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Headline Series

GERMANY

Promise and Perils

Sigmund Neumann

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

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HEADLINE SERIES

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Germany: Promise and Perils

By Sigmund Neumann

FIVE YEARS AFTER the total defeat of Nazi totalitarianism we are still haunted by the ghosts of the past. Are the Nazis coming back again? Is Germany still a menace to peace? Has it become, by now, the pawn or partner of the world powers? What is Germany's political destiny—what future for the German people at home and for their neighbors abroad?

Stereotypes quickly come to mind. In a way it all looks so frightfully familiar. Like a nightmare, we cannot shake off the apprehension: "This is where we came in, and everything that happened before will happen again."

Thoughtful observers warn against the rise of a new nationalism in an "incurable Germany," rampant, arrogant, insatiable, now fed by the genuine grievances of a hopelessly partitioned fatherland, of radical territorial amputations and of millions of homeless expellees. On the other hand, voices—louder each day—are raised in favor of making Germany the bastion against Bolshevism; and there are forces within the nation preparing themselves for this accustomed role. Is this a repetition of the Munich days of 1938? These two prevailing interpretations of German trends make one feel that a whole decade has been blotted out, all its sacrifices in vain.

At first sight there is good reason to heed these warnings. But

there are better reasons for taking a second look. Both stereotypes reflect only half-truths. In fact, the real situation may prove to be altogether different from what appears on the political façade of this proud and impenetrable people. One has to dig deeper to define the actual plight of the nation that, for better or worse, has been placed by geography and history at the heart of Europe. We simply cannot afford to declare Germany a "hopeless case." There is too much at stake for Europe and the world to dismiss Germany as a futile and insoluble problem. Before a responsible public opinion can be formed, a mature appraisal is needed of the Second German Republic, its promise and its perils.

Only the hasty traveler will have all the answers. The constant and careful student will be confused by the complexity and contradictions of Germany today, where the familiar mixes with strange new features and the whole does not quite add up. His can be merely a preliminary account, because he realizes the German problem reflects century-old dilemmas. They did not emerge yesterday; they will not be solved by tomorrow. We may have to learn to live with them in years to come.

Fundamental Traits and Tensions

It is dangerous, no doubt, to blame all the past and present difficulties over Germany on an imaginary and mysterious "national character"—that "last resort of baffled historians." Such an approach makes for easy excuses, idle speculations, prejudicial assertions and simplified, short-cut answers when hard thinking and realistic appraisals are required. And yet, intangible and illusive as it may be, a people's attitude, the reflection of their long history and social surroundings, can serve as a persistent sign-post in the seemingly chaotic flood of a nation's shifting events. Used with caution and discrimination, this sign-post may permit a rational prognosis of future actions and reactions.

The Germans have, of course, differed from one era of history to another; they differ among themselves in their regional groups

and social classes—now more than ever. (One need only note the conflicts between the peoples from different areas and classes thrown together in the pulverized cities of Germany today.) There are, however, certain common traits, resistant to change, that help to explain the contrasts and complications of this “problem child of Europe.”

The lack of a strong unifying national thread is one of these characteristic traits. So different from the British with their unbroken historical tradition (at least since the Glorious Revolution of 1688), the Germans still cannot decide what the true Germany ought to be. Is it the tribal Germany, pugnacious and parochial, of Tacitus' days? Is it the universal Holy Roman Empire or the provincialism of the medieval territorial princes? Are the dreams of a humanitarian *Kultur* nation of Herder, Schiller and Goethe more real than the ardent desire of a belated nationalism? Who has more right to represent the Reich: Catholic Hapsburg or Bismarck's Protestant Prussia? How deeply did the short-lived Weimar Republic, reaching out toward the West, affect German imagination? How much has the Nazi rejection of Europe awakened the real ambitions of its people? All these forces are very much present in the groping attempts of a new Fourth Reich to come to the fore in our time. Germany's history often seems like a continuous beginning. What image is finally to emerge? Or is it the fate of the Germans to be torn by inner contradictions which, since recorded time, have puzzled friend and foe?

Geographic Insecurity

If history has left a confusing and complex heritage to the German people, geography has also added to their tribulations—in fact, it has partly created the conditions for such contradictions. Germany is the *Land der Mitte*, Land of the Middle. It lies between East and West, without natural barriers to hinder the swinging pendulum that first brought westward migration, then

Low's Record of Germany—1946




THE READERS: "WELL, THAT'S THE END OF THE NAZIS"

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eastern colonization and finally the more recent reassertion of the East, of which Soviet imperialism is the latest expression.

Bridge or battlefield, balance or buffer, Germany carried the brunt of all the dynamic forces that spilled across the northern plains of Europe. Again, so different from the British Isles—protected for almost a millenium from foreign invasions—Germany could not crystallize and mature its national form. It remained formless, frontierless, insecure, open to any outside influence and attack.

Geography goes far toward explaining the autocratic tradition and militant aggressiveness of a people who, continuously threatened from without, have tried to overcome and overcompensate




IT ALL DEPENDS ON HOW YOU LOOK AT IT

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their insecurity by a persistent drive for power and prowess. This drive has given the military an essential function and a preferred position. It has made the soldier the "ideal type," personifying German aspirations. The army's prestige has not even been broken by defeat in two World Wars. "Blood and Iron" still command high respect.

Insecurity has permeated the whole social fabric. A chaotic nation has always highly prized order and discipline. No wonder the word most often used in the German vocabulary is *Ordnung* (order). The fondness for titles and the insistence on proper respect for status is another illustration of a nation that is "formless with emphasis," as philosopher Oswald Spengler once put it. The unruly at heart submits to the strict formalism of the omni-



"SAWING THROUGH A WOMAN"

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present police and the orderly bureaucrat, knowing that the slightest deviation from the set rules of an outside power might throw him back into the chaos of his inner uncertainties. He has to surround himself with *Verboten* signs. He needs a rule for everything. Even his revolutions have to be orderly and lawful; as long as they seemingly follow regular procedure, they are acceptable to the law-abiding citizen.

Prussianism and the spirit of the Prussian monarchy have kept a persistent hold on the nation. Yet, against the Germany that centered on the Potsdam of Frederick the Great there is contrasted



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the Germany of Weimar—of world-famous poets and democratic aspirations, a Germany that had its brief day under the 1918-1933 Republic.

The Two Germanies

The split goes through Germany, if not through every German. Today's cleavage between Germany east of the River Elbe and Germany west of the Elbe seems rather artificial. But 2,000 years ago the nation had its *Limes Germanicus*, the frontier between the Roman Empire and the barbarians of the north, a line that ran roughly from Bonn on the Rhine to Regensburg on the Danube. Such a dividing line, moving back and forth through history, was not uncommon. It marked the varying degrees of Europeanization of the different parts of Germany. The eastern provinces, even if they were drawn belatedly into the European family, were touched only superficially on the surface, while Southern and Western Germany were always European to the

core. These districts had an outstanding share in the nation's great cultural legacy. From the adoption of Christianity and Graeco-Roman traditions, to the development of feudalism and Gothic art, to the individual's awakening in the Renaissance and Reformation, to the unfolding of the power of an absolute monarchy with its army and bureaucracy, to the enlightenment and the rise of rationalism, crowned in the French Revolution, and finally to the Industrial Revolution and the victory of middle-class civilization—in all these experiences Western Germany played an outstanding part. Its proud cities, its monuments and cathedrals, its great poets and thinkers, testified to its lasting contributions. Few nations have given as many really great Europeans—Leibnitz, Goethe, Beethoven, for example—to the world as Germany has done.

Isolated Intelligentsia

Yet, the German intelligentsia, symbol though it was to Europe and recognized as such by the whole world, lived essentially separated from the German people, who did not understand its problems and did not share its experiences. The tragic isolation of these intellectuals, so different from the position of the French *hommes de lettres*, was partly due to the deep antagonism which has prevailed between the politically powerful and the cultural elite in German history, between *Macht und Geist*, between political power and spiritual forces, a tension that the Weimar Republic tried in vain to eliminate.

