королевства от декабря 1945 года, в целях выполнения этого решения, возобновила свою работу 21 мая 1947 года в соответствии с договоренностью, достигнутой в процессе переписки между Министром Иностранных дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВЫМ и Государственным Секретарем США Д.МАРШАЛЛОМ в апреле-мае 1947 года.

Согласно этой договоренности в качестве основы для возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии были приняты предложения Советского Командующего в Северной Корее, изложенные в его письме от 26 ноября 1946 года, с поправками, предложенными Американским Командующим в Южной Корее в его письме от 24 декабря 1946 года. Эти условия были в следующем виде текстуально приведены в письме Министра Иностранных дел В.М.МОЛОТОВА от 7 мая 1947 года и приняты Государственным Секретарем США Д.МАРШАЛЛОМ в письме от 13 мая 1947 года :

...

"... Советский командующий в письме от 26 ноября 1946 года выдвинул следующие предложения в качестве основы для возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии ;

1. Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться с теми демократическими партиями и организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение о Корее.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]. Партии или общественные организации, привлеченные к консультации с Совместной Комиссией, не должны выделять для консультации таких представителей, которые скомпрометировали себя активными выступлениями против Московского решения.

[illegible]. Партии и общественные организации, привлеченные к консультации с Совместной Комиссией, не должны и не будут выступать или подстрекать к выступлениям против Московского решения в работе Совместной Комиссии. В противном случае такие партии и общественные организации [illegible] обеих делегаций будут отстранены от дальнейших консультаций с Совместной Комиссией.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Предложение № 1 может быть [illegible] следующим образом. Подписание декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, будет рассматриваться как заявление о добром намерении полностью поддерживать Московское решение и подписавшим ее партиям или организациям дает право быть выдвинутыми для первоначальной консультации.

Предложение № 2. Я считаю, что партия или организация, сделавшая такое заявление, имеет право назначить такого представителя, который, по ее мнению, сможет наилучшим образом представить Совместной Комиссии ее взгляды о выполнении Московского решения.

Однако, если такой представитель по совершенно веским причинам будет считаться антагонистичным по отношению к выполнению Московского решения или к одной из союзных держав, то Совместная Комиссия после взаимного согласования сможет потребовать, чтобы партия, сделавшая такое заявление /декларацию/, выделила вместо него другого представителя.

Предложение № 3. Предлагается следующая формулировка этого пункта : лица, партии и общественные организации, приглашенные для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, не должны после подписания декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, разжигать или подстрекать к активным выступлениям против работы Совместной Комиссии или против одной из союзных держав или против выполнения Московского решения.

То лица, партии или общественные организации, которые после подписания декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, будут разжигать или подстрекать к активным выступлениям против работы Совместной Комиссии или против одной из союзных держав или против выполнения Московского решения, будут исключены из дальнейшей консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Решение относительно исключения таких лиц, партий или общественных организаций будет приниматься соглашением двух делегаций в Совместной Комиссии".

В целях ускорения возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии и создания Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, я готов принять вышеизложенные поправки, предложенные американскими командующими ... "

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 22 мая 1947 года было решено, что работа Комиссии будет состоять из двух этапов :

Первый этап - выполнение параграфа 2 Московского решения о Корее.

Второй этап - выполнение параграфа 3 Московского решения о Корее.

Согласно тому же решения / № 8 /, первый этап работы Комиссии включает следующие вопроси :

1. Условия и порядок консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

2. Выработка рекомендаций о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение /.

3. Предварительная выработка политической платформы и других надлежащих мероприятий для будущего Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

4. Выработка рекомендации о персональном составе Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

5. Порядок приема власти Временным Корейским Демократическим Правительством и порядок подбора аппарата для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

В соответствии с принятым порядком работы, Совместная Комиссия прежде всего занялась вопросом об условиях и порядке консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

Этот вопрос был предметом продолжительной дискуссии во время работы Совместной Комиссии в 1946 году. Тогда

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

...же и было должно ... " (с условия и порядке консульта-
...ии с политическими партиями и общественными организациями
... ", должно должно ... консультации осуществляться по всем
...ам, должны быть ... , прежде, ... рассмотрения проблем
...ы, должны ... и общественных организаций, представляющих
... должно ... ", ...) ... (условия консультации, должно ...
... ", ...

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

надлежащими полномочиями и официально уведомляют Комиссию о выделенном представителе или представителях, сообщая их фамилии и имена, место и год рождения и положение, занимаемое ими в партии или в общественной организации".

Поскольку в процессе переписки между [illegible] и [illegible] было достигнуто соглашение по [illegible] вопросам, касающимся консультации, Советская делегация, чтобы не возобновлять дискуссии, предложила положить в основу документа о порядке консультации прошлогоднее решение, дополненное в соответствии с договоренностью по вопросу о консультации, достигнутой между [illegible] и [illegible].

Американская делегация отклонила это предложение Советской делегации и потребовала полного пересмотра решения № 4. Она предложила консультироваться с любой партией и организацией, подписавшей декларацию, содержащуюся в коммюнике № 5 Совместной Комиссии, если такая партия или организация имеет не менее 1.000 членов и отделы не менее, чем в двух провинциях.

Советская делегация заявила, что привлечение к консультации всякого рода мелких групп и организаций может только осложнить и запутать работу Совместной Комиссии и создать извращенное представление о состоянии общественного мнения в Корее.

Советская делегация указала, далее, что вышеупомянутое американское предложение ставит крупные политические объединения в равное положение со всякого рода незначительными группами, не представляющими интересов широких слоев корейского народа. Принятие американского предложения могло бы привести к тому, что мелкие, наскоро созданные организации заглушили бы голоса влиятельных демократических организаций и что, таким образом, выявление действительных стремлений корейского народа было бы затруднено ,а работа Совместной Комиссии - искусственно осложнена. Советская делегация настаивала на обеспечении справедливого представительства демократических партий и общественных организаций, пропорционально их влиянию и количеству членов

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Советская делегация предложила включить в документ о порядке консультации три условия консультации, о которых договорились два Министра Иностранных дел. Американская делегация возражала против этого, заявила, что, по ее мнению, нельзя включать в документ и, следовательно, принимать к руководству эти условия, так как эти условия не отражают полностью договоренности, достигнутой между двумя Министрами, и что необходимо руководствоваться всей перепиской между Молотовым и Макартуром. Советская делегация настаивала на включении трех условий в тот вид, в каком они приведены в письме т. Молотова от 7 мая 1947 года.

Советская делегация в подготовке № 1 указывала, что отсутствие необходимой информации о количестве партий и организаций и их членов препятствует быстрому и правильному решению вопроса о консультации. Она неоднократно предлагала Американской делегации обменяться списками партий и организаций по соответствующей зоне до окончательного согласования документа о консультации. Однако, Американская делегация уклонялась от такого обмена.

21 мая Советская делегация внесла предложение о последовательном опубликовании двух пресс-коммюнике : 1/ о приглашении к партиям и организациям, желающим участвовать в консультации, подписать декларацию ; 2/ о утверждении Комиссией вопросников. Советская делегация указала, что принятие этого предложения ускорит работу Комиссии, даст ей возможность определить, какие и сколько партий и организаций желают консультировать Комиссию, а также обеспечит быстрейшее привлечение корейских партий и организаций к сотрудничеству с Совместной Комиссией. Американская делегация не согласилась опубликовать вышеуказанные коммюнике до окончательного согласования документа о консультации.

7 июня Совместная Комиссия утвердила документ " О порядке консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями Северной и Южной Кореи " / решение № 12 прилагается /.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Документ о порядке консультации предусматривал, что Совместная Комиссия при консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями будет руководствоваться условиями, изложенными в письме Министра Иностранных дел СССР [illegible] от 7 мая 1947 года, которые были полностью включены в этот документ. Партии и организации, желающие принять участие в консультации, должны были подписать декларации о поддержке Московского решения и подать в Совместную Комиссию соответствующие заявления через свои центральные органы зоны. Эти партии приглашались также представить в Совместную Комиссию свои соображения по вопросникам относительно Временного Положения и политической платформы для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Кроме первоначальной устной консультации, решение № 10 предусматривало, что для консультации и оказания помощи Совместной Комиссии при выработке рекомендаций относительно Временного Положения и политической платформы для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства будут приглашены представители политических партий и общественных организаций, выделяемые в соответствии с количеством их членов и учитывая, насколько возможно, их влияние. В документе указывалось, что демократические партии и общественные организации как Северной, так и Южной Кореи будут иметь равные права и возможности для консультации с Совместной Комиссией.

Одновременно с документом о порядке консультации Совместная Комиссия утвердила вопросники для письменной консультации / решения № 10 и № 13 /. При этом, вопросник о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение / был принят без изменений в редакции, утвержденной на 20-м заседании Комиссии 27 апреля 1946 г.

Что касается вопросника о политической платформе Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, то хотя он также был согласован в прошлом году, Американская делегация высказалась вообще против специального вопросника о

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

политической платформе, мотивируя это тем, что важнейшие части политической платформы включены в документ о Временном Положении. Советская делегация разъяснила, что эти два документа не могут быть объединены в один, поскольку политическая платформа включает программу деятельности Временного Правительства, в то время как Временное Положение является документом конституционного характера.

Тогда Американская делегация предложила внести ряд изменений в редакцию вопросника по политической платформе, утвержденную в прошлом году. В частности, она предложила не включать вопрос о мероприятиях по устранению влияния пропонских элементов, а в вопросе : " как должна быть предотвращена деятельность реакционных, антидемократических элементов, пытающихся подорвать Временное Корейское Демократическое Правительство ? ", исключить слова " деятельность реакционных элементов ". Последнее предложение Американская делегация мотивировала тем, что еще неизвестно против кого нужно будет бороться Временному Правительству - против реакционных элементов или каких-либо других. Эти предложения были отклонены Советской делегацией, и принятый в прошлом году вопросник о политической платформе был утвержден с незначительными редакционными поправками.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 11 июня было принято решение № 14 "О порядке рассылки вопросника и декларации, содержащейся в коммюнике № 5, демократическим партиям и общественным организациям и получения от них ответов и рекомендаций ". Работа во исполнение этого решения была проведена Советской и Американской делегациями, соответственно по Северной и Южной Корее точно и своевременно.

11 июня Совместная Комиссия приняла решение, согласно которому, в целях предварительного изучения структуры и функций существующих в Северной и Южной Корее исполнительных, законодательных и судебных органов и их руководящего состава, обе делегации согласились обменяться до 1 июля 1947 года по возможности подробными письменными данными по вышеуказанным

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

вопросам, относящимся к соответствующим зонам / решение № 15/. Советский представитель в подкомиссии № 3 неоднократно напоминал американскому представителю в этой подкомиссии о необходимости обменяться такой информацией, но американская сторона под разными предлогами оттягивала представление информации, и решение № 15 осталось невыполненным.

12 июня 1947 года Совместная Комиссия опубликовала документ о порядке консультации, а также вопросники по временному положению и политической платформе. Заявления на участие в консультации должны были быть представлены 28 июня 1947 года, а письменные соображения по вопросникам к 5 июля 1947 года.

В соответствии с параграфами 5 и 6 решения № 12 и решением № 16 Совместной Комиссии каждая делегация в подкомиссии № 1 составляет список партий и организаций, подавших заявления по своей зоне, а также список выделенных ими представителей. Этот список обсуждается в подкомиссии № 1 и после достижения соглашения, представляется на утверждение Совместной Комиссии.

Представленный советской стороной список по Северной Корее включал 38 демократических партий и общественных организаций с общим количеством членов 13.300 тысяч человек.

Список партий и организаций Южной Кореи, подавших заявления на участие в консультации, представленный Американской стороной в подкомиссии № 1, включал 429 партий и организаций.

Письменные соображения по вопросникам были получены от 38 партий и организаций Северной Кореи и 397 партий и организаций Южной Кореи.

Анализируя предварительный список партий и организаций Южной Кореи, представленный в подкомиссию № 1 Американской делегацией, Советская делегация отметила, что общее количество членов этих партий и организаций выражалось фантастической цифрой 70 миллионов человек, в то время как все население Южной Кореи составляет, примерно, 18 миллионов человек. Это означает, что каждый взрослый кореец, как мужчина, так

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

и женщина ,состоит в восьми организациях, что далеко от действительности. Такое положение не могло не вызвать сомнений в правильности сведений, представленных некоторыми партиями и организациями, тем более, что вскоре американский представитель в подкомиссии № 1 сам отметил факты подачи ложных сведений.

Кроме того, уже в процессе предварительного изучения списка по Южной Корее были обнаружены несуществующие организации. В связи с этим советский представитель в подкомиссии № 1 предложил проверить те организации, наличие или количество членов которых вызывает сомнение.

По соглашению глав делегаций Совместная Комиссия, не ожидая составления списка для консультации, провела 25 июня 1947 года в Сеуле совместное заседание с представителями партий и организаций Южной Кореи и 1 июля 1947 года - в Пхеньяне с представителями партий и организаций Северной Кореи.

Начало устной консультации было намечено на 7 июля 1947 года. Но ввиду разногласий между делегациями по вопросу составления списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации, устная консультация не была начата.

Изучение предварительных списков, представленных обеими делегациями,и составление согласованного списка входило в задачу подкомиссии № 1. Однако, Американская делегация в подкомиссии № 1 отказалась от обсуждения списков и поэтому, вопреки решению № 16, подкомиссия № 1 так и не представила Совместной Комиссии согласованного списка партий и общественных организаций.

Начиная со 2 июля дискуссия по вопросу о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций велась в самой Комиссии.

Ниже излагаются позиции Советской и Американской делегаций по вопросу о составлении списка для консультации.

Позиция Советской делегации :

1. Среди партий и организаций Южной Кореи ,подавших заявления на участие в консультации, имеются организации,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

которые не являются общественными : торговые и промышленные компании, административные учреждения, учебные заведения и т.п. Поскольку Московское решение о Корее предусматривает консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, Советская делегация предложила не включать в список для консультации те организации, которые не являются общественными.

2. Советская делегация указала, что среди поданных заявлений на участие в консультации от Южной Кореи имеются филиалы центральных организаций и узко местные незначительные организации, не носящие зонального характера. Советская делегация предложила не включать эти организации в список для консультации, заявив, что, по ее мнению, решение № 12 Совместной Комиссии предусматривает консультацию с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями зонального масштаба. При этом, Советская делегация указала, что количество местных организаций как на Севере, так и на Юге Кореи очень велико и если бы Совместная Комиссия стала консультироваться со всеми местными незначительными организациями, то это могло бы надолго затянуть и запутать ее работу.

3. Советская делегация заявила, что в соответствии с соглашением, достигнутым между Министром Иностранных дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВЫМ и Государственным Секретарем США Д.МАРШАЛЛОМ в апреле-мае 1947 года , Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, которые полностью поддерживают Московское решение о Корее и которые после подписания декларации не подстрекают к активным выступлениям против работы Совместной Комиссии, или против одной из союзных держав ,или против выполнения Московского решения . Исходя из этого, Советская делегация внесла предложение о том, что партии и общественные организации ,подавшие заявления на участие в консультации, которые входят в Комитет борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации только в том случае, если они выйдут

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация указала, что после возобновления работы Комиссии и даже после опубликования решения Совместной Комиссии о порядке консультации, Комитет борьбы против оккн не только не прекратил ,но ,наоборот, усилил борьбу против Московского решения и Совместной Комиссии, стремясь сорвать ее работу по созданию временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. До тех пор, пока партии и организации, входящие в этот Комитет ,не заявят о своем выходе из Комитета, они продолжают нести ответственность за его действия.

Советская делегация, далее, указала, что партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против оккн, подписав декларацию ,тем самым взяли на себя обязательство полностью поддерживать Московское решение о Корее. Вместе с тем, оставаясь членами этого Комитета, указанные партии и организации оставляют свою подпись под программой Комитета, содержащей обязательство - бороться против Московского решения, и продолжают фактически участвовать в борьбе против Московского решения. Одно с другим несовместимо.

Позиция Американской делегации.

Американская делегация отклонила предложения Советской делегации, сославшись на следующие мотивы :

1. Нет оснований отстранять от консультации необщественные организации, так как Московское решение и решение № 12 Совместной Комиссии не содержат определения термина " общественные организации".

2. Районные и другие много местные организации не подлежат ни консультации ни Московским решением, ни соглашением МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА, ни решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии .

3. Партии, состоящие членами Комитета борьбы против оккн или подобных организаций, имеют, по соглашению МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА ,право на участие в первоначальной консультации,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

если они подали заявления и подписали требуемую декларацию. Они продолжают иметь право на консультации ,если и до тех пор, пока не будут исключены по взаимному соглашению двух делегаций по обвинению их на основании параграфа 3 условий консультации, согласованных между двумя Министрами.

Американская делегация обвинила Советскую делегацию в стремлении односторонне исключить из списка некоторые партии и организации. При этом, она заявила, что по мнению Американской делегации, Комиссия уже имеет список партий и общественных организаций и.что,следовательно, теперь речь идет об исключении из этого списка.

Поскольку дискуссия по этому вопросу задерживала начало устной консультации , Советская делегация , в целях ускорения работы Комиссии, много раз предлагала , не ожидая составления окончательного списка, начать консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, в отношении консультации с которыми нет возражений ни со стороны Советской,ни со стороны Американской делегации.

Советская делегация также неоднократно предлагала поручить подкомиссии № 1 конкретно рассмотреть возражения или замечания по каждой организации в отдельности, но Американская делегация отклонила это предложение.

Что касается вопроса о составлении списка, то Советская делегация заявила, что поскольку подкомиссия № 1 не представила согласованного списка партий и организаций, Совместной Комиссии предстоит решать, какие партии и организации, подавшие заявления, должны быть включены в список для первоначальной устной консультации в соответствии с Московским решением и решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии. Исключать из списка можно будет только тогда, когда будет список,утвержденный Комиссией. Советская делегация указала, что позиция Американской делегации в этом вопросе состоит в том, что Совместная Комиссия должна консультироваться со всеми партиями и организациями,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

которых Американская делегация считает нужным пригласить для консультации.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 10 июля 1947 года Советская делегация предложила включить в список для консультации демократические партии и общественные организации с заявленным количеством членов свыше 10 тысяч человек и предложила проект такого списка с тем, чтобы подкомиссия № 1 было поручено уточнить этот список. В предложении говорилось, что партии и общественные организации, которые не включены в список, если они пожелают что-либо добавить к представленным ими письменным соображениям, будут иметь возможность прислать своих представителей для устной консультации после окончания консультации с партиями и общественными организациями, включенными в список. В предложении, далее, указывалось, что партии и общественные организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, могут быть допущены к консультации в том случае, если они выйдут из этого Комитета и прекратят борьбу против Советского решения в Совместной Комиссии.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 16 июля Американская делегация заявила, что она принимает ,с незначительными поправками, это предложение Советской делегации, за исключением пункта, в котором говорится о партиях и организациях, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки.

После этого, вопрос о допущении к консультации этих партий и организаций остался по существу единственным несогласованным вопросом, препятствовавшим проведению устной консультации.

Несмотря на многочисленные и широко известные факты враждебной Советскому решению деятельности Комитета борьбы против опеки, на которые неоднократно указывала Советская делегация, Американская делегация настаивала на безоговорочном допущении к консультации партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки.

Советская делегация, в целях разрешения этого вопроса и ускорения работы Совместной Комиссии, неоднократно предлагала вызвать на заседание подкомиссии № 1 или на заседание Совместной Комиссии представителей партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, для того, чтобы уточ -

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

нить их позиции в отношении Московского решения и работы Совместной Комиссии. Американская делегация отклонила эти предложения.

Советская делегация не раз указывала, что позиция Американской делегации в вопросе о Комитете борьбы против опеки отличалась непоследовательностью и противоречивостью.

В начале дискуссии Американская делегация утверждала, что Комитет борьбы против опеки уже прекратил свое существование. Вместе с тем, Американская делегация сама по существу признала, что Комитет борьбы против опеки враждебен по отношению к Московскому решению и что цели и программа этого Комитета несовместимы с позицией партий и организаций, выступающих за поддержку Совместной Комиссии. Так, например, в заявлении Американской делегации от 10 июля о результатах изучения деятельности Комитета борьбы против опеки отмечалось, что этот Комитет стремился "объединить все правые партии для активной борьбы против опеки". В том же заявлении указывалось, что :

> " партии, которым Советская делегация предъявляет обвинение, не желали отказать своей подписи под целями данного Комитета и настаивали на поддержке работы Совместной Комиссии. Главным образом, в результате именно этой позиции, занятой указанными партиями, выступающими открыто против программы Комитета борьбы против опеки и за поддержку работы Совместной Комиссии, объясняется то, что Комитет борьбы против опеки превратился в бездействующий".

На заседании 24 июля генерал ВРАУН заявил, что " в распоряжении Американской делегации имеется достоверная информация ,указывающая, что подозрительные для Советской делегации партии и организации отказываются следовать программе Комитета борьбы против опеки и отвергают водительство КПК-ГУ ". На том же заседании генерал ВРАУН заявил, что " подписавшие декларации упомянутые партии и организации дискредитировали руководство КПК ГУ и ЛИ СИН МАНА, которые совершенно не хотели содействовать каким-либо образом работе

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Совместной Комиссии ".

После того, как партии и организации, входящие в Комитет борьбы против опеки, своими действиями и заявлениями опровергли вышеупомянутые утверждения Американской делегации и подтвердили ,что они продолжают оставаться в Комитете, руководимом [illegible], Американская делегация заявила, что ,по ее мнению, пребывание политической партии или организации в Комитете борьбы против опеки не является препятствием для допущения ее к консультации Совместной Комиссии. Обосновывая свою позицию, Американская делегация утверждала, что этот Комитет ограничивается выражением мнения и не доходит до развития и подстрекания активной оппозиции против московского решения и работы Совместной Комиссии.

Добиваясь привлечения к консультации партий и организаций ,входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки , Американская делегация заявила ,что это необходимо для сохранения определенного якобы установившегося в политической жизни Кореи соотношения между партиями правого и левого течения как 1 к 2. Она обвиняла Советскую делегацию в стремлении нарушить это соотношение в пользу партий левого направления.

Советская делегация отвергла такой подход к разрешению вопроса ,указав, что нельзя проводить работу Совместной Комиссии на партийной основе. Советская делегация заявила, что Совместная Комиссия в вопросе консультации с корейскими партиями и организациями должна исходить из отношения последних к Московскому решению ,а не из их принадлежности к тому или другому политическому направлению. Эта позиция Советской делегации нашла свое выражение ,в частности, в списке партий и организаций с количеством членов свыше 10 тысяч , который был представлен Советской делегацией 10 июля для обсуждения в подкомиссии № 1. Этот список включал 147 партий и общественных организаций ,в том числе 28 партий и организаций от Северной Кореи и 119 - от Южной Кореи. Среди последних Советская делегация предлагала пригласить для устной консультации

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

партий и организаций правого направления - 74, левого направления - 34 и центра - 11. В список не были включены лишь 20 партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки ; однако, Советская делегация соглашалась допустить к консультации и эти партии и организации после того, как они заявят о своем выходе из Комитета борьбы против опеки.

Ввиду трудностей, возникших в работе Комиссии в результате фактического отказа Американской делегации применять соглашение [illegible] и партиям и организациям, входящим в Комитет борьбы против опеки, Советская делегация, в целях ускорения работы Комиссии внесла 5 августа предложение, наряду с обсуждением вопроса о составлении списка, приступить к изучению в подкомиссиях письменных соображений, представленных партиями и общественными организациями, и к подготовке предложений по вопросам, непосредственно связанным с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Американская делегация отклонила это предложение, заявив, что, по ее мнению, бесполезно переходить к обсуждению других вопросов, пока не решен вопрос о списке партий и организаций.

12 августа Американская делегация внесла следующее предложение :

" 1. Устная консультация не будет проводиться, а вопросники, представленные корейскими политическими партиями и общественными организациями, будут приняты в качестве консультации, предусмотренной московским решением.

2. Поручить подкомиссии № 2 закончить и представить Совместной Комиссии Временное Положение и политическую платформу для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. В этом Положении должно быть указано - какие должности назначаются, какие выбираются.

3. В Положении, имеющем быть представленным перед четырьмя державами, Совместная Комиссия предусматривает проведение немедленных всеобщих выборов по избранию Национального Законодательного

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

органа и других правительственных должностных лиц, которые будут предусмотрены в Положении. Такие выборы предусматривают свободную предвыборную кампанию ; тайна голосования и представительство более чем одной партии обеспечивается международным контролем над выборами. Подкомиссии № 2 поручается подготовить детальные планы для этих всеобщих выборов как на севере, так и на юге Кореи, которые будут представлены четырем державам с предложенным Положением.

4. Поручить подкомиссии № 3 подготовить план для подбора назначаемого личного состава для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства вместе с планом по объединению существующих правительственных функций Северной и Южной Кореи ".

На заседании Комиссии 26 августа Советская делегация изложила свой ответ на предложение Американской делегации. Это предложение было признано ею неудовлетворительным по следующим мотивам :

Основная задача Совместной Комиссии - создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства -в американском предложении обходится и запутывается ,в то время, как корейский народ ждет от Совместной Комиссии,прежде всего, разрешения именно этого вопроса ;

В американском предложении не говорится о консультации, предусмотренной в параграфе 9 решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, но глава Американской делегации, отвечая на вопрос Советской делегации, разъяснил, что эта консультация должна иметь место. Однако, он не внес никаких предложений о способах проведения этой консультации.

Советская делегация заявила, что она считает само собой разумеющимся, что во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание законодательного органа, избираемого на основе всеобщего, прямого и равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании. Советская делегация отметила, что у нее сложилось впечатление, что предложение Американской делегации от 12 августа было внесено с чисто пропагандистской целью.

Согласившись с предложением не проводить устной консультации, предусмотренной в параграфе 7 решения № 12 Совместно

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Комиссия, ввиду невозможности достичь соглашения по списку партий и организаций, Советская делегация внесла следующее предложение :

" 1. Поручить :

а/ подкомиссии № 2 немедленно приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, которые были разосланы Совместной Комиссией, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты структуры Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение/ и политической платформы, и

б/ подкомиссии № представить в Совместную Комиссию предложение относительно персонального состава Временного Правительства и о порядке приема Правительством власти.

2. Создать консультативный орган - Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций.

Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание сформировать из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций, подавших заявления в Совместную Комиссию о консультации, с заявленным числом членов этих организаций свыше 10.000, и полностью поддерживающих Московское решение, а также не выступающих против Совместной Комиссии и союзных держав.

Количество представителей во Временном Общекорейском Народном Собрании от Северной и Южной Кореи должно быть одинаково.

Представительство от различных партий и организаций установит Совместная Комиссия в соответствии с количеством их членов и учитывая, насколько возможно, их влияние.

3. Совместная Комиссия привлекает Временное Общекорейское Народное Собрание к разработке предложений по вопросу структуры и принципов организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение/ ,политической платформы и персонального состава Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и порядка приема власти Правительством и другим вопросам.

Во Временном Положении должно быть предусмотрено создание законодательного органа, выборы в который должны быть проведены по всей Корее на основе всеобщего, прямого, равного избирательного права, при тайном голосовании.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

... На этих выборах все демократические партии и общественные организации должны иметь равные возможности выставления своих кандидатов и свободной агитации за них и за свою программу ".

На заседании Совместной комиссии 20 августа Советская делегация обратила внимание Американской делегации на факты жестоких репрессий властей южной Кореи против тех демократических партий и общественных организаций, которые активно поддерживают роскольское решение и работу Совместной Комиссии. Советская делегация, в частности, указала на фактическое закрытие демократических партий и общественных организаций левого направления, массовые аресты их руководителей, членов и даже представителей, выделенных для консультации Совместной Комиссии, погромы левых демократических газет, аресты работников левой демократической печати, членов делегаций, посетивших Совместную Комиссию для передачи ей требований и пожеланий народа и др.

В подтверждение этого Советская делегация привела большое количество фактов.

Советская делегация заявила, что многочисленные аресты руководителей демократических партий и организаций, многие из которых являются представителями этих партий и организаций для консультации с Совместной Комиссией, создали в Южной Корее обстановку, которая препятствует выполнению Московского решения о Корее и договоренности, достигнутой между [illegible] и МАРШАЛЛОМ. Такая обстановка создается, повидимому, с целью сорвать работу Совместной Комиссии. Обратив серьезное внимание Американской делегации на эти обстоятельства, Советская делегация настаивала на принятии немедленных мер к восстановлению нормальной обстановки для существования и деятельности демократических партий и организаций Южной Кореи и надлежащих условий для работы Совместной Комиссии.

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 25 августа Американская делегация сделала ответное заявление, в которо не только не опровергла приведенных Советской делегацией фактов арестов и погромов, но фактически подтвердила их. Американская делегация упрекнула Советскую делегацию в том, что Советская делегация, находясь в Южной Корее в качестве гостя американских

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

властей, пытается якобы вмешиваться во внутренние дела
жной Кореи.

Советская делегация ответила, что она является не
просто гостем, а членом международной Комиссии, предусмотренно
Московским решением трех министров о Корее, которая несет
ответственность за выполнение этого решения. Поэтому Советская
делегация не может относиться безразлично к событиям, о кото-
рых идет речь.

Американская делегация в своем заявлении выразила
особую заинтересованность в консультациях с определенными
лидерами, арестованными в прошлом году под арестом в Север-
ной Корее.

Советская делегация ответила, что американская де-
легация не назвала ни одного деятеля, который был бы арестован
властями в Северной Корее. Советская делегация указала, что
в Северной Корее лидеры партий и организаций не арестовываются
партии и организации не преследуются ,их учреждения и газеты
не закрываются ,и с момента освобождения в Северной Корее
не было таких фактов, чтобы была закрыта газета какой-нибудь
партии или организации ,или разгромлена редакция ,или закрыто
учреждение той или иной партии или организации. Все партии
сотрудничают между собой и решают вопросы, имея равные воз-
можности и одинаковые права.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СОВМЕСТНАЯ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ
СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ
Сеул, Корея

ГЛАВЕ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ
КОМИССИИ
Генерал-майору Альберту Е.БРАУН

"9" сентября 1947 г.

Уважаемый генерал БРАУН !

6 сентября 1947 года в 12 час.15 мин. переводчик Советской делегации ПАК ТХЯ СЕБ, следуя из здания Дворца ДУК СУ на завтрак на территорию, где размещается Советская делегация, при выходе из здания дворца ДУК СУ был остановлен американским солдатом, который, ничего не спрашивая, стал обыскивать ПАК ТХЯ СЕБА и пытался из внутреннего кармана пиджака вынуть письмо и газеты.

В это время вышел из здания дворца ДУК СУ сотрудник Американской делегации капитан ФИЛИППС, к которому и обратился ПАК ТХЯ СЕБ по существу такого вызывающего случая. Капитан ФИЛИППС объяснил это тем, что американский солдат не знал, кто такой ПАК ТХЯ СЕБ.

Считая такое действие военнослужащего американской армии по отношению к сотруднику Советской делегации недопустимым, прошу Вас довести о вышеизложенном до сведения Американского военного командования с тем, чтобы были приняты необходимые меры к недопущению впредь подобных случаев.

С уважением

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК

Т.Ф.ШТЫКОВ

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NND 760090
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ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА НА ПРЕСС-КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

9 сентября 1947 года.

4 сентября 1947 года Министр Иностранных Дел СССР [illegible] направил через Советского посла в США Государственному Секретарю США Д.МАРШАЛЛУ следующий ответ на письмо Зам.Государственного Секретаря США г-на МОБЕТТА от 26 августа 1947 г. по вопросу о Корее:

"Уважаемый господин МАРШАЛЛ,

Подтверждаю получение письма г-на МОБЕТТА от [illegible] августа 1947 года.

Считаю необходимым обратить Ваше внимание на то, что предварительная разработка мероприятий для оказания содействия образованию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, согласно решению Московского совещания Трех Министров Иностранных Дел, производится Совместной Комиссией, созданной из представителей командования советских войск в Северной Корее и командования американских войск в Южной Корее.

На рассмотрение четырех правительств, в том числе Великобританского и Китайского правительств, согласно Московскому решению, должны быть переданы выработанные Совместной Комиссией рекомендации до принятия по ним окончательного решения.

Кроме того, правительства Великобритании и Китая примут участие в рассмотрении, совместно с правительствами СССР и США, разработанных Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссией предложений о мерах помощи и содействия /опека/ политическому, экономическому и социальному прогрессу корейского народа, развитию демократического самоуправления и установлению государственной независимости Кореи с тем, чтобы выработать соглашение об опеке четырех держав в отношении Кореи.

Задача Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии, как известно, состоит в оказании помощи в создании единого для всей Кореи Временного Демократического Правительства. Совместная Комиссия в этом направлении действительно сделала еще немногое,

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

но такое положение явилось результатом, главным образом, позиции, занятой Американской делегацией по вопросу консультации Комиссии с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями, что было отмечено в моем последнем письме на Ваше имя.

Если бы Американская делегация проявила должное стремление к оказанию содействия в создании действительно демократического Правительства в Корее, то работа Совместной Комиссии была бы более успешной; задача, возложенная на нее, могла бы быть выполнена и не было бы того застойного состояния в работе Совместной Комиссии, которое в письме г-на [illegible] названо тупиком.

Как Вам известно, Советская делегация, желая разрешить создавшееся в Совместной Комиссии положение и стремясь ускорить работу по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, согласилась с предложением Американской делегации не проводить устной консультации с корейскими демократическими партиями и общественными организациями и 26 августа 1947 года внесла новое предложение о создании консультативного органа - Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций всей Кореи. Это предложение не должно, по нашему мнению, встретить возражений со стороны Американской делегации, так как оно могло бы устранить трудности, с которыми столкнулась Совместная Комиссия.

К изложенному считаем нужным добавить, что успешное осуществление указанного в предложении Советской делегации мероприятия возможно лишь на основе свободной и невоспрепятствованной деятельности демократических партий и организаций, представители которых в настоящее время в Южной Корее подвергаются арестам и другим репрессиям, что несовместимо с принципами демократии и законности, а также с теми обязательствами, которые в отношении Кореи взяли на себя правительства США и СССР.

В связи с содержащимся в письме г-на ДОЛЕТТА утверждениями по поводу позиции Советской делегации в Совместной Комиссии, смысл которых сводится к тому, что Советская делегация якобы не проявляет никакого понимания предложений Американской делегации,

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

я не вижу необходимости останавливаться на этих утверждениях, ввиду явной их несостоятельности.

Не могу, вместе с тем, не выразить сожаления по поводу предпринятых Вами в одностороннем порядке таких действий, как посылка приглашения правительствам Великобритании и Китая принять участие в обсуждении этого вопроса, с установлением места и даты совещания. Ваше предложение о передаче вопроса относительно созыва Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства на обсуждение правительств четырех стран, Советское Правительство считает нецелесообразным, так как Совместная Комиссия еще далеко не исчерпала всех своих возможностей для выработки согласованных рекомендаций, что вполне возможно.

Также неприемлемы указанные в Вашем письме г-на СТЕТТИНИУСА "предложения Соединенных Штатов относительно Кореи". Эти предложения не могут не повлечь за собой дальнейшее разъединение Кореи, поскольку они предусматривают создание отдельных законодательных собраний на Юге и на Севере Кореи /с советской и американской зонах/, в то время как насущная задача состоит в том, чтобы как можно скорее добиться совместного, хотя и временного, но единого органа власти - Общекорейского Временного Демократического Правительства.

Американские предложения не устраняют ныне существующего в Корее положения - деления страны на две зоны, к ликвидации которого должны быть направлены все усилия, - а, наоборот, закрепляют это ненормальное положение.

Имея в виду, что предложение о рассмотрении вопроса о Корее на совместном совещании представителей четырех держав не вытекает из Московского решения Трех Министров Иностранных Дел о Корее, а принимая во внимание изложенные выше соображения, Советское Правительство не видит возможности принять выдвинутые в письме г-на БЕРНСА предложения.

Копия этого письма направляется мною правительствам Великобритании и Китая.

Прошу Вас, г-н Государственный Секретарь, принять уверения в моем весьма высоком уважении

В.М.МОЛОТОВ

4 сентября 1947 года".

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

11 September 1947

Guard Colonel General T.F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US-USSR Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

I have had an investigation made of the incident which you reported in your letter of 9 September.

The investigation reveals that:

1. At about 1210, 6 September, the guard on duty at the front entrance of the palace saw a Korean, whom he did not identify as a member of either delegation, start to leave the palace while carrying some papers partially concealed under his coat.

2. The members of the guard have been directed to search Korean laborers leaving the building during other than normal duty hours.

3. His suspicions aroused by the papers, the guard stopped the Korean and turned back his coat in order to see the papers. He identified them as being in either Korean or Russian.

4. Satisfied as to the nature of the papers, the guard permitted the Korean to proceed.

5. The Korean at no time made any explanation to the guard.

6. Captain Phillips met the Korean, whom he identified as PAK, Tai Seb, in the parking lot. Captain Phillips walked with PAK and a Korean newspaper man (who acted as interpreter) to where the guard was standing. Captain Phillips learned from the guard the reason for his stopping and searching the Korean and relayed it to PAK through the newspaper man. Thereupon PAK shook

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

hands with Captain Phillips and said, also through the newspaper man, "I understand and it is OK," or words to that effect.

I am sure that after learning the above details you will agree with me that the guard properly performed his duty, further that no affront to a member of the Soviet Delegation was intended. It is quite possible that there will be similar incidents until such time as Korean members of both delegations are known to all members of the guard or can quickly identify themselves to members of the guard.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Joint Soviet-American Commission
The Soviet Delegation
Seoul, Korea

9 September 1947

Major General Albert E. Brown
The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation
The US-USSR Joint Commission

Dear General Brown:

On 6 September 1947 at 1215 hours PAK, TSI SEB, the interpreter of the Soviet Delegation, upon leaving for lunch the Duk Soo Palace where the Joint Commission is located, was stopped by an American soldier, who without asking any questions, started searching PAK, TSI SEB and attempted to remove a letter and newspapers from his coat pocket.

Captain Phillips, a member of the American Delegation, came out of the Duk Soo Palace at this time, and PAK, TSI SEB turned to him for assistance in such an ~~outrageous~~ PROVOKING occurrence. Captain Phillips explained that what happened was that the American soldier did not know who PAK, TSI SEB was.

Considering such action on the part of a soldier of the American Army toward a member of the Soviet Delegation inadmissible, I request that you bring the above-mentioned incident to the attention of the American Command, in order that necessary measures should be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

Respectfully yours,

Colonel General T. F. SHTIKOV
The Chief Commissioner of the
Soviet Delegation in the Joint
Soviet-American Commission

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Blankenship, Robert S., Pvt., 7th Infantry Division Palace Guard

On 6 September 1947 at about 1210 hours, I was on Post #2 at the top of the steps at the main entrance to the Duk Soo Palace.

The Corporal of the Guard was going around checking the windows and safes at this time.

A Korean passed me and I noticed he had a bunch of papers under his coat. To me this looked suspicious, so I stopped him and turned back his coat to see what they were. I saw they were papers with Korean or Russian writing on them. As I did this, he pushed my arm away and started down the steps. I put my hand on his shoulder, told him I was a guard, and authorized to search Korean workers. He didn't say anything but turned around and went back into the Palace, and down the American Wing. I followed him. He looked in Major General Brown's office and then turned around, went back out the main entrance, and down the steps to the parking area. A few minutes later he returned with Captain Phillips and a Korean. I explained the incident to Captain Phillips and he relayed it on to the Russian delegate that it was a mistake on my part because I did not recognize the Korean as a member of the Russian Delegation. The Korean in question did not show me any identification.

Robert S. Blankenship RA16232025
Pvt., US Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
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ПИСЬМО МИНИСТРА ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР В.МОЛОТОВА, НАПРАВЛЕННОЕ 9 ОКТЯБРЯ 1947 ГОДА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОМУ СЕКРЕТАРЮ США Д.МАРШАЛЛУ ПО ВОПРОСУ О КОРЕЕ.

" Уважаемый господин Маршалл,

Позиция, занятая делегацией США в Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии в Сеуле, говорит о том, что делегация США не желает продолжать работу Совместной Комиссии с целью достижения , на основе точного соблюдения Московского соглашения о Корее, согласованных решений по вопросам, связанным с созданием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

В нарушение Московского соглашения о Корее и договоренности, достигнутой между правительствами СССР и США в мае 1947 года об условиях возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии, делегация США настаивает на том, чтобы в формировании Корейского Правительства принимали участие не только демократические партии и группы Северной и Южной Кореи, которые подписали декларацию о поддержке целей Московского соглашения и лойяльно выполняют условия этой декларации, но и также реакционные группы, которые, подписав эту декларацию, ведут борьбу против Московского соглашения и продолжают состоять в так называемом "Комитете борьбы против опеки", что противоречит указанной выше договоренности между правительствами СССР и США.

Советская делегация, последовательно отстаивающая принципы Московского соглашения, разумеется, не может согласиться с этим.

Позиция делегации США сделала невозможным образование Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства в соответствии с Московским соглашением, что тормозит восстановление Кореи, как единого демократического государства.

Ввиду создавшегося положения правительство СССР поручило Советской делегации внести в Совместную Комиссию в Сеуле новое предложение, а именно : предоста-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

вить возможность корейцам сформировать правительство самим, без помощи и участия со стороны Соединенных Штатов Америки и Советского Союза, при условии вывода американских и советских войск из Кореи.

Если правительство США согласно с предложением о выводе из Кореи всех иностранных войск в начале 1948 года, то советские войска будут готовы покинуть Корею одновременно с американскими войсками.

Несмотря на то, что это предложение было внесено Советской делегацией на заседании Совместной Комиссии еще 26 сентября 1947 года, делегация США, к сожалению, до сих пор не дала на него ответа, что не может не тормозить решение корейского вопроса.

Что касается рассмотрения корейского вопроса на сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи организации Объединенных Наций, как это предложено в письме господина ЛОВЕТТА от 17 сентября 1947 года, то, как Вам известно, позиция Советского правительства по данному вопросу уже изложена Советской делегацией на Генеральной Ассамблее.

Копии этого письма, направляются мной Правительствам Великобритании и Китая.

Прошу Вас, господин Государственный Секретарь, принять уверения в моем весьма высоком уважении

В. МОЛОТОВ

Москва, 9 октября 1947 года "

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
17 СЕНТЯБРЯ 1947 Г.

Работа Совместной Комиссии уже в течение длительного времени находится в состоянии застоя. Советская делегация с сожалением констатирует ясно выявившееся за последнее время нежелание Американской делегации работать в Совместной Комиссии над разрешением вопросов, связанных с созданием единого Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Вместо того, чтобы стремиться к преодолению возникших в Совместной Комиссии трудностей и к принятию согласованных решений, Американская делегация пошла по пути искусственного осложнения и затягивания работы Комиссии, подчеркивания и обострения разногласий между делегациями с целью доказать невозможность разрешения стоящих перед Комиссией вопросов.

Это особенно ярко выявилось при составлении Комиссией совместного доклада. Еще до обсуждения представленных обеими делегациями проектов совместного доклада, Американская делегация предложила отказаться от составления совместного доклада, и направить представленные Советской и Американской делегациями проекты доклада правительствам с сопроводительным письмом, в котором указать, что делегации не могли достигнуть соглашения относительно совместного доклада. Вместо делового обсуждения представленных проектов с целью составления приемлемого совместного доклада, Американская делегация пошла по пути мелочных придирок, подчеркивая расхождения между проектами, стремясь исключить всякую возможность составления совместного доклада, и, таким образом, попытаться и на этом примере показать невозможность достижения соглашения в Совместной Комиссии.

События, имевшие за последнее время место в Совместной Комиссии и вне ее, полностью подтвердили опасения, касающиеся действительного отношения Американской делегации к работе Совместной Комиссии, которые невольно возникали и ранее в связи с позицией Американской делегации в отношении предложений, которые выдвигались Советской делегацией с целью ускорения работы Сов. Ком.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

рения работы Совместной Комиссии.

Как известно, работа Совместной Комиссии задержалась вследствие разногласий между делегациями по вопросу о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации.

Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить разрешение вопроса о составлении списка для консультации, неоднократно предлагала - поручить подкомиссии № 1 приступить к рассмотрению поступивших от партий и организаций заявлений на участие в консультации, включить в список и немедленно приступить к устной консультации с теми партиями и организациями, допущение которых к консультации, в соответствии с Московским решением, соглашением между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, а также решением № 12 Совместной Комиссии, не вызывало сомнений, а затем продолжать обсуждение и проверку остальных заявлений. Что касается партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против онеки, то Советская делегация сделала несколько предложений, имевших целью разрешить этот вопрос в соответствии с соглашением МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА. Если бы Американская делегация проявила достаточное желание ускорить разрешение спорных вопросов, то работа Совместной Комиссии еще в июле месяце могла бы значительно двинуться вперед. Однако, вышеупомянутые предложения Советской делегации были отвергнуты Американской делегацией, которая предпочитала вести дискуссию по общим вопросам, уклонилась от конкретного обсуждения представленных партиями и организациями заявлений на участие в консультации, каждого в отдельности, и тем самым затягивая работу Комиссии.

Учитывая, что вследствие позиции, занятой Американской делегацией по вопросу о составлении списка, задержалась вся работа Совместной Комиссии, Советская делегация еще 5 августа 1947 года предложила приступить к разработке предложений по Временному Положению, политической платформе, а также по вопросам персонального состава Временного Правительства, порядка приема власти Временным Правительством и подбора аппарата.

Советская делегация исходила из того, что Совместной Комиссии предстоит большая работа по разработке вышеуказан-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

них предложений, и что к этой работе необходимо приступить как можно раньше. Однако, и это предложение Советской делегации было отвергнуто Американской делегацией, которая отказалась обсуждать другие вопросы, стоящие в программе работы Комиссии, пока не решен вопрос о списке партий и организаций для консультации.

26 августа 1947 года Советская делегация внесла новые предложения в ответ на предложения Американской делегации от 12 августа 1947 года. Советская делегация приняла пункт 1 предложений Американской делегации - не проводить устной консультации и заменить ее письменными предложениями корейских партий и организаций, поступившими в Комиссию в ответ на вопросники. Таким образом, по этому вопросу между делегациями имеется согласие.

Советская делегация предложила - поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты предложений по соответствующим вопросам. Эти предложения вытекают из принятого на заседании Совместной Комиссии 22 мая 1947 года плана работы, согласно которому первый этап работы Совместной Комиссии включает следующие вопросы :

1. Условия и порядок консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

2. Выработка рекомендаций о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти / Временное Положение/.

3. Предварительная выработка политической платформы и других надлежащих мероприятий для будущего Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

4. Выработка рекомендаций о персональном составе Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

5. Порядок приема власти Временным Корейским Демократическим Правительством и порядок подбора аппарата для Времен-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Предложения Советской делегации от 26 августа относительно работы подкомиссий № 2 и № 3 во многом сходятся с предложениями Американской делегации от 12 августа.

Предложения Советской делегации от 26 августа предусматривали также создание Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций. Этот консультативный орган должен быть создан для того, чтобы уже сейчас привлечь корейцев к непосредственному участию в разработке всех вопросов, связанных с образованием Корейского Временного Правительства.

Американская делегация на заседании Совместной Комиссии 3 сентября высказалась против предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа в целом, но выдвинула возражения только против предложений о создании Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания.

Американская делегация, по существу, не возражала против других пунктов предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа.

Учитывая вышеизложенное, Советская делегация, стремясь добиться создания Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, настаивает на реализации тех положений из предложений Американской делегации от 12 августа и предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа, по которым точки зрения обеих делегаций сближаются, и которые соответствуют приведенному выше решению Совместной Комиссии от 22 мая 1947 года, и предлагает поручить:

1. Подкомиссии № 2 немедленно приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, которые были разосланы Совместной Комиссией, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты структуры Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/ и политической платформы.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1. Подкомиссии № 3 представить в Совместную Комиссию предложения относительно персонального состава Временного Правительства и о порядке приема правительством власти.

Что касается вопроса о создании Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания, то Советская делегация считает возражения, выдвинутые по этому вопросу Американской делегацией в заявлении от 5 сентября, неосновательными, и полагает, что обсуждение этого вопроса следует продолжить с целью достижения соглашения.

Если это предложение будет принято Американской делегацией, Совместная Комиссия сможет непосредственно приступить к разработке предложений по вопросам, связанным с образованием временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, которое, в соответствии с Московским решением, она должна предоставить соответствующим правительствам.

Советская делегация считает необходимым добавить, что успешная работа Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства возможна лишь при условии полной отмены репрессий в отношении демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной Кореи, освобождения арестованных руководителей и членов этих организаций и обеспечения свободной и невоспрепятствованной деятельности указанных партий и организаций.

Советская делегация исходит из того, что все усилия должны быть направлены на создание единого общекорейского органа власти - Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и считает, что выдвигаемые за последнее время планы, ведущие фактически к закреплению существующего разделения страны на две зоны, таят большую опасность для корейского народа.

Советская делегация попрежнему придерживается той точки зрения, что при наличии желания обеих делегаций точно и полностью выполнить Московское решение о Корее и соглашение между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, Совместная Комиссия может успешно разрешить поставленную перед ней задачу образования единого Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства чего с таким нетерпением ожидает корейский народ.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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СООБЩЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

ДЛЯ ПЕЧАТИ

17 октября 1947 года

17 октября 1947 года генерал-полковник ШТЫКОВ посетил Командующего американскими войсками в Южной Корее генерал-лейтенанта ХОДЖ и заявил ему протест по поводу заявления Начальника сеульской полиции от 13 октября 1947 года, которое было опубликовано в сеульских газетах 14 октября 1947 года.

Генерал ШТЫКОВ указал, что в своём заявлении Начальник сеульской полиции допустил враждебные выпады против Советской делегации в Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии и пытался выдвинуть нелепые клеветнические обвинения в отношении одного из сотрудников Советской делегации.

Генерал ШТЫКОВ далее указал, что подобное заявление Начальника сеульской полиции, действия которого контролируются американскими военными властями, могло появиться только с разрешения последних, в силу чего ответственность за это заявление он возлагает полностью на американское военное командование в Южной Корее.

Генерал ШТЫКОВ заявил по этому поводу протест и потребовал немедленного отстранения Начальника сеульской полиции от должности и принятия таких мер, которые гарантировали бы невозможность появления в будущем клеветнических и провокационных выпадов против Советской делегации в Сеуле и её сотрудников.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА ДЛЯ ПЕЧАТИ

18 сентября 1947 года.

17 сентября состоялось 30-е заседание Совместной Комиссии, на котором Советская делегация сделала следующее заявление:

«Работа Совместной Комиссии уже в течение длительного времени находится в состоянии застоя. Советская делегация с сожалением констатирует ясно выявившееся за последнее время нежелание Американской делегации работать в Совместной Комиссии над разрешением вопросов, связанных с созданием единого временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Вместо того, чтобы стремиться к преодолению возникших в Совместной Комиссии трудностей и к принятию согласованных решений, Американская делегация пошла по пути искуственного осложнения и затягивания работы Комиссии, подчеркивания и обострения разногласий между делегациями с целью доказать невозможность разрешения стоящих перед Комиссией вопросов.

Это особенно ярко выявилось при составлении Комиссией совместного доклада. Еще до обсуждения представленных обеими делегациями проектов совместного доклада, Американская делегация предложила отказаться от составления совместного доклада, и направить представленные Советской и Американской делегациями проекты доклада правительствам с сопроводительным письмом, в котором указать, что делегации не могли достигнуть соглашения относительно совместного доклада. Вместо делового обсуждения представленных проектов, с целью составления приемлемого совместного доклада, Американская делегация пошла по

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пути мелочных придирок, подчеркивая расхождения между проектами, стремясь исключить всякую возможность составления совместного доклада, и, таким образом, попытаться и на этом примере показать невозможность достижения соглашения в Совместной Комиссии.

События, имевшие за последнее время место в Совместной Комиссии и вне ее, полностью подтвердили опасения, касающиеся действительного отношения Американской делегации к работе Совместной Комиссии, которые невольно возникали и ранее в связи с позицией Американской делегации в отношении предложений, которые выдвигались Советской делегацией с целью ускорения работы Совместной Комиссии.

Как известно, работа Совместной Комиссии задержалась в следствие разногласий между делегациями по вопросу о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации.

Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить разрешение вопроса о составлении списка для консультации, неоднократно предлагала - поручить подкомиссии № 1 приступить к рассмотрению поступивших от партий и организаций заявлений на участие в консультации, включить в список и немедленно приступить к устной консультации с теми партиями и организациями, допущение которых к консультации, в соответствии с Московским решением, соглашением между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, а также решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, не вызвало сомнений, а затем продолжать обсуждение и проверку остальных заявлений. Что касается партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, то Советская делегация сделала несколько предложений, имеющих целью разрешить этот вопрос в соответствии с соглашением МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА. Если бы Американская

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делегация проявила достаточное желание ускорить разрешение спорных вопросов, то работа Совместной Комиссии еще в июле месяце могла бы значительно двинуться вперед. Однако, вышеупомянутые предложения Советской делегации были отвергнуты Американской делегацией, которая предпочитала вести дискуссию по общим вопросам, уклоняясь от конкретного обсуждения представленных партиями и организациями заявлений на участие в консультации, каждого в отдельности, и тем самым затягивая работу Комиссии.

Учитывая, что в следствие позиции, занятой Американской делегацией по вопросу о составлении списка, задерживалась вся работа Совместной Комиссии, Советская делегация еще 5 августа 1947 года предложила приступить к разработке предложений по Временному Положению, политической платформе, а также по вопросам персонального состава Временного Правительства, порядка приема власти Временным Правительством и подбора аппарата.

Советская делегация исходила из того, что Совместной Комиссии предстоит большая работа по разработке вышеуказанных предложений, и что к этой работе необходимо приступить как можно раньше. Однако, и это предложение Советской делегации было отвергнуто Американской делегацией, которая отказалась обсуждать другие вопросы, стоящие в программе работы Комиссии, пока не решен вопрос о списке партий и организаций для консультации.

26 августа 1947 года Советская делегация внесла новые предложения в ответ на предложения Американской делегации от 12 августа 1947 года. Советская делегация приняла пункт 1 предложения Американской делегации - не проводить устной консультации и заменить ее письменными предложениями корейских партий и организаций поступившими в Комиссию в ответ на вопросники. Таким образом, по этому вопросу между делегациями имеется соглашение.

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Советская делегация предложила - поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты предложений по соответствующим вопросам. Эти предложения вытекают из принятого на заседании Совместной Комиссии 22 мая 1947 года плана работы, согласно которому первый этап работы Совместной Комиссии включает следующие вопросы:

1. Условия и порядок консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

2. Выработка рекомендаций о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/.

3. Предварительная выработка политической платформы и других надлежащих мероприятий для будущего Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

4. Выработка рекомендаций о персональном составе Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

5. Порядок приема власти Временным Корейским Демократическим Правительством и порядок подбора аппарата для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Предложения Советской делегации от 26 августа относительно работы подкомиссий № 2 и № 3 во многом сходятся с предложениями Американской делегации от 12 августа.

Предложения Советской делегации от 26 августа предусматривали также создание Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций. Этот консультативный орган должен быть создан

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для того, чтобы уже сейчас привлечь корейцев к непосредственному участию в разработке всех вопросов, связанных с образованием Временного правительства.

Американская делегация на заседании Совместной комиссии 4 сентября высказалась против предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа в целом, но выдвинула возражения только против предложений о создании Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания.

Американская делегация, по существу, не возражала против других пунктов предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа.

Учитывая вышеизложенное, Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить создание Временного Корейского демократического правительства, настаивает на реализации тех положений из предложений Американской делегации от 12 августа и предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа, по которым точки зрения обеих делегаций сближаются, и которые соответствуют приведенному выше решению Совместной Комиссии от 22 мая 1947 года, и предлагает поручить:

1. Подкомиссии № 2 немедленно приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, которые были разосланы Совместной Комиссией, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты структуры Временного Корейского демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /временное положение/ и политической платформы.

2. Подкомиссии № 3 представить в Совместную Комиссию предложения относительно персонального состава Временного Правительства и о порядке приема правительством власти.

Что касается вопроса о создании Временного Общекорейс-

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кого Народного Собрания, то Советская делегация считает возражения, выдвинутые по этому вопросу Американской делегацией в заявлении от 3 сентября, необоснованными, и полагает, что обсуждение этого вопроса следует продолжить с целью достижения соглашения.

Если это предложение будет принято Американской делегацией, то Совместная комиссия сможет непосредственно приступить к разработке предложений по вопросам, связанным с образованием Временного Корейского демократического правительства, которое, в соответствии с Московским решением, она должна представить соответствующим правительствам.

Советская делегация считает необходимым добавить, что успешная работа Совместной комиссии по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства возможна лишь при условии полной отмены репрессий в отношении демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной Кореи, освобождения арестованных руководителей и членов этих организаций и обеспечения свободной и невоспрепятствованной деятельности указанных партий и организаций.

Советская делегация исходит из того, что все усилия должны быть направлены на создание единого общекорейского органа власти - Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и считает, что выдвигаемые за последнее время планы, ведущие фактически к закреплению существующего разделения страны на две зоны, таят большую опасность для корейского народа.

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Советская делегация попрежнему придерживается той точки зрения, что при наличии желания обеих делегаций точно и полностью выполнить Московское решение о Корее и соглашение между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, Совместная Комиссия может успешно разрешить поставленную перед ней задачу образования единого Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, чего с таким нетерпением ожидает корейский народ."

отп. 7 экз.
К.Ю.

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By NARS, Date

oviet elegation
in the
Joint oviet American Commission
eoul, Korea

3 .e tember 1947

ajor eneral ilbert .. Brown
hief of the Merie n elegation
Joint oviet- erie n Commission on Korea.

e r en r l rown:

In the Joint Commission meeting on 17 eptember of this year, the oviet elegation introduced a proposal to begin the repatriation of those civil s from the provinces of the erie n elegation of 15 ugust 1947 and the proposals of the oviet elegation of 26 ugust 1947 on which the points of view of both elegations drew closer, i.e., to direct Subcommissions 2 and 3 to begin immediately the study of the written proposals of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, to elaborate and present to the Joint Commission proposals on questions entrusted to these Subcommissions. The American elegation stated that it will study this proposal and will submit a reply; at the same time, the erie n elegation pointed out that as soon as the reply will be ready, it will inform the oviet elegation to this effect.

The afore-mentioned proposal of the oviet elegation did not contain any representative or new issues. Noting that the Merican elegation has had sufficient time for the study of this proposal and for the preparation of a reply, and in order to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, I propose to call the meeting of the Joint Commission today on 23 e tember, at the usual time, i.e., at 1400.

ith sincere res ects.

olonel ene r l .. . tikov
hief, oviet elegation

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Seoul, Korea
16 May 47

Gen Brown
Gen Weckerling
Lt Col Edwards
Lt Bertsch
Mr Bunce
Mr Sargent
Mr Kinney
Mr Prosser
Mr Rowe

Major General Albert E. Brown
Joint Commission on Korea
Seoul

THRU:

Public Relations Officer
GHQ 24th Corps
US Army

Dear Sir:

It is our understanding that certain sessions of the Joint Commission will be held in the Soviet occupation zone.

In order that proceedings of the Commission may be fully reported to the American people, it is requested that this reporter, and other correspondents covering the sessions of the Commission in Seoul, be permitted to accompany the Commission if and when it journeys to the Soviet zone, and to report on its activities there.

Sincerely,
William H. Newton
William H. Newton
Scripps-HowardNewspaper Alliance
c/o Public Relations Officer
GHQ 24th Corps

23-5-52

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
AFO 235

24 May 1947

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov
Chief Commissioner
Soviet Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Shtikov:

At the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 May 1947 I agreed to forward a translation of the condition under which the American Delegation accepted Joint Commission Decision No. 3 as amended to include the new para. 2.a.5.

This condition is quoted:

"The American Delegation will accept original Joint Commission Decision No. 3 as amended by the addition of a new sub-paragraph 5 under the heading 'The first stage, etc.' reading, 'The procedure of the assumption of power by the Korean Provisional Government and the procedure of the selection of the personnel for the Provisional Government in Korea', with the specific understanding that the wording of Joint Commission Decision No. 3 as accepted by the American Delegation does not in any way restrict the power of decision of the Subcommission of the Joint Commission, nor of the Joint Commission itself to further determination as to the method to be utilized in procuring any or all personnel of the Provisional Korean Government."

Sincerely yours,

Albert E. Brown
Major General U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner
American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

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Американская Делегация
АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
п/п 235

24 Мая 1947

Генерал полк. Т. Ф. Штыков
Глава Советской Делегации
США-СССР Совместной Комиссии
Сеул, Корея

Уважаемый Генерал Штыков:

На заседании Совместной Комиссии 23-го Мая 1947 года я согласился препроводить перевод условия, при котором Американская Делегация приняла Решение № 3 Совместной Комиссии, измененного добавлением нового параграфа 2.а.5.

Это условие приводится ниже:

" Американская делагация примет первоначальное Решение № 3 Совместной Комиссии, измененное добавлением нового подпараграфа 5 под заглавием "Первый этап, и т.д.", гласящего, 'Процедура принятия власти Корейским Временным Правительством и процедура выборов личного состава Временного Правительства в Корее', с точным пониманием текста Решения № 3 Совместной Комиссии, принятого Американской Делегацией, каковое никоим образом не ограничивает силу решения ни Подкомиссий Совместной Комиссии, ни самой Совместной Комиссии в дальнейшем определении способа, который будет применен для набора состава Временного Корейского Правительства."

Уважающий Вас

Альберт Е. Браун
Генерал майор Армии С.Ш.
Глава Американской Делегации
Американско-Советской Совместной
Комиссии.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 May 1947.

TO: Chief Commissioner, Soviet Delegation.
(Chairman, US - USSR Joint Commission,
for week 26 to 31 May 1947)

SUBJECT: Meeting of Joint Commission.

1. Chairman of Subcommission Number 1, American Delegation, Minister A. C. Bunce, has reported to the Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, that Subcommission Number 1 has been unable to reach an agreement on Decision Number 4 (Method of Consultation with Political Parties and Social Organizations). In view of this fact, it is requested that the Joint Commission be convened at 1330, Thursday, May 29th, to discuss this matter.

2. In view of the vital interest held by Koreans and all people of the world in the discussion of this question and the decisions to be reached and the results to be achieved by the Joint Commission, it is recommended that the meeting of Thursday, May 29th, be an open meeting and that members of the press be admitted to the meeting.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner - American Delegation

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Американская Делегация
АМЕРИКАНСКО-СОВЕТСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
Сеул, Корея

27 Мая 1947

Генералу Полковнику Т. Ф. Штыкову
Главе Советской Делегации
Американско-Советской
СовместнойКомиссии
Сеул, Корея

Уважаемый Генерал Штыков:

Я прилагаю копию письма г-на Вильяма Л. Чьютона из газетной корпорации Скрипт-Ховард. Как вы видите из этого письма, американские корреспонденты желают сопровождать Американскую делегацию в поездках в Пхеньян для заседаний Совместной Комиссии для отчета в прессе тех новостей, связанных с заседаниями, которые будут разрешены для опубликования.

Я представляю это письмо вам с пожеланием вашего благоприятного рассмотрения. Ввиду того, что необходимо время для устройства поездки и других административных дел, ваш быстрый ответ очень желателен.

Примерно пятнадцать /15/ американских корреспондентов заинтересовано в таких поездках. Подробности, включая имена их и названия газет, будут представлены вам задолго до отправки в Пхеньян.

Искренно ваш,

Альберт Е. Браун
Ренерал майор Армии С.Ш.
Глава Комиссии.

Копии: Архив Генерального Штаба
Г-ну Дж. Л. Стюарт, Отдел Общественной Информации
Г-ну Вильям Х. Ньютон, От. Общестенной Информации

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Копия

Сеул, Корея
16 Мая 1947

Генерал-майору Альберту Е. Брауну
Совместная Комиссия в Корее
Сеул

Через

Отдел Информации и Связи
Штаб 24-го Корпуса
Армии Соединенных Штатов

М. Г.:

Насколько нам известно, некоторые заседания Совместной Комиссии будут происходить в зоне Советской оккупации.

Для полной информации американского народа о работе Комиссии настоящим запрашивается, чтобы этот репортер и другие корреспонденты, покрывающие заседания Комиссии в Сеуле, были бы допущены сопровождать Комиссию в случае и во время поездок в Советскую зону для информации ее работ там.

Искренно Ваш,

Вильям Х. Ньютон
Газетная Корпорация
Скрипт-Ховард
через Отдел Информации и Связи
Главный Штаб 24-го Корпуса.

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COPY

Soviet Delegation
JOINT US - USSR COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

30 May 1947

Dear General Brown:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 27th, 1947, in which you inform of the desire of American correspondents to accompany the American Delegation to Pyongyang.

As I understand from your letter, you would like to receive a permit from me for this trip. To my regret questions of such nature are not within my authority. Questions concerning trips from North to South and vice versa, as you know, are authorized by agreement of the two Commanders.

Respectfully yours,

Chairman of the
Soviet Delegation
Colonel General
T. F. Shtikov

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1st Ind.

Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea. 4 June 1947.

TO: Commanding General, USAFIK.

1. Request that matter presented be taken up by C.G., USAFIK, with Russian C.G. in North Korea.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner

Incls.
Ltr. Mr. Newton to Gen. Brown of 16 May 47
Ltr. Gen. Brown to Gen. Shtikov of 27 May 1947
Ltr. Gen. Brown to Mr. Newton of 4 June 1947.

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Seoul, Korea
16 May 47

Major General Albert E. Brown
Joint Commission on Korea
Seoul

THRU:

Public Relations Officer
GHQ 24th Corps
US Army

Dear Sir:

It is our understanding that certain sessions of the Joint Commission will be held in the Soviet occupation zone.

In order that proceedings of the Commission may be fully reported to the American people, it is requested that this reporter, and other correspondents covering the sessions of the Commission in Seoul, be permitted to accompany the Commission if and when it journeys to the Soviet zone, and to report on its activities there.

Sincerely,

/S/

William H. Newton
Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance
c/o Public Relations Officer
GHQ 24th Corps

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

27 May 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

I enclose a copy of a letter written by Mr. William H. Newton of the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance. As this letter shows, American newspapermen desire to accompany the American Delegation when it journeys to Pyongyang for meetings of the Joint Commission and to report such news incident to those meetings as is permissible.

I submit this letter to you recommending favorable consideration. In view of the transportation and administrative arrangements which must be made, early reply is requested.

There are approximately fifteen (15) American correspondents involved. Full details, including names and papers represented, will be furnished you in ample time prior to departure for Pyongyang.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

cc: AG records
Mr. J. L. Stewart, PIO
Mr. William H. Newton, PIO

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

4 June 1947.

Mr. William H. Newton,
Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance,
c/o Public Information Officer,
GHQ, XXIV Corps,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. Newton:

Reference my letter of 27 May 1947 to General Shtikov, copy of which was sent to you, your attention is invited to letter from Chairman of the Soviet Delegation of 30 May 1947.

This matter is being referred to C.G., USAFIK, requesting action by him.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

Encl.
Copy ltr. Chairman of
Soviet Delegation of 30 May

cc: C.G., USAFIK
Mr. J. L. Stewart, PIO.

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СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ
СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ

Сеул, Корея

30 мая 1947 года

Дорогой генерал ЕРАЛЛ,

Подтверждаю получение Вашего письма от 27 мая 1947 года, в котором Вы сообщаете о желании американских корреспондентов сопровождать Американскую делегацию в Пхеньян.

Как я понял из Вашего письма, Вы хотели бы получить мое разрешение на эту поездку. К сожалению, подобного рода вопросы не входят в мою компетенцию. Вопрос, связанные с поездками лиц с севера на юг и с юга на север Кореи, как Вам известно, регулятся по договоренности между двумя Командованиями.

С уважением

Председатель Советской делегации
Генерал-полковник

Т.Ф.ШТЫКОВ

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COPY

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

4 June 1947

Mr. William H. Newton,
Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance,
c/o Public Information Officer,
GHQ, XXIV Corps,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. Newton:

Reference my letter of 27 May 1947 to General Shtikov, copy of which was sent to you, your attention is invited to letter from Chairman of the Soviet Delegation of 31 May 1947.

This matter is being referred to C.G., USAFIK, requesting action by him.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

Encl.
Copy ltr. from Chairman of
Soviet Delegation of 30 May.

cc: C.G., USAFIK
Mr. J. L. Stewart, P.O.

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(1) Col Edwards
(2) Central files

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

12 June 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

Representatives of the American and Korean press have both requested permission to attend a Joint Commission session to be held in Seoul 25 June 1947 for the purpose of conducting the joint meeting with representatives of parties and social organizations in South Korea.

The American Delegation believes it would be advantageous to admit representatives of the press to this meeting. If you have no objection, they will be so advised.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

MEMO FOR RECORD: 12 June 1947.

This letter was not sent to General Shtikov. General Brown and General Shtikov had a meeting afternoon of 12 June, and General Shtikov approved above request. Capt. Phillips has been notified and he will notify press.

A.A.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

13 June 1947.

Memorandum to: Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

SUBJECT : Work of the Joint Commission.

1. There are certain problems which must be solved by the Joint Commission irrespective of the type and composition of the provisional government established. These problems should be solved, at least in principle, at the earliest possible date. They include problems on which common agreement must be reached in order that the work of government now being performed by existing governments, North - South Korea, may be carried by the provisional government without loss of efficiency. Included are such problems as transportation, communications, finance, food collection and distribution, communications, etc. (See Enclosure 1 for clarification.)

2. In order that early and thorough consideration may be given to evolving plans pointing to solution of these problems, it is suggested that the Russian members of Subcommission No. 3 meet with the American members and perfect an organization for and a method of proceeding to proper solutions of the problems listed and similar problems which may be involved in the overall consideration of the assumption by the provisional government of the work responsibility of the existing governments, North - South Korea.

3. It may be considered advantageous by you that these problems be discussed in a general manner by the Joint Commission prior to reference to Subcommission No. 3 for consideration. The American Delegation is prepared to assume the responsibility for proper performance of this task in such manner as you may suggest.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

Enclosure
(1) Suggested problems of government.

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SUGGESTED

PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED BY JOINT COMMISSION

I. TRANSPORTATION:

1. Railways,
2. Merchant Marine,
3. Bus Lines.

II. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. Telephone System,
2. Telegraph,
3. Postal Service.

III. FINANCE:

1. Currency,
2. Financial Institutions,
3. Foreign Exchange.

IV. FOOD COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION.

V. COMMERCE:

1. Price Levels.
   a. Price Controls,
   b. Relative supply levels in North and South.
2. Customs Regulations,
3. Import and Export Controls.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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By NARS, Date

1.16

SOVIET DELEGATION
JOINT SOVIET - AMERICAN COMMISSION

17 June 1947

Memorandum: Major General Albert L. Brown
Head of the American Delegation
Joint Soviet - American Commission
Seoul, Korea

I received your memorandum of 13 June 1947. In your memorandum you suggest to start work on the problems concerned with transportation, communication, and collection and distribution of food products, etc. You, also, suggest that Joint Subcommission No. 3 now start the work on these problems.

The Soviet Delegation, after studying your proposal and taking into consideration the content of these problems which are worked out by the Commission, considers that the problems, mentioned in your memorandum, are not of first importance at this stage of the work of the Commission.

You know that we have only a month and a half left to submit our governments the recommendation in accordance with the Point No. 2 of the Moscow Decision. If we at this very moment will begin to study the problems proposed by you this would detract from the Joint Commission and in particular the Joint Subcommission from fulfillment of urgent problems. Namely, the working out of recommendations on the selection of the personnel of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, on the order of the taking over the authority by the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and on the order of the selection of the personnel for this Government.

The Soviet Delegation considers that these questions are immense and serious, that they will take much time, that the study and the solution of these problems pointed by you in your memorandum are to be taken by the Joint Commission with the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

In view of the above mentioned I do not consider it appropriate to submit the problems set in your memorandum for the discussion by the Joint Soviet - American Commission.

Head of Soviet Delegation
Colonel General
T. F. Shtikov

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By NARS, Date

СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ

В СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ.

17 июня 1947 года.

ПАМЯТНАЯ ЗАПИСКА: Генерал-майору Альберту Е.ЭРАУН
Главе Американской делегации в
Совместной Советско-Американской
Комиссии.
г.Сеул,Корея.

Вашу записку от 13 июня 1947 года получил.Вы в своей записке предлагаете приступить к разработке вопросов связанных с транспортом,связью,сбором и распределением продукутов и т.д. Причем,Вы предлагаете,чтобы подкомиссия № 3 уже сейчас приступила к работе над этими вопросами.

Советская делегация ознакомившись с Вашим предложением и учтя содержание вопросов,над которыми работает Комиссия считает,что задачи,упомянутые в Вашей записке,на данном этапе работы Комиссии не являются первоочередными.

Вам известно,что у нас осталось всего лишь полтора месяца для того,чтобы мы могли представить своим правительствам рекомендации,в соответствии с пунктом 2 Московского решения,если же мы в данный момент приступим к изучению предложенных Вами проблем,то это отвлечет Совместную Комиссию, и в частности подкомиссию № 3,от выполнения первоочередной задачи.А именно, выработки рекомендаций,о подборе персонального состава Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства,о порядке приема власти Временным Корейским Демократическим Правительством и порядке подбора аппарата для этого правительства.

Советская делегация считает,что эти вопросы очень большие и серьезные,они займут много времени,что изучением и разрешением проблем,указанных в Вашей памятной записке,Совместная Комиссия должна заняться с Временным Корейским Демократическим Правительством.

В силу вышеизложенного считаю нецелесообразным вносить на обсуждение Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии проблемы изложенные в Вашей записке.

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК.-

/Т.Ф.ШТЫКОВ/

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Soviet Delegation
USSR-US JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 June 1947

Chief of the American Delegation
Major General A. E. Brown

I wish to inform you that the Soviet Delegation of the USSR-US Joint Commission is leaving for Pyongyang on 26 June 1947, approximately at 1200 o'clock noon.

I attach herewith the lists of those members of the Soviet Delegation who are leaving for Pyongyang and those remaining in Seoul.

Responsible Secretary of the Soviet Delegation, Colonel Avramenko, will head the remaining staff of the Soviet Delegation in Seoul, including the technical and servicing personnel. It will be his responsibility to accept from the Secretariat of the American Delegation the answers to the questionnaires and other documents, which might be forwarded by parties and social organizations of South Korea.

Enclosures:
1. The list of the members of the Soviet Delegation leaving for Pyongyang - two (2) sheets.
2. The list of the members of the Soviet Delegation remaining in Seoul - two (2) sheets.

T. F. SHTIKOV
Colonel General
Chief of the Soviet Delegation

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LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION LEAVING FOR PYONGYANG ON 26 JUNE 1947.

1. Colonel General Shtikov, T. F., Chief Commissioner
2. Tunkin, G. I., Commissioner
3. Major General Lebedeff, N. G., Commissioner
4. Balasanov, G. M., Commissioner
5. Colonel Korkulenko, T. I., Commissioner
6. Lt. Colonel Kravtsov, I. V., Aide to the Chief Commissioner
7. Captain Korneev, V. M., Aide-De-Camp
8. Lt. Kadishnikov, A. C., Aide-De-Camp

ADVISERS AND EXPERTS

9. Latushkin, G. F. - Adviser
10. Shchetinin, B. V. - Adviser
11. Petuhov, V. I. - Expert

SECRETARIAT

12. Maslov, A. S. - Assistant to the Responsible Secretary
13. Klepikova, Y. A. - Assistant
14. Galikova, O. V. - Assistant
15. Mironenko, O. P. - Assistant
16. Mesyatz, I. D. - Assistant
17. Maslova, O. Z. - Assistant
18. Vishnyak, V. L. - Assistant
19. Pak, Thya Seb - Assistant

TECHNICAL AND SERVICING PERSONNEL

20. Major Turkin, P. M.
21. Captain Rudakov, N. I.
22. Captain Saharov, V. G.
23. Captain Mironuk, A. I.
24. Sgt. Klementiev, A. A.
25. Jr. Sgt. Sidorkin, V. A.
26. Jr. Sgt. Isangeldin, S. H.
27. Pvt. Zaitsev, N. A.

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28. Pvt. Timoshenko, I. P.

29. Cook Evtushenko, V. M.

30. Waitress Strogaya, O. F.

31. Shturmarevich, S. F. - hired help

32. Cpl. Demodov, N. P.

33. Pvt. Evdokimov, S. A.

34. Pvt. Ryachkin, M. N.

35. Pvt. Syachin, N. V.

36. Pvt. Ivanov, V. A.

37. Waitress Monahova, T. I.

Colonel Avramenko
Responsible Secretary of the
Soviet Delegation

24 June 1947
Seoul, Korea

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LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION REMAINING IN SEOUL.

1. Colonel Avramenko, I. T. - Responsible Secretary
2. Lt. Colonel Zagatnyi, G. I. - Adviser
3. Mr. Shabshin, A. I. - Adviser

SECRETARIAT

4. Iliushchenko, K. M. - Assistant
5. Kramar, A. S. - Assistant
6. Shargorodskaya, M. G. - Assistant
7. Volenko, I. I. - Assistant
8. Molchanoff, B. S. - Assistant
9. Pax, Yen Bin - Assistant
10. Nam, S. T.

TECHNICAL AND SERVICING PERSONNEL

11. Major Riabov, P. S.
12. Captain Dementiev, V. A.
13. Captain Panek, I. S.
14. Captain Staviovskii, V. V.
15. Sr. Lt. Kuksin, S. G.
16. Pvt. Moshnikov, V. Z.
17. Pvt. Balabukha, V. I.
18. Pvt. Barabanov, G. M.
19. Pvt. Vasiliev, A. G.
20. Oleinik, Z. K. - hired help
21. Virtuozova, O. M. - hired help
22. Nikolaeva, A. I. - Hired help
23. Firyulin, F. I. - foreman
24. Sr. Sgt. Leonov, V. I.
25. Sr. Sgt. Gavislov, N. N.
26. Sgt. Fedotov, F. F.
27. Jr. Sgt. Treiger, M. Ya.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

28. Jr. Sgt. Yakovlev, V. K.
29. Jr. Sgt. Sviderskii, V. M.
30. Jr. Sgt. Kiryuskin, V. A.
31. Jr. Sgt. Arnautov, S. S.
32. Cpl. Trofimov, V. S.
33. Pvt. Sharov, G. A.
34. Pvt. Trusov, A. F.
35. Pvt. Noskov, I. F.
36. Pvt. Zarva, A. D.
37. Pvt. Tantalov, P. V.
38. Cpl. Faenko, P. I.
39. Jr. Sgt. Krainov, I. A.
40. Sr. Sgt. Kadyrov, K. B.
41. Cpl. Dmitriev, P. S.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

25 June 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief of the Soviet Delegation,
USSR - US Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 23rd June 1947 which confirms the expression of your indignation in connection with certain provocative action of irresponsible Korean youths which you made orally to me the afternoon of June 23rd, 1947. As I stated to you at that time, I regretted to hear of the discourteous conduct of these young hoodlums which you for the first time brought to my attention.

The information which you furnished me the afternoon of June 23rd, which in substance covers two of the three instances of molestation by stoning or threats against the occupants of automobiles bearing members or attaches of the Soviet Delegation, was promptly reported by me to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea. The Commanding General, USAFIK, took immediate positive action to avoid recurrence of similar disgraceful actions. He regrets as strongly as I do the discourtesy shown to you and the members of your staff.

Very truly yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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COPY

THE SOVIET DELEGATION

USSR US JOINT COMMISSION

23 June, 1947

Seoul, Korea

Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation
US USSR Joint Commission

Dear General Brown:

Today at 10:30 a.m. in the proximity of the gates of the former USSR General Consulate, in Seoul, a group of Koreans stoned the automobile in which the responsible secretary of the Soviet Delegation, Colonel Avramenko, was driving to his place of work, at the Duk Soo Palace.

At 12:30 p.m., Colonel Avramenko, returning from Duk Soo Palace to the former USSR General Consulate in Seoul, was again attacked by a group of demonstrators who stoned his automobile.

Approximately at 11:40a.m., the car in which Mr. G.M. Balasanov, member of the Soviet Delegation, and Mr. A.I. Shabshin, advisor to the Soviet Delegation, were leaving Duk Soo Palace, was surrounded by a group of drunken demonstrators who conducted themselves in a hostile manner and tried to threaten the lives of Mr. Balasanov and Mr. Shabshin, whose safety was assured, only through the energetic intervention by the American soldiers.

At 12:30 p.m. 250 meters from the gates of the former USSR General Consulate in Seoul, the car in which Mr. PAK THAI SEB, interpreter of the Soviet Delegation, was riding, also was stoned by a group of Korean demonstrators.

I deem it necessary to add that in places where the above mentioned

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actions against the members of the Soviet Delegation took place, the Korean police was present, but did not take any measures in order to prevent this outrageous behavior; on the contrary, the Korean policemen laughed openly and by their indifferent attitude towards this occurrence encouraged even more the unruly reactionaries and hooligans.

I express my indignation in connection with such provocative actions, directed against the members of the Soviet Delegation by the unruly reactionaries and terrorists.

I also ask you, General Brown, that as the Head of the American Delegation, you bring to the attention of the American Military Command the abovementioned, so that necessary measures be taken for the prevention of similar occurrences in the future.

Very truly yours,

T.F. SHTIKOV

Colonel General

Chief of the Soviet Delegation

USSR US Joint Commission

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

19 July 1947

Col. General T. F. Shtikov
Chief Commissioner Soviet Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
Seoul. Korea

Dear General Shtikov:

A group of prominent newspaper publishers and editors is scheduled to tour South Korea from the 22 July 1947 to 25 July 1947. This group has requested an interview with the members of the Soviet Delegation as well as the American Delegation, to the Joint Commission.

If the Soviet Delegation desires to grant such an interview please indicate the time and place and I shall be happy to notify the group of editors and publishers. The suggested time for an interview would be the afternoon of the 23rd or the morning of the 24th of July.

For your information the following is a list of the editors and publishers who are making the tour:

Wright Bryan - Editor of Atlanta Journal representing James M. Cox newspapers also publishing Dalton Ohio News.

William Chenery - Publisher of Colliers Magazine.

Marshall Dana - Editor of Portland Oregon Journal.

Sidney F. Harris - Co-publisher and editor of Harris newspapers publishing Hutchinson Kansas News Herald, Ottowa Kansas Herald, Burlington Iowa Hawkeye Gazette and Salina Kansas Journal.

Lee Mills - Managing editor of the Miami Herals representing Jack Knoght Newspapers and Chicago Daily News Syndicate. Other Knoght papers are Detroit Free Press, Akron Beacon Journal and Chicago Daily News.

Earl Johnson - Vice-President and General News Manager of United Press.

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Hamilton Owens - Editor in Chief of Baltimore Sun.
Lee F. Payne - Editor of the Los Angeles News.

Joseph J. Packman - Managing editor of Milwaukee Sentinal representing Hearst newspapers and International News Service.

Walker Stone - Washington Editor of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers Alliance.

Very truly yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of U.S. Delegation

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 August 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

[illegible] which you state that the Soviet delegation has [illegible] about the letter addressed by the Secretary of State of the United States, General [illegible], to the Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., [illegible].

The [illegible] desire to request the Joint Commission to report to the two governments concerned in July or August on the progress of their work. The letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, George Marshall, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, dated 17 June 1947, requests that the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations by August 21, 1947. I think you will agree with me that there is very little time remaining for the completion of this rather comprehensive task, and I hope that it will be convenient for the Soviet Delegation to convene a meeting of the Joint Commission at the earliest possible date. I would suggest that this meeting take place tomorrow, Friday, 15 August, at 1330 hours. I do not think that we can delay our necessary preliminary discussions.

It is requested that you inform me as early as possible of your agreement to this proposal.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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Американская Делегация
Американско-Советская Совместная Комиссия
Сеул, Корея.

14 Августа 1947 г.

Генерал-полковнику Т.Ф.Штыкову,
Главе Советской Делегации,
Американско-Советской
Совместной Комиссии,
Гор. Сеул, Корея.

Дорогой Генерал Штыков:

Сим желаю засвидетельствовать получение Вашего письма от 14 Августа 1947 года, в котором Вы сообщаете, что Советская делегация была информирована относительно письма адресованного Государственным СекретаремСоединенных Штатов, генералом Джордж С. Маршаллом, Министру Иностранных Дел СССР, г-ну В.М. Молотову.

В предыдущей переписке между г-ом Маршаллом и г-ом Молотовым указывается об их намерении запросить Совместную Комиссию представить отчет двум правительствам в течение Июля или Августа месяцев о прогрессе своей работы. В своем письме, Государственный Секретарь Соединенных Штатов, г-н Джордж Маршалл, Министру Иностранных Дел СССР В.М. Молотову, от 12 Августа запрашивает, чтобы Совместная Комиссия представила отчет о своей работе к 21 Августа 1947 года. Я думаю, что Вы согласитесь со мной в том, что у нас осталось мало времени для завершения этой довольно сложной задачи и я надеюсь, что и для Советской делегации будет желательно созвать заседание Совместной Комиссии как можно скорее. Я предложил бы, чтобы собрание состоялось завтра, в Пятницу, 15 Августа, в 1330. Мне не кажется, что мы можем задерживать необходимые предварительные дискуссии.

Желательно чтобы Вы информировали меня возможно скорее о своем согласии с моим предложением.

Уважающий Вас

Альберт Е. Браун,
Генерал-Майор, Армия США
Глава Американской Делегации.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Американская Делегация
Американско-Советская Совместная Комиссия
Сеул, Корея.

14 Августа 1947 г.

Генерал-полковнику Т.Ф.Штыкову,
Главе Советской Делегации,
Американско-Советской
Совместной Комиссии,
Гор. Сеул, Корея.

Дорогой Генерал Штыков:

Сим желаю засвидетельствовать получение вашего письма от 13 Августа 1947 года, в котором Вы сообщаете, что Советская делегация была информирована относительно письма адресованного Государственным Секретарем Соединенных Штатов, генералом Джордж С. Маршаллом, Министру Иностранных дел СССР, г-ну В.М. Молотову.

В предыдущей переписке между г-ом Маршаллом и г-ом Молотовым указывается об их намерении запросить Совместную Комиссию представить отчет двум правительствам в течение Июля или Августа месяцев о прогрессе своей работы. В своем письме, Государственный Секретарь Соединенных Штатов, г-н Джордж Маршалл, Министру Иностранных дел СССР В.М. Молотову, от 12 Августа запрашивает, чтобы Совместная Комиссия представила отчет о своей работе к 31 Августа 1947 года. Я думаю, что вы согласитесь со мной в том, что у нас осталось мало времени для завершения этой довольно сложной задачи и я надеюсь, что и для Советской делегации будет желательно созвать заседание Совместной Комиссии как можно скорее. Я предложил бы, чтобы собрание состоялось завтра, в Пятницу, 15 Августа, в 1330. Мне не кажется, что мы можем задерживать необходимые предварительные дискуссии.

Желательно чтобы Вы информировали меня возможно скорее о своем согласии с моим предложением.

Уважающий Вас

Альберт Е. Браун,
Генерал-Майор, Армия США
Глава Американской Делегации.

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Американская Делегация
Американско-Советская Совместная Комиссия
Сеул, Корея.

14 Августа 1947 г.

Генерал-полковнику Т. Ф. Штыкову,
Главе Советской Делегации,
Американско-Советской
Совместной Комиссии,
г. Сеул, Корея.

Дорогой Генерал Штыков:

Сим желаю засвидетельствовать получение Вашего письма от 13 Августа 1947 года, в котором Вы сообщаете, что Советская Делегация была информирована относительно письма адресованного Государственным Секретарем Соединенных Штатов, генералом Джордж С. Маршаллом, Министру Иностранных дел СССР, г-ну В. М. Молотову.

В предыдущей переписке между г-ом Маршаллом и г-ом Молотовым указывается об их намерении запросить Совместную Комиссию представить отчет двум правительствам в течение Июля или Августа месяцев о прогрессе своей работы. В своем письме, Государственный Секретарь Соединенных Штатов, г-н Джордж Маршалл, Министру Иностранных дел СССР В. М. Молотову, от 14 Августа запрашивает, чтобы Совместная Комиссия представила отчет о своей работе к 31 Августа 1947 года. Я думаю, что Вы согласитесь со мной в том, что у нас осталось мало времени для завершения этой довольно сложной задачи и я надеюсь, что и для Советской Делегации будет желательно созвать заседание Совместной Комиссии как можно скорее. Я предложил бы, чтобы собрание состоялось завтра, в Пятницу, 15 Августа, в 1330. Мне не кажется, что мы можем задерживать необходимые предварительные дискуссии.

Желательно чтобы Вы информировали меня возможно скорее о своем согласии с моим предложением.

Уважающий Вас

Альберт Л. Браун,
Генерал-Майор, Армия США
Глава Американской Делегации.

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SOVIET - AMERICAN JOINT COMMISSION
SOVIET DELEGATION

Seoul, Korea, 14 August 1947.

To: Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation

Major Gen. A. E. Brown

Dear General Brown

I have received your 14th proposal to convene a meeting of the joint Commission on 14 August together with the agenda.

The Soviet Delegation knows about the letter, mentioned in the agenda, which had been addressed by the Secretary of State of the United States, George Marshall, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. V.M. Molotov.

Whereas the Soviet Delegation has not yet received any instructions from its Government in connection with this letter it does not deem it expedient to convene a meeting of the Joint Commission for to-day, 14 August.

Respectfully yours,

Chief Commissioner of the Soviet
Delegation, Col.Gen. T.F. Shtikov.

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By NARS, Date

СОВМЕСТНАЯ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ.
СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ.
Сеул, Корея.

ГЛАВЕ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОРУ В Р А У Н А.Е.

I4 августа I947 г.

Уважаемый генерал БРАУН !

Ваше предложение о созыве заседания Совместной Комиссии I4 августа и повестку дня получил.

Советской делегации известно указанное в повестке дня письмо, с которым Государственный Секретарь США Д.МАРШАЛЛ обратился к Министру Иностранных Дел СССР В.М.МОЛОТОВУ.

Поскольку Советская делегация еще не получила от своего правительства указаний в связи с этим письмом, она не считает целесообразным созыв заседания Совместной Комиссии сегодня, I4 августа.

С уважением

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК

/Т.Ф.Штыков/

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Return to Lyn Brown

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

11 September 1947

Guard Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US-USSR Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

I have had an investigation made of the incident which you reported in your letter of 9 September.

The investigation reveals that:

1. At about 1210, 6 September, the guard on duty at the front entrance of the palace saw a Korean, whom he did not identify as a member of either delegation, start to leave the palace while carrying some papers partially concealed under his coat.

2. The members of the guard have been directed to search Korean laborers leaving the building during other than normal duty hours.

3. His suspicions aroused by the papers, the guard stopped the Korean and turned back his coat in order to see the papers. He identified them as being in either Korean or Russian.

4. Satisfied as to the nature of the papers, the guard permitted the Korean to proceed.

5. The Korean at no time made any explanation to the guard.

6. Captain Phillips met the Korean, whom he identified as PAK, Tai Seb, in the parking lot. Captain Phillips walked with PAK and a Korean newspaper man (who acted as interpreter) to where the guard was standing. Captain Phillips learned from the guard the reason for his stopping and searching the Korean and relayed it to PAK through the newspaper man. Thereupon PAK shook hands with Captain Phillips and said, also through the

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

newspaper man, "I understand and it is OK," or words to that effect.

I am sure that after learning the above details you will agree with me that the guard properly performed his duty, further that no affront to a member of the Soviet Delegation was intended. It is quite possible that there will be similar incidents until such time as Korean members of both delegations are known to all members of the guard or can quickly identify themselves to members of the guard.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

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Joint Soviet-American Commission
The Soviet Delegation
Seoul, Korea

9 September 1947

Major General Albert E. Brown
The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation
The US-USSR Joint Commission

Dear General Brown:

On 6 September 1947 at 1215 hours PAK, TSI SEB, the interpreter of the Soviet Delegation, upon leaving for lunch the Duk Soo Palace where the Joint Commission is located, was stopped by an American soldier, who without asking any questions, started searching PAK, TSI SEB and attempted to remove a letter and newspapers from his coat pocket.

Captain Phillips, a member of the American Delegation, come out of the Duk Soo Palace at this time, and PAK, TSI SEB turned to him for assistance in such ~~an outrageous~~ occurrence. Captain Phillips explained that what happened was that the American soldier did not know who PAK, TSI SEB was.

Considering such action on the part of a soldier of the American Army toward a member of the Soviet Delegation inadmissible, I request that you bring the above-mentioned incident to the attention of the American Command, in order that necessary measures should be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

Respectfully yours,

Colonel General T. F. SHTIKOV
The Chief Commissioner of the
Soviet Delegation in the Joint
Soviet-American Commission

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Blankenship, Robert S., Pvt., 7th Infantry Division Palace Guard

On 6 September 1947 at about 1210 hours, I was on Post # 2 at the top of the steps at the main entrance to the Duk Soo Palace.

The Corporal of the Guard was going around checking the windows and safes at this time.

A Korean passed me and I noticed he had a bunch of papers under his coat. To me this looked suspicious, so I stopped him and turned back his coat to see what they were. I saw they were papers with Korean or Russian writing on them. As I did this, he pushed my arm away and started down the steps. I put my hand on his shoulder, told him I was a guard, and authorized to search Korean workers. He didn't say anything but turned around and went back into the Palace, and down the American Wing. I followed him. He looked in Major General Brown's office and then turned around, went back out the main entrance, and down the steps to the parking area. A few minutes later he returned with Captain Phillips and a Korean. I explained the incident to Captain Phillips and he relayed it on to the Russian delegate that it was a mistake on my part because I did not recognize the Korean as a member of the Russian Delegation. The Korean in question did not show me any identification.

Robert S. Blankenship

Robert S. Blankenship RA16232025
Pvt., US Army

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Soviet Delegation
in the
Joint Soviet American Commission
Seoul, Korea

23 September 1947

Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief of the American Delegation
Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea.

Dear General Brown:

In the Joint Commission meeting on 17 September of this year, the Soviet Delegation introduced a proposal to begin the realization of those points from the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August 1947 and the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August 1947 on which the points of view of both Delegations draw closer, i.e., to direct Subcommissions #2 and #3 to begin immediately the study of the written proposals of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, to elaborate and present to the Joint Commission proposals on questions entrusted to these Subcommissions. The American Delegation stated that it will study this proposal and will submit a reply; at the same time, the American Delegation pointed out that as soon as the reply will be ready, it willinform the Soviet Delegation to this effect.

The aforementioned proposal of the Soviet Delegation did not contain any argumentative or new issues. Hoping that the American Delegation has had sufficient time for the study of this proposal and for the preparation of a reply, and in order to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, I propose to call the meeting of the Joint Commission today on 23 September, at the usual time, i.e., at 1330.

With sincere respects,

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov
Chief, Soviet Delegation

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By NARS, Date

Soviet Delegation
in the
Joint Soviet-American Commission
Seoul, Korea

23 September 1947

Maj. General Albert E. Brown
Chief Commission of the
American Delegation in the
Joint Soviet-American Commission
in Korea.

