Ethnic Politics and Campaign Strategies in Contemporary Africa: Evidence from Ghana and Kenya

By
Charles Fernandes Taylor

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This dissertation is approved by the following members of the final oral committee:
Scott Straus, Professor, Political Science
Jon Pevehouse, Professor, Political Science
Aili Tripp, Professor, Political Science and Gender & Women's Studies
Noam Lupu, Assistant Professor, Political Science
Nadav Shelef, Associate Professor, Political Science

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CHAPTER 1- A THEORY OF CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES

The Puzzle of Campaign Strategies in Africa

The wave of democratization in the early 1990s marked a significant shift in regime type across much of Africa. Several states inaugurated a new era of multiparty competition after decades of authoritarian rule and failed democratic experiments. Over the course of the next two decades, multiparty elections became commonplace throughout the continent. By 2006, Swaziland, Somalia, and Eritrea remained the only states that had not held at least one national multiparty election since the era of liberalization began (Lindberg 2006; Diamond 2010, x). Furthermore, although elections in several countries remain flawed, margins of victory in national elections have narrowed over time, and the likelihood of political turnovers to opposition parties has significantly increased (Lindberg 2006).

Political parties play an ambiguous role in Africa's elections. On the one hand, the presence of competing parties that wage vigorous campaigns signals a more liberalized political environment in comparison to the previous authoritarian era. On the other hand, parties' democratic credentials are often dubious. Most parties have no clear ideological orientation (van de Walle 2003) and many act as vehicles to further the political ambitions of individual elites (Ake 2000). Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that the introduction of political competition has not eliminated the neopatrimonialism endemic to previous authoritarian regimes (van de Walle 2001).

The existing literature argues that under these circumstances, parties will prefer to dispense patronage or appeal to voters' ethnic identities during campaigns in place of committing themselves to clear policy programs (Keefer 2007, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Chandra 2007). However, not all parties' campaigns in recent elections conform to these expectations. Some

parties' campaign platforms have emphasized clear policy proposals for national public goods, a strategy with little apparent explanation from the existing scholarship. These proposals, including ambitious national healthcare plans and national education reforms, are precisely the types of appeals which the literature suggests are too risky for parties in new democracies to offer (Keefer 2007, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Furthermore, as I show below, party strategies have not converged within countries despite the intensely competitive nature of many elections. What explains this divergence in campaign strategies, both within and across countries?

Although a relatively well-developed literature exists on campaign strategies in advanced democracies, significantly less is known about campaigning in newer democracies. This represents an important gap in our understanding of party competition. Campaigns provide for critical moments in election cycles in which large portions of the population are mobilized for the selection of political leaders (Boas 2009). Parties employ a variety of relevant symbols, slogans, and messages to attract voters' support. Civil society organizations use campaign periods as an opportunity to express their grievances and hold political elites accountable for their actions. The "shared values, history, and aspirations celebrated in election campaigns are perhaps the clearest expression of a democracy's continually evolving mythology and perception of its own essential character…In both pragmatic and symbolic terms, campaigns are a microcosm that reflects and shapes a nation's social, economic, cultural, and, of course, political life" (Mancini & Swanson 1996, 1). In newer regimes specifically, campaigns have significant implications for the health of democratic institutions. When political candidates offer little beyond vague slogans during campaigns, they are bound by few commitments once in office and voters have little criteria on which to evaluate their performance (Boas 2009). Furthermore, in ethnically divided societies, campaigns serve as opportunities for ethnic groups to mobilize

around group interests, vocalize collective grievances, and define who their ethnic allies and opponents are. Beyond just mirroring the ethnic cleavages of a society, elections can redefine and exacerbate such divisions (Horowitz 2000).

This dissertation makes two main arguments about campaign strategies in Africa's multiparty regimes. First, the variation in campaign strategies across parties is largely due to differences in the ethnic makeup of parties' support bases. I find that parties that draw a significant majority of their support from a single large ethnic group are *more* likely to develop campaign strategies based on programmatic, policy-based appeals. These appeals are generally in the form of specific policies for the provision of national public goods. This choice of strategy is due to the electoral dilemma created by the dominant ethnic core of the party. While the party can rely on a large number of ethnic voters for support, it struggles to attract the non-ethnic swing voters needed to win an election. Thus, campaign pledges for specific national public goods serve to counteract fears of domination by the large ethnic core of the party.

Second, the stability of a country's party system influences parties' approaches to campaigning. Where parties are more fragmented and unstable, politicians are more prone to rely on intermediaries, such as ethnic elders and community spokesman, to recruit voters. I find that this approach to campaigning contributes to the perception that elections are competitions between rival ethnic groups for access to political power and state resources. The tendency for political elites to appeal to ethnic intermediaries leads to campaigns with much more overt ethnic rhetoric. I argue that more stable party systems discourage the use of ethnic intermediaries in favor of the established grassroots structures of the parties. Campaign discourse is then dominated by party elites pushing national agendas in place of narrower ethnic agendas.

The evidence offered in this dissertation suggests that some modifications regarding our understanding of party behavior in Africa are in order. Campaigns contain more policy-based dialogue than is generally accepted, but the variation in such dialogue warrants further attention. The study also makes more specific what role ethnic politics plays in Africa's competitive multiparty systems. Several studies examine voting behavior using large surveys and voting returns,[1] but few attempt to link the historical construction of ethnic identities to contemporary party politics. I suggest that such an approach leads to a better understanding of how parties mobilize voters in competitive elections. These findings are not necessarily limited to elections in Africa. The arguments should be applicable to new democracies in which three conditions hold: First, elections are competitive and parties must campaign to win votes; second, parties must attract the support of voters from multiple ethnic groups to win elections; and third, the common perception among voters, whether empirically true or not, is that parties act in the interests of the ethnic groups they are thought to represent. I discuss the importance of these below.

Competing Explanations of Campaign Strategy

The argument I present in this chapter departs from existing studies of campaign strategy which offer multiple explanations for differences in strategy choice, as well as several ways of conceptualizing and measuring the content of campaigns. As I discuss later, I make significant use of these studies in developing my own content analysis of campaign content. However, the existing theoretical explanations are insufficient to explain the variation in campaign strategies in

[1] See for example Bratton et al. (2012), Ishiyama (2012), Basedou et al. (2011), Bratton & Kimenyi (2008), and Lindberg & Morrison (2008).

new democracies in Africa. I group the major contributions in the literature into four categories below and briefly discuss why they are not able to fully explain the variation in this study.

Issue Position:

One of the strongest influences on party behavior during campaigns comes from the tradition of spatial modeling. Downs' (1957) seminal work on party competition shows that when two parties pursue vote-maximizing strategies along one issue dimension, their issue positions will converge to the median voter. Downs further suggests that voters use party labels and ideologies as heuristic devices when they lack information about the candidates. More recent studies in spatial modeling show how parties' behavior changes when the number of parties increases (Schofield et al. 1998) and when the number of issues increases (Shepsle 1979). Theories in this tradition are particularly useful when considering issues that fall along a right-left ideological spectrum and when it can plausibly be assumed that voters will support the party which is closest to their own issue position (Rohrschneider 2002).

These assumptions are rather stringent, and several studies challenge the spatial modeling approach to issue-based campaigning. The most famous critique of the Downsian model comes from Stokes (1963), who argues that rather than taking positions on polarizing ideological issues, parties focus on "valence issues," meaning issues where there is little debate regarding the desirability of the issue, such as fighting corruption. Parties instead debate over which of them is most competent at delivering on such issues. In one of the few applications of this literature to elections in Africa, Bleck and van de Walle (2012) find that parties in Africa also have a preference for valence issues over position issues. However, this distinction between position and valence issues does not do justice to some major differences in campaign strategies between parties in Africa, in particular the degree to which parties are willing to make pre-election

pledges in the form of clear national public goods. Indeed, I show below that in some elections, competing parties have focused on a similar set of issues but have differed in whether they develop clear policies to address those issues.

Positive versus Negative Campaigning:

A second approach to the study of campaigns focuses on the tone of a campaign, where positive campaigning is a party's appeals about its own policies, values, candidates, etc., and negative campaigning is its criticism of opponents. These studies ask whether negative campaigning has become more frequent with the rise of television adverting (Greer 2006, Buell & Sigelman 2008), what makes candidates more prone to employ negative tactics (Skaperdas & Grofman 1995, Lau & Pomper 2001, Djupe 2002), and whether negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning (Lau & Pomper 2002). Studies that are somewhat more relevant to the contexts of newer democracies ask what effect negative campaigning has on the quality of the democratic process. Franklin (1991) finds that negative campaigning actually decreases clarity about the candidates among voters, meaning that competitive elections do not necessarily lead to a more informed electorate when candidates spend their resources attacking one another. Ansolabehere et al. (1994) argue that negative campaigning has a tendency to decrease voter turnout and increase cynicism about the democratic process, thus demobilizing the electorate.[2]

I do not code for negative campaigning *per se* in my own content analysis below, but obviously the particular manner in which parties choose to criticize their opponents plays a major role in any campaign. I therefore asked all interview participants about their thoughts on negative campaigning and how they attempted to portray their opponents. As I discuss more in

[2] It should be noted that several studies have challenged the Ansolabehere at al. (1994) "demobilization hypothesis," including Finkel & Greer (1995) and Kahn & Kennedy (1999).

the empirical chapters, the most common negative campaigning involved accusations of corruption, general incompetence, and ethnic or regional favoritism. The accusation of ethnic favoritism plays a particularly important role in the campaigns which I examined, although less for its own sake and more because it illustrates the particular challenges facing parties with a large core of ethnic support. My findings suggest that these parties choose the campaign strategies they do because they are so vulnerable to the accusation of ethnic favoritism.

Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Campaigning:

Generally speaking, the scholarship already discussed assumes that the only type of linkage between elected officials and voters is programmatic, meaning that voters hold political elites accountable to their issue-based appeals and their previous policy achievements (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). However, many new democracies are characterized by appeals to voters based on some form of non-programmatic linkage, where candidates offer voters direct payments, access to employment, or other forms of targeted benefits in place of national public goods (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). This is not to say that programmatic campaigning is not also meaningful in these countries. Parties can still outline a clear set of policies to which they are committed, but they use these pledges in combination with a variety of non-programmatic strategies as well (Boas 2010). Parties therefore have what Kitschelt and Kselman (2010) refer to as a "linkage portfolio" when vying for voters' support. Along these lines, Greene (2007) argues that in new democracies with a history of non-programmatic distribution, it is opposition parties that develop highly programmatic appeals in their appeals to the electorate. Whereas incumbent parties incorporate elites through the extension of their patronage networks, opposition parties are made up of ideologically driven elites who are unwilling to be coopted into ruling parties. Thus, the resource asymmetry between incumbent and opposition parties drives

differences in campaign strategies, with incumbents exploiting their advantages in non-programmatic distribution.

Distinguishing between programmatic and non-programmatic campaigning, and between different types of non-programmatic campaigning, is not straightforward and some debate exists as to exactly how various appeals should be classified. Stokes at el. (2013, 10) argue that non-programmatic distribution exists when "either there are no public criteria of distribution or the public criteria are subverted by private, usually partisan ones." Within the category of non-programmatic distribution, the authors further distinguish between "clientelism" and "partisan bias," where clientelism is non-programmatic distribution where "the party offers material benefits only on the condition that the recipient returns the favor with a vote or other forms of material support. The voter suffers a punishment (or reasonably fears that he or she will suffer one) should he or she defect from the implicit bargain of a benefit for a vote" (Stokes et al. 2013, 13). On the other hand, partisan bias describes non-conditional benefits that are designed to increase goodwill for the party among the electorate, but do not include the threat of individual punishments for defection. With this breakdown, what is often described as "pork-barrel politics," where particular club goods are targeted to certain geographic collectives, counts as partisan bias rather than clientelism, as such goods cannot be used to sanction individual voters who fail to support the party. This differs somewhat from other definitions of clientelism. For example, in a field experiment on the efficacy of campaign strategies in Benin, Wantchekon (2003, 409) distinguishes between 'pure' clientelist campaign appeals and 'pure' national public policy appeals, where a clientelist appeal takes the form of "a specific promise to the village, for example, for government patronage jobs, or local public goods, such as establishing a new local university or providing financial support for local fisherman or cotton producers." This

conceptualization obviously includes local club goods, which Stokes et al. call pork, within the category of clientelism.

In my own data collection, I borrow the distinction used by Stokes et al. (2013) and differentiate between clientelism and pork, and I code for pork appeals. Whichever term one chooses, the importance of these appeals is that they signify to voters that their own community will be given its share of the "national cake," by definition at the expense of other communities, rather than be given access to a national public good that all communities could, at least in principle, enjoy access to. To examine clientelism as Stokes et al. (2013) define it, in the empirical chapters I take advantage of the available Afrobarometer data on vote buying. However, I find that theories of non-programmatic distribution are unable to explain critical aspects of campaigns. I find that vote buying and pork appeals do not make up as much of parties' campaigns as they are often thought to. I further find that contrary to Greene's (2007) focus on resource asymmetries, whether or not a party is in opposition does not determine how much programmatic material it uses in its campaign.

Resource Distribution

A fourth approach to the study of campaigns asks how parties distribute their resources between "chasing" swing voters and mobilizing their core supporters (Rohrschneider 2002). On the side of swing-voter favoritism, Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) argue that vote-maximizing strategies should push competing parties to favor "marginal" (swing) voters, meaning either those voters who are ideologically indifferent or those who are indifferent between voting and not voting. Similarly, the model offered by Dixit & Londregan (1996, 1135) argues that parties "favor groups of voters with relatively many political 'moderates' who are indifferent between the two parties and groups with relatively high willingness to abandon their ideological

preferences in exchange for particularistic benefits."[3] A competing set of models suggest that parties tend to favor core voters over swing voters. Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that politicians are risk-averse, and therefore over-invest in their core supporters, even when the logic of maximizing vote share suggests that they should invest more in swing communities. The variability of responsiveness among swing communities to candidates' largesse is larger than that of their core supporters, and hence politicians prefer the predictability of their core. A more recent application of this approach is offered by Stokes et al. (2013) who offer a "broker-mediated" model of non-programmatic distribution in their study of machine politics in Latin America. In these party machines, national party leaders rely on teams of intermediaries to distribute benefits to their clients. Although national party leaders might prefer to spend more resources on chasing the support of swing voters, the brokers they rely on at the grassroots face high incentives to increase the size of their own network of clients by recruiting core voters rather than swing voters.

The theory I offer in this study is more consistent with models which suggest that parties spend more time and resources attracting swing voters. However, existing theories in this vein do not offer explanations for why competing parties in the same country should pick systematically different campaign strategies in terms of their appeals, which is what I seek to explain here. Furthermore, as I discuss more below, I find that in addition spending more resources on swing voters, parties alter the particular type of campaign discourse they use with swing voters in comparison to core voters.

[3] Dixit and Londregan (1996) do allow for core-group favoritism under the conditions on urban machine politics, where parties have detailed knowledge of the particular needs of their core supporters, and thus the introduction of non-programmatic linkage changes their findings slightly. However, they further suggest that internecine conflicts of parties should still cause competing politicians to still favor swing voters who fall within the purview of a particular machine.

Political Parties in Africa

Parties emerged in Africa during the late colonial era amid growing calls for independence. Although an urban intelligentsia had promoted nationalist and pan-Africanist ideas since the late nineteenth century, nationalist movements did not gain a popular following until the interwar period (Osei 2012, 73). Party development in Africa was thus markedly different from that in Europe. Whereas party development in Europe "was contingent on the emergence of parliamentary institutions, the result of suffrage, ideological movements, union, church, as well as civil society and social movements, African political parties were in some instances created instantaneously by a small groups of political elite to contest elections in preparation for independence" (Salih 2003, 5). The largely urban and elite nature of parties meant that few had the organizational structures capable of penetrating beyond urban centers. At the time, scholars mistakenly compared nationalist parties in Africa to the 'mass parties' prevalent in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s (Erdmann 2004).

However the nationalist momentum generated by the independence movements was distinct from the mass mobilization of voters in Europe, which required large and complex party organizations (Gunther & Diamond 2003). In truth, parties in Africa were structurally weak and forced to rely on local intermediaries as clients in order to mobilize bases of support in rural areas. Several parties, despite their nationalist rhetoric, relied on ethnic and regional bases of support. In Ghana for example, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) drew its support largely from Ashanti chiefs and urban elites. In Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) drew its support largely from Kikuyu and Luo communities while its rival, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), represented the collective interests of several smaller ethnic groups (Lynch 2007).

Post-independence rulers then faced the challenge of maintaining broad political support for new governments with the major unifying goal of independence already achieved. Most rulers responded to their precarious bases of support by declaring multiparty competition inimical to the more important goals of nation building and economic development (Osei 2012). What resulted was the creation of authoritarian party-states across most of the continent. Young (1994) has argued that this response to opposition was largely due to the extractive and authoritarian nature of the colonial state apparatus which African governments inherited. Similarly, Salih (2003, 2) argues that independence parties in Africa "emerged during the colonial rule which was neither democratic nor legitimate. In a sense, African political parties emerged in a non-democratic setting, which to a large extent informed their practice during independence." Along with the banning opposition parties, opposition leaders were in many cases either jailed or coopted into the network of ruling parties. Party states further co-opted unions, student groups, and a variety of other civil society organizations to preclude the emergence of independent bases of political support beyond the purview of the party (Osei 2012). Some of the ruling parties of the party-state era have been able to survive well into the multiparty era. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, for example, has continued to remain in power in Tanzania. Others, such as the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, fared worse and were defeated as soon as they held multiparty elections. Still others such as the Kenya African National Union (KANU) survived initial multiparty elections but eventually lost in competitive elections.

This history is discussed in very broad terms, and there are significant variations across the continent in party development. Still, the commonalities have made for several characteristic features of Africa's parties since the early 1990s. One of the clearest and most discussed is

parties' lack of programmatic appeal (van de Walle 2003a, 2003b). This is particularly pronounced given that the ideological orientations of most parties in other regions are largely absent. Erdmann suggests that much of this is due to the fact that "the traditional European social conflicts—urban versus rural, religion versus state, labour versus capital and centre versus periphery—can be identified in Africa as well, but they are weakly developed and thus contribute little" to party politics (Erdmann 2004, 71). This has not universally been the case, and some independence parties had at least a rhetorical commitment to socialist/Marxist principles. However, Ottaway (1999, 311) argues that the failure of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of socialism "made it difficult for political parties to define themselves in ideological terms and thus attract multiethnic cross sections of the population on the basis of their programmatic appeal." Young (1999, 29) similarly argues that "in an epoch where all forms of socialism remain blighted by the stigma of the failed Soviet version, political challengers have great difficulty in defining an alternative *projet de société*. Electoral discourse is thus limited to vague slogans of change…and opposition to incumbents."

Political Competition and Ethnicity

In addition to low ideological salience, a further commonality across much of the continent has been for parties to rely on some form of ethnic mobilization in order to win elections. Bates (1983) argues that the strength of ethnic identities has persisted throughout the post-colonial period because of the strong incentives to organize along ethnic lines in the competition for the scarce resources associated with modernization. Political elites organize collective support by appealing to the identities of their co-ethnics, and ethnic groups are in turn able to "exert powerful social pressures upon the modern elite in order to satisfy the demands of

their members" (Bates 1983, 162). Although Bates' work precedes political liberalization in the 1990s, evidence suggests that the same logic of ethnic competition influences party behavior. Mozaffar el al. (2003) find that the structure of a country's ethnopolitical cleavages has a significant effect on its number of political parties. Their findings suggest that political candidates rely strongly on ethnic mobilization to win elections (Mozaffar el al. 2003, 389). Eifert et al. (2010) find that impending elections have a tendency to strengthen ethnic identification, especially when elections are competitive. With a competitive presidential election approaching, a survey respondent was 1.8 percent more likely to identify himself or herself in ethnic terms every month closer to the election the survey was held (Eifert et al. 2010, 495). Studies analyzing voting behavior further show that ethnicity is in many cases a good predictor of party affiliation. Bratton et al. (2012) find that, controlling for a variety of factors, voters are highly likely to vote for an incumbent party when they are from the same ethnic group as the president. Similarly, voters are very likely to vote for an opposition party when they believe that the government discriminates against their own ethnic group (Bratton et al. 2012, 41).

Several studies further show that ethnic politics is often closely related to clientelism. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007, 39) note that "where ethnic markers are salient and the economy is politicized, voters do not expect politicians to employ political authority in an ethnoculturally unbiased, universalistic fashion, but always in favor of some ethnic group." Chandra (2007) argues that this is in part because of severe information constraints facing voters in patronage democracies. As the beneficiaries of patronage benefits are often not made public, voters have little to use in evaluating future promises of clientelism. They use ethnicity as an indicator of which candidates can be trusted to deliver such goods, and candidates respond by distributing

goods along ethnic lines. Empirically, Wantchekon (2003) finds in his field experiment in Benin that the appeals which he identified as 'pure' clientelist reinforced patterns of ethnic voting. Voters apparently found such appeals credible and it influenced their vote choice.

These findings suggest that for many voters and politicians in Africa, ethnicity serves a largely instrumental role. Politicians use their membership in a given ethnic group to mobilize co-ethnic voters in support of their candidacy. Voters prefer to support candidates from their own ethnic group because they believe having a co-ethnic in a position of power will allow them access to state resources. Given these expectations, we should expect politicians in Africa to struggle to build the multiethnic support required to win elections. Indeed, in Zambia, Posner (2005, 105) finds that "given expectations about how patronage resources are distributed, politicians' promises to share the spoils of power with members of other groups are not likely to be viewed as credible." Arriola (2013) argues that opposition parties often do not cooperate to unseat incumbents because they cannot credibly commit to sharing resources between the multiple ethnic groups which they represent.

Building Multiethnic Parties

Despite the centrality of ethnicity in Africa's new democracies, two important caveats are in order when considering ethnic politics and party competition. First, many voters do not base their vote choice only on ethnicity. In their analysis of survey data from twelve African countries, Bratton et al. find that "for all countries studied, vote choice is first and foremost a product of popular performance evaluations" (2005, 307). In their analysis of the 2008 elections in Ghana, Ferree et al. (2009, 8) find that "Ghanaians gleaned relevant information not just from ethnicity, but also the attributes of parties, including incumbent performance, policies, and other

characteristics to determine their vote." Lindberg and Morrison similarly find in their survey of voters in Ghana that "voting based on patron-client relationships was far behind broader and more democratic sources, such as candidate performance and party platforms" (2008, 111). Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) find that in Kenya, voters who define themselves in terms other than ethnicity (class, profession, etc.) base their vote choice on policies and party platforms rather than the ethnicities of the candidates. These studies do not discount the importance of ethnicity during elections, but they show that for many voters, especially those from ethnic groups not commonly associated with a particular party, vote choice often involves an evaluation of parties' platforms and their previous policy accomplishments.

Second, an important distinction should be made between the presence of ethnic voting and the presence of ethnic parties. While ethnicity may serve as the basis from which political elites derive much of their support, the political arena in most multiparty systems in Africa is not dominated by what can be called "ethnic parties". There is some debate over what constitutes an ethnic party, but perhaps the most influential definition is offered by Horowitz (2000, 291): An ethnic party "derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group. In practice the party will serve the interests of the group comprising its overwhelming support or quickly forfeit that support, so the test of an ethnic party is simply the distribution of support." Furthermore, an ethnic party "is identified with the cause of the ethnic groups it represents…No doubt, an ethnic party may need to moderate ethnic demands on occasion, in anticipation of the reaction of other groups outside the party or of practical difficulties in translating the demands into policy. But its overall mission is to foster the interests of the groups it represents. There are no countervailing competitive incentives" (ibid, 296).

For the most part, these criteria do not describe parties in Africa. To begin with, formally ethnic parties are banned in much of continent, and open ethnic chauvinism on behalf of candidates is either illegal or socially unacceptable (Bogaards 2010). More significantly, few ethnic groups are large enough to constitute a winning bloc of votes without gaining the support of either additional ethnic groups or voters who base their vote on non-ethnic criteria. In a few countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Botswana, a single ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population. In most others, no party is able to win an election relying on the votes of one ethnic group alone (Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999). This inevitably results in multiethnic parties and coalitions rather than strictly ethnic parties. Cheeseman & Ford (2007) show that only about twenty percent of parties can be classified as "ethnic" using Horowitz's criteria of overwhelming electoral support from a particular ethnic group. The majority of these are either very small, uncompetitive parties or are parties in Botswana, where one ethnic group makes up the overwhelming majority of the population. Most parties in Africa must therefore commit significant time and resources to appealing to the needs of voters from several ethnic groups. This may mean downplaying, or outright denying, that they have any ethnic component whatsoever.

Case Selection

The cases examined here are Ghana's elections in 2008 and 2012 and Kenya's elections in 2002 and 2007. Elections in Ghana and Kenya make for excellent cases to examine campaign strategies, as they are largely representative of the broader population of competitive elections in Africa. Both countries reverted to authoritarian, neopatrimonial regimes soon after

independence, and both held multiparty elections in 1992.[4] Recent elections in both have been highly competitive, with each country experiencing at least one changeover of power to an opposition party.[5] Each is also characterized by high levels of ethnic voting, but neither has an ethnic group that is able to win elections without significant support of voters from other communities (Cheeseman & Ford 2007).

For the purposes of testing competing theories of campaign strategy, these elections are particularly useful, as they allow me to take advantage of variation on a few key independent variables across the cases. In each election, one party has drawn its support largely from a historically dominant ethnic group. However, elections within each country vary on whether the party with the ethnic core of support is the incumbent party or in opposition. This allows me to test my theory against Greene's (2007) theory of resource asymmetry as the primary cause of differences in the amount of programmatic content in parties' campaigns. Variation across the two countries on several factors, including their histories party institutionalization, their overall levels of vote buying, and their histories of electoral violence further allow me to see whether cross-national differences cause any variation in programmatic content between parties. As I discuss more below, these cross-national differences do not affect differences in programmatic material between parties within each country. However, differences in party institutionalization do influence the extent to which campaigns are characterized by overt ethnic language.

[4] Between independence and third-wave liberalization, Ghana and Kenya did follow somewhat different political trajectories, as I detail more in the historical chapters. While Kenya was under the one-party rule of KANU, Ghana underwent several military coups multiple short-lived democratic experiments. Kenya's economic performance over the same time period was also considerably better than that of Ghana's (Bates 1989). Yet despite this, Ghana's current GDP per capita of $2,288 is somewhat higher than Kenya's at $1,468 (*Penn World Tables*).

[5] Kenya has seen one turnover of power since 1992 (in 2002), and Ghana has seen two (in 2000 and 2008).

Methodology for Comparing Campaign Strategies

A systematic comparison of campaigning across different parties is required to test the hypotheses of this theory. As discussed above, various studies operationalize parties' campaign strategies differently. These studies use a variety of different data sources to measure campaigning including newspapers' campaign coverage (Franklin 1991, Lau & Pomper 2001), televised political advertisements (Freedman & Goldstein 1999), and official campaign press releases (Flowers et al. 2003). The primary source of data used in this study to measure campaign strategies is newspaper articles covering the campaigns. For each election, a major national newspaper was selected and examined for coverage of the parties and their campaigns. For Ghana the *Daily Graphic* was selected, and for Kenya the *Daily Nation* was selected. Each is the most widely read print news source its respective country. For each paper, the eight weeks of material preceding each election was examined for articles covering the parties' campaigns. Following Franklin (1991), articles were coded for verbatim campaign appeals or paraphrases of appeals by one of the presidential candidates, vice presidential candidates, or other party members such as parliamentary candidates or members of the campaign teams. An appeal was identified whenever any of these speakers clearly offered a particular reason for voters to support the presidential candidate or the party. Only appeals which referred to the speaker's own party or that party's presidential candidate were coded. Negative appeals, that is, appeals which criticized opponents, were not coded. Parliamentary candidates' appeals regarding their own individual candidacy for their constituency were also not coded.

Once identified, each appeal was then coded according to a scheme broadly based on Kitschelt's (2000) typology of democratic linkage. Following this framework, I conceptualize campaign strategies as consisting of three types of appeals: (1) *programmatic*, where elites

promises to implement a certain set of national policies once in office, or mention previous national policies which have been delivered; (2) *pork*, where elites promise specific club goods to targeted groups of voters, or mention club goods which have already been delivered;[6] or (3) *trait*, where elites emphasize the personality traits or values of the presidential candidate, or traits and values for which the party stands.[7] All candidate appeals identified in the text were coded according to one of these three types.

Programmatic appeals were further coded for their subject matter (i.e. education, healthcare, agriculture, etc.). Table 1.1 summarizes the list of subjects which I coded for. In total, I coded for 39 subjects. The purpose of this is to give a measurement of which issues each party chooses to emphasize within its programmatic appeals. The list of categories was generated after a preliminary examination of the newspaper data, as no current standards exist for coding election material in African elections. Much of the existing literature on campaign content focuses on elections in the United States and Western Europe, and the issues which scholars often code for are often not relevant in the context of African elections.

All programmatic appeals were further categorized as being either "general" or "specific" (Boas 2010). There is some subjectivity here regarding what constitutes a specific versus general appeal, but specific appeals were identified when candidates discussed particular policies or benchmark goals or accomplishments that were clearer than general subject appeals. These additional coding criteria are necessary given the difference between making a vague promise "to improve education" versus a more specific promise, such as "to make senior secondary high school free." The more specific the policy that is mentioned, the easier it is for voters to confirm

[6] Kitschelt (2000) subsumes pork into his conceptualization of clientelism.
[7] Kitschelt's (2000) typology uses "charismatic linkage" as opposed to "trait". His description is more fitting for highly charismatic/revolutionary personalities, so I substitute "trait" to capture personality/value-based campaigning.

Table 1.1: Programmatic Appeal Categories

Subject Label	Included Topics
Agriculture	Agriculture, farmers, farms, cocoa/maize/cassava prices
Chiefs	Empower chiefs, traditional authorities
Roads	Roads, highways
Economic Growth/Development	Economy, economic development, living standards, debt, debt cancellation, alleviate poverty, prosperity
Jobs	Job creation, youth employment
Infrastructure	Infrastructure, general electricity, general construction, harbors, dams
Education	Education, schools, teachers
Health	Health/healthcare, clinics
Democracy	Democracy, good governance, human rights, transparency, accountability, election administration
Transportation	Public transportation, buses, railroads, tracks
Pension	Pensions, pensions for farmers, old age insurance, social security
Police	Police/Domestic law enforcement, deal with crime, drug smuggling
Nationalize	Nationalize industry/factory, re-nationalize, socialize
Business	Business/Industry, business environment, entrepreneurship, support local business, trade competitiveness, private sector
Environment	Environment, pollution, clean up waste, trash, refuse dumps
Labor	Workers' rights, wages, unions, labor standards
Peace	Work for peace, truth and reconciliation
Government salaries	Government/Public sector salaries or benefits
Housing	Houses, public housing, better quality homes
Oil	Oversight of oil production, efficiency of oil extraction, increase drilling
Religion	Ensure religious freedom, religious tolerance
Fuel	Reduce fuel/gas prices, alternative energy sources, foreign oil dependence
Decentralization	Decentralization, federalism, local government, strengthen local government
Tourism	Encourage tourism, brings Ghanaians back from abroad
Water	Potable water, pipes, sanitation, toilets
Redistribution	Redistribute wealth, share national cake, more equitable distribution
Women	Women's rights, women's entrepreneurship, gender equality
Disabled	Rights for disabled/for the blind
Intl. Relations	International relations, diplomacy, negotiate with donors, African Union
Courts	Legal reform, judiciary, Supreme Court
Science	Science, research & technology, invest in technological modernization
Corruption	Fight corruption, strengthen anti-corruption laws/organizations
Sport	Sports, youth sports, national team, football
Culture	Respect cultural heritage, national culture, honor cultural history
Spending	Cut government spending, cut wasteful spending
Constitution	Constitutional reform, review constitution
Land	Deal with land issues, land reform, give lands back, recognize land claims
Collection	Tax collection, improved/efficient tax collection
Unitary	Unitary state, centralized state

its implementation or monitor future compliance with the pledge. In this sense, specific programmatic campaigning is a much riskier approach than is more general programmatic campaigning, where confirming implementation and monitoring compliance are more difficult and open to greater interpretation.

This method of collecting data on the content of campaigns will not capture every facet of each party's strategy, and difficult coding decisions needed to be made. However, the systematic coding of statements in newspapers should offer a relatively objective measure of which parties emphasized which appeals in each election. Table 1.2 below outlines this breakdown of campaign strategy and includes examples of appeals captured in the data. All examples are from Ghana's 2008 election, with one example from the flag bearer from each party for each category.

Table 1.2: Sample Campaign Appeals and Coding

Programmatic		*Pork*	*Trait*
Specific:	*General:*		
"[John Atta Mills] said his government would set up a buffer stock management agency to buy and store excess food items for the lean season." (*Daily Graphic* 10/29/08, p.15)	"[John Atta Mills] said under his administration, corruption would be punished to serve as a deterrent to others and also as a means of guarding the scarce resources of the state…" (*Daily Graphic* 10/6/08, p.3)	"For his part, Prof. [John Atta] Mills promised to reconstruct the roads linking the Upper West and Upper East Regions…" (*Daily Graphic* 11/22/08, p.13)	"[John Atta Mills] assured the enthusiastic supporters who thronged the Akosombo lorry park that if given mandate, he would lead the country with humility…" (*Daily Graphic* 12/2/08, p.13)
"Nana Akufo-Addo reaffirmed his commitment to ensure that students in the second cycle schools had free education." (*Daily Graphic* 11/13/08, p.17)	"Nana Akufo-Addo …said on the whole the NPP performed better than the NDC in the health sector." (*Daily Graphic* 10/29/08, p.16)	"…Nana Akufo-Addo expressed the commitment of the NPP under his administration to establish a [palm] oil plantation at Begoro..." (*Daily Graphic* 11/28/08, p.17)	"[Nana Akufo-Addo] said he was not in politics for personal gain. 'I am a famous lawyer and if I want to make money, I will stay in my chambers,' he remarked." (*Daily Graphic* 11/26/08, p.16)

Newspaper data is not without potential drawbacks. Studies of campaigns often rely on televised campaign advertisements or parties' press releases because they are an unfiltered source of communication from parties to the electorate. Campaign appeals gleaned from newspaper articles are inevitably influenced by editors' choices of what to publish. This may introduce a potential selection bias in the data if such choices do not reflect the true content of the campaign. Furthermore, newspapers may not be neutral in their coverage. If a newspaper is sympathetic to the cause of a particular party, then the reportage may be biased both in the amount of coverage given to a given party and the nature of the content which is published. This may be an even greater concern where media sources are state-owned or independent media outlets face intimidation or censorship. Both Ghana and Kenya do have a history of media bias and intimidation, and although the *Daily Nation* in Kenya is privately owned, the *Daily Graphic* in Ghana is owned by the state.

While not all of these drawbacks are avoidable, it is unlikely that they bias the data to a significant degree. Although newspaper content is influenced by the choices of editors, this particular coding scheme is not as easily biased as would be a study on the tone of campaigns, meaning the overall positive or negative content of parties' appeals. Editors may choose to publish more negative than positive material to generate controversy around an election, or choose to publish the negative appeals from the party which they support to paint an unfavorable picture of the opposition, but it is somewhat less likely that they would systematically bias the programmatic, pork, or trait material of a campaign in any particular direction. While it could still be argued that data from the state-owned *Daily Graphic* in Ghana would still be biased in favor of the incumbent, given that the data show that more total coverage was given to the incumbent party in each election, my interviews with party elites confirmed that the differences

in content of campaign strategies are in fact due to intentional strategy rather than newspaper bias.

Even without such biases, there are certain aspects of campaigning that newspapers may not pick up. For example, vote buying is a feature of most campaigns in Africa, although systematic evidence of it will not show up in newspaper coverage. To account for this, I examine the available data on vote buying from the relevant Afrobarometer surveys below and in later chapters. Mainstream newspapers such as the *Daily Graphic* and the *Daily Nation* also tend not to transmit overt ethnic chauvinism. While coverage in these papers does mention politicians' references to ethnicity, the most extreme forms of such speech are usually omitted. To account for such omissions, I examined several additional secondary sources with information on campaigns, including reports from various human rights groups, election monitoring reports, and articles in newspapers with a somewhat more "tabloid" appeal, which tend to be less hesitant to publish inflammatory material.

Over the course of approximately nine months of field research, including two trips to Ghana and one to Kenya,[8] I further conducted interviews with those individuals directly responsible for orchestrating and implementing the campaigns for each of the major parties examined in this study.[9] This included members of official national campaign teams, national and regional officials of the major parties, youth leaders, as well as local activists. I also interviewed a handful of voters who agreed to discuss their own political beliefs as well as their interactions with parties and candidates during campaigns. In total, I conducted 47 formal interviews. Interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour, although a few of the

[8] Research in Ghana was conducted during the summer of 2012 and summer of 2013. Research in Kenya was conducted during the summer of 2014.

[9] Research was funded by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Political Science and the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School.

interviews were somewhat shorter, as several interviewees were members of parliament and could not grant me more than thirty minutes of their time. Most interviews were held in the offices of the interview subjects, although it was more convenient for some to meet over coffee or lunch. All participants were promised anonymity if quotations were used in any future publications. Subjects are therefore identified in subsequent chapters using only group characteristics. Anonymity for participants ultimately proved to be important, as interviewees were able to openly discuss certain sensitive issues, such their thoughts regarding participating in vote buying, their displeasure at certain aspects or individuals of their own parties, and their concerns about funding their campaigns (one campaign official discussed the means by which his party violates campaign finance laws to meet the hefty costs of running a campaign).

The interviews with campaign team members began with relatively general questions about recent campaigns, such as what particular tasks the subjects had performed for their parties, what the biggest challenges of a campaign were, and why they felt one party had been more successful than the other in wooing the electorate. Subjects were also asked what differences in campaign strategies they noticed between their own party and that of their opponents, how they tried to portray their opponents to the electorate (that is, negative campaigning), and how they felt their opponents portrayed them. I also questioned interviewees about the differences in strategy between mobilizing loyal voters versus attracting swing voters. To get a clearer sense of these differences, I made sure to interview both individuals with experience campaigning in traditional strongholds as well as those with experience campaigning in swing regions. The purpose of these interviews was to uncover the major factors that influence political elites as they craft their appeals to the electorate. While the content analysis of newspaper coverage gives an overall campaign profile for each party in each election, it

cannot uncover the motivations behind why certain appeals are preferred to others. The interviews provided the means by which I was able to understand party elites' beliefs about voters and how voters would respond to particular appeals, personalities, and criticisms of opponents.