Seen in the light of these traditional discrepancies, the present split of Germany gains a grave significance. Continued over a longer period, the two parts may drift farther and farther away from each other.

In fact, even a cursory look behind that Iron Curtain, drawn right across the streets of Berlin, reveals that they have already grown apart. It is this very danger of permanent loss of community that heightens a renewed appeal to nationalism in Ger-

many. This cry for unity reiterates tendencies that have caused havoc before.

The Late Arrival

Germany, like Italy, a late arrival among the well-established powers in the mid-nineteenth century, has ever since suffered from the inferiority of a boisterous newcomer trying to make up for missed opportunities.

This has not made for good-neighbor relations in the heart of Europe. The claim of the have-nots against the haves, the "right of the young peoples," in the words of German nationalist Moeller van den Bruck, to take over the reins from the slipping hands of the superannuated, will understandably be rejected by the possessing powers as arrogant aggression and an utterly improper demand, especially if they can point at the inability of the "usurper" to rule himself and to hold his own at home.

Indeed, the political unification of Germany not only came late but it was received from above by authority of the Iron Chancellor. In this Bismarckian compromise, the middle class—defeated in 1848 and in 1862-1866 in its attempt to win political control—acquiesced in the continued rule of the old Junker class. And this, despite the fact that the feudal order had outlived its social-economic usefulness. In return for the promise by the all-powerful "father state" to support expanding capitalism's drive for colonial markets abroad and to protect it against growing proletarian unrest at home, the middle class surrendered politics and society to the "experienced hands" of the *ancien régime*. How different from the Victorian compromise in which a British aristocracy complied with middle class standards (and Queen Victoria became the Empire's Number One Bourgeois). The German burgher became "feudalized" in all his social concepts and images.

It was only after World War I that the serious consequences of this surrender became evident. When the Weimar Republic offered a belated chance for the burgher's rehabilitation, he found

himself and his class weak and ill-equipped for the tasks of leadership. His social code was feudal; his economics were bureaucratic; he was timid and irresponsible in politics. Moreover, in a few short years he was faced with great problems—Germany's rampant inflation followed by the acute domestic phases of a world-wide depression. Perhaps the Weimar era did not last long enough to undo the damage done to the German citizen for centuries. At any rate his failure was complete, and his final surrender to National Socialism was only the last episode of a habitual escape from political responsibility. It relieved him of mastering his daily tasks at home and, at the same time, offered him day-dreams of unlimited world domination.

The German Dilemma

It is strange to hear even today thoughtful Germans complaining about their nation's historic inability ever to attain the democratic self-rule of other Western peoples and yet demanding the controlling position in the future United States of Europe, which "as a matter of course" could be run only by Germany. It is not too farfetched to recognize in this behavior pattern attitudes of a politically adolescent people, burdened with all the attributes of "the awkward age." Strutting self-assertiveness and excessive pride become the natural counterparts to utter insecurity and uncertainty. In all walks of life one meets this strange mixture of boastfulness and timidity, of brutality and sentimentality, of illusions of grandeur and morbid self-negation. *Himmelhochjauchzend—zu Tode betrübt* (exuberantly elated—in the depth of despair), the young moves in extremes.

The adolescent in world affairs is proud and insolent, blunt and impetuous, over-confident in his mission to make a better world tomorrow and despondent in his utter helplessness to master the present. He is bewildered, confronted with an adult life which he rejects in his youthful rebellion and which he cannot yet replace with a new design of his own. His constant fracas

with his neighbors are only an attempt to quell the inquietude of his inner contradictions. If, following the Epicurean definition, happiness is a state of tranquillity, the Germans have never been a happy nation, never at peace with themselves or with the outside world. The great idea of *sophrosyne*—balance, sanity, self-control and moderation—could not take root in a nation charged with tensions and moving in extremes.

Such a people are easily hurt; they are the perfect introverts. They have little or no consideration for the people around them, yet they nurse a continuous grudge, with a good measure of self-pity, against the cold outer world that does not appreciate them and never understands them. Here is a people looking towards the Infinite in order to find certainty in God, a people producing the most all-conclusive *Weltanschauungen* (world philosophy) as guides for a complete view of life.

Perennial Adolescent?


This is the design for a nation of great thinkers and poets, but it does not make for pragmatic politics. The key concept of politics, the idea of compromise—the recognition of and respect for the outside world—is only “compromising” to the adolescent, who accepts nothing but absolute, uncompromising solutions.

In view of the long and persistent history of this “young people,” still not grown to full maturity, one may wonder whether Germany is not fated to be a “perennial adolescent.” There is greatness in the impetuous youth who will always ask the disquieting fundamental question and who wants the answer, black or white. He contends with the angels, yet as in the Greek myth, the flight of Icarus brings, not life, but death. The Third Reich, in its all-consuming deadly drive for world power, was the latest, the most arrogant flight into unlimited undertakings. Does its downfall presage a new beginning?

A people cannot free itself easily and quickly from such trying experiences. In fact, it will readily fall back into accustomed

patterns even though new and powerful experiences slowly transform it. It is against such a background that the present must be measured and that the challenge of a German reorientation must be viewed. There are elements in the German present that may indicate some basic transformations. For one, total war and dictatorship have left a deep impression on the German people.

Legacy of War and Nazism



“FROM SUCH A DEFEAT one does not recover any longer as peoples formerly did after Jena or after Sedan. Such a defeat marks the turning point in the life of nations.” These were the notes written on April 11, 1945 in the diary *Strahlungen* by Ernst Juenger, a spokesman of a nationalist youth and a spiritual forerunner of National Socialism after World War I, who later turned against the Third Reich, and who has once again emerged as a much-talked-about author in Germany. And there is the Nestor of the German historians, Friedrich Meinecke, whose *German Catastrophe* also declared the year 1945 “a turning point with no return.” Has the debacle really meant a turning point?

This second aftermath of a defeated Germany is altogether different from 1918. There is first the vast physical destruction. Even though the rubble is now, five years after the war, in neat piles, Germany is still in many ways a ruined nation. The centers of almost all its major cities were destroyed beyond recognition and in many cases beyond repair. The maimed in their shabby uniforms, frequently encountered in the streets, are painful reminders of past glory; so are the little, newly-built store fronts that form a poor, cardboard façade for the wreckage of once proud business palaces in the main thoroughfares of Munich, Frankfort and even Stuttgart, the prize city of recovery.

The political disintegration may be even more serious. The Treaty of Versailles had left Germany united. With the sur-

render on May 8, 1945 the German government ceased to exist. Its sovereign rights were transferred to the Allied military authorities. Their divided rule spelled the doom of an empire's dream. Soon Berlin, the quartered city, was to serve as a telling symbol of this breakdown.

Germany Between the Superpowers

The return of partial sovereignty with the establishment of the German Federal Republic of the West and the German Democratic Republic of the East does not simply restore the power of the erstwhile Reich. Above all one must note another and most crucial element in this post-war picture: the complete shift of the European balance in this world of the two peripheral superpowers, who may have entered Europe to stay. Germany's future is decided in Moscow and Washington and is kept in suspense between the conflicts of these two poles.

All these are lasting effects on Germany's political landscape. So is the memory of past dictatorship. It has certainly not disappeared with its military defeat.

Yet it may be too early to tell what this all means to the Germany of tomorrow. The Germans themselves are the last to know. They have recovered from the stupor of defeat, but their first and often disturbing signs of strength may well be deceptive to them and to the world. It may well be another decade before the full impact of the aftermath is felt not only in Germany but throughout our global society.

In the meantime it is safe to state that the consequences of World War II do not seem to follow expectations. For one, there were many who believed in 1945 that the omnipresent ruins would suffice as a constant warning against the fatal fallacy of war and dictatorship. The visitor to Germany today must report that this is not so. On the contrary, the ruins have been made a self-righteous reminder of the victor's "wrong-doings" and thus an easy vindication of the vanquished nation's guilt. Such a turn

might well have been expected as a natural reaction of a proud people.

