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FALLOUT SHELTER IN WISCONSIN by Dr. William K. Chipman, State CD Director

The map on page 1 of this issue of the Bulletin shows the results of Phase II of the National Shelter shows the results of Phase II of the National Sherter survey: In 3287 presently existing schools, court-houses, hotels, factories and other buildings, we have 2,119,835 shelter spaces, enough for 53.6% of our population. These spaces have a "protection factor" of 40 or better; that is, they will admit only 1/40 (2)(%) of the order order in 1/40 ($2\frac{1}{2}$ %) of the outdoor radiation.

This is the maximum potential shelter we now have. It will become a usuable shelter system only in direct proportion to the efforts made by state and local CD staffs to develop it, specifically, to see that:

- (1) All owners of buildings affording fallout shelter sign "licenses", to permit their premises to be used as shelters in time of war.
- (2) Food and other supplies for licensed shelters are requisitioned for the full capacity identified by the survey, to make maximum use of licensed shelter space.
- (3) Supplies are moved into shelters promptly, to prepare them for possible emergency use at the earliest date.
- (4) At least three Shelter Managers, three Radiation Monitors, and two Auxiliary Police are trained as soon as possible for each shelter *area*. (There are 7307 separate *areas* providing shelter within the 3287 Wisconsin buildings qualifying as shelter.)
- (5) Shelter-use plans are drawn, to ensure maximum use of the potential shelter we have licensed, marked and stocked.

These things, which must be done if we are to realize the maximum actual protection from our 2.12 million potential spaces, will get done only by hard work, and to the extent that state and local legislative bodies support their civil defense directors with funds.

Licensing Shelters

For example, a shelter which is not licensed will not be marked or stocked. But in Wisconsin roughly half of our 2.12 million potential spaces remain to be licensed. The Navy's sign-posting teams are spuring many owners who have so far hung back to grant li-censes. To bring the total of actually licensed spaces to even 1.5 to 1.8 million, however, will take hard, unremitting work by local CD Directors. It will take letters, press releases, but most of all hour upon hour of personal contact with the building owners, to explain to them the vital need for licensing their buildings.

EVERY POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE NOT LICENSED CAN COST ONE AMERICAN LIFE.

Stocking Shelters

After a building is licensed, shelter supplies must be requisitioned for its full rated capacity, if it is to provide a useful refuge for our men, women and children in time of war. But many owners who have licensed their buildings are hard put to find storage space for all of the supplies required to stock the building to capacity. Again, the only way to realize maximum stocking is for local CD staffs to spend hour upon hour with building owners, to locate space in or somewhere near the shelter area in which to store the biscuits, water drums, sanitary and medical kits, and radiation meters without which shelters provide only illusory refuge.

When supplies have been requisitioned, they must be moved into shelter areas. This, again, needs both hard work and - in many cases - money. The supplies do not float into the shelter areas (often difficult of access) on magic carpets. Rather, local CD Directors must organize volunteers and trucks to handle them, or must get funds to pay county or city public works departments or private haulers to move tons of food and other supplies into shelter areas.

A lifeboat is useful in case of shipwreck only if it contains food, water, and a compass. A fallout shelter is useful in case of nuclear war only if it contains biscuits, water drums and radiation meters.

EVERY POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE NOT STOCKED CAN COST ONE AMERICAN LIFE.

Training Shelter Staffs

A lifeboat needs a trained officer in charge, and a crew member trained to navigate. A fallout shelter area needs, as a minimum, enough trained Shelter Managers, Radiation Monitors, and Auxiliary Police for 2 or 3-shift, 24-hour operation. For the 7307 shel-ter areas in our 3287 buildings, we shall need at least 23,000 Shelter Managers, trained in a 32-hour OCD course; at least 23,000 Radiation Monitors, trained in a 10-hour course; and at least 15,000 Auxiliary Police, trained for some 30 hours each.

That is a total of at least 61,000 volunteers, trained for an average of some 20 or 25 hours each. It is an impressive total. Compare, for example, our excellent Army National Guard (with paid officers and men, and with nearly 500 full-time paid employees), which totals about 10,000. Civil defense directors, in short, are expected to train a force of unpaid citizen volunteers some SIX times the size of the Army National Guard.

Yet THE COST OF AN UNSTAFFED SHELTER AREA MAY BE MEASURED IN AMERICAN LIVES

Planning Shelter Utilization

It is sometimes argued that since we do not now have shelters for every citizen, we should not attempt to develop the 2.12 million spaces that do exist. That is like arguing that since the Titanic did not have a lifeboat space for every passenger, the lifeboats it did have should have been scuttled. It is like arguing that if a smallpox or diphtheria epidemic found us with vaccine for only half our population, the existing vaccine should be destroyed.