Dear General Brown:

Today, at 9 A.M. I forwarded to you a letter in which I proposed to call a meeting of the Joint Commission at 1330. Although it is already 1600, I still did not receive any reply to this letter.

The Soviet Delegation cannot interpret this fact in any other way, but as a new proof of the unwillingness on the part of the American Delegation to work in the Joint Commission and as an attempt to delay and undermine the work of the Commission.

Considering the present situation inadmissible, the Soviet Delegation proposes to call a meeting of the Joint Commission on 24 September at 1030 or at any other hour, convenient for the American Delegation, in order to discuss the questions confronting the Joint Commission.

With sincere respects,

Chief Commissioner of the
Soviet Delegation
Colonel General T. F. Shtikov

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Soviet Delegation
in the
JOINT SOVIET - AMERICAN COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 September 1947

Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief of the American Delegation
Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea

Dear General Brown:

Your letter of 24 September 1947, in reply to my two letters of 23 September 1947, I received at 1110, that is, 40 minutes later than the time of the meeting suggested by me.

On 23 September 1947 at 0915, my first letter was handed to your Secretary Edwards by the Assistant Secretary of the Soviet Delegation, Mr. I. Volenko, in which I suggested the convening of a Joint Commission meeting at 1330 on 23 September. Failing to receive any answer from you until 1600, I wrote a second letter in which I suggested the convening of a Joint Commission meeting on 24 September at 1030 or any other time convenient to the American Delegation. This letter was handed by the Soviet Secretariat to the American Secretariat on 23 September at 1645. The American Secretary did not give a definite answer to my first letter but through his assistant, Capt. Bojus, on his own behalf vaguely stated that General Brown is busy with his plan and he was sure that the meeting could not be held. I cannot consider this statement as an answer to my letter.

You are well aware that the Joint Commission after 5 September 1947, on the initiative of the Soviet Delegation, held a meeting on 17 September 1947 and after this waits until the American Delegation will have an answer ready for the purpose of continuing the work of the Joint Commission. Seven days have passed but the American Delegation evades a meeting. The Soviet Delegation cannot waste precious time.

Without regard to whether the American Delegation is ready with an answer, the Soviet Delegation insists on calling a Joint Commission meeting on 25 September 1947 at 1030 or any other time convenient to the American Delegation for the purpose of discussing further steps in the work of the Joint Commission.

I am awaiting your answer.

Respectfully yours,

Chief Commissioner of the
Soviet Delegation, Colonel
General of the Soviet Army
T. SHTIKOV

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 September 1947

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

Receipt of your letter of 24 September 1947 insisting that the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, who is Chairman of the Joint Commission for the week ending 27 September 1947, call a meeting of the Joint Commission at 1030, 25 September 1947, or any other time convenient to the American Delegation, for the purpose of discussing further steps in the work of the Joint Commission is acknowledged.

At your insistence the Chairman will call a meeting of the Joint Commission for 1330, Friday, 26 September 1947.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner,
American Delegation.

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By NARS, Date

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

24 September 1947.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov,
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation,
US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear General Shtikov:

Your letters of 23rd September, apparently written a few hours apart, were not considered by me until this morning. The reason was that I was occupied throughout yesterday on work which required my presence elsewhere than at my desk in the American Delegation. It is a fact, however, that the Secretary of the American Delegation did promptly reply to your first letter through the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation.

Your statement in your first letter that "The American Delegation stated that it will study this proposal and will submit a reply; at the same time, the American Delegation pointed out that as soon as the reply will be ready, it will inform the Soviet Delegation to this effect" is correct.

As Chairman of the Joint Commission for the week ending September 27th, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation will request the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation to meet in joint session with the American Delegation if and as soon as the American Delegation is prepared to reply to the statement of the Soviet Delegation of September 17, 1947.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner,
American Delegation.

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Soviet-American Joint Commission
Soviet Delegation
Seoul, Korea

21 October 1947

To: The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission
Major General A. G. Arnold
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Arnold:

In answer to your proposal at the ending of the Joint Conference of 18 October 1947 I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

[illegible] the point of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Soviet Delegation has submitted all its efforts to the steadfast fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement with which, on the basis of that decision, began the creation of a united independent Korean Democratic Government.

In view of the position of the American delegation, which made impossible the realization of the Moscow decision, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of a united independent Korea, on 26 October 1947 introduced, at the direction of its Government, a proposal to withdraw simultaneously the American and Soviet troops from Korea during the beginning of 1948 and to afford Koreans themselves the opportunity of forming the Government of Korea.

The American Delegation refused to discuss this proposal and at the Joint Commission meeting of 18 October 1947, referring to the direction of its

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government, proposed to interrupt the work of the Joint Commission.

In connection with the above stated, the Soviet Delegation has received from its government, a direction to depart for Pyongyang.

Chief of the Soviet Delegation in the
Joint Soviet-American Commission
Colonel General Shtikov

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By NARS, Date

СОВМЕСТНАЯ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ
СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЯ

Сеул, Корея

Главе Американской делегации
в Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии

Генерал-майору А.Е.БРАУНУ

Сеул, Корея

"21" октября 1947 года

Уважаемый генерал БРАУН,

В ответ на Ваше предложение на заседании Совместной Комиссии 18 октября 1947 года имею честь сообщить Вам следующее :

За период работы Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии Советская делегация прилагала все усилия к быстрейшему выполнению Московского решения о Корее и созданию на основе этого решения объединённой независимой Кореи под руководством Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Ввиду позиции Американской делегации, которая сделала невозможным осуществление Московского соглашения, Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить создание объединённой независимой Кореи, 26 сентября 1947 года внесла, по указанию своего Правительства, предложение одновременно вывести из Кореи американские и советские войска в начале 1948 года и предоставить самим корейцам возможность сформировать Правительство Кореи.

Американская делегация отказалась обсуждать это предложение и на заседании Совместной Комиссии 18 октября 1947 года, ссылаясь на указание своего Правительства , предложила прервать работу Совместной Комиссии.

В связи с изложенным,Советская делегация получила от своего Правительства указание выехать в Пхеньян.

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
В СОВМЕСТНОЙ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ КОМИССИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ- ПОЛКОВНИК

Т. ШТЫКОВ

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

П Л А Н

ВЫЕЗДА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ ИЗ ГОР.СЕУЛА В ГОР.ПХЕНЬЯН

1. Самолётом 21 октября 1947 г. в 13.00 - 7 человек

2. Поездом :

Первый эшелон - отправляется 21 октября в 11.00

Состав поезда:

1. Паровоз - 1
2. Полувагон с углём - 1
3. Вагон-салон - 1
4. Классный вагон - 1
5. Общий классный вагон - 1
6. Крытый вагон товарный - 1
7. Платформ - 2

В с е г о - 8 единиц.

Список лиц, следующих с первым эшелоном, будет представлен дополнительно.

3. Поездом :

Второй эшелон - отправляется 22-23 октября.

Состав поезда :

1. Паровоз - 1
2. Полувагон с углём - 1
3. Вагон классный - 1
4. Крытые вагоны товарные - 3
5. Платформы - 3

В с е г о - 9 единиц

Список лиц, следующих со вторым эшелоном, будет представлен дополнительно.

Глава Советской делегации
в Совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК

Т.ШТЫКОВ

21-10-46.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

I acknowledge receipt of Secret Memo from Col. Edwards dated 10 April 1947 re assumed hypothetical removal of US and USSR from Korea.

10 April 1947
Returned & destroyed 4/25 — Mr. Bunce
Returned & destroyed 4/25 — Mr. Langdon
Mr. Sargent
Lt. Col. Edwards
Mr. Kinney
Returned & destroyed 4/25 — Mr. Prostov
Gen Werkuling

Bunce
Sargent
RA Kinney
Prostov
Original

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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American Telegraphic

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[illegible]

1. [illegible] details of withdrawal be decided by joint consideration of:

   a. [illegible]
   b. [illegible] Laos, Cambodia, United Nations and [illegible]

2. Should general settlement be attempted under [illegible] or should all differences be left for [illegible]

3. What conditions must exist prior to withdrawal, specifically:

   a. [illegible] power could be [illegible] effective [illegible] of Korea

   b. [illegible] 1/(Population) basis acceptable [illegible]

4. Is there likely to be provision for [illegible] of the Korean economy by [illegible] years after withdrawal [illegible]

5. Should [illegible] integration with [illegible] withdrawal [illegible]

   a. [illegible]

6. Should the 38th parallel barrier be removed

7. [illegible]

8. Should withdrawal be effected by [illegible]

Any other pertinent matters may be included. Brevity of answers is essential.

Enclosure 1.

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I acknowledge receipt of secret memo from Colonel Edwards dated 14 April 1947 giving his views re withdrawal of U.S. and U.S.S.R. from Korea.

General Weckerling
Dr. Bunce
~~Mr. Hamblen~~
Mr. Sargent
Mr. Kinney
Mr. Frostov

Law & original returned 4/25
ECB
Date 4/25
GMF
RAK
HBB

Ltr signed 4/25 Book shipped to Place.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

14 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Weckerling
Dr. Bunce
Mr. Langdon
Mr. Sargent
Mr. Kinney
Mr. Prostov.

1. My personal views on the questions raised in memorandum of 10 April are circulated for consideration.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel AGD
Secretary

Inclosure.

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1. (Q) Should the details of withdrawal be decided by joint commission of:

   A. United States and Russia?
   B. United States, Russia, United Kingdom and China?

   (A) U.S. and U.S.S.R. only, should decide the details of withdrawal.

2. (Q) Should general nation-wide elections be conducted under U.S.-U.S.S.R. supervision or under all subscribers to the Moscow Agreement?

   (A) Four Power supervision of national elections would be most desirable.

3. (Q) What conditions must exist prior to withdrawal, specifically:

   A. Should a permanent government be installed effective with departure of forces?
   B. If answer to "A" is affirmative, on what basis should it be elected? Is the 1911 basis acceptable? (population)

   (A) A. A permanent government should be installed at least 60 days prior to withdrawal, otherwise a vacuum may develop and revolution ensue which would endanger the security of the remaining U.S. nationals.

   B. No view.

4. (Q) Should there be provisions for joint tutelage of the Korean Government by two or more powers after withdrawal? What powers?

   (A) Provision for tutelage of the Korean Government should be made. The Joint Commission would be the logical agency and should be expanded to include representatives of Britain and China in an advisory capacity.

5. (Q) Should industry be integrated prior to withdrawal? If so, how long before?

   (A) No view.

6. (Q) When should the 38° parallel barrier be removed?

   (A) The 38° parallel barrier should be removed effective with the establishment of the permanent government.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7. (Q) What should be the time of withdrawal?

(A) Imponderables, such as availability of bottors will dictate the time of withdrawal. Provision should be made for wide latitude such as "within six months" to permit flexibility of plans.

8. (Q) Should withdrawal be effected by increments?

(A) Realistically, withdrawal must be effected by increment considering availability of facilities, transport, etc., and security of forces. Tentative figure might be estimating G-Day to be the date of establishment of the permanent government:

Period G + 1 to G + 30 30 % of strength
" G + 30 to G + 75 40 % " "
" G + 75 to G + 120 Remainder

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17 April 1947.

Copy of General Heckerling's views on the local planning in case the USSR proposes simultaneous withdrawal from Korea.

~~Gen. Heckerling~~ Has Original
~~Col. Burns~~ Has Copy
~~Mr. Bunce~~ A/C/S
Mr. Langdon

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT
17 April

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

I. THE PROBLEM:

1. To undertake prior planning on the local level in case the Soviet Government should propose simultaneous withdrawal of both occupation forces from Korea.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

2. The following assumptions are made:

a. That the U.S. Government would accept the Soviet proposal subject to certain stipulations.

b. That the State and War Departments and CINCFE will request the recommendations of the C.G., USAFIK.

c. That the Joint Commission has been adjourned since May 1946.

3. A Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal from Korea of both forces is an excellent plan from the USSR point of view. The Korean question is deadlocked. The USSR position excludes from consultation before the Joint Commission all Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals who have opposed, or still oppose, the Moscow Agreement.

4. The U.S. position protects the right of freedom of expression by Koreans.

5. Resolving these considerable differences of view between the two countries would necessitate material Soviet compromise (and loss of prestige in USSR eyes). Further, if U.S. plans in South Korea are carried to fruition, particularly economic assistance, the Soviets may be faced with considerable dissatisfaction in the north, which will become increasingly grave if U.S. objectives are successful.

6. The statement of the President on Greece and Turkey, as well as recent pronouncements on Korea by other top U.S. officials, should convince the Soviets of U.S. determination to resist the

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

spread of Communism and to spend important sums of money to this end, even at the risk of war.

7. There is no doubt that the Soviets have made considerable effort to train "leave-behind" Communist groups in North Korea, civil and military. There is, however, no absolutely reliable gauge of their success with this effort.

8. The Soviets may actually be proceeding with the withdrawal of most of their forces from North Korea now.

9. If the Soviets' plan is successful and a strong military force has been trained, it would be effective surprise tactics to suddenly propose simultaneous withdrawal of both forces. World opinion might go against the U.S. if we did not accept this ostensibly fair proposal, and our State Department might find it expedient to accept.

10. With borders contiguous to Korea, it would be comparatively easy for the USSR to intervene in Korea if civil war broke out in the future.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

11. In the event that such a proposal is made and accepted by the U.S. and the assumptions materialize, the following steps are recommended for proposal to the State Department:

a. The United States should propose that the US - USSR Joint Commission meet at once to decide:

(1) Establishment of a Provisional Korean Government within thirty (30) days.

(2) Plan for integration of communications, transportation and national industries to become effective upon removal of 38° barrier.

(3) Details of withdrawal.

b. The U.S. should also propose prior Soviet agreement to the following:

(1) The 38° parallel barrier to be removed effective with the establishment of the Provisional Korean Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(2) Establishment of the Provisional Government on proportional basis of 19 to 11 (population).

(3) Korean political and social groups and individuals to be consulted on composition of Provisional Government.

(4) General elections to be held within six (6) months after proclamation of Provisional Government, supervised by the US - USSR Joint Commission.

(5) The Joint Commission to remain in Korea with a supervisory mission until separate agreement to dissolve is reached.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

17 April 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Techerling,
Dr. Bunce,
Mr. Langdon,
Mr. Sargent,
Mr. Kinney.

1. The attached paper contains views of Mr. Prostov regarding the questions raised in memorandum of 10 April, and is circulated for consideration.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

Enclosure.

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By NARS, Date

D R T
17 April 1947

SECRET

1. The details of withdrawal should be decided by joint commission of the Four Powers signatories of the Moscow Decision. This would serve:

(a) To extend the validity of the Moscow Decision over the whole situation;

(b) To protect China's legitimate interests, which are expected to coincide with the U.S. interests.

2. General nation-wide elections should be conducted under the supervision of the four signatory powers.

3. A provisional government shall be established prior to the departure of forces. The government shall become permanent effective with the departure of forces upon satisfying set conditions, to be determined by the Four Powers. Among such conditions shall be disarming of all Korean forces, save for a small national militia officered by the Allies, to take place of both the police and the constabulary.

B. The government shall be elected on the basis of actual population of various provinces, following a general census supervised by the signatory powers. The actual ratio is expected to be 1:9, but no specific ratio should be insisted on.

4. There need not be a provision for joint tutelage, provided an Inter-Allied Commission of observers are stationed in key centers of Korea. The permanent government shall conclude a ten-year treaty with the Allies, allowing the introduction of armed forces of all the Allies in case of a threat to peace, when decided by majority of the Allies.

5. Industry shall be integrated following the formation of the provisional government, but prior to the troop withdrawal. It may be preceded by a census of manufactures supervised by the Allies.

6. 38° Parallel shall be removed following the inauguration of the Provisional Government, as early as possible.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7. Time of withdrawal shall be contingent upon satisfaction, by the provisional government, of the set conditions determined by the Allies. A year should be sufficient.

8. Withdrawal shall be effected in two stages:

(a) The main forces, in such increments as may be decided;

(b) The small task forces attached to the Inter-Allied Commission of observers.

PROTOCOL

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18 April 1947

Copy of General Wedemeyer's views on the local planning in case the USSR proposes simultaneous withdrawal from Korea.

Gen. Wedemeyer *Has signed*
Col. Edwards *for*
Mr. Vince *acb*
Mr. Langdon
Mr. Kinney
Mr. Prestov *Eugene V Prestov*

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3rd
DRAFT
16 April 1947

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

I. THE PROBLEM:

1. To undertake prior planning on the local level in case the Soviet Government should propose simultaneous withdrawal of both occupation forces from Korea.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

2. The following assumptions are made:

a. That the U.S. Government would accept the Soviet proposal subject to certain stipulations.

b. That the State and War Departments and CINCFE will request the recommendations of the C.G., USAFIK.

c. That the Joint Commission has not recommenced, ~~been adjourned since May 1946~~.

III. DISCUSSION:

3. A Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal from Korea of both forces would be advantageous from the USSR point of view. The Korean question is deadlocked. The USSR position excludes from consultation before the Joint Commission all Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals who have opposed, or still oppose, the Moscow Agreement.

4. The U.S. position strongly affirms the right of freedom of expression by Koreans.

5. The statement of the President on Greece and Turkey, as well as recent pronouncements on Korea by other top U.S. officials, should convince the Soviets of U.S. determination to resist the spread of Communism and to spend important sums of money to this end, even at the risk of war.

6. Resolving the considerable ideological differences between the two countries would necessitate material Soviet compromise (and loss of prestige in USSR eyes). Further, if U.S. plans in South Korea are carried to fruition, particularly economic assistance, the Soviets may be faced with considerable dissatisfaction in the

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

north, which will become increasingly grave if U.S. objectives are successful.

7. The Soviets have made a considerable effort to train "leave-behind" Communist groups in North Korea, civil and military. There is, however, no absolutely reliable gauge of the extent of their success with this effort.

8. If a strong military force has been trained in North Korea, simultaneous withdrawal of both forces would favor control of all Korea by Russian puppets from the north. World opinion might well go against the U.S. if we did not accept an ostensibly fair proposal to withdraw U.S. military forces, and our State Department might find it expedient to accept.

9. The Soviets may actually be proceeding with the withdrawal of most of their forces from North Korea now.

10. With borders contiguous to Korea, the USSR could justify intervention in Korea if civil war broke out in the future.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

11. In the event that such a proposal is made and accepted by the U.S., the following steps should be recommended to the State Department:

a. The United States to propose that the US - USSR Joint Commission be convened at once under the broad framework of the Moscow Agreement to work out:

(1) Establishment of a Provisional Korean Government.

(2) Plan for integration of communications, transportation and national industries to become effective upon removal of 38° parallel barrier.

(3) Details of withdrawal.

b. The U.S. should, however, secure prior Soviet agreement to the following:

(1) Designation of mutually acceptable date within sixty (60) days after convening of Joint Commission for a joint review by both governments of the progress made.

(2) Removal of 38° parallel barrier effective upon the establishment of the Provisional Korean Government.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(3) Establishment of provisional government on proportional population basis.

(4) Consultation with Korean political and social groups and individuals on composition of provisional government.

(5) Disarming of all Korean forces except for a small national constabulary under the control of the Provisional Korean Government and succeeding governments.

(6) Holding of general elections within six (6) months after proclamation of provisional government, supervised by the US - USSR Joint Commission.

(7) Stationing of the Joint Commission in Korea with a supervisory mission until the final disposition of this group is decided by the two powers.

WECKERLING.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Adviser
to the Commanding General
USAFIK

21 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO:

General Weckerling
Mr. Langdon
Mr. Sargent
Mr. Kinney
Mr. Prostov
Lt.Col. Edwards

Attached are my views on the paper submitted by Colonel Edwards.

Arthur C. Bunce

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Seoul Korea

21 April 1947

1. Since the Moscow Decision provides for a Four-Power review of the work of the Joint Commission, I believe that the Four Powers should make the final decisions on the details of withdrawal of troops.

2. I believe that the Four Powers should also supervise a general, nation-wide election through the use of teams of observers stationed throughout the country.

3. It is essential that a strong national government be installed before the departure of troops. I believe that nation-wide elections under careful supervision of the Four Powers could be held and that representation between north and south should be on a population basis.

4. Upon completion of the withdrawal of troops, a Four-Power Commission should be established to see that the conditions of withdrawal are met and to provide a medium for "aid and assistance" to the new government. The appointment of this Commission should not exclude Korea from membership in the United Nations. The supervisory powers of this Commission would include such tasks as seeing to it that no private armies retain power and influence.

5. and 6. These two problems go together and the country should be integrated by joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. action extended over a period of at least three months, working in direct contact with Korean advisors and operating technicians of both north and south.

Part of this integration must, of necessity, take place before the general election is held; and I would say that, in terms of communi-

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cations, transportation, and movement of people, attempts should be made to complete the unification three months before the elections are held. A unified, national currency would also be desirable before the elections. It is probable that U.S.S.R. will oppose all such measures before the elections.

Another part of the unification can only take place after the national government is formed. This will cover such subjects as: development of a unified system of grain collection and rationing, coordinated international trade controls, and a unified system for the national police.

The form of unification in the case of industry and trade will depend upon the wishes of the national government which should be given power to dispose of all vested properties. This would make it essential that Japanese property be granted to Korea either by the Reparations Conference or by the Japanese Government divesting its citizens of all property rights in Korea. This should be done before the national government takes office.

7. Troops should be withdrawn within a period of six months after the establishment of the national government and its police force.

8. Withdrawals should be by increments extending over this period, with the Commission having the right to call upon the Four Powers if troops are required to put down any internal disturbances that may threaten the security of the government.

---C---

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21 April 1947

[illegible] dated 21 April 1947.

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DRAFT

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

April 21, 1947

I. THE PROBLEM

1. To make recommendations to the Government in the event that the U.S.S.R. and U. S. have mutually agreed to the withdrawal of all forces from Korea.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

1. There seems no likelihood of the question being presented to us in the above form. Rather, the hypothesis should be that Russia has proposed withdrawal and that we are called upon to make recommendations on the terms of withdrawal. There is no point in discussing mutual agreement to withdrawal in the past tense as we would have to follow whatever was agreed upon. On this hypothesis, the following is suggested:

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Our reply should be that we favor acceptance of the Russian proposal and are ready immediately to conclude an agreement of withdrawal to replace the Moscow agreement, with such agreement to be concurred in by Great Britain and China.

2. The terms of the agreement of withdrawal might be:

   a. Immediate removal of the 38 degree parallel barrier ~~and~~ on movement of persons and goods, and integration of the transportation, communications and power systems under a temporary joint technical board.

   b. Immediate reconvening of the Joint Commission to draft, in conjunction with committees from the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea and the Central Peoples Committee of North Korea, a charter for a provisional government of the Republic of Korea.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

c. Establishment, under the direction of the Joint Commission and through the instrumentality of a special joint (or four-power) elections board, of a provisional national government and local governments--methods of election (by an elective constituent assembly or direct), elective offices, etc., to be set forth in the charter.

d. Conclusion of a standard treaty with each of the four powers defining their relations with the provisional government, rights of their nationals in Korea, etc., in the interim period. Provision to be made in such treaties for replacement within suitable period of provisional government charter and provisional government by a national constitution and a permanent constitutional government thereunder, and for undertaking by four powers to extend formal recognition to latter and gain its admission into UNO.

e. Conclusion of a four-power agreement with the provisional government for a four-power loan consortium for handling, administering, and servicing financial aid from the International Bank or other loan or rehabilitation agency.

3. Twelve months ~~for~~ from conclusion of the agreement of withdrawal might be set as the deadline for implementation of all its terms, with a schedule of implementation of successive steps, including troop withdrawals by increments.

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COMMENTS

The argument might be made that Russia, being no more disposed to live up to a new agreement than to carry out the Moscow Agreement, would propose only unconditional and immediate withdrawal so that the large and well-equipped north Korean Communist-dominated forces and quasi-military organizations might take over the whole country after such withdrawal. This does not seem a valid argument, as such action would constitute a proposal to set aside an international agreement and to evade a solemn obligation. Supposing for the sake of argument, that we did receive such a proposal, American public opinion could readily be made to see that establishment of a Korean government of sorts was a prerequisite to withdrawal and that withdrawal prior to creation of such a government to take over from us would constitute disorderly retreat and a dereliction of our duty.

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U.S.—Soviet Joint Commission
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

21 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO:

General Heckerling
Mr. Langdon
Mr. Sargent
Mr. Frostov
Lt Col. Edwards

Attached are my views on the paper submitted by Colonel Edwards.

RAK
Robert A. Kinney

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Seoul, Korea

22 April 1947

1. The details of withdrawal should be decided by the Joint Commission of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China.

   a) This would make the decision multilateral, rather than bilateral, in line with the Cairo Declaration and the Moscow Decision which recognizes the multilateral interest in Korean independence.

   b) It would strengthen the hand of the United States for, should there be any Soviet violations of the agreement, it would involve breaking an agreement with China and the United Kingdom, as well as with the United States. Since the question would then probably be referred to the United Nations, this aspect is important.

   c) It would emphasize to the Koreans that the problem of Korean independence involves more than Soviet-American relations.

2. The general, nation-wide elections should be conducted under supervision of the Four-Powers signatories to the Moscow Decision.

3. Conditions which must exist prior to withdrawal:

   a) A Provisional Government should be established for several months prior to departure of the armed forces.

   b) Representation in legislature should be decided on a proportional basis, according to population. The actual population at present is probably about 19.5 to 9.

4. There should be a provision for tutelage of the Korean Government by the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom; but this tutelage should not be termed "trusteeship."

5. Industry should be integrated as soon as possible, certainly several months before the withdrawal of troops.

6. The 38° parallel barrier should be removed as soon as possible, and at the latest at the time of the establishment of a Korean government.

7. The time for complete withdrawal should be several months after the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government and the removal of the 38° parallel barrier.

8. In the period before this complete withdrawal, there could be a gradual reduction of forces, so that final withdrawal could be consummated within a specified month.

ROBERT A. KINNEY

cc. as per covering sheet

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Plan for Simultaneous Withdrawal from Korea of US and USSR.

1	21 Apr 1947	Jt. Comm.	C.C., USAFIK

1. The attached study for planning purposes (assuming Soviet proposal and U.S. acceptance of simultaneous withdrawal of both forces from Korea) was prepared at the direction of the Commanding General.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Attachment
5 copies of study.

(Distribution of study:
5 copies to C.G.,
1 copy J.C. files,
1 copy to Gen. Weckerling,
1 copy to Col. Edwards)

destroyed

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

21 April 1947.

I. THE PROBLEM:

1. To undertake prior planning on the local level in case the Soviet Government should propose simultaneous withdrawal of both occupation forces from Korea.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

2. The following assumptions are made:

a. That the U.S. Government would accept the Soviet proposal subject to certain stipulations.

b. That the State and War Departments and CINCFE will request the recommendations of the C.G., USAFIK.

c. That the situation exists as at present, or substantially so, and no agreement has been reached to reconvene the Joint Commission.

III. DISCUSSION:

3. A Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal from Korea of both forces would be advantageous from the USSR point of view. The Korean question is deadlocked. The Soviets insist upon excluding from consultation before the Joint Commission all Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals who have opposed, or still oppose, the Moscow Agreement.

4. The U.S. position strongly affirms the right of freedom of expression by Koreans.

5. The statement of the President on Greece and Turkey, as well as recent pronouncements on Korea by other top U.S. officials, should convince the Soviets of U.S. determination to resist the spread of Communism and to spend important sums of money to this end, even at the risk of war.

6. Considerable Soviet concession and compromise (with loss of prestige) would be necessary to resolve the ideological differences between the two countries in the solution of the Korean

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

problem. Further, if U.S. plans in South Korea are carried to fruition, particularly economic assistance, the Soviets may be faced with considerable dissatisfaction in the north, which will be incressed if U.S. objectives are accomplished.

7. The Soviets have made a considerable effort to train "leave-behind" Communist groups in North Korea, civil and military. There is, however, no absolutely reliable gauge of the extent of their success.

8. If a relatively strong military force has been trained in North Korea, a hurried, simultaneous withdrawal of both forces would favor control of all Korea by Russian puppets from the north. However, world and U.S. internal opinion might well go against U.S. policies if we did not accept an ostensibly fair proposal to withdraw simultaneously, and our State Department might find it expedient to accept.

9. The Soviets may actually be prepared to withdraw their forces from North Korea now and could conceivably propose an immediate withdrawal to further their ends and to attempt to place the U.S. in an untenable position.

10. With borders contiguous to Korea, the USSR could justify later intervention in Korea if civil war broke out in the future.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

11. In the event that such a proposal is made and accepted by the U.S., the following steps should be recommended to the State Department:

a. The United States to propose that the US - USSR Joint Commission be convened at once under the broad framework of the Moscow Agreement to work out:

(1) Establishment of a Provisional Korean Government.

(2) Plan for integration of communications, transportation and national industries to become effective upon removal of 38° parallel barrier.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(3) Details of withdrawal.

b. The U.S. should, however, secure prior Soviet agreement on governmental level to the following:

(1) eview by both governments of progress made by the Joint Commission in workin out tasks enumerated in paragraph 11. a. (1), (2) and (3), sixty (60) days after convening.

(2) Consultation with Korean political and social groups and individuals on composition of provisional government.

(3) stablishment of provisional government on proportional population basis.

(4) emoval of 38° parallel barrier effective upon the establishment of the Provisional Korean Government.

(5) isarming of all Korean forces except for a small national constabulary under the control of the Provisional Korean Government and succeeding governments.

(6) olding of general elections within six (6) months after proclamation of provisional government, supervised by the U.S. - USSR Joint Commission.

(7) ithdrawal of both forces by phases:

(a) Maximum strength of 40,000 troops of each country to be reached within sixty (60) days after official assumption of office by Korean Provisional Government.

(b) Maximum strength of 5,000 troops of each country to be reached within thirty (30) days after inauguration of permanent Korean Government.

(c) All troops to be withdrawn within ninety (90) days after inauguration of permanent Korean Government.

(8) Stationing of the Joint Commission in Korea with general powers of supervision until the final disposition of this group is decided by the two powers. Strength of Joint Commission, including small guard and service detachments, to be determined by mutual agreement.

SECRET

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ROUTING SLIP

COPY

1 Possible Simultaneous Withdrawal of Both Occupation Forces from Korea.

1 28 Apr DC CG

1. In my opinion, three lines of action are offered:

a. Solution through the Moscow Agreement;

b. Continuation of present status;

c. Arbitrary decision to withdraw.

2. The solution submitted by the Joint Commission adheres to method 1 a, and is therefore not a means of affecting an arbitrary decision, 1 c.

3. The decision to proceed under 1 c is not a matter concerning this command, except as to method and possibly as to recommendations based on knowledge of the local situation gained through long familiarity. Should solution 1 c be placed into effect, it is believed that the natural result would be

a. A period of civil disturbance, followed by

b. Russian occupancy.

It is not believed that as an ultimate objective this is desired by the United States, nor would it be acceptable to Great Britain and China, the other signatories to the Moscow Agreement.

4. The United States, being a signatory to the Moscow Agreement, cannot, it is believed, proceed unilateraly or in agreement with one other signatory power to arbitrary action. This, however, is a matter for the higher levels.

5. It is my personal opinion that pending agreement of the Russians to implement the Moscow Decision, the status quo should continue. We should inaugurate some such program as recently proposed in Washington, and endeavor by this means and the general application of force throughout the diplomatic front to force Russia to compliance with the terms of the Moscow Agreement under reasonable interpretation.

A.R.R.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

29 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Hickerling
Dr. Bunce
Mr. Sargent
Mr. Langdon
Lt. Colonel Edwards
Mr. Kinney
Mr. Krostov

SUBJECT : Possible Developments Affecting the Joint Commission.

1. Your comment on the problem presented in the Inclosure is requested not later than 2 May 1947.

2. The statements contained in paragraph 5 of the inclosure are not intended to be restrictive. Further elaboration or addition is invited.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM R. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel AGD
Secretary

Inclosure: 1

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The policy of the United States "To secure an independent Korea in due course" remains unchanged.

2. The Russians have refused to cooperate with the United States in securing an independent Korea under the Moscow Agreement.

3. The Russian government has:

a. Proposed mutual withdrawal of US-USSR troops from Korea or,

b. Completed unilateral withdrawal and has demanded that US troops be withdrawn.

4. The War Department has requested the recommendation of the Commanding General, USAFIK as to terms upon which acceptance of the Russian proposal should be based.

The Problem

5. To recommend practical means to:

a. Secure the early independence of Korea under a government selected by general election or other effective measures from North and South Korea, proportionate to population strength.

b. Set up a government of all Korea; type and organization to be decided by Koreans.

c. Eliminate the 38th parallel barrier or any other line of demarcation between the two areas as soon as the provisional government takes form.

d. Provide adequate safeguards to assure insofar as practicable

(1) The stability of the government when established.

(2) The security from agression by any power of an independent Korea under the established government.

(3) Such aid and assistance as the Korean government may require without "Trusteeship", insofar as practicable.

e. Orderly and prompt evacuation of troops under a time program, integrated with the establishment and development of the government and security measures above stated.

f. Disarmament of all forces except police and constabulary.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

28 April 1947

[illegible]
Dr. Bunce
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
RAK

[illegible]

[illegible]

Inclosure:

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

ASSUMPTIONS

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The Problem

5. To recommend practical means to:

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   b. [illegible] of all forces: type and organization to be decided by Koreans.

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      (2) The security from agression by any power of an independent Korea under the established government.

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   f. Disarmament of all forces except police and constabulary.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Advisor
Seoul, Korea

May 1st, 1947.

To: Brig.Gen. John H. Weckerling

From: Minister Arthur C. Bunce

SUBJECT: USSR Proposal to Withdraw Troops

1. Any proposal which abrogates the Moscow Decision must be agreed to by the four signatory powers and can not be agreed to on a bi-lateral basis.

2. Since the Moscow Decision establishes the Joint Commission through the medium of the Army Commanders in North and South Korea, the removal of such Commanders abrogates the Moscow Decision and, therefore, must have four power agreement.

3. If the USSR proposes the removal of troops simultaneously the U.S.A. should immediately agree to refer the matter to the four powers because it involves the abrogation of the Moscow Decision.

4. In the event of a four power conference to consider the USSR proposal alternative measures to the Joint Commission and Moscow Decision on Korea should be considered at that time.

5. Until a new four power agreement is reached regarding measures for the establishment of Korea as an independent nation, the U.S. should follow the present plan of aid and assistance to South Korea.

6. At the four power conference the U.S. should support the following basic principles:

(1) Establishment of a National Korean Government before withdrawal. This could be achieved by:
   a. Agreement between the two Commands
   b. Union of the Legislative Assembly with the People's Committee
   c. National elections.
   In all cases population should be used as a basis of representation of North and South and the four powers should have some supervisory relationship and be a court of appeal. Detailed plans for each alternative should be prepared.

(2) There must be integration of the economy. This is a complex problem and the timing of the unification of various segments will depend upon the solution agreed upon in (1) above. Detailed programs to meet all contingencies should be developed.

Secret

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(3) Some form of supervision to see that the terms of the agreement are carried out must be established. The supervisory group could be
   a. A civilian Joint Commission.
   b. Two Ambassadors with civilian staffs.
   c. A Four Power Council.

(4) Specific agreements should also be reached upon the following points:
   a. Military intervention in the case of civil disturbance threatening the established government.
   b. The duration and scope of the supervision mentioned in (3)
   c. Control over or disarming of any existing forces in Korea at the time of establishment of the National Government.
   d. Withdrawal of troops.
   e. Relationship of the National Government to the U.N.C.
   f. Economic aid and assistance to the new government.

7. To cover the essential points raised above, a new SWNCC Directive will have to be prepared as a guide to the U.S. representatives at the conference.

dean

c.c. Mr. Sargent
Mr. Langdon
Lt. Col. Edwards
Mr. Kinney
Mr. Prostov

ACB/vw

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Copy No. 6.

American Delegation
US - USSR Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

1 May 1947

I. PURPOSE:

1. To recommend practical courses of action to accomplish United States objectives in case the U.S.S.R. (a) proposes simultaneous withdrawal of troops from Korea, or alternatively (b) withdraws unilaterally and then demands United States withdrawal.

II. [illegible].

2. The policy of the United States "to secure an independent Korea in the course" remains unchanged.

3. The Russians have refused to negotiate with the United States for a series on independent Korea under the Moscow Agreement.

4. The Russian government has:

a. Proposed mutual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea or

b. Unilateral withdrawal and has demanded that U.S. troops be withdrawn.

5. The War Department has requested the recommendation of the Commanding General, USAFIK as to terms upon which acceptance of the Russian proposal should be based.

III. DISCUSSION:

6. The facts are too well known for repetition.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

7. The U.S.S.R. intends to Communize Korea or as a minimum to establish a Soviet dominated satellite.

8. It would be advantageous from the Soviet point of view to propose simultaneous withdrawal from Korea. A unilateral withdrawal is also possible. This move has very definite advantages to the U.S.S.R. from the long range viewpoint.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

9. U.S.S.R. preparations in North Korea for this move may be well advanced.

10. The U.N.T.C. is in an excellent position to intervene in Korea after U.S. troops have been withdrawn.

11. It is doubtful if the U.S. forces would again return to Korea unless war or a situation approximating war would ensue.

V. [redacted]:

(Alternative for assumptions under paragraph 4a)

12. That U.N. and U.N.T.C. to nominate Korean representatives on population basis (1% to 11) to meet in Seoul to establish a Korean Provisional Government.

13. 38th parallel barrier to be removed effective upon establishment of the Provisional Government.

14. All Korean military or quasi military forces to be disarmed and completely demilitarized by date of inauguration of Provisional Government.

15. General elections to be held within six (6) months after proclamation of Provisional Government supervised by representatives of Four Powers.

16. Final withdrawal of both forces:

(a) Maximum strength of 25,000 troops of each country to be reached within sixty (60) days after official assumption of office by Korean Provisional Government.

(b) Maximum strength of 5,000 troops of each country to be reached within thirty (30) days after inauguration of permanent Korean Government.

(c) All troops to be withdrawn within ninety (90) days after inauguration of permanent Korean Government.

17. Economic aid and assistance on basis of direct U.S. - Korean negotiations similar to U.S. proposals to aid Greece and Turkey.

18. United States propose and sponsor Korean membership in United Nations when permanent government established.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(Alternative in assumptions under paragraph 4b)

a. State Department to announce that U.S. objectives in Korea remain the same and that U.S. troops will be withdrawn progressively as those objectives are secured (assuming a strong national policy to prevent spread of Communism still exists).

b. Secure Soviet and support Korean efforts for political unification and economic integration.

c. Announce that

(1) ... will reduce forces to [illegible] sixty (60) days after formation of a provisional government, and

(2) ... will withdraw all forces ninety (90) days after formation of permanent government.

d. Provide additional assistance on basis of direct ... upon a recommendation similar to ... responsible to all Koreans and United Nations when permanent government established.

JOHN ECKERLING
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Acting Chief Commissioner

Distribution:
Mr. Bunce - Agreed
Mr. Langdon - Discussed 5/1/47.
Mr. Sargent - Agreed
Col. Edwards - Noted & destroyed
Gen. Eckerling
File = No. 6.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Inter-Office
Routing Slip

	Initials		Initials
~~Gen Brown~~		Mr Bunce	
~~Gen Eckerling~~		Mr Kinney	
~~Col Lincoln~~			CBF
Lt ~~Bertsch~~			✓
~~Lt Althaus~~		Mr Prostov	

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

南 朝 鮮 過 渡 政 府
SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT

書 類 回 送 表
MEMO ROUTING SLIP

以 下 의 順 序 로 回 送 할 사
To the following in order indicated:

	姓名又는職名 (Name or Title)	事務室名 (Organ)	事務室番號 (Room)	署名 (Initials)	日字 (Date)
1	General Hodge				
2					
3					

Returned with Comment as directed.

1 Incl
Memo w/

發信者
FROM 아-취. 엘. 러-취.
ARCHER L. LERCH
美 國 名 陸 事務室名 少 將 事務室番號
Major (Name) U. United States Army (Room)
副官
ADJUTANT
南 朝 鮮 過 渡 政 府
SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT

日字 (Date)
8/14/47
電話 (Tel)

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Justice
Seoul, Korea

1 May 1947

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Proposal to Withdraw Forces

TO : The Military Governor

I.-- A move, on the part of the Soviet Government, proposing a simultaneous withdrawal of both occupation forces from Korea, is well within the realm of possibility. Indeed it may be somewhat surprising that such a maneuver--a maneuver it would be--has not been proposed before.

II.-- That the United States Government would have any other alternative to acceptance of the proposal is not believed. But preliminary negotiations and measures would be necessary. If the move should be a diplomatic maneuver, as is virtually certain, the problem arises of meeting it without antagonizing domestic as well as international public opinion. This is all the more important since an offer to withdraw would have appeal to those who have not thought the problem through and have not realized consequences of complete withdrawal without the establishment of a stable Korean permanent government, capable of maintaining law and order. Withdrawal without the creation of such a government could very well be considered repudiation of the powers's obligations to the cause of international peace and to the Korean people. It might very well mean abandonment of Korea to chaos and disorders, if not civil war, which would give the Soviets plausible excuse for intervention caused by disorders near their boundaries, an intervention which could be justified, or attempted to be justified, by principles of international law and even defended by alleged precedents furnished by past American interventions in Cuba and the Central American republics. A complete withdrawal, not preceded by the creation of a functioning government, is, therefore, a practical and moral impossibility. It is also a question whether a complete withdrawal without more would not be tantamount to an abrogation of the Moscow declaration, an agreement still valid and presumably adhered to by both powers.

III.-- That a proposal for simultaneous withdrawal from Korea would be advantageous to the Soviets, and by the same token not to the United States, admits of no doubt. This is so not only morally, for propaganda purposes, but for other reasons, especially because of geographical proximity and because of the existence of well organized,

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

conspiratorial, unmoral and ruthless communist methods. The Soviets could and would control Korea through their version of a Fifth Column, the Communist elements. Once the United States completely withdrew, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to exercise any influence in Korea with a consequent recession of the democratic front and loss of prestige throughout Asia, in which part of the world we have always been interested and never isolationist. If we are to resist the spread of Communism and the retreat of democracy, as happened in Central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia), it is not to the interest of the United States, or that of the democratic cause, to withdraw prematurely from Korea. It is not in the interests of international peace. Wars have started, and spread, from less serious situations.

It is safe to say that the ideological differences between the Soviets and the United States cannot be reconciled. But the onsweep of totalitarianism may perhaps be arrested by not permitting ourselves to be delayed or even dissuaded in plans to support democratic countries, or those which at least promise to develop into democracies. Whatever the Soviet tactics and maneuvers, plans of economic assistance to southern Korea should continue, and the bills, about to be introduced in Congress, should be voted. That is a form of pressure which may cause the Soviets to make concessions, especially if a face saving device is found. A possible face saving device would consist of taking the position that a Provisional Government would necessarily be composed of personages acceptable to both powers, in other words there would be a mutual right of veto. But provisions would be imperative that a permanent government must be established on a democratic basis, that is to say, free, universal and secret suffrage, and that the first elections be held under the Joint Commission supervision.

If we assume, as seems likely and as must be assumed, that the Soviets have trained a relatively strong Korean Communist military force in North Korea, a withdrawal by them of regular Soviet Army forces would be meaningless. It would not be a real and bona fide withdrawal, since such formations would be subject to the control of Moscow. It follows that it would become necessary to provide for disarming of all Korean forces except such units as should appear absolutely necessary for police purposes and which would be under the supervision of the provisional government.

IV.-- From this brief comment the conclusion is warranted that a withdrawal at one fell swoop cannot be thought of. In principle withdrawal may have to be accepted, but its accomplishment can be effected only by successive stages which should be the subject of preliminary negotiation. It is to the interest of the United States, of Korea and peace generally, that American military occupation, even

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

if in decreasing force, continue until a permanent government is established on fairly firm foundations. Even then any Korean government will be subject to Soviet pressure, and the situation will need constant watching.

It is likely that the United States, as a matter of principle and also of tactics, should insist upon carrying out of the Moscow declaration, the first objective of which is establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. Conferences should be held only when, on a governmental level, the preliminary conditions are met by the Soviets. Otherwise they would not promise success, and disillusionment would be the only result.

Charles Pergler

CHARLES PERGLER

I concur with Dr. Pergler.

A. L. L.
5/1/47

ARCH[illegible] L. LERCH

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Justice
Seoul, Korea

1 May 1947

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SECRET

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Charles Bergler
CHARLES BERGLER

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

南朝鮮過渡政府
SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT

書類回送表
MEMO ROUTING SLIP

以下의順序로回送함사
To the following in order indicated:

Dr Pergler 署名 (Initials)

	姓名又는職名 (Name or Title)	事務室名 (Organ)	事務室番號 (Room)	日字 (Date)
1				
2				
3				

I learn to Comment on this.
I need your advice. I feel
we shmed not get out.
Do ym?

發信者
FROM 차. 엘 퍼-거
姓名 ARCHER L. PERGLER
(Name)
事務室名 (Organ)
事務室番號 (Room)
AMG
41 29 47

日字 (Date)
電話 (Tel)

南朝鮮過渡政府
SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS

ROUTING SLIP

28 4p 1947

FROM: G/S SECTION

TO : Gen. Lich

Chief of Staff	Fiscal Off
G-1	Hq Comdt
G-2	Inspector General
G-3	I & E Off
G-4	I & H Off
Adjutant General	Joint Commission
Air Off	Judge Advocate
Army Exchange Off	Machine Record Unit
Chaplain	Ordnance Off
Chemical	Provost Marshal
Civilian Personal Off	Public Relations Off
Claims Service	Quartermaster
Dependent Housing Sec	Signal Off
Engineer	Special Service
Finance Off	Surgeon

Re G-3 note.

FOR :

Attachment of Reference	Initials
Comment or Concurrence	Issuance of Orders
Dispatch	Necessary Action
File	Note and Return
Information	Signature

Remarks (Use Reverse Side Also

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

American Delegation
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

21 April 1947.

I. The Issue:

1. To undertake prior planning on the local level in case the Soviet Government should propose simultaneous withdrawal of both occupation forces from Korea.

II. Facts Bearing on the Issue:

1. The following assumptions are made:

a. That the U.S. Government would accept the Soviet proposal subject to certain safeguards.

b. That the interim report submitted by the U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission will represent the recommendations of the U.S. Government.

c. That the situation exists at present, or substantially so, and no agreement has been reached to reconvene the Joint Commission.

III. Discussion:

1. A Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal from Korea of both forces would be advantageous from the U.S. point of view. The Korean question is deadlocked. The Soviets insist upon excluding from consultation before the Joint Commission all Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals who have opposed, or still oppose, the Moscow Agreement.

2. The U.S. position strongly affirms the right of freedom of expression by Koreans.

3. The statement of the President on Greece and Turkey, as well as recent pronouncements on Korea by other top U.S. officials, should convince the Soviets of U.S. determination to resist the spread of Communism and to spend important sums of money to this end, even at the risk of war.

4. Considerable Soviet concession and compromise (with loss of prestige) would be necessary to resolve the ideological differences between the two countries in the solution of the Korean

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

21 Apr 1947

problem. Further, if U.S. plans in South Korea are carried to fruition, particularly economic assistance, the Soviets may be faced with considerable dissatisfaction in the north, which will be increased if U.S. objectives are accomplished.

2. The Soviets have made a considerable effort to build "leveraged" Communist groups in South Korea, civil and military. There is, however, no absolutely reliable index of the extent of their success.

3. If a relatively strong military force has been built in north Korea, a buried, if clandestine withdrawal of both troops will give control of all area by Soviet-run units from the north. Moreover, world and U.S. internal opinion might well go against U.S. efforts if we did not accept an ostensibly fair proposal to withdraw simultaneously, and the Soviet might find it expedient to accept.

4. The Soviets may actually be prepared to withdraw their north Korean puppets and could correctively propose an immediate withdrawal to further their ends and to attempt to [illegible] in an untenable position.

5. If Soviet leaders are ambitious to force, the U.S. would justify later intervention in case civil war broke out in the future.

IV. [redacted]:

11. In the event that such a proposal is made and accepted by the U.S., the following steps should be recommended to the State Department:

a. The United States to propose that the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission be convened at once under the broad framework of the Moscow Agreement to work out:

(1) Establishment of a Provisional Korean Government.

(2) Plan for integration of communications, transportation and national industries to become effective upon removal of 38th parallel barrier.

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21 [illegible] 1947

(3) Details of withdrawal.

b. The U.S. should, however, secure prior [illegible] agreement on provisional level to the following:

(1) [illegible] by both governments of provisions [illegible] by the Joint Commission in order that [illegible] in paragraph 1. a. (1), (2) and (3), sixty (60) days after convening.

(2) Consultation with [illegible] political and social [illegible] in the work of reconstitution of provisional government.

(3) [illegible] of provisional government on pro- [illegible] national population basis.

(4) [illegible] of all [illegible] troops except for a small national [illegible] in the control of the provisional Korean government pending withdrawal.

(5) Holding of general elections within six (6) months after proclamation of provisional government, supervised by the Joint Commission.

(7) Withdrawal of both forces by stages:

(a) Maximum strength of 40,000 troops of each country to be reached within sixty (60) days after official assumption of office by Korean provisional government.

(b) Maximum strength of 5,000 troops of each country to be reached within thirty (30) days after inauguration of permanent Korean government.

(c) All troops to be withdrawn within ninety (90) days after inauguration of permanent Korean government.

(8) Stationing of the Joint Commission in Korea with general powers of supervision until the final disposition of this group is decided by the two powers. Strength of Joint Commission, including small guard and service detachments, to be determined by mutual agreement.

JOHN [illegible],
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Advisor
Seoul, Korea.

May 2nd, 1947

To: Brig. Gen. John H. Hilldring

From: Robert A. Kinney RAK

SUBJECT: Comments on Possible Soviet Proposal to Withdraw Troops

1. Acceptance of either Soviet proposals prior to the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government would in effect abrogate the Moscow Decision. For this reason the United States should enter into such an agreement only with the consent of China and the United Kingdom, the other signatories to the Moscow Decision.

2. The Korean Government should be set up before withdrawal and after a general election which should be supervised by the four powers signatory to the Moscow Decision, or by the United Nations. Electors should be chosen from the provinces in proportion to population, and should meet in Seoul to assist in developing a united Korean Government.

3. Of necessity there will have to be a transitional period in which the two administrations, Military Government and the Peoples' Committee, would be gradually merged into one coordinated administration. In merging the two administrations, first priority should be given to developing a coordinated national government, to be followed later by necessary adjustments in provincial and local governments.

4. In eliminating the 38th parallel, priority should be given to:

   a. Restoring through train service between Seoul and Pyongyang and Wonsan.
   b. Restoring normal communications between the two zones.
   c. Assuring freedom of movement of persons and goods.

5. To minimize economic confusion resulting from resumption of a free flow of goods between the two zones, which have developed somewhat different price structures and methods of economic controls during their almost two years of division it will be necessary to work out detailed programs to assist in the coordination of the two zones economically. Mutual agreement with regard to currency or currencies to be considered legal tender is essential.

6. Agreement is essential with regard to:

   a. International guarantee for security from aggression.
   Provision for Korea's entrance into the United Nations,

Secret

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

plus a Four Power commitment to uphold the territorial integrity of Korea, would be desirable.

b. Aid and assistance to the Korean Government. To develop economic stability, and prevent foreign economic aggression, provision should be made for providing Korea with necessary foreign exchange, possibly through a credit in the World Bank, to bridge the period of economic rehabilitation, until Korea's foreign trade can be brought into balance.

c.c. Mr. Sargent
Mr. Langdon
Lt.Col. Edwards
Dr. Bunce
Mr. Prostov

RAK/W

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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(Conclusions under 4 b)

3. Unless the Soviets have abandoned their determination to dominate Korea or are willing to risk a full-scale war with the United States they cannot afford to undertake unilateral withdrawal for the following reasons:

a. This action would be regarded as abrogation of the Moscow Agreement and would be interpreted as abandonment of her international commitments in Korea.

b. Such a move would create grave military problems as:

(1) The U.S. Military Government would then be the only recognized legal authority in Korea.

(2) Puppet forces in North Korea would become a serious and continuing menace to the security of U.S. forces. They would be regarded as rebels and would be systematically destroyed by U.S. forces.

(3) The U.S. would be morally obliged to maintain law and order in all Korea as the only existing legal authority.

(4) The U.S. Commander in South Korea would be forced by considerations of security to disregard the 38° parallel barrier.

(Recommendations under 4b)

1. That the U.S. Commander, speaking for the only legal authority in Korea, issue an ultimatum to KIM, Il Sung demanding the immediate disarming and surrender of his rebel forces or suffer the consequences.

2. State Department to announce that the United States regards this action as abrogation of the Moscow Agreement and abandonment of Soviet international commitments in Korea. Hence, as the only remaining legal authority in Korea, the United States has no alternative to the immediate implementation of the terms of the Moscow Agreement on behalf of the other signatory powers.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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Gen. Wedemeyer

[illegible] 1947

1. [illegible] the resolutions stated in para. 2 of the memorandum.

[illegible] alternative courses under the two resolutions listed:

(1) To [illegible] execution of the recommendations, with the result that South Korea is [illegible] government, while with the [illegible] might remain in Korea, in some fifty years, [illegible] the United Nations. That, however would be [illegible] and the [illegible] and the [illegible] and [illegible] and [illegible] and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible], but could, in the [illegible], result in the [illegible] of hostilities.

[illegible]

(--) [illegible]

[illegible]

(--)

[illegible]

(a) [illegible],

(b) [illegible],

(c) Procedure for reconstitution of Korea and removal of the 38th Parallel.

4. A possible procedure for establishing an independent Korean [illegible] number 2 above.

5. In the [illegible] differences between the positions within [illegible] of the Korean problem. Differences are chiefly found with the Soviet Union, the [illegible] difficult [illegible] possible to carry this [illegible] Union, however, would in [illegible]. [illegible] by the [illegible] would [illegible] the [illegible] that will [illegible] establishment of [illegible] IL. [illegible] the people's [illegible], [illegible] their local [illegible].

6. [illegible] for unification of the two [illegible] will have to [illegible] by the Koreans themselves, subject to endorsement:

(a) by the Korean people, by means of referendum;

(b) by the [illegible] powers.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

I. [illegible]: as stated.

II. [illegible]: be added, thus -

[illegible]:

5. [illegible] of the provisional government,

[illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] and [illegible] with [illegible] provisional government.

6. [illegible] are [illegible] the [illegible] of the provisional government.

III. [illegible]:

[illegible] 3. b - [illegible] -

[illegible] of troops [illegible] II and II 5.

[illegible] the provisional government. [illegible] of troops [illegible] an essential part of any [illegible] to assist in [illegible] provisional government. Without troops we shall [illegible] to fulfill our obligations. The act of complete troop withdrawal cannot be performed until after establishment and trial of the provisional government. Consequently, complete unilateral troop withdrawal by the USA (assumption 3. b) would constitute a deliberate disregard of a responsibility collateral with the basic responsibility placed upon the US and USSR Governments by the Moscow Agreement. Furthermore, such withdrawal would remove the Soviet authority with which the American Government is instructed, under the Moscow Agreement and otherwise, to negotiate. It is felt that the possibility of Assumption 3. b may be disregarded. In the unanticipated event of its occurrence, however, it would be necessary for the US to precede any corresponding act of withdrawal by supervising complete disarrament of all North Korea forces other than reasonable police and constabulary forces. The alternative methods for

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] this are listed in the order of preference:

(1) Voluntary disarmament resulting from negotiation and Soviet request;

(2) Enforced disarmament by Korean forces under Soviet supervision; and

(3) Enforced disarmament by U.S. forces.

While the disarmament of all surplus physical equipment of the Korean forces, the ultimate disposition of the U.S. forces will be by supervised withdrawal, etc., by negotiation and agreement.

In each step, timing of the completion of a Korean withdrawal movement, would be critical. Time for withdrawal (U.S. and Soviet) or a Soviet withdrawal (with the U.S.) to [illegible] would be required in addition to fulfill objectives of the withdrawal movement. This action would be based upon establishing the U.S.'s relinquishment of responsibility by the unilateral withdrawal of two or more [illegible].

The foregoing sets like a fairly logical course of action in the event of occurrences assumed under par. 3. b. That the U.S. pursue a course resembling the above certainly would be in consideration of the U.S.S.R. and Non-consideration unilateral withdrawal. It is most unlikely that the Soviet Command, ~~not~~ with ~~knowing~~ the foregoing assumption, would conduct unilateral withdrawal.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

1. That Assumption 3. a., assuming a proposal by either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S., constitutes an offer to disclaim and abrogate responsibility placed upon the proposing nation by the Moscow Agreement, and consequently offers to abrogate and nullify the Moscow Agreement.

2. That Assumption 3. b, assuming that the U.S.S.R. has completed unilateral withdrawal of all armed forces from North Korea, constitutes a definite and deliberate disregard and complete abandonment of responsibility placed upon the Soviet Command by the Moscow

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] consequently constitutes [illegible] to [illegible] of the [illegible] agreement.

3. [illegible] invited or actual [illegible] of the [illegible] agreement, as [illegible] set forth [illegible] assumptions 3. [illegible] 2 [illegible] determined [illegible] conclusions 1 and 2, above, [illegible] upon the [illegible] responsibility for [illegible] the initiative in steps leading [illegible] to establish the [illegible] elections of the [illegible] terms at [illegible] time (1948), sooner (1947), or later (1945).

4. [illegible] the interest or [illegible] of the [illegible] action, [illegible] agreement [illegible] the [illegible] would [illegible] be [illegible] by [illegible] of [illegible] trial of [illegible] agreement by [illegible] of [illegible] which could be [illegible] to be [illegible], or [illegible] currently [illegible] evidence of [illegible] that [illegible] will [illegible].

5. [illegible] to [illegible] immediate difficulty, [illegible] agreement, [illegible] frustration [illegible] trial of [illegible] agreement by [illegible] of [illegible] which could be [illegible] to be [illegible], or currently [illegible] evidence of [illegible] that [illegible] will [illegible].

today

6. RECOMMENDED:

That [illegible] action [illegible] assumptions 2. [illegible] and 3, [illegible] recommendations [illegible], the [illegible] be [illegible] to the United States Government, with recommendations that:

1. The United States Government request its termination to secure [illegible] envisaged in Allied declarations [illegible] Cairo, Potsdam and Moscow Conferences, and in [illegible] declarations by the U.S., stating its intention for the withdrawal of all forces to remain from any further action, other than [illegible] to Korea, until the problem created by the USSR's attempt has been referred to the Four Powers.

2. The United States invite the USSR, UK, China to participate in a Four Power conference (possibly with limited Korean participation) to plan and effect earliest formation of a Provisional Korean Government. A specific and mandatory directive to the Four Powers Conference should be ~~used~~ issued by the four governments.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

3. In the event of actions envisioned in assumption 3. b., that the [illegible] unilaterally has withdrawn her occupation forces, the United States, in addition to following the course outlined in recommendation 1, must:

(a) Supervise or effect disarmament of all [illegible] forces other than [illegible] police and constabulary forces.

(b) [illegible] administration of law [illegible] of all forces [illegible] police and constabulary.

(c) [illegible] occupation forces [illegible].

SARGENT

[illegible]:
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Lt. Col. [illegible] Returned
[illegible]
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Copy No. 4.
Col. Edwards

2nd DRAFT
2 May 1947

I. KEY PROBLEM:

1. To recommend practical courses of action on the local level to accomplish United States objectives in case the USSR:

a. Proposes simultaneous withdrawal of troops from Korea, or alternatively,

b. Withdraws unilaterally and then demands United States withdrawal.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

2. The policy of the United States "to secure an independent Korea in due course" remains unchanged.

3. The Russians have refused to cooperate with the United States in securing an independent Korea under the Moscow Agreement.

4. The Russian Government has:

a. Proposed mutual withdrawal of US - USSR troops from Korea, or

b. Completed unilateral withdrawal and has demanded that US troops be withdrawn.

5. The War Department has requested the recommendation of the Commanding General, USAFIK, as to terms upon which acceptance of the Russian proposal should be based.

III. DISCUSSION:

6. The facts are too well known for repetition. However, it might be well to point out that the State Department has always insisted upon the "sanctity of agreements" and the Department probably would view the USSR proposal to withdraw as abrogation, although there is nothing in the Moscow Agreement about maintenance or evacuation of troops. It should also be borne in mind that Four Powers (China, Great Britain, US and USSR) are concerned in the Moscow Agreement, and that the State Department has been consistently "protocol" minded.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

7. The USSR intends to communize Korea or as a minimum aim to establish a Soviet-dominated satellite.

8. It would be advantageous from the Soviet point of view, the objectives of which might be the to propose simultaneous withdrawal from Korea, probable defeat of US economic program, withdrawal of immediate US influence, saving to the Soviet in money and manpower, etc. A unilateral USSR withdrawal is also possible. Both moves have advantages to the USSR also from the long range viewpoint. X

9. USSR preparations in north Korea for this move may be well advanced.

10. The USSR is in an excellent position geographically to intervene in Korea after US troops have been withdrawn.

11. The USSR probably knows that US forces would not return to Korea unless war or a situation approximating war occurs.

V. PROPOSED LINES:

(In case the USSR proposes simultaneous withdrawal)

~~12. The US and USSR to nominate Korean repres~~

It is recommended that the State Department propose the following conditions for withdrawal:

12. The US and USSR to nominate Korean representatives on population basis (19 to 10) to meet in Seoul to establish a Korean Provisional Government, subject to review by the four powers as envisaged by the Moscow agreement.

13. 38th parallel barrier to be removed not later than date of inauguration of Provisional Government.

14. All Korean military or quasi military forces, except reasonable police forces, to be disarmed and completely demilitarized not later than date of inauguration of Korean Provisional Government.

15. General elections for a permanent government to be held within six (6) months after inauguration of Korean Provisional Government and to be supervised by representatives of the Four Powers.

16. Timed withdrawal of both forces:

(a) Maximum strength of 25,000 troops of each country (US and USSR) to be reached within sixty (60) days after

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

inauguration of Korean Provisional Government.

(b) Maximum strength of 5,000 troops of each country (US - USSR) to be reached within thirty (30) days after inauguration of permanent Korean Government.

(c) All troops to be withdrawn within ninety (90) days after inauguration of permanent Korean Government.

17. As unilateral action, the US should:

(a) Appoint Ambassador and strong staff to take effect on inauguration of Provisional Government.

(b) Offer economic aid and assistance to Korea on basis of direct US - Korean negotiations similar to US proposals to aid Greece and Turkey.

(c) Propose and sponsor Korean membership in United Nations when permanent government established.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(In case the USSR withdraws and then demands that US do the same.)

18. It is recommended that the US adopt the following plan:

(a) Announce that US objectives in Korea remain the same and that US troops will be withdrawn progressively as these objectives are assured (assuring a strong US national policy to prevent spread of Communism still exists).

(b) Encourage and support Korean efforts for political unification and economic integration.

(c) Remain south of the 38° parallel barrier initially.

(d) Announce that:

(1) US will reduce forces to 15,000 men sixty (60) days after formation of a Korean Provisional Government, and

(2) US will withdraw all forces ninety (90) days after formation of permanent government.

(e) Announce that planned reductions in strength of forces and any future economic assistance are contingent upon:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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(1) Disarming and demilitarizing of all military or quasi-military forces, and

(2) Removal of 38° parallel barrier.

(f) Offer economic aid and assistance to Korea on basis of direct US.- Korean negotiations similar to UN proposals to aid Greece and Turkey.

(g) Propose and sponsor Korean membership in United Nations when permanent government established.

(h) Appoint Ambassador and strong staff to take office at inauguration of Korean Provisional Government.

ECHELLING

Distribution:
Copy No. 1 - Dr. Bunce
" " 2 - Mr. Langdon
" " 3 - Mr. Sargent
" " 4 - Col. Edwards
" " 5 - Gen. Beckerling
" " 6 - Files

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July 1947
DRAFT

In the stated contingency that the United States is

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Assuming the contingency to have arisen, and assuming further that the United States should be prepared to move in, the question is what attitude should be taken toward the Greek decision.

It is suggested that [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] in the [illegible] of the Greek decision by the [illegible] of the Greek government [illegible] the United States [illegible] to be taken [illegible] in the form of [illegible].

[illegible] the United States should [illegible] to intensify [illegible] with the execution of the Greek decision by the [illegible], in consultation with appropriate [illegible] the United States [illegible] to be carried out.

In the meantime, it is essential even at the present time that preparations be intensified both in Greece and in the world at large, that the Greek government already reached the Greek decision. Even though the consultative collaboration of Britain and China should be [illegible], the obvious responsibility

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

- 3 -

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]

[illegible]he objective of the United States is not only to establish an independent zone; it is to establish as speedily as possible an independent zone that will remain stable and independent.'

If the Soviets actually [illegible] will be used [illegible] that they are [illegible] through the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

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COPY

1 May

I concur with the attached memorandum, except

1. Section III, "Discussion", par 6: "However, it might be well to point out that the State Department has always strongly upheld the principle of 'sanctity of agreements' and would almost certainly insist upon execution of the 'Moscow Agreement.....' It is my opinion that the failure of the Russians to agree to implementation of the Moscow Agreement is in fact an abrogation of contract and would authorize a similar abrogation by the United States.

(Note by Gen. Hodge: Believe to be correct as it is.)

2. Section V, "Recommendations", par 12-16: In my opinion the method proposed in par 12 would lead to no tangible result. Suggest the following be substituted:

a. Existing governments North and South to function as at present until replaced, agency by agency as shown below, by government to be created.

b. A general election to be held at a specified date, not later than sixty days following acceptance of proposal, for the purpose of electing a provisional legislative assembly for a united Korea. This assembly to consist of 116 members, elected on the basis of 19 South to 10 North. To meet within thirty days after the elections and to proceed

(1) To review the governments established in North and South Korea.

(2) To modify the existing government <u>established in South Korea to</u> meet the requirements of an overall government for Korea.

(Note by Gen. Hodge re 2. b. (2): Too optimistic. Russians would not accept this. May be better to get a National Congress elected by provinces to handle whole establishment of a govt.)

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NND 760090
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1 6 May [illegible]
cont'd

(Note by Gen. [illegible]
on f: [illegible])

f. The provisional legislature to determine the strength and composition of Korean military forces to be maintained. All Korean quasi military or other forces not earmarked for retention to be disbanded not later than the date that the president assumes office.

(Note by Gen. Hodge
on g: Believe 5000
inc. better)

g. Maximum strength of 25,000 troops (US-KOR) to be reached within thirty days after Korean president assumes office, withdrawal thereafter in increments of approximately 10,000 so that all troops will be evacuated not later than ninety days subsequent to assumption of office by Korean president.

(Note by Gen. Hodge
on h: OK.)

h. Respective military commanders to assure the orderly development under the above plans up to a period sixty days subsequent to assumption of office by Korean president.

AMF

- -

Gen. Hodge — Gen. Hickerling — See comments above. You may want to make some changes. Believe this to be a study we should keep thinking about and revising, rather than completely chrystalize at present.

JBH.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

9 May 1947.

Memorandum for: General Eckerling,
Dr. Bunce,
Mr. Sargent,
Lt. Col. Edwards,
Mr. Prostov.

1. The enclosed report by General Eckerling and comments thereon by Generals Hodge and Brown, are circulated for comment.

2. Comment should be submitted not later than 23 May 1947.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO:

[redacted]

POSTAL
Registry No.

Date 8 May 1947

Serial No.
File No.
or Subject | Problem of US-USSR JC Delegation

with: 1 inclosure(s)

_____ indorsement(s)

Addressee:

Gen. Weckerling
Joint Commission

Receipt for communication(s) described above is hereby acknowledged by:

_____ (Signature of officer)

[redacted] (Rank and organization)

(TRIPLICATE)

_____ (Date received)

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 996, 16 July 1943 (See AR 380-5). CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT RECEIPT 16-36504-1

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TO:

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Deputy Commander ✓
Deputy Chief of Staff ____
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G-2 ____
G-3 ____
G-4 ____
Adjutant General ____
Air Off ____
Army Exchange Off ____
Chaplain ____
Chemical Off ____
Civilian Personnel Off ____
Claims Service ____
Dependent Housing Sec ____
Engineer ____
Fiscal Off ____

Hq Comdt ____
Historian ____
Inspector General ____
I & E Off ____
Joint Commission ____
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Public Relations Off ____
Quartermaster ____
Seoul Billeting Hq ____
Signal Off ____
Special Service Off ____
Surgeon ____

(2) Gen Wickersham

FOR: M.B.

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Comment or Concurrence ____
Dispatch ____
File ____
Information ____

Initials ____
Issuance of Orders ____
Necessary Action ____
Note and Return ____
Signature ____

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

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For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. ***Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.***

SUBJECT:

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	6 May	DC	CG	I concur with the attached memorandum, except 1. Section III, "Discussion", par 6: "However, it might be well to point out that the State Department has always strongly upheld the principle of 'sanctity of agreements' and would almost certainly insist upon execution of the Moscow Agreement....." It is my opinion that the failure of the Russians to agree to implementation of the Moscow Agreement is in fact an abrogation of contract and would authorize a similar abrogation by the United States. 2. Section V, "Recommendations", par 12-16: in my opinion the method proposed in par 12 would lead to no tangible result. Suggest the following be substituted: a. Existing governments North and South to function as at present until replaced, agency by agency as shown below, by government to be created. b. A general election to be held at a specified date, not later than sixty days following acceptance of proposal, for the purpose of electing a provisional legislative assembly for a united Korea. This assembly to consist of 116 members elected on the basis of 19 South to 10 North. To meet within thirty days after the elections and to proceed (1) To review the governments established in North and South Korea. (2) To modify the existing government established in South Korea to meet the requirements of an overall government for Korea.

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

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For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. ***Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.***

SUBJECT:

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1 Contd	6 May	DC	CG	f. The provisional legislature to determine the strength and composition of Korean military forces to be maintained. All Korean quasi military or other forces not earmarked for retention to be disbanded not later than the date that the president assumes office. g. Maximum strength of 25,000 troops US-USSR to be reached within thirty days after Korean president assumes office, withdrawal thereafter in increments of approximately 10,000 so that all troops will be evacuated not later than ninety days subsequent to assumption of office by Korean president. h. Respective military commanders to assure the orderly development under the above plans up to a period sixty days subsequent to assumption of office by Korean president. AEB Pursuing Sec Def's letter you may wish to withdraw and have a study made. Keep him informed about and advising, rather than committing him at present. JMH

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

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SUBJECT: [illegible]

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
–	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] John W Gassling [illegible]
		C/S	C/S	Plse obsy and immed. [illegible]

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Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. ***Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.***

SUBJECT:

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	6 May	DC	CG	I concur with the attached memorandum, except 1. Section III, "Discussion", par 6: "However, it might be well to point out that the State Department has always strongly upheld the principle of 'sanctity of agreements' and would almost certainly insist upon execution of the Moscow Agreement....." It is my opinion that the failure of the Russians to agree to implementation of the Moscow Agreement is in fact an abrogation of contract and would authorize a similar abrogation by the United States. 2. Section V, "Recommendations", par 12-16: in my opinion the method proposed in par 12 would lead to no tangible result. Suggest the following be substituted: a. Existing governments North and South to function as at present until replaced, agency by agency as shown below, by government to be created. b. A general election to be held at a specified date, not later than sixty days following acceptance of proposal, for the purpose of electing a provisional legislative assembly for a united Korea. This assembly to consist of 116 members elected on the basis of 19 South to 10 North. To meet within thirty days after the elections and to proceed (1) To review the governments established in North and South Korea. (2) To modify the existing government established in South Korea to meet the requirements of an overall government for Korea.

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Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1 Contd	6 May	DC	CG	(3) To review and where desired replace Korean employees of the agencies of the revised government of Korea which have been decided on for retention, in order to bring those departments and agencies in line with the accepted idea of the proposed government. (4) To designate heads for newly created agencies and to specify the composition of and method of procurement of essential personnel. (5) To determine a method of selection of a president (or other designated head) of the government, and for the designation of and provision for securing such assistants (vice presidents or other designated officials) as they may determine to be desirable. The head of government to be installed not later than sixty days after the convening of the legislature. (6) To draft an act providing for the election of a replacement legislative assembly. c. Members of the legislative assembly to be eligible to fill any office newly established or declared vacant. d. General election for selection of members of the first permanent legislature to be held not later than thirty days after the president (head of government) assumes office. e. The 38th Parallel barrier to be removed on the date when the president assumes office, and in any event not later than sixty days subsequent to the convening of the legislature.

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[illegible]erican delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

[illegible] 1947.

I. [illegible]:

1. [illegible] practical consideration to reconcile [illegible] objectives in case the [illegible]:

a. [illegible] [illegible], or [illegible],

b. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

II. [illegible]:

a. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

b. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

c. [illegible] [illegible]:

1. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], or [illegible],

2. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible].

3. The Department has reversed the decision of the Joint Chiefs, [illegible], as to bases upon which terms of the Russian proposal should be based.

III. [illegible]:

4. The facts of the Korean problem are too well known for [illegible]. However, it might be well to point out that the State Department has always strongly upheld the principle of "sanctity of agreements" and would almost certainly insist upon execution of the Korean agreement, so as not to [illegible] [illegible] execution of other more important agreements, if confronted with this proposal to withdraw. The State Department has also been consistently 'protocol' minded and would probably consult both China and Great Britain prior to taking any action under the assumptions of this problem.

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IV. [illegible]:

[illegible]

V. [illegible]:

(a) [illegible]

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

(3) [illegible] to be reached within thirty (30) days after the initiation of [illegible] withdrawal movement.

b. [illegible] strength of 45,000 troops of each signatory (3) [illegible] to be reached within thirty (30) days after the initiation of simultaneous withdrawal movement.

c. [illegible] to be withdrawn within thirty (30) days [illegible] withdrawal movement.

d. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

e. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

f. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

g. [illegible]:

(1) [illegible] will reduce forces to 15,000 or thirty (30) days after formation of a Korean Provisional Government, and

(2) US will withdraw all forces ninety (90) days after formation of permanent government.

e. Announce that planned reductions in strength of forces and any future economic assistance are contingent upon:

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(1) Disarming and demilitarizing of all military or quasi-military forces, and

(2) [illegible] of any [illegible] border.

2. [illegible] of them steps to [illegible] out [illegible] of Yalta [illegible] agreement.

3. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL ADVI ORY GROUP
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

1 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN:

SUBJECT: Reaction of Korean Political Parties to the Soviet Proposal of 26 September 1947.

1. As requested in your memorandum of 30 September 1947, the following is a summary of comments and reactions of Korean political parties to the Soviet proposal of 26 September 1947 for the withdrawal of both American and Soviet armies from Korea in early 1948.

2. In general, clear-cut reactions have not been characteristic; there is not a great deal of uniformity of opinion even among groups of similar political leanings. The trend of reaction is, however, toward opposition to the Soviet proposal. The moderate groups especially, waver and are far from unanimous; they give the impression of approval but attach conditions which in effect oppose the proposal. Even leftist sentiment has not been notably united. Leftist statements are far from clear and have appeared later than statements from other political groups which make one feel that they had not been prepared in advance. The only clear-cut opposition has been from the extreme right which absolutely and unconditionally oppose the Soviet proposal. It should be noted that the reaction of the farmers and country people throughout South Korea has not yet been determined.

3. Comments of various Korean political parties are given below based upon newspaper accounts and about twenty personal interviews by members of PAG:

a. The National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (extreme right): "Agreement in principle" but feels sure the United States will not be so irresponsible as to "leave the gentle sheep before the open mouth of the tiger."

b. The Chosan Democratic Party (right--followers of CHO, Man Sik): Proposal is a subterfuge to obscure true motives and gain sympathy for Soviets in the UN.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

c. The Hankuk Independence Party (right): Proposal is a step forward but should be given to the UN along with the American proposal.

d. The Hankuk Democratic Party (right): Labels the Soviet proposal as "irresponsible"; supports the American plan to withdraw troops only after (1) a general election (2) establishment of united government (3) admission of Korea to membership in the UN.

e. The New Korea Nationalist Party (moderate right): Complete approval of the Soviet proposal.

f. Coalition Committee (moderate): In a confused and ready-mouthed statement: "Korea needs the help of the Allies...people are divided by the powers...Koreans better able to solve their own problems if foreign forces are withdrawn."

g. The Laboring People's Party (moderate left): In the press stated the Soviet proposal has given them "great light" and hopes the proposal will materialize immediately. In private interviews with a representative of PAG, two members of the party's central committee, Mr. CHO, Han Yong and Mr. YI, Chong Ku, stated that they felt a withdrawal would be premature.

h. The Peoples Republican Party (left--member of Democratic Peoples Front): Hopes that the two Powers are approaching agreement on the Korean problem.

i. The Democratic Peoples Front and the South Korea Labor Party, in statements which appeared in newspapers on 1 October 1947, supported the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of troops from Korea. Their statement explains that since the Joint Commission has failed, the Front accepts the Soviet proposal as the only method solving the Korean problem.

4. Given below are statements made by individuals, not speaking for a particular group but considered important:

a. Dr. KIMM, Kiusic stated in interview with representatives of PAG: "I oppose the Soviet proposal and view it as a subterfuge". Dr. Kimm expressed the hope that the American forces will not withdraw until the United States has fulfilled its obligation to assist in the establishment of an independent Korean government.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

b. Mr. KWAN, Tai Suk (moderate--a loose follower of KIM, Kiusic): His reaction to the Soviet proposal was one of disapproval; he believes the proposal to be a dishonest effort to achieve Communist control over the entire country by the Soviets.

c. Mr. CHO, So Ang welcomed the proposal; he stated that he believes it is better for Korea to be reunited even if under a Communist regime.

d. Mrs. PARK, Hyun Suk (moderate rightist--member of KILA): Contended that the proposal is Soviet trickery. In her opinion, the withdrawal of American forces would mean a total sweep of South Korea by Soviet-trained North Korean forces.

e. Mr. CHANG, Hyung (member of KILA): A conservative rightist, Mr. Chang hopes that Americans will not fall into the "Soviet trap". Only Communists, he feels, would want Americans to accept the Russian proposal.

f. Mr. LYUH, Woon Hong (leader of Social Democratic Party, moderate leftist, member of KILA): Feels that on the surface the Soviet proposal is a generous and democratic gesture; however, he does not believe the Russians are sincere in making the proposal and that America would not pull out until a democratic, independent Korean government is established.

5. The above represents comments and opinions so far collected by PAG from press and interview sources. Further significant comments will be reported as obtained.

CLYDE D. SARGENT
Chief
Political Advisory Group

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Hea[illegible]quarters XXIV [illegible]orps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

COPY JC

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Pamphlet Distributed in Seoul, 5 Oct 47.

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	6 Oct 1947	PM	G-2	1. While touring the city yesterday on inspection at approximately 1500 hours, I noticed a Korean distributing the attached pamphlet. A Korean Policeman was picking up several of them and I asked for one. 2. Attached is the translation by one of my agents, for your information. J. E. B. /1/ JEB
2	6 Oct	G-2	C/S	Info CG. Copy to JC, Gen Helmick, Mr. Jacobs. This is the Commie slant. JNR /1/ JNR

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REPRODUCED BY 69 TH ENGR TOPO CO - XXIV CORPS

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43

7773 182

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TRANSLATION OF KOREAN PAMPHLET (5 Oct 47)

Let us support the plan of the both Army's evacuation from Korea, shattering the traitorous, 5th October, National Assembly. To propose Korean problem on the UN is the pro-Japanese and reactional. Lee Sung Man and Kim Koo's plan to make Korea Manchuriaized, assisting the traitors who want to establish South-Korea Single Government. Let us oppose the compulsory mobilization for the National Assembly, which is like the 15th August Assembly. And let us reject participation for the traitorous assembly. The three big foreign Ministers' Conference - decision is the only one the international agreement to make Korea Democratic independent country. We welcome the Russian delegate Shtikov's proposal of the same time evacuation from Korea, and his proposal is founded on the big three foreign ministers spirits, supporting the big three ministers conference - decision. United States should be entitled for the Joint US and Russian Conference, cancel the Korean problem on the United Nation, and should establish the Korean Democratic Interim Government, excepting the Korea Democracy Party and their pro-Japanese groups. Otherwise, United States should same time move out from Korea as well as Russian Army until the beginning of next year, and never interfere with the Koreans establishing the government by their own wish.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Communists

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
G-2 Section
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

6 October 1947 (Date) CS#KO/_____

From:	To:
PARK Sang Kern 47, Kwanchon-li, [illegible] Kyonggi-do, Korea	[illegible]

Distribution	Date of Communications:	Number of Inclosures:
AFPAC CCD, GHQ XXIV CORPS G-2 CIC Provost Mar USAMGIK D C/S BPO	Comment By:	Language:
	Type of Communication:	Disposition Original Communication:
	Letter	Number of Previous Records

COMMENT

Request notification of positive results based on this C[illegible]

OPINIONS: PRAISES [illegible] PROPOSAL [illegible] COMMUNIST [illegible] DPRK

Writer states:

"We are glad to hear that the Russian delegation at the [illegible] Commission proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of both armies [illegible] Korea around the beginning of 1948. It is the only way to accomplish the union of Korea. At that time there will be no chip d'etat [illegible] communists. If the withdrawal is prolonged [illegible] great civil war, for during the lapse of time [illegible] to prepare for war."

Examiner's Note:
The Kanji for address is [illegible]

"Distribution of the information contained in this document obtained from private communications will be confined solely to those officials, military and/or civilian, who are specifically authorized to receive such information."
Examiner: _____

Condemned or Detained communications are Retained in the files of CCIG-K
Form No. CCIG-1/k

Communists

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 750112
By [illegible] NARS, Date MAY 12 1977

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] dated 5 October 1947; subj: [illegible], Public Relations Activities;

[illegible] Main; [illegible] areas.

[illegible] am a member of said [illegible] to [illegible] public [illegible] or a, [illegible] Washington.

[illegible] elsewhere in [illegible] reported in [illegible] for the [illegible] public welfare [illegible]

[illegible] the land-[illegible] complete, [illegible] tance, we [illegible] will, we, [illegible] Soviet [illegible]

[illegible] ago. [illegible] South [illegible] Association, [illegible]

[illegible] with [illegible] are at the [illegible] land, [illegible] ago. [illegible] to, [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] Army.

[illegible] information:
[illegible] Secretary [illegible] Secretary
Distribution:
[illegible] 2 Copies
[illegible] 2 Copies

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

TFGDS 370 10 October 1947

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea

TO : Distribution "S"

1. It is desired for planning purposes that the following information be furnished the G-4 Section, Headquarters, XXIV Corps not later than 10 November 1947, (see Incls. #1, 2 and 3).

2. Assumptions are as follows:

a. Assumption No. 1. That United States Forces will be directed to orderly withdraw from Korea as a Corps, taking all equipment currently in the hands of troops and in depots, to a new location for further service in the Far East Command.

b. Assumption No. 2. That United States Forces will be directed to orderly withdraw from Korea as a Corps, taking only minimum essential equipment, for further service within the Far East Command. All organizational, post, camp and station equipment and depot stocks will be consolidated at storage areas to be announced later and disposed of in accordance with policies of higher headquarters unknown at this time.

c. Assumption No. 3. That XXIV Corps and attached elements will be inactivated in Korea and personnel will be reassigned to other Commands within the Far East. Personnel will move from Korea as casuals, and all property other than individual equipment will be consolidated at storage areas and disposed of in accordance with policies to be announced later.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

/s/ J. W. Fraser
/t/ J. W. FRASER
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

3 Incls:
1. Questions Assumption No. 1
2. Questions Assumption No. 2
3. Questions Assumption No. 3

REPRODUCED Hq Sp Trs XXIV Corps
APO 235 16 October 1947

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION DESIRED BY G-4 UNDER ASSUMPTION NO. 1

1. Requirements for packing and crating material, stenciling and banding equipment, water proofing and processing materials.

2. Estimated weight and cubic feet of baggage by unit (Camp location).

3. Estimated weight and cubic feet of T/O & E equipment and time estimate to pack and crate.

4. Estimated weight and cubic feet of minimum essential equipment and time estimate to pack and crate.

5. Estimated time to turn-in all equipment and supplies not authorized under T/O & E to storage area.

6. Approximate amount of equipment and supplies (including construction materials) over T/O & E on hand by weight. (Report construction materials separate).

7. Personnel strength by unit at each Camp. Show actual strength and T/O & E.

8. a. Number of dependents (wife, son, daughter, etc.) in Major Command (by Camp).

b. Number of privately-owned automobiles with weight and cubic feet.

c. Number of pieces of household goods and dependent baggage (each separate) with weight and cubic feet when packed and crated.

d. Estimated time to complete packing and crating all household goods and dependent baggage.

9. Estimated time required to process units in southern part of Korea and ship out of ports on southern seaboard.

NOTE: Minimum essential equipment is to be construed as:

a. Individual clothing and equipment.

b. Organizational equipment essential to sustain unit enroute and immediately upon debarkation; for example: Typewriters, field ranges, cleaning and preserving materials, field desks, etc.

REPRODUCED Hq Sp Trs XXIV Corps
APO 235 16 October 1947

INCL #1

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION DESIRED BY G-4 UNDER ASSUMPTION NO. 2

1. Requirements for packing and crating material, stenciling and banding equipment, waterproofing and processing materials.

2. Estimated weight and cubic feet of baggage by unit (Camp location).

3. Estimated weight and cubic feet of T/O & E equipment and time estimate to pack and crate.

4. Estimated weight and cubic feet of minimum essential equipment and time estimate to pack and crate.

5. Estimated time to turn-in all equipment and supplies not authorized under T/O & E to storage area.

6. Approximate amount of equipment and supplies (including construction materials) over T/O & E on hand by weight. (Report construction materials separate).

7. Personnel strength by unit at each Camp. Show actual strength and T/O & E.

8. a. Number of dependents (wife, son, daughter, etc.) in Major Command (by Camp).

b. Number of privately-owned automibles with weight and cubic feet.

c. Number of pieces of household goods and dependent baggage (each separate) with weight and cubic feet when packed and crated.

d. Estimated time to complete packing and crating of all household goods and dependent baggage.

9. Area in sguare yards needed to assemble supplies and equipment to be disposed of in accordance with policies of higher headquarters unknown at this time.

10. Estimated time to process units in southern part of Korea and ship out of ports on southern seaboard.

NOTE: Minimum essential equipment is to be construed as:

a. Individual clothing and equipment.

b. Organizational equipment essential to sustain unit enroute and immediately upon debarkation; for example: Typewriters field ranges, cleaning and preserving materials, field desks, etc.

Incl. #2

REPRODUCED Hq Sp Trs XXIV Corps
APO 235 16 October 1947

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION DESIRED BY G-4 UNDER ASSUMPTION NO. 3

1. Requirements for packing and crating material, stenciling and banding equipment, water proofing and processing materials.

2. Estimated weight and cubic feet of baggage by unit (Camp location)

3. Number of personnel by unit, by Camp (T/O & E and actual strength)

4. Approximate length of time to assemble excess equipment and supplies to be disposed of in accordance with policies of higher headquarters unknown at this time. 1 day

5. Estimated time required to process units in southern part of Korea and ship out of ports on southern seaboard.

6. a. Number of dependents (wife, son, daughter, etc.) in Major Command (by Camp).

b. Number of privately-owned automibles with weight and cubic feet.

c. Number of pieces of household goods and dependent baggage (each separate) with weight and cubic feet when packed and crated.

d. Estimated time to complete packing and crating all household goods and dependent baggage.

REPRODUCED Hq Sp Trs XXIV Corps
APO 235 16 October 1947.

Incl. #3

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS
XXIV CORPS
APO 235

20 October 1947

SUBJECT: Packing and Crating

TO : Distribution "P"

1. Reference to ltr, Hq USAFIK, file 370, Subj "Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea", dtd 10 October 1947, the following is disseminated for your information and guidance;

a. All assumptions will be based on complete T/O & E allowances.

b. Equiptment and supplies not authorized under T/O & E will not be packed or crated for turn in to storage area.

c. Combat loading will not be used in either assumption 1 or 2 listed in letter refered to above.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BELL;

CHARIS R SPARRA
Major FA
Adjutant

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Confidential

AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

5 November 1947

Subject: Withdrawal of U. S. Forces from Korea.

To : Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235
Attn: G-4

1. In compliance with letter no. [illegible], file 370, dated 10 October, 1947, above subject, the following information is submitted.

a. Information under assumption no. 1 (See Attached Incl. # 1.)

b. Information under assumption no. 2 (See Attached Incl. # 2.)

c. Information under assumption no. 3 (See Attached Incl. # 3.)

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM [illegible]
It. Col. AGD

3 Incls:
1. Information assumption no. 1
2. Information assumption no. 2
3. Information assumption no. 3

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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INFORMATION DESIRED BY G-4 UNDER ASSISTIC NO. 1

1. Requirements for packing and crating material, stenciling and handing equipment, water proofing and processing materials:

3000 ft. crating lumber 3/4 x 4"
2000 ft. lumber for packing boxes ¾x6"
50 lbs nails
1 Banding machine with bands (5000 ft. of bands)
48 Stencils, uncut
10,000 yards paper, tar, waterproof

2. Estimated weight and cubic feet of baggage by unit:

3850 lbs. - 190 cubic ft.

3. Estimated weight and cubic feet of T/O & E equipment and time required to pack and crate:

3,225 lbs. - 342 cubic ft. - three (3) days.

4. Estimated weight and cubic feet of minimum essential equipment and time required to pack and crate:

2000 lbs. - 100 cubic ft. - one (1) day.

5. Estimated time to turn-in all equipment and supplies not authorized under T/O & E to storage area:

One (1) day.

6. Approximate amount of equipment and supplies (including construction materials) over T/O & E on hand by weight. (Report construction materials separate):

None.

7. Personnel strength by unit at each camp. Show actual strength and T/O & E:

T/O & E : 12 officers-1 W O - 14 Enlisted men.
Actual : 10 officers-1 WO - 12 Enlisted men.

8. a. Number of dependents: Total 18
: 8 Wives - 3 Sons - 7 Daughters.

b. Number of privately owned automobiles with weight and cubic ft. :
2 Vehicles ¼ Ton Truck, 4 x 4
Total cubic ft. - 1,222½
Total weight - 16,265 lbs.

c. Number of pieces of household goods and dependent baggage (each separate) with weight and cubic feet when packed and crated:
Household goods- Crates 188 - Cu.ft. 3,528 - Wt.25,990
Dependent baggage- Crates 29 - Cu. Ft. 319 - Wt.2,460

d. Estimated time to complete c, above: Five (5) days.

9. Not applicable.

FWC1 #1

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INFORMATION REQUIRED BY G-4 UNDER ASSUMPTION NO. 2

1. Requirements for packing and crating material, stenciling and banding equipment, water proofing and processing materials:

3000 ft. crating lumber 3/4 x 4"
2000 ft. lumber for making boxes 1 x 6"
50 lbs nails
1 Banding machine with bands (5000 ft. of bands)
40 stencils, uncut
10,000 yards paper, tar, waterproof

2. Estimated weight and cubic feet of baggage by unit:

3200 lbs - 180 cubic ft.

3. Estimated weight and cubic feet of T/O & E equipment and time to pack and crate:

2,000 lbs - 240 cubic ft. - three (3) days.

4. Estimated weight and cubic feet of minimum essential equipment and time estimated to pack and crate:

2000 lbs. - 100 cubic ft. - one (1) day.

5. Estimated time to turn-in all equipment and supplies not authorized under T/O & E to storage when:

One (1) day.

6. Approximate amount of equipment and supplies (to exclude construction materials) over T/O & E on hand by weight. (Report construction materials separately):

None.

7. Personnel strength by units at each camp. Show actual strength and T/O & E:

T/O & E : 12 officers - 1 W O - 14 enlisted men.
Actual : 10 officers - 1 W O - 12 enlisted men.

8. a. Number of dependents: Total 18
: 8 Wives - 3 Sons - 7 Daughters.

b. Number of privately owned automobiles with weight and cu ft.:

5 Vehicles ¼ ton truck, 4 x 4
Total cubic Ft. - 1, 222½
Total weight - 16,265 lbs.

c. Number of pieces of household goods and dependent baggage (each separate) with weight and cubic ft. when packed and crated:

Household goods- Crates 188 - Cu ft. 3,588 - Wt. 25,990
Dependent baggage- Crates 29 - Cu ft. 319 - Wt. 2,460

d. Estimated time to complete c, above: Five (5) days.

9. Area in square yards needed to assemble supplies and equipment to be disposed of in accordance with policies of higher headquarters unknown at this time:

30 square yards.

10. Not Applicable.

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INFORMATION REQUIRED BY G-4 UNDER ASSUMPTION NO. 3

1. Requirements for packing and crating material, stenciling and banding equipment, water proofing and processing materials:

   6000 ft. crating lumber 3/4 x 4"
   2000 ft. lumber for making boxes 1 x 6"
   50 lbs nails
   1 Banding machine with bands (5000 ft. of bands)
   48 stencils, uncut
   1000 sheets paper, tar, waterproof

2. Estimated weight and cubic feet of baggage by unit:

   3,770 lbs - 170 cubic ft.

3. Personnel strength by units and classes:

   Authorized: 10 officers - 1 W.O. - 14 enlisted men.
   Actual : 10 officers - 1 W.O. - 12 enlisted men.

4. Estimate to length of time to assemble excess equipment and supplies to be disposed of in accordance with policies of higher headquarters unknown at this time:

   One (1) day.

5. Not applicable.

6. a. Number of dependents in unit: Total 12
   : 8 wives - 2 Sons - 2 Daughters

   b. Number of privately owned automobiles with weight and cubic feet:

   2 Vehicles 1 ton, truck, 4 x 4
   Total cubic ft. - 1,222½
   Total weight - 15,265

   c. Number of pieces of household goods and dependent baggage (each separate) with weight and cubic ft. when packed and crated:

   Household goods- Crates 188 - Cu ft. 3,892 - Lt. 25,990
   Dependent Baggage - Crates 29 - Cu ft. 319 - Lt. 2,460

   d. Estimated time to complete c, above: Five (5) days.

Incl # 3

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

31 Oct 47

LET US SUPPORT AND EXECUTE THE PLAN TO WITHDRAW US AND USSR ARMY FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1948.

OUR THIRTY MILLION COMPATRIOTS!

xxxxxx

315th Hq Intel Det

We must unify KOREA which is divided into two parts and accomplish a democratic and perfect independence. The more independence is delayed, the worse condition the people's living is brought to and our fatherland reduced to slavery. Therefore, our people have supported the Moscow Decision to the best of our power under the terrible pressure; overcoming all difficulties created by the reactionaries, we have promoted the Joint Commission just before the establishment of unified democratic provisional government which our people desire eagerly.

At this historical moment, why do they give up the Joint Commission? And why do they introduce our problems into the UN General Assembly? These are the reasons: first, they intend to postpone the establishment of unified democratic government as much as they can; second, beginning with the abandonment of the Moscow Decision, they are going to overthrow all international decisions made for the purpose of the world peace and the democratic development; third, they are planning to make our fatherland a colony again actually by means of one country's trusteeship through UN; fourth, it is a conspiracy in order to find a pretext in case of establishment of an autocratic separate government which consists of the pro-Japanese and the reactionaries in South KOREA.