What is more surprising is the fact that the average German, by now, takes ruins for granted. He hardly sees them any more. One gets used to life in the midst of ruins; one probably has to, in order to live on. Moreover, even ruins can grow on you. One cannot easily forget the little German boy, seven years old, who was sent to Switzerland for a vacation. And what did he have to say on his return? "Well, it was all right in Switzerland, but there were no ruins to play in."

Even the memory of air raids has acquired a certain nostalgia. To the very young at the time, those were exciting days—life out of the ordinary, a lot of noise and a liberating equalization with the grown-ups, whose world of security was smashed before their own eyes. Even to the older people, hateful though the whole atmosphere without privacy and possession was, looking backward, the years of destruction have attained a heroic aspect. By now that wretched life in the bunkers is elevated to a community of great ordeals, to a new "socialism of the trenches."

Spiritual Vacuum

In order to destroy the real legacy of dictatorship and war, these experiences must be lifted to a new level; otherwise, they will come back in the form of reaction and revenge. National Socialism may be dead. Actually, only a few convinced Nazis are left; yet democracy has failed to fill the spiritual vacuum.

The spiritual destruction may have a more lasting effect than the physical levelling in Germany's big cities. If there had ever been a lost generation, dictatorship and war created it. In all walks of life the missing generation is obvious by its absence—in politics and economics, as well as in the field of education. An over-age group, whose crucial experiences date back to the early Weimar days or even to the era of Kaiser Wilhelm, has taken possession of the key positions. At best it can only provide place

holders. Neither German politics nor its educational system can be built up with men in their seventies and eighties. If there is any hope at all, it lies with the young. What do they really think?

They themselves may not know it yet—they certainly are not articulate about it—but one thing is sure: this crucial group is still waiting and watching. The youth remain outside of the politics of the old men. One might, however, recognize some promising signs. There is first of all the rediscovery of free conversation. This new freedom is especially appreciated in view of the Soviet dictatorship next door. If it were not for this proximity, liberty would not be so highly valued. Yet, even the desire for free exchanges does not create the atmosphere suitable to its fulfillment. The art of compromise, democracy's fundamental virtue, is still missing. Tension rises quickly. The electoral campaign for the First Federal Diet (Bundestag) in the summer of 1949 was pathetically reminiscent of the days before 1933.

'Propaganda-Wise' Generation


And still an understanding observer may recognize, beneath the surface of a confused and complicated lingo (another heritage of dictatorial days and their need for cryptic camouflage), a new realism among the young which is very different from the aftermath of World War I. They are suspicious of big words because they have become "propaganda-wise." This is a positive legacy of dictatorship. They are critical of and almost cynical towards everything and, above all, towards ideologies. It is a sober and experienced generation, grown old on the battlefields of Russia and in the grim realities of prison camps.

This is a pragmatic generation, and as such it constitutes something really new in German history. Here for the first time is a group of young Germans who could appreciate the American way of life, if it were only presented to them in an articulate fashion. By the very same token they reject the present German party

system. It is not that they are opposed to politics as such or are indifferent to national life, but as a young German put it, "I am neither Christian enough to be a Christian Democrat nor Socialist enough to be a Social Democrat." Many among them, and often the best, refuse to join up with any of the predominant *Westanschauungs* parties. They might well have been ready to embrace political parties similar to the Anglo-American pattern.

The German parties, however, were prematurely (although for good reason) re-established in 1945 when the policies of occupation did not permit the rise of a genuine party system. This led to a re-emphasis of those fundamental and tragic traits of German political organization. The retreat of Allied military control and the re-establishment of a German government (limited, however, in its sovereign rights by the Occupation Statute) call for a party system that is not in existence and will have a hard time in evolving from the present alignments. To the historical liabilities of German development the existence of military government has added further complications for the future of German democracy.

Occupation Balance Sheet



THE TRANSITION FROM military government to civilian authority, under the Occupation Statute of April 1949 marks the end of an era. This is a good time to take account of its results.

The difficulties are obvious. It was an untried experiment of victorious powers who probably were not model conquerors applied toward a people who definitely were not a model conquered. Moreover, the aims of the occupation were diversified and at cross purposes. After the primary phase of military control—guaranteeing the effective pursuit of military warfare—was concluded by total victory, military government still had to serve a twofold task: “The effective elimination of Germany’s ability to wage modern war and the reconstruction of German and European life on a democratic basis,” (President Roosevelt’s letter to Foreign Economic Administrator Leo T. Crowley on September 29, 1944). The tug-of-war between security and democratization constantly created conflicts which became visible in the changing policies, contradictory statements and frustrating actions of the military authorities.

The destruction of the German war potential did not always favor conditions promising the rise of a democratic society. And a successful reconstruction of the German economy aroused the concern of the still weakened neighbors over the international threat of a reinvigorated Reich. It was the coincidence of disarmament, dismantling, denazification and democratization that created havoc for military government.

Moreover, from the very beginning a different emphasis if not an altogether different interpretation was given by the occupation authorities to the above four aims, according to the divergent national interests of the victor powers. True, the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945 proclaimed "a coordinated Allied policy" and "uniformity of treatment of the German population"—with the significant reservation "so far as is practicable." Yet, the ambiguity of its key concepts—democracy, militarism, Nazism, war criminals, reparations, economic concentration and political centralization—the divergent policies of the contracting powers and the "supreme authority exercised by the Commanders in Chief each in his zone of occupation" soon annulled the coordinating functions of the Allied Control Council and split the nation into strictly separated zones, with the final emergence of two Germanys.

French Concern for Security

The French and the Russians in a way were more fortunate in their one-track approach than were the British and the Americans. To the French, security was naturally the principal, if not the exclusive, concern. All Allied policies were judged by this objective. Centralization was strictly opposed, the principle of federalism, if not separatism, was strongly supported. A politically weak and divided Germany gave promise of greater security. To live off the land seemed equally justified for the victorious power which, twice invaded by Germany in a generation, was deathly afraid of this potentially stronger neighbor. Any policy that could shift the balance was worth trying.

The integration of the Saar Basin into the French economy, with the possible prospect of an eventual political absorption, was quietly and effectively pursued. It is not surprising that the newly established Western German government, as a first show of its semi-independence, protested against such a *fait accompli* before the peace treaties fixed definite post-war borderlines.

The recent Schuman proposal of a European coal-steel pool, however, may put the whole issue on a new plane and may open new vistas of a close and fruitful cooperation of the traditional enemies; but it is still too early to predict a radical turn in French-German relations.

In the meantime even the positive policies of the French occupation forces, their notable educational and cultural work, could be seen as an attempt to re-establish the Germany of the eighteenth century, when Germany was divided into territorial principalities and did not constitute a danger to French security.

Russian Reparations

The Russians followed an equally clear line. The immediate purpose of their military government was to produce reparations for the tremendous Russian losses suffered as the result of Nazi aggression. Dismantling, therefore, was foremost on the Russian mind, even and especially if it meant a stripping of the German economy and removal of capital equipment in violation of the Potsdam agreement. Such actions did not make the Russians popular with the German people nor with the Western Allies who largely had to pay with their own contributions for the surrender of reparations taken out of the Western zones.

The other obvious aim of Russia's policy, and soon the predominant program, was the establishment of a regime "friendly to the Soviet Union." In contrast to the British and American forces, the U.S.S.R. had no scruples against direct intervention. For the Soviet Union, democratization meant the establishment of a satellite regime, and all political forces that would resist conformity were quickly labeled "Fascist."


The Russians knew what they wanted, and within their own zone, with support of bayonets, they succeeded in suppressing all opposition forces. Even though their greater aim to extend their sway over all Germany failed, at least for the time being, within their own zone the Communists quickly changed the social struc-

FOUR D's OF ALLIED POLICY


1. DISARMAMENT



2. DISMANTLING



3. DENAZIFICATION



4. DEMOCRATIZATION



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

ture by dissolving the big estates and by nationalizing an ever-increasing segment of German industry. Such a radical transformation, according to Soviet definition, guaranteed the destruction of the true basis of fascism. It certainly spelled the end of the middle class in the Eastern zone.