The Argument

This study of campaign strategies reveals several findings. First, parties devote the majority of their campaign resources to recruiting swing voters to their cause rather than mobilizing core supporters. While this may not surprise those who subscribe to the Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan (1996) theories of resource distribution, which predict that parties should target resources at swing voters, it does contradict much of the literature on ethnic politics, which suggests that in environments where ethnicity largely determines vote choice, parties get the greatest electoral returns by devoting the bulk of their resources to mobilizing their ethnic supporters (Horowtiz 2000, Chandra 2007). Interview subjects for this study noted the importance of not neglecting one's regional stronghold, but further noted that the real challenge of campaigning is in attracting those voters in swing regions needed to win an election.

Second, just as the *amount* of campaign resources devoted to core and swing regions differs within both countries, so does the *type* of campaigning in core and swing regions. When campaigning in swing regions, emphasis is placed on policy pledges, previous accomplishments, and promises to meet the development needs of the local community. In core regions on the other hand, greater emphasis is placed on appealing to the emotions and identities of loyal supporters. Interestingly, and again contrary to much of the literature on ethnic politics,

campaigning in regional strongholds often did not involve promises of future patronage benefits. The link between ethnic politics and preferential access to state resources, often cited as the glue binding voters to co-ethnic candidates (Bates 1983, Chandra 2007), did not need to be explicitly reaffirmed during campaigns. In fact, my findings show that appealing to core supporters' identities involved a heavier dose of negative campaigning, that is, criticizing one's opponents rather than offering any kind of patronage. Campaign strategists whom I interviewed suggested that these emotive appeals are a more effective means of mobilizing their bases than are policy pledges or promises of future development resources. As one Kenyan campaign strategist put it, "in swing areas, you must offer hope and create fear at the same time…In your stronghold, you just create fear."[10]

The third finding of this study is that variation in campaign strategies across parties is due to differences in the composition of their ethnic support. My findings suggest that parties which draw the majority of their support from a single, dominant ethnic group are more likely to develop campaign strategies that focus on clear policy programs in the form of specific national public goods. I suggest that this is because parties can generally only credibly commit to acting in the interests of the ethnic group which they are thought to represent (Posner 2005, Chandra 2007). Voters assume that if a party's core is dominated by a particular ethnic group, this group will enjoy the lion's share of the any patronage resources, and thus incentives to support such a party before an election are low.

Of course, if these groups' large size was their only defining feature, we might expect them to be able to attract support from voters who want to support a party that is likely to win. However, if the large group has a history of economic and political dominance, it makes for a

[10] Interview, July 30, 2014, Nairobi.

much less attractive election partner. Voters may be heavily influenced by claims from other parties that elite ethnic groups will behave in a dominant and self-interested manner once in office. Because of both their large size and their histories of elitism, promises to share future benefits with members of other ethnic groups will not be seen as credible. For these parties, commitments to non-excludable national public goods serve as a clear pre-election pledge that the party will serve national rather than ethnic interests.

In focusing on the dominant ethnic core of a party, and identifying what makes a group dominant, I rely on previous studies about ethnicity and unequal distributions of wealth and power, including Chua (2004, 6), who focuses on "market dominant minorities," meaning minority ethnic groups which enjoy "often spectacular wealth" relative to a largely impoverished majority, as well as Kaufmann (2008, 746), who examines "politically dominant minorities," which he defines as "those communally differentiated ruling groups who are able to govern majorities despite being demographically outnumbered." The historical processes by which certain ethnic groups became dominant over others are multifaceted, but European colonial policies played a significant role in constructing economic and social differences by allowing some groups preferential access to state resources (Young 1997). Berman (1998, 328) argues that "political tribalism in Africa was shaped by the asymmetry of relations that developed between various groups in several contexts of the colonial situation…The colonial state's strategy of fragmentation and isolation of distinct tribal units promoted ethnic competition and conflict. This was reinforced in many colonies by a hierarchal ordering and the labour or production specialization of different African societies as martial peoples, trading and administrative groups, cash crop farmers, migrant labourers, etc. expressed in sharply drawn ethnic stereotypes." Those ethnic groups that enjoyed preferential treatment under colonial

governments were often able to establish themselves as dominant economic and political forces in the years leading up to independence.

In this study I draw a parallel between recent elections in Ghana and Kenya in which one party in each election has relied on a large and historically dominant ethnic group for its core of support. In Ghana, this has been the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in both 2008 and 2012, drawing its core of support from the Akan, or more specifically, from the Asante and the Akyem sub-groups of the Akan.[11] In Kenya, this was the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 and the Party of National Unity (PNU) in 2007, which both drew the core of their support from the Kikuyu. Both the Asante and Akyem in Ghana and the Kikuyu in Kenya have a history of political and economic dominance in their respective countries and are thus vulnerable to accusations of ethnic elitism and self-interest.

While the first three findings of this study focus on cross-national similarities, the fourth finding highlights a critical difference in campaigning between countries, particularly between countries which differ in the degree to which their party systems are stable and institutionalized. I argue that these institutional differences across countries make for different approaches in attracting the multiethnic following needed to win elections. Specifically, I show that where parties are weak and volatile, a critical campaign strategy is to recruit the support of influential community leaders, in particular the elders and clan heads of the various ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups, in order to receive a public endorsement of support. Seasoned campaigners in Kenya, where national parties are often no more than "coalitions of convenience" (Elischer 2013), felt that the recruitment of intermediaries between themselves and voters was a critical step in gaining the votes of a particular community. However, interviewees in Ghana, which has

[11] The Asante and the Akyem are both Akan-speaking and are culturally and politically closely aligned, although they are distinct subgroups of the Akan.

a stable two-party system, placed significantly less importance on this strategy, and instead stressed the importance of working through established party structures at the grassroots. While some campaigners in Ghana discussed the importance of intermediaries, more often they felt that these intermediaries held little sway over voters, and were in some cases untrustworthy. Officials in Ghana consistently stated that using party members to make direct contact with voters was a much more effective campaign strategy than was recruiting intermediaries.

I argue that the reliance on ethnic intermediaries in Kenya has heightened the degree to which elections are seen as competitions between rival ethnic groups vying for power, a particular perspective that does not have the same intensity in Ghana. Ethnic intermediaries have high incentives to encourage their co-ethnics to act as unified blocs of votes to maximize the group's impact on elections. Politicians likewise have high incentives to appeal to these identities and make themselves into the champions or "kingpins" of particular ethnic blocs. Ethnic chauvinism and hate speech thus tend to be much more common in Kenya than in Ghana, despite the multiple similarities which they otherwise share during campaigns.

Here I build on a growing literature in African politics regarding the effects of political party systems on a variety of outcomes. Pitcher (2012), for example, argues that where party systems are fragmented and seat volatility is high, parties do not make good on previous commitments to enact liberal economic reforms. Incumbent parties are too preoccupied with stalling and manipulating the reform process to preclude defection to opposition parties. Similarly, Wahman (2014) finds that in systems where party institutionalization is low, an election victory by the opposition will not necessarily lead to further democratization. Newly elected leaders may stall the reform process due to the uncertainty of keeping their coalition together when parties are weak and fluid. Like these studies, I treat party system as an

independent variable when comparing strategies across Ghana and Kenya. However, I discuss the roots of these different systems in the historical chapters and argue that the type of authoritarian regime which preceded democratic reforms is critical for understanding the differences in these party systems (Riedl 2014). The final chapter tests the validity of this argument by subjecting Afrobarometer survey data to a series of hierarchical linear models to determine if party system institutionalization has a cross-national effect on the likelihood that respondents identify themselves in ethnic terms. These models build on previous work that finds that exposure to political campaigns causes voters in Africa to be more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic identities (Eifert et al. 2010). The findings presented in that chapter are consistent with the proposed mechanism.

Before moving on to the historical and empirical chapters, I briefly discuss two aspects of elections that could conceivably confound the findings of this study: vote buying and electoral violence. As neither is measured explicitly in either the content analysis or the interview data, I discuss them each in turn here.

Campaign Strategies and Vote Buying

A growing literature on clientelism in newer democracies examined patterns of vote buying. Studies ask a variety of questions, including whether vote buying is targeted at swing voters or loyal voters (Nichter 2008, Stokes et al. 2013), to what extent income and economic development influence vote buying (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Jensen & Justesen 2014), and to what extent vote buying actually influences voters' behavior at the polls (Finan & Schechter 2012). Interviews with political elites in both countries confirmed the presence of vote buying, although interviewees in Kenya discussed it more frequently as part and parcel of their

interactions with voters and displayed more frustration with the demands that voters placed on candidates for money during campaigns.[12] Figure 1 below shows the frequency of vote buying across 29 sub-Saharan African countries from the Afrobarometer Round 5 survey. The question was phrased as follows: "During the last election, how often if ever did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something like food, or a gift, or money in return for your vote?" The possible answers were "Never," "Once or Twice," "A few times," or "Often." Figure 1.1 below combines the last three responses for each country to measure the overall presence of vote buying.

Figure 1.1 Percent of Voters Experiencing Vote Buying vs. GDP per capita



Sources: Afrobarometer Round 5, Penn World Tables

The overall negative correlation of vote buying with GDP per capita is in support of the theories which suggest that clientelistic strategies should decline as a country becomes wealthier (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Stokes et al. 2013). The figure further shows that there is

[12] In fairness, one regional party official in Ghana did describe voters' constant requests for money as one of the most difficult aspect of running a campaign.

considerable variation in vote buying across the region, although all countries recorded some level of vote buying greater than zero. My own interview data suggest that candidates in both Ghana and Kenya are expected to engage in some form of resource distribution if they are to be at all competitive. One Kenyan voter stated to me that voters may tell you that they would like to support a candidate who rides a bicycle, but in truth would not take a politician seriously unless he drives a Range Rover.[13] Indeed, particularly in Kenya, interviewees suggested that distributing cash was one of the means by which a candidate could demonstrate that he or she was a person of status and would thus be influential once in office. One party official stated that the norm "derives from our cultural heritage, which has been now modernized. The traditional African leadership was such that the chief was a benefactor to the community. So if you move around as the chief, seeing your estate, the people you control, you will be moving around with goodies when you reach them, as you move along. People who came to your court brought things in expectation of favors, and you also give some in expectation of their loyalty. When it comes to campaigns, this modern democratic process was brought through the colonialism. So we are trying to modernize the old traditional relationship system. Now, if you want to be a leader…you need to walk around [as] a big bodied person, with a lot of goodies. So you dish money around." [14]

The institutionalized patron-client relationship between political "big men" and voters described by this official is a feature of most of Africa's neopatrimonial regimes (van de Walle 2001). However, the Afrobarometer data above suggest that the practice is more widespread in Kenya than in Ghana. While 7 percent of respondents in Ghana reported experience with vote buying, 32 percent reported such experience in Kenya. My own interview data supports this

[13] Interview, June 18 2014, Nairobi.
[14] Interview, June 25, 2014, Nairobi.

finding. I suggest in the historical chapters that because Kenya's political liberalization in the 1990s took place in an environment of economic decline and weak, highly personalized political parties, the ruling KANU government and its competitors relied on vote buying more heavily than did parties in Ghana.

Critically, interview participants offered a variety of answers when asked whether they felt distributing cash actually influenced vote choice. Opposition parties in both Ghana and Kenya have used slogans during their campaigns encouraging voters to accept cash from all parties then vote for their preferred candidate. And if voters are in fact rational actors maximizing their utility, this is how we should expect them to behave. The fact that opposition parties have been able to unseat incumbents suggests that vote buying is not enough to guarantee victory at the polls. An interviewee in Kenya recounted the story of a particular MP candidate who was very wealthy and devoted tremendous resources to distributing cash. However, the fact that he was a political novice and had few links with the community meant that his displays of wealth came across as arrogant, and he ultimately lost the election despite voters' willingness to accept his payments.[15] In a second instance, during my interview with a former gubernatorial candidate in the 2013 election in Machakos County, Kenya, he recounted an interaction with voters where his convoy approached a village to find a crowd of voters waiting. Mistaking him for one of his competitors, they were displaying the paraphernalia of a different candidate, expecting the candidate to distribute cash to them. Upon realizing which candidate was in the convoy, the voters quickly fled, then returned with the correct paraphernalia and promptly requested payment.[16]

[15] Interview, May 14, 2014, Nairobi.
[16] Interview, July 2, 2014, Nairobi.

This suggests that despite the presence of cash distribution during elections, politicians lack the ability to monitor voters' compliance with their end of the bargain. In their study of clientelism in Latin America, Stokes et al. (2013) find that parties that regularly distribute patronage to voters actually rely on extensive networks of brokers to ensure that voters reward the party's largesse with their loyalty. Simply put, machine politics is required for this type of clientelism to be a successful political strategy. If we look at parties in Africa, very few meet the criteria of political machines, including those in Ghana, which, while much stronger than those in Kenya, simply do not have the monitoring capabilities of Latin American parties. While the distribution of resources during elections has become part of the political culture in many African countries (particularly so in Kenya), it would be a mistake to focus solely on vote buying as the means by which parties attract voters. I examine in more detail the available Afrobarometer data in the empirical chapters but ultimately argue that the key differences in campaigning rest elsewhere.

Campaign Strategies and Electoral Violence

Violence has been a feature of elections in several African countries since the widespread transition to multiparty rule in the early 1990s. Straus and Taylor (2012) find that about 20 percent of elections in Africa between 1990 and 2008 have been characterized by relatively high levels of violence. About 80 percent of these violent elections experience high levels of violence in the pre-vote period, that is, while parties are campaigning. The vast majority of this pre-vote violence is perpetrated by security forces or groups loyal to the ruling party (72 percent).

The four elections examined in this study did not witness high levels of violence in the pre-vote period, and thus electoral violence is not explicitly considered as part of campaign

strategies as I have conceptualized them here. Over the course of its six elections since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, Ghana has not witnessed any high levels of electoral violence. Kenya on the other hand, despite having only low levels of violence prior to elections in 2002 and 2007, experienced high pre-vote violence in 1992 and 1997, and high post-election violence in 2007 (Straus & Taylor 2012, 27). The threat of violence during campaigns, even if it does not fully materialize, is therefore undoubtedly a feature of Kenyan elections.

In the empirical chapters below, I suggest that Kenya's propensity for electoral violence is at least in part due to the more explicitly ethnic nature of the political discourse surrounding its campaigns. I argue that this heightened level of ethnic campaigning is due to candidates' reliance on ethnic intermediaries, a pattern of campaigning that encourages mobilization along ethnic lines and the identification of rival ethnic groups. This is not to say that Ghana and Kenya do not have additional differences between them that have influenced their levels of electoral violence. As the historical chapters show, Kenya's history as a settler colony and the subsequent controversies over land redistribution play an important role in its political violence. However, Ghana is not without its own conflicts regarding localized issues, including land and chieftaincy disputes which have led to periodic outbreaks of violence. Yet campaigns in Ghana have nowhere near the militant and extreme campaign rhetoric seen in Kenya. The chapters on Ghana suggest that this outcome is at least partially mitigated by a preference for the use of party structures during campaigns as opposed to ethnic spokesmen.

Dissertation Outline

The remainder of the dissertation develops the arguments presented here as they relate to elections in Ghana and Kenya. Chapters 2 and 4 give the necessary historical context to

elections in each country. In each historical chapter, I emphasize two topics in particular. First, I discuss the development of the politically relevant ethnic cleavages, and in particular how particular groups have come to be perceived as politically and economically elite. This will provide the necessary context in understanding contemporary campaign discourse, which in both countries contains accusations of elitism and defenses against these claims. Campaigns in each country are replete with competing interpretations of the key historical events that have shaped current understandings of these ethnic dynamics. I discuss the most influential and commonly debated events in these two historical chapters. The interview data in the empirical chapters shows that the historical construction of ethnic relationships weighs heavily on politicians' minds when they plan their campaigns. Second, I discuss the evolution of each country's party system to explain why Ghana has developed a stable two-party system while Kenya's party system remains unstable. I argue that the key difference is in the nature of the authoritarian regime that preceded political liberalization in each country. Because chapter 6 discusses the effects of party system institutionalization on campaign strategies, it is important to discuss why party system institutionalization can be taken to be an exogenous variable.

Chapter 3 examines campaign strategies in Ghana's 2008 and 2012 elections. Chapter 5 examines Kenya's elections in 2002 and 2007. In each of these empirical chapters, I use both the content analysis data and the interview data to illustrate the validity of my arguments. While the content analysis data is used more to demonstrate that the variation in strategies is statistically significant, the interview data is used to demonstrate the motivations and incentives facing those responsible for designing campaigns. Importantly, in no interview or other data source did any party official state conclusively that his or her party's preference for certain campaign appeals was due to the ethnic makeup of the party's core supporters. Neither did any interviewees

explicitly point to the structure of their country's party system as the cause of the frequency of overt ethnic appeals in the campaigns. However, I show that when I asked party elites about the challenges and motivations involved in campaigning, the answers give significant weight to these arguments. Chapter 6 explores the argument that party system stability influences the nature of ethnic discourse during campaigns in somewhat more detail. I use Afrobarometer survey data to show that respondents in countries with volatile party systems are more likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms over the course of a political campaign.

CHAPTER 2- HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS IN GHANA

This chapter traces the history behind Ghana's current political party system to establish the necessary background to election campaigns in the Fourth Republic (1992-). Campaign discourse in Ghana is replete with historical references, but unsurprisingly the 'proper' interpretation of particular events is the subject of much controversy. The chapter focuses particularly on three historical processes that continue to influence party behavior today. The first is the emergence of the Asante, and to a lesser extent the Akyem, as the dominant ethnic groups in Ghana. Both are Akan-speaking groups with their geographic homelands in southern Ghana, and both have enjoyed more access to wealth and political power in comparison to Ghana's other ethnic groups. The Asante are the largest ethnic group in Ghana, making up roughly fifteen percent of the population and forming a large majority of the Ashanti Region. However, the Asante's status as a dominant ethnic group is based less on size and more on a strong tradition of ethnic nationalism, military expansion, and economic domination over its neighbors. The Akyem, quite a bit smaller with approximately three percent of the population, claim many of Ghana's most influential politicians and wealthiest businessmen. Despite their small size, Akyems have featured prominently across Ghana's political landscape since the independence era.[17]

The second process is the creation of the current affiliations of particular ethnic groups with each of Ghana's two major parties. Contemporary political discourse in Ghana focuses largely on the affiliations of the Asante and the Akyem with the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the Ewe with the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The Ewe are the second largest ethnic group in Ghana, making up roughly thirteen percent of the population, but largely focused in the

[17] Four of the 'Big Six,' the six leaders of Ghana's independence movement, were Akyems.

Volta Region where Ewes are about seventy-four percent of the local population. These party-ethnicity associations are not without merit. An exit poll of the 2008 election showed that nearly 83 percent of Asante voters and 75 percent of Akyem voters cast their ballots in favor of the NPP. Nearly 72 percent of Ewe voters supported the NDC (Hoffman & Long 2013). However, contrary to popular discourse, these associations do not date back to the beginning of multiparty competition (Fridy 2007). The historical evidence shows that ethnic groups have not reliably formed the same allegiances in each election across the four republics. Thus, the current political discourses that portray party politics as an Asante/Akyem versus Ewe affair need to be placed in their proper context.

The third process is the formation of a relatively stable two-party system. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in Ghana, the NDC and the NPP have proven to be the only viable contenders for the presidency, and between them have controlled no fewer than ninety-five percent of parliamentary seats after each election. The analysis presented here suggests that this is largely due to the circumstances surrounding party formation in the run up to the reintroduction of political liberalization in the early 1990s (Riedl 2014). This stability of political parties in Ghana contrasts markedly with the overall weakness and fractured nature of political parties in Kenya. Later chapters show that differences in party system stability between Ghana and Kenya have significant effects on political campaigns in each country, especially with regards to the frequency and type of ethnic appeals used in each country's campaigns.

The Ashanti Empire and Colonial Rule

Beginning with the founding of the Ashanti Empire in the late eighteenth century, the center of Asante political and cultural authority has been located in Kumasi, the current capital of

the Ashanti Region. With the unification of the eight Asante clans under the rule of the *Asantehene*, the king of the Asante, the Asante replaced the neighboring Denkyira as the most powerful kingdom in the region. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ashanti Kingdom had become the dominant political force across much of modern-day Ghana, seeking to expand its reach from inland Ashanti to the sea in order to maximize the benefits from coastal trade. This led to open warfare between the Asante and several southern ethnic groups, including other Akan-speaking groups that resisted Asante expansion (Priestly 1961). From the kingdoms to the north that it had defeated, the Asante demanded tribute, often in the form of slaves. The subjugation of the north and military expansion in the south created tremendous resentment for the Asante and, in the minds of many, associated Asante politics with imperialism, exploitation, and wealth accumulation (Ladouceur 1979, Asante & Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

British colonialism eventually led to military defeat for the Asante nation and the creation of the Ashanti Protectorate in 1902. However, the growth of the gold trade and the introduction of cocoa and other cash crops into Akan-speaking areas enabled southern Akan elites, especially Asantes and Akyems, access to disproportionately large wealth (Allman 1990, Oelbaum 2004). The recruitment of migrant labor for southern farms and mines continued to create resentment for the wealthy Akans, particularly among northerners. Ladouceur (1979, 49) finds that "like the earlier conflicts between the Northern kingdoms and Asante, the pattern of migration established a type of North-South relation and served to create attitudes which persisted and marred the development of harmonious relations." Unequal access to education under colonialism further meant that most of the early intelligentsia who led the initial calls for independence were southerners.

Founding the Two Traditions: UGCC and CPP

The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was the first major political party in colonial Ghana (Osei 2012). Formed in 1947, the UGCC represented the interests of well-educated southern businessmen and professionals. This elite intelligentsia began the movement for independence behind the relatively conservative call for self-government "in the shortest possible time" (quoted in Apter 1963, 167). The prominent intellectuals and businessmen leading the UGCC, such as Joseph Boakye (J.B.) Danquah, George Alfred Grant, Edward Akufo-Addo, and Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey, were less interested in a popular mass movement and more interested in protecting indigenous business interests and increasing their political clout under the colonial government. Independence was the eventual goal for the UGCC elites, but they thought of themselves as the new intelligentsia of the colony and felt it natural for them to manage the transition to self-rule (Apter 1963, Austin 1964).

By 1949, this conservatism had caused a split within the party, with the more radical General Secretary Kwame Nkrumah breaking away from the UGCC and forming his own Convention People's Party (CPP). The UGCC had recruited Nkrumah to act as its General Secretary based on his reputation as a skillful organizer and communicator, but his preference for direct action and popular mobilization against the colonial government made him largely incompatible with the old guard intelligentsia of the party. In contrast to his UGCC colleagues, who were lawyers, scholars, and businessmen, Nkrumah was a former school teacher. While living in the United States, he had participated in Harlem demonstrations and had developed friendships with African and Caribbean student activists and European leftists (Morrison 2004). His more firebrand, populist approach was rejected by his conservative colleagues.

The 1951 elections pitted the UGCC against the CPP for control over the new Legislative Assembly created by the new 1951 Constitution. It also officially inaugurated competition between what are popularly known today as the "two traditions" of Ghanaian politics, with J.B Danquah (and later Dr. Kofi Busia) and the UGCC representing one side and Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP representing the other. Unfortunately for the UGCC, their previous willingness to negotiate with British colonial officials and an alliance of convenience with several landowning chiefs (despite having previously denounced them as agents of colonialism) made its case for control of the Legislative Assembly somewhat uninspiring. Perhaps even more significantly, when Nkrumah left the UGCC, he took with him the bulk of the UGCC's youth following and quickly allied his movement with previously existing unions, farmer's organizations, and youth groups (Austin 1964).

CPP cadres soon established dozens of local party branches and manned an effective propaganda machine that promoted the party's symbols and campaign slogans. The CPP manifesto contained several attractive phrases that were widely quoted throughout the campaign, including "Seek ye first The Political Kingdom and All things will be added unto it" and "Vote wisely and God will Save Ghana from the Imperialists" (Austin 1964, 131). The party was further strengthened by Nkrumah's "acquaintance with Marxism…His abilities to act as an orator gained him a following among the young, the disadvantaged, the disillusioned, and the idealistic…With the youth groups on his side, and a network of organizations spreading throughout the country, he proposed a political program which seemed to sum up the aspirations of thousands of people" (Apter 1963, 168). With these advantages, the CPP won a decisive victory with thirty-four out of thirty-eight seats in the Legislative Assembly and Nkrumah

serving as Prime Minister. Danquah and the UGCC managed to win only two seats. The UGCC dissolved a short time later.

The election itself made Nkrumah the undisputed leader of the push for independence, but the significance of this initial cleavage between the Danquah/Busia group and the Nkrumahist group deserves some attention. Morrison (2004) argues that this cleavage has been recreated in various iterations in three out of the four subsequent republics in Ghana, with the fleeting Third Republic (1979-1981) as the one exception. The initial cleavage, he argues, created institutional and structural patterns that have proven to be reinforcing over time (Morrison 2004, 438-439). Indeed, each major party today openly claims to be the modern incarnation of a particular tradition, with the NPP claiming the Danquah/Busiaist mantle and the NDC the Nkrumahist mantle. Furthermore, if one examines the personnel associated with each of the two major parties today, the importance of the rivalries in 1951 is difficult to refute. The current chairman of the NPP is Jacob Obetsebi-Lamptey, the son of UGCC co-founder Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey. The NPP's presidential candidate in both 2008 and 2012 was Nana Akufo-Addo, son of Edward Akufo-Addo and nephew of J.B. Danquah. Current NDC President John Dramani Mahama is the son of Emmanuel Adama Mahama, Kwame Nkrumah's Regional Minister for the Northern Region in the First Republic.

However, the exact content and meaning behind each tradition is debated each time Ghanaians go to the polls. Importantly, what is often ignored in contemporary political discourse is that during initial elections in 1951 and 1954, the ethno/regional divisions that characterize politics today were not in place. In 1951, the UGCC, today the reputed 'Asante' party forbearer, won only 1% of the vote in the Ashanti Protectorate. In 1954, the second iteration of this tradition, the Ghana Congress Party, fared only slightly better, winning 9% of the vote in Ashanti

(Fridy 2007). These early incarnations of the Danquah/Busia traditions were not so much ethnic in nature as they were elitist. This element of the tradition is pointed to pejoratively by today's NDC. However, in modern political discourse, this class element is also infused with a particular ethnic element that was not, strictly speaking, present at the founding of the two traditions. A member of the NDC's propaganda team for the 2008 and 2012 elections explained the following to me:

> [The NPP] is a party that is largely, largely Ashanti and Akyem dominated. And that definitely is a baggage they carry. So the Ashanti and Akyem domination and those people historically, the Akyems for example have always thought of themselves as some of the brainy lawyers and stuff like that. Traditionally that is what they thought of themselves, while the Ashantis have thought of themselves, by virtue of the fact that they had access to cocoa and some of the minerals, they tend to look at themselves as relatively richer and wealthier. So there is that feeling of superiority that goes with those tribes, and unfortunately has also permeated into the party because it has been very difficult to disconnect it. While NDC, following up on Kwame Nkrumah, because Kwame Nkrumah really, what we have in NDC, the truth is actually a new Nkrumah reality, really. The same group that was with Nkrumah that has really gravitated, now are in the base of the NDC.[18]

Indeed, later events in the evolution of party politics have helped to create this amalgamation of class-ethnicity-region in popular understandings of the political parties, but during initial elections in 1951 and 1954, these associations were not firmly in place despite current recollections to the contrary. Ghana's Ewe speakers in Trans-Volta Togoland in these early elections (now the Volta Region), although today firmly associated with the Nkrumahist tradition, tended not to think of themselves as a single unified ethnic group. Togoland in fact had its own regional party in the form of the Togoland Congress (TC), which campaigned against the CPP and in favor of re-unification with French Togoland (Austin 1964, 190). By 1954 the TC had grown large enough to win 29 percent of the popular vote in British Togoland, but as a group the Ewe could not be said to firmly be in either tradition's camp.

[18] Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

Thus, in these early elections, the founding parties did not have the substantial followings among each of the largest ethnic groups that their offspring have since developed. Party competition was much more about organizational advantages and successful mobilization of voters. The CPP maintained a significant lead over its competitors in these areas through the 1954 election, winning 72 of 104 seats. Nkrumah remained Prime Minister and maintained a large majority. J.B. Danquah, running under the banner of the Ghana Congress Party, failed to win reelection in his own constituency. The official voice of conservative opposition to Nkrumah fell to Dr. Kofi Busia, a prominent sociology professor-turned-politician. He was, however, the only member of the Ghana Congress Party who was able to secure a seat.

The Rebirth of Asante Nationalism and the National Liberation Movement

With Danquah and most of the intelligentsia decisively beaten for the second time after the 1954 election, the CPP had solidified its position as the only political party with any broad national appeal. But the 1954 election had also created several splits within the CPP. The 104 available seats in the Assembly were not enough to satisfy the demand among CPP aspirants, and several of those who failed to gain CPP nominations for their candidacies chose to contest the seats as independents. Nkrumah, uninterested in seeing his party weakened by defections, quickly labeled these upstarts as "rebels" whose lack of party discipline meant that "firm action had to be taken" (quoted in Austin 1964, 209). Allman (1993, 24) argues that fully 81 of the 160 'independents' who ran in the 1954 election were CPP rebels. CPP dealt with these aspirants swiftly by holding a rally in Kumasi and publically expelling each of them from the party.

This public denunciation was intended to be a dramatic show of the CPP's strength, but it also revealed a nascent discontent within the party. The party simply was not large enough to

accommodate the ambitions of all of its members (Rathbone 1973, Allman 1993). Within the Ashanti Protectorate, criticism of the CPP had become somewhat louder in the lead up to the 1954 election when the CPP government allotted the Ashanti Region 20 percent of the 104 seats to be contested in the 1954 Legislative Assembly election. Ashanti had previously had 25 percent of the seats in the 1951 Council. Allman (1990, 265) argues that Asante representatives found that the new distribution of seats "reflected a total insensitivity to the historic, economic, and political importance of Asante to the Gold Coast. Asante, they argued, should be entitled to no fewer than thirty seats." However, murmurs of discontent in Ashanti moved decisively in the direction of a regional opposition movement on August 10, 1954, when Minster of Finance Komla Agbeli Gbedemah introduced the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds Bill into the Legislative Assembly. The bill proposed a freezing of the price paid to cocoa farmers at 72 shillings per 60-pound bag (Allman 1993, 26). Since the beginning of commercial cocoa farming towards the end of the nineteenth century, agricultural wealth in much of southern Ghana depended on cocoa farming. By 1955 more than half of Ghana's cocoa production came from Ashanti (Allman 1993, 36).

Initially, those most incensed by the new cocoa policy were not the farmers but rather the educated young men of Ashanti, many of them members of the Asante Youth Association (AYA) (Allman 1990). It was in fact these young men who had previously led the CPP's drive into Ashanti prior to the 1951 election. The CPP had been attractive to the youngmen because of its more populist appeal in comparison to the UGCC, but the CPP also offered a chance at political and social mobility, which was in scarce supply under British colonial authorities and traditional chiefs of Ashanti. However, "the freezing of the cocoa price and a development policy that was based on the expropriation of wealth from Asante cocoa farmers only served to

reinforce the youngmen's growing alarm that the CPP was seeking to build its kingdom on the backs of Asantes without giving the youngmen of Asante a voice in that kingdom or allowing them to reap its rewards" (Allman 1990, 272). On September 19, 1954, the National Liberation Movement, an overtly Asante nationalist movement, was officially founded in a ceremony in Kumasi in front of 40,000 people to challenge the CPP's hegemony over the new political scene.

In the years leading up to the 1956 election, the NLM would campaign under the banner of *Asante Kotoko* (porcupine), historically the symbol of the Ashanti Empire's war machine that had subdued most of southern Ghana in the nineteenth century. The youngmen could count on the support of the former Asante 'rebels' who had been expelled from the CPP as well as a growing class of urban Asante businessmen who found themselves locked out of the CPP's overstaffed patronage networks (Rathbone 1973). They soon looked to the *Asantehene*, the monarch of the Asante, and Ashanti paramount chiefs. The young men "turned to the paramount chiefs of Asante in an effort to legitimize their movement, culturally and politically, against Nkrumah. They believed that the support of the chiefs was an ideological necessity: the chiefs would bring with them the support of the spirits and ancestors of the entire nation and the struggle against Nkrumah would become the struggle of the Asante nation against political slavery, economic slavery and 'black imperialism'" (Allman 1990, 272). To demonstrate the importance of the Asante traditional authorities to the movement, they made one of the *Asantehene's* senior linguists, Bafuor Osei Akoto, the chairman of the NLM.

As the NLM gained momentum, it was joined by Kofi Busia, the leader of the opposition in the Legislative Assembly, and himself an Asante. J.B. Danqua, although an Akyem and a member of the Ghana Congress Party, spoke out publicly in favor of the movement and the growing regional movements which sought to challenge the centralizing CPP with calls for a

federal constitution. The movement further galvanized in October of 1954 when Emmanuel Yaw Baffoe, propaganda secretary of the NLM and former CPP rebel, was stabbed to death in Kumasi by CPP regional propaganda secretary K. A. Twumasi-Ankrah. The murder caused mass demonstrations across Kumasi, and although the motive for the killing remained unclear, the NLM was happy to portray it as a CPP-backed assassination. The General Secretary of the NLM R.R. Amponsah would later say that Baffoe's murder "had sown the true spirit of nationalism in and reminded Ashantis of their past glorious history to press for building the nation anew" (quoted in Allman 1993, 63). An editorial in the Ashanti-based *Pioneer* newspaper at the time stated: "Our ancestors fought and spilled their dear blood to crystallize this Ashanti of which we are so proud…It is for us, Ashanti nationalists today to protect and defend those precious things that our ancestors have handed down to us. It is for us to stand upright and save the Ashanti nation…Baffoe's death should not be in vain" (quoted in Allman 1993, 63).

The 1956 election offered opposition parties the opportunity to capitalize on growing discontent with Nkrumah's supposed dictatorial ambitions and allegations of corruption within the CPP. The goal for the opposition was to elect enough members of the Assembly such that a federal constitution could be passed that would guarantee political autonomy for Ashanti, British Togoland, the Northern Territories, with the federal interests of Togoland and the Northern Territories represented by the Togoland Congress and the Northern Peoples' Party respectively. It was felt that this was the best way to protect against future assaults from Nkrumah and the CPP. However, defeating the CPP in the Legislative Assembly would require the NLM to win several seats in swing regions outside of Ashanti, as the Togoland Congress and the Northern People's Party did not run any candidates outside of their respective strongholds. The NLM would therefore have to walk the delicate line of generating nationalist fervor within Ashanti

while also broadening their message when campaigning outside of the region. In the swing constituencies of the Colony, the Ashanti nationalist appeal "was understandably kept at a minimum since it was thought (quite rightly) that this might damage the party's alliances beyond Ashanti" (Austin 1964, 333).

This proved to be highly problematic, as the NLM conspicuously glorified Asante political and cultural history, which inextricably bound with Ashanti's previous conquests of its neighbors. At its height, the Ashanti Empire had made heavy use of slave labor from those it conquered to the north and later had attempted to expand its reach to the coast. This brought it into conflict with coastal Akans, particularly the Fante, who acted as middlemen between the European traders and inland Ashanti (Priestly 1961, Asante & Gymah-Boadi 2004). Austin (1964, 344-345) argues that as voters in these swing regions "listened to the propaganda coming out of the Ashanti capital, and saw preparations being made for the extension of the party in the Colony, they saw the NLM not as the farmer's friend but as the spearhead of a new Ashanti invasion of the south. This alarm was widespread in the western area of the Colony, which stretched from Ashanti through Assin to Cape Coast, where cocoa was of secondary importance and stories of the havoc wrought by Ashanti armies in the nineteenth century were not yet forgotten." Similarly, Allman (1993, 98) argues that "the fact remained that the very 'nationalism' the leadership had to reinforce in order to consolidate the NLM's position in Asante was the very 'nationalism' capable of alienating the external, non-Asante support so essential to the constitutional strategy" (Allman 1993, 98). Nkrumah and the CPP "made skillful use of a local suspicion of Ashanti intensions, and countered the NLM demand for a higher cocoa price with the offer of loans through the Cocoa Purchasing Company" (Austin 1964, 342).

This early strategy of using Asante nationalism as a fear tactic against an Asante-supported party continues to shape Ghanaian politics. Of the influence of these initial partisan battles on contemporary politics, a member of the NPP's campaign stated during my interview with him:

> Part of our politics, the genesis of part of our politics, has been rooted in ethnicity because around the struggle of independence, the time of the struggle of independence, also embedded in that was the struggle for economic rights. The center of the country, the Ashanti Region, the center of the country, largely fought on the issue of cocoa. They sweat and toil in producing cocoa, and the tax, because cocoa has been taxed around 60 percent, and the farmers were in revolt, I mean Shaye's Rebellion kind of attitude…And the twist that was put on there was that 'the people in Ashanti don't want the rest of the country to develop. They want to keep it for themselves'…The spin on it alienated the rest of the country from Ashanti basically, and that has sort of deepened over time.[19]

Unsurprisingly, the NLM proved unable to attract support outside of its stronghold in the 1956 election and won only twelve seats, all of them in Ashanti, and less than twelve percent of the vote in the Colony. Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004, 27) argue that this was largely because the "propaganda mounted by the CPP highlighting the threat of re-establishment of the Ashanti domination over the country in the event of an NLM victory" proved an effective campaign strategy. The next chapter shows that this strategy has some very clear parallels with the current Fourth Republic, where the NDC frequently labels the NPP in terms not unlike those directed at the NLM. An NPP campaign strategist stated to me that

> the NDC, when they tag us as an Ashanti or an Akan party, they are resurrecting ethnic conflicts of yesteryear. Right? So when they say to the Bronos, that this is an Ashanti party, they are resurrecting the conflict among the Ashantis and the Bronos in the 40s that led to the formation of Brong Ahafo Region in 1958. They are resurrecting the rivalries that have existed between the Fante and the Ashanti from the colonial times, up to 1901. Intense rivalry with the British backing the Fantes. That is what they are resurrecting. When they talk of the Ashanti to the Northerner,…they are talking of the old tribal wars among the Ashanti and Gonja, among the Ashanti and the Dagomba, and so on and so forth. Resurrecting those fears, to me, is not the way you develop the nation.[20]

[19] Interview, August 5, 2012, Accra.
[20] Interview, August 5, 2012, Accra.

In the aftermath of the NLM defeat, several members called for the secession of the Ashanti nation via a direct appeal to the British government. The British government rebuffed any suggestion of secession, and the CPP soon passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act which outlawed any political parties with an ethnic, regional, or religious basis (Austin 1964, 377). The government also removed those chiefs who had supported the NLM (with the exception of the *Asantehene*) and divided Ashanti nearly in half into what are today the Ashanti Region and the Brong-Ahafo Region, fulfilling promise Nkrumah had made to the Brono chiefs of Brong-Ahafo in exchange for their opposition to the NLM. The CPP also passed the Preventive Detention Act allowing the arrest (without trial) of those suspected of harming the security of the state. By 1958, thirty-eight members of the opposition had been places under arrest (Austin 164, 381).