Unless the Moscow Decision is accurately executed, unified democratic government cannot be established only by an international decision, and it merely results in the pro-Japanese and reactionaries attaining their conspiracy; that is, the establishment of a separate government, and the foreign army remaining

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in KOREA. Now, our race faces the greatest crisis of disunion and humiliation.

In case the Moscow Decision is not accurately executed, it is only the best way for Korean independence that with perfect unification between rightists and leftists and also South and North, all our patriots should establish our own government by ourselves through the withdrawal of US and USSR army forces and the exclusion of pro-Japanese.

Our compatriots!

Now, a new road toward the unified, perfect independence which is our long cherished desire will be made by General SHTIKOV, the representative of USSR, who proposes the plan of the simultaneous withdrawal of US and USSR army forces at the beginning of 1948, for our people who had been devasted by the foreign aggression for half a century.

Our compatriots!

At the moment that the way to independence is actually opened, the reactionaries who have plotted a separate government under the slogan of "Instant Independence," and "Removal of 38-degree parallel," entreat the US army forces to remain in KOREA. Pay attention to those betrayers' true character!

Our people must bind themselves against those betrayers' conspiracy, support absolutely the proposal of General SHTIKOV and demand firmly its execution. Since USA declares openly to help Korean independence, how can she postpone and refuse our independence? With perfect unity, we must push away and fight against the enemy of independence at all costs till our aim is accomplished.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

To the Commander of American Forces
in Southern Korea,
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

Dear General Hodge,

I have received your letter regarding debarkation of Korean refugees at the port of Inchon during the afternoon of 7 February 1946, through Colonel Booth.

I have inquired of the Soviet Command at the port of Inchon as to whether it has [illegible] concerning the embarkation of Korean refugees there on the motor launch "Yosen" and as to whether it intends to grant to this or any other vessel to carry Korean refugees to Southern Korean ports.

I have been informed that neither the motor launch "Yosen" nor any other vessels carrying refugees have left the port of Inchon, either to Pusan or to Southern ports without [illegible]. The Soviet Command has informed me that no vessel connected with the [illegible] "Yosen" will be allowed to put to sea [illegible] to the Southern ports. It seems, unfortunately, that the [illegible] of the Soviet Command [illegible] the launch "Yosen," while [illegible], [illegible] Korean refugees.

[illegible] of the Soviet Command
[illegible]
[illegible]:-

[illegible]

Copy

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Dear General

On the 6th of March 1946 I received by telephone a letter, addressed to you from the Commanding General, of Soviet troops in Northern Korea, of the following content.

To: Commanding General in Southern Korea
Lt Gen John R. Hodge

Dear Gen Hodge

Your letter with the proposal to start the negotiations about delivery of fertilizer from Northern Korea to Southern was received.

On my part I presume, that the negotiations about this question will bring practical results, if you will garantee that in return for fertilizer Northern Korea will get from Southern food-stuff (rice)

As soon as you will inform me that you are willing to carry on negotiations on these terms my representative will immediately be dispatched to Seoul for working out with your representative the details of delivery and payment.

Which I hasten to deliver to you.

Very respectfully

Consul-General of the U.S.S.R.

Polyansky

MG is handling this
RHB

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

[illegible] February 1946

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Dear [illegible]:

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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NND 760090
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#1

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON
METHOD OF OPERATION OF THE
JOINT COMMISSION FOR KOREA.

I. Operation of the Joint Commission

1. Composition and Functions

The Joint Commission shall be composed of [illegible] commissioners from each of the two [illegible]. Its duties will be to carry out the decisions of the Conference of Foreign Ministers as outlined in Section II (Part A, Paragraphs 1-3, of the Moscow Conference, and to complete the work of the Conference of Military Commanders as outlined [illegible].

2. [illegible]

[illegible] the Commissioners will alternate weekly between the two Chief Commissioners [illegible] the Committees and Sub-Committees as it may be necessary to establish will alternate [illegible] under the authority of the Chairman of the Commission. In the [illegible] of Commissioner to [illegible] one of his Commissioners to act as his deputy.

3. Meetings

The Commission will meet in formal session on [illegible] by the Chief Commissioners jointly. In case of necessity, either of the two Commissioners may call [illegible], after giving reasonable notice of his intention to do so.

4. Attendance at Meetings

The following will attend meetings of the Commission: the Chief Commissioners (or in their absence, their duly authorized deputies), the Commissioners, and, as invited, officers, specialists, and representatives of [illegible] democratic political parties and social organizations.

5. Preliminary Dissemination of Agenda, etc.

Every meeting shall be preceded by the preliminary dissemination of proposed agenda, draft resolutions, and

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U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
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DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON
METHOD OF OPERATION OF THE
JOINT COMMISSION FOR KOREA.

I. Operation of the Joint Commission

1. Composition and Functions

The Joint Commission shall consist of [illegible] commissioners from each of the two [illegible]. Its duties will be to carry out the decisions of the Conference of Foreign Ministers as outlined in Section III (Korea), Paragraphs 1-4, of the [illegible] Conference, and to complete the work of the Conference of Military Commanders as outlined [illegible] of this same Section.

2. [illegible]

The Chairmanship of the Commission will alternate weekly between the two Chief Commissioners. As a rule the [illegible] of the various committees and subcommittees as it may be necessary to establish will alternate [illegible] according to the Chairmanship of the Commission. In the absence of the Chief Commissioner it will be up to the Commissioners to act as his deputy.

3. Meetings

The Commission will meet in formal session on [illegible] as the Chief Commissioners may decide. In case of necessity, either of the two Commissioners may call for a meeting, after giving reasonable notice of his intention to do so.

4. Attendance at Meetings

The following will attend meetings of the Commission: the Chief Commissioners (or in their absence, their duly authorized deputies), the Commissioners, and, as invited, advisors, specialists, and representatives of Korean democratic political parties and social organizations.

5. Preliminary Dissemination of Agenda, etc.

Every meeting shall be preceded by the preliminary dissemination of proposed agenda, draft resolutions, and

Secret

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] essential documents which shall have been submitted to the Joint Secretariat (see below) for distribution in appropriate form and language 2-3 days before the meeting. [illegible] subject to final approval of the Commission at the commencement of each meeting, but each Chief Commissioner has the right to include in the agenda [illegible] he may consider appropriate for discussion.

[illegible]

[illegible]

II. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] the participating [illegible] translating [illegible] upon basis of the [illegible] already.

[illegible] Secretary General

The two Chief Secretaries shall [illegible] as Secretary General of the Commission, so that the nationality of the Secretary General corresponds to that of the Chairman of the Commission.

[illegible] Duties

It shall be the duty of the Joint Secretariat:

(a) to prepare on the basis of instructions from the two Chief Commissioners, the agenda of meetings, and to disseminate them 24 hours in advance of each meeting to each member of the Commission in the appropriate language.

(b) to prepare and disseminate for amendment and correction draft minutes of all meetings of the Commission. These draft minutes should include brief resumes of discussions, as well as all decisions and conclusions of the Commission. Minutes will not be considered final and of-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

final until they have been submitted for amendment to and approved by the Chief Commissioners or their designated deputies. (Ordinarily the approval of the minutes of the previous meeting will be the first point on the agenda of each subsequent meeting)

(c) [illegible] all documents submitted to it by members of the Commission. Such documents may be circulated by either [illegible]. Such documents shall ordinarily be distributed not later than 24 hours before the meeting at which they are to be discussed in order that they may be adequately studied before the meeting.

(d) [illegible]

(e) [illegible]

(f) [illegible]

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File copy
Communication

HEADQUARTERS
U ITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

1 March 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Twenty Fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
[illegible], Korea

I have the honor to inform you that the members of the United States representatives of the Joint Soviet-American Commission for Korea [illegible] are as follows:

[illegible] for General [illegible]
Major General Clyde L. Hasson
Mr William [illegible]. Langdon
Mr Charles [illegible]. Thayer
Colonel [illegible]. Boots

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File Copy
Commander

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
APO 235

2 March 1946

Colonel General Ivan Mihailovitch Chistiakov
Commanding General Twenty Fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

On the afternoon of 27 February the motorship Yoshu arrived [illegible] carrying [illegible] and their service in the harbor of Inchon, carrying three hundred and eleven Koreans. The ship, commanded by Soviet officers, and [illegible] by a Korean and a Chinese, had an authorization to make the voyage from the Hainan Marine Police Bureau. It was also [illegible] that [illegible] Koreans are expected to leave Manchuria for South Korea, and [illegible] are planning rapid [illegible] Manchurian and South Korean ports.

It is with regret that I have issued instructions [illegible] Koreans arriving in South Korea, not [illegible] operating under plans and schedules approved by me, will be permitted to disembark Korean nationals. However, I am prepared to discuss with your headquarters or [illegible] for moving Koreans from Manchuria, provided they are bona fide residents of South Korea. Until an agreement is reached, unscheduled ships must be returned with their passengers to the port of embarkation or to a port in South Korea approved by you.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

(G-3 File Copy)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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КОМАНДУЮЩЕМУ АМЕРИКАНСКИМИ ВОЙСКАМИ
В ЮЖНОЙ КОРЕЕ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТУ Х О Д Ж.

Уважаемый генерал ХОДЖ.

За период с 15 августа 1945 года по 28 февраля 1946 года от электростанций Северной Кореи передано для нужд Южной Кореи 220 миллионов киловатт часов электроэнергии. При цене электроэнергии, действовавшей к 1 августа 1945 года в 2,9 сены за один киловатт час, общая сумма задолженности на 1 марта 1946 года составляет 6.534.000 иен.

Электростанции работают на хозяйственном расчете. Служащим и рабочим необходимо выплачивать денежное содержание. Невыплата положенного содержания рабочим и служащим может вызвать неприятные осложнения.

Прошу Вас, господин генерал, дать указание Военной администрации в Южной Корее произвести расчет за полученную с гидростанций Северной зоны Кореи до 1 марта 1946 года электроэнергию.

Оплату задолженности за электроэнергию прошу произвести в форме поставок риса, запасных частей и материалов по ценам на 1 августа 1945 года, согласно прилагаемого перечня, в сроки с 1 марта по 1 июня 1946 г.

Без оплаты задолженности за электроэнергию советское военное командование не может гарантировать дальнейшую бесперебойную поставку электроэнергии.

КОМАНДУЮЩИЙ СОВЕТСКИМИ ВОЙСКАМИ В СЕВЕРНОЙ КОРЕЕ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИК _____ (ЧИСТЯКОВ)

№ 4

"3" марта 1946 года

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

П Е Р Е Ч Е Н Ь.

Продовольствия, оборудования и материалов, поставляемых из Южной Кореи для промышленности Северной Кореи в обмен за электроэнергию в период с 1 марта по 1 июня 1946 года.

Наименование	Количество
Рис	20.000 тонн
Хл. бум. пряжа	25.000 англо-фунт.
Хл. бумажная ткань	500.000 ярдов
Рыболовные сети	1.500 англо-фунт.
Трансформаторы однофазные:	
3300/100 3 кв.	50 шт.
-"- 5 кв.	60 шт.
-"- 7,5 кв.	100 шт.
-"- 10 кв.	90 шт.
-"- 15 кв.	15 шт.
-"- 20 кв.	15 шт.
Медный провод голый сечением	
25 кв.мм	60 тонн
36 " "	
50 " "	
Электромоторы 3- фазные 200 ватт	
5 л.с.	2 шт.
7,5 "	8 "
10 "	4 "
15 "	5 "
30 "	2 "
40 "	2 "
50 "	2 "
Подшипники турбогенератора 100 тыс.квт. /ремонт на заводе СИБАУРА г. ИЗИНСЕН/	2 компл.
Электролампы на сумму	448.778 иен.

Приложение к № 4

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] to electric power. It is our desire to [illegible] compatible [illegible] regarding such an exchange are being prepared, and will be submitted in a separate communication.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Again I wish to reiterate the importance of this fertilizer for the attainment of food self-sufficiency at only in South Korea but i all Korea. An early reply to the foregoing proposals will be appreciated in order that details can be worked out quickly. I am,

Very respectfully,

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]
[illegible]
Seoul, Korea

9 March 1946

Dear General Chistiakov,

When Colonel Booth and his associates visited your office on 4 March you agreed to supply South Korea with chlorine provided the necessary containers were furnished.

[illegible], at the present time, monthly requirements of [illegible] of liquid chlorine. They should be made available in containers of [illegible] lbs or less.

Lt. Col. [illegible] Chistiakov, our liaison officer at your headquarters, has in his possession the following containers for your use in the shipment of chlorine to South Korea:

No. of containers	Size of containers
[illegible]	[illegible] lbs each
[illegible]	50 lbs each
1[illegible]	10 lbs each

[illegible] total containers. [illegible] lbs total net.

During the month of March we will be limited by the quantity (approximately 4 tons) of these containers.

Thereafter, we will advise you each month of our [illegible] requirements by number and size of the containers available.

It is understood that an accurate record will be kept of the chlorine furnished by you and that a settlement will be made at a later date. I am,

Very respectfully,

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, [illegible]
Commanding

ols

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Dec

Lieut. Gen. John . lodge,
[illegible]
[illegible]
c/o . .. [illegible],
California.

Dear General Lodge:

I [illegible] on the [illegible] into the
Commission on the [illegible] which [illegible] to the
Army for the purpose of [illegible] the [illegible] to
the Army Staff. [illegible] in Virginia, I [illegible] and interest [illegible] unbeknownst [illegible] Department were not very much interested in this. The only [illegible] I could obtain was that there [illegible] hope for such a commission from any [illegible] Whether or not by such a group.

The officers in the Civil Affairs Division of the Department have [illegible] which [illegible] where our troops are participating, and [illegible] believed it important [illegible] Furthermore, they were interested [illegible] be retained [illegible] that [illegible] the Department and [illegible] but not to any office of the Department. The Commission [illegible] felt that since the Korean Commission was initiated by the Army, it was [illegible] Department. After many interviews with both Departments and [illegible] recommended [illegible] coordinate [illegible] the Department and [illegible] the Commission [illegible] of the Commission [illegible] duties of the group.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In the meantime, because the Bureau of Personnel requires that an officer be assigned to a definite department for record purposes, they became discouraged and referred me back to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Upon the basis of your dispatch in November asking for my services with the Korean Commission, the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery approved my request to be retained on active duty for service with the commission until May 12th, or before if their mission is completed. At first he was very reluctant to approve this extension because the Secretary of the Navy has made it mandatory to release all reserve Medical Officers within 60 days of their date of eligibility by points, and I already had been on extended duty four months. My duty with the Koreans was interpreted as an urgent military necessity and thereby justified the additional extension. Incidentally, in answer to your request to the Navy in November for orders for me to serve with this group, the Navy Department had already issued orders detaching me from the Seventh Fleet and bringing me to Washington to the Bureau to work in that capacity. So I am now on duty at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery with verbal instructions to work with the Koreans when they arrive.

Until the Korean mission arrives, at the request of Mr. John Carter Vincent, Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, I am writing a report of the political conditions in Korea and their development during the first four months of our occupation. I will forward a copy to you.

I have been permitted numerous conferences with the officers of the War Department's Civil Affairs Administration, who are specifically concerned in policies in Korea. I find that they have a very little idea of the actual conditions out there and that they would appreciate much more detailed information from your command. In response to a question concerning the basis for formulation of their policies in Korea I was told that only broad and general occupation policies were established here and that the details and actual functions and organization were left to the Commanding General. With reference to the instructions practically prohibiting the employment of certain Koreans in the occupation government, they said that there was no intention of such interference from here and that if any directives were so interpreted they were misunderstood. They assurred me that the Commanding General was expected to utilize the services of any persons he considered valuable and that he was free to govern his selection by the local national conditions and political circumstances.

Similar conferences with members of the Far Eastern Affairs Section of the State Department revealed an attitude of "hands off" regarding formation of policy because they did not feel justified in "interferring" in the jurisdiction of the Army who were solely responsible at present in the zones of occupation. So far as Korea is concerned, their general attitude is definitely that it is too small and insignificant worry too much about in contrast to China, Manchuria, the Pacific Islands and Japan.

Therefore, I received the definite impression that all authorities here would not be critical of the Commanding General utilizing any Korean Personnel

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

needed, even such persons as Kim Koo and his group particularly if there is evidence that they will definitely contribute to cooperation by the Korean public in general. The attitude here in the State Department is hardening very rapidly in regard to Russian actions and policies and I am confident that firm action by the General in local negotiations will not be criticized.

There are many private foundations and agencies which are very much interested in the Korean Commission, particularly the Rockefeller Foundation and the combined Church Boards for Foreign Missions. I furthermore believe that when the group arrives and the State Department finds that the Koreans are not going to "demonstrate" or make independent excessive demands, their interest will greatly increase and they will obtain much valuable aid for Korea. Mr. Bowles of the Cultural Aid division and Mr. Martin of the Economic Aid section are already interested and will welcome them.

It was quite a disappointment to hear that Dr. Cho Myung Ok is not coming with the group. I believe that he could have given much valuable information concerning the Korean people and their desires to the War and State Department officials. Still more important perhaps, he could see what we as a country are facing and carry back to the Korean Leaders a report of our true sincerity and of the wider and important efforts that are being made for the small countries. I feel that such a contact would materially help the Military Government prestige among the Koreans. I had also hoped that Mr. Yun, Yi Ik could come along and that his name would be added instead of Dr. Byron Koo. Mr. Yun is the type of man who would inspire confidence among the officials here and I am confident arrangements could be made for contacts with many persons who help determine overall Far Eastern policy.

The letter from your Command to the War Department requesting employment of Mrs. Williams as a civilian nurse in the Military Government in Korea has not been received by the War Department and must have been stopped in the Theater Headquarters. Colonel Conau, in charge of the Civilian Personnel Division of the War Department informed me that such a request for the employment of a civilian nurse could not be initiated here but would have originate from your headquarters. The War Department does not know local needs and does not presume to send civilian personnel unless specifically requested. Furthermore, they told me that requests from the local occupation Commanding General should include a description of the type of duty assignment, the responsibilities of the assignment, specification of the C A F rating, and yearly salary. They suggest for a nurse of Mrs. Williams' training and experience (operating supervisor and obstetrical supervisor) a rating of C A F 8 at $3510 per year, this being the rating used by UNRRA for nurses. Mrs. Williams is definitely interested in going to Korea for one or two years but feels that we cannot leave our daughter here but should take her along; she is 15 years of age. I understand this will be possible after May 1st, with the approval of the Commanding General.

With regard to myself, I fear that in view of the technical difficulties encountered in my recent voluntary request to extend active duty for only 90 days, that it may be difficult to obtain approval for a further extension of one or two years as a resefve unless a very strong and urgent request to the Navy is initiated by the Twenty-fourth Corps and endorsed by the War Department.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

If such a request fails to obtain Navy approval due to technicalties of demobilization requirements, it will be necessary for me to apply as a civilian doctor after my return to inactive duty status in May. In this case, if you still believe that I would be of service in your command as a civilian physician in charge of the Public Health Bureau or of the Medical Education, it would be necessary for a dispatch request to be initiated by your command to the War Department specifying my name, proposed position in the Military Government, responsibilities, C A F rating and yearly salary. Colonel Carau suggested C A F rating 15 at a salary of $8750 per year which they consider equivalent rating for Captain in the Naval Reserve, or my civilian position.

I have been keeping in as close touch as possible with events in Korea through the New York Times and the dispatch file at the War Department where the officers of the Civil Affairs Division are very helpful in keeping me posted and permitting me access to reports from your command. During one of our many conferences concerning political conditions in Korea I remarked rather pessimitically concerning their directive requiring organization of a unified Korean group and governing commission with the Russian Occupation Forces, I pointed out that it was an impossible assignment in view of the Russian attitude and the Communist party attitude of refusing to compromise on their demands for controlling power and majority representation. They of course asked me for a substitute method of procedure and I made a suggestion based on my experiences while in your command in Korea. The suggestion received considerable favorable comment from these officers. They requested that I forward the idea to you for consideration and application of any part of it which is deemed practical. Therefore, I am enclosing the suggestion for whatever value it may be, although you and your staff undoubtedly have considered most if not all of its various points.

Since I am not officially attached to either the War or State Departments, but considered by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the War Department as responsible to you for my activities with the Korean group, I will report by mail directly to you from time to time if you so desire.

Please give my very best regards to General Arnold.

With the desire that my services here will be of some help to the Occupation Forces and the Korean people, I remain,

Very sincerely yours,

Geo dr. George F. Tilliers, (MC) USNR

C/T:t

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Plan For

[illegible]

Premises:

(The following concepts and factors will have to be [illegible], but are listed for the purpose of specific bases for the plan).

1. True unification and free economic, social and political intercourse and communication between northern and southern Korea are impossible so long as the two parts are occupied by military forces of such opposite political ideology as the United States and Russia.

2. It is unjust to the people of Korea for a single political system that is communism to be forced upon them in one half of the country and also for them on the other half to be required to give communism a major place in their politics.

3. Since the communist ideology is the only one given actual opportunity for operation in the north half of Korea, the United States is obligated to give temporary equal support in the southern half in order to uphold the commitments of the Atlantic Charter.

4. The fact of division of Korea into two separate "states" by the present dual occupation should be recognized as permanent for the occupation period and to be regarded in planning for any type of Korean government.

5. Korean Nationalist and Democratic leaders of the southern part should be permitted to work out their own form of governing group, and method of representation by the peoples without interference from occupation forces except to assure that they are not coerced by political minority groups and are protected from violence by radical opponents who take advantage of American support of the Freedom of license to use subversive and violent means to force compliance with their minority program.

6. Koreans are not experienced nor educated in the operation of democracy and cannot undertake the responsibilities of a two or three party system. However, they can very probably start by accepting division of the country into two states, north and south, each controlled by supervised sovereign governing bodies of opposing political ideology. Then all supporters of each group can migrate to the state representing their political loyalty or accept subordination of their ideas.

Plan For Governmental Organization:

1. Two Korean "States", Northern and Southern could be recognized, each to be sovereign in all matters except interstate relations and national policies of foreign relations. This is, of course, a scheme that has been found practical in the United States and might well be adapted to Korea with modifications developed by the Koreans themselves.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

2. Each State would be governed by a Korean body conforming in each case to the most practical form feasible under the occupation conditions - that is, democratic type in the south and communist in the north.

3. The highest bodies in each State (House, council, assembly or commission), should be elected by a larger representative body of Koreans. These latter would be delegated by the people through some modified form of election by "town councils" or similar Korean groups. In turn, these two State bodies should select a designated number of trusted and duly authorized leaders as members of the Joint National Interstate Council. Their recommendations to the Allied Commission (of Occupation Forces representatives) would constitute the Korean participation in National government and Foreign relations. This Interstate body should be given progressively more responsibility until it becomes in fact the Governing body of all Korea for National and Interstate matters, but it should not be permitted to interfer with internal State affairs, except when they definitely jeopardize the peoples rights of the other State or the country as a whole, as in health and communication matters.

The Interstate Council would be directly responsible to the Joint Allied Occupation Forces Commission and its actions would be subject to approval by that Commission. It is probable that in certain far reaching matters of national policy its decisions should be referred back to the two individual State governing bodies and their "assemblies" for ratification even after approval by the Allied Occupation Forces Commission.

4. In the south, it is believed the Korean State governing organization should be modeled after a democratic form. In view of the history of the Korean Government in Exile (Kim Koo and his Cabinet) and of their close association with the Chinese National Government, the responsibility of primary organization could well be delegated to them and Dr. Rhee Sung Man and the Democratic and Nationalist party leaders. It is probable that the highly developed House and Senate system of the United States government is too complicated for the inexperienced Koreans. Therefore, as a first step a single house system may be better.

The Southern State House of Delegates could be composed of 100 to 160 delegates elected by periodic sessions of the State Assembly. This assembly would be composed of representatives selected by the people through their local Ban (Pan) Councils (similar to the town council in New England, and an ancient oriental institution). Representation should be at the rate of about one per 10,000 population per province to keep the number of representatives at between 1000 and 2000. This assembly would be of proper size to supply the numerous committies and commissions required for studies and recommendations of governmental policies and procedures in the fields of administration, economics, etc. The State House and its Executive council would carry out the executive functions.

5. It is believed that such a plan of State Houses representing the people in each State and each Sovereign in its part of the country, will provide the major political groups (communists in the north and nationalist in the south) sufficient sense of authority and power and enough responsibilities and feeling of accomplishment to reduce the present political confusion, disorganization and antagonism. To be effective, this plan will require differential and positive support of the Nationalist and Democratic groups in the south to balance the strong support of the Communists by the Russian Occupation Forces. It is believed that the Russians will oppose such support on the part of the American Occupation Forces but will at

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the same time admire it because its principle is in accordance with their own realistic policies. It is feared that any policy including compromise or cooperation with the Communists in the south will result in forcing Koreans to accept communism as the controlling political influence throughout Korea.

6. Finally, it is anticipated that when Korea becomes independent from outside military occupation and active political control, and true national unification becomes possible, the Northern State House (undoubtedly communist) and the Southern State House (it is hoped that it will be democratic in principle) can be brought together into a single two-house Congress representing the majority and minority peoples' groups. Such an arrangement may tend to avoid civil armed strife, and to promote the ideal of arbitrating majority and minority differences.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

14 March 1946

Guard Colonel General I.M.Chistiakov
Commanding General Twenty-Fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov,

Reference is made to General Arnold's memorandum of 22 January proposing changes in boundary between military zones of responsibility. At the time of the original proposal to you on this subject, I considered such a change desirable in order to reduce administrative difficulties.

Because of the prolonged delay in receiving any reply to my proposal, the altered circumstances since it was made, and the tasks of the forthcoming Joint Commission as enunciated in the Moscow Communique, I no longer regard the change as desirable and am therefore withdrawing my proposal herewith.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

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NND 760090
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TO ACCOMPANY LETTER REGARDING CHANGES IN MILITARY BOUNDARY

ADVANTAGES

1. Expresses objection to Soviet delay.

2. Emphasize U.S. position on opening of border by Joint Commission.

3. Prevents stripping of additional territory by Soviets.

4. A change in border on eve of meeting of Commission would reemphasize the division of the country and imply permanency of the division of Korea.

5. Retention of an arbitrary military boundary across administrative subdivision would strengthen U.S. Commissioners demand for free movement across the boundary in the normal functioning of provincial activities.

6. Loss of a supply of concentrates of salt and rice in South (U.S.) Hwanghea, which were included in exchange of goods in the Joint-Conference.

7. Effect on Southern Koreans of transferring the South Hwanghea population, now friendly to U.S. to the control of the Soviets.

8. Possible second change of boundary by the Joint Commission.

9. Informs Soviets that U.S. does not intend to await their convenience.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Loss of Hwachon Hydro Electric plant on Pukhan River, if Soviets agree to transfer it to U.S. control.

2. Loss of opportunity to secure first hand information of Soviet treatment of Korea.

3. Continued difficulty in communication and supply of local administrative units of South (U.S.) Hwanghea province.

4. Reduction of number of control posts to guard the Military boundary.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

14 March 1946

Guard Colonel General I.M.Chistiakov
Commanding General Twenty-Fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov,

On 8 Feb Generals Arnold and Shtikov signed an agreement on authority of their governments that the Soviet Commission should meet "not later than one month after the work of the present Conference is completed". Since at least a week has now passed since the final date set for the convening of the Commission without the receipt of any official explanation as to the failure of a Soviet delegation to arrive in Seoul, I should appreciate early advice from you in the premises. Otherwise I shall be obliged to inform my government of the failure of the Soviet Command to comply with the agreement and request instructions as to the fulfillment of the terms of the Moscow Communique.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH SOVIET ARMY IN KOREA
P'YONGYANG, KOREA

15 March 1946

TO: Commanding General,
American Forces in Southern Korea
Lieutenant General JOHN R. HODGE
Seoul, Korea

Lieutenant General HODGE,

On the 14th of March, through the Vice-Consul of U.S.A. Mr. [illegible] received your letter dealing with the question of beginning of the work of the commission.

Before writing about the reasons for the delay of my reply I consider it necessary to inform you that Colonel General SHTYKOV, appointed by me as Chief of the Soviet Delegation, has been ill for a long time and only today, 15th March, arrived in Seoul.

The doctors forbade him to start working for the next two or three days.

It is supposed that around the 18th or 19th of March General Colonel SHTYKOV and the Soviet Delegation will be able to arrive in Seoul.

Remain,
Respectfully yours,

Commanding General
25th Soviet Army in Northern Korea
Guard General Colonel
I. M. CHISTYAKOV

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1 lo Mar / JG

1. A ~~text~~ Cable was received this date from Col Scott at 1000. He stated that General Ismay was out and that he would be busy all the day. The contents of the letter which Col Scott carried to London had been discussed with General Ismay. It could not get a final OK on the letter, but [illegible] Scott the following as a probable answer, subject to approval by General Antonov:

a. [illegible] the following amounts: [illegible] and [illegible] monthly thereafter.

b. Fertilizer: They do not have fertilizer in the quantities requested, but believe they can furnish fertilizer in the following amounts: [illegible] tons in March; [illegible] tons in April; [illegible] tons monthly thereafter. General Ismay pointed out that the plant from which the fertilizer is to come is located in Baku. They do not have the transportation necessary to move it, but General Ismay recommends that it be moved by sea. Again the Soviets cannot furnish the ships, but recommend that we furnish the necessary shipping. If definite answers can be received today or tomorrow, Scott will bring the answers down with him Monday or Tuesday.

2. There is no definite information yet concerning the arrival of the liaison detachment of the Soviet mission. The determination of the time of departure is dependent upon General Antonov's decision. He (Scott) will call me tomorrow unless something special develops between now and then.

[illegible]
Brigadier General,
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished: Gen Arnold
Gen Marsh
G-1 & G-2

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]
of Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang

15 March 1946

Dear General Hodge:

I have received your letter of 13 February 1946, [illegible] the [illegible] of the commission and the appendix to it.

[illegible] conferring with the generals and officers [illegible] first Soviet-American conference, I have come to the conclusion that the organizational work of the commission, the [illegible] staff, serving the commission, [illegible] be [illegible] united.

[illegible] to the questions in the first section of the "Draft Directive" worked out by you, I would consider it necessary:

a. To exclude from your first point of the project [illegible] dealing with the functions of the commission, as such [illegible] functions were clearly defined by paragraph [illegible], section III, of the decision of the Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers.

b. To add at the end of point 4, determining the make up of the persons attending the meetings of the commission, to be formulated thus: "and also the representatives of Korean democratic political parties and social organizations on special invitations, agreed upon by the heads of both delegations."

c. As to point 5, it should be pointed out that both [illegible] of the commission have the right to include into the agenda any question which concerns itself with the function of the commission, determined by the decision of the Moscow Conference in [illegible] of that decision. I have no objections to the rest of your proposals in this section.

I have given instructions to the need, and to the members of the commission to take into consideration your proposals [illegible] for establishing a procedure for the work of the commission, which should be approved at the first session of the commission.

I do not deem the establishment of the joint secretariat [illegible], since its establishment, first of all, will require a considerable increase of technical personnel on my part, and secondly, it will lead to the complication and slow-up of the work of the organization.

Respectfully yours,

Guard Colonel General Chistiakov

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

lt: ...ding General,
     ...th Corps,
     Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge,
     Seoul, Korea.

...r General Hodge,

In accordance with paragraph 2, section 4, of the recent Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the agreement signed by General Shtikov and Arnold, regarding the establishment of a Joint Commission to assist in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, I have designated the following representatives of the Soviet Section of this Commission:

Chief of the Soviet Delegation
Colonel General Shtikov

Members of the Soviet Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary Terentiy Fomenko
Major General Lebedev
Political Adviser Ostrovtsov
Colonel Romanenko

The Delegation will be accompanied by a group of staff and technical personnel, including military officers and civilians.

The Soviet Section, after ... additional ... will be announced.

The Commission will meet for ... at ... the ... by General Hodge.

Respectfully,

Shtikov
Lieutenant Colonel General

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Initial	
1	C
2	RHT
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5	By
6	ACB

Separate file for this

Action to [illegible]

File

[illegible] March 1946

[illegible] ur General Christian[illegible],

[illegible] were advised by [illegible] our liaison officer at your headquarters that you will be able to furnish a total of eight thousand metric tons of liquid chlorine during the month of March and 5 tons each month thereafter.

[illegible] understand that you will ship this by rail in containers furnished by us. We would appreciate your notifying our liaison officer at the time of each shipment so that he will be prepared to receive it.

We are prepared to [illegible] immediately by rail [illegible] lbs. of cotton yarn in consideration for the metric tons of chlorine to be shipped during the months of March, April, May and June. These figures are based on a price of 32.50 ¢ per lb. on cotton yarn and a price of $[illegible] per metric ton for chlorine.

If this arrangement is satisfactory will you please advise our liaison officer at your headquarters. I am,

Very respectfully,

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

JPL/jrc

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

22 March 1946

Dear General [illegible],

We were very glad to learn through our liaison officer at your headquarters that you can supply 20,000 tons of fertilizer in addition to 5,000 tons recently shipped. A description of the fertilizers available is not given. It is understood that these fertilizers will be available at Inchon (Jinsen) for water transportation to our ships.

We are [illegible] by the lack of fertilizer [illegible] (Kunsan),

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

by this command [illegible] these transactions. [illegible] will be [illegible] back to the [illegible] fertilizer [illegible] available [illegible] both ports [illegible] above will [illegible] 5,000 tons [illegible] to April 1946.

With respect to [illegible] use of port facilities in loading of our ships at Inchon, [illegible] ships, cargoes, [illegible] time of their arrival at your port.

Your cooperation in advising us of the availability of fertilizer for both ports is deeply appreciated. If the foregoing arrangements are satisfactory, will you please advise our liaison officer at your headquarters, I am,

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

LWY

file WN

Initial	
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Keijo, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov,

The operation of air transport in the Pacific area is being hampered by a lack of current meteoroligical data from Northern Korea and Manchuria. I have been instructed to contact you for the purpose of completing arrangements for the rapid interchange of technical information concerning weather, broadcasting schedules, radio frequencies, codes, and locations of reporting stations. It is my understanding that the Soviet Weather Liaison Officer at the War Department, Washington, D. C., U. S. A., concurs in the plan for the direct exchange of current weather data between our commands.

The following weather stations, with locations as indicated, are known to have been operative in the past. It would be highly beneficial to air transport operations if current weather reports from these stations, or others in the immediate vicinity, could be made available to this command:

International Index Number	Name of Stations	Location Latitude	Longitude
699	Gensen	N 39 11	E 127 26
700	Syosin	40 40	129 12
701	Manchuria	49 40	117 45
702	Tsikikar	47 28	124 05
703	Kharbin	45 45	126 38
704	Kirin	43 48	126 22
705	Kungahaling	43 31	124 48
706	Yuki	42 20	130 24
707	Mukden	41 48	123 23
708	Kalgan	40 48	114 29
709	Yinkow	40 43	122 09
710	Shan-hai Kuan	40 00	119 47
711	Anting	39 59	124 30
714	Helampo	50 20	127 32
736	Dairen	38 54	121 38
753	Myayzoocha	49 00	120 50
754	Kaiyun	42 41	124 09
755	Anshan	41 00	123 00
---	Kaisyu	38 10	126 00
---	Heizyo	39 00	126 00
---	Singisyu	40 00	125 00
---	Nekka	41 00	118 00
---	Chunganshno	42 00	127 00

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

International Index Number	Name of Station	Location	
		Latitude	Longitude
---	Cairo	N 43 00	E 121 00
---	Botanko	44 00	130 00
---	Chansuk	46 30	130 00
---	Soron	47 00	122 00

Upon being informed of your willingness to exchange current weather data, I will dispatch a weather officer to your headquarters to make detailed arrangements for the exchange of weather data between our commands, or if you prefer, I would be pleased to receive an officer from your headquarters at Seoul to discuss these arrangements.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. [illegible]
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
25TH SOVIET ARMY IN N. KOREA

Heijo, Korea

31 March 1946

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN FORCES, LT GEN JOHN R HODGE

Dear General:

Your letter, dated 28 March 1946 has been received.

I would be much obliged if you would give these letters to the representative of the Soviet Command Colonel-General CHISTIAKOFF, who is in SEOUL now and who has been requested to transmit them to me immediately.

However, if you consider it imperative to send these letters direct to me in PYENGYANG, then I have nothing against your sending them by plane with a special courier.

Respectfully yours

COMMANDER OF SOVIET ARMIES
IN NORTHERN KOREA
GUARD COLONEL GENERAL

Chistiakov signed

31 March 1946

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

EXHIBIT
1 C
2 RTB
3 6144

To the Commander of the American Forces

Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge

Dear General Hodge:

This will introduce to you the following officers from my headquarters, who are to serve as Liaison Officers in the Headquarters of American Forces in Southern Korea.

Major V. A. Torbin

Major [illegible]. I. Ivanoff

Captain L. A. Lebedeff
(Capt Lebedeff will arrive within a week)

They have received instructions to be available to you at any time for such assistance and information as you may require for solving questions of mutual interest to our Commands.

Respectfully yours,

COMMANDER OF SOVIET FORCES
IN NORTHERN KOREA
GUARD COLONEL GENERAL

Chistiakoff signed

1 April 1946

Copy to: G-2
Gen Arnold
Col Lynch

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
COMMANDING GENERAL OF SOVIET FORCES IN NORTHERN KOREA

Heijo, Korea
3 April 1946

Letter of Instructions to:

1. Major U. A. Torbin
2. Major [illegible]. P. Ivanoff
3. Captain [illegible]. [illegible]eleneff

In the capacity of the Soviet Armed Forces liaison officers attached to the Commanding General of American Forces in Southern Korea, you must fulfill the following obligations.

1. [illegible] American forces all communications, letters, documents and [illegible], sent from the Soviet Military Command.

2. [illegible] American forces in Southern Korea, in connection with all communications, letters, documents and [illegible] the American Military Command.

3. [illegible] request from the American forces in Southern Korea, to establish daytime telephone communications, contribute to the joint interests of the Soviet and American Commands in Korea.

4. Undertake any necessary steps through the headquarters of American forces, to ensure the proper and continuous functioning of the telephone communication line between yourself and headquarters 25th Soviet Army.

5. [illegible] report to Brig General Garvin and arrange with him, to transmit to you copies of all communications and information sent from the American Armed Forces to the Soviet Armed Forces, or a summary of the contents of such communications or information.

6. We will inform you in due time concerning any questions which will be discussed or agreed upon.

Commanding General
25th Soviet Army in Northern
Korea

Major General - (Shanin)

4 April 1946

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

16 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Heijo, Korea

My dear General Chistiakov:

A matter of considerable concern to me is the recent increase in reported acts of depredation, thievery and attacks on civilians committed by Russian soldiers south of the 38th parallel of north latitude. Areas particularly affected are in the vicinity of KAESONG, Lat N. 37° 58', Long E. 126° 34', and CH'ONGWAN, Lat N. 37° 58', Long E. 126° 56'.

In establishment of boundary control posts I directed my troops to leave a small neutral zone south of the location of the 38th parallel of north latitude. It was my hope and my belief that your forces would follow a similar procedure north of the border so that a resultant neutral zone would effectively prevent any cause for unfortunate incident which might lead to misunderstandings between members of our respective forces and nations.

I readily appreciate the difficulties of exactly locating the 38th parallel of north latitude on the ground. I am informed, however, that your forces are equipped with maps comparable to ours and that the location of the 38th parallel is identical for both. Undoubtedly the members of your force are no less skillful in the use of these maps than are the members of the U.S. forces in southern Korea. Hence it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that any presence of Soviet troops south of the 38th parallel is intentional. As a matter of fact in some instances, some members of your forces on the ground have tacitly admitted they were south of the border offering as a justification the statement that they had been ordered to that locality by higher headquarters.

I fear that continued encroachment by Soviet troops south of the 38th parallel of north latitude may eventually result in some unfortunate and unwanted incident. Since I am most anxious that nothing shall disturb the amicable relations between our forces and our nations, I request that you take steps to withdraw to the north of the boundary all forces you now have south of the 38° north parallel and take such steps as are necessary to prevent their unauthorized return.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

So far I have been reluctant to delineate the 38th parallel of north latitude any more closely than necessary. I have always believed that it was an artificial boundary for which there was no reason or justification for its existence. If, however, you consider it necessary at any locality to fix precisely its location I will be only too glad to have my engineers cooperate with yours in establishing its position on the ground to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Gen Arnold

Initial
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

17 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Heijo, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov,

South Korea is in need of the following items each month:

Item	Container	Quantity	Weight Each	Total
Wood Pulp	R.R. Car	80	30 tons	2400 tons
Sulphite Pulp	Bale	8000	320 lbs	1380 tons
Caustic Soda	Drum	1230	650 lbs	400 tons
Soda Ashes	Bale	2275	154 lbs	175.2 tons
Bleaching Powder	Wooden Box	875	400 lbs	175 tons

These materials were formerly available in North Korea. If you are in a position to make them available to us now, we would be glad to exchange them for available materials, other than foodstuffs, that you desire.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Gen Arnold

Initial
1 (illegible)
2 (illegible)
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

17 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Heijo, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov,

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Soda Ashes	Bale	2275	154 lbs	175.2 tons
Bleaching Powder	Wooden Box	875	400 lbs	175 tons

These materials were formerly available in North Korea. If you are in a position to make them available to us now, we would be glad to exchange them for available materials, other than foodstuffs, that you desire.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Routing
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

24 April 1946

TO: Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov,
Commanding General XXV Army,
Soviet Forces in Korea,
Heijo, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

As you know, the matter of railroad and motor transportation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. occupied zones in Korea together with coastwise shipping between ports of Northern and Southern Korea was placed on the agenda for discussion by the first U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

The chiefs of both U.S. and Soviet delegations mutually agreed to Item III of the joint agenda which provides for the establishment of a Technical Joint Transportation Commission. This Commission would meet once a month and coordinate methods and procedure for the operation and control of overland traffic and coastwise shipping between the two zones.

Up to the present time no definite action has been taken in connection with setting up this commission. In view of the continual problems of transportion arising and which call for close coordination between both zones, it is my opinion that there should be no further delay in creating this commission as mutually agreed.

It is earnestly requested that full consideration be given to this matter and that the Technical Joint Commission be organized and able to function at the earliest possible moment.

Very Respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

24 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Heijo, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I have been informed by your liaison officer, Major Ivanoff, concerning the reputed disarming of a Soviet sentry along the 38 degree boundary. I have caused an investigation to be made and find the circumstances to be as described on the attached communication. I am informed that the weapon in question will be returned to your local representatives on the ground on 24 April.

I regret any and all misunderstandings between our troops along the 38 degree boundary and have constantly made every effort to avoid them. However, I point out again to you that as stated in my letter of 16 April 1946, there has been a recent increase in reported depredations by members of your command south of the 38 degree boundary. In discussion here with your Lt. Col. Lannin last fall on the subject, it was agreed that troops of either force found in the zone of the other command would be apprehended and turned over to the nearest military post of the other force. I also point out that there is continued misunderstanding locally as to the exact location on the ground of the 38 degree parallel.

In this connection, I have investigated the Soviet charge that an American Major threatened an attack on one of the Soviet outposts. I can find nothing to substantiate the charge. On the contrary, the local American battalion commander has made every effort to obtain clear understanding with the local Soviet battalion commander and up to the last report had not been successful in contacting him for a conference on the ground.

In order to avoid any further misunderstandings or local disputes along the boundary, I request that local commanders on battalion or higher level get together and decide on the ground the location of the 38 degree parallel and place well defined marker signs where the line crosses roads and well traveled trails so that there can be no question of agreed locations and zones of responsibility.

Please let me hear from you on this subject at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

C-O-P-Y

23 April 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Incident near 38° Parallel

(1) Location of incident: A point ½ mile South of [illegible] (385.6-1696.0). [illegible] is located approximately 2300 yards NW of [illegible] (387-1694).

(2) Time and date: 1745, 22 April 1946.

(3) Summary of incident:

The afternoon of 22 April 1945 a patrol consisting of two (2) U.S. soldiers and six (6) Korean civilian policemen were dispatched to investigate a rumor that Soviet troops were taking rice from the Koreans in the vicinity of [illegible]. The patrol was transported by two Korean trucks, with Koreans as drivers. The party drove to a point ½ mile South of [illegible] and dismounted to proceed by foot. The trucks were left at the dismount point. After the patrol had walked for about ten minutes toward [illegible] a Korean caught up with them and said that a Russian soldier was driving away one of the trucks. The truck at this time was parked one mile South of the 38° parallel. The patrol returned to the truck immediately and as they approached the truck Sgt. America who was a member of the patrol saw one Russian soldier running away from the truck. The sergeant called to the Russian to halt. The Russian soldier turned around, cocked his weapon, looked around and started to run north. After the Russian started to run North one of the Korean policemen fired a round into the air. The Russian soldier stopped, turned around and started to run again. When the Russian soldier turned to run the second time all of the Korean police started firing into the air and ran after him. When the firing started the Russian dropped his weapon and ran on without it. Sgt. America tried to stop the Koreans from firing, but was unable to restrain them. The rifle was picked up about 300 yards North of the marked truck, and about one mile South of the 38° parallel. The rifle is now in possession of the tactical troops at [illegible].

C-O-P-Y

2 Inclosures
maps

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]
[illegible] U.S. ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

26 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Twenty Fifth Army,
Soviet Forces in Korea,
Keijo, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov,

It has come to the attention of this Command that the entire watershed supplying water to the City of Kaesong, Kyonggi Do, covering an area of two square miles of land (1283 acres), is located several kilometers north of the 38th parallel and within the Soviet Zone of Occupation.

For the purpose of safeguarding their water supply system from contamination, the City of Kaesong would normally prohibit the general public from entering the watershed.

In order to protect the health of a large number of Korean people in the Kaesong area, it is requested that Soviet authorities continue to prohibit local residents from entering the area contained within this watershed.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

27 April 1946.

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Soviet 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Reference is made to my letter of 27 February 1946, in which I suggested reciprocity between our two zones for American and Soviet press representatives.

My nation is extremely interested in news of the Joint Commission in Korea and will be disappointed if some representatives of its press are not allowed to accompany the Commission during its sessions in North Korea.

Since I wrote you on the subject of reciprocity of press representatives, the American press personnel here has changed slightly and now includes:

Richard J. H. Johnston - - - New York Times
Palmer Hoyt, Jr. - - - - - United Press
Roy A. Roberts - - - - - Associated Press
William H. Buntin - - - - - International News Service

I request that you give me your decision in this matter at an early date, in order that I may inform the American press representatives of their status and they can know whether or not they will be welcome in your zone.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

27 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Twenty-Fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

My letters of 1 March 1946 and 12 March 1946 informed you of the composition of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

This letter is written to advise you that Mr. Arthur C. Bunce, formerly an alternate member of the American Delegation, has replaced Mr. William R. Langdon as a member of the Delegation. Mr. Langdon has assumed duties as an alternate member of the Delegation.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

30 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

The schedule for the exchange of mail between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. zones of military responsibility in Korea and which was inaugurated on 15 March 1946 has been working out quite satisfactorily. Excluding the first official exchange of mail which was exceptionally heavy due to past accumulation, an average of better than twenty-five bags of mail has been transferred to north of the 38 degree parallel on a bi-weekly schedule. The movement from north to south was somewhat less in volume.

At the exchange of mail on 12 April 1946, the Korean postal officials in both zones of occupation expressed a desire that a more frequent exchange schedule be established. Based upon past experiences it is believed that a weekly exchange is desirable in order to restore the flow of mail to a closer degree of normalcy. It is estimated that from now on there will be an average of twenty to twenty-five bags of mail each week from our zone ready for exchange to the zone of Soviet occupation.

Please give this matter your consideration and advise if a weekly exchange of mail is acceptable to you and can be put into effect at an early date.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

30 April 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Command General XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

The keeper of the museum of Posung College, Seoul, Korea, Mr. Kim Pyung Khan has presented a request to the Military Governor, United States Army Forces in Korea, for the return of a number of art objects which are alleged to be in the possession of the Soviet authorities of Kyuntchun (Yonchon) Town, Kyunki Province north of 38 degrees north parallel.

Mr. Kim Pyung Khan's letter of petition and a listing of the articles involved are attached for your information.

Your cooperation in expediting the return of these articles to the Posung College Museum would be greatly appreciated.

This headquarters will be glad to cooperate in any manner possible in assisting in the return of these art objects.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

2 Incls.
1 - ltr of petition
2 - catalogue list of art objects

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

April 7, 1946.

Major General Lerch,
Military Governor of Korea,
Capitol Palace, Seoul:

Dear Sir:

I have the privilege of presenting to you the following case in the hope that you will take up the matter with the authorities of the Soviet occupation forces in the north of 38 degrees north latitude so that the latter will [illegible] to us, the [illegible] of this petition may [illegible] be [illegible] have [illegible] of reference materials indispensable for [illegible] work, be benefitted by [illegible] Union, Quantchun Min, [illegible] Russia, in the year 1938 was sent, right after [illegible] to Seoul, [illegible] to which they personally [illegible] to the division line of [illegible] Seoul. [illegible] Min, together with [illegible] Chosen Min, [illegible] and removed them to their own territorial [illegible] to live in the south, are unable to [illegible] to their land. Soviet authority, and therefore, have [illegible] to the Soviet consulate general in Seoul; but [illegible] have informed us that we should present the case to the American military government so that the American authority could take up the matter with the proper Soviet authorities. We accordingly present herewith the case to you in the earnest hope that you will be good enough to make investigations and exercise such powers of authority as may be deemed necessary in restoring the articles of [illegible] that are so necessary for educational purposes.

Yours respectfully,

Kim Kyung Nam,
Keeper of the Museum,
No. 3 Na-Chei-[illegible], Seoul.

Certified true copy.

[illegible]
Office of Foreign Affairs

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] OF THE ARTICLES OF FURNITURE WHICH HAVE BEEN
[illegible] BY THE HONORABLE [illegible] ARTHUR ASHLEY.

(Name)	(Number)
[illegible], red lacquered and mother of pearl inlaid.	1
[illegible] box, red lacquered	2
[illegible] wooden cabinet, large & small	2
[illegible] cabinet, small	1
Book case, black persimmon wooden made	3
[illegible] case, square three storeyed	1
[illegible], with Tai-Shih mark	1
[illegible] cabinet, three storeyed	1
[illegible] case cabinet, three storeyed	1
[illegible] wooden cabinet, three storeyed	2
[illegible] small	1
[illegible]	2
[illegible] box, carved	1
[illegible] table	1
Limestone table, black lacquered & carved	1
[illegible], small carved & inlaid with mother of pearl inlaid	1
[illegible], large red lacquered	1
[illegible] wooden table	1
[illegible] box, made of bamboo wood	1
[illegible] Box, small	1
[illegible] box, small	1
[illegible] tea tray box, containing cosmetic	1
[illegible], of various kinds in my store	1
[illegible], stool like wooden made	1
[illegible], wooden box, square	1
[illegible] wooden box, of various sizes, containing porcelains	60
[illegible] wooden Box, containing pictures	10
[illegible], large, medium, small	15
[illegible], large, medium, small	6
[illegible], various kinds	12
[illegible] to [illegible] Mary Jane)	1
[illegible], mahogany edged	1
[illegible], of various kinds	12
[illegible]	1
[illegible], [illegible], of various kinds	20
[illegible]	1
[illegible], records, various kinds	150
[illegible], motion picture taking	1
[illegible] of pictures	1
[illegible] household furniture of the "super	(Entirety)
book case, mother of pearl inlaid, large	1
" , small	1
table, mother of pearl inlaid	1
[illegible]anholder, double stare, bamboo made	1

"END"

Certified
true copy:
[illegible]
Lt Col, [illegible]
Acting Director
Off For Aff.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

4 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Twenty-Fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I am in receipt of your letter of 30 April concerning the arrival in your area of Colonel Swift and Captain McKane. Colonel Swift and Captain McKane were each detailed to accompany a train to Pyongyang, in view of the fact that in each case one leg of the round trip was to be made without any officer aboard and one was needed to be in charge of and responsible for the safeguarding and proper routing of the train. Their selection was based upon their being most readily available at the moment. I wish to continue following this procedure. The officer aboard in such cases is considered as one of the crew and has no official status as regards dealing with your headquarters.

In this connection I point out that sometime ago I received a complaint through our liaison officer, that the number of Koreans aboard trains going to northern Korea was excessive. One of the duties of the officer in charge of each train is to see that no unauthorized persons ride the train and that the number and size of the crew is reduced to a number considered essential.

Records here indicate that you were informed through my liaison officer in the case of both officers named. I regret that this information did not reach you. In the future I will see that information concerning the rail crew officer is given through your liaison group here as well as through my own.

In this connection there have been cases of entry of Soviet officials and Nationals into the American zone and some changes made in those working with the Joint Commission without any notification to me. I am asking General Shtikov to give me an up-to-date list of these (see attached copy of letter to General Shtikov.) In the future I request that your headquarters keep me informed of all changes or additions made in those connected with the work of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

4 May 1946

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov
Chief of Soviet Delegation
Joint Soviet-American Commission for Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Shtikov:

I have received information that since the arrival of the Soviet Delegates of the Commission, there have been changes made in the composition of the personnel connected with the Commission. I believe you will readily understand that, as Commanding General of Southern Korea, I should be informed of the arrival and departure of friendly Nationals in this area. This information is necessary both for the protection of the friendly Nationals and for proper records to be kept to enable me to see that they are properly cared for. In order that my records may be brought up-to-date and that they be kept up-to-date, I request that I be furnished with a list of all personnel either on the Commission or in any way connected with the Commission together with their duties.

I further request that my headquarters be informed of all changes made to this list in the future.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

copy furnished General Chistiakov

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
XXV SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

5 May 1946

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

The question of establishing a weekly exchange of mail between North and South Korea brings forth no objections on my part.

I have already given directions to my Headquarters to organize a weekly exchange of mail, on Mondays, beginning next week.

Sincerely yours,

I.M. Chistiakov
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

5 May 1

HEAD-UARTERS
...VIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Kore-

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear Sir:

In reply to your question, voiced in your letter of [illegible] 1946, concerning the delivery of liquid chlorine to you and the conditions of such delivery, I am glad to convey the following:

The first part of the chlorine, 5,500 kg in amount, has already been dispatched to you in the period 4-[illegible] April 1946. In the future I shall undertake all measures which are required of me to dispatch to you, 3,000 kg of liquid chlorine monthly, if the return of the empty chlorine containers in due time will be ensured by you. Regarding the price for the liquid chlorine and for the containers which you mention in connection with the payment, I would like to note that the price list in force on 15 August 1946, regarding which mention was made was reached at the Seoul Conference of our representatives in January of 1946. In this case the price of the liquid chlorine will be reckoned at 472 yen a ton, and yen to the price of [illegible] yen per English pound.

In the event of your agreement, instructions for keeping [illegible] will be given by me. It is known for [illegible] that the cost of rail transportation would be [illegible].

Sincerely yours,

I. M. Chistiakov
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

9 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I assume you are fully aware of the differences of opinion that have arisen within the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission. I regret very much that any block to fast progress has arisen, but the American delegation cannot agree to exclusion of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders from consultation concerning the future of their nation because of expression of their political views on the Moscow Decision.

For your information as to my attitude on the subject, I am enclosing a transcript of the conference between General Shtikov and myself on 3 May 1946.

The Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day notice. All accommodations used by the Soviet Delegation remain open for their use.

If there remain other issues to be cleared up before the Commission reconvenes, I suggest that we meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you suggest. I will gladly come to Pyongyang for such a meeting, or I will be delighted if you would accept my long standing invitation to visit me in the Korean metropolis of Seoul.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
XXV SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

11 May 1946

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

Conforming with the agreement under Item III of Paragraph 11 of the Joint Agenda of the Seoul Conference between the representatives of the Soviet and American Military Commands in Korea, I have approved the following members for the Technical Transportation Commission:

Members (Colonel Taherov, T.A. - Chairman
(Major Volgin, I.T. - Engineer
(Lieutenant Fedrov, T.F. - Senior Technician

I request that you make known to me the members appointed to the Technical Transportation Commission by the American Command.

Very sincerely yours,

I. M. Chistiakov
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

13 May 1946

Lieutenant General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 2nd Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Reference is made to your letter of [illegible] concerning two units of the bearing mounts of the turbines of the hydro-electric station Suiho, submitted for repair under the Japanese regime to the former Japanese firm Okuura in the city of Jinsen.

Our investigation shows the bearing mount units to be on hand at the Korea Electric Manufacturing Company, Limited, Korea, a former subsidiary of Okuura Company, Tokyo, Japan. Work under agreement terms including rough and intermediate grinding of the bearing surfaces has been completed. Final grinding of the surfaces to desired tolerances was to have been completed at Jinsen with the technical assistance of representatives from Suiho and the Okuura office in Tokyo, or the materials were to be returned to Suiho for completion on advice of its parent organization, the Korea Electric Power Company. In either event it was understood that finishing scraper operations were to have been performed at Suiho.

The Korea Electric Power Company now requests return of the materials in their present condition to Suiho hydroelectric power station for completion of repairs, facilities for which are said to be available there.

Upon receipt of your advice the bearing mount units will be returned promptly. Arrangements for settlement of the obligations incurred will be determined later.

Respectfully yours,

John R. Hodge
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

15 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

In accordance with the agreement under paragraph eleven, item three, of the joint agenda of the Seoul conference between the representatives of the Soviet and American military commands in Korea, I have approved the following American members for the technical joint transportation commission:

Lt Col. A. J. Cornelson, Inf - Chairman
Lt Col. J. M. McLellan, TC - Operating Engineer
Mr. E. E. Braden, Transportation Technician.

I have also approved 2d lt. A. D. Kosen, TC, to represent the US-USSR technical transportation commission as secretary-recorder (without vote.) This officer is well qualified, since he speaks, reads, and writes both English and Russian.

A proposed agenda is attached. This agenda is based on holding the first meeting at Seoul.

I request that you inform me of your desires and suggest a date for the first meeting.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Incl.
proposed agenda

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. [illegible] COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

[illegible] (suggested)

First Meeting of Commission to be held
Hours, May 1945,
t Seoul, Korea.

1. Organization and procedure of Commission.

2. Rail.

   a. Method of interchange of railroad rolling stock at boundary.

   b. Repair of railroad rolling stock.

   c. Procurement of spare parts for railroad rolling stock.

   d. Coordination and control of movements between and within the two areas of responsibility.

3. Truck.

   a. Coordination and control of movements between and within the two areas of responsibility.

4. Coastal water.

   a. Coordination and control of ship movements between northern and southern ports.

   b. Coordination and control of ports, lighterage and unloading facilities.

5. Payment for transportation services rendered for all forms of transportation.

6. Uniform regulations (tariffs, demurrage, forms, restricted commodities, safety) for all forms of transportation.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

13 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

My dear General Chistiakov:

I am in receipt of your letter of 11 May in which you list incidents in which American planes are alleged to have flown north of the 38 degree Parallel.

Some of the incidents mentioned had previously been reported to me and I have issued strict orders on the subject to members of my command. I regret the incidents and can assure you that I have and will continue to punish offenders who violate my orders.

In order to assist me in enforcement, I request that any incidents of this nature be promptly reported, giving not only type of plane, but any identifying marks, such as; special colors, lettering, and numbers.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

[illegible]

[illegible] Lieutenant General J. L. Williams
[illegible] United States Army
[illegible]
[illegible], Korea

[illegible]:

[illegible] to inform you of an incident
[illegible] on 1 May 1948.

[illegible] you will recall the service [illegible] to the Joint Commission [illegible] May 1948, a Soviet train [illegible] on [illegible] by your delegation. In view [illegible] certain [illegible] the Soviet delegation [illegible] extraordinary measure to insure safety of the train which [illegible].

Captain Craig J. Kelly was in command of the pilot train [illegible] consisted of a locomotive and a third-class coach. Captain Kelly proceeded to Tosung-Ni where he directed the two trains bearing the Soviet delegation be held for a few minutes until the route could be checked to the 38th parallel of north latitude. It was necessary to hold the trains at this point until the pilot train returned to Tosung-Ni as there were no cross-over facilities between that point and the occupation boundary line.

Upon arrival of the pilot train near the 38 degree parallel at 1400 hours, it was stopped about 150 yards south of the Soviet outpost and in United States occupied territory. Captain Kelly, through an interpreter, made certain inquiries concerning United States outposts in that area and then started to return to Tosung-Ni. An argument ensued and Captain Kelly was forced at the point of a gun to take the pilot train to the town of Yohyon-Ni where it was held until 1600 hours. The pilot train then returned to Tosung-Ni at 1422 hours at which time the two trains bearing the Soviet officials were able to proceed on their way to Pyongyang. In this connection it is interesting to note that all maps available to this headquarters show Yohyon-Ni to be south of the 38th parallel.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov

14 May 1946

This incident is a matter of considerable concern to me. In the first place, I must strongly protest the unwarranted seizure of the pilot train by the Soviet outpost when it had not crossed the boundary. In the second place, the incident unnecessarily delayed by about two hours the passage of the Soviet delegates when we were doing all we could to comply with General Shtikov's request for a fast safe passage. I must therefore request that you take appropriate action to prevent a recurrence of similar unwarranted action on the part of your boundary outposts.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

RUSSIAN TRANSACTIONS

SUBJECT: [illegible]

APPROVED: _____
J. T. Arnold
Major General, United States Army
Commissioner [illegible]

APPROVED: _____
Archer L. Lynch
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor of Korea

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Incoming
1
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16 May 1945

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

Lieutenant General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 4th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

My dear General Chistiakov,

We are very glad to receive your 7 May letter [illegible] Fertilizer.

In reference in your letter to our letter of [illegible] to accept the charge of payment in United States [illegible] in New York. While I consider the additional charge too high, the need for fertilizer is so great that, in the best [illegible] of all Koreas, I have decided to accept delivery on your terms at once.

The prices in my 22 March letter considered [illegible] in April. I am informing my government that I find it advisable to extend the offer to include all deliveries you are able to place aboard our ships to and including 31 July [illegible]. Deliveries after that date are not desired since it might not help the current crop.

We would prefer sending our ships to Seishin to [illegible] if practicable, but will accept delivery at Kanko. Due to the urgency of the situation it will be advisable to arrange for sailing and clearances by telephone through our respective [illegible] officers. The ten-day notice of ship arrival requested in your 7 May letter will reach you by telephone through our [illegible] officer.

Respectfully yours.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

13 May 1946

Lieutenant General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General:

I am informed that the source of irrigation water serving in the Yon Baek Gun, Chungchong Do, on the 38th parallel.

In the Yon Baek irrigation project the water sources are north of the parallel, while most of the rice paddies are to the south. The people of the north have stopped the flow of water to the south.

The Yon Baek irrigated area is the third largest in Korea. Its rice production [illegible] metric tons of rice. It helps to feed many communities whose lands are less productive.

I am informed that rice seedlings have been planted in the Yon Baek area south of the 38th parallel which makes it extremely critical that the water be supplied at once and continuously, since the loss or damage to these seedlings may be very injurious to our present critical food situation.

This is a year of desperate hunger in many countries. The rice of Korea is her one strong defense against starvation. Anything which endangers the crop of large districts is a threat to all Koreans.

I am sure that you understand this and that you desire as I do to maximize Korea's rice production. Therefore I feel sure that you will want to take the earliest opportunity to investigate this matter.

I request that the traditional water service in Yon Baek Gun be resumed as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

20 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, USSR Army
[illegible]
[illegible], Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I am in receipt of your letter of 18 May in which you list two alleged crossings of the 38th parallel by American planes on 11 and 14 May. Strictest control measures have been [illegible] and I hope they will be successful. I would like to point out, however, that [illegible] are unfamiliar with this area. Also, there is considerable air traffic in and out of Seoul from [illegible] fields, not under my command, in many cases flown by pilots who have never before been in this region. In fact, some planes reported by you are types not stationed at fields under my command. For these reasons, it is not impossible that individual planes may stray near the 38th parallel without knowing it.

I regret the incidents and, as pointed out to you in my letter of 18 May, I have and will continue to punish violators whenever their identity can be established. I have instructed my units stationed near the 38 degree line to report by telephone any [illegible] flying near the line, giving positive individual identifications, including numbers on wings or fuselage. I have also repeatedly sent warnings to air bases not under my command concerning the prohibited areas. It will be of great assistance to me if your troops can identify specific planes flying over territory under your control.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

28 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 24th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I have instituted detailed and complete investigation into the incident near [illegible] described to me in your letter of 28 May 1946.

On 17 May United States guards at the [illegible] outpost observed a thirty foot diesel motorboat traveling to the north with a fishing boat in tow. My guards, using a rowboat and without firing a shot, intercepted and stopped the two boats about one and one half miles southeast of [illegible]. Because both boats were considerably south of the thirty-eight degree line, the guards impounded the vessels and took the persons aboard to [illegible] for interrogation.

The interrogation of the Korean fishermen revealed that they had been arrested and were being taken to [illegible] for questioning as suspected thieves. The investigation did not indicate that these fishermen are guilty of an offense; therefore they have been released.

It was determined from the investigation of the persons aboard the police motorboat that one was a newspaper reporter from [illegible] and the other a policeman who stated that he had come south of the thirty-eight degree parallel to look for thieves. I have directed that these two Koreans be delivered, with the police launch, to the commander of your outpost at [illegible] in the afternoon of 1 June 1946. I have taken no punitive action against the policeman or the reporter for patrolling outside of your area of responsibility but assume that you will take such disciplinary action as you think appropriate.

It is with regret that I read of your conclusion that my patrol had evidenced a "policy of noncooperation with police measures" in guarding the thirty-eight degree boundary. I view the incident as evidence that my directives for restricting travel north across the boundary are being obeyed.

Respectfully

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

4th May 1946

Lt Gen Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Twenty-fifth Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Yongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I have been informed that on or about 4 May 1946 the Agricultural Association of Suchon Gun, Kyonsei Do, sent a truck to Kaesong, Kyonggi Do. On the return trip the Korean driver lost his way and crossed over the boundary near Koryongpo, Kangden Gun. The truck and crew were arrested by the Soviet outpost and are being detained.

I am requesting that you give the necessary instructions for the return of the truck which bore the license No. 6326, together with the three Korean members of the crew.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT LETTER TO GENERAL CHISTIAKOV:

8 June 1946

Dear General Chistiakov:

Although it has been one month since I wrote you suggesting that we meet to discuss and clear-up between us any misunderstood points of difference between our two delegations on the US - Soviet Joint Commission, I have not had the honor of a reply to my letter, and I am left to assume that such a meeting does not have your agreement or interest.

However, I do feel that further delay in carrying out the promise of the three great powers given in the Moscow Decision to unite Korea, give it a Provisional Korean Government, and improve its economic status, cannot be interpreted as being in the interest of the Korean people; nor can it add to their good will toward our two great nations who have pledged its future welfare.

The American Command stands ready to resume negotiations of the Joint Commission at any time you suggest, and to carry out fully the Moscow Decision in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It is suggested that the Commission could well take up negotiations again immediately following the agreement announced in the Fifth Joint Communique.

Therefore, I invite you to return your delegation to Seoul at an early date to resume negotiations aimed at fully carrying out the terms of the Moscow Decision in the cooperative spirit in which that Decision was made.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FAST

RADIOGRAM
RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

KWEGM SK149/FE037 NEWYORK 17 11 1710

LC LT GEN JOHN R HODGE SEOUL

AGGRESSIVE POLICY BY YOU WILL BE SUPPORTED LETTER ENROUTE
GOODFELLOW

Form RCA-TT-89

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

15 June 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Although it has been more than one month since I wrote you suggesting that we meet to discuss and clear-up between us any misunderstood points of difference between our two delegations on the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission, I have not had the honor of a reply.

As indicated in my letter, the American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in the Joint Commission at any time you suggest, in order fully to carry out the Moscow Decision in accordance with the principles of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. Therefore, I reiterate the invitation indicated in my letter of May 9, that you return your delegation to Seoul at an early date to resume negotiations for the complete fulfillment of the terms of the Moscow Decision in the cooperative spirit in which that Decision was made.

Should you decide to accept this invitation, I request advance notice of arrival of the Soviet delegation in order to rearrange for their housing and messing.

I will appreciate an early reply.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]
[illegible]oul, Korea

7 June 1946

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
XXV SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

9 July 1946

COPY

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

In your letter of 8 March 1946 you have pointed out that the sum of money due North Korea for the supplied energy is being covered allegedly, by the funds of the Korean Electric Power Company and by the expenses for the maintenance of the transmission (power) lines which transmit electric energy to Southern Korea.

I cannot recognize these reasons as being right. Even if the above mentioned firm, the Korean Electric Power Co., had any sort of funds in North Korea up to the time of entry of Soviet Forces there is no foundation to claim that South Korea be reimbursed for these funds, inasmuch as there is a ground to demand that the funds of the Korean Electric Co. or any other firms which were in Southern Korea up to the time of entry of American Forces should be reimbursed to North Korea. Besides that, the question of payment for electric energy is a question of recent, mutual furnishing of supplies in the form of exchange of goods between Northern and Southern Korea and is not connected with the question of mutual claims to the ownership of the capital of the different companies.

Compensation for the expenses of transmission of electric energy from the 38th parallel to other points, for which the rate is 3 sen per kw hour could be acceptable to us according to the standard market prices existing up to 15 Aug 1945.

Regarding the rate of electric energy, inasmuch as the agreement between the Korea Electric Power Co. and the Seoul Electro-Trust has been made according to the rate, and that rate has been put into effect by an order from the office of the Military Governor, then all the accounts must be settled on this new rate - 3 sen.

The quantity of electric energy supplied to South Korea from 15 August 1945 - 1 June 1946 is approximately 380,416,000 kw hours which is equivalent to the sum of 11,412,000 yen.

Regardless of the fact that the Soviet Command is still continuing to supply South Korea with the necessary electric energy, the American Command has taken no steps for its payment, which highly unfavorably reflects on the financial status of those concerns of North Korea which are connected in the supply of power.

Such conditions cannot help but lead to the drastic deterioration in the work of electric stations, which in turn will result in difficulties for

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normal supply of electric energy to South Korea.

The pressing and urgent need of settling this question of payment for the supplied electrical energy is evident to you.

In view of this I request you to consider this question and be kind enough to inform me which goods and in what quantity could be supplied for the credit of the above mentioned sums based on the 15th August 1945 prices.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

COPY
7-25-1946

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS USAMGIK
INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.

SUBJECT: Ltr to General Hodge.

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1.	25 Jul 46	NEB	Le Palace ATTN: Colonel Booth	1. Attached is copy of letter from North Korea as arranged. 2. This was forwarded through XXIV Corps to OCA to DMG to Foreign Affairs and through Bureau of Industry in Department of Commerce to NEB. 3.- Reply will be available Today. James H. Shoemaker JAMES H. SHOEMAKER Chairman National Economic Bd. JHS/clm.

Page No. ____

OVER

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Initial
Jcm
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[illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] of the joint exhibit [illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible] 14 June, [illegible]
[illegible] tions.

[illegible] letter of 9 May I stated that [illegible]
[illegible] year within the necessary span one
[illegible]. I [illegible] that [illegible]
[illegible] style rifle. I [illegible]
[illegible] is a necessity for [illegible]
[illegible] review [illegible]
[illegible], and in view [illegible]
[illegible] the choice of the Soviet delegation.

[illegible] to [illegible]
[illegible] I [illegible] the possibility,
[illegible] alluded to you in the above quoted letter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. DEANE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

26 July 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Upon receipt of your letter of 9 July 1946 regarding payment for electrical energy, arrangements were made for a thorough review of the points which you made in respect to the rate per kw hour.

It is my earnest desire to make a just and amicable payment for the electrical power which has been furnished South Korea. But there still remain differences of view involving complicated technical matters which can best be settled by a direct exchange between competent experts. In accordance with item IV of the jointly approved agreements of the January conference, I suggest that a board of Russian experts, especially chosen for this purpose, meet with a similar board of American experts in order to reach a reasonable solution. This meeting can be held in Seoul or in Pyongyang.

Should a meeting in Seoul be agreeable, if you will inform me in respect to the names of the members of the Russian Board of experts, arrangements will be made for their transportation, housing, and mess, during the period of this conference.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

To: The Unification Conference
of the Rightists and leftists
Duk Soo Palace, Seoul

R153

WARNING

At the first stage of concluding the treaty of Five Clauses (1906) forty years ago, I was one of forty nine volunteers who dedicated his life to the effort of preventing Korea from falling headlong into an impending ignominious fate. Our purpose at that time was to represent our people in a protest against such an infamy before the ambassadors returned to their respective countries. Without achieving our purpose some of us barely escaped with our lives, the attempts having been made within our country and abroad.

Following the surrender of the Japanese, I was held a prisoner in North Korea for six months, after which time I came to Seoul. When the independence of Korea is at stake, our lives are also swinging in the balance. We are patiently awaiting the day of independence and if that day never materializes the entire responsibility of Korea's fate will be placed upon your shoulders.

We have now come to the final stage of our conciliatory movements. Therefore, it is our earnest wish that you, the liberating powers, will amend whatever differences between you there may exist and thereby fulfill the desires of thirty million people. If this cannot be realized, then consider yourselves as glorified benefactors by sacrificing personal ambitions in preference for the reconstruction of Korea by Koreans.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Warning you for the last time and with a sincere wish of good luck to you all, I am

Kim Hong Si

(Worrying to death for the country)
July 27, 1946

P.S. In the affairs of state abandon all personal ambitions and display the spirit of devotion and sacrifice.
I am not the only man signing this warning. So and so and so are joining me in this.

c/o Kim Hwak Pong
182 No 1 Kwang Hi Street

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

To: Unification Conference
Duk Soo Palace, Seoul

@ 1
TRHP

I wish to thank you for the unpleasantries you leaders are going through in these exceptionally hot days. We wish you success in the unification of the right and left wings, but it should be remembered that in the fundamental principles of unification the problems which both sides hold out from cooperation should be decided upon by the popular vote of the people.

Concerning the Moscow Decision it is essential that each party and organization refrain from self seeking aggrandizement. It is the prerogative of thirty million Koreans to choose their representatives. Not withstanding the fact that absolutely no one has decided who would represent which side or which class, these parties and organizations have corrupted a newly acquired political freedom.

We thirty million people can never watch this in silence, and consequently should give our undivided attention to it. The proceedings of the Conference for Unification ought to be published in detail for discussion by the populace. All of the important problems of the day should be met with a conscientious solution by each party and organization of this restless transitional period; a period which prevails not by the choice of the thirty million people. It should never be that the road trodden by the traitors of forty years ago be followed again!

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In particular, it is my wish that the commemoration of the 1st anniversary of world war two, the account of which was published on the first page of the "Marine Press" no. 298 of July 28, 1946, be made public.

More important than the celebration of world war two, is the pressing and paramount issue of a multitude dying from starvation. It is not time to make a lot of patriotic noises. (I do not soil the holy commemoration of world war two.)

The hunger of our countrymen!

The unemployment of our countrymen!

Are these not the problems of a great emergency? We are not foolish people who may be satisfied with false propaganda!

July 28, 1946

A certain Pak

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

To: Unification Conference
Duk Soo Palace, Seoul

1. We advocate the unification of Korea and the organization of a temporary provisional government.
2. The provisional government should work for the abolition of the 38th parallel boundary and the immediate withdrawal of the American and Russian Armies.
3. Problems concerning trusteeship, anti-trusteeship and their relations should be resolved by the general opinion of the Korean people after the abolition of the 38th parallel boundary. The method of settling vital issues should be by popular vote.

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By NARS, Date

Kim Kyu Sik
Chairman of the delegates for the
Unification Committee between rightists and leftists
Duk Soo Palace

Having fallen into agony, the people are no longer able to stand the torture. Pray for the success of unification between rightists and leftists, of freedom and independence. Please weed out all pro-Japanese and traitors.

Paikchun

Li Tan Ku

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

To: Unification Conference

Duk Soo Palace, Seoul

It is desirable to have a unified Korea and a provisional government organized at a time when our people are in such a precarious position. However, any decision concerning a trusteeship should be left to the general opinion of the people.

As the foremost issue, the 38th parallel boundary should be liquidated after the organization of the provisional government and the withdrawal of the American and Russian Armies.

Unification is desired only on the condition that a trusteeship will be decided upon by popular vote. If the provisional government decides upon this issue, the people will be exposed to too great a danger.

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UNITED NATIONS

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Dear Messers Lyeh Yun Hyung
and
Kim Kyu Sik

We, in the name of the general meeting of the Hong Sung Branch of Women's Alliance, send the following message to you, two, who have labored for the happines s and national blessing of the Korean people for the coming century.

We, women t oo, in the hope to repay you for your noble efforts want to be as much the front line fighters as the men are in the liberation front holding the hoes in the right arm and the sickle in the left. We assure you, dear leaders, without the liberation of the Korean women, there can never be a true democratic nation, the more so when the life of the village women is no more comparable to that of the women of the Dark Middle Age.

We grieve and lament over women's share of double oppression, torture, their unconditional surrender to injustice and maltreatment. To overcome all these offenses we have come together to this gathering. More than anything else, we, representing 120,000 women and their thoughts, respectfully offer you a sugestion that an unified provisional government from both Southern and Northern Korea, not a haphazard government but one that emerged from the fundamentally unified rightists and leftists., be formed.
Lastly, we hope that we may dispose of all the pro-Japs, traitors and fascists and get to-gether all those conscientious patriots among the leftists and rightists into one solid group. Wish you two leaders health and successful fight and

1. Hurrah for the success of conscientious cooperation between leftists and rightists;

2. Hurrah for the establishment of unified government between North and South;

3. Hurrah for the liberation of Korean women.

August 3, 1946

General Gathering of
Hong Sung Branch of
Korean Women's Alliance.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

呂運亨先生와
金奎植先生과
全民族의 注視下에 民族의 幸福을 爲하야 國家의 百年之
計를 爲하야 平素에 主義主張을 異하는 各 政黨과 團體
同盟罷業 等 全國的 總結成大會의 名譽로서 四人을 選擧하
고자 하는 바 女性 全先生과 本人을 選擧하였으며 呂先生과
金先生께서 不幸히 逝去하시고 全先生과 本人만이 남게 되었
아 民族先頭에 서서 男性과 같이 解放戰線의 第一
兵士가 되고저 하는 바이며 또한 女性에게 政治的 暗黑
時代에 있어서 女性에게 政治的 訓練을 시키고저 하는 바이며
이에 대한 協助를 要望하는 바입니다

過去 五千年間 女性은 無能과 無智의 絶對化!! 우리는
이러한 封建的 殘滓를 淸算하고 新朝鮮 女性의 完全解放
을 爲하야 農村女性의 啓蒙運動을 展開하고저 하는 바이며
이러한 運動은 民主主義國家의 建設과 同時에 이루어지지 못할 것이
므로 우리는 이 運動을 通하야 封建的 暗黑 生活의 殘存物인 二十世紀的 暗黑 生活
을 淸算하고 女性에게 政治的 訓練을 시키고저 하는 바이며
또한 女性에게 政治的 訓練을 시키는 데는 무엇보다도 強要된 二重的 壓
迫을 除去하는 것이 必要하다고 생각하는 바입니다

우리는 過去 三千年間 女性은 無能과 無智의 絶對化!! 우리는
이러한 封建的 殘滓를 淸算하고 新朝鮮 女性의 完全解放
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迫을 除去하는 것이 必要하다고 생각하는 바입니다

過去 五

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

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UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

UNRRA MISSION IN KOREA

Seoul, Korea
August 6, 1946

TO: Col. General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, Soviet Forces in Korea

SUBJECT: Contributed Clothing

We are glad to inform you that a cable has come from UNRRA, Washington, saying that the contributed clothing is being loaded upon an Army vessel and clearing the port of San Francisco in a post for Inchon. We have not yet been informed of either the name of the vessel or the date of clearance, and will let you know these further details directly they come to hand.

We are further informed that there will be 2324 bales of clothing and 1194 bags of footwear for the Soviet Zone, and this represents a total weight of about 800,000 pounds. The clothing will consist of the following:

Item	Bales
Heavy Clothing (Men's)	445
Men's Light Clothing	305
Women's Heavy	420
Women's Light	333
Children's Heavy	190
Children's Light	129
Infants	63
Bedding	99
Hosiery and Underwear	254
Remnants	236
	2324

	Bags
Men's Shoes	243
Women's Shoes	290
Children's and Infants	165
Miscellaneous Shoes	496
	1194

We have been informed by our headquarters that in order to get the contributed clothing shipped to Korea with the utmost speed, it has not been possible to put it through a refined sorting, mending and cleaning process in the United States, as this would entail too great a delay. The pressure of baling may destroy buttons and fasteners, and a large proportion of the clothing may need some mending.

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By NARS, Date

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The Administration has, therefore, asked us to suggest to the Soviet Government that prior to distribution of the clothing, arrangements should be made for the setting up of work shops where the clothing can be re-sorted and any additional processing carried out. We are sure that you have some plan in mind for the distribution of the clothing in the various provinces, and it would seem to us preferable that this sorting and processing be carried out in the provinces rather than in a central depot, say, at [illegible]. In this way, the clothing will reach the recipients in the best possible condition. [illegible] clothing.

[illegible] to footwear, [illegible] to the second-hand footwear that is best suitable [illegible] differences of the [illegible] with those in Persia, we think that much of the footwear [illegible] usable for [illegible] in Persia.

[illegible] about the transfer [illegible]

Sincerely yours,

/s/ [illegible]
[illegible]
Acting Chief

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
XXV SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

6 August 1946

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I have received your letter of 15 June 1946 pertaining to reconvening the Soviet-American Joint Commission in Seoul.

Having studied the material of the work of the Soviet-American Joint Commission, I have come to the conclusion that the stand taken by the Soviet Delegation in its negotiations, which took place in Seoul, was correct.

The Soviet Delegation was motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of 3 Foreign Ministers on Korea, the only document in which is laid out the program of the Allies, foreseeing the creation of a democratic government in Korea and also the measures of assistance for developing Korea on democratic principles and the establishment of an independent Korean state.

As you know, the break in the work of the Joint Commission, fulfilling this decision, came about on the initiative and suggestion of the American Delegation.

Regretfully, your letter did not state whether the American Delegation in the Joint Commission will uphold the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and consult only with those parties and organizations and their representatives, which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision.

Upon receiving your consent to resume negotiations on the basis of the above mentioned, I am ready at any time to send a representative of the Soviet Command to the city of Seoul for conducting negotiations in the Soviet-American Joint Commission for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Respectfully yours

I.M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
The Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date AUG 31 1977

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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Last Packet - Cpy

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR
SEOUL, KOREA.

8 August 1946

Mr. Pack:

Here is the procedure for funds for K. D. C.

1. For Civilian Employees -- give names to Colonel Parmley who will have the civilians employed and paid.

2. For furniture and supplies -- see Lieutenant Colonel Alt.

3. For money--

a. Present budget to Lieutenant Bertch

b. Get approval by General Hodge.

c. Payment will be made by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon.

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army,
Military Governor

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
AUTH: C.G. USAMGIK
9 August 1946
Initials

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Anderson,
Military Governor of Kyonggi-Do,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Colonel Anderson:

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of four (4) representatives. This is based on a population of 3,635,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult your key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

Including Kwanghae-Do

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946.

: S E C R E T :
: ATTN: C.O. USAMGIK :
: 9 August 1946 :
: Initials :

Colonel [illegible],
Military Governor of Kangwon-Do,
Chunchon, Korea.

Dear Colonel [illegible]:

It is planned to set up a Korean national legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of one (1) representative. This is based on a population of 1,154,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult your key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH,
Major General, United States Army,
Military Governor

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
AUTH: C.G. USAMGIK
9 August 1946
Initials:

Lieutenant Colonel Roland E. Murphy,
Military Governor of Chung Chong Pukto,
Chongju, Korea.

Dear Colonel Murphy:

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of one (1) representative. This is based on a population of 1,201,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult you key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH,
Major General, United States Army,
Military Governor.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
AUTH: C.G. USAMGIK
9 August 1946
Initials

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Karn
Military Governor of Chung Chong Namdo
Taejon, Korea

Dear Colonel Karn:

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represented the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of two (2) representatives. This is based on a population of 1,097,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult your key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
AUTH: C.G. USAMGIK
9 August 1946
Initials

Colonel Grover B. Egger
Military Governor Cholla Pukto
Chonju, Korea

Dear Colonel Egger:

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of two (2) representatives. This is based on a population of 1,922,000. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult you key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely your,

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
ATTN: C.G. CHANGIK
9 August 1946
Initials

Colonel Raymond G. Peeke,
Military Governor of Cholla Namdo,
Kwangju, Korea.

Dear Colonel Peeke:

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of three (3) representatives. This is based on a population of 2,759,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult your key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH,
Major General, United States Army,
Military Governor.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
AUTH: C.G. USAFIK
9 August 1946
Initials

Lieutenant Colonel Harwood C. Denton
Military Governor of Kyongsang Namdo
Pusan, Korea

Dear Colonel Denton:

It is planned to set up a Korean National Legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "Hagedorn" system for the selection of three (3) representatives. This is based on a population of 2,747,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult you key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946.

: S E C R E T :
: AUTH: C.G. USAMGIK:
: 9 August 1946. :
: Initials :

Colonel Gordon J. F. Herron,
Military Governor of Kyongsang Pukto,
Taegu, Korea.

Dear Colonel Herron:

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 15, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of three (3) representatives. This is based on a population of 3,071,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult your key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH,
Major General, United States Army,
Military Governor.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government In Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 August 1946

SECRET
AUTH: C.G. USAMGIK
9 August 1946
Initials

Major Thurman A. Stout,
Military Governor of Cheju-Do,
Cheju Island, Korea.

Dear Major Stout;

It is planned to set up a Korean National legislature in Seoul to assist Military Government in enacting ordinances. It is hoped that the first session will be held about September 1, 1946.

For the first session part of the members will be elected to represent the provinces. The remainder will be appointed by the Military Governor.

Provinces will be represented in general on the basis of one representative for each one million population or major fraction thereof, provided that each province will have at least one representative.

You are requested to prepare plans for the election by "headman" system for the selection of one (1) representative. This is based on a population of 300,000 persons. No publicity will be given until you are given formal instructions. This is merely an alert. You may consult your key American and Korean officials if you desire.

It is planned that early in 1947 an election will be held on a universal suffrage basis.

Please call on me if you need further information.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH,
Major General, United States Army,
Military Governor

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

RHG
7(c)

Gen Arnold
Edo, comment
and suggest
appropriate

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

12 August 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 24th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

This is in answer to your letter of 6 August 1946 in regard to resumption of negotiations by the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission in Korea.

I note with interest your statement that the Soviet delegation is motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. I take this opportunity to state that the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation, and is exactly what it will try to accomplish when the Commission reconvenes.

However, there are certain factors in this connection that I am impelled to point out. These are:

a. There is nothing the U.S. Delegation can read into the Moscow Decision that requires or implies that only those parties and organizations which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision are to be consulted by the Joint Commission. Reading this interpretation into the Moscow Decision is purely unilateral.

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b. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision or in the general usage of the word "Democratic" throughout the world that restricts its application only to organizations of the Communist Party or Communist Party controlled satellite elements. The American Delegation can apply the word "Democratic" only as it is applied in common usage throughout the world which would normally exclude only avowed royalist, fascist and nazi elements.

c. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government.

d. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that makes any predetermination of the terms or nature of the four Power Trusteeship beyond the one provision imposing a limit of five years duration. On the contrary, the Moscow Decision states positively that "The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the ****(four Powers)**** for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years." ~~Koreans see no dual interpretation possible for the Commission~~ I see no reason for the Joint Commission or ~~to pressure any Soviet~~ the Korean people to enter into commitments concerning a ~~definite terms and period of~~ a four Power Trusteeship before the Korean Provisional Government is formed.

In view ~~of the attitude and actions~~ of the Soviet Delegation as ~~with respect to the~~ interpretation of the Moscow Decision during

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

~~this session~~ that ~~I suggested that I~~ restudy ~~my action~~ the sessions last spring, the Decision ~~[illegible]~~ IN THE LIGHT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED

Since the Moscow Decision was made by our foreign Ministers in good faith and is the only legal vehicle for setting up the independence of Korea, the U.S. Delegation has no alternative but to carry it out exactly and in full, and has no intention of making changes in the Decision or of asking for any repudiation. However I can assure you that the U.S. Delegation ~~will not give in~~ cannot be a party to any arbitrary exclusive or punitive tactics in dealing with the accredited representatives of the Korean people on grounds not specifically stated in the Moscow Decision itself, and ~~giving due consideration to~~ inconsistent with the world-accepted definition of the word "Democratic".

On the basis given above, I not only welcome but invite the Soviet Delegation to return to negotiations of the Joint Commission and suggest that you send your representative to Seoul at an early date to make preliminary arrangements.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

12 August 1946

Guard Colonel (name illegible)
Commanding General, 24th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General (illegible):

This is in answer to your letter of 6 August 1946 in regard to your [illegible] of the U.S. - Soviet Commission in Korea.

I agree with you that [illegible] fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, [illegible] tunity to state that the great bulk [illegible] Decision [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to try to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

normally would exclude only parties or organizations opposed to popular rule by elected representatives and to equal rights for all classes of the people.

c. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision to prohibit Koreans in some areas with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and views in formation of their own government.

d. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that makes any prelate [illegible] of the terms of return of the Joint Commission beyond the one hundred and [illegible] a limit of five years duration. [illegible] Moscow Decision states positively that the proceeds of the Joint Commission shall be primarily [illegible] [illegible] the Provisional Korean Government [illegible] joint consultation of the [illegible] [illegible] which will [illegible] Korean democratic [illegible] [illegible] two years.

In view of the Soviet delegation's interpretation of the Moscow Decision during the sessions just ended, that delegation might wish to restudy the decision in the light of the views expressed above.

Since the Moscow Decision was made by our foreign ministers in good faith and is the only legal vehicle for [illegible] the immediate [illegible] Korea, the U.S. delegation has not only the objective but to carry it out exactly and in full, and has no intention of making changes in the decision or of seeking its repudiation. However, I can assure you that the U.S. delegation cannot be a party to any arbitrary exclusion or obstructive tactics in dealing with the accredited representatives of the Korean people on grounds not specifically stated in the Moscow Decision itself, and inconsistent with the world-accepted definition of the word "democratic".

On the basis given above, I not only welcome but invite the Soviet delegation to return to negotiations of the Joint Commission and suggest that you send your representative to Seoul at an early date to make preliminary arrangements.

Respectfully yours,

John R. Hodge
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

RH

G. W. a 1

824 Connecticut Avenue,
Washington, D. C.

August 28, 1946

Lieut. General John R. Hodge,
Headquarters XXIV Corps,
APO 235,
c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

Dear General:

Korea has been getting plenty of publicity in the papers in the last few days and today the enclosed story appeared in the Saturday Evening Post. I am also enclosing an article by Joseph Alsop. He wrote one of the books on OSS. His idea, I am sure, will be very interesting to you.

The War Department is sending me the monthly report of the happenings in Korea so I am trying to keep up on my reading.

I had a letter from Mrs. Hodge dated August 23d thanking me for a box which I forwarded to her from Mrs. Rhee. She says in her letter that your daughter was stricken with polio but is recovering nicely. I was terribly sorry to learn of her affliction and hope that she soon will be completely recovered.

I wonder whether trade with Korea will open soon? Apparently we are pushing ahead in Germany and if that is true of an enemy country it should be doubly true of a country not an enemy. I think it would help your political problems immeasurably to have a resumption of imports and exports and it would also help solve your money exchange problems.

Is there any chance of your coming to the States for a brief visit? Is there anything I can do here for you?

With kindest regards, Iam

Sincerely,

W. Preston Goodfellow

D

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

[illegible]
25th Civil Affairs Company
Taegu, Korea

16 October 1950

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
U.S. Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

In your letter of [illegible] you [illegible] the [illegible] of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, and, in [illegible] the intentions of the American delegation to [illegible] decisions of the Commission, to [illegible] the Soviet [illegible].

In order to [illegible] I have [illegible] the Joint Commission [illegible] Korea, and [illegible] the Joint Commission to [illegible] Korea.

As far as the [illegible] of the Joint Commission is concerned, as you well know it was the American Delegation itself which drew [illegible] in the course of the [illegible] suggested that the [illegible] Joint Commission to [illegible], [illegible] of the Moscow [illegible] [illegible].

In your letter you state that "the [illegible] Joint Commission is only [illegible] the [illegible] decision".

I must however note that during the work of the Joint Commission the American Delegation did not, in fact, evince such a [illegible] and many times even declared that it did not [illegible] Moscow Decision on Korea.

Your assertion that the Soviet Delegation allegedly interprets unilaterally the Moscow Decision concerning the creation of a

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State Dept. Instr. 12 Aug and 8 July 1976
By NARS, Date APR 01 1977

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the consultation on the subject with Korean political parties and social organizations is provided.

In the decision on Korea reached by the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, a number of measures were laid out aimed at the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on democratic principles and the speedy liquidation of the ruinous after-effects of the Japanese domination in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation, being guided by the aims and spirit of the Moscow decision, deems that it would not be right to consult on the question of the views of political parties and organizations which are taking a position against this decision, or those, who for factional considerations, although declaring their support of the decision, actually are taking such steps which convert their statement of support of the Moscow Decision into an empty declaration.

In regard to that part of your letter concerning the definition of the word "democratic", the Soviet Delegation would like to point out that in this question it is necessary to consider not the declarative announcements of the party, and not the names of separate parties and organizations, but the actual policies pursued by a given party.

Inasmuch as the Moscow Decision has outlined the necessary measures for the democratic reconstruction of Korea, it is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the attitude of different parties and groups towards the Moscow Decision is the most important criterion of their true democratic nature and of their striving to see Korea a democratic state.

Thus, the position of the Soviet Delegation on the question of consultation of the Joint Commission with the Korean democratic parties and organizations fully corresponds to the Moscow Decision.

At the same time it is impossible not to note that there is an obvious contradiction between the interpretation in your letter of the word "democracy" and the actual position which the American Delegation assumed during the period of the work of the Joint Commission.

It is well known that the American Delegation has included in the list of political parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission on the question of the creation of the

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Provisional Korean Democratic Government, all political parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition against the Moscow Decision and only three democratic parties which upheld the Moscow Decision. It is completely obvious that the American Delegation, when it excluded from participation in consultation with the Joint Commission such democratic parties and organizations of mass character as the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Confederation of Labor, the All Korean Women's Union, the All-Korean Youth Union, the All-Korean Farmer's Union and a number of other organizations, was guided by other than democratic principles.

As regards the freedom for the Koreans to express their opinion for or against the formation of the Korean Government or the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Soviet Delegation has never opposed proposals directed against the freedom of expression by the representatives of various parties and organizations, wherever they may be, and it is accordingly understood that any party or person as well as any individual Korean citizen, can express similar ideas or present them to the Joint Commission.