British Accent on Administration

The British had none of these far-reaching plans. One might even suspect that they originally approached military government as merely a problem of colonial administration, of which they were past masters. A good part of the personnel of the British


occupation forces were drawn from their far-flung empire, and even the shift in policies under the Labor government did not radically change the composition of the occupational echelons.

One might state, on the other hand, that this continuity in personnel, so different from the United States administration, meant greater strength and efficiency in the British zone. De-nazification and democratization were played down in the name of a well-functioning administration. Right-wing forces had an easier time in reasserting themselves, and even former military leaders were not silenced. Dismantling seemed to be the main restrictive policy in the British zone, and here German public opinion quickly suspected fear of German competition as a main motive. While such an assumption may not be fair, the strict enforcement of dismantling certainly did not enhance British prestige.

American Democratization

The Americans entered the administration of military government without any personal aims and for this reason commanded the greatest respect among the Germans. It is indeed this great expectation of unselfish leadership and possibly the lack of a clearly directed aim that eventually brought about the sharp criticism raised against the American military government. Having no immediate stake in security or reparations—so different from the neighboring countries, France and the U.S.S.R.—the United States concentrated on the more lofty aims of democratization. Although these plans for a “re-education of Germany” were obviously naive and even at times arrogant—if democratization is possible, it can never be enforced from without but only developed from within—it was not primitive proselyting ardor that brought about the ambitious policies of “reorientation.” American policy was based on the correct realization that dictatorship is not destroyed on the battlefield, but must be eradicated from the mind of the conquered.

FOUR OCCUPATION VIEWS



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We were setting out to create the conditions for a democratic climate. Leaving aside the question whether we are by nature good missionaries (which we are not; nor are we good haters) and whether such an aim of democratization is in the reach of an occupational authority (which may well be doubted), the German problem was soon overshadowed by another paramount

issue: the East-West split. From this point on, Germany was dealt with less on its own merits and more as a tool of the cold war. The split affected, if it did not frustrate, all measures of denazification and democratization, of disarmament and dismantling. It created wrong fronts and artificial alliances and naturally gave leeway to the playing of both ends by the occupied. An ardent anti-Communist is not automatically a good democrat, and if given arms in the name of Western vigilance, he may again turn against the West.

The Need for Quality

The two-front war against an antidemocratic Germany and against a Communist dictatorship demanded flexible finesse and profound knowledge which even the best among the occupation authorities rarely possessed.

In this connection one might well be reminded of the remarkable lines in John Hersey's *A Bell for Adano*: "You see, the theories about administering occupied territories all turned out to be just theories, and, in fact, the thing which determined whether we Americans would be successful in that toughest of all jobs was nothing more or less than the quality of the men who did the administering."

No doubt there were many, especially in the early days of military government and even today, whose trained intelligence and generous spirit have done much in creating among the promising elements in Germany the self-confidence which always will be the foundation of "re-education." But the source of manpower has been drying up and the difficulties in recruiting adequate personnel have increased as the years go on. The tedium of occupation, its sudden luxury, its pervading sense of superiority, the easy dismissal of the Germans as "them Krauts," have emphasized greatly the difficulties that have resulted from the divisions on the higher policy-making level. The shifts in policies and personnel have often left the impression that, in the words of an

high official of the occupying force, "we are always in a stage of transition." In the light of all these difficulties, it seems almost surprising how much has been accomplished.

If one makes an assessment today, one might state that the policy of denazification was not a success. This difficult task would have been simplified if it had concentrated on a clearly defined and very limited group of responsible top Nazis and if the process had been accelerated. The opposite, however, was the case. A great number of Nazis, big and little, were brought to book, and the whole process took a long time, leading to general insecurity which was unfavorable to the creation of a democratic climate. Moreover, the formula of a collective German guilt created, unfortunately, a "sense of social solidarity" that rallied many Germans against denazification. It even led to a widespread self-justification according to which Nazism was merely regarded as a political error or even as a badly administered social idea—in short, to be blamed only for its failure, not for its immorality.

Problems Still Ahead


These problems remain, despite the establishment of the German Federal Republic in 1949 and the drafting of the Occupation Statute, which limits the role of Allied forces but still allows far-reaching controls on the part of the Council of American British, and French High Commissioners. With the transfer of denazification to German authorities, there was a return of former Nazis to positions of influence. As disheartening as this was to the sincere democrats in Germany, perhaps more serious was the fact that democratization has not gone beyond the formal adaptation of democratic techniques.

Despite the frequently-heard criticism of the American record, the efforts were not all in vain. The invisible and informal influences of the occupation especially should not be underestimated. The daily encounter with a sincere democratic force and

the possible extension of a well-planned exchange program might, in the long run, have a lasting effect in instilling democratic procedures and habits, in reawakening respect for civil liberties, for the rule of law and for constitutional safeguards (all of which are missing in the Eastern zone).

No doubt, even in its limited functions, the need for occupational government is obvious. In private conversations at least, responsible party leaders of Germany frankly admit this, their public declarations notwithstanding. Above all, the threat of a powerful U.S.S.R. would upset the balance if the occupation armies would be withdrawn; no less dangerous would be the disrupting forces within the still feeble democracy of Germany.

How Real Is Recovery?



IF THE FINAL VICTORY over National Socialism can only be accomplished by the destruction of those forces which created it, real success will be measured in terms of the effort to restore a healthy balance, at last, to the social and economic life of the German people. The danger in Germany is the possible rise of new "crisis strata"—large sections of the population deprived of their basic needs and aspirations, impoverished, rootless, embittered. It was such a group in the thirties which marked the fever curve of a sick society and fell prey to the dictator's promises of security.

Where do we stand five years after the breakdown of the Third Reich? Great progress has been made since the days immediately after the end of the war, days without hope and without food when a pulverized society had lost its standards of conduct and when black markets demoralized the everyday life of the nation's men and women.

The turning point came with the currency reform of June 20, 1948. Like the monetary stabilization of 1923 which checked the runaway inflation following World War I, the introduction of the new mark in Western Germany in 1948 produced an overnight miracle which allowed the economy to pull itself together. Only two years later the recovery of Germany can measure up to that of any other European nation. Stimulated by the efforts of Allied military government and the more recent inclusion of

Germany in the Marshall Plan, industrial production has more than doubled. By 1950 it had reached the level of 1936.


Despite this spectacular success, currency stabilization has still left fundamental problems unsolved and has created new ones. The production of an array of luxury goods at disproportionately high prices and profit margins has completely upset the distribution of goods and earnings. Not the least responsible for such an unfortunate development may be the very active re-established trade associations with their price-fixing policies and the new German administration with its hurried removal of governmental controls. Whoever is to blame, the discrepancies between the few who profited greatly and the overwhelming majority of the populace who shared only to a very limited extent in this new prosperity have led to new tensions. Such contrasts definitely do not create a large and solid middle class, which in the Western world constitutes the basis for a sound economy and a healthy democracy.

It is questionable whether or not Germany ever possessed such a sound middle-class basis. Alliances between authoritarian political forces and the monster economic combines that controlled German industry weakened the young Weimar Republic and were instrumental in its early surrender to Nazism. Hitler changed the slant of the German economy, and often the recipients of its profits as well, but the main result was greater concentration, deeply involving the captains of industry in the totalitarian, power-mad state.

Old Mixture as Before?

Has the German economy undergone any fundamental change since the breakdown of the Third Reich? Recognizing that the prospects for peace and democracy in Germany would be related to social and economic reorganization, United States military directives were aimed at the dissolution of gigantic combines such as the I.G. Farben chemical trust and at the establishment

FACTS ON GERMANY'S ECONOMY



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of an "International Ruhr Authority." But the decartelization program, in a way representing the transfer of American antitrust legislation to Germany, met with great difficulties, if not complete failure. The reasons for its failure were many—the need for industrial efficiency and productivity which called for the return of "seasoned experts," American preference for free enterprise, German resistance to outside interference. The result seems to be largely that the old leaders of industry have become its new managers.

It is still too early to tell what lasting impact the Nazi experi-



ment has made on these industrialists. They had tried to hire a political manager in Hitler and he turned out to be their master. Business leaders, as a consequence, may have become more cautious in playing for high political stakes. Have they become more attached to the democratic way?


