(Re)imagining and (Re)enacting Competing Policy Imperatives:

The Case of Post-Apartheid South African Higher Education

By

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Educational Policy Studies and Development Studies)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2019

Date of final oral examination: 01/29/2019

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Acknowledgement

Abstract

This dissertation recognizes that the emergence of post-apartheid South Africa as the most popular study destination in Africa follows racial segregation, regional destabilization, and international isolation during apartheid. Today, the country's public higher education institutions face intensifying pressures to respond simultaneously to national, regional, and global policy imperatives that often conflict in the missions and daily functioning of the public universities. To understand how the different imaginaries of national, regional and international higher education policy imperatives are conceptualized, contested, institutionalized and experienced, I conducted an institutional ethnography of one of the country's top-rated, desegregated and formerly-White public universities. Data consisted of more than 100 hours of audio-recorded interviews with 26 top and mid-level administrators, 15 faculty and staff members, 30 non-national students, and 19 black and white South African students; participant observations of on-campus and off-campus events and meetings; and review of institutional documents (e.g. strategic frameworks, surveys, reports, and enrollment statistics). Data was mainly analyzed by concept mapping, which involved developing visuals to capture and represent patterns, interpretations, and relational concepts emerging from the research texts.

Based on the analytic categories emerging from the data, I developed a four-quadrant mapping of *discursive frames*, *policy discourses, organizing logics,* and *racial* and *national identity markers* that shaped institutional policy contests in negotiating what it means for universities to serve public purposes. Findings show that the global competition imperative to internationalize the university privileged depoliticized policy practices based on market-oriented best practices that excluded and alienated historically marginalized black South Africans. Conversely, the national racial justice imperative to transform and decolonize the university was premised on nationalistic and racialized conceptions of racial justice that de-prioritized regional solidarity/cooperation and de-legitimized the multiracial thrust of social cohesion imperatives. The mobilization strategy premised on equity, nationality, and blackness thus alienated non-national and non-black student constituencies, prompting them to mobilize around quality, inclusiveness and social cohesion. The research underscores the policy and practice implications attending the drawing of boundaries and borders in determining who public universities in deeply connected regions belong to and who they should serve, and in constraining possibilities for cross-national and cross-racial solidarities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I – INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

    Introduction
    Background
    Research Objectives
    Research Design
    Research Site
    Data Collection and Analysis
    Summary of Key Findings
    Dissertation Outline

    Introduction
    Higher Education in South Africa: An Historical Overview
    Higher Education during the Apartheid Era: 1948-1990
    Extension of University Education Act 45 of 1959
    "Open" University
    Apartheid Era
    Response to Nationalist Government Challenge
    Agitation against Apartheid University
    Translation to Democracy and Post-1994 Restructuring

    Introduction
    Globalization and Internationalization
    Re-orienting Internationalization
    Local Responsiveness and Relevance
    Africanization
    Quality/Equity Imperatives
    Beyond the Binaries
    Conclusion

PART II – POST-APARTHEID POLICY IMPERATIVES

    Introduction
    Policy as Text, Practice, and Discourse

Inbound Regional Student Mobility
SADC Region and Porous Borders
Future Research Directions

Chapter 1

Introduction and Background

Introduction

Public higher education institutions in post-apartheid South Africa are experiencing simultaneous, contradictory demands: global pressures to integrate within a competitive, globalized higher education market; regional demands for geopolitical redress and development cooperation; national demands for racial justice, educational equity, decolonized curriculum; and social cohesion imperatives to heal the racial divisions of the apartheid era. These policy imperatives emanate from the country's historical context of international isolation, regional destabilization, and racial segregation during apartheid, respectively. These clashing demands shape the opportunities and experiences of both domestic and non-national students who migrate mainly from neighboring countries to seek university education in South Africa.

This dissertation study examines how public South African universities pursue global excellence and regional solidarity, and concurrently seek to redress racial injustices of the past and foster national social cohesion. It offers an analysis of how the competing imperatives of the post-apartheid South African higher education shape the lives, educational opportunities, and experiences of the majority black South African students and their non-national counterparts studying at World Class University (WCU),[1] one of the top-ranked South African public universities. The study also shines a spotlight on how different student constituencies respond to and shape institutional policy debates and practices.

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[1] Pseudonym

Upwards of 70% of South Africa's foreign students are[2] from neighboring countries in

the Southern African Development Community (SADC).[3] In 2015, the SADC students amounted

to 52,878 out of 72,960 non-national students and 985,212 total students in the country's

universities (VitalStats, 2017). I elect to use the "regional" or "non-national student" notations to

underscore the regional origin (southern Africa) and black racial identity of the majority of

WCU's international/foreign student population. Despite the preeminence of colonially imposed

national boundaries, the shared history (e.g. long history of migration to South African mines

and support for the anti-apartheid struggle), and the interconnected cultural and linguistic

heritage of countries in Southern Africa, demand that the "international/foreign" designation be

deployed cautiously or even avoided. The regional, non-national, or non-South African

designations that I adopt here recognize that colonially imposed notions of national citizenship is

the factor that distinguishes the regional students from domestic students; otherwise, there is far

more in common between the two groups.

The study shows how WCU administrators wanted to compete globally and be

recognized as a world-class university. On the other hand, black South African student activists

were challenging the continued legacy of apartheid in the country's top-ranked formerly white

universities. With curricula, hiring practices, and services for students continuing to favor white

and wealthy students, the black South African students were tired of their limited access to the

schools and how little has changed in the universities since the apartheid era. On account of these

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[2] I use the present tense here and in other instances in the dissertation to signal anything ongoing as of the time of writing. Otherwise, I default to the past tense in recognition that the dissertation covers time-specific ethnographic moments.

[3] A regional economic community comprising the following 15 member states: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

realities, the 2015-2016 #Rhodes/FeesMustFall student movements demanded a decolonized

curriculum and access for financially and academically excluded black South Africans.

The study puts the regional (SADC) students at the heart of the policy debates on global

competition among universities (as through university ranking systems, for instance) and

national efforts to expand and equalize educational access. Doing so recognizes that SADC

students did not appear in the rhetoric about the new global education marketplace, what

Wildavsky (2010) calls the international competition for the brightest minds. This is because, far

from being the much sought-after, self-funding international student, SADC students studying in

South Africa are actually subsidized by the host country. The SADC students also did not appear

in the national story about transforming and decolonizing South African universities because

they are not South African nationals. Thus, they were mainly invisible in both the global and

national narratives. Yet, though they were not visible in the usual stories that we hear about

South African higher education, the study shows us how SADC students were being used in two

distinct ways in the university.

The legacy of apartheid in South Africa means that many black South Africans struggle

to succeed in college because of poor K-12 educational experiences in under-resourced rural and

township schools. Contrary to the low throughput of black South African students, and the

resultant inefficiency and high costs of tertiary education, the SADC students have higher levels

of academic preparation, for the most part. They are admitted at WCU and other such South

African universities in part because they improve key institutional indicators, such as earning

better grades and high on-time graduation rates. According to Asale (a non-national student from

one of South Africa's neighbors) non-South African students worked harder such that they

constitute most of the students who make the Dean's list.[4] Aside from academic factors, the

SADC students, who are almost all black, were being used to increase the number of black

students that the university could claim to be educating. In other words, the SADC students made

it possible for the university to argue that it could be globally competitive while educating more

black students.

SADC students were absent in dominant global and national narratives at a time when

migration for education, for climate change, for work opportunities, and for survival is increasing

across the SADC region, on the continent, and across the world. The study shows how we need

to very carefully research how we make sense of each other as people. This includes highlighting

migrants' experiences in ways that do not otherize and criminalize migrants as has been

predominant in the U.S. and Europe lately. Instead, the study calls for human ways, including

ideas of Ubuntu and Pan-Africanism, for example, to question how we make sense of what is

happening in the world, and what a bright future looks like. The research is one of a small

number of studies that are intended to change our understanding of people' relationships with

one another and to education systems, and what it means for how we might live together in a

way that recognizes our shared humanity and our connections to one another in a much deeper

way.

Background

My ideas about the dissertation project have always revolved around understanding the

migration experiences of people in the SADC region, but the exact interests have changed over

time. In 2012 when I started my doctoral studies, I was interested in crisis migration with

particular emphasis on professionals from Zimbabwe (my home country), and their migration

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[4] At WCU, the Dean's list refers to awards given in recognition of consistent academic excellence. Nominations for the award take into consideration individual program load as well as the total duration of the degree.

intentions and experiences out of the country. After taking a range of cross-disciplinary courses, my interests and focus on crisis migration gradually shifted to the internationalization of higher education in South Africa. I developed a deep interest in what was happening in the country's universities, especially elite and formerly white public universities, more than two decades after the end of apartheid.

The post-apartheid period was supposed to see radical transformation in terms of who has access to higher education, and what education will do for people. My interest was, however, not in South Africa per se, but rather it focused on the experiences of SADC students who were attending university in South Africa. I wanted to understand what these students' experiences of migrating for education could tell us about how South Africa was relating to neighboring countries in the region and other countries on the continent and around the world. Beyond that, I was interested in what South Africa's engagement with immediate neighbors meant for the region's shared future; and for our understanding of what happens when countries have internal battles that are intricately connected to deeply troubling histories at the regional level.

My interest in the shape and scope of regional student mobility into South African universities, including the opportunities available to them, their experiences and responses, is a recognition that although the bulk of student mobility literature pays attention to south-north mobility, "a significant proportion of international education occurs across shared borders throughout the world" (Lee & Sehoole, 2015, p. 828). In the SADC region, intra-regional educational mobility has become far more numerically significant than migration to Europe (Segatti & Landau, 2011). In fact, nearly half of all mobile students from SADC countries go to study in South Africa (Chien & Kot, 2012)[5] such that the country has become the most popular

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[5] Followed by the United Kingdom (10%), the United States (8%), France (7%) and Australia (6%).

African study destination and ranks 11th in the world as a destination for international students (The Institute for International Education, 2018).[6]

South Africa emerged as the most coveted study destination because the country has the most developed higher education system in the region with some internationally renowned institutions such as University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University, University of Pretoria, and the University of the Witwatersrand. The fact that these were all formerly white directly ties the global reputation that the universities currently enjoy to South Africa's despised apartheid past. In contrast to South Africa being home to a range of top universities perceived to be comprehensible internationally, endemic economic challenges and political instability have resulted in limited higher education opportunities in neighboring countries. Non-nationals from the immediate SADC region and the rest of the continent recognize that South African degrees carry international currency that makes them a different and better kind of investment than a degree from their home countries. For European and American students, South African universities are attractive because they offer French, German, Dutch, Italian and Portuguese. In addition, the favorable rand-US dollar and Euro exchange rates make studying in South Africa cheaper than in the US or Europe (Sehoole, 2012).

The high proportion of regional students in South African universities provides crucial insights into the understudied phenomena of inbound student mobility to study destinations located in the global south. Unlike most popular study destinations in the world (e.g. the U.S. and Canada), where the bulk of non-national students do not come from immediate neighboring countries, in the case of South Africa, the source countries for education and labor migrants are the same. In that case, individuals and families from countries experiencing economic and

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[6] https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Open-Doors/Data/US-Study-Abroad/Destinations

political downward spiral or stagnation (e.g. Zimbabwe) might not necessarily make a distinction between migrating for school and migrating for work. This situation means that research on migration in Southern Africa ought to pay close attention to the connections between education and labor migration, and the implications of those linkages for migration patterns and outcomes.

My interest in regional student mobility to South Africa was also informed by the fact that, pursuant of the SADC Protocol of 1997, these SADC students are subsidized by the South African state. The Protocol stipulates that member states shall treat students from SADC countries as home students for purposes of fees and accommodation. Considering the emergence of post-apartheid South Africa as the most popular study destination in Africa, South Africa hosts far more regional students than any other country in the SADC region and way more than it sends to the neighbours. As a result, South Africa spends disproportionately more in subsidizing regional students than any of the other SADC countries.

What might be misconstrued as students moving across national borders is, however, fraught with moral/ethical implications because South Africa's history, development prospects and interests remain closely bound up with those of its neighbors in the SADC region (Saunders, 2011). These ties include the long history of labor migration of workers from the southern Africa region to South African mines; the role that the neighboring countries played in supporting the anti-apartheid struggle; and South Africa's sprawling business interests in the region. I discuss each of these in detail in chapter 4. Post-apartheid efforts to nurture regional ties (e.g. the regional inward mobility of foreign African nationals into South Africa) have had to contend with widespread and persistent anti-immigrant sentiments among ordinary South African citizens, government officials, and public and private service providers (Misago, 2017).

Almost 100% of the African foreign students in South African public universities are black, and more than half come from Zimbabwe, the country's immediate northern neighbor. The disproportionate volume of Zimbabwean students in South African universities is consistent with the claim that Zimbabwe has one of the highest literacy rates in Africa[7] and that Zimbabweans living in South Africa tend to speak better English and are more employable than their South African counterparts (Prew, 2014). Whereas the colonial administration in Zimbabwe had impeded access of the vast majority of black learners to educational opportunities, Prew points out that, at independence in 1980, Mugabe's government committed to deracializing education while making it free, compulsory, and fully accessible as a basic human right.

The success of the Zimbabwean school system in the decade after independence means that by the end of apartheid in 1994, Zimbabwe had a vast pool of academically prepared learners who were attracted to the top-rated formerly white universities such as WCU. As already pointed out, WCU found these students better prepared to succeed than the products of under-performing rural and township South African schools struggling to reverse the deleterious legacies of apartheid.

It is important to note that Zimbabwe is also the source of the bulk of low/unskilled and undocumented labor migrants in South Africa. Given how closely related labor and education migration are in the region, the claims that regional non-national students can make to higher education opportunities in South Africa is a source of tension in the country's townships, workplaces, and universities. In particular, the inflows of non-South African blacks from neighboring countries generate and stoke black South African students' resentment of regional

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[7] Although UNESCO puts the literacy rate at 92.22%, Prew (2014) notes that the Zimbabwean Minister of Education in 2012 indicated he could not support the figure and questioned how it was obtained.

competition over resources and opportunities and have been linked to persistent xenophobic rhetoric and actions (Handmaker & Parsley, 2001; Reilly, 2001).

Once I embarked on exploratory fieldwork in the summer of 2014, I realized that I could not study the phenomenon of regional student mobility outside of the country's history of international isolation and racial segregation during apartheid. According to Dolby (2010) and Maassen & Cloete (2006), South Africa is caught between and conflicted about global and national reform agendas that promote competition, efficiency, and effectiveness,[8] and that emphasize locally driven post-apartheid concerns such as redress, democratization, reconstruction and equity, respectively. The research project thus evolved from a singular focus on regional student mobility and the experiences of regional non-national students in South Africa to explore the intensifying pressures faced by post-apartheid South African public higher education institutions to respond simultaneously to national, regional, and global policy pressures that often conflict in the missions and daily functioning of public universities.