I cannot agree with the interpretation set forth in your letter on the question of trusteeship under such an interpretation actually places in doubt the decision of the Moscow Conference on this question. As it is known the Moscow decision states: "It will be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to also work out measures for helping and assisting (on trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

Thus, after the terms of the Joint Commission is included the preparation of proposals dealing with the establishment of a trusteeship in regard to Korea with the stipulation that these proposals relating to Korea for a period up to 5 years will after consultation with the Provisional Korean Government, be submitted for joint consideration to the governments of the four Powers.

From the above it is clear that the question of the establishment of the trusteeship as a measure which must aid in the democratic transformation of Korea has been definitely decided by the Moscow Conference and on this basis there must be prepared concrete proposals for the eventual working out of the agreement on trusteeship.

During the interruption in the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission many events have occurred in South as well as in North Korea.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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All these events testify that the Korean people are striving to unite their country, to have a democratic government, and to carry out their democratic transformation.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the delay in the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government impedes the so necessary unification of Korea into a single state; it is having a negative effect on the economic and political situation of the Korean people and is hindering the realization of democratic transformation in all Korea.

The Soviet Delegation is greatly concerned that the negotiations of the Joint Commission, interrupted on the initiative of the American Delegation on [illegible], have not yet been resumed due to the failure to reach an agreement on the questions of the implementation of the Moscow Decision.

In order to take this into account, also with the forthcoming visit, next [illegible] to meet with the leaders of the Soviet Delegation to discuss the question of the Joint Commission;

[illegible] Korea,

I. I. SHTYKOV
Lieutenant General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea

~~SECRET~~

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

Final Version

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

1 November 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I thank you for your letter of October 26th, 1946, and agree with you that the continuation of the division of Korea into two parts works a great hardship on the Korean people. It also weakens the prestige of two great Allies who cooperated so fully to bring a victorious end to the bitterest war in history. Each added month of this division tends to make more difficult the implementation of the Moscow Decision on Korea made by the Foreign Ministers of the Allies last December.

For the purposes of reconciling the differences between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. delegations, which are not fully resolved in your letter, I propose that the following basis of agreement for reconvening the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission be accepted by both the Soviet and American delegations with a view to the early resumption of the sessions of the Joint Commission:

> It is agreed to interpret paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration in Communique #5 of the US-USSR Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 1946, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organizations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties, and social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.
>
> In consideration of this interpretation of the declaration published in Communique #5 of the Joint Commission, dated April 17, 1946, both Delegations agree that they will not oppose consultation with any individual, political party, or social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in Joint Communique #5.

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In order to eliminate any possible future misunderstanding I believe it is advisable briefly to restate the position of the United States at this time.

(a) The United States has always favored the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision by the Joint Commission. This Decision obviously includes the preparation of proposals "for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years" which "shall be submitted for the joint consideration" of the Four Powers "<u>following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government</u>". However, there is nothing in the Moscow Decision which predetermines the terms or nature of a Four Power trusteeship except that it shall be a method "for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea" to be worked out "<u>with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government</u>," and a limitation placed upon its duration.

(b) The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision; and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government.

On the basis of the United States position herein stated and the suggested interpretation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration in Communique No. 5 of the Joint Commission which I approved for the United States Delegation, the American Command proposes that the Joint Commission resume its work without delay and I again cordially invite the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul at an early date for the purpose of resuming negotiations.

I shall be pleased to hear from you as early as possible in order that the necessary preliminary arrangements can be effected.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Headquarters
[illegible]
Pyongyang, Korea

30 November 1947

[illegible]
Commanding General
Army Forces in South Korea
[illegible], Korea

Dear Mr. [illegible]:

I [illegible] receipt of your letter of November 1st, 1947.

It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions under which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in substance do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letters, which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Actually, you propose that the Joint Commission should consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to the principles of the declaration published in Communique #5, moreover, such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

Thus, according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only with democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue their activities directed against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

The acceptance of such a proposal would mean, rather an call on reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position towards the Moscow Decision, but merely to curtail temporarily their activities directed against this decision so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commission. I must remind you that it was precisely in such manner that these parties accepted your public announcement of April 17, 1947 which contained an analogous interpretation of the agreement embodied in Communique #5.

ELIC/ROTH

[illegible] 1946 [illegible]

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The result was that the parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition to the Moscow Decision agreed to sign the declaration, but on the very second day after the termination of the work of the Joint Commission, prominent leaders of these parties and organizations again returned to an active fight against the Moscow Decision and its supporters.

There is no doubt that participation of these elements in the consultations would be utilized by them with the aim of sabotaging the fulfillment of the Moscow decision on Korea and facilitate their activities in that direction.

I must also declare that [illegible] detail and complete realization of the Moscow decision on Korea, then, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, it is impossible to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling this decision with those persons, parties and organizations who voice a position to the above mentioned decision and who aim at sabotaging its fulfillment, but who, for tactical considerations, may for the period of consultation with the Joint Commission temporarily end in part limit their activities directed against the Moscow decision in order that they may renew these activities in full force as soon as consultation with the Joint Commission is terminated.

The foregoing in no way limits the freedom of Korean democratic parties, social organizations or individuals to express their position regarding the formation of the Korean government or other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

In my previous letter I have already directed your attention to the fact that the Soviet delegation has never made proposals directed against the freedom of individuals, parties or organizations to express anywhere their views on these questions and it is accordingly understood that any party or social organization as well as an individual Korean citizen can express similar views or present them to the Joint Commission.

Desiring to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea as speedily as practicably as possible, the Soviet side advances the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

1. The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

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2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and Social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultations with the Joint Commission.

In the event you should agree to the foregoing proposals the Soviet delegation is prepared, without delay, to arrive in Seoul for the resumption of the negotiations of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

24 Dec 4

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov,
Commanding General of the Soviet
Forces in Northern Korea,
Headquarters, 25th Soviet Army,
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 November 1946.

I have had attached to this letter a copy of your letter of 26 November 1946 with paragraphs numbered to facilitate reference.

From a careful reading of paragraphs II to VIII, both inclusive, the impression I receive is that the Soviet Delegation believes that proposals previously submitted by the United States Delegation appear to encourage "reactionary parties and groups" to continue hostile opposition to the Moscow Decision. I assure you that the United States Delegation has no such intention and desires to cooperate with you in preventing such hostile opposition. Paragraphs IX and X of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet Delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals "regarding the formation of the Korean government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea." The views expressed in these paragraphs are identical with the position assumed by the United States Delegation.

The last three paragraphs of your letter numbered 1 to 3, although apparently in conflict with paragraphs IX and X nevertheless provide a basis for further discussion.

In view of the closeness of our positions, I suggest that your proposals with the following modifications be made the basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

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Proposal No. 1 to be interpreted as follows: Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

Proposal No. 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission, may after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

Proposal No. 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by a recommendation of the Joint Commission."

I trust that the basis proposed above will be acceptable to you and that you will notify me so that I may make the necessary preliminary arrangements for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding, United States
Army in Korea

1 Incl.
Copy ltr of
Gen. Chistiakov
dtd 26 Nov 46

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

COPY

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY FORCES IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

28 February 1947.

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

Confirming the receipt of your letter of December 24, 1946, it is with satisfaction I note that as a result of our correspondence the positions of both sides have actually drawn closer together.

1. I take note of your declaration that you are ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals set forth in my letter dated November 26, 1946. I agree with your interpretation of proposal #1, bearing in mind that the matter may not and must not be confined merely to expressions of good intentions to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on the part of those parties and organizations which will sign the declaration contained in Communique #5. Subsequent actions of these parties and organizations who have signed the above mentioned declaration, and consequently have accepted the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, likewise must be consonant with that obligation.

2. In reference to paragraph #2 of my proposals, I should like to explain that the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

Bearing this in mind, and taking into consideration your observations, I propose the following wording for paragraph #2:

"A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION SIGNATORY TO THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN COMMUNIQUE #5 HAS THE RIGHT TO APPOINT SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE WHO IN ITS OPINION CAN BEST PRESENT TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ITS VIEWS REGARDING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION, AND WHO HAS NOT COMPROMISED HIMSELF BY ACTIVELY VOICING OPPOSITION TO THAT DECISION. HOWEVER, IF THE APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE, FOR COMPLETELY VALID

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By NARS, Date

REASONS, BE CONSIDERED ANTAGONISTIC TOWARD THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION OR TOWARD EITHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS, THEN THE JOINT COMMISSION, FOLLOWING MUTUAL AGREEMENT, MAY DEMAND THAT THE PARTY HAVING MADE SUCH A STATEMENT (DECLARATION) SHOULD DESIGNATE ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE IN HIS PLACE."

3. I agree with your wording of proposal #3. I assume, however, that by the concept "individuals" shall be understood representatives of parties and social organizations invited to participate in consultations in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph #2 above.

I would deem it more expedient to substitute for the word "individuals" the words "and their representatives" with the result that the first sentence of your third proposal would be worded as follows:

"Parties and social organizations and their representatives invited for consultations," etc. according to the text.

The remainder of the wording of this proposal is accepted by me without change.

4. Concerning your observations regarding the alleged existence of conflict between paragraphs 9 and 10 of my letter, and the proposals set forth in that letter, I must say that I do not discern any such conflict.

I hope that agreement by us on the conditions of consultation will assure a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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DRAFT
4 March 1947

O.K.
AWB.

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov,
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea,
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 28, 1947.

I am pleased to note that as a result of exchanges of proposals and counterproposals, embodied in your letters of 26 November and 28 February, and my letter of 24 December, the American and Soviet positions are substantially in agreement. I accept proposals numbers 1 and 3 of your letter of 26 November, as modified in subsequent correspondence. Only the amendment to proposal number 2 reading "and who has not compromised himself by actively voicing opposition to that Decision" cannot be accepted.

It is well known that many leaders in all the parties and social groups in South Korea have at one time or another voiced their honest and patriotic opposition to portions of the Moscow Agreement. This was done, prior to the consummation of any agreement on the future conduct of the meetings of the Joint Commission, in the utmost good faith in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed to the citizens of South Korea. The adoption of your proposed amendment would result in elimination of many leaders who now support the Moscow Agreement, besides constituting an unwarranted penalty against the exercise of freedom of expression.

Your suggested rewording of proposal number 2 without the above quoted phrase provides ~~adequate~~ ample safeguards that organization and party representatives will not engage in activities inimical to the work of the Joint Commission.

For convenience of reference I recapitulate in the inclosure the full texts of the agreements that have been reached to date, assuming that my latest proposal is acceptable to you.

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I fully reciprocate your hope that mutual agreement on these points will bring about a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. To that end I would suggest that May 1, 1947, be established tentatively as the date for the arrival of the Russian Delegation in Seoul for the reconvening of the Joint Commission in order that the necessary preparatory arrangements can be effected.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN R. HODGE,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

1 April 1947

Lt. Gen. G. F. Korotkov
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Korotkov:

[illegible] letter [illegible] Mr. [illegible], [illegible] June. [illegible] Soviet Delegation [illegible] North Korea, [illegible] [illegible] transmitted to [illegible] through it. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] receipt of [illegible] letter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the matter of supply of electrical current [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] the matter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

1 April 1947

Lt. Gen. G. F. Korotkov
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea
[illegible], Korea

Dear General Korotkov:

The enclosed translation of a letter from [illegible] Kim, Il Sung, Chairman, the People's Committee of North Korea, dated [illegible] March 1947, has been transmitted to me through Lt. Col [illegible], [illegible] officer at your Headquarters.

The receipt of this letter came as a considerable surprise to me, since the matter of supply of electrical current [illegible] to, since the matter of supply of electrical current [illegible] inter-zonal embassies heretofore have been matters for joint discussion by the representatives of the two commands under Article 4 of the Trade Decision (Section III of Annex). If Mr. Kim, Il Sung is, in fact, your agent and has been authorized by you to receive these letters, I would appreciate it if he would transmit his communications to you and that you inform me of your desires in the matter.

It has been and still is the earnest desire of this Command to reach an early settlement to the matter of indebtedness. You may be assured that this Command will make every effort to meet the obligations of South Korea in a satisfactory manner for power and other commodities supplied by North Korea. In the meantime, recognizing also our obligations to assist in every practical way to maintain the electrical power system, we are willing to allocate such emergency electrical articles of appropriate design which may be available in South Korea or readily obtainable elsewhere. A request by you for emergency electrical articles including necessary specifications will be given expeditious consideration.

I again wish to renew our invitation which was last extended to General Shtikov on 31 August 1946, to form a joint committee of technical experts to resolve the technical difficulties which are apparent in this problem.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

It is hoped that you will take the measures on your part necessary to insure an early meeting of the proposed joint committee of technical experts to draw up as speedily as possible specifications for electrical equipment desired, compute existing indebtedness for equipment furnished, and arrange for reimbursement.

Very respectfully,

[illegible]
for General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl
Translation of letter
from Berlin, 11 July,
dated June 30th 1927

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

1 April 1947

Lt. General G. F. Korotkov
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Korotkov:

The enclosed translation of a letter from Mr. Kim, Il Sung, Chairman, the People's Committee of North Korea, dated 19 March 1947 has been transmitted to me through Colonel [illegible], my liaison officer at your Headquarters.

The receipt of this letter came as a considerable surprise to me, since the matter of supply of electrical current and other inter-zonal exchanges heretofore have been matters for joint disposition by the representatives of the two commands under Article 4 (Section III on Korea). of the Moscow Decision. If Mr. Kim, Il Sung is in fact your agent and has been authorized by you to resolve these matters, I would appreciate it if he would transmit his communications to you and that you inform me of your desires in the matter.

An indebtedness to North Korea for electric power which has been furnished is well known. It is the earnest desire of this Command to reach an early settlement of the matter of indebtedness. You may rest assured that this Command will make every effort to meet the obligations of South Korea for power and other commodities supplied by in a satisfactory manner.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

North Korea, [redacted]. In the meantime, recognizing also our obligation to assist in every practical way to maintain the electrical power system, we are willing to allocate such emergency electrical articles of appropriate design which may be available in South Korea or readily obtainable elsewhere. A request by you for emergency electrical articles, including necessary specifications will be given expeditious consideration.

I again wish to renew our invitation which was last extended to General Chistiakov on 31 August, 1946 to form a joint committee of technical experts to resolve the technical difficulties which are apparent in this problem.

It is hoped that you will take the measures on your part necessary to insure an early meeting of the proposed joint committee of technical experts to draw up as speedily as possible specifications for electrical equipment desired, compute existing indebtedness for commodities furnished, and arrange for reimbursement.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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By NARS, Date

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1 Apri 1947

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

1 April 1947

Lt. General G. P. Korotkov
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Korotkov:

The enclosed translation of a letter from Mr. Kim, Il Sung, Chairman, the People's Committee of North Korea, dated 19 March 1947 has been transmitted to me through Lt. Colonel McClish, my liaison officer at your Headquarters.

The receipt of this letter came as a considerable surprise to me, since the matter of supply of electrical current and other inter-zonal exchanges heretofore have been matters for joint disposition by the representatives of the two commands under Article 4 ~~of~~ IV the Moscow Decision (Section III on Korea). If Mr. Kim, Il Sung is in fact your agent and has been authorized by you to resolve these matters, ~~then~~ I would appreciate it if he would transmit his communications to you for your views and that you inform me of your desires in the matter, accordingly.

~~In indebtedness to North Korea for electric power which has been furnished is well known.~~ It has been and still is the earnest desire of this Command to reach an early settlement of this the matter of indebtedness. You may rest be assured that this Command will make every effort to meet the obligations of South

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Korea in a satisfactory manner for power and other commodities supplied by North Korea, in a satisfactory manner. In the meantime, recognizing also our obligation to assist in every practical way to maintain the electrical power system, we are willing to allocate such emergency electrical articles of appropriate design which may be available in South Korea or readily obtainable elsewhere. A request by you for emergency electrical articles including together with necessary specifications will be given expeditious consideration.

I again wish to renew ~~repeat~~ our invitation which was last extended to General Chistiakov on 31 August, 1946 to form a joint committee of technical experts to resolve the technical difficulties which are apparent in this problem.

It is hoped that you will take the measures on your part necessary to insure an early meeting of the proposed joint committee of technical experts to draw up as speedily as possible specifications for electrical equipment desired, compute existing indebtedness for commodities furnished, and arrange for reimbursement.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Inter-Office
Routing Slip

	Initials		Initials
Gen Brown		Mr Burce	
Gen Weckerling		Mr Kinney	
Col Lincoln			
Lt Bertsch			
~~Lt Althaus~~		Mr Prostov	
Col Edwards			

REMARKS: _____

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Date Time Recd	Msg. Cen No.	How Recd
CLASSIFICATION:	INCOMING MESSAGE	PRECEDENCE:

FROM: CITE:

TO:

INFO:

Distribution: Action Distribution (Made by C/S)

C/S	MG	G-1	Air O	QM	IG	I & E O			
G-1	AG	G-2	Cml C	Sig O	Fis O	AES			
G-2	308 PW	G-3	Engr	Surg	Chap	Postal O			
G-3	KBC	G-4	Ord O	J.A.	SSO	MG			
G-4		AG	P M	C.S	DHS	KBC			

Note: Section or command receiving this message for action will return action copy to C/S with brief of action taken noted on this msg.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Inter-Office
Routing Slip

	Initials		Initials
____ Gen Brown	____	✓ Mr Burce	Seoul
✓ Gen Weckerling	✓	____ Mr Kinney	____
✓ Col Lincoln	✓	____	____
✓ Lt Bertsch	B	____	____
____ Lt Althaus	____	✓ Mr Prostov	✓
✓ Col. Edwards	Rob also	____ Mr. Tyler	Not copied has seen

REMARKS: _____

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Date Time Recd	Msg Cen. No.	How Recd
CLASSIFICATION:	INCOMING MESSAGE	PRECEDENCE:

FROM: _____ CITE: _____

TO: _____

INFO: _____

LIMITED

Joint Comm Ltr

Distribution: Action Distribution (Made by C/S)

C/S	MG	G-1	Inf	Air O	_____	QM	_____	IG	_____	I & E O	_____
G-1	AG	G-2	Inf	Cml O	_____	Sig O	_____	Fis O	_____	AES	_____
G-2	308 BW	G-3	_____	Engr	_____	Surg	_____	Chap	_____	Postal O	Inf
G-3	KBC	G-4	_____	Ord O	_____	JA	_____	SSO	_____	MG	_____
G-4		AG	Info	P M	_____	C&S	_____	DHS	_____	KBC	_____

Note: Section or command receiving this message for action will return action copy to C/S with brief of action taken noted on this msg.

Postal - Inf

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NND 760090
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TASS Release Concerning Chistiakov Letter.

1	3/14/47	J.C.	C.G., XXIV Corps	1. The Joint Commission (except the undersigned) believes it would be desirable to remind the State and War Departments concerning local reaction to the recent TASS statement attached. (Tab "A"). 2. I recommend that no further action be taken at the present time in so far as the governmental level is concerned for the following reasons: a. Washington has all the information that we have. b. Nothing of importance has happened to justify additional recommendations. c. A brief statement such as authorized by you verbally on 13 March that "General Chistiakov's letter of February 28 has been received and is being studied" is sufficient for local use. John Weckerling, Brigadier General, U.S.A.

- -

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

Urgent

In light of TASS release concerning Chistiakov's reply ~~to~~ of February 28 to our December 24 letter which will appear in all Korean papers, it seems desirable from local point of view not to delay reply to Chistiakov and to release it to press immediately. In meantime I intend to prepare press release ~~on past correspondence~~ indicating that USSR has partially accepted U.S. proposals and their last letter is being studied. End. Brown

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HEADQUARTERS USAFIK XXIV CORPS

FROM: PRO - ROUTING SLIP TO: 13 March 47

COMMANDING GENERAL ✓	FISCAL OFF
AIDE-DE-CAMP	HQ COMMANDANT
CHIEF OF STAFF	FOREIGN CLAIMS COMM
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	INSPECTOR GENERAL
G-1	P & E OFF
G-2	P & H OFF
G-3	JOINT US SOVIET COMM
G-4	JUDGE ADVOCATE
ADJUTANT GENERAL	MILITARY GOVERNMENT
AIR OFFICE	MRU
ARMY EXCHANGE OFF	ORDNANCE OFF
BD OF REV PROVOST CT CASES	PROVOST MARSHAL
CHAPLAIN	PUBLIC RELATIONS OFF
CHEMICAL	QUARTERMASTER
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SEC	REPORTS CONTROL OFF (C/S)
CLAIMS SERVICE	SEOUL BILLETING SECTION
DEPENDENT HOUSING	SIGNAL OFF
ENGINEER	SPECIAL SERVICE OFF
	SURGEON

Joint Commn.

FOR:

APPROVAL	INFORMATION ✓
ATTACHMENT OF REFERENCE	INITIALS
COMMENT OR CONCURRENCE	ISSUANCE OF ORDERS
DISPATCH	NECESSARY ACTION
FILE	NOTE AND RETURN
INDICATION OF DISTRIBUTION DESIRED	SIGNATURE 5/13/47

REMARKS: (USE REVERSE SIDE ALSO)

C/S Send [illegible] messenger to V.C. [illegible]

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

FEUP25 ATTENTION SECUL DATELINE NEWYORK TASS REPORTS NEW EXCHANGE LETTERS BETWEEN HODGE AND SOVIET COMMANDER NORTHERN KOREA COLONELGENERAL CHISTYAKOV ON UESTION RESUMPTION WORK JOINT SOVIETAMERICAN COMMISSION. TASS SAID CHISTYAKOV FEB TWENTYEIGTH SENT LETTER HODGE ACCEPTING HODGES INTERPRETATION RUSSIAN COMMANDERS PROPOSAL JOINT COMMISSION SHOUID CONSULT ONLY THOSE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ORGANIZATIONS WHICH FULLY SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION ON KOREA. TASS SAID CHISTYAKOV SAID IN LATEST LETTER HE FEELS QUOTE BOTH PARTIES HAVE REALLY COME CLOSER TO EACH OTHER UN QUOTE. TASS INDICATES RUSSIANS WANT AMERICANS AGREE CONSULT ONLY THOSE KOREAN GROUPS WHICH ACTUALLY APPROVE SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION AND NOT MERELY QUOTE EXPRESS INTENTION FULLY SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION UN QUOTE. RUSSIAN COMMANDER ALSO INSISTS KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS MUST NOT ALLOWED DESIGNATE FOR CONSULTATION ANY REPRESENTATIVE QUOTE WHO COMPRISED THEMSELVES BY ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO MOSCOW DECISION ON KOREA UN QUOTE. TO THAT DEMAND TASS SAID HODGE IN DECEMBER TWENTYFOURTH IETTER TO WHICH CHISTYAKOV HAS JUST REPLIED WITH TWO MONTHS DELAY REPLIED THAT KOREAN PARTIES ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD HAVE RIGHT PICK OWN REPRESENTATIVE BUT TASS SAID HODGE ADDED QUOTE HOWEVER IF SUCH REPRESENTATIVE FOR PERFECTLY WEIGHTY REASONS SHALL REGARDED AS ANTAGONISTIC TOWARDS FULFILLMENT MOSCOW DECISION OR TOWARDS ONE OF ALLIED POWERS COMMA JOINT COMMISSION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT CAN DEDAD WARTY NAME ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE UNQUOTE. TASS SAID HODGE ALSO AGREED IMMEDIATELY EXCLUDE FROM FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ANY KOREAN PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH AFTER PLEDGING SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION QUOTE FANS OR INSTIGATES ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO WORK JOINT COMMISSION OR ANY ALLIED POWER UN QUOTE.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FEUP25 ATTENTION SEOUL DATELINE NEW YORK TASS REPORTS NEW EXCHANGE LETTERS BETWEEN HODGE AND SOVIET COMMANDER NORTHERN KOREA COLONELGENERAL CHISTYAKOV ON QUESTION RESUMPTION WORK JOINT SOVIETAMERICAN COMMISSION. TASS SAID CHISTYAKOV FEB TWENTYEIGHTH SENT LETTER HODGE ACCEPTING HODGES INTERPRETATION RUSSIAN COMMANDERS PROPOSAL JOINT COMMISSION SHOULD CONSULT ONLY THOSE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ORGANIZATIONS WHICH FULLY SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION ON KOREA. TASS SAID CHISTYAKOV SAID IN LATEST LETTER HE FEELS QUOTE BOTH PARTIES HAVE REALLY COME CLOSER TO EACH OTHER UN QUOTE. TASS INDICATES RUSSIANS WANT AMERICANS AGREE CONSULT ONLY THOSE KOREAN GROUPS WHICH ACTUALLY APPROVE SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION AND NOT MERELY QUOTE EXPRESS INTENTION FULLY SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION UN QUOTE. RUSSIAN COMMANDER ALSO INSISTS KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS MUST NOT ALLOWED DESIGNATE FOR CONSULTATION ANY REPRESENTATIVE QUOTE WHO COMPRISED THEMSELVES BY ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO MOSCOW DECISION ON KOREA UN QUOTE. TO THAT DEMAND TASS SAID HODGE IN DECEMBER TWENTYFOURTH LETTER TO WHICH CHISTYAKOV HAS JUST REPLIED WITH TWO MONTHS DELAY REPLIED THAT KOREAN PARTIES ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD HAVE RIGHT PICK OWN REPRESENTATIVE BUT TASS SAID HODGE ADDED QUOTE HOWEVER IF SUCH REPRESENTATIVE FOR PERFECTLY WEIGHTY REASONS SHALL REGARDED AS ANTAGONISTIC TOWARDS FULFILLMENT MOSCOW DECISION OR TOWARDS ONE OF ALLIED POWERS COMMA JOINT COMMISSION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT CAN DEMAND WARTY NAME ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE UN QUOTE. TASS SAID HODGE ALSO AGREED IMMEDIATELY EXCLUDE FROM FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ANY KOREAN PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH AFTER PLEDGING SUPPORT MOSCOW DECISION QUOTE FANS OR INSTIGATES ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO WORK JOINT COMMISSION OR ANY ALLIED POWER UN QUOTE.

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By NARS, Date

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ZGCG

5 MARCH 1947

ACTION: AMEMBASSY PASS TO STATE AND TO MISSIONER FOR HODGE

INFO : CINCFE

FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED RECOMMENDED REPLY TO CHISTIAKOVS LETTER QUOTED IN MY ZGCG TWO SEVEN ZERO OF ONE MARCH FOR CONCURRENCE PARA QUOTE I WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY TWENTY EIGHT CMA NINETEEN FORTY SEVEN PD PARA I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGES OF PROPOSALS AND COUNTERPROPOSALS CMA REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTERS OF TWENTY SIX NOVEMBER AND TWENTY EIGHT FEBRUARY CMA AND MY LETTER OF TWENTY FOUR DECEMBER CMA THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET POSITIONS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IN AGREEMENT PD I ACCEPT PROPOSALS SUBMITTED ONE AND THREE OF YOUR LETTER OF TWENTY SIX NOVEMBER CMA AS MODIFIED IN SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE PD ONLY THE AMENDMENT TO PROPOSAL NUMBER TWO READING QUOTATION AND NO ONE NOT COMPROMISED HIMSELF BY ACTIVELY VOICING OPPOSITION TO THAT DECISION END QUOTATION CANNOT BE ACCEPTED PD PARA IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT MANY LEADERS IN ALL THE PARTIES AND SOCIAL GROUPS IN SOUTH KOREA HAVE AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER VOICED THEIR HONEST AND PATRIOTIC OPPOSITION TO PORTIONS OF THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT PD THIS WAS DONE CMA PRIOR TO THE CONSUMMATION OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE MEETINGS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION CMA IN THE FIRM BELIEF IN GOOD FAITH IN THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH GUARANTEED TO THE CITIZENS OF SOUTH KOREA PD THE ADOPTION OF YOUR PROPOSED AMENDMENT WOULD RESULT IN ELIMINATION OF MANY LEADERS WHO NOW SUPPORT THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT CMA BESIDES CONSTITUTING AN

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By NARS, Date

SECRET

UNWARRANTED PENALTY AGAINST THE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PD PARA YOUR SUGGESTED REWORDING OF PROPOSAL NUMBER TWO WITHOUT THE ABOVE JOINT PROPOSAL PROVIDES AMPLE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE JOINT COMMISSION [illegible] TO CONTROL THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY REPRESENTATIVES OR MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS INIMICAL TO ITS WORK PD PARA FOR CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION I RECAPITULATE IN THE ENCLOSURE THE FULL TEXT OF THE AGREED SIX POINT PLAN [illegible] ADOPTED BY BOTH CMA [illegible] PARA I AGREE WITH YOU IN PT PARA I FURTHER SUGGEST THAT IF LOCAL PARTIES OUTSIDE OF THE FOUR POWERS WILL [illegible] SIGNIFY THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SIX POINTS OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS A BASIS FOR THE JOINT COMMISSION IN ORDER THAT THE NECESSARY CONSULTATORY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE EFFECTED PD YOURS SINCERELY CMA JOHN R HODGE CMA LIEUTENANT GENERAL CMA UNITED STATES ARMY CMA COMMANDING PD UNQTE ENCLOSURE IS AS FOLLOWS QTE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN GUARD COLONEL GENERAL CHISTIAKOV CMA COMMANDING GENERAL CMA SOVIET FORCES IN NORTH KOREA CMA AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R HODGE CMA COMMANDING GENERAL CMA UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA CMA AS THE RESULT OF EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THEM FROM TWENTY SIX NOVEMBER NINETEEN FORTY SIX TO BLANK MARCH NINETEEN FORTY SEVEN PD PARA ONE PD THE JOINT COMMISSION MUST CONSULT WITH [illegible] DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WHICH UPHOLD FULLY THE [illegible] DECISION ON KOREA PD SIGNING THE DECLARATION IN COMMUNIQUE

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

NUMBER FIVE WILL BE ACCEPTED AS A DECLARATION OF GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO UPHOLDING FULLY THE MOSCOW DECISION AND WILL MAKE THE SIGNATORY PARTY OR ORGANIZATION ELIGIBLE FOR INITIAL CONSULTATION PD PARA TWO PD A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION SUBSIDIARY TO THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN COMMUNIQUE NUMBER FIVE HAS THE RIGHT TO APPOINT SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE WHO IN ITS OPINION CAN BEST PRESENT TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ITS VIEWS REGARDING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION PD FURTHER PARA IF THE APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE PARA FOR COMPLETELY VALID REASONS PARA BE CONSIDERED ANTAGONISTIC TO A D THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION OR TOWARD EITHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS PARA THEN THE JOINT COMMISSION, PARA FOLLOWING MUTUAL AGREEMENT PARA MAY DEMAND THAT THE PARTY HAVING SIGNED THE DECLARATION IN COMMUNIQUE NUMBER FIVE SHOULD NOMINATE ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE IN HIS PLACE PD PARA THREE PD PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES INVITED FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE JOINT COMMISSION SHALL NOT AFTER SIGNING THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN COMMUNIQUE NUMBER FIVE FOMENT OR INSTIGATE ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION OR TO EITHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS OR TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION PD THOSE INDIVIDUALS PARA PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH AFTER SIGNING THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN COMMUNIQUE NUMBER FIVE DO FOMENT OR INSTIGATE ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION OR TO EITHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS OR TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION SHALL BE EXCLUDED FROM FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH THE

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JOINT COMMISSION PD THE DECISION EXCLUDING SUCH INDIVIDUALS CMA
PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS SHALL BE BY AGREEMENT OF THE
JOINT COMMISSION PD UNQTE PD END BROWN

CG USAFIK

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

DISTRIBUTION: C/S AG JC POLAD

050710/2

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

23 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HODGE

SUBJECT: Letter to General Chistiakov.

The latest proposed letter to General Chistiakov is attached for your signature. It is now written as you proposed it to the State Department on 7 Dec (TFGCG547) with minor changes as suggested by State Department in War 88256 of 22 Dec. Recommend you inform State and War Departments of despatch of this letter to General Chistiakov. A draft radio is attached.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

2 Incls.
1. Draft radio.
2. Proposed ltr to Gen. Chistiakov.

Sent by messenger to C/S Section XXIV Corps 1630 23 Dec 46

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

DRAFT

SECRET

TO: CINCAFPAC.

Request you pass to War and State Departments information that I have on ____ December signed and sent to General Chistiakov letter as proposed in my TFGCG 547 of 7 December with changes as recommended in War 88256 190150Z.

Hodge.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Reconvening of Joint Commission.

1	15 May 1947	Jt. Comm.	C.C., USAFIK	1. The attached letter has been prepared for your signature to the Soviet Commander in North Korea, advising him of the readiness of the American Delegation to resume negotiations of the US - USSR Joint Commission, and suggesting that he send a small advance party to complete arrangements for the billeting and quartering of the Soviet Delegation.

2. Recommendations:

It is recommended that the attached letter be signed and dispatched.

A.E.B.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

15 May 1947.

Lt. General G. F. Korotkov,
Commanding General,
Soviet Forces in Korea,
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Korotkov:

On behalf of my Government, I cordially invite the Soviet Delegation of the US - USSR Joint Commission to return to Seoul to resume negotiations in accordance with the agreement reached during the recent correspondence exchanged between the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov.

In order that the necessary preliminary arrangements may be effected for the reception and billeting of the Soviet Delegation, I suggest that a small advance party be sent to Seoul as early as possible to complete these arrangements.

The American Delegation is ready to resume negotiations of the US - USSR Joint Commission and would like to inquire when the Soviet Delegation is prepared to go ahead with the work which has been assigned to the two Commands by our respective Governments.

I assure you that the American Command is looking forward to welcoming the Soviet Delegation on its arrival.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. HODGE,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

COME BACK COPY
US-Soviet Joint Commission

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

~~Gen Brown~~ 11/13
Gen Wedemeyer
Gen Hodge
Lt. Berger
Mr Bunce
Mr Sargent
Mr Lacy
Mr Pinkney
Mr Rowe
Read Ltr

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET FORCES IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

15 May 1947

John R. Hodge
Lt. General
Commanding American Forces
in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I have received your letter dated 15 May 1947, in which you kindly invite the Soviet delegation to come to Seoul for the resumption of the discussions of the Joint USSR-US Commission on questions relating to Korea.

I am happy to inform you that the Soviet delegation is fully prepared for the resumption of the work of the Joint USSR-US Commission in order to fulfill the task placed upon each of our commands by our Governments.

To come to a mutual understanding, in regard to the billeting of the Soviet delegates of the USSR-US Joint Commission, I am sending the following representatives to Seoul:

Mr. MASLOV - - - - - Assistant to the Responsible Secretary of the Commission

Major TURKIN - - - - Supply Officer

PAK THA SEV - - - - Korean Interpreter

My above named representatives are intending to depart for Seoul with your Liaison Officer to my Headquarters, Lt. Col. McClish, at 1000 16 May 1947.

I would desire that during the period of the work of the Joint USSR-US Commission in Seoul, that my delegation would be provided with rations, billets and service as it was done last time, and when the work will be transferred to Pyongyang, I shall fully provide with all the necessities to your representatives.

The expense of the rations can be interchanged accordingly, or as you desire to make it otherwise.

The tentative list of personnel, namely, the advisers, experts, technicians and house-keeping personnel, will comprise approximately 75 people.

c/s 5739

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

The personnel list will be given to you by the Chief of the Soviet Delegation.

I hope that you shall extend all the necessary help to my representatives in solving all the questions which may arise in connection with the preparation, prior to the arrival of my delegation.

Respectfully,

T. F. KOROTKOV
Guard Lt. General
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

REVIEWED
BY
DATE

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

17 May 1947

Guard Lieutenant General G. F. Korotkov
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea

Dear General Korotkov:

In reply to your letter of 12 May 1947, agreeing to the arrangement of a meeting of representatives of both North and South Korea to discuss questions regarding the Yong Baek irrigation reservoirs, we are prepared to discuss the following points as outlined in your letter:

1. Payment of debts to the People's Committee of North Korea for irrigation of 13,600 chungbo of rice plantations located south of parallel during the years 1945 and 1946.

2. The amounts and method of payment for irrigation of above mentioned plantations during following period.

3. Repair work to be done on the Kuam reservoir dam.

In accordance with your wishes, it is proposed to name the following named personnel:

1. Military Government representative: Lt. Col. Charles A. Anderson

2. Local Korean administrator: Mr. Kim Kyung Pal, Gun Soo, Yong Baek Gun

3. Korean irrigation engineer: Mr. Kang Chong Moo

4. Interpreter: Mr. V. Pekansky

It is suggested that the meeting be held at the Kuam dam site on 23 May 1947, at 1300 hours.

Your early reply will be appreciated.

Respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lt. General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

19 May 1947

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
Commanding General
American Forces in Southern Korea
Seoul, Korea

My dear General Hodge:

I am writing this letter to advise you that the former member of the Russian Delegation of the U.S. - USSR Joint Commission on Korea, Mister [illegible], has been recalled to perform other duties. Mr. G. I. [illegible] has been appointed to replace Mr. Tsarapkin.

Sincerely yours,

G. F. KOROTKOV
Guard Lieutenant General
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea

21-5-2

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Joint Commission

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

21 May 1947

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
U.S. Army Forces in Korea
Seoul, Korea

My Dear General Hodge:

I am writing this letter to advise you that due to illness of Mr. LEE Wan, Peoples' Committee of North Korea appointed Mr. LEE Sun Gun as the representative to the Conference on the question of payment for irrigation and repair work on the Kwan Reservoir Dam.

Two interpreters will also be present at the Conference on our part:

1. Mr. LEE, Bai

2. 1st Sgt. N. E. BURCHENKOV

Sincerely yours,

G. I. SHANIN
Major General
Chief of Staff
Soviet Forces in
Northern Korea
P.P. of Commanding General,
Soviet Forces in Northern Korea

Received at 1450 21 May 47
by Major Costello

22-5-26

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET FORCES IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

26 May 1947

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
U. S. Army Forces in Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I have received a message, that in connection with resuming the work of the USSR-US Joint Commission on Korea, TASS is sending to Korea its own TASS Correspondent, Mr. N. G. BRATSENKO, who will arrive at Pyongyang in a few days.

I ask you for permission for Mr. Bratsenko to stay in Seoul as a TASS Correspondent during the period of the work of the USSR-US Joint Commission.

Respectfully,

G. I. SHAN[illegible]
Major General
Chief of Staff
Soviet Forces in
Northern Korea
I.F. of Commander
General Soviet
Forces in Northern Korea

Received from Maj. Giblo
at 2000 - 26 May 47
by Maj. Dousovito

[illegible] 27-5-146

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

C
O
P
Y

DRAFT

SECRET

26 May 1947

Letter
to: Guard Lt. Gen. G. P. Korotkov
Commanding General, Soviet Forces in Korea

from: Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General, United States Forces in Korea

During the approximately twenty-one months since the entry of the Soviet and American armed forces into Korea, there has been a continuous stream of Korean residents of northern Korea crossing the 38th parallel north latitude to come to live in southern Korea. During the past several months this influx of Korean refugees into southern Korea has increased steadily, and Koreans from northern Korea are currently crossing the 38th parallel at the rate of well over 50,000 per month.

This post-war influx of about one million Koreans formerly living in northern Korea into the southern half of the peninsula is in addition to the repatriation of over 1,500,000 Koreans from Japan, China (including Manchuria), and other Far Eastern areas into Korea south of the 38th parallel. While at the time of the last Korean national census in 1944, about 15,950,000 (or 63.5 per cent) of the total of 25,120,000 Koreans living in the peninsula were south of the 38th parallel, it is estimated that almost 70.0 per cent of the Korean population now lives in the American occupation zone. This abnormally high percentage of the total Korean population residing south of the 38th parallel is increasing each month as more and more Koreans leave their homes in northern Korea to come south.

Since it never was the intention of the United States that the dividing line between Soviet and American occupation zones in Korea at the 38th parallel should be anything more than a temporary expedient to delimit the responsibilities of our respective forces in disarming and repatriating the Japanese in Korea, the Americans have not restricted

SECRET

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

this movement of Koreans across the 38th parallel. The Military Government in southern Korea has established feeding and medical stations, assembly camps, and other facilities at the border and in other parts of southern Korea in an effort to assist these hundreds of thousands of refugees from northern Korea in reestablishing themselves in the southern part of their native land.

However, it is obviously not to the long-term interest of the Korean nation to have an ever-increasing proportion of its population living in the most densely populated part of the peninsula. In addition, this daily influx of thousands of refugges is taxing the capacity of the southern part of Korea to house and to care for them adequately. Therefore I request your cooperation, under the Soviet-American agreement on "Movement of Korean Citizens from One Zone to the Other" reached at the United States-Soviet Joint Conference on 1 February 1946, in discouraging insofar as possible the present large-scale migration of Koreans from their urban homes and farms in northern Korea across the 38th parallel into southern Korea. Paragraph 1-b of this Joint Conference agreement, which was officially approved by the Commanding Generals of their respective occupation forces, stated in part: "Korean citizens will be permitted to travel from one zone to the other in accordance with plans approved by both commands ..."

John R. Hodge, Lt.Gen. U.S.Army
Commanding General
United States Forces in Korea

SECRET

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Commanding General
Seoul, Korea

28 May 1947

Major General G. I. Shanin
Chief of Staff
Soviet Forces in Northern Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Shanin:

I have received your letter of 26 May regarding the desire of Mr. [illegible] Krotsenko to come to Seoul to report the activities of the [illegible] Joint Commission for the Press News Agency.

Both in the area under my command and other American areas, United States authorities are always happy to welcome foreign news correspondents. In a spirit of reciprocity, however, accredited American news journalists must be permitted to visit home areas of those foreign correspondents visiting our territories.

It is the understanding that American news correspondents will be permitted in the Soviet zone to report the activities of the Joint Commission when sessions are held in Pyongyang. I will be happy to clear Mr. Krotsenko to be in Seoul during negotiations of the Joint Commission in this City.

Very truly yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Joint Press

27-S-18

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

consideration the statement of [illegible] the American command to quickly solve the question for electric energy, [illegible] agreement with the [illegible] meeting of representatives of both the South [illegible] part of the question of the liability for electric energy, [illegible] to convene this meeting in the city of Pyongyang [illegible] days of June 1947. [illegible] representatives from [illegible] be limited to a representative of the military command, [illegible] the Korean operating [illegible] Korean electrical [illegible] interpreter.

[illegible] you inform me of your [illegible] concerning this [illegible].

[illegible] respectfully,

[illegible]
[illegible] Department General
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea

3-6-47

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

2 June 1947

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
Commanding General
American Forces in Southern Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I received your letter of 1 May 1947, in which you kindly [illegible] Representative, K. Shtykov, to come to Seoul to attend [illegible] meeting of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Korea as a representative of the Soviet Forces during the period which the Commission will [illegible] in Seoul.

I thank you for your permission and I assure you that when the [illegible] Commission will take place in Pyongyang, a representative [illegible] Forces will also be permitted in Pyongyang.

[illegible] Representative, K. Shtykov, will leave for Seoul on the [illegible] 4 June. You will be notified of his departure from Pyongyang.

With sincere respect,

I. M. Chistyakov
Guard Lieutenant General
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea

Letter received from Maj. Kornechev
by Maj. Dousovito
at 1300 3 June 1947

4-6-62

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

4 June 1947

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
Commanding General
American Forces in Southern Korea
Seoul, Korea

My dear General Hodge:

I am writing this letter to advise you that I desire to send a TASS correspondent to Seoul on equal terms, i.e., I am sending one TASS correspondent to Seoul, and you, on your part, may send one American press representative to Pyongyang for the period of the work of the Joint Commission in Pyongyang.

If you agree with my proposal, I shall send a TASS correspondent to Seoul for the period of the work of the Joint Commission in Seoul.

Respectfully,

[illegible]
Guard Lieutenant General
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea

Received by Capt. Tuboy
at 041020 June 47

101 5-5

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Commanding General
Seoul, Korea

4 June 1947

Major General [illegible]
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Korotkov:

It is requested that permission be granted for Captain Craig A. [illegible], [illegible], and one interpreter, to visit KUM-[illegible], Korea at intervals during the transfer of cement from KAIJO to KUM-[illegible] for the repair of the irrigation dam at that site.

Captain [illegible] is the officer in charge of the area immediately affected by the project and his presence is necessary for the efficient accomplishment of the reconstruction work.

It will be appreciated if you will give this request your early attention.

Respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Headquarters
United States Army Forces, Korea
Office of the Commanding General
Seoul, Korea

5 June 1947

Major Lieutenant General W. F. Dean
Commanding General
U.S. Troops in Northern Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Dean:

I have letters of [illegible] May and 3 June stating that I could not be ready to agree to accept the [illegible] correspondents [illegible] zone on the condition that all accredited news correspondents [illegible] notes to accompany the American delegation to Pyongyang be [illegible] by you. With this, of course, goes the understanding that the number of Soviet correspondents you may send to Seoul is [illegible] only by the accommodations which may be given them.

As you know, there is no official American news agency [illegible] full news coverage to the nation. There are present in [illegible] representatives of several world-wide competitive news [illegible] and of several different competitive publications. These correspondents operate only as free agents of their news service [illegible] organization. It is impossible for me to designate any one correspondent who could qualify as an official representative of the press group. As I interpret any exchange of press privileges, it should be on a basis of reciprocity between representatives of the world's press rather than between individuals.

For the foregoing reasons, I must urge that clearance [illegible] for the American press representatives to enter the American zone be [illegible] upon clearing such accredited representatives of the [illegible] present in the American zone who are designated to accompany the American delegation to Pyongyang, subject only to limitations which may be necessary because of limited housing accommodations.

I consider news of the proceedings of the Joint Commission [illegible] of world-wide importance and of great interest. Therefore, I trust that you will see your way clear to grant reciprocal press privileges on the foregoing basis, and that I may have an early and favorable reply.

Respectfully,

[illegible]
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

6-5-47

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

29 June 1947

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
Commanding General
American Forces in Southern Korea
Seoul, Korea

My dear General Hodge:

On 28 June 1947, your liaison officer, Lt. Colonel Gillich, advised me of your desire to get permission for American correspondents to visit the city of Pyongyang during the period of work of the US-USSR Joint Commission in Pyongyang.

I understand your desire and on my part I agree to permit one American correspondent to visit Pyongyang during the work of the Joint Commission us here, providing that the principle of reciprocity will be observed, that is, one Soviet correspondent will get permission to come to Seoul for the period of work of the Joint Commission in Seoul.

Please advise me of your decision on this question.

Respectfully,

S. F. KOZLOV
Guard Lieutenant General
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in Northern Korea

1-7-1
30-6

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

461 (TFURC) 28 February 1946

SUBJECT: Request for Publications.

TO : Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, APO 235, U. S. Army.

1. It is requested the following XXIV Corps publications be furnished the U. S. delegation of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission:

a. G-2 Weekly Summary (including all back issues since arrival in Korea).

b. G-2 Periodic Reports (including all back issues since arrival in Korea).

c. Intelligence Summary of North Korea (complete).

2. It is further requested that the Joint Commission be placed on the XXIV Corps distrubution list for all correspondence dealing with the military or political situation in Korea, or areas adjacent where information is pertinent to Korea, whether the correspondence originates in the XXIV Corps or other headquarters.

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief Commissioner

Copy for record USSHC

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE
Seoul, Korea

18 March 1946

SUBJECT: Request for Telephone Service

TO: Communications Officer, USAMGIK

1. Request that an extension for WHITEHORSE 62 be installed in Major General Arnold's residence.

2. Residence is at #2 Chungmok, Taiwhachung. (house at foot of hill below 7th Division Artillery Headquarters; intersection of Yak Cho Chung and Wang Geum Chung) Installation personnel may report to Sgt Foster or Sgt Strickland for exact directions.

BY DIRECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

PAGE H GILMAN
1st Lt
Aide-de-Camp

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

19 March 1946

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Commanding General, USAMGIK, Seoul, Korea.

1. I would like to take this opportunity to express to you and the members of your command my appreciation for the superior renovation and decoration of the Tuck-Soo Palace. We have received many compliments on the tasteful furnishings and facilities from every visitor, both American and Russian. The Tuck-Soo Palace is a fitting background for the important international conferences which will take place there, and a great credit to American efficiency and artistic sense. It is with great pride that I send this letter of appreciation to those responsible for this fine accomplishment.

2. Most particularly I would like to compliment Lt. Col. A. P. Evans, 1st Lt. W. C. Kerney and the officers and men of the Accounts Section for the rapidity with which the work was begun and completed. In the space of a very few weeks they transformed an unsightly and dirty museum into the kind of palace building which it had once been.

3. Thanks are due also to Major J. J. Hicks and the G-4 Section for a remarkable job of procurement and supply, without which the important work of the Commission could not possibly be done. I am happy to say that the American and Soviet Delegations will be able to begin work tomorrow with no delays due to this superior attention to duty and enthusiasm.

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
SEOUL, KOREA

20 March 1946

MEMO: Procedure for liaison with USAMGIK on matters under jurisdiction of the administration committee of the Joint Commission.

1. Person in charge at USAMGIK--Major Hill, Phone Wh 54.

2. Person to contact on liaison with USAMGIK--Captain Bobb, Phone Wh 44.

3. All requests of USAMGIK on the Commission regarding matters of this nature will be processed by the USAMGIK originating officer thru Captain Bobb to the Commission. Direct contact with the Commission will be made by the originating USAMGIK officer only in very special cases.

4. Likewise in all cases on matters where the Joint Commission desires information, requests on USAMGIK will be made by the Commission Secretary thru Captain Bobb. (These requests should be specific, requiring direct and not general answers.)

W. W. McALLISTER
Captain, CAC

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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2 RHV
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5 WW
6

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Soeul, Korea

21 March 1946

MEMO: Daily Program

1. It is requested that complete information (agenda + time proposals) regarding any meeting of the Joint Commission or committees or subcommittees thereof, be furnished the Secretary at least ~~twenty-four~~ hours in advance of the day of the meeting. Such will permit the completion of the necessary prearrangements such as assignment of rooms, preparation of papers, etc.

2. A copy of proposed daily PROGRAM is attached. Adequate copies will be prepared to inform all concerned persons. If changes are recommended, please note.

W. W. McALLISTER
Captain, CAC

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

P R O G R A M

for

21 March 1946

COMMISSION MEETING

0900 hours — Bldg. & City Room_____ — Major General Arnold, Chairman

COMMITTEE MEETINGS

0900 hours — Bldg. & City Room_____ — (Name of Committee and Chairman)

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS

0900 hours — Bldg. & City Room____ — (Name of Subcommittee and Chairman)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

South File

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

28 March 1946.

SUBJECT: Police Guard for Main Gate, Duk Soo Palace.

TO: Headquarters, Provincial Police,
Seoul, Korea. (thru channels).

1. Request a 24 hour guard be maintained by the Korean constabulary at the Main Gate of the Duk Soo Palace, starting as of this date.

2. Duties to be observed by this guard are:

a. Permit all U.S. and Soviet personnel to freely pass through the gate at all hours. Between the hours of 1800 to 0600, the guard will open the gate for this purpose.

b. Between the hours of 0600 to 1800 Korean Nationals will also be permitted free passage. Between the hours of 1800 to 0600 however, Korean Nationals will be required to present a pass (copy attached) before being permitted to pass.

W. W. McALLISTER
Captain, CAC
Secretary, American Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

3 April 1946

MEMORANDUM:

Classified information will not be included or discussed in telephone conversations unless both telephones used are in the Tuk Soo Palace (Palace Exchange.)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD

V.V.MCALLISTER, CAPT., CAC
Secretary,
United States Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

5 April 1946

SUBJECT: Speed limit within Palace Grounds.

TO: Drivers assigned to Duk Soo Palace.

1. It has been reported that drivers assigned to the Duk Soo Palace have been exceeding the speed limit and violating additional regulations.

2. In compliance with local traffic regulations, drivers will not exceed the speed limit of 15 miles per hour, and will refrain from demonstrations constituting reckless driving.

3. Violation of the above regulations will necessitate disicplinary action.

ROBERT S. DOUGLASS JR
1st Lt, G-4 Section
Duk Soo Palace

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. -SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

10 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM: Burning of Classified Papers.

1. The administrative officer will have all waste paper collected at 1155 and 1700 daily (holidays excluded).

2. The administrative officer will personally supervise the burning of all such paper (as prescribed in AR 380-5).

3. Any person discarding classified paper between the hours of 1155 to 1300 and 1700 to 0830 the following day or on holidays, will be responsible for maintaining the security of said paper until regular office hours.

4. All waste paper gathered in the building by the building maintenance section will be completely and promptly destroyed by burning under the supervision of US Army personnel of that section.

W. W. McALLISTER,
Captain, CAC,
Secretary.

Copies to
1. Lt Douglas
2. Mr Hopkins

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

RDP

10 April 1946

Dear General Shtikov,

General Hodge is returning this afternoon from a visit to General MacArthur and as I would like to discuss with him the question of the form of the proposed communique, I should appreciate postponing this afternoon's meeting until tomorrow at 1300.

Hoping this is agreeable to you, I am

Sincerely yours,

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ДОРОГОЙ ГЕНЕРАЛ АРНОЛЬД,

Ваше письмо с просьбой отложить заседание Совместной Комиссии на 15.00 , 11 апреля 1946 года - получил. Я согласен.

Уважающий Вас

ГЕНЕРАЛ -ПОЛКОВНИК

Т.ШТЫКОВ .

"10" апреля 1946 г.

Сеул- Корея.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

11 April 1946

Dear General Shtikov,

General Hodge was prevented by weather from returning from Tokyo yesterday, and as flying conditions today have not improved, he is unlikely to be back till tomorrow. I shall not, therefore, be able to discuss the form of our communique today. If, however, you have some other aspects of our program of work which you would like to discuss, our delegation would be glad to go on with today's meeting as scheduled.

Sincerely,

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Hap - This
[illegible]
[illegible] SA [illegible] TC

Tab
(11)

U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Arnold

I see no necessity for postponing today's meeting of the Joint Commission. During the last meeting there was no final decision on the necessity of issuing a Joint Communique.

I propose the following agenda for today's meeting:

1. Approving minutes of the 11th session.
2. Continuation of discussion of item 1 of the program of work.
3. Joint Press release.
4. Fixing time of next meeting.

Respectfully yours,

11 April 46

Colonel General Shtikov

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ.

Сеул, Корея.

Дорогой Генерал АРНОЛЬД,

Считаю нет необходимости откладывать сегодняшее заседание Совместной Комиссии. На прошлом заседании не было окончательного решения о необходимости выпуска совместного Коммюнике.

Предлагаю следующую повестку дня сегодняшнего заседания:

1. Утверждение протокола заседания № 11.
2. Продолжение обсуждения пункта 1 программы работы.
3. О совместном Коммюнике.
4. Определение времени следующего заседания.

С уважением

Генерал - Полковник
/ ШТЫКОВ /.

" 11 " апреля 1946 г.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File WDY

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

April 16, 1946

MEMORANDUM: Re Interpreters

1. The U.S. Delegation of the Joint Commission has present for duty nine (9) interpreters and translators who display the following abilities:

a. Fully capable of interpreting at a commission meeting.

(1) Prostov, Eugene V., Civilian.
(2) Kryloff, Eugene B., Lt. Col.
(3) Kogan, Rudolph W., 1st Lt.

b. Translator from English to Russian.

(1) Kirillian, Lulce, Major

c. Translator from Russian to English.

(1) Matisohn, Joseph, 1st Lt.
(2) Bojus, John, 1st Lt.
(3) Hamas, Steve J., Jr., 1st Lt.
(4) Prisloe, Michael P., 2nd Lt.
(5) Karas, Michael A., Pvt.

2. In case the Commission has more than three subcommissions or committees functioning at a time additional interpreters will be necessary.

3. It is therefore recommended that the four interpreters (civilian) be acquired providing they are qualified interpreters.

W. W. McAllister
Capt. CAC
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

19 April 1946

SUBJECT: Recreational Facilities.

TO: Members of U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission.

1. The area in rear of the Duk Soo Palace has been designated as a Recreation center for members of the Commission.

2. The following games will be available and equipment can be drawn upon request from local supply personnel:

Horseshoes
Volley ball
Ping pong equipment
Dart board
Playing cards
Checkers.

Robert S. Douglass Jr.
ROBERT S. DOUGLASS JR.
1st. Lt. G-4 Section

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File
original to
Col Booth
24 April 46

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 April 1946

MEMO: Need for Qualified Korean Translator-Interpreter.

TO : Colonel Booth

1. As the work of the Commission progresses and the contacts with Koreans increase, it becomes more essential that we have a highly qualified Korean Interpreter-Translator.

2. Request for such has been made on G-1 Corps and Korean Personnel Section at USAMGIK. It is believed that more pressure must be used to get results.

3. The Joint Commission has received around 500 papers from democratic parties and social organizations in the past week. The few translations made by our present translators have received unfavorable comments.

4. The Soviet Delegation recently brought in two highly qualified Russian Korean Interpreter-Translators, and from outward appearances are carefully translating all incoming messages and newspapers.

5. It is believed that one qualified person could handle our present work. The future needs of the Commission after moving to Pyongyang are unknown.

W. W. McALLISTER
Captain, CAC

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 April 1946

SUBJECT: Screening of Korean Personnel.

TO: Commanding Officer
XXIV Corps
(Attn: Counter Intelligence Corps)

It is requested that the attached list of persons presently employed at the Duk Soo Palace be screened.

W. W. McALLISTER
Capt, CAC
Secretary

file

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Following is a list of the Korean employees employed at the Duk Soo Palace in Seoul Korea:

Receptionists
1. Chong Chin Duk
2. Chang Shek Yung

Cleaners
1. Pak Hyu Hi
2. Di Tu Jun
3. Chon Dong Hak
4. Ri Chun Ha
5. Won Se Heun
6. Pak Yung Sik
7. Yeun Chi Un
8. Pak Hong Noe
9. Pak Chi Shim
10. Im Tong Hup
11. Pak O Dong
12. Chun Da Chul
13. Ko Te Jun
14. Chung Tae Soun
15. Kim Do Yeung
16. Shen Hung Sik
17. Ree Po Duk
18. Hong Moon Sun
19. Hong Chul
20. Kim In Suk
21. Ree Chon Gon
22. Ree Chu Sup

Boiler Men
1. Yeung Song Huin
2. Im Tong Il
3. Pak Wha Suk
4. Yeun Pyung Tai
5. Yeun Ik Huin
6. Kim Chong Huin
7. Ree Chin Whan
8. Pak Chin Yeung
9. Shin Bong Ho
10. Kim Hueng Ok

Carpenters
1. Ree Moon Yeung
2. Cher Cha Ok

Serving Girls
1. Kang Ki Suk
2. Ree Bohi
3. Song Yuang Soun
4. Ree Kyong Ok

Electricians
1. Min Sung Ki
2. Shim Sum San
3. Cho Kwang Soo

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Capt
W D
for

US - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

SPECIAL ORDER #1

30 April 1946

SUBJECT: Movement to Pyengyang

TO: Personnel listed.

1. The Joint Commission will meet in Pyengyang, Korea by mutual agreement.

2. On or about 5 May 1946 the U. S. Delegation and all attached units will move by rail to Pyengyang.

3. (a) Time of departure - 0900

(b) Place: Seoul Station, Track #_____

(c) Train loading as follows:

Car #1 - Coach - Enlisted Personnel (PC)
" 2 - " - " "
" 3 - Pullor - Officers and W. D. Civilians
" 4 - " - " " " " "
" 5 - Diner -
" 6 - Obsn - Gen Arnold and Commission
" 7 - Flat - Sedans - Drivers - Miscellaneous
" 8 - " - Class III Rations
" 9 - " - Sedans and Drivers
" 10 - Box - Communications
" 11 - " - Class II Rations - Office and Miscellaneous Equipment

Cars numbered from front to rear.

Major Johnson - Transportation Bureau - Train Commander - Charge of Loading. Tel. Wabash 5 or 14.

(d) Sandwich lunch to be served EM.

(e) Officers and War Dept Civilians to have Diner Service.

(f) ETA 1700 - to be met by Col. Choinski and adequate transportation.

4. Lt. Douglas in charge of Supply - Tel. Palace 41.

5. (a) Col Bell or his authorized representative in charge of Communications. Tel. Washington 10.

(b) Lt. Arnold - Overall Planning - Tel. Palace 6

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD

A. V. ARNOLD, JR.
2nd Lt. ADC.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U. S.-SOVIET COMMISSION TRIP TO PYENGYANG

Personnel

Commission	48	(30 Off. - 6 Girls -		12 EM)
Gen Arnold's Mess	3			3 EM
Drivers	5			5 EM
Palace Guard	32	(2 Off. -		30 EM)
Koreans (Int.)	3			
Communication	25	(1 Off. -		24 EM)
Medics	2			2 EM
Mess	5			5 EM
	~~123~~ 123	33	6	81

ERRATA:

Bedding and beds will be furnished.

Mirrors are not available at Pyengyang.

One Week's PX supplies should be taken by each individual.

All EM will carry canteen and cup with water.

Mess gear will be furnished in Pyengyang.

TRAIN WILL LEAVE SEOUL STATION AT 0900 ON DAY OF DEPARTURE.

Bedding facilities will be available - no cleaners.

Weather reports of Pyengyang are essentially the same as Seoul.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File
RHV

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

9 May 1946

SUBJECT: Special Services

TO: Members of U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION

1. Effective Monday, 13th of May 46, coffee service will be on the palace roof. (During inclement weather coffee and juice will be served on the balcony (2nd floor) directly above the main mess). The hours of service will remain the same.

2. The room now utilized for coffee service will be put to its traditional use, i.e. the 3rd floor, south side.

Robert L. Boughton
ROBERT L. BOUGHTON
1st Lt, G-2 Section



DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

15 May 1946

REPORT

A meeting was held at the residence of General Arnold at 1600, 14 May 1946. The following were present: General Arnold, Colonel Roth, Colonel Thayer, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Kim Kiu Sik, Mr. Kim Jack Yeon, Mr. Ko Chung Il, Mr. Choi Tong O, Choi Tong O is the vice-chairman of the Democratic National Assembly. The other seven are the liaison committee appointed to deal with the Joint Commission. Six of these are regular members of the Representative Democratic Council. The seventh, Mr. Ko Chung Il, is a fluent Russian speaker who was added to the committee.

The declared purpose of the meeting was to request advice as to the best course which the members of the American delegation, or the American Command, could take to increase the prospects of Korean unity.

General Arnold started the discussion by reading excerpts from the Commission's communiques in the effort to make it perfectly clear that what the Americans had contended for was not the success of any particular political philosophy but rather the principle of free expression. This principle, he said, applied no less to those who favor trusteeship than to those who oppose it. Dr. Kim Kiu Sik did most of the talking for the Koreans present. He indicated a very considerable degree of resentment against military government, some of it being left undocumented.

It was readily apparent that greater resentment was directed against the Russians and against the leftist parties in southern Korea.

General Arnold, in attempting to bring out the point that the two occupying powers are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the respective zones, used language which Dr. Kimm Kiu Sik chose to misconstrue as meaning that the Russians were protecting the people in the northern zone. Dr. Kimm went into one of his not uncommon spasms of almost uncontrollable rage, gesturing violently and shouting at the top of his voice. He declared that the Russians are "protecting" the Koreans in the northern zone by wholesale robbery, rape, murder and deportation of Korean political leaders. He said, "If the Russians had done even to the Indians in Alaska

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

a small portion of what they have done to our brethren in the North, you would have long since made war upon them". He further gave indication of a possibly understandable bias against the white world, a bias which he generally keeps rather carefully concealed, when he said, "When I was in Virginia, I have known of the lynching of negroes for individual acts of the same character which are commonplace with the Russian soldiers.

It was the general desire of the others present to calm the troubled atmosphere after Dr. Kimm's outbreak. In this connection, Yon Hei Woon made a quiet comment that carried much more conviction than Dr. Kimm's oratorical outburst. Mr. Yon said, "In the city of Hamhyeung there are the fresh graves of thousands of Japanese who died this past winter frozen and starved to death by the cruelty of the Russians. These Japanese were our enemies, but they were humans, and we are also human. To these things we cannot blind ourselves; these things we cannot condone."

Despite General Arnold's frank efforts to bring the session back to a consideration of what steps could be taken towards unity, the discussion centered largely about the statement of reasons why the Korean rightist leaders regard unity as impossible. Clearly apparent were three obvious factors; bitter hatred of the Russians, hatred and contempt for the Communists and their allies, and a feeling of frustration over the failure of the Commission thus far to achieve a government. Also present was a feeling of resentment that Koreans have been given no share in the administrative responsibility of government in the southern zone.

General Arnold attempted to convey the thought that through unity it would be possible to secure a measure of control over policy and administration. This message appears to have been largely disregarded. Nevertheless, certain tangible gains can be marked from the session. Most notably, the General seems to have succeeded in killing completely the discussion of a new movement for the Democratic Council to create a Korean government by unilateral action. Further, he made it perfectly clear that the Moscow Decision must be regarded as the basic law of Korea, and that under the decision there is provided sufficient amount of leeway for Koreans to work freely for their objectives.

It must be added that there have been a few faint indications that a wider measure of unity is not at the present time beyond the bounds of possibility. Kimm Kiu Sik, himself, voiced the viewpoint

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

that it would be possible to arrive with all parties that pledged themselves to the cause of independence. This could conceivably be a formula which could be worked out further. He stated it said that he believed the people would fall in line behind the movement to create a government in the South under military government. [illegible] assured the Korean that Koreans could continue to cooperate. [illegible] went further, saying that Koreans continue to have faith in the United States and still continue to work with us even when they disagree.

[illegible] position of Kim Ku in the would be considered as being one of [illegible] uncertainty, which led him necessarily to talk more vigorously against us in the presence of his followers than [illegible] with them alone. It is submitted that he can still [illegible] work as a stabilizing influence.

It is respectfully recommended that there be an effort made to establish more continuous liaison between the military authorities and Koreans basically friendly to our cause, and that further discussions continue with a view to implementing Korean party unity. In this latter connection, it will be desirable to use the approach that what we now have is a system which is temporarily forced upon us and which is in fact worse than trusteeship, that we and the Koreans share the same desire to achieve independence as rapidly as possible, that we must work together to that end, and that the attainment of party unity in the South is a stepping stone to a wider unity, and thus to independence.

It should be emphasized that we do not ask the rightists to surrender their principles but only to cooperate practically so that those principles can be attained sooner. It should further be revealed and emphasized that the government of the United States will not turn the full power over to any Korean government other than one freely and honestly elected, and that for this reason the parties of the right can afford to be liberal in seeking unity at present, since they may safely conclude that their stock is improving, and that they can count upon eventual success in the polls.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
2nd Lt. CMP

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]
ROSTER OF TROOPS*

INITIAL*—[redacted] ROSTER
(See AR 345-900)

AMERICAN DELEGATION US-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION (Organization) | SEOUL, KOREA (Station) | 20 May 1946 (Date)

This roster of 1 sheets contains the names of all {[redacted] enlisted men*}, including those attached, of this organization.

Reason for submission Activation under provisions of GO 80 Headquarters XXIV Corps, APO-235 dtd 16 May 1946.

(These blocks are for use of the Machine Records Unit and should be left blank.)

(Signature. Name to be written)
ROBERT B. HOPKINS, CWO, USA
AMERICAN DELEGATION US-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
(Grade and organization)

Serial No.	GRADE Last name—First name—Middle initial (List alphabetic by grade)	Special-ist rating	Arm or service	Compo-nent	Date of current commission or enlistment (Day—month—year)	Type of enlist-ment	Race	Principal duty (officers) Duty and mil. occup. specl. (Enlisted men)†	Status
	STAFF SERGEANT							502	
36907612	Schachtele, John W.	502	Inf	AUS	28 Jul44	Ind	W	Chief Clerk	Asgd
	TECHNICIANS FOURTH GRADE							405	
44057253	Matthews, Lawrence C.	405	FA	AUS	25 Nov44	Ind	W	Clerk-Typist	Asgd
								405	
36915895	Lee, John H. H.	405	Inf	AUS	22 Sep44	Ind	W	Clerk-Typist	Asgd
	CORPORALS							405	
37762230	Biermann, Homer F.	405	Inf	AUS	19 Feb45	Ind	W	Clerk-Typist	Asgd
	TECHNICIANS FIFTH GRADE							405	
33944278	Haydock, Albin W.	405	Inf	AUS	14 Dec44	Ind	W	Clerk-Typist	Asgd
	PRIVATES FIRST CLASS							320	
33969852	Karas, Michael A.	320	Inf	AUS	9 May45	Ind	W	Interpreter	Asgd
								835	
35786479	Rieser, Louis S.	835	Inf	AUS		Ind	W	Supply Clerk	Asgd
								405	
39747101	Goldern, Richard L.	405	Inf	RA	28 Nov45	Enl	W	Clerk Typist	Asgd
								055	
19233461	Safford, Charles D. Jr.	055	Inf	RA	26Oct45	Enl	W	Clerk General	Asgd
								055	
33870868	Scantling, Harry C. Jr.	055	Inf	RA	2 Nov45	Enl	W	Clerk General	Asgd
								821	
42193184	Brown, Wilby R.	821	Inf	RA	5 Dec45	Enl	W	Supply	Asgd
	PRIVATES							055	
13160001	Elliott, Donald L.	055	Inf	RA	3 Nov45	Enl	W	Clerk General	Asgd

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 309
November 1, 1941

*Line out words not applicable.
†Insert specification serial number of enlisted man's *duty above* dotted line and military occupational speciality *below dotted line*. State duty of officers below line.

16—19298-2

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ROSTER OF OFFICERS*
~~ENLISTED PERSONNEL~~

INITIAL*—~~SPECIAL~~*—~~SUPPLY~~* ROSTER

(See AR 345-900)

AMERICAN DELEGATION US-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION (Organization) SEOUL, KOREA (Station) 20 May 1946 (Date)

This roster of 1 sheets contains the names of all {officers* ~~enlisted men~~*}, including those attached, of this organization.

Reason for submission Activation under provisions of GO 80 Headquarters XXIV Corps, APO-235, dtd 16 May 1946.

(These blocks are for use of the Machine Records Unit and should be left blank.)

(Signature—Name (typewritten))
RODNEY B. HOPKINS, CWO, USA
AMERICAN DELEGATION US-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
(Grade and organization)

Serial No.	GRADE Last name—First name—Middle initial (List alphabetic by grade)	Special-ist rating	Arm or service	Compo-nent	Date of current commission or enlistment (Day—month—year)	Type of enlist-ment	Race	Principal duty (officers) Duty and mil. occup. specl. (Enlisted men)†	Status
	MAJOR GENERAL							*	
03395	Arnold, Archibald V.	0002	USA	RA	12 Jun12		W	Chief Commis-sioner U.S. Delegation *	Asgd
	COLONEL								
018093	Booth, Robert H.	2010	GSC	RA	12 Jun30		W	Commissioner US Delegation 9332	Asgd
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL								
0298273	Kryloff, Eugene B.	8104	FA	NG	16 May32		W	Chief Interpreter 9332	Asgd
	MAJORS								
0246941	Kirillin, Luke (NMI)	2136	6 CAV	NRS	2 Sep41		W	Interpreter * *	Asgd
0303473	McAllister, Warren W.	8104	CAC	NRS	12 Feb42		W	Secretariat 5402	Asgd
01044041	Moore, William R.	8104	CAC	AUS	18 Sep42		W	Public Relat-ions Officer 9332	Asgd
	CAPTAIN								
0350832	Bojus, John (NMI)	9300	INF	NRS	12 Jan42		W	Interpreter 9332	Asgd
	FIRST LIEUTENANTS								
01330588	Prisloe, Michael P.	9332	INF	NRS	11 Jan45		W	Interpreter 9332	Asgd
01117054	Matisohn, Joseph (NMI)	9332	CE	AUS	14 Jun44		W	Interpreter 2030	Asgd
	SECOND LIEUTENANT								
027184	Arnold, Archibald V. Jr.	1193	FA	RA	5 Jun45		W	Aid Eq Camp 2600	Asgd
	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS								
W2110236	Hopkins, Rodney B.	2600	None	AUS	19 Sep42		W	Administrative Officer	Asgd
	*(Note: TM 12-405 does not give MOS for officer with this duty.)								

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 309
November 1, 1941

*Line out words not applicable.
†Insert specification serial number of enlisted man's *duty above* dotted line and military occupational speciality *below dotted line.* State duty of officers below line.

16—19298-2

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

28 May 1946

SUBJECT: Officer Personnel with MOS denoting Linguistic Ability.

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps
APO 235.

1. Reference par 2, Ltr Hq XXIV Corps AG 210.21 (TFGAP). Subject: As above dated 27 May 46.

2. The T/O for the American Delegation does not specify the duty MOS for each grade.

3. The following officers have the MOS of interpreters (Russian) and at present are doing that duty:

NAME	RANK	ASN	MOS	MOS SV	CAT.	POSITION
Bojus, John	Capt(Inf)	0350832	9332	53	I	Interpreter (1)
Matisohn, Joseph	1st Lt(CE)	01117054	9332	38	V	Interpreter (1)
Prisloe, Michael P.	1st Lt(Inf)	01330588	9332	36	V	Interpreter (1)

4. The months service of the above is as of 31 May 1946.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM R. MOORE
Major, CAC
Acting Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
APO 235

AG 210.21 (TFGAP) 27 May 1946

SUBJECT: Officer Personnel with MOS denoting Linguistic Ability.

TO: DISTRIBUTION "C"

1. The following radio from CINCAFPAC is quoted for your information and guidance:

"REDUBADS CX 59071 AND ZX 29908 NUMEROUS REPORTS REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS THAT OFFICERS WHOSE MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY DENOTE LINGUISTIC ABILITY ARE BEING RETAINED WITHOUT BEING UTILIZED IN SUCH MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY, FOR EXAMPLE AS ADJUTANTS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS, SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICERS AND MILITARY POLICE. ONLY THOSE LINGUISTS MAY BE RETAINED BEYOND 24 MONTHS WHO ARE OCCUPYING POSITIONS WHICH ARE AUTHORIZED THE APPROPRIATE LINGUISTIC MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY BY TABLE OF ORGANIZATION OR BY BONAFIDE ESTABLISHMENT FROM OVERHEAD ALLOTMENTS. IT IS DESIRED THAT POSITIONS AUTHORIZED SUCH MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES BE IMMEDIATELY FILLED WITH QUALIFIED PERSONNEL HAVING THE LEAST SERVICE AND THAT ANY RESULTING SURPLUS BE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT DELAY PER PARAGRAPH 38B AFPAC READJUSTMENT REGULATIONS CIRCULAR NUMBER 5."

2. Report will be submitted to this headquarters prior to 31 May to include the following:

a. T/O authorization for linguistic officers where applicable.

b. Roster of all officers whose MOS denotes linguistic ability, including name, rank, serial number, MOS, months of service, category, and position presently occupied. Indicate on this roster (1) those officers who are filling authorized T/O or authorized overhead positions and (2) those officers who can be declared surplus on the basis of the above quoted radio.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

6 June 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Personnel

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps
APO 235.

1. Private Donald L. Elliott, 13160001, American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission enlisted in the Regular Army 3 Nov 1945 as Army Airforce unassigned, Pacific Theater, for a period of three years.

2. Soldier's service record shows that he was never assigned to an air force unit but Replacement Depot # 2, Fort Ord, California as a rifleman replacement for overseas shipment, Korea.

3. It is therefor requested this enlisted man be assigned to an air force unit within the Pacific Theater.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. W. McALLISTER
Major, CAC
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AG 220.3-Elliott, Donald L (TFXAG E) 1st Ind JDL/wf

Hq XXIV Corps, APO 235. JUN

TO: Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, APO 500.

1. Attention is invited to basic communication.

2. Request advise as to organization to which enlisted men should report.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AG 220.3 (TFXAG-E) Elliott, Donald L. 3d Ind JDL/er

Hq XXIV Corps, APO 235, JUN 20 1946

TO: Commanding General, American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission

For compliance with preceding indorsement and return of correspondence through this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

[illegible]MAN
[illegible], AGD
Asst Adj Gen

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

201-Elliott, Donald L. (Enl) 4th Ind

American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, 21 June 1946.

TO: CG XXIV Corps, APO 235.

1. In accordance with paragraph 7b, AR 615-200, as amended, the following information is submitted:

a. Soldier is white.

b. Age at enlistment: 18 Years 7 months.

c. Marital status: Married with one child, dependents will not accompany soldier.

d. Physical profile: 111111

e. Prior service: Co. B. 8 ITB, 14 Jul 44 to 2 Nov 45. Discharged to reenlist and serve in the Regular Army for a period of three years 3 Nov 45; IRTC Camp Wheeler, Georgia, 3 Nov 45 to 16 Nov 45; Casual AGF RD #2, Ft. Ord, Calif., 26 Nov 45 to 15 Feb 46; Shipment No. GH-B9333 (a)-A, 2 Feb 46 to 28 Feb 46; Hq XXIV Corps, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, 1 Mar 46 to present date. Time lost under A.W. 107, 75 days.

f. Convictions by Courts Martial: Tried and found guilty by Special Court Martial, under 61st A.W.,.26 Nov 45.

g. Soldier is not under charges, in confinement, or undergoing company punishment.

h. Due soldier accrued pay and allowances. Last paid to include May 46.

i. MCO 482, Student High School; MOS 055.

j. Character: Excellent

k. AGCT Score II (117).

2. Authorized enlisted strength 14. Actual strength 12.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

R.H.BOOTH
Colonel, GSC
Commissioner, U.S. Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

8 June 1946

SUBJECT: Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Studies

TO: Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO 235
(Attn: AGO)

1. In accordance with Hq XXIV Corps routing-slip, 28 May 1946, Subject: Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff Study (documents) a negative report was submitted by this unit. This report was in error and is to be destroyed.

2. The following Joint Chiefs of Staff Studies are on file at the American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission:

JCS 1483	24 Aug 45	Pgs. 1-2 Incl.	Copy No. 33
JCS 1483/1	2 Sept 45	Pgs. 3-32 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/2	11 Sept 45	Pgs. 33-35 Incl.	Copy No. 34
JCS 1483/3	12 Sept 45	Pgs. 36-48 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/4	15 Sept 45	Pg. 49	Copy No. 37
JCS 1483/5	20 Sept 45	Pgs. 50-73 Incl.	Copy No. 81
JCS 1483/6	20 Sept 45	Pgs. 74-75 Incl.	Copy No. 37
JCS 1483/7	24 Sept 45	Pg. 76	Copy No. 45
JCS 1483/8	28 Sept 45	Pgs. 77-79 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/9	28 Sept 45	Pgs. 80-84 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/10	2 Oct 45	Pgs. 85-93 Incl.	Copy No. 46
JCS 1483/11	2 Oct 45	Pgs. 94-95 Incl.	Copy No. 36
JCS 1483/12	3 Oct 45	Pgs. 96-100 Incl.	Copy No. 36
JCS 1483/13	4 Oct 45	Pgs. 101-102 Incl.	Copy No. 36
JCS 1483/14	8 Oct 45	Pgs. 103-104 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/15	15 Oct 45	Pgs. 105-131 Incl.	Copy No. 51
JCS 1483/16	24 Nov 45	Pgs. 132-137 Incl.	Copy No. 36
JCS 1483/17	4 Dec 45	Pgs. 138-139 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/18	18 Dec 45	Pgs. 140-146 Incl.	Copy No. 35
JCS 1483/19	19 Dec 45	Pgs. 147-148 Incl.	Copy No. 76
JCS 1483/20	30 Dec 45	Pgs. 149-151 Incl.	Copy No. 36
JCS 1483/21	3 Jan 46	Pgs. 152-156 Incl.	Copy No. 29
JCS 1483/22	7 Jan 46	Pgs. 157-158 Incl.	Copy No. 50

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W.W.McALLISTER
Major, CAC
Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

RHP
12

10 June 1946

TO: General Arnold

The Russian division of land in the Northern zone continues to have a large effect upon local opinion, and information concerning it has been widespread outside Korea as well.

The color is that Koreans still fearful of some return to twelve and one-half chungbo are supposed to be collected by local Communist committees are given discretion to give confiscation in favor of large landholders who show some devotion to the state, and for other political purposes.

By persistent report, it appears that fifty thousands of people have already been evicted from their land and sent as paupers to other areas and, in some cases, to liberate. At the same time, equally persistent rumour has it that eminent people of wealth and position are buying up land at ridiculous prices and added more.

There is the further fact that under the new dispensation no person is allowed to own more land than he can cultivate with the family power of labor at his command.

Under these circumstances it would be of considerable value to us to have a number of concrete cases which could be properly written up and presented to the Korean people and to the outside world as well. For this purpose I suggest the use of liaison in Pyongyang and a careful effort to determine actual facts, with names, dates, and circumstances, from local refugees.

It should be possible to present a contrast between the skillful unscrupulous politicians growing richer on the one hand, while on the other hand we have the contrast of the small landholder whose holdings barely exceeded the limit, who is not cut down to the peasant but instead is turned out upon the road with his family, leaving the burial place of his ancestors.

The purpose of the entire presentation would be to point out that the Soviet-sponsored land reform is not land reform at all but only a new and cruel application of the ancient cure of political graft.

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By NARS, Date

Such information properly secured and prepared could be leaked to the Koreans and world press.

LEONARD V. BARTSCH
2nd Lieutenant, C.M.P.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

26 June 1946

REPORT TO COMMANDING GENERAL:

The information contained in this report is indirect and has not been confirmed by firsthand inquiry. Subject to this qualification, the existing facts are set forth. It is believed that they are correct, but they will be further checked personally this evening. The source of the information herein given is Dr. KIMM, Kiu Sic.

On Sunday, Mr. HWANG, Chin Nam went by train to Chonju. He noticed that LEE, Chung Young was a passenger on the same train. On Monday, both parties were returning to Seoul, again on the same train. There was a delay of some fifty minutes at the station at Yongpyan. As soon as the train stopped, LEE, Chung Young left the car and disappeared from the station. Some fifteen minutes later, twenty thugs appeared and attacked Mr. Hwang and his two companions. One of the companions escaped. Hwang and the other companion were severely beaten. Our information is that Hwang's injuries were nearly fatal and that he is at present hospitalized. It is further stated that there were three police within sight and that they made no effort at all to intervene. It is further stated that the police have made no effort whatsoever to investigage the incident.

It is recognized that on this statement of facts there does not exist an adequate case for the conviction of LEE, Chung Young. In the light of his activities, it is a moral certainty that he is the responsible party. It is respectfully submitted that he should be arrested and held under custody on suspicion pending a complete investigation.

Had this same incident occurred in changed circumstances, with a Rightist politician being the victim, there is no doubt that arrests in large numbers would have already been made.

It is respectfully pointed out that if this matter is merely referred to the police for action without specific and pointed directions as to the manner of handling, the police will presumably merely arrest one or two stooges, who will "take the rap", and they will leave the guilty instigator completely unpunished.

In the light of the known connections that exist between RHEE, Syngman and LEE, Chung Young, and between RHEE, Syngman and high Korean officials of the police department, it may confidently

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be stated that in the normal course of police procedure, unless direct impetus is given from the highest military authority, there will be no serious effort made to pin the responsibility where it belongs.

It must be emphasized that there is no basis to make any accusation of complicity in the actual crime against any party higher than LEE, Chung Young. No such intention is suggested. It is, however, demonstratively true that higher parties have sought to protect this culprit in the past and will seek to protect him again in the present.

This incident may well be regarded as a test case. LEE, Chung Young has constantly advocated violence against all whom he disapproves, and he has blatantly voiced his disapproval of the efforts at political unity, in which efforts Mr. Hwang has been serving as a faithful intermediary. If this incident is allowed to go unpunished, this person's capacity for evil will be vastly enhanced, and the prospect of achieving unity or harmony will be remote. Every possible effort should be made to take advantage of this situation to place LEE, Chung Young in a position where he can do no further damage.

It is respectfully submitted that nothing short of a personal directive to the police from the highest military authority will be adequate to meet the situation. It is further respectfully submitted that the police should be instructed, and ordered, to find the guilty parties, and to promise them freedom from prosecution in return for evidence that will convict the primary criminal who instigated the attack.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
2nd Lieutenant, C.M.P.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

27 June 1946

SUBJECT: Assignment of Officers and Enlisted Men.

TO: G-1, Headquarters XXIV Corps.

1. Following is roster of all officers and enlisted men assigned to this organization with the information requested by your headquarters:

NAME	RANK	ASN	BR SV	MO SV	ASRS	MOS
Arnold, Archibald V.	Maj. Gen.	O-3395	USA	60		0002
Booth, Robert H.	Col.	O-018093	GSC	60		2010
Kirillin, Luke	Maj.	O-246941	CAV	48	70	2136
Kryloff, Eugene B.	Maj.	O-298273	FA	55	67	8104
Bojus, John	Capt.	O-350832	INF	44	63	9332
Matisohn, Joseph	1st Lt.	O-1117054	CE	29	29	9332
Prisloe, Michael P.	1st Lt.	O-1330588	INF	27	27	9332
Arnold, Archibald V. Jr.	2d Lt.	O-27184	FA(ADC)	3		1193
Hopkins, Rodney B.	CWO	W-2110236		60	100	2600
Schachtele, John W.	S/Sgt	36907612	INF	14	27	502
Brown, Wilby R. Jr.	Sgt	RA42193184	INF			821
Rieser, Louis S.	Sgt	35786479	INF	9	17	835
Biermann, Homer F.	Tec 4	37762230	INF	7	8	405
Foster, Eugene L.	Tec 4	37752152	INF	12	24	060
Haydock, Albin W.	Tec 4	33944278	INF	9	17	405
Karas, Michael A.	Tec 4	33969852	INF	4	4	320
Lee, John H. H.	Tec 4	36915895	INF	12	24	405
Matthews, Lawrence C.	Tec 4	44057253	INF	10	19	405
Golden, Richard L.	Tec 5	RA39747101	INF			405
Safford, Charles D. Jr.	Tec 5	RA19233461	INF			055
Scantling, Harry C. Jr.	Tec 5	RA33870868	INF			055
Wong, Eng H.	Pfc	42163205	INF	9	11	695
Elliott, Donald L.	Pvt	RA13160001	INF			055

2. Above officers and enlisted men are occupying vacancies created by grade allotment published in Par 4c, Sect II, GO 80, Headquarters XXIV Corps, cs.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

R.H.BOOTH
Colonel, GSC
Commissioner, U.S. Delegation

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT: Assignment of Officers and Enlisted Men.

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1.	18 Jun	G-1	All Sections and Hq Co	1. In order that a complete and accurate record of each officer assigned to this Headquarters may be kept, it is desired that each section submit to this office, the name, rank, serial number, branch of service, months service and ASRS as of 2 Sep 45, and MOS of each officer and enlisted men assigned to the section. 2. Each report will indicate whether the person is occupying a T/O or overhead vacancy. 3. The results of the muster on 14 June 46 showed our Headquarters to be excess in T/O strength. The overhead allotment for this Headquarters is not being properly utilized. 4. Each section will initiate a request to this office for the transfer of personnel to their proper assignment, namely: Hq XXIV Corps; XXIV Corps Hq Overhead Det; Hq Co, XXIV Corps. Such requests will contain all information as outlined in paragraph 1 above. T. Christ MFG G-1

Page No.....

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 23 May 46

OVER

7773 [162]

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

29 June 1946

SUBJECT: Allotment of Overhead Grades and Strength.

TO: Headquarters XXIV Corps
APO 235.

In accordance with par 2, GO 105, Hq XXIV Corps, 28 June 1946, the following Table of Distribution forwarded for your information:

Officers and Warrant Officers:

Authorized Allotment

Gen or Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2d Lt	CWO	WOJG
3	2	2	5	0	0	0	1

Present Strength

Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2d Lt	CWO	WOJG
1	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	0

Enlisted Men (by grade):

Authorized Allotment

1st	2d	3d	4th	5th	6th	7th
1	0	1	8	2	2	0

Present Strength

1st	2d	3d	4th	5th	6th	7th
0	0	2	7	3	1	1

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

R. H. BOOTH
Colonel, GSC
Commissioner, U.S. Delegation

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
1 JULY 1946

NOTICE

Effective today, 1 July 1946, coffee service will be resumed in the morning between the hours of 0930 and 1130. Orange juice will also be served when available.

During inclement weather service will be maintained on the balcony directly above the main entrance to the palace. Daily notices will be distributed announcing the time and place in accordance with the weather conditions.

Robert S Douglass Jr
ROBERT S. DOUGLASS JR
1st Lt. C-A Sect.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
2 JULY 1946

R-47

NOTICE

Coffee service will be on the Palace Roof. However the source of supply is endangered by the permanent closure of local Red Cross Canteens. Until some other arrangements can be made juice may become a substitute. Efforts are now being made to obtain the facilities for making coffee within the Palace or use by the members of Joint Commission.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
3 July 1946

RHR

NOTICE

The closing of the Red Cross Canteens throughout Korea has resulted in the suspension of coffee service to the members of the Joint Commission. Earnest efforts are now being made to obtain the equipment and supplies which may be utilized within the palace for the use of its occupants. Until the negotiations have been completed only juice will be served.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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AMERICAN D LEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

24 July 1946

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL HOGAN:

Pursuant to our discussions, the two houses located at Sin Dang Chung, to be exempted from requisition are the following: #353-35 and #357-9.

One of these is occupied by Dr. Music Inn and the other by Dr. Lyuh Woon Hyung.

A copy of this memorandum is being sent also to the Provincial Property Custodian.

LEONARD E. BARNICH
2nd Lieutenant, C. .P.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AM RICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

26 July 1946

MEMORANDUM TO MAJOR MARKET, Provisional Property Custodian

1. General Arnold has directed that I request your assistance in obtaining suitable living quarters for the family of WON, Sei Yoon. Mr. Won is the most influential assistant of Dr. KIM, Kiu Sic, a present member of the Representative Democratic Council, and is looked upon as one of the three or four key figures in the new governmental setup.

2. In conformity with the policy, I have checked to find suitable buildings which could be taken away from the present occupants properly. Such case has been found for me by Chief C.I.C. Tek Kar of the Provincial Police, who has provided me with the following information: The property in question is located at 1 Chung Lot Block 66. It is occupied by Jung, Quang Kil and Yun, Bok Ki, who are both under prosecution for the crime of having stolen Japanese property that was located in the building. Although the building has heretofore been used as a restaurant, I am informed by Chief Chang that it is equally practical to consider it a dwelling house.

3. We will greatly appreciate it if you will take whatever steps are necessary to see that this property can be vacated as soon as possible and made available for occupancy by Mr. WON, Sei Yoon.

LEONARD M. BARTSCH
2nd Lieutenant, C.M.P.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

27 July 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, XXIV CORPS:

SUBJECT: Dependent Housing

1. In view of the probable arrival of my dependents earlier than previously anticipated it is requested that steps be taken to accelerate repairs to a reconversion of the house to which I have been assigned: No. 3, Tong Sa Hyung Chung Area.

2. Specifically, the following are essential:

a. Water pump, pipe, and other material necessary for increase of pressure to supply water to the nine houses in this area.

b. Plumbing accessories and materials to provide showers and toilets.

c. Certain electrical equipment to repair heating and lighting systems.

3. It is understood that these materials have been requested in writing by the officers in charge of the reconversion project, but that no action has been taken at Corps Headquarters as yet.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

29 July 1946

TO: MAJ REPORT, G-2 AM JOINT COMMITTEE:

On the evening of Sunday, 28 July, it was learned that Kuk Heung Young had demanded that the Left delegates absent themselves from the sessions of the Joint Committee and that he and Lyuh Woon Hyung were arguing on this point.

At ten o'clock on the morning of 29 July, Music Hall received from Mr. Lyuh a private note, substantially as follows:

> I have the honor to convey my respectful greetings to you. My illness has taken a turn for the worse, and I have completely lost my appetite. I need a few days' leave of absence for medical treatment. I shall be back within the week. My sincere best wishes. -- L. W.H.

The five delegates of the Right attended the scheduled session at two p.m., at which time they found waiting for them a messenger from the Left delegate, who brought with him a letter signed by all five of the leftist delegates, including Lyuh Woon Hyung. The gist of the letter was:

> We are waiting for your answer to our five-point proposal. At the same time, we are anxious to receive your counter proposals, and we will be grateful if you will give us a chance to study them. In order to give us enough time for study, we think it desirable to postpone our session until a later date. Further, Mr. Lyuh's condition has taken a turn for the worse, and temporarily he needs medical treatment and rest.

The delegation of the Right held a short caucus and rejected the decision to release their eight-point counter proposals. (This counter proposal they had previously determined to withhold temporarily, but the decision was changed in response to the invitation of the Left.) The proposal follows in its entirety:

> 1. To make all possible efforts to bring about the formation of a democratic provisional government embracing both northern and southern Korea.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

2. To issue a joint communique urging the US-Soviet Joint Commission to reconvene.

3. In accordance with the decision of the Moscow Three-Power Conference, discussions concerning the so-called trusteeship question be initiated following the establishment of a provisional government between the said government and the US-Soviet Joint Commission with the basic aim of making Korea an independent nation.

4. To convene a people's representative assembly to facilitate general elections six months after the formation of a provisional government.

5. To establish a national government within three months after the opening of the people's representative assembly.

6. To safeguard future general elections, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of organization, freedom of the press, freedom of travel and communication, freedom of suffrage, etc., be upheld throughout the country.

7. Laws and by-laws concerning political, economic and social problems be promulgated by the people's representative assembly.

8. Special legal machinery be set up after the formation of a provisional government to deal with collaborators and traitors.

This proposal was sent to the Left and was also given to the newspapers. The message was also sent that in the event it was desired to postpone any subsequent sessions, notice of such desire should be given at least one day in advance.

It remains to consider what is the meaning of the postponement. The most probable explanation is that this represents a compromise between the demand of Pak that the Committee cease functioning, and the demand of Lyuh that it continue.

Dr. Kimm says that his private sources of information confirm the belief that Kim Won Bong is supporting Lyuh

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

against the other three members of the residium.

Dr. Kimm requests that I go to see Kim Won Bong and fortify him in his determination, and also that we work on Ho Hun and Pak Hon Uk, both of whom he believes are still open to conviction.

LEONARD M. [illegible]SCH
2nd Lieutenant, C.M.P.

L'S:jg
cc: Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge
Major-General A.V. Arnold
Major-General Archer L. Lerch
G-2, XXIV Corps

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN MISSION
U.S. - JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

2 August 1946

SUBJECT: Suggested Investigation into Activities of Lyuh Woon-hyung

1. On the basis of hearsay information, it appears to be true that Lyuh maintained highly secret relations with a number of very key Japanese and Koreans throughout the war. It appears to be a fact that he made between eight and fourteen trips to Japan, on various political missions, between 1937 and 1945. Lyuh himself has admitted to me that he had private interviews with Ugaki, Abe, and with others. Inadvertently, he once stated that he was not interested, in the sum of 1,000,000 yen proposed to him by some Japanese that they had no right to arrest him because he had been promised safe-conduct by the Premier personally. This last arrest apparently occurred in Pusan, when Lyuh stepped off the boat from Shimonoseki.

2. Lyuh's attitude of fear of the Communists is believed to be inspired in part by the knowledge that the Communists hold certain information, probably documentary, about these activites.