Trade Union Influence

The future of German democracy will depend to a large extent on a fundamental transformation in German society, which, if it comes, must come from within. Where are the forces for such a democratic change?

The social class that most consistently, even throughout the Nazi period, tied its fate to democracy in Germany was the proletariat. Today, however, it is not in its strongest position. Unemployment and fear of inflation have weakened its bargaining power. Wages now constitute a lesser share (38 per cent) of the national income than they did before the war; real wages are about 70 per cent of what they were in 1936. The re-established trade unions, with the impressive membership of 6 million, deserve credit for their part in the economic recovery of Western Germany; nevertheless they are politically handicapped by their organization into a single federation. In contrast to the pre-war pattern when there were three leading organizations, the present unified movement, because of the stresses within it, has to adhere to virtual neutrality in party politics. The trade unions are now seeking "co-determination" in industry—a voice for labor in the economic decisions from which it was previously excluded. This may promise sober and responsible participation; yet will it effectively mobilize the constructive spirit of this great potential force for a dynamic democracy?

And constructive ideas will be needed to regain lasting economic stability. The quick revival of German productivity is surprising and, to the superficial observer, so is the unusual return to "normalcy." Yet it is an artificial recovery supported by

GERMAN PROBLEMS




Who shall control industry?



How to feed and house millions of expellees?



How to restore East-West trade?



What to do about unemployment?

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the easy market and the subsidies of the occupation powers. The key issues still remain unresolved: the renewal of capital accumulation, the recapture of international markets and the crucial problem of convertibility for the German mark into other cur-

rencies, the price of which may be a lower standard of living.


Pre-war Germany was not self-sufficient and had to import 15 to 30 per cent of its essential food. Because of the loss of Eastern farmland, Western Germany may have to import up to 45 per cent, paying for this imported food by heavy industrial exports. The revival of East-West trade, obviously attractive on traditional grounds, is being pushed by the Eastern bloc for political reasons and is sought by ambitious West German power groups. But it may not be the natural nor the cheapest international trade route, as an increasing number of experts emphasize. Yet the alternative sources, especially outside continental Europe, will still have to be explored. The same goes for the promising Schuman plan for pooling the heavy industries of Western Europe. The need for markets is an increasingly important one; it is bound up with Germany's craving for *Lebensraum*, an appeal made so effectively by the last dictator and which may be made again with even greater statistical evidence. Germany's population density is now 196 per square kilometer, as compared with 75 in France.

Unemployment

In the meantime there are other warning signs for the economy of the West German state. While Western progress is impressive and its head start over the Soviet zone is substantial, Eastern Germany's rate of recovery should not be underrated in the battle for popular allegiance, particularly because of its emphasis on full employment.

Unemployment in the West totals in 1950, even in the favorable summer months, close to 2 million (including 300,000 in West Berlin alone), and the influx of the numerically strong generation of "Hitler babies" into an oversaturated labor market presages even more sombre prospects of unemployed youth. This is not merely an industrial reserve army, to be quickly absorbed by the normal process of the economic fluctuations. It threatens

GERMANY'S POPULATION PROBLEM



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to become another political reserve army like the one that broke the dams of society in 1933.

It all looks like the return of the "crisis strata" that ushered in the rise of demagogical dictatorship. How simple it should be to the new Hitlers, Goebbels and Stalins to exploit the blatant

contrasts between thriving night clubs, where the few well-to-do display their conspicuous consumption, and the bombed-out basement flats of subhuman mass existence. Is it not, indeed, senseless to have a quarter of a million jobless construction workers walk the ruined streets that cry for rebuilding? What small relief can be found in 250,000 "projected" dwellings when 5 million housing units are needed?

Germany's Stepchildren

What makes matters worse is the fact that the economic difficulties cannot be easily overcome even with wiser policies on the part of the Bonn government and the occupation authorities. First of all, the partition of Germany—despite the definite statement in the Potsdam agreement that "Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit"—splits the industrial West from the agrarian East, putting a greater burden on the West.

Second, the continuous stream of expellees from the East further strains the economy. Many of the expellees were forcefully evacuated, in accordance with pre-treaty arrangements, from Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland and from the former German provinces handed over to Polish administration. Moreover, the daily influx of about one thousand voluntary refugees (*Flüchtlinge*) from the Eastern zone has swelled the number of these unhappy homeless to 8 million. If one adds the 2 million evacuees of wartime bombing (*Ausgebombte*), this new "Fifth Estate" of cast-outs represents one-fifth of the total population, and in some provinces, such as Schleswig-Holstein more than one-third.

These refugees make the German people readily forget their responsibilities for the millions of displaced persons sent on the road to despair and death by the Nazi quest for *Lebensraum*. Now, as a consequence of that arrogant New Order, the *Volksdeutsche* are really in search of bare living space, and their motherland cannot offer it to them.

Even in the villages and small towns where the expellees were received in the first gestures of magnanimity, today there is a sharp contrast between the prosperous, toiling peasants and the idle dispossessed. Peaceful cottages have become hotbeds of discord and a new kind of class struggle. The truth is that the expellees can never be fully absorbed and integrated—economically, socially, politically—into the shrunken German state. A world-wide resettlement project may be necessary before this legacy of Nazism is liquidated.

Meanwhile, the expellees are the stepchildren of Germany, uprooted from their traditional homesteads, their jobs and their accustomed social life and thrown into a cold, strange world that does not feed them, shelter them, want them. Here is a crisis group whose only hope seems to be an irredentism—agitation for the return of the “lost territories” beyond the Oder-Neisse line. They will be an easy prey for Germany’s new demagogues.

Politics in the Bonn Republic



ON MAY 8, 1949—FOUR years to the day after the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich—the basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany was promulgated. On August 14 the elections for the first Federal Diet took place. On September 12 the new President, Theodor Heuss, was voted into power by the Federal Convention, consisting of the members of the Peoples' Parliament and an equal number of representatives of the *Länder*, the provinces or states which are the basic units of German federalism. Three days later the Diet accepted—by a one-vote majority, to be sure—Konrad Adenauer for the powerful office of Chancellor of the Republic.

Transitional Government

This is a transitional government, interim and improvised, as far as its leaders, its parties and its loyalties are concerned. On first sight it looks like a strong democracy in which close to 80 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, and 80 per cent of these voted for moderate parties. In fact, the Bonn constitution—or Fundamental Law, as it is called—is an intricate document adopted after a nine-months struggle which recalled earlier German constitutional debates. It reflects the thoroughness and devotion to democratic ideals of the “old professionals” who wanted to destroy the ghosts of the past—both the Nazi totalitarianism and the weak and unstable Weimar system.

The result is a strong cabinet government giving the Chancellor an almost invulnerable predominance (possibly stronger than Bismarck's), a great power of patronage and far-reaching bureaucratic controls. Like many social documents, the constitution was conceived as a bulwark against the last usurper. Will it protect Germany against the next aggressor?

Threats to Democracy

What are the threats to a stable German democracy? American preoccupation with the problem of federalism has given a misleading impression of the fundamental issues of the young Republic. The German *Länder* are not living units today—economically, politically, culturally. Moreover, careful students of German constitutional development have shown that in a nation without the restraining experiences of the Western democracies, popular government is not guaranteed by a decentralization of political responsibilities and by a start at the “grass roots.” If these basic cells are not genuinely democratic, as they are not in the German *Länder*, the strengthening of local and regional forces may just as well open an easy avenue to power for new antidemocratic elements and vested interests.

The real difficulty in Germany is due to the fact that the pro-democratic and antidemocratic groups are nearly an even match. It is not true that there is no democratic tradition at all to be found in Germany; if that were the case, the chances for German democracy would be very slim. On the contrary, throughout the short history of German parliamentarianism, truly democratic parties mustered strong support and often represented a majority of the electorate; yet it was always an uneasy majority, faced with an articulate and powerful opposition.

The current strength of the democratic parties in Germany is deceptive. So is the noisy and much-talked about resurgence of a nationalist opposition. The truth lies below the surface—the answer to the question asked by Germany's outstanding social

scientist, Professor Albert Weber: "Have we Germans failed since 1945 in that great purgatory that demands a complete recasting of the German past in order to establish a more meaningful future?"