The only rational approach is to make the best pos-sible use of the shelter we have, and then to set about getting more. We cannot have shelter for all of our people before we have shelter for some of them.

It was a tragic fact that of the lifeboats the Titanic did possess, many were only partly loaded, while others were overloaded and swamped in the North Atlantic. Making the best use of the shelters we do have will take countless thousands of hours of intricate, complex planning: Are people to be assigned to shelters in their vacinity? What of day-time vs. night-time population patterns? Or should shelters be filled on a basis of first-come, first-served? Will citizens be required to move to shelters—usually concentrated downtown in cities-on foot, or can the use of cars be permitted? How long a time for movement can be allowed? Who will control this movement, and how?

It is obvious that civil defense directors and police and traffic department will be called upon for shelter use planning of a complexity dwarfing the evacuation planning of the 1950's. But the job can be done, given the will and given budget support. It can be







done, in fact, for pennies per capita, in contrast to the hundreds of dollars which each of us pays each year to support our Army, Navy and Air Force.

EVERY SHELTER SPACE NOT USED IN TIME OF WAR DUE TO INADEQUATE SHELTER-USE PLANNING MEANS ONE AMERICAN DEAD.

Securing Fallout Shelter for Every Citizen

It is obvious that even with the utmost effort to license, mark, stock and staff our 2.12 million present potential shelter spaces, we shall not be able to provide shelter for each of our 4 million citizens. With the most devoted efforts during the next year, we shall probably realize only some 1.5 or 1.7 million fully stocked and usable spaces. Even the areas added by a follow-up survey, to cover new construction and buildings missed on the initial survey, will not add many thousands of spaces.

What of our other 2.5 million citizens? It is patent that we must have *more* shelter than that developed under the survey.

To provide shelter life insurance for every citizen of Wisconsin, we must, each of us,

-SUPPORT SECRETARY McNAMARA'S SHELTER FINANCING PROGRAM.



With the program, we can expect to see up to 2 million more shelter spaces in Wisconsin by 1967. Without it, in case of war, we would see up to 2 million lives lost needlessly in Wisconsin alone.

-URGE HOME SHELTER CONSTRUCTION.

Even with shelter added to most of our schools, hospitals and courthouses, there would be hundreds of thousands of our citizens, mostly in rural or suburban areas, who would not have ready access to a public fallout shelter. Others might wish to have more than the 10 square feet of space or the austere supplies provided in the public shelters.

These hundreds of thousands would have only one sure recourse-bome fallout shelters. We may or may not ever see an income tax deduction allowed for home shelter construction. But whether home shelters are ever needed will not depend on the enactment of a deduction. It will depend, rather upon decisions made in the Kremlin.

-SUPPORT CIVIL DEFENSE BUDGETS AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

We shall have shelter and the other life insurance needed to protect our country against nuclear attack only if we pay for it. The cost is small, the protection beyond price.

Federal vs. State and Local CD Budgets

The Federal Government is investing at least $\$8\ mil$ lion in Wisconsin alone for the Shelter Survey. That is the cost of the engineering work to identify the 2.12 million potential spaces; of the supplies the Defense Department is furnishing to Wisconsin to stock our licensed shelters; and of the signs which Navy teams are posting on our licensed buildings.

The state and local mission is to develop this federally-identified potential into usable shelter, as outlined above, with local money and hard work. Without state and local funds sufficient to do the job, we shall not fully realize the life-saving potential located by the federal investment of \$8 million.

That would be a tragedy whose cost would be beyond reckoning, should a nuclear war occur by accident, by miscalculation, or by design.

Cuba

We stood closer to the brink of nuclear war in October and November, 1962, than we have ever stood. The Air Force dispersed its B-47 jet bombers to Milwaukee and to other civilian air fields, to protect them from surprise attack on the bases of the Strategic Air Command. The Air Force dispersed its supersonic fighters from Madison and Duluth, to protect them from surprise attack on the SAGE air defense centers there. The Army moved armored and infantry divisions to the southeastern states, ready to invade Cuba should the order have come. The Navy's ships were at sea.

It Can't Happen Here?

Who can guarantee that It Can't Happen Here? What U.S. Senator or Representative, what state Senator or Assemblyman, what County Supervisor, what city Alderman, can guarantee, after the lessons of Cuba, that there will never be a nuclear war? Who can guarantee that there can never be a war sparked by a revolt in East Germany, by China, or by a desperate Premier of the USSR, who might be unwilling to back down as Khruschev did in Cuba?