The national pressures emanate from persisting patterns of systemic marginalization for black South Africans (Badat, 2009), who expect to be the primary beneficiaries of the post-apartheid government's equity focus (Ramphele, 1999). As Habib (2016a) points out, the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall student movements that engulfed South African public universities in 2015 and 2016 captured the alienation of the largely black student population and reflected valid concerns about institutional racism and/or the slow pace of transformation at all the country's universities.

The protests featured students in the agenda-setting role as they applied pressure on both university administrators and the state to actualize what the students perceived as yet-to-be-

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[8] But, also global excellence—which is not always linked to market principles.

realized transformation promises of the 1994 democratic transition. Similarly, one faculty member who I interviewed pointed out that, as a result of the slow pace of transformation, a decolonization agenda had since gained currency targeting what the most radical among students called white privilege/whiteness. The decolonization movement aimed to destroy the colonial situation and the old white university and replace it with a university that would be Afro-centered both in its constituencies and curricula content.

National pressures notwithstanding, the emergence of, and the dominance of the new orthodoxy of the knowledge economy (Naidoo, 2011) places high value on elite, world-class and research-intensive universities, which in turn puts pressure on universities worldwide to benchmark against international norms, standards and best practices. These external pressures force WCU and other top South African universities to recruit international graduate students and faculty in order to increase their research outputs and financial health. This selective admission agenda often directly contradicts the demands made by South African student activists to further and deepen the transformation/decolonization of public universities.

Research Objectives

The objective of the research project was to explore the intersection, in South Africa's post-apartheid higher education sector, of national demands for a transition from the elitist and exclusionary legacy of apartheid to a mass-based tertiary education system (Ramphele, 1999); a regional development cooperation agenda; and pressures to integrate within the competitive, globalized knowledge economy. The questions guiding the research were as follows:

1) What are the different conceptualizations of national, regional, and global imperatives at South African public universities that self-describe as simultaneously locally and regionally responsive and globally competitive?

2) How do university administrators and faculty attempt to manage competing logics of transformation/decolonization, regionalization, and internationalization?

3) How do contestations around transformation/decolonization, regionalization, and internationalization shape opportunities for and the experiences of regional non-national students and South African Black and White students, including their conceptions of the potential for solidarity within and across racial and national lines?

4) How do different student constituencies organize to respond to and shape institutional policy debates and practices?

Methodology

Research Design

To understand the articulation of the competing policy pressures confronting post-apartheid South African higher education, I conducted six months of institutional ethnographic research at one of the country's public universities. The university is among the country's top-rated, historically white, research-intensive public universities and has some of the highest proportions of black South African and non-national students. The university sits at the intersection of global, regional and national pressures and tensions, and so it afforded the opportunity to study how the different imaginaries of the roles and missions of public universities were conceptualized, contested, institutionalized and experienced in post-apartheid South African higher education. Although the bulk of my fieldwork focused on a careful study of one institution, I built a more comprehensive picture of the country's university sector as a whole by collecting interview and textual data from seven additional public South African universities with diverse racial and institutional histories.

The research was informed by and builds on the work of cultural and critical anthropologists of higher education and sociologists engaged with the study of organizations. It is structured as a social analysis of the local historicity and particularities (Smith, 1987) of South African public universities within the global higher education context. It draws on the work of anthropologists and sociologists grappling with how to situate the disciplines' intimate knowledge of local interactions and individual consciousness in a broader set of structural forces affecting higher education institutions (e.g. Armstrong & Hamilton, 2010; Marcus, 1986; Mamdani, 2007; Mertz, 2007; Shore, 2010; Nathan, 2005; Nespor, 1994; Stevens, 2007; Tuchman, 2009).

Although the anthropology of education emerged in the 1950s in the U.S. (Anderson-Levitt, 2011), ethnography has until recently been a rarely adopted approach in higher education research (Pabian, 2014; Shumar, 2004b). Lucas (2012) notes, however, that ethnographic work is expanding and proving to be potentially highly fruitful for exploring the complex world of higher education. According to Shumar (2004b), the usefulness of a cultural anthropological study of higher education lies in that contemporary anthropologists tend to step back from all interactions and institutions and ask basic questions about what these things are, why they function the way they do, and whose interests they serve. This approach, coupled with the intimate knowledge that an anthropologist acquires about a group of people, can be a very powerful form of critique.

Whether anthropologically or sociologically informed, ethnographic studies of education share a commitment to analyzing issues in local context, to grasping the meaning made by local participants, and to conducting relatively long-term participant observation to gain those insights (Anderson-Levitt, 2011). Because ethnographic fieldwork is usually intensive and prolonged, Pabian (2014) notes that it can lead to insights that can hardly be gained by other research

approaches. Pabian is quick to note, however, that being long-term and labor-intensive, ethnography can easily become prohibitively expensive. For that reason, I ended up limiting fieldwork to six months, although if resources had permitted, I would have preferred to spend longer and to expand the ethnographic scope of the study beyond one core institution.

Aside from the long-term nature, Lucas (2012) points to the potentially personally intrusive nature of ethnographic research, difficulties in how these rich experiences can be told, and perplexities of closeness/distance and authentic/sanitized accounts. Shumar (2004a) brings up the tension between local data and the larger social theory: how much local actors understand about the larger forces acting upon them, and how much one can read into their local activities. While I do the best I can to describe what I saw in the field, I am also cognizant of the fact that divulging personal information that some research participants confidentially shared with me would be a breach of trust. Therefore, rather than focus entirely on individual research participants, I strive to show how particular participant groups' collective and shared experiences interact with institutional dynamics and shape policy debates. Where I bring up the cases of individual participants, as in chapter 7, I make sure to change some details of the cases to protect the individuals' identity.

Whereas the task of the anthropology of organizations is to identify the roles, formal and informal, that those who participate in the organization understand and endeavor to enact, and how that enactment effectively configures the organization (Hamann et al., 2013), the challenge for the institutional ethnographer is how to be inclusive of all participants in an organization. This challenge is evident in that most of the existing ethnographies of higher education focus on just a segment of the higher education institution. Mamdani (2007) pays attention to university governing bodies but leaves out the fundamentally important aspect of student experiences.

Armstrong & Hamilton (2013) study students' experiences on one residence hall floor. Stevens (2007) focuses on just the admission office. While the depth of analysis that comes out of concentrated attention to just one part of the institution is undoubtedly needed in institutional studies, it also highlights the challenges and limitations of trying to understand the entirety of dynamics of a large-scale organization such as a university.

My study pays attention to institutional logics, processes, and to the voices and experiences of people who are differentially positioned within the institution. As a result, my research captures both the story the institution tells about itself and the diverse perceptions, reflections and experiences of a cross-section of people whose daily work lives constitute the institution. I seek to accomplish this through the analysis of a wide spectrum of institutional documents, in-depth interviews with structurally diverse actors (administrators and staff, faculty from diverse schools, foreign students, and black and white South Africa students); and observations of diverse university settings (student organization offices, hallways, cafeterias, dorms, etc.).

In determining where to focus my research, my study draws on Bartlett & Vavrus' (2017) notion of the vertical case study. The vertical case study model emphasizes the importance and interconnections among micro-level understanding, macro-level analysis, and change over time. It requires scholars to think critically about the politics of knowledge production and it provides a conceptual model for researching and analyzing the relations among analytic units (people, groups, institutions, states, etc.).

The vertical case study approach is a solution to the tendency of ethnographies to focus exclusively on a single site, rather than to carefully explore how changes in national and international institutions, discourses, and policies influence social practice at the single sites.

Bartlett & Vavrus' (2017) call for comparisons of similarities and differences across multiple levels is based on the fact that educational policy, programming, and practice are shaped by and in turn influence local, national, and international forces. Bartlett & Vavrus (2017) stress that attention to the local should be matched by ethnographic exploration of the national or international levels, and that contemporary qualitative work in Comparative and International Education must examine how the global and the local mutually shape one another. Comparatively knowing, they argue, requires simultaneous attention to multiple levels, including (at least) international, national, and local ones, and the careful study of flows of influence, ideas, and actions through these levels and across time.

As per Bartlett & Vavrus' (2017) recommendation, the bulk of my fieldwork focuses on a careful study of one institution; however, this study constantly reaches out to and connects with sites, ideas, discourses, and flows of resources across levels. Consistent with the horizontal comparison approach, my analysis focuses on one university, but I compared the research site to seven other South African universities, including data collected from government officials, and alumni of South African universities currently both within and outside South Africa. While I recognize that local, regional and global levels are themselves constructed, I adopted the vertical comparison by grounding the research in one locality that is analytically embedded in national and global networks. Doing so yielded rich insights into how the flows of ideas, people, resources, and actions across these levels constitute "local" social and educational practices in South African universities. Lastly, I include the vertical/transversal by historicizing the higher education policy debates (see chapters 2 and 3).

Research Site

The post-apartheid South African university sector is usually broken down into three types of institutions: traditional universities, universities of technology, and comprehensive universities (Study South Africa, 2016). Based on this categorization, the sector comprised of 25 institutions at the time I started the research: eleven traditional universities, six universities of technology, and eight comprehensive universities.[9] The universities in the first category offer bachelor's degrees and have high proportions of postgraduate students, which translates to strong research capacities. In contrast, the six universities of technology are vocationally oriented; they award certificates, diplomas and degrees in technology and have some postgraduate and research capacity. Lastly, the comprehensive universities combine academic, research and vocationally-oriented education. Thus, they offer both bachelor and technology qualifications, and focus on undergraduate teaching, postgraduate study, and research.

This categorization of the country's universities has been criticized for failing to capture social justice issues associated with race-class student inequalities (Cooper, 2015; Jooste, 2015). Cooper (2015) proposes an alternative categorization that consists of an upper-band of five elite and research-intensive universities; a middle-band of seven average universities with a moderate research profile; and a lower-band of eleven disadvantaged historically black universities. This categorization is, however, based on the 23 institutions that made up the South African public university sector before the addition of Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University in 2015, and Sol Plaatje University and the University of Mpumalanga, both launched 2014. To the extent that this categorization centers research intensity (as measured by proportion of master's and PhD graduates, and research output per permanent academic staff member), it is useful for exposing the racialized and classed permutations of quality and excellence. While all the top-tier

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[9] Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University, unveiled in April 2015 makes the 26th. As a specialized university, it does not quite fit any of the three categories.

research-intensive universities are historically white, the bottom-tier institutions are far less research-oriented and their student population is still almost entirely black.

WCU, the research site where I conducted the bulk of the study, is among the upper band, top-rated, historically white universities. Having undergone intensive institutional internationalization and transformation since 1994, the university sits at the intersection of global, national and regional pressures and tensions. It, therefore, afforded the opportunity to study how such universities manage, and how students experience and respond to the competing logics shaping public higher education policy and practice. As already pointed out, I also sought to build a more comprehensive picture of the country's university sector as a whole by connecting with ideas, discourses, and flows of resources at seven additional public South African universities with diverse racial and institutional histories as well as with government officials and alumni of South African universities.

Student Enrollment

In keeping with many research-intensive universities around the world, WCU's top administrators believed that the production of high-level and internationally visible research largely depends on how the university manages its enrolment growth.[10] To that end, the university intentionally regulated the growth in student enrollment and kept it in tandem with available resources. According to the university's enrollment figures, when I started fieldwork in 2014, WCU had over 30,000 students: two thirds undergraduates, a third postgraduate (graduate), about 55% female, and 51% black/African students. As of 2017, there had been a noticeable increase in the proportion of black (African) students to 56%. This trend is consistent with the redress and racial justice demands that I discuss in further detail in subsequent chapters.

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[10] WCU Enrollment Report, 2007 – 2013.

A Note on Racial Categories

The racial categories formally instituted and enforced during apartheid, i.e. *African, Colored, Asian* and *White*, are still widely used in present day South Africa. While the first three (*African, Colored* and *Asian*) are all considered *black*, *African* denotes the country's native black inhabitants; *Colored* corresponds with what would be regarded as bi-racial in the U.S.; and as the name implies, *Asian* encompassed people of Asian descent. The Chinese, however, were often categorized as white, a category that included people of European descent, made up the Dutch and the British.

Approximately 10% of the student body at WCU has been made up of non-national students. Among this group, postgraduates outnumbered undergraduates; and, while non-national students made up more than 10% of the postgraduate total, they made up only 5% of the undergraduate total. As already mentioned, upwards of 70% of the non-national students were fellow black Africans from South Africa's immediate neighboring countries in the SADC region (e.g. Zimbabwe, Swaziland, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia).

Staff

Although blacks made up the majority among students, black faculty members constituted only about 20%, while whites made up close to 70% of the total. This circumstance whereby the university had a high proportion of black students and a high proportion of white faculty members meant that increasing black representation in the academy and professoriate became one of the single biggest transformation concerns for student activists. The subject is covered in detail in chapter 6 on #FeesMustFall.

WCU's faculties (e.g. Science, Engineering, and Humanities) comprised over 30 schools offering approximately 3,600 courses. About half of the students were enrolled in Science,

Engineering and Technology fields, including Health Science. The other half was split almost

equally between Business and Management, and Humanities and Education.

As is common across the world, public universities have seen drastic cuts in funding for

higher education over the years, forcing most to resort to tuition and fee hikes. At WCU, fees and

government subsidies comprised 54%, with 26% provided through State appropriations from

subsidies and grants, and 28% from tuition and other fees. The remainder was generated from

research contracts and other third-stream activities. The 2015 – 2016 #FeesMustFall student

protests in South Africa (see chapter 6) spoke to the financial exclusion that inevitably results

when universities pass on the cost of higher education to families, but without providing

adequate safety nets to take care of poor students' financial needs. Along with an alienating

institutional culture for the majority black students, concerns around financial exclusion are at

the center of the policy discourses and debates that this study addresses.

Data Collection and Analysis

This institutional ethnography was embedded in a vertical ethnographic framework (see

Methodology section) through document analysis, interviews, observations, and electronic

correspondence and informal conversations with participants. Data consisted of approximately

100 hours of audio-recorded interviews with diverse institutional actors including 26 top and

mid-level administrators. These included current and former top-level administrators and a broad

range of mid-level administrators.[11] Other interview participants included 15 faculty and staff

members, 28 non-national students from at least 8 African countries, and 19 black and white

South African students. I also observed a variety of university settings (e.g. student organization

offices, hallways, cafeterias, dorms, etc.) and participated in on-campus and off-campus events

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[11] I have refrained from mentioning specific offices by name in order to protect the identity of research participants.

and meetings; reviewed a wide spectrum of institutional documents (e.g. strategic frameworks, surveys, reports, and enrollment statistics), news articles, and over 500 pages of field notes and memos.

The data enabled me to gain a deep understanding of institutional logics and processes, and to capture the voices of actors who are differentially positioned within the institution to unravel both the story the university tells about itself and diverse actors' perceptions, opportunities, experiences, and responses. To verify insights gained from the main research site, five expert interviews with administrators from other South African universities and the Department of Higher Education and Training were conducted. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.

Upon returning from the field, I had a lot of data and information that I struggled to make sense of. I tried, through systematic in-depth data analysis and thematic memoing, to take my own experience of doing the research as well as all of what I had seen and heard to make sense of the larger social, political, economic and other forces acting upon participants' local activities. This task was especially hard for me because I felt strongly that I should not merely describe and analyze my own experiences conducting the research, but more importantly, the experiences and views of people with whom I engaged in the field, some of whom I continued to engage with long after I had left the field.