Lifeblood of Politics

The political parties, the vital stream of any genuine democracy, still live a shadow existence, reaching only a small percentage of the population. Re-created since the war, the parties are already mortgaged by a past. They tend to reflect zonal differences and the coloring of their respective occupational authorities. The East, traditionally autocratic, with strong Right- and Left-wing parties and only a weak moderate group to keep the balance, has by now been petrified into a one-party system. Soviet authorities keep up the semblance of a multiparty system, but it is the Social Unity party (SED), the forced merger of the Socialists and Communists under the exclusive leadership of trustworthy, Moscow-trained functionaries, that controls all key positions in the Eastern "Democratic" Republic.

Since the establishment of the Western Federal Republic and the coming to office of a coalition led by Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union, the zonal differences between the three Western occupation areas have become somewhat blurred. One can still recognize in the British zone the predominance of the Social Democrats, now the main opposition party in the Republic. The American zone shows the traditional division between genuinely democratic Württemberg-Baden and a strongly Right-wing Catholic Bavaria, while the French zone represents similar variations.

The real trouble with the German party system is that it does not reach down to the people and that it only represents a thin layer of political activity, superimposed on a country in which most of the people still keep out of politics. A deep-seated scepticism and a lack of political self-confidence—"a burned child dreads fire"—have stifled interest. Above all the fear of becoming,

or being called, Quislings made the truly politically-minded hesitant to enter fully into party life which, in 1945, looked too much like a controlled experiment under military government.

Whatever the reasons, the result was the return of old programs and old leaders who had failed before 1933 and had been eclipsed by Hitler. The party system looks like that of the Weimar Republic, second edition, and a weaker one at that.

Government by Stepuagenarian

In all justice one should say that the good old democrats who came through got even better (although there were fewer of them). There is an unbelievable rejuvenation of the septuagenarians and the octogenarians in Germany today. How long can they carry the torch? Where are the new leaders to replace them?

There are some young and new leaders but not many. Some of those who might have emerged were broken in body and spirit in Hitler's concentration camps. Some were lost in futile revolts against the all-powerful dictatorship, the most promising being killed after the unsuccessful July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life. A few young and enterprising legislators have appeared in the Diet at Bonn, in regional party headquarters throughout the country, in newspaper offices, even in sleepy university towns. But some of these are already worn out by ever-increasing duties and responsibilities placed upon them simply because they are young and promising.

While Germany waits for a gap of nearly two generations to be filled, the country remains in the hands of its elders. Who stand out among them? Three men—Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic; Konrad Adenauer, its Chancellor; and Kurt Schumacher, leader of the Social Democratic opposition.

Heuss, who did not seek office but fits it well, is about the best German liberalism can offer. Sixty-five years old, he has fought for German democracy ever since his youth. He was a disciple of Friedrich Naumann, the outstanding ethical reformer at the

turn of the century. He became a leader of the Democratic party in the days of the Weimar Republic and today represents all that is worth saving of the traditions of that era. A gifted publicist, historian and teacher, Heuss returned to an academic life after 1945 but was soon absorbed in the strenuous leadership of the newly-founded Free Democratic party. His party, polling 11.9 per cent of the 1949 vote, has served as a cushion between the two major parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats. The Free Democrats stand for individual initiative and responsibility and have attracted both Right-wing *laissez-faire* support and young liberal intellectuals who, after their experience under Hitler, stress freedom above everything else.

Heuss himself has been a sincere broker, a great balancer, particularly in the struggle to draft the Bonn constitution. What he said of his role as Minister of Education in Württemberg—"I give no directives, I give atmosphere"—is still true of him as President of the Federal Republic.

Adenauer and the Christian Democrats

Towering over the mediocrities at Bonn, where trouble is plentiful and style scarce, is Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Reich. Seventy-four years old, this erect and energetic leader does not look nor act his age. He has a tremendous will-power and strictly disciplined ambitions. Moreover, he has an unblemished record as a courageous, though cautious, fighter for democracy. To be sure, it is a democracy of a special brand; his political foes accuse him of being an autocrat. He made his reputation as the Lord Mayor of Cologne, an office he held from 1917 to 1933, turning old Cologne into a modern, model city.

His is a difficult task indeed. His party, the Christian Democratic Union, is a heterogeneous group which comprises a strong conservative wing (of which he is the leader) and an equally articulate Leftist group of Christian Socialists, whose



Konrad Adenauer



Kurt Schumacher

spokesman is the dynamic and likeable Dr. Karl Arnold, Prime Minister of North-Rhine-Westphalia and now President of the Federal Council, the upper chamber of the German parliament. As Chancellor, Adenauer commands a very slim and shaky majority in which the small Right-wing German party commands a disproportionate influence. (One of the dismal effects of the reintroduced, although qualified, system of proportional representation is that 30 per cent of the electorate voted for splinter parties in the 1949 election.) To lead his own party, itself divided, as well as the other elements of his coalition, Adenauer needs the strategy of a fox. He is a veteran who sees through all jealousies and weaknesses of his opposition and as the master of the party machine knows how to make use of them.

He recognizes the deep-seated dilemmas of his own people. In quiet conversation he will even confess his doubts about the democratic chances of his people, who lack two fundamental qualities of a working democracy: a sense of fair play and compromise and an ability to recognize quality of leadership. A half

century of life in public affairs gives him justified concern about his country's strength to resist the rise of another demagogue. In the meantime he holds the reins with a strong hand—the spokesman of stability, conservatism and heavy industry. But he is a European statesman too. In fact, his leanings are strongly toward the French, and if a bridge between the two neighbors and traditional antagonists is to be constructed, Adenauer may well be one of its architects.

Adenauer's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is in a sense the heir to the powerful Catholic Center party of pre-Hitler days, although it has tried with some success to draw in Protestants too. It is in close cooperation with the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), successor to the more conservative and predominantly agrarian Bavarian Peoples' party. Together the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union polled 31 per cent of the 1949 vote.

Schumacher and the Socialists

Adenauer's chief opponent is Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the ardent spokesman for a united Germany and the leader of the Social Democratic party. Although the Social Democrats are strong (29.2 per cent of the vote in 1949) and single-minded, they may still be unable to play the role of a "responsible opposition" to perfection. Schumacher himself is partly responsible for this. An extraordinary man, his moral stamina, political intelligence and sincere integrity are beyond doubt. Yet he is also stubborn, tough and uncompromising. He has the courage, background and zeal of a martyr; he lost one arm in World War I and spent ten years in Nazi concentration camps, emerging as a physical wreck.

He is the builder of the new Social Democratic party. He knows it, and so do his followers. Although he antagonizes many of his subordinates and is resented by some of the best of them, he is still the unchallenged leader of the Social Democratic masses.

His oratory is unequalled in Germany today, and his hatreds are reminiscent of the demagogue era.

If there is any one in the high council of the Social Democratic party who could bring about statesmanlike moderation and a refreshing renewal of its slightly dusty ranks, it is Professor Carlo Schmidt. Fifty-four years old, he is a burly, cosmopolitan cross between Heywood Broun and Trygve Lie. He is the son of a German professor and French noblewoman, an authority on international law and a gifted writer. He entered politics in 1945 and soon became a leader of the Socialists at Bonn, where he took a major part in shaping the new German constitution.

Other figures among the Socialists who bear watching are Waldemar von Knoeringen of Bavaria and Ernst Reuter and Otto Suhr, both of whom have been active in the beleaguered city of Berlin. These three have been attempting to reshape the old Social Democratic party, with its rather rigid Marxism, into the image of the more flexible British Labor party.

The Social Democrats have more than held their own in popular strength as compared with the days of the Weimar Republic. They have won over a great part of the former Communist vote in Western Germany; the Communists who polled 8.6 per cent of the ballots in the 1928 election are now down to 5.7 per cent.