3. Again emphasizing that this particular information is merely hearsay, I have been informed by some individuals close to him that he was the go-between in negotiations carried on between the Russians and Japanese, and that these negotiations were aimed at effectuating a final and permanent agreement to keep Russia out of the war.

4. It is believed that in the summer of 1945 Lyuh carried an offer from the Japanese, granting the Russians economic and territorial concessions and agreeing to grant Korea a limited measure of autonomy.

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5. If this is true, it is readily conceivable that Lyuh is most anxious that it not be made known to the people generally, since successful results of his efforts would have been designed to perpetuating Japanese sovereignty over Korea.

6. At the present time Lyuh still occupies a key position in Korean politics. As of this date, it appears most probable that he will throw his influence with us. Whether he does or does not join us, it would appear to be highly desirable that we have possession of all information concerning his relations with the Japanese. In the event that he should join us, we will need this information to avoid surprise and to prepare any necessary rebuttals.

7. It is specifically recommended that an Officer be sent to Korea with the request from this Command for facilities to carry on a broad investigation into the general subject of Lyuh's relations. Particularly, an effort should be made to ascertain any information that can be given by Tojo, Koiso, former Governor-General Abe, and the former Japanese officials of the Seoul police.

8. This measure will require an Officer well versed in the technique of interrogation, thoroughly informed on the general background of Korean politics, and possessed of tact and resourcefulness. It is respectfully suggested that Major Charles J. Riordan, at present serving with Military Government, Office of Foreign Affairs, would be an excellent nominee for this investigation.

LEONARD E. REECE
2nd Lieutenant, C.A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

5 August 1946

REPORT TO COMMANDING GENERAL, XXIV CORPS

Subject: Representative Democratic Council Motor Pool

1. The Motor Pool for the official use of the members of the Representative Democratic Council was established by order of the Commanding General in February 1946, was located in a garage building on Wang Deug Chung, and was placed under the control and operation of the 3040th Car Company with a staff of Korean drivers and mechanic assistants. The operation was unsatisfactory from the beginning. Complaints were made, by members of the Council, that drivers habitually treated them with discourtesy, which was evidently supported by their officers. The cars were frequently used by officials for their private enterprises. On three separate occasions when I checked the vehicles at the garage of Mr. Lyuh, I found one or more vehicles out being improperly used by soldiers with Korean women.

2. On one occasion three vehicles being thus used were impounded by Military Police and the incident kept the Council members from their use for some days. On another occasion, the vehicle used for the president of the Council was overloaded by five soldiers and their Korean mates with the result that the springs were broken and the vehicle was put out of commission. There were continual repetitions of embarrassing experiences, occasioned by the finding of evidences of immorality in the vehicles.

3. Repeated complaints were made to Col. Goodfellow and to me by members of the Council. When these complaints were carried to the officers of the 3040th, the invariable attitude was one of resentment that Koreans would dare to criticise the military. This was expressed characteristically by an enlisted man who was reprimanded by me for using the vehicle for his private date, and who responded, "Who the hell runs this country, us or these gooks?". Seven vehicles had originally been assigned for use of the Council members. Due in part to daily abuses and in greater part to the difficulty of obtaining replacement of parts, all but seven of these vehicles are now completely unusable.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

4. This has resulted in the situation wherein it is almost impossible to have adequate service provided, particularly since the difficulties of communication make the operation of a motor pool very inefficient even under optimum operating conditions.

5. Continual complaints as to the operation included a complaint that the gasoline allowance designated for official use by Council members was being diverted and improperly used otherwise. This complaint, which was never investigated officially, receives credence from the fact that the allowance tentatively established during the interim period since June, has been habitually disregarded.

6. In mid-June, as the result of continual complaint, it was decided by Col. Bell that function of operating the motor pool should be changed. However, instead of providing a reasonable degree of time for a transitional arrangement, the responsible officers simply walked out on the enlisted men and the trucks and left the operation both and dry without notice.

7. Ever since that time, I have been attempting, without success, to set up a reasonable operating procedure. It was decided between Col. Bell and Col. Champeny that the new operation should be taken over by Military Government as soon as possible, and that meanwhile the 3040th Company continue to provide temporary allowance of gasoline, grease, etc. and the use of tools. It was further required by Col. Smith (Headquarters Commandant) that all vehicles should be checked by Ordnance, that those found unusable should be junked, and that these should be replaced by Military Government, with the objective of establishing an operating car pool. It is apparently the intention of Military Government to have these vehicles, when the new system is established, cared for by the Military Government garage. Meanwhile, the operation of the system has been continuing and has been increasingly unsatisfactory.

8. With the assistance of Col. Bell and Col. Smith, I was able to secure the loan of a set of tools from 3040th, subject to the condition that I personally sign the responsibility for them. It was impossible to keep even the few operable vehicles running without tools; I have signed an M-R for the tool set.

9. It had been tentatively agreed that the civilian employees would be transferred to Military Government payroll. At my direction, the Council officials provided

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

illitary Government with a list of the civilian payrolls previously reported. This list comes to 17,150 men per week. [illegible] Due to difficulties of interpretation and procedure, Military Government is still not [illegible] start paying, and the 3040th stopped paying a [illegible] day for the fifth consecutive payday [illegible] advanced by [illegible]. I have [illegible], upon the basis of my conversation [illegible], that this would be re- [illegible].

[illegible] time of the entire affair is closed and [illegible] that the first [illegible] report [illegible] over-concentrated in the [illegible] of motors [illegible] the [illegible] more than sufficient difficulties. [illegible] complain that they are re- [illegible] difference in the [illegible] welding rigs on the [illegible] and have had to [illegible] manual filling [illegible] for the [illegible] from Military [illegible] to [illegible].

[illegible] which have been used as a basis [illegible] will be disintegrated until it [illegible] constant source of irritation to those [illegible] who must principally rely for our civilian support.

[illegible] of the background of the problem and [illegible] action, it is most important for me to give [illegible] attention to the solution of this problem.

[illegible] differentials were related to one part or [illegible] action; [illegible] deliveries were delivered by the [illegible] at 2, one more on at 3, and none had been delivered up 'til 10:30 o'clock [illegible] at 4, despite that it had been agreed and ordered that a tentative temporary delivery allowance of three drums (the delivery usage established by Col. Codfelter in February) would be continued. In the morning of 4 August various of the members of the Council had important engagements having to do with repairing our defenses in the present Communist political campaign. The motor pool was completely frozen by lack of gasoline and had been so frozen for 24 hours. I called the 3040th and ascertained that there was gasoline there. On the basis of my discussions with the responsible officers, there appeared to be absolutely no reason why the gasoline had not been sent out other than direct culpable negligence. It should be added that the officials of the EDC insist that they are frequently sent drums with as little as one-fourth of the full quantity of gasoline. I have been unable to verify the truth of this beyond their statements.

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14. It is respectfully recommended that an officer be detailed to the duty of working out an adequate solution of the problem of providing the officials of the Council with motor service, and with properly liquidating the subsidiary problems herein outlined.

L. M. BERTSCH
2nd Lt., CMP

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

9 August 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDING GENERAL, XXIV CORPS.

SUBJECT: HYERN DAI ILBO.

The newspaper HYERN DAI ILBO carried an editorial on 7th August, reported in the press summary, discussing the "corruption of the Judicial Department".

Without venturing a statement as to whether these are or are not true cases which are cited, it is generally believed that there is at least some truth in the accusations.

It is submitted that the fact that this is a communist newspaper could not be permitted to affect the procedure to be followed in the case. It is respectfully recommended that an investigation be conducted separate from the auspices of the Judicial Department.

It would appear that an impartial effort to find the truth is necessary before arriving at a decision whether to prosecute the judges or the newspaper people. One group or the other is guilty. If the case against the judges is not sound, then it would appear to exist as a case against the newspaper writers.

This story has aroused public interest, partly because it coincides with the beliefs of the largest number of the people. Whether these beliefs are soundly based or not, it is respectfully submitted that sound public morale requires that the editorial should neither go unnoticed nor become the target of mere unilateral repressive action.

L. M. BERTSCH,
2nd Lt., CMP.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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ASHINGTON, D. C. AUGUST 14, 1946.

L (WAR DAYS NIGHTLETTER)

"Via RCA"

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED FORCES
TOKYO, JAPAN

[illegible] THIRTEENTH OCCASION, SINCE A YEAR AGO TODAY SAW THE SURRENDER OF JAPANESE FORCES AND THE SUBSEQUENT LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLE OF KOREA, I AGAIN EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION AT YOUR APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS AND MY DEEP APPRECIATION OF THE ASSISTANCE RENDERED OUR COUNTRY IN THE YEAR WHICH HAS JUST COME TO A CLOSE. [illegible] PARTICULARLY [illegible] AND STATESMANLIKE CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE, MAJOR-GENERAL ARCHER L. LYNCH AND MAJOR-GENERAL ARCHIBALD V. ARNOLD.

I AM GREATLY HEARTENED BY THE CONTINUING INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WELFARE OF ALL THE KOREAN PEOPLE, AS EXPRESSED OFFICIALLY YESTERDAY BY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON, AND I HOPE THAT AMERICAN ENLIGHTENED AND EARNESTNESS TO SEE KOREA A UNITED NATION AND A FREE AND INDEPENDENT NATION WITH A GOVERNMENT OF ITS OWN CHOOSING SOON MAY BE SHARED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE ARMIES OF WHICH NOW OCCUPY MORE THAN HALF OF OUR NATION.

THE KOREAN COMMISSION and
THE KOREAN-AMERICAN COUNCIL

FULL-RATE MESSAGE UNLESS MARKED OTHERWISE
Sender's Name and Address
(Not to be transmitted)

Form 104—L—OS—WN-1

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

19 August 1946

SUBJECT: Removal of Enlisted Man from Readjustment.

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Replacement Battalion

1. Request Tec 4 Belton Strickland, 44045328 be removed from the shipping list for readjustment and return to his previous organization.

2. Your attention is invited to the attached waiver.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

H. H. BOOTH
Colonel, GSC
Commissioner, U.S. Delegation

1 Incl
Waiver

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

WAIVER

19 August 1946

Regardless of my present eligibility for separation under current criteria, or any change therein, I elect to remain in the Army, unless sooner relieved as a Class IV volunteer, for duty with General Arnold's Mess until 19 November 1946.

Belton Strickland

Tec 4, 44045828

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

19 August 1946

MEMORANDUM

1. Mr. Kim, Kwang Soo and Mr. Toh, Yuho, both of the Democratic National Front, called on me today and expressed their gratitude for being permitted to hold their separate meeting at Seoul stadium.

2. They commented favorably on the arrangements and handling of the 15 August celebration but hinted that much of the credit was due to Leftist patience and forbearance. They reminded me of the promise that they had made during the earlier negotiations for the parade that the Leftist parade would be orderly. They stated that in marching the Leftist parade through Seoul that they had been "challenged" by Rightist Youngmen's groups.

3. They complained of Rightist and police repression in two provinces, Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo, particularly in the towns of Kimchai, Soonchun, Moo-an, and Kwang-ju, and stated that in the towns mentioned, the police and in one instance U.S. Military Police had "pointed" guns at Leftist demonstrations. They asked that this matter be brought to the attention of Generals Hodge and Lerch for possible action against the officials of these towns.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General USA

Distribution:
General Hodge
General Lerch
General Arnold
File

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

6 September 1946

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Visit of Leftist Leader

1. Mr. Toh, Yu'o, Ph.D., Diplomatic Section of the Democratic National Front, called on me today at 1100. His purpose in calling was to make a general complaint of mistreatment of the Leftists but specific objectives appeared during the course of his talk.

2. He started his conversation by complaining of Leftist mistreatment. He cited [illegible], for the past two or three weeks because of [illegible] for the [illegible] against [illegible] and pointed the arrest of Mr. Lyo [illegible] people's patriotic party, who is reported to have been arrested for inflammatory [illegible] to the arrest. Mr. Toh [illegible] of other cases of Leftist [illegible]. He then inserted a question [illegible] asked rather seriously whether or not the United States State Department had ordered restriction on Leftist activity. I explained to Mr. Toh that the United States favored free speech, freedom of assembly and other rights of man, and such a directive would not be compatible with the United States policy. I also explained fully that we are intensely interested jointly with Koreans at this very moment in trying to further the coalition of Rightists and Leftists including Korean Communists.

3. Mr. Toh then brought out at some length the Leftist complaints against the rice collection program. He complained that even the Japs did not take any part of the summer grain for distribution. He criticized the rice collection program "citing extensive profiteering" among Koreans.

4. Mr. Toh denied that he was a member of the Communist Party. He praised both the land and the grain

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programs in north Korea and spoke rather glowingly of Soviet policy in north Korea. He lauded control of rice distribution in the same area.

5. I utilized the conversation with Mr. Toh to emphasize the importance of Koreans solving Korean problems mentioned by the Koreans themselves. I suggested that the lack of cohesion and unity among Leftists and Rightists might be a primary cause of all the troubles complained of by Mr. Toh. I suggested that a Korean legislature was the first step to be taken by Koreans in their march toward independence and as a means of showing the world that Koreans could unite to solve their own problems including economic difficulties. Mr. Toh weakly replied with a standard Leftist argument that they "could not trust the Rightists". Mr. Toh frequently referred to his mistrust of Military Government officials, principally United States officers, although he said at one time that he thought our intentions were good but that we did not know what our Korean subordinates in Military Government were doing.

6. He left urging vaguely that something be done to prevent suppression of Leftist views and a solution to economic problems.

J. W.

JOHN WICKERSHAM
Brigadier General, USA

Distribution:
Gen. Hodge
Gen. Lerch
Gen. Arnold
File

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

10 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Lerch

1. I agree with your estimate of Toh. Since the big labor meeting in August which I attended as representative of General Hodge, I have been the wailing wall for Leftist complaints. I listen to these criticisms because I believe that we should keep an open mind on all suggestions and should be willing to listen to all shades of political comment. When I do get interesting comments from either Rightists or Leftists, it is my habit to write a brief summary of the interview. I followed the usual custom in this case.

2. I hope that none of your boys in M.G. have an idea that I am pro-Leftist or pro-anything else. It so happens that most of my customers have Leftist leanings.

Att.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, USA

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

210

14 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR G-1, 7TH DIVISION

SUBJECT: Information for Record.

1. You have in your files a letter from the mother of Lieutenant McIntyre who was killed in combat on Okinawa, asking that a Silver Star be awarded her son.

2. I wrote General Ready and Colonel Lackler to see if they had sufficient knowledge to recommend a change of the Bronze Star to a Silver Star.

3. General Ready in a letter written from 133 Main Street, Okland, Maine, on 26 August states that he believes the award of a Bronze Star was in line with other cases of a sirilar nature.

4. I report this for your files.

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General USA

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

16 Sept 1946

Lt Col James E. Wilson
Hq, 40th Military Government Co.
Office of the Military Mayor
City Hall, Seoul

Dear Col. Wilson:

It is indeed a pleasure to accept the privilege of being appointed an Honorary Fire Chief of the Seoul Fire Department.

During the American occupation of Korea, it has been my opportunity to observe the Seoul Fire Department grow from nothing to a smooth and efficient operating organization.

Please accept my most sincere gratitude.

Very sincerely,

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
40TH Military Government Co
Office of the Military Mayor
City Hall Seoul, Korea

Lt Col James E. Wilson AC

軍政
서울市

Gen Arnold:-

I feel that the City of Seoul by virtue of Ordinance 106, is honored in having you accept the enclosed certificate and badge of office as Honorary Fire Chief of its new, up and coming fire department.

Yours truly,
James E. Wilson
Lt Col AC
Mil Mayor of Seoul

Yes...

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

REPORT TO GENERAL LERCH

Subject: KIM, Hong Sup

20 September 1946

1. Ever since the incident of the donation of 10 million yen to Dr. Rhee, Syngman, Dr. Rhee has continually attempted to induce or coerce the committee of millionaires, who made the original donation, to give him a further sum for "patriotic purposes". The amount requested has varied at various times, but the figure of 5 million yen has been generally named.

2. This group has been acting in close concert with me, as requested by General Hodge, and I have requested them to make no further funds available to Dr. Rhee at this time.

3. On 11 September Kim, Hong Sup, a Procurator of the Department of Justice, (and a member of the Han Kook Democratic Party) sent out policemen to bring in three of the committee, under arrest, to his office. The three sent for were Pak, Ki Ho, Chun, Yong Son and Cho, Chun Ho. These three had all argued strongly in the committee in favor of following a policy of cooperation with the military in the disposition of their fund.

4. Cho, Chun Ho was absent from his home when the policemen attempted to serve the warrant. The other two members were brought in to the Department of Justice where they were kept waiting for an hour and a half and were then interviewed by Kim, Hong Sup. Kim demanded to know why they had refused to give Dr. Rhee the second 10 million yen of the 20 million yen fund. He demanded also to know what disposition they had made of the rest of the fund and to whom it had been paid. He was informed by both Mr. Pak and Mr. Chun that this was a matter in which they had become involved at the request of a previous advisor of General Hodge, that they had been requested by Col. Goodfellow to treat the entire matter as a secret to be shared with only the highest military authorities, and that they were not free to answer his questions concerning the fund. They went on to say that it involved only their own money and that they had spent it in encouragement of patriotic activities.

5. Kim at this point told them that he presumed that the money represented a graft from their black market activities, and he added that he believed they should be prosecuted. However, after the lapse of another hour, he ordered their release and informed them that they need not return.

6. This matter was brought to my attention by Mr. Pak, Ki Ho on 14 September. Mr. Pak at this time stated that he and

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the rest of the committee feared that there would be prosecution against them on some fictitious basis unless they capitulated to the demands of Dr. Rhee as enforced by the Department of Justice. I requested then that Mr. Pak do nothing whatever, and that his committee do nothing, until I had had opportunity to investigate further. I then reported verbally to General Hodge, who instructed that I ascertain all the facts and report to General Leech.

7. At noon on 18 September, taking Mr. Herbert Kim as an interpreter, I called at Court Room #4, the office of Mr. Kim, Hong Sup. Observing that there was a case in progress, I seated myself at the rear to wait for the noon adjournment. At this point I was requested by Captain MacFarlon to wait outside the room, for the reason that the case in progress was the counterfeit case, and the Captain did not desire any more than the minimum of Americans present in the Court Room. In response to his request, I immediately withdrew, leaving Mr. Herbert Kim behind with instructions to request an interview with Mr. Kim as soon as the court adjourned. Mr. Kim, Hong Sup and Mr. Herbert Kim shortly thereafter came out and the three of us went to an anteroom which I assumed to be the office of the Procurator.

8. I started the conversation by introducing myself, giving Mr. Kim my card. I added specifically that I was not authorized to make arrests or orders but was merely soliciting information. I specifically omitted any mention of the name of General Hodge, as I have been previously instructed to do in such cases. I told Mr. Kim that I had come to make inquiry concerning the arrest of Mr. Pak and Mr. Chun. Mr. Kim stated that they had been served with warrants and brought to court for the reason that "certain persons had made accusation that they were guilty of certain crimes" which accusation he had desired to investigate.

9. Upon further questioning he stated that he was not able to remember any names of the individuals who had made accusation, and that he did not now remember any of the crimes which had been charged. Upon my expression of some wonder at this statement, he amended his answer, saying that he personally had had some reason to believe that these parties had been "collecting money under false pretenses". The false pretense, he then said, was that the money would be used for patriotic purposes, in spite of which promise the culprits had refused to give the money to Dr. Rhee.

10. I asked Mr. Kim if he was aware of the fact that the money had not been collected but had in fact been contributed directly by the members of the committee. He said that he had since learned this to be the truth, and he added that upon the

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

basis of his investigation he had decided that there had been no crime committeed, and he had released the accused, who would not again be prosecuted.

11. I asked Mr. Kim if he regarded it as being a sound procedure for individuals to be arrested on so tenuous a charge, and he stated that he did so regard it. I then stated my opinion that this was probably the procedure followed by Japanese courts but that it did not seem to be in accordance with sound democratic procedure. Thereupon I indicated that I had received all the information which I required, I thanked Mr. Kim and I arose to leave.

12. Mr. Kim asked what I intended to do and I informed him that I had been directed to report to the Military Governor. At this point Mr. Kim asked that I be seated again and said that he desired further conversation. He stated that the situation had not been his fault, but had been ordered by higher authority. I asked if he would care to add any further information, and indicated my willingnes to include in my report anything that he might desire to state. Mr. Kim said that he wished to think the matter over more carefully, and asked if we could not meet again later in the day. I expressed willingness to remain as long as necessary, but he stated his preference to have time to think alone before continuing our conversation. He asked if he could see me on the day following and I said I would be able to see him at 2 o'clock. Mr. Kim then requested that I have him assurance that I would not make any statement before giving him a chance to give me all his information, and I have him my assurance that I would wait with any report until he had full opportunity to make a complete statement.

13. It must be emphasized that throughout the entire conversation I neither stated nor implied that I had any power to take any action, whatever, and I made the contrary perfectly clear to Mr. Kim. Subsequently the same night I learned from various newsmen that Mr. Kim had called a press conference for the following day, and that he had already stated to a number of individual newsmen that he was being impeded in the prosecution of criminals.

14. A further small indication of the complete fabrication offered by the Procurator is his claim that the session lasted one and a half hours. Actually, we arrived after twelve, and Mr. Herbert Kim and I were at lunch at the Hanto well before one o'clock.

15. It is relevant to add the detail that Kim, Yong Sup is the son-in-law of Kim, Chun Yong of the Democratic Party, who is the close ally of Lee, Chung Hyung and Shin, Ik Hi.

16. I reported the incident verbally to General Berch at

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

9:30 o'clock 19 September. On the 19th, Mr. Kim held a press conference to which he invited representatives of all the papers, to whom he stated that I had interrupted the session of his court, that I had demanded that the prosecution of certain "criminals" cease, and that I had ordered him to come to the Dŭk Soo Palace, for all of which reasons he was tendering his resignation. He strongly implied that he did not believe the Department of Justice would accept his resignation, and that his entire course of conduct constituted a courageous defense of justice.

17. It will be observed that the conduct of Mr. Kim constitutes a careful effort to turn what was originally a mere blackmail plot into a political incident in favor of himself. He carefully creates the false impression that there has been an intervention on behalf of malefactors of great wealth.

18. This is part of a concerted effort on the part of a corrupt clique in the department to safe-guard their ability to continue using the courts as instruments of personal and partisan gain.

19. It is submitted that if this is successful, it will be exceedingly difficult to make any effort at all to purify the department in the future.

20. The matter ties in closely, also, to the effort for coalition, which is being covertly opposed by Rhee, Syngman and by the Korean personnel of the Justice Department.

21. Major Connally has made continued efforts to keep the Department free of bribery and political chicanery. It is not an easy task in the face of the absolute monopoly enjoyed by the followers of Dr. Rhee in his department.

22. It is respectfully recommended that the resignation of Kim, Hong Sup be accepted and that proceedings for criminal libel be instituted against him. Alternatively, proceedings under Ordinance 2 might be considered. Any prosecution should be in a military tribunal rather than in civilian court, which will be under control of his allies.

23. With reference to my own conduct in similar cases, in the future I have been instructed by General Lerch to conduct any inquiry through the department affected.

24. Of the newspapers to whom the story was given, only Chung Oi Shin Po carried the full story as offered by Mr. Kim. It is further recommended that the same action be taken against the editor of this publication, unless an immediate retraction is published.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
2nd Lt CMP

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

file

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

2 October 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO: Major General C. H. Gardiner,
British Army.

Subject : International and National Situation.

Reference : Korea, October 1946.

In accordance with your request that you be furnished a brief summary of the discussion covered in our conference of today, the following is furnished:

A. U.S. - U.S.S.R. Situation.

On the 20th of March the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission met to carry our paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Section III of the Moscow Decision. From the very beginning the subject of trusteeship was the key. Throughout the deliberations the Soviet Delegation refused to consult with any parties which had opposed the Moscow Decision by proclaiming against trusteeship. In spite of every effort made by the American Delegation to reach a compromise, the Commission suspended its operations because the Soviet Delegation refused consistently and absolutely to have any advice from anti-trusteeship parties, which were the parties of the Right.

B. Present Political Situation.

Military Government at its initiation employed those Koreans who were competent of filling the various positions and who had knowledge of English. This led to a utilization of more conservative or Rightist members. The Left group, led primarily by approximately 20,000 Korean Communists residing in South Korea, have consistently opposed and more recently attacked the policies of Military Government and the Korean members of Military Government.

In order to take the next step in establishing a democratic government for Korea, it is desired to create a legislature. In order to initiate this movement, a so-called "Unification Committee" of ten members - five rightists and five leftists - has been meeting for the past six weeks endeavoring to establish unity of the two primary political parties and to form principles under which a legislature might be brought into being. The five rightist members are led by Dr. KIM Kiu Sic, the leader of the more liberal rightist group. The five leftists are led by Mr. LYUH Woon Hyung, the more liberal of the leftist group. Agreement was reached by the

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ten members of the Unification Committee as to the principles under which a legislature would be established, but when the time came to sign this agreement Mr. LYUH refused to sign. His refusal led the other leftist members to refuse, and the Unification Committee adjourned to be called together at the call of Dr. KIM Kiu Sic. Mr. LYUH was reported as having gone North of the 38th Parallel to confer with the Korean leader of the North Korea Communist Party in order to obtain his assistance in opposing the leader of the radical element of the South Korea Communist Party. Mr. LYUH represents the patriotic Korean. The radical element of the Communist Party desired to Russianize Korea. Mr. LYUH returned from North Korea on October 1st, and on October 2nd met for an informal discussion with Dr. KIM Kiu Sic. The results of that discussion are not now known.

C. The Rice Situation.

The food situation in South Korea is very serious and has become one of the major elements in the political picture. The reason for the shortage of rice lies in the following facts: The population of South Korea has increased over the past year by more than two million persons; over the last five years fertilizers have been short and, as a result, yields have been below normal; in addition, there was considerable damage done this summer by floods. The actual conditions are that there is not sufficient rice to give every Korean the amount that he would like to eat. In facing this situation, Military Government has developed a scheme which would collect all rental rice from Korean landlords as well as the very large quantity which they will obtain from the Japanese owned lands now held by Military Government. These rental collections will provide approximately 75 percent of the rice objective established in the collection program. The other 25 percent will be obtained by direct purchase from the farmers. Associated with this is a rationing program which will allocate to all non-producing Koreans an equal ration of rice and other grains, and it is hoped that this will reach two and a half hop per day, which will provide approximately 1300 calories per person. The reasons that the rice and food shortage has become a political factor are mainly two. In the first place, the Communists in the past have done everything to oppose the Government rice collection program and are doing everything they can at present to obstruct the present Government program. At the same time, the rightists oppose the present program and advocate a return to the collection of rent by landlords and an open market for all grain sold by the farmers. Unless we can obtain control of this year's rice crop, the prospects of preventing hyper-inflation are very slim. The great hope lies in having this or an equally constructive rice collection and rationing program supported by the

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Union Political Group with both the right and the left supporting the program and accepting responsibility for its success.

D. For more complete information see inclosures.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, USA.

Inclosures:
(1) Political Developments in Korea.
(2) Moscow Decision.
(3) Special Press Release, 8 May 1946.
(4) Joint Communique No. 5, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, 17 April 1946.

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SUBJECT: Moscow Conference (Korea Section)

"Section III - Korea Section

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

Reproduced 22 April 1946
by U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION.

RBH

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

17 April 1946

JOINT COMMUNIQUE NO. 5

The U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission continued discussion on the question of conditions of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. COLONEL GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV, Chief of the Soviet Delegation, was chairman at sessions held on 8, 9, 11 and 13 April 1946, in the Tuk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea, and MAJOR GENERAL J. V. ARNOLD, Chief of the United States Delegation, was chairman at the session 17 April 1946.

As a result of thorough investigation and analysis of the points of view of the Soviet Delegation and the Delegation of the United States, the Joint Commission reached the following decision on the first point of the joint program of work covering the conditions of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations:

"DECISION

"The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declarations:

"We _____ declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow Decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely:

"'The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state,
The creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and,
The earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea'.

Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government;

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Further, we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out by it with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision."

Signed _____

Representing the _____Party or Organization

The procedure for inviting representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations to consult with the Joint Commission is being worked out by Joint Sub-Commission No. 1. When details of the procedure are completed, it will be announced publicly.

Joint Sub-Commission No. 2, taking into consideration the proposals of the Korean democratic parties and social organizations with which it will consult, will prepare for the Joint Commission a charter on the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government at all levels. This charter will designate the various agencies of government that will exercise executive, legislative and judicial authority, with their duties and functions.

Joint Sub-Commission No. 3 has been directed to work out a political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

This Sub-Commission, also, will consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

The platform will be a document stating the aspirations and objectives of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government in the political, economic and cultural fields. It will be comprehensive enough to embrace such questions as industry, agriculture, transportation, finance, public education, and freedom of speech and press, etc.

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of U.S. Delegation

T. F. SHTIKOV
Colonel General
Chief of Soviet Delegation

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC R L[illegible] OFFICE
H.DQU[illegible] ARMY [illegible] CORPS
Seoul, Korea

2 May 1946

[illegible] for [illegible]erican Press Wire Tokyo and Army News Service.

[illegible]-Soviet Joint Commission [illegible]

The following statement on the [illegible] of the American-Soviet Joint Commission was issued today by Lieut. Gen. [illegible] of United States Army Forces in Korea:

"When the Joint Commission entered discussions on the formation of a provisional government, the Soviet delegation proposed that all Korean elements which 'had voiced opposition to the Moscow Decision' be excluded from participation in the formation of the provisional Government. The American delegation opposed any such exclusive rule on the ground that it denied the people the fundamental democratic right of freedom of expression.

"When the Moscow Decision on Korea was made public, all parties in southern Korea, regardless of their position, expressed opposition to the provision of the decision which provided for establishment of trusteeship in Korea. The vast majority of Korean parties objected to this clause because they believed that it might [illegible] enhance their independence. Subsequently, a majority of [illegible] parties dominated by an insidious group, directly reversed their position on this issue. With their exception, unlike of trusteeship [illegible], to this day, to commend the [illegible]th.

"After prolonged negotiations, the Soviet delegation offered as a compromise to consult with parties and organizations declaring their future support of the Moscow Decision and publicly 'denouncing the leadership which had misled them'. Further, such leaders were to be excluded from any participation in the future Provisional Government of Korea. The American delegation rejected this suggestion on the ground that it amounted to a dictated purge of parties and was not in accord with the American conception of democratic political activity.

"As a result of four weeks of negotiation, the Joint Commission agreed to require a reasonable degree of cooperation on the part of democratic parties and social organizations which were to be consulted. This agreement published in Communique #5 did not require support of trusteeship but merely that parties and organizations to be consulted should 'cooperate with the Commission in the working out of proposals concerning measures' regarding trusteeship. In other words, parties and organizations would be free to express themselves against a possible trusteeship when the Commission undertook the working out of recommendations on the matter. This was clear in the declaration itself and was made a matter of record by the American delegation when the agreement was reached. Furthermore, in a number of explanatory statements, the American Commander publicly stated that no matter what form trusteeship might or might not take, Southern Koreans were free to speak their minds on this subject.

"Having made this agreement and having thus, in the view of the American delegation, disposed of the problem of exclusion from participation in the formation of a government, the Commission was later presented with an additional proposal by the Soviet delegation to exclude as representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations, those who 'actively oppose the Moscow Decision.' As this appeared to be a violation of its previous agreement, and was clearly contrary to the principle of freedom of expression, the American delegation refused to agree to the Soviet proposal.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible], in order to facilitate the progress of work, it offered to discuss in the Commission the eligibility of a representative if the issue were raised in individual cases. The Soviet delegation, however insisted that a statement be published "reaffirming" the organizations not to select representatives who were opposed to the Moscow Decision."

Discussions on this point were still in progress when the Soviet delegation informed the Commission that all political and social organizations [illegible] with the Representative Democratic Council of southern Korea, an advisory body to the Military Commander, were considered by it to be ineligible for consultation because of a statement of the acting Chairman of the Council, whom the Soviet delegation quoted as follows:

"After detailed discussion on Communique 5, we have decided that signing the declaration means cooperation with the American-Soviet Commission in the matter of forming a provisional government and that part of the movement is formed of many groups of opposition organizations."

The Soviet delegation made it clear that it [illegible] these parties, unless and until they renounced their views, because of the fact that they signed the declaration [illegible].

[illegible] the new situation thus created by the [illegible] will inevitably involve considerable delay in the work of the Joint Commission, in addition to the six weeks already devoted to it. Besides, the American delegation pointed out that [illegible] plan [illegible] of the Polish, the Commission proposed to remove the 38th degree parallel boundary as an obstacle to the reunification of Korea. The Soviet delegation refused to consider this proposal. Since there was no other task that the Commission could undertake at this stage, the American delegation was left with no other alternative but to wait for instructions of the Commission. This was agreed to and the Commission adjourned on May 1946, sine die pending clarification of the matter of consultation.

In accordance with established democratic principles, the American Command in southern Korea has permitted complete freedom of expression for all elements of the political community to the limit consistent with military security. In the exercise of this right political parties and leaders have been free to express their objections to the trusteeship clause, just as others have been free consistently and actively to criticize the policies of the American Command. To deny any democratic elements a voice in the formation of a Korean government would mean penalizing them for expressing their views and denying them a right which has been enjoyed impartially by all parties and organizations in southern Korea since the American troops liberated it.

It is not the purpose of the American delegation to defend any school of political thought or to permit obstruction to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, nor is the American delegation defending the views of those who believe that trusteeship may unduly delay Korea's independence. However, it cannot and will not agree to any action by the Joint Commission which would deny over 100 Korean democratic parties and social organizations the right guaranteed bythe Moscow Decision to participate in the formation of their own government simply because they have expressed, honestly and openly, their preference for immediate independence rather than for trusteeship. To agree to such an exclusion would not merely mean the elimination from political activity of all but a small group who have submitted to the prospect of trusteeship, but would violate the universally acknowledged right of all peoples to freedom of expression promised them in the Atlantic Charter.

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NND 760090
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

REFERENCE ONLY

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA

During the Japanese regime there was no activity of political parties permitted, but there was a certain amount of underground activity. Shortly after V-J Day on the 15th of August, Mr. Endo, the Japanese Civil Administrator, called in two or three Koreans and asked that they take over the responsibility for peace and order in Korea until the occupation troops could arrive. All Koreans except Mr. LYUH, Woon Kyung, refused. Mr. LYUH was given ¥ 70,000,000 with the authority to organize the country so that there would be no disturbances. He set about the organization of People's Committees throughout Korea. For a central control organization in Seoul, he organized the People's Republic which had all the aspects of a government, including a president, a prime minister and cabinet ministers.

The XXIV Corps with the 7th Division landed on the 8th of September. The Japanese Governor General Abe turned over control of Korea to the American army in a surrender ceremony in the Government General Building in Seoul on the 9th of September. On the same date the United States Military Government was established.

During September the Communist Party under PAK, Hyun Yung made its appearance by attacks in the newspapers which were all dominated by People's Committees. The People's Republic came to the attention of the Military Government when it announced in the press the date of March 1st for national elections of its government. The Communist Party now controlled the People's Republic and the People's Committees throughout Korea.

On the 22nd of September the 40th Division arrived and began taking over control of the southeastern tip of Korea. The 7th Division, following its landing, took control of Seoul and the remainder of Kyonggi Province, the area up to the 38th Parallel, and expanded southward as rapidly as it was possible. This southern expansion of the 7th Division was regulated by the withdrawal of the Jap army,

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

whose evacuation was completed on the 30th of October.

On the 7th of October LYUH, Woon Hyung, who stated that he objected to Communist domination of the People's Republic which he had organized, began the organization of a seperate party called IN MIN DANG (People's Party). The control of this party was taken over by the Communists without delay.

On the 16th of October Dr. RHEE, Syngman arrived in Korea from the United States. Dr. RHEE was one of the old Korean patriots who had fought for independence under the Japanese, who had withdrawn to Shanghai and later to Chungking with the Korean Government-in-exile, and who had then gone to the United States where he attempted to put Korea's problem before the eyes of the world. There was widespread demand in south Korea for the return of Dr. RHEE.

On the 10th of November the first of the Military Government teams who were trained in the Military Government schools in the United States for occupation duty arrived, were briefed, and started for their assigned positions in south Korea. These Military Government teams, each of which consisted of 15 officers and 60 men, had been trained for occupation duty in Japan. After the shift of objective, there was no time for any additional education so they started their work under handicap. The most severe handicap was the language barrier. There were very few interpreters available and many of the interpreters found in the provinces were Communist of members of the People's Republic.

On the 22nd of November the Chungking Provisional Government, for which there was a popular demand, landed in south Korea. It brought with it KIM, Koo, who was the president, and KIM, Kiusic, who was the vice-president. This group came with the pledge that they would act as private individuals only.

By the 5th of December there were 51 Military Government teams in place and beginning to operate. In this period between V-J Day and the first of December there was very little political control by the U.S. forces in south Korea. The occupation forces were busy with their taking over of the country and maintaining law and order.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

[illegible] were combat troops who had little conception of Military Government [illegible] there was too much country for them to cover to be able to take any part in the political situation. During this period the People's Republic through its People's Committees secured a very firm hold on the country. In many areas they were the government. They either made the laws or interpreted the laws of Military Government, carrying out the execution of such as they deemed helpful to them. During the fall by the activities of the People's Committees and the People's Republic, both dominated by the Communists, [illegible] have the control of greatest Communist control in South Korea.

[illegible] Government teams took over Military Government operations [illegible] South Korea, the country was brought under control of the U.S. occupation forces and political of South Korea into [illegible]. During November and in the early part of December the conflict between Military Government and the People's Republic increased. In several areas there was direct and open opposition to Military Government laws and ordinances which were rewritten or [illegible] by the People's Republic. Even such petitled ordinances were issued over the signature of the Military Governor. In order to end the activities of this People's Republic, the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Korea ordered its dissolution on the 12th of December. Outwardly it obeyed this order and maintained its political activities as a party but it continued attempting to operate as a government in the provinces for some time.

On the 27th of December the Moscow Decision was published. First information in Korea was received through the press releases from Washington, which unfortunately emphasized a trusteeship for Korea. The Koreans had just been liberated from 35 years of Japanese oppression which was carried out under the guise of a trusteeship. The word "trusteeship" aroused the most intense feeling among the Koreans. All Koreans immediately took a very strong, fanatical position against [illegible]. This feeling was expressed by the Communists also in spite of their active hostility to the United States. The Commanding General of Korea called in the heads of

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

political parties to explain to them the meaning of trusteeship, but this explanation did not change their feeling. As an example of the intensity of this feeling there was the assassination of SONG, Chin Yu, head of the Han Kook Democratic Party. He was one of the abler heads and understood the Commanding General's explanation. He left the meeting and attempted to calm his party. On the 29th of December he was shot to death while asleep, and the finger of suspicion points to the Chungking Provisional Government group who were extreme rightists and who were educated in strong arm methods and terrorism. On New Year's Eve this Chungking group attempted to take over the government. They ordered a strike of all Military Government employees, and attempted to take over the police stations. It was an all-out effort on their part to take over the government and prevent a trusteeship over Korea. Through the efforts of a few loyal Korean Military Government officials, the police stood firm and the take-over effort failed. On the 1st of January the Rightists paraded in large numbers protesting against trusteeship. On the 2nd of January the Leftists, dominated by the Communists, had arranged a parade in protest against trusteeship. On the evening of the 1st, instructions were received from the Communist organization in north Korea to reverse their position and come out for trusteeship. There was considerable confusion in the organization of the leftist parade on January 2nd because many people objected to trusteeship and were unwilling to demonstrate for trusteeship. Guards were placed along the line of march to keep the people in line. There were some banners proclaiming for trusteeship and banners against trusteeship. After a three day holiday the striking Military Government officials returned to work, and the Chungking attempt at seizing the government was over.

On the 16th of January the Soviet Delegation from north Korea arrived to take part in the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Conference for carrying out paragraph 4 of Section III of the Moscow Decision. This paragraph called for the administrative-economic coordination of north and south Korea and also to solve urgent economic problems. Inasmuch as the communists in south Korea had been directed by the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

communist control in north Korea to fight trusteeship, there was considerable hostility toward the Soviet Delegation. This was shown by an anti-trusteeship parade past the place of meeting of the Joint Conference.

Dr. Syngman RHEE came to Korea to unify the people, and from the time of his arrival he worked at persuading the leftists and rightists to organize as one group. On the 1st of February the National Emergency Congress was formed with a theoretical representation of all parties in Seoul as well as in the provinces. The communist left refused to cooperate, and the National Emergency Council existed solely as a rightist organization.

From the very beginning of the occupation of south Korea it was apparent that Korean advice was essential to carry out the functions of Military Government. The language barrier was a handicap and because there had been no preparation of Military Government teams for Korea, there was little knowledge of Korean psychology. Late in September of 1945 a Korean Advisory Council was brought together and included LYUH, Woon Hyung as a leftist representative. He appeared at the first meeting but later submitted his resignation. The Advisory Council became purely a rightist organization. In December another effort was begun to bring about a truly representative advisory council. This finally bore fruit on the 14th of February, with the establishment of the Representative Democratic Council. Mr. LYUH and two other representatives of the People's Party, a leftist organization, had agreed to take part. On the morning of the meeting LYUH failed to appear, and later gave as an excuse that he was ill because of a night of visitation by a succession of communists. The R.D.C. represented only rightist organizations and included, besides church groups and social organizations, the following major parties:

HAN KOOK MIN JU DANG (Korean Democratic Party), KIM SUNG SOO CHUNG KYUNG LIM SI CHUNG BU (Chungking Provisional Government), KIM KOO HAN KOOK DOK NIP DANG (Korean Independence Party), AHN CHAI WONG I SANG KOOK MIN HAI YE (National Emergency Congress), CHAI

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

SEIN HAN MIN JU DANG (New Korean Democratic Party).

On the 15th of February the left organized an opposite organization - the People's Democratic Front. This was dominated by the communists and throughout the period of the Joint Commission contested with the Representative Democratic Council and actively worked against the efforts of the United States occupation troops. The parties comprising the Front are:

I[illegible] DANG (People's Party), [illegible] OK HYUNG (CHANG [illegible] DAE)

K[illegible] DANG (Communist Party), PAK HON YONG

[illegible] DANG (New People's Party), PAK DAE [illegible] (GUI)

[illegible] HYUK MYONG DANG (Korean Revolutionary Party), KIM [illegible] BONG

[illegible] (Korean People's Republic), HUR HUN

On the 20th of March the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission met to carry out paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Section III of the Moscow Decision. From the very beginning the subject of trusteeship was the key. Throughout the deliberations the Soviet Delegation refused to consult with any parties which had opposed the Moscow Decision by proclaiming against trusteeship. In spite of every effort made by the American Delegation to reach a compromise, the Commission suspended its operations because the Soviet Delegation refused consistently and absolutely to have any advice from anti-trusteeship parties, which were the parties of the right.

On the 3rd of May a large-scale counterfeiting case was uncovered. Counterfeiting was done from government plates stolen before the arrival of United States troops. The notes were printed on paper stolen from a shipment to Military Government, and the printing was done on the presses of the communist newspaper. Counterfeiting is considered a heinous offense by Koreans, and the Communist Party was dealt a very severe blow. From the time of the People's Republic, communist power in south Korea steadily waned, and the counterfeiting case was a large factor in turning the people against communism.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

great deal of communist propaganda work had been done in the Russian Consulate in Seoul. On the 2nd of July the Russian Consulate was removed when the Soviets preferred withdrawal instead of permitting the establishment of a parallel American Consulate in north Korea.

The American stand in the Joint Commission improved the position of the Americans in the minds of all Koreans. The United States' peace proposal for a unification of all parties in a national effort, which had been wanted from the very beginning of our occupation, was to take hold and unification became a popular move. A committee consisting of five rightists and five leftists was organized and held three weeks of preliminary meetings with considerable cooperative spirit. The Representative Democratic Council and the Coalition Democratic Front were actively for unification. Even the Communists had a representative who was enthusiastic and cooperative. Because of the counterfeiting case and many other examples of poor leadership, PAK was under fire as president of the communists of south Korea. On the 22nd of July he returned from north Korea with the information that his leadership was backed by the communist control in north Korea, and that the communists would oppose unification actively. He called a meeting of the People's Democratic Front without notifying LYUH, secured a majority of the presidium and declared against unification. This caused a suspension of the efforts of this ten-man committee for unification.

When PAK Hyung Yung returned from north Korea he proposed that the leftist organizations, including the Communist Party, be merged into a labor party and that the Communist Party then be disbanded. His attempt at a merger met with considerable opposition from a group of the Communist Party as well as from leftists. PAK had been running the party in a high handed manner, never calling for the action of the Central Committee, and as a result six prominent communists objected to PAK's orders and began the organization of a move to oust PAK from the presidency.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

In the People's Party, LYUH committed himself to a purge of the communists from his party. A meeting was held in which 31 members of the Central Committee voted for the resignation of the communists, 48- who were communists and had been bribed the Communist Party - voted to maintain their position, 50 members of the Central Committee abstained from voting. The 31 members of the People's Party gathered strength and then sent an ultimatum to the Communist Party to withdraw their communists from the People's Party or they would be expelled. This strengthening of the anti-communist part of the People's Party has had a serious affect on the merger of the leftist parties under communist control. The dissident communists state that they were against taking orders from outside south Korea, that they are for the independence of Korea and revere Korea as their Fatherland. The split in the People's Party has blocked the merger of the leftists into the labor party and that, aided by the counterfeiting trial, has brought the communist control to a new low.

A new group of leftist representatives is now preparing to meet with the rightists in the coalition group with the objective of going ahead with unification efforts and bringing about a Korean legislature in Military Government.

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Confidential

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

26 October 1946

MEMORANDUM TO MILITARY GOVERNOR

Subject: Items presented by Dr. Kimm Kiusic.

Re subject stated Dr. Kimm Kiusic presented the following:

1. The Korean police chief is making wholesale arrests of Leftists. Kim Chul-Soo and two sons were arrested October 23, and released October 24. They were badly beaten up at Yong Pong-Po police station.

2. Huh-Hurn was arrested October 19, released October 20. He was badly beaten up at West Gate police station.

3. Police chief Chang (he questions the identity of the individual) has been asking different groups for contributions to reward the police for their efficient work in quelling the recent strikes. On October 24, a poster appeared in Seoul signed by the Chief of Police requesting all former servicemen of the police force (meaning former Japanese police force members) to enlist.

4. Y. T. Kim, employed with the Finance Department, Military Government, as interpreter, has been posing as director of the Department. Recently Yuh Ho-Byung has been appointed director, Finance Department. Both Y. T. Kim and Yuh Ho-Byung are persona non grata to the Korean people. Yuh as a collaborator, Kim as an impostor. Chang Hong-Sik is recommended for appointment as director, Finance Department. He is considered eminently suited. It is understood that his name is now being considered.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

Confidential

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

28 October 1946

SUBJECT: Mr. Herbert Yim.

TO : General A. E. Brown, United States Representative, United States-Soviet Joint Commission, Duck Soo Palace, Seoul.

1. The Metals Section of the Mining Bureau has been ordered to make an engineering calculation of tonnages and to take accurate samples of some 5 separate stockpiles of tungsten concentrates and ores in South Korea.

2. Three of these stockpiles are located considerable distances from Seoul and apart from each other. It is estimated that the combined tonnage is in excess of 800 tons.

3. At present U.S.A. prices, this tungsten is valued at over ¥100,000,000.00. The tonnages and assays are urgently needed so that true calculations can be made for export of this tungsten to America.

4. A competent engineer is needed for this important engineering task.

5. [illegible] one man this Bureau would recommend and could guarantee for this [illegible] is subject person.

6. It is requested that Mr. Yim be relieved of his present duties for a period of one month in order that he may perform this urgently required engineering mission.

Dana W. Lefke

DANA W. LEFKE
Advisor, Metals
Section, Bureau
of Mining,
Dept of Commerce
Hq USAMGIK APO 235

CC:
File

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr of Advisor, Metals Section, Bureau of Mining, Dept. of Commerce, USAMGIK, Subj Mr. Herbert Kim, 28 Oct 46

1st Ind.

American Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea, 13 November 1946

TO: USAMGIK (Attn: Mr. Leeke, Bureau of Mining)

Mr. Herbert Kim will be released to you for this work on or about 14 November 1946.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL BROWN:

R. H. BOOTH
Col GSC

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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4. A competent engineer is needed for this important engineering work.

5. The one man this Bureau would recommend and could guarantee for this work is subject person.

6. It is requested that Mr. Yim be relieved of his present duties for a period of one month in order that he may perform this urgently required engineering mission.

DANA W. WILKE
Adviser, Metals
Section, Bureau
of Mining,
Dept of Commerce
Hq USAMGIK APO 235

cc:
File

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

BASIC: Ltr of Advisor, Metals Section, Bureau of Mining, Dept. of Commerce, USAMGIK, Subj Mr. Herbert Kim, 28 Oct 46

1st Ind.

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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL BROWN:

R. H. BOOTH
Col GSC

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

31 October 1946

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LERCH:

1. I have been informed that CHUNG, Hai Yong, Head of the People's Party in Cholla Namdo, has been detained by the Korean Police. It is further reported to me that he is being badly treated. My informants profess to believe that Mr. Chung is being held without cause.

2. Will you please look into this matter and give me the facts in this case.

ALBERT L. BROWN
Lt Gen, U.S.A. Major General, U.S. Army

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To Gen. Tsekouris
Chung Hai Yong, whom I know
personally, ~~is~~ is the Head of the
Peoples Party in Hellas
Nam Do. He has been detained
by the Korean police and
accused to be a Communist
Communist and espionage Act.
of State.

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

1 November 1946

Dr. KIMM, Kiusic:

The following individuals have indicated their willingness to join the Coalition Committee:

CHO, Bong Oong

KIM, Chul Soo

Both are Leftist leaders.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

2 November 1946

AG 201 - Burnett, John W.

SUBJECT: Officer Evaluation Report

TO : Asst Adjutant General, Gen Hq, USAFPAC
APO 500 (Att: W. C. McMillion, Lt Col AGD)

The officer, Maj John W. Burnett, O-291834, did not serve under my command during the period stated. I have no recollection of the officer and am therefore not able to prepare an OER.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT: Copy SPECIALISTS (EM and Officers)

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	4Nov	Hq Tps XXIV Corps	US-USSR Jt Com	1. Report called for will be submitted so as to reach this headquarters not later than 1200, 6 Nov 1946. 2. Negative reports are required. ROBERT B. SPENCER Capt., Cav Adjutant
	5 Nov	US-Soviet Jt Com	Hq Tps XXIV Corps	In compliance with 1 above and radio TFGAP 1046 Hq XXIV Corps, the following is the authorized strength in MOS and SSN as shown: OFFICERS MOS — A/S — Auth No. 9330 (Russian) — Immaterial — 3 9332 (Russian) — " — 3 ENLISTED MEN SSN — Branch 070 — Engr — 1 320 (Russian) — G-2 DGS — 2 405 — AJD — 3 JOHN BOJUS Capt Inf Secretary

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43
7773 182

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

5 November 1946

Mr. Rah, Myung Kyoon
President
Korean Horse Association
Seoul

Dear Mr. Rah:

May I express my appreciation for the invitation to present the awards at the horse race to be held Sunday, November 10. I regret that due to a previous engagement, I will be unable to attend.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Korean Horse Association

[illegible] Oct, 1945.

Subject : Invitation to the Horse-race

To : Major General Brown

Head Representative of the American side, American-Soviet Joint-Commission.

Dear General Brown,

I thank you for your sleepless efforts for the independence of our country. Our Association is going to hold a horse-race by the approval of the Military Government.

We have made a special horse-race schedule in honour of you as follows, and the prize, which is to be awarded by you, is also prepared. It will be a great happiness for our association to have the honour of your very attendance.

Accounts:

1. Date and time : From 3.00P.M. until 4.00P.M.
Sun, 18th November 1945.

2. Place : Seoul Turf, 88, Shin Sul Dong, Seoul.

Pal Myung Kyun,
President, Korean Horse Association.
Signed by Moung Kyun, Pak.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Copy

HEADQUARTERS
KOREA BASE COMMAND
APO 901

AG 451 (TKYDO)

SUBJECT: Vehicle Registration Numbers Report

TO : Commanding Officer, Amer Del US-USSR Jt Comm

1. The data requested in letter of Headquarters, XXIV Corps, dated 13 August 1946, above subject, (see attached copy) has not been received.

2. Request that the information called for be forwarded to this Headquarters, attention, Ordnance Officer, without delay.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ K. H. OWENS
Lt Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Ltr Hq XXIV Corps
dated 13 August 46

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

BASIC: Ltr Hq KBC, AG 451 (TKYDO) Subj: Vehicle Registration Numbers Report.

451

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, US Army, 5 November 1946.

To: Commanding General, Korea Base Command, APO 901, US Army. (Attention, Ordnance Officer)

The following vehicle is on MR to Maj Gen A. E. Brown from Hq Co XXIV Corps at the time specified by paragraph 2 of inclosure 1:

Registration No	20635493
Motor No	MB479273
Serial No	373901
Nomenclature	TRUCK, ¼ ton, 4x4 C/R
Type of Property	MR

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

1 Incl n/c

JOHN BOJUS
Capt., Inf
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235

AG 201.62 (TFYMG)

8 November 1946

SUBJECT: Clearance of Officer

TO : Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235

1. Request 1st Lt. Leonard M. Bertsch, 01799818, CMP, be instructed to return to this Headquarters for the purpose of obtaining proper clearance.

2. Subject officer was transferred to your command per 4, Special Orders 266, your headquarters c.s., EDCMR 22 October 1946.

3. Repeated informal attempts to have this officer discharge his obligations to this command have failed.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

McDONALD BAILEY
Major AGD
Adjutant General

AG 140 (TFXAG-O) Bertsch, Leonard M. (O) 1st Ind /acr
Hq XXIV Corps, APO 235,

TO: Commanding Officer, American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, APO 235.

For necessary action.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

[illegible]
1st Lt, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

AG 140 (TFXAG-O) 2nd Ind.
Bertsch, Leonard M. (O)

American Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235
15 Nov 46.

TO: Lt L. M. Bertsch, O-1799818

For compliance.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND
By
File

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

13 November 1946

Mr. Rah, Myung Kyoon
President
Korean Horse Association
Seoul

Dear Mr. Rah:

Due to a previous engagement it will be impossible for me to be present at the horse race on Sunday, 17 November, to which you have so kindly extended me an invitation.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Korean Horse Association.

11 November 1945.

Subject : Invitation to the Horse-race

To : Major General Albert E. Brown,

American Delegate A, U. S. -Soviet Joint Commission.

Dear General Brown,

Allow me to thank you for your sleepless efforts for Korean People and for Koreans. Our Association is going to open a horse-race by the approval of the Military Government.

We have made a special horse-race schedule in honour of you as follows. We are expecting to have the honour of your attendance on that day.

Accounts :

1. Date and time : From 3P.M. until 4P. M. Sun. 17 November 1945
2. Place : Seoul Turf,

So, Shin Sul Chung, Seoul.

Rah Kyung Kyoon,

President, Korean Horse Association.

Signed by

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUBJECT: On the deal of trucks between the New Korea Company and Han Sung Yang Hang and New Korea Transport Co. as witnessed by the writer of this report.

1. Vice-President of the New Korea Company - Pak, Yong Min - asked me to correct any errors in the draft of contract for sales of twenty trucks, each on a certain condition, to Han Sung Yang Hang and to the New Korea Transport Co.

2. The buyers' side, represented by five or six men, submitted a draft of contract through a man, Mr. Son, on the next day.

3. I took the draft home and corrected a few words, putting in their place legal terms. The next morning I returned the draft to Mr. Pak, Yong Min telling him that I made the necessary corrections, and making a remark that the price of the trucks was exceptionably cheap. But his reply was that this was because of the reason that the trucks were out of commission and that the buyers, therefore, have to repair them spending much money for the repair. No further remarks were then made by me.

4. After this Mr. so and so (the spelling of the name is not known) of the New Korea Company called me to his office. When I went in, I found four or five men sitting in the office talking over certain matters. There was another man - Mr. Kim, President of Heung Up Company in Chulla Pukto. These men were evidently discussing different matters at random; but when I entered, they began talking to me concerning the trucks to be sold to these would-be-buyers. "We have now forty trucks sold to us by the Military Government, but we do not really need them for anything", said Mr. Pak of the New Korea Company. This being the case, he wanted to sell them to Han Sung Yang Hang and to the New Korea Transport Company. While this was being contemplated, the Heung Up Company in Chulla Pukto was in need of at least two trucks and the President of this Company was urging Mr. Pak to talk it over with the would-be-buyers whether they should not be inclined to sell two trucks - one each - out of the twenty allotted to each of the two Companies mentioned above. At first the buyers were not inclined to share even one each with the Heung Up Company. Because of such unwillingness to share, Mr. Pak urged me to talk to the buyers in such a way as to make them willing. So I did, and they agreed to do so. Mr. Pak also asked me about the English translation of the draft of the contract. When it was done, he would let me check it, but he never since then spoke to me with regard to the English translation.

5. After the draft in the Korean version was made, I corrected a few errors; and the contract was signed by both parties - the buyer and the seller - in my presence. The made two copies of the draft, and each has kept one. I testify that the contract of the truck sales was made in the above manner.

14 November 1946

Kwak, Myung Tuk
Legal Adviser
of the New Korea Company

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr fr Kwak, Myung Tak ne: Contract to sell trucks between New Korea Co, Han Sung Yang Hang and New Korea Transport Co, dated 14 Nov 46.

1st Ind

American Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 234, 12 December 1946

TO: The Military Governor, USAMGIK, APO 235 US Army

Forwarded as a matter of primary interest.

FOR THE CHIEF OF MISSION:

JOHN BOJES
Capt., Inf
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

14 November 1946

MEMORANDUM TO LT BERTSCH:

SUBJECT: Press Release.

The Joint Korean-American Conference has not issued a press release since 5 November 1946. It is believed advisable that a press release be issued not later than Saturday. This release to include in general terms the activities of the Conference since the date of the last release and to include its meeting of Friday, 15 November. It is requested that you draft such a release.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
APO 500

AG 201—Arthur, Thomas J.
( )AG-PO
Subject: Officer Evaluation Report.

To : Lt. Gen. Robert L. Brown

1. Maj. Thomas J. Arthur 0-472317 has made application for a commission in the Regular Army and has indicated that you were his immediate superior or were a superior officer familiar with his World War II service during the period June 1—Sept 45.

2. In accordance with Circular 209, War Department, 1946, it is requested that completed Officer Evaluation Report (WD AGO FRT-461) for the above named officer be forwarded to Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, Attention: AGPO, within 72 hours of receipt. Prompt compliance is necessary in order that this report may be considered.

3. Pending publication of change the "Remarks" now appearing on page 16, WD AGO FRT-462 are amended to require the reporting officer to include under section E, WD AGO FRT-461 a concise and careful statement giving his reasons why the officer being evaluated should or should not be appointed an Officer in the Regular Army.

4. Request that WD AGO FRT-462 be returned with completed Officer Evaluation Report.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

W. C. HEMPHILL
Lt Col AGD
Asst Adjutant General

2 Incls:
1. WD AGO FRT-461
2. WD AGO FRT-462

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr USAFPAC, 15 Nov 46, AG 201 Anthony, Thomas M. (15 Nov 46) AG-PO Subj: Officer Evaluation Report

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235 US Army, 26 Nov 46

TO: Commander-in-Chief, USAFPAC, APO 500 US Army
Attn: Lt Col W. C. McMillian, AGD

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

JOHN BOJUS
Capt Inf
Secretary

2 Incls n/c

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PALACE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

EXCHANGE PALACE (thru Whitehorse or Washington)

	OFFICE Palace	BILLET Washington
U.S. COMMISSION		
MAJ. GEN. A.E. BROWN (Chief Commissioner)	6	26
BRIG. GEN. JOHN WECKERLING	4	353
COL. R.H. BOOTH	7	26
MR. W.R. LANGDON	5	226
MR. A.C. BUNCE	5	459
LT. WILKINSON, ADC	6	26
LT. BERTSCH	3	451
STENOGRAPHER	6	WH. 239
U.S. SECRETARY		
CAPT. BOJUS	26	457
MR. E. PROSTOV	27	459
MRS. WRIGHT	27	WH. 239
U.S. ADMINISTRATION SECTION		
CWO HOPKINS	20	—
STENOGRAPHERS	29	WH. 239
U.S. CONFERENCE ROOM		
MR. MURPHY	28	WH. 229
MISS SCIUGAM	28	WH. 462R2
SUPPLY		
LT. JONES	41	WH. 531
DISPATCHER	41	—
PALACE GUARD	21	DUPONT
JOINT COMMISSION CONFERENCE ROOM	23-37	
KOREAN CONFERENCE ROOM	40	
RECEPTIONIST	21	
JOINT SECRETARIAT	38	213
RUSSIAN INTERPRETERS		
AMERICAN INTERPRETERS	39	—
MAJ. KIRILLIN		WASH-MINSK-NY
AMERICAN LIAISON OFFICER - P'YONG YANG	WH. 123	
RUSSIAN AFFAIRS (FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE)	32	
USSR SECRETARY	34-35	
USSR ADMINISTRATION AND SECRETARIES	36	
USSR COMMISSION	WASH 256	
USSR CONSULATE		
USSR COMMISSION	WASH 335	
COMMANDING GENERAL	" 119	
DELEGATION	" 213	
INTERPRETERS SECTION	" 519	
LIAISON		128
QUARTERS		119
RUSSIAN HOUSE #1		
JOINT KOREAN AMERICAN CONFERENCE	35	
KIM, KIU SIC, CHAIRMAN		208

Personnel at Duk Soo Palace can be reached on Saturday afternoons, and Sundays by calling Washington and asking for Palace 260.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DUK SOO
PALACE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

US-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION

AMERICAN DELEGATION	ROOM NO.	TELE NO.
Chief Commissioner:		
Maj. Gen. A.E. BROWN	3	6
Commissioners:		
Brig. Gen. JOHN WECKERLING	3	4
Col. R.H. BOOTH	3	7
Mr. W.R. LANGDON	3	5
Mr. A.C. PUNCE	3	5
Aide de Camp:		
1st Lt. C.A. WILKINSON JR.	3	6
Political Adviser:		
1st Lt. L.M. BERTSCH	3	3
Stenographer:		
Miss Y. WOOD	3	6
U.S. SECRETARY		
Secretary		
Capt. J. BOJUS	5	26
Political Adviser		
Mr. E. PROSTOV	5	27
Stenographer		
Mrs. M. WRIGHT	5	27
U.S. ADMINISTRATION SECTION		
Administrative Officer		
CWO R.B. HOPKINS	7	20
Stenopraphers		
Miss A. ANDERSON	7	29
Miss D. CASCIONI	7	29
INTERPRETERS SECTION		
Military Interpreter		
Maj. L. KIRILLIN	12	39
Civilian Interpreters		
Mr. D. MURPHY	9	28
Miss T. SCIUG M	9	28
SUPPLY SECTION		
Supply Officer		
1st Lt. J.P. JONES	Basement	41
PALACE GUARD	Lobby	21
RECEPTIONIST	Lobby	21

Personnel at Duk Soo Palace can be reached Saturday afternoons, and Sundays by calling Washington and asking for Palace 260.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

AGO-P 201 Lordell, Emery J.
(5 Nov 46) O 505 320

20 Nov 46

Subject: Legion of Merit

To: Commander-in-Chief
US Army Forces, Pacific
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to your 32 Indorsement of 1 October 1946, forwarding recommendation of Major General A. V. Arnold, American Delegation, U.S. Soviet Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea AFO 235, 6 September 1946, that the Legion of Merit be awarded to Lieutenant Colonel Emery J. Lordell, Judge Advocate General's Department, for services from September 1946 to May 1946.

2. By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress, approved 20 July 1942, and Executive Order No. 9260, 29 October 1942, the Legion of Merit was awarded by the War Department to Colonel Lordell. The award will be announced in War Department General Orders and the decoration will be presented to him at his present address.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

/s/ Leon J. Gund
Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr, WD, TAG, AGPD-B 201 Woodall, Emery J. (5 Nov 46) O 525 620, dated 20 November 1946, subject: Legion of Merit.

AG 201-WOODALL, Emery J. (20 Nov 46)AG-PA 1st Ind. 5(3 Jan 47)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, APO 500, 3 December 1946.

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235.

210

For information.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

ELIN D. GILLETON,
Lt Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

AG 300.6 (TRAAG-M) 3d Ind ALA/cr

H., XXIV CORPS, APO 235. 1948

TO: Commanding General, American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission.

To note and return.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

[illegible],
Capt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr, WD, TAG, AGPD-B 201 Woodall, Emery J. (5 Nov 46)
O 525 62C, dated 20 Nov 46, subj: Legion of Merit.

200.6 (TFURC) 3d Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235,
10 December 1946.

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235, US Army.

Noted.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel, CE

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul. Korea.

File

21 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN.

Subject: Dwelling for WON, Sei Hoon.

1. On 29th October I addressed a memorandum to you on the subject of the WON house, which had been on the agenda for over four months. With your endorsement the original was forwarded to General Hodge. It was sent by General Hodge to General Lerch. General Lerch sent it down to his subordinates for immediate action. This fact I know from atelephone conversation with Mr. Frisbie of the Office of the Property Custodian. Mr. Frisbie telephoned me for background information immediately after receiving the order. This was approximately November 1st.

2. During the ensuing three weeks I have attempted to see what progress has been made in obeying the General's instructions. There appears to be as little progress now as before.

3. On inquiring yesterday at the Seoul Property Custodian's Office, I learned that the memorandum had "apparently been lost".

L.M. BERTSCH
1st Lt., CMD.

26 Dec 46
Mr Won received possession
of 24 December.
Lt Mitchell, (M.G. Office
Seoul Quartermaster) states that there has been
inefficiency in the processing handling, and
that system has occurred
LMB

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235
21 Nov 46

TO: Military Governor, USAMGIK, APO 235, US Army

1. It is requested that investigation be made:

a. To secure action on basic memorandum, copy attached.

b. To determine the reason for the delay in handling this matter to conclusion.

2. Request inform of action.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Maj Gen, USA
Chief Commissioner

1 Incl
Memo to Gen Brown
29 Oct 46

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] EDUCATION
U.S. - SOUTH [illegible]
[illegible] Korea.

10 October 1946.

[illegible] FOR [illegible] REPORT:

1. An illustration of some of the difficulties being placed in the way of the achievement of [illegible] will be provided by a [illegible] of the salient facts [illegible] the effort to obtain a house for [illegible].

2. [illegible] has been the right hand man and chief lieutenant [illegible] over the period of the past six months. He [illegible] friend. [illegible] is obliged to live in a room in the [illegible] obtaining [illegible] for Mr. [illegible] last June. [illegible] made [illegible] to secure a house which would be [illegible] property Custodian's office. [illegible] order that there be no question whatever [illegible] of obtaining [illegible] to give no [illegible] circumstances [illegible] the most [illegible] checked [illegible] of the same [illegible] effort of [illegible] told [illegible] the [illegible] cost-of [illegible] [illegible] assured [illegible] the [illegible] to obtain this [illegible] action [illegible].

3. Meanwhile [illegible] service to [illegible] the intense antagonism of certain [illegible] both to the President of the Chohung Bank and to the Korean personnel of the Property Custodian's office. The bank president, [illegible] Chon Yong, made statements that his connections were such that there was no power in Korea which could turn his mistress out of the property. During the ensuing four months, Mr. Won states that he spent approximately twenty hours at various times on fruitless efforts to determine the status of his application. He has frequently been kept sitting in the Property Custodian's office for several hours at a time without being attended to by anyone. At no time [illegible] informed him that the application (which he was told in June had been approved) was disapproved apparently in September.

4. The American officials of the Property Custodian's office [illegible] stated that the case was clear cut and there was no reason

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Memo to General Brown.

29 October 1946

for delaying action. The matter went to a Board of Review which apparently concluded that the claims of the embezzling mistress were superior to those of the second most helpful political figure in Korea.

6. In the face of the fact that General Arnold gave his personal promise to Mr. on that he would try to secure him this honor, and that this office, under the Generals order, did prepare the case to secure it in accordance with the standard procedure of the Property Custodian's office, the [illegible] that this case [illegible] involves embezzlement to the military government.

7. Inquiry from various sources of information leaves it impossible to determine by whose decision his property was in fact denied to Mr. Won. Major Scott of the Purchasing Board [illegible] section of the case. Captain O'Connell of the Property Office [illegible] stated that it was his understanding that the decision was [illegible] Captain Shute of the office of Base Weeks. Captain Shute disclaims all knowledge of it and insists that the decision was [illegible] Major Nesbitt. Mr. Frisbie of the Property Office states that the decision ultimately reached was in opposition to his strong recommendation. It appears probable that the result was related upon the Americans by acting [illegible] all the facts or who distorted them.

8. During the four weeks since the appeart final decision of Mr. Won's application, I have made three separate requests for information as to the status of the case in the Office of the Property Custodian. On each occasion I have been assured that the matter would be checked and I would be called back. I have never been called back.

9. A word about the character and background of [illegible], President of the Choheung Bank, is germane to this discussion. Mr. CHUNG is an intimate of the leading figures in the Han Kook Democratic Party. As President of the Choheung Bank he has been strongly opposed by many of his stockholders. I cannot verify the truth of this story, but it is widely repeated and believed that the stockholders have attempted to upset Chung's control of the bank and have had their action countermanded by Koreans officials of the Department of Finance.

9. The ramifications of his interests appear to be very wide. From separate andpresumably authentic sources has come information to the members of the Coalition Committee in recent weeks that Mr. Chung has been soliciting donations from wealthy acquaintances who desire to be members of the legislature. He is said to have stated that for 1,000,000 ¥ he could secure a seat for anyone.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Memo to General Brown.

29 October 1946

This report is included here only for general background. It is not believed that Mr. Chung claims to have influence with American officials.

10. It is respectfully recommended that this matter be reopened for investigation and for the punishment and removal of culpable parties. It is further recommended that the Commanding General direct some procedure whereby the need of Mr. Won for a residence can be immediately filled.

LEONARD M. FERTSCH
1st Lt., CMP

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

AG 333.5 (CFOOG) 22 November 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Investigations regarding Disturbances at Taegu, Korea

TO : Major General A. E. Brown
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

1. The inclosed copy of report of investigation re disturbances at Taegu, Korea, is furnished for your information.

2. Request that it be returned to this headquarters for file when you have no further need for it.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

1 Incl
Report of Investigation
regarding Disturbances
at Taegu, Korea

CHARLES ENNIS
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

1095

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr Hq USAFIK, Off of CG, AG 333.5 (TFGCC), 22 Nov 46
Subj: Report of Investigations regarding Disturbances at Taegu, Korea.

1st Ind.

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, 26 Nov 46

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, APO 235, US Army.

Noted.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

JOHN POJUS
Capt., Inf.
Secretary

1 Incl n/c

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

[illegible] November 1947

[illegible]

SUBJECT: Korean Political Situation.

1. As result of discussion of the Joint Commission with Brig Gen [illegible], Military Government and Mr. H. A. Sidney, Bermuda Mission present, the following conclusions as to the political situation were reached:

a. The Coalition Committee as approved by the Commanding General as it has developed represents in fact the only known leftist political group of sufficient reliability with which the Commanding General could negotiate on political matters.

b. The Coalition Committee has made certain recommendations to the Commanding General, specifically:

(1) That the recent elections be cancelled in the province of Kyongsang-do and in the City of Seoul.

(2) That certain reforms be made in the police department, primarily to result from the dismissal of certain senior officers of that department.

(3) That rice collection from small farmers be cancelled.

2. The Joint Commission recently submitted to the Commanding General its recommendations that he approve recommendation b.(1) of the Coalition Committee above and in addition that he approve the removal of Chief, Kuk Sang, Chief of sub-area (A) and Police Chief of the City of Seoul, from office. In addition there was presented to the Commanding General a draft of proposed conclusions and recommendations to be considered by the Joint Korean-American Conference concerning the police

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] Memo to G-3, WDC (Comm. Subj: Korean Political Situation, dtd [illegible]

[illegible]. It is believed that recommendations on the [illegible] should be made public after the Joint Chiefs of Staff [illegible] have taken action on [illegible] No. 1 to the Secretary of State, which [illegible] the Commission.

In order to discourage this movement by the Party [illegible] Commission, it is the opinion of this Commission [illegible]

a. Failure of the [illegible] to [illegible] the minimum recommendations of [illegible] Commission, b.(1) and b.(2) of [illegible] would probably result in [illegible] withdrawal of [illegible] from South Korea [illegible] who left [illegible] Soviet Zone.

b. The legislature, if it [illegible] would consist mainly of members of [illegible] who would in fact be [illegible].

c. [illegible] Commission [illegible] with the failure of the Commission [illegible] what they consider reasonable [illegible] would be expected to [illegible] Commission [illegible].

d. The Military Government [illegible] the Koreans [illegible] the Commission policy [illegible] to withdraw their support and [illegible] to oppose such policy.

e. The result of this policy would [illegible] negotiations with the Russians for a non-Communist dominated provisional government much more difficult because they could claim that the group supported by the United States represents but one of many political groups.

4. The Commission renews its recommendations submitted in memo to Commanding General dated 20 November 1947.

ALBERT C. WEDE
Major General, U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 November 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Enlisted Men

THRU: Commanding Officer, 3040th QM Car Co, APO 235

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235

Request Tec 5th grade Spencer L. Younce, 20931544, 3040th QM Car Co, now on duty as my driver, be transferred to the American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission and Tec 5th grade William H. Markus, RA37883870 be placed on duty in his place.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, USA

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

25 November 1946

MEMORANDUM TO ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

SUBJECT: Assignments.

1. Request orders be issued relieving 1st Lt Candler A. Wilkinson, Jr. Inf, O-25289 as Aide de Camp to the undersigned and with assignment to the U.S. - S.J.C. Commission.

2. Lieut Wilkinson requests return to the 6th Inf Div for assignment. He desires if practicable assignment to the 20th Inf.

3. It is desired that 1st Lt Kenneth G. Altheus, Jr. Inf, O-524[illegible]0 be assigned vice Lieut Wilkinson.

ALBERT J. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

25 November 1946

SUBJECT: Accident to Private Vehicle.

TO: CHIEF OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. About 1600 Saturday, 23 November, while proceeding in his private jeep from the Peoples Building to the 29th General Hospital north on Thar Gwer Chang Street, Major General Albert [illegible] became involved in the following accident.

About two miles northeast of the Peoples Building a Korean woman stooped in the middle of the road and carried a pail of water from her yard. It was necessary in order to avoid injuring her to stop the jeep. About thirty seconds or so after the jeep stopped a street car hit the rear end of the jeep. Apparently the motorman thought it had sufficient clearance to pass. The jeep itself was not badly damaged but the winterized covering on the jeep top received about two inches.

2. The jeep has been returned to the military government agency which placed the winterized cover on. The number of the street car involved was [illegible]. Field Warrant Officer Alfred B. Watson was a passenger in the jeep with General Brown and has submitted an accident report to the Provost Marshal.

3. It is requested

a. that the Military Government Agency concerned repair the winterized covering on the jeep and send the bill to General Brown.

b. that the motorman of car [illegible] and members of his crew who may have knowledge be

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Memo to Military Governor, subj: Accident to Private Vehicle, 25 November 1946.

questioned as to the reason for the accident.

4. It is General Brown's intention to present the bill covering the repair of his jeep to the street car company for payment after he determines specifically the amounts involved.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of Headquarters Supply
APO 235

AG 400 (TFYMG)

25 November 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Duplicating Machines and Computing Machines on Hand

TO : All Departments, Bureaus, Sections and Detachments of Headquarters USAMGIK, APO 235

1. Property Officer of all units supplied by Headquarters Supply Section USAMGIK, will submit a complete list by serial number and manufactures name, of all, Machines, Duplicating (mimeograph) and Machines, Computing on hand.

2. Such report will reach S-4 Section, Headquarters USAMGIK not later than Friday, 29 November 1946.

3. Negative reports are required.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HELMICK:

McDONALD BAILEY
Major, AGD
Adjutant General

Copies to:
Chiefs, all Staff Sections
Directors, all Departments and Offices
Chiefs, all Separate Activities and
Commanding Officer, HQS CO. USAMGIK

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file

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

26 November 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Duplicating Machines on Hand

TO: Hq USAMGIK, Office of Headquarters Supply, APO 235

In compliance with letter your headquarters dated 25 Nov 1946, file AG 400 (TFYMG), Subject: as above, the following information is submitted:

Machines, Duplicating (mimeograph), numbers 45857 and 459333, manufactured by A. B. Dick. Machines, Computing - None on hand.

JOHN BOJUS
Capt Inf
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

26 November 1946

Heu Hun, Chairman
Constitutional Committee
The South Korea Labour Party
Seoul

Dear Mr. Heu:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your invitation to attend the inauguration meeting of your party, November 23, and November 24.

Your invitation was delivered to me by your messenger on the morning of November 25.

Very truly yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief Commissioner

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

30 November 1946

Mr. Lyuh, Woon Byung

Dear Mr. Lyuh:

Reference your undated memorandum presented to Major General A. E. Brown which was received by General Brown about 20 November and about which Lieut Bertsch spoke to me yesterday. This memorandum as you recall covered your recommendations for the removal of Commissioner of Police, Chough, Byawng Ok, and Chief of Police, Chang, Taik Sang, primarily as stated by you "from the beginning of their services Chang, Taik Sang and Chough, Byawng Ok have operated their offices as partisan aids to their political party".

This document was read by the Chairman before all members present at the meeting of the Joint Korean-American Conference 21 November and the document itself was entered as exhibit 17 of the record. Copies of this exhibit are being furnished to the Military Governor with request that the matters raised by you be investigated insofar as the time which has elapsed and the availability of witnesses will permit.

I am now requesting that if in the future you are annoyed by illegal actions of the police or if any of your close associates are illegally arrested or other illegal action is taken against you or them by the police that you give me a written statement of the circumstance, the time and the place and those individuals who have knowledge of and can give possible evidence concerning the incident. I promise you that with the information which you furnish a prompt and thorough investigation of the situation reported will be made and that necessary action will be taken against any member of the police force who has acted illegally against you or any other individual.

Yours truly,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

30 November 1946

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Chairman, Coalition Committee
Seoul

Dear Doctor:

Informal information received from Brigadier General C. G. Helmick, Acting Military Governor, is to the effect that the present election schedule for the City of Seoul is as follows:

Dec 7 - Registration complete
Dec 14-16 - Tung Chung representatives are elected
Dec 17 - Elected Tung Chung representatives meet to nominate their selections
Dec 20 - Final election

The information concerning the dates of the Kangwon-do election have not yet been received. More complete information concerning both elections will be furnished you as soon as received.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea.

December 4, 1946.

To: Col. Anderson, Military Governor of Kyunggi Do.

Subject: PETITION OF CHO HAN SIK

In the case of CHO, Han Sik, a petition on whose behalf I am filing herewith, I wish respectfully to present the following record of facts:

Last February, while I was assigned to the Department of Public Information in Military Government, I was working in association with Mrs. PAK. In Duk (Mrs. Pak is an eminent rightist, orator and women's leader and is now making a tour of the United States speaking before women's organizations) Mrs. Pak knowing that I had been admitted to membership in the Korean Bar, asked that I look into this case, which she regarded as a miscarriage of justice and of which she stated that she had personal knowledge. With the consent of Col. Newman I checked into the facts and then assisted the family of Cho in preparing their appeal.

The background of the case had been as follows: About the first of the year, the so-called Preparatory Association for the National Army, a leftist organization, had been usurping a number of governmental powers and had claimed the right to take over property and was using this practice as a means of obtaining funds unlawfully. A group of members of this Association were living in a house in Seoul, and from this house as their headquarters they had conducted a blackmailing business. They had warned two Japanese women who lived in a nearby house that they must move out of their property or they would be harmed. The Japanese women had appealed to the police for protection and the police had raided this illegal headquarters. Cho han Sik was a farmer, and a rightist in so far as he had any political beliefs at all. His home was on a farm some ten miles from the City. He had been afflicted with severe boils on his neck and had tried the local "doctors" and the native herb medicines without success. On the day of the raid he had come into the city with the intention of finding a city doctor and had gone to the home of his cousin, a city dweller, who might be expected to be able to recommend a good doctor. He had traced his cousin to the so-called headquarters, and was there when the raid occurred.

Mr. Cho had had no lawyer and had been totally unfamiliar with legal proceedings. Apart from continuing to declare his innocence, he had been too bewildered to do

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anything else to defend himself. He and a group of others who were arrested at the same time were tried together and convicted together and he was sentenced to one year in prison. After some weeks his family managed to learn what had happened to him and they had appealed to Mrs. Pak In Duk to assist them.

In conjunction with Mrs. Pak I talked to the Military Judge who had heard the case (whose name I do not now recall) and also to Mr. Cho and his fellow prisoners, as well as to the Japanese women who had been the chief witnesses. The women stated that they were unable to identify individuals specifically. The fellow prisoners confirmed Cho's claim that he was not a member of their group. The Judge did not recollect that the evidence had been conclusive against any individual but rather against the group as a unit.

On these circumstances I aided the Cho family in writing and filing their appeal. The sentencing had occurred on January 23rd, and the appeal was made on April 2nd (case No.1773). I was informed by the reviewing office in May that the appeal had been sustained by their investigators, and that the matter would await the signature of General Hodge, which might be a matter of some weeks.

I informed Mrs. Pak who gave the information to the family and I thereupon forgot the case completely.

A week ago several of the family came again to Seoul and asked my further assistance. Checking the matter I learned that the appeal had been denied. The family say that they have been living in exceedingly great hardship; they have thirteen children, most of whom have been living on the charity of neighbours. They say that if their father can be released at this time he can earn some money by chopping wood and bringing it to the city for sale.

Under the circumstances I am filing the appeal personally acting in the capacity of CHO, Han Sik's lawyer. I wish to emphasise that this is being done in purely a personal capacity, but I respectfully recommend and request that your office will give favourable consideration and will expedite the release of this man at the present time.

L.D/w

L.M.BERTSCH
Lt. CMP

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

PETITION OF CHO HAN SIK

To: Military Governor of Kyunggi Do

The undersigned CHO, Han Sik. hereby petitions for the review of his case and for the revocation of the remaining portion of his sentence, for the reason that he was never a member of the Preparatory Association for the National Army and that he did not in any way participate in any illegal activity.

CHO HAN SIK

By: _____
Attorney

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

6 December 1946

SUBJECT: Budget for 1947-48 Fiscal Year.

TO: Department of Finance, Hq USAMGIK, APO 235

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 3 December 1946.

Correction in amount requested for fuel is hereby made to ¥- 1,625,640 instead of ¥- 350,000.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

JOHN BOJUS
Capt., Inf
Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

6 December 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. General John R. Hodge,
Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Replacement of Dr. Clough and Chief Chang.

The attached memorandum was received from Mr. Ahn, Chai Hong. A copy is being sent to the Military Governor.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Maj. General, USA.

cc: Military Governor

Confidential

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY

Dec. 6, 1946.

Major General Albert E. Brown:-

Dear Sir:-

I pay my respects to your excellency. Concerning to the candidates for the director of the Department of Police and for the Bureau of Capital Police I have the honor to recommend, if it is not too late, the following persons as the well-qualified men for that post. I present this to you with all my sincerity for your personal infomation.

I am

Truly yours,

/S/ Ahn, Chai Hong

Mr. Sur Sei Choong
(Recommend to the Director of the Department of Police)
Mr. Sur cannot speak English. It may be his defect. Otherwise he is well qualified. Only recently he has become the active staff of the so-called "People's League", and this needs a careful consideration.

Mr. Park Kun Won
(Recommend also to the Director of the Department of Police)
Mr. Park is now the Governor of Kangwon Province. Compared with Mr. Sur he is by no means inferior as a man of business. He has no connection whatsoever with any political party.

Mr. Lee Choong Chai
(Recommend to the Chief of Headquarters, Metropolitan Police Division and to the Headquarters Assistant Director for First Police)
Mr. Lee is a graduate of the Tokyo Agricultural University, Japan, but he can speak English and he has the ability and strength for the post mentioned above. He is now the president of Tong-Yang Cotton Co. He is about 50 years old.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Mr. Park Kun Woo (HKW)

(Received and left the Minutes of the Sept 8 meeting)

Mr. Park was told the substance of the Sept 8 meeting. Emphasis was placed on the necessity for Korean unity as a means of keeping the Communists out of Korea. He was cautioned against taking any political party.

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to the Chief of Headquarters
Metropolitan Police Division and to the
Headquarters assistant Director For

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

7 December 1946

MEMORANDUM TO DIRECTOR, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL,
XXIV CORPS

SUBJECT: Extension of Contract.

1. It is requested that the contract of Miss Yvonne A. Wood, employee of the Joint Commission, be extended from 15 December 1946 to approximately 30 January 1947.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

File

1

1st Ind.

American Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission,
APO 235, 7 Dec 46.

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps

Recommend approval of Incl. 1.

1 Incl.
Proposed Commendation
to Lieut Bertsch.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

7 December 1946

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : 1st Lieut. Leonard M. Bertsch, O-1799818

1. I desire to commend you for outstanding performance and devotion to duty during the period 20 March 1946 to 6 November 1946.

2. During the sessions of the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission from 20 March to 9 May 1946 your summaries and analyses of the work of the joint sessions were invaluable in keeping me advised of daily developments. Your knowledge of political activities and organizations were of great assistance to the Joint Commission in its efforts to establish a basis for consultation with Koreans under the provisions of the Moscow Decision for the establishment of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. Following the adjournment of the Joint Commission, when the necessity for political unity in southern Korea took on added importance, your efforts to win the support of both political wings for a coalition movement contributed materially to the progress made. The magnitude of that task cannot be over-emphasized. However, by your persistency of purpose, sincerity in dealing with Korean leaders, understanding of oriental psychology and customs, and extraordinary patience and devotion to duty, you assisted immeasurably in the development of this movement.

3. Under the provisions of War Dept Circ No. 377 dated 18 Dec 1945, you are hereby authorized to wear the Army Commendation Ribbon.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

9 December 1946

SUBJECT: Request for Job Ratings

TO : The Director of Civilian Personnel
XXIV Corps, APO #235, U.S. Army

1. It is recommended that job ratings on the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission be established for the civilian positions indicated below.

Position	Minimum Rating Recommended	Number Required
(a) High speed reporter for Joint Committee and subcommittee hearings.	CAF-7	4
(b) Personal secretary and stenographer to U. S. Chief of the Commission (Maj. Gen.) and Deputy Chief (B.G.)	CAF-7	1
(c) Clerk-Stenographers for general stenographic work.	CAF-5	3
(d) Chief of interpreting and translating section.	P-5	1
(e) Chief interpreter	CAF-9-11	1
(f) Translator (Editor of Russian texts).	CAF-9-11	1
(g) Translator (Editor of English texts).	CAF-9-11	1

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(h) Interpreters, bilingual. To interpret from Russian into English ordinary debates.	CAF-6-8	3
(i) Translators, bilingual. To translate from Russian into English and vice versa, materials of average difficulty.	CAF-6-8	3

2. The duties and responsibilities of the above positions are as follows:

(a) Act as high speed reporter and take verbatim transcript at a minimum rate of 175 words per minute of the U. S. - Soviet Joint Committee meetings and subcommittee meetings lasting four hours or more. This includes taking verbatim notes of long speeches followed by question and answer testimony. The conference may include fifteen or more delegates and involve a rapid interchange of questions and answers including some from non-delegates present. Conferences may include Koreans as well as Russians and some of these nationals not infrequently attempt to discourse in highly imperfect English adding immeasurably to the difficulties of accurate reporting. In such a case where the verbatim record would not convey the true sense of the statement, the clerk is required to transcribe a statement as near verbatim as will convey the true meaning. Thus the clerk must not only make absolute accurate, speedy, verbatim records when statements are made in acceptable English, but must also record accurately the sense of any statements made in English so imperfect as to be useless in a transcription. No interruptions are permitted. A high degree of speed is essential in transcribing the record since it must be available to members of the Commission very shortly after the meetings.

Four (4) individuals may be required for the duties of position (a) so that a team of two will always be available for recording a conference without interference with transcription of conferences just completed. Furthermore, due to hearings and conferences of subcommittees, more than one recording team may be required at any given time.

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(b) This individual should have the qualifications of position (a) in order to substitute in an emergency. Normal duties will require rapid and accurate stenographic and typist work, screening papers coming to the Joint Commission in order to determine which the Chief should see, determining the desires and importance of foreign as well as American visitors who desire to interview the Chief of the Commission.

(c) In addition to positions (a) and (b), important stenographic work must be performed. This position will require taking rapid dictation from American members of the Commission and transcribing quickly and with accuracy. Reports, estimates, plans and proposals to be presented by the United States side will constitute the bulk of this work.

(d) Head of interpreting and translating section: To supervise the work of all translators and interpreters of the Commission; to select and train, when necessary, interpreting and translating personnel; to approve all final versions of documents, in English and Russian; to act as interpreter on specially important occasions (open and general sessions of the Joint Commission).

(e) To handle especially difficult or responsible conference interpreting in the Joint Commission, especially English into Russian; fluent knowledge of both Russian and English with sufficient background in conference work. To supervise other interpreters, assist in training, and act as understudy to head of section.

(f) To translate into Russian very difficult subject matter, and to edit the translations by the regular translators. Should have full command of the Russian language, familiarity with Russian protocol expressions and high proficiency in the English language.

(g) To translate into English especially difficult subject matter, and to edit translations into English by regular translators. In addition to a good knowledge and understanding of the Russian language, should have the ability to write flawless English and have some familiarity with protocol language.

(h) Also interpret from English into Russian at subcommission level. Should have a sound and fluent knowledge of both languages and personality traits (poise, quick judgment, fluency) required in this type of work.

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By NARS, Date

(i) At least one of these should be able to write correct idiomatic English. Experience in writing reports, etc. is highly desirable.

3. Total authorized civilian personnel for Joint Commission - 28.

Total positions for which rating is requested in this letter - 18.

4. This office will forward in a separate communication a statement of the minimum requirements for assignment of personnel to fill the positions indicated in paragraph 1 above.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel CE

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

10 December 1946

SUBJECT: Family Allowance ODB Form No 630.

TO: Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO 235, US Army

1. The attached notice of allowance was mailed direct to this unit from ODB, Newark 2, N. J.

2. Pvt. John G. Fowler, 44 116 548, has never been a member of this organization.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

1 Incl
ODB Form No 630
(Pvt John G. Fowler)

J. B. HOPKINS
CWO USA
Adm Officer.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul; Korea

220

10 December 1946

SUBJECT: Transfer of Enlisted Personnel.

TO: Commanding Officer
3040th QM TC Co.
APO 235, US Army

TO: Commanding General
Hq XXIV Corps
APO 235, US Army

1. Request Tec 5 Allan E. Kane 19215126, 3040th QM TC Co., now on duty as Major General Albert E. Brown's driver, be transferred to the American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission.

2. Tec 5 Kane will be assigned on the same duty as at present, and it will be unnecessary for the 3040th QM TC Co. to furnish a driver for General Brown.

BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel, CE

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

13 December 1946

SUBJECT: Mr. Herbert Kim.

TO : General A. E. Brown, United States Representative, United States-Soviet Joint Commission, Duck Soo Palace, Seoul.

1. Refer to letter on subject person dated 28 October 1946, paragraph 6. The one months period is about completed.

2. Please be advised that we are extremely short of competent mining personnel in this Bureau. Mr. Kim is at present rendering valuable service.

3. This Bureau hereby requests his release by the Joint Commission, for a position of permanency here.

Dana W. Leeke.

DANA W. LEEKE
Metals Section,
Bureau of Mines,
Dept. of Commerce,
HQ USAMGIK, APO 235

CC:
File

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr fr Dana W. Leeke, to Gen Brown, dated 13 Dec 46, Subj: Mr. Herbert Kim

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, 16 December 1946.

TO: The Military Governor, USAMGIK, APO 235, US Army
(Attn: Bureau of Mining)

The Commission agrees to the release as per request in basic communication.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel, CE

1 Incl.
Ltr fr Dana W.
Leeke, 28 Oct 46,
Re: Herbert Kim.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

LT. JONES

REQUEST FOR NATIVE HOUSE EMPLOYEES

SUBMITTED BY: US-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION DATE: 23 December 1946

LOCATION: SUR-BOO [illegible], Seoul, Korea FOR MONTH OF : January 1947

No. of Employees	Nature of Duty	Maximum Rate of Pay	Local Currency Equivalent
1	Interpreter	PRETER	
1	Interpreter	PRETER	
1	SUPERINTENDENT		
1	[illegible]		
1	Cook		
2	[illegible]		
1	Driver for Staff Car	General Brown	600 Yen
1	Chauffeur	[illegible]	360 "
1	Chauffeur	[illegible]	240 "
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] "
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] "
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] "
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] "
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] "
1

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

Confidential

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

16 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

SUBJECT: Discharge of CHANG, Hoong Sik as Director, Chosun Savings Bank

1. Dr. KIM, Kiusic several weeks ago submitted a confidential recommendation to Major General Albert E. Brown that Mr. CHANG, Hoong Sik be considered by the Military Governor for appointment as Director of Finance. General Brown transmitted this recommendation confidentially to the Military Governor.

2. Dr. KIM, Kiusic today informed General Brown that CHANG, Hoong Sik was recently ordered to vacate the Director's room of the Chosun Savings Bank, that apparently some difficulty arose over this matter, and as a result CHANG, Hoong Sik has been discharged and replaced by an individual from the Development Bank.

3. Dr. KIM, Kiusic feels that his recommendation transmitted confidentially to General Brown resulted in the dismissal of CHANG, Hoong Sik from his office. He stated that he does not know this man personally, but that he was highly recommended to him, that he is a man of good banking experience, and he feels that his recommendation to General Brown should have been regarded as confidential and that certainly no injury should have resulted to Mr. CHANG, Hoong Sik as a result of it.

4. It is requested that confidential inquiry concerning this matter be initiated and that General Brown be furnished the substance of a reply to Dr. KIM, Kiusic.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S.A.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

17 December 1946

MEMORANDUM TO MILITARY GOVERNOR:

SUBJECT: Dependable Police Chiefs.

1. Dr. Kimm, Kiusic reported to General Brown December 14, 1946, that during the riots in south Korea and the Province of Kyongsang Pukto that the following Five Chiefs of Police, all newly appointed and without prior experience under the Japanese, maintained perfect order in the areas of their responsibilities:

Moon, Kyung
Chung, Song
Young, Yang
Sui, Sung
Ahn, Tong

He attributes this fact to the respect in which they are held by the people.

2. He informs that in nineteen other police areas, all presided over by police chiefs who had prior service with the Japanese, that great disorder occurred. He attributes this fact to the hostile feeling of the people for police chiefs with prior experience under the Japanese.

3. This information is being transmitted to you purely because it was presented by Dr. Kimm, Kiusic.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

SUBJECT: The grafting of YUN BUM CHOON, Manager of Chosen Rubber Company and of LEE CHONG LYUL of New Korea Company.