In response to the ban on regional and ethnic parties, the opposition parties combined under the banner of the United Party (UP) with J.B. Danquah as its presidential candidate in the 1960 election. However, Nkrumah enjoyed a tremendous resources advantage through his control of state coffers and his willingness to imprison or send into exile key members of the UP. He defeated the UP handily, winning nearly 90% of the vote. In 1964, Nkrumah banned all opposition and made Ghana into a one party state. It should be noted that Nkrumah's turn towards authoritarianism beginning in 1957 did not go unchallenged. Several violent protests rocked the government and an attempt was made on Nkrumah's life via a grenade attack in August of 1962 as he returned from a trip to Burkina Faso. Nkrumah had UP leaders jailed on multiple occasions, with both Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey and J.B. Danqua dying in custody.

Nkrumah's creation of the one-party state, his imprisonment of his opponents, and the surrounded political violence is the topic of much debate today as parties throw accusations at

one another regarding which party emanates from a more violent and bloody forbearer. To today's NPP, the post-1960 CPP is a dictatorship that is directly responsible for the deaths of their party's founders. To the NDC, the UP lost the 1960 election and responded by attempting to overthrow a legitimate government. A member of the NDC's propaganda team during both the 2008 and 2012 elections stated to me:

> Historically the most violent political party in this country is the opposition NPP, if you look at the days of throwing of bombs and maiming of political opponents. They are there… There are names, and their sons and daughters are practicing politics. Like Obetsebi-Lamptey. His father was manufacturing bombs, and he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment and he died in prison.[21] J.B. Danquah, if you have heard these names, The Danquah Institute, you understand, in the memory of a very serious political persecutionist.[22] You understand? But they have established an institution in his honor. Edward Akufo Addo— the NPP candidate's father, you see...They were persecuting Nkrumah because they found out that they can't defeat Nkrumah if he is alive. They have to kill him.[23]

The Second and Third Republics

On February 24, 1966, in the midst of an economic crisis and growing public discontent, Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup by a group of officers known as the National Liberation Council (NLC). It was in the years after this coup that the Asante-versus-Ewe cleavage began to congeal as a major feature of Ghanaian politics. Although the coup itself was led by three Ewe officers and two Akans, in the lead up to the 1969 elections, it was Akans that became more prominent in government. An attempted coup in 1967, which saw the killing of two Ewe officers, seemed to portray an Ewe plot to maintain power despite their minority status (Brown 1982). The return to multiparty politics reflected these newer cleavages, with the

[21] Jacob Obetsebi-Lamptey is the son of Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey and current chairman of the NPP.
[22] The Danquah Institute is a conservative think tank and policy analysis organization in Accra founded by Gabby Darko, who is a grandson of J.B. Danquah and an NPP insider and campaign strategist.
[23] Interview, August 10, 2012, Accra.

1969 election featuring the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by K. A. Gbedemah, Nkrumah's former Minister of Finance and an Ewe, against the PP led by Kofi Busia, previously leader of the opposition to Nkrumah and a prominent Asante. The campaign, especially in the southern half of the country, "was a confrontation between the 'Ewe party' and the 'Akan party' and it was the mobilization of these ethnic identities which provided the backcloth to the various constituency campaigns…In Ewe areas, where the NAL activists saw their party as the revival of the CPP, they based their campaign on the argument that 'Gbedemah won't deceive us because he is Ewe…Progress Party activists, for their part, referred repeatedly to the 'Ewe menace' image of Gbedemah and his party" (Brown 1982, 58). Busia did not take on the Asante nationalist image of the NLM, but rather "took advantage of anti-Ewe and Ga sentiment fueled by the predominance of these groups in the NLC, and succeeded in rallying the coastal and inland Akan under one umbrella movement. The PP thus…created an openly pan-Akan party" (Chazan 1983, 222).

When the PP defeated the NAL, Busia's government took full advantage of lingering anti-Ewe sentiment. The PP expelled Gbedemah from parliament and excluded Ewes from all Cabinet posts. Ewes fared badly in civil service promotions and the government allotted the Volta Region limited resources for development projects. In perhaps the most widely circulated example, PP Minister of External Affairs Victor Owusu referred to the Ewe community as "notorious for its inward-looking tribalism" (quoted in Brown 1982, 59). Chazan (1983, 223) argues that "the Second Republic therefore heralded a redrawing of the factional lines in the country. The professional-rural elite-planter-Asante faction of the 1950s had expanded in scope to encompass professional-educated youngmen-planter and all Akan groups." In Busia's

government, Asantes, Akyems, and Bronos (Akans from the Brong-Ahafo Region) fared best, controlling ten of fourteen cabinet posts (Fridy 2007, 128).

Busia's government further exacerbated ethnic tensions in the country in its response to increasing public concerns over unemployment and urban crime. In November of 1969, the government passed the Aliens Compliance Order requiring all 'aliens' living in Ghana to obtain the requisite documentation within two weeks or face immediate removal from the country. The new legislation led to the expulsion of over 100,000 aliens, with Ghana's large Muslim population, many of them Hausa speakers, most severely affected (Peil 1971). Many of these so-called aliens were second or third generation residents of Ghana with no other country to call home but found themselves labeled as foreigners nonetheless. As many of these Hausa-speakers had backed the Muslim Association Party when it formed part of Danquah's UP alliance prior to the 1960 election, the Aliens Compliance Order was seen as an outright betrayal. As I discuss more in the next chapter, the passage of the Aliens Compliance Order continues to be invoked by NDC politicians as an example of how politicians associated with the Danqua/Busia tradition cannot be trusted by non-Asantes and non-Akyems.

Busia's government lasted until 1972, when it was overthrown in another military coup. The most immediate cause of the coup was the government's devaluation of the currency, but the regime had developed a reputation for corruption, heavy-handed responses to strikes and other protests, and Asante favoritism. Chazan (1983, 226-227) finds that the "gradual whittling away of Akan solidarity was cast in ethnic terms, in no small measure as a response to the regime's ethnic posture…The expectation of favors from one's own group, and of discrimination by members of other ethnic groups, was intensified by the ethnic key used by the government in the

allocation of access to state-controlled perks and resources." In short, the public began to view the regime as guided by a sense of Asante entitlement.

The new Supreme Military Council (SMC) under General Ignatius Akutu Achempong is generally remembered for its venality and economic mismanagement. The regime made some effort to implement several much-needed reforms, including an attempt at agricultural self-sufficiency dubbed 'Operation Feed Yourself.' However, the regime's policies did not stem the overall economic and political malaise inherited from the Second Republic. Conceding to popular pressure, the military allowed for some political pluralism in the late 1970s, and a wave of strikes and general discontent with the government left the political scene largely in turmoil. Furthermore, Achempong had allowed ethnic cleavages in the ruling elite to largely determine the distribution of jobs and patronage resources. Rivalries between Akans and Ewes were present within the military, and Brown argues that by the late 1970s, "Ewe suspicions of Akan dominance, and the suspicion of Ewes by other Ghanaian communities had [been] so frequently manipulated by the political elites, and had become sufficiently established in popular mythology, as to ensure their re-emergence in national politics as soon as the question arose of replacing the discredited military regime" (Brown 1982, 64). Achempong was first removed by members of his own regime. The SMC regime was then deposed in a coup staged by young Ewe officer Jerry John Rawlings in 1979.

Initially, Rawlings' revolution did little to improve political stability. In what the new military regime deemed a necessary 'house-cleaning exercise,' several military leaders were arrested and executed. Despite being advertised as a 'revolution' to rid the country corruption, quickly took on ethnic undertones. Brown (1982, 65) argues that "Rawlings had identified the corrupt elite, not in class terms as a bourgeoisie to be overthrown, but rather as immoral

individuals who had been corrupted by power; and while their group character was never clearly formulated, the target group was nevertheless popularly identified in either generational terms, as the 'old guard'; or in ethnic terms as the Brong and Ashanti Akans…who were condemned as 'tribalistic, enriching themselves and very selfish.'" As I show in the next chapter, this discourse of 'selfish' and 'tribalistic' wealthy Akans continues to shape campaign content in the Fourth Republic.

To his credit, Rawlings agreed to hold civilian elections and step down from power. The reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1979 saw six parties compete in the June elections, with the People's National Party (PNP) and the Popular Front Party (PFP) emerging as the two strongest. The PNP enjoyed an ethnically diverse backing, and chose Dr. Hilla Limann, a northerner, as its presidential candidate. The PFP, largely made up of former ministers from Kofi Busia's Second Republic government, drew its support largely from southern Akans. With its more widespread support, the PNP won 71 of 140 parliamentary seats, and Limann defeated the PFP's presidential candidate Victor Owosu in a run-off election with 62 percent of the vote. Unfortunately, Limann's government lacked any coherent economic strategy and was plagued by allegations of corruption and malfeasance. The Third Republic lasted just over two years.

Jerry Rawlings' Second Coming and the PNDC

On December 31, 1981, Rawlings launched his second coup. More than a house cleaning exercise, Rawlings and his associates billed his so-called 'second coming' as a full scale revolution in which they had no intent of relinquishing power in the short term. The new military government, called the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) promised to implement a 'people's democracy,' which although lacking any political parties or elections,

would recover the country's wealth from the economic elite on behalf of the Ghanaian people. The discourse that surrounded the PNDC was built around a broad populist, anti-imperial, anti-corruption ideology that blamed Ghana's economic predicament on the country's economic and political oligarchs.

This rhetoric was not radically different from Ghana's previous military governments. However, Rawlings' military government differed from pervious regimes in critical institutional ways that would have lasting impacts on Ghana's party system in the 1990s. Unlike his predecessors, Rawlings and the PNDC used their control over the state institutions to mobilize grassroots support for their political and economic reforms. This included investing in local revolutionary organs in towns and villages as well as in workplaces. There were called People's Defense Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defense Committees (WDCs). To help fund these party organs, as well as make them relevant to their local populations, the regime encouraged both WDCs and PDC to establish communal farms that would generate revenue to finance local development projects. In urban areas, "the PDCs were able to fill a significant vacuum. Although the cities already had their metropolitan authorities, the latter performed very few of the functions that were required of them. There was no proper system for coping with refuse, urban sanitation was usually inadequate and clogged gutters provided an ideal breeding ground for mosquitos…Neighborhood PDCs established their local credentials by addressing themselves to some of these perennial problems of urban living" (Nugent 1995, 68).

In the workplace, members of WDCs were encouraged to punish business owners and managers for corruption, hoarding or smuggling goods, or otherwise violating state regulations. The PNDC's goal "was to create organs of the party-state that could bring the population in, to potentially include all Ghanaians previously divided by the past political upheavals and contests

for power. The PNDC sought to establish a new social base of support as a foundation for its rule, through decentralization and incorporation of the masses into the party and revolutionary organs at the grass-roots level" (Riedl 2014, 87). The involvement of lower orders of society in the Revolution was not without controversy, and the Defense Committees were accused of excess violence and intimidation tactics against the populace. But they still represented a form of popular participation in the regime that for many Ghanaians was a welcome alternative from previous regimes.

In additional to the Defense Committees, other important social groups were incorporated into the regime with various state-sponsored organizations. To represent women's interests, the regime created the 31st December Women's Movement. Although at first designed to mobilize women's support for the government, the Movement has had tremendous lasting power and remains in place today. In addition to generating political support, the organization "also sought to organize groups of urban and rural women into cooperatives for the production of consumer items such as soap and *gari*. Furthermore, it took up a range of issues that were of specific concern to women, such as the provision of daycare centres and literacy classes" (Nugent 1995, 145). The Movement was by no means universally accepted by Ghanaian women, as it also served to limit the growth of opposition women's movements that opposed the PNDC (Fallon 2003). Still, by 1987 the Movement had a membership of 250,000 and Nana Konadu Rawlings, Jerry Rawlings' wife, was its National President.

To incorporate Ghana's traditional authorities, especially chiefs, into the regime, the PNDC appointed several chiefs to important government positions and enacted multiple laws to strengthen the authority of chiefs at the local level. Reidl (2014) refers to this strategy of authoritarian rule as "incorporation," where the regime successfully co-opts large segments of

society into the apparatus of the ruling party. This is done by including traditional authorities, socio-economic elites, and other local power brokers into the patronage network of the party. These incentives for compliance are backed up by the coercive apparatus of the state. By "building a strong and ubiquitous party, by incorporating important elements of the preexisting social landscape into the PNDC regime particularly through connections to local notables across the national territory, and by transferring the regime's revolutionary zeal from violence to economic progress, the PNDC built a strong base of usable resources—political social and economic—that justified its existence and consolidated its power" (Riedl 2014, 88).

The strategy of establishing a stable, hierarchical organization was largely successful for the PNDC. It ensured not only that the military government was able to implement its economic reforms, but that the party was able to survive when the political arena was liberalized. Although subservient to the national PNDC structure, local party organs were given enough autonomy to be locally relevant and responsive to communities' needs. In the early 1990s, with both international and domestic pressure growing for the regime to legalize opposition parties, the PNDC recast itself into a civilian party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Rawlings abandoned his military fatigues remade himself into a civilian presidential candidate to contest the 1992 presidential elections. The success of the government's economic recovery plan further boosted popular support as well as provided Rawlings with the necessary patronage resources that could be used to shore up support when the opposition parties coalesced into a united front. The NDC was then able to largely control the transition process to its own advantage rather than yielding to an interim government or being removed by a popular uprising.

Critically, in addition to facilitating its own continued political power throughout the 1990s, the NDC's investment in a lasting party organization encouraged the political opposition

to do the same. Opposition to the PNDC was strongest among the urban elite, including the heads of many important professional organizations, such as the Ghana Bar Association, as well as the older generation of political leaders of the Danqua/Busia tradition. Although formal party politics remained banned throughout the 1980s, these individuals continued to maintain networks of opposition through informal meetings and social functions such as funerals and baptisms, as well as student groups on university campuses (Ayee 2009, Riedl 2014). With increasing calls for the reintroduction of multiparty politics, "these associations and traditions provided a base and national human infrastructure for rapid party organization to mobilize in opposition to the authoritarian incumbent" (Riedl 2014, 181). Regime opponents in rural areas began to have a larger impact beginning with the "no-party" elections for district assemblies in 1988-1989, which provided a forum for voices of political opposition outside the urban base of the opposition.

Perhaps just as importantly, the Rawlings government passed the Political Parties Law in 1992, which required new parties to meet strict criteria be able to register with the electoral commission. Parties needed to present constitutions, pay high registration fees, and provide evidence of party branches across the country. This meant having physical offices and party officials in all 160 districts (Riedl 2014). The intent of the policy was to raise the threshold required for successful opposition mobilization against the government. However, Riedl (2014) finds that by forcing the opposition to invest in a national infrastructure, complete with constituency-level branches and party primaries for presidential and parliamentary candidates, the government gave the opposition incentives to coalesce under a unified party. Largely because of the institutional development of party bases in the late 1980's and early 1990s, Ghana has had a stable two-party system since the adoption of the Fourth Republic's constitution in

April of 1992. In chapter 6, I discuss more the effects of a stable party system with established grassroots organizations on campaign strategy.

Party Politics in the Fourth Republic

The December 1992 election was by no means free and fair. The NDC used its access to state resources to fund a campaign based on continuing the country's economic recovery and emphasizing Rawlings' efforts to reduce corruption and improve rural living standards. The NPP picked longtime democracy advocate and prominent academic Albert Adu Boahen as its presidential candidate. Boahen enjoyed significant support in urban areas, but he was seen as an Asante elitist, a feature which the NDC repeatedly emphasized (Elischer 2014). The NPP did draw attention to the NDC's record as a military government with a poor human rights record, but Boahen's discussion of private sector reforms had little appeal outside of the Ashanti Region. The party lacked the resources needed to seriously challenge the NDC at the polls, and was only able to garner 30 percent of the popular vote to Rawlings' 58.4 percent. In protest of the conduct of the election, the NPP boycotted the subsequent legislative elections, leaving the NDC still in firm control of government.

Between 1992 and 1996, the NPP worked to increase its national appeal. John Kufuor replaced Boahen as the new presidential candidate and adopted a more inclusive national rhetoric, abandoning the more academic and intellectual approach of Boahen (Elischer 2014). Although also a wealthy Asante, Kufuor made more effort to campaign outside of the Ashanti Region, in particular in the northern regions of the country. Although still well short of the NDC's financial resources, the 1996 election saw Kufuor and the NPP win 40 percent of the

popular vote. The NPP also won 60 of the 200 seats in the parliament, firmly establishing itself as the unified opposition to the NDC.

With Rawlings approaching the end of his term limit in 2000, he made it clear that he would step down from power and placed his political support behind his vice-president, John Atta Mills as his successor. Mills, a former university professor, was much more soft-spoken than Rawlings and his campaign lacked the passionate, populist appeal that Rawlings had used in 1992 and 1996. With Rawling's backing, Mills was also seen as an extension of Rawlings and the previous authoritarian regime. During its campaign, the NPP reinforced the idea that a vote for Mills would simply mean a continuation of Rawlings' authority. In addition to calls for meaningful political change, the NDC faced several unexpected financial hurdles. In the year prior to the election, significant international price drops in both gold and cocoa combined with an increase in oil to limit state revenue and reduce economic growth. Furthermore, Ghana received significantly less in foreign aid in 1999-2000 than it had in previous years (Briggs 2012). The NDC was therefore unable to ensure electoral victory through patronage distribution.

Kufuor's campaign emphasized the need for real political change and focused on promises to improve both economic and political rights (Ayee 2002). It also highlighted the various corruption charges leveled at members of the ruling party. In a runoff election between Kufuor and Mills, Kufuor won 56.90 percent of the vote. The NPP further won 99 seats in parliament to the NDC's 92 seat. The NDC conceded defeat, marking the first peaceful transition of power to an opposition party in Ghana's history.

Between 2000 and 2004, the NPP government instituted several economic reforms that qualified for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. The NPP also began plans for a national healthcare program, which they argued would be an improvement over

the cash-and-carry healthcare system under Rawlings. The plan was ultimately passed into law in 2003 as the National Health Insurance Scheme. The NPP under Kufuor again won the elections in 2004 under a slogan of "so far, so very good," emphasizing the reforms it had implemented as well as its commitment to democracy. The NDC again chose John Atta Mills as its presidential candidate. However, the party was beset by internal rivalries and had little to offer in its campaign other than criticism of the NPP's market reforms as favoring only a small minority of Ghana's citizens. Mills was only able to marginally improve on his previous campaign, winning 45 percent of the vote.

The period from 1992-2004 thus saw a gradual improvement in the quality of Ghana's democracy. However, whereas elections in 1992 and 1996 were characterized largely by debates on democratic reform, election fairness, and human rights, as the elections became more competitive, ethnicity began to play a more important role. Tonah (2009, 72) argues that "if the use of ethnicity in the 1992 and 1996 elections was rather covert, it became very obvious in the 2000 and 2004 elections. For example, during the 2004 general elections, the NPP's slogan in the Ashanti Region was 'Operation 39 seats,' and the party's (unofficial) campaign strategy indicated clearly to the electorate that it would be treacherous and ludicrous for any person of Asante origin to vote for the Ewe-dominated NDC party." The NPP's accusations of ethnic favoritism by the NDC were largely reciprocated, with the NDC portraying the NPP as party for only the Akan elite. As I show in the next chapter, this ethnic dynamic has become perhaps the major defining feature of elections in Ghana. The NPP has attempted to use its policy accomplishments to good use during both the 2008 and 2012 election campaigns, but it has been unable to shake off the perception that it is a party that serves the needs of the Asante and Akyem elite.

CHAPTER 3- CAMPAIGNING IN GHANA'S 2008 AND 2012 ELECTIONS

In this chapter, I look in detail at campaign strategies from Ghana's most two most recent national elections. The findings strongly suggest that the historical associations of ethnic elitism with Akan elites, in particular Asantes and Akyems, have significant effects on campaign strategies. Because of this history discussed in the previous chapter, many Ghanaians would agree with the analysis of Oelbaum (2004, 266), who argues that "there is a rich literature of the Asante emphasis on wealth, its perceived social benefit and the importance of its display…The association with wealth and superior status is deeply ingrained in Asante culture." Tonah (2009, 68), somewhat more bluntly, argues that "the Asante are considered by others to be arrogant, money-minded, flamboyant and tribalistic." I show below that this feature of ethnic politics is one of the most important dynamics of party competition in contemporary Ghana.

Table 3.1 shows the approximate ethnic makeup of modern Ghana. Comprising the Akan are several sub-groups, the largest of which is the Asante, the ethnic group of President Kufuor, with roughly 15 percent of the population. On their own, the Asante are the largest single ethnic group in the country and makeup the vast majority of the population in the Ashanti Region of central Ghana. The Akyem are somewhat smaller with 3 percent of the population and do not have the same history of military conquest as the Asante, but have historically been among the wealthier and more politically powerful members of Ghanaian society. The historical homeland of the Akyem is in the Eastern Region of the country, although they are closely politically and culturally aligned with the Asante. The findings in the chapter show that the party with the core of Asante/Akyem support adopts campaign strategies that are consistent with the theory.

Table 3.1: Ethnic Makeup of Ghana*

Ethnic Group	*Approximate Percent of Population*
Akan (total)	49%
-Asante	15%
-Fante	10%
-Brono (Brong)	5%
-Akyem	3%
-Other Akan	16%
Ewe	13%
Ga-Adangme	8%
Dagomba	4%
Dagarte	4%
Others	22%

*Percentages are based on the 2000 Housing and Population Census (*Ghana Statistical Service*) and should be considered approximate.

The 2008 Campaign

The NPP began its campaign in 2008 with a number of positive developments in Ghana for which it could claim credit. Since beating the NDC in 2000 to mark the first changeover of power in the Fourth Republic, President John Kufuor and the NPP had overseen an economy that had grown at nearly 6 percent per year (OECD 2008), and the government had introduced several popular national programs. Among these were a school feeding program, a capitation grant for schools designed to reduce tuition fees, and a national healthcare plan entitled the National Health Insurance Scheme. Additionally, international donors consistently cited Ghana an exemplary case of a consolidated African democracy, and President Kufuor had been given several international awards and accolades (Gyimah-Boadi & Yakah 2012).

However, the opposition NDC could point to several shortcomings of the NPP government. Multiple corruption scandals dogged the NPP as it began its party primaries to select its parliamentary and presidential candidates. For example, the state-owned telecommunications company had been privatized and sold at what was considered a highly

undervalued price, with rumors of bribery surrounding the government officials involved and the NDC promising to renegotiate the agreement should it win power.[24] Furthermore, at least on the surface, several NPP insiders appeared to be living rather ostentatious lifestyles, and popularly-circulated copies of what were said to be the bank statements of members of government suggested that the NPP had used its eight years in office to enrich its members.[25] Although such documents were likely fake, the surrounding debate fed into the NDC's claims of massive government corruption. President Kufuor himself was implicated in the suspicious sale of an Accra hotel which saw his son became the new owner.[26]

In tandem with these allegations, the NPP faced accusations that it had become a party that only served the interests of ethnic Akans, and specifically of elite Akans from the Asante and Akyem sub-groups. For example, by 2005 President Kufuor, himself an Asante, had a 29-member cabinet consisting of 20 Akans (69 percent), despite the Akan making up less than half of the national population (Elischer 2013). In his study on ethnicity in the Fourth Republic, Tonah (2009, 69) argues that "since 2000, the perception has prevailed that President Kufuor has favored the Asante/Akan as well as his close relations and friends in the distribution of top political, civil/public service and military positions." In fairness, the NPP had won elections in 2000 and 2004 with relatively widespread support outside of its stronghold in the Ashanti Region, the regional homeland of the Asante, and since its inception it has maintained several non-Akans in leadership positions within party.[27] However, as the party entered the 2008 elections, these were not enough to overcome the popular view that the party catered specifically to Asantes and Akyems.

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[24] "Corruption claims and rows tarnish Accra's Record," *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 50, No. 29, 2009.
[25] Interview, June 27, 2012, Accra.
[26] "NDC on War Path," *The Chronicle*, January 10, 2008, Accra.
[27] For example, the current National Chairman and National Organizer are both Gas.

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of respondents by ethnic group in the Round 4 and Round 5 *Afrobarometer* surveys who answered that they "feel close" to a political party. This measure captures the approximate ethnic differences in the bases of support for each party. The largest six ethnic groups making up each party's base of support are listed. Of those who answered that they felt close to the NPP in the Round 4 survey, taken prior to the 2008 election, 60.9 percent are Akan. For the Round 5 survey, taken prior to the 2012 election, 78.4 percent of those who felt close to the NPP are Akan. Although the *Afrobarometer* data does not disaggregate Akan respondents by subgroup, a recent survey by Hoffman & Long (2013) suggests that much of the Akan affiliation with the NPP is due to the overwhelming support given to the NPP by the Asante and the Akyem. In their survey, 82.7 percent of Asantes and 75.0 percent of Akyems reported voting for the NPP presidential candidate in 2012 (Hoffman & Long 2013, 136).

The Ewe, the second largest ethnic group in Ghana, and the group from which former president and NDC founder Jerry Rawlings hails, has supported the NDC throughout the Fourth Republic. The Ewes predominate in the Volta Region, which serves as the NDC's regional stronghold during elections. Appendix 3.1, which breaks down the partisan support of each ethnic group in the Afrobarometer surveys, shows this consistent Ewe support for the party. However, as Table 3.2 shows, the NDC draws its core of support from a much more multiethnic base than does the NPP, including significant support from non-Asante or Akyem Akans.

Table 3.2: Breakdown of Party Support by Ethnic Group

Ghana- Before 2008 Election
(*Afrobarometer* Round 4)

NDC			**NPP**	
Ethnic Group	*Percent*		*Ethnic Group*	*Percent*
Ewe/Anglo	28.9		Akan	60.9
Akan	20.4		Ga/Adangbe	6.3
Ga/Adangbe	12.9		Ewe/Anglo	6.1
Dagomba	11.1		Dagomba	5.1
Kusasi	2.2		Nzema	1.6
Mamprusi	2.2		Frafra	1.6
Others	22.3		Others	18.4

-225 Respondents -430 Respondents

Ghana- Before 2012 Election
(*Afrobarometer* Round 5)

NDC			**NPP**	
Ethnic Group	*Percent*		*Ethnic Group*	*Percent*
Akan	31.0		Akan	78.4
Ewe/Anglo	21.4		Dagomba	4.8
Dagomba	10.0		Ewe/Anglo	4.5
Dagarti	9.1		Ga/Adangbe	2.9
Ga/Adangbe	7.4		Other Northern Tribes	1.9
Konkomba	3.2		Dagarti	1.6
Others	17.9		Others	5.9

-593 Respondents -693 Respondents

It would be an overstatement to say that the only meaningful political cleavages in Ghana are based around ethnicity, and several studies suggest that voters in Ghana consider a variety of factors in deciding whom to vote for, including the state of the economy, the prevalence of corruption, and parties' policy proposals (Lindberg & Morrison 2008, Ferree et al. 2009). Furthermore, as Appendix 3.1 shows, most ethnic groups not associated with either party do not vote predictably vote one way or the other. However, since its inception the Fourth Republic has been characterized by debates around whether certain ethnic groups receive disproportionate benefits from each political party, with the NPP proving to be particularly vulnerable to

accusations of favoritism towards its core Asante and Akyem supporters. Importantly, whether or not a party is thought to favor some ethnic groups over others may have little basis in reality; however, as my interview subjects consistently reminded me, politics is often about perception. These accusations had particular resonance in the lead up to the 2008 elections given the corruption scandals facing the NPP, which fed into stereotypes of elite Asantes and Akyems as being selfish, arrogant, untrustworthy, and ethnically exclusive. As one member of the NDC's 2008 campaign team said to me when I asked about the differences in ethnic support for each party:

> You can see by and large where NDC draws its strength. It draws its strength from people who are scattered across the length and breadth of the country and also people who have a certain natural--how shall I call it--resentment towards that thinking of the elitism that unfortunately permeates from the NPP historically. They have not been able to completely distance themselves out of it. But there are many genuine humble people in the NPP. That is not to say that whole party is full of elites and so on. There are very humble people. But unfortunately it is not just a perception. It has crystallized over decades and continues. For instance, it is impossible to get anybody who is not an Ashanti or an Akyem to emerge out of the leadership of the NPP. It's never happened and it's not going to happen easily. Whereas with the NDC, basically you can have anyone.[28]

Similarly, although without referring specifically to Asantes or Akyems, another member of the NDC campaign team stated:

> The NDC is very free. We don't mind whatever or whoever you are. We will talk to you. We approach you. We appreciate everybody. And you know, people like that more than those who are so arrogant…That is how come each and everyone likes the party, especially the other tribes. You know, I am sorry to use these words—in this country, there are areas that people are—excuse me to use that word—looked at like inferiors. You understand? People are looking and seeing that they are inferior. And those people, you know what I mean, are human beings. So if you don't recognize him, he won't recognize you. So he will go to those who will recognize him…So that is how come we have so many

[28] Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

> tribes who like the NDC party, because in NDC party there is no discrimination. Let me use that word. We don't discriminate.[29]

Of course, the NPP is not above accusing their opponents of favoritism and has often attempted to portray the NDC as serving only the interests of Ewes and other inhabitants of the Volta Region. However, such accusations carry much less weight with the electorate given the more dispersed nature of the NDC's core of support and the absence of the history of economic and political dominance which plagues the elite of the NPP. Furthermore, the NDC has not fielded any Ewe presidential or vice-presidential candidates since 1996, making such accusations of Ewe favoritism largely untenable.

The particular intra-party rivalries that plagued the NPP's presidential primary in 2008 did little to assuage public concerns over the party's ethnic core. As presidential hopefuls wooed party delegates from across the country, deep divisions emerged between the followers of the two frontrunners, Alan Kyeremetan, the former Minister of Trade and Industry, and Nana Akufo-Addo, the former Attorney General, with President John Kufuor, having reached the end of his term limits, supporting his longtime associate Kyeremetan.[30] Kyeremetan's backing from Kufuor largely placed the Asante contingent of the party against the Akyem contingent and the financial muscle of Akufo-Addo, one of the wealthiest men in Ghana and a relative of three of the four Akyem members of the "Big Six."[31] Given that John Kufuor descends from Asante royalty and Nana Akufo-Addo descends from Akyem royalty,[32] the ethnic dynamics of the rivalry were impossible to ignore. Akufo-Addo eventually emerged victorious, although he

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[29] Interview, August 12, 2013, Kumasi.
[30] Alan Kyeremetan is half Asante, half Fante.
[31] Akufo-Addo is the son of Edward Akufo-Addo, the grandnephew of Joseph Boakye Danqua, and the nephew of William Ofori-Atta.
[32] John Kufuor's father was an Oyoko clan royal in the Ashanti Region. Nana Akufo-Addo's mother was the daughter of the Okyenhene Nana Ofori-Atta I.

faced outspoken criticism from within his own party that he had used his wealth to bribe the party delegates needed to win the nomination.[33] Akufo-Addo's victory further led to a public discussion suggesting that the leadership of the NPP had effectively been taken over by an "Akyem Mafia," which now excluded party members from other ethnic groups (Kennedy 2009).

The animosity surrounding the NPP's primaries contrasted markedly with the selection process from within the NDC, which saw John Atta Mills, Vice-President under Jerry Rawlings and the party's presidential candidate in 2000 and 2004, comfortably win the nomination with widespread support. Mills, himself a Fante and known for his soft-spoken and humble demeanor, had the backing of former President Rawlings, an Ewe, and by picking John Mahama, a Gonja from northern Ghana as his running mate, ensured that the NDC appeared much more inclusive and diverse than the NPP. This image of ethnic inclusiveness, according to one NDC official, was critical to contrast the party with the NPP:

> We must also show that we are far more broad-based. Meaning when we are in office, many more Ghanaians will benefit than they will. Because [the NPP] tends to be too limited to a few places. So naturally they push development to those few places. A lot of it will go back to Ashanti, [it] will go back to Akyem, to Akan enclaves, whereas NDC will absolutely go to those same Akan enclaves because we have support there. But we will also go across to other places.[34]

It should be noted that some studies of Ghanaian politics, contrary to this argument emphasizing the differences in ethnic support between the parties, suggest that both parties in fact have ideological orientations not unlike those found in Europe or the United States, with the NDC being more center-left and the NPP more center-right (Daddieh 2009, Elischer 2012). Indeed, the NDC's party manifesto identifies the party as being social democratic, while the

[33] "Akufo-Addo Splashes 640m," *The Chronicle*, November 28, 2007, Accra.
[34] Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

NPP's manifesto stresses the party's belief in a "property-owning democracy," with many of its founding members prominent businessmen who opposed the Rawlings military regime (Ayee 2009). During my interviews with officials from each party, many confirmed such labels, but only at a very broad level. For example, a member of the NPP's campaign team in 2008 stated that "in this country, no other party can beat us in terms of business. We are business friendly. We are businessmen…We are more pro-business than any other political party, who are mostly on the left."[35] Similarly, a member of the 2008 NDC campaign team stated the following: "We are social democrats. We must ensure that we bring about fairness and equity in the distribution of wealth…We also are abhorring opulence and stuff like that, and so all that we do revolves around a pivot that is our philosophy as social democrats."[36]

Additionally, some of the NDC's campaign rhetoric does employ references to socioeconomic class rather than explicitly to ethnicity or region. One member of the 2008 and 2012 NDC campaign teams phrased the distinction between the parties to me as follows:

> You see, generally, the NPP is seen as an elitist party while our party is a grassroots party. You go to any institution in this country, the managing director, the directors, the chiefs, in those businesses, are most likely to be NPP, while the watchmen, the laborers, the washers, the what not, are more likely to be NDC. This is the type of system that we have here. Their party was formed historically by lawyers and huge business people. Our party came out of revolution, by Rawlings' revolution, mobilizing the masses behind him and then subsequently metamorphosing into a democratic government. So generally our party is more attractive to the downtrodden, the people in the grassroots.[37]

[35] Interview, June 27, 2012, Accra.
[36] Interview, August 15, 2012, Accra.
[37] Interview, July 10, 2013, Accra.

However, more often party officials suggested that any ideological labels, while having some historical relevance, had little meaning during campaigns or in influencing policy decisions of governments. As one member of the NPP's 2008 and 2012 campaign team stated:

> Ideologies and whether it is center right or social democrat doesn't really matter here. I mean Nana [Akufo-]Addo is a realist, apart from what this party's tradition belongs to. For example we still are center-right, but when President Kufuor introduced the National Health Insurance Scheme, he introduced youth employment, he introduced free school feeding, he introduced free maternal care and all that, so that in looking at your situation as a nation, looking at the poverty levels, you can't be that hard and fast center-right. It doesn't work.[38]

More common than references to particular ideological or class differences are attempts to affiliate one's opponent with the negative stereotypes that are popularly associated with its core ethnic groups. For example, a member of the NDC campaign team in 2008 stated his view of his opponents as follows:

> [The NPP] is a party that is largely, largely Ashanti and Akyem dominated.[39] And that definitely is a baggage they carry. So the Ashanti and Akyem domination and those people historically--the Akyems for example have always thought of themselves as some of the brainy lawyers and stuff like that. Traditionally that is what they thought of themselves, while the Ashantis have thought of themselves, by virtue of the fact that they had access to cocoa and some of the minerals, they tend to look at themselves as relatively richer and wealthier. So there is that feeling of superiority that goes with those tribes, and unfortunately has also permeated into the party because it has been very difficult to disconnect it.[40]

Similarly, another NDC campaign team member stated:

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[38] Interview, July 19, 2012, Accra.
[39] In Ghana, Ashanti and Asante are often used interchangeably, although technically Ashanti refers to the Ashanti Region and Asante refers to the predominant ethnic group in the region.
[40] Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

> Since the NPP was formed, the NPP-UP tradition, you've either come from Ashanti Region or Eastern Region.[41] So all of that has, as it were, deepened the perception, and virtually crystalized it, and you know politics is a lot of perception. And look, you don't have a chance if you are not an Ashanti or if you are not from the Eastern Region…You don't really belong. You are not part of their forefathers…So there is always that perception that also these guys are elitist and they—it's a small clique, and if you are not from that elitist clique, forget it.[42]

The NPP's rhetoric in their portrayals of the NDC is less based less on cultural stereotypes around ethnicity and more based on the negative aspects of the PNDC military government under Jerry Rawlings, which came to power in a bloody coup and was thought to be a largely pro-Ewe regime (Fridy 2007). When I asked one NPP official about how his party portrays the NDC to the public, he stated.

> When they are in power, the corruption,…the cronyism, it's also there, because you go to government and it's packed with a certain group of people. Either they are relatives of the president, friends of the president, or they are from a particular tribe. And also, they don't understand the rule of law. They take things into their hands…Lawlessness…Mayhem was visited on the nation. You get NDC and it vandalizes state property...So that is the kind. Then from their tradition, they were born out of a coup d'etat. Lots of blood was spilled, so we tell people about them. This is the group of people who want to rule you.[43]

Because Mills had been Rawlings' Vice-President, the NPP consistently associated Mills with Rawlings throughout the campaign period, suggesting that electing Mills would mean electing a pawn of Rawlings and the other Ewe leaders in the NDC.[44] However, the NPP officials with whom I spoke acknowledged that the associations of their own party with ethnic elitism did tremendous damage to their own credibility with the electorate. Indeed, rather than refuting the historical dominance of NPP's ethnic core, many of my interviewees accepted that

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[41] The three Akyem states are located in the Eastern Region.
[42] Interview, August 8, 2013, Accra.
[43] Interview, August 13, 2013, Kumasi.
[44] "Rawlings Can't Dictate to Me, Mills Tells Dunkwa Chiefs," *The Chronicle*, July 16, 2008, Accra.

some of the historical grievances were real, and something that they needed to take into account in their campaign. For example, one NPP regional campaign leader stated:

> The NDC tends to use ethnic politics, and pushing people against others. So they create—making the claim that it looks like we are Asante. They don't even say that it is an Akan party. They are specific—it is an Asante party…They push it. And Professor Mills was doing it during the campaign in 2008. That was the biggest thing we confronted…You see historically, Asantes, they were war-like historically, and by 1798, they conquered about two thirds of the nation of present day Ghana. So they ruled all those places. So people think that they lorded over them. So there is that historical hatred for them, because when somebody comes to lord over you, then [the NDC] tells you, 'these were the people who came to enslave your grandparents.' You see what I am talking about. So they make the Asante look bad in the eyes of others. So when you tag the party with that, definitely, they know that that might influence those who believe in that historical antecedent. That is a big thing.[45]

Grievances against wealthy southern Akans are particularly pronounced in the three northern regions of Ghana,[46] where several northern ethnic groups have historically faced military confrontations and slave raids from southern Akan groups, in particular the Asante. Northern Ghana still remains poorer and less developed than the rest of the country, and many northerners migrate to southern Ghana in search in work. Since its inception, the NPP has struggled to attract northern voters, and when I asked a member of the NPP's Northern Region campaign team why his party has never performed particularly well in the region, he answered:

> They think our party is Akan-dominated. And the Akans, over the years, have looked down upon the northerners. In those days, the northerners will travel--even now--they go there to work in the cocoa farms, they go there to wash things, they go there to do the menial jobs, and the land owners and the owners of the factories, industries, and the farms are the Akans. And then, 'oh, get up and go do this, foolish people!' You see, they have now taken that, and they are punishing the party because of that…You in America are lucky. Everybody is one. There is no tradition, there is no conflict, everybody is going by the law, everybody is

[45] Interview, August 13, 2013, Kumasi.
[46] Northern Ghana constitutes what is today the Northern Region, the Upper East Region, and the Upper West Region.