The answer, obviously, is no one. We are accustomed to spending-or more accurately, Congress is accustomed to spending-the more than \$50 billion we need each year for our active defenses, our missiles, our bombers, our ships, and our divisions. We hope that these weapons will deter war, and that they will never have to be used. But we cannot be sure. Whether war is deterred does not depend upon decisions taken in Wisconsin or in Washington. It depends, rather, upon decisions taken in Moscow or Peiping.

As a nation, we have not yet fully faced up to the fact that it *could* happen here, that despite the hundreds of billions we have spent for deterrent forces since 1945, there *could* be a nuclear war. And if such a war did occur, fallout shelters can save from 60 to 120 million American lives. But we can have this life insurance only if Congress, if every state legislature, and if every county board appropriate the pennies needed to buy it.

Plea of the Secretary of Defense

This is what Secretary McNamara told the Congress in January, 1963, (in speaking of possible antimissile defenses):

INDEED, IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE FALLOUT SHELTERS, AN ACTIVE DEFENSE MIGHT NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION SURVIVING AN ALL-OUT NUCLEAR ATTACK. FOR THIS REASON, THE VERY AUSTERE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT... SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER ANY MAJOR ADDITIONS TO THE ACTIVE DEFENSES.



The Secretary of Defense may be assumed to know more about our defense requirements than most.

The Lessons of 1940 and 1941

We are stirred when we read, more than twenty years later, the words of Winston Churchill during the disasters of 1940, when Britain was fighting alone with her back to the wall: 'I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.// What is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory-victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be.// Arm yourselves, and be ye men of valour. . . .// We shall go on to the end, we shall fight on the seas and the oceans. . .we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender. . . .// Death and sorrow will be the companions of our journey; hardship our garment; constancy and valour our only shield."

We are moved when we remember the stand of the men of MacArthur and Wainwright, on Bataan and Corregidor, with antiquated weapons, with scanty ammunition, and on starvation rations.

But how often do we remember why there was disaster in 1940, why so many men of the BEF had to die in France and on the beaches of Dunkirk? How often do we remember why Americans-including a Wisconsin National Guard Tank Company-had to die at Bataan, or on the Death March, or in the Philippine prison camps?

It was due to the blind, feckless parsimony of both Britain and the United States as late as 1939, 1940 and even 1941. British and American soldiers were condemned to die because in London and in Washington executive and legislative leaders could not fully believe It Could Happen.

1963

Today, our Congress provides fully for the missiles, bombers, ships and divisions that we pray will deter World War III. But neither Congress, many state Legislatures, nor all County Boards have yet provided the pennies it costs, per capita, to develop the shelter and other defenses which can save 60 to 120 million lives if war is *not* deterred. The threat is perhaps too new, too novel. Fallout, after all, was virtually unknown to the public before 1954.

After 10 days, return to STATE BUREAU OF CIVIL DEFENSE 110 South Dickinson Street Madison 3, Wisconsin But regardless of the novelty of the threat, it is there. It will not go away if we ignore it. We must and we can protect ourselves against it in the 1960's. We know precisely what can be done to save 60 to 120 million Americans, in the dread event of nuclear war, and to provide for early recovery. To be without this protection, which costs so little, would be folly dwarfing the follies of 1933 to 1941.

Sunday night, December 7, 1941, and during the months of disaster which followed, many Senators and Congressmen must have known chilling hours of remorse, of bitter regret for the money and the weapons they had denied to our fighting men. Those ''economies'' were redeemed in the Philippines, with American lives.

If a nuclear war should occur in the 1960's-as it could so easily have done over Cuba-let us hope that no American officer of government at any level will have cause to regret the shelters that might have been stocked, and might have been built-and the millions of lives that need not have been lost. For the price of *these* economies would be paid not by soldiers and sailors and airmen in the Far East. It would be paid, rather, by fathers and mothers and children in the United States and in Wisconsin.

SHELTER MODELS AVAILABLE

Region 4 has now available for loan as exhibits several new sets of shelter models patterned after certain shelters illustrated in H-7 "Family Shelter Designs." The models represent those shown on pages 3, 11, 19, and 27 of that booklet. A fifth model in the set illustrates a community shelter in a school basement.

These models are generally similar in cost and makeup to the five-piece set of earlier shelter models based on designs in MP-15 "Family Fallout Shelter." Questions concerning purchase of each set should be directed to:

American Research Manufacturing Corporation Attention: Mr. Fogelgren 920 Halpine Avenue Rockville, Maryland

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