1. In April 1946 Yun Bum Choon received 390,000 yen for 3,000 pairs of rubber shoes that he sold at black market price. These shoes he received from the second factory of the Chosen Rubber Company as rental for trucks loaned to this second factory. Out of the 390,000 yen he kept 90,000 yen for himself. It is believed that he will also keep for himself some of the 300,000 yen left for the employees of the Company. As a measure of protection of himself from being exposed to the public of such grafting, he dismissed from their respective positions Pang Do Bum, Kim Whak Tai, Choi Byung Doo and Shu Soo Yong, all of whom conspired the dishonesty with him.

2. In June 1946 he grafted 90,000 yen supposed to have been paid to a coal company, the name of the manager of which is Pak Eun Sook. He said that he bought 100 tons of coal from Pak Eun Sook in front of So Sa railway station. But after an investigation conducted by the deputy manager of the Chosen Rubber Company, it was discovered that there lived in front of the station neither the coal dealer Pak Eun Sook nor had he actually bought any coal. The fact of the matter is like this: In October 1945 when the price of coal was at the highest he purchased 500 tons of coal from Kobayashi Mining Company, and lent 150 tons to La Yul Company which was received on taken over by the New Korea Company. This year he received cash estimated at 200 yen per ton for 150 tons that was lent to the above Company. The coal that he was supposed to have bought for the company was estimated at 900 yen per ton and he actually set aside 700 yen per ton for himself, the actual price of the coal per ton being 200 yen. Thus he kept 70,000 yen for himself.

3. In November 1946 he bought, it was told by him, machinery for the Company and paid out 140,000 yen, receiving the receipt for it from Lee Chong Lyul, Chief of the Industrial Section of the New Korea Company. Since Lee Chong Lyul is not a dealer in machinery, his receipt could not have been valid to acknowledge the receipt of 140,000 yen. The whole frame-up proves that they were dishonest and that they grafted that much money. To prove this, the machinery has not yet been delivered to the company.

4. In October 1946 he sold on the black market 3 drums of oil at a black market price of 4,000 yen each totalling 12,000 yen, and he kept this for himself.

5. In October 1946 he sold 150 batteries and kept the money for himself - 7,500 yen.

6. From August 1946 to October, he sold certain articles (Cook Ju Choong Tai) 600 of them, manufactured by the company, at a total price of 150,000 yen, but the money has not yet come into the treasury of the company. This shows that he kept the money for himself.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

7. Out of 30 bolts of muslin or canvas for making shoes, which were allotted to the company by the Military Government, he sold one bolt, 50 yards, at 4,500 yen, and he kept this for himself.

8. The Chosen Rubber Company paid out 60,000 yen for repairing an automobile that is owned by the Chosen Rubber Company but is used by the New Korea Company. This is not right.

9. Since September 1946 he has been paying 600 yen every month to a driver of the New Korea Company, and this is not right also.

10. He says that he has deposited the capital of the Rubber Company in the New Korea Company. It is believed that he and Lee Chong Lyul of the New Korea Company consumed a great deal of that money for their private purposes.

11. He often does not come to the office, but when he does, he marks down presence on the time keeping book even for the days of his absence.

12. If one should go over the books of this company, one would find many illegal transactions.

13. Afraid of being exposed of such many illegal transactions and grafting, Yun Bum Choon and Lee Chong Lyul, plotting together, discharged the deputy director of the company, Lee Won Sik, though this man has no fault to be discharged.

14. In November 1946 Lee Bum Choon invited Lee Won Sik and Bun Mong Pil on two occasions, once to his own home and at another time to a restaurant; and he coaxed them to overlook the things not entered in the books of the company, and to sell such things to buy their homes, but these men refused flatly.

Submitted by: LEE WON SIK
Deputy Director
CHOSEN RUBBER CO.

W.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

1st Ind.

American Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235,
U.S. Army, 19 December 1946

TO: The Military Governor, USAMGIK. 19 Dec 46

Forwarded as a matter of primary interest.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

JOHN BOJUS
Capt, Inf
Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

19 December 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HELMICK,
Acting Military Governor.

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Toiling Masses Party Account.

1. The following notes may assist you in reaching a decision with respect to the projected withdrawal of funds from the Bank of Chosun by the Toiling Masses Party, which was discussed by you and General Brown yesterday.

a. The account is in the name of Han, Am Hoi, Vice President of the Toiling Masses Party. We were informed that the total amount in the account was ¥319,000, and that the account number was No. 28966.

b. Mr. Kang, Soon, President of the Toiling Masses Party, stated that the money in Japanese yen was brought to Korea by the executive officials of the Toiling Masses Party and deposited in the Bank of Chosun. The party officials were unaware of the provisions against withdrawal, according to Mr. Kang.

c. The money originally belonged to Mr. Han, according to Kang who stated that Han was wealthy and the financial backer of the party.

2. Mr. Kang stated that he would like to withdraw one-half of the total amount during this month and the remainder within a month.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brig. Gen., USA.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

21 December 1946

Chairman, Association for
Preparation of the Chosun Youth Party
Seoul, Korea

Dear Sir:

Your letter of December 16, inviting me to the Inauguration Ceremony of the Chosun Youth Party to be held at 1300, December 18, 1946 at the Tuk Soo Palace, was not received by me until December 20. I regret that I was therefore unable to attend.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

December 16, 1946

Invitation

To Major General Albert War Brown.

You are cordially invited to the inauguration ceremony of the Chosun Youth Party to be Held at 13:00, December 16, 1946 at the Tokkyo Palace.

The Association for preparation of
the Chosun Youth Party
L. Sun. Keun

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Dec. 18, 1946

Fundamental Program

1, We are resolved to work for the complete self-independence of our fatherland by collecting the total power and ability of our youth.

2, We are resolved to realize an equal society of coproprity of our nation and to develope it by all the intelligence and wisdom of our youth on our efforts.

3, We are resolved to contribute to the establishment of world peace by inheriting and enhancing our eternal national culture with sincerity and virtues of our youth.

4, We are resolved to avoid intrecine stifes resolutely and to work for solidarity of the nation and wealth and strength of the states through pure patriotism of our youth.

5, We are resolved to reject and purge all external and internal factors, which impede reconstruction of our fatherland, by brave actions of our youth.

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By NARS, Date

DECLAMATION OF THE CHOSUN YOUTH PARTY AT THE INAUGURATION MEETING

Dear eight million young comrades who were born in Korea, who love Korea and who are ready to die for Korea! Our fatherland which was believed to have been liberated is still agonizing under the yoke of the 38 iron barrier and the thirty million people who believed themselves to have been liberated are on the verge of ruin, being devided into north and sough and involved in internecine strifes.

Who is it that will save the nation and state out of the unprecidented crisis, and recover order, maintain public peace, reconstruct culture and industries ?

Dear eight million young comrades ! The nation is calling you only, the spirits of our forefathers are calling you only, our fatherland is calling you only, and the souls of ye our dead bretheren are calling you only.

Realizing that it is the last mission of the nation, let us get together and march together and fight together in answer to the supreme order of our fatherland. Dear comrades who will impair our solidarity, obstruct our march, and object our fight ? The time to rely only on our fathers and elders has passed. The time to roam about on the streets devided by agitation of factions and favouritism has passed. We will not mark time under the pressure of money and power. We will not hesitate to lay down our life. Though political parties are divided into right and left due to difference of ideology and the country is devided into north and south by alien guests we youth alone will get together and ignore the 38 parallel barrier.

Dear comrades if we do not achive independence what is the use of our assertion and where will our right be ? Even the Japs who trampled on our country are working together to save their country and people. We should not be invaded a third time by the Japs and be laughed at by the world.

For this reson the youth groups which have been carrying on powerful youth movement since August 15, 1945 have now got together and formed the Chosun Youth Party. Eight million comrades, do not hesitate to rally round the banner of the Chsun Youth Party. Let us hoist our banner above the 38 line, unify the nation, move the world, regain our fatherland, and realized peace and happiness of humanity.

Hurrah for the Chosun Youth Party !

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

23 December 1946

Colonel Gillett
American Advisor to
Military Governor, Kyongsang Namdo
Pusan, Korea

Dear Gillett,

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic, Chairman of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly sent to me one Ahn, Chao Hong, the bearer of this letter, with request that I refer the matter to be presented by him to you.

I would appreciate your having someone interview Mr. Ahn with the object of obtaining his story and seeing that he is accorded the consideration to which he is entitled.

Many thanks.

Best regards,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

26 December 1946

SUBJECT: Installation of extension Telephone

TO: Signal Officer, USAMGIK, APO 235-2, U.S. Army

Request installation of an extension telephone in Room 4 of the Duk Soo Palace. Telephone need not be supplied for installation.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

JOHN POJUS
Capt., Inf
Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

30 December 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT: Detention of CHUNG, Hai Yong.

1. The attached concerns the arrest of a Chung, Hai Yong by the police in Kwangju during October 1946, because he had propaganda and documents of the People's Party on his person.

2. If you do not wish to send the proposed attached memorandum to General Helmick, it is recommended that you mention this matter orally to him at your next meeting.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Maj. General, U.S.A.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT

Confidential

SUBJECT: Detention of [illegible], Pil Yong.

TO : G-2, USAFIK.

1. In a report to Major General [illegible], reference GA-014.5 ([illegible]), dated 6 December 1946, upon subject as above, the following statement was made:

"a. On 1 October 1946, during a period of special precautions and watch, commented by the police of Division [illegible], because of the [illegible] caused by [illegible], Pil Yong was picked up because of his [illegible] propaganda and movements of the People's Party on this person. [illegible] a student in the Chongju Hotel at the time. He was detained until 9 October 1946, pending results of the investigation of the above facts, and was released because of insufficient evidence."

2. This statement gives the definite impression that Mr. Chung was detained by the Korean police for political reasons. I expect that all measures for the maintenance of public safety and order be taken vigorously by the responsible officials, but at the same time I do not approve of arrests simply because suspects are carrying propaganda sponsored by parties of different political ideology. The fact that Mr. Chung was later released because of insufficient evidence indicates that the propaganda and documents carried by him were not inimical to public order and security.

3. We cannot go to the Korean people and urge unification and coalition if acts such as are indicated above are done routinely by the police.

4. I reiterate my desire for a firm hand by the police in the interests of the Korean people, but the police must be made to realize that their actions must be free from political bias at all times.

JOHN R. HODGE

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235-2

CA 014.5 (MGOCG) 28 December 1946

SUBJECT: Detention of CHUNG, Hai Yong

TO : Major General Albert E. Brown
United States Army, American Delegation
United States - Soviet Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

1. Pursuant to the information contained in the attached memorandum, I have had the case of CHUNG, Hai Yong investigated and the following facts are reported.

a. On 12 October 1946, during a period of special precautions and search, conducted by the police of Division H, because of the expected trouble in this locality, CHUNG, Hai Yong was picked up because of having propaganda and documents of the People's Party on his person. He was staying in the Kwangju Hotel at the time. He was detained until 29 October 1946, pending results of investigation of the above facts. He was released because of insufficient evidence.

b. Lt. Chong Pan Nam, Chief Detective of Kwangju City Police, states that Mr. Chung is now living in Pusan.

c. A special investigator reported to me that he could uncover no indications or evidence of bad treatment to Mr. Chung, while being held in Kwangju jail.

d. Mr. Chung was released from jail prior to the date of your request for the facts in this case.

C. G. HELMICK
Brigadier General, United States Army
Commanding

1 Incl.
Memorandum for General Brown

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

C O P Y

~~Confidential~~

28 DECEMBER 1946

KORPITAL
SEOUL

TEN PLEASE PUBLISH THROUGH PRESS OTHER CHANNELS MY NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO ALL OUR PEOPLE THAT SENTIMENT IN AMERICA AND NEARLY ALL UN OVERWHELMINGLY WITH US IN OUR DETERMINATION TO REALIZE INDEPENDENCE NOW WE KNOW THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT KOREA AND FEELS SOMETHING MUST BE DONE NOW GENERAL MACARTHUR KNOWS KOREAN COMMUNISTS WILL NEVER COOPERATE WITH US YET FEW APPEASERS IN STATE DEPARTMENT ARE TRYING TO BLOCK US EVERY WAY WE MUST JOIN ALL OUR FORCES WITH OTHERS IN WORLD IN OUR FIGHT TO BREAK THROUGH THIS BLOCK EVERYONE KNOWS MOSCOW DECISION HAS BEEN SCRAPPED BY SOVIET STOP FOR FIFTEEN MONTHS IN SPITE OF CONVICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY WE COMPLETELY COOPERATED WITH AMG IN FIVE DIFFERENT PLANS INAUGURATED BY THEM BUT ALL FAILED BECAUSE A FEW SOCALLED LEFTIST LEADERS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE WE HAVE FAILED TO CONVINCE AMG THAT THESE COMMUNIST LEADERS ONLY AIM IS TO RULE OR REIGN STOP WE CANNOT EXPECT TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE BY PATIENTLY WAITING BY LONGER THEREFORE WE MUST TAKE PROPER STEPS TO PROVE TO WORLD OUR CAPABILITY FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE WE ARE DOING THE IMMEDIATE CARRYING OUT OF THE PLAN OF TURNING THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO KOREAN ADMINISTRATORS AS ANNOUNCED BY GENERAL HODGE AND GENERAL LERCH OR IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
9 July 1975
PUBLICATION 1977

~~Confidential~~

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

NATIONAL ELECTION WITH NO EMPTY PROMISES OR DILATORY MEASURES
WE DO NOT BLAME GENERAL HODGE AS WE KNOW THE DIFFICULTY OF
HIS POSITION BUT WE HOPE HE WILL FOLLOW GENERAL MACARTHURS
POLICY REGARDING COMMUNIST TERRORISTS WE ARE NEITHER ANTI-
AMERICAN NOR ANTI-SOCIAL NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST WE ARE SOLELY
FOR KOREAN PEOPLES INTERESTS AND FOR IMMEDIATE RESTORATION
OF OUR INDEPENDENCE WE ARE STILL ENDEAVORING TO SOLVE OUR
PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY ALL THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO DO IS TO
EXERT OUR RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATIONS IF OTHERS DO NOT LIKE
IT WE CANNOT OUR PEOPLE MUST BE UNITED IN ONE PURPOSE THE
IMMEDIATE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR INDEPENDENCE

SYNGMAN RHEE
WASHINGTON DC

C
O
P
Y

~~Confidential~~

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Confidential

1500 hours, 31 Dec. 1946

Noted AMS

MEETING AT MRS. SYNGMAN RHEE'S.

Present: General Brown,
Mrs. Rhee,
Mr. Kim Koo,
Mr. Cho, Wan Koo ,
Mrs. Pahk, Chung Soo,
Lt. Althaus.

General Brown informed those present that a New Year's message had been received from Dr. Syngman Rhee directed to the Korean people but which could not be extended due to the agitation it would cause in an already heavy atmosphere. The General mentioned the highlights of Rhee's message and explained why certain statements contained therein could not be made public.

Mr. Kim stated he had always been sympathetic towards Military Government and would continue to offer his support; however, there were many Koreans who believe the American occupation to be worse than that of the Japanese and he questioned General Brown as to why this could be so. The General threw the question right back to Mr. Kim and asked him "why". Mr. Kim went on to say that many Koreans are opposed to the way Military Government so quickly changes its laws, citing the instance whereby the number of legislators necessary for a quorum was changed. He also referred to the state of agitation resulting from high prices of commodities and the Korean people's resistance to the rice collection program.

Seemingly to deviate from the question involved, Mr. Kim said the leftists are telling the people they uphold the Moscow Decision (including that which pertains to "Trusteeship"). He said he (Kim Koo) would also support the Moscow Decision but would never agree to "Trusteeship".

Mr. Cho Wan Koo said 30 million Koreans oppose Trusteeship and that plus the dissatisfaction of high prices, etc., may lead to an open revolt. He hoped Military Government would be able to do something before such a condition should arise. He also said the Indonesian revolution is stimulating the same feeling among the Koreans.

Mrs. Pahk said she receives word regularly from North Korea, and the people there are also ready to revolt. All agreed that a revolution would enable the Russians to move in from the North and stated they would do what they could to prevent a revolution.

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CONCLUSIONS:

The Koreans present at the above meeting concur with Dr. Rhee's present policy. They seem more than anxious to get the Americans out of Korea, especially since they do not have control of the Legislature. The changing of the quorum law prevented that in the beginning and was referred to by Mr. Cho. They appear afraid that leftist control may afford a basis for negotiations with the Russians in accordance with Russian interpretation of the Moscow Decision. This causes the Rhee followers added concern because of their intense opposition to Trusteeship. Their plan seems to be to get the Americans out, take control of the South Korean Government and, somehow, negotiate with the Russians for force them to meet their demands for complete independence.

If Dr. Rhee can find enough support in the United States for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea, and should such stateside agitation coincide with a revolution in Korea, American forces here may find themselves being recalled.

K. G. ALTHAUS.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

2 January 1946

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDING GENERAL, XXIV CORPS

SUBJECT: New Year's Message, Syngman Rhee.

1. Reference subject, I conferred Tuesday afternoon, December 31, with Mrs. Syngman Rhee, Mr. Kim Koo, Mr. Cho, Won Koo and Mrs. Park, Hyun Took at the home of Mrs. Syngman Rhee.

2. General Brown informed the above-named individual that certain parts of the message of Dr. Rhee were inflammatory in nature and not proper for release for publication, that it was the duty of the leaders of Korea to restrain, not to incite the mass of the people, that certain parts of the message were inaccurate, that the policy of the United States was clear and had been repeated a few days ago by the Secretary of State, and that the intimation by Dr. Rhee that the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and General MacArthur supported his views which were contrary to the announced policy of the United States was inaccurate and could not be published.

3. Mr. Kim Koo stated that he had always cooperated with Military Government and would continue to do so, that Military Government was not a good government, that the people were much disturbed by the rice collection policy and by certain actions of the police. He stated that he, nevertheless, supported Military Government because if any uprisings occurred in the South, the Russians would move in. He further stated that in the coalition of the right and left wing, the left wing members supported trusteeship and that he, Kim Koo, would never support trusteeship.

4. Mr. Cho, Won Koo stated that the cost of living is so high that the people are in a state of unrest which may at any time lead to disturbances. Both he and Mr. Kim Koo agreed that Dr. Rhee's telegram simply reflects the

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Memo from Gen Brown to Gen Hodge dtd 2 Jan 47, subj: New Year's Message, Syngman Rhee.

views of the Korean people. He further stated that the Korean people could not understand how Indonesia could be granted its independence before Korea. Both he and Mr. Kim Koo expressed their disapproval of the recent change in the authorized quorum of the legislature.

5. Mrs. Park, Hyun Sook expressed views very similar to those of Mr. Kim Koo and Mr. Cho, Don Koo. She further stated that she was from North Korea and was in constant communication with its people, that they were living under severe hardships and must be rescued by the people of South Korea.

6. Mrs. Rhee did not commit herself on any point.

7. In discussing American-Russian-Korean relationship, disappointment was expressed at the slowness with which Korean independence was being obtained, and that it was clearly intimated by the Koreans that if disturbances occurred in the South, it would bring the condition of Korea forcibly to the attention of the world and would aid in securing Korean independence more quickly. The discussions of this subject led me to the conclusion that while open revolt which may get beyond the bounds of their control would in their opinion, be undesireble, that they were not opposed to uprisings which would keep Korea in the international eye. When asked if they were willing to sacrifice their people to accomplish this objective, they seemed willing to do so.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation US-USSR Int. Comm. Corr. (Letters Misc.)

Date 2 Jan. 1942

From E.V. Prostov

To Col. Lincoln

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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☒ Otherwise Restricted Information

GSA/Censorship
Authority

1 13 76
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

3 January 1947.

TO: Major General A. E. Brown.

FROM: E. V. Prostov.

SUBJ: Dr. Rhee's Lobby in America and its Recent Activities.

Note: The full report, of which this is a summary, will be forwarded at later date.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

In October, Dr. Rhee's organization in the United States, which had shown few signs of life during the summer, began a large scale press and publicity campaign for immediate Korean independence. During November, Dr. Rhee's special envoy, Miss Louise Yim, assisted by a staff consisting of several Koreans and Americans centering around a Washington Korean lobby, has laid the ground for a campaign to present Korea's case at the U.N. General Assembly in order to secure the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, immediate freedom for the country, and membership in the United Nations. This was to be accomplished by forcing the U.S. and Russia to abrogate the Moscow Decision and an alleged "Yalta Secret Pact" (both providing for joint trusteeship over Korea) and by persuading the United Nations to recognize Korean personnel in Military Government as the government of Korea which could negotiate with the great powers. Although Miss Yim succeeded in securing the support of several small countries and a very good press, no delegation volunteered to place the proposals on the agenda of the General Assembly. Early in December Dr. Rhee went to America announcing that his objective was: at first, "to clarify the true situation of Korea to the United Nations General Assembly"; later, "to get American support for the settlement of Korean independence question." Even before his departure for America, it was apparent that although Miss Yim's efforts were sincere and genuine, Dr. Rhee could hardly have hoped to overcome the opposition, implemented with the veto power, of the two interested Great Powers and get any action on the part of the United Nations at this time. As a matter of fact, Rhee, whom his associates tried to dissuade from coming to America, did not go to New York until after the adjournment of the Assembly, and had devoted his time to conducting what appears to be a large-scale campaign, one of the purposes of which was to discredit American occupation of Korea on the grounds that the American Command is unable to maintain law and order in Korea. Rhee and his staff in Washington

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By NARS, Date

SUBJ: Dr. Rhee's Lobby in America and its Recent Activities.

and New York, assisted by the Representative Democratic Council in Seoul, while ostensibly trying to get the abrogation of the American-Soviet pacts on Korea and recognition of South Korea as the Korean state, released a great volume of publicity, both in the form of press statements and messages to prominent individuals and political leaders in America and abroad, asserting that because of the "inaction" and "neutrality" of the Americans, South Korea was on the verge of an uprising because of the intolerable economic and political conditions and the presence of thousands of Communistic terrorists from the North, with whom the Americans were either unable to cope or whom they actually encouraged. Rhee's immediate objective was disclosed early in December in his interview with General MacArthur, when he evidently spoke unfavorably of General Hodge's policies of meeting with alleged Communists. The reason for this opposition becomes apparent from the examination of Dr. Rhee's career during the past fifteen months, in the course of which he had been gradually losing ground in the eyes of the Americans. An intensely ambitious and autocratic man, Dr. Rhee had apparently lent his name and prestige to a commercial scheme, had by his arbitrary actions alienated many moderate elements in Korean politics, and had attempted to sabotage the American efforts to unify Koreans behind a program for self-rule. At the present time Dr. Rhee is apparently as much concerned with saving Korea from trusteeship as he is with reasserting his position as the paramount leader of the Korean people. His current tactics in America seem to be: (a) to identify himself, in the eyes of the American people, as the genuine national leader of the oppressed and mistreated Korean people; and (b) to make use of the strong wave of anti-Communist feeling in the U.S., on one hand, and the strengthening of the anti-Administration forces, on the other, in such a way as to influence the Department of State policy towards Korea in general and Dr. Rhee in particular. With the help of friendly press, and because of the lack of any effective opposition, Dr. Rhee is represented as the gallant champion of the Korean people against the Communists, the "neutral" and "inactive" American Command, and the State Department, "without a crystallized policy on Korea." In his work Dr. Rhee is assisted by a competent staff of ambitious Koreans and Americans in New York, some of whom may be idealistic supporters of Korean cause, but the majority are individuals bent on deriving personal advantage from being associated with Dr. Rhee.

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Appendix: THE PRINCIPALS IN RHEE'S U.S. CAMPAIGN

Dr. Rhee's headquarters in Washington is managed by "Colonel" Ben Limb, commissioned by Rhee in the Provisional Government's Army, described as a long-time salesman of various Japanese products in the United States. Limb is said to be personable and smooth, and a rabid Rhee partisan. The brains -- and landlord -- of the headquarters is John W. Staggers, a prosperous Washington attorney, long associated with Rhee, and whose advice Rhee values and follows. Although Staggers' name had been recently connected with a promotion scheme (a company to exploit Korean resources), backed with unfortunate political results by Rhee, it is rumored that he is primarily interested in social prestige likely to accrue to him from being associated with the cause of Korean independence. Another Rhee backer in Washington is Jay (Jerome) Williams, described as a retired public relations man interested in championing lost causes, with talent for staging publicity stunts, and with good contacts in the political world. A new recruit, operating largely in New York, is Miss Louise Yim (in private life Mrs. Soon Kyo Hahn), the president of the Korean Women's College. She is assisted by Kim Dong Sung, the chief of the Korea Pacific Press. Miss Yim has been eminently successful collecting funds in America for various Korean colleges in the 1920s and 1930s and has succeeded in establishing the Pfeiffer Foundation in Chicago apparently managed by her husband and devoted to Korean education. Miss Yim's travel permit, issued in Seoul in August 1946, was ostensibly to attend to certain matters pertaining to the administration of Pfeiffer Foundation, which also underwrote her trip. Miss Yim has the persuasive manner of a professional fund gatherer, with emphasis on the emotional approach, and has many old friends among the eminent (including Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt) and the rich. The last group, obviously, includes many influential extreme conservatives who could be expected to be generous towards any anti-Communist activity, such as the Rhee crusade, both with funds and political influence. This would also be true of the journalistic friends of both Miss Yim and Dr. Rhee, which include many key figures in the MacCormick-Patterson and Hearst constellations.

Somewhere in the background is also Colonel Goodfellow, proprietor of The Brooklyn Eagle, long a friend of Rhee's and well known to the American Commend in Seoul, who is doubtless lending his astuteness and vast political contacts to the cause of Rhee's Korea. Still further in the shadows are ambitious businessmen, like Samuel Dolbears, the original minerals concession man, other promoters and technicians recruited by Rhee

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Appendix: The Principals in Rhee's U.S. Campaign (cont'd)

with extravagant promises of a Korean bonanza, once the right man was at the helm; and a few rich Koreans of the West Coast and Hawaii (those who have not yet been disappointed) also with a stake in the Kingdom.

A special place in the list of Rhee's operators is occupied by Dr. Robert T. Oliver of Syracuse University. Dr. Oliver, who had also been associated with the World Trading Company and is described as young and ambitious, had come out to Korea under Dr. Rhee's auspices and is currently stumping the U.S. lecturing on Korea, writing articles and letters to Congressmen and newspapers and contacting individual public figures like Dorothy Thompson and Senator Morse, all on Dr. Rhee's behalf.

At least some of the Rhee people seem to be definitely on the shady side. Among them the first place is occupied by the pamphlet-writing ex-physician, James Shinn, who allegedly lost his medical license in connection with a narcotics irregularity, and whom Rhee was recently trying to induce to go to London as his personal representative.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FHC

BASIC: Memo to Gen Brown from Lt Bertsch, subj: Illegal Activities of Taihan Minchung, dtd 3 Jan 47.

1st Ind.

American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission,
APO 235, U.S. Army, 4 January 1947.

TO: Military Governor, USAMGIK

Info and such action as he deems appropriate.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

1 Incl.
Memo to Gen Brown
from Lt Bertsch
dtd 3 Jan 47.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

3 January 1947

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL BROWN

SUBJECT: Illegal Activities of Taihan Minchung.

1. On December 24, I received a letter from Colonel Robert H. Booth reminding me of the interest he and General Arnold had taken in the Korean Arts Academy and requesting that I render the Academy any service that I could. He also asked that I look up the Chairman, Mr. Pai, Un Sun, and convey him his Christmas greetings.

2. In carrying out the Colonel's request on December 29, I became aware of the following situation which is herein reported:

The City Property Custodian had given a lease on a former temple building to the Arts Academy, subject to the condition that the Academy could not move in until the Refugee Service Organization which was then using the building, would have moved out. It appears that no one has at any time questioned the fact of the lease having been issued or the legality of its issuance.

On December 26, the Refugee Organization moves out and informed the Arts Academy people, who then prepared to move in. Mr. Pai and a group of the other artists went to the building. While there, they were accosted by one Choi, Dum Sul, who claims to be an official of the so-called Buddhist Central Council. Mr. Choi ordered Mr. Pai and the artists to leave the building at once. He was informed that they had a lease issued by Military Government and thereupon, he went to telephone and called the Taihan Minchung.

(It will be remembered that the Taihan Minchung is an illegal strong-arm organization which has been usurping police functions for a long period of time. On questioning before the Korean-American Conference, Chief Chang, Taik Sang stated that he regarded it as illegal, but was unable to locate its officers to arrest them).

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BASIC: Memo from Lt. Bertsch to Gen. Brown, subj: Illegal Activities of Taihan Minchung, dtd 3 Jan 47.

Shortly afterwards some 30 members of the Taihan Minchung came to the temple and forcibly evicted most of the artist's group. Mr. Pai and several others were held by the hoodlums "in custody" for some short time and were then released and threatened not to return. No one appears to have received any physical injury, which fact the artists claimed is due only to their having withdrawn rather than to stand upon their rights.

Dr. Lee, Hyuh Mook stated that in his opinion the claim of the Buddhists is not sound, that he believes the artists need such a building and that he believes that Military Government had full authority to issue the lease. He is certain that the Committee can straighten out the question of occupancy satisfactorily. This is not, however, the most important point.

It is submitted that this is a clear case of the usurpation of police power by this organization and that action to punish the guilty parties would be salutary.

In considering the gravity of the offense, it should be borne in mind that the Arts Academy had received the active support of General Arnold and of General Leech, and that this illegal organization presumed in effect to hold the authority to negate by violence the action of Military Government.

3. It is recommended that prosecution of Choi, Bun Sul and his accessories be directed.

LEONARD H. BERTSCH
1st Lt CMP

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 201-WF [illegible] Clarence N. Jr. APO 500
(6 JAN 194)AG-PO 6 JAN 194
Subject: Officer Evaluation Report.

To: Brigadier General John Weckerling
Headquarters, United States Soviet Joint Commission
APO 235

1. Major Clarence N. Weems Jr. O 12806 has made application for a commission in the Regular Army and has indicated that you were his immediate superior or were a superior officer familiar with his World War II service during the period March 1943 to January 1947.

2. In accordance with Circular 289, War Department, 1946, it is requested that completed Officer Evaluation Report (WD AGO PRT-461) for the above named officer be forwarded to Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, Attention: AGPO, within 72 hours of redeipt. Prompt compliance is necessary in order that this report may be corsidered.

3. Pending publication of charge the "Remarks" now appearing on page 16, WD AGO PRT-462 are amended to require the reporting Officer to include under section E, WD AGO PRT-461 a concise and careful statement giving his reasons why the Officer being evaluated should or should not be appointed an Officer in the Regular Army.

4. Request the WD AGO PRT-462 be returned with completed Officer Evaluation Report.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

2 Incls:
1. WD AGO PRT-461
2. WD AGO PRT-462

W. C. McMILLION,
Lt Col AGD,
Asst Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr fr GHQ, CINCFE, 6 Jan 47, AG 201-Weems, Clarence N. Jr '6 Jan 47) AG-OP, Subject: Officer Evaluation Report.

AG 201-Weems, Clarence N., Jr. 1st Ind.

American Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, U.S. Army,
13 January 1947.

TO: CINCFE, GHQ, APO 500.

1. Basic communication and inclosures received 11 Jan 47 and returned herewith.

2. Major Weems has never served under my direct command. The observation of his work which is the basis for this report is not the close supervision and intimate association which usually characterizes relationships between superior and subordinate. Therefore, in justice to Major Weems, the enclosed report should be viewed in that light.

3. My observation of Major Weems' work is limited to that performed by him as a Korean Specialist. To my knowledge his entire service has been in that capacity.

JOHN BECHERLING,
Brigadier General, USA.

1 Incln
n/c

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

A LETTER OF APPRECIATION

To: The Military Governor of Korea.

We were immigrants in North China until August 15, 1945, but through the grace of God, we were privileged to come home in February, 1946. There being no homes of our own, we were taken into the refugee camp, Chang Choong Tan, where we found ourselves well taken care of.

Under the guidance and help of the president of the Farm Association for War Refugees, we organized a self-help society to help ourselves, but we were unable to do so. Seeing this, the welfare section of the city government assisted us by building refugee homes here we find ourselves comfortably located.

We wish to express our gratitude to you for your generous help extended to us; and we pledge that we will do all we can in building a new Korea.

[illegible]
Representative of the
Farmers' Self-Help Society
Young Deung Po

Oct. 1946

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr of Appreciation fr Whang Wun Choo, Rep of Farmers' Self-Help Society, Oct 46.

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, US Army, 7 January 1947.

TO: Military Governor, USAMGIK, APO 235-2, US Army.

1. Transmitted.

2. The attached was left with Joint Korean-American Commission.

ALBERT F. BROWN
Major General, US Army

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

7 January 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN:

SUBJECT: Policy on Newspapers.

1. The question of the editorial policies of newspapers is a matter of vital political concern, and a problem upon which no concrete policy appears to have been effectuated.

2. The large numbers of semi-literate Koreans have a tendency to accept as true whatever they see in print, and this situation is aggravated by the fact that virtually no Korean newspapers have the ability to differentiate between news and editorials. Coloring the news items to fit the political bias of the paper is a universal practice.

3. When the Commanding General ordered the suppression of the three extreme radical papers last summer, he made the statement that these papers might in due course reopen if proper assurances could be given that they would subsequently observe the law. Thus far, none of the three have reopened, but today's press carries the statement that "Hyern Dai Ilbo" (one of the three) is about to be reopened under the control of SUH, Sang Chun. If this report is true, the end result may be very little better than the beginning, since SUH, Sang Chun is an extreme reactionary and close personal and political follower of RHEE, Syngman. A new source of expression hostile to the present policies of the Commanding General and potentially favorable to violence by the Right may prove to be but little preferable to an exponent of violence by the Left

4. A review of the existing press of Korea, and particularly of Seoul, leads to the conviction that the extreme Right and Left are preponderantly represented, and are thereby giving an undue influence in molding public opinion against the policies of the military command.

5. It is suggested that this is not a purely economic problem, and that the political implications warrant giving thought to the creation of a concrete policy.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

6. In this consideration several points should be made. First, we have here the unusual situation that most of the Korean press, having been Japanese owned or Japanese controlled, is now under the proprietary control of the Military Government, either directly or indirectly. The issue that is therefore involved is not directly the issue of free expression or free press but rather the question of the use of Military Government property to our best political advantage.

7. A review of the editorial policies leads to the preliminary conclusion that the Comintern viewpoint is still too generously represented. The Communists, being on the scene early with their organization prepared, moved by force or by implied force into the virtual control of a number of publishing institutions in 1945. In some cases, that control has not since been shifted.

8. It would appear desirable that a vehicle of expression should be left to the group who might be called the semi-loyal Communists, but it is difficult to form a sound argument in support of a military command bending its efforts to provide scarce paper and equipment for the followers of Ta K, Yeung Young. It would appear to be a sound, tentative policy in the case of this group to restrict freedom of expression insofar as it can be done without violence to our own principles.

9. It is recommended that a committee should be established to give thorough study to this problem and prepare a complete report for the consideration of the Commanding General and the Military Governor. Such a committee should study the economic problems pertinent to the question as well as the political and administrative aspects, and might propose for the Military Governor a specific directive on the problem for the guidance of provincial authorities.

10. In many cases, the operation of the newspaper is factually joined to the operation of a printing establishment, but the two are under separate corporate control. Proper consideration of the problem of newspapers therefore envisages also the consideration of printing companies.

11. It is recommended that the membership of the committee to study the problem should include representatives

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of Military Government, Departments of Public Information and of Commerce, and the Office of the Property Custodian as well as the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lieutenant, CMP

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7 pages

A PETITION

Lee, Chong Ha, Born in Li Sung Koon, is now employed by Sang, Choo Koon as the head of the Agricultural Products Section of the Koon. He has climbed to the present position from a service boy at a Koon office. He has been capitalizing this fact to the extent of being bombastic. When he was employed by the Keum Chun Koon Office, he was so severe in collecting rice for the Japanese government, that the people in that Koon were on the virge of starvation, rice having been turned in in its entirety. But he was lauded by Japanese officials as the most Praiseworthy man in that Koon.

At last Heaven helped us and the long cherished freedom of our people came! At this juncture for him, he had to run away from that Koon for life. Thus he came to Sang Choo Koon where he thought he would be safe.

In this Koon he duplicated his former practices and policies, causing a great deal of complaints among the people. Although the Military Government has allowed six hal of polished rice to each person and told that the rest of this amount be turned in, he does insist that the entire amount of quota to this Koon shall be turned in. When carried out by him, this insistance of his would leave the people in this Koon in a state of starvation. To make the situation even worse, he may use the police in the Koon to arrest those who would not be able to turn in the entire amount allocated them, and may drag them around town fastened hand to hand as a public chastisement.

We the simple farmers appeal to you gentlemen of the Central Government for a wise and kind solution of the predicament in which we are placed. We believe that you will hear our plea and save us from starvation and live without much fear.

It is said that people in other towns and villages are rejoicing over the fact that their quota is light for them to bear. Thus they praise their administrators. We admit that we are going through a transition period when things may not run as ideally as one expects, but there should at least be justice or impartiality in administration. The people of one village rejoice, while those of another groan. Why should this be?

Above mentioned Lee, Chong Ha always insists on his own ways and policies and never listens to the people. When one is elected representative of the people, one is immediately labeled by him as a fomenter of rebellion, and is threatened with imprisonment. All we can say about such a conduct as this on the part of an administrator is that it is the left-over policy --"obey or else-- from the Japanese regime. Such a conduct as this is what retards the progress of building a new Korea. The way that should hel;

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

build a new Korea is to get rid first of all of such men as Lee, Chong Ha.

If there were no farmers, who could feed the starving refugees? If there were no farmers, even a grain of rice cannot be produced. "Desk plan" can not save starving people, but rice can.

We request you gentlemen to look into our situation and help us farmers to live and labor in peace.

Submitted by

Han, Tum Suk

Representative of the people of
Nai Kok Tong, Nak Tong Myun, Sang
Choo Koon, Kyung Sang Pukto

This petition
written in
December

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Petition submitted by Han, Tum Suk rep of people of Nai Kok Tong, Nak Tong Myun, Sang Choo Koon, Kyung Sang Pukto, Dec 46.

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission, APO 235, US Army, 7 January 1947.

TO: Military Governor, USAMGIK, APO 235-2, US Army.

1. Transmitted.

2. The attached was left with Joint Korean-American Commission.

ALBERT L. BROWN
Major General, US Army

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government in Korea
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

9 January 1947

TO: General Albert E. Brown,
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul, Korea.

1. Reference your telephone conversation of 7 January 1947, the following information has been received from Division "E", Kyongsang Pukto.

Police received information that plans for staging a second series of riots in Kyongsang Pukto were being made. At 2:00 P.M., January 3, 1947, a group of radical Leftists headed by YI, Sang Paik were found holding unauthorized meetings. All were placed under arrest. YI, Sang Paik was released at the end of sixteen hours confinement with the approval of the Military Governor. He is being investigated but is not in custody. Seven other leaders who were arrested at the same time were released at the end of two days' confinement.

C. G. HELMICK
Brigadier General, United States Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

10 January 1947.

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic,
Chairman,
Korean Interim Legislative Assembly,
The Capitol,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Dr. Kimm:

Concerning your note transmitted to me by George Whang on 7 January 1947 with reference to the arrest of YI, Sang Paik, I am enclosing for your information a copy of a memorandum transmitted to me this date by the Military Governor, to whom I referred your request to me for the release of this individual.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, USA.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]
[redacted], A.P.O.

13 January 1944

MEMO FOR RECORD:

General Weckerling proposed that the attached letter be sent to the AC of S, G-2, XXIV Corps. General Brown thought that it should not be sent because it would give the impression of undue interference in the work of the XXIV Corps Staff.

J.M.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

11 January 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR ACofS, G-2, XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT: Essential Elements of Information.

1. A recommendation was made for assigning high priority to certain essential elements of information based on the experience of members of the Joint Commission. (Tab "A")

2. An excellent summary dated 6 January was prepared and transmitted by CIC through G-2 presenting the existing situation. This summary has been circulated to all members of the Joint Commission.

3. It is recommended that the suggested essential elements of information be adopted as part of the intelligence plan for the procurement of vital information for the CG, XXIV Corps.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, USA,
Chief Commissioner.

Encl.
Tab "A" (Our memo of
3 Jan 47, same subj
to ACofS, G-2.)

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

3 January 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR ACofS, G-2, XXIV Corps

SUBJECT: Essential Elements of Information.

As an essential element of information, I strongly recommend that high priority be given to the following:

a. What are the secret political activities of extreme Rightist Korean elements?

b. What are the more important youth organizations, primarily quasi military and "brown shirt"? What are their present harmful activities? Are they increasing in number and in membership?

c. What is the potential for creating disturbances of groups mentioned in 1a and b?

d. What funds are being illegally raised in South Korea, for what purposes and in what amounts?

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

File No. _____
6 January 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ. GEN. BROWN:

SUBJECT: Essential Elements of Information.

1. The following information is forwarded to your headquarters, through G-2, USAFIK, as requested in Memorandum For AC of S, G-2, XXIV Corps, subject: Essential Elements of Information, dated 3 January 1947.

2. What are the secret political activities of extreme Rightist Korean elements?

Since the time of the riots, the extreme rightist groups have engaged in the following activities:

a. Organization of counter-riot groups.
b. Anti-Communistic propaganda, blaming the communists for the riots and disorders.
c. Agitation for more power to be given to those in authority (Korean employees) under Military Government.
d. Propaganda and organization for rightist supremacy within the Legislative Assembly.
e. Financial collections for RHEE, Syng Man's trip to the United Nation's Conference.
f. Establishment of branches (particularly the National Society for the Acceleration of Independence, the Han Kook Democratic Party, and the Korean National Headquarters for Racial Unification).

3. What are the more important youth organizations, primarily quasi military and "brown shirt"? What are their present harmful activities? Are they increasing in number and in membership?

The following rightist youth groups are considered the more important because of their activities, membership, and general potential:

The Kwan Bok Young Men's Association
The Keun Kook Young Men's Association
The Dai Han Young Men's Association
The Independence Young Men's Association
The So Book Young Men's Association
The So Book Student's Alliance
There are several smaller groups representing north Korean Provinces, which are radical, but very small, usually working with and coordinating with one of the above mentioned groups.

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Essential Elements of Information, dated 6 January 1947, Cont'd-

The following harmful activities have been participated in by one or all of the above mentioned groups:

(a) Several of these groups (particularly the Dai Han and Kwan Bok) have noticeably become military. In Chonju the Kwan Bok has participated in drills, carries banners, operates with military precision. In Kyongsang Namdo the Dai Han drills, hikes, marches, and holds military type meetings. Both of these groups have uniformed squads. The Kwan Bok group has petitioned Military Government and police in order to have permission to carry weapons.

Both of these groups state that such drills are a means of morale building and preparedness for leftist outbreaks. Actually these two groups were responsible in many cases for presevation of peace during the recent riots and strikes.

(b) Several of the above mentioned groups have attacked the homes of leftists. In several instances property was destroyed, but in all cases recorded, no damage was done to leftist personnel. These attacks were made shortly after the riots, and in cities where police had been killed while these rightists were assisting the police. In each case the rightists worked with the police, and seemingly had the sanctions of the police for carrying out such activities.

(c) There is evidence that the rightists have taken advantage of the present state of affairs to collect money illegally. Most of these appropriations (immediately following the riots) were given to police groups, to families of police. and to those who suffered as a result of the disorders. Later, however, some of these forced contributions were for RHEE, Syng Man's trip to the United Nations Conference, although no proof of this exists. Actually a part of these collections were used in local organizations.

(d) There is evidence that these rightist groups are attempting to infiltrate the Korean Constabulary, the Korean Coast Guard, the Railroad Police, and other peace preservation agencies. This infiltration is done openly and admittedly as a counter-communist activity.

Although the above activities are not deemed legal; nevertheless, there is a question as to whether or not these groups should be prosecuted to fullest extent. These groups have faith in the United States, and in its representatives here in Korea. They have in most cases sworn (some in blood) to protect Korea from Communism. If these groups loose this faith, they may turn on the occupation forces in the same manner as the Min Chung (Democratic Young Men's Association- left wing) and cause greater hazards to occupation. This later suposition is doubtful, for these groups would consider the United States as an unfriendly ally, still maintaining their supreme activities against the communists. At the present time (under guidance and close surveillance) this headquarters considers these organizations an asset to peace preservation.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The following information discloses that these groups are incresing in numbers and in membership.

(a) Recent reports (November and December 1946) show that new branches of all of these organizations have been established. The Kwan Bok, Dai Han, and Keun Kook, have campaigned for membership, and have been successful in recruiting large numbers of members who were formerly followers of leftist groups.

This increase is due in part to the fact that the Min Chung (leftist) received much adverse comment because of its participation in the riots and disturbances.

Close affiliation with police and other such agencies have caused many to fall in line.

Forced recruiting following the riots aided in bringing these groups to a greater strength. (If young men didn't join they were declared communists).

Since these groups were (until last week) the only youth groups operating above ground, they were in a much better position to increase their memberships.

To join these groups a youth has very little trouble. Allegiance to individuals or nations is not involved, merely the ability to lead or be led, with an oath of anti-communism, these are the requirements. In most cases small fees are collected, but if persons are unable to pay, this collection is forgotten.

Rightist politicians have attempted to have their factory owner friends employ these youths, and in some cases this has been the cause of left-right troubles. This too, has increased the membership of the rightist groups.

4. What is the potential for creating disturbances of groups mentioned in 1a and b?

This office makes periodic checks upon these organizations, in addition to covering meetings (above and below ground), surveilling activities, and questioning members.

These groups provide personnel for large demonstrations, especially since their activities are condoned by the police. The leaders in most cities are known and are reputidly in high standing. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it is very possible that such groups could cause trouble similar to the riots, sponsored by the left wing.

If cultivated, but surveilled, these groups can be of distinct service.

Weapons have been taken from these groups, and all reports concerning their possession of weapons are immediately investigated.

In each case where trouble could be expected (National Holidays etc), the leaders of these groups assume the responsibility, by written declarations, that their groups will not engage in subversive activities.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

In each case, control of leaders means control of the organization. This could be carried on to state that control of RHEE, Syng Man and his circle would mean control of these groups.

These groups have been responsible for some terroristic activities; however, since 13 May 1946 (Anti-Trusteeship demonstration following the dissolution of the Joint Commission), only small outbreaks have occured, usually after a leftist disorder.

Many of the youths employed in strategic positions with United States Army Forces and Military Government are members of these groups. These groups should also receive credit for informing the proper authorities of impending disorders, and for cooperating in the solving of such problems.

Although there have been many attempts to form these ultra-rightist groups into one over-all organization, such plans have met with little success. Actually the organizations will join a new group, but will maintain their loyalty to their original organization. This office knows of several young men who attend meetings, pay membership dues, and engage in activities of at least three of these organizations, without being disloyal to any one of the groups.

5. What funds are being illegally raised in South Korea, for what purposes and in what amounts?

The following examples of funds being illegally raised have been brought to the attention of this office during the period of November- December 1946:

(a) Money collected by rightist groups through assessments for use of RHEE, Syng Man.

(b) Money collected by rightist groups within factories to be used for building, organizing, and financing the Dai Han Labor Union (DAI HAN NO CHONG).

(c) Collections of youth groups subsequent to riots (mentioned in paragraph 4c above).

(d) Collections made by Min Chung (Democratic Young Men's Association- left wing) for cleaning streets, assisting in harvesting rice, etc. Although not legal, these collections are only minor. Presumably the funds will be used in the establishment of the Min Chung above-ground. (Min Chung, as well as other leftist groups are all planning to put their organizations in this position as soon as possible).

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

(e) Collections (not actually illegally made), but with some force or promise, by the Korean Independence Party (HAN KOOK TONG NIP DANG). This party, suffering in prestige (along with its members who were formerly with the Provisional Government in China) have attempted to rejuvinate the party through collections, which presumably will be used in a membership drive.

(f) Several reports concerning local illegal collections are of little or no import. These have been made by leftist, rightist, religious, and cultural organizations.

6. There are continued investigations (local and national), of all of the organizations mentioned in this report.

Of each organization, this headquarters maintains files which show the activities, leaders, addresses, constitutions, sponsors, financial status, and other information which is considered essential to security of the United States Army Forces in Korea.

This information can be extracted at any time. From time to time, when deemed neccessary, periodic reports are compiled, which record the activities of the organization in question.

Specific answers to any questions concerning the above organizations can be answered by this headquarters, either by use of these continuing files, or by active investigations.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER

James K. Patchell
James K. Patchell
1st Lt., Inf.
OIC Political Section

Previous Distribution:

None

Distribution:

Maj. Gen. Brown, 2
CIC-K, file, 1

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 January 1947.

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, XXIV CORPS.

SUBJECT: Stolen Truck.

1. It is reported that a one-quarter ton truck (jeep), 3040th Car Company No. 56, U.S.A. 20442031, assigned to me was stolen from the side of my residence at about 1750 on 13 January 1947. Verbal report was made immediately to the 3040th Car Company and to the Provost Marshal.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, USA.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

16th January 1947

Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief Commissioner
US-Soviet Joint Commission,
Seoul

Dear General Brown,

Please request that a telephone, preferably on the Washington exchange, be installed as soon as practicable at my new quarters, 1-12 Koshi Chung, 1, Chung Mok (D.H.111, Apt.6). The telephone is indispensable for my work for the Joint Commission and for the Department of State.

Very truly yours

EUGENE V. PROSTOV
Foreign Service Staff Officer,
Department of State.

- -

1st Ind.

American Delegation, US-Soviet Joint Commission,
APO 235, US Army, 16 January 1947.

To: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235, US Army.

Recommend Approval.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, USA

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUBJECT: Moscow Conference (U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and U.K.)

"Section III - (Korea)
of the Moscow Agreement of
27 December 1945

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the praticipation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

Reproduced 17 Feb 1947
by U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

TEXT OF RADIO BROADCAST DELIVERED BY GENERAL HODGE ON MOSCOW PACT -
INITIALLY DELIVERED 301700 Dec 45 over Radio Station JODK, Seoul, Korea

Piecemeal, conflicting, and confusing press releases with reference to recent Moscow conference have caused undue concern and hastly judgements on the part of the Korean people. Therefore, I take this opportunity to present to you a brief summary of the meaning of the official communique issued after the three-power meeting in Moscow.

The text of this communique as received officially by my headquarters has been repeated over this station several times. The plan provided for the following:

1. Early elimination of the 38th parallel separation of the Korean nation. The powers have ordered a meeting in Korea between representatives of United States and Soviet Forces within two weeks to arrange the details of opening the 38 degree barrier.

2. Establishment of a two-power Joint Commission in Korea by United States and Soviet powers to give Allied assistance in the formation of a Democratic Korean Government and an independent Korea nation.

3. Establishment by Koreans of a Democratic Korean Provisional Government with the assistance of the two-power commission under a plan approved by the four Great Powers. The plan for establishing the Korean Government will be prepared by the two-power commission and submitted to the four great powers after full consultation with the leaders of the democratic political parties and societies representing the people of the entire Korean Nation, not just south Korea alone or North Korea alone, but Korea united into one country.

4. Continuing assistance to be given to the Korean National Government by the two-power commission. This assistance will be both economic assistance and political assistance. Among other things it will include helping Korea to establish world trade, foreign credits, national defense, a comprehensive educational system, internal and external transportation and communications facilities, as well as establishment of diplomatic relations with other nations of the world and fostering the renewal of Korean culture. Its chief aim will be to help Korea to establish its national independence so that it may stand prominently in the family of nations.

In brief, the plan as presented in the official communique provided the necessary steps to unite Korea by removal of the 38 degree barrier, the establishment of the National Independence of Korea.

Despite the piecemeal so-called "Interpretative" releases written hurriedly by persons who never saw Korea except on a map and who do not know Korea or Koreans, there is nothing in the communique that says there has to be a "Trusteeship" established for Korea or that says that one

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

definitely will be established. It does provide that after the establishment of the unity of Korea and after the Korean Government has been established, the two-power commission will consult with the Korean Government about and make recommendation to the four great powers concerning a four-power "Trusteeship for a period of up to five years". There is nothing in the wordingof the statement which leads me to believe that there will be a four-power "Trusteeship" forced upon the Koreans against their will, there is everything in the wording of the statement to make me believe that the plan set forth is designed to give full aid and protection to Korea in reestablishing itself as an independent nation. After careful study of the full statement in all its details I see nothing in its provisions that Koreans need to fear.

I hear from many sources that several Korean leaders are urging demonstrations and wide-spread non-cooperation by Koreans in protest at the establishment of a "Trusteeship" for Korea. Since there has been no "Trusteeship" established by the Allied Powers and there will be none established except after consultation with Korean Government such demonstrations and non-cooperations would be based on great misunderstandings of the plan presented. In any case I am sure that such actions will do great harm to the cause of Korea in the eyes of the United Nations, will greatly delay the vital program of full independence for Korea and will cause unneeded suffering among the Korean people.

I fully understand what the word "Trusteeship" means to Korean. In the meaning that you apply to that word, it is even more abhorrent to me as to a responsible representative of my nation that it can be to you. The diplomats of the great powers do not use the word in the same meaning as do Koreans, because they did not experience forty years of Japanese domination. If they did understand your thoughts of the term "Trusteeship" they would use another term to express the assistance and advice they are willing to give Korea. I can assure you that I need no demonstrations of any kind to make me do all in my power to remove all references to"Trusteeship" from future discussions of Korea.

My advice and strong urging to Korean leaders and to the Korean people is that you do not use your energies in useless demonstrations that can only work against your aims and desires for your nation, but that you do use your energies to unite yourselves in preparing to form a democratic Korean Government as outlined in the Allied Powers plan in order that you may sooner have your nation completely independent.

I have great hopes for the future of Korea and a great love for the Korean people. I do not want to see that future jeopardized or the Korean people to suffer because of misunderstandings. Disorders and turmoil at this time may prove disasterous to your national aspirations.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN JOHN R. HODGE
TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE

January 1946

What I have to say is intended only for those truly patriotic and unselfish Koreans who really wish a fully independent and democratic government. Others need not read or listen.

First, I want to express my happiness that the people of Southern Korea are beginning to realize that a four power "Trusteeship" is nd yet definitely established, but is a subject for future discussion between the two Power Commission and the Korean Government after that government is established and for recommendations to the Allied Powers. I am in full agreement with the Korean abhorence of "trusteeship" as Koreans understand it, and I will do all I can to prevent any prolonged and objectionable control over Korea.

However, I must inform you of the cold fact that I cannot do it alone. The Korean people must do their part. The fact that the Allied Powers in the Moscow conference planned to discuss further the question of "trusteeship" indicates that there is still doubt in the minds of the great powers as to the readiness of the Korean people to take over their own affairs. That doubt can be erased only by the manner in which Koreans conduct themselves and by the way in which they cooperate and work with the plan now set up to unite Korea into one, to establish a Korean Democratic Government and make Korea into an independent Nation.

Based upon what I have seen here in the past few weeks, I fear there are prominent Korean political leaders and false prophets who are not above leading the Korean people astray in an attempt to gain personal power and advantage. These leaders apparentlyknow little of the outside world and of international affairs, and are not competent to judge the bad effect of their selfish actions on the great powers. Apparently some of these leaders care less for the welfare of the people of their nation than they do for their own prestige. I advise selfish political leaders to reflect upon themselves and I advise the Korean people to reflect upon their leaders. Each should examine the other carefully. The Korean people should refuse the leadership of those who continually agitate the people and stir up trouble for the sake of their own personal prestige or gains. The Korean leaders should keep always in mind, and labor unselfishly for, the welfare of the Korean people. I have heard too much talk of the 50-50 division of spoils between political groups, when actually there are at this time no spoils. There will never be any spoils if the strife continues, there can only be prolonged unhappiness and hardship which is not wanted either by the Korean people or the Allied Powers. I do not believe that the coninued personal strife and quarrelling of Korean political leaders ver political "spoils" are brought about by the wish and will of the people.

I ask you what will come forth if the Korean people do not clean their own house? I have been trying to present Korea to the world as being ready soon to take over her own affairs. Lack of unity among the people of South Korea plus the recent politically lead and guided mis-understandings and disorders in the American Zone have not helped to present a pleasing picture

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of Korea to the world. I make earnest request to the Korean people that the future council meetings of the United Nations may see a picture of Korea really building for the future rather than the recent view they have had of Korea in a state of chaos and opposing Allied efforts to better her condition. I hope the Korean people for their leaders to awaken to the necessity of uniting their efforts behind the one banner of all Korea rather than these continuing grabs for personal power and prestige.

There are many, many ills in Korea that cannot be corrected by action of U. S. Army, by the police or by government officials alone, but must be stamped out and corrected by the will of the Korean people. For example, no black market can exist that is not supported by the people. If the people refuse to purchase, the black market will die. Profiteers and hoarders of rice cannot operate without the knowledge and connivance of others. The people themselves should report them to authorities in order that their goods may be seized and put in proper channels. Smuggling of rice and critical goods to Japan cannot be done against the will of a people who give real assistance and information to the authorities. All of these ills can readily be corrected if the Korean people will cooperate and help the authorities. All the people must realize that the business of law and order is the business of every man, woman and child in the country and that the maintenance of law and order requires their full assistance in every possible way.

To me it is a most shameful sight to see students and youth of the nation organized into groups by various political leaders for the purpose of misleading them into terrorist activities. It is a shameful sight to see attempts by political leaders to form private and personal armies that prey on the people for support and are used as a tool to try to enforce the will of some selfish individual or to retaliate against persons whom a leader does not like. It is a shameful sight to see innocent shool children drawn into political demonstrations against this or for that, about which they know nothing. The great powers cannot and will not excuse such actions. Koreans say they want an independent democratic nation. These acts are not the acts of democracy. Their continuance cannot and will not lead to an independent democracy. Korea and the Korean people are now on trial before the world, and the manner in which they conduct themselves now andhenceforth will have a far-reaching effect on the future of the Korean nation.

I believe all of you know and understand that in order to repair all the damages of Japanese domination that Korea must have some help from outside the nation. Korea may be compared to sick/a person. The sick person needs the attention of doctors and nurses. He needs special food and care and help until he is strong again. The Allied Powers are prepared to sit with the outside world, needs goods, needs transportation on land and sea and in the air, needs markets for products, needs parts and repairs for industrial plants, needs oil products, needs guidance in democratic ways of government and for a while at least, needs protection from aggression from outside and from terrorism inside the land. Korea needs many other things to be an independent nation. It is the pledged promise of the Allied Powers who freed Korea on the battlefields to give Korea the aid needed to recover from the Japanese oppression and to help repair the damage of forty years under Japanese control.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The recent Moscow conference provided a plan to unite Korea, to let Korea establish a real Korean Democratic Government and to become independent. The details of this plan are based upon existing conditions and facts. They may not coincide exactly with those of the plan you individually would have set up, but after careful study of the plan, I honestly and truly believe there is nothing in it that Koreans need to fear if they really want independence and if they will cooperate and work with the plan.

We should look upon this plan as a broad stairway upon which Korea can climb to the height of her indepenence. The stairway is firm, safe, and easy to climb. It has the handrails of Allied assistance, so as to aid Korea in the climb to independence. It may not have the exact spacing of steps you would have put into it. It may not be painted exactly the color you have hoped. But it is there and ready for use. It is strong, safe, stable, and useful. At present it is the only path open to use. The Allies can and will keep outsiders from destroying this stair, but Koreans are already on the bottom step and are in position to destroy it very easily by means of non-cooperation, disorders, and chaos among themselves such as have recently taken place. If this now completed stairway is destroyed or burned by Koreans through disunity, non-cooperation, disorders and chaos brought about by attempts through selfish political leaders to grab the so called "spoils" or the power of government, it may take years to build another stairway and that second stairway would probably be much less to the liking of the Korean people. In fact the stairway may never be rebuilt. My urgent advice toKoreans is to unite your efforts and use this presently built stairway and climb to the goal of independence without hesitation. Then, when your goal is reached and your representative independent government is established you will be in a strong position to shape completely your own destinies. If the stair is not used or is destroyed by unpatriotic acts of Koreans themselves, I have great fear for the future of Korea.

For the bright future of your nation, I urge your good judgement to cooperate fully with the carefully planned efforts of the Allied Powers to make Korea indepenent. I urge you to cooperate fully with the efforts of Military Government to build up your country and fully reestablish its economy, its health and its wealth. The United States does not want any territory in Korea. They do not want to rule or control Korea in the future. They do not want to keep expensive military forces in Korea any longer than required to insure the fulfillment of the Cairo agreement. The United States does want to see a truly free and independent Korea as pledged by the Allied Powers at Cairo. If Koreans will not unite and help themselves in the efforts of the Allies to set Korea up as an independent nation, I can make no pledges or promises for the future of your nation. If Koreans will do their part, I can renew the pledge for my nation that she will extend every effort to see that the Korean dream comes true.

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STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN R. HODGE, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA, TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

21 January 1946

I am extremely disappointed that some of the best intentioned Korean People are actually working against the interests of their country. I refer to the continuing demonstrations and disorders revolving around the term "Trusteeship". After all efforts to present Korea favorable to the great nations, it is disheartening to see Koreans keep their land in a state of disorder.

Let us face facts. The Soviet-American Conference to arrange for alleviation of Korea's immediate problems is not in progress. The eyes of the world are on Korea. The world already knows that Korea does not want "Trusteeship". There is no reason for any further demonstrations and continuation of demonstrations and disorders can only hurt the Korean cause. It is the carefully considered opinion of all real friends of Korea that such actions are the surest of all ways of gaining a "Trusteeship" imposed upon Korea, since they lead the Great Powers to believe that Koreans are unstable and that Korea is not ready for independence.

I appeal to the good sense of the Korean people to dispense with all further demonstrations and disorders immediately. Nothing can help the cause of Korean independence one half as much as the orderly behavior of all the nation's 30,000,000 people and the full use of all their energies in building up instead of tearing down.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The following statement has been issued byLt Gen John R. Hodge, Commander of United Forces in Korea:

Korea recently has passed successfully through a crisis in her national life. At this time the tense situation of the past several days has eased back to normal andit is to the credit of the country, her people and leaders that their demonstrations and protests, for the most part, were carried out without violence. Reason and common sense have prevailed. Yet the Korean people, looking forward with pride to their future, have not denied themselves what they felt were justified vigorous expressions of opinion.

American troops have conducted themselves with admirable restraint and have conformed in good spirit with the restrictions it was necessary to impose temporarily.

These are the facts of the past few days in order that you may be fully informed of what is going on:

" Incomplete press reports arrived in Seoul purporting to give the outcome of the Moscow meeting of representatives of the United States, Russia and Great Britain. This unofficial and misleading news confused and disappointed the Koreans in the city where the rumor quickly spread. They erroneously intepreted the piecemeal report as a breach of promise of their eventual independence. The official communique which arrived the following day dispelled this notion. The powers had agreed to give Korea all assistence during a period not to exceed five years while she is preparing for independence, however some people had already closed their minds to this truth and began organizing protest marches and walkouts. In a large number of cases those people who left their jobs during our regular New Year holiday did so under threats from the organizers. And in the remote areas where the misleading rumors did not circulate there was little if any resentment shown towards American forces or the three-power decision when it was fully and correctly understood.

"Some Koreans died and other were wounded before normalcy returned. Mr. Song Chin Wu, leader of the Democratic Party, was assassinated. Terrorist groups were active. But no American was injured. There were instances of rock throwing. But these were done by misinformed and irresponsible youths. When some of the Korean leaders learned that this information was appearing in the American press they were greatly concerned for the adverse effect this would have on public opinion back home and offered apoligies.

"Mr. Byrnes of the State Department further clarified the Korean situatdion with a radic address in which he pointed out that trusteeship was not definitely provided and that it may be entirely unnecessary.

As tension relaxed, tempers cooled and more news arrived, Mr. Kim Koo , president of the Provisional Government, issued a statement urging the people to go back to their jobs. This they have done, having expressed their feelings, and are now ready to resume their tasks of grooming their country for the responsibilities ahead. The crisis has passed and perhaps both we and the Korean people have gained by the show of our mutual integrity. Our normal relations will now go on again. It is expected that pass and curfew restrictions will be lifted effective tomorrow, January 3. A further announcement will be made over this station.

Issued some time in January 1946

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

LT. GEN. JOHN R. HODGE'S MESSAGE TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE

11 February 1946

As all of you know, most of the troubles and unhappiness of individuals and of nations are based on misunderstandings. Misunderstandings are normal and to be expected so long as men are individuals and are blessed with normal processes of thought. These normal misunderstandings increase where man is granted free speech, free thought and free press. They may become extremely aggravated and cause undue difficulties in those cases where individuals or political parties deliberately pick up loose ends and wrong interpretations to use for their own ends. You have already seen some of this in Korea. In order to prevent more of this, I shall try from time to time to make clear statements of fact, either myself or through normal news releases given to the press. I request you to accept them for the facts that they are and not to be led astray by the fog of partisan politics.

Today, I wish to discuss briefly the American-Soviet Conference just recently ended. We have tried to make it clear from the beginning that this conference was a preliminary conference held under the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Moscow Communique between representatives of the American and Soviet Commanders of Korea to discuss urgent administrative-economic affairs affected by the 38 degree boundary between the occupying forces, and to develope subjects for further discussions between the two commanders and for the American-Soviet Two Power Commission when it starts its meetings within one month from the close of the preliminary conference. Apparently, the Korean people have not understood that this preliminary conference was purely preliminary and thought it was the first meeting of the two power commission to plan a Korean interim government. Because of this, many Koreans have expected the solution in this preliminary conference of all the problems pertaining to Korean independence and there may be a tendency toward being disappointed because more of these problems were not solved.

In rendering your judgement upon results from this preliminary conference, you should keep in mind the following facts:

1. This preliminary conference was not intended to and did not discuss political matters. When you analyze what that means, you will see immediately that many items closest to the heart of the Korean people were barred from discussion.

2. The brief communiques issued from the conference did not give details of accomplishments. These details will be put into effect after approval of the conference proceedings and will be announced as they become effective.

3. Many items were discussed without any final decision or action, but these are under further study to be taken up at meetings of the Two Power Commission.

4. The way is opened by this preliminary conference for further local arrangements between the American and Societ Commanders concerning details of operation and adjustments between South and North Korea.

I well understand and appreciate the strong desire of the Korean people for speed in solution of all their problems. I myself get impatient with what appears to be slow progress. However, it is a fact that sound progress is being made. One of the oldest and truest proverbs in the English language is that "Haste makes waste". The truth of the proverb has already been demonstrated many times here in Korea since the Japanese surrender where hasty and ill advised efforts to accomplish some good have not only met with failure, but have actually delayed the projected accomplishment.

My best advice to the Korean people is to accept the fact that the Allies are confronted with the solution of problems affecting the future of Korea for centuries to come and that we must not expect hasty and ill advised action based upon snap decisions. Hasty and poorly considered decisions and actions concerning Korea forty years ago were extremely costly to the Koreans and caused untold grief to the nation. I do not believe Koreans want any repetition of that. I can assure you that the Allies are as interested in rapidly reaching sound decisions and action as are the Korean people.

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FROM : PRO, USAFIK.

TO : Public Relations Officer, HQ.
Attn: Lt. Col. Reid.

Seoul, Korea, March 6, 1946---

Lt. General John R. Hodge announced today that the first meeting of the Joint American-Soviet Commission is expected to be held in Seoul, Korea no later than the 14th of March, 1946. This Joint Commission was agreed upon during the Moscow Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as stipulated under section 5, paragraph 2 of the "Moscow Conference." The preliminary conferences of representatives to the Joint American-Soviet Conference were held in Seoul, Korea 16 January, 1946 through 5 February, 1946. Major General Archibald V. Arnold is chief of the American Commission. The head of the Soviet Commission and other participating representatives have not been announced. end item.

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AMERICAN DELEGATION

CHIEF — MAJOR GENERAL A.V. ARNOLD

MEMBER — WILLIAM R. LANGDON

MEMBER — CHARLES W. THAYER

MEMBER — COLONEL ROBERT H. BOOTH

MEMBER — COLONEL FRANK H. BRITTON

SOVIET DELEGATION

CHIEF — COLONEL GENERAL TERENTY POLITCH SHTIKOV

(Former Army Commander on the Western Front; was Senior Representative of USSR at Joint Conference held in Seoul, Jan.-Feb., 1946)

MEMBER — SELION KONSTANTINOVITCH TSARAPKIN

(Political Advisor with rank of 4-star general; was accredited as Extraordinary Minister Plenipotentiary at Joint Conference; was a Soviet delegate to the UNO conference at San Francisco.)

MEMBER — MAJOR GENERAL NICOLAI GEORGEVITCH LEBEDEFF

(Was a member of the Far East War Council, has been stationed in Northern Korea.)

MEMBER — GERASIM MARTINOVITCH BALASANOV

(Political Advisor to XXV Army; attended Joint Conference at Seoul; formerly stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo.)

MEMBER — LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIKHON IVANOVITCH KORKUNENKO

(Was Technical Advisor at Joint Conference in Seoul and member of the Economic Subcommittee at that Conference.)

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13 MARCH - 46 - PRE RELEASE

COPY

Maj. General Archibald V. Arnold, former Military Governor of the American Occupation Zone in South Korea, has been named chief of the American Delegation to the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, it was announced today by Lt. General John R. Hodge, XXIV Army Corps Commander.

General Arnold, born in Collinsville, Connecticut, served as artillery Commander of the Seventh Division during the [illegible] and Anglo-American campaigns and as Division Commander of the Army of Occupation.

Other members of the Delegation are Mr. Clifton B. Lanedon, Jr. Charles W. Thayer, Col. Robert L. Booth, and Col. Frank N. Britton.

Mr. Lanedon, a State Department career officer since 1914, is U. S. Consul-General at Mukden, a position he previously held in Manchuria, China. He has also served with the State Department in Japan and Cuba.

Mr. Thayer also has a lengthy record with the Foreign Service. He has served in Russia, Germany, and Afghanistan, and as advisor to the U. S. Delegation of the European Advisory Commission in London.

Col. Booth, now executive Assistant to the Military Governor, also served with the Seventh Division as Artillery Executive Officer and Chief of Staff. Prior to his overseas service, he was instructor at the United States Military Academy, and Administration Officer of Army Ground Forces Headquarters.

Col. Britton, like Col. Booth, was an instructor at West Point and was later assigned to Army Ground Forces Headquarters. He served

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ith General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area in New Guinea and the Philippines until he was assigned to General Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander.

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[illegible]

[illegible], MARCH 13, 1946

The first meeting of the Joint American-Soviet Commission which is scheduled to go into session at Seoul, Korea on or about April 15th has been postponed for a few days. The delay in opening the meeting will be occasioned by the illness of the senior member of the Soviet Delegation. All preparations for living and office facilities for American and Soviet delegations have been completed. It is anticipated that the Commission will go into session immediately upon the arrival of the Soviet group from Northern Korea.

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HQ HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS

PRESS RELEASE

SEOUL, KOREA, MARCH 18

An advance liaison party headed by three officers of the Red Army arrived in Seoul at 10:15 A. M. Sunday to complete arrangements for the forthcoming sessions of the Joint American-Soviet Commission.

Arriving by special train from the Russian zone in Northern Korea, the three liaison officers were taken immediately to confer with Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold, chief of the American Delegation to the Commission, according to Alexander Poliansky, Soviet Union Counsul, who met them at the train.

Members of the party made no statement to American or Korean press representatives who were at the station.

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[illegible] SCAP

[illegible]

[illegible], August [illegible] 1

The first meeting of the complete Joint American-Soviet Commission is scheduled to convene at one o'clock Wednesday afternoon [illegible] of, in the Seoul Palace, it was announced today by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, USAF/ Army Corps Commander.

American representatives who will sit down with the Soviet delegation to assist in the formation of a provisional Korean government, include: Maj. Gen. A.V. Arnold, chief of the delegation, William R. Langdon, U.S. Consul-General to Korea, Charles M. Thayer, State Department representative, Col. Robert H. Booth and Col. Frank L. Pritton.

Chief of the Soviet Union delegation who arrived in Seoul today (Tuesday) will be Col. Gen. Terenty Foritch Shtikov, former Army Commander on the Eastern Front and senior representative of the USSR at the Joint Conference held in Seoul, early this year.

Other members are:

[illegible] Konstantinovitch Tsarapkin, political advisor with the [illegible] rank of 4-star general who was accredited as extraordinary minister plenipotentiary at the Joint Conference at San Francisco;

Maj. Gen. Nicolai Georgevitch Lebedef, member of the Far East War Council which has been stationed in Northern Korea;

Gerasim Martinovitch Balasanov, political advisor to XXV Army, attended the Joint Conference at Seoul, and was formerly stationed at the Soviet Consulate in Tokyo;

Lt. Col. Timon Ivanovitch Markulenko, technical advisor to the Joint Conference in Seoul and member of the secretariat committee at the Joint Conference.

[illegible] personnel to aid members of the commission.

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HQ [illegible] XXIV CORPS

[illegible]

SEOUL, KOREA, MARCH 19---The five man Soviet Union delegation to the Joint American-Soviet Commission arrived in Seoul today (Monday) at 2:45 P. M. by special train from the Russian Zone of Northern Korea. They were accompanied by more than 100 technical assistants and attendants.

First deliberations of the Commission will not take place before tomorrow (Tuesday).

Members of the Soviet Union delegation to the Commission are: Col. Gen. Terenty Fomitch Shtikov, Chief of the delegation, Maj. Gen. Mikolai Georgevich Lebedeff, Lt. Gen. Serion Konstantinovitch Tsarapkin, Lt. Gen. Gerasim Martinovich Balasanov, and Lt. Col. Tikhon Ivanovich Karmalenko.

The members of the Commission were met at the station by Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold, chief of the American Delegation, and other American Army Officers, together with members of the advance liaison party from the Red Army who arrived yesterday, and representatives of the Soviet Union Consular staff.

In front of the station a small group of Korean civilians unfurled American, Korean, and Soviet Union flags together with banners in Russian.

Personnel of the Soviet Union delegation will be quartered for the duration of their stay in two homes in the neighborhood of the Soviet Consulate and in an army barracks in the Seventh Division area.

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STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE
AT OPENING SESSION OF JOINT SOVIET-UNITED STATES COMMISSION
AT SEOUL, KOREA, ON 20 MARCH 1946

General Shtikov, members of the Joint Commission, and visitors at the opening session: It is with great pleasure and expectation that I welcome the Soviet delegates to Seoul and open the initial meeting of the Joint Russian-American Commission in Korea to carry out the provisions of the Moscow agreement.

Today is an important day in Korean history. It is a day to which all Koreans have looked forward with great hope for the future of their nation, and should be a day Koreans will celebrate in the future as the start of a new era in Korean history. The eyes of the entire world, as well as of the Korean people, will be watching our deliberations here. The results of the work of this commission will prove the ability of two great nations of the world to cooperate fully in capitalizing upon their victory over oppression and despotism and to restore a less fortunate, long oppressed nation to an independent, sovereign status among the family of free nations. Our successful results in the councils of this commission will have lasting effect upon the peace and happiness of the world, as well as the future of Korea.

As a representative of the United States, I express my hope and confidence that our joint efforts here will be able to solve amicably and justly all Korean problems presented, whether they be political, economic, or administrative.

General Shtikov, I repeat my sincere welcome to you and your distinguished co-workers. I and my fellow representatives of the United States look forward with confidence to our coming relationships in our efforts to help Korea. I introduce to you the American members of the Commission: General Arnold, Mr. Langdon, Mr. Thayer, Colonel Booth, and Colonel Britton.

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THE SPEECH

Of the head of the Soviet Delegation made on the opening session of the Joint American - Soviet Commission in Korea,

General Hodge, gentlemen:

Our joint commission representing the American and Soviet Commands is called upon to carry out the historic decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom pertaining to Korea. These decisions express the good will and the wishes of the great Allied Powers to assist by all means in the rehabilitation of an independent Korea, and in the creation of conditions for the development of this country on a democratic basis.

The great armies of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, having crushed the Japanese imperialists, have forever eliminated Japanese domination in Korea and liberated the Korean people.

Korea has entered a new stage of her development--a stage of national rebirth and reestablishment of state independency.

Gentlemen: The people of Korea with their ancient culture vividly expressed national self-consciousness, year after year suffering hardships and humiliation of colonial slavery--this people deserves the best future possible. With their blood and innumerable sufferings, the Korean people have earned the right for independence and a free way of life.

The Soviet people warmly supported this right of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always championed and will always champion their self determination and free existence of any nation without exception.

As all of us are convinced, the people of Korea are bent upon and have already their determination to create, with the help of the allied powers, a free democratic Korean government, friendly to all the freedom loving nations.

The great aims of creating a democratic independent Korean state have brought to life wide political activity of the whole of the people of Korea.

The Korean people have formed their democratic parties, public organizations, people's committees as an organ of democratic self-government.

However, the the way of gradual democratization of the whole of the internal life of the Korean people, there stand serious difficulties, brought about by the furious resistence of reactionary and anti-democratic groups and certain elements, whose object is to undermine the work of creating and firmly establishing a democratic system in Korea.

The task of the U. S. - Soviet Commission is to help the Korean people create a provisional Korean democratic government capable of fulfilling the tasks arising from the democratization and reconstruction of the country

The future provisional Korean democratic government must be created on a basis of wide unification of all the democratic parties and organizations, supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Only such a government will be able to abolish entirely the remnants of the former Japanese domination in the political and economic life of Korea, to launch a decisive battle with reactionary anti-democratic elements inside the country, to carry out radical measures in the rehabilitation of economic life, to give political liberties to the Koreans and fight for peace in the Far East.

The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.

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The task of the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission deriving from the decision of the Conference of the Three Ministers concerning Korea consists also in working out, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and assistance of Korean democratic organizations, the measures of aid and assistance with respect to trusteeship in political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and in establishing sovereign independence of Korea. Such temporary trusteeship corresponds with the fundamental interests of the Korean people, inasmuch as it assures the condition of a most rapid national reconstruction and a revival of an independent Korean state on a democratic basis.

General Hodge. Concluding my speech, I wish on behalf of the Soviet Delegation to extend my sincere greetings to you and your distinguished delegates, and to express my deep gratification that we shall work together with the representatives of the American Command in the interests and for the good of the Korean people.

I am fully assured that our joint work will proceed in a spirit of mutual understanding and friendship and that we shall successfully and honorably fulfill the will of our governments, expressed in the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers concerning Korea.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV ARMY CORPS

PRESS RELEASE
STATEMENT OF AIMS, U.S. DELEGATION
ON JOINT AMERICAN-SOVIET COMMISSION IN KOREA

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge issued the following statement:

On the eve of the convening of the Joint Commission, it is considered appropriate to state the aims of the U. S. Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission and the steps taken thus far by the American Command to prepare for the achievement of these aims.

First and foremost, it has been the object of the American Forces to establish and perpetuate the freedoms of speech, assembly, religion and press in Korea. These freedoms are not mere words to be used to gain political favor. They represent principles on which any genuine democracy must be based and are as old as democracy itself. Furthermore they are absolute and not relative or subject to exceptions. They apply to all democratic persons, all democratic schools of thought, all democratic parties, no matter how their following or whether or not their programs may correspond to the ideas of the existing authorities. Thus in South Korea it has been the American policy to permit all democratic groups, whether moderates or extremists, capitalists or communist to establish their own parties, hold their own meetings, broadcast their own speeches, propagate their own ideas and philosophies and publish their own newspapers without censorship, restriction or special privilege. These freedoms are basic in the American idea of Democracy. They are also what we believe the vast majority of the Korean people want, and it is what the American Delegation of the Joint Commission wants to help the Koreans to attain throughout their entire country.

The purpose of the Joint Commission as stated in the Moscow communique is to assist the formation of a provisional Korean Government and to undertake the preliminary elaboration of appropriate measures to that end. It is also the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures for assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The communique specifies that in preparing their proposals the commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic political parties and social organizations.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

It is of course impossible to say-at this time the precise manner in which the details will be worked out, since this is a matter to be determined by the Joint Commission and approved by the four great powers. However, it is the view of the American delegation that one of the primary requisites for accomplishing the Commission's tasks is the early unification of Korea both economically and politically. Until the economic entity of the country has been restored and the effects of the 38 degree parallel eliminated in the internal functions of Korea and until all democratic elements of the country have freedom to hold meetings, to confer among themselves, to propagate their ideas by speeches, by radio and by the press, and to organize parties, recruit members, and carry on political activities not only in North and South Korea separately but between the two areas, it is not considered possible to form a genuinely representative democratic government. In the carrying out of its functions as part of the Commission it is the intention of the American Delegation to travel throughout the country and to confer freely with representatives of democratic political and social organizations. It is the American view that Korean political leaders of all democratic parties both in north and in the south should enjoy the same opportunities.

In its efforts to assist in forming a provisional government for Korea, it is not the purpose of the American Delegation to bring about a government of any particular group or wing. It is their purpose to see that a government that corresponds to the views of the majority is established. The programs thus far published by the political parties in southern Korea differ considerably from those of the leading parties in America, but these programs have not been opposed nor will they be opposed by the American authorities so long as they represent the views held by most of the truly democratic Koreans. At the same time it is the earnest intention of the American Delegation to prevent the domination of Korea by small minorities, no matter how vocal and well organized they are or how energetic they may be in their political activities.

This statement is to present the attitude of the American members of the Joint Commission in solving the problems of Korea. The Soviet members of the Commission represent another great nation that fought for liberation of Korea from the Japanese, was a signatory to the Moscow agreement and is greatly interested in making Korea an independent democratic nation. Therefore it is safe to assume that the two delegations will work together harmoniously and in a truly cooperative effort to accomplish the aims expressed in that agreement.

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Immediately following the close of the ceremonies, members of the Commission posed for photographers and newsreel men, after which the room was cleared for the opening of the business session.

Full texts of Gen. Volge's address and translation Gen. Shtikov's speech have been previously distributed.

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NND 760090
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SPEECH OF COLONEL GENERAL SHTIKOV, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE OPENING OF THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON KOREA.

General Hodge, Gentlemen:

First of all, I wish to express on behalf of the Soviet Delegation gratitude to Lieutenant General Hodge, the Commander of the American Armed Forces in South Korea, and Major General Brown, head of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission, for the hearty and warm welcome of the Soviet Delegation. I also would like to convey our cordial and friendly greetings to the Korean people.

The long awaited and joyous day has come for all the Korean people. In accordance with the recent correspondence between our governments on Korea, the Joint Soviet-American Commission resumes its work today.

We were witnesses of the political enthusiasm with which the Korean people welcomed the decisions of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.

The Korean people are impatiently waiting for the speediest realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea and first of all for the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This places still more responsibility on the Commission for the work it has to carry out.

The Korean people liberated from Japanese imperialists by the common efforts of the Allies have shown their determination and aspiration for the establishment of a responsible democratic state, independent of any external interference.

In the zone of responsibility of the Soviet Commander in North Korea considerable progress has been achieved in the field of democratization and development of national economy and culture during the period that passed after the expulsion of Japanese imperialists.

We are certain that on the basis of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, Korea will develop along democratic lines and become an independent state and will join the family of the peace-loving nations as an equal member.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Being conscious of all the responsibility that is placed upon the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation will make every effort for the speediest and exact carrying out of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

May I greet the American Command and my colleagues in the Commission and express my confidence that the Joint Commission will fulfill the tasks it is charged with, and first of all, the task of the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government.

Now I would like to introduce the members of the Soviet Delegation:

Mr. G. Tounkin, First Class Consellor

Major General N. Lebedeff

Mr. G. Balasanov, Second Class Consellor

Colonel T. Korkulenko

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

GENERAL SHTIKOV'S STATEMENT

20 March 1946

General Hodge, Gentlemen-

Our joint commission of representatives of the American and Soviet Commands has been called on to act upon the historical decision, concerning Korea, of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom.

These decisions are an expression of great will and the aim of the great Allied powers to cooperate in every way possible in the restoration of an independent Korean State and the establishment of conditions for the development of the country on democratic principles. The great armies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., having crushed the Japanese domination in Korea, and have freed the Korean people.

Now Korea has entered into a new era of her development--an era of national rebirth and restoration of national independence.

Gentlemen, the Korean people with their centuries of culture, have vividly expressed with national consciousness, long years of hardship and the ignomony of colonial slavery--these people are worthy of the brightest future. The Korean people have earned the right, with blood and innumerable sufferings, to a free and independent way of life.

The Soviet people heartily support this right of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always championed and will always champion the self-determination and free existence of any nation without exception.

As we all are convinced, the Korean people are filled with ambition and have already shown their inclination to establish with the help of the Allied powers a free democratic Korean government, friendly to all peace-loving nations.

The high goals for the creation of democratic, independent Korean state have brought to life much political activity on the part of all the Korean people. The Korean people have created its democratic parties, social organizations and national committees as an organ of democratic self government, nevertheless great difficulties stand in the way of gradual democratization of the entire internal life of the Korean people; these are evoked by the fierce opposition of the reactionary anti-democratic groups, and individual elements, which have for their aim the frustration of the creation and establishment of a democratic regime in Korea.

The problem of the Joint American-Soviet Commission consists in helping the Korean people in creating a provisional Korean democratic government, capable of accomplishing the problems of democratization and rebirth of the country, which had been set before it.

The future Korean democratic government must be set up upon the basis of a broad unification of all democratic parties and organizations which support the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Only such a government would be capable of abolishing completely the vestiges of former Japanese domination of the political and economic life of Korea, of waging a decisive struggle against the reactionary anti-democratic elements within the country, of putting into life radical measures for the reconstruction of national economy, of assuring the Korean people the political freedoms, and of struggling for the establishment of peace in the Far East.

The Soviet Union is vitally interested in seeing Korea a truly democratic independent state, friendly to the Soviet Union, in such a way that it should not become a military base and starting point for an attack against the Soviet Union.

The problem of the Joint American-Soviet Commission which derives from the decision, concerning Korea, of the conference of three ministers, consists also in effecting with the help of the provisional Korean democratic government and with the assistance of the Korean democratic organizations to elaborate the measures of assistance and collaboration (with regard to the trusteeship) to the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government, and the establishment of the sovereign independence of Korea. Such temporary trusteeship corresponds with the fundamental interests of the Korean people, in as much as it assures survival of an independent Korean state on a democratic basis.

General Hodge, concluding my speech, I wish in behalf of the Soviet Delegation, to extend my sincere greetings to you and your distinguished delegates and express my deep gratification that we shall work together with the representatives of the American Command in the interest and for the good of Korean people.

I am fully assured that our joint work will proceed in a spirit of mutual understanding and friendship and that we shall successfully and honorably fulfill the will of our governments, expressed in the decisions of the Moscow Conference and the Foreign Ministers concerning Korea.

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[illegible] Gen. Hodge's speech is [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]. As usual, [illegible]

Text

THE SPEECH

of the head of the Soviet Delegation made on the opening session of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in Korea.

General Hodge, gentlemen:

Our joint Commission representing the American and Soviet Commands is called upon to carry out the historic decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U. S. A. and the United Kingdom pertaining to Korea. These decisions express the good will and the wishes of the great Allied Powers to assist by all means in the rehabilitation of an independent Korea, and in the creation of conditions for the development of this country on a democratic basis.

The great armies of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, having crushed the Japanese imperialists, have forever eliminated Japanese domination in Korea and liberated the Korean people.

Korea has entered a new stage of her development--a stage of national rebirth and reestablishment of state independency.

Gentlemen: The people of Korea with their ancient culture vividly expressed national self-consciousness, year after year suffering hardships and the humiliation of colonial slavery--this people deserves the best future possible. With their blood and innumerable sufferings, the Korean people have earned the right for independence and a free way of life.

The Soviet people warmly supported this right of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always championed and will always champion their self determination and free existence of any nation without exception.

As all of us are convinced, the people of Korea are bent upon and have already shown their determination to create, with the help of the allied powers, a free democratic Korean government, friendly to all the freedom loving nations.

The great aims of creating a democratic independent Korean state have brought to life wide political activity of the whole of the people of Korea.

The Korean people have formed their democratic parties, public organizations, people's committees as an organ of democratic self-government.

However, in the way of gradual democratization of the whole of the internal life of the Korean people, there stand serious difficulties, brought about by the furious resistance of reactionary and anti-democratic groups and certain elements, whose object is to undermine the work of creating and firmly establishing a democratic system in Korea.

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NND 760090
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The task of the U. S. - Soviet Commission is to help the Korean people create a provisional Korean democratic government capable of fulfilling the tasks arising from the democratization and reconstruction of the country.

The future provisional Korean democratic government must be created on a basis of wide unification of all the democratic parties and organizations, supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Only such a government will be able to abolish entirely the remnants of the former Japanese domination in the political and economic life of Korea, to launch a decisive battle with reactionary anti-democratic elements inside the country, to carry out radical measures in the rehabilitation of economic life, to give political liberties to the Koreans and fight for peace in the Far East.

The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.

The task of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission deriving from the decisions of the Conference of the Three Ministers concerning Korea consists also in working out, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and assistance of Korean democratic organizations, the measures of aid and assistance with respect to trusteeship in political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and in establishing sovereign independence of Korea. Such temporary trusteeship corresponds with the fundamental interests of the Korean people, inasmuch as it assures the condition of a most rapid national reconstruction and a revival of an independent Korean state on a democratic basis.

General Hodge. Concluding my speech, I wish on behalf of the Soviet Delegation, to extend my sincere greetings to you and your distinguished delegates, and to express my deep gratification that we shall work together with the representatives of the American Command in the interests and for the good of the Korean people.

I am fully assured that our joint work will proceed in a spirit of mutual understanding and friendship and that we shall successfully and honorably fulfill the will of our governments, expressed in the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers concerning Korea.

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STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE
AT OPENING SESSION OF JOINT SOVIET-UNITED STATES COMMISSION
AT SEOUL, KOREA, ON 20 MARCH 1946

General Shtikov, members of the Joint Commission, and visitors at the opening session: It is with great pleasure and expectation that I welcome the Soviet delegates to Seoul and open the initial meeting of the Joint Russian-American Commission in Korea to carry out the provisions of the Moscow agreement.

Today is an important day in Korean history. It is a day to which all Koreans have looked forward with great hope for the future of their nation, and should be a day Koreans will celebrate in the future as the start of a new era in Korean history. The eyes of the entire world, as well as of the Korean people, will be watching our deliberations here. The results of the work of this commission will prove the ability of two great nations of the world to cooperate fully in capitalizing upon their victory over oppression and despotism and to restore a less fortunate, long oppressed nation to an independent, sovereign status among the family of free nations. Our successful results in the councils of this commission will have lasting effect upon the peace and happiness of the world, as well as the future of Korea.

As a representative of the United States, I express my hope and confidence that our joint efforts here will be able to solve amicably and justly all Korean problems presented, whether they be political, economic, or administrative.

General Shtikov, I repeat my sincere welcome to you and your distinguished co-workers. I and my fellow representatives of the United States look forward with confidence to our coming relationships in our efforts to help Korea. I introduce to you the American members of the Commission: General Arnold, Mr. Langdon, Mr. Thayer, Colonel Booth, and Colonel Britton.

Enrolling??

Shtikov – Col Lt
Tsarapkin – Minister extraordinary (foreign office)
Lebedeff – Major General
Balasanov – Foreign office
Kovkelyenko – Colonel –

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하ㅣ지中將

美蘇共同委員會開會辭

(於朝鮮서울德壽宮 一九四六年三月二十日)

스티코우將軍、共同委員諸位及本開會式에參規하시는여러분! 나는 큰즐거움과期待를가지고 모스코三相会議에서決定된條項을履行하기為하야朝鮮서울에서開催되는美蘇共同委員会開会式에 蘇聯代表를歡迎합니다 오늘은朝鮮歷史上重大한날입니다 이날이야말로全朝鮮民族이朝鮮国家의將来를為하야 큰希望을가지고 기다려오든그날이요 또朝鮮歷史上新紀元의出発日로將来에도慶祝할 그날이올시다 全世界와朝鮮人의眼目이 이자리에서되는우리의審議를지켜보고있습니다 世界의二大強国이压迫과虐政을打破하고 얻은그勝利를善用하야圓滿한努力을하느냐 또한不幸하고 오래压迫을받은 나라를自由列国中의一個独立自主国으로恢復시킬能力이있느냐는이 共同委員会의結果가證明할것입니다 이委員会가成功하야成果를거두면 이것은朝鮮의將来와世界의平和幸福에恒久한結果를남길것입니다 美国의代表者의一人으로兩国의共同努力은이会議에上程된政治経済行政에関한모든朝鮮問題를友誼的으로公正하게解決할수있으리라고나는나의希望과自信을表現하는것입니다 스티코우將軍! 나는거듭閣下와閣下의高名한同僚代表諸位를眞心으로歡迎합니다 朝鮮을援助하려는우리兩国代表間의関係와協力에있어 나와나의同僚美国代表들은自信을가지고기다리고있습니다 인제共同委員의美国側代表인 아놀드將軍랭든氏 예이열氏、뿌드大佐及뿌리든大佐를紹介해들입니다

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The Soviet people warmly supported this right of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always championed and will always champion their self determination and free existence of any nation without exception.

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Only such a government will be able to abolish entirely the remnants of the former Japanese domination in the political and economic life of Korea, to launch a decisive battle with reactionary anti-democratic elements inside the country, to carry out radical measures in the rehabilitation of economic life, to give political liberties to the Koreans and fight for peace in the Far East.

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ТЕКСТ РЕЧИ

Главы Советской делегации при открытии заседания совместной Советско-Американской Комиссии в Корее.

Генерал Гадж, Господа.

Наша совместная Комиссия представителей Американского и Советского Командования призвана осуществить исторические решения Московского Совещания Министров Иностранных Дел Советского Союза, США и Соединенного Королевства о Корее. Эти решения являются выражением доброй воли и стремления великих союзных держав всемерно содействовать восстановлению независимости корейского государства и создания условий для развития страны на демократических началах.

Великие армии США и СССР, разгромив японских империалистов, навсегда уничтожили японское господство в Корее и освободили корейский народ.

Сейчас Корея вступила в новую полосу своего развития - полосу национального возрождения и воссоздания государственной независимости.

Господа. Народ Кореи с его тысячелетней культурой, ярко выраженным национальным самосознанием долгие годы переносивший

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

тяготы и унижения колониального рабства,- этот народ достоин самого лучшего будущего. Корейский народ кровью и неисчислимыми страданиями заслужил право на независимость, на свободную самостоятельную жизнь.

Советский народ горячо поддерживает это право корейского народа. Советский Союз всегда отстаивал и будет отстаивать право всех без исключения наций на их самоопределение и свободное существование.

Как мы все убедились, корейский народ преисполнен стремлением, и уже показал свою решимость, создать при помощи союзных государств, свободное демократическое корейское государство, дружественно относящееся ко всем свободолюбивым нациям.

Великие цели создания демократического независимого корейского государства вызвали к жизни большую политическую активность всего народа Кореи.