> going by the broader picture. But for us, our kingdoms established because we fought wars. And if you have fought wars with people centuries ago, in the minds of the people, we are still fighting. And so if you come and you are seeking political power, they think 'no, we can't give that to you, because we have had problems with you.'[47]

Very similarly, a member of the NDC's campaign team in the Northern Region stated that his party does better in the north than the NPP because:

> We have this kind of historical antecedence of northerners have problems with the southerners. In those days, they come and pick us here and send us down there work in their farms, cocoa farms and all that, and they see the kind of problems we went through under them. They didn't give the kind of respect we deserve. So when we came to the democratic era, they started moving up for us to give them the mandate, we said, 'no no, you have not treated us a lot, and so we won't give you [*sic*].' And so you see a traditional northerner will not support an Akan party, no matter what. It is only those few people who are around who want to share the glory of being in power who will support them. But if they put a northerner and an Ashanti man there, they will never vote the Ashanti man because of that perception.[48]

The NPP's response to any NDC candidate or party official who referenced the ethnicity of NPP personnel is generally to accuse the NDC of engaging in antiquated "tribalism" which would only divide the country on outdated historical lines.[49] Unfortunately for the NPP, the history of wars and slave raiding are not the only reason that those of northern ancestry continue to distrust the party. More recently, the Kofi Busia government of the Second Republic[50] passed the Aliens Complience in 1969 requiring all "aliens" living in Ghana to obtain the requisite documentation within two weeks or face immediate removal from the country. The legislation led to the expulsion of over 100,000 people mainly of Nigerian and Burkinabe descent, although many of these so-called aliens were second or third generation residents of Ghana, many of them

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[47] Interview, August 14, 2013, Tamale.
[48] Interview, August 15, 2013, Tamale.
[49] "Reject Politics of Tribalism," *Accra Daily Mail*, November 26, 2008, Accra.
[50] The Second Republic lasted from 1969 to 1972.

northerners who had voted for Busia.[51] In an interview with a current NDC member of parliament who represents a constituency in the Ashanti Region largely made up of northern migrants and their descendants, I asked why the NPP had struggled to win his seat despite the constituency's location in the heart of the NPP's stronghold. I suggested that his community might benefit from an NPP government in power given its location, but he immediately referenced the perceived betrayal by the Busia's government as an intervening factor in such a consideration:

> After [Busia] won the election, he abandoned them. And he not only abandoned them, but he brought the [Aliens Compliance Order] where many of them were claimed to be Nigerians and Burkinabes and were forcibly returned to these countries. And many of them died along the road, simply because of the language they speak…[So] the people there never trusted the NPP…So it's like, yes, that history is there. And two, many people who were coming from the north, like my great grandparents, even my father, were coming down to the South. They didn't have an education and were working like laborers. They were working like laborers to the indigenous people. So even when I have got an education and I have sat in the same classroom with even the *Asantehene's* child,[52] he still disrespects me because he thought my father was a laborer to his father. So while that is there, it creates a problem. There is no trust. That is one of the major things…They don't trust the NPP…As we grew, my parents, my family will tell me the story, I tell my child, my child will tell his child. So the story keeps running. So it is sharp in our mind. So it creates the mistrust.[53]

Very similarly, another member of the NDC's campaign team in the Ashanti Region said of the Aliens Compliance Order:

> That is one cardinal issue that makes northerners shun away the party. That is one point…We remind people of that: 'Those people, at the end of the day, when they get power this is what they are going to do to you…so you need to be very careful with them.' And those who experienced those exercises those days,…the majority of them, in those days who were young, they are now grownups. They

[51] Many former supporters of the Northern People's Party supported Busia's Progress Party at the start of the Second Republic (Chazan 1983).
[52] The *Asantehene* is the monarch of the Asante people.
[53] Interview, June 13, 2013, Accra.

> teach their youth…Those people tell them, they tell their siblings, or their family, that these people, when you follow them, this is what is going to happen. So these are the issues that we use to win the souls of the people.[54]

Unsurprisingly, in selecting their running mates in 2008, both parties opted for northerners to offer a more national appeal, given that both Mills and Akufo-Addo were born in the south. Mills and the NDC chose John Mahama, an ethnic Gonja and former Minister of Communications under Rawlings. As a Member of Parliament and the son of Emmanuel Mahama, a member of Kwame Nkrumah's cabinet, Mahama added popularity and name recognition to the NDC ticket. The NPP considered several candidates for its candidate, but internal party debates regarding the selection were publicly displayed and in addition to revealing internal party factions, illustrated the gender biases prevalent in selecting political candidates. In his analysis of 'big man rule' in Ghana, Nugent argues that "to be a big man, one has to be able to look the part…men have generally had access to more arenas in which to exhibit worldly success than their female counterparts. It is surely significant that 'bigness' is imbued with gender specificity" (Nugent 1995, 4). While this feature of politics is not unique to the NPP or to Africa more generally, the public debates around the selection of the vice-presidential candidate proved particularly germane.

In the lead up to the beginning of the NPP's campaign, it was widely expected that NPP flag bearer Nana Akufo-Addo would select Hajia Alima Mahama, the Minister for Women's and Children's Affairs in the previous administration, as his running mate. By most accounts, she was well qualified for the position and had been a longtime NPP loyalist. As a northern Muslim, she would also help the NPP attract votes outside of its southern Christian stronghold. However, rumors of her imminent nomination prompted loud protests from within the NPP, particularly

[54] Interview, August 12, 2013, Kumasi.

with regards to her being an unmarried mother. Arthur Kennedy, Chairman of the NPP's 2008 Campaign Communications Committee, recounts the debate within the party as follows: "Suddenly, those opposing the nomination had a new sense of urgency. Some went to Nana to urge him 'not to do this to the party.' Traditional rulers, many from the North, starting reaching out to party leaders to help change the candidate's mind…The crux of the argument against Hajia was that while she was a fine lady, it would be difficult, particularly in the north, to sell an unmarried woman on the ticket. Her supporters argued that the opposition to her nomination was sexist and that her life story as a poor girl who managed to become a lawyer and a single woman raising a child by herself would inspire many women. Unfortunately, many and probably the majority of those opposed to her were women" (Kennedy 2009, 64).

The fact that Mahama was an unmarried mother was the most frequently discussed criticism in public, as this status violated both the dominant Muslim and Christian mores which politicians constantly reference during campaigns. However, an article in the *Daily Guide* perhaps summed up the motivation behind the objections to her nomination a bit more accurately: "Some contend that the Moslem community is not ready for a female Vice President. According to them, since a Vice President is a shadow President, Moslems must always make full use of the opportunity by presenting a man for the position."[55] This particular view addressed the more deep seated concern with a potential female nominee, one that is not at all unique to Ghana's Muslim community: A female Vice President would simply not be as influential as a male in the same role, and if the North was to maximize its potential influence within the executive office, then it required a male nominee. Ultimately, the criticism of Mahama was enough to end the possibility of her nomination as the running mate, and Akufo-

[55] "Who is Who in the NPP," *The Daily Guide*, July 18, 2008, Accra.

Addo quickly chose Mahamudu Bawumia, a young northern[56] economist who had previously been the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana. Although Bawumia is a northerner and a Muslim, he had no real political experience or any popular following that might have further aided the campaign.

As the campaigns began, the NPP framed its national message around the slogan "We are Moving Forward,"[57] a phrase repeated throughout the campaign to emphasize the NPP's accomplishments in office. It further tried to capitalize on a popular song entitled "Kangaroo" and encouraged party elites and members to perform the dance from the music video during campaign rallies. The NDC framed its message around the idea of "A Better Ghana Agenda," with the manifesto declaring: "'A Better Ghana' because the current rulers have failed us miserably. In the areas of the economy, employment, the environment, health, education, utilities–you name it–failure is the best mark that can be given to the NPP Government."[58] As the campaign moved closer to election day on December 7, the NDC modified the slogan to say "Change for a Better Ghana" in an attempt to capitalize on the recent election victory of Barack Obama (Whitfield 2009).

Comparing Campaign Strategies in 2008

Figure 3.1 shows the frequency of each type of appeal identified in the content analysis of eight weeks of campaign material covered in the *Daily Graphic*, Ghana's most widely read daily newspaper. In total, I identified 749 total appeals in this election for all party officials who campaigned on behalf of the party or its presidential candidate for the two major parties. As the

[56] Mahamudu Bawumia is an ethnic Mamprusi.
[57] NPP 2008 Election Manifesto, Accra.
[58] NDC 2008 Election Manifesto, p. 1, Accra,

theory would predict, the data show that the NPP, the party with the ethnic core of loyal support, opted for more specific programmatic content in its campaign than did the NDC. The two-sample difference of proportions tests show that this difference is statistically significant. The figure also shows that specific programmatic appeals were the most common type of appeal offered by the NPP, while general programmatic appeals were the most common appeals from the NDC. The NPP did offer somewhat more pork content in its campaign than the NDC (17 percent compared to 12 percent), as theories of non-programmatic distribution would predict given that the NPP was the incumbent party in 2008. However, this difference is not statistically significant, and the NPP's pork content is less than half of both its specific programmatic content as well as its general programmatic content. Thus, despite the advantages in distributing non-programmatic goods which incumbent parties are thought to enjoy (Greene 2007), the NPP in fact chose to emphasize its programmatic content in its appeals to the electorate. The NDC opted for roughly the same amount of trait material as it did specific programmatic material in its campaign, and the larger amount of trait material in the NDC's campaign is statistically significant in comparison to the NPP's trait appeals. The NDC did offer slightly more general programmatic material than the NPP in its campaign, but this difference is not statistically significant. Appendix 3.3 examines the distribution of appeals for only the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, who make up for 384 of the 749 appeals that I coded (51%). The results are nearly identical to the results with all speakers included. The difference between the two parties' candidates in the amount of specific programmatic content is statistically significant with the expected sign.

Figure 3.1



NDC to NPP- Two Sample Difference of Proportions

Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-3.28** (0.036)
General Programmatic	0.92 (0.037)
Pork	-1.79* (0.028)
Trait	4.90** (0.028)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

My interviews with members of the 2008 campaign teams from each party suggest that the significant differences in specific programmatic appeals and trait appeals between the parties are in fact due to intentional strategy rather than a product of any bias in the newspaper data. The members of the NPP campaign team with whom I spoke consistently cited the party's pledge to make senior high school free as well the major national policy accomplishments of the NPP government since 2000. The particular accomplishments they cited almost always included

the implementation of the school feeding program, the capitation grant, and the development of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). This focus on education and healthcare policies is evident in Table 3.4 which shows all of the subjects which each party used in its programmatic appeals more than once. The NPP devoted more than 63 percent of its programmatic specific content to education and healthcare appeals, capturing its focus on these particular national public goods. Interestingly, education and healthcare were the two most frequently used subjects by the NDC in its specific programmatic content, although to a much lower degree in total, and despite the specificity of some of these appeals, no clear policy agenda could be detected in the data with regards to either education or healthcare.

Rather than emphasize such policy pledges or accomplishments, the NDC party officials with whom I spoke constantly reiterated the importance of their presidential candidate's personality in their own campaign. A member of the NDC's campaign team said to me that John Atta Mills "was so respected, trusted, and believed in because he has been consistent in the running and he has been consistent with his message of peace…He always shows respect to human dignity. And his own nature is very humble, so all those things became a market premium. So we…centered our campaign on the personality that we have." He further suggested that since its victory in 2000, the NPP had "made nonsense of the practice of promises" by making several policy promises over the years and not delivering on them. So the NDC did not "just rely on the manifesto, to just rely on programs and policies that we are about, as you can see, because the then NPP government has thrown away the good will in policy campaigning."[59] In a fairly typical example of this strategy, another member of the campaign team stated to the pro-NDC newspaper *Enquirer*: "For me, I always call the presidential

[59] Interview, August 21, 2012, Accra.

candidate of our great party, Prof. Mills, a walking political saint because of [his] truthfulness, humility and integrity."[60] Indeed, the emphasis on these types of traits, as well as Mill's perceived piety and intelligence, were reiterated throughout the NDC campaign.

Table 3.3: 2008 Programmatic Issues by Party

Programmatic Specific Issues

NDC				NPP		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Education	23	35.9		Education	73	39.9
Health	9	14.1		Health	43	23.5
Econ. Growth/Development	7	10.9		Econ. Growth/Development	12	6.6
Science/Tech.	7	10.9		Agriculture	7	3.8
Agriculture	4	6.3		Jobs	7	3.8
Corruption	2	3.1		Corruption	6	3.3
Infrastructure	2	3.1		Transportation	6	3.3
Jobs	2	3.1		Women	6	3.3
				Pension	5	2.7
				Sport	5	2.7
				Business	4	2.2
				Infrastructure	3	1.6
				Police/Crime	2	1.1

[60] *Enquirer*, October 15-16, 2008.

Table 3.3 continued:

Programmatic General Issues

NDC				NPP		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Econ. Growth/Development	23	23.5		Econ. Growth/Development	71	41.0
Education	11	11.2		Education	19	11.0
Redistribution	9	9.2		Democracy	18	10.4
Jobs	8	8.1		Health	11	6.4
Police/Crime	6	6.1		Oil	10	5.8
Democracy	5	5.1		Agriculture	9	5.2
Agriculture	4	4.1		Jobs	5	2.9
Business	4	4.1		Peace	5	2.9
Corruption	4	4.1		Women	5	2.9
Infrastructure	4	4.1		Roads	4	2.3
Water	4	4.1		Science/Tech.	4	2.3
Health	3	3.1		Business	2	1.2
Housing	3	3.1		Infrastructure	2	1.2
Peace	2	2.0		Water	2	1.2
Roads	2	2.0				
Science/Tech.	2	2.0				

If we examine the general programmatic appeals for each party in Table 3.3, both the NDC and the NPP devoted the largest portion of these appeals to economic growth or economic development, an unsurprising strategy given Ghana's relatively high levels of poverty. Somewhat more interestingly, the NDC spent more than nine percent of these appeals on general promises of economic redistribution, often phrased along the lines of "sharing the national cake" more equally or promising a more equitable distribution of national resources. This played into the NDC's strategy of portraying the NPP as a party that had used its eight years in office to allow only certain Akan groups to benefit economically. For example, in one illustrative case the *Daily Graphic* reported that during a campaign speech in Greater Accra, John Atta Mills "maintained that although the nation was rich in resources which could cater for all Ghanaians, President Kufuor and his cronies alone were the people who were enjoying the resources of the nation to the detriment of the ordinary people. He promised that his administration would share

the resources of the nation more equally, paying special attention to the poor and the vulnerable."[61] The reference to president Kufuor's "cronies" might not necessarily appear to be a reference to ethnic favoritism on its own, however across the campaign Mills made several allusions to the popular perception that the NPP government had only served elite Asante and Akyem interests. In one widely reported case, Mills visited several fishing communities in the Central Region where the NPP government had been accused of inaction over foreign vessels fishing in Ghanaian waters. Mills reportedly said that "because there is no sea in the Ashanti Region, President Kufuor does not see the need to pay attention to the plight of the fisherman."[62]

The NPP's campaign strategy of emphasizing clear policies for national public goods provisions is thus evident in the newspaper data and confirmed by interviews with party officials. Although no NPP stated to me in uncertain terms that such a strategy was to compensate for the party's lack of credibility with the electorate, one interviewee noted the importance of the fact that it was a clear promise not to discriminate: "Why Nana Addo was saying [free SHS] was that it is the only way we can share the national cake for everybody to benefit. As for education, everybody needs education. So if he says free education, that means everybody, whether you are in the village or not, you will benefit from it. So at that level, the national cake has been shared equally."[63] Several members of the campaign team further understood that the strategy was relatively risky. As one NPP official told me, the electorate's experiences with various governments "has turned the nation to a certain level of cynicism towards political promises and has made the nation a little more careful in what they hear from politicians. Now they want some

[61] *Daily Graphic*, October 17, 2008.
[62] "I will make C/R one of the Richest-Mills," *Ghanaian Chronicle*, August 27, 2008, Accra.
[63] Interview, August 6, 2013, Accra.

cogent proof in what you say rather than slogans and empty promises. So we are now in a political terrain that is more critical in how they view things."[64]

When I asked another member of the NPP's campaign team how he felt voters responded to the party's emphasis on national education policies, he answered: "People respond, but the important thing I have realized is that you have to let the people know that this is a need. That you are going to address that need for them to identify with you. People vote for people because of only two reasons: they like you or they need you. Those are the only two reasons people will vote for you."[65] This NPP official did not explicitly say that the party or its leaders were not liked, or that convincing voters that they "needed" the NPP was to compensate for the perceived elitism or ethnic exclusiveness of the party. Yet over the course of my interviews with members of both parties, no NDC officials ever expressed to me that they felt that their party lacked any credibility with the electorate or had any historical baggage which would make voters hesitant to support the party. On the other hand, NPP officials consistently discussed their frustration at being labeled an Akan or Ashanti/Akyem party and discussed in detail why this damaged their chances at the polls.

A potential alternative strategy that the party could have used to attract swing voters would have been to engage in large scale vote buying, given that the party was in power in 2008 and would have enjoyed access to greater financial resources than its opponents. However, the available data from the *Afrobarometer* Round 5 survey suggests that neither the NPP nor the NDC employed vote buying to any great degree, as only 7 percent of respondents reported any experience with parties attempting to purchase their votes. In Appendix 3.2, I run a series of logit regressions on the vote buying data to determine what appears to make voters more likely to

[64] Interview, July 9, 2012, Accra.
[65] Interview, July 24, 2012, Accra.

be targets of such offers, but the overall low prevalence[66] and the importance which my interviewees placed on developing their public appeals suggests that parties invest significant time and energy into developing appeals which will make them most attractive to voters.

Results of the 2008 Election

The 2008 election was held on December 7 and was incredibly close. In the first round of voting, Nana Akufo-Addo held a slight lead with 49.13 percent of the vote, with Mills having 47.92 percent. However, as neither had earned more than the required fifty percent to be declared winner, a runoff was scheduled for December 28. Table 3.4 shows the results of both rounds of voting of the presidential election by region. Unsurprisingly, each party fared well in its regional stronghold, with the NDC earning 82.9 percent of the vote in Volta Region and the NPP earning 72.4 percent in Ashanti Region in the first round. Both parties also won the regions from which their presidential candidates hailed, with the NPP winning in Eastern Region and the NDC winning in Central Region in both rounds.

Table 3.4: 2008 Presidential Election Results by Region

Region	NDC Vote Share (%)		NPP Vote Share (%)	
	1st Round	2nd Round	1st Round	2nd Round
Ashanti	26.1	25.0	72.4	75.0
Brong-Ahafo	47.7	51.5	50.6	48.5
Central	50.6	53.8	46.0	46.2
Eastern	41.1	42.5	57.1	57.5
Greater Accra	52.1	54.4	46.0	45.6
Northern	56.8	61.6	38.3	38.4
Upper East	56.1	65.6	35.3	34.4
Upper West	54.4	62.3	37.7	37.7
Volta	82.9	86.1	15.0	13.9
Western	47.1	51.9	47.6	48.1

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

[66] The low prevalence of vote buying could be partly due to social desirability bias, but neither the *Afrobarometer* data nor my own interview data suggest that vote buying is particularly common in Ghana.

However, the NDC did much better in the other swing regions of Greater Accra and Western than it had in 2004, making the first round 2008 election much closer than the 2004 election. Furthermore, the NDC secured a parliamentary majority in the first round of voting, giving the party significant momentum heading into the run off (Whitfield 2009). In the run off, the NDC performed even better in the swing regions of Central, Western, and Greater Accra. This, combined with the NDC ability to attract voters from the smaller uncompetitive parties in the first round, gave Mills and the NDC a narrow victory with 50.23 percent of the vote.[67] The voting results thus suggest that over the course of the campaign, the NDC was more successful in attracting swing voters and that this support earned them the election.

Core Voters and Swing Voters

The argument that specific programmatic campaigning serves as a clear, pre-election commitment to represent national interests suggests that campaigns are targeted at swing voters rather than core voters, as it is swing voters which might hesitate to vote for a party with a dominant ethnic core. However, some models of campaigning argue that parties in fact favor core voters in their distribution of campaign resources (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Stokes et al. 2013). To examine which voters parties actually target with their campaigns, I recorded the location of the speaker for any campaign appeal made by a presidential or vice presidential candidate in the newspaper data. This serves as a reasonably good measure of which voters are being targeted by the appeals. In the 2008 election, the NPP candidates made only 6.3% of their appeals in the Ashanti Region, and the NDC candidates made only 11.4% of their appeals in the

[67] Electoral Commission of Ghana, <http://www.ec.gov.gh/>.

Volta Region. In 2012, the NPP recorded somewhat more appeals in their regional stronghold, with 21.4% of their appeals in the Ashanti Region, while NDC candidates made only 5.1% of their appeals in the Volta Region. This suggests that the bulk of appeals are targeted at swing voters rather than core voters.[68] I further test these competing hypotheses in Appendix 3.2 with the *Afrobarometer* vote buying data, although no clear pattern emerges from the analysis.

My interviews with party elites further suggested that in addition to more resources being spent on attracting swing voters, the type of campaign varies between core and swing regions. Several interviewees said that when attracting swing voters to the party, the important thing is to focus on what you can do for them, either in terms of national policies or development projects. On the other hand, the key to mobilizing the base of the party in one's regional stronghold was to appeal to peoples' emotions and identities. For example, one member of the NDC's 2012 campaign team said that in swing regions, the party ran a campaign that focused on macroeconomic policies and local development projects. However, when it came to mobilizing the base of the party in the Volta Region,

> Sometimes you go to the extent of whipping that kind of minority interest. I don't want to say that you whip ethnic interests,[69] but in Volta you need to whip up the interests of the people to let them know how safe NDC in power makes them. It is the same with NPP when you go to Ashanti. They need to whip up that interest…Mobilize their base. To say look, our presence in government shows our dominance as the major ethnic group in this country or something.[70]

Another official for the NDC who worked in both the 2008 and 2012 campaigns stated that "for constituencies that float, you need clearly to establish beyond doubt that the NDC is the

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[68] Appendix 3.3 shows the distribution of appeals in each election by speaker to illustrate that the appeals made by presidential and vice-presidential candidates do not differ much from those made by other party officials.
[69] This interviewee's initial hesitance to refer explicitly to ethnicity illustrates that overt ethnic appeals and ethnic chauvinism are somewhat taboo in Ghanaian politics, especially in comparison to politics in Kenya.
[70] Interview, July 10, 2013, Accra.

better vehicle for development than the NPP. You need to establish that clearly, and that's where really that battle of minds and hearts becomes pretty strong, for instance, and they have different parameters for comparison." On the other hand, core voters in the Volta Region

> have a sentimental attachment to the NDC. You understand, a sentimental attachment to the NDC. In fact you can actually call it spiritual…[They] will tell you that the NDC is like a spiritual institution as far as they are concerned. So no matter how tough things are, they feel it is their sacred responsibility to stand by the NDC…they tell themselves, listen, even if it is not going well, who is going to make it better? Obviously the other group will not make it better for us, so we have to remain loyal to the party.[71]

The evidence suggests that the NPP uses a similar strategy in its stronghold in Ashanti. For example, Tonah (2009, 72) finds that throughout the Fourth Republic, "the party's (unofficial) campaign strategy [has] indicated clearly to the electorate that it would be treacherous and ludicrous for any person of Asante origin to vote for the Ewe-dominated NDC party." However, for the NPP, energizing its base with such a strategy comes with potentially negative consequences, given the importance of needing to downplay the ethnic core of the party to appeal to a national audience. I discuss below how some of the NPP candidate's statements to core voters in the 2012 campaign were immediately portrayed as evidence of the party's ethnic favoritism by the NDC.

The 2012 Campaign

As the parties began preparations for the 2012 campaigns, rumors swirled throughout the press that President Mills, who had made very few public appearances that year, was in very poor health. Although the government maintained that Mills was fine, on July 24 he passed

[71] Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

away in Accra. John Mahama became president and appointed Kwesi Amissah-Arthur, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana and former Deputy Finance Minister, as his vice president. On September 1, Mahama and Arthur became the NDC's candidates for the upcoming election without any objection within the party. The NPP, learning from the divisive and acrimonious primary of 2008, expanded the number of party delegates able to cast ballots during the previous primary from 2,300 to more than 100,000, making it much more difficult for candidates to bribe party delegates.[72] Nana Akufo-Addo again won the nomination, and again selected Mahamudu Bawumia as his running mate. Akufo-Addo chose a different campaign manager[73] and made sure to include former President John Kufuor in his campaign team in an attempt to demonstrate that the party's internal divisions had been healed.[74]

Many of the dynamics of 2012 election were therefore very similar to 2008. Nana Akufo-Addo again stressed that his government would implement free SHS if it won power, as well as reinvigorate the NHIS, which the NPP accused the NDC of failing to ensure was properly funded.[75] The NPP further accused the NDC of corruption and allowing Ghana's currency to rapidly depreciate.[76] John Mahama emphasized that President Mills had been his mentor and that he would continue the "Better Ghana Agenda" that defined the Mills campaign in 2008. To this end, his campaign adopted the slogan "Adebekeke," which had been popularized by a mobile phone provider's advertising campaign earlier in the year. Roughly translated, it means "things are going well."[77]

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[72] "Who Leads The NPP? Alan, Nana in Tight Race," *Daily Graphic*, August 7, 2010, Accra.
[73] Boakye Agyarko replaced Kofi Apraku as the 2012 campaign manager.
[74] "NPP Picks Team 2012," *Daily Guide*, July 1, 2011, Accra.
[75] "I'll Fight Corruption with Vigour-Nana Addo," *The Chronicle*, October 12, 2012, Accra.
[76] "NDC has been Bad-NPP Says People are Wailing Under Mill's Austerity," March 9, 2012, Accra.
[77] Interview, June 4, 2013, Accra.

Perhaps the most important difference was that for the first time in the Fourth Republic, a major party was running a northerner as its presidential candidate. Given the continuing poverty of the North relative to the South, the NDC's campaign in the three northern regions emphasized that this was North's opportunity to be fully recognized by the government in Accra, as the President understood their plight, and indeed the plight of all poor Ghanaians, first hand. This was only partly true of course, as Mahama came from a prominent political family, but the NDC's portrayal of Mahama was intended to contrast as sharply as possible with the wealthy and elite Akufo-Addo. As one NDC constituency organizer explained to me:

> When you compare John Mahama to Akufo-Addo, they are two different things. Akufo-Addo…is somebody who is arrogant. And he doesn't respect any human being. He thinks he is from a rich family, and therefore he doesn't experience any hardship in life at all…He doesn't touch people's hearts. But in the case of John Mahama, [he] is from a very poor background. He knows how to approach people, how to communicate with people, how when someone is in pain or something, he knows how to convince you…the way he will even talk to you, that alone can give you some hope or assurance…He feels for people.[78]

Specifically during the campaign in the North, the NDC attempted to minimize the differences across the many ethnic groups in northern Ghana and defined Mahama as a northerner who would represent all of them and not just his fellow Gonjas. As one member of the NDC's campaign team in the Northern Region explained:

> The key thing is that he is a northerner. The primary tribe in Gonja didn't matter. What matters to us is that he is a northerner. And we drum home that. So everybody, all the smaller tribes in the region, thought it was…natural that we should have a northern president. So it has also gone down in the annals of the history of Ghana that all the tribes, the major tribes--the regions, let's put in the regions--have tasted the presidency. It is only the northern tribe that has not tasted the presidency. So it went that way.[79]

[78] Interview, July 27, 2013, Accra.
[79] Interview, August 15, 2013, Tamale.

The conflation of tribe and region in this interview is illustrative of the constructive nature of identities, as it shows the way in which the party attempted to promote the idea of a "northern" identity as akin to a tribal or ethnic identity,[80] when in fact there are dozens of ethnic groups across northern Ghana. This strategy is largely consistent with the findings of Posner (2005) who argues that elections in several African countries since the early 1990s have been characterized by political parties attempting to highlight or redefine identities such that their vote shares will increase at the polls.

Unfortunately for the NPP, perceptions about the party's ethnic core have largely limited its ability to emphasize a pan-Akan identity that might allow the party to perform better in Akan-speaking areas beyond the Ashanti Region and the Akyem constituencies. One member of the NPP's campaign team said to me that he was one of the few people in the party who was in favor of pursuing such a strategy since the Akan are nearly half the population. However, most of his colleagues objected to the idea given the historical rivalries between Akan groups as well as the likelihood that the party would lose most of its non-Akan support.[81] In one instance during a rally in the Eastern Region, Nana Akufo-Addo, in an attempt to heal the divisions between various Akan groups within the NPP, declared "Yen Akanfo," meaning "we are the Akans" in Twi.[82] While the declaration was an attempt to solidify the core of the party, the NDC immediately took advantage of the statement and accused the NPP of ethnocentrism. As one member of the NDC campaign portrayed the incident to me: "Their candidate made an appeal to ethnic sentiments, which was not received well. When he said that "*Yen Akanfo*"—we are the Akans—maybe for [them] to fight for [their] birthright, that did not go down well…I must admit,

[80] Ethnic group and tribe are used largely interchangeably in Ghana.
[81] Interview, July 31, 2013, Accra.
[82] Twi is the most commonly spoken Akan language in Ghana.

we…took advantage of a lot of the gaffes of our opponent in terms of his tribal statements."[83] Another statement which the NDC capitalized on was the catchphrase "all die be die," which Akufo-Addo used in several early campaign rallies to motivate the party faithful to devote themselves to the party's cause.[84] Predictably, the phrase was turned against him by the NDC. As one NDC official said:

> As soon as their leader declared all die be die, they know that these are war mongers. You can't declare an election 'all die be die.' And then apart from that you are adding that people see 'we are the Akans. We are feared'… So we capitalized on that for the campaign and told them. You have to warn them: 'these are war mongers.'[85]

As it had in 2008, the NPP thus faced a serious challenge in rallying their base with the kind of emotive appeals that are thought to maximize turnout among loyal supporters while also appearing to be a credible, broad-based party that would be able to act in the national interest.

Comparing Campaign Strategies in 2012

Figure 3.2 below shows the distribution of appeals by all party officials for each party during the eight weeks of campaigning covered in the *Daily Graphic*. As the theory would predict, the difference between the amounts of specific programmatic material in each campaign is again statistically significant, with the NPP having more specific programmatic material in its campaign. The NDC's four years in office did not lead it to emphasize its specific policy accomplishments or offer new specific policies any more than it had in 2008; the proportion of specific programmatic appeals for the NDC in both elections is .25. It does appear that four years in office did lead the NDC to increase the amount of general programmatic material in its

[83] Interview, August 8, 2013, Accra.
[84] "Akufo-Addo defends 'All Die Be Die' Mantra," *Daily Graphic*, July 3, 2012, Accra.
[85] Interview, August 15, 2013, Tamale.

campaign, which in 2012 was significantly higher than the NPP's proportion of general programmatic appeals. The NPP, despite its loss in 2008, did not abandon its strategy of emphasizing clear policies in its campaign. The total proportion of specific programmatic appeals is actually higher in 2012 than it was in 2008. Unlike in 2008 the parties do not show any significant difference in the amount of trait campaigning, but do show a difference in the amount of pork appeals, with the NDC using significantly more pork in its campaign than the NPP. However, the proportion of pork for the NDC (.13) is roughly the same as it was in 2008 (.12), showing that this difference is due to the NPP reducing its proportion of pork appeals in 2012. Appendix 3.3 limits the analysis to just the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, who make up for 67% of the coded appeals. The results are the same as in the full sample, with the NPP have significantly more specific programmatic content.

Figure 3.2



NDC to NPP- Two Sample Difference of Proportions	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-7.37** (0.028)
General Programmatic	4.35** (0.030)
Pork	3.06** (0.019)
Trait	1.14 (0.017)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

Examining the issues which the parties emphasized in each type of programmatic campaigning shows several similarities with 2008. Again, the NPP's focus in its specific programmatic appeals was on education and healthcare, with those two issues making up 62 percent of the programmatic specific material. The pledge of free SHS and promises to reform and improve the NHIS were emphasized the most among the specific programmatic appeals. The NPP also emphasized economic growth and development most frequently in its general programmatic, as it had in 2008. Interestingly, although the NDC used a lower proportion of

specific programmatic appeals than the NPP, they devoted the majority of them to education appeals. Education appeals also made up the largest share of the general programmatic appeals. My interviews with members of the 2012 NDC campaign team suggested that this new focus on education was largely in response to the NPP's proposal of free SHS in 2008 and 2012, which the NDC felt that it needed to respond to with its own emphasis on education.[86] Thus, in addition to criticizing the NPP's free SHS appeal as impractical, the party developed its own pledge to build 200 new high schools should John Mahama win the election. This suggests that although the parties used different overall strategies with regards to the appeal types they emphasized, there is some effect of campaigning on creating meaningful political debates regarding the best approach to addressing a deficit in public goods provisions.

Table 3.5: 2012 Programmatic Issues by Party

Programmatic Specific Issues

NDC				NPP		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Education	118	57.0		Education	86	46.0
Jobs	20	9.7		Health	30	16.0
Housing	9	4.4		Agriculture	13	7.0
Health	8	3.4		Econ. Growth/Development	12	6.4
Business	7	3.4		Housing	9	4.8
Econ. Growth/Development	7	3.4		Fuel	7	3.7
Agriculture	6	2.9		Jobs	7	3.7
Fuel	5	2.4		Business	6	3.2
Police/Crime	4	1.9		Transportation	5	2.7
Science/Tech.	4	1.9		Corruption	3	1.6
Infrastructure	3	1.5		Religion	3	1.6
Tax Collection	2	1.0		Police/Crime	2	1.1
Labor	2	1.0				
Oil	2	1.0				
Transportation	2	1.0				

[86] Interview, June 4, 2013, Accra.

Table 3.5 continued:

Programmatic General Issues

NDC				NPP		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Education	102	23.6		Econ. Growth/Development	37	22.8
Econ. Growth/Development	78	18.0		Education	16	9.9
Health	59	13.6		Agriculture	14	8.6
Infrastructure	46	10.6		Health	14	8.6
Roads	24	5.5		Jobs	10	6.2
Housing	19	4.4		Business	9	5.6
Democracy	15	3.5		Police/Crime	9	5.6
Jobs	14	3.2		Corruption	7	4.3
Agriculture	13	3.0		Democracy	7	4.3
Business	10	2.3		Water	6	3.7
Peace	10	2.3		Housing	4	2.5
Water	10	2.3		Infrastructure	4	2.5
Redistribution	5	1.2		Peace	4	2.5
Fuel	4	.9		Religion	4	2.5
Police/Crime	4	.9		International Relations	3	1.9
Labor	3	.7		Oil	3	1.9
Women	3	.7		Culture	2	1.2
Corruption	2	.5		Environment	2	1.2
Decentralization	2	.5		Fuel	2	1.2
Government Salaries	2	.5		Roads	2	1.2
Oil	2	.5				
Transportation	2	.5				

These findings, taken together with the campaign strategies in 2008, suggest that regardless of whether the NPP is in power or in opposition, clear policies for national public goods make up a larger proportion of its campaigns than they do for the NDC. The NDC's campaigns were somewhat different between 2008 and 2012, although in both elections the party used general programmatic appeals more frequently than all others. In 2008, the party stressed the importance of their presidential candidate with a large portion of trait appeal, while in 2012 such appeals were limited. However, in both elections, we see the NDC favoring other appeals over the clear pre-election policy appeals which the NPP employed.

Results of the 2012 Election

The NDC again emerged victorious in 2012, with John Mahama earning 50.7 percent of the vote to Nana Akufo-Addo's 47.7 percent. As Mahama had won more than half of the vote, no run off was needed. The NPP immediately challenged the verdict, alleging several discrepancies in the results, and subsequent debates in the Supreme Court lasted until August of 2013. Ultimately, the Court sided with the Electoral Commission and the NDC, declaring Mahama the winner.

Table 3.6: 2012 Presidential Election Results by Region

Region	NDC Vote Share (%)	NPP Vote Share (%)
Ashanti	28.1	71.2
Brong-Ahafo	51.5	47.3
Central	52.3	45.4
Eastern	42.6	56.3
Greater Accra	52.3	46.9
Northern	58.2	39.1
Upper East	66.4	29.3
Upper West	65.5	29.3
Volta	83.7	14.7
Western	53.9	44.3

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

Along with dominating in its stronghold in Volta, the NDC again won the critical swing regions of Western, Central, and Greater Accra. The NPP did relatively well in the Northern Region, considering it was challenging a president who was born there, and even captured several parliamentary seats which the NDC had previously held. However, the NPP's overall performance was somewhat worse than it had been in 2008, suggesting that swing voters simply did not warm to the NPP despite its investment in clear policy proposals in its campaigns. When

I asked an NDC official why he thought that the NPP's promise of free SHS was not more popular among the electorate, he answered:

> In the NPP you are not going to emerge as a leader unless you are Ashanti or you are Akyem. Those are the real two power blocks that can emerge in the leadership. And naturally those things naturally affect how people perceive the party and also how they want to rally around a political party. Some of these are subliminal in nature. They are not necessarily issues that you can put down and analyze. But those are things that crystallize in the minds and hearts of people. And no matter what policy you are talking about, they are like, 'listen, I cannot really connect with you. I mean, you don't connect with me. You are not down to earth as I wish you could be, and so your party is too much of a minority-dominated party rather than broad-based party.' So those are important considerations.[87]

Party System and Campaign Strategies

Beyond the appeals which have I have discussed, an additional important feature of campaigns in Ghana regards the institutional strength of the two major parties. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the NDC and the NPP have remained the only two nationally competitive parties, and as I discussed more in the previous chapter, over time they have both developed largely comparable internal structures that include clear national and regional hierarchies, as well as local constituency-level branches (Morrison 2004).