Having considered my own strengths and weaknesses and having thought through how I wanted to analyze the data, I adopted a concept mapping approach to data analysis. The approach involves sifting through research texts and documenting emerging interpretation in a series of visual, relational concepts (Butler-Kisber 2010). I spent a good part of my first year after fieldwork working on data visualization with the Design Lab team at their station in one of the

campus libraries. The Design Lab is a digital media design consultancy service intended to assist with the conceptual, aesthetic, and overall design of media projects for class assignments, student organizations, independent projects, and personal professional development. Through one-on-one consultations, I worked with the Design Lab staff to turn my ideas into visual representations and to create visual representations of what I thought was happening at WCU.

The visual mapping technique allows for a conceptual understanding and a holistic overview of patterns in the data and helps with the formulation of emerging analytic ideas as they are being conceptualized (Butler-Kisber 2010). Visualizing analytic themes emerging from the data revealed ideas about the research in a much better and much faster way than writing about the ideas. Thus, over the next year after returning from the field, I brought visual models of the analytic themes to my advisors with whom I talked about what each visual was trying to show overall, and what portions and aspects of the data it did not account for.

Between the Design Lab sessions and discussing the emerging themes with my advisors, I progressed through the data analysis process with more clarity and with more depth. The concept mapping approach revealed connections and new meanings that made it possible to develop diagrams of the institutional policy landscape and map thereto the policy and political optics that organize the competing higher education policy discourses and shape student opportunities and experiences at WCU. The institutional policy landscape is the subject of chapter 4.

Summary of Key Findings

Findings from the study show that national racial justice and global competition imperatives were extensively institutionalized within WCU, yet they conflicted with each other in how they were conceptualized by most research participants and institutionalized in the

university. The global competition imperative to internationalize the university privileged depoliticized policy practices based on market-oriented best practices that excluded and alienated historically marginalized black South Africans. Conversely, the national racial justice imperative to transform and decolonize the university was premised on narrowly nationalistic and racialized conceptions of racial justice that de-prioritized regional solidarity/cooperation and de-legitimized the multiracial thrust of social cohesion imperatives.

Despite being narrow vis-à-vis WCU's multinational and multiracial composition of student and staff populations and the global aspirations of the university's academic mission, the national racial justice struggle itself was by no means narrow. #FeesMustFall student protesters' calls for the radical transformation of race relations included demands to end outsourcing labor. Outsourcing denotes the operational cost cutting practice whereby public universities engaged private-sector companies to provide services considered as "non-core" within the university (e.g. cleaning). Student protesters charged these private companies for exploiting the mainly poor black South African workers, and accused the University for failing to put in place protections to prevent the exploitation. The linkages between demands for access for historically excluded black students, and the attention paid to black South African workers' plight clarify the explicit intersection of race and class in the context of the country's racialized history and class relations.

The division and tension between transformation/decolonization and internationalization imperatives reflected very different logics of race and class relations vis-à-vis global capitalism and white supremacy. Allen (2001) describes white supremacy as "the global system that confers unearned power and privilege on those who become identified as white while conferring dis-privilege and disempowerment on those who become identified as people of color" (p. 476). Allen posits that the interpolation of globalization into the cannon of commonsense popularizes

hegemonic Western public discourses on global interconnectedness as both profoundly novel and purely positive. On the other hand, counter-narratives such as Marxist and critical race theory perspectives regard capitalism as the most encompassing global superstructure and white supremacy as the most totalizing of contexts, respectively. As the handmaiden of capitalism, white supremacy serves to fuel, justify, and strengthen it at every turn, and constantly works against efforts to build principled coalitions to confront global capitalism (Pinkard, 2013). While anti-white supremacy sentiments animated the student-led transformation/decolonization project, Pinkard would fault the student activists' narrow forms of identity politics for assuming that groups of people organized around identity can achieve liberation from oppression in silos.

To hold together the conflicting global competition and national racial justice imperatives, WCU admitted significant numbers of black students from the immediate SADC region. These regional students made the university more internationalized (global competition imperative), made the campus appear more racially integrated (national racial justice imperative), and addressed regional calls for geopolitical redress and development cooperation. Yet, the regional students are not the typical self-funding international students who provide a much-needed source of income to host universities; they are, in fact, heavily subsidized by South African public funds. Nor are they black South African students benefitting from the government's post-apartheid equity focus. Because of these contradictions and the tensions that they created on campus, the possibility for regionalizing and Pan-Africanizing black South Africans' racial justice struggle was overtaken by resentment of regional competition over access to higher education and other opportunities.

Dissertation Outline

Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 situates the research site within the deeply racialized history of the founding of WCU in the early 20th century and its development through the apartheid era. Being one among English-medium universities that, prior to the 1959 *Extension of University Education Act*, operated as "open" universities, the chapter focuses on the institution's history dealing with the process by which it became "open" and the scope and significance of the openness to the post-apartheid policy imperatives.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the debates relating to the post-colonial and globalizing contexts of higher education in South Africa in the 21st century. It argues that existing scholarship that addresses this complicated and often contentious recent history of South African universities takes a limiting global-local, quality-equity approach that fails to account for other dimensions (mainly regional permutations) of policy imperatives of post-apartheid South African higher education.

Chapter 4 provides a four-quadrant mapping and analytical description of the policy landscape at WCU. The mapping sheds light on the contours and configuration of the contests to negotiate what it means to serve conflicting demands and mandates and shows how institutional actors and policy pressures are situated in relation to, and interact with competing internal and external policy pressures and with each other. The chapter is organized around three features/attributes defining the shape and complexion of the policy tensions: two contrasting pairs of discursive frames that define the parameters of the policy discourses and debates at WCU; the four most prominent policy discourses and the corresponding organizing logics; and racial and national identity markers associated with each of the four quadrants.

Chapter 5 addresses how WCU administrators respond to the competing post-apartheid higher education policy imperatives and focuses on which discourses get institutionalized in the

university (and which do not). The chapter shows that, whereas internationalization and transformation policies are explicitly institutionalized through the allocation of institutional resources and structures (e.g., physical offices as well as staff assigned thereto), neither the social cohesion nor the regional solidarity logics has any such institutional support. I argue that the institutionalization of internationalization and transformation, and the limited policy attention given to the regionalization and social cohesion imperatives indicate how WCU both reflects and ferments the tensions related to the nature and role of public universities in the post-apartheid era.

Chapter 6 focuses on the possibilities and limitations of the 2015-2016 #FeesMustFall (#FMF) student protests. At the time of the research, the protests were the most far-reaching manifestation of student political mobilization and activism in post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter addresses how this student mobilization mirrored and shaped the contestations around the competing policy imperatives and discourses among institutional actors situated in different quadrants of the institutional policy landscape. The chapter shows that student political factions mobilized students to rally around their own particular interpretation and priorities in ways that fomented political polarization. For instance, the narrowly nationalistic sensibilities and rhetoric of blackness that animated the factions aligned to the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) characterized the other factions as anti-black. The mobilization strategy premised on equity, nationality, and blackness thus alienated non-national and non-black student constituencies, prompting them to mobilize around quality, inclusiveness and social cohesion.

Chapter 7 addresses how non-national students experienced and understood the difficulties they faced as both students and non-nationals in South Africa, and how they

maneuvered within the constraints of WCU and national student movements. The chapter discusses the opportunities, experiences, and responses of non-national students within the context of widespread and persistent anti-immigrant hostility in South Africa, and shows how they mobilized and engaged with institutional discourses, practices, and systems. I argue that non-national students came to make consumer and citizenship claims premised on their membership as registered students of the university and long-standing claims for regional redress for hardships created in their home countries by the apartheid regime; and hinged on the prospects of future South African citizenship.

In the closing chapter, I reflect on the notion of borders, boundaries, and belonging. I consider the policy and practice implications thereof for regional hubs such as South Africa and broadly for public universities and higher education systems grappling with conflicting interests regarding to whom they belong and who they should serve, and what claims different student constituencies can make on the university. The closing chapter also charts out possible future research directions pertaining to the state of knowledge generation and the possibilities (or lack thereof) for cross-national solidarities in the envisioned futures of higher education in Africa.

Chapter 2

Historical Background: Public Higher Education in South Africa

Introduction

This chapter pivots back to the pre-1994 era to trace how the persistent salience of race (Seekings, 2008) in current South African higher education policy discourses and debates is rooted in the deeply racialized history of the founding of public universities and their development through the apartheid era. The first section provides a broad historical overview of higher education in South Africa in the context of the country's political developments, particularly the apartheid policies. The next section focuses on the historical account of World Class University (WCU) during the apartheid government's segregationist policies. The section focuses on how WCU, as one among English-medium universities, operated as "open" university in the face of legislation introduced to entrench racial segregation (e.g. the 1959 *Extension of University Education Act*). Particular attention will be paid to the process by which the institution became "open" and the meaning and scope of the openness. The last section provides a broad overview of the agitation and struggle to dismantle the apartheid university and the subsequent transition to democracy and post-apartheid restructuring of the country's higher education system.

This historical overview provides the context for exploring how ideas about the public university's place and role in the apartheid and post-apartheid South African society were/are conceptualized, contested, actualized, experienced, and responded to by student constituencies. Notably invisible in the historical overview are the non-South African students from the SADC region, who are the main subjects of the dissertation as a whole. These regional students are absent mainly because in 1954, the apartheid government effected a ban blocking non-European

students from territories beyond the borders of the country from enrolling at any South African educational institution (Hidden reference, 1997).[12] The decision to prohibit foreign African students from attending institutions of higher education in South Africa was based on the claim that there were insufficient educational facilities available for the country's own black population, even as the apartheid regime relied on these neighboring countries to supply the much-needed labor for the mining industry.

Aside from extracting labor, the Apartheid State also became involved in virtual wars on its northern borders with the intention of flushing out the leadership of the banned African National Congress operating from bases in neighboring countries. I discuss the regional destabilization strategy adopted by the Apartheid State, and its implications for the claims that citizens from the destabilized countries can make to South African higher education in chapters 4 and 8. While this chapter dwells on the apartheid regime's creation of supremacist spaces nationally, it suggests that the absence of SADC students in the historical account of apartheid-era higher education correlates with their invisibility in institutional discourses and structures for both transformation and internationalization in the post-apartheid era.

Higher Education in South Africa: An Historical Overview

South Africa, the country context/site for my dissertation research, does not quite fit the narrative and some of the debates prominent in the literature on African higher education. Consistent with the historical trajectory of most African countries, the literature mainly focuses on four phases in the evolution higher education on the continent (e.g. Brock-Utne, 2003; Heyneman, 2003; Jowi et al., 2013; Lindow, 2011; Mazrui, 1975; Psacharopoulos, 1981, 1987,

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[12] In this chapter, I have either withheld or altered citation details of institutional documents, books and articles, the university's webpage, or any other sources that explicitly mention the research site by name, or would explicitly reveal it. The full citations are, however, available by request and upon approval by the University of Wisconsin-Madison IRB.

1988; Teferra, 2009; Teferra & Altbach, 2003, 2004; Waghid, 2011; Sawyerr, 2004). The phases include the emergence of universities as colonial creations, their developmentalist roles following independence, their decline during the World Bank-led neoliberal policies rolled out in the 1980s, and the repositioning of higher education as a key engine for socioeconomic growth in the era of globalization and the knowledge economy.

South Africa is different in its political, economic, institutional and social relationship to higher education, and has been since the origins of the country's higher education dating back to 1829 (Mabokela, 1997). Having been colonized by the Dutch in 1652, conquered by Britain in 1803, and unified in 1910 after a devastating war, South Africa was ruled by a quasi-Western state which came to an end in 1994 when a predominantly white government gave way to majority black rule. While the roots of higher education have been traced back to 1829, university education dates back to the establishment of the University of the Cape of Good Hope (present day University of Cape Town) in 1873 and the founding of the University of Stellenbosch in 1874 (Mabokela, 1997; Council for Higher Education, 2010).

As Mabokela (1997) points out, these early institutions were modeled after British institutions, and were established primarily to prepare white males for further educational training abroad. The students were white, and the academic staff came primarily from Britain and other European countries. Provisions for the establishment of higher education opportunities for non-white South Africans only came about four decades later with the passage of the *University Act* of 1916. The 1916 legislation recognized three universities: Cape Town, Stellenbosch, and the University of South Africa (UNISA), a non-residential/correspondence university to which six institutions (e.g. Rhodes University, the Orange Free State, Pretoria, and the Witwatersrand) were affiliated (Moodie, 1994).

Even before the ascendance of the minority white National Party to power in 1948 and the institutionalization of apartheid, the country's residential universities were already divided along distinct racial and ethnic lines (Davies, 1996; Moodie, 1994). White universities included English- and Afrikaans-medium institutions, while the University of Fort Hare was reserved for blacks. Given its non-residential status, UNISA was the only university that could be, and was, genuinely bilingual and multiracial (Moodie, 1994). Each of the racially-organized universities had a different admission policy (e.g. the English-medium universities admitted a small proportion of non-white students) and would have a distinct relationship with the Apartheid State between 1948 and 1990. Additionally, the three categories remain significant to this day, albeit with new labels which recognize the post-apartheid removal of formal racial barriers to admission: top-rated formerly white and the historically black universities.

Higher Education during the Apartheid Era: 1948 – 1990

Apartheid was a comprehensive, state driven, top-down system premised on making and remaking of society through policy formulated by government and implemented by the different government departments and state apparatuses at the national level (Muller, 2006). Based on social, political and economic discrimination and inequalities of class, race and gender, the apartheid ideology established and enforced separation of races in all educational institutions thus establishing patterns of systemic inclusion and marginalization and propagating segregated and inferior schooling particularly for blacks (Badat, 2009; Maile, 2011; Oxlund, 2010). More doctrinaire, extensive and repressive than the racist regime existing before it, apartheid sought to defend white domination and economic prosperity against what the Nationalist Party saw as the threat by an increasingly assertive urban African working class (Davies, 1996).

One of the key schemes of the apartheid dispensation was to fragment racial solidarity. To that end, starting in the 1950s, the Nationalist Party worked to separate blacks from whites by removing the later from urban areas into tribal reserves, also known as Bantustans or ethnic homelands (Butler, et al., 1978; Evans, 2014; Unterhalter, 1987). In all, ten homelands were created: the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Venda, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, and QwaQwa. Each Bantustan was designated for a specific ethnic group, for instance the kwaZulu Bantustan was designated for the Zulu, and Bophuthatswana for the Tswana people. The arrangement made it legal for blacks to become citizens of their respective Bantustans and purportedly gave the blacks the responsibility to run their own independent states and governments. This scheme justified the withdrawal of civil rights from blacks in what the Apartheid State conceived as "White South Africa." According to Legassick & Wolpe (1976), the political and ideological forms of segregation embodied in the idea of the homelands actually served the purpose of providing the apartheid regime with a reserve army of labor for the capital accumulation.