Other Parties

The other parties on the German political scene consist mainly of Right-wing groups—the German party, German Rightist party, National Democratic party and similar organizations. Both the extreme Right and the extreme Left constitute a threat, but the present-day rabble rousers such as Communist Max Reimann and Alfred Loritz of the Economic Reconstruction Association have had only limited success.

The crucial question remains: How deeply do the political parties penetrate the German people? The sober and clear-headed attitude of many burghers, peasants and workers is an

impressive record for the Republic's first year; however, the economic crisis and Germany's uncertain position in today's strife-torn Europe mean that there is a great sector of the public who may yet be exploited by new demagogues.

The future of the young German Republic will depend on its ability to integrate this sector of the population, with its nationalist resentments. Above all, to capture the younger generation, Germany's leaders must find new images and goals worth striving for. There is hope for such an inner renewal which would solve the German problem, but it is a hope that awaits a definition of Germany's proper place in the world of nations.

Germany and the Nations



IN A WORLD SPLIT BY the overwhelming East-West conflict, what could be more tempting than to use this tug-of-war as a potent weapon for a reassertion of power, to play off Russia against the West and to gain advantage from both sides? To Germany, *Land der Mitte*, this would not be an unfamiliar strategy. The former Allies, wooing yesterday's foe, practically invite such a policy.

Therefore, today's Germany has an atmosphere of intrigue and scheming which easily creates strange alliances in the name of "sober *Realpolitik*." The great simplifiers are back again. The old Nazi tactics which presented politics as a choice between fascism or communism have reappeared. The fear of Bolshevism has made for comrades-in-arms who are not fighting for the same cause; even if they are "democrats in name," they are not at all "democrats by conviction."

On the other hand, the German politicians who favor an Eastern orientation are not necessarily Communists either. The Eastern school knows no class or party lines. The aftermath of World War I proved that all too well. The turn toward Russia was not only made by ardent Communists but also by industrialists and intellectuals, by diplomats, and, above all, by the military. There was General Hans Von Seeckt, the founder of the Reichswehr; there was the brilliant diplomat, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Germany's spokesman at Versailles and its first ambassador to the

Kremlin (though he warned against an exclusively Eastern course); there was Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau, the architect of the German-Soviet Rapallo treaty of 1922; and there were literary men like Moeller van den Bruck and Karl Haushofer, the master of German geopolitik.

Today, they find their parallels in ex-Ambassador Rudolf Nadolny; former Centrist leader, Dr. Andreas Hermes; and Professor Ulrich Noack and his Nauheim circle. Yet, power constellations are very different now. In this age of ideological civil war it is more dangerous to play the game of strategic alliances, of which the men of the Kremlin are master manipulators. Last but not least, the experiences of the Soviet satellite countries should forewarn industrialists and intellectuals alike against working for German unification and liberation on Moscow terms.

Drive for Unity

And yet the drive for unity has a tremendous power. Few Germans can acquiesce in the fatal split of their fatherland. An astute Soviet propaganda has put the exclusive blame for this unfortunate state of the nation on Western policies and may be holding in reserve a trump card—another Polish partition which would return some of the Eastern territories to a “friendly” Germany.

The dramatic battle of Berlin in 1948-49 was won by the resolution of General Lucius B. Clay and the heroes of the airlift, but no less by the daily stamina of Berlin, that proud citadel and saving-grace of German common sense. Still this was only the first round. The glamor of heroic resistance has faded away into the grey hopelessness of the daily grind. In the meantime the strategy of the Russians and their East German satellite government works unrelentingly: a policy of exhaustion, vague insinuations of Western unreliability paired with open threats of retaliation when “the day” comes and the “Amis” (Americans) will be more than 3,000 miles away. Dress rehearsals, like the

Berlin youth demonstration in May 1950, keep supporters mobilized and alert and seek out the enemy's soft spots. Such concerted efforts may finally break even the staunchest fighters for freedom and convince them of the utter futility of holding out for "a lost cause." Berlin has become a symbol and a yardstick of Western democracy. General Clay knew it when he took a stand. Our substantial and unreserved support—economically, politically, militarily—of Berlin is vital for the preservation and strengthening of the democratic lifeline.

Appeal of Neutrality

In this worldwide conflagration, with Germany again in the midst of the battle lines, is it surprising that peoples, within and without, will be attracted by the prospects of a "neutralization," taking Germany altogether out of the conflict and making it a greater Switzerland?

Germans may well prefer to decline either an Eastern or a Western orientation. Yet without a balancing power of their own, such a vacuum could be preserved only if the neighboring nations wanted it. As long as no genuine East-West agreement seems possible, withdrawal of the occupation forces will only lay open the country to the threatening attacks of the Soviet Union. Neutralization, in other words, would mean above all a neutralization of United States forces. It certainly would not restore Germany to the position of a balancer or a "third force" in a two-power world.

The complex reality suggests neither a militant partnership nor a neutralization of defeated Germany, but a restoration of the nation to an endurable position which at the same time does not threaten the peace of its neighbors. Western policy has pursued the creation of such conditions of lasting peace. The inclusion of Western Germany into the Marshall Plan has helped toward its economic recovery; yet the true test will only be passed when a sound economy will have absorbed all possible crisis

strata that can serve as an opening wedge for a Communist drive. This battle is certainly not won yet.

Even if the economic recovery is fully guaranteed, and especially then, the national integrity will still be a major concern of the Germans. They, too, want security, and if a remilitarization of the nation (unwanted by the vast majority of the Germans) is refused, as it most probably should be, the guarantee of protection against a Soviet attack or against the prospect of becoming a battlefield of the two superpowers must be given to Germany by the Western bloc. As of today, the military potential of the West cannot assure such guarantees.

Even given such security, there still remains the most fundamental question in the mind of the Germans, especially the young ones, as to their place in the world. Beyond economy and strategy, a spiritual vacuum must be filled. Here is one of the real weaknesses of our policy in the war's aftermath. Germany, as in many other respects, serves only as a focal point for this challenge that has not yet been met.

Germany and United Europe

The United States of Europe represents a clarion call which may rally a new generation to a new beginning and may eclipse the old appeal of the Third International. The historic rivals for Europe's domination may finally line up in a common front for its self-preservation. Indeed, the European idea catches the imagination of an increasing number. It has moved beyond the stage of drawing-room conversation and has become, with the creation of the Council of Europe and the launching of the Schuman plan, an issue of policy-making. This, however, does not mean that European unity is around the corner. Will Great Britain pool its forces with Western Europe? How will the United States support it? What will be the reaction of the U.S.S.R.?

Centuries-old conflicts between the European nations must be

overcome, accustomed patterns of thought abandoned and new loyalties created. The adjustment of diverse modes and levels of living will demand many patient, practical steps. It all will take time. And time may be wanting. Western Europe will need the ingenuity of better men than Briand and Stresemann; and it will have to have a more constructive and a more lasting formula than that of Locarno. The German problem is only a small part, though a crucial one, of this world-wide issue. In fact, its solution will depend on decisions in Washington and Moscow. Their policies, in critical days to come, may spell the promise or perils of Germany.

The Author

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Germany's Political Future

by Robert W. Schleck

THE SECOND HALF OF 1950 finds the European front line of the world struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union drawn squarely across the body of Germany. Control of Germany is crucial to the success of either contestant, and neither will permit the prize to fall to the other without a struggle.

While Germany is incapable of acting independently as a great power, its population, industrialization and organization make it potentially the strongest state on the European continent, barring Russia itself. If United States influence prevails in Germany, the maintenance of a strong Atlantic community of nations is assured. If the Soviet Union gains ascendancy, the goals of the Kremlin's world policy will be brought immeasurably closer.

Modifications Since Potsdam

For this reason the original drastic policies laid down at Potsdam for the political and economic future of Germany have been progressively modified. Since 1949 the world ideological split has been faithfully mirrored in the existence of two German states: the Federal Republic of Germany in the West and

the German Democratic Republic in the East. Each claims to represent the entire nation, and each denounces the other as the agent of foreign domination. Whichever triumphs will do so because it has succeeded in rallying to itself the bulk of the population.