With regards to campaigns, the institutional features of Ghana's parties have critical effects on how they mobilize voters, especially when compared to campaign strategies in a more volatile party system such as Kenya. Over the course my interviews in both countries I asked members of all campaign teams how important using local intermediaries, such as chiefs, community elders, clan leaders, and religious figures was to mounting a successful campaign. Several studies of party linkage suggest that parties in fact rely on such local intermediaries to maintain direct contact with voters, especially in poorer countries where voters may be reliant on

[87] Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

local patrons for their livelihood (Koter 2013, Stokes et al. 2013). However, interviewees in Ghana often rejected the importance of such a strategy, and instead emphasized the importance of their party's extensive grassroots networks. Campaign discourse is therefore dominated by party officials attempting to increase each party's national appeal. Ethnic intermediaries are limited in their influence and often bypassed completely by the parties during campaigns.

In Kenya, the reliance on ethnic intermediaries means that campaigns become opportunities to voice historical grievances against rival ethnic groups. As I show in later chapters, parties in Kenya are significantly weaker and often do not last beyond one or two elections. They therefore have few grassroots structures on which they can rely during campaigns. To compensate for this, political candidates in Kenya make much greater use of local intermediaries to mobilize voters on their behalf. To the great frustration of the candidates, in exchange for their services such intermediaries demand a variety of rents, including large amounts of cash, government contracts, and government jobs for members of their families. However, such intermediaries also tend to be spokesman of particular ethnic communities, such as ethnic elders or clan heads, who mobilize voters strictly along ethnic lines. Elections in Kenya are thus perceived as competitions between competing coalitions of ethnic groups rather than between national parties. As I show in later chapters, overt ethnic chauvinism, hate speech, and calls for violence against such groups are thus much more common in Kenyan elections in comparison to those in Ghana. Chapter 6 develops this argument further using both interview data from both countries as well as cross-national survey data.

Appendix 3.1: Breakdown of Party Affinity by Ethnic Group
(Source: *Afrobarometer*)

Ghana

2008 (Round 4):

	No, not close	*Close to NDC*	*Close to NPP*	*Close to other party*	*Don't know/ Refuse to answer*
Akan	35.7	8.2	46.5	2.0	7.6
Ewe/Anglo	31.3	40.6	16.3	3.1	8.8
Ga/Adangbe	44.4	23.4	21.8	0.0	10.5
Dagomba	19.2	34.3	30.4	8.2	8.2
Dagate	45.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	15.0
Frafra	31.3	6.3	43.8	6.3	12.5
Kusasi	25.0	31.3	31.3	6.3	6.3
Mamprusi	25.0	31.3	31.3	6.3	6.3
Sefwi	42.9	28.6	28.6	0.0	0.0
Sisila	38.5	15.4	7.7	23.1	15.4

2012 (Round 5):

	No, not close	*Close to NDC*	*Close to NPP*	*Close to other party*	*Don't know/ Refuse to answer*
Akan	32.3	14.2	41.9	2.5	9.0
Ewe/Anglo	38.9	39.2	9.6	2.5	9.9
Ga/Adangbe	48.8	25.6	11.6	1.7	12.2
Dagomba	31.0	38.1	21.3	3.2	6.5
Dagarti	14.8	66.7	13.6	0.0	4.9
Kusasi	51.9	34.6	11.5	0.0	1.9
Konkomba	32.7	38.8	20.4	0.0	8.2
Hausa	42.2	33.3	11.1	2.2	11.1
Frafra	66.7	22.2	11.1	0.0	0.0
Mamprusi	20.0	52.0	16.0	8.0	4.0

Appendix 3.2: Binary Logit Regressions on Vote Buying

The *Afrobarometer* survey asks respondents how often they were offered a material incentive such as food, a gift, or money in exchange for their vote, with the possible answers "Never", "Once or twice," "A few times," or "Often." I collapse the latter three categories into a single indicator to measure any experience with vote buying and run a set of logit regressions predicting any experience with vote buying in the 2008 election. The Afrobarometer data records the district in which the interview took place, and thus to test whether parties seem to target core or swing voters with material rewards, I aggregate constituency level voting returns from the 2008 elections up to the district level. I then take the absolute value of the difference between the percent of votes won by NDC presidential candidate John Atta Mills and the percent of votes won by NPP presidential candidate Nana Akufo-Addo to get the margin of victory by which the either candidate won in that district. This is labeled 'Margin' in the results table below. While this potentially creates an endogeneity concern, as vote buying could influence voting returns, using returns from the 2004 election is problematic given the creation of several new districts just prior to the 2008 election. I thus assume that parties are reasonably good at predicting which districts will be most competitive.

Following the existing literature on vote buying in Africa (Jensen & Justesen 2014, Kramon 2009), I include controls for the sex, age, the approximate level of poverty of the respondent,[88] and whether the voter resides in an urban or rural location. I also use three control variables to measure the level of education of the respondent. These are dummy variables to

[88] To measure a respondent's approximate poverty level, I follow Jenson & Justesen (2014) and use the Afrobarometer data to construct the *Index of Lived Poverty*, which aggregates respondents' answers on five questions that ask how often in the past year they or their family have gone without the following: (1) Enough food to eat; (2) enough clean water; (3) medicine or medical treatment ; (4) fuel to cook food; (5) cash income. Answers are measured on a five-point scale from 0=Never to 4=Always. Higher scores on this index indicate a higher level of poverty.

measure whether the respondent has any level of primary education, secondary education, or tertiary education, with no formal education serving as the reference category. These controls are important given that the theoretical explanations for vote buying suggest that if parties are acting rationally, they should target poorer, more rural, and potentially less educated voters, as these voters should be more willing to trade their votes for material rewards (Kitshchelt & Wilkinson 2007, Stokes 2013). In further iterations of the model, I introduce three additional dummy control variables. First, I control for whether the respondent identifies more strongly with his or her ethnic group rather than the nation of Ghana. This is so that I can capture whether voters who are likely to vote based on ethnic considerations are targeted more often. Second, I control for whether the respondent made contact with a Member of Parliament, assemblyman, or political party officer in the past year about some problem or to express his or her views. This is to control for an individual's propensity to seek out the help of political elites, which may increase the likelihood that he or she is then approached during campaigns (). Third, I control for whether the respondent "feels close" to a particular political party. Interpreting this last control variable is somewhat difficult due to reverse causality. Parties may target those who have an affinity towards the party, or being offered a material reward may cause an individual to feel close to that party. I thus only include it in a few models. I report the results of some iterations with clustered standard errors to account for any within-district dependency in the data.

The regression results do not strongly suggest that vote buying is targeted at either swing voters or core voters, at least in this election. There is some weak evidence suggesting that core voters may receive some favoritism, as the margin of victory coefficient is positive and is statistically significant in some of the models. However, as I add in control variables and use clustered standard errors, the significance is eliminated. The coefficient for whether or not a

Binary Logit Results Predicting Probability of Vote Buying

	Logit 1	Logit 2	Logit 3	Logit 4	Logit 5 (Clust. SE)	Logit 6 (Clust. SE)
Margin	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Male	0.37** (0.17)	-.37** (0.17)	0.23 (0.17)	0.19 (0.17)	0.23 (0.18)	0.19 (0.18)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Poverty	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Urban	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.18)	-0.012 (0.18)	-0.18 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.22)
Primary Education	0.31 (0.22)	0.31 (0.22)	0.29 (0.22)	0.31 (0.22)	0.29 (0.25)	0.31 (0.25)
Secondary Education	0.62*** (0.22)	0.63*** (0.22)	0.60*** (0.22)	0.62*** (0.22)	0.60* (0.31)	0.62** (0.30)
Tertiary Education	-0.07 (0.28)	-0.07 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.28)	-0.14 (0.29)	-0.15 (0.36)	-0.14 (0.36)
Ethnic Identity	-	0.10 (0.41)	0.08 (0.41)	0.04 (0.41)	0.08 (0.50)	0.04* (0.51)
Contact with Elite	-	-	0.73*** (0.17)	0.67*** (0.17)	0.73*** (0.17)	0.67*** (0.18)
Close to Party	-	-	-	0.53*** (0.18)	-	0.53** (0.21)
Constant	-3.19*** (0.32)	-3.19*** (0.32)	-3.30*** (0.33)	-3.64*** (0.35)	-3.30*** (0.38)	-3.64*** (0.40)
N	2379	2379	2379	2379	2379	2379
Log Likelihood	-588.16	-588.13	-578.87	-574.47	-578.87	-574.47

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Standard errors are in parentheses.

respondent feels close to a political party is also significant in the models in which it is included. However, this does not necessarily suggest that it is core voters who are offered gifts due to the reverse causality problem. Somewhat surprisingly, whether a respondent has received any secondary education increases the likelihood of him or her being offered a material incentive. This runs contrary to theories suggesting that less educated voters are more likely to receive offers from political parties. The variable that remains consistently significant is whether the respondent recently made contact with an MP, assemblyman, or political party official in regards to a particular problem or to express his or her views. Parties may therefore target those voters with whom they have had previous contact and perhaps have developed some rapport. This suggests that parties in Ghana do not find it to be an efficient strategy to engage in mass vote buying with voters whom they feel they cannot trust to uphold their end of the implicit contract.

Appendix 3.3: Breakdown of Appeals for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates

2008 Election



NDC to NPP- Two Sample Difference of Proportions	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-2.34** (0.048)
General Programmatic	0.16 (0.050)
Pork	-1.15 (0.037)
Trait	3.85** (0.038)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

2012 Election



NDC to NPP- Two Sample Difference of Proportions	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-4.15** (0.036)
General Programmatic	2.91** (0.038)
Pork	2.10** (0.023)
Trait	-0.67* (0.018)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

CHAPTER 4- HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA

This chapter examines the historical roots of contemporary party politics in Kenya. In particular, I focus on the creation of the Kikuyu as the dominant ethnic group in Kenya, the politics of current ethnic alignments with political parties, and Kenya's highly unstable party system. Similarly to elite Akans in Ghana, elite Kikuyus enjoyed preferential treatment under British colonialism and established themselves as a dominant economic and political force at independence. However, the issue of access to agricultural land plays a more central role in Kenya, and as I discuss below, popular perceptions of Kikuyu dominance are inextricably bound up with the belief that Kikuyus have unjustly reserved Kenya's best land for themselves. This has inevitably influenced popular perceptions of elite Kikuyu politicians running for national office, in particular among those ethnic groups which feel most aggrieved by Kikuyu settlement on what they believe to be their ancestral homelands. However, even without the issue of land, Kikuyus struggle to distance themselves from stereotypes of ethnic self-interest. For example, post-independence relationships between Kikuyu and Luo politicians have created a strong sense of injustice among Luos, who believe that their ethnic leaders have allied with Kikuyus on multiple occasions only to be cast aside once a Kikuyu president is elected to office. I also discuss the roots of Kenya's highly unstable party system, which lie in former President Moi's mode of highly personalized authoritarian rule, which discouraged investment in any lasting party organizations at the grassroots. I discuss in the final chapter how this difference in party systems between Ghana and Kenya influences campaign strategies.

British Colonialism and the Rise of Jomo Kenyatta

The Kikuyu were not an expansionist empire in the way that the Asante were in Ghana. Rather, their history as a dominant ethnic group begins largely during the colonial era. In Kenya, the British looked to create a settler colony with large white-owned agricultural estates. To this end, the colonial government declared much of the colony's best agricultural land around Nairobi to be reserved for white settlement. The creation of the so-called 'White Highlands' expropriated three million hectares of the colony's best farmland exclusively for European farming (Kanyinga 2009, 327). The affected African populations were forced into native 'reserves' and were banned from participating in the most lucrative agricultural markets. In the Central Province, the Kikuyu were the most affected ethnic group. Settlement in the Rift Valley displaced mainly the Kalenjin and the Maasai, both traditionally pastoralist communities. White settlers encouraged mainly Kikuyus to migrate from the reserves to the White Highlands to work as agricultural laborers. These laborers had no formal property rights, but were permitted to live on European estates as squatters.

The African population also grew in Nairobi, where both unionization and membership in ethnic organizations began to grow. Jomo Kenyatta became active with the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) while living in Nairobi, first as the editor of the KCA newspaper and eventually as its general secretary. Although not a member of the Kikuyu elite yet, he was a skilled communicator and was eventually chosen to represent the Kikuyu in London in their attempts to redress access to farmland and continued discrimination in the economy. Although Kenyatta achieved very little while in Europe, he had effectively become the most prominent spokesman for the Kikuyu against the colonial administration. Upon his return to Kenya, he married the daughter of senior Kikuyu chief Koinange from Kiambu as his third wife. With this

marriage, Kenyatta "gained acceptance into the traditional leadership of the Kiambu Kikuyu… Nearer his home in Gatundu, Kenyatta married the daughter of chief Muhoho as his fourth wife. His place in the Kikuyu leadership was now assured; he was now finally part of the Kikuyu artistocracy" (Muigai 2004, 204).

While Kenyatta was abroad, voices calling for Kenya's independence had coalesced into the Kenya African Union (KAU). The KAU contained most of the elites from the KCA, and as Kenyatta had become perhaps the most visible figure calling for independence, he was made KAU chairman in 1947. The KAU contained both conservative and radical interests. The conservatives, represented by Kenyatta, sought to protect their own business interests and pursue a constitutional approach to independence. The more radical members favored military confrontation and undertook ritual oathings, in particular of poorer Kikuyus, to expand the reach of the KAU into the African reserves. Kenyatta initially encouraged the mass oathings, but was determined to pursue a conservative path with the colonial government.

However, Kenyatta was unable to limit the influence of the radicals in the KAU largely because his conservative approach accomplished little. Colonial land seizures had created tremendous overcrowding and land competition within the African reserves. This was exacerbated by changes in colonial agricultural policies after World War II. An increase in the cultivation of land by Europeans as well growth in the commercial dairy market led to mass expulsions of squatters from the White Highlands (Bates 1989). The colonial government shipped many of the squatters back to the African reserves. However, within the Kikuyu reserves the value of land had grown considerably since in the post-war years. The Kikuyu reserves were in close proximity to Nairobi, and expansion of commercial production for the urban market had led to the legal creation of private land rights for those in the reserves. A small

minority of Kikuyu in the reserves, generally either members of prominent families or those few who were highly educated, were then able to exploit the advantages offered by the colonial economy. Kikuyu elites' ability to invest in commercial farming in the reserves created "an incipient gentry" whose economic interests and political interests were tied to the colonial government (Bates 1989, 39). The squatters who had been expelled from the White Highlands "returned to find the residents of the reserves invoking the power of the courts to to claim exclusive rights over every patch of land; having been absent during the legal struggles and with but weak claims to ownership in any case, many found themselves landless" (Bates 1989, 29).

The landless Kikuyu peasantry made for a ripe pool of supporters for the more militant KAU members, many of them based in Nairobi's trade unions, who opposed both the colonial government as well as the loyalist chiefs in the reserves. For Kikuyu urban militants such as Bildad Kaggia and Fred Kubai, the politics of Kenyatta and the KAU elites were far too conservative, and they encouraged the spread of oathing to Kikuyu squatters and the landless in the reserves, a practice that would come to signal loyalty to the violent overthrow of the colonial government. They also began collecting weapons for an armed struggle against the British. Most studies date the beginning of what became known as the Mau Mau rebellion to the assassination of chief Waruhiu, a Kikuyu chief loyal to the colonial administration. On October 7, 1952, Mau Mau fighters gunned down the chief as he was returning in his car from Nairobi. The colonial government responded with a state of emergency and a brutal repression. Tens of thousands of Kikuyus, mainly poor Kikuyus, were arrested and crowded into concentration camps where forced labor, torture, and execution were commonplace (Anderson 2005, Elkins 2005). Most of the moderate African elites that advocated for independence were also arrested. Jomo Kenyatta stood accused of being one of the leaders of Mau Mau and was placed under

arrest for eight years, although he likely had no role in the rebellion and publicly denounced it. The Mau Mau Rebellion effectively became both an anticolonial war as well as a civil war among the Kikuyu between rebels and loyalists. Many of those soldiers who fought for the colonial government were in fact Kikuyu based in the reserves while those on the side of the rebellion were generally from the ranks of the squatters.

Critically, the British rewarded Kikuyu loyalists with access to commercial agricultural markets. In a development scheme known as the Swynnerton Plan, agricultural production and economic growth was encouraged in the Kikuyu reserves, with loyalists given the land and livestock of those Kikuyu who were thought to support Mau Mau (Anderson 2005, 294). Bates (1989, 39) argues that "while applying the stick on the one hand, the government offered the carrot on the other. With the cooperation of Kikuyu elites, the government implemented an intensive program of rural development: one designed to bring prosperity to the reserves through the growing and marketing of cash crops. In the fight against Mau Mau, the aggressive elites of the Kikuyu reserves thus gained even greater access to the coercive power and economic resources of the colonial government." Similarly, Ajulu (2002, 254) argues that during colonialism "it was in the Central Province of Kenya, among the Kikuyu ethnic group, that capitalist penetration got near to achieving its classical form, resulting in proletarianisation on a large scale and, at the same time, engendering a concentration of a landed and propertied class." It was therefore wealthy Kikuyus who emerged at the end of colonialism as the dominant political and economic force in the country. Bates finds (1989, 53) finds that "of all the groups in Kenya, the Kikuyu were the richest. Their physical and economic location, as well as their history, endowed them with advantages unattainable by others." Thus, during the era of the Mau Mau uprising, while poorer Kikuyus suffered under severe colonial repression, wealthier landed

Kikuyus benefitted disproportionately from agricultural policies and emerged as the dominant political force during the independence era.

By 1960, the colonial government had eliminated Mau Mau but was facing mounting calls for independence, as many of those among the loyalists had converted into moderate nationalists who sought a peaceful transition to independence (Anderson 2005). The 1950s also saw a growth in the number of political parties. These eventually united into two competing parties in 1960. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was made up the KAU elites with James Gichuru serving as acting president while Kenyatta was still in prison, Oginga Odinga as vice president, and Tom Mboya as secretary. Odinga and Mboya were both Luos, with Odinga recognized as the chief spokesman for the Luo people and Mboya representing the large urban population of unionized Luo laborers in Nairobi. KANU was thus largely dominated by Kikuyu and Luo politicians. The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was made up of elites from several smaller ethnic groups, with Ronald Ngala serving as president, Daniel Arap Moi serving as party chairman, and Musinde Muliro serving as general secretary. Ngala represented the myriad of ethnic groups that inhabited the coastal region. Moi had emerged as the most influential Kalenjin politician in the Rift Valley. Muliro was a prominent Luhya from western Kenya. All three believed the the numerical dominance of the Kikuyu and Luo needed to be counteracted.

In the debates surrounding what independent Kenya's constitution would look like, KADU advocated for a decentralized system that granted significant political powers to the regional governments. This framework was referred to as *majimboism*, after the Swahili word for region (*jimbo*). In particular, KADU elites wanted local governments to have control over land policy, education, policing, and social services (Lynch 2011). The issue of land policy was

particularly salient for those ethnic groups, such as the Kalenjin and Maasai, who felt that Kikuyu migration into 'their' homelands during the colonial era had robbed them of large swathes of ancestral land. If local governments could be empowered to limit the further spread of Kikuyus, then local resources could be protected even if Kikuyus dominated the national government. It was widely anticipated that European-owned land would soon be made available for African settlement, and KADU elites used the land issue to invoke fears of further Kikuyu colonization if a central government under KANU came to power (Lynch 2011). KANU countered that the *majimbo* proposal was hugely inefficient and would balkanize the country, making economic development impossible. Problematically for the KADU *majimboists*, Kenya's white settler population favored the *majimbo* structure, believing they stood a better chance of retaining their land under a decentralized system. This proved awkward for Moi and Ngala. While KADU enjoyed the European's support, European affiliation with the *majimbo* cause contributed to arguments that decentralization was antithetical to nation building.

It was in these early constitutional debates that the Kikuyu were first portrayed as a dominant, self-seeking ethnic group by rival politicians from smaller ethnic communities on the national political stage. The Kikuyu were often referred to as 'settlers,' 'migrants,' and 'foreigners' by KADU elites looking to identify the Kikuyu as the rival 'other' to the smaller, less wealthy ethnic groups (Lynch 2011). The national government was not yet dominated by wealthy Kikuyus, and these initial debates were largely about the future of land allocation. But the dynamic of Kenya's smaller ethnic groups needing form and alliance to counteract Kikuyu elitism would re-emerge with political liberalization in the 1990s.

KADU politicians eventually agreed to a constitution that abandoned *majimbo* if they were given seats in a KANU cabinet. In 1963, KADU was dissolved and its formers leaders

joined Kenyatta and KANU. Moi, Ngala, and Muliro were all given ministerships under Kenyatta, as was Tom Mboya. Odinga was made vice president. At independence, KANU thus had representatives of every major ethnic group in its ranks. However, the uneasy alliance between all of the competing factions in KANU would prove untenable after independence. Even before accepting members of KADU, KANU was divided between conservatives who supported Kenyatta and radicals who supported Odinga. While Kenyatta's supporters wanted to protect the interests of Kenya's wealthiest elites and work cooperatively with the white European population, Odinga spoke fondly of the Soviet Union and called for public seizures of European-owned property. Tom Mboya and Daniel Arap Moi were both also thought to have their own presidential ambitions. This created a situation in which Kenya's elites jockeyed for position under Kenyatta to best position themselves in the growing neo-patrimonial state.

Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-1978

In addition to balancing the demands of the competing political factions, the Kenyatta government faced the task of resettling those in the African reserves and squatters in the White Highlands. Boone (2012) finds that there were three primary means by which the Kenyatta government reallocated land to the Kenyan population. All three of these methods were highly politicized and intended to extend the patronage of Kenyatta. The first was through settlement schemes that were financed through government loans. The schemes were generally of two types: either 'high density schemes' in which the land was divided into 4-6 hectare plots, or 'low density schemes' in which the land was divided into 8-16 hectare plots. Through these settlement schemes, the government settled approximately half-a-million people, much of it in the former White Highlands, where approximately twenty percent of the land once reserved for

Europeans was given to Kenyans (Boone 2012, 80). However, the settlers often were not given formal titles until they began repaying their loans to the Central Land Board, and thus "indebtedness and low rates of titling, especially on the high-density settlement scheme, kept alive the direct political tie between the rights-holders and the state" (Boone 2012, 80). The second method was through Land Buying Companies (LBCs), which were private organizations whose formation was encouraged by the government. These organizations purchased or leased large farms, then subdivided the plots to individual shareholders. The heads of the LBCs tended to be KANU insiders with their eyes on the most valuable farm land. The third was via new settlement on forest land, much of it in the Rift Valley. Some of this was via legal means, but much of the settlement on Rift Valley forest land was informal and illegal. Boone (2012, 82) finds that "over the course of the 1960s and 1970s politicians, district officers, and the forestry service looked the other way as parts of the Mau Forest in Nakuru District…were settled by Kikuyu squatters under the protection of the Kenyatta government." This illegal settlement by Kikuyus further increased the high population density in the Rift Valley and complicated the ethnic rivalries between the autochthonous population and the resettled population, given that many of the new arrivals did not have formal title to the land.

In addition to rewarding his loyal clients with access to land, Kenyatta also permitted favored individuals to engage in smuggling as well as profit from the illegal ivory trade. He also turned against the more radical faction of KANU in government, looking to limit the influence in particular of Oginga Odinga. Despite being Vice-President, Odinga's influence in the cabinet was becoming more limited. Kenyatta increasingly favored Moi over Odinga, as Moi was proving himself to be a more loyal client as well as an effective mobilizer of support among the smaller ethnic groups of the Rift Valley. On the other hand, Odinga and his allies were critical

of the wealth accumulation among the KANU elite and called for government seizures of foreign-owned farms and businesses (Lynch 2011). In a sign of the tactics that would later define KANU's rule, Odinga's chief political adviser Pio Gama Pinto was assassinated outside of his home in Februrary of 1965. Pinto had been a longtime anticolonial activist and had founded KANU's newspaper, *Sauti ya KANU* ('Voice of KANU'), after his release from detention under the British. However, his belief in socialism and his support for Odinga likely led members of the conservative faction of KANU to see him as a political threat and have him killed (Branch 2011).

In 1966, the radical faction of KANU led by Odinga attempted a mass defection under the label of the Kenya People's Union (KPU). Twenty-nine senators and house representatives crossed the floor in opposition, with Odinga resigning as Vice-President. KANU leaders responded by passing an amendment in Parliament requiring the defectors to immediately stand for reelection. The by-elections, referred to as the 'Little General Election,' saw most KPU politicians defeated, with only nine KPU members returning. Six of them were Luos from Odinga's home Nyanza Province, as KANU used its control over state resources to limit KPU's appeal outside of Nyanza. Moi helped organize a campaign in the Rift Valley in which he and the provincial administration "vigorously campaigned against the KPU, which was portrayed as a Luo party owned by foreign communist regimes, whose promises were unrealistic" (Lynch 2011, 95). In their campaign, KANU politicians also highlighted the cultural differences between the Luo and Kenya's other ethnic groups, suggesting for example that because Luos did not circumcise their men, they were culturally more distinct than Kenya's other groups were to one another. The electoral defeat of KPU cemented Moi as a loyal KANU insider behind Kenyatta, and he replaced Odinga as Vice-President.

By the late 1960s, Tom Mboya had come to represent one of the biggest threats to Kikuyu supremacy over the state. Mboya, a Luo, was widely thought to have his own presidential ambitions, but having been overlooked for the vice presidency in favor of Moi, he had recently spoken out against government repression of the KPU. Even though he had helped preclude a unified Luo opposition to Kenyatta and his political skills were widely respected within several circles of KANU, he was assassinated on July 5, 1969. His death was met with widespread protests in Nyanza Province, with most believing that he had been killed to cement the authority of Kenyatta and Moi. Mboya's assassination, along with the marginalization of Odinga, is today considered by many Luos to be yet another case of a Luo politician who was abandoned by the Kikuyu elite after helping them win political power. Despite Mboya's service to KANU and longtime support of Kenyatta, Mboya's funeral was attended by very few of the Kikuyu political elite. One of these was J.M. Kariuki, a prominent socialist politician who was highly critical of the KANU's neglect of Kenya's landless poor and the opulence with which the KANU elite lived. Kariuki himself would later be assassinated in 1975.

The assassination of Mboya increased criticism of KANU elites among the general public. This was particularly pronounced among the Luo, who now had no ethnic leader within the upper echelons of KANU. Luo dissatisfaction came to a head in October of 1969, when Kenyatta traveled to Nyanza Province to open a new hospital in Kisumu. He was met by several thousand protesters, many of them shouting KPU slogans and heckling him during his speech. At one point during his remarks, Kenyatta spoke directly to Odinga, who was among the VIPs in attendance, saying, "these stupid people must end their nonsense, and unless they do so, we will deal with them severely…If it was not for my respect for you, Odinga, I would put you in prison now and see who has the power in this country" (quoted in Branch 2011, 88). Fights between

KANU and KPU supporters at the event soon turned violent and Kenyatta's bodyguards open fire, killing several attendees.[89]

The assassination of Mboya led to a short-term political crisis in which criticism of the Kenyatta government reached its peak. The response from the government was decisive. After the shooting in Kisumu, the government banned the KPU, turning Kenya into a *de facto* one party state. Kenyatta and his inner circle "reacted by seeking cover under Kikuyu ethnicity. The government organized and orchestrated an oathing campaign to mobilize the Kikuyu peasantry, and urban *sans-culottes*, and its professional classes behind the Kenyatta regime. It was not the small hegemonic elite that was threatened by the crisis, which they had brought upon themselves; rather, they argued, it was the entire Kikuyu ethnic group that was under threat" (Ajulu 2002, 261). The practice of oathing was reminiscent of the Mau Mau era, and indicated to most non-Kikuyu a sense of ethnic nationalism among the Kikuyu that excluded the majority of Kenyans from accessing the privileges of the Kikuyu elite. Yet despite this increasing antagonism toward the Kikuyu elite, Kenyatta and KANU included enough leaders from smaller ethnic groups to keep a multiethnic opposition from forming. By isolating Odinga in opposition, Kenyatta had effectively limited the choice of political leadership to himself and Odinga, who was widely distrusted. Thus, while KANU had initially incorporated politicians from multiple ethnic groups at independence, Omolo (2002, 214) notes that by 1969, "political power had effectively been colonized by the Kikuyu, with Kenyatta at the helm but closely surrounded by ethnic relatives and friends…It soon became apparent that Jomo Kenyatta looked up to the Kikuyu elite as the true inheritors of the state." The majority of other ethnic groups in Kenya soon came to resent the political and economic clout of the Kikuyu elite, an elite that "was

[89] Estimates on the number killed vary from eight to several dozen.

Kenyatta's inner cabal" and was "exclusively from the Kiambu district of the Central Province—the Kiambu Bourgeoisie or the 'Family' as it is sometimes called" (Ajulu 2002, 261). By the end of 1971, Kikuyus, Merus, and Embus "held every single one of the key portfolios of the state: defense, foreign affairs, finance and economic planning, local government, agriculture, lands and settlement, and attorney general. A similar pattern could be observed in the upper echelons of the provincial administration and the civil service" (Branch 2011, 99).

Over time, the Kenyatta's government also became increasingly authoritarian. Emblematic of this was the fate of J.M. Kariuki. By the mid 1970s, Kariuki, a longtime critic of the government's neglect of the landless poor, and in particular of its refusal to compensate landless Mau Mau veterans, was becoming more scathing in criticism his of government corruption. As a former Assistant Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, he also chastised the government for its tolerance of illegal poaching and the growth of the illegal ivory trade. Kariuki, himself a Kikuyu, had been able to maintain his seat in Parliament despite attempts from the KANU elite to have him removed. He was finally assassinated in February of 1975 after being taken into custody by the security services.

With Kenyatta's health beginning to fade in the mid-1970s, two competing power blocs emerged from within KANU, each looking to secure the presidency for itself upon Kenyatta's death. The first bloc supported Moi, who as Vice President stood to automatically assume the presidency upon Kenyatta's death. The second stood behind Njoroge Mungai, a cousin of Kenyatta and a member of his cabinet. Mungai was backed by several Kikuyu elites who opposed the idea of a Kalenjin president and felt that their own business and political interests would be better protected under Mungai.

However, Moi enjoyed several advantages over Mungai. As a Kalenjin, much of the public saw him as the best option to end Kikuyu dominance over the country's resources. He also enjoyed a close relationship with the British diplomatic corp. The thinking among the British was that "the widespread unpopularity of the Kenyatta family would result in substantial unrest should Mungai succeed. British diplomats therefore thought continued economic growth and political stability would most likely be achieved under Moi" (Branch 2011, 129). Perhaps most importantly, Moi had cultivated a close relationship with key Kikuyu politicians who were willing to help defeat any barriers to his succession. One of these was the then Attorney General Charles Njonjo. When supporters of Mungai began the so-called 'Change the Constitution' movement in 1976 to keep Moi from assuming the presidency after Kenyatta's death, Njonjo was able to declare such actions treasonous. The movement failed to gain significant traction in Parliament and was effectively silenced (Branch 2011).

Kenya Under Daniel Arap Moi

When Kenyatta died in August of 1978, Moi inherited a powerful presidency from which he was able to entrench himself for the next twenty-four years. Moi replaced Kenyatta's spirit of *harambee* with the idea of *nyayo*, the Swahili word for 'footsteps,' to portray himself as the natural inheritor to the Kenyan state after Kenyatta. To symbolize the new era of Kenyan politics, Moi commissioned the building of Kenya's first high rise building in downtown Nairobi, calling it *Nyayo* House. However, Moi inherited a deteriorating economy as well as a Kenyan public that was dissatisfied with the rampant official corruption and political assassinations that had come to define the later years of Kenyatta's government. Student activism in Nairobi's universities had led to numerous urban protests, and despite increasing

authoritarian environment, the Kenyan media was able to remain relatively independent and critical of KANU.[90]

Over the course of his tenure in office, Moi proved himself to be an adroit politician, earning the nickname 'the Professor of Politics.' His method of rule was based on centralizing the distribution of patronage around himself and insisting on total loyalty from his clients. Turnover within his cabinets tended to be rapid and at times arbitrary, but it served to keep Kenya's political elite dependent upon his patronage to ensure their own access to wealth (Bueno de Mesquito & Smith, 2011). Moi was particularly adept at balancing the demands of Kenya's multiple ethnic communities, always maintaining a multiethnic government despite the increasing prominence of his fellow Kalenjins in the public sector and the rise in development funds targeted at his home Baringo District.[91] Moi cleverly used the public's general distrust of Kikuyu political elites to maintain the support of Kenya's smaller ethnic communities, promising that those communities that had been marginalized by the Kikuyu would now receive their fair share of development resources.

With regards to the issue of access to land, Moi publically called into question that land allocation policies under Kenyatta that had favored the Kikuyu. In the Rift Valley, Moi opened up new reserves for the settlement of the Kalenjin and other smaller pastoralist groups who felt that the Rift Valley was their rightful ancestral land. Boone (2012, 85) argues that "most notoriously, the Rift Valley forest reserves were plundered for this purpose, especially the Mau

[90] Unlike other African states after independence, the private Kenyan print media was able to avoid full cooptation by the ruling party. In particular, the *Daily Nation* has remained an independent source of news since its inception in the 1950s.

[91] By the time he became president, Moi was the undisputed leader of the Kalenjin. However, over the course of his Vice-Presidency, he had to fend off more radical Kalenjin politicians, such as Jean-Marie Seroney, who opposed working within the Kikuyu-dominated KANU. While Moi is remembered for effectively uniting the Kalenjin into a formidable political bloc, many Kalenjins believe he neglected the smaller Kalenjin sub-groups (the Pokot, Marakwet, and Sabaot) in favor of the more numerous Tugen, Nandi, Kipsigis (Lynch 2011).

forest reserves, but so were state properties such as Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) farms, which were supposed to be devoted to agricultural research, and Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) properties that were recently acquired or had not been divvied up in the earlier period." Of course, relatively little of the newly redistributed wealth trickled down to ordinary Kenyans. As had been the norm during the Kenyatta era, the most highly coveted plots were used as patronage goods and allotted to Moi's closest allies, who were also given lucrative business contracts and permitted to participate in the illicit economy. But by allowing an airing of anti-Kikuyu grievances as a means of generating political support, Moi began an ethno-populist political strategy that would be reinvigorated during the multiparty era (Boone 2012).

Critically, Moi was also sure to keep several key Kikuyu politicians within his ruling network, including Charles Njonjo, Mwai Kibaki, and Josephat Karanja. Those elite Kikuyus who did not oppose Moi's government were generally permitted to maintain whatever fortunes they had amassed under Kenyatta. Furthermore, the placement of elite Kikuyus in government precluded a united Kikuyu movement that would oppose Moi. Indeed, when Moi moved to turn Kenya into a *de jure* one-party state via a constitutional amendment in mid-1982, he was able to count on the support of several Kikuyu elites. Most wealthy Kikuyus felt safer under Moi than they would under a government controlled by Oginga Odinga, who remained the most prominent voice in opposition and was attempting to form his own political party to compete in the 1983 elections (Branch 2011). This marked the second time that Odinga had been barred from seeking political power by a former political ally. Lynch (2011, 114) argues that "the exclusion of Odinga from national politics, together with the realities of economic stagnation and relative underdevelopment of Nyanza Province, contributed to the collective narrative that, once again, the Luo faced political and economic marginalization by a state controlled by an ethnic 'other'."

As I show in the next chapter, this discourse of Luo marginalization would come into play again in the 2007 election, with Raila Odinga inheriting the mantle of the Luo leader who was 'stabbed in the back' by his coalition members.

Moi's government turned decisively repressive in the wake of an attempted coup in August of 1982. Members of Kenya's armed services felt the effects of the worsening economic situation through losses in salaries and poor living conditions. Poor relations throughout the chain of command meant that morale among the rank and file had deteriorated (Branch 2011). On August 1, members of the Kenya Air Force (KAF) attempted to depose Moi, announcing over the radio that they had taken control of the country. The coup was quickly defeated by security forces loyal to Moi, and most coup participants were dead or in custody by the end of the day.

The attempted coup gave Moi an opportunity to crackdown on his political opponents and silence public discontent with his government. The University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University were immediately closed the day after the coup and hundreds of student activists were arrested. Those members of the security services who were thought to have supported the coup were quickly arrested, with twelve summarily executed. Evidence emerged that the coup plotters had been in contact with Oginga Odinga and his son Raila prior to the attempt. Raila Odinga was arrested and detained without trial until 1986. Moi also replaced most of the heads of the security services, whom he had inherited from Kenyatta, with his own appointees. Even Attorney General Charles Njonjo, who helped secure Moi's succession, was accused of participating in the coup and forced out of public life, although this was almost certainly because he was thought to have his own presidential ambitions rather than because of any active participation in the coup attempt (Branch 2011). The violence of the post-coup years came to be

a regular feature of politics under Moi. The *Nyayo* House building that had symbolized the dawn of a new era in Kenyan politics was in fact also being used as a detention and torture facility for Moi's opponents.

Corruption within KANU had reached such levels by the late 1980s that many regime insiders believed that the country's relationship with foreign donors was being placed in considerable jeopardy. One such individual was Robert Ouko, a Luo and Foreign Minister under Moi. Although not a democratic reformer, Ouko was a key figure in Luo politics, and he was particularly critical of Nicholas Biwott, Moi's close ally who had amassed a fortune for himself and controlled elements of the security services to protect his business interests (Branch 2011). In February of 1990, Ouko was found dead with a gunshot to his head and his body partially burned. Though Biwott was suspected of involvement, he was never charged, and Ouko's death is seen as another case of a Luo politician who was eliminated from the political scene to maintain the ethnic status quo.

Moi's preference for highly personalized, elite-driven politics contrasts sharply with the efforts of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana to build his authoritarian government into a lasting political party. In Kenya, Moi's personalization of politics corresponded with an attempt to legitimize his rule through naming public buildings, schools, hospitals, and even a national holiday after himself. His image appeared on the new currency notes and his portrait was prominently displayed in offices and homes (Lynch 2011, 116). Whereas Rawlings had invested in effective local party organs that incorporated community elites and were responsive to local demands, Moi's "strategy of rule depended on a direct insertion of the party into local communities, as well as the expansion of authoritarian and coercive controls over popular constituencies. Thus, during the 1980s, there was an increasing centralization of power around party institutions.

Local authorities were more aggressively policed and sanctioned by the center" (LeBas 2011, 164). KANU under Moi was thus designed more as a network of personal patronage distribution and political control than a formal political party, where personal loyalty to Moi and his inner circle was more important than maintaining a formal party apparatus.