Consistent with the vision of a separated society, the South African higher education system before the 1994 democratic transition was segregated into institutions reserved for white South Africans and institutions tasked with providing limited tertiary education to those who were not classified as white (Council for Higher Education, 2010). Intended to ensure that blacks would have no place in the European/white community, apartheid education limited opportunities for blacks to semi-skilled labor force thereby forging inferiority among blacks and superiority among whites, which in turn promoted black intellectual under-development (Maile, 2011).

Between 1948 and the 1994 democratic elections, the National Party government played a decisive role in the development of higher education (Mabokela, 1997). The experience of South Africa's universities under the National Party government was heavily colored by oppressive measures used to enforce the plethora of legislation introduced by the apartheid regime in an effort to entrench racial segregation at all levels of society (Moodie, 1994). Two of the key legislation were passed within five years of the National Party taking power. The *Bantu Education Act* of 1953 created separate systems of primary and secondary education for Africans, Coloreds, Indians/ Asians, and Whites.[13] The *Extension of University Education Act 45* of 1959 prohibited the admission of blacks to historically white universities and established separate universities for blacks along racial/ethnic lines.

Extension of University Education Act 45 of 1959

In March of 1957, the Nationalist Party government introduced the *Separate University Education Bill* in parliament. The objective of the bill was to close off "open" universities to non-white persons and to transfer to the government the University College of Fort Hare and the Medical School for non-Europeans of the University of Natal (Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975). Despite heated opposition from the United Party,[14] the Native Representatives, and the "open" universities themselves, the bill passed and was translated into law as the *Extension of University Education Act 45* of 1959.

As spelled out by Moodie (1994), Murray (1990), and Shear (1994), the legislation had two crucial purposes. Firstly, it sought to prohibit the existing Afrikaans-medium and English-medium white or predominantly white universities from admitting black students except in

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[13] Although this legislation is obviously significant and related to the *Extension of University Education Act 45*, it lies outside the scope of this dissertation project, which deals specifically with the university sector.

[14] The other main white political party. It lost the 1948 election to the National Party and never held power again.

special circumstances where a course of study was not available elsewhere, and only with specific permission of the minister in each individual case. Secondly, it sought to establish, manage and control new university colleges for blacks: one for Indians, one for the Colored population, and three for different language-groups among the Africans, designated as *Natives* or *Bantu persons*.[15] The legislation did not only restrict the admission of blacks at white universities, it also prohibited the attendance of a white person as a student at any of the colleges created by the Act. Contravention of one of these sections was punishable by a fine of 200 Rands or by imprisonment for six months (Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975).

The *Extension of University Education* act required that Africans attend different tribal institutions in the Bantustans, and Coloreds and Indians their own exclusive campuses (Davies, 1996). The law thus set forth provisions for ethnically based institutions of higher learning all located in African (rural) homelands (Mabokela, 1997; Shear, 1996; Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975). The institutions were allocated as follows: the University College of the North at Turfloop for the Northern Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana and Venda; the University College Ngoya for the Zulu; and the South African Native College (renamed the University of Fort Hare with the 1959 legislation) for the Xhosa. The University College of the Bellville served the Colored, Malay and Griqua groups; and University College, Durban the Asian.[16] Aside from the universities, the apartheid government also developed racially segregated technikons (polytechnics). By 1981 there were seven historically white technikons, one each for Colored and Indian students, and five for African students in or adjacent to the rural homelands (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001).

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[15] The Colored and Asians were referred to as *non-white persons* other than *Bantu persons*.

[16] Plus other two special purpose historically black universities: Medunsa, providing medical training for black students; and Vista, a university with multiple urban sub-campuses for city-based Africans (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001).

Collectively these new institutions were referred to pejoratively as the Bantu, Black, Bush, or Tribal colleges (Moodie, 1994). Rather than use the pejorative terminology, I adopt what Moodie refers to as a more accurate and neutral label for these universities: the "fifty-niners," a reference to their origins out of the 1959 *Extension of University Education* act.

When the "fifty-niners" emerged, the rhetoric in Parliament had been about building universities to reflect and develop the distinctive cultures of the non-European races. However, whites predominantly staffed the universities throughout the first decade of their existence. Apart from teaching staff, both council and senate in each of the colleges were reserved for white members of staff, most of whom were Afrikaners. Through this staffing arrangement, the government intended to exercise enough tight control over the universities to prevent the possibility of conflict between universities and the State. In addition to inequitable resourcing at the historically-white and historically-black universities and technikons, the range of programs offered reflected assumptions about the kind of careers for which students of different races were being prepared (Council on Higher Education, 2010), which I elaborate on below.

Affiliated with the correspondence-based UNISA, which governed their curricula and academic matters, the "fifty-niners" did not achieve full university status until 1969 (Mabokela, 1997). Davies (1996) argues that, from the beginning, "Bantustan universities were appendages of the central state which appointed their governing bodies, dictated their academic standards and prescribed the curriculum and ensured that government-supporting Afrikaners dominated administrative and academic positions" p. 322. The inferior facilities and absence of academic freedom at these universities were disregarded until increasing militancy of black students rendered them virtually ungovernable and led to their forced closure for prolonged periods (Shear, 1996).

Even after the "fifty-niners" assumed university status in 1969, and gained formal autonomy and equality by the mid-1980s, they were not so much institutional protagonists as battlegrounds upon which the State and the university authorities were ranged against their students and some staff. The students at these universities frequently protested against their teaching and political subordination such that the universities became the birthplace of the Black Consciousness movement, which declared psychological war on apartheid thus underlining the failure of these so-called Bush colleges to inculcate docility within the black university system (Davies, 1996). Moodie (1994) sees the vibrant student activism as a tribute to the inherent fertility of any campus in which intelligent young people are brought together.

By the end of the 1980s, some of the "fifty-niners" had black Rectors, and were engaged in fierce arguments with both the State and other universities over funding levels, for instance (Moodie, 1994). The #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016 (see chapter 6), however, demonstrate the fate of the historically-black universities in post-apartheid South Africa. In spite of the history of robust student mobilization in these universities, the persistent agitation over resourcing, access, and academic standards has essentially been going on outside the public eye. Only after black students at previously white universities protested against the financial exclusion and alienating institutional cultures did the issue find its way into public policy debates.

In the face of national and international criticism, the Nationalist Party government claimed success for its apartheid policy by citing the increasing numbers of students gaining access to higher education. The State argued that black universities had provided opportunities to Africans, Asians, and Colored students and staff, which may have been lacking at the "open" universities before 1959. For instance, fees at the black universities were sufficiently low to

enable significantly more black students to obtain a higher education than had previously been the case (Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975).

Enrollment reports indicate that from about 22,000 students in nine residential universities in 1957, the number of students rose to 74,567 in 15 residential universities by 1974 (Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975). However, the majority of these students (64,813) were whites studying at the 10 white-only and predominantly white institutions. Only 3,632 were Africans studying at three universities for Africans (Fort Hare, the University of the North, and the University of Zululand). 2,192 were Asians at the University of Durban-Westville and 1,600 were Colored at the University of Western Cape. As Moodie (1994) points out, in spite of the expansion of black enrollments into higher education, the number of students per 1000 of the population was still fewer than three for Africans and over 30 for whites.

Another phase in the development of racially segregated university education in South Africa involved the establishment of universities in the so-called independent homelands of Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1979, and Venda in 1983 (Mabokela, 1997). These universities were created to train personnel for administrative positions in the homelands. Additionally, the Medical University of South Africa was founded in 1976 to provide training for blacks interested in the medical professions, and Vista University was established in 1983 to offer curricula to black in-service teachers.

Key differences between the governance and funding structures at the white and black universities are crucial for understanding the relationship of each to the Apartheid State. (Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975) and Shear (1996) indicate that the white universities operated under the general aegis of the Minister of National Education and enjoyed significant levels of autonomy. 75 percent of their revenue came from a State subsidy. In contrast, the black universities did not

enjoy comparable autonomy neither of the university itself nor of the freedom of faculty and student in terms of the content of what was taught, who taught, and the subjects of research. Not only were all their revenues derived from the State, but the African, Colored and Indian universities were placed under the close administrative control of the government, – but separate Ministers of Bantu Education, Colored Relations, and Indian Affairs. No less significant, none of these universities had a Convocation. Traditionally in South Africa, the Convocation has representation on the Council, and is an expression of the continuity of university life and the corporate identity of graduates.

Given that apartheid sought to contain the heightened aspirations of the most educated blacks and arrest the development of an African urban middle class, why did the Apartheid State feel compelled to provide blacks with university education in the first place? Could it be that the permission granted English-medium universities to admit black students demonstrated government respect for university independence? Davies (1996) challenges the notion that apartheid functioned according to the dictates of a single uncontested grand design, and argues instead that it was shaped by conflicting ideological inputs from within State departments. While the extreme right opposed any expansion of higher education to blacks at State expense, the pragmatists, led by Prime Minister Verwoerd, recognized that the functioning and credibility of the Bantustans depended on a loyal university-trained black bureaucracy. The disagreement between the two poles centered on the dilemma of how to reverse African urbanization without undermining the economic benefits of African labor.

South Africa's universities in the post-apartheid era have had to contend with what Moodie (1994) calls the mixed legacy of Nationalist rule. The universities are part of the largest and most comprehensive system of post-secondary education in Africa, yet it is a system

burdened by its past segregationist goals. Whereas the system remains immensely hospitable to not-very-clever well-off white students, it still struggles to cope with the bright but ill-prepared products of *Bantu* secondary education. Wide disparities of facilities, tradition, and quality – closely tied in with differences of race, culture, language and class – remain. Mabokela (1997) attributes gross inequalities across racial/ ethnic, gender, and class lines – elements that are still prevalent in the current system –, to the apartheid-era racial fragmentation of the higher education system.

At the time of Nelson Mandela's election as president, the apartheid-era racial fragmentation was most evident among Afrikaans-medium institutions (Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Rand Afrikaans University, Orange Free State, Stellenbosch, and Port Elizabeth), which all supported the government and apartheid education and did not admit black students at all (Shear, 1996). In contrast, having rejected the absolute segregationist legacy of the Afrikaans-medium institutions, WCU is among English-medium residential universities commonly described as "open" during the period leading up to the legally enforced racial segregation of the apartheid era. These universities admitted non-white students and purported to treat them on a footing of equality with white students. It was this notion of a purely academic admission criteria that differentiated "open" universities from the country's other residential universities that either entirely excluded non-whites or taught them in separate classes. The following section will show that the "open" idea existed mainly in theory since the admission of black students was severely restricted in these universities all the way from the enactment of the *Extension of University Education Act* 45 of 1959 (Shear, 1996).

"Open" University

To the best of my knowledge, there is very limited literature devoted to recounting the history of WCU. A few institutional insiders, including a history professor and a former top administrator, have produced the most comprehensive of the available literature. The history professor's two-volume set covers close to 100 years of the university's existence, and the former top administrator was commissioned by the university in the 2000s to put on record how the institution had handled the apartheid era.[17] Other valuable sources include a booklet produced by a WCU committee in collaboration with another English-medium university, and a memoir of a former staff member who had first arrived at the university as a student in the 1940s.

For the most part, I draw from the first two sources whose work was explicitly intended to document the institutional history, and constitute the most comprehensive and most cited history of the institution.[18] The volume by the history professor (hereafter, the Institutional Historian),[19] covers the protracted struggle to establish the university and its eventual emergency after World War 1. It then provides an extensive overview of the university's early years and the period from the 1940s to the 1959 enactment of the *Extension of University Education Act*. Last, it covers the significance of World War 2 for the opening of the Medical School to a small number of black students; the adoption of a compromising policy of academic non-segregation

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[17] In light of Institutional Review Board (IRB) confidentiality requirements, details associated with the institutional history and people involved in writing about it have been changed to keep the name of the research site anonymous and protect the identity of research participants. I have, therefore, elected to alter dates and identifiable personal information.

[18] Due to time contains, I was not able to do my own archival research on the history of the university. Aside from that, the focus of my research was not historical. Therefore, for this historical chapter, I was content to rely on the available literature.

[19] This is in recognition of the fact that the individual is credited for having produced the official history of the institution.

but social segregation; and the place the university came to occupy as a major center for liberal thought and criticism in apartheid South Africa.

Coincidentally, the former top administrator (hereafter Apartheid-era Historian)'s work on the institutional struggles against the measures taken by the apartheid government to control the operation of universities picks up from the 1950s through the 1990 transition to democracy. Having arrived at the university as first-year student in the 1960s, and having stayed into the 2000s, the Apartheid-era Historian was a member of the university for almost the entire apartheid period. This included his tenure as a senior administrator during the state of emergency of the 1980s that was induced by student agitation to bring down the apartheid regime. I will have more to say about the history and role of student agitation in the anti-apartheid struggle during and in the post-apartheid era later in the chapter and in chapter 6, respectively.

Institutional History from Insiders' Perspective: A Critique

WCU prides itself for having granted the Institutional Historian such unrestricted access to institutional records that he could access any publications and files in the university's archives. Aside from access to institutional records, the Institutional Historian also explored government archives and examined the papers of other institutions and individuals; and interviewed those who were participants in the period under consideration. His account of the university's position on racial discrimination, opposition to infringements of fundamental human rights, and contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle is, however, mainly based on official university records, reports and speeches.

Critical analysts of the historical record have hardly questioned the Institutional Historian's account of how the university navigated challenges posed by racial segregation. However, while institutional insiders and official institutional records have their place in

constructing the history of an institution, the objectivity of authors, whether professed or not, should not be taken as a given. In view of the centrality of student experiences in my study, I cannot agree more with the contention that reliance on official university records severely narrowed the angle from which the university's history has been constructed (Hidden citation, 2000). Not only do the core business of any modern university – the teaching and research functions –, receive only secondary attention, the Institutional Historian's coverage of students leaves a lot to be desired. Other than student politics, other aspects of campus life are either covered in passing or relegated to appendix-type chapters neither written by the author himself nor linked in any meaningful way to the rest of the book. Similarly, student voices barely feature in the former Apartheid-era Historian's account, and the author's personal voice winds up unnecessarily constrained as well.

The Meaning and Scope of Openness

A liberal university at odds with the apartheid state, the WCU never officially adopted a policy of excluding students on the grounds of race or color. However, without exception, the Institutional Historian makes it clear that from its inception, the university adopted admission policies that reflected the prejudices of the society to which it belonged. Inescapably part and parcel of a segregationist society, the university remained hesitant to accept substantial numbers of black students and its policies never really came around to granting unrestricted access nor full equality to black students. The Apartheid-era Historian also points out that racial social integration on campus did not happen until the late 1970s. As a result, the few black students who got admitted to the university before then were excluded from formal student social functions, sports facilities and main residences. Confronted with pressure from its white constituency (faculty, students, and alumni), survival as a liberal institution in apartheid South

Africa often demanded compromises that administrators at "open' universities viewed as necessary in the circumstances but which may be seen by others as weakness – and, at worst, as collusion with racial segregation and discrimination (Vorster & Bozzoli, 1975).