Ordinarily it might be possible to survey the political parties and their electoral strength to gain an insight for the prediction of national policies—especially in Germany where parties in the past have attempted to present a “world-philosophy” expressing the creed of that section of the population to which they appealed and upon which they depended.

Today this is not necessarily so. The party structure that has emerged after the defeat of Nazi totalitarianism is strikingly similar to the pre-1933 pattern. The political struggle in Germany ostensibly represents the clash between two groups—the parties supporting the Bonn republic and the German Communist party adhering to the East.

German Solidarity

However, despite the considerable electoral strength of these two groups, several factors must be taken into account. The democratic parties—Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria, Social Democratic party (SPD), Free Democratic party (FDP), and so forth—include in addition to a hard core of convinced adherents a large marginal fringe of apathetic or transitory supporters. The younger elements and the refugees have to a large extent no fixed political loyalty. They stand apart from political activity and judge programs and policies on a pragmatic rather than ideological basis. In the East the strength of the Communist dominated Social Unity party (SED) is due to the Soviet-sponsored shotgun marriage between the German Communist party and the Social Democratic party of the Russian zone.

The issue of primary importance in assessing the role of the political parties is their position in regard to the East-West struggle. The average German, while largely retaining his predilection for political parties based upon *Weltanschauungen*, has at the same time an overriding conception of national solidarity. He has a profound aversion for any group which compromises that cohesion for temporary party advantage.

However, the tempo of the cold war has forced a decision upon Germans as to which of the two contesting sides they are going to support. Today it can be said without fear of serious contradiction that the bulk of the population favors the groups adhering to the West.

In support of Western orientation are the parties comprising the Bonn coalition: the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, Free Democrats and the German party (the descendant of the conservative Lower Saxon People's party). Similarly, the Social Democrats are overwhelmingly anti-Soviet—even though they disliked at first the whole concept of a Western German republic and disliked even more the policies of the Adenauer government to which they form the main opposition.

Support for the West

The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, is a strong advocate of complete Western orientation. The middle classes, the conservative peasantry and the sections of the working classes making up the Left wing of the Christian Democrats support him in this. The inner conflict within his own party, between his Right wing and the Left wing headed by Karl Arnold and Jakob Kaiser over the degree of economic socialization, does not affect the complete opposition of both groups to any collaboration with the Soviet Union.

The activities of such Christian Democrats as Dr. Andreas Hermes, George Dertinger (Foreign Minister of the Eastern

German Republic) and the Nauheim circle for securing the unity of Germany on Eastern terms are of small importance. Similarly, the statements of Pastor Martin Niemoeller, asserting that the West German Republic was "conceived in the Vatican and born in Washington," do not appear to have shaken the Catholic-Evangelical cooperation in the Christian Democratic Union in favor of Bonn and against any Eastern orientation.

The Ruhr industrial interests are at present largely behind the Adenauer government, although they are uneasy over the amount of co-determination which the Christian Democrat Left-wing may succeed in forcing through. Statements about this or that industrial personality favoring cooperation with the Soviets are usually exaggerated.

These industrialists undoubtedly desire an assured Eastern European market for expanded West German steel production. If they succeed in raising the ceiling on steel production to the level possible under present plant capacity (about 14 million tons), the marketing problem would be serious without these outlets. This does not mean, however, that they advocate a pro-Soviet political orientation for the Western Republic.

Russian Aims

There are undoubtedly large segments of the former Right at present included in the Christian Democratic Union and in the small Rightist splinter parties who would not be against an alliance for external purposes with the Soviet Union. But this alliance would necessitate Stalin's consent to a strong non-Communist Germany to which East Prussia and the territory given to Poland at the end of the war had been restored. In 1950 an agreement under such conditions is virtually impossible.

Analysis of the minds of the Soviet leaders is fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that Soviet policy does not aim at the creation of any strong German state, either Commu-

nist or non-Communist. The recent Soviet-sponsored Warsaw agreement between Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Premier of the East German state, and the government of Communist Poland, recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent "frontier of peace" should offer proof of this fact.

The German Communist party has apparently been directed to concentrate its efforts on the complete amalgamation of the Soviet zone into the ranks of the Eastern European satellites. The U.S.S.R. may or may not sign a treaty of peace with the Eastern German government to enhance its prestige by recognizing it as the legal government of all Germany. The chances of the Communists getting any substantial support west of the Elbe are practically nil."

Communist Tactics

Soviet control will therefore in all likelihood not be achieved. The SED will be maintained and the Communists will advocate cooperation with the Soviet Union as the panacea for all Germany's difficulties. Moscow will take advantage of every chink in the propaganda, of every mistake in policy, of the Western powers. That worthy successor of Dr. Goebbels, Gerhard Eisler, will continue to accuse the United States of such machinations as dropping Colorado beetles on German potato fields in order to be able to dump the American potato surplus, of offering poisoned candy to East German children and of having hired the Bonn government as its "spittoon-lickers."

Nevertheless, despite all internal wrangling and clashes in Western Germany, the groups represented in the Bonn parliament (except for Max Reimann and his handful of fellow Communists) may be expected to stand together on one issue. There will be no cooperation with the plans of Ulbricht and Eisler for making Germany a truncated Soviet satellite.

The Social Democrats under the flamboyant leadership of Dr.

Kurt Schumacher will continue to oppose the bulk of the domestic policies of the Adenauer government. But the party and its rank and file can be expected to carry out this opposition within the framework of the Bonn Republic just so long as there is hope of a reasonably strong German state and an effective reform of social and economic problems to be gained by cooperation with the West.

Economic Issues

The Social Democrats—and the Left-wing of the Christian Democratic Union as well—can be expected to continue their charges that the *laissez-faire* policies of Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Dr. Adenauer's Minister of Economics, have contributed to serious unemployment, social injustice and unbalanced recovery efforts. The Bonn government's economic policies have also been questioned by the United States High Commissioner, John J. McCloy.

But the opposition leaders within the Western parliament are not apt to urge departure from the Bonn constitution as they press their criticisms on the government. It is unlikely that Schumacher, Karl Arnold, Kaiser and others will sign up with Ulbricht's national front.

Perhaps the strongest opportunity for whole-hearted Western orientation has come about through the announcement of the Schuman plan for the merger of the French and German iron and steel industries. This measure could settle once and for all the perennial and, at present, unrealistic Franco-German feud. It could pave the way for an eventual settlement of the Saar issue. And it would associate the Bonn Republic on an equal footing with the rest of Western Europe.

The Social Democrats have been somewhat aloof toward the suggested Schuman plan and positively hostile to participation in the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, the recent Soviet moves may convince them that the best chance for German unity, ex-

cept as a Soviet satellite, will come about by enlisting the active support of the Western powers.

In short, it can be said that the Communists have wrecked their chances of securing power in a united Germany, barring Soviet military conquest. The German Communist party will probably strengthen its control east of the Elbe and suffer progressive loss of strength west of it.

Hopes for the Federal Republic

The West, due to an almost complete reversal in French policy, has the opportunity to tie Germany effectively to a Western orientation.

The Federal German Republic—as distinct from any particular West German cabinet—can become associated in the minds of the German population with the restoration of reasonable state power and the rehabilitation of the national economy. In any event, it will continue to enjoy the support of the middle classes, the peasants, the religiously orientated sections of the population, the leadership of the Social Democratic party and most probably the bulk of its rank and file.

The disaffection of large groups among the youth, the refugees, the ex-Nazis and others will remain, but in a latent form so long as the Bonn Republic appears capable of solving the major issues. If the United States, however, is unable to pursue a consistent German policy, or to make up its mind what it really wants in Germany and from Germany, the Western Republic could take on the status of a colonial regime. Similarly if after 1952 the economic situation in Western Germany seriously deteriorates, those groups which assume responsibility for its policies will find the ground of political support sinking under their feet.

What would then result is not a surrender to communism. Rather, the most likely outcome would be to activate the latent

opposition of all apathetic or hostile groups into a ground-swell for a neo-nationalist party which would oppose cooperation with either the United States or the U.S.S.R., set out to abolish the concept of a parliamentary state, stress national unity and prestige *über alles* and become something akin to National Socialism, a "party to end all parties."

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