KANU previously under Kenyatta was certainly not democratic. However, "single-party elections in the Kenyatta period were surprisingly participatory and contentious. Moi did not allow the continuation of this election-led fluidity…The party established disciplinary committees that vetted candidates, expelled party critics from party membership, and reduced local constituencies' freedom to elect and sanction their own MPs" (LeBas 2011, 164). KANU also declared illegal or incorporated into the ruling party several civil society organizations that had long had independent, representative roles. Among those incorporated into KANU were the national women's organization and the national confederation of trade unions. They were then effectively demobilized as independent organizations. KANU's goal "was to ensure that there would be no bases for political organization and political activity outside the state" (Widner 1993, 169). The personalization of politics without any investment in durable party structures was coupled with a weakening of the state bureaucracy, as "bureaucrats became increasingly anxious about potential disapproval of their own activities by the Office of the President and hesitant to make controversial decisions on their own. The Office of the President became the reference point, slowing the process of institutional development not only in the legislature but in the bureaucracy itself" (Widner 1993, 163). Unsurprisingly, Kenya's economic prospects did not improve under Moi, and thus the party lacked any of the performance legitimacy that Rawlings cultivated in Ghana. KANU effectively relied only on the personality of Moi and

access to state funds to exist. When Moi reached the end of his term limit in 2002, the party ceased to play any major role in Kenyan politics.

1992: The Return of Multipartyism

Like many longtime African incumbents in the early 1990s, Moi faced increasing pressure from foreign donors to allow for multiparty elections. The IMF, World Bank, and several bilateral donors had suspended or canceled further development aid until Moi addressed systemic corruption and introduced some form of government accountability (LeBas 2011). Moi was thus no longer in a position to resist domestic calls for liberalization, and in 1991 the ban on opposition parties was lifted.

The first major opposition movement, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), was founded by former KANU ministers Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba. It registered as a formal political party 1992 to contest the 1992 elections and initially gained the support of a broad multiethnic coalition of opposition elites. However, FORD had no grassroots organizations on which they could rely for popular support. Authoritarian rule under Moi had eliminated unions, ethnic associations, and other civil society groups which might have given their support to FORD. Furthermore, Kenya's private sector remained largely under the control of the state, giving opposition leaders limited resources with which to work (Arriola 2011). FORD's leaders were effectively ethnic figureheads who had once been KANU members but had found themselves locked out of Moi's distribution of patronage. LeBas (2011) argues that this lack of party institutionalization under Moi limited the organizational strength of the opposition. Although "there were popular protests, these were uncoordinated. And though politicians attempted to form inclusive opposition partnerships, they did not have the common

interests or the mobilizing structures to hold these coalitions together" (Lebas 2011, 168). FORD, like KANU, was thus more an alliance of elites than a political party with any meaningful organizations. Reidl (2014) finds that when an incumbent parties in Africa's multiparty regimes neglected to build strong party structures while in power, opposition parties fail to do so as well. In the era of initial liberalization, "new parties must innovate to create new linkages to newly available voters. In the period of party formation for the founding elections, new parties must organize quickly and frequently build on regional or ethnic ties to mobilize followers in the absence of national party organizations. The proliferation of new parties and unstructured competition leads to a volatile new party system, regional fragmentation, and low party system institutionalization in the long term" (Riedl 2014, 15).

Indeed, FORD quickly fractured into competing factions only months after its founding. Oginga Odinga took his largely Luo base and formed FORD-Kenya (FORD-K) with the support of several influential Luhya politicians. Kenneth Matiba, a Kikuyu, formed FORD-Asili (FORD-A) and ran as its presidential candidate, attempting to appeal to the country's rural poor. A third opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), representing largely wealthy Kikuyus who were previously members of Moi's inner circle, formed under the presidential candidacy of Mwai Kibaki. The opposition in Kenya thus entered the 1992 elections hopelessly divided between three presidential contenders.

In preparation for the 1992 election, KANU also began a systematic campaign of state-sponsored violence, in particular in the Rift Valley, to ensure that opposition parties' strongholds were limited to only their leaders' homelands. Declaring the Rift Valley to be a 'KANU zone,' politicians mobilized local militias from the so-called KAMATUSA ethnic groups (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu) to expel Kikuyus, Luos, and Luhyas, who had become

associated with the various opposition parties, from the Rift Valley. The immediate political goal of the violence was to disenfranchise those voters who were likely to support the opposition. But the violence was justified by local elites on the grounds that those victimized groups were non-indigenous "settlers" whose access to land was based on colonial and Kenyatta-era land settlement schemes. KANU elites suggested that an opposition election victory would lead to additional encroachment on KAMATUSA land, and thus indigenous residents should remove the threat immediately. The language used invoked the debates regarding access to land that had plagued the Rift Valley since independence. In particular, politicians from the Maasai and Kalenjin communities reignited the debate about *majimboism*, effectively calling for political decentralization and increased local control over resources by indigenous ethnic communities. Importantly for KANU politicians, evictions of residents from "settler" ethnic groups then freed up land that could then be used as a patronage good for the upcoming election (Branch 2011). Lebas (2011, 234) finds that the state's use of violence "reinforced the salience of local ethnic animosities rather than national partisan ones," further inhibiting the rise of coherent national parties. The violence also created lasting "networks of violence specialists" that existed outside the structure of any of the formal parties, causing politicians to rely on these local militias and strongmen to do their bidding at the local level rather than any grassroots partisan structures (LeBas 2011, 234). Moi also opened state coffers to KANU candidates to facilitate vote-buying in place of any meaningful campaign.

With the use of violence and his control over state resources, as well as the internal divisions within the opposition, Moi was able to win reelection with only thirty-six percent of the vote. In the wake of the 1992 election, evidence of massive government corruption also began to emerge. In what became known as the Goldenberg Scandal, government insiders developed a

scheme to take advantage of export credits that were designed to boost the country's foreign exchange reserves. An export company called Goldenberg International had been awarded the monopoly rights to gold and diamond exports and claimed approximately 120 million dollars from the Central Bank of Kenya for its resource exports, despite the country having little gold or diamonds to speak of (Branch 2011). The exports were in fact fraudulent, and much of the money was used to fund KANU's 1992 election campaign as well as enrich Moi's close associates. Insiders were also using the revenue generated by the scheme to engage in currency speculation. The speculation and increase in the money supply had contributed to an inflation rate of over forty percent by 1993 (Branch 2011, 220).

With the deteriorating economy and KANU's lack of popularity outside of its KAMATUSA base, the opposition likely could have defeated Moi in 1997 had they been able to coalesce into a single party. However, it emerged that multiple members of the opposition, including Oginga Odinga, had also received funds from the head of Goldenberg International in the lead up to the 1992 election, making government corruption a more difficult issue to criticize. Furthermore, no opposition parties had invested in any grassroots organizations, meaning that after the 1992 election, most party offices closed. Opposition forces were further divided when Oginga Odinga died in 1994 and FORD-K was plagued by an internal struggle for leadership between Raila Odinga, Oginga Odinga's son, and Michael Kijana Wamalwa, a prominent Luhya. When Wamalwa emerged as the parties next presidential candidate, Raila Odinga left the party and became leader of the previously insignificant National Democratic Party (NDP). FORD-A was also considerably weakened, as Kenneth Matiba's health had deteriorated considerably and he no longer funded the party through his own fortune, as he had fallen out with Martin Shikuku, a Luhya who emerged as the party's presidential candidate. To ensure that Mwai Kibaki's DP

did not emerge as a force that could defeat KANU in the 1997 elections, President Moi lured much of the wealthy Kikuyu business community back into the KANU fold. This was done through the creation of the Central Province Development Support Group (CPDSG), which effectively served as a means to target credit and government contracts to only those wealthy Kikuyus who abstained from funding Kibaki's DP (Arriola 2013). This was done in conjunction with continuing to mobilize his own political base with anti-Kikuyu rhetoric that reminded them that the previous Kikuyu government had been responsible for the land resettlement schemes that favored Kikuyus over the KAMATUSA ethnic groups.

Kibaki was able to emerge as the most prominent politician in opposition in the lead up to the 1997 election, but a lack of resources relative to KANU meant that he garnered only thirty-one percent of the vote to Moi's forty percent. KANU again mobilized militias of 'indigenous' communities against those 'settler' communities that supported opposition parties. In 1997, the violence was most intense in the Coast Province, where pro-KANU militias targeted Kikuyu, Kamba, and Luo communities (Branch 2011). Moi was thus again reelected, however KANU had lost the support of several ethnic groups to various opposition parties. FORD-A and FORD-K were both led by prominent Luhyas. Charity Ngilu emerged as the most prominent Kamba in opposition and ran under the banner of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Kibaki had become the only major Kikuyu candidate in opposition with the Democratic Party, and Raila Odinga represented the Luo, and his own father's legacy, with the NDP.

To compensate for this, Moi offered a cabinet position to Raila Odinga after the election, bringing the NDP and its bloc of Luo votes back into KANU temporarily. Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, was made into a KANU vice-chairman in an attempt to keep some of the Kikuyu vote within KANU. However, Moi would struggle to make any further headway in

broadening KANU's appeal between the 1997 and 2002 elections. Arriola (2013) argues that the neo-liberal economic reforms required by foreign donors also limited the state's control over the private sector by the late 1990s. In particular, liberalization of the banking sector gave wealthy Kikuyu businessmen access to credit outside the control of the state. Their preferred candidate in 1997 was Mwai Kibaki of the DP, himself a wealthy Kikuyu businessman. However, fearing financial retribution from Moi's government, most withheld financial support for Kibaki until after 1997. With KANU lacking broad popularity and Moi reaching the end of his term limits, Kibaki would become the most prominent and most well-funded opposition candidate in the lead up to the 2002 election. Although Jomo Kenyatta's son Uhuru remained within KANU, it would be Mwai Kibaki who would gain the overwhelming support of Kikuyus with Moi stepping down.

CHAPTER 5- CAMPAIGNING IN KENYA'S 2002 AND 2007 ELECTIONS

In this chapter, I look in detail at campaign strategies in Kenya's 2002 and 2007 election. Both elections were considerably more competitive than previous elections had been largely because opposition parties were able to unite behind a single presidential candidate who stood a chance at defeating the incumbent party. However, I show below that the parties with a core of Kikuyu support faced considerable challenges in attracting a multiethnic following because of the history of the Kikuyu as a dominant ethnic group. As I discuss below, these challenges were more acute in the 2007 election than they were in the 2002 election, as the 2002 election represented an opportunity for a multiethnic alliance to unseat KANU from power. However, the subsequent campaign strategies chosen by parties in both elections fit the expectations of the theory. In both elections, parties with a Kikuyu core of support opted for campaigns with significantly more specific programmatic material.

Table 5.1: Ethnic Makeup of Kenya*

Ethnic Group	*Approximate Percent of Population*
Kikuyu	21%
Luhya	14%
Luo	14%
Kamba	11%
Kalenjin	11%
Meru	5%
Kisii	5%
Mijikenda	5%
Embu	2%
Somali	2%
Maasai	2%
Others	8%

*Percentages are from Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999) and should be considered approximate.

The 2002 Campaign

The 2002 election was preceded by a formal alliance of the major opposition candidates from 1997. In February of 2002, Mwai Kibaki, Michael Kijana Wamalwa, and Charity Ngilu announced the creation of the National Alliace for Change (NAC), and agreed to back a single presidential candidate. Although at the time they had yet to announce which of them would be the chosen candidate, Kibaki was in the strongest financial position by far. The Kikuyu business community, now freed from the financial controls of the state, moved decisively behind Kibaki (Arriola 2013). Prominent Kikuyus such as Njenga Karume, Duncan Ndegwa, and Joseph Wanjui now openly organized the Kikuyu community behind Kibaki without fear of state reprisal. Politically, Kibaki's biggest liability also that he was that he was a wealthy Kikuyu and enjoyed the support of elite Kikuyu donors. He would need demonstrate a willingness to share state resources with other ethnic groups to be successful.

This was partly achieved by securing Wamalwa as his vice-presidential candidate. Although by far the most popular Luhya politician in the country, Wamalwa had been left short of funds after his 1997 FORD-A campaign, and the state had begun bankruptcy proceedings against him in an attempt to disqualify him as a presidential or vice-presidential candidate. Yet Wamalwa was able to cover much of his outstanding debts once the creation of the NAC was announced, strongly suggesting that Kibaki's financial supporters agreed to bail him out financially if he would support Kibaki's presidency. Similarly, despite her popularity in the Kamba community, Ngilu was short on financial resources herself and faced increasing internal challenges within the SDP. She united behind Kibaki after being promised a future role as Prime Minister under a reformed constitution (Arriola 2013, 203).

Kibaki enjoyed a further boost with defection of several influential elites from KANU. The so-called 'Rainbow Alliance' led by Raila Odinga was unhappy with Moi's control over KANU and the selection process of its next presidential candidate. After months of internal bickering, Raila Odinga and his allies, including former Vice-President George Saitoti, KANU Secretary General Joseph Kamotho, and prominent Kamba cabinet member Kalonzo Musyoka defected from KANU. In September of 2002, the defectors formally allied with the NAC behind Kibaki's candidacy to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Raila Odinga replaced Ngilu as Kibaki's choice for future Prime Minster and was promised an equal share of cabinet appointments.

The growing multiethnic opposition represented a real threat to KANU for the first time since independence. Two months prior to the election, Moi selected Musalia Mudavadi, a prominent Luhya politician, as Vice-President to replace Saitoti in an attempt to attract Luhya voters back to KANU. Moi also picked Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and Jomo Kenyatta's son, as KANU's presidential candidate. Although Kenyatta was not from his own Kalenjin ethnic group, this choice had some strategic advantages for Moi. As a Kikuyu, there was a chance that Kenyatta could attract some of Mwai Kibaki's supporters back into KANU and effectively split the Kikuyu vote. Furthermore, as a somewhat more junior politician than other potential contenders in KANU, Kenyatta would be reliant on Moi's support for political survival, giving the outgoing president a degree of influence in a new KANU government. As the heir to one of Kenya's largest fortunes, Kenyatta would also be able to contribute large amounts from his own personal fortune to KANU's campaign, which would be less-well funded than in previous elections due to Moi's weakened control over the private sector (Arriola 2013).

However, the choice of Kenyatta created several challenges for KANU as well. Part of Moi's strategy during the previous two campaigns in 1992 and 1997 had been to emphasize the risk of having a Kikuyu president such as Mwai Kibaki or Kenneth Matiba, who might undo the gains that the KAMATUSA ethnic groups had made since Kenyatta's death. With Kenyatta now representing KANU, the anti-Kikuyu rhetoric which KANU had previously employed was now of little use. Kenyatta also faced the difficult task of convincing the public that he would not simply represent an extension of Moi's presidency. With the public acutely aware of the massive corruption and political violence that had defined the Moi years, this was nearly impossible, as Kenyatta owed his quick rise within KANU to Moi's patronage.

Table 5.2: Breakdown of Party Support by Ethnic Group

Kenya- Before 2002 Election

(*Afrobarometer* Round 2)

KANU	
Ethnic Group	*Percent*
Kalenjin	45.4
Kikuyu	12.0
Maasai/Samburu	9.3
Somali	8.3
Luhya	6.5
Kamba	4.6
Others	13.9

-108 Respondents

NARC (& Allies)	
Ethnic Group	*Percent*
Kikuyu	19.9
Kamba	15.1
Luhya	14.1
Luo	13.3
Kalenjin	10.0
Meru	6.4
Others	21.2

-1,444 Respondents

Kenya- Before 2007 Election

(*Afrobarometer* Round 5)

ODM (& Allies)	
Ethnic Group	*Percent*
Luo	28.2
Luhya	24.2
Kamba	7.0
Somali	6.8
Kalenjin	5.1
Kisii	5.0
Others	23.7

-724 Respondents

PNU (& Allies)	
Ethnic Group	*Percent*
Kikuyu	41.2
Meru/Embu	12.2
Luhya	9.8
Somali	7.2
Kamba	6.7
Kalenjin	4.6
Others	18.3

-461 Respondents

Unfortunately for Moi, the hope that Kenyatta would split the Kikuyu vote was likely misplaced, given how overwhelmingly Kikuyus backed NARC. Table 5.2 shows that of those who answered that they 'felt close' to each party in the elections under consideration. Of those respondents who said that they felt close to NARC, about 20% are Kikuyu. However, this is somewhat misleading, as NARC was a coalition of individual parties. The party which Mwai Kibaki belonged to at that time was the Democratic Party (DP), and of those who answered that they felt close to the DP, 80.4% were Kikuyu. Appendix 5.1 further shows that 64 percent of Kikuyus in the survey answered that they felt close to NARC, whereas only 2.9 percent of Kikuyus felt close to KANU. We can therefore say that NARC had a large core of Kikuyu support, as well as enjoying the backing of several other smaller ethnic groups. KANU enjoyed a large following of Kalenjin support, however, as Appendix 5.1 shows, far more Kalenjins actually felt close to NARC than felt close to KANU, showing how unpopular KANU had become by 2002. KANU's base of support was still in the KAMATUSA communities of the Rift Valley, but given that Kenyatta was not a member of any of these ethnic groups, he would struggle to generate considerable popular support among them.

Considering the large multiethnic support and significant funding that NARC enjoyed during the campaign, the party likely could have based its campaign on relatively vague slogans for change and democratic reforms as well as reinforced the need for a new constitution. Indeed, the issue of constitutional reform loomed large for NARC, as the pre-election agreement between the various parties was based on the creation of new constitution with an office for the Prime Minister. During the campaign, the issue of a new constitution with reduced presidential powers and an influential Prime Minister reinforced NARC's image as a more democratic and representative party than KANU.

However, Mwai Kibaki and his campaign team opted instead to emphasize a pledge of implementing free primary education. This is somewhat surprising, as it would seem to be a relatively risky, and perhaps unnecessary, promise to make. Figure 5.1 below shows the campaign strategies used by each party in the 2002 election, based on the distribution of appeals coded in the *Daily Nation* newspaper from the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Consistent with the theory that the party with the core of Kikuyu support should adopt a more

Figure 5.1



Kenya 2002- KANU to NARC	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-4.93** (0.034)
General Programmatic	4.06** (0.042)
Pork	-1.87* (0.026)
Trait	1.86* (0.026)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

programmatic campaign, NARC does indeed offer more than twice the amount of specific programmatic pledges than KANU. The difference between the two parties in specific programmatic material is statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Table 5.2 shows that by far the largest share of these appeals was in education (27.4 percent). Across the country, Kibaki and Wamalwa repeatedly reinforced the pledge to introduce free primary education once in power. The issue of constitutional reform was used as well, but with considerably less frequency, with only 7.1 percent of NARC's specific programmatic appeals. NARC did also offer more pork appeals than KANU, whereas KANU offered more trait appeals than NARC (both significant with 90 percent conficence). However, pork and trait appeals made up a relatively small amount of each campaign.

Examining each party's preferences for appeals also shows that both parties prefer general programmatic appeals to all others, but that NARC has a strong preference for specific programmatic appeals over both pork and trait appeals. KANU's overall strategy is relatively difficult to define, beyond its preference for general programmatic content and its focus on appeals based on agriculture. Kenyatta's major promise during the campaign was a pledge to reinvigorate the agricultural sector, but he offered little in the way of specifics beyond this. This is perhaps not surprising however, given that KANU had become relatively unpopular in many parts of the country and entered the 2002 elections with few policy accomplishments for which it could claim credit. As noted above, Kenyatta was in the difficult position of needing to mobilize KANU's base without using the anti-Kikuyu rhetoric that had served Moi so well in 1992 and

Table 5.3: 2002 Programmatic Issues by Party

Programmatic Specific Issues

KANU				NARC		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Agriculture	13	37.1		Education	23	27.4
Business	3	8.6		Econ. Growth/Development	8	9.5
Corruption	3	8.6		Constitution	6	7.1
Infrastructure	3	8.6		Agriculture	5	6.0
Transportation	3	8.6		Democracy	5	6.0
Environment	2	5.7		Infrastructure	5	6.0
Roads	2	5.7		Business	3	3.6
Constitution	2	5.7		Health	3	3.6
				Housing	3	3.6
				Roads	3	3.6
				Science/Tech.	3	3.6
				Women	3	3.6
				Corruption	3	3.6
				Peace	3	3.6
				Fuel	2	2.4

Programmatic General Issues

KANU				NARC		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Agriculture	44	23.8		Econ. Growth/Development	22	15.6
Business	24	13.0		Corruption	15	10.6
Econ. Growth/Development	22	11.9		Business	14	9.9
Environment	22	11.9		Agriculture	11	7.8
Democracy	10	5.4		Democracy	11	7.8
Roads	8	4.3		Jobs	7	5.0
Infrastructure	7	3.8		Health	6	4.3
Science/Tech.	6	3.2		Peace	6	4.3
Water	6	3.2		Infrastructure	5	3.6
Health	5	2.7		Police/Crime	4	2.8
Land	5	2.7		Science/Tech.	3	2.1
Corruption	4	2.2		Tax Collection	3	2.1
Education	3	1.6		Courts	3	2.1
Peace	3	1.6		Education	3	2.1
Transportation	3	1.6		Environment	3	2.1
Constitution	3	1.6		Fuel	3	2.1
Jobs	2	1.1		Water	3	2.1
Oil	2	1.1		Land	3	2.1
				International Relations	2	1.4
				Roads	2	1.4
				Transportation	2	1.4
				Decentralization	2	1.4
				Women	2	1.4

1997. He also had little credibility among the electorate, serving only as a nominated member of Parliament under Moi without ever having won a political campaign for national office.[92] It should be noted that NARC's campaign time was partly curtailed, as Kibaki suffered injuries in a car accident that required medical attention abroad for several days. Vice-Presidential candidate Michael Wamalwa also needed to spend time abroad during the campaign for his own medical attention. However, their absences did not seem to affect NARC's momentum, and the numerous political elites who had pledged their support to NARC picked up the slack on the campaign trail.

2002 Results

Kibaki and NARC won the the 2002 election easily with 62.2 percent of the vote to Kenyatta's 31.3 percent. NARC also won 125 of the 210 contested seats in Parliament.

Table 5.3: 2002 Presidential Election Results by Province

Province	KANU Vote Share (%)	NARC Vote Share (%)	Others Vote Share (%)
Nairobi	20.7	76.6	2.7
Coast	32.0	64.0	4.0
North Eastern	61.8	37.1	1.1
Eastern	25.0	73.4	1.6
Central	30.0	69.2	0.8
Rift Valley	53.0	43.0	4.0
Western	21.6	74.9	3.5
Nyanza	7.8	58.9	33.3

Kenyatta and KANU were only able to win majorities in the party's provincial base in the Rift Valley as well as the more sparsely-populated North Eastern Province. Furthermore, KANU's

[92] Kenyatta had contested his father's previous seat in Parliament in the Gatundu South Constituency in 1997, but lost.

results in the the Rift Valley were only slightly better than the opposition. Kenyatta was thus unable to generate either a considerable following of his fellow Kikuyus, who decisively backed Kibaki, or mobilize the KAMATUSA Rift Valley ethnic groups to any great extent. The 2002 election was somewhat unique in Kenyan elections in that both major parties featured Kikuyu presidential candidates. Kibaki thus did not face the anti-Kikuyu rhetoric that he would need to handle in 2007.

2005 Constitutional Referendum

Kibaki began his tenure as president by introducing several much-needed economic reforms, including reinvigorating several moribund state marketing boards (Branch 2011). With much fanfare, the government also implemented its campaign promise of free primary education, as well as created a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) for local development projects (Lynch 2011). In an attempt to indicate his commitment to fighting corruption, Kibaki appointed longtime anti-corruption campaigner John Githongo to the post of Permanent Secretary for Government and Ethics, effectively making him the government's anti-corruption chief. The liberalized political environment combined with healthy economic growth to give Kenyans a belief that the country had moved decidedly away from Moi's style of crony authoritarianism.

Unfortunately for Kibaki, his government's popularity soon waned with the discovery that tens of millions dollar's worth of public contracts had been fraudulently awarded to a company called Anglo Leasing, which was actually a front for government insiders to siphon public funds. In secretly recorded conversations with close Kibaki associates, John Githongo revealed to the Kenyan public that much of the money was being used to provide the funds that would ensure Kibaki's reelection in 2007. What became known as the 'Anglo Leasing Scandal'

plagued Kibaki's government in much the same way that the Goldenberg scandal had epitomized corruption under Moi's KANU government.

By 2005, Kibaki had also not introduced the new constitution that he promised during the 2002 campaign, largely because the appointed Constitutional Conference was beset by disagreements between the various factions of NARC as to what the shape the new constitution would take. According to Raila Odinga and his allies, Kibaki had promised that the new constitution would reduce presidential powers, decentralize the government, and create an office of Prime Minister, with Odinga's appointment as the first Prime Minister the condition under which he had joined NARC in 2002. Odinga and the LDP faction of NARC further claimed that they had been promised half of Kibaki's cabinet appointments once the new constitution was passed. However, with Kibaki having won the election, his allies were now unwilling to consider any significant reduction in executive authority. The draft constitution proposed by the Constitutional Conference, known as the 'Bomas Draft' due to the location of the conference, ultimately recommended significantly reduced executive powers and a new Prime Minister. President Kibaki's allies walked out of the conference rather than support the draft. They instead drafted their own constitution in Parliament, which became known as the 'Wako Draft,' after then Attorney General Amos Wako. The Wako draft kept most executive powers in place and offered only minor devolution reforms. It would be the Wako Draft that the public would vote on during the referendum in November of 2005.

As the Wako Draft did not contain the reforms that many Kenyans expected after 2002, opponents of Kibaki united behind the 'No' movement, with Raila Odinga emerging as the major face of the campaign. As a Luo, and specifically as the son of Oginga Odinga, Raila became the modern symbol of Luo exploitation by the Kikuyu. According to this discourse, Raila's father

had supported Jomo Kenyatta while Kenyatta was under arrest by the British colonial government. Oginga Odinga had insisted on Kenyatta's release, only to be 'stabbed in the back' and removed from KANU by Kenyatta after independence. Now Raila had been manipulated and abandoned by the modern incarnation of the Kikuyu elite with their refusal to appoint him Prime Minister. Raila's defection from NARC effectively removed Kibaki's bloc of Luo support, with most Luo politicians joining Raila in denouncing the Wako constitution. Prominent Luo political scientist and longtime politician Peter Anyang' Nyong'o famously called the draft a "bad and fraudulent constitution made by a small group of people mesmerized by power who think the rest of Kenyans are foolish" (quoted in Branch 2011, 259).

Anger at the government's constitution was not limited to Luos. Lynch (2006, 257) argues that the government's support of the Wako draft "persuaded many Kenyan's that Kikuyu leaders had taken over the process of constitutional review for the benefit of their own community." This was combined with public suspicion over Kibaki's appointment of fellow Kikuyus to the most coveted ministries and security positions (Branch 2011). Many non-Kikuyu from NARC had been relegated to more minor government posts, and used their apparent marginalization as a signal of which community's interests Kibaki's government actually represented. When Vice President Michael Wamalwa passed away, Kibaki replaced him with Moody Awoori. Awoori, although also a Luhya, was a more controversial appointment and stood accused of being one of the major beneficiaries of the Anglo Leasing Scandal.

With rival politicians on either side, the weeks leading up to the referendum looked much more like a political campaign than a popular referendum. The two factions campaigned behind the symbols that they had been assigned on the balloting paper, with the pro-Wako draft government faction using a banana and the anti-Wako draft faction using an orange. In an

approach that would largely shape their campaign strategy in the 2007 election, the orange anti-government movement portrayed Kibaki as the new Kenyatta who was attempting to reorient the government in favor of the Kikuyu elite. With this strategy, the "blame for the myriad social, political and economic ills that had plagued Kenya for half a century was heaped on the Kikuyu" (Kagwanja 2008, 374).

The orange campaign succeeded in defeating the Wako constitution, with 58 percent of the population rejecting the reforms. Only in the Kikuyu-dominated Central Region did the pro-Wako faction win a majority. Kibaki thus remained in power with the large presidential powers that he had inherited from the existing constitution. However, the multiethnic rainbow alliance that had brought him to power had collapsed. He consolidated his position by appointing his own Kikuyu allies to most key government positions as well as allying with several former KANU elites whom he had unseated in 2002. Such was Kibaki's need for political support that he would eventually seek and receive the backing of former President Moi. Beyond defeating the Wako constitution, the campaign surrounding the referendum united government opposition under the common cause of unseating Kibaki in 2007. The Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) was thus born out of the 'No' movement, taking the color and symbolism of the anti-Wako draft movement. Raila Odinga became the major political figure in opposition, effectively beginning his own presidential campaign in the wake of the 2005 referendum.

The 2007 Campaign

With NARC having collapsed and his attempt to pass the Wako constitution defeated, Kibaki needed to create a new platform on which to run in 2007. With the remnants of his own Democratic Party, the remaining loyal elements of NARC, and KANU elites from the Coast and

Rift Valley Provinces, Kibaki formed the Party of National Unity (PNU). PNU would eventually secure the backing of Uhuru Kenyatta, decisively uniting the Kikuyu behind PNU for the 2007 election. Looking at Table 5.2 above, the Kikuyu made up over forty percent of the support of the PNU. This is not quite half of the respondents who feel close to the PNU, but if one considers that fewer than four percent of Kikuyus report feeling close to a party outside the PNU alliance, it is fair to say that the Kikuyu formed the dominant core of PNU in 2007.

Raila Odinga and his allies formed the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya in opposition, capitalizing on the symbolism of the orange from the successful 2005 'No' constitutional referendum campaign. ODM-K itself would begin to fracture, with Kolonzo Musyoka falling out with Odinga and opting to run his own presidential campaign using the ODM-K name. However, the majority of politicians in opposition to Kibaki stayed in Raila Odinga's camp under the mantle of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). As by far the most prominent Luo in the country, Odinga would be able to count on the support of the vast majority of Luo voters. He was also able to attract a large multiethnic collection of elites to ODM, which he united under his 'Pentagon' campaign team. This consisted of William Ruto, who had become the most influential Kalenjin politician in the country, Charity Ngilu, whose inclusion helped compensate for the loss of those Kambas who supported Musyoka, Najib Balala, who it was hoped would help ODM capture the Muslim coastal communities, Joseph Nygah, a prominent Embu, and former Luhya Vice-President Musalia Mudavadi, who would serve as Odinga's running mate. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of those survey respondents who answered that they felt close to ODM. Although it had a large following of Luo voters, ODM enjoyed a more multiethnic base than PNU, with Luos making up less than thirty percent

of the party's base. This is only slightly more than the Luhya and only slightly more than the "Others" category.

Critical to the image of ODM was representing the party as an alliance of ethnic groups who opposed Kikuyu power and would redistribute the wealth accumulated by Kibaki and his close associates. Cheeseman (2008, 175) argues that "by creating a coalition of groups which believe they have been historically disenfranchised and promising to free them from central domination—which in many cases was interpreted as Kikuyu domination—Odinga effectively gave his alliance partners common cause." Odinga and ODM effectively used Kibaki's refusal to accept a new constitution as evidence of Kikuyu selfishness and elitism, playing on many of the negative stereotypes of Kikuyu that returned to popular political discourse in the elections of the 1990s. Odinga thus made the cornerstone of his own campaign a new constitution that would embrace *majimbosim*, meaning the decentralization of power and resources to local governments that represented each province's indigenous ethnic groups. While the issue of decentralization was on its face an institutional change, it was advertised in no uncertain terms to the electorate as a type of ethnic redistribution—away from the Kikuyu-dominated central government. Local governments were to be given greater control over land rights and other local resources as well as be given increased development funds from the central government. This would guarantee that Kikuyu elites would not be able to monopolize power in the future.

A *majimbo* constitution would be particularly attractive to those ethnic groups who still felt aggrieved at Kikuyu settlement in their traditional homelands. This included both the KAMATUSA groups, who were represented by William Ruto (Kalenjin) in the Pentagon, and the smaller coastal ethnic groups represented by Najib Balala and Noah Ngala, son of Ronald Ngala—one of the main proponents of *majimboism* in the 1960s—who defected to ODM from

KANU. Neither of these communities had a strong historical link to the Odinga's Luo ethnic group. However, Odinga portrayed himself and the Luo as having been manipulated and abandoned by Kibaki and his inner circle, and thus ODM portrayed their alliance collectively as the unified victims of the Kikuyu. By "playing on the widespread demand for devolution of power, and by campaigning on a slogan that many populations interpreted as promising greater control over land, Odinga was able to support a base with little history of unity" (Cheeseman 2008, 175).

My interviews with members of Kibaki's 2007 campaign team consistently stated that the portrayal of Kibaki as an elite, untrustworthy Kikuyu was biggest challenge posed by ODM. One Member of Parliament who campaigned for PNU in the Coastal Province said of ODM's campaign:

> It was anti-Kikuyu. You know them, they just ran with the anti-Kikuyu message, that Kikuyus want to come back to power so that they can continue oppressing us. You know, 'they are thieves, they are land grabbers,' you see. It was anti-Kikuyu. Just that. It started in 2005. In 2005 there was a constitution which we tried to pass…And from this campaign, the message was that 'this is a Kikuyu constitution. It favors them to continue dominating us,' and all that. So that propaganda won…Anti-Kikuyu. Anti-Kikuyu. Anti-Kikuyu.[93]

A Luhya parliamentary candidate in 2007 who represented PNU and worked with the national campaign team similarly described the problems he faced in attempting to convince his co-ethnics to support him with Kibaki as the PNU candidate.

> Even my elders called me and told me, 'we want you. We really would like you. We like your policies.' I had done a number of things, development projects, like food, primary schools, some youth things…They say yeah, but they believe Kikuyus are thieves, they are grabbers, land and national resources, they take everything, they are inconsiderate, they are tribalistic. They don't consider other people. They are monopolistic, they have monopolized everything. Those are some of the things.

[93] Interview, June 8, 2014, Nairobi.

> Some of them are not really true, but you see that is also what the local campaign is like. Raila's campaign was just on that…That was absolute. Actually, he only ran one campaign: 'Kikuyus are bad. Don't vote for them.' That was his campaign…[My opponent] was asking 'why is he going with our enemies, the Kikuyu? They are our enemies.' That became the clarion…It is just unfortunate that the party I was running on was a Kikuyu party. But don't now vote the party. Vote me. That would not work, because for them, anything associated with the Kikuyu is bad.[94]

A Kikuyu member of PNU's communications team perhaps summed up the struggles faced by a party thought to be controlled by Kikuyus best:

> Kikuyus are very visible everywhere. If you go to Luo Nyanza, those public transporters and in the shops and everything, they will be Kikuyu owned. So it is very easy. It is like the Indians. The way Indians will be all over having shops. Or the Jews. I hear they are very prominent in the US and even in other countries. Our success also is a problem. And the deeds of President [Jomo] Kenyatta. Like he had a cabinet of his own, mainly Kikuyus. So there is that feeling…They are very busy people. We go to the Coast, to Western, we go all over. You will see them all over…Even in your village, even if it is western Kenya, the manager that is operating will be a Kikuyu and is charging you for everyday. Whether it is rightful, you will feel like these people are taking our money. So there is that general feeling.[95]

Thus, the history of Kikuyu dominance in the Kenyan economy combined with Kibaki's record of failing to implement the constitutional reforms and his government's corruption scandals to make a largely anti-Kikuyu campaign an attractive option for ODM. PNU thus needed to counteract claims of ethnic self-interest during its own campaign. Figure 5.2 below shows the distribution of campaign appeals coded in the *Daily Nation*. Consistent with the theory that the party with largely Kikuyu support should offer clear policy programs to the electorate, PNU offers more specific programmatic content than does ODM. In the figure below, this does not quite reach the level of statistical significance, however Appendix 5.2 shows that when the appeals are limited to just the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, the

[94] Interview, June 16, 2014, Nairobi.
[95] Interview, June 10, 2014, Nairobi.

difference is significant with 90 percent confidence. Similarly to the NPP in Ghana, Mwai Kibaki chose free secondary school as a cornerstone policy of his 2007 campaign. He often employed this pledge with a reminder that he had passed legislation for free primary school during his time in office. This focus on national education appeals is picked up in Table 4, which shows that more than forty percent of the PNU's specific programmatic appeals were about national education policies. A further eight percent of Kibaki's general programmatic appeals were on the issue of education as well.

Figure 5.2



Kenya 2007- ODM to PNU	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-1.62 (0.037)
General Programmatic	-2.13** (0.040)
Pork	4.39** (0.033)
Trait	0.09 (0.023)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

Table 5.5: 2007 Programmatic Issues by Party

Programmatic Specific Issues

ODM				PNU		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Decentralization	17	21.3		Education	39	40.6
Education	12	15.0		Econ. Growth/Development	20	20.8
Constitution	8	10.0		Jobs	6	6.3
Police/Crime	6	7.5		Agriculture	5	5.2
Corruption	5	6.3		Business	4	5.1
Infrastructure	5	6.3		Religion	4	5.1
Econ. Growth/Development	4	5.0		Women	4	5.1
Health	4	5.0		Decentralization	3	3.1
Agriculture	3	3.8		Health	3	3.1
International Relations	3	3.8		International Relations	3	3.1
Housing	2	2.5				
Peace	2	2.5				
Women	2	2.5				

Programmatic General Issues

ODM				PNU		
Subject	*Freq.*	*Percent*		*Subject*	*Freq.*	*Percent*
Econ. Growth/Development	16	14.6		Econ. Growth/Development	38	28.6
Democracy	11	10.0		Infrastructure	15	11.3
Infrastructure	10	9.1		Education	11	8.3
Corruption	9	8.2		Health	8	6.0
Redistribution	7	6.4		Business	7	5.3
Business	5	4.6		Women	7	5.3
Decentralization	5	4.6		Redistribution	6	4.5
Health	5	4.6		Transportation	6	4.5
Land	5	4.6		Police/Crime	4	3.0
Police/Crime	5	4.6		Roads	4	3.0
Transportation	4	3.6		Agriculture	3	2.3
Water	4	3.6		Corruption	3	2.3
Housing	3	2.7		Decentralization	3	2.3
Roads	3	2.7		Housing	3	2.3
Sport	3	2.7		Water	3	2.3
Women	3	2.7		Tax Collection	2	1.5
Agriculture	2	1.8		Constitution	2	1.5
Education	2	1.8		Jobs	2	1.5
Jobs	2	1.8		Sport	2	1.5

Kenya's 2007 election was somewhat unusual in that the non-Kikuyu, more multiethnic party also had a set of cornerstone policies that were coded as specific programmatic. However, the particular issues which the ODM focused on in its programmatic appeals clearly reveal the ethnic dynamics at work in the election. ODM's campaign was largely focused on the closely related issues of political decentralization, known as *majimboism*, and constitutional reform. I coded these two issues separately in my content analysis, but combined they account for more than 30 percent of ODM's campaign appeals. We thus see that ODM placed a strong emphasis on resource redistribution away from the dominant core of the PNU. This is also partly picked up by the 7.1 percent of general programmatic appeals that were about promises for economic redistribution. Thus, where the 'Kikuyu party' focused its efforts on a clear policy for a national public good (education), ODM exploited the public's distrust of the Kikuyu and based its policies on promises to limit the future economic and political power of the Kikuyu.