To the extent that WCU ever became "open" it was over the period between the outbreak of World War II and the passage of the *Extension of University Education Act* in 1959. The Institutional Historian recounts how the circumstances of the war made it virtually impossible for prospective black doctors to proceed overseas for their medical training, thus accelerating the process by which the university's Medical School was opened up to blacks. The focus on the admission of blacks into the Medical School recognizes that a significantly high proportion of black university students at the country's "open" universities were studying Medicine.

As of 1945, 80 of the 127 non-European students at WCU were in Medicine. This was because Medicine, teaching and the religion were the only professions open to Africans, and among them, medicine was the most paying. Although the only legal barriers preventing black access to the professions prior to World War 2 pertained to the mining industry, black students had been kept out of the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and other such professions on the grounds that there were inadequate facilities for their clinical training. Having already broken into the legal profession, the situation was slightly better for Indians and Coloreds. However, they too were denied articles and so remained excluded from Accountancy and Architecture.

The Opening of the Medical School to Black Students

Although the University Council had, by 1934, accepted the admission of black students to lecture courses in the Medical School, only a very limited number of blacks had enrolled by the start of the war in 1939. The university's policy prior to the war had made the provision of a medical training for black students conditional on the State financing separate facilities. Because

of this policy, blacks continued to be excluded from clinical training in both Medicine and Dentistry. Dating back to a 1928 Public Hospitals Ordinance, any hospital board could exclude any registered medical practitioner from accessing its hospitals. In refusing blacks admission to clinical training, the Board of the Faculty of Medicine had claimed that clinical facilities were not available.

As a result of the onset of war in Europe, black South Africans would have to receive their full medical training in South Africa, or they would not be trained at all. For instance, in 1940 the university had nine non-white students in Medical School (two in the third year, two in the second year, and five in the first year) who would no longer be able to complete their training if clinical training was not made available locally. In what represented a major reversal of the previous admission policy, the university agreed to open up the Medical School and admit blacks to full clinical training in the non-European Hospital even though fully separate facilities were not yet available.

Although the outbreak of the war provided the main lever for opening up clinical training for black students, there was yet another factor. The country's sustained economic growth during the years leading up to the war had made the government and business aware of the urgent need to train black doctors to combat the pervasive ill-health of the country's black labor force. The black labor force provided the cheap labor that made it possible to run the gold mines and other industries driving the economic growth. The opening of the Medical School to black students was, therefore, far from being an intentional institutional strategy, rather a result of external factors which essentially forced the university to make provisions for the admission of limited, but significant, numbers of non-white students.

As the very thin spread of black students on campus and the attendant restrictions show, the university was never fully open, though. As of 1940 the university had enrolled a mere nine black medical students, all of whom were Indian. By the end of the war in 1945, 150 black students (out of a total student population of 3,000) were attending the university, including 82 medical students (46 Indian, 33 African, and 3 Colored – also, 5 Chinese). The numbers had risen to 297 black students and 4,813 whites by 1959 when the *Extension of University Education Act* was enacted.

Not only did the proportion of black students never exceed six percent, the university's official policy of academic non-segregation and social segregation relegated the black students to a very low profile. On the one hand, the academic non-segregation policy provided some room for black students to be treated with racial impartiality with respect to academic matters, and offered them the maximum practicable access to open-to-all academic facilities such as classrooms, library, refectory, toilets and most cultural societies. On the other hand, formal social contact with white students was such severely curtailed that blacks were excluded from the main residences (desegregation of residences was only effected in the early 1980s), the sports fields, and formal social activities organized by whites such as dances.

Whereas the Faculty of Medicine had, in 1937, agreed to admit a few blacks to its pre-clinical courses, the Faculty of Dentistry had adopted what became a series of resolutions that precluded them from training black dentists. The Faculty of Dentistry cited the absence of separate facilities (e.g. common rooms and toilets) and resentments perceived to arise among white students were they compelled to train alongside black students at the dental hospital as responsible for their unwillingness to admit blacks to a clinical training. Other excuses presented include the unavailability of staff members who would be required to cater to the additional

students and that demand from blacks for access to a dental training was still too negligible to warrant attention. The resistance against the training of blacks was so consistent that when a new Dental and Oral Hospital that was opened in 1952, neither the Faculty of Dentistry nor the University Council made plans to include facilities for black students. The decision to exclude blacks from Dental training was, however, not without criticism. The Convocation, the SRC, and sometimes Senate made the Faculty of Dentistry a major target of liberal criticism.

The Institutional Historian sees the policy that the university developed towards black students (that they were there for academic purposes only and were not thereafter to participate in the general social and sporting life on campus) as reflecting the thinking of the white liberals presiding over WCU over the course of the "open" years. Although the white liberals advocated that every effort should be made to promote black advancement, they believed in the maintenance of white supremacy. As exemplified in one of the leading administrators since the late 1920s through the 1930s, a progressive concern to promote the creation of a substantial black professional class in South Africa was tempered by a distaste of seeing blacks competing equally with whites in a free market.

In a typical paternalist attitude to blacks, the administrator was convinced that the academic non-segregation and social segregation policy adopted by the university offered the best middle-course means through which the university could ensure that the white race maintained the ascendancy while the non-Europeans were provided limited opportunities that kept them in check. Ultimately, the middle-of-the-road approach spelled the limits of white South African liberalism under apartheid. The limitations include preference for words over deeds; abhorrence of anything remotely communist, violent or illegal; ultimate acceptance of apartheid laws, however bad; lack of social contact with black South Africans; and reliance on

cheap black labor both at work and in the home (Hidden citation, 2000). It is no surprise then that white supremacy (whiteness) has been one of the key targets of the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall student activists' ire.

Apartheid Era

With the Nationalist Party returning to power in the 1948 general elections, the issue of black students at WCU and the other English-medium universities became hotly politicized. Whereas prior to 1948, the Council, Senate, and respective Faculty Boards determined the university admission policy and the treatment of black students, the victory of the Nationalist Party ushered in sustained State interference. In fact, the Nationalist Party had campaigned on the platform of including universities in their projected apartheid policy. To that end, the incoming Prime Minister Malan announced, in August of 1948, the creation of racially segregated university institutions. Before the year was out, the new government also announced the termination, at the end of 1949, of state scholarships for African medical students.

Given the sustained pressure the Nationalist government exerted on the then "open" universities, the Institutional Historian argues that this self-proclaimed liberal institution never evolved into a fully "open" university. After 1953, the Medical School instituted a quota system restricting the number of blacks. While the Dentistry remained resolutely closed to black students, the blacks were also denied entry to courses in physiotherapy and occupational therapy. Given that white models were often used in the life drawing studios, the Bachelors in Fine Arts was as well closed to blacks. The same applied to the BA in Logopedics for which no facilities existed for blacks. Although all eight Engineering branches were supposedly open to blacks, arrangements for vacation practical work were not possible in some branches for reasons beyond

the university's control. This was most notable in Mining Engineering where, by law, no black could qualify for a blasting certificate.

Black students were not the only ones negatively affected by these new developments. The status of lecturer also became closed to blacks such that the black members of the academic staff engaged by the university were all in African Languages, and were described pejoratively as Language Assistants. Aside from academics, the introduction of segregated seating in buildings used for exams, meetings, and performances in 1953, had portended a tightening up on social segregation on campus.

Despite WCU and other English-medium universities' strong activism and opposition to apartheid, the National Party government proceeded with enacting and entrenching apartheid segregation in ways that curtailed the numbers of African, Colored and Indian students who were allowed to study at white-designated universities. Considering that most black students were in the Medical School, the introduction of a quota system negatively impacted the overall black enrolments. The university's total black enrolments declined from a high of 245 in 1952 to 195 by 1955. It was only a major increase in Indian admissions that pushed the total up to 297 by 1959.

The Institutional Historian points out that, following the passage of the *Extension of University Education Act* in 1959, the number of African students fell precipitously from 74 in 1959 to 26 in 1973 (Figure 1). In the intervening years, the numbers had even gone down to 24 in 1962 and 14 in 1964. By comparison, Asiatic students, who had always formed the larger proportion of the non-European student population on campus saw their numbers decline only marginally from 194 in 1959 to 177 in 1964. As pointed out by Vorster & Bozzoli (1975), after 1959, students other than whites were admitted to this and other English-medium universities

only with the consent of the responsible minister. In practice, this meant that permission would generally be granted only where no alternative facilities existed at the racially segregated apartheid institutions.

Figure 1: Students Numbers by Race, 1959 and 1973

	African	Asian	Colored	White
1959	74	193	30	4,813
1973	26	385	21	9,803

1959 ■1973

Response to Nationalist Government Challenge

With the Prime Minister's warning at the end of 1952 that the dual policy of academic non-segregation and social segregation had become untenable in the era of institutionalized racial segregation, the university's Council decided to review its overall policy on black admissions. As it turned out, some of the key members of Council had in fact become increasingly uncomfortable with what they saw as an influx of black students into the university. This discomfort had particularly been triggered by a 30 percent increase in the 1952 first year enrolment of non-white students, from 70 to 101. On the other hand, left-leaning white students believed that these initial government forays would inevitably lead to a total ban on black students at the university. Black students themselves were incensed more by the general sense of

marginalization and discrimination than by the specific practices of social segregation, which gradually and steadily fell into disuse during the 1980s without having been formally withdrawn. In the Medical School, for instance, black students were excluded from post-mortems on white cadavers, and clinical teachers preferred to do their ward rounds in the white hospitals, where black students were not allowed entry, rather than the black hospitals.

In this polarized environment, WCU's Council believed that they might ward off State intervention by tightening up on their policy of social segregation on campus, keeping black enrolments within limits, and maintaining the university's political neutrality. The white student left disagreed with the notion that universities could be divorced from the politics of the wider society. Based on the principle that universities were integral parts of the wider society, the student left campaigned to extend the rights of black students on campus and to involve the student body in the wider political struggle against the Nationalist Party government.

Despite their angst against segregationist practices on campus, the broader black student body did not initially subscribe wholesale to the idea of waging a war against such practices. They reasoned that doing so could only prove counter-productive. In a way, black students' cautious response to the Nationalists' segregationist agenda mirrored the Council's strategy that was opposed to "rocking the boat," but was at odds with the white student left who regarded the Council approach as a futile policy of appeasement, and at worst, downright collaboration with the State.

Contrary to the appeasement and collaboration criticism leveled against the university administration by the white student left, Vorster & Bozzoli (1975) point to a university that declared unequivocal opposition to the National Party government's 1957 *Separate University Education Bill*. The bill intended to apply racial separation in university education by closing the

"open" universities to non-white persons. The university expressed its objection to the government by organizing the country's first academic procession of protests which consisted of 2,000 professors, lecturers, students and members of the Convocation, and marched to the city where WCU is located. As already pointed out, WCU also teamed up with another English-medium open university and published a booklet that publicly denounced racial segregation in universities and advocated for four essential freedoms of a university. These freedoms included the right of the university to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. Upon the passing of the Extension *of University Education Act* in 1959, WCU also made a solemn affirmation to uphold the principle that a university is a place for the pursuit and advancement of knowledge without regard to gender, race or color. The affirmation also included a commitment to maintain, defend and restore the autonomy of the university.

Additionally, WCU passed resolutions in late 1956 asserting institutional rights to continue the policy of academic non-segregation; published a full defense in 1957 of non-segregation, university autonomy, and academic freedom; organized massive public protests such as street marches involving administrators, students and staff; and erected memorial plaques reminiscing their loss of autonomy (Moodie, 1994). As Moodie argues, however, the "open" universities' opposition to the government was as restricted in its scope. The public statements, for instance, focused almost entirely on the threats to academic freedom (conceived around the idea of university autonomy) posed by the new legislation. In reality, university autonomy from State interference did not necessarily constitute a commitment to dismantle racial segregation within the university. Both the Institutional Historian and the Apartheid-era Historian have pointed out that in the 1930s and 1940s the WCU Council was actually ahead of the state in its

desire to implement university segregation. By the time the *Extension of University Education Act* was passed in 1959, many of the restrictions curbing the admission of black students were in fact imposed by the university itself.

Agitation against the Apartheid University

By the 1980s, the swelling tide of opposition had made it obvious that apartheid was not sustainable in the long term. Mindful of the rapid political and demographic changes that would inform future policy for the university, WCU's Vice Chancellor in the late 1970s had set in motion plans to consider southern Africa and the other constituencies excluded during the height of apartheid in the drawing up a long-term academic plan. Published in 1980, the plan recognized that the university had predominantly served the white middle-class community of the university's immediate vicinity, and that efforts should be made to effectively open the university to all who were qualified and wished to receive an education in the English language, including non-nationals from other African countries.

The 1980s are especially significant for the massive rise in black militancy that was met with a brutal response from the Apartheid State (Shear, 1996); and for how the State that had become a formidable authoritarian machine struggled to contain the popular challenge to white domination in general and to apartheid university education in particular (Davies, 1996). Students at the English-medium "open" universities had gradually adopted protest marches to register their opposition to educational injustices perpetrated by the apartheid regime. When the government enacted laws providing for the detention of individuals for extended periods without trial, protest marches were replaced by picket demonstrations. But, these too were frequently prohibited in terms of the *Riotous Assemblies Act*. A 1974 amendment to the *Riotous Assemblies Act* went on to expand the State's powers to prohibit meetings on both public and private

property. The State responded to institutional efforts to keep the spirit of protest alive (through the inauguration of academic freedom addresses, for instance) by initiating measures designed to coerce the "open" universities into political conformity. The 1983 *Quota Bill*, for instance, provided for subsidy cuts if these institutions did not fall in line with the State's segregationist educational policies. A similar threat in 1986 and 1987 sought to enforce tight controls on the political activities of staff and students on their campuses.

Could one read WCU's history of the apartheid period as close to co-operation as to confrontation, rather than only as one of conflict between State and "open" universities as popularized in the literature on "open" English-medium universities? The "open" universities "collectively subscribed to Western liberal academic traditions and therefore to the belief that the pursuit of intellectual excellence and the defense of academic freedom require strong institutional boundaries to keep out the State" (Davies, 1996, p. 323). Along with other draconian legislation, the *Extension of University Education Act* served to enforce apartheid conventions and stifle the kind of dissent associated with liberalistic institutions.

Despite mutual ideological sniping in public, relations between the State and the "open" universities were only occasionally hostile (Davies, 1996). Davies points out that the State depended on the utilitarian functions of university education such that any direct attack on the institutions would have provoked a crisis of legitimacy for the State within the English-language community. Owing to generous donations to university coffers, English- speaking corporate capitalism exerted corporate influence on university governing boards. Aside from that, the existence of mutual professional respect and membership of a small white elite bonded together senior State officials and university administrators. Lastly, the universities themselves were more

concerned with their own institutional rights than about the emancipation of black South

Africans or the expansion of access to black non-nationals.

In view of these platforms for cooperation between the English-medium universities and

the Apartheid State, Davies (1996) posits that it was the political activities of the National Union

of South African Students (NUSAS), rather than academic staff, which was more likely to incite

the State. Similarly, it would be the 2015-2016 student protests, rather than university

administrators' haggling with the State, that forced administrators and the post-apartheid State to

attend to black students' widespread complaints against the academic and financial exclusion, as

well as inhospitable institutional cultures.