Корейский народ создал свои демократические партии, общественные организации, народные комитеты, как орган демократического самоуправления. Однако на пути последовательной демократизации всей внутренней жизни корейского народа стоят серьезные трудности, вызываемые яростным сопротивлением реакционных и антидемократических групп и

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

отдельных элементов, ставящих своей целью сорвать дело создания и утверждения демократического строя в Корее.

Задача совместной Американско-Советской Комиссии состоит в том, чтобы помочь корейскому народу создать временное корейское демократическое правительство, способное осуществить поставленные перед ним задачи демократизации и возрождения страны.

Создание временного корейского демократического правительства должно быть основано на основе широкого объединения всех демократических партий и организаций, поддерживающих решения Московского Совещания трех министров иностранных дел.

Только такое правительство способно будет окончательно ликвидировать остатки бывшего японского господства в политической и экономической жизни Кореи, провести решительную борьбу с реакционными антидемократическими элементами внутри страны, провести решительные меры по восстановлению народного хозяйства, обеспечить корейский народ политическими свободами и бороться за создание мира на Дальнем Востоке.

Советский Союз кровно заинтересован в том, чтобы Корея была действительно демократической независимой и дружественным Советскому Союзу государством, чтобы в будущем она не стала базой и плацдармом для нападения на Советский Союз.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Задача совместной американо-Советской Комиссии, как это вытекает из решения Совещания трех Министров о Корее, состоит также и в том, чтобы при участии Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, с привлечением корейских демократических организаций, разработать меры помощи и содействия /об опеке/, политическому, экономическому, социальному прогрессу корейского народа, развития демократического самоуправления и установления государственной независимости Кореи. Такая временная опека отвечает коренным интересам корейского народа, ибо она обеспечивает условия быстрейшего национального возрождения и воссоздания независимого корейского государства на демократических началах.

Генерал ХАДЛ.

Заканчивая свою речь, я хочу от имени Советской делегации искренне приветствовать Вас и Ваших выдающихся делегатов и выразить глубокое удовлетворение тем, что мы будем работать совместно с представителями Американского Командования в интересах и на благо корейского народа.

Я глубоко уверен в том, что наша совместная работа будет протекать в атмосфере взаимного понимания и дружбы и мы успешно и с честью выполним волю своих правительств, выраженных в решениях Московского Совещания Министров Иностранных Дел о Корее.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

"It had been further agreed that the Combined [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"The [illegible] in which these [illegible] to be accomplished upon the adoption of proposals submitted by each Delegation at the first session.

"Today's discussion turned on the techniques for putting into effect paragraph 9, Section III (Moscow) of the decision of the Moscow conference of the Foreign Ministers. The exchange of views is to provide a basis for determining the order in which these tasks are to be accomplished.

"[illegible]."

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV ARMY CORPS

PRESS RELEASE

SEOUL, KOREA, MARCH 23, 1946---1700---The second joint communique issued today by the Joint American-Soviet Commission over the signatures of Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold, chief of the United States delegation, and Col. Gen. T. F. Shtikov, chief of the Soviet delegation, follows:

"The Joint Commission opened its second session at 1300--22 March, 1946 in the Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea.

"MAJOR GENERAL A. V. ARNOLD, chief of the United States delegation was chairman. It had been agreed at the first session that the chairmanship normally would alternate weekly between GENERAL ARNOLD and COLONEL GENERAL T. F. SHTKOV, chief of the Soviet delegation, with more frequent changes in chairmanship to be by mutual a greement in special cases. GENERAL SHTIKOV a nd GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the latter would preside the first week.

"It had been further a greed that the Commission would meet as frequently as the two Chief Commissioners might decide, or upon request of either in case of necessity.

"Representatives of Korean democratic political parties may attend Commission meetings by special invitation upon mutual agreement of the two Chief Commissioners."

"All meetings will be carried on in both English and Russian, and all documents of the Commission will be in both languages. These documents may include proclamations, which would be translated into Korean also."

"Duties of the secretaries to the delegations also were detailed at the first session, it being agreed that chief responsibility would rest with the secretary of the nationality of the chairman of the Commission.

"The Joint Commission today completed discussion of the methods of publicising materials which explain its work.

"Inasmuch as the public in general and the Korean people in particular have the right to know as much as possible of the efforts of the Joint Commission to assist detailed Joint Communiques to the press after the settlement of each question but not less than once each week.

"The Joint Commission then turned to a consideration of one of the tasks outlined for it by the decision of the communique of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers--to assist in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government.

"The order in which these tasks are to be accomplished was the subject of proposals submitted by each delegation at the first session.

"Today's discussion turned on the techniques for putting into effect paragraph 2, Section III (Korea) of the decision of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers. The exchange of views is to serve as a basis for determining the order in which these tasks are to be accomplished.

"The meeting adjourned at 1645."

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SEOUL, KOREA, MARCH 23, 1946---The fifty-thousandth enlisted man has just cleared the Korea Disposition Center processing routine on his homeward journey, Lt. Col. Norman C. Finney, commander of the Center announced today. He is Pfc. Clyde D. Jones, Headquarters, 32nd. Infantry, and is on his way home to Sahuarita, Ariz. after 24 months of service.

After the departure of the General Eltinge, the Center will have 540 officers and men remaining. It is expected that all will be aboard the Cape Perpetua, the next ship scheduled to leave Korea for the United States. The last of the officers and enlisted men now eligible to return to the States under present regulations are on orders and are also expected to leave on the Cape Perpetua. This includes all officers with 65 points or 42 months of service, and all enlisted men with 40 points or 24 months of service as of June 30.

The Korea Disposition Center opened on November 7, 1945. With the completion of the processing of currently eligible personnel, it will have processed 2,691 officers, 155 nurses, and 50,440 enlisted men. Also listed as having passed the Center, "unofficially" are two dozen dogs and at least one monkey.

"The officers and men operating the Korea Disposition Center are to be complimented on having accomplished the task of processing so many men and getting them on their way home in such a short time," Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, commander of XXIV Army Corps, said in commenting on the record of the Center.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

"The preliminary elimination of the political platform and other irrelevant measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

"Elimination of recommendations of the removal of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

"The [illegible] assessment for the work of the Commission to [illegible] provide, sub-Commissions for each [illegible] and in each [illegible] by the Commission.

"The [illegible] to work [illegible] sub-Commissions:

"[illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] of consultation [illegible] the Provisional Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations and [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] sub-Commissions from the U. S. Zone of [illegible] the U. S. Zone of the Soviet Occupation.

"[illegible] the [illegible] of the recommendations on the [illegible] and [illegible] of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government [illegible] [illegible] the Provisional Korean Democratic Government [illegible] [illegible] U. S. [illegible] the Soviet Occupation Zone.

"[illegible] the modification or elimination of the political platform and [illegible] Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Elimination of this sub-Commission from U. S. [illegible] Soviet Occupation Zone.

"The [illegible] will [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] sub-Commissions."

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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STATEMENTS OF GENERAL SHTIKOV IN JOINT COMMISSION MEETING, 6 APRIL 1946.

If this 38 parallel is abolished now there is no possible way of regulating the traffic, etc, but if the government is established there will be a boss to do this job.

- - - - -

Our problem now is to form a government, and it is the understanding of the Soviet Delegates that as soon as such a government is formed there won't be any barriers and obstacles for the Koreans. It is logical and practical as well.

- - - - -

The main problem should be solved and the other problems will be solved by themselves. Korea must have a boss, and it is the government of Korea, and once there is a boss there will be somebody to take care of the Koreans so that it will be a real care of the Koreans.

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Our main task is the creation of a government. As soon as there is a government for the Koreans, there will be no parallel and the government will influence the whole country.

(spread over)

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State Dept Instr. 12 Apr and 8 July 1976
FWB/Cohn NARS, Date APR 01 1977

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FBO HEADQUARTERS NEW YORK

Cable rec'd

SECRET. Priority. Ambassador Bowers via Tokio and Army Radio Service.

The American-Soviet Joint Commission, which has been meeting [illegible] to discuss plans of relief and rehabilitation of Korea, [illegible] the Soviet Commissioner, Lieutenant General [illegible], and the Senior American Member, Major General J. R. Hodge, Chief of the U. S. Military Mission, [illegible].

In our judgment:

"[illegible]

"[illegible]

"[illegible]

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] procedure for inviting repre-entatives of Korean demo-
[illegible] parties and social organizations to consult with the
Joint Commission is being worked out by Joint Sub-Commission
[illegible] Some details of the procedure are outlined, it will
be announced widely.

Joint Sub-Commission No. 2, having fully considered the proposals of the Korean Democratic parties and social organizations which it will consult, will prepare for the Joint Commission a chapter on the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government at all levels. This chapter will designate the various agencies of government that will exercise executive, legislative and judicial authority, and shall outline and organize.

Joint Sub-Commission No. 2 will then direct itself to work out a political platform and all other appropriate measures for the future activities of Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The Sub-Commission, also will consult with the Korean democratic and social organizations.

The decision will be a document stating the principles and [illegible] of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government [illegible] political, economic and cultural fields. It will be necessary [illegible] agreement to certain questions as [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], public [illegible], and [illegible] of press and [illegible].

[illegible]
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of U.S. Delegation

[illegible]
Colonel General
Chief of Soviet Delegation

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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Presented 3 April

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible] original [illegible] proposals, [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] no [illegible] rules [illegible] it [illegible] that the oral, cross
[illegible], be inserted in our directive. However, the
[illegible] that they should [illegible] either,
[illegible] delegation believes that [illegible] to
[illegible] rules [illegible] at least [illegible] the practice,
[illegible] but, since [illegible] of [illegible] to
[illegible] by the [illegible] or [illegible] as
follows:

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] also
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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SECRET

CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL ARNOLD AND GENERAL SHTIKOV
16 APRIL 1946 - 10:00 a.m.

General Arnold explained to General Shtikov his diagram of the work of the Commission in setting up the Provisional Government. The American position was that it was necessary to have a sub-Commission of Korean technicians to do the work of interpreting and unifying the views of the various parties and organizations.

The arguments in favor of such a group of Koreans were:

(1) Koreans were better qualified to do certain types of work, based on thorough understanding of native psychology.

(2) Koreans should be given opportunity to participate actively in the formation of their own government.

(3) This would speed up the work of the Commission.

(4) The government formed with the active participation of the Koreans would enjoy greater prestige with the Koreans than one imposed on them by the great powers.

(5) Korean parties should learn how to work together at the earliest possible moment.

In his answer, General Shtikov referred to the Soviet paper no. 16. He claimed that the Soviet Delegation also had in mind Korean psychology when compiling the document. According to him, it was important to forestall quarreling among Koreans, and the creation of further divergences of view which would follow if such a Korean Commission were formed. He disliked creating the impression that some parties were specially favored. At the same time he would expect Korean experts to participate in the work of the Sub-Committees set up by the Joint Sub-Commission. In his view, all (eligible) parties in the South would get an identical assignment, to be completed in 2 weeks time following intensive discussion by both the control

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

organs and the local branches of the parties. The final suggestions would be submitted to the Joint Commission in writing. During the two weeks while the parties complete their work, the Joint Commission would travel to the Northern Zone to give similar assignment to the parties in that zone.

Following the submission of the written suggestions, these would be turned over to the sub-Committee No. 5, which would then form several sub-committees to carry out the details. These sub-committees would include the experts [illegible] in the best way to get the parties all together since they would then obtain the slightly [illegible] concessions from the Allied authorities.

After the hearing and the [illegible], it might be possible to [illegible] to the executives of all the parties. The procedure would be the same. Subsequently, there would be [illegible] to the parties of the North. The [illegible] would be either to the North, or to invite the northern parties, with their documents, to come to Seoul.

At this point a second meeting ought to be held with the North Korean party representatives, in order to get their views uniting the Korean parties.

This would be better, since parties are more representative than individuals. At the same time, they (the parties) don't trust each other, and always complain of favoritism.

In general Shishkov's view, the main divergence between the U. S. diagram and the Soviet views are:

(a) The use of the Consultative Union in the diagram. In the Soviet view this should be in an inclusive group of "representatives of democratic parties and social organizations".

(b) The U. S. diagram adds a third category, "Korean Citizens", for later consultation. This is not acceptable.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Everything in the diagram below that stage would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.

In conclusion, General Shtikov agreed to prepare a diagram of his own.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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NND 760090
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DRAFT:
25 April 1946

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State Dept. Instr. 12 Apr and 8 July 1976
FWB/BAM NARS, Date APR 01 1977

Summary of conversation between General Arnold and General Shtikov, 22 April 1946, 15:00 - 17:00

1. General Arnold explained to General Shtikov his time chart, devised to determine the sequence of the principal events between the first meeting of the Joint Commission and the full independence of Korea, as well as the exact points, with respect to the various stages of the activity of the Commission, at which the planning of each principal event should begin, and its execution should be completed.

2. General Shtikov expressed his view by taking as illustration any executive department, e.g. railroads or agriculture.

(a) At the first stage there would be three simultaneous activities in the Joint Commission (2 weeks time).

(1) Working out the organizational structure of the Provisional Government.

(2) Working out the provisional charter

(3) Working out the political platform

(b) Following this, the Executive organ, consisting of ministers (responsible heads of departments) will be appointed (1 month).

(c) All this will be embodied in a document (5-10 days) (The recommendations of the Joint Commission) which shall be submitted to the US and USSR for approval, and transmission to the four powers.

(d) While the governments are ratifying the recommendations, (approximately 1-1½ months) the Joint Commission with the ministers-designate shall complete the selection of the Korean personnel (3000-5000 administrators, managers and technicians).

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(e) Soviet Delegation attaches exceptional importance to this stage.

(f) The ablest Koreans in the South are known to the US Military Government; in the North, to the Soviet Command.

(g) Although there are parallel departments in all instances, these should not be united mechanically.

(h) The time necessary for this work, 1 - 1½ months.

(i) The work to be done by a Special Commission, with Special Sub-Commissions for each ministry.

(j) There will be a complete staff, ready to begin work the instant the recommendations are ratified.

(k) The combination of two parallel departments (e.g. of agriculture) will begin at this point; the work of integration will be done by the newly appointed ministers, who will take over.

(l) Records and other materials from the North will be brought down to Seoul by those retained for the positions in the ministries; combined with those from the South.

(m) Following the study of the materials jointly with the Joint Commission, the ministry of the Government will begin discharging duties, in implementing paragraph 3.

(n) Koreans should participate at every stage of planning, since this is the best way to learn the business. They should also realize that there is more to management than sitting down and giving orders.

3. General Arnold pointed out that General Shtikov agreed that preliminary planning was necessary.

4. General Shtikov conceded:

(a) That many questions of planning would be solved in the process of working out the <u>structure</u> of

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the government (e.g. the [redacted] charter, duties, departments, jobs for the ministry of Finance) will be worked out on paper, after which the appropriate people will be distributed to fill the jobs. (We should not think in terms of unification, since that will be automatically understood).

(b) That some items, e.g. questions of finance, money, etc., would take more time and research, jointly by the Provisional Government and the Joint Commission, than the other (e.g. railroads and agriculture, which will be merely taken over).

(c) The introduction of interim money would shake the Koreans' confidence, and the whole thing would have to be worked out by the government and established by law.

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SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE : Public Information, USAMGIK

27 April 1946

The following statement was made by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea.

General Arnold, my chief representative on the Joint Commission, confirms to me the understanding that by signing the declaration outlined in Communique No. 5 of the Joint Commission, political parties and social organizations thereby assure themselves of the privilege of expressing their views to the commission, either for or against trusteeship. Signing the declaration for consultation with the Joint Commission does not indicate that the political party or social organization favors trusteeship, or that the organization commits itself to support of trusteeship.

Those who will not sign the declaration, nowever, will not be consulted by the Joint Commission.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

27 April 1946

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Those who will not sign the declaration, however, will not be consulted by the Joint Commission.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Headquarters
United States Army Military Government in Korea
Department Public Information
Seoul, Korea

27 April 19[illegible]

美蘇共同委員이要求한宣言書署名에関한
하-지中將의 声明書

美蘇共同委員会 美国側首席代表아-놀드將軍은 明書第五号에表示된 宣言書署名에関하야 나와左記事에 見解가同一함

1.) 그宣言書를署名하는 政党과社会団体에게 信託의 賛成或은反対하는 意見発表의特典을保障함

2.) 美蘇共同声明委員과 協議하기爲하야 宣言書를署名한다고해서 그政党이나社会団体가 信託을賛成한다는가 或은信託支持에 言質을준다는 表示는無함

但 그宣言書를署名치않는어는 共同委員의協議의 ~~처가되지아니함~~

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Secret

CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL ARNOLD AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 29 APRIL 1946, 1500-1730

General Shtikov: I examined the text of General Arnold's proposed wording and discussed it with the Soviet Delegation.

Conclusion:

Such text cannot be accepted by the Soviet Delegation because of the same reasons we mentioned at the previous session.

a. Nothing is stated about the Moscow Decision.

The holy of holies for the Joint Commission is the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation feels that it is the basic document for it. The decision of 17 April 1946 in Communique #5 only states whether parties and organizations, if they wish, may make a declaration of their parties in consultation.

The first part puts the United States and Soviet Delegations in identical positions, the second seemingly places all responsibility for demands on the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Delegation feels that the last wording proposed by it is most acceptable as it answers equally well the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Our clear conseience is before the United States. We do not have such parties and organizations and press which voiced opposition against the Moscow Decision or even against the United States. We have not encouraged such, and will not, I assure you.

In South Korea there are such papers and leaders which slander the U.S.S.R. and Soviet Command in North Korea. With such we do not wish to talk.

Consequently, we regard our demand legitimate and logical--not to consult with such. If the United States had made such demands, we would support it too.

General Arnold: Since the Soviet Delegation cannot accept our last proposal, I withdraw it and we shall return to full support of paragraph 2, American Text or the Soviet Text without the words "from the membership of the party or organization, who have not [illegible] by actively voicing their opposition against

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Our clear conscience is before the United States. We do not have such parties and organizations and press which voiced opposition against the Moscow Decision or even against the United States. We have not encouraged such, and will not, I assure you.

In South Korea there are such papers and leaders which slander the U.S.S.R. and Soviet Command in North Korea. With such we do not wish to talk.

Consequently, we regard our demand legitimate and logical--not to consult with such. If the United States had made such demands, we would support it too.

General Arnold: Since the Soviet Delegation cannot accept our last proposal, I withdraw it and we shall return to full support of paragraph 2, American Text or the Soviet Text without the words "from the membership of the party or organization, who have not compromised themselves by actively voicing their opposition against

Secret

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Moscow Decision and against the Allies." I wish to read a memorandum to myself from General Hodge dated April 28th on the discussions in the Joint Commission. (Memorandum is read as appended) These parties are young. They should be taught like children. We ought to excuse their actions because of their immaturity. If we conduct the consultation the way a father does with his child, both sides will obtain the desirable decision.

These parties lack in training and experience. All their contacts with the Joint Commission are experience and training. I consider that paragraph 2 opens a wide field for the training of the political parties. Consequently, we have two different points of view. You have your own ideas of democracy--we have our own. You think that your methods are best--we think that ours are. That is why I submit this plan.

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation will follow the wishes of its Command. The Soviet people have shed their blood for the Korean people and have the right to see in the Korean government people who are loyal to the Soviet Union, and we will not consult with those who mislead the Korean people by slandering the U.S.S.R. It will likewise object to the inclusion of such people in the government. We know Koreans have never been inimical to Russia. Consequently, we have no basis to admit to the government those who are against us. We do not regard enmity towards the Soviet Union as a sign of patriotism. Consequently, Korean parties and organizations should be able to furnish people who are loyal to the Soviet Union. We are not selfish. We too are a democratic country and will defend democracy. Therefore, the Joint Commission cannot consult with those opposing the Moscow Decision or the Allies.

General Arnold: We are discussing the eligibility of members of political parties. Our position is that when the parties sign the declaration, they do so according to the will of their members.

Political parties are not animated beings. The members voice the will of the political parties. Since the will of the parties is expressed by the members, every member participates in the signing of the declaration.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The American Delegation considers that if we accept the declaration without this phrase, we will get the identical results. The point of view of the American Delegation is that if a party is eligible, then the representative is too since he expresses the will of the party. The Delegation of the U.S. have nothing against members of the political parties which have signed the necessary declaration.

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation has already expressed its view. We feel that it is equally objective to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

It does not offer a position of special advantage to either the Soviet Delegation or the American Delegation. Consequently, we feel that we should be able to accept the Soviet text of paragraph 2.

The Soviet Delegation feels that it cannot consult with those who spit in its face. It cannot demean the prestige of our country by doing so. Korean people wish the help from the United States and the Soviet Union.

General Arnold: In the American zone, we will not hold this against the political parties because of our convictions regarding the freedom of speech. A Korean may be opposed to trusteeship and desire independence but I would not think he could be excluded because of his attitude toward Trusteeship. We do not think that any additional conditions for consultation are necessary other than those mentioned in the agreement of 17 April. Consequently, the Delegation of the U.S. is not changing its position on paragraph 2. If we wish to continue our work, we must accept the text without the phrase I have already mentioned.

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation cannot change the wording of its proposal for paragraph 2. We feel that any political party has individuals who are able to reflect the interests of the party, and they should be those who have not compromised themselves by voicing opposition against the Moscow Decision or the Allies.

General Arnold: General Hodge has explained this matter, We have all the reasons to accuse a certain political party of the South who alone has voiced opposition against the efforts of the U.S. in South Korea

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

from the very beginning of the occupation. They have harmed the cause of the party and they have harmed the cause of Korean in the South and throughout the world. The U.S. Command in South Korea recognizes the foolishness of such actions. But since this party consists of Koreans and since the Koreans are interested in the government which we are trying to form, and since we have gathered here in order to give to the Koreans their first government, the U.S. Military Command (represented by the Delegation of the U.S.) shall not take any action against such party and get up any idea of excluding this party from consultation or from further discussion in the course of the founding of the Korean Provisional Government.

The U.S. Delegation believes in the freedom of speech. The activities of these parties are excused because of this. If the Delegation of the U.S. cannot regard them in this light and still fulfill its mission, that is to say, fulfill the Moscow Decision, maybe the Soviet Delegation can occupy a similar position and we should be able to continue our efforts in creating the Provisional Government.

General Shtikov: Can there be such a party in Korea which has consistently objected to the United States whose influence has spread throughout the world. I doubt that there is such a political party.

Korean political parties cannot be assured as yet of their influence over Koreans. How can they therefore spread it over the world?

General [illegible]: During my service as a Military Governor, this certain party has opposed many of my efforts and has attacked me personally in the press dominated by such parties, but I am not discussing this matter. This question is not related to the question of representatives of political parties which we are discussing. We are now discussing paragraph 2 of the American proposal. The declaration of the U.S. is convinced that when we accept this paragraph, we shall complete our work on the method of consultation and should be able to continue our work. The U.S. Delegation is against any expression about the exclusion from consultation. This has been also expressed by General Hodge in his letter. The U.S. Delegation will not accept the phrase: "from the membership of the party or organization, who have not compromised

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

themselves by actively voicing their opposition against the Moscow Decision and against the Allies." Without this phrase we shall accept the Soviet formula.

This is the present position of the American Delegation.

I am convinced that paragraph 2 (American Text or the Soviet Text without the phrase as above) shall enable the Joint Commission to fulfill without any difficulty the Moscow Decision. The main thing is to continue our work. We are leaving to the consideration of the Soviet Delegation paragraph 2 as it is stated in the document of the Joint Commission.

General Shtikov: I do not think that General Arnold is more democratic than I. Since I have been elected many times, I know what the will of the people is and value democracy, but I doubt that there could be a political party in South Korea which could cause such damage on a world-wide scale.

The rest are old parties. I am interested in the Korean press--both South Korean and North Korean--and read both. I have not seen any such attacks against the American Command as I have against the U.S.S.R. Command. When General Arnold is in North Korea, he will able to convince himself that the attitude there is identical towards both the United States and the Soviet Union and that they are equally grateful for liberation.

If there is some criticism of the Soviet Command and it is objective and not lying, we always take it into consideration in our work. Maybe the Soviet Command is luckier than the American Command in having fewer outsiders (from abroad) in North Korea, but all the leaders there and also the press are loyal to both the Soviet and United States Commands. The Soviet Command has never encouraged those opposed to the United States or those who slander it regardless of the party which circulated such slander.

There is a Russian saying "People are not condemned for mistakes", but when the mistakes are systematically repeated, we do not encourage such behavior. The Soviet Delegation wishes to succeed in the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, and the United States has had a

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

chance to become convinced of it. We are sincere. The United States Delegation must understand our demands since, as I pointed out, they put both the United States and Soviet Delegations in a position of equality.

General Arnold: Our proposal is to combine two kinds of democracy. The Joint Commission must coordinate its views on democracy and then think about the way the Koreans think of it. It does not matter that each one of our countries had been attacked by the Koreans. Our democracy includes a concept of the free press which is sometimes a difficult problem for us. With this kind of freedom of press, any person can express his views against any political parties or schools of thought. We do not think that anybody should be penalized for such expression.

In a new country like Korea there are new liberties and new ideas of democracy. The Koreans have committed and said many foolish things. If we feel that young people make mistakes and if they repeat those mistakes, we correct them more severely. Nevertheless, we here in the South have been successfully training Koreans in the democratic way and I personally feel that we have made great achievements in this direction.

Because of the American ideas of democracy, they expressed openly their views of the Moscow Decision. Consequently, we have not taken them very seriously when they opposed us.

This comes from our belief in our explanation of democracy.

This does not mean that we are less exacting in our desire to fulfill the Moscow Decision than you are. We understand fully the sincerity of the Soviet Union. The main problem is to coordinate two concepts of democracy--the Soviet and the American.

We must fulfill the Moscow Decision.

We intend to do so. Our ideas of democracy have been inherited since childhood. They should not prevent us in working together with the Soviet Union and Korea in the course of successful fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

We are convinced that paragraph 2 of the American Text will make success of the proposed method. Consequently, I propose that we accept paragraph 2 and implement it in that spirit in which it had been written.

General Shtikov: I have already declared that the Soviet Delegation is not guided by its own brand of democracy and does not wish to foist it upon the Koreans since Koreans need several years of hard work before they can reach the level of Soviet democracy. We likewise cannot speak of United States democracy. The press, in the United States concept, is a money motivated institution. In the Soviet Union the press is used to speak with the various classes of population--workers and peasants. Therefore, we cannot be guided by United States democracy and do not propose to guide Korea by Soviet democracy. I have already said "They do not condemn for mistakes", but those who persist in errors must be punished.

The Soviet Delegation is against those who still oppose the Moscow Decision and the Soviet Union. We do not wish separate individuals, in their dislike for the Soviet Union (which has done no harm to them), to speak against it, thus creating wrong attitudes and actions of Koreans towards the Soviet Union.

Consequently, we have included in our paragraph 2 the words warning parties and organizations against those who compromise themselves by opposing the Moscow Decision and the Allies.

General Arnold cannot convince me that he or his military command is indifferent since the United States Command rules Korea through its Military Government, and the Military Government does not permit any attacks against the United States. That is only natural. It is known to both you and me as soldiers. That is why we insist on our wording of paragraph 2.

General Arnold: From the previous declarations of General Shtikov and from my own, I consider that we are agreed that we should give to Korea such a type of democracy which the Koreans wish.

We must accept the 2nd paragraph (in the American Text) and give the Koreans the kind of democracy they wish. If we are agreed

Secret

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

that we wish to give to the Koreans their own form of democracy and not that of the U.S. or the Soviet Union, we have already agreed that the political parties redeem themselves when they sign the declaration.

When the parties redeem themselves, then we consider that the members have redeemed themselves also. We do not know which parties have signed or will sign the declaration but when we agreed on the April 17 decision accepting the party which signed the declaration, we cannot state that we are against the members of such parties.

The Delegation of the U.S. is against any kind of an agreement on exclusion.

By signing the declaration political parties redeemed themselves. If you accept paragraph 2 (American Text), you should not have any worries about the individual members.

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation cannot be indifferent to the Korean government. We can only allow the government of such people who are loyal to the Soviet Union. We will not allow those who are inimical. Let General Arnold understand this once and for all. Korea is a neighbor of the Soviet Union. We do not wish the Korean government to have such leaders who from their first day in office would begin organizing opposition against the Soviet Union. We wish the Korean government to be loyal to the Soviet Union. There are some leaders who from the very birth of the Soviet Union disliked it and agitated against it. Our people have had enough trouble with Japanese imperialism. In the present era, the Soviet people have sacrificed much in the war against Germany and Japan and have the right to peace and to security of their boundaries. Consequently, we shall not agree that people inimical to the Soviet Union participate in consultation, and still less that they participate in the Government.

General Arnold: We are working on paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision. We shall work on paragraph 3 after the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government. Why is General Shtikov worried about paragraph 3?

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The American Delegation does not hold it against a Korean party if it prefers independence to trusteeship. That is not ~~a crime~~. The American Delegation has declared that many times--that the expression of preference for independence instead of trusteeship is not a valid reason to exclude a party or person from consultation.

This applies not only to the political parties and ordinary members, but it also applies to the leaders who can also express their preference for independence without forfeiting his right to be consulted.

We do not think that such individuals are dangerous for Korea since we recognize their right to express party opinions. Consequently, we do not feel that we are avoiding exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision when we take the position that Koreans can express preference for independence, and do not deserve to be punished for it. We maintain this position. We shall not take any action whatever to eliminate from consultation, and as I said, we will not agree to any additional conditions on consultation. The American Delegation will not agree to the Soviet Text and is upholding its own text of paragraph 2.

It is quite late. What does General Shtikov propose?

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation is so brought up that if it has signed a document it shall faithfully fulfill it. We conceded to the wishes of the United States Delegation and signed the declaration of 17 April 1946 agreeing that all political parties and social organizations signing the declaration could participate in consultation. We have done that conscientiously, believing that not all party members are guilty but that there are individuals who have misled their political parties by an incorrect explanation of the Moscow Decision. These are the people who, according to us, may not consult with us since they were themselves misled and have misled the parties and organizations. Consequently, they cannot be of use to the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Command likewise did not prohibit opposition to the Moscow Decision in North Korea. It only explained its nature. I know the declaration of General Arnold in which he pointed out that Koreans are not capable of acquiring power--that they must be taught.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

~~Secret~~

I cannot understand why General Arnold encourages those who oppose the Moscow Decision.

We are realists and must realistically assess the circumstances in Korea. Korea must be aided. I think that the United States Delegation is for such aid as is the Soviet Delegation. This does not constitute a violation of democracy.

General Arnold has become convinced that if it were not for the United States Command in South Korea and the Soviet Command in North Korea, there would be disorders. This was pointed out publicly many times by General Hodge and, I think, by General Arnold when he was Military Governor. There are individual leaders in Korea who wish to get along without the United States and the Soviet Union. They are dangerous to Korea. They have no ground on which to stand in Korea, and the Moscow Decision was not made for their sake, but for the sake of the Korean people. We must fulfill the Moscow Decision exactly. We can get along without the aid of such "leaders" who aspire to power in Korea. There will be found more than enough Koreans who are friendly towards the United States and the Soviet Union--who really understand conditions. They must be the ones to participate in both consultation and in the Provisional Democratic Korean Government. The political parties will understand us if we adopt the Soviet text of paragraph 2 and will know that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union encourage slanderers of our states.

This does not contradict democracy. It corresponds to the interest of the Korean people. The Soviet Delegation is not interested in trusteeship more than the United States Delegation, but the Soviet Delegation is serious towards the Moscow Decision since it has been signed by our Foreign Minister and we are accustomed to exactly fulfilling the orders of our government.

This is the only correct decision on Korea because only it will give the Koreans independence and true freedom to develop democracy. As for those who for decades were outside Korea, being separated from Korea, or those who collaborated with the Japs, they oppose the Moscow Decision, aspiring to power in Korea without any grounds for this.

~~Secret~~

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

There is a Russian saying "Vox populi, vox dei". The people see who their true representatives are and who are against the people. Those whom the Soviet Delegation will oppose are not only against paragraph 3 but they are against the Moscow Decision in its entirety. I have already told General Arnold that the Soviet Delegation does not intend to speak with those who are against the Moscow Decision and who are against the Allies, especially against the Soviet Union, and we cannot accept any other wording than ours of the 26 April and 27 April meetings of the Subcommission.

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation has explained several times and does not understand why the Russian arguments are not clear to the United States Delegation. Just for example, if the child is tired or does not walk yet, and if General Arnold or I tried to help but the child threw stones, I then would refuse to aid since if the child throws stones, it understands what it does.

General Arnold: We propose that the Soviet Delegation should agree to our proposed text of paragraph 2. We shall present this question at the Joint Commission meeting tomorrow at 1300 for action.

If we once more agree that we disagree, we may then agree on a Joint Communique which shall present before the Korean people and the entire world our views and will take the necessary steps which may be indicated by the reaction.

We have nothing else to suggest. Today's agenda is satisfactory for tomorrow's meeting.

General Shtikov: The Soviet Delegation does not feel that a question on which there is disagreement should be submitted to a third party for the decision. If we appeal to a third party, we confess that we are unable to solve the problem.

The Soviet Delegation has no basis yet for believing that it is unable to solve the problem concerning the Moscow Decision.

General Arnold: We are discussing paragraph 2 of the document and we are not discussing the official government of Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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I feel that the declaration will suffice in order to clear both the parties and the representatives of the parties. We so understood this when we agreed on the declaration about consultation and we still maintain our position.

Does the Soviet Delegation consider that the political party, independently from its past, is recognized as eligible for consultation when it signs the declaration?

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Statement by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

The U.S.-Soviet Commission has just issued a communique, which is one of the most significant steps toward Korean independence. The delegates of the two Great Nations agreed on consulting with the Korean Democratic Political parties and social organizations to prepare proposals for the formation of the provisional Korean Democratic Government. Now the Koreans have a long waited opportunity to cooperate with the Joint Commission in moulding the future of their own native country. The U.S. Army Forces have laid down a practical plan for Korea's progress. What is important to us now, all the patriotic Koreans must study the provisions of the Moscow Agreement more judicially and calmly in order to understand fully what course they should take to accomplish their long cherished end - the independence of Korea.

Let us examine the Moscow Decision sentence by sentence. Paragraph 1 reads as follows:

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for development of the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport, and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people."

This is a clear statement of the aims of the Moscow Conference that should fulfill Korean desires and provides for establishing a Korean Government. It is clear cut and needs no further comment.

Going to paragraph 2 of the agreement:

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea."

This sentence provides for the establishment of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission that is now meeting in Seoul. It accepts the basic fact that troops of the two nations are now in occupation of Korea to eliminate the Japanese and makes arrangement to have the representatives of the two great nations that are closest to the Korean problem to help the Koreans form a provisional government and make preliminary arrangements to ease the pressing Korean problems. This commission is to prepare proposals for the formation of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government.

"In preparing their proposals, the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations."

This provision insures that Koreans get a hand in the arrangements and plans for their own provisional government. It is predicated on the hypotheses that Korean political parties and social organizations of a democratic character will willingly cooperate with and give their best efforts to help the commission in its work when called upon to do so. Going on:

"The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for consideration to the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission."

It should be noted here that the Joint Commission does not make the final decision on the subject of the interim Korean government. It works out a recommendation and presents it to the four great powers for their consideration. This provision in the Moscow Agreement, providing for consideration by four powers of the recommendations of the Joint Commission after their consultations with the Korean representatives, provides a check and safeguard

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

against adopting any ill-advised plan or any plan detrimental to the Korean nation.

We now go to paragraph 3:

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

This is a very important point in the agreement. To begin with, it defines definitely the word "trusteeship" (trusteeship as known in) that has caused so much concern to Koreans. Note that the "trusteeship" is already defined in the Moscow Decision as "measures for helping and assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea." Further note that it is indicated regardless of what political party may say. What measures that may be recommended by the commission (see first quoted sentence of the above agreement) will be worked out with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and the Korean democratic organizations. This makes clear that no measures of any kind for helping and assisting the Korean nation can be worked out until after the Provisional Government is formed and has been consulted. The purpose of this required consultation is to determine just what and how much help and assistance is needed and wanted. Now let's examine the second and last sentence of paragraph 3.

"The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship (go back to the definition as given in the Agreement) of Korea for a period of up to five years."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

This provides that the proposals of the Joint Commission, drawn up after it has consulted with the accepted Korean representatives (Provisional Korean Government), will be submitted to the four great powers for them to work out the agreement for what help and assistance that is to be given to Korea by the four powers. Note particularly the wording of this sentence as to the time element of the help and assistance. It says "period of up to five years." If the Koreans are sure they need no help or only limited help and assistance from the four great powers and the great powers agree, it is possible to dispense with it entirely or to limit it to any period necessary up to five years. The only limitation indicated is that it will not run beyond five years in so far as the Moscow Decision is concerned. The best estimate is that the degree and time period set for any help and assistance will depend entirely upon the Korean people and the ability they show in full taking care of themselves.

It is suggested that you now go back and re-read this statement, or if you hear it on the radio, that you catch the next broadcast and listen to it again, so you may study it carefully and know for yourself just what the Moscow plan is and exactly what it involves. You may be told by politicians for political reasons that the purpose of this statement is to prepare you to receive the hated "Trusteeship". It has no such purpose and whoever says so is making false statements for private or political ends of his own. The sole purpose of this orientation is to get the Korean people to open their ears, their eyes, and their minds to intelligent discussions of their own affairs and to inform them fully of the directive under which the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission in Korea is now working. It is an effort to stop irresponsible loose talk and political mis-information about the terms of the Moscow agreement. One other point should b kept in mind. The Moscow agreement is not American, nor is it Russian. It is the result of careful and painstaking thought and planning on the part of the American, Soviet, and British nations to restore Korea to the family of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

independent and sovereign nations and was prepared by their three ministers in conference. It behooves all Koreans who want restoration of their nation to:

(1) Get a full understanding of what the great powers are trying and willing to do.

(2) Unite in their own efforts to form a new Korean nation for Koreans, friendly with and respected by, the great democratic nations.

(3) Cooperate with and assist the efforts of the Joint Commission in implementing the Moscow agreement to the end that Korea gain her independence.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS

Statement by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

The U. S.-Soviet Commission has just issued a communique, which is one of the most significant steps toward Korean independence. The delegates of the Two Great Nations agreed on consulting with the Korean Democratic Political Parties and social organizations to prepare proposals for the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Now the Koreans have the long awaited opportunity to cooperate with the Joint Commission in moulding the future of their own beloved country. The Big Three Powers laid down a practical plan for Korea at Moscow. With an important task ahead of them, all patriotic Koreans should study the provisions of the Moscow Agreement more judicially and calmly in order to understand fully what courses they should take to accomplish their long cherished end-the independence of Korea.

Let us examine the Moscow Decision sentence by sentence. Paragraph 1 reads as follows:

> "1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport, and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people."

This is a clear statement of the aims of the Moscow Decision that should fulfill Korean desires and provides for establishing a Korean Government. It is clear cut and needs no further comment.

Going to paragraph 2 of the agreement:

> "2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea."

This sentence provides for the establishment of the Joint U. S. Soviet Commission that is now meeting in Seoul. It accepts the basic fact that troops of the two nations are now in occupation of Korea to eliminate the Japanese stranglehold and makes arrangement to have the representatives of the two great nations that are closest to the Korean problem help the Koreans form a provisional government and make preliminary arrangements to ease many pressing Korean problems. This commission is to prepare proposals for the formation of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government.

> "In preparing their proposals, the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations."

This provision insures that Koreans participate in the arrangements and plans for their own provisional government. It is predicated on the hypotheses that Korean political parties and social organizations of a democratic character shall willingly cooperate with and give their best efforts to assist the commission in its work. Continuing:

> "The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for consideration to the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission."

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

It should be noted here that the Joint Commission does not make the final decision on the subject of the interim Korean government. With the participation of the Koreans it works out a recommendation and presents it to the four great powers for their consideration. This provision in the Moscow Decision, providing for consideration by four powers of the recommendations of the Joint Commission after their consultations with the Korean representatives, provides an added check and safeguard against adopting any ill-advised plan or any plan detrimental to the Korean nation.

We now go to paragraph 3:

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trustees..ip) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

This is a very important statement in the agreement. To begin with, it defines definitely the word "Trusteeship" that has caused so much concern to Koreans. Note carefully that "Trusteeship" is specifically defined in the Moscow Decision as "measures for helping and assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea." Nothing more than that is indicated regardless of what politicians may say. Whatever measures that may be recommended by the commission (see next quoted sentence of the Moscow Decision) will be worked out with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and the Korean democratic organizations. This makes clear that no measures of any kind for helping and assisting the Korean nation can be worked out until after the Provisional Government is formed and has been consulted. The purpose of this required consultation is to determine just what and how much help and assistance the Korean Provisional Government needs and wants. Now let's examine the second and last sentence of paragraph 3.

"The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship (go back to the definition as given in the Agreement) of Korea for a period of up to five years."

This provides that the proposals of the Joint Commission, drawn up after it has consulted with the accepted Korean representatives (Provisional Korean Government and Korean Democratic Organizations), will be submitted to the four great powers for them to work out the agreement for what help and assistance that is to be given to Korea by the four powers. Note particularly the wording of this sentence as to the time element of the help and assistance. It says "period of up to five years." If the Koreans demonstrate they need no help or only limited help and assistance from the four great powers and the great powers agree, it may be possible to dispense with it entirely or to limit it to any period necessary up to five years. The only limitation indicated is that it will not run beyond five years. The best estimate is that the degree and time period set for any help and assistance will depend entirely upon the Korean people and the ability they show in taking full care of themselves.

It is suggested that you now go back and re-read this statement, or if you hear it on the radio, catch the next broadcast and listen to it again, so you may study it carefully and know for yourself just what the Moscow plan is and exactly what it involves.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

You may be told by politicians for political reasons that the purpose of this statement is to prepare you to receive the hated "Trusteeship". It has no such purpose and whoever says so is making false statements for private or political ends. The sole purpose of this orientation is to get the Korean people to open their ears, their eyes, and their minds to intelligent discussions of their own affairs and to inform them fully of the directive under which the Joint U. S.-Soviet Commission in Korea is now working. It is an effort to stop irresponsible loose talk and political misinformation about the terms of the Moscow agreement. One other point should be kept in mind. The Moscow Decision is not American only, nor is it Russian only. It is the result of careful and painstaking thought and planning on the part of the American, Soviet, and British nations to restore Korea to the family of independent and sovereign nations and was prepared by their three ministers in conference. It behooves all Koreans who want restoration of their nation to:

(1) Get a full understanding of what the great powers are trying and willing to do.

(2) Unite in their own efforts to form a new Korean nation for Koreans, friendly with and respected by, the great democratic nations.

(3) Cooperate with and assist the efforts of the Joint Commission in implementing the Moscow Decision to the end that Korea gain her independence.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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DRAFT: 2 May 1946
Mr, Prostov

~~S E C R E T~~

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E.O. 12 Apr and 8 July 1976
FwalStm NARS, Date APR 21 1977

STATEMENT OF GENERAL SHTIKOV - 2 May 1946 - 1000

(General Shtikov presented the following diagram of stages of work of the Joint Commission).

Beginning of work of the Joint Commission.

1.

Elaboration on recommendations.

2.

Approval by our governments.

3.

We have elaborated the questionnaire and are short of half way in Stage 1. What is the next step? We haven't yet made the list of parties. When these are completed, we shall hold the meeting and hand over the questions in order that parties and social organizations may begin work on elaborating the recommendations. (We shall need about 15 days). We shall then put together all proposals and recommendations from parties and social organizations. Following this the Sub-Commissions shall begin processing the proposals and recommendations on the following questions:

Provisional Charter

Organic Structure of the Government

Political Platform

(This shall occupy between two or three weeks).

The work will include the big problem of elaboration of questions of government structure, including details on each ministry (number of people of high, medium and technical grades needed). This stage, however, shall be included in the two or three weeks mentioned above.

We feel that details will not be received from Koreans who do not know them. The work will proceed in the Joint Commission which will draft the Koreans into this work. This is a complex work and we shall need many advisors after working out the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Provisional Charter, political platform and the structure of the government.

The Joint Commission shall examine these in a preliminary manner and then shall report to the Koreans the draft documents which will have been elaborated on the basis of their proposals. This will constitute the complete structure of government. Following the amendments, if any, a Draft Sub-Committee shall be appointed. The aim of the draft Sub-Committee shall be to edit the document for submission to our governments. This document shall be finally approved by us and sent on.

At this stage we shall begin selecting personnel for various government jobs. At this stage we shall have to take into consideration the interested parties and social organizations and we shall select not only the ministers but also vice ministers so as to represent as many parties and social organizations as possible in the provisional government.

After selection and approval by the Joint Commission the proposed personnel is submitted to our governments for approval along with the Provisional Charter, political platform and governmental structure.

This ends the first period (See Chart).

Second Period:

During this period we begin to select the entire personnel jointly with the ministers*. We shall need approximately 5,000 Korean employees.

The apparatus will have to be created completely anew; it shall be selected with the participation of the government; each minister shall participate in the selection.

In order, best to organize the work, there should be created a Chief Commission and several Sub-Commissions. (one for each ministry.)

*Though not yet approved.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Chief Commission shall consist of the Joint Commission members, the head of the future government (Prime Minister) and of his assistants. In each Sub-Commission there shall be a Joint Commission member, the minister and additional individuals as the Joint Commission sees fit.

STAFFING:

Individual members of the government apparatus will be selected from among the Koreans working in the Military Government and the People's Committee in the North as well as from various other agencies. This period shall end when we receive the approval of our governments. As soon as approval is received, we shall declare that the decision had been made, then we shall convene a solemn session at which the Decision is handed to the ministers.

Having received its "mandate" the Korean government shall take the oath of office and shall proclaim its declaration of aims and objectives. This ceremony shall be attended by delegates from all of the Provinces.

The government shall sign the appointments of personnel which had been previously worked out by the Joint Commission and Sub-Commissions. A general meeting of the personnel shall then take place and at that time the oath of office shall be administered.

At this point the government shall take over the economy and culture of both North and South. The order of taking over is as follows:

1. All ministries shall receive all records, statistics and reports from Military Government in the South and the People's Committee in the North. Materials shall be handed over by the Chiefs of various departments.

2. After receiving the records the Provisional Government shall prepare a joint report on the economic and cultural conditions of entire Korea. This is submitted to the government for approval.

3. After receiving the joint report, the provisional government

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

and Joint Commission shall make the plan of work, determining the priority of measures on the basis of the national needs (and consistently with the political platform). (2 or 3 weeks shall be needed to complete this work)

Having determined the priority of measures, the government apparatus should begin its work. The Joint Commission should begin elaborating the measures of aid for economic, political and cultural developments of the Korean people (same as second stage of the work of the Commission).

For this work we shall create several Sub-Commissions:

A. Economical

Industry

Transportation

Agriculture

B. Internal and External Trade

C. Financial

D. Training Korean Personnel

E. National Culture

Economics

Culture

Health

F. Political

Constitution

Government Structure

G. Justice

Court System, Legal Codes, etc.

Simultaneously, a code on the elections of local organs of authority shall be worked out. We feel that the Koreans should begin to feel their rights through carrying out local elections, up to and including the provincial level. The structure of the local government will have been determined during the first stage of work.

We shall then work out our proposals and shall submit them to our respective governments.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7 May 1946

RELEASE ON THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

When the Joint Commission commenced discussions on the formation of a provisional government, the Soviet delegation proposed that all Korean elements which had voiced opposition to the Moscow decision be excluded from participation in the formation of the provisional government. The American delegation objected to such an exclusion rule on the ground that it denied the Koreans the fundamental democratic right of freedom of expression.

When the Moscow decision was made public, all parties and party leaders in southern Korea, practically without exception, expressed opposition to that provision of the decision which called for the establishment of trusteeship in Korea. The vast majority of southern Koreans objected to this clause because they believed that it might unduly postpone their independence. Subsequently, a minority of southern parties dominated by an inspired group of politicians abruptly reversed their position on this issue. With this exception, dislike of trusteeship prevails, to this day, throughout the South, although, according to the Soviet delegation, all northern Korean parties, which are recognized by the Soviet authorities, favor trusteeship.

After prolonged negotiations, the Soviet delegation offered as a compromise to consult with parties and organizations declaring their future support of the Moscow decision and publicly "denouncing the leadership which had misled them." Further, such leaders were to be excluded from any participation in the future Provisional Government of Korea. The American delegation rejected this suggestion on the ground that it amounted to a dictated purge of parties and was not in accord with the American conception of democratic political activity.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

As a result of four weeks of negotiation, the Joint Commission agreed to require a reasonable degree of cooperation on the part of democratic parties and social organizations which were to be consulted. This agreement published in Communique #5 did not require support of trusteeship but merely that parties and organizations to be consulted should "cooperate with the Commission in the working out of proposals concerning measures" regarding trusteeship. In other words, parties and organizations would be free to express themselves against a possible trusteeship when the Commission undertook the working out of recommendations on the matter. This was clear in the declaration itself and was made a matter of record by the American delegation when the agreement was reached. Furthermore, in a number of explanatory statements, the American Commander publicly stated that no matter what form trusteeship might or might not take, Southern Koreans were free to speak their minds on the subject.

Having made this agreement and having thus, in the view of the American delegation, disposed of the problem of exclusion from participation in the formation of a government, the Commission was later presented with an additional proposal by the Soviet delegation to exclude as representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations, those who "actively oppose the Moscow Decision." As this appeared to be a violation of its previous agreement, and was clearly contrary to the principle of freedom of expression, the American delegation refused to agree to the Soviet proposal. However, in order to facilitate the progress of work, it offered to discuss in the Commission the eligibility of a representative if the issue were raised in individual cases. The Soviet delegation, however, insisted that a statement be published "warning" the organizations not to select representatives who were "opposed to the Moscow Decision."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Discussions on this point were still in progress when the Soviet delegation informed the Commission that all parties and organizations affiliated with the representative democratic bodies in southern Korea, as already submitted to the American Commander, were considered by it to be ineligible for consultation with the Commission under the terms of the Moscow Decision, [illegible]

[illegible] the Soviet delegation was unable to claim that it was not prepared to consult all those parties, under the broad principles of the Moscow Decision, which signified the willingness to cooperate [illegible].

[illegible] the US situation then existing by the Soviet delegation would inevitably involve considerable delay in forming a provisional government. In addition to the six months already devoted to this question, the American delegation suggested that pending clarification of the point, the Commission undertake to remove the 38 degree parallel boundary as an obstacle to the reunification of Korea. The Soviet delegation refused to consider this proposal. Since there was no other task that the Commission could undertake at this stage, the American delegation was left with no other alternative but to ask for an adjournment of the Commission. This was agreed to and the Commission adjourned on 6 [illegible] 1946, sine die pending clarification of the matter of consultation.

In accordance with established democratic principles, the American Command in southern Korea has permitted complete freedom of expression for all elements of the political community to the limit consistent with military security. In the exercise of this right, political parties and leaders have been free

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to express their objections to the trusteeship clause, just as others have been free consistently and actively to criticize the policies of the American Command. To deny any democratic elements a voice in the formation of a Korean government would mean penalizing them for expressing their views and denying them a right which has been enjoyed impartially by all parties and organizations in southern Korea since the American troops liberated it.

It is not the purpose of the American delegation to defend any school of political thought or to permit obstruction to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, nor is the American delegation defending the views of those who believe that trusteeship may unduly delay Korea's independence. However, it cannot and will not agree to any action by the Joint Commission which would deny 219 Korean democratic parties and social organizations the right guaranteed by the Moscow Decision to participate in the formation of their own government simply because they have expressed, honestly and openly, their preference for immediate independence rather than for trusteeship. To agree to such an exclusion would not merely mean the elimination from political activity of all but a small group who have submitted to the prospect of trusteeship, but would violate the universally acknowledged right of all peoples to freedom of expression promised them in the Atlantic Charter.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL SHTIKOV AND GENERAL HODGE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

Those Present: General Shtikov, Mr. Maslov (Interpreter); General Hodge, General Garvin, Lt. Dubson (Interpreter)

TIME: 10:00 a.m. 8 May 1946.

General Shtikov: Now we shall start?

General Hodge: All right go ahead.

General Shtikov: General Shtikov said that nothing comes out with General Arnold to decide on principles of the Moscow Decision. (They cannot agree.) It is necessary that higher Commander would help us. We would like to know your opinion about this subject as far as you are acquainted with all materials of the conference. He reported that results of his conference on 6 May to his command and is expecting his reply.

General Hodge: You say he wants to know my opinion, is that what you said? -- In what respect?

General Shtikov: Who is guilty. What is your observation on this subject?

General Hodge: I think General Arnold showed General Shtikov a letter of mine as to the American stand on exclusion, because of the principle of the American people on freedom of speech. I take the attitude that this government is to be a government for and by Koreans. The Americans have allowed them freedom of speech and freedom of discussion. We have not penalized them for expressing their ideas of what they want, and we do not propose to exclude parties or individuals from consultation based purely upon their expression of political views. We are very anxious to carry out the Moscow Decision. The Moscow

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Decision says nothing about the exclusion of political parties or individuals because of their political opinion. The fact of consultation gives them freedom to express to the Commission their ideas. That is included in the democratic principle of freedom of speech. The degree in which the Commission accepts their ideas is a matter for the Commission to decide after consultation. The Commission has spent considerable time on discussion of this principle -- more time than I feel is necessary by far. My hope is that the Commission will go back and take the declaration, the Communique No. 5, live up to it in spirit, and go ahead with the consultation of the parties, without any further effort at exclusion. If they wish to go ahead and get the Provisional Government formed under the Moscow Decision without any violation of the Moscow Decision, some agreement, the context of which is equal to the letter which General Arnold sent you yesterday, should clear the thing up and we can go ahead with the business.

The Americans are not interested in getting any reactionaries or extremists in the government. We are interested in allowing the Korean people to express themselves freely without punishment as to the type of government they want by self-determination as outlined in the Atlantic Charter.

I am thoroughly familiar with General Arnold's stand and am in complete accord and agreement. I am greatly interested in furthering the work of the Commission and I hope that the Commission may be able to go ahead on a firm foundation with their work. Unless this can be done, I feel it incombent upon me to give the story of the disagreement to the press. This is not a wish on my part, but if we cannot agree upon specific principles, I feel such a step is required. My government knows the entire history of the operations here and I have received no restrictions upon my actions.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

General Shtikov: Yes I read a letter addressed you to General Arnold. The Soviet Delegation put the question regarding not to consult with political parties and social organizations which objected to the Moscow Decision. When the Moscow Decision was accepted the whole world and America all thought this decision the most progressive on which could be made for Korea, to form a free colony. The result of good will. Our countries made Korea an independent state, gave Korea freedom and possibility to develop Korea on democratic basis. Not a single colonial country in the world has such possibilities which has now Korea. With the help of two great countries, United States and Russia to bring its own government on the basis of democratic principles. This is a great deed on the part of our two countries.

When the Moscow Decision was published in Korea, there were such leaders which raised their voices against, or objected to the Moscow Decision in substance. We consider that objections were reactionary objections. These leaders led astray the part of Korean people. They attempted to slander the Moscow Decision -- only because United States and Russia declared that Koreans should (must) develop its own democratic lines, it must organize its own provisional democratic government. The leaders who wanted to seize power in Korea declared, as it was written by American correspondent, Edgar Snow, they attempted to seize power, and you, General Hodge, asked them to order. After your statement with explanation of Moscow Decision* in general, this reactionary element continued objections to Moscow Decision andAllies; that is why the Soviet Delegation considered that those who destroyed the Moscow Decision in their interest, who slandered allies, should not be consulted with Joint Commission. Because they could not be objective, they could not give advice. The Soviet Delegation considered and still considers that Korea is

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

one of t first of colonial countr's which with the help of American and Russia will receive independence and democratic self-government. This is guaranteed to them by the Moscow Decision. *(to General Hodge - Your explanation of the Moscow Decision in January.)

During the work of the Joint Commission objections on the part of newspapers against the Moscow Decision continued. After the Joint Commission reached the single decision and made a decision expressed in Communique No. 5 on 17 April. Soviet Delegation considered that these parties and its leaders should understand that they could not stop the work of the Joint Commission and Moscow Decision would be fulfilled. -- exactly. Your statement made on 22 April was accepted by Soviet Delegation with great satisfaction. The Soviet Delegation considered that it would be an end to the outburst of leaders and parties against the Moscow Decision. I use the case of our personal meeting, previously I did not have possibility to speak about this subject on the Joint Commission. Soviet Delegation didn't understand a correction made by General Hodge on the subject that Koreans might raise their voices or object on part of Moscow Decision -- particularly the trusteeship part. We consider that this gave a chance to these parties and leaders to begin their objections against the Moscow Decision. These parties used this statement and made a decision the Democratic Council published on the 1 May and declared their opposition to the Moscow Decision. They raised their voices against the Moscow Decision. I don't know what instruction you got, General Hodge, from your superior command or maybe it is your personal opinion, but this is a unilateral interpretation of Moscow Decision -- that Moscow Decision can be changed. I didn't have a possibility in detail to inform my superior command and cannot tell now what is his opinion or point of view on this subject. Will he give the same interpretation as

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

was given by General Hodge or my command or superior command will exactly fulfill Moscow Decision without any retreats. It is known to the Soviet Delegation as a document signed on behalf of our government. This document would be exactly fulfilled. We know from the statement of General Hodge and statements of General Arnold, made on the Joint Commission, that Koreans cannot themselves rule the country. They need help. This help is foreseen by the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation considered as far as our view regarding the help and assistance to the Korean people in rehabilitation of their government and establishment of democracy is necessary and such help should be rendered by strong countries as United States and Russia. Because of this we have to say straight to those who object Moscow Decision and tell them that they should not interfere and should not lead astray Korean people and stop their hostile agitation or propaganda both to America and Russia.

The main reason why the Soviet Delegation insisted on barring certain persons in consulting and taking part in consulting, General Hodge, it is clear that Russia is close neighbor to Korea and because of this interested in establishing in Korea provisional democratic government which would be loyal to the Soviet Union. The leaders who objected to Moscow Decision and raised their voices against the Soviet Union, slandered the Soviet Union and spread it with mud. If they would seize power in the government, the government wouldn't be loyal to Russian and its people would be instrumental in organizing hostile actions on the part of the Korean people against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Delegation always would have been agreeable to the American Delegation if they demanded that people who are in hostile mood toward American should not be in the government. I want to put forth one more question -- taking the chance of personal meeting with General Hodge.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

It is unknown to me whether the American Delegation had any instructions, but in the process of negotiations General Arnold several times stated that as far as our states have different systems of government and different democracies, because of this, Joint Commission cannot reach single agreement on fulfillment of Moscow Decision on Korea. For the Soviet Delegation it was strange and unclear. It is known to the whole world that in fighting with German Nazis, fascism, and with Japanese imperialism, our governments and our people could find the common language and smash the most powerful, in the military sense, governments of Germany and Japan and were victorious. What can prevent us from fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea? We explained on the meetings to the American Delegation that the Soviet Delegation, while fulfilling the Moscow Decision, is not guided by its democracy or by the democracy of its government, and that the aim of the Soviet Delegation is to fulfill the Moscow Decision and Soviet Delegation has no intention to set up in Korea, Soviet order or Soviet System. It seems to me that as a result of not correct conceptions regarding the difference of our two systems on which point General Arnold always dwelt, led to the delay of our joint work.

Too, it is also not clear to us when, while compiling the list of parties and social organizations, the American member in subcommission submitted a list of parties and organizations in which were not large workers and peasants organizations, trade unions, peasant unions and democratic union of youth, though these unions represent largest part of Korean population. General Hodge, of course, understands my intention as far as I received instructions, is to fulfill, together with representatives of America, the Moscow Decision. I have no other wish. I reported in detail to my superior command about the situation and about the results of the meeting on the 6th of May. I

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

asked for the necessary instructions. As soon as I receive these instructions, I will immediately inform General Hodge. These instructions I expect to receive today. I don't exclude the possibility and I presume - I believe that my command in their turn will ask the instructions from their superior command and because of this, the answer may be received not tod y, tut tomorrow. Alone I cannot decide this question which is mentioned in the letter from General Arnold. I cannot decide this question alone.

General Hodge: The Americans here will carry out the Moscow Decision. This agreement, if you will read it carefully, provides:

"The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with the provisional Korean government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom, and China for the working out of an agreement concerning the four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years."

We consider trusteeship a matter to be discussed with the Korean provisional government after it is formed. To me that is the clear intent of the Moscow Decision that is borne out by a statement made by Mr. Byrnes last January in which he said in effect, that it might be possible to modify the five-year trusteeship. Mr. Byrnes was at the Moscow Conference and participated in the making of the Moscow Decision. The fact that it is to be submitted to the four powers, as indicated here, shows that it is their decision after the Korean Government is formed. When I arrived in Korea with my forces, I operated under a directive to allow the freedoms of democracy to Koreans, including freedom of speech. I have continued that policy and expect to do so. In many cases it has not been comfortable to contimue such a policy. There are

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

certainly parties and organizations and their leaders in Korea, who have made bitter personal and official attacks upon me, opposed all of my efforts to help the Koreans, and have done everything in their power to discredit the American forces. That still continues. I have allowed individuals and parties to talk freely, express their political opinions, even when derogatory to me and in many, many cases against my own personal opinions. My attitude in this matter led to an attack by the Soviet Press on me, stating that I was leading reactionary elements into revolt. That, I have not done. I have allowed the Korean people to discuss their affairs freely and without punishment. Since Korea is the nation of the Koreans, I feel that it is required of me that they be allowed to express themselves upon matters of their own affairs. I have talked to leaders of all Korean parties frequently -- even those who have attacked me and my forces and have expressed hostility to the United States. Since they are Koreans, and represent groups of Korean people, I do not feel that we can overlook them in establishing a Korean government. The expression of their views, if not in general consistent with the welfare of the future Korea, is not binding upon the Commission, nor does not bind the Commission to a particular line of action. As to the type of government to be established for Korea, I consider the matter to be wide open to the Commission and to their recommendations which will in turn be submitted to the four powers. I am not fully cognizant of any statements made by General Arnold in this connection and therefore cannot discuss it. (That is the question in connection with General Shtikov's question in regard to the different viewpoints.) However, I can assure you that they were not instructed statements if they were in line with what you allege and I can assure you they were not intended to cause disruption within the Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

As to the question of selecting representative parties, I do not know what went on in the subcommission; that is a matter within the Commission and for the Commission members to work out.

In connection with the matter of Korean opposition to trusteeship, I do not necessarily support their stand because I allow them to talk about it. I hope the talk will die down. I cannot prohibit such talk without curtailing freedom of speech which I do not intend to do. I do not feel that all the discussions of trusteeship by Koreans indicate real opposition to the aid and assistance which our two nations have agreed to give. When the results of the Moscow Conference were first announced, there was misunderstanding generally throughout my entire zone, as to the meaning of the term (trusteeship.) They associated it with the 1910 control that was given to the Japs. Some of the present discussion may still be due to lack of understanding, some of it is due to the Oriental trait of attempting to save face. I feel sure that if the Commission will proceed to its task of forming the provisional government without attempting to exclude from consultation or to punish those parties and individuals who discuss the trusteeship issue, that the matter will take care of itself after the provisional government is formed. I see no other intent in the Moscow Decisionbut that the matter be brought up with the Korean provisional government after its formation.

I can assure you that my government will give all aid and assistance to the Koreans, as expected under the Moscow Decision and if approved by the four powers, after we make recommendation from the Commission.

I have been accused of making improper unilateral statements. I do not consider the statement made by me to violate in any way the sacredness of the Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

It was a statement made by me in the capacity of my position as Commander of the forces in Southern Korea, to further calm down the political situation. I intend to continue the effort to educate Koreans to the meaning, need, and intent of the aid and assistance given in the Moscow Decision. (General Hodge repeated the above statement.) It is interesting to note that considerably more than half of the Koreans in the American zone still bitterly oppose the trusteeship as they understand it. (I want to make that clear, as they understand it.) So far as I can determine that is the only point in question in anybody's mind in opposition to the Moscow Decision.

The sampling poll throughout the entire area (that is the sample questions) of all walks of life of Koreans, indicates a friendliness to the Allied Powers and to the aims of the Moscow Decision. It is the hope of the Americans as well as the Soviet nation that we can carry out the Moscow Decision and establish an independent Korea that will be friendly to both nations. We certainly do not want a Korea hostile to either of our nations. Knowing Koreans as I do, it is my considered opinion that if we continue freedom of speech, and expression of their views, we will develop a nation far more friendly to both powers than by suppression or exclusion of those whose views may differ in some degree from our own. I do not believe that these expressions indicate true hostility. However if suppressed forcibly, the Korean will react with a lasting hostility.

I hope sincerely that we do not have to air our differences in the Commission, don't have to discuss our differences in the Commission to the Koreans and to the world. The long drawn out proceedings already past, are causing conjecture as to the success of the Commission. Many people believe now that we have already failed. At

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

present I see only one fudamental difference in opinion -- that is, whether or not we allow Koreans freedom of speech to express their political views. So far as the American nation is concerned, I can say that they will not be a party to exclusion of political parties or individuals because of their political statements. I can speak freely on that subject, because of the statements and actions of several political parties against myself, my forces, and my nation. If we were interested in exclusion of groups and individuals because of their hostile statements, our list would be long and startling.

I would like to ask General Shtikov if he wishes to wait until he hears from his government before he can give me the future attitude of his delegation on the subject we have just been discussing? I gathered from his discussion that he would like to wait for a decision until he hears from his superiors -- I want to verify that.

General Shtikov:

General said it is clear. He would like General Hodge to understand him clearly. What he stated in his previous statement exactly corresponds with what was going on in the Joint Commission. General Arnold and American delegation many times stated that the reason of delay of our work is the difference of our government systems. This General Hodge might see in the minutes. There was the statements on behalf of the American delegation regarding the policy of our government, but we rejected these statements because the Joint Commission is not authorized to discuss any actions of their governments. We also are for freedom of speech and press. I cannot say anything about the statement about the article which was published in our central newspaper, aimed (directed) against General Hodge. My power is not spread on the central newspapers. I cannot do anything about this subject, but I should state and assure General Hodge that in Korean newspapers in northern

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Korea, we don't allow any false stories and slandering articles to be published in newspapers against friendly nations, as America, or its Army in south Korea. We explain to the Koreans by all available means that Korea was liberated due to joint actions of Allied Powers -- due to Russia and America and by all means available thus we educate Koreans in the spirit of friendship towards America and the Soviet Union. In my turn I would like to ask General Hodge to take necessary measures in order that the newspapers of southern Korea do not publish false stories and hostile articles to the Red Army in northern part of Korea and towards the Soviet Union. I don't think that the false stories and slander which are made by separate persons and leaders of political parties through the newspapers against our countries or against the Soviet Commanders and Soviet Army are the true expression of democracy and they do bring harm to our countries and this means to the Korean people. The spirit of the majority of Korean people in their relationship to Soviet Russia and America is extremely friendly in their attitude. There is a group of persons who don't like the policy which is now carried out by American Command and Soviet Command in the spirit of the Moscow Decision. This particular group should not be considered and should be put aside in order that this group should not bring harm to Korean people.

Yes, I am agreed, I would like for General Hodge not to undertake any unilateral actions concerning the work of the Joint Commission until that time I receive instructions from my superior command. As soon as I get these instructions, I immediately inform General Hodge on their contents. That is all.

General Hodge: All right, I will take up the answers first on this -- with the understanding that neither of us will make any public statement until word from his superiors. Is that okay?

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

General Shtikov: Okay.

General Hodge: I hope I have made myself clear on the stand of the American delegation, acting on instructions from our nation. Allow me to repeat that it is my intent as well as the intent of the American Delegation of the American people that we will carry out the Moscow Decision. So far as we are concerned any disagreement that might arise within the Commission is a matter of interpretation. We do not interpret that the Moscow Decision requires that any political party or the accorded representative of any political party be barred from consultation. There can be no change in that stand by the Americans. As to General Shtikov's suggestion on the newspapers, we now have an educational campaign on that subject. I believe it can succeed in the end that he desires, without any cessation of freedom of speech. I believe that by leadership we can stop all talk against the Allied Powers far more effectively than we can by muzzling. One thing that will greatly assist in obtaining full friendliness and full ccoperation from all Koreans, is the speeding up of the proceedings of the Joint Commission without small differences constantly coming up. I have instructed my delegates to that effect. I sincerely hope that the directive that he gets from his superior will allow us to proceed more rapidly in the formation of the provisional government.

General Shtikov: That is all?

General Hodge: All right, Sir, we will hold everything.

General Shtikov: Today or maybe tomorrow.

General Hodge: I will appreciate it. Just as soon as he hears, you let me know.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

8 May 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE for American press via Tokyo and Army News Service.

AMERICAN-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION ADJOURNS.

The following statement on the adjournment of the American-Soviet Joint Commission was issued today by Headquarters of United States Army Forces in Korea:

When the Joint Commission commenced discussions on the formation of a Provisional Government, the Soviet delegation proposed that all Korean elements which "had voiced opposition to the Moscow Decision" be excluded from participation in the formation of the Provisional Government. The American delegation opposed any such exclusion rule on the ground that it denied the Koreans the fundamental democratic right of freedom of expression.

When the Moscow Decision on Korea was made public, all parties and party leaders in southern Korea, practically without exception, expressed opposition to that provision of the decision which foresaw the establishment of trusteeship in Korea. The vast majority of southern Koreans objected to this clause because they believed that it might unduly postpone their independence. Subsequently, a minority of southern parties dominated by an inspired group, abruptly reversed their position on this issue. With this exception, dislike of trusteeship prevails, to this day, throughout the South.

After prolonged negotiations, the Soviet delegation offered as a compromise to consult with parties and organizations declaring their future support of the Moscow Decision and publicly "denouncing the leadership which had misled them". Further, such leaders were to be excluded from any participation in the future Provisional Government of Korea. The American delegation rejected this suggestion on the ground that it amounted to a dictated purge of parties and was not in accord with the American conception of democratic political activity.

As a result of four weeks of negotiation, the Joint Commission agreed to require a reasonable degree of cooperation on the part of democratic parties and social organizations which were to be consulted. This agreement published in Communique #5 did not require support of trusteeship but merely that parties and organizations to be consulted should "cooperate with the Commission in the working out of proposals concerning measures" regarding trusteeship. In other words, parties and organizations would be free to express themselves against a possible trusteeship when the Commission undertook the working out of recommendations on the matter. This was clear in the declaration itself and was made a matter of record by the American delegation when the agreement was reached. Furthermore, in a number of explanatory statements, the American Commander publicly stated that no matter what form trusteeship might or might not take, Southern Koreans were free to speak their minds on this subject.

Having made this agreement and having thus, in the view of the American delegation, disposed of the problem of exclusion from participation in the formation of a government, the Commission was later presented with an additional proposal by the Soviet delegation to exclude as representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations, those who "actively oppose the Moscow Decision." As this appeared to be a violation of its previous agreement, and was clearly contrary to the principle of freedom of expression, the American delegation refused to agree to the Soviet proposal.

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However, in order to facilitate the progress of work, it offered to discuss in the Commission the eligibility of a representative if the issue were raised in individual cases. The Soviet delegation, however, insisted that a statement be published "warning" the organizations not to select representatives who were "opposed to the Moscow Decision."

Discussions on this point were still in progress when the Soviet delegation informed the Commission that all parties and organizations affiliated with the Representative Democratic Council of southern Korea, an advisory body to the American Commander, were considered by it to be ineligible for consultation because of a statement of the acting Chairman of the Council, whom the Soviet delegation quoted as follows:

"After detailed discussion of Communique #5, we have decided that signing the declaration means cooperation with the American-Soviet Joint Commission in the matter of forming a Provisional Government and that after the government is formed we may express our opposition to trusteeship."

The Soviet delegation made it clear that it was not prepared to consult with those parties, unless and until they renounced such views, despite the fact that they signed the declaration in Communique #5.

Inasmuch as the new situation thus created by the Soviet delegation will inevitably involve considerable delay in forming a Provisional Government, in addition to the six weeks already devoted to this question, the American delegation suggested that pending clarification of the point, the Commission undertake to remove the 38 degree parallel boundary as an obstacle to the reunification of Korea. The Soviet delegation refused to consider this proposal. Since there was no other task that the Commission could undertake at this stage, the American delegation was left with no other alternative but to ask for an adjournment of the Commission. This was agreed to and the Commission adjourned on 6 May 1946, sine die pending clarification of the matter of consultation.

In accordance with established democratic principles, the American Command in southern Korea has permitted complete freedom of expression for all elements of the political community to the limit consistent with military security. In the exercise of this right, political parties and leaders have been free to express their objections to the trusteeship clause, just as others have been free consistently and actively to criticize the policies of the American Command. To deny any democratic elements a voice in the formation of a Korean government would mean penalizing them for expressing their views and denying them a right which has been enjoyed impartially by all parties and organizations in southern Korea since the American troops liberated it.

It is not the purpose of the American delegation to defend any school of political thought or to permit obstruction to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, nor is the American delegation defending the views of those who believe that trusteeship may unduly delay Korea's independence. However, it cannot and will not agree to any action by the Joint Commission which would deny over 100 Korean democratic parties and social organizations the right guaranteed by the Moscow Decision to participate in the formation of their own government simply because they have expressed, honestly and openly, their preference for immediate independence rather than for trusteeship. To agree to such an exclusion would not merely mean the elimination from political activity of all but a small group who have submitted to the prospect of trusteeship, but would violate the universally acknowledged right of all peoples to freedom of expression promised them in the Atlantic Charter.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE XXIV CORPS 8 May 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE for American press via Tokyo and Army News Service.

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After prolonged negotiations, the Soviet delegation offered as a compromise to consult with parties and organizations declaring their future support to the Moscow Decision and publicly "denouncing the leadership which had misled them". Further, such leaders were to be excluded from any participation in the future Provisional Government of Korea. The American delegation rejected this suggestion on the ground that it amounted to a dictated purge of parties andwas not in accord with theAmerican conception of democratic political activity.

As a result of four weeks of negotiation, the Joint Commission agreed to require a reasonable degree of cooperation on the part of democratic parties and social organizations whichwere to be consulted. This agreement published in Communique # 5 did not require support of trusteeship but merely that parties and organizations to be consulted should "cooperate with the Commission in the working out of proposals concerning measures" regarding trusteeship. In other words, parties and organizations would be free to express themselves against a possible trusteeship when the Commission undertook the working out of recommendations on the matter.

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Having made this agreement and having thus, in the view of the American delegation, disposed of the problem of exclusion from participation in the formation of a government, the Commission was later presented with an additional proposal by the Soviet delegation to exclude as representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations, those who"actively oppose the Moscow Decision." As this appeared to be a violation of its previous agreement, and was clearly contrary to the principle of freedom of expression, the American delegation refused to agree to the Soviet proposal. However, in order to facilitate the progress of work, it offered to discuss in the Commission the eleigibility of a representative if the issue were raised in individual cases. The Soviet delegation, however, insisted that a statement be published "warning" the organizations not to select representatives who were "opposed to the Moscow Decision."

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

From PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE XXIV CORPS 8 May 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Following the adjournment of the Joint Commission on 6 May, General Shtikov was informed that in the American view it would be possible to resume work at once if the Joint Commission agreed to recognize the right of all democratic groups and individuals in Korea to freedom of speech by not excluding them from consultation with the Joint Commission or from participation in the Provisional Korean Democratic Government because of the expression of their views on trusteeship, the Moscow Decision or any other political issue. Otherwise, it was pointed out, that if there were to be any further delay, the people, both in Korea and abroad, had a right to know what the Commission had expended seven weeks without makkng any more substantial progress.

at 10:00 a.m. on 8 May, General Shtikov was received by General Hodge and the entire situation was reviewed with him during a three-hour discussion.

At 8:00 p.m. on 8 May General Shtikov again called on General Hodge and informed him that after having communicated with higher headquarters, he had received orders to stop work and return to northern Korea with his delegation.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

8 May 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE for American press via Tokyo and Army News Service.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL HODGE AND GENERAL SHTIKOV
AT 8:00 P.M., 8 MAY 1946, at COMMANDING GENERAL'S RESIDENCE
SEOUL, KOREA

General Shtikov: I have received the instructions from my Military Command to terminate the work and go back. As to the Communiques for the Press, none are to be made.

General Hodge: You are not to make any.

General Shtikov: Consequently, I ask you to give the necessary instructions so that I could leave at 11:00 a.m., tomorrow morning. I have taken the following decision in order to be able to perform the necessary work for transferring the property which the delegation has been using and also, for settling the accounts for the services of the delegation: To leave Major Turkin, an interpreter, a chauffeur and a car and one enlisted man. They are planning to return by car. It would not be worth organizing a special train for them.

General Hodge: Going to return by automobile.

General Shtikov: Those are our instructions.

General Hodge: Well, orders are orders. I regret to see you leave. I have--I think of you as my good friend and will always think of you as my good friend and I hope you return.

General Shtikov: As yet, I can give--I have no further instructions.

General Hodge: Well, let's see, does the train go back tomorrow?

General Shtikov: At 11:00 o'clock.

General Hodge: The train goes at 11:00.

General Shtikov: I want to plan it so as to arrive in daylight.

General Hodge: Yes.

General Shtikov: Plan to get back by 7:00 - that is - 1900.

General Hodge: Yes.

General Shtikov: Everything is all right with the locomotive except one of them isn't in complete order but I hope that it will be fixed and ready.

General Hodge: Now what can we do to help? Is there anything that you would like us to do other than to take over the property?

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

General Shtikov: You have done enough for us; they can stay here. Major Turkin has been working closely with Colonel Sinclair and they will be able to take care of it.

General Hodge: I will tell them to do everything.

General Shtikov: Everything else is under control and in complete order.

General Hodge: Major Turkin will stay behind?

General Shtikov: Also an interpreter, one enlisted man and a chauffeur. Four men all told.

General Hodge: All right.

General Shtikov: Also a jeep.

General Hodge: All right.

General Shtikov: So that they could just get on it and get back.

General Hodge: Will this move take away the liaison detachment that is here?

General Shtikov: No, the delegation has no connection with that group.

General Hodge: I thought that Turkin was part of the liaison detachment.

General Shtikov: No, he was especially attached to the delegation to take care of the business matters and had no connection with the liaison work.

General Hodge: I see. I see.

General Shtikov: The liaison officers have had their eyes on my house and they want to get it--they want to get it.

General Hodge: They want it, huh?

General Shtikov: They like the garden with the fountain in it. The other group is left to wind up the business affairs and straighten out the accounts and won't take them more than two or three days to complete the business with Colonel Sinclair.

General Hodge: I see.

General Shtikov: That (with gesture) is it.

General Hodge: Well, I hate to see you go, General Shtikov; your conduct has been, to my mind, very pleasant to us. You were a

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

pleasant comrade to have around and my personal attitude toward you and your group is that of the highest respect.

General Shtikov: I thank you for all the attention, both personally from you and from the members of your staff. The delegation was well taken care of and I have only thanks to give for the attention and care.

General Hodge: I appreciate that very much.

General Shtikov: That's it.

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SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

Hq USAMGIK, Dept of Pub Information 9 May 1946

Statement of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge on 9 May 1946.

I take this opportunity to warn the Korean people against undue excitement over the temporary adjournment of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission. It is to be expected that rumors and conjectures will be exciting and widespread. Most of them will be without foundation. The local radio will carry news of any new developments. The American Delegation remains on duty at the Duk Soo Palace, ready to resume joint meetings on short notice. It is the intention of the United States to carry out the Moscow Decision to attain the sovereign independence of Korea. Cool, calm heads and calm behavior on thepart of the Korean people will be the greatest assistance known for speeding the wheels of progress toward re-establishment of the Korean nation. Mudslinging, personal attacks, demonstrations and derogatory remakrs about any of the Allied Powers or their representatives can only operate to hurt the cause of Korean Independence.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Radio speech of [illegible]
7 [illegible]

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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Personal letter from Dr. Rhee Syng Man to Democratic Representative Council - April 29, 1946 - Published - Chosun Ilbo May 3, 1946.

1. General Hodge made a clear statement on April 26 and since he is a sincere friend of Korean independence we can feel sure that he would not deceive us. I therefore urge my fellow countrymen to trust him.

2. The declaration which we are to sign is not a statement supporting trusteeship but an indication of our cooperation in the discussions for the solution of the trusteeship problem. If we do not take part in this discussion we can hardly hope for a satisfactory solution of this problem. If we do take part in this discussion and a satisfactory agreement should not be arrived at, it will not be too late to then take other measures.

3. It is my understanding that the procedure is to set up the Provisional Government and that then this question will be taken up by the Provisional Government and the Joint Commission. Therefore, if we establish a truly satisfactory Provisional Government, I feel that there will be no further need for concern.

4. However, we must realize one thing, namely, that the explanation of the Moscow Decision for trusteeship as political, economic and social help is not enough to make us willing to sign an acceptance of this measure. The reason why we cannot accept this explanation is that in the future this phraseology might be used an excuse for undue interference in our internal affairs and we must guard against such a possibility. However, even this is not a question for the present but in the future when this question is taken up by the provisional Government and the Joint Commission, no one can then force us to sign the declaration if we do not wish to do so.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Izvestia charged that the American at the recent Joint US-Russian Commission for Korea tried to open a path for reactionaries to seize power over Koreans.

It said the meeting broke down after six weeks because the Americans failed to [illegible] understanding of the meaning of the Moscow decisions reached at the Moscow Conference.

The Soviet article was the first comprehensive comment of the meeting in the Soviet press. It said the American aim was ending all the meeting after a deadlock developed over their efforts to [illegible] the 3 degree zone and dividing and unifying the nation permanently. The Soviet newspaper rejected the [illegible] the grounds that "such questions could have to be raised first and discussed by the Koreans themselves and their provisional government after its formation and that the Joint Commission has no authority to [illegible] to interfere in the domestic affairs of Korea."

[illegible] said the Moscow Decision was binding on both parties, but the Americans had [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible].

[illegible] Izvestia asserted the American effort to [illegible] coalitions directed toward the liquidation of the Moscow decision.

Izvestia and Lieut. Gen. [illegible] R. [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] that it grossly interpreted the Moscow decision both participation of democratic elements [illegible] provisional government.

"This speech cannot be looked upon otherwise than as stimulation and direct counsel to reactionary parties to take the path of violating [illegible] with the Joint Commission."

(A Moscow broadcast quoting Izvestia said, "The American Delegation strove to open the door for consultation with the Joint Commission to those reactionary Korean parties and organizations which fought and stubbornly continue fighting against the Moscow Decision which barred their way to seizure of power of the Korean people.")

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

9 May 1946

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하ㅣ지中將의特別聲明

美蘇共同委員会가一時休會하였다하야民間에不必要한
이있을가(저히)참으로 이機會를라서 몇마다警告의 말씀을
니다 事態가 이렇하니만큼 浪說과臆測이 蔓延하며民心을
奮시킨念慮가 있을듯하나 그런風說과臆測의大多數는全然
가 없을것입니다 새로 안이進展되는대로 放送을通하야 알
리겠습니다. 美國代表는德壽宮에 如前히 남어있어 事
執行하며 共同委員会續会의 通知가 있으면 곳 다시 모
準備를 하고 있습니다 美國의意圖는 모스코協定을
하야 朝鮮의自主独立을 実現시키려는데 있습니다 여러
言行에 冷靜沈着해주시면 朝鮮國家再建을 促成함에 第
도움이 되겠습니다 聯合國中 何國이나 그나라의代表에
辱說 人身攻擊 示威行列 其他 점잔치 못한 言
朝鮮独立을 為하야 不利할 일이라고 믿습니다

一九四六年五月九日

朝鮮駐屯美軍最高司令官

陸軍中將 쫀 알 하ㅣ지

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By NARS, Date

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Speech

Dr.Rhee Syngman's Press Conference at Chonju
3:30 P.M.,4 June

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(Chonju,Hap Dong News,Correspondent Kim Sung Lak,4 June)

Question: In your speech made at Chung Eup yesterday(3rd) you spoke of " a government for the South,etc." Do you mean to set up a separate government for Southern Korea ?

Answer: It is my personal idea. The people in general want to have some kind of orgznization for Southern Korea. I agree with them.

Question: You said that after your return to Seoul you would set up a unified organization of our people. What sort of organization will it be ?

Answer: In October last year(45) we had a merger of 72 parties and groups. Some new parties sprang up thereafter and we could not get the fullest result. I want to dissuss with them again and hope to achieve a united front.

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Dr.Rhee Syngman's Speech

(Chonju,Hap Dong News,Correspondent Kim Sung Lak,3 June)

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Dr.Rhee Syngman made the following speech at Chung Eup, Cholla Namdo:

Now there is no sign of having the Joint Commission resume its meeting;and our long awaited desire for a unified government cannot be materialized. Therefore,even for the Southern Korea alone we must organize either a Provisional Government or a (governing) Committee. This body will appeal (the Korean) case)to the world opinion to (make) Russia evacuate her troops from the North of 38 line.

I have been working for a united organization of our people. This time after my return to Seoul I will immediately form such an organization. I wish that those who are in Provinces must work systematically in compliance with the orders coming from the central (capital).

Received
USSC
07.0430

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PUBLIC REL TIONS OFFICE
HE DQU RTERS XIV / RMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

4 June 1946

PRESS RELEASE for American press via Tokyo and Army News Service.

The following statement was issued today by Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley at his Seoul Headquarters:

"We have completed our tour of portions of Korea in the Soviet-occupied territory North of the 38th Parallel. We visited the following areas and cities:

Pyongyang Area - Pyongyang, Kyomip'o, Chinnampo, Sunch'on

Supong Area - Sinuiju, Yongampo

Wonsan Area - Wonsan

We have inspected substantially all of the industries in these areas which include the following:

Iron & Steel
Metal Working
Chemical
Power
Mines, Mills, & Smelters
Textiles
Pulp, Paper & Food

Some of these industries we found operating, some we found idle. We were conducted on this tour by General Romanenko, and our trip was well planned and prepared in advance by the Soviet Authorities.

In as much as we had heard, in both the United States and Southern Korea, many rumors of substantial industrial equipment removals; I asked General I.M. Chistiakov the direct question as to whether there were removals, and if so, what they consisted of. General Chistiakov stated that there were no removals of industrial equipment of any kind to the Soviet Union. He added, that it was a policy laid down by high Soviet officials that there would be no removals and the directions were given to him.

The entire group because of these rumors and their anxiety to revive Korean Industry for the benefit of the Koreans and the peoples of the Far East were particularly observant to see if there were evidences of such removals having taken place. Only on two or three occasions did we view anything that would indicate that such removals had taken place, and those only to a minor extent. One was in a railroad marshalling yard the first day out, where we passed a train loaded with miscellaneous machine tools and two cars of heavy copper wire. This may have been

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By NARS, Date

going between points in Korea. The others were power substations, where we noticed that electrical and transformer equipment had been taken out or was packaged ready for shipment. This could well have been for intra-Korean movement.

On the whole, the Soviets in the territory were trying to revive the industry and were handicapped by lack of skilled help. They were using, in most instances, Japanese skilled help where necessary. In one place, namely the locomotive works at Wonsan, they were using Soviet technical help such as foremen, mechanics, etc., and Japanese prisoners of war.

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I. Committee Originally Requested by SCAP

- For both Japan and Korea
- Three months in Japan
- Believe many basic products are similar;
- Some are different.

II. [illegible]

- Fields: Labor relations
  Protective legislation
  Wage policy
  Labor exchanges and employment
  Public works
  Social Insurance
  Organization - Minister of Labor

III. Recommendations

- Report to General Marquat
  Recommendations generally accepted - found
  constructive actions taken on basic directives.

IV. Basic policies on labor organizations

- Basic Directive - Japan & Korea - same basic instrument
- Spelled out in detail in Supply Directive for Japan
- Present policies in Korea seem thoroughly inconsistent with basic directive for Korea.

V. Apparent present policy of AMGIK

1 - General policy appears to be to discourage unions and collective bargaining - have found no positive action to encourage democratic organizations.

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(.. current pres[illegible]olicy of [illegible] - continued)

c. - General policy - to the extent spelled out in ordinances can be construed only as discouragement

(a) Organize 55 political parties

(b) Protection vs discrimination for union activities

(c) Unclear policy on police intervention

d. - [illegible] policy - frequently deferred to considerable extent by local GG officials and plant managers.

e. - Results - only really to alert-ize and left-ing [illegible] and slow development of non-political unions

f. - [illegible] on the increase in frustration, but on development of democratic institutions

VI - [illegible]

a. - [illegible] will develop - [illegible] articulate and politically conscious group in Korea.

b. - [illegible] economic action [illegible] be driven to political action; let all accumulated steam.

c. - [illegible] alternative leadership develops, all cling to Communist leadership.

d. - Some legitimate complaints will go unattended solely because we disapprove of the movement given chosen by the workers.

e. - Important class in population will be drawn closer to Russia, expecting nothing from United States.

VII - Recommended Policy

1. - Encourage "democratic unions"

2. - Define "democratic" in terms not referring to politics.

3. - True unions **not** to be considered as political parties.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

4. - Strengthen administrative machinery

5. - Clarify policy for guidance of all MG employees - especially those responsible for management of government enterprises.

6. - Establish relatively high minimum standards of labor protection -- safety, health, child labor, etc.

VIII - Protective legislation

1. - Situation in Japan

2. - Equally high standards important in Korea

3. - Timing problems

4. - Immediate action:

(a) Child labor

(b) Limit working hours of women

(c) Minimum wage if feasible (?)

(d) Safety requirements

IX. - Employment Policy

1. Present unemployment

2. Qualitative shortages - skilled and technical workers.

3. Hence need for labor exchanges; also related to administration of labor standards.

4. Importance of information on labor supply and demand.

5. Production goals and economic planning.

X. - Social Insurance

1. Workmen's compensation for accident.

(a) Terms of eligibility

(b) Financial adequacy

2. Health Insurance

(a) At least for industrial workers.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

XI. - Report of Findings

1. To General Lerch - Agreed
2. To GHQ - SCAP
3. To General Hodge
4. Further technical assistance to support our action (?)

5 June 1946

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

8 June 1946

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE TODAY BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE COMMANDING GENERAL USAFIK:

"There are current rumors misquoting me directly or by inference, concerning the prospects of the Joint Commission's reconvening."

"My views on this matter were expressed in my statements on May 8 and 9. They have not changed. When there are new developments, the people of Korea will be informed officially."

"in the meantime, the public is cautioned against giving credence to rumors of alleged statements by private individuals purporting to give information emanating from official sources."

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(1) N 1 June 1946

The following statement by LIEUT. GENERAL HODGE was released to radio stations Saturday and to the press today:

"There are current rumors misquoting me directly or by inference, concerning the prospects of the Joint Commission's reconvening.

"My views on this matter were expressed in my statements of May 8 and 9. They have not changed. When there are new developments, the people of Korea will be informed officially.

"In the meantime, the public is cautioned against giving credence to rumors of alleged statements by private individuals purporting to give information emanating from official sources."

(The radio announcement quoted the May 9 release, attached.)

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

9 May 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

Statement of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge on 9 May 1946.

I take this opportunity to warn the Korean people against undue excitement over the temporary adjournment of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission. It is to be expected that rumors and conjectures will be exciting and wide-spread. Most of them will be without foundation. The local radio will carry news of any new developments. The American Delegation remains on duty at the Duk Soo Palace, ready to resume joint meetings on short notice. It is the intention of the United States to carry out the Moscow Decision to attain the sovereign independence of Korea. Cool, calm heads and calm behavior on the part of the Korean people will be the greatest assistance known for speeding the wheels of progress toward re-establishment of the Korean nation. Mudslinging, personal attacks, demonstrations and derogatory remarks about any of the Allied Powers or their representatives can only operate to hurt the cause of Korean Independence.

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NND 760090
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対ソ日米共同声明

米議会両院合同会議ニ時局を改善する為貴国の大統領
の御来訪を招きたしとの御意向を承知致しました
ので私は喜んで御招待申上ます
貴大統領が御来訪の際は国賓の礼遇を以て御迎へ
致す事は勿論であります 之に関する詳細の大綱は
既に決定されて居ります

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

THE CHUNGOI SHIMPO EDITORIAL
1 August 1946

"On Gen. Hodge's Statement"

In making comments on the unfortunate incident that took plac on 29th (July), the day for trial of the counterfeit case, General Hodge pointed out that it was very unfortunate to interfere with the administration of justice through terrorism, riots and organized mob action.

This is, of course, a more than unfortunate incident. If the terroristic activities, demonstrations, and riots were definitely directed by a certain Party, as Gen. Hodge is led to believe, the Party is pursuing a very cowardly strategy and a foolish policy. History proves that all the terroristic activities and political strifes instigated by opportunists failed. If there is a Political Party that gave directives to young men to interfere with the administration of justice, it is very regretable for that Party. Moreover, the Korean people could not tolerate that Party. Because this kind of reckless directive may give an outlet to emotion but it, in return, exacts a big sacrifice. Furthermore, it hinders the development of democracy and does not do any good to the people. For this reason the people would never tolerate such a thing.

On the other hand, if the intelligence that is in the hands of Gen. Hodge is either an attempt to evade a responsibility or an outcome of a partisan plot, it is a serious matter.

The Korean people would never tolerate any attempt to screen the police force that fired to the crowd without arms and that made not word of apology to the public. Is there any democratic nation that would approve of such an action? Is there any Korean who would stick to political bickerings and insist on legality while an innocent student was killed in cold blood and his mother fainted at the news of her only son's death? Is Korea as heartless as this? Those who have conscience must reflect themselves.

We cannot agree with Gen. Hodge unless concrete proofs are shown to the people that there were organized demonstrations and terroristic activities.

To what extent did the people put up organized demonstrations and terroristic activities? We are waiting for an answer from the people. It is a cold fact that here lies a student's corpse while the police (that fired him) is praised. Show us the evidence of organized terroristic activities which could deny this cruel fact. Then we could not

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

tolerate such a Party (that instigated all this). If there is a group of politicians who wanted to avoid a responsibility and furnished Gen. Hodge with a partisan intelligence to issue such a statement, then that Party's crime will be remembered forever in the history of Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS

Statement by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

The U. S.-Soviet Commission has just issued a communique, which is one of the most significant steps toward Korean independence. The delegates of the Two Great Nations agreed on consulting with the Korean Democratic Political Parties and social organizations to prepare proposals for the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Now the Koreans have the long awaited opportunity to cooperate with the Joint Commission in moulding the future of their own beloved country. The Big Three Powers laid down a practical plan for Korea at Moscow. With an important task ahead of them, all patriotic Koreans should study the provisions of the Moscow Agreement more judicially and calmly in order to understand fully what courses they should take to accomplish their long cherished end-the independence of Korea.

Let us examine the Moscow Decision sentence by sentence. Paragraph 1 reads as follows:

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport, and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people."

This is a clear statement of the aims of the Moscow Decision that should fulfill Korean desires and provides for establishing a Korean Government. It is clear cut and needs no further comment.

Going to paragraph 2 of the agreement:

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea."

This sentence provides for the establishment of the Joint U. S. Soviet Commission that is now meeting in Seoul. It accepts the basic fact that troops of the two nations are now in occupation of Korea to eliminate the Japanese stranglehold and makes arrangement to have the representatives of the two great nations that are closest to the Korean problem help the Koreans form a provisional government and make preliminary arrangements to ease many pressing Korean problems. This commission is to prepare proposals for the formation of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government.