Core and Swing Voters

As is the case in Ghanaian elections, the evidence suggests that parties in Kenya also devote the bulk of their resources to campaigning in swing regions as opposed to their loyal regions. As I did for elections in Ghana, for elections in Kenya I recorded where a campaign appeal was made for all appeals that were made by a presidential or vice presidential candidate. This should offer a reasonably good measure of how much time parties devoted to campaigning in core versus swing regions. In Kenya's 2002 election, identifying the strongholds of each party is somewhat difficult, as KANU lacked meaningful support in most of the country and by the

day of the election, NARC had benefitted from KANU defectors from almost every province.[96] However, in Kenya's 2007 election, ODM candidates made only 13.8% of their appeals in Nyanza Province, Odinga's home province and the regional heartland of the Luo. Similarly, the PNU candidates made only 1.4% of their appeals in the Kikuyu-dominated Central Province.

The parties' focus on communities with swing voters is supported by other studies on elections in Kenya. In his own work on campaigning in Kenya's 2007 election, Horowitz (2012) finds that candidates devote the majority of their time to swing regions. His recording of the location of campaign rallies suggests that "while there is some variation across parties, the candidates largely converged on the same communities, rather than targeting distinct, non-overlapping coalitions" (Horowitz forthcoming, 23). The focus on swing voters is further supported by Kramon (2009), who finds in his research on vote buying that swing voters are significantly more likely to be offered material resources in exchange for their votes.

My interview data confirmed this, as well as the tendency for parties to use different types of appeals when attracting core versus swing voters. This was similar to what my interviews revealed in Ghana. Whereas campaign appeals in swing regions were more about policies, campaigns in strongholds were about emotive appeals, often based on the ethnic or regional identities of the voters. One Embu Member of Parliament who was a member of PNU's campaign team in 2007 stated:

> I think when it comes to the strongholds it is easier because you are talking the converted so to speak. They are already with you, they just need consolidation. And I think in this case, we were mainly consolidating the votes. We focused mainly on 'come out to vote'…Now, going outside our strongholds, rallies were not the best way to go about it. Political rallies in public were not it. We did them, but we went further. We had county hall meetings. County hall meetings because then you are able to really take your time and convince people why your policies are better than theirs…and really

[96] Furthermore, the 2002 election was somewhat unusual, as both Kibaki and Kenyatta are Kikuyu and hail from the Central Province, theoretically giving both of them a 'stronghold' in the Central Province.

> convince them, and give them a question and answer session so that you are able to really hear them, understand them, and also understand why they would have issues of not wanting to vote for you. So it is really convincing a crowd that is probably not too friendly politically, and so it needed a more personal touch…[What] we sold to the swing voter was our policy of inclusion, ensuring that everybody in the country is included and is part and parcel of government so they are not feeling like once these people win, it will be for "their people" to be in power and therefore to benefit in terms of positions, appointments, etc.[97]

A member of ODM's national campaign team stated similarly:

> When you go to the other regions which are outside Nyzana, what it means is that you have to craft your message in such a way so that they see 'what is in it for us? Yes, you are asking me for support. What's our stake in it once you get it? What shall we benefit from it, as a people, as a region?' So you have to send that message….You are invoking the electorate to tell them we have a better offer for you then the opponent. Because there the opponent is also visible. When we are campaigning in Nyanza, we know that the presidential race is a cakewalk. That is why we are talking about get out the vote. When you go to the other regions, it is not a cakewalk. It is a contested area. And therefore you have to win the hearts and minds there.[98]

Members of campaign teams from both ODM and PNU mentioned the importance of invoking the identities and emotions of voters in provincial strongholds. A member of ODM's communications team who had worked on mobilizing voters in the predominantly Luo Nyanza Province stated to me:

> My approach has been that in the swing areas, the new grounds, you must offer hope and create fear at the same time. You create fear first without necessarily being seen to be the one creating the fear, and then you come as the hope. In your stronghold you just create fear…It is like hell and heaven…Make sure they don't win. In your stronghold, you make them fear the prospect of losing so that it becomes a matter of life and death.[99]

[97] Interview, July 15, 2014, Nairobi.
[98] Interview, July 18, 2014, Nairobi.
[99] Interview, August 10, 2014, Nairobi.

A Kikuyu member of PNU's campaign team, although without such vivid language, noted that a similar strategy can be used to mobilize Kikuyu voters:

> Because our people have a lot of property and so on, they need to protect it, it is actually very easily to mobilize Kikuyus to come and vote. All of them, you can have 99 percent turnout. Even my grandmother who is 100 will go and vote. Because they will say, if these other people get leadership…our property is going to be stolen. It is going to be destroyed…So you say, Oh, now they are killing us and they are not in power. Suppose they were in power! That is the issue of the argument. It is not because of anything else.[100]

However, this particular campaign team member also noted that his party needed to be careful in using explicitly ethnic language in its stronghold because of how this would be perceived by the media and swing voters. At times, it was better to let Kikuyu voters see the ethnic, anti-Kikuyu language of the opposition and allow that to invoke a reaction from his own community. He said to me that "if you try to do politics around [just] that, then you lose support. So just shut up and let them see…[ODM] plays a lot of tribal politics…They play that all the time. That is what happened in 2007-2008. They don't understand the psychology of the Kikuyus." Indeed, given the difficulties facing a party thought to be dominated by Kikuyus, it was best not to rely too much on the mobilization of core voters.

Results of the 2007 Election and the Aftermath

In a change from previous elections, the campaign period in 2007 was accompanied by several pre-election polls conducted by both newspapers and independent survey institutes. In the lead up to election day, the majority of these polls suggested that Raila Odinga had a narrow but consistent lead over Kibaki, although Kibaki and the PNU had closed the gap on ODM

[100] Interview, June 10, 2014, Nairobi.

considerably over the course of the campaign. The final poll, published one week before the election, showed Odinga leading with 45 percent of the vote compared to Kibaki's 43 percent (Cheeseman 2008, 176). Election day itself went relatively smoothly, with few reported cases of violence or irregularities, however delays in the announcement of the presidential results sparked rumors that the incumbent government was attempting to influence the vote-counting process. ODM officials further claimed to have evidence of rigging by the government (Branch 2011).

Table 4.2: 2007 Presidential Election Results by Province

Province	ODM Vote Share (%)	PNU Vote Share (%)	ODM-K Vote Share (%)
Nairobi	44.0	47.7	8.1
Coast	59.4	33.1	6.5
North Eastern	47.2	50.3	2.3
Eastern	5.0	50.3	43.7
Central	1.9	96.9	0.7
Rift Valley	64.7	33.5	1.4
Western	65.5	32.2	0.7
Nyanza	82.3	16.9	0.3

When ECK Chairman Samuel Kivuitu announced that Mwai Kibaki had won the election with 4,584,721 to Raila Odinga's 4,352,993, ODM supporters were certain that the results had been changed in favor of Kibaki in particular constituencies. The fact that the presidential results stood in stark contrast to the dominant victory to that ODM had won in the parliamentary elections seemed to support the allegations of rigging. Several hours after Kivuitu's announcement, in a hastily-arranged ceremony at State House in Nairobi, Kibaki was sworn in for his second term as the President of Kenya. The ceremony had been arranged so quickly that no one remembered to have the national anthem played, and several dignitaries and officials were still finding their seats as Kibaki took his oath (Cheeseman 2008). Protests broke out

across the country alleging fraud. Problematically for Kibaki, international election observers had noted several irregularities in the vote-counting process (Branch 2011). Kivuitu would later concede that he had been under tremendous pressure from the incumbent government to announce the results certifying Kibaki as the winner, and that he could not say with certainty which candidate had actually won the election.

In response to the Mwai Kibaki taking the oath of office for his second term, ODM announced that they would hold their own swearing-in ceremony at Uhuru Park in central Nairobi to swear in Raila Odinga as the legitimate President of Kenya. The event was banned by the police and the protests deteriorated into violence. In addition to the protests in Nairobi, Kisumu, and Mombasa, violence broke out across the Rift Valley, in particular in communities that had minority Kikuyu populations and majority Kalenjin populations. The Kalenjin had mobilized largely behind ODM, and Kibaki's apparent attempt to rig the election seemed to many to be a way to block the Kalenjin from gaining control over land rights in the Rift Valley. In particular, Uasin Gishu and Nakuru Counties, and saw violent expulsions of Kikuyus and other so called 'settler' populations that were thought to have backed PNU (Anderson 2008). Odinga's stronghold in Nyanza Province also saw violence directed at ethnic Kikuyus and Kisiis. In response to this violence, the government ordered the police and military to intervene. However, many of the victims of the state's response were apparently innocent civilians themselves (CIPEV 2008). Kikuyu politicians also organized retaliatory attacks in the Rift Valley via the *Mungiki*, and ethnic Kikuyu organized crime network that runs extortion rackets in Nairobi. These attacks generally targeted ethnic Kalenjins and Luos in the Rift Valley (Anderson 2008). In total, the post-election violence left nearly 1,200 dead and created an internal refugee crisis of several hundred thousand (CIPEV 2008).

The goal here is not to identify all of the causes of the violence after the 2007 election. Historical land grievances and a previous history of election violence in the 1990s are both critical features that must be taken into consideration. However, without question the particular ethnic language used by many of the candidates and party officials in the lead up to the 2007 election made post-election violence much more likely than it otherwise would have been. Indeed, one of the key features of Kenya's campaigns that distinguishes it from Ghana is the frequency of explicitly ethnic appeals during its campaigns. As I have shown in the content analysis of the candidates' public appeals, Ghana and Kenya share several similarities in the strategies that each of their parties opt for during campaigns with regards to their public appeals published in newspapers. However, Kenya's elections are further characterized by a stronger reliance on ethnic stereotypes and more explicit references to ethnic rivals and ethnic allies. These particular features of the campaigns may not be published in the national newspapers in clear terms, but they may be relayed via vernacular radio stations or through local political elites.

Here and in the next chapter, I argue that the more 'ethnicized' nature of Kenya's campaigns is due partly to the weakness of Kenya's political parties. As chapter 4 discussed, Kenya's political parties are notoriously weak, largely as a product of the late Moi years when politics was a highly personalized and authoritarian affair. No political parties invested in lasting organizations, but chose rather to build networks around individual personalities. What this has meant is that politicians have no grassroots organizations on which they can rely during campaigns as they do in Ghana. What most politicians in Kenya must do to gain popular support is work through local intermediaries, generally local ethnic and clan leaders, who I refer to ethnic intermediaries. Gaining the backing of an influential intermediary at the local level is very much

the *modus operandi* of a Kenyan political campaign. Reaching an agreement with the influential local notables was a strategy that was discussed throughout my interviews in Kenya.

In my interview with a member of PNU's campaign team, he noted that when campaigning the Northeastern Province, the clan elders essentially decide who their preferred candidates are well before a general election, and if you and your party are not chosen, you need not bother attempting to win votes:

> The clan elders are also usually very key in some places. Like in the Northeastern [Province], once the clan elders have met and have decided, you have no right. In fact, first of all they even distribute the seats. Like in Mandera, that's what they did…Then they went ahead and decided, 'how many clans are we here?' And every clan will get something…So they distribute. In northeastern, the election is done before, a long way before. They have already decided and the seatings have been negotiated. Particularly for clans, where a clan decides, clan elders decide most of these things in northeastern and pastoral communities. They decide a long way before.[101]

This strategy of working through local elites rather than a party structure was confirmed by interviewees who had campaigned in other provinces as well. A member of PNU's campaign team who ran as an incumbent member of parliament in the Eastern Province in 2007 stated that

> In terms of strategy, even before you go to a political rally, you must have a leaders' meeting. A leaders' forum. And this by the way was in both the swing vote areas and the stronghold areas…So you would have the religious leaders, the village elders, the opinion shapers or the opinion leaders of that community, community-based organization leadership, whether it is youth or women, they would be called to a meeting, a closed-door meeting, and it is in that closed-door meeting where real development agenda issues are discussed, and other critical issues affecting the community, so that they can be able to understand what plan the president had for them as for their issues are concerned… That becomes critical because beyond the campaign rally, you know, public rally, there is need for more activity once the candidate leaves. So those are the people who are left doing that work.[102]

[101] Interview, June 16, 2014, Nairobi.
[102] Interview, July 15, 2014, Nairobi.

Importantly, this interviewee noted that a local intermediary did not need to be an explicitly 'ethnic' representative. In areas where local politics is not defined by rivalries between ethnic groups, the most critical local leaders may not be notable because of their ethnic following, and thus a campaign may not be characterized by explicitly ethnic speech. However, where a community is characterized by ethnic divisions, ethnic spokesmen become very influential during campaigns. When parties have no grassroots organizations to use in mobilizing voters, politicians compete for the public backing of such intermediaries. I develop this argument more in the next chapter and argue that more explicitly ethnic language, identifying ethnic rivals as 'others', and outright hate speech become more acceptable when politicians lack formal party structures in their campaigns.

Appendix 5.1: Breakdown of Party Affinity by Ethnic Group
(Source: *Afrobarometer*)

Kenya

2002 (Round 2):

	No, not close	*Close to KANU*	*Close to NARC (& Allies)*	*Close to other party*	*Don't know/ Refuse to answer*
Kikuyu	31.1	2.9	64.0	0.7	1.3
Luhya	40.1	1.2	57.3	0.6	0.0
Luo	31.7	0.4	67.6	0.3	0.0
Kalenjin	29.6	17.5	51.5	0.7	0.7
Kamba	16.7	1.9	80.7	0.4	0.4
Kisii	19.4	0.0	4.5	36.6	2.2
Meru	28.0	1.5	69.7	0.0	0.8
Somali	40.0	7.5	49.2	0.8	2.5
Mijikenda	49.5	1.9	46.7	0.0	1.9
Masaai/Samburu	22.6	18.9	56.6	0.0	1.9

2007 (Round 5):

	No, not close	*Close to ODM (& Allies)*	*Close to PNU (& Allies)*	*Close to other party*	*Don't know/ Refuse to answer*
Kikuyu	53.5	2.7	39.6	0.8	3.3
Luhya	29.1	49.9	12.8	2.8	5.1
Luo	26.9	68.7	1.3	0.0	2.7
Kamba	31.6	19.9	12.1	27.7	8.2
Kalenjin	37.3	18.1	10.3	26.0	8.3
Somali	37.1	34.3	23.1	2.8	2.8
Meru/Embu	29.4	23.5	41.2	0.0	5.1
Kisii	43.5	31.3	15.7	0.0	8.7
Mijikenda	48.5	29.3	15.2	6.1	0.0
Turkana	42.6	31.1	13.1	0.0	13.1

Appendix 5.2: Appendix 3.3: Breakdown of Appeals for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates

2002 Election



Kenya 2002- KANU to NARC	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-4.71** (0.043)
General Programmatic	3.35** (0.049)
Pork	-0.40 (0.025)
Trait	1.59 (0.027)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

2007 Election



Kenya 2007- ODM to PNU	
Appeal	*z*
Specific Programmatic	-1.94* (0.041)
General Programmatic	-1.19 (0.043)
Pork	3.29** (0.038)
Trait	0.13 (0.023)

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$

CHAPTER 6- PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN AFRICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

Chapters 3 and 5 largely focus on the similar features of political campaigns in Ghana and Kenya. I have argued that these similarities are due to the role of historically dominant ethnic groups in each country and the increased likelihood that their affiliated parties will offer policy programs in their campaigns. This chapter examines a key difference between campaigning in the two countries. This is in the amount of overtly ethnic rhetoric that parties employ in their campaigns. Ethnicity obviously plays an important role in party politics in Ghana, but campaigns are not characterized by overt ethnic rhetoric. Occasionally, individual candidates or party activists make inflammatory statements referencing ethnicity, but this is the exception rather than the norm, and those who have used such language have generally not risen to national prominence. On the other hand, campaigns in Kenya are notoriously ethnic in character. National candidates have not shied away from campaigning using explicitly ethnic language, including hate speech and ethnic chauvinism.

The use of ethnic language in campaigns has multiple causes. I have discussed at length the importance of ethnicity in influencing voters' beliefs regarding which ethnic groups stand to benefit from patronage distribution from a particular government. However, even where voters do not necessarily expect additional benefits from electing a co-ethnic, they may still vote similarly if they fear the loss of financial resources, land, or political power should a rival ethnic group come to power. Thus even when the availability of patronage may be limited, the fear of dominance or exclusion by a different ethnic group may be sufficient to produce high levels of ethnic voting (Horowitz 2000). Politicians may take advantage of these fears among the

electorate during campaigns by encouraging ethnic group solidarity, invoking historical grievances, and defining ethnic rivals and ethnic allies.

However, this tendency is not uniform across the continent. The variation in parties' tendencies to take on an explicitly ethnic character during elections is noted in several cross-national studies (Basedau et al. 2011, Elischer 2014), but few of them offer a generalizable theory that is applicable across Africa. Most existing studies on ethnic politics in Ghana and Kenya focus on country-specific traits. Studies on the intensity of ethnic rhetoric in contemporary Kenya for example have focused on the historical legacy of unequal access to arable land (Rutten & Owuor 2009) as well as the particular strategies of ethnic polarization used by former president Daniel Arap Moi (Omolo 2002). Studies of the more subdued nature of ethnic rhetoric in Ghana have focused on the lack of ethnic divisiveness in Ghanaian civil society (McLean 2004) and the more revolutionary, non-ethnic rhetoric of former president Jerry Rawlings (Nugent 1995).

Rather than taking the particular features of each country in isolation, this chapter offers a more generalizable theory of ethnic rhetoric during campaigns. I argue that the stability of a country's party system influences approaches to campaigning. Where parties are more fragmented and unstable, politicians are more prone to rely on local intermediaries, such as ethnic elders and community spokesman, to recruit voters. I find that this approach to campaigning contributes to the perception that elections are competitions between rival ethnic groups for access to political power and state resources. The tendency for political elites to employ ethnic intermediaries leads to campaigns with much more overt ethnic rhetoric. I argue that more stable party systems discourage the use of ethnic intermediaries in favor of the

established grassroots structures of the parties. Campaign discourse is then dominated by party elites pushing national agendas in place of narrower ethnic agendas.

The chapter presents both quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of this argument. Qualitative evidence comes from interviews with political elites in Ghana and Kenya who have experience participating in recent political campaigns in each country. Quantitative evidence is based on a series of cross-national regression models on the three most recent survey rounds of the Afrobarometer survey. The results offer some evidence of campaign effects in competitive elections for unstable party systems on the probability that a survey respondent will identify herself in terms of her ethnicity. At the end of the chapter I consider the plausibility of the assumption that party system stability can be considered an exogenous variable.

Political Parties, Party Systems, and Intermediaries

Political parties are important elements in any competitive election, and institutionalized political parties have long been identified as critical for aggregating voters' interests and disciplining politicians' actions (Huntington 1968). Several measures of party system institutionalization exist, but one of the more widely referenced is Mainwaring's (1999, 26-27) four-part conceptualization. First, institutionalized party systems are characterized by stable parties, meaning parties that last for several election cycles. This is in contrast to a system where new competitive parties regularly appear, only to be replaced or reduced to minor parties in a relatively short amount of time. Second, institutionalized party systems have stable roots in society. Voters thus have a sense of what parties stand for in terms of their policy preferences, as well as which societal groups identify with which parties. Third, political actors (elites, activists, and voters) accept the legitimacy of political parties. Where actors are willing to invest time and

resources in political parties rather than in a particular individual, or in an anti-party movement, a party system is more institutionalized. Finally, institutionalized party systems have parties with developed internal organizations that grant them some autonomy from individual politicians. With stronger party organizations, procedures for selecting political leaders and changing party leadership are more established and accepted. This helps provide a certain regularity and routinization of political behavior on behalf of elites. With stronger institutionalization, parties are less likely to be used as vehicles to advance the interests of a single individual. In the context of developing democracies, strong parties may not have clearly defined ideologies that map onto their policy programs, but their organizational strength can serve as an effective institutional constraint on elites' behavior.

The argument offered in this chapter is based on cross-national variation in the stability of political party systems. It contributes to a new but growing literature on the beneficial effects that party system stability can have on democratic practice in Africa. For example, Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) find that stable party systems are associated with higher levels of democracy. Similarly, Wahman (2010) finds that where parties are stronger and more stable, incumbent governments behave in a more democratic manner, as they are not constantly in fear defections from their own alliance to the opposition. Pitcher (2012) finds that stable party systems provide incentives for governments to successfully implement needed economic reforms.

I argue here that more stable party systems decrease the likelihood of explicitly ethnic campaigning. Under these conditions, political elites' campaign priorities tend to be focused on giving their party the broadest national, non-ethnic appeal that they can. A politician or local activist who employs divisive, ethnic rhetoric is a potentially risky member of such a political party as he or she provides the opposition with the evidence needed to brand the party as

ethnocentric and divisive. Party officials therefore work hard to socialize their members to emphasize national campaign messages, highlights of the party manifesto, and the character of the presidential candidate. Indeed, many of my interviewees in Ghana discussed the training they had received from ranking party members on how to properly advertise the party to the electorate. Parliamentary candidates and grassroots canvassers tended to follow their party's lead, as their future promotion within the party was tied to their usefulness as party spokesmen. The resulting campaigns were much more disciplined and non-inflammatory. This is not to say that interview subjects did not discuss the importance of ethnicity in Ghanaian campaigns. But the emphasis was placed on portraying the opposition as ethnically biased rather than championing the causes of any particular ethnic group at the expense of another.

On the other hand, where parties are weak, politicians are forced to rely on local power brokers to establish linkages between themselves and voters. These intermediaries are often ethnic leaders, meaning community elders, clan leaders, or spokesmen for particular ethnic groups who are established figures within their communities and have both a moral and material influence over members of their communities. Intermediaries can potentially be of a non-ethnic variety, such as religious leaders, local economic elites, or state bureaucrats. However, in systems where there is a prevailing belief that political decisions are made along ethnic lines, ethnic intermediaries serve as particularly useful mobilizers of electoral support. A recognized ethnic leader will generally have detailed knowledge of the needs of the community, a network of his own subordinates that can be used to generate support for a candidate, and perhaps most importantly, the legitimacy to represent and speak on behalf of his co-ethnics. For a candidate, receiving the endorsement of an influential ethnic elite can potentially give a politician a nearly unified bloc of votes from that community. Rather than national parties, presidential candidates

then run under a banner of a coalition of ethnic groups. As in the case of Kenya, the party names may even be created shortly before an election and not last beyond a single election cycle.

The importance of local elites in serving as link between politicians and individual citizens has been documented in several topics in African politics. A well-established literature examines strategies of state building through local intermediaries as a response to institutional weakness (Migdal 1988, Mamdani 1996, Boone 2003). More recently, Riedl (2014) argues that authoritarian rulers' willingness to incorporate local elites into their regimes has had decisive effects on the type of party system that emerged in the democratic era. In countries where rulers successfully incorporated local intermediaries, the subsequent party systems were significantly more stable. A few recent studies of political campaigns in Africa further highlight the role of local intermediaries in influencing party and voter behavior. In Zambia, Baldwin (2013) finds that local elites, often unelected chiefs, are able to deliver significant votes to a candidate when they demonstrate that they have a close relationship with that individual. When voters see that their local patron has a strong collaborative relationship with a particular candidate, they expect that candidate will be in the best position to deliver needed development resources to the community. The "embeddedness of patrons within their communities gives them the capacity to broker relationships between voters and politicians, and the incentive to do so…In contexts where individuals have little choice over their patron but are free to vote for their political representatives, they have an incentive to use their vote to select a politician who will work well with their patron" (Baldwin 2013, 795-796).

Koter (2013) similarly finds that reliance on intermediaries in Senegal is a critical aspect of campaigning. Local leaders are able to exert significant influence over voters because they "act as social mediators, control access to resources, and provide valuable goods and services. In

sum, they provide essential safety nets to their dependents in an environment of poverty and unmet needs" (Koter 2013, 193). Interestingly, Koter finds that when those local leaders are of a non-ethnic variety and are able to build cross-ethnic alliances for their preferred candidate, they may actually attenuate ethnic voting. In Senegal, Sufi religious clerics known as marabouts serve this role. Koter argues that in their capacity as powerful non-ethnic local patrons, marabouts are able to use their spiritual and material authority to limit the importance of ethnic identity in determining vote choice.

Studies of campaigning outside of Africa also highlight the role of local patrons in generating support for politicians. Stokes et al. (2013) argue that party machines in Latin America operate through local brokers who act as intermediaries between national politicians and voters. Brokers have detailed information regarding voters' behavior and are able to provide patronage benefits to particular individuals in exchange for political support. In Eastern Europe, Mares and Young (2015) find that local state bureaucrats as well as managers of private firms are used by incumbent politicians as local power brokers who can give voters both positive and negative incentives to support their favored candidacies.

Thus, while intermediaries can be non-ethnic, reliance on ethnic intermediaries specifically gives candidates an incentive to publicly champion the interests of particular ethnic groups, as that is likely the major condition under which a local ethnic leader will agree to support the candidate. In his own capacity as a community leader, an ethnic intermediary will likely perceive it as his responsibility to back the candidate who promises to promote his ethnic group's welfare rather than a candidate who pledges to implement policy in an unbiased, non-ethnic manner. A candidate who refuses to acknowledge the specific needs of a community will likely find himself or herself 'outbid' (Horowitz 2000) by a candidate who makes a more explicit

promise to divert resources or address the historical grievances of the ethnic group, thus missing out on the critical backing of the local leaders. This assumes some pre-existing grievances that are politically salient among members of an ethnic community. However, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have some level of politicized ethnicity as a result of colonial policies and post independence governments that favored certain ethnic groups over others in the distribution of political and economic resources (Young 1997).

An ethnic intermediary will also have his own financial interests, and as I discuss more below, will generally insist on private payments from the candidate in return for his backing. But when the candidate meets the demands of local leaders, he will be able to count on the influence and resources of those leaders during a campaign. The resulting campaign is then characterized by the candidate advertising his endorsement from those local leaders and demonstrating his commitment to the causes of the groups he is attempting to mobilize. An important part of this process is the candidate appearing publically at campaign rallies alongside the ethnic elders whose support he has successfully won over. This process is not necessarily exclusionary or chauvinistic. The purpose of this strategy in weak-party systems is to reinforce a sense of group solidarity to encourage bloc voting. However, when campaigns under these circumstances tap into historical or material rivalries with other ethnic groups, we may see campaign rhetoric intensify to a level of ethnic chauvinism or hate speech against a rival group.

When political parties are more institutionalized, candidates have less need to appeal to ethnic intermediaries. They have more developed party institutions on the ground and mobilize their loyal grassroots base in the lead up to elections. By doing this, politicians avoid the expensive fees demanded by local ethnic elites. They also maintain control over the campaign message that is communicated to voters, which is designed to have a national appeal. Party

candidates and activists then deliver a message that has been crafted by national party campaign teams rather than one that has suits the needs of particular ethnic elites. Local party activists largely follow the instruction given to them from above to demonstrate their loyalty to the party in hopes of later promotion within the party hierarchy.

One important aspect of this theoretical argument is that the stability of a county's party system is taken to be exogenous—that is, not a product itself of a country's ethnic demographics. However, one could argue that both party system and proclivity for ethnic politics could in fact be a product of a country's particular structural features. The same factors that drive the likelihood of ethnic identification during political campaigns might therefore be producing more or less stable party systems. For example, a widely-cited set of theories based on Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argues that a country's party system will to some extent be a product of its social cleavages. We might therefore expect more ethnically fractured countries to have more unstable party systems.

Panels A and B in Figure 3 show the bivariate relationships between party system institutionalization (PSI) and two commonly-cited measures of ethnic fractionalization in Africa: the Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG)[103] index and the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF)[104] index. For the 14 countries in the sample for which PSI measures are available, no clear bivariate relationship between party system and ethnic diversity is apparent. Rather than a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and party system institutionalization, several of the more ethnically diverse countries in the sample, including Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania, have very stable party systems.

[103] The PREG values for African countries are published in Posner (2004).
[104] The ELF values are available in Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

A more recent and nuanced study regarding the relationship between ethnic cleavages and party systems comes from Elischer (2014). This argument suggests that countries that have a single large "core" ethnic group (more than 20% of the population) are more prone to develop stable, non-ethnic party systems whereas countries without such a core ethnic group have highly ethnicized and fractionalized party systems. Panel C in Figure 3 shows the relationship between PSI and the percent of a country's total population the largest ethnic group accounts for. The population percentages are taken from Scarritt and Mozaffar's (1999) categorization of ethnic groups in Africa. Again, the graph does not suggest a clear relationship between PSI and the size of the country's largest ethnic group. Many of the countries in the sample have largest ethnic groups that make up comparable proportions of their respective populations, yet they still display significant variation in PSI.

Finally, Panel D shows the relationship between PSI and wealth, measured as the natural log of GDP per capita. If it were the case that countries that are relatively poor also have relatively unstable party systems, this could potentially confound the findings. One could argue that because poorer countries may be more prone to ethnic politics (Chandra 2004, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007), the relationship between party stability and ethnic identification could be spurious. However, only a very loose positive correlation exists between national wealth and party institutionalization. The data do not suggest that poorer countries in Africa are significantly more likely to have unstable party systems.

Figure 3: Bivariate Relationships for Party System Institutionalization



Thus, the same structural features that might explain a particular country's propensity to have more ethnicized campaigns do not seem to be driving differences in party system stability. I am therefore reasonably confident that party system stability can be used in the analysis as an exogenous variable. Two recent and notable publications offer potential explanations for the large variation in party systems across Africa. Reidl (2014) argues that the roots of current party systems can be traced to strategies of rule under previous authoritarian regimes. When authoritarian rulers successfully incorporated local social and economic leaders into the regime's fold, they entered the era of multiparty competition in a relatively strong position. Opposition politicians were then forced to coalesce into a unified anti-incumbent faction. Where authoritarian leaders did not establish linkages with local social and economic leaders, they were

much weaker during political liberalization. These rulers "[lost] control of the transition agenda and new players [contributed] in uncoordinated ways to press for greater reform and more open participation, resulting in lower party system institutionalization in the democratic era" (Reidl 2014, 12). Lebas (2011) argues that more stable parties emerged in the multiparty era when opposition parties both made use of existing political institutions, such as trade unions, as well as used party-building strategies that increased the social distance between themselves and other parties, thus creating a highly polarized environment. Political polarization was therefore "an effective party-building strategy. By reinforcing conflicts with other parties or with incumbents, opposition elites are sometimes able to recraft existing (and in some cases cross-cutting) social identities around the single cleavage of political partisanship" (LeBas 6, 2011).

Given these contributions, one could argue that my own argument regarding the relationship between party system institutionalization and campaign effects is simply a product of countries' experience with a particular type of authoritarian rule or type of democratic transition. Indeed, I would not argue that countries' historical legacies matter both for party systems and the salience of ethnic identities. However, in the multiparty era, I would suggest that campaigns have an independent and very important effect on patterns of behavior among party elites. Unlike in an authoritarian era, campaigns are critical moments in which large numbers of the electorate are mobilized for political action. Ethnic identities, including the identification of ethnic allies and ethnic opponents as well as the common political goals and cultural values, can be reinforced or redefined in ways very different than they were in a previous era. I argue that we should therefore be careful not to give too much weight to inherited historical legacies at the expense of examining the more proximate causes of elite behavior. The effects identified here are relevant specifically under competitive-election circumstances, and

while theories of historical legacies may speak to party systems or ethnic salience, they are somewhat less helpful in understanding the interaction effects between party system institutionalization, election competitiveness, and proximity to a presidential election.

Alternative Explanations

A few competing explanations have been offered in the African politics literature for cross-national differences in how explicitly ethnicity is employed in contemporary campaigns. Dickovick (2008) argues that those countries with socialist, ideologically oriented political leaders after independence are less likely to exhibit explicitly ethnic political mobilization. According to this argument, leftist politicians "attempted to mobilise masses using class ideology, and explicitly sought to structure support along lines other than ethnicity" (Dickovick 2008, 1122). Socialist political mobilization thus created cross-cutting cleavages and attenuated the importance of ethnic identities. This had a path-dependent effect of reducing strictly ethnic mobilization with the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s in those countries. Dickovick suggests that Ghana's socialist experiment under Kwame Nkrumah after independence and its later experience under the leftist military government of Jerry Rawlings has dampened the use of ethnicity by political parties. However, given the very short length of Nkrumah's government after independence (1960-1966), as well as Nkrumah's willingness to use ethnic rhetoric during competitive elections (see Chapter 2), Dickovick's theory of path dependence is likely overstated. Likewise, while Rawlings' leftist revolutionary regime did enjoy multiethnic support for much of the 1980s, by the time the Fourth Republic began in 1992, he relied largely on Ewe support from his home Volta Region and faced an opposition that was

largely dominated by wealthy Asantes and Akyems. Neither of Ghana's leftist governments thus had quite the non-ethnic legacy that Dickovick gives them credit for.

Elischer (2014) argues that countries' ethnic structure affects the likelihood of explicitly ethnic mobilization. When countries have a single large ethnic group and lower ethnic fractionalization, parties are more likely to be non-ethnic. He argues that under these structural conditions, there is a "bandwagoning" effect where leaders of smaller ethnic groups enter into political alliances with leaders of the larger ethnic group. In considering Ghana, Elischer argues that the presence of a large Akan 'ethnic group' that has elites in the upper echelons of both major parties has caused bandwagoning by smaller ethnic groups, leading to campaigns characterized by non-ethnic rhetoric (Elischer 2014, 252-254). He suggests that Kenya's parties have taken on a much more ethnic character because of the lack of a single large ethnic group.

However, the previous chapters of this dissertation have shown that in Ghana, Akan is better thought of as a language group rather than an ethnic group given the critical differences between different Akan-speaking groups. Indeed, many non-Asante and non-Akyem Akan-speakers consider the Asante and the Akyem to be elite groups who have a closer affinity with one another rather than with other Akan groups. Accordingly, many non-Asante and non-Akyem Akans prefer to support the NDC in opposition to the Asante/Akyem. Given these important distinctions between Akan sub-groups, I suggest that bandwagoning by smaller ethnic groups with the Akan is an unlikely mechanism explaining Ghana's campaign rhetoric.

Party Strength and Campaigning in Ghana

As Chapters 3 and 4 discuss, the NDC and the NPP have been the only nationally competitive parties since the beginning of Ghana's Fourth Republic. Over time they have both

developed largely comparable internal structures that include clear national and regional hierarchies, as well as local constituency-level branches (Morrison 2004). Although the individuals in charge of parties' activities change from election to election, the structures themselves remain largely in place (Riedl 2014).

With regards to campaigns, the institutional features of Ghana's parties have critical effects on how elites mobilize voters. Over the course my interviews, I asked members of all campaign teams how important using local intermediaries, such as chiefs, community elders, clan leaders, and religious figures was to mounting a successful campaign. However, interviewees in Ghana often rejected the importance of such a strategy during campaigns and instead emphasized the importance of their party's extensive grassroots networks. For example, when I asked a leading member of the NDC's campaign team in 2012 whether he thought that recruiting such intermediaries to mobilize voters was a necessary strategy, he answered no; the party, he said,

> has its own structures on the ground. From national, to regional, to constituency branch. So we have our own structures. Now if you happen to get a chief or opinion leader to endorse you, all the better. But we don't depend on that. Because if the chief is against you, then what happens? Of course, where we can get them to make positive statements, like 'we brought you electricity, we've done schools, we've done boreholes, we've done water, we've done that, that, and that,'… they say it…[But] they don't say vote for John Mahama[105]…You know, the truth of the matter is that the party is like an electoral machine…We may not be very scientifically—as in, if you come to my computer, I can't give you the name and telephone number of every branch organization—every branch, we have about 27,000 branches, and I can't give you the specifics…But I am saying that come election time, they just come out.[106]

Regarding mobilizing voters at the grassroots level, a member of the NPP's national campaign team in both 2008 and 2012 answered very similarly:

[105] John Mahama was the NDC presidential candidate in 2012.
[106] Interview, June 4, 2013, Accra.

> First of all, the party has structures already to the grassroots level--where we vote at polling station levels, spread across villages and hamlets, and smaller areas. The party has its own structure already, as in at every polling station there is party structure there…The membership, or leadership of that party structure takes up the campaign. Of course these are people who believe in the principles, the ideologies the party has stood for, and have died for it, are ready to die for it. So you can count on them. And they do it voluntarily. They try to rally other people around, they try to join people in [*sic*], and they do a lot of work for us.[107]

All interviewees acknowledged that it was important to pay homage to whomever the local community leader is, whether it is a chief or other local elite,[108] when a campaign team is working within his realm of authority. However, as one NPP constituency secretary explained, "You seek community leader's permission to campaign, but nobody tells people how to vote. You appeal to peoples' conscience…You train people to go and deliver a message."[109] A member of the NDC's campaign teams in 2008 and 2012 agreed, stating of local community leaders: "Yes, we show respect. We give them their due, but you would be in a big mess if you thought that that is all you have to do, and that they have so much influence. Really, I don't know if they ever had. But if they ever did, then those days are gone. You need to show respect, but go and concentrate on the voters, one by one."[110]

Some interviewees suggested that when their party campaigned in the three northern regions, the importance of local community and cultural leaders increased, given the lower incomes of the voters and their dependence on farming land owned by a chief or other local patron.[111] However, the party leaders whom I interviewed with experience campaigning in the north suggested that this strategy was not sufficient on its own. As one interviewee explained,

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[107] Interview, July 19, 2012, Accra.
[108] Formal political activity by chiefs is banned in Ghana. Some interviewees noted this in their responses regarding the limitations of using local intermediaries; however, others did not distinguish between different types of community leaders in their own answers.
[109] Interview, August 6, 2013, Accra.
[110] Interview, August 8, 2013, Accra.
[111] Interview, July 17, 2013, Accra; Interview, July 24, 2013, Accra.

there is no way of knowing whether or not the local elite has also reached some kind of agreement with the other party.[112] Party officials thus felt that involving local intermediaries in their campaign activities was potentially risky. As the parties have relatively strong mechanisms to recruit canvassers and local campaign team members already in place, there seemed little reason to rely too strongly on local ethnic elites.