One could conceptualize the Apartheid State's interactions with the racially fragmented

university system in terms of the notion of boundaries, which implies flux and volatility (Davies,

1996). At one level, the demands of the state for accountability conflicted with those of the

universities for autonomy. On another level, the authoritarian regime was constrained by a lack

of legitimacy. Just like all modem states, the apartheid regime relied heavily on universities, both

to produce highly skilled labor and sustain stratification. Additionally, state-university relations

were also mediated by big business pressure, student aspirations and the society/community.

This contest between the State and universities was uneven (Davies, 1996) because the

Parliament defined the financial and other relationships between the State and universities

(Moodie, 1994). This established a long tradition of legislative intervention and of legal

dependence upon the State. Although Moodie argues that State involvement was informed and

guided a genuine, if qualified, respect both for higher education and for university autonomy, he

is explicit about the reach and extent of the intervention. The relevant Minister appointed

between six to eight members to every university Council; universities were legally required to

submit annual budgets to government for approval; all new university statutes were to be submitted both to the Minister and to Parliament. Additionally, members of academic staff could appeal against dismissal to the minister, and universities were legally obliged to seek State approval before establishing new courses, departments, or faculties.

One university reform that would purportedly ease apartheid restrictions on the admission of black students to white universities came in the form of the 1983 *Universities Amendment Bill*. The legislation, which replaced the system under which students had to apply for individual permission from the Minister, included a clause permitting the government to impose a racial quota system to be administered by the universities themselves (Davies, 1996; Moodie, 1994). Vice Chancellors of the four English-medium universities criticized the new arrangement as the State's way of forcing the universities to do the government's dirty work of selecting the fortunate individuals from amongst black applicants (Moodie, 1994). Although the legal possibility for implementation remained, the legislation was never implemented, and so no quotas ever got fixed.

Crises involving militant and mass actions of the mid-1970s expressed the depth of alienation within black schooling and provided the backdrop for further university reform (Davies, 1996). The presence of black students on predominantly white campuses fundamentally changed the face of university student politics. Forging links with other activists at the black universities and the township schools, the black students at predominantly-white universities established a working relationship with a newly radicalized National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). The student militants' resolve to mobilize a mass political movement combined with the growth of militant industrial action among urban blacks and the revolt against Bantu education by thousands of Soweto school children in 1976. The state's brutal suppression

of the Soweto uprising outraged international opinion and unnerved South Africa's foreign

investors.

Although the State virtually remained in intermittent conflict with some universities,

students, and academics until 1990, the extent, nature, and origins of the conflict varied

immensely between the three main university groups (Moodie, 1994). Moodie makes a

distinction between protest actions undertaken by individuals within the university (such as

students against the university and/or the State) and those undertaken by the university.

Opposition, let alone conflict, was particularly weak among the Afrikaans-medium universities.

Closely tied to the National Party leadership, the Afrikaans-medium institutions featured

immense social and peer-group pressures to ensure public conformity and private discretion in

the interests of Afrikaner solidarity. Moodie further points out that most of the senior academic

and administrative staff seem to have been members of the *Broederbond,* the secret all-male

society of the Protestant Afrikaner elite, which acted as a major transmission-belt for ideas and

policies between the political and other leaders in Nationalist South Africa. Although, not all at

the Afrikaans-medium universities subscribed to the ideologies and politics of their powerful

alumni in government, critics played no part in public disputes between universities and the State

either about academic freedom and university autonomy or about the wider issues of apartheid

policy.

Among other things, the new Constitution of 1983 contributed to making the 1980s a

particularly turbulent period nationally (Moodie, 1994). The Constitution engendered active

hostility on the part of the Africans because it gave some political rights in the Republic to

Indians and Coloreds but none to Africans. In the wake of successive states of emergency and

with more people banned or detained than at any time since the early 1960s, the banished and

exiled opposition organizations were increasingly turning to the armed struggle. Within the National Party itself, the notion of reform revolved around neutralizing the opponents of the State through a combination of enhanced security and socioeconomic reform. Dubbed the *Total Strategy* by the security forces who pushed for it, the reform agenda involved reconstructing apartheid rather than eliminating white domination and State control.

The most far-reaching proposals for change came from the corporate sector and had the backing of the chief executives of South Africa's largest companies. Business leaders argued that the only way to sustain profitability and forestall revolution was to substantially deracialize the economy and partially depoliticize society. Both of these aspects of reform implied a diminishing role for the Apartheid State and a shift away from statist ideology. These businesspersons demanded that immediate consideration be given to the formation of a black middle class, which they imagined could be co-opted and help alleviate the problem of high-level skill shortages.

Given the absence of material assets among black South Africans, university selection and qualifications assumed added importance in class formation. Thus, changes to the racial order and to the class structure ultimately required the involvement of the universities. Universities played a key role because they operate at the cutting edge of social differentiation through their role in the reproduction of the mental-manual division of labor upon which differences in both racial and class identities are constructed. Given the antipathy of the most aspiring blacks to the *Bush Colleges* and the hostility of the Afrikaans university sector to the idea of black access, the envisioned project of growing black middle class would only happen at the English-medium universities.

There has been attempts to take stock of the impacts of apartheid in the development of the country's higher education sector. Moodie (1994) posits that political pressures potentially

led to the migration of actual and potential scholars to other countries and the drying-up of overseas sources of new staff. Even though both the international cultural and academic boycott and South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth complicated the mechanics of recruitment, without institutional records of the numbers who resigned to go abroad, it is virtually impossible to quantify those losses. Based on personal experience and anecdotal evidence, Moodie argues that a significant proportion of the emigres were English-speaking and either liberal or left-wing in outlook, who found the apartheid regime politically or morally repugnant.

Transition to Democracy and Post-1994 Restructuring

The structural inequalities within the South African higher education sector today are hardly surprising when one considers that the transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa was a negotiated settlement. As Davies (1996) points out, the settlement involved major compromises on both sides. The National Party accepted that, to be credible, any new government would have to be predominantly black, and so relinquished political power. On their end, "the African National Congress (ANC) accepted power sharing until the end of the century, guaranteed white public service jobs, reaffirmed private property rights and eschewed radical economic transformation" p. 329. Davies (1996) further discusses the implications of the negotiated settlement for university policy. After 1990, the National Party dropped race as an organizing principle and replaced it with a color-blind, market-driven model of higher education, which promoted the virtues of privatization, elitism and stratification. The adoption of a market approach in the sector redrew the boundaries between the State and the university system in favor of accountability to the corporate sector and to the International Monetary Fund.

Higher education policy post-1994 has largely been determined by the National Commission on Higher Education (Council on Higher Education, 2010). Reporting its findings

in 1996, the National Commission on Higher Education proposed a unitary higher education system based on increased participation, greater responsiveness and increased cooperation and partnerships (National Commission on Higher Education, 1996). With the publication of the National Plan on Higher Education in 2001, the government started a process of restructuring of the higher education system through mergers and incorporations. According to Bundy (2006) as cited in Council on Higher Education (2010) the mergers have kept many institutions inwardly focused on trying to address the challenges of integrating human resource processes, organizational cultures and operating over geographically dispersed campuses. The restructuring has consequently seen 36 higher education institutions in place in 1994 (comprising of 21 universities and 15 technikons) reduced to 23. Apart from reducing the number, the restructuring has also created two new institutional types: comprehensive universities and universities of technology, which I discussed in the previous chapter.

Key among the factors driving the restructuring agenda were student enrollment dynamics. As Cooper (2015) points out, historically black universities within the former Bantustans, and all at least 200 km from the nearest major city, had initially maintained student body that was over 95 percent African. They saw an increase in students during the 1988–1993 period, and then experienced a drastic decline in student numbers during the 1996–1998 period. Cooper attributes the post-1996 decline in student enrolment to bureaucratic dislocation or inefficiencies within most rural historically black universities, the withdrawal of the homeland student bursary system, and the increasing exclusion of students who could not pay their fees on time. Among other things, these developments prompted the Minister of Education began to push strongly after 2000 for mergers of some of these rural historically black universities with other universities or technikons.

The mergers notwithstanding, there still remains significant differences in the resourcing, skill levels and outputs of historically white universities and those that served other racial groups, and between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking institutions which aligned with different political and ideological positions (Council on Higher Education, 2010). The persisting disparities are not really surprising when one considers that the restructuring exercise essentially left untouched more than half of the 13 historically white universities consisting of four large, elite white universities: UCT, Stellenbosch, Pretoria and Witwatersrand; two smaller white universities: Free State and Rhodes; and one historically colored university: University of the Western Cape (Cooper, 2015). While the University of Fort Hare was considered untouchable because of its long line of graduates who became influential politicians, UCT has retained a high international reputation and ability attract top overseas academics by maintaining low student ratios and demanding entrance requirement (Chetty & Merrett, 2014). Cooper argues that structures of inequality across the 23 higher education institutions were already built into the architectural framework of this new system itself via what was, and was not, merged.

The 1994 *Policy Framework for Education and Training* provides insights into the ruling ANC's thinking, priorities and visions regarding universities. Premised on a technocratic orientation, the framework embraces the neo-liberal logic favored by the corporate sector and the World Bank, a position that privileges the conception of university reform as a vehicle for improving the international competitiveness of the state. The pursuit of international competitiveness distances the ANC from long-held positions on the transformation of the university system, involving resource redistribution, equitable access and institutional democratization.

The competition and transformation poles constitute the classic dilemma between economic development and social equity that has persisted for more than two decades after the end of apartheid in South Africa. I recognize that the ruling ANC government would posit that economic development and social equity are not mutually exclusive; rather, broad-based economic empowerment removes social inequality. However, economic development is not necessarily equitable, especially in South Africa. As Moodie (1994) points out, the legacies of apartheid left the university sector ill-prepared to adapt to a system of mass post-secondary education for all, to redefine the pursuit of excellence, and to shed or at least radically modify their Eurocentrism without jeopardizing their membership in world-wide discipline-based communities of scholar. The debates relating to the post-apartheid and globalizing contexts of higher education in South Africa is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Global-Local Paradox of South African Universities

Introduction

This chapter addresses the impacts of and policy responses to globalization in local

contexts, and provides an overview of the debates relating to the globalizing and post-colonial

tensions of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. It discusses the globalizing context

within which South African public universities entered the transformational, post-1994 epoch

characterized by the need to be responsive and relevant to African identity, culture and realities.

These transformation demands coincided with, and so cannot be divorced from, the influence of

modernizing, neo-liberal global trend towards managerialism, neo-conservatism in higher

education, and the corporatization and commercialization of the knowledge production process

(Chetty & Merrett, 2014; Kistner, 2008).

Consequently, the country's public universities have had to simultaneously support the

further expansion and transformation of higher education systems and participate in a global

economy, particularly the treatment of higher education as a tradable service under the World

Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade and Services (Enders & Fulton, 2002). These

pressures are particularly acute at the country's top-rated, historically white, research-intensive

public universities, such as World Class University (WCU), which openly aspire for world-class

status, greater economic productivity and high skills development (within a Western framework

and neo-liberal macro-economic system) while simultaneously pursuing equity and redress goals.

The bulk of existing literature on South African higher education in the aftermaths of

international isolation and racial segregation during apartheid generally adopt a global-local

conceptual framework (e.g. Chan, 2007; Cross, Mhlanga & Ojo, 2011; Fielding & Vidovich,

2017; Patel, 2017; Tabulawa, 2007; Wilson, 2006). As will be explored in detail in chapter 5, the aspiration to become a top 100 university drives WCU's internationalization policy, yet political demands coming from student body and wider national political and higher education environment is that the institution needs to be transformed in a way that is much more supportive and hospitable to black South Africans. For instance, responding to why and how universities face both pressures, Prof. Aristle (a black South African professor), offered an explanation for the contradiction between the aspiration to be global and the local demand for justice. He argued that the business of competition is to produce winners and losers, rather to redress historical injustices.

The global-local framework is, therefore, often presented as a factor of the twin challenges confronting post-apartheid South African universities: how to become more quality-oriented and globally-competitive while also aiming to be more equity-oriented and nationally/locally responsive (Badat, 2017; Habib, 2016b; Louw, 2009; Moulder, 1991; Portnoi & Kretz, 2010). According to Jansen (2002), the dilemma about how to both globalize and Africanize is rooted in "the logic of resolving the racist apartheid legacy in higher education and the logic of incorporating the higher education system within the context of a competitive, globalized economy" (p. 160).

I first review the literature on globalization and internationalization with a focus on the dominance of managerialism and neo-conservatism and the corporatization and commercialization of the knowledge production process. Then I turn to the discourses and debates around Africanizing and transforming the South African higher education system. The third section reviews the quality-equity binary literature. In the last section, I draw on Nitsch's (2010) beyond-binaries framework for understanding the country's post-apartheid higher

education policy debates. A deconstruction of the binaries, the framework helps show that the global-local and/or quality-equity binaries overlook South African universities' roles and situation in the regional context and so offer a limiting approach that fails to account for the regional permutations of higher education policy imperatives of post-apartheid South Africa.

Globalization and Internationalization

An examination of the concept of globalization not only helps illuminate the under-researched epistemological foundations of the field of global studies, but also has the potential of contributing to an investigation of the social underpinnings of how we take for granted our social place in an increasingly interconnected world (James & Steger, 2014). Globalization has been characterized as the idea of social processes that describe the rapid movement of ideas, goods, and people around the globe, radically transforming relations among people and communities across national borders (Cohen & Kennedy, 2007). Maringe & Foskett (2010) presents it as a multidimensional concept whereby the social, cultural, technological, political and ideological aspects of life become increasingly homogeneous with economic interdependence and growth driven by the principles of the free market. While people may continue to live in particular localities, globalization has given rise to new forms of transnational interconnectivity and so these localities are increasingly integrated into larger systems of global network (Rizvi, 2011).

According to Altbach & Knight (2007), globalization denotes the economic, political, and societal forces pushing 21st century higher education toward greater international involvement. The elements of globalization that have direct relevance for higher education include global capital heavily investing in knowledge industries worldwide reflecting the emergence of the knowledge society, the rise of the service sector, and the dependence of many societies on knowledge products and highly educated personnel for economic growth (Altbach & Knight,

2007). The knowledge economy has been described as an interconnected, globalized economy where knowledge resources such as technology and expertise are as critical as other economic resources (Shrivastava and Shrivastava, 2014).

The intensification of globalization produces dramatic changes in higher education including economic transformations involving transnational corporations, regional alliances, and intergovernmental policies that regulate global competition; innovations in technology and communications; and movements of artifacts, ideas, and bodies (Matus & Talburt, 2009). As pointed out by Altbach & Knight (2007), the most notable results of globalization in higher education include the integration of research, the use of English as the lingua franca for scientific communication, the growing international labor market for scholars and scientists, the growth of communications firms and of multinational and technology publishing, and the use of information technology. Information technology is particularly key as it permits efficient storage, selection, and dissemination of knowledge; and allows providers to offer academic programs through e-learning.

These changes are seen as creating a seeming imperative for universities to respond to globalization by internationalizing their student and faculty bodies, research and teaching functions, and administrative processes (Matus & Talburt, 2009). Thus, as globalization has intensified over the last few decades, higher education has turned to internationalization as both a response and a proactive way of meeting the demands of greater globalization, both in the immediate and as preparation for envisaged futures (Maringe & Foskett, 2010). Internationalization, therefore, has come to include the academic programs, policies and practices undertaken by academic systems and institutions in response to, and to cope with, the global academic environment and to reap its benefits (Altbach & Knight, 2007). Looked at this

way, globalization and internationalization are mutually reinforcing ideas, especially in the field

of higher education (Maringe & Foskett, 2010). While globalization largely provides the external

impetus for accelerated institutional internationalization, the intensification of university

internationalization activity reinforces accelerated globalization. This helps explain why some

scholars see higher education internationalization discourses as obscuring the role that the local

plays in producing the global. Matus & Talburt (2009), for instance, argues that universities do

not simply respond to dominant logics of globalization, but are active participants in the

(re)production of the instrumental logic of economic globalization.

In spite of the dominant narrative that rationalizes internationalization, celebrates its

virtues, expounds on the shape and form it takes, and offers tool-kits of best practices for

countries and higher education systems and institutions, there is a growing recognition of the

dark side of internationalization. For example, the dominance of neoliberalism has re-defined

higher education in market terms such that there has been a growing influence of labor markets

on internationalization, and the inequalities inherent in both globalization processes and

internationalization capabilities among nations disproportionately benefits the wealthier regions

of the world than the poorer.

Scholars have identified the worldwide ascendance and dominance of neoliberalism as

responsible for the redefinition of higher education in market terms (Bok, 2003; Gupta, 2015;

Olssen & Peters, 2005; Packham, 2003; Payne, 2008; Shrivastava & Shrivastava, 2014). A

political and economic ideology driving economic globalization, and the financialization of

national and international economies, neoliberalism supports market liberalization, privatization,

deregulation, as produced and necessitated by the withdrawal of the State from the funding of its

public universities (Shrivastava & Shrivastava, 2014). Notwithstanding the declining State

funding of higher education, universities increasingly feel pressured to enter the global space and

embrace neoliberal logics that require them to compete in a free market in order to constitute

themselves as ideal institutions that can act in the knowledge economy (Matus & Talburt, 2009).

As reinforced through the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), the World

Trade Organization (WTO) has come to categorize higher education as a tradeable service in the

same way as transportation, communication, and health (Gupta, 2015). The trade emphasis in

GATS' characterization of higher education can be seen in the industrialization, marketization

and commercialization of the sector (see knight & Tapper, 2002; Power & Frandji, 2010). The

characterization features the 10 Cs: cultivation of private and foreign universities, customer fees,

client-oriented programs, corporate rationality, cooperation with business, casualization of labor,

contracting out, cutbacks, conditional funding, and coordination that combines dynamics of

collaboration and competition in the system (Gupta, 2015). Gupta postulates that in the context

of a world-wide education market, internationalization of higher education is nothing but

international trade in education services. In that sense, internationalization provides commercial

opportunities for developed countries, who in the first place, took the initiative to treat education

as a tradable service under the WTO regulations. In the case of transnational education, for

example, Gupta argues that the arrangement whereby learners are located in a country different

from the one where the awarding institution is based offers more benefits for the exporter and

poses myriad challenges for the host country.

The growing influence of labor markets on internationalization have had implications for

national priorities, goals and resources for higher education as universities have to respond to

globalization of the economy; the information, communication and technology revolution;

competitiveness driven by the knowledge economy; and the increasing importance of global

competencies among graduates (Knight, 1997). Sehoole (2004) posits that, as a phenomenon of globalization, trade in education has the potential to undermine the sovereignty of nation states in developing countries in their struggle to overcome the effects of colonization and structural adjustment programs.

Stromquist (2007) offers a list of outcomes that one can expect when the market logic dominates. Universities feel compelled to join the market and its strategies and greater salience is given to those fields that can be directly linked to growth in revenue while the rest of courses and programs risk disappearing. In addition, university rankings receive top priority, students are configured as customers, the sense of common purpose that traditionally united different disciplines decreases, and academic programs are structured to promote students' economic potential rather than their intellectual growth. These adverse effects are even more acute in African countries where the higher education sector is critically crippled by colonial legacies and the underfunding of the Structural Adjustment era.

Post-apartheid South African universities demonstrate how universities in Africa and much of the developing world get caught up in (re)producing the instrumental logic of economic globalization. As pointed out by Chetty & Merrett (2014), the economic and competition logic finds expression in South African government policy in the form of the Growth, Expansion and Redistribution (GEAR), macroeconomic policy framework. A neoliberal framework premised on tough efficiency-driven regulatory measures and tight fiscal policies, this 1996 package of mainly macro-economic measures included faster fiscal deficit reduction, budget reform, consistent monetary policy, stable and co-ordinated policies, and a strong emphasis on efficiency and restraint on government spending (Muller, Maassem & Cloete, 2006).

Under the direction of the GEAR macro-economic framework, the national discourse in South Africa shifted towards a knowledge system driven by the competitiveness of South Africa's industrial products (Shrivastava & Shrivastava, 2014). Not open to consultation or negotiation, it constituted a move away from democratic consensus and precedence of equity and redress to State-centred decision-making and preoccupation with efficiency and effectiveness. Once GEAR became the country's premier instrument of finance policy, the Department of Higher Education and Training's participation approach to governance and policy in higher education – the antithesis of GEAR's market-led approach – stood no chance of being implemented (Muller, Maassem & Cloete, 2006). Cooper (2015) finds the increasing dominance of GEAR constraining the translation into higher education policy of a vision rooted in the discourses of social justice and the notion of local responsiveness.

Critics have pointed out that, in spite of claims to the contrary, neoliberalism as a form of globalization has not worked as an engine for universal prosperity (Gupta, 2015; Sharma, 2002). Instead of producing a "trickle-down effect" to benefit everyone, global capitalism has brought about a "vacuum- up effect" and led to the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few (Gupta, 2015). Sharma (2002) argues that, just as with colonization and modernization, the logic of global capitalism is a project of the global north to capture the markets of the global south by manipulating the latter to believe that it is a new development strategy, which would accelerate their development.

According to Gupta (2015), the so-called free market economics, laissez-fairism, freedom of commerce or free trade have actually widened the gap between the rich and the poor nations, the rich and the poor people, and has produced acute educational inequalities. The international education equation has, on the one hand, higher education institutions located in the

industrialized world endowed with research-oriented faculty, being centers of knowledge

production and pinnacles of the academic system. On the other hand, universities in the

developing world are peripheral institutions incapacitated by lack of facilities, infrastructure and

fiscal constraints, psychologically dependent upon the academic superpowers and distributers of

knowledge. Given its imperialist and capitalist character, globalization both integrates and

marginalizes developing countries in ways that do not translate into benefits for the developing

countries (Nzimande, 2001).

The dominance of the economic logic in higher education is compounded by the

dominance of western models in shaping understanding and practice in higher education

internationalization (Maringe & Foskett, 2010). The bulk of scholarship on globalization and

internationalization in higher education is generated by western scholars and is based on research

and evidence in western realities and experiences (Altbach & Knight, 2007; Brooks & Waters,

2011; de Wit, 2002; Green, 2005; Knight, 1997, 2004, 2008; Streitwieser, 2014). This

scholarship tends to project overwhelmingly positive/optimistic assumptions about

internationalization. For instance, internationalization is portrayed as facilitating cross-national

collaboration and partnerships, which engender cross-pollination of ideas and global

competencies required in the knowledge economy of the 21st century.

It should be noted that, for the U.S. and Australia and other major destinations of mobile

students and scholars, internationalization is a major source of revenue. Australia is an

illustrative case. According to 2015 figures, education was the country's third largest export and

the largest service sector export.[20] With the necessity of internationalization hardly questioned,

much of the mainstream literature is preoccupied with how to do internationalization, what

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[20] http://www.afr.com/news/policy/education/education-revenue-soars-to-become-australias-20-billion-export-20160203-gmke3k

Hudzik (2015) refers to as integrating internationalization into core institutional ethos, values, and missions. Increasingly, these western conceptual frames have been adopted to the study of non-western regions and countries: Africa (Sehoole & Knight, 2013; Teferra & Knight, 2008), Asia (Mok, 2014; Palmer, 2011; Yang, 2002), and Latin America (de Wit, 2005).

Despite being peripheral in the international sense, universities in the developing world are quite central in their local contexts (Gupta, 2015) and thus they often feel compelled to engage with how internationalization can be re-oriented for greater local control, local focus and local benefit. To that end, the following section addresses the challenges associated with re-orienting dominant internationalization models originating from Europe and the U.S. in global south contexts.

Re-orienting Internationalization

Within mainstream higher education internationalization scholarship, the focus tends to be on the ills within the practice and implementation domains such as the proliferation of degree mills. However, emerging scholarship (Jooste & Heleta, 2017; Jowi, 2012; Maringe, Fostett & Woodfield, 2013; Singh, 2010), mainly from the global south, critically engages with the very logic of internationalization. These scholars argue that the conceptions, discourses/debates, research/publications, theories/analytical models, frames of reference, approaches, strategies, policies, processes and practices of higher education internationalization as adopted around the world, subscribe more to the needs and realities of universities in the global north than they do to those of universities in the global south.

Altbach & Knight (2007) also allude to the inequalities inherent in both globalization processes and internationalization capabilities among nations. Globalization tends to concentrate wealth, knowledge, and power in those already possessing these elements such that northern

institutions and corporations own most knowledge, knowledge products, and IT infrastructure. Similarly, international academic mobility favors well-developed education systems and institutions, thereby compounding existing inequalities: traditionally, students have moved largely from south to north.

These inequalities are often compounded by the free trade context within which internationalization currently operates. According to Altbach & Knight (2007), the current thinking sees international higher education as a commodity to be freely traded and sees higher education as a private good, not a public responsibility. As will be explored in further detail in subsequent chapters, ideas about the role of the university have implications for who it belongs to and who it should serve. Increasingly, the preoccupations of universities across the world (e.g. the brain race, world university rankings and aspirations towards world-class status) and the underlying rationales and ideologies of internationalization are all mainly driven by the competition and economic logics. Wildavsky (2010), for instance, indicates that the original goal of mobility programs, helping developing country students to complete a degree in another country and then return home to contribute to national development, is fading fast as nations compete in the 21st century brain race.

The notion of internationalization having been developed in, and being dominated by Euro-American actors, systems and institutions, the imaginaries that dictate the contours of higher education internationalization come to function as a single, common and neutral global template. Lacking inclusivity, representation and genuine collaboration, ideas about internationalization end up ignoring, marginalizing, sidelining, and excluding global south voices and experiences. To some in Africa, internationalization becomes synonymous with and an

escalation of the notion of westernization, and so a form of recolonization of the African psyche (Jowi, 2012).

Jooste & Heleta (2017), Jowi (2012) and Singh (2010) highlight how the past and current power asymmetries in north-south partnerships are rooted in part in the fact that formal university education in Africa is a colonial creation, and so takes after European university traditions. Given this history, these scholars argue that internationalization could lead to more manipulation of African universities by foreign partners and widen rather than diminish north-south disparities. Although the existing north-south disparities warrant that the rationales and practice of internationalization be context-specific, below I outline why the pressures exerted by the dominant competition logic inherent in internationalization limit how much African universities can innovate independently around internationalization

Jooste & Heleta (2017) and Jowi (2012) describe how Africa confronts myriad persistent challenges as a region for potential and future internationalization. In terms of infrastructure, trade connectivity, capacity and language, Africa is a fragmented continent too dependent on external resources. Due to its turbulent history and economic and political contexts, the continent is in such a position of weakness that it faces persistent risks of brain drain and commercialization – Africa sends abroad far more students than it receives and many of those who leave do not return. No less significant is the rapid expansion of the higher education sector, weak governance structures, quality concerns, poor regulatory mechanisms and insufficient protectionist policies to stem the tide of global forces. Additionally, the ubiquitous global university rankings have shifted the focus and priorities toward unrealistic goals. Lastly, Africa does not have an edge in commercializing programs and does not have any campuses beyond its borders.

Writing from a practitioner's point of view, Adam Habib (2012), Vice Chancellor at one of South Africa's public universities, acknowledges that bilateral and multilateral partnerships that romanticize internationalization and use it as a positive variable in their calculations may be driven by well-intentioned academics and university leaders. However, multiple voices from the developing world suggest that there are too many self-centered relationships initiated under the guise of internationalization. Habib gives the example of study abroad partnerships: largely a one-way traffic of students, the programs essentially provide means for some universities in the global south to supplement their inadequate resources, but run the risk of skewing expenditure away from immediate institutional needs.

One of the most visible aspects of higher education internationalization, international student mobility, is an illustrative case of how the concept of internationalization has clear connections with international power and dominance. African countries are primarily sending countries for mobile students and staff, and receiving countries in relation to cross-border provision (Jooste & Heleta, 2017; Jowi, 2012; Singh, 2010). The 2015 Open Door report on international student exchange shows that while the U.S. is the top destination for international students, the top three countries of origin (China, India and South Korea) and the countries that registered the largest growth in sending students (Brazil, India, Kuwait, and Nigeria) are all in the global south or emerging economies. Even when global north students study abroad in the global south, they tend to do so on a short-term basis as non-degree seeking students. By contrast, global south students attend western universities as degree-seeking students, and a significant number stay beyond their studies for employment.

In view of these realities, Jooste & Heleta (2017) call for a critical social research approach, which both challenges existing frameworks, paradigms, and power structures and

questions how institutions and policies are formulated and implemented in practice. Some of the desired outcomes include inclusive and truly representative international engagement; real collaboration between equals; context-specific approaches informed by sound research; and the reconfiguration of global south actors from beneficiaries to real partners. Jowi (2012) proposes strengthening university collaborations within the continent to consolidate their areas of strength from which to engage with the rest of the world; utilizing African scholars in the diaspora; creating competitive frontiers for internationalization; and boosting government support for regional and continental policy frameworks. Jowi also sees the need for the global north to minimize imbalances and disparities in the knowledge society and facilitate the establishment of interlinked global research commons to enhance research capacity and collaboration.

Local Responsiveness and Relevance

As spelled out in the *White Paper for Post-School Education and Training: Building an Expanded, Effective and Integrated Post-School System*, the South African government is cognizant that if the local context and the peculiarities and needs thereof are not considered, internationalization has the potential to impact negatively on country's higher education sector. Internationalization should, therefore, offer the "opportunity to take local and/or indigenous knowledge to the international community" and should be the means "for finding solutions to global challenges such as sustainable development, security, renewable energy and HIV/AIDS" (p. 40). The discourses emphasizing the local context are rooted in a widespread understanding that the South African public university's primary responsibility is toward the advancement of the South African people and the country (Botha, 2010). This conception of the South African public university's mandate is based on the institution being geographically situated in South Africa (and by extension, in Africa), as populated mainly by South African students and staff,

and as established and maintained by the South African government through the taxpayers' money. However, the central argument of my study is that South Africa's historical relationship with the immediate southern African region means that the country cannot and should not be talked about in just national terms.

Calls from student and scholar activists for South African universities to be more responsive and relevant to African identity, culture and realities and to foreground and transmit African paradigms and knowledge are often discussed in policy debates as Africanization, Transformation, and most recently Decolonization (Badat, 2009; Chemhuru, 2016; Chimakonam, 2016; Elliott-Cooper, 2017; Govinder, Zondo & Makgoba, 2013; Horsthemke, 2009; Okeke, 2011; Ramose, 2016). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016)[21] refers to the policy discourses as the grammars of change lying at the heart of marginalized and excluded black students' anti-apartheid and post-apartheid struggles to expand and democratize access in South African public universities.

The genesis of the idea of and mobilization around Africanization has been traced to Pan-African national-liberationist ideals of the 1950s and early 1960s and the Black Consciousness movement from the late 1960s onwards (Cross, 1999; Kistner, 2008). Magaziner's (2010) historicist reading of the political philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement provides a crucial reference point for contextualizing the re-emergence in the post-1994 period of Africanization as a key theme in higher education debates. With universities at the center of the battles with students, transformation and decolonization became the most popular concepts deployed to capture the spirit of change in South Africa. The transformation and decolonization discourses find expression through the agenda to de-racialize formerly white-only universities to

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[21] Keynote Address Delivered at the 5th Annual Students Conference on Decolonizing the Humanities and Social Sciences in South Africa/Africa, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 6-7 October 2016.

achieve a more representative demographic profile on South African campuses, and to adapt curricula and syllabi to ensure that teaching and learning are adapted to the physical and cultural realities of the African environment (Letsekha, 2013; Luckett, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016).

The next section, therefore, explores the ideas, meanings, logics, problems, and prospects of Africanization as an earlier and broader discourse and grammar of change, and so the root of the transformation and decolonization narratives. This exploration offers the possibility for drawing parallels between the lineal history that runs from black consciousness to recent calls for an Afrocentric university and the lineal history that runs from the "liberal" apartheid era university (discussed in the previous chapter) to the neo-liberal post-apartheid university. Just as there is a history of the "liberal" and neo-liberal universities' failures, chapter 6 will address the limitations of the radical student movement to decolonize the university.

Africanization

The notion of Africanization forms part of anti-colonial discourse informed by past western supremacy and the resistance against it (Asante, 1987; Urch, 1968). It is generally seen as a renewed focus on Africa, the foregrounding of the African worldview and indigenous knowledge systems to address Africa's problems and challenges, and a re-narration of the African existence to salvage and reclaim what has been stripped from the continent (Letseka, 2013; Louw, 2009; Okeke, 2011; Seepe, 2000).

Arguments for Africanization frame universities in Africa as colonial creations more inclined to perpetuate colonial legacies institutionalized and embodied in the deep structures of the institutions than to define their own academic and intellectual identity and destiny (Mazrui, 1975; Moulder, 1991). Since the curriculum in most universities in Africa was introduced during the colonial era, the content of what is taught is dominated by the cultures, scholarship and

methodological paradigms of the northern hemisphere and does not speak to the experiences of learners or reflect the philosophical, social realities of their communities (Lebakeng, Manthiba & Dalindjebo, 2006; Moulder, 1991).

Calls for Africanization are rooted in Afrocentricism (the valorization of all that is African), which is based on a binary code of the "modern West" versus the "traditional African" and rests on the assertion that local knowledge, values and identities suppressed by colonialism and apartheid need to be freed from these shackles (Kistner, 2008). Makgoba (1997) describes Africanization as "the process or vehicle for defining, interpreting, promoting and transmitting African thought, philosophy, identity, and culture encompassing a shift from the European to an African paradigm" (p. 203). Thus, early African nationalists emphasized the need to study African history, African music and African arts as part of Africanization process (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016).

To the extent that African nationalists understood universities in Africa as seeking to introduce foreign cultures and to alienate Africans from themselves, they sought to indigenize and Africanize the university in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016). Ndlovu-Gatsheni offers the first president of independent Ghana as an example. Nkrumah envisioned universities on African soil taking root and drawing inspiration from an African past, fusing ancient cultural traditions with modern mainly Marxist ideas, and producing graduates capable of working and living in Africa. Nkrumah thus who pushed for the University of Ghana to engage in intellectual decolonization, which he understood to mean a new way of looking at the world from an African standpoint.

According to Botha (2010), the call for Africanization is neither an advocacy to be anti-West, nor is it discouragement to learn from the West. Rather than being about excluding

Europeans and their cultures, the philosophy informing Africanization is actually an encouragement to learn from the West, but in a selective and constructive manner that affirms the African culture and its identity in a world community (Botha, 2010; Louw, 2009). Makgoba (1997) similarly denounces the idea that Africanization constitutes a process of exclusion, preferring to cast it as involving "incorporating, adapting and integrating other cultures into and through African visions to provide the dynamism, evolution and flexibility so essential in the global village" (p. 199). Furthermore, the Africanization project does not deny Africans their national citizenship or national autonomy (Okeke, 2011).

Rather than inserting a new knowledge hegemony, Africanization has been envisaged as opening up spaces for interplay between diverse knowledge systems, an outcome based on acknowledging and legitimating indigenous science alongside that of the western tradition and subjecting both to critical scrutiny (Pityana, 2007). Botha (2010) argues that Africanization should be understood as all the dimensions of the process whereby a university endeavors to retain its African character to achieve certain academic, economic, political, and cultural aims. To that end, Vorster (1995) makes the appeal, first to Africans to uphold African aspirations, descent, cultural heritage, own ideas, rights, interests and ideals, self-concept and own rationality in an intercultural context, and to Europeans and other non-Africans to respect and accommodate Africans' efforts to realize the first.

Beyond taking simply culturalist and anti-colonial positions, the decolonization campaign that has re-emerged in post-apartheid South African universities is animated by the fact that "decolonization of the state did not translate into decolonization of universities in Africa into African universities" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016, p. 12). In other words, the universities only tinkered with margins of Africanization without delving deep enough into the epistemological

questions and so did not undergo decolonization. [22] Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the fundamental question of decolonization of the universities raised by the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall protests (see chapter 6) indicate beyond doubt that the earlier initiatives must have failed. Consequently, the major challenge facing higher education in Africa is how to change the very idea of the university from being a "university in Africa" to an "African university."

To show that the change trajectory has been more on the reform than overhaul side, Maile (2011) outlines three main waves of curriculum development in post-apartheid South Africa. The first wave pertains to the years immediately after the 1994 elections and involved what Jansen (1999) describes as cleansing of the syllabi from the most offensive racist language and a purging of controversial and outdated content. However, the fear of endangering the spirit of national unity among political ideologies at variance with each other made it impossible to translate democratic principles such as non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equity, and redress into the classroom content. The national unity sensibility underlying this wave and its failure to deliver liberation promises of the anti-apartheid struggle correlates with and represents the social cohesion logic and rainbow nation discourse that I discuss in more detail in the next chapter. The second wave, characterized as a discourse of morality, and initiated by Kader Asmal shortly after his appointment in 1999 as Minister of Education, covered the late 1990s and prescribed, in predetermined and undemocratic ways, what ought to be happening in the classroom. *Curriculum 2005,* the South African version of outcomes-based education, constituted the third wave. Devoid of specifications on content, it remained broad and distanced enough from day-to-day decision-making in schools as regards matters of context.

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[22] One could argue, however, that even the decolonization of the State did not happen.

Because of the inappropriateness and irrelevance of the epistemological model underlying the current educational system in South Africa, and the African sociocultural milieu in general, calls for its complete overhaul abound (e.g. Letsekha, 2013). Aside from the dependent, decontextualized and alienating character of the higher education curricula on the continent, privileged positions in the country's universities have been monopolized by those not classified as black. Consequently, Letsekha (2013) and Moulder (1991) are concerned that most of the people who control the universities do not feel very comfortable with the idea that they are Africans or that Africa's culture and Africa's problems should determine the agenda.

The current iteration of Africanization as it relates to post-apartheid South African higher education encompasses scholarship emphasizing curriculum responsiveness, an epistemological re-direction, and an identity re-creation of the South African university (The Higher Education Monitor, 2010). To promote Africanization, there should be changes in the composition of students, academics and administrators; the content of what is taught; the ways in which teaching is organized; and the criteria that determine what excellent research is as dictated by the way in which a problem is tackled rather than in the problem itself (Moulder, 1991). As the chapter on #FeesMustFall will show, student protesters wanted the institutional culture to be responsive to the academic and other needs of black South Africans, for instance the racial distribution of students and faculty should mirror the country's racial demographics. I discuss the link to and implications of these demands for the quality-equity arguments below, but first turn to the contestations around the meanings of Africanization.

Some scholars argue that there is a lack of clarity about both what the idea of Africanization means and what it involves or implies. Horsthemke (2004), for instance, describes Makgoba (1997) and Odora-Hoppers (2000)'s idea of "African identify and culture" as

potentially misleading in that it carries connotations of a single, homogeneous, monolithic identity and culture. Horsthemke also points out that no proponent of Africanization offers a definition, or elaborates on the understanding of the traditional, local or indigenous knowledge that they are working with. Similarly, Letsekha (2013) challenges Ramose (1998)'s assertion that the African experience is communicable only by Africans, and argues that the push to define who or what is African can easily lead to marginalization and exclusion which proponents of Africanization are trying to avoid. Chetty & Merrett (2014) also posit that, by treating international best practice as Eurocentric or colonial, the thinking around Africanization of curricula ignores the distinction between philosophy and methods, which are universal, and application, which includes local relevance.

Advocates of Africanization, however, point out that the critique of or resistance to programs aimed towards Africanizing higher education in South Africa predominantly comes from white scholars. Maile (2011), for instance, argues that the agenda to Africanize the curriculum has evoked debates, emotions and fear among scholars with Eurocentric intellectual leanings for whom an African curriculum is exclusionary, racial and intimidating. Maile postulates that when Africanization is equated with political propaganda bent on racial cleansing, and is seen as closed, static, and an impediment to progress brought about by globalization, it is not surprising that it is opposed without considering the merits and demerits of the debate.

The contestations around globalization/internationalization and Africanization lie at the heart of policy debates on how to conceptualize and operationalize institutional responsiveness in relation to the quality and equity imperatives of the post-apartheid South African higher education. I now turn to the quality-equity debates.

Quality/Equity Imperatives

Scholars who recognize the post-apartheid imperative to craft policies that accomplish both equity and quality are not oblivious to the uneasy relationship, tensions and contradictions that are inherent in any attempt to redress social structural inequalities and pursue development and quality goals simultaneously (e.g. Badat, 2017; Badat, Wolpe & Barends, 1993; Luckett, 2001; Wolpe 1993). These scholars argue that the failure to recognize that addressing apartheid-induced inequalities and implementing a new development path and the production of scientific and other knowledge stand in a relationship of permanent tension, has the potential to engender populist or pragmatist positions which ultimately may advance neither social equity nor economic, social, political and cultural development.

Although the tensions between quality and equity offer another iteration of the limiting global-local binary, the concepts speak to a fundamental dimension of the policy discourses in post-apartheid South African higher education. The quality-equity debates occur in the context of vast institutional inequalities generated by apartheid. These inequalities pertain to student access to and success in universities, staffing, capacity of institutions, range of disciplines, and number of postgraduates, teaching loads, and research output. Given this context, Wolpe (1993) and Badat, Wolpe & Barends (1993) present arguments about the future of post-secondary education (PSE) in South Africa as dominated by two conflicting positions: development/quality and equality/equity/redress. The binary corresponds to the local-global binary popularized in the literature on the impacts of and responses to globalization in local contexts. I argue that, although allusion is made to regional students in South African universities (e.g. Badat, 2017), local-global approaches to studying the policy imperatives of South African higher education lack an appreciation of the intersection of quality and equity with regional solidarity and national social cohesion imperatives (see chapter 4).

The development/quality position pushes for the maintenance and enhancement of historically white universities (HWUs), for instance the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand, and their role and capacity to produce the human resources, particularly at the postgraduate level, and the scientific knowledge needed for economic development and political management. This position is most strongly expressed by some leading HWUs. In contrast, the equality/equity/redress position, mostly prevalent among black students and parents, the broad liberation movement, and within historically black universities (HBUs), is that the singular aim of new policies must be to eradicate inequalities of access to post-secondary institutions and unequal resourcing among the institutions themselves. What distinguishes these HWUs from HBUs is their research, professional and postgraduate teaching programs and capacities, their reputation as centers of excellence and their production of high-level person-power, especially in the fields of natural science, medical science, and engineering.

The development/quality position is premised on the view that HWUs constitute vital national resources and that any diversion of resources away from them would be detrimental to economic and social development. The national resource framing of the country's HWUs is rationalized on the basis of the need to maintain internationally recognized universities which would make the country's economy competitive on international markets and simultaneously responsive to the basic needs of the people in a democratic South Africa. Thus, financial and other resources should not be redistributed toward the advancement of the HBUs in ways and to a degree which would endanger the capacities and impair the maintenance and development of the HWUs.

The singular pursuit of the development/quality position is seen as leading to the prioritization of the development goals over equality, equity, and redress (Wolpe, 1993; Badat,

Wolpe & Barends, 1993). Conversely, the singular pursuit of the equality, equity, and redress objectives would entail triumph over and the elimination of development and quality goals of the post-secondary education system. On the one hand, an exclusive focus on economic development is based on the assumption that the basic economic and social needs of the people cannot be attained without the production of the skilled human resources needed by an advanced economy. Even if such the prioritization of economic development may result in a general rise in living standards, it may well be accompanied by an intensification of inequalities among the population, thus effectively delaying or retarding the equalization process.

On the other hand, an exclusive focus on the right of all to post-secondary education disregards the fact that the limited number of institutions or the resources available to them limits access to higher education and that equality of education, on its own, does not guarantee achievement of equality in the social order. In fact, the financial and other resources required to redress the legacies of the apartheid-capitalist system at the post-secondary education level are not immediately available and are extremely unlikely to be available. The sole concentration on equality, therefore, disregards the fact that equal access to and equality between institutions may be achieved in some respects but not in others and that new forms of stratification may result from new policies. Consequently, the position leads to the formulation of policies which are abstracted from the conditions in which the policies must be applied.

Criticism has been levelled on the assumption that changes in the education system, including the equalizing of access, will have transformative effects on the economy and will produce systematic levelling effects on class, race, gender and other forms of inequalities (Wolpe, 1993; Badat, Wolpe & Barends, 1993). This is because social mobility between strata is extremely limited and that inter-generation mobility is highly restricted. Moreover, the

stratification of the occupational structure is a product of multiple determinations and not solely determined by education. Access to education and training, particularly at the postsecondary educational levels, tends to be structured by a complex of social structural conditions of which race, however important, is only one of them.

There is a recognition by Badat, Wolpe & Barends (1993