"In preparing their proposals, the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations."

This provision insures that Koreans participate in the arrangements and plans for their own provisional government. It is predicated on the hypotheses that Korean political parties and social organizations of a democratic character shall willingly cooperate with and give their best efforts to assist the commission in its work. Continuing:

"The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for consideration to the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission."

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

It should be noted here that the Joint Commission does not make the final decision on the subject of the interim Korean government. With the participation of the Koreans it works out a recommendation and presents it to the four great powers for their consideration. This provision in the Moscow Decision, providing for consideration by four powers of the recommendations of the Joint Commission after their consultations with the Korean representatives, provides an added check and safeguard against adopting any ill-advised plan or any plan detrimental to the Korean nation.

We now go to paragraph 3:

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

This is a very important statement in the agreement. To begin with, it defines definitely the word "Trusteeship" that has caused so much concern to Koreans. Note carefully that "Trusteeship" is specifically defined in the Moscow Decision as "measures for helping and assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea." Nothing more than that is indicated regardless of what politicians may say. Whatever measures that may be recommended by the commission (see next quoted sentence of the Moscow Decision) will be worked out with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and the Korean democratic organizations. This makes clear that no measures of any kind for helping and assisting the Korean nation can be worked out until after the Provisional Government is formed and has been consulted. The purpose of this required consultation is to determine just what and how much help and assistance the Korean Provisional Government needs and wants. Now let's examine the second and last sentence of paragraph 3.

"The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship (go back to the definition as given in the Agreement) of Korea for a period of up to five years."

This provides that the proposals of the Joint Commission, drawn up after it has consulted with the accepted Korean representatives (Provisional Korean Government and Korean Democratic Organizations), will be submitted to the four great powers for them to work out the agreement for what help and assistance that is to be given to Korea by the four powers. Note particularly the wording of this sentence as to the time element of the help and assistance. It says "period of up to five years." If the Koreans demonstrate they need no help or only limited help and assistance from the four great powers and the great powers agree, it may be possible to dispense with it entirely or to limit it to any period necessary up to five years. The only limitation indicated is that it will not run beyond five years. The best estimate is that the degree and time period set for any help and assistance will depend entirely upon the Korean people and the ability they show in taking full care of themselves.

It is suggested that you now go back and re-read this statement, or if you hear it on the radio, catch the next broadcast and listen to it again, so you may study it carefully and know for yourself just what the Moscow plan is and exactly what it involves.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

You may be told by politicians for political reasons that the purpose of this statement is to prepare you to receive the hated "Trusteeship". It has no such purpose and whoever says so is making false statements for private or political ends. The sole purpose of this orientation is to get the Korean people to open their ears, their eyes, and their minds to intelligent discussions of their own affairs and to inform them fully of the directive under which the Joint U. S.-Soviet Commission in Korea is now working. It is an effort to stop irresponsible loose talk and political misinformation about the terms of the Moscow agreement. One other point should be kept in mind. The Moscow Decision is not American only, nor is it Russian only. It is the result of careful and painstaking thought and planning on the part of the American, Soviet, and British nations to restore Korea to the family of independent and sovereign nations and was prepared by their three ministers in conference. It behooves all Koreans who want restoration of their nation to:

(1) Get a full understanding of what the great powers are trying and willing to do.

(2) Unite in their own efforts to form a new Korean nation for Koreans, friendly with and respected by, the great democratic nations.

(3) Cooperate with and assist the efforts of the Joint Commission in implementing the Moscow Decision to the end that Korea gain her independence.

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NND 760090
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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

29 June 1946

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
United States Army Forces in Korea
APO #235

Dear General Hodge:

As you know, I have recently ordered the suspension of Military Government Ordinance #72. The suspension was directed in order to enable the Ordinance to receive further study and because it became clearly evident that the Korean people did not like it.

In earlier ordinances such as those dealing with the New Korea Company and the registration of political parties, steps have been taken to give effect to the desires of the Korean people.

I know that it is your desire and the desire of the President of the United States that Military Government in Korea be administered as democratically as possible.

Without some sort of a legislative body, it is impossible for me always to determine the wishes of the Korean people.

If it is in keeping with your policy, I suggest that there be established a Korean legislative body which could speak on behalf of, and help me to determine the wishes of, the Korean people.

The legislative body would consist of a number of members, some of whom would represent the major political parties of all shades of opinion, and some would be elected to represent the several provinces. They would have power to enact ordinances, which when approved, would have the force and effect of law. They would also have power to screen past appointments of Koreans to the more responsible jobs in Military Government and to confirm future appointments.

Gradually the body should become more and more elective in nature and would take from me more and more of the responsibilities of enacting ordinances.

The whole structure, of course, would be under the present Military Government and could in no way be considered as a separate government for South Korea. We are aware that the present policy of the United States is firmly against the setting up of such a separate government. The body I propose would not be an independent regime but would represent the Korean people on the higher level

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of administration in southern Korea and would be a great help to me in carrying on my job as Military Governor.

Such a plan should in no way delay the establishment of the Korean provisional government contemplated by the Moscow Conference. On the other hand, it should provide an excellent opportunity for the Korean leaders to obtain practical experience and familiarize themselves more intimately with the serious problems that will confront them when the provisional government is formed through the Joint Commission.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS

ADDRESS BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

JOINT U.S. - KOREAN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 15. 1946

CAPITOL BUILDING - SEOUL KOREA

One year ago today marked the end of the greatest war in history; the end of a war that closely affected more nations and more peoples than had ever before been involved.

"This war was won by nations who fought for democracy, the freedom of mankind from despotism, oppression and dictatorships. It was won because great nations for the duration laid aside their petty quarrels and irritations and joined together in their one aim. The end of this tremendous conflict brought with it the liberation of the Korean people from their Japanese oppressors who had ruled, strangled and exploited them for many years.

This first anniversary of the end of the war, including as it did the liberation of Korea, is a day of great celebration throughout the civilized world. Since I have devoted my entire existence to the rehabilitation of Korea since the end of the war, I consider it a great personal and official honor to participate in the celebration of this great occasion in Korea with the Korean people as the senior representative of the American People.

When the United States forces came to Korea the American people were not well acquainted with your country, and relatively few Americans were familiar with the Korean problems. During the past year that picture has changed greatly. American correspondents and visitors to Korea have seen to it that Americans got news of Korea. Many, many thousands of American soldiers, replaced in the occupation forces by those with shorter service, have returned to homes widely scattered all over the United States. The American people have developed a tremendous interest in Korea and watch the news carefully for items on occurrences here. They have developed a great friendliness to Korea and a great understanding and sympathy for Korean desires, aspirations and wishes for true democratic independence, for the Korean cause in general.

Despite statements by certain inspired groups, the United States has no interest in colonial penetration or exploitation in Korea nor in anything that savors of permanent military bases. Our one and only interest is in the rehabilitation and reestablishment of an independent and united nation under a sovereign Korean government representing the freely expressed will of all the Korean people.

When I arrived in Korea, I had hoped such a government could be established before now. For reasons beyond my control, that ambition has not been possible. I can assure the Korean people that I, my forces here, and the American nation are fully aware of the great hope and ambition for independence by the Korean people and that we will do everything we can to see that it is accomplished. I can further assure you that it will be the happiest day of my life when I can participate in a great ceremony of inaugurating a Korean government of the people by the people and for the people.

It is my great honor at this time to read to you a personal message to the Korean people from that great student of Oriental affairs and champion of Korean independence, General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur:

'This day being the first anniversary of their liberation from Japanese oppression, I desire to extend to the Korean people my personal felicitations and good wishes. Knowing full well the aspirations and hopes which animate them I wish to assure the Korean people that I am heartily in sympathy with their well-founded and universal desire for a sovereign united nation. I look forward with confidence to an independent and free Korea built upon a sound and lasting economy. To make such a future possible, I shall do everything within my power.'

Through the personal interest and efforts of General MacArthur, I have been

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

able to have returned to Korea the following historically significant documents and items pertaining to your national history:

1. The Treaty of Annexation of 1910 between Japan and Korea in both Korean and Japanese languages.

2. Seal of the Imperial Order.

3. Imperial Ordinance Seal.

4. The Generalissimo's Seal.

5. Seal of the State of Korea.

6. Seal of the Cabinets.

7. Seal of the Imperial Edict.

8. Seal of the Emperor

9. Prime Minister's Seal.

I cannot say what the Korean people will wish as to their eventual disposition. I propose, however, that they be held secure in the government's vaults until the inauguration of a Korean government who can take appropriate action.

At this time, I am going to ask the Chairman of the Citizen's Committee, one of your most venerable and revered Korean citizens and an orginal signer of the Korean Declaration of Independence to make symbolic acceptance of these items on behalf of the Korean people."

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

23 August 1946

Following is a broadcast by Lt. General John R. Hodge, Commanding General USAFIK, to the United States over the Mutual Broadcasting System. Royal Arch Gunnison, of the Mutual Broadcasting System, interviewing.

Gunnison - Hello the United States. This is Royal Arch Gunnison reporting to you in the first direct broadcast made to the United States from Korea. I'm reporting tonight -- its the middle of the night here in Seoul, Korea -- from the headquarters of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commanding officer of all American occupation forces in Korea... That's more General Hodge is right here with me.

General Hodge is a long-time combat officer who commanded troops from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. He is the original commander of the 24th Corps which fought at Leyte and Okinawa. He brought the Corps to Korea and has remained on the job since he landed here last September.

There is no one person who has seen more of the history of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese, nor who has been closer to the American-Russian problem in Korea. That's why we are particularly fortunate to have the General on this broadcast tonight.

And now General Hodge: General, how would you say the liberation of Korea is progressing after one year?

Hodge - We can't say Korea is truly liberated so long as the country is divided at the 38th north parallel into two zones of occupation with the Russians north and the Americans south. However, south of 38°, we have made fine progress. The Japanese are out of South Korea. Koreans are thinking for themselves and speaking their own mind. They are learning how to handle political matters under the democratic freedoms, and they are gaining invaluable experience in operating the government of south Korea with the help and guidance and advice of American Military Government personnel.

Gunnison - General, there's another problem -- of an international nature I know everyone's interested in ....

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Hodge - ...what's that?

Gunnison - It's about the Joint United States-Soviet Commission which was laying out the plans for the future independent government of Korea under the Moscow Decision. The Commission stopped its discussions last May...Do you expect the Commission to resume its discussions or is there something standing in the way of its meeting again ?

Hodge - So far as we are concerned Mr. Gunnison, there is nothing standing in the way of continuing these discussions. The American Delegation is standing by here in Korea, ready and willing to resume deliberations and to fulfill the terms of the Moscow Decision on the basis that Koreans are allowed to express themselves freely concerning the establishment of their own government. The Soviet Delegation is fully aware of this fact.

Gunnison - Now just to follow this subject one step further, exactly, what is the present United States policy towards the speedy independence of, or the continued occupation of Korea?

Hodge - ...well, Mr. Gunnison, in a way, the answer to the question as stated is somewhat paradoxical. We are committed to and desire early independence for Korea, but we have also guaranteed to the Koreans that their independence is to be on a solid foundation. It is not the policy of the United States to occupy Korea one day longer than is necessary to fulfill the commitments made by our government, but there is no intention of leaving until the job is done.

Gunnison - In regard to other jobs to be done what would you say is the main problem of the moment in the occupation of Korea?

Hodge - There are a number of things I might mention, but I believe they are all related to the food supply. This problem is aggravated by a net increase in population in our zone of about a million and a half people, gained during our extensive repatriation activities. We are now importing and must continue to make substantial imports of grain from the United States.

You might say that the question of political unity is high on the list of problems but I'd reply that no country ever had political unity on an empty stomach.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Gunnison - To change the subject rather abruptly, General, since our time's getting rather short, I think the folks at home would like to know how you feel about the usual Gee Eye comment I've been hearing here that "we're stuck way off here at the end of the line"?

Hodge - I agree with the soldier. We ARE at "the end of the line" in more ways than one. The end of the line here is an important position. Important jobs are rarely easy jobs, and our job here isn't easy.

However, despite being at the end of the line, with almost no stateside luxuries, personnel of this command are doing the excellent job expected of young Americans.

Gunnison - Thank you General. Our time is up. You've been listening to an exclusive interview with Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding Officer of American Occupation Forces in Korea on the first direct network broadcast to the United States from Korea. This is Royal Arch Gunnison reporting. I return you to Mutual in the United States.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

31 August 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE.

NOTE TO EDITORS

(The following press release has been broken down into four parts to facilitat handling by the Korean Press. Newspapers may use parts as desired over a period of several days, however it is requested that they be used in proper sequence and not cut or edited. If full text is to be published in one issue the parenthesized lead on each part should be omitted. The full text of this message will be broadcast by Korean radio stations on date of release and repeated the following day.)

PART I

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK, issued the following message to the Korean people today:

"It has been interesting to watch the recently growing play of vicious propaganda coming from the mouths, press, pamphlets and posters of some political groups in South Korea, particularly the "line" aimed at the United States as a nation, at its representatives here in the occupation of South Korea and at the Military Government operating under United States guidance. It is clearly apparent that somewhere there are well organized propaganda factories working in all out efforts to discredit all American effort to help the rebuilding of Korea.

We Americans have a clear conscience in our aims and efforts to help smaller nations; therefore we welcome just criticism. However, freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of assembly allowed to the people in South Korea are being diverted to unwarranted attacks on our efforts to help the Korean nation and to spread entirely false representations of our aims and the aims of those conscientious Korean patriots who are cooperating in the effort to help their own people. Such diversion of democratic freedoms can be viewed only as license and violations of the basic principles of freedom of speech, press and assembly, and in flagrant cases as a violation of the provisions of Proclamation Number 2.

For the benefit of the Korean people, I will give a few recent examples of what I mean:

The American Command in Korea is bringing in many millions of dollars worth o. medical supplies, clothing, food and other items to prevent disease and suffering among the Korean people caused by conditions left over from the Japanese rule. These supplies are without expense to any future Korean government. We use our ships to bring them all the way from the United States. In emergencies such as the cholera epidemic, we fly in many tons of supplies by our airplanes. Most of these supplies we bring in would normally be used by our own people at home, but they are more than willing to sacrifice and do without these items in order to help Korea. The false interpretation by these propagandists, is that the bringing in of these items is an act of imperialism aimed at colonization of Korea. I know of no greater falsehood. The United States is not interested in any exploitation of Korea, but is interested in helping the nation in every possible way.

The American Command in Korea brings all of its own supplies to Korea from th United States in order that we need not add to the load of the overburdened economy of your country for anything we use. Also, Americans here are forbidden to purcha Korean food and other items vitally needed by the Koreans. This leads our critics, in an effort to make Koreans dislike American soldiers, to state that the Americans feel too superior to use Korean items. Such a statement is unsupportable on its face, when the American soldiers are complaining daily about the lack of many desirable items that are here in Korea and could be taken from the people.

The economy of Korea needs a tremendous amount of supplies to get fully on th road to economic recovery. Many items, such as trucks, boats, road-building and irrigation project construction equipment as well as medical supplies and communications equipment are available in surplus United States Army and Navy supplies scattered throughout the Pacific area.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The American Command in Korea after several delays beyond its control, finally arranged for a $25,000,000 credit to purchase for Korea urgently needed items at an average of considerably less than one-third their cost to the United States Government. All surplus supplies will be carefully screened and only those items greatly needed are to be purchased. This credit to South Korea is the first credit extended to any but a fully established sovereign government. Its overall terms are the most favorable that have been granted to date by the United States Federal Liquidation Commission. Because the urgent need for these supplies is too great to delay action, the Military Government is accepting the credit. Because we do not wish to commit the Korean people, the agreement provides that this credit will be included as an item for negotiation with the Korean government after it is formed. In so far as the Americans are concerned, all items to be negotiated with the future Korean Government will be negotiated in the best interests of the Korean people and their newly recovered nation. In the meanwhile, Korea will have full use of many needed items that must come from outside Korea and are needed now. The interpretation placed by the malicious propagandists on this effort by the United States to help rebuild Korea is that the United States is trying to gain economic control of Korea. Nothing can be further from the truth. The announced position taken by the United States Government and the orders under which the American Command here operates are that the occupation of Korea shall in no way be used to give special privileges to any vested business interests of any nation, business firms of individuals to incur concessions, monopolies, or credits that can operate against the interests of Korea and Koreans."

PART II

(This is the second in a series of comments by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge on the harmful propaganda practices which are being employed by a minority political group in an apparent effort to discredit the American effort to assist in the rebuilding of Korea.)

"The Military Governor has proposed to me and I have approved in principle the idea that there be established in South Korea a Korean legislature representative of the Korean people. This body would be a law-making and policy body for South Korea and would survey the qualifications of those Koreans now in or proposed to go into high positions in the Military Government. It is aimed at giving Korea a great degree of control over policies in South Korea. In this manner, Korean leaders and representatives of the people will have an opportunity to influence policies and handling of Korean affairs until such time as the Korean Provisional Government is established under the Moscow Decision. One group I speak of opposes this legislative body on the ground that it will prolong the duration of the Military Government. We have repeatedly announced, and I believe all Koreans know that the Military Government will end just as soon as the Joint Commission carries out the Moscow Decision, and can recognize the falsity of this propaganda "line". In "basic principles" recently announced, this political group supports the Moscow Decision in its entirety on the one hand and in the same document makes the demand that all governmental functions in South Korea be turned over to the Peoples Committees. These Peoples Committees are the organized control-agencies of this minority group. There certainly is no provision in the Moscow Decision that governmental functions be turned over to the Peoples Committees. The aims of this group are easy to understand, but their line of reasoning and logic are impossible to follow. I assure you that no Korean can be more anxious to see a fully representative Korean government established over a united Korea than are the Americans, both here in the Korean Command and in the United States. The Americans avoid everything that might delay the formation of such a government and will do everything possible to expedite it. However, Americans do not wish to see a government formed in such a manner that the Korean people are not allowed to express themselves freely in its formation.

The Military Government operates a grain collection program for the purpose of obtaining surplus food to feed over one and one-half-million Korean refugees and the people in the cities and the food deficient provinces where there is no adequate source of food. This plan includes allowing the farmers to retain ample grain for their own needs, receiving reasonable and adequate payment for grains sold and giving the farmers first priority on the purchase of much needed consumer goods. It also includes an intensive search for and seizure of any existing profiteer hoarded stocks. The directed propaganda and orders from the leaders of one political group tell the farmers not to sell grain; that the Americans will eat it or ship it out; that the objective of Military Government is to make the poor farmer poorer; and that the Military Government allows the farmer's grain collected by it to reach the hoarded stocks of profiteers. At the same time the agitators pass this "line" to the farmers through the politically controlled "farmers associations,

(NEXT PAGE)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

other agents and propaganda organs of the same group tell the people in the cities and food deficient areas that they are short of food because the Military Government will not provide it and urge them to stage food riots and demonstrations against Military Government to get more food. It is obvious that these stratagems are to create disorder and unrest by attempts to make the people believe they are being deliberately mistreated, and try to get them to follow this group."

PART III

(This is the third in a series of comments by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge on the harmful propaganda practices which are being employed by minority political groups in an apparent effort to discredit the American effort to assist in the rebuilding of Korea.)

"Propaganda passed out at meetings of one group calls the United States a nation of fascists, reactionaries, imperialists, etc. All Koreans know that all wars fought by the United States have been wars against these very evils. Nowhere in the world is true freedom and democrary more highly valued than in the United States. At these same meetings and in hand bills passed out extolling the liberators of Korea, this group very pointedly makes no mention of the millions of United States soldiers and sailors, of the United States fleets of thousands of warships, of the United States Air Forces of thousands of airplanes, all of which fought for almost four years in destroying the Japanese Army and Navy in the Pacific Area, reduced the Japanese homeland to a shambles of rubbish and killed hundreds and houndreds of thousands of Japanese, thus destroying their power to fight. Nor is any mention made of the many, many thousands of young American lives expended for this great victory. Having personally partitiicipated in the war to defeat the Japanese, beginning with its earliest battles, it is impossible for me to understand just why this tremendous effort of the United States is so patently ignored. The truth is that because of the crushing blows by the United States in the Pacific, the Japanese knew they were defeated and began making peace overtures as early as June, 1945. The Japanese Emperor decided in July, 1945, to end the war at any cost to save his people from complete destruction. The world knows that the defeat of the Japanese Empire liberated Korea.

Another highly significent propaganda theme of late is the vociferous outcry against the national police. Hatred and criticism by law-breakers against an effective police force is as old as police organization itself. The anti-police propaganda, of course, is an attempt to break down police morale and discipline, and to create a fear on the part of the police to perform fully what are frequently unpleasant duties in protecting life and property and keeping order, thus giving law breakers greater license. Your Korean police force in South Korea is a fine body of men that is improving every day in performance of its duties and in its service and protection for the Korean people. They have been specifically ordered that in no case will police powers be used in persecution or suppression of political parties. Those very few members of the police who prove to be dishonest or who use their official position to play polities are being removed as fast as discovered. Their indoctrination in the spirit of service to the Korean people continues."

PART IV

(This is the fourth in a series of comments by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge on the harmful propaganda practices which are being employed by minority political groups in an apparent effort to discredit the American effort to assist in the rebuilding of Korea.)

"I have mentioned only a few of many, many examples of vicious propaganda that are being used under the freedom of press, speech, and assembly in South Korea. There are many more examples and those who manufacture such propaganda are apparently becoming more bold and more fanatical in their blatant perversions of truth, their falsehoods, and their lies. Because I see many good and patriotic Koreans being misled and confused by this means I feel impelled to state the facts concerning what goes on. It is unnecessary to name the individuals or the political groups who are engagin in these activities. You can recognize them by their own words and actions. I rely on the sound knowledge and good judgement of the Korean people to spot activity against their national interest, when they see it. I am sure that with a little thoughtfulness on your part you will

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

know the difference between the facts that present truth and the distortions that are aimed at producing the disorders, confusion, and disunity within your nation that can only delay independence and economic recovery.

The instances I have mentioned in this statement are examples of the old trick long used by agitators and anarchists the world over. These tricks are not needed in Korea particularly at this time when the nation requires the full and united effort of all its people on the march toward complete rehabilitation of the country. They should not be tolerated by the Korean people.

No honest man fears truth. All honest men stick to truth in statements and in writings. I advise the Korean people to learn to differentiate between true facts as opposed to distortions, falsehoods and fabrications that are presented for selfish aims. We should examine carefully the statements of politicians who sling mud, so that we may separate truth from pure propaganda. When violent political mud-slinging starts we may be sure that there is something beyond fact to be presented and that this diversion from fact has some definite purpose. We should follow the advice of those sound leaders who preach unity of all truly Korean people and unification of truly Korean efforts for a better nation and better life. Above all, beware of any leader who preaches and practices terrorism, violent revolution, class warfare and class hatred as a means to separate the people, and who makes great promises of something for nothing."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

September 3, 1946

The following is the full text of Acting Secretary of State Acheson's statement issued at a press conference August 30 in Washington D.C.:

"United States wishes to see the united independent Democratic Korean Government established as early as possible and has made solemn commitments to aid the Korean people to achieve their independence. This is the sole reason why Americans are in Korea. To attain this end, the United States is ready to carry out the Moscow Decision including the continuation at any time of work of the Joint Commission and has instructed its Commander in Korea, Leiutenant General Hodge, to assure the Korean people that the United States will uphold its commitments and will stand by them uhtid these commitments are fully achieved. We believe in the right of the Korean people to determine for themselves the kind of economy and democratic political organization they require and are opposed to establishing any minority group in power. We stand for the freedom of speech, assembly, and press. Honest criticism is not considered a crime, but is welcomed and in many cases programs are modified as good suggestions are received. All political parties have functioned freely in South Korea. The United States has no imperialistic aims in Korea. Military Government was established to take over when the Japanese rule collapsed. It is temporary in nature. The United States gains no economic advantages in Korea from our occupation. The major objectives of Military Government may be summarized as follows:

--Stimulation of production to relieve accumulated shortages of consumers goods;
--Assurance of fair collection and distribution of food and other essentials so that all people may have enough to eat and share equally in other goods;
--Restoration of trade between Korea and other nations so that the country will develop a healthy economy independent of Japan;
--Development of Democratic labor organizations and improvement of labor conditions;
--Land reforms which will reflect wishes of Koreans and their desire to replace widespread tenancy with full ownership of land by individual farmers;
--A stable currency and price level that will achieve a fair balance between farmer and other segments of society;
--Removal of all monopolistic controls in hands of individuals and prevention of unhealthy concentration of wealth, particularly in hands of those who attained their wealth through collaboration with the Japanese;
--Expansion of educational opportunities and cooperation in the development of a national culture;
--Establishment of impartial judiciary and a Korean police force free from domination by any group or faction.

Delay in uniting the country has made it essential that we proceed in South Korea with the solution of urgent social and economic problems along lines which embody the will of Korean people. Therefore, we desire to establish cooperation between all political parties and the Korean legislative body to express Korean views and aspirations and to provide Korean leadership."

Before reading the prepared release, the Acting Secretary said that he wanted to emphasize two main points. One, that we are prepared, at any time that the Soviet Government will do so, to resume the discussions of the Commission, the purpose of which is to bring about a unified Korea; second, that we intend to remain in Korea and carry out our duty there until we have achieved our purpose of bringing into being an independent nation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Corr: We would like to know the reason why the number elected to the Legislature is to be the same as the number selected.

Gen.Lerch: We had to arrive at some figure. Some people advised one thing. Some others advised another. I remember what the gentleman who asked me the question advised me. I remember what some of the other members of this group advised me. I am not going to tell, but I acted upon the advise of all of them. We reached the figure 45-45.

Corr: Provincial and municipal councilors actually help the municipal mayors to govern the city. On the other hand the municipal councilors are not any higher than the mayors. We think mayors should be included. Mayors are not included just because they hold lower ranks, because they are lower than chokunin.

Gen.Lerch: This provision was drawn up after consulting with a great many persons. I talked to 50 or more persons before drawing up this law. Always remember that this ordinance is only a temporary ordinance and that when the legislature meets they may change it themselves any way they want to. Mr. Hill tells me that somebody from the Justice Department is coming to discuss the ordinance with you. Any other questions you have, you may ask him.

Corr: Japan was at war for five years but there are many leaders being tried as war criminals. Korea fought Japan for 40 years and if you say chokunins and section chiefs, that would be less than twenty. We think you should eliminate more than that.

Gen.Lerch: I wish that I had had these suggestions when we were drafting the ordinance. I invited all of you gentlemen to come and tell me what you thought should be in the ordinance. Only about eight or ten came. The ordinance is out now. I suggest that what we do is to concentrate on electing good men to the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

legislature; and when you know who the representative is from your province, then bring him these suggestions that you are making as to how the law should be changed. I will not object to a law being changed any way the legislature wants to change it. I will insist that democratic principals be maintained, and "democratic principals" consists of two things. The first one: Every individual shall ~~###~~ have a right to be heard as to how his government should be run. The second is: after each individual has been heard, the will of the majority shall become the law of the land. With those two things in mind the legislature can change the ordinance any way they want to change it.

I suggest if you are going to have somebody from the Department of Justice, that we close my part of the conference.

Chung-(Justice) Yesterday you asked questions on Section VII of the ordinance, particularly on the appointment of provincial and municipal councilors and bureau chiefs. The provision means that any Korean who collaborated with the Japanese to such extent that he is a detriment to Korean interests will not be eligible.

Corr: First of Section VII "No person may be elected as a member of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly unless he or she is a Korean who shall have passed his or her twenty-fifth birthday on the date of assuming office, and unless he or she has been a bona fide resident of the province or area represented for ~~#~~at least one year immediately preceding his or her election." There are some Koreans who have come back from other countries and have been in Korea less than four or five months. They are able to be members but cannot be eligible because they have not stayed for one year. There will be many leaders who will not be eligible if their eligibility is not recognized because of that.

Captelli (Justice) I appreciate that fact, but they do not know the situation of the province or area.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Corr: Does this apply to approved members?

Capt.H: This refers only to elective members.

Corr: What about people who have just returned from overseas?

Capt.H: The fact that a man is in the army does not make him lose his residence if he returns to the same domicile. Section III says "There shall be elected from each province and the independent city of Seoul a representative at large. The remaining members shall be approved so as to represent equally and fairly major democratic elements of Korean life, economic and intellectual." That includes people from all walks of life.

Corr: The Coalition Committee proposed they should be in charge of selecting the members with Gen. Hodge's approval. Did Gen. Hodge approve of that idea?

Capt.H. I do not know.

Capt.B: The understanding is that all of this is to be carried out in accordance with the agreement reached by the Coalition Committee.

Corr: Section III mentioned only of elective members but not selection.

Capt.H: This refers only to elective members. Selection will be left to the Military Governor.

Corr: That is what we want to know, how is he going to select them?

Capt.H/ The method has not been announced.

Corr: The councilors will not be elected but how about mayors who were more powerful than councilors?

Capt.H. Capt.Braden tells me that the General has already answered that question.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

ADDRESS --- LT. GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

Commemoration of American Landing 8 September 1945.

It is exactly one year since American forces, pouring ashore from their ships of war, raised the curtain on a new era for the Korean nation. It would be well to recount what we have done, so that by knowing where we have arrived we can more clearly comprehend where we are directed.

These brave men, fresh from the bloody battle fields of the Pacific, who pulled their weapons, their equipment---and themselves, through this fire-storm shore, were far more than soldiers; more than liberators. They were exponents of a way of life, a consistent tradition which has established in their minds as they have lived by it. This tradition was part of an indivisible freedom, bried and preserved in the very core of liberty they were with the steel which have of such soldiers had carried the fight.

To the people of Korea these men brought the promise of liberty; opportunity to grow, to realize prosperity, and to claim their estranged right as a free people. Since that day America and Korea have cemented their fellowship. We have one common cause. We are partners in a gigantic task whose burdens have been many and varied. Where the progress and the perils to which our efforts have led we have kept whole our trust in the capacity of free peoples to meet and surmount the difficulties which retard them. We have sought no formula, no magic solvent which will minimize or dispel the magnitude of the work we are in. Difficulties do not deter us and we still ~~cripple~~ hold to our conviction in the extraordinary possibilities of ordinary men. We have done much, but we are not blind to how much needs to be done.

So that there may be none to misinterpret our enumeration of this joint progress let it be said now that we view them as strides leading to, but not attaining, our goals. Those goals themselves should, at this juncture, be quite clear. America has no claim, no design, no ulterior plot in her cooperation with the Korean people.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

None except that which she recognizes in herself as in the rest of the world---that there shall be no impediment, no threat to the expression and the implementation of the freely expressed desires of peoples. America's aims are broadcast for the eyes of all men to see. We seek justice, we seek harmony and stability. We seek strength for but one force---Freedom. We believe that the cause of liberty is upheld everywhere when it is pursued anywhere. These beliefs we will not discard. It is through them that we have tried to work.

I need not catalogue at length what we together have done here. To do so would be overly to depart from what remains. But to ignore these accomplishments would be to detract from the contribution of an energetic and patriotic people. I am always annoyed when persons speak dejectedly of the progress made in Korea. Whether these people are unfamiliar with the situation in Korea or are so close to their own tasks that they can't see beyond a very limited horizon, Progress has been and is being made not only by United States personnel but more significantly by Koreans themselves--progress leading to an independent, free Korea.

We jointly encourage and support the establishment of a representative legislature as a preliminary organ to the future republican government.

Americans, mindful of the interdependency of Korea's northern and southern zones have made untiring efforts for the reopening of the Joint Commission as a prerequisite to carrying out the Moscow Decision and achieving Korean independence. Believing that democracy endures on the principle of compromise, but not on the compromise of principle, the United States has stood fast for this reopening on the free and uninhibited representation of all political elements, who, reflecting of all shades of doctrinal theory, believe as we believe, that they have a just claim in desiring a voice in their government.

We have established a temporary military government to direct and carry on the recovery of the Korean economy, and to execute those needed services of health, transportation, communications, law, and the multitude of related functions in which it is now engaged. In

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

this activity have been enlisted many men and women, unskilled and untrained, who have, beyond the difficulties which this condition has imposed, been faced with the added burdens of an economy and governmental structure sacked and stripped by the Japanese.

We have, with the utmost cooperation of the Korean people, rooted out all vestiges of Japanese hegemony and have returned and are returning to their homeland 1,000,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians. To Korea we have repatriated 1,260,000 of her exiled citizens.

We have overhauled, rebuilt, and made serviceable most of the broken transportation system of Korea. Regular trains connect all provinces of South Korea.

We have reestablished the education system of Korea so that future generations will be schooled and trained to take on the responsibilities of democratic citizenship.

We have treated, supplied, and endowed Korea's hospitals and medical installations, and with Korean science and skill produced quantities of medicines and drugs such as are today combatting the spread of cholera.

We have worked slowly but undeviatingly to build a police and court system based on firm, impartial equality of justice.

We have enlisted the intelligence and cooperation of Korean farmers in a nation wide effort to fill depleted rice stores for the needs of the coming winter months. This program innaugurated in early summer has met with gratifying response.

From America have been sent innumerable essential items to rehabilitate Korean industry, transportation, medical, and other services. These have been put to the immediate use of the Korean people.

In all these endeavours we have preserved the principles for which America fought, and for which Koreans have patiently waited. We still believe in the dignity of men and the necessity for freedom of speech, press, assembly, and action.

All of us have been together in an enterprise which tests the propriety of the causes for which the war was waged. In the nature

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

of the case free men will, under these conditions, fall into error and misjudgment, but these errors once made are behind and their example leaves us all with a greater perception of what is profitable and correct. We learn by doing.

In this connection it is of equal importance that I remark upon things which discretion and our responsibility to the Korean people have made us refrain from doing. We have committed the Korean people to no course of economy or politics from which circumstances may later force them to swerve, with consequent disorder and hardship to themselves. We have done nothing to jeopardize the position of the Korean government or to predicate its course of action - long before it was finally inevitable. We have left it for the Korean government, in response to the expressed desires of the Korean people, to solve those problems of a lasting nature which Americans may be glad to arbitrate. It is for Koreans to decide the method by which Korean lands will be returned to the Korean people, and for them to decide therein will be vested the ownership of industry and its control. We have instituted no regulations or ordinances upon the Korean people which they, in the interest of the health, welfare, stability and progress of themselves and their children, would not have found reasonable and necessary to initiate. We have not compelled obedience to revolutionary edicts or programs which, however productive and impressive in their magnitude they may have been, are still unsound because unjust and unrepresentative. We will leave to the people of Korea the decision in programs of such general and enduring effect that no one else can rightfully assume.

We have not gone untroubled in these efforts. We have not been without our detractors. Our aims have been distorted and our motives suspected. We and the vast majority of Koreans who have stood shoulder to shoulder with us in their country's need have been slandered and abused.

We are not intimidated. We do not hesitate to open our aims and our record to the eyes of the world. What we have done we have

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By ___ NARS, Date ___

done in the name of objectives in which we are presently engaged. We do not depart from them. You have not known us to default our word. I do not do so now. I tell you that America still holds to her oft-repeated promise that Korea shall be free, united and independent, unfettered by foreign influence. We are moved by no cause less and none greater than that of the progress and liberty of the Korean people.

I pledge to the Korean people that America has not abjured her concern with their independence, nor lessened her interest in freedom's spread.

I look ahead to the days when these same beaches over which is poured one more gift will be witness to the profitable commerce between Korea and the nations of the world. We will not be content with less than Korea stands as a free nation, secure upon the firm ground of her independence, her sons raised upon the stair to their own destiny. Korea must walk before she runs, but when she does it must be alone. We are all architects in that future.

That is the work we are in. Let us get on with it.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

8 September 1946

BROADCAST ADDRESS --- LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

Commemoration of American Landing, 8 September 1945
Radio Station JODK

"It is exactly one year since American forces, pouring ashore from their ships of war, opened up a new era for the Korean nation. On that day we began working for and with the Korean people. Before I refer to what in the future we are pledged to do, it would be well to recount what we have done, so that by knowing what has been done we can more clearly comprehend what we still must do.

These stalwart Americans, fresh from the bloody battle fields of the Pacific were far more than soldiers, far more than mere liberators. They were exponents of a free way of life, a consistent tradition which has materialized in their minds as they have lived it. This tradition is that of inviolate freedom of man, tried and preserved in the many years of liberty through which a nation with a rich admixture of nationalties has carried its faith.

To the friendly people of Korea these same men brought the meaning of liberty everywhere --- opportunity. Opportunity to grow, opportunity to realize capacity, opportunity to exercise their long estranged rights as a free people. Since that day Americans and Koreans have cemented their fellowship. We have made common cause. We are partners in a gigantic task whose burdens have been many and varied. Through the progress and the hazards to which our efforts have led us, we have kept whole our trust in the capacity of a free people to meet and surmount the difficulties which handicap them. There is no magic formula, no magic solvent which will minimize or dispel the magnitude of the work we are doing. Difficulties and obstacles do not deter us from our goal, and we still hold to our conviction in the extraordinary possibilities of ordinary men. We have accomplished much, but we are not blind to what still needs to be done.

So that none may misinterpret our enumeration of this joint progress let it be said now that we view our gains only as strides leading to our final goals. At this time these goals themselves should be quite clear. America has no claim, no design, no ulterior plot in her cooperation with the Korean people. Americans insist that there shall be no impediment, no threat to the expression and the implementation of the freely expressed desires of the Korean people. America's aims are broadcast for the eyes of all men to see. We seek justice, harmony and stability. We seek strength for but one force --- freedom of human beings. We believe that the cause of liberty is upheld everywhere when it is pursued anywhere; consequently a threat to freedom anywhere menaces it everywhere. America desires to build, not to destroy. We believe in individualism and initiative as opposed to regimentation. It is through these ideals that we are working.

I need not catalogue at great length what all of us together have done here. To do so would be overly to depart from what remains to be done. But to ignore all accomplishments would be to detract from the great contribution of an energetic and patriotic Korean people. To give that contribution its due I cite outstanding measures:

The Americans and the Korean people together have established a temporary government in South Korea to direct and carry on the recovery of the Korean economy, and to execute those needed services of health, transportation, communications, law, and the multitude of related functions in which it is now engaged. In this activity have been enlisted many splendid Korean men and women, who have, beyond the difficulties which this condition has imposed, been faced with the added burdens of an economy and governmental structure sacked and stripped by the Japanese. In this government many thousand Koreans are being trained in governmental functions.

We have, with the utmost cooperation of the Korean people, rooted out the vestiges of Japanese hegemony and have returned to Japan over 840,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians. To Korea we have repatriated from overseas 1,200,000 of her evicted citizens in addition to some 800,000 coming into the ~~American zone~~ from Korea north of 38°.

(OVER)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

We have overhauled, repaired, and made serviceable much of the broken transportation system of Korea. Regular trains, guarded by trained policemen, connect all provinces of South Korea.

We have reestablished the education system of Korea including schooling in Korean language for Korean children so that future generations will be schooled and trained to take up the responsibilities of democratic citizenship.

We have trained personnel to operate and have supplied and equipped Korea's hospitals and medical installations, and with Korean science and skill are producing large quantities of vital medicines and drugs such as are today combatting the spread of cholera.

We have worked carefully and undeviating to build a sound police and court system based on firm, impartial equality of justice.

We have called upon the intelligence and cooperation of Korean farmers in a nation wide effort to fill depleted grain stores for the needs of Koreans for the coming months to the end that suffering from hunger may be wiped out. This program inaugurated in early summer is meeting with gratifying response.

From America have been sent innumerable essential items to rehabilitate Korean industry, transportation, medical, and other services. These have been put to the immediate use of the Korean people.

We are concerned now with the structure of a representative legislature as a preliminary organ to increase Korean participation in the policies of their temporary government.

Americans, mindful of the interdependency of Korea's northern and southern zones have made all possible overtures for the reopening of the Joint Commission to unite Korea and establish a Korean Provisional Government. Believing that democracy endures on the principle of compromise, but not on the compromise of principle, we have stood fast for this reopening on the basis of free and uninhibited representation of all political elements, who, reflecting all shades of doctrinal theory, believe as we believe, that Koreans have a just claim in desiring a voice in their government.

In all endeavors we have preserved the principles for which Americans fought, and for which Koreans have patiently waited. We believe in the dignity of free men and the necessity for freedom of speech, press, assembly, and worship.

All of us here, both American and Korean, have been working together in an enterprise which tests the propriety of the causes for which the war was waged. It is the very nature of democracy that free men will occasionally fall into some error of misjudgment, but such mistakes once made are behind and the experience gained leaves us all with a greater perception of what is profitable and correct. We learn by doing.

In this connection it is of equal importance that I remark upon those things our discretion and our responsibility to the Korean people have made us refrain from doing. We have not committed the Korean people to any course of economy or political life from which circumstances may later force them to swerve, with consequent disorder and hardship to themselves. We have done nothing to jeopardize the position of the future Korean government or to predicate its course of action along lines it may find undesireable or impracticable. We have left it for the Korean government, in response to the expressed desires of the Korean people, to solve their problems of a lasting nature which Americans have no right to arbitrate. It is for Koreans to decide the method by which Korean lands will be returned to the Korean people, and for them to decide wherein will finally be vested the ownership and control of Korean industry. We have instituted no regulations or ordinances upon the Korean people which they, in the interest of the health, welfare, stability and progress of themselves and their children, would not have found reasonable and necessary to initiate. We have not compelled obedience to revolutionary edicts or programs which, however productive and impressive in their magnitude they may appear, are still unsound because they are unjust and unrepresentative. We do not intend to impose the payment for our errors of foresight upon the people of Korea, but to leave to them the final decision in programs of such general and enduring effect that no one else can rightfully decide.

(NEXT PAGE)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

We have not gone untroubled in these efforts. We have not been without our detractors. Our aims have been distorted and our motives suspected. The Americans and those splendid Korean patriots who have stood shoulder to shoulder with us in their country's need have been frequently slandered and abused. We have been the targets of libel and slander. Croaking voices and venomous pens have sometimes tried to make of American policy here something different than it is and of Korean-American progress something less than it is.

We do not fear or resent honest and constructive criticisms. We do not hesitate to open our aims and our record to the eyes of the world. What we have done we have done in the name of objectives in which we are presently engaged. We do not depart from them.

We do not intend to stand by and see a minority group or a self-interested, venal segment of the people impose their shoddy power. We have not brought liberty across bloody seas to see it abruptly discarded or lightly suspended.

I pledge to the Korean people that America has not abdicated her concern with their united independence, nor has her interest in Korean freedom lapsed.

We look ahead to the days when those same beaches over which Americans came one year ago will witness profitable commerce between Korea and all other nations of the world. We do not intend to leave those same shores until Korea stands as a free nation, her feet upon the firm ground of her independence, her gaze fixed upon the star of her own destiny. Korea must walk before she runs, but when she runs it must be alone. We are all architects in that future.

That is the work we are in. Let us get on with it with full unity of the Korean people for sound progress to reach the Korean goal."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FUNERAL EULOGY

This solemn occasion bring to our minds sentiments of both admiration and of sorrow, sentiments of admiration for a life that has been lived nobly and well, sentiments of sorrow that one of Korea's greatest patriots should have been called from his work at this time when his services are so sorely needed.

Hong Jin was indeed a truly great Korean patriot. He was a man whose lofty vision went above and beyond considerations of personal ambition or of party prejudice. He saw clearly that the road to independence lay in the fullest cooperation of all patriots, and he spent his strength in the hope of bringing about that great objective.

Hong Jin's leadership cannot be spared. His passing is a grievous loss to this country. It must serve to call us all to an increased determination to work all the harder for the great purpose for which he so well lived.

I wish at this time to pay solemn tribute to his memory, and to convey on behalf of General Hodge the deep sympathy of the American Command to the bereaved family and to the Korean nation.

MEMO FOR RECORD

The above eulogy was delivered by Gen. Weckerling at the funeral of Mr. Hong Jin held at the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Seoul on 13 Sept 46.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File speeches

file

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO ATTEND THIS HAPPY OCCASION AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL HODGE, AND TO EXTEND FELICITATIONS TO THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY UPON THIS FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF ITS FOUNDATION.

THE GREAT WORK FOR WHICH KOREAN POLITICAL PARTIES ARE NOW NEEDED IS THE WORK OF ESTABLISHING INDEPENDENCE. THAT WORK HAS BEEN WELL BEGUN, BUT THERE STILL REMAINS MUCH TO BE DONE BEFORE THE GOAL WILL BE ACHIEVED. ON SUCH OCCASIONS AS THIS, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD NOT ONLY LOOK BACK OVER THE YEAR THAT IS PAST, BUT MORE IMPORTANT, WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE WORK THAT REMAINS TO BE DONE.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT, RECOGNIZING THE NEED OF KOREAN RESPONSIBILITY IN SOLVING KOREAN PROBLEMS, IS EVEN NOW ENGAGED IN TURNING OVER DIRECT CONTROL TO ITS KOREAN OFFICIALS. THIS TREND WILL BE FURTHER DEVELOPED, WE TRUST, BY THE SPEEDY CREATION OF A LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROMULGATION OF MEASURES TO AID THE KOREAN PEOPLE. SUCH A LEGISLATURE MUST BE AND WILL BE THE PRODUCT OF A GENUINE COALITION OF THE PATRIOTIC AND PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS OF BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT. FOR SUCH A LEGISLATURE AND SUCH A COALITION WE CONFIDENTLY EXPECT THE SUPPORT OF THIS PARTY.

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE EVER TO IMPROVE ITSELF, AND WILL DEDICATE ITS EFFORTS TO THE BETTERMENT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND TO THE ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE KOREAN NATION.

Speech delivered by Maj Gen at anniversary of Han Kook Dem. Party on 16 Sept. 1946

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Initial
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

17 September 1946

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

Maj. Gen. A.V. Arnold, Chief U.S. Commissioner, Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission, makes the following statement:

There appears to be a growing idea among minority elements of Korean politicians that they can establish a Korean Government and an independent nation outside of and disregarding the Moscow Decision by the simple process of mass meetings and proclamations announcing such a Government. Obviously such measures have no legal status and therefore can do nothing but place the Korean people in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the rest of the world. Persons who entertain this misconception are either ignorant of the realities of the international situation or they are deliberately working for their own selfish interests. Certainly the development of such ideas in Korea would have a very detrimental effect on the future of Korea and would seriously retard if not actually jeopardize the establishment of Korean independence. Such ideas would only play into the hands of those who wish to delay Korean independence. Leaders who further such thinking are not to be trusted and should be discredited by the press, by patriotic politicians and by the mass of the Korean people.

I strongly urge the Korean people not to support or participate in movements which are harmful to Korea.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

PRESS RELEASE 7 October 1946

Major General A. V. Arnold, formerly head of the United States Delegation of the United States - Soviet Joint Commission and a great friend of Korea and an admirer of the Korean people, has returned to the United States after a long period of service overseas.

MP

General Arnold arrived in Korea September, 1945 as the commander of the 7th Division but shortly afterward was appointed Military Governor of Korea. Through his diligent and untiring efforts, governmental machinery was set up and in the short space of three and one half months while he was Military Governor had accomplished tasks that would have been impossible under lesser leadership. General Arnold ably assisted patriotic Koreans to initiate the training of Koreans in the methods of good government, the removal of 70,000 Japanese from the government of Korea, and the reopening of industries, transportation and communications, as well as many other essential tasks.

Knowing the needs of Korea, he adopted the uniting of Korean political factions as one of his ardent hopes. He worked toward this end incessantly, both while Military Governor and after his appointment in January 1946 as head of the American Delegation to the United States - Soviet Joint Commission in Korea. Conditions beyond local control forced General Arnold to leave here before his hopes of seeing a Korean legislature and unification of all Korea could be realized.

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge has officially announced the appointment of Major General Albert E. Brown to head the American Delegation of the United States - Soviet Joint Commission.

General Brown, who has been carefully selected to fill the vacancy left by General Arnold, is highly qualified for this work, having had wide experience in high staff and command positions in the Army and in important civil contacts. He is well grounded in Korean affairs. Prior to arrival in Seoul to prepare for his new assignment as head of the United States Delegation to the Joint Commission, General Brown was in command of the 6th Infantry Division which covers the southern portion of the American zone since June 1, 1946.

General Brown is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, class of 1912, and has spent over 38 years in the United States Army. He commanded troops in France in the First World War where he participated in the Aisne-Marne offensive and the Argonne offensive, serving also in the St. Die and in the Marbauche Sectors. Returning to the United States after that war, he was detailed as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the University of South Dakota where he stayed for several years, later being detailed to various other important tasks. He is a graduate of the Infantry School, the Command and General Staff School, the United States Army War College and the United States Naval War College.

He has served in highly important capacities in command of troops, in various staff positions in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army including duty as the Chief of the Army Budget and Legislative Branch, where he handled the preparation of the United States Army Budget and its presentation to Congress in addition to handling matters of Congressional legislation. He was in this last named position when World War II began.

He commanded the 7th Infantry Division (now in Korea) in 1942 and 1943, and was the Commanding General of the Army Force that captured Attu in the Aluetian Islands from the Japanese in May 1943.

General Brown was sent to the European Theater of Operations in 1944 where he saw service with the 75th Infantry Division, the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, the XII Army Group, XXII Army Corps, the 9th Infantry Division and the 2nd Division, and was in command of the 5th Infantry Division when the war ended. He led the 5th Division in the final campaign in eastern Bavaria and into Austria and Czechoslovakia. He then brought the division back to the United States and stayed with it until he was transferred to duty in Korea, where he was initially assigned to the 6th Infantry Division. Since [illegible] arriving in Korea in June, 1946,

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

he has traveled widely through South Korea, and has learned conditions in farming, in industry and other phases of Korean life by first hand observation.

All who know General Brown have the highest respect for his wide experience and have full confidence in his fine judgement and his high ability. Following the loss of General Arnold, his appointment to head the American Delegation of the United States - Soviet Joint Commission is considered highly appropriate.

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AUTH: DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.1
DATE 7-11-80

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Speech by Brig Gen John Weckerling
given at "Han Kul" ceremony at Duk Soo Palace on October 9, 1946

I regret that I am unable to address you in the Korean language.

The people of Korea are today celebrating the 500th anniversary of the establishment of the Korean alphabet - Han Kul. By the western calendar this historic event which we are celebrating occurred in 1446 or nearly 50 years before the discovery of America by Columbus. However, Han Kul is only one of the outward signs of the age old and distinctive culture of Korea.

Throughout the long ages of the past and the more recent oppression of the Japanese occupation, Koreans have clung tenaciously to the preservation of their cultural inheritances.

Now that Korea is on the high road leading to the establishment of an independent, democratic country, the precious national cultures of which Han Kul is a part, will assume greater importance in the hearts of all Koreans.

I congratulate you on the celebration of this significant event in the long history of Korea.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

12 October 1946

PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL A. E. BROWN
CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION

"As Chief of the American Delegation to the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, I desire to extend my congratulations to the patriotic members of the Coalition Committee, who have worked so zealously for political unity in Southern Korea.

I cannot too strongly stress the importance of political unity. As all of you well understand, the political disunity which has prevailed in Southern Korea has constituted a serious impediment toward progress in Korea and has definitely delayed your independence. The firm establishment of a real working coalition will go far toward eliminating that obstacle.

One of the most valuable of the traditions of all self-governing peoples is the concept that in times of national emergency political differences should be subordinated to the vital necessity of working together for the common end. We who are greatly interested in seeing this country become a strong democratic nation are particularly pleased to see this sound democratic instinct now asserting itself in Korea. We are pleased also that the Coalition Committee has wisely recognized the need of reaching a still wider measure of unity. The door is not closed. I urge all to join in supporting the coalition effort.

I regard the work of the Coalition Committee as a great step forward. On behalf of the American Delegation, I congratulate all those who have so unselfishly and diligently made these gains possible. It is our great hope that this progress will continue and will bring ever closer the attainment of the great goal which we share as our common objective--the independence of a united Korea."

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PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL A. E. BROWN,
CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION,
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION

As Chief of the American Delegation to the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, I desire to extend my congratulations to the patriotic members of the Coalition Committee, who have worked so zealously for political unity in Southern Korea.

I cannot too strongly stress the importance of this achievement. As all of you well understand, the political disunity which has prevailed in Southern Korea has constituted a serious impediment toward progress in Korea. These recent acts will go far to eliminate that obstacle.

One of the most valuable of the traditions of all self-governing peoples is the concept that in times of national emergency political differences should be subordinated to the vital necessity of finding a basis upon which to work together. We who are greatly interested in seeing this country become a strong democratic nation are particularly pleased to see this sound democratic instinct asserting itself in Korea. We are pleased also that the Coalition Committee has wisely recognized the need of reaching a still wider measure of unity. The door is not closed.

On behalf of the American Delegation, I congratulate all those who have so unselfishly and diligently made these gains possible. It is our great hope that this progress will continue and will bring ever closer the attainment of the great goal which we share as our common objective--the independence of a united Korea. I regard the work of the Coalition Committee as a great step forward.

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DRAFT

Statement of General Brown:

As Chief of the American Delegation to the US-USSR Joint Commission, I desire to extend my congratulations to the patriotic members of the Coalition Committee, who have joined in creating a basis for political unity in Southern Korea.

I cannot too strongly stress the importance of this achievement. As all of you well understand, the political disunity which has prevailed in Southern Korea has constituted a serious handicap to the Joint Commission in its efforts to establish a provisional government for the entire country.

These recent acts will go far to eliminate that obstacle to the progress of Korea. I regard the work of the Coalition Committee as a great step forward, which will undoubtedly hasten the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government. We are beginning to move on the road to National Independence.

One of the most valuable of the traditions of all self-governing peoples is the concept that in times of national emergency political differences should be subordinated to the great necessity of finding a basis upon which to work together. We who are vitally interested in seeing this country become a strong democratic republic are particularly pleased to see this sound democratic instinct asserting itself in Korea. We are pleased also that the Coalition Committee has wisely recognized the need of reaching a still wider measure of unity. The door is not closed.

We hope that there will be a movement of the Korean parties and people to cooperate in the creation of the legislature upon the basis of coalition of all the patriotic elements of right and left. It cannot be too often reiterated that the road to independence lies through cooperation, and the only practical means of cooperation is through coalition.

On behalf of the American Delegation I again express our appreciation of the gains that have been made and our great hope that this progress will continue and will bring ever closer the attainment of the great goal which we share as our common objective - the independence of a united Korea.

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File

There appears to be a growing idea among minority elements of Korean politicans that they can establish a Korean Government and an independent nation outside of and disregarding the Moscow Decision by the simple process of mass meetings and proclamations announcing such a Government. Obviously such governments have no legal status and therefore can do nothing but place the Korean people in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the rest of the world. Persons who entertain this misconception are either ignorant of the realities of the international situation or they are deliberately working for their own selfish interests. Certainly the development of such ideas in Korea would have a very detrimental effect on the future of Korea and would seriously retard if not actually jeopardize the establishment of Korean independence. Such ideas would only play into the hands of those who wish to delay Korean independence. Self-styled leaders who further such thinking are not to be trusted and should be discredited by the press by patriotic politicians and by the mass of the Korean people.

I strongly urge the Korean people not to support or participate in movements which are harmful to Korea.

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FILE

CONGRATULATORY SPEECH DELIVERED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE REPRESENTING GENERAL HODGE AT KOREA INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITION AT CHANG DUK PALACE ON OCTOBER 19, 1946.

- -

General Hodge greatly regrets that the pressure of official business makes it impossible for him to be present today.

To those of us who feel so keenly that in a well balanced agricultural and industrial economy lies the hope of a strong and independent Korea, this Industry Exhibit is a significant event.

Among these nine buildings scattered over these historic grounds, we get a glimpse of the riches and comforts that lie in store for the Korean people. We see here the textile plants from these looms will come the fabrics that all Koreans will be able to wear and that Korean workers will be selling on the world market. We see, too, the machines that will come into the many industrial plants, the mines, the oil and copper and tungsten and other minerals will be mined for the world markets needs, and the hydroelectric plants and electric power by which Korea is to rich. Here, too, we catch a glimpse of life in Korea once the benefits of a thriving industry are made available to all the Korean people. We see a comfortable Korean home with attractive tile fixtures, electrical appliances and heating systems, all made by Koreans in Korean plants.

It is noteworthy that this picture of the future represents the imagination and industry of the Korean people. Conceived by Koreans and staged by Koreans, this exposition is a testimony to their foresight and resourcefulness in these troubled times of readjustment. The Korean people realize full well that the agricultural wealth and traditions of this country must be supplemented by a vigorous industrial development in order to give Korea both economic and social stability. It is only fitting and proper that in a country so rich in natural resources that these steps be taken so that this national wealth can be developed by and for the Korean people.

I hope every Korean can visit this exhibit and get this glimpse into the future of their country. I hope, too, that every American can come and see the Korea that the Korean people are planning to fashion for themselves.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV ARMY CORPS
Seoul, Korea

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE 7 November 1946

STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE.

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge announced today that he had received from the Soviet Commander in North Korea under date of 26 October an answer to the American letter of 12 August in which Gen. Hodge had clarified the position of the American Delegation to the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission, and had invited the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul to resume negotiations under the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Commander discussed frankly the attitude of the Soviet Delegation concerning the consultation of democratic parties and organizations by the Joint Commission, and stated that the Soviet Delegation wishes to return to carry out fully the Moscow Decision. His letter recognises the right to freedom of expression by Koreans in presenting their views to the Joint Commission. However, it did not completely resolve the differences between the two delegations on the matter of consulting democratic parties and organizations.

Gen. Hodge stated that he answered the Soviet Commander's letter on 1 November, again inviting the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul to resume negotiations to carry out the Moscow Decision in full. He reiterated the American position of allowing Koreans freedom of expression concerning the establishment of their own Provisional Government. He agreed that the Joint Commission could exclude from consultation those individuals, parties and organizations who foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfilment of the Moscow Decision. The exclusion of such persons is in the spirit of the Joint Commission Communique No. 5 issued on 17 April, 1946, which required prospective consultees to agree to cooperate with the work of the Joint Commission.

In further comment on this exchange of letter, Gen. Hodge pointed out that the Moscow Decision is a solemn agreement between the great Allied Powers, made in the interest of an orderly restoration of Korean sovereignty and safe-guarding Korean interests from encroachment by other nations. He said, "Neither the American nor the Soviet Delegation has any power to change the Moscow Decision and both are required to live up to it in full."

Asked about the matter of objection by many Koreans to the word "Trusteeship", Gen. Hodge said, "Based upon my observations and discussions of the subject with Koreans for almost one year, I am convinced that those Korean who oppose the 'Trusteeship' provision in the Moscow Decision have a highly erroneous concept of what it

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NND 760090
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means. They have jumped at the conclusion that it would be the same as or similar to the protectorate over Korea assumed by the Japanese. Such a concept is entirely incorrect. I fear that many Koreans have never really studied the Moscow Decision and have greatly misinterpreted its terms. The Moscow Decision defines 'Trusteeship' in these words '....measures for helping and assisting (Trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea'". When asked what the concrete terms of the "Trusteeship" are, Gen. Hodge said frankly he did not know. He explained, "In spite of all the discussions about 'Trusteeship,' no one knows what the concrete terms will be. No one can possibly know, because they haven't been worked out. We must remember that the first task of the Joint Commission is to get the Korean Provisional Government established. After that, the Moscow Decision specifically provides that the measures for helping and assisting (Trusteeship) will be worked out by the Joint Commission 'with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the Korean Democratic organizations.' The Moscow Decision further specifically provides that the proposals of the Joint Commission 'concerning a four power Trusteeship' shall be submitted for the consideration of the four powers 'following consultation with the Korean Provisional Government'". He added, "How can I know the specific terms: how can any one know the specific terms? How can any of the Korean people work up a political furor over a mere word when it is impossible for them to know what specific measures may be recommended by the Joint Commission after consultation with the Korean Provisional Government? Before any one can know the exact meaning of 'Trusteeship' to Korea, the Korean Provisional Government must be established, and considerable work, planning and discussion must be done by the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Government and Korean democratic and social organizations, and approval given by the four great Allied Powers. When all of this has been done, I don't see how the helping and assisting "trusteeship" worked out by the powers and the Korean people need be anything for Koreans to fear." In conclusion, he stated: "The Americans hope the Joint Commission will soon take up its work again and complete its task set forth in the Moscow Decision, thus ending the unhappy division of Korea and the uncertainty of its people."

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AMERICAN DELEGATION, USSJC
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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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The sessions of the joint [illegible] conference during the past week have been devoted chiefly to the consideration of [illegible] of police administration.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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Dr. Ch[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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By NARS, Date

심을 가졌다.

[illegible] 검찰부는 [illegible] 본 사건을 [illegible] 하여 이와 같이 [illegible] 하였다 -- 민주주의에 있어 [illegible] 이러한 [illegible] 되기 [illegible] 민주주의 [illegible] 민주적 [illegible] 하는 것이 [illegible] 이로 [illegible] 하여 [illegible] 책임을 [illegible] 하였다.

[illegible] 변호인들의 [illegible] 검찰부가 [illegible] 행함에 있어 [illegible] 이에 [illegible] 하였다. 변호인들은 [illegible] 이에 [illegible] 이 사건을 [illegible] 하고 [illegible] 이 안이라는 것을 [illegible] 하였다. [illegible] 또한 [illegible] 이 [illegible] 하는 [illegible] 하여 [illegible] 하였다.

[illegible] 심리 [illegible] 한 [illegible] 심리가 [illegible] 있고 [illegible] 이와 같이 [illegible] 하였다.

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月曜日會議에 이어 ~~[illegible]~~ 朱會議는 南朝鮮의 福利에 反對하여 소동을 ~~[illegible]~~ 날 크는 사람들에 對한 討議가 이을 것이다. 來週 木曜日에 三人軍에 對한 五個條目 [illegible]의 結論을 지도로 [illegible]하려 하며 [illegible] 그 [illegible]에는 [illegible]에 對한 問題를 [illegible] 會議 [illegible]에 [illegible]討議할 것인데 그 첫째 討議할 問題는 朱 [illegible] 集計 [illegible]일 것이다.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Translation

Partial

The statement of the [illegible] Min Ju Dang (Korean Democratic Party) concerning the nullification of the Seoul City and Kang Won Do.

On 25th (Nov) through the Department of Public Information, General Hodge declared that the election of Legislative members both in the city of Seoul and Kang Won Do should be null and void and that a new election should be conducted. According to the later findings the reasons for nullifying the election do not lie either in the qualifications of the persons elected or in the election itself, but in the inadequate preparations of the election machinery. By giving the following reasons our party hereby points out unfairness on the part of General Hodge in nullifying the election and requests him to give a very careful consideration to this matter:

1. Although there might have been some defects in the election machinery, basing on this, declaring the whole election is not fair because it ignores the will of voters.

2. We do not know in what respect the election machinery was inadequate. However, it is true that there was no set of election regulations and that every ward had to devise its own way (of conducting the election). In spite of it the nullification is based on inadequate preparations of election machinery. It simply ignores the social conditions and has no legal foundation whatsoever.

3. Legislative body is independent of Executive branch of government. Therefore, the Executive office has nothing to say about Legislature. The matter should have been decided by the Judicial Office. Moreover, declaring the election by the Commanding General is against basic principles of democracy. Even the Military Government should act (decide) very deliberately.

4. Discarding the return of popular election in accordance with the Coalition Committee's request, which is composed of a small number of persons, encrouches upon the authroity of election. This bad precedent will bring about dangerous confusion in the future.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]

[redacted]

To the following in the order indicated:

		Initials
1	General Hodge	
2		Date
3	Gen Burns	

28,000 of the attached letters from General Hodge to the police of Korea were distributed through the National Police Department. English attached.

Joe

FROM			
C. G. Helmick Brig. Gen. U.S.A.	OMG	200	11/29/46
(Name)	(Comm)	(Room)	(Date) WH 6 (Ext)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 76007D
By NARS, Date

朝鮮解放五週年記念特輯
陸軍中將 朴・ウ・ナ・イ 氏
一九四六年十一月 日

民主主義國家의 樹立



朴・ウ・ナ・イ 氏

本日를 期하야 朝鮮 各地에서 一齊히 擧行되는 朝鮮解放 五週年 記念式典에 參加하는 朝鮮人民의 感激은 實로 크다 할 것이다 三千萬 朝鮮人民이 日帝의 壓迫에서 解放된 지 五年이 되는 今日에 이르기까지 朝鮮人民은 實로 많은 苦難과 犧牲을 겪어 왔다 日帝의 壓迫에서 解放된 朝鮮人民은 自己의 國家를 建設하기 爲하야 全力을 다하여 왔다 그러나

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

POLICE FORCES IN A DEMOCRACY

This is written in hope that it will be of help to every member of the Korean Police Force. I hope each one of you will study it and apply the principles to your everyday work as a member of the police.

In a Democracy, the police are the servants of the people and protectors of the life and property of the people. They command the respect of all law abiding persons by their honesty, their stalwart devotion to duty and their sense of fairness in dealing with suspected law violators, as well as with the general public. They do not operate as a political body, nor are they controlled by any political group. Their allegiance is to their nation, their community, and their superiors in the maintenance of law and order. They are loyal to their country, are loyal to their superiors and are loyal to their solemn duty as police.

Police of a democratic nation do not administer punishment themselves; they leave that to the judges. They do not beat or slap prisoners merely to impress them or cow them. They never use force beyond that required to handle prisoners who physically resist arrest or try to escape. They do not beat or torture prisoners to gain confessions. Confessions so gained have no standing as evidence before courts of democratic nations.

Police of democratic nations have the highest code of honor in performance of their duties, and operate so as to command the full love and respect of their people. They do not take actions of personal vengeance or oppression against those they do not like, or against those who think differently than they do.

All of us here in Korea want the full development of democracy in the new Korean nation. True and real democracy is essential to our happiness. By this I mean a democracy where every man is free to think and believe as he

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Special

[illegible] ROUTING SLIP

To the following in order indicated:

		(Initials)	
1	General Hodge		(to be)
	(Name or Title) (Org.) (Room)		
2			
3			

Attached are English and Korean copies of handbills that were distributed through the usual channels, 200,000 of each.

No. 1 was written by Jimmy Kim, and No. 2 was written by Miss Ahn, who works in Dr. Clarence Ryee's office, DPI.

FROM:			12-5-46 (Date)
Helmick	MG	200	(Tel) Wh 6
(Name)	(Org.)	(Room)	

삼천만동포 여러분!!

조선을 망시키려는 이십선동자(惡質煽動者)들이
농촌에가서는 정미에 썩을 팔지말라고 아단
하고
도회지에 와서는 식량배급을 달라고아단
하고
농촌에가서는 썩을 정부에팔지말라고하고 한
편에서는 소송배급을주지않으면 굶어죽는다고
떠들고있다
농촌에서 썩을 공출하지않으면 정부가 어떠
케배급을 할수있단말이냐?
어리석은 그들이 그런 악질선동을하는
생각해보지이있읍니까?
범죄자들이 우리나라를 위하여
그와같은선동자
그런수단을 쓴다고 생각하십니까?
이러다가는 우리나라가 그들의말을 믿지말시다!

조선생활개신위원회

DECLASSIFIED
N.N.J. 76-0070
By NARS, Date

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

rice -- ~~gather~~

OUR 30 MILLION BROTHERS!

Agitators, trying to bring ruin to our country, are urging the farmers not to sell their rice to the government.

These very same agitators are demanding that 6 hops of rice be issued to them in the cities.

If they go to the country and tell the farmer not to sell his rice to the government and at the same time loudly demand that they will die from hunger if they don't get a six-hop ration, how do they expect the government to issue any rice at all?

Have you ever considered why these agitators spread their malicious rumors?

Do you believe they are using these tactics for the benefit of our country?

The answer is "No"!

Do not place your trust in those whose purpose is the destruction of our country.

KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR THE BETTER LIFE

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

rice -- ~~farmer~~ (agn) 200,000

TO THE KOREAN FARMERS:

Our wise and zealous brothers on the farms, you who love your country and your brethren, your sweat and blood have borne good fruit.

What are you going to do with this fruit? Are you going to use it for the benefit of your country?

We have confidence in you, Farmers, who have pure and beautiful hearts and are determined to drive away the hunger which is threatening your country. Furthermore, not only are you willing, but you are persuading your neighbors to sell rice to your government.

Have you turned in your quota to the government?

You will have the joy of knowing that you have done your duty only when you have turned in your quota!

KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR THE BETTER LIFE

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

December 16, 1946

Invitation

To Lt. General John. R. Hodge.

You are cordially invited to the inauguration ceremony of the Chosun Youth Party to be held at 13:00, December 16, 1946 at the Tucksoo Palace..

The Association for preparation of
the Chosun Youth Party

Lee Jun Hum

17 Dec.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Dec. 18, 1946

Fundamental Program

1, We are resolved to work for the complete self-independence of our fatherland by collecting the total power and ability of our youth.

2, We are resolved to realize an equal society of coprosprity of our nation and to develope it by all the intelligence and wisdom of our youth on our efforts.

3, We are resolved to contribute to the establishment of world peace by inheriting and enhancing our eternal national culture with sincerity and virtues of our youth.

4, We are resolved to avoid interecine strifes resolutely and to work for solidarity of the nation and wealth and strength of the states through pure patriotism of our youth.

5, We are resolved to reject and purge all external and interna nal factors, which impede reconstruction of our fatherland, by brave actions of our youth.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

DECLARATION OF THE CHOSUN YOUTH PARTY
AT THE INAUGURATION MEETING

Dear eight million young comrades who were born in Korea, who love Korea and who are ready to die for Korea! Our fatherland which was believed to have been liberated is still agonizing under the yoke of the 38 iron barrier and the thirty million people who believed themselves to have been liberated are on the verge of ruin, being devided into north and south and involved in internecine strifes.

Who is it that will save the nation and state out of the unprecidented crisis, and recover order, maintain public peace, reconstruct culture and industries ?

Dear eight million young comrades ! The nation is calling you only, the spirits of our forefathers are calling you only, our fatherland is calling you only, and the souls of ye our dead bretheren are calling you only.

Realizing that it is the last wish of the nation, let us get together and march together and fight together in answer to the supreme order of our fatherland. Dear comrades who will impair our solidarity, obstruct our march, and object our fight ? The time to rely only on our fathers and elders has passed. The time to roam about on the streets devided by agitatown of factions and favouritism has passed. We will not mark time under the pressure of money and power. We will not hesitate to lay down our life. Though political parties are divided into right and left due to difference of ideology and the country is devided into north and south by alien guests we youth alone will get together and ignore the 38 parallel barrier.

Dear comrades if we do not achive independence what is the use of our assertion and where will our right be ? Even the Japs who trampled on our country are working together to save their country and people. We should not be invaded a third time by the Japs and be laughed at by the world.

For this reson the youth groups which have been carrying on powerful youth movement since August 15, 1945 have now got together and formed the Chosun Youth Party. Eight million comrades, do not hesitate to rally round the banner of the Chsun Youth Party. Let us hoist our banner above the 38 line, unify the nation, move the world, regain our fatherland, and realized peace and happiness of humanity.

Hurrah for the Chosun Youth Party !

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NARS, Date

朝鮮青年黨發黨大會式順

一、開會宣言
一、國旗拜禮
一、愛國歌奉唱
一、殉國先烈追念
一、烽火祭
一、開會辭
一、經過報告
一、黨宣言發表
一、黨基本綱領發表
一、黨行動綱領發表
一、青年盟約發表
一、黨規約發表
一、黨中央執行委員及中央部署發表
一、最高委員決意表明
一、解放祭
一、祝辭
一、祝賀飛行（傳單散布）
　民族領袖
　聯合國代表
　各界代表
一、花砲祭　（祝砲十四發）
一、萬歲三唱　（完全自由獨立萬歲、朝鮮青年黨萬歲）
一、示威行進
一、閉會宣言

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

F 14

ADDRESS OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN WECKERLING AT THE INAUGURATION CEREMONY OF THE CHOSUN YOUTH PARTY AT 1300 DECEMBER 18, 1946 AT DUK SOO PALACE.

- - - -

General Hodge greatly regretted his inability to be present with you this afternoon at the inauguration meeting of the Chosun Youth Party.

I have read your fundamental program with a great deal of interest. I have noted your strong resolve to achieve independence by avoiding internal strife and resolutely working for the solidarity of the nation. This is a very worthy objective.

The United States is in complete sympathy with the desire of the Korean people for independence. It is perhaps unnecessary to make this statement. The Korean people are well aware of this sympathy through the statements and actions of United States leaders including the warm and friendly understanding of General Hodge here in Korea. The position of the United States is clear.

It desires to see Korea a free and independent country as soon as possible.

The United States wants to leave Korea without danger of Korea being dominated by any foreign nation.

The United States has no interest in obtaining any concession, territory or other material advantage in Korea.

I can't emphasize too strongly the desire of the people of the United States to retain the friendship of the Korean people for all time.

The unity of the Korean people is gradually taking shape and is illustrated by the successful accomplishment of coalition and the establishment of the Interim Legislature. But these are first steps only in the democratic process which will lead eventually to complete unity of the entire country and independence.

I congratulate the Chosun Youth Party on this their Inauguration Day and urge their unselfish, patriotic efforts toward the achievement of unity and solidarity.

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By NARS, Date

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

DECEMBER 27, 1946
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FUTURE RELEASE

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Following is the text of an NBC broadcast, the 98th in a series entitled "Our Foreign Policy" presented by the NBC University of the Air.

Subject: Our Policy in Korea

Participants: Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, Department of State;

Mr. Hugh Borton, Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, Department of State;

Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.

- - -

ANNOUNCER: This is Our Foreign Policy. On this broadcast we bring you Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, Department of State; Mr. Hugh Borton, Chairman of the Japan-Korea Secretariat and Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, Department of State; and Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. They will discuss our policy in Korea. Mr. Fisher.

FISHER: Gentlemen, I have some rather blunt questions I want to ask you on the broadcast. For instance, why are we still in Korea? A year ago, Mr. Martin, you appeared on this program, and at that time we finished on a rather optimistic note. Furthermore, the indication then was that we would not be making such a very long stay in Korea. As I say, that was a year ago. In that year the picture seems to have changed considerably. I judge, from your

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

from your own remarks to me that you expect--both of you expect--that we shall not be pulling out in the near future.

MARTIN: That's right, and a year ago, Mr. Fisher, we did not anticipate that we would still be playing a lone hand in southern Korea.

FISHER: I remember that, Mr. Martin. You said then: "If we can settle the Korean question quickly and fairly, through the cooperation of the great powers, it will remove a potential trouble-spot and contribute greatly to the peace of Asia."

MARTIN: Yes, I did. And that's still true.

FISHER: But since then the picture has changed.

BORTON: Yes, it has, Mr. Fisher. We have so far been unable to make progress with the Soviets along lines laid down by the Foreign Ministers at Moscow a year ago. Consequently we are going ahead alone, for the time being, with a program in our zone in Korea.

FISHER: Yes, Mr. Borton, apparently we are. Why are we? It's going to cost us quite a lot, isn't it, to stay in Korea? I mean it's going to cost the taxpayer.

BORTON: I'm afraid it is.

FISHER: Why should we foot the bill? Why don't we get out? Why is it, that, having won the war, liberated Korea, we don't step aside? To use that rather hackneyed question: What's in it for us?

MARTIN: A lot of trouble, that's sure. But seriously that is a big question and is the reason we are here for this broadcast.

FISHER: Well, both of you--you, Mr. Martin, and you, Mr. Borton--are in charge of the divisions of the State Department which have responsibility for our policies on Korea. If anyone can explain our presence there, and our policy, you ought to be able to. What I'd like you

to do

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

to do on this broadcast is give that explanation simply and in non-technical terms so that our listeners--tax paying Americans who will have to foot the bill--will know why they're being called upon for the check. I'd like to begin by recalling that, on our broadcast a year ago, you expected, Mr. Martin, that, by now, we and our Allies would be leading a unified Korea well along toward independence. We're not doing that, evidently. Why not?

MARTIN: There's a question before that, I think, Mr. Fisher. You asked it just now.

BORTON: Yes. Why we're in Korea in the first place.

FISHER: Go ahead, Mr. Borton. Let's have that one answered.

BORTON: It goes back to the Cairo Declaration, Mr. Fisher. Three years ago, in December, Great Britain, China, and the United States said that, and I quote: "Mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, (we) are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." I should like to point out also that the Soviets subsequently accepted this promise.

MARTIN: We are committed to a free and independent Korea, Mr. Fisher. In the eyes of the world we have assumed an obligation. That obligation is a free Korea.

BORTON: Now there are quite a number of reasons why we cannot just say to the Koreans that they are free and for them to go ahead and run things the way they want to.

FISHER: One of them is Russia, of course.

MARTIN: Well, you're saying that, Mr. Fisher. Not me.

FISHER: But you know it's true. In the first place Korea is divided into two zones isn't it? The Northern half Russia, the Southern half American. By the way, the dividing line is the 38th parallel, isn't it? That seems a somewhat arbitrary division. Why was it made?

BORTON: Originally

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BORTON: Originally that was a military division, Mr. Fisher. It was made only to assist us and our allies, the Russians, in fighting the Japanese in Korea. But they surrendered before we got there and the military division stuck and became a political one.

FISHER: All right. But a year ago the Moscow Agreement was drawn up, wasn't it? An agreement providing for two conferences between us and the Russians, to work out steps leading to Korean independence. The first of those conferences was going on during our broadcast on Korea a year ago. What happened to it?

BORTON: Bluntly, Mr. Fisher, it flopped. The fault was not entirely ours. Nor was it entirely the Russians.

FISHER: All right. But there was a second conference. What happened to that?

MARTIN: It adjourned in May without appointing a time for meeting again.

FISHER: Did it get anything done? As the two occupying forces in Korea--we and Russia--we were supposed under the terms of the Moscow agreement to work out with Russia the terms under which Korea would have full independence. From what you say, we adjourned without working them out. Furthermore, no time has been set for us to get together with the Russians in the future to continue trying to work them out. Now just what does that mean?

BORTON: Our position, Mr. Fisher, the position of the United States, is that we stand ready to sit down with the Russians at any time to try again to work out under the Moscow agreement an acceptable formula for turning Korea over to the Koreans.

FISHER: Well, I don't suppose you can say this, Mr. Borton, but, not being in the State Department myself I think I can. It is, I think, what a lot of us are wondering and thinking

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

thinking: I take it when we sat down with the Russians for the second conference and got nowhere, it was because we could not agree on what a democratic Korea should look like. But, Mr. Borton, do you think we can reach agreement? Given time?

BORTON: Yes, I think so, Mr. Fisher.

FISHER: But in the meantime we have to stay in Korea? In the southern zone.

BORTON: Yes, we do.

FISHER: I lived for a good many years in the Far East, myself, Mr. Borton, as you have. Being realistic about it, there are political reasons for our decision as well as idealistic ones, aren't there? For instance, if anyone takes the trouble to look at a map he'll see without much difficulty that Korea is a peninsula between Japan, Russia, and China. And therefore of strategic importance.

BORTON: Of course, there are political reasons, Mr. Fisher. We've just fought a bitter and costly war to get peace. A free and independent Korea, carrying on independent relationships with Japan, China and Russia is a lot better insurance for peace in Asia than a Korea dominated by another country, ourselves included.

FISHER: We think that it is going to take some time then, for Korea to attain independence?

MARTIN: I'm afraid it will.

FISHER: Mr. Martin, you said earlier -- I think it was you -- that we were going ahead in Southern Korea alone, if necessary.

BORTON: I said it, Mr. Fisher.

FISHER: Oh...well,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FISHER: Oh...well, I think you've given the answer between you to the question why we're in Korea. We're committed to seeing an independent and free Korea by solemn obligation assumed at Cairo three years ago and reinforced at Moscow a year ago. Politically we're also bound because we want to see an Asia that is stable and a free Korea is good insurance. This brings us to the question of why we--the United States government--has decided to go ahead alone in the southern zone, our zone, in Korea. Why is it going to cost us money? Why do you think we shall have to stay for quite some time?

MARTIN: Those questions will take quite a lot of time to answer, Mr. Fisher.

FISHER: All right, Mr. Martin. Let's get going with them.

MARTIN: In the first place, Mr. Fisher, our job, as we see it, in our zone, is to do what we can to assist the Koreans to attain independence...

FISHER: Let me interrupt...Korea is not very well known to us. Why do they have to be helped? Mr. Borton?

BORTON: They were annexed by Japan not quite forty years ago, as you know. Japan immediately developed Korea as a colony. Koreans had nothing whatever to say about their government. Japan did it all for them.

MARTIN: Japan did everything for Korea. But she did it for Japan's own interest. Not the Koreans.

BORTON: When General Hodge entered Korea he found that the government--all forms of it--was in the hands of Japanese. So was their economy.

MARTIN: Our major job, I think, is to help the Koreans to help themselves. We've kicked the Japanese out. As fast as we can we're turning over to the Koreans the job of running the country. We've made a lot of progress in this

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

in this direction. But it takes time to train leaders in either government or business. Even more difficult is the job of educating the mass of the people to take an active and intelligent interest in running their government, particularly when getting enough to eat has to be their major interest. A country threatened with starvation isn't fertile ground in which to develop an understanding and a desire for democracy. So the first job we have to do is see that the Koreans have enough to eat.

FISHER: Well, they used to grow their own rice.

MARTIN: Yes. But last year the crop failed--40 per cent of the grain crop and 20% of the rice crop failed.

FISHER: The economy of Korea is a rice economy. We can't ship them rice.

MARTIN: No, we can't. And neither can any other country in Asia. But while we're in there we've got to see that they have food. As a matter of fact they're already blaming us.

FISHER: What for? And in what way?

MARTIN: Well, as you pointed out, we haven't been able to send them rice though we're still trying to get a little. But we do have surplus wheat, so we're sending them that. Though it has been hard, considering the world food shortage, to send them enough.

FISHER: As a matter of fact, the people of Asia haven't learned to eat wheat as a major item.

BORTON: The Koreans are no exception to that. And don't like it.

MARTIN: And

MARTIN: And they're saying that under the Japanese they got millet - under us, they're getting short rations of wheat and corn. Now you and I like wheat and corn. We are used to it and know how to cook it. But, they don't know how to cook wheat. And if we print recipes for them, which as a matter of fact we have done, most of them can't read them. The Japs saw to it that most Koreans were illiterate.

BORTON: Which reminds me of one of our toughest problems - that is to help the Koreans to build up their own educational system. As you know, Mr. Fisher, since you were out there, the schools were taught in Japanese. The text books were in Japanese. And of course biased. It isn't just a matter of education now. It's also a matter of providing text books. Writing text books. And training teachers. Under Japanese rule the teachers were all Japanese. They used to come to classes wearing swords. We said earlier we expected to be in Korea some time. That is one reason. It will take time to write the text books, to train the teachers. To substitute for the Japanese system a system that is Korean and independent.

FISHER: Meanwhile some of them are saying that we are providing wheat which isn't any better than the millet they got under the Japanese, and that they're not getting as much of it.

MARTIN: Some of them are saying that. When you remember I said that many of them couldn't read, you'll understand how rumors grow. It's really important to the general economic situation, too, because about fifty percent of what a Korean earns he spends on grains. We must get agriculture back on its feet as quickly as possible, and meanwhile get rice or other grains to them in substantial quantities

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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quantities

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

quantities -- say 650,000 metric tons in 1947 -- to prevent a collapse of the economy and to provide a minimum diet.

FISHER: Under normal conditions I take it they can support themselves -- I mean they can grow enough rice for their own needs.

BORTON: Yes, they can. But they'll need lots of fertilizer, nearly half a million tons a year. During the war the Japs converted Korean fertilizer plants to producing explosives. And they're in the northern zone so we have to depend on imports for our zone until unification has been put through.

MARTIN: Meanwhile, we have to ship in food. That bill has to be met by us. And it's not only the food and fertilizer that's costing us so much, it's the transportation. It costs us twice as much to ship them to Korea as to pay for the food and fertilizer itself. They're half way across the world and we have to ship from here because we're the only people in the world today with surpluses.

FISHER: Southern Korea is chiefly an agricultural zone, isn't it?

MARTIN: Yes. And that brings me to the second problem we face. First, as I've said, we must feed them in order for them to be able to keep going. Next, we have to work with them to help them get what industry they do have into production.

BORTON: And again, before this can be done, we have to finance the importation of raw materials. Their import problem is a substantial one. The Japanese used Korea for the past ten or fifteen years as a source of war materials. We have to help the Koreans convert to a peace time basis.

FISHER: Well, what sort of industry is the country as a whole capable of?

MARTIN: Well, as a

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MARTIN: Well, as a unified country she can do pretty well. But most of her mineral and industrial wealth is in the north, which means that the south has to look to us for imports to keep it going until unification. She can produce enough coal in the north for the whole country. Under the Japanese sizeable chemical, textile and metal industries were developed in the north. There is lots of cheap hydro electric power there.

FISHER: How about industry in southern Korea?

MARTIN: Southern Korea's industries run more to the mining of special minerals, such as molybdenum, graphite, fullers' earth, tungsten and such. It also produces on a relatively small scale lumber products, tobacco, ginseng, fish products, textiles, and handicraft wares.

FISHER: I take it, then, that one of our objectives will be to encourage trade between Korea and other countries in the world.

MARTIN: Yes. If we can get that started, then a unified Korea will be able to pay for the imports we now have to pay for. The point is that southern Korea really has very few things that the rest of the world wants. Or perhaps I should say she does not have them in sufficient quantity.

FISHER: What about China?

MARTIN: China is probably situated so as to be her best customer. But in the coming year if southern Korea's exports to everyone amounts to ten million dollars it will be a major achievement.

FISHER: Ten million dollars for all her exports?

MARTIN: Yes. It's not much. And if Korea achieves that, as I say, it will be quite a feat.

FISHER: An export

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FISHER: An export trade of ten million dollars, of course, is just a drop in the bucket.

BORTON: Of course it is, Mr. Fisher. We often forget that there are more than 18,000,000 people in our zone in Korea -- more than all the areas the United States occupies in Germany.

FISHER: Yes, that's true. Well, I guess we have to see that they have food until they can get their crops going again. We are exporting to them so that they can begin to build up their own industry...

MARTIN: May I interrupt, Mr. Fisher?... The imports they are getting are not all just gifts. I think that ought to be clear.

FISHER: I don't quite understand you, Mr. Martin. Their economy is shot to pieces at the moment. Are we running them into debt?

MARTIN: Yes and no. When we get out, there will have to be a balancing of accounts. To the extent we are successful in building up her economy she will be able to assume some share of the cost of that reconstruction. We can't count on much though as it would defeat our whole purpose to leave Korea saddled with an international debt which would be a millstone around her neck.

FISHER: How are they getting their imports?

MARTIN: For the next year or so the bulk of them, the food and fertilizer, most of the industrial equipment and repair parts, will have to be paid for out of U.S. appropriations. Another thing we have done is let them have army surplus items that couldn't be shipped back to the U.S. Korea has secured some 18 million dollars worth of army surplus material, mostly transportation equipment and medicine. Then, we have had Japan ship coal, textile machinery parts, yard goods and silk worm eggs on account.

FISHER: As I remember,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FISHER: As I remember, Mr. Martin, there was no silk manufacturing in Korea before the war.

MARTIN: There wasn't. They grew the cocoons, but the Japs made them ship them to Japan for manufacture. But there's no reason why there shouldn't be. We're shipping silk worm eggs in from Japan in order to help the Koreans build up a silk industry of their own.

FISHER: That of course will put her in competition with Japan.

BORTON: After all, why not? Our economy, our way of life, is predicated on free competitive enterprise. That's one of the things we mean when we speak of Democracy.

FISHER: I agree with you. But when can we expect to pull out of Korea?

MARTIN: These problems of economic reconstruction and unification are an important part of the reason why we can't get out now or in the near future. And by the same token why we must, at least for the immediate future, support our presence with enough money to accomplish the purposes which must be achieved before we can in good conscience withdraw.

FISHER: Well, if I may ask a very direct question, Mr. Borton, we were not the only ones to assume that obligation. At Cairo we assumed it with Great Britain and China. Neither China nor Great Britain seem to have anything to say about what goes on. You remember the stand we took some years ago on the question of taxation without representation. What are they doing about it?

BORTON: One thing has to be remembered, Mr. Fisher. At the time of these agreements the U.S. and the Soviets also were given the job of initiating arrangements for a

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

unified and independent Korea. This means taking care of our zones until the job is completed. These arrangements will then be put up to the other countries for approval.

FISHER: There's another question that occurs to me, Mr. Borton, and I rather imagine to a great many other people. Do we know how Russia is getting along in the Northern zone?

BORTON: Not very much, Mr. Fisher. What evidence we have seems to indicate that the Russians are doing a better job of feeding the Koreans in their zone than we are in ours.

FISHER: If they are, I should think that might have political implications.

BORTON: Undoubtedly it would.

FISHER: The Russian point of view, of course, is not ours. An obvious comment but it has its point in this connection.

BORTON: Yes sir. The Koreans are going to have to choose the sort of government they want. All we're committed to is an independent Korea. But we want to see Korea independent in a Democratic way. Last March General Shtikov, the Russian representative, opened the second conference.....

FISHER: The one that adjourned without setting a date to resume?

BORTON: Yes....General Shtikov opened the session with a public speech in which he said that the Soviet aim for Korea, and I quote, was for "a true democratic country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for attack on Russia."

FISHER: But our

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FISHER: But our interpretation of democracy and that of the Russians differs, doesn't it?

BORTON: Yes. And I say, the Koreans will make the choice.

FISHER: It seems to me, Mr. Borton, that we -- by we I mean the United States -- are very much on trial in Asia at this moment.

BORTON: I think we are. But I'd like to know if we think so for the same reasons.

FISHER: Well, my reasons are these: We promised The Philippines independence. We have given them independence. In the years ahead we propose gradually to cut loose the ties that bind them to us. There's been a good deal of criticism about the way we're going about cutting them loose, about the restrictions with which we've hedged the Filipinos during the coming quarter of a century or so. In the long run history will record whether the ideal which we stated was lived up to with due regard for the practical details which beset all ideals in the sort of a world we live in. Now, in Korea, we're on record as favoring another ideal -- a free and independent Korea. On this broadcast both you Mr. Borton, and you Mr. Martin, have given reasons why that ideal is not attainable overnight. In the meanwhile it's our job to see that we work towards it. And again history will record the degree to which we stick to our promise. The point, as I see it, is this: all Asia is watching us. The success of the sort of democracy we believe in and want, not only here but in the world, will depend, in Asia, to no small extent on what we do in The Philippines. And what we do in Korea.

Now there's another question this raises in my mind. Under the Cairo and Moscow agreements we're committed to

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Korean independence, yes -- but we're also committed to working out a solution with Russia. From what you've said on this broadcast it rather looks to me as if we've decided to skip that. Is that right?

MARTIN: No, Mr. Fisher. That's not right. We have not. We are still seeking a basis of understanding which will permit the resumption of discussions with a fair prospect of success.

BORTON: But we do have to face this practical question: It looks as though that will not be in the near future. So our job is to go ahead and do the best we can for the Koreans in our zone. Not only do we have to do the best we can for the Koreans but we must help them to do the best they can for themselves. Our job is to train them to educate their own people, to train their own mechanics, as far as possible in a country that is arbitrarily divided, to run their own country. And I want to make this next point very clear: Nothing that we are doing will prevent immediate unification of Korea, north and south, once we can get agreement with Russia. I'd like to underline that: -- In all our planning we have taken into account the fact that we are committed to a Korea that is completely independent. Not just in one zone, but throughout the country. We have been very careful to do nothing to perpetuate the arbitrary split that divides the country today.

FISHER: All right. But, as a matter of practical issues, however, Mr. Borton, isn't it likely that our having to go ahead on our own in the southern zone of Korea may mean that the country will in the next few years split into two? I'd like to know what you think about that.

BORTON: That is an extremely important question and I want to make it clear that our present program in Korea is

designed

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

designed to assist the Koreans. It is for their benefit but it is for our benefit as well, since a friendly, prosperous, democratic Korea can be an important stabilizing factor in the Far East and a peaceful Far East is a most important objective of U. S. foreign policy. We are therefore assisting the Koreans in their educational program, in their political program, and in any efforts we may make to sustain and develop the economic self-sufficiency of the southern part of Korea. Consequently, there is no question in my mind but that when the barrier of the 38th parallel, which divides Korea into two occupation zones, is eliminated, nothing we have done in the south under our present program will prevent the rapid unification of Korean social, economic and political life. On the contrary if we have contributed to the revival of Korean economic life in the south, and if we have helped in the development of Korean experience in governmental operations, these contributions and developments will benefit all of Korea to the extent that they have been successful. Most important of all, Mr. Fisher, the Koreans themselves have absolutely no desire to see their country split in two, so I don't think there's much danger of it.

FISHER: Thank you, Mr. Borton. Now, in the few moments we have left, Mr. Martin, I wish you'd summarize for us our position in Korea. The position as it is today and, in your opinion, what it will be in the immediate future. And how the situation has changed since a year ago.

MARTIN: Our position in southern Korea today is at a definite turning point. If the rice collection quotas are met satisfactorily, if we are able to keep up a steady flow of food, consumer goods and raw materials into Korea, if Korean technicians are quick at picking up industrial know-how, then we ought to be able to hold our own. But a completely

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

solid economic basis for independence cannot be provided without unification.

If we do not do our share in rehabilitating southern Korea, we can expect serious food riots and a complete breakdown of production and distribution in the near future. Under these circumstances democratization, would become an impossible goal.

We would be joining the ranks of those big nations who have defaulted on their obligations to little nations. All of the Far East is watching the performance of "the American way" in Korea. The deciding factor between success and failure can be our ability to get supplies to Korea during the next year. If we are penny-wise on this, we will be pound-foolish regarding our position in the Far East.

We have had a hard year in Korea. Beset by bad crops, floods, cholera, the breakdown of transportation, food shortages, political dissension and the task of repatriating millions of Koreans and Japanese, we have had to play a lone hand in our zone when we expected the two zones to be working together. With perseverance and adequate American support, southern Korea can get back on her own feet, prepared to play her proper role in the united, independent Korea which is the goal of all of us.

FISHER: Thank you. Well, I see that our time is about up. Mr. Borton, and you, Mr. Martin -- thank you both very much for appearing on this broadcast. I don't think we have reason to be as cheerful about Korea as we were when we wound up our program a year ago. Perhaps we may find the situation changing before the next twelve months are up. In which case I hope you'll both come on again to bring us up to date on our foreign policy in this corner of the Far East.

ANNOUNCER: That

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ANNOUNCER: That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. With him on this program were Mr. Hugh Borton, Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, and Chairman of the Japanese-Korean Secretariat, Department of State, and Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, Department of State. They discussed our foreign policy in Korea and the changes that had taken place in it during the past year.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Next week at this time we bring you Senator Warren R. Austin, Chief United States Delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations in his first broadcast to the people of the United States on the achievements of the past session of the General Assembly. Senator Austin will analyze and discuss the weaknesses and strengths that showed up in the first session of the General Assembly on the soil of the country where it is to make its permanent home.

This series is coordinated by Murray Dyer. Kennedy Ludlam speaking.

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

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