Several of my interviewees described how rather then seeking the endorsement of a local leader, they would design a local campaign team to pursue the votes of a particular community. Local teams, or committees as they were often called, would be composed of members of the ethnic groups from which they party was trying to gain votes. Members were given clear instructions on the points to emphasize from the party's overall national campaign messages rather. As one NDC party official stated in the Northern Region said, he made sure to recruit an individual from each ethnic group in the community to be a member of the party's campaign team,

> and make sure I deploy him to his area so that the people identify themselves with him. He is talking to them about our messages. They think that he is one of them, and it has worked…. I train him, I package the message nicely for him with the necessary logistics, and send him there. He goes to the place, they see him as a homeboy, and so they identify themselves. They come with their problems to him [and] can easily share their difficulties that they have with him. And he also knows the developmental challenges of the area, so the feedback, what is the feeling of the people makes it better for us.[113]

Along with this eschewing of ethnic intermediaries, Ghana has little of the overt ethnic chauvinism that characterizes several other African states. Politicians in Ghana certainly will make reference to ethnicity in their campaign speeches, in particular when they accuse one another of ethnic favoritism. Each of the major parties is popularly associated with a large ethnic

[112] Interview, July 17, 2013, Accra.
[113] Interview, August 15, 2013, Tamale.

group, with NDC associated with the Ewe and the NPP associated with the Asante (Hoffman & Long 2013). Furthermore, patterns of voting in Ghana do display definite ethnic characteristics, with several groups beyond the Ewe and Asante tending to support one party or the other across elections (Morrison & Hong 2006). However, parties' campaigns are not designed to demonstrate allied and opposing ethnic groups to voters. Nugent (2001, 3) notes that in the lead up to the 2000 election, when the opposition NPP successfully unseated the NDC, a notable feature was that "ethnicity did not feature particularly overtly in the campaign. Each of the parties…was at pains to project itself as a party of the entire nation." In subsequent elections, despite high levels of competitiveness, cases of ethnic hate speech have been quite rare and very little campaign discourse is designed to mobilize voters around a fear of any purported ethnic enemies.

Politicians instead spend much of their time during campaigns highlighting their policy accomplishments, making reference to their election manifestos, and portraying their opponents as incompetent and corrupt. Party elites further appeal to the antecedent political parties and historical personalities from which they claim to draw their lineage (Morrison 2004). In the case of the NDC, this is Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party, which won Ghana's first elections in the lead up to independence. This is in an attempt to give the party a somewhat more populist/Socialist appeal. In the case of the NPP, the historical tradition referenced is the United Gold Coast Convention to associate the party with Ghana's early business and political elites who first called for independence in the 1940s. While these references are used selectively and may not be entirely accurate (Nugent 1999), it is telling that the parties make extensive use of historical appeals rather than relying on explicitly ethnic mobilization.

Party Weakness and Campaigning in Kenya

On the other hand, political parties in Kenya are significantly weaker and often do not last beyond one or two elections. They are generally made up of revolving coalitions of wealthy political elites cobbled prior to elections. As Chapter 4 discusses, much of this is due to patterns of authority during one-party rule under the Kenya African National Union (KANU), under which President Daniel Arap Moi ran a highly personalized and coercive state apparatus. Civil society and grassroots organizations were thus very weak upon the reintroduction of multiparty politics (LeBas 2011). Neither KANU nor the opposition parties invested in significant grassroots party-building after liberalization. The parties therefore have few structures on which they can rely during campaigns.

To compensate for this, politicians in Kenya make much greater use of local intermediaries to mobilize voters on their behalf. To the great frustration of the candidates, in exchange for their services such intermediaries demand a variety of rents, including large amounts of cash, government contracts, and government jobs for members of their families. However, such intermediaries also tend to be spokesmen for particular ethnic communities, such as ethnic elders or clan heads, who mobilize voters strictly along ethnic lines, and they work on behalf of political parties to mobilize their co-ethnics during elections. Elections in Kenya are thus perceived as competitions between competing coalitions of ethnic groups rather than between national parties. Whereas in Ghana, where ethnic intermediaries are limited in their influence or even bypassed completely by the parties, in Kenya such intermediaries are an integral part of the campaigning process. One former Member of Parliament and member of the Mwai Kibaki's national campaign team in 2007 stated to me that local intermediaries

> are quite influential in that the locals trust them, believe in them. And therefore if they back you, you are halfway through the stage of convincing the local voters to vote for you…It is an issue of getting early endorsement from those who matter down there…I think it is important for [voters] to see who your bridges are at their level so that it is not a one off, you just flew in, campaigned, talked very well, and left…You need your foundations wherever you go.[114]

Likewise, with regards to beginning a campaign, a member of Odinga's campaign team in 2007 stated of local community leaders:

> So before you go to your voters or start your campaign, you have to talk to them, and get a blessing from them…Because you have time to organize your party, you have to identify opinion shapers in the area. Because when you are going to do election, without having that opinion shaper or clan elder with your party, then it will be very difficult for you to penetrate that area.[115]

It is illustrative that this interviewee discussed 'organizing his party' in terms of gaining the backing of local community leaders, who of course are not party members, but do represent the interests of the local community. A Kenyan lawyer who has worked closely with the country's political parties similarly stated to me that during elections, the

> strategy for a lot of political parties is that you get the endorsement of X, and X is either a key person in that community or a group of elders. That is why you see a lot of politicians spend time either getting the endorsement of elders or creating some parallel elder system…You are then seen to be representing the interests of that community if the people who have a say over what the interests of the community are, and who negotiate on behalf of the community have endorsed you…That has implications on how the community views you. That is why it is a very strong strategy for every community to, for every political party, to try to get links and endorsement from the opinion shapers of that community.[116]

To demonstrate their credentials as reliable patrons for particular ethnic groups, in addition to appearing publicly with an ethnic groups' elders or clan heads, candidates will often

[114] Interview, May 1, 2014, Nairobi.
[115] Interview, August 11, 2014, Kisumu.
[116] Interview, July 22, 2014, Nairobi.

attempt to turn themselves into so-called 'ethnic kingpins' of those groups. This process involves securing the support of the necessary intermediaries as well as outbidding one's co-ethnic competition for the right to speak for the ethnic group (Horowitz 2000). Both the candidate and the intermediaries then have an interest in convincing the ethnic group to vote as a bloc and use the necessary political discourse needed to achieve this. The reliance on ethnic intermediaries thus means that campaigns become opportunities to voice historical grievances against rival ethnic groups. Overt ethnic chauvinism, hate speech, and calls for violence against such groups have thus been much more common in Kenya since political liberalization. A particularly illustrative example of this involves the Kalenjin, an ethnic group based in the Rift Valley with approximately eleven percent of the country's population. One seasoned campaigner described his political strategy as follows:

> Among the Kalenjin, unless they are told by their elders to go and do something, they don't do it, depending on how highly educated they are. So when you are going to the Kalenjin communities, the first thing you will do is go to the elders. Don't bother with the young people…It will depend with how the elders stand. Each community has their elders. You go to the Meru there is also the elder system. [It] is very powerful. It is an institution unto itself. The Kikuyus don't have elders as such, but they have very highly respected people…The key thing in Kenyan politics is to know who is listened to by the community. There is one person who can speak, and the whole community is mobilized.[117]

In the lead up to the 2007 election, many Kalenjin felt that their land claims and future political power would be placed in jeopardy if Mwai Kibaki, the incumbent Kikuyu president, was able to win reelection. Capitalizing on these sentiments, William Ruto, a Kalenjin Member of Parliament, fashioned himself into the new Kalenjin kingpin, effectively taking over from former President Moi. When Ruto declared his support for Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), he successfully brought the vast majority of Kalenjin voters into ODM. This

[117] Interview, June 10, 2014, Nairobi.

was largely because he was able to secure the backing of the major Kalenjin elders and clan leaders, who publicly pledged their support for Ruto. In multiple public campaign events, Kalenjin elders stood on stage with Ruto, and even declared him to be an honorary elder of the Kalenjin.[118] Ruto then spent much of the 2007 campaign rallying Kalenjin voters throughout the Rift Valley using explicitly ethnic language in which he played on his co-ethnics' fears of Kikuyu domination should Kibaki and his Party of National Unity (PNU) stay in power. In the aftermath of the violence that followed the contested reelection of Kibaki, Ruto was one of six Kenyans indicted by the International Criminal Court, in part because of his alleged use of hate speech during the campaign.[119]

Ethnic campaigning in 2007 was not limited to ODM politicians. Klopp and Kamungi (2007/08, 14) note that in the run up to election day, "animosity persisted and ethnic slurs intensified…[PNU politicians] consolidated their base on a platform of continued reform but also appealed to Kikuyu nationalism. Some made disparaging comments about Luo beliefs and practices with the aim of raising doubts about Odinga's fitness to take the presidential post." Many derogatory claims about Odinga and his fellow Luo referenced the Luo practice of not circumcising their men. Circumcision is performed as part adulthood rights among several of Kenya's other ethnic groups, including the Kikuyu. PNU politicians "used references to circumcision and frequently derided Odinga, the ODM and its supporters, as 'beasts from the west,' 'baboons' or 'animals from the west'" (Somerville 2011). Politicians from both sides were joined by local ethnic elites as well as hosts of vernacular radio stations in using highly inflammatory and derogatory language over the course of the campaign (KNCHR 2007,

[118] *The Standard*, "Ruto takes his campaign a notch higher," March 10, 2007; *Daily Nation,* "Ruto man of the moment as the Orange takes Eldoret by storm," *August* 19, 2007.
[119] *The New York Times,* Nicholas Kulish, "Deputy President of Kenya goes on trial at the Hague," September 10, 2013.

Somerville 2011). The resulting pre-election atmosphere was a highly charged ethnic environment which largely contributed to the outbreak of violence immediately following the election (CIPEV 2008).

The use of hate speech, and ultimately of election violence, was particularly pronounced in the case of Kenya's 2007 election, and ethnic discourse in other countries often does not reach such intense levels. Ethnic appeals may be somewhat more subtle and coded. But the case of Kenya does illustrate the proposed mechanism at work. In the absence of strong political parties, elections become competitions between rival ethnic groups, with politicians making use of local intermediaries to mobilize voters along ethnic cleavages instead of under national party labels. Indeed, none of the parties, with the exception of what remains of KANU, have any lengthy historical legacy on which to draw.

Cross-National Data and Methodology

To test an important observable implication of the theory using cross national data, I examine whether political campaigns in countries with unstable party systems tend to prime ethnic identities among voters to a greater extent than campaigns in countries with stable party systems. The methodology I use borrows from that used by Eifert et al. (2010) in their analysis of voters' likelihood of identifying in ethnic terms in the run up to an election. In that study, the authors compile survey data from rounds one and two of the Afrobarometer. They run a series of regressions with the dependent variable as the respondents' answers to the question, "We have spoken to many people in this country and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being [*a citizen of country X*], which specific group do you feel you belong to

first and foremost?" The authors group respondents' answers into five categories: ethnic, religion, class/occupation, gender, and 'other' (Eifert et al. 2010, 497). Their sample includes 35,505 respondents in 10 countries. The analysis rests on the results of a model that include country fixed effects, several individual-level controls, a variable for the competitiveness of the nearest presidential election (measured as the margin of victory in percentage for the winner),[120] a variable for the proximity in which the survey was taken to the nearest presidential election (measured in months),[121] and a multiplicative interaction term between competiveness and proximity.

The authors find strong evidence in support of the idea that politicians tend to prime ethnic cleavages in the lead up to elections. In their model, the additive component of proximity to the nearest election as well as the interaction term between competitiveness and proximity are statistically significant. Their model suggests that in competitive elections, "the likelihood that a person will identify him- or herself in ethnic terms increases by 1.8 percentage points for each month closer to an election the survey is administered" (Eifert et al. 2010, 503). In uncompetitive elections, the effect of proximity to an election on ethnic identification is negligible.

To test my own theory regarding the effect of party institutionalization on ethnic campaigning, I construct a similar dataset to that of Eifert et al., however I use more recent Afrobarometer data from rounds 3, 4, and 5. I use countries which have data for more than one survey round so that no single election is given too much weight for a given country. This leads

[120] As in Eifert et al. (2010), competitiveness is coded as -1*(vote share winner-vote share loser) so that larger numbers indicate more competitive elections.

[121] Similarly, proximity is coded as -1*|(months to/from nearest election)| so that larger numbers indicate that the survey was taken closer to the election. There is an assumption here that the effect of proximity on the likelihood of identifying in ethnic terms is symmetric around the date of the election, meaning that effects will be similar one year prior to and one year after an election.

to a dataset with 16 countries and 73,056 observations.[122] Table 1 lists the included countries. All countries began the process of political liberalization at roughly the same time in the early 1990s and thus had approximately the same experience with multiparty competition when their respective surveys were taken. It should be noted that the questions across different rounds of the Afrobarometer are not entirely consistent. The particular question that is used to construct the dependent variable changes in wording such that in rounds 3-5, the relevant question reads,

Table 1: Countries and Survey Rounds Included in Regression Models

Countries Included in Cross-National Analysis (16 countries)	***Observations (73,056 total)***
Benin	3,598
Botswana	3,600
Burkina Faso	2,400
Ghana	4,797
Kenya*	3,503
Malawi	4,807
Mali	3,676
Mozambique	4,798
Namibia	3,600
Nigeria	7,087
Senegal	3,600
South Africa	7,199
Tanzania	4,912
Uganda	7,231
Zambia	3,600
Zimbabwe	4,648

*Round 3 survey data from Kenya is excluded due to its close proximity to the 2005 constitutional referendum.

[122] Although survey data is available, I do not include data from Cape Verde or Lesotho due to their relative ethnic homogeneity. I also exclude data from Madagascar because of relatively lengthy spell of political upheaval in which the country held no presidential election for nearly 7 years (2006-2013) but held multiple constitutional referenda. I further exclude Kenya's Round 3 data because the survey was taken in close proximity to the 2005 constitutional referendum but more than 2 years from any national election. The referendum was unusual in that competing political factions waged intense campaigns for and against ratification, often using ethnic references in the process. This round is excluded so as not to confound the effects of proximity to presidential elections.

"Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [*member of country X*] and being a [*respondent's ethnic group*]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?" I use the answers to this question to construct a dichotomous dependent variable where 1= feeling more a member of the ethnic group and 0= feeling more a member of the country. The theory predicts that campaign effects on the likelihood of ethnic identification should be higher in countries with unstable party systems.

The models take the form:

$$logit\left(\Pr y_{ij} = ethnic|\boldsymbol{Z}_j, \boldsymbol{X}_{ij}\right) = \boldsymbol{Z}_j'\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \boldsymbol{X}_{ij}'\boldsymbol{\beta}$$

The $\boldsymbol{X}$ matrix consists of individual-level variables, including proximity to the nearest presidential election (measured in months),[123] the competitiveness of the election, the interaction between them, and individual-level control variables. $\boldsymbol{Z}$ is a matrix of country fixed effects. The fixed effects setup controls for any unobserved country-specific traits that may effect the probability of identifying in ethnic terms, such as national wealth or colonial history. The model thus estimates a within-country, over time effect.

Where possible, I use the same control variables used by Eifert et al. on the newer data.[124] This includes controls for age, sex, education, urban residency, income, and media exposure.[125]

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[123] A particular survey within a country may have been conducted over the course of several months. This value is therefore not the same for each respondent in a country survey-round. The variable is measured to the level of the ½ month.

[124] Many thanks to the authors for providing their Stata log file from the original article. Later rounds of the Afrobarometer do not include questions on the respondent's occupation, and thus these controls cannot be included. Interestingly, using my model specification and the more recent Afrobarometer data, I am not able to reproduce the findings from the original article either with the reduced sample of ten countries from their article or the full sample of 16 countries. In no iteration of the model is the variable measuring proximity to the nearest election or the interaction term between proximity and election competitiveness statistically significant. This does not imply that the original study is incorrect. As I note, the survey questions have changed somewhat across different survey rounds, including the question used to construct the dependent variable.

[125] Education is measured with three indicator variables for having completed primary school, having completed secondary school, and having a post-secondary education, with no formal education serving as the reference category. Income is measured using the Index of Lived Poverty (Jensen & Justesen 2014, 224), which is constructed based on respondents' answers to questions regarding their access to food, clean water, medical services, cooking fuel, and cash income. Larger numbers indicate a relatively poorer respondent with possible values ranging from 0-

As robustness checks, I include controls for enumerator and interview-context effects,[126] as well as sampling weights for each observation.[127] To differentiate between stable and unstable party systems, I rely on the index of Party System Institutionalization (PSI) developed by Riedl (2014, 37-42). The PSI index is a composite measure that combines three aspects of party system stability: electoral volatility, social rootedness, and popular belief in party system legitimacy.

Table 2: Stable and Unstable Party Systems by Party System Institutionalization

Stable Party Systems (PSI>4.0)	***Unstable Party Systems (PSI≤4.0)***
Botswana	Benin
Ghana	Burkina Faso
Mozambique	Kenya
Namibia	Malawi
Senegal	Mali
South Africa	Nigeria
Tanzania	Zambia
Uganda*	
Zimbabwe*	

*Uganda and Zimbabwe are not included in Riedl's (2014) original study.

The index is thus closely related to Mainwaring's (1999) conceptualization of party systems. Electoral volatility is determined by Pedersen's index of volatility, meaning the amount of seat or vote share changes between elections.[128] Social rootedness, or the degree to which parties maintain stable roots in society, is measured both by the percent of seats in the lower chamber controlled by parties that competed in the first multiparty election as well as the amount of time

25. Media exposure is measured with two variables indicating whether the respondent listens to the radio on a daily basis and whether the respondent reads the newspaper on a weekly basis.

[126] These include an indicator variable for whether the surveyor and the respondent share the same primary language, whether the interview was conducted where others could overhear the respondent's answers, and whether the enumerator felt that the respondent had provided misleading answers.

[127] Observations are weighted by 1/(number of observations from that country).

[128] Presidential and legislative volatility scores are averaged together for a mean electoral volatility score.

each party has been in existence since the country's transition to multiparty rule.[129] Belief in party system legitimacy is determined by whether in recent elections the country experienced a boycott of an election, had the losers refuse to accept an election result, had international observers deem an election not free and fair, or experienced a military disruption of an elected government. Countries lose points on their PSI score if any of these conditions hold. The PSI index takes values from 0-6 with larger numbers indicating more stable party systems.

For the purposes of testing the theory proposed here, I divide my sample of 16 countries into stable and unstable party systems, with countries having a PSI score larger than 4 coded as stable. Riedl does not include Uganda and Zimbabwe in her original study. However, given that multiple rounds of survey data are available for each country, I include survey data from both in the models below. Based on the available descriptions of the indicators, I reasonably code each as having a stable party system in a dichotomous coding of stability. Table 2 shows the division of the sample. I then run the same iterations of the model on each set of countries separately to see how the coefficients change when applied to each group of countries. Dividing the sample by party system stability reduces the power of the statistical models, but it avoids using a combined sample with a three-way interaction term, the results of which would be exceedingly difficult to interpret.

Results

The results of the models suggest that there are different campaign effects in stable versus unstable party systems. Table 3 shows the results of the binary logit models with sample divided by party system institutionalization. Models 3 and 6 include enumerator and interview-context

[129] Each of these two measures is given a separate numerical value. They are added together to obtain the social rootedness aspect of PSI.

controls as well as sample weights for each observation. All models use clustered standard errors at the country level. In the models predicting ethnic identification in stable party systems (the left half of the Table 4), the main effects of proximity to the nearest election and the competitiveness of the election are not statistically significant in any of the iterations. In Model 6, the interaction term is statistically significant, but the coefficient has a negative sign. In fact, for the countries that have stable party systems, all interaction and main effects for the *proximity* and *compete* variables have negative signs. This does not necessarily mean that the probability of a respondent identifying in ethnic terms decreases the closer one gets to the election because the coefficients are generally not significant. Rather, the findings suggest that no clear relationship can be seen in stable party systems between proximity to an election, election competitiveness, and the probability of a respondent identifying in ethnic terms.

In countries with unstable party systems, the effects are very different. When the interaction term is included, the *proximity* variable and the interaction term between *proximity* and *compete* are positive and statistically significant at the .10 and .05 levels, respectively. This suggests that the finding first identified by Eifert et al.—that in competitive elections campaigns tend to prime ethnic identities—is true for the more recent survey rounds, but only in countries with unstable party systems.[130] This is consistent with the theory proposed that explicit ethnic language is a particularly useful campaign strategy for politicians working in environments with weak political parties. These results are robust to the inclusion of enumerator/interview-context control variables and sampling weights.[131]

[130] The effects estimated here are somewhat smaller than in the original article.
[131] It is worth noting that across all model specifications, there is a significant and robust negative effect of education. This suggests that more educated individuals tend to be less likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms.

Table 3: Binary Logit Models by Party System Stability

	Stable Party Systems			*Unstable Party Systems*		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Male	-0.094 (0.066)	-0.093 (0.065)	-0.100 (0.072)	-0.159*** (0.055)	-0.161*** (0.055)	-0.176*** (0.067)
Urban	-0.012 (0.078)	0.001 (0.080)	-0.031 (0.092)	-0.067 (0.059)	-0.068 (0.062)	-0.081 (0.070)
Primary Ed.	-0.398*** (0.083)	-0.400*** (0.085)	-0.436*** (0.077)	-0.316** (0.140)	-0.310** (0.143)	-0.346*** (0.113)
Secondary Ed.	-0.513*** (0.072)	-0.522*** (0.075)	-0.538*** (0.065)	-0.513*** (0.193)	-0.501** (0.194)	0.545*** (0.179)
Post-Secondary Ed.	-0.461*** (0.091)	-0.472*** (0.095)	-0.510*** (0.098)	-0.560*** (0.142)	-0.539*** (0.144)	-0.573*** (0.144)
Poverty	0.030*** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.015 (0.012)	0.014 (0.010)	0.009 (0.011)
Read Newspaper Weekly	-0.169*** (0.040)	-0.169*** (0.040)	-0.165*** (0.039)	0.090* (0.050)	0.068 (0.046)	0.079 (0.059)
Listen Radio Daily	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.048 (0.047)	-0.053 (0.048)	-0.073 (0.051)
Competitiveness	0.008 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.020 (0.019)	0.015 (0.018)
Proximity	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.022 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.012)	0.044* (0.025)	0.041* (0.024)
Proximity* Competitiveness	---	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	---	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Weights	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Enumerator/ Interview Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Countries	9	9	9	7	7	7
Observations	39,887	39,887	39,629	27,356	27,356	27,061
Pseudo- R^2	0.030	0.031	0.032	0.039	0.042	0.042

All models include country fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Statistical Significance: p<0.10; p<0.05**; p<0.01****

Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities for Competitive and Uncompetitive Elections by Party System Institutionalization



Marginal Effect* of Proximity at 24 months (d(Pr(y_{ij}=*ethnic*)/dX) for Stable Party Systems		Marginal Effect of Proximity at 24 months (d(Pr(y_{ij}=*ethnic*)/dX) for Unstable Party Systems	
Uncompetitive	-0.001 (0.001)	*Uncompetitive*	-0.001 (0.001)
Competitive	-0.003 (0.002)	*Competitive*	0.004* (0.002)

Statistical Significance: p<0.10; p<0.05**; p<0.01****
*Marginal effects are calculated with continuous variables held at their means and dichotomous variables held at their modes for the full sample.

To better examine these effects, I graph the predicted probabilities for stable and unstable party systems under both competitive and uncompetitive conditions in Figure 1. For competitive elections, I estimate the probability y_{ij}=*ethnic* with the *compete* variable at -8, indicating an 8-point gap between first and second place presidential candidates. For uncompetitive elections, I estimate the predicted probabilities at *compete*=-30. Predicted probabilities and marginal effects are calculated with continuous independent variables held at their means and dichotomous independent variables held at their modes for the full sample.

The left panel of Figure 1 shows that in stable party systems there is little effect of competitivess or proximity on the probability of an individual identifying in ethnic terms. The

estimated marginal effects are similar in both competitive and uncompetitive cases and are not statistically significant. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that in unstable systems, when elections are competitive, there is a postive effect of proximity to an election on ethnic identification. The marginal effects at 24 months away from an election suggests that under these circumstances, a respondent is nearly one-half of a percentage point more likely to identify in ethnic terms as she gets one month closer to the election date, estimated with 90% confidence. It should be noted that the closer one gets to an election, although the model estimates a consistent positive (and slighlty increasing) effect of *proximity* in competitive elections, there is significantly more uncertainty around the estimates. As Figure 1 shows, the 95% confidence bands around the predicted probabilities become relatively large. Unfortuntely, there is relatively little survey data this close to the elections in this sample, and thus the model attaches increasing uncertainty to the estimates as the *proximity* variable goes to zero. Still, the effects are significant in earlier time periods, suggesting that there are in fact some significant campaign effects on ethnic identification.

Figure 2 below shows the predicted probabilities for Ghana and Kenya under competitive-election conditions to illustrate the model effects for the two countries in which interviews were conducted. The marginal effect of a respondent answering in ethnic terms moving one month closer to an election in Ghana is -0.2 % at 24 months away from an election, although the effect is not statistically significant.[132] In Kenya, the marginal effect on ethnic identification of moving one month closer to an election is 0.3%. The effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. This finding is consistent with the interview evidence collected with Kenyan politicians and members of their campaign teams. As politicians begin the process of

[132] This is unsurprising given that the neither the main component of the proximity variable nor the interaction term is statistically significant.

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Ethnic Identification for Ghana and Kenya



Marginal Effect* of Proximity at 24 months (d(Pr(y_{ij}=*ethnic*)/dX) for Stable Party Systems		Marginal Effect of Proximity at 24 months (d(Pr(y_{ij}=*ethnic*)/dX) for Unstable Party Systems	
Competitive	-0.002 (0.002)	*Competitive*	0.003** (0.001)

Statistical Significance: p<0.10; p<0.05**; p<0.01****
*Marginal effects are calculated with continuous variables held at their means and dichotomous variables held at their modes for the full sample.

campaigning, we should expect that they will start recruiting local intermediaries to support their candidacies, and that these intermediaries will begin mobilizing an ethnic following for the candidates. Again, there is decreasing confidence in the estimates the closer one gets to an election due to the lack of available survey data, and thus it is unclear if the marginal effect of *proximity* continues to increase or tapers off as proximity goes to zero. However, the positive effect in Kenya across the year prior to an election year is consistent with the proposed theory.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to contribute to a new and growing literature on political parties in Africa. It is widely accepted across the literature in African politics that parties often use ethnicity to mobilize voters. However, the cross-national variation in the extent to which elections become overtly ethnic competitions has received relatively little attention until recently. This chapter offers an argument based on the level of party system institutionalization. The interviews with political elites suggest that where parties are strong and have established internal structures, politicians make use of the existing institutions. Campaign appeals are largely based on the national message of the party and its presidential candidate. Parliamentary candidates, regional campaign managers, and local activists remain largely disciplined in using relatively little inflammatory ethnic rhetoric, as their future promotion within the party hierarchy depends largely on their ability to help the party make successful national appeal. On the other hand, where party systems are unstable, politicians do not have grassroots partisan structures on which they can rely. They employ local intermediaries who have an extensive ethnic following to help them establish linkages with voters. Political campaigns then become charged with significantly more explicit ethnic rhetoric as politicians attempt to fashion themselves into the champions of particular ethnic groups.

The cross-national model offers some evidence of significant campaign effects in countries that have unstable party systems consistent with this theory. The model predicts a positive effect on the probability of a survey respondent identifying in ethnic terms over the course of a campaign. There are limitations to the data and some caveats should be made. The effects do become more ambiguous the closer one gets to an election, and unfortunately the paucity of data in close proximity to an election makes does not enable estimation of more

precise effects. Furthermore, I do not have a cross-national measure of the amount or intensity of ethnic rhetoric in each of the electoral periods included in the regression models. It is therefore possible that elections increase the salience of ethnic identities in unstable party systems without generating the intensely ethnicized campaigns that I observed in Kenya. The findings, however, are broadly consistent with the theory. The argument is also in line with theories of ethnic politics that emphasize the constructed nature of ethnic identities (Chandra 2004) and the importance of political institutions in determining elites' incentives to mobilize voters along ethnic lines (Posner 2005, Eifert et al. 2010). It hopes to contribute to the growing literature in African politics on the importance of political parties as critical variables in structuring the democratization process.

Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to contribute to the extensive literature on party politics in new democracies. I make two key arguments. First, contrary to much of the literature, the data collected in Ghana and Kenya show that some parties in new democracies do offer the electorate clear policy packages during their campaigns. This programmatic strategy is most likely to be employed by a party characterized by a dominant ethnic core. Thus, while much of the literature emphasizes the relationship between ethnic politics and non-programmatic electoral strategies, this study has shown that the need for dominant ethnic groups to attract a multi-ethnic following has the opposite effect. Parties that are perceived to be ethnically exclusive adopt programmatic strategies to demonstrate their willingness to support national development goals as opposed to narrow ethnic interests. Those parties with a more multi-ethnic following often base their campaigns on promises to redistribute national resources away from the dominant core of their opponents. This pattern holds regardless of which party is the incumbent.

Second, party system institutionalization has important consequences for how explicitly ethnic campaign discourse becomes. Where parties are weak, candidates make greater use of local intermediaries during campaigns. When garnering votes in political systems where voters believe that ethnicity determines the distribution of national resources, the most useful intermediaries often are ethnic elites, such as ethnic elders, who can deliver a bloc of ethnic votes to a political party. For candidates, the process of gaining the endorsement of such an intermediary means publically championing the goals of that group, often using overtly ethnic language. On the other hand, where parties are stronger, intermediaries are often excluded from the campaigning process. Party elites prioritize giving their parties a national appeal, and overt ethnic discourse is rare.

These arguments are based on research in two African countries, but they should be applicable to new democracies more broadly. Given the prominence of ethnicity and the frequency with which national economic and political power are thought to be unevenly distributed across ethnic groups, we should expect that elite, historically dominant ethnic groups will struggle to attract widespread support for political parties they are thought to control. I argued in the first chapter that campaigns in newer democracies are critically important moments when parties can improve democratic accountability by offering voters a clear indication of their policy goals. The adoption of a programmatic campaign strategy by certain parties to compensate for their electoral disadvantages should improve the overall quality of campaign discourse, and potentially the quality of policies adopted once in office. The adoption of major healthcare and education programs in the two countries under study suggests that this is the case.

Of course, several countries with politically relevant ethnic cleavages and a history of clientelism are characterized by a single ethnic group that makes up a clear majority of the population. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, known as being a pro-Hindu party, does not necessarily need to use a campaign strategy that appeals to multiple ethnic groups due to the large majority of Hindu voters (Chandra 2005). However, because of India's federal system, which sub-divides the country into states and districts with considerable powers, we might expect to see parties with a core of ethnic support use programmatic strategies in local elections where the demographics and regional political institutions do not allow ethnic parties to win elections by simply mobilizing their core supporters. Indeed, Chandra (2005) finds that the particular structure of the Indian constitution encourages parties to activate cross-cutting social cleavages during state-wide elections rather than rely on only the major ethnic cleavages. For example, rather than relying only on a Hindu versus Muslim discourse, parties in the state of

Utter Pradesh mobilize multiethnic support for their more policy-based appeals to lower-caste voters (Chandra 2005, 244-245). Thus, the need for the Hindu party to incorporate policies that appeal to voters based on their caste has promoted a more programmatic approach to local politics.

This suggests that there are institutional variables that should be taken into account when determining the implications of the findings presented in this study. Both Ghana and Kenya are historically highly centralized, presidential systems. Like in many neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, this has given presidents significant discretionary powers over the distribution of resources. Thus, the assumption that presidents will not be checked in favoring the ethnic group that forms the core of their party has been a very realistic concern for most voters. However, a reduction in the powers of the central government might reduce the concern of core-group favoritism. In the wake of the 2007-2008 election violence, Kenya introduced a new constitution that incorporated several of the provisions first proposed by the Rainbow Alliance in the 2002 election campaign to help curb the powers of the presidency. These included the creation of a deputy president, increased devolution to forty-seven new county governments, and the creation of a Senate in the legislature. Although still in the very early phases of campaigning under this newer set of institutions, one can see how the importance of Kikuyu elitism may play a different role in future party politics. Importantly, the new county governments do not correspond to the ethnic divisions that would have been reinforced under the *majimbo* system proposed by the ODM in 2007, which emphasized local ownership of ethnic *jimbos*. Thus, with the new political geography and the reduced powers of the presidency, the potential for local multi-ethnic alliances is considerably larger than it has been previously. With the reduced powers of the presidency, non-Kikuyu voters may find the prospect of supporting a Kikuyu president more

acceptable. Alternatively, with political devolution, we could also see the same dynamic we see at the national level duplicated in local elections, with local Kikuyu candidates offering programmatic appeals to voters to attract a multiethnic following.

It should be noted that the long-term process of institutionalizing programmatic politics also involves all major parties adopting a programmatic approach to their campaigns and not just those with a core of ethnic support. This may take somewhat more time than this study has been able to account for. In the case of Ghana, the NPP's programmatic appeals based on education and healthcare have generated a widespread public debate about the merits of such programs, including their overall desirability and practicality. However, the NDC has not yet adopted a decisively programmatic tone in its own campaigns. Although NDC candidates are happy to engage in a policy debate in which they can criticize their opponent's proposals, they have yet to offer clear alternatives.

In Kenya, although this study shows that the party with a core of Kikuyu support employs campaign strategies similar to the NPP in Ghana, Kenyan parties suffer from the drawback of systemic institutional weakness. When parties are created just prior to elections and coalitions regularly fall apart once in power, voters may not believe that policy platforms are credible. They may further be more responsive to the largely ethnic discourse regularly used to mobilize support. The example of Kenya shows that programmatic campaigning can take place even when overt ethnic language dominates the political landscape. However, the advantages of programmatic campaigns in terms of improving governance are contingent on the survival of the democratic regime. With the outbreak of violence in Kenya after the 2007 election and subsequent power sharing agreement, the major policy promises offered by Kibaki and the PNU became largely irrelevant, with attention shifted to restoring peace and implementing a new

constitution. The broader implication of this finding is therefore that longer term benefits of programmatic campaigns may require a stable party system to have significant effects on public policy. With increasing party institutionalization over time comes the development of party brands as well as a record previous policy accomplishments for which parties can take credit when making their appeals.

The research presented here also suggests that party system institutionalization leads to a weakening of the influence of local patrons in determining campaign behavior. With stronger parties and less input from local ethnic elders, we should expect to see a reduction in the emphasis on ethnicity during elections. Ghana's development of a stable party system is largely due to the willingness of Jerry Rawlings to invest in grassroots structures, which he correctly thought would provide him with the widespread rural base of support he would need when he agreed to implement structural adjustment reforms. With the liberalization of politics in the early 1990s, the opposition adopted similar party building methods.

Political elites in Kenya have opted instead to continue the elite, patronage-based method of ad hoc party building developed under Daniel Arap Moi. Able to extract rents from commercial agriculture and tourism, Moi never invested in a party organization. Party mobilization remains a chaotic, unstructured affair. This would suggest that the many foreign aid projects targeted at strengthening political parties in Africa by helping them draft manifestos, incorporate women's rights issues into their platforms, and eschew ethnic discourse will likely have a limited impact absent political incentives for elites to invest in durable party structures.

Still, the findings presented here suggest that there are considerably more incentives in place to develop programmatic campaigns than is currently acknowledged. It is hoped that this

project has shed some light on the significant variation in approaches to winning elections that characterizes African elections.

Methodological Appendix

The content analysis portion of this study was made possible by the excellent archives of the Center for Research Libraries (CRL) in Chicago, Il. All newspaper records from the Daily Graphic and the Daily Nation were accessed on microfiche and delivered to the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Memorial Library from the CRL. The eight weeks of newspaper material prior to each election in the study was then scanned for any articles covering the campaigns of the major parties. After being converted into .pdf format, the articles were then coded for campaign appeals.

In this study, I define campaign appeals as a quotation or paraphrase where a party member offers a particular reason for the electorate to support the party or its presidential candidate. Appeals can take a few different forms in the syntax of a newspaper article. An appeal can be in the form of a single sentence, or phrase within a sentence. A particular sentence can thus have multiple appeals (for example, if a candidate promises to improve both "education and maternal healthcare"). The key distinction is when the candidate discussed pledges to act (or to have previously acted) on a distinct political issue, idea, or concept. I then categorized each appeal into one of the four categories discussed in the first chapter. I further coded all specific and general programmatic appeals into one of the 39 appeal types. I borrowed this method from Lau and Pomper (2001), who themselves modified Franklin's (1991) coding methods. Both of these studies use newspaper campaign appeals as their primary source of data. Richard Lau and Charles Franklin were both kind enough to send me the original coding criteria and instructions they used in their own studies.

I chose not to code for negative campaign appeals, meaning those appeals that criticize one's opponents, because of the potential biases regarding which negative appeals are published.

The potential for newspaper editors to publish more sensational negative appeals to sell more papers would likely bias which types of negative appeals appear in print. However, this particular source of bias would be less likely to affect the type of positive appeals in newspapers. I also did not code candidate statements that were not in the form of a pledge or reminder of previous accomplishment. For example, if a candidate states that his country's road network is in a deplorable state, this, on its own, would not be coded unless the candidate promised to act on that observation by improving the roads.

I established the reliability of the coding by hiring an advanced graduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to independently code a sample of appeals into one of the four appeal categories. The coder was given a random sample of articles from Ghana's 2008 election that contained fifty-three appeals. The text containing the appeals in each article was highlighted, and the second coder was instructed to categorize the appeals into one of the four categories. The reliability rate in between the coder and me was 73.6%.

The field research component of the study consisted largely of interviews with party elites with significant experience working on campaigns. These took place over the course of three separate research trips in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Field research was funded in part by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School and the Department of Political Science. Each of these trips lasted for approximately three months. In both Ghana and Kenya, I first targeted members of the parties' national campaign teams, who were often Members of Parliament or officials within the party hierarchies. Some subjects were retired from formal political roles in their parties. After these interviews, I then used those party members, or the staff at the national party offices, to get names and contact information for party members who had more local experience working on campaigns. In particular, I attempted to interview elites

with a variety of local campaign experience, both those with experience working in regional strongholds and those with experience working in swing regions. Almost all interview subjects were contacted first on their mobile phones then interviewed at a location most convenient for them. This was generally either in their offices, at a café, or in a hotel lobby. Some interviews in Ghana took place outside the chamber of parliament. Most interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 75 minutes. Some current Members of Parliament and high ranking party members were only able to be interviewed for closer to 30 minutes due to their busy schedules.

All interviews were based on a similar interview protocol but were open ended and varied depending on the experiences of the interview subject. I asked all interview subjects about the largest challenges they faced in executing their campaigns, what they felt the most effective campaign strategies were, and how they explained particular patterns of voting behavior. I also asked about the differences between mobilizing core supporters and attracting swing supporters, as well as what the subjects thought the biggest differences were between their own party's campaign strategy and that of their opponents. Perhaps the largest difference between interviews in Ghana versus those in Kenya was during discussions on the importance of local intermediaries during campaigns. With regards to this issue, I asked about what role intermediaries play during campaigns, what kinds of intermediaries make for effective partners, and what intermediaries ask of party elites in return for their services during campaigns.

In accordance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) proposal for this study, all interview subjects were promised anonymity in this dissertation as well as in any subsequent publications. The IRB submission number for this project is SE-2012-0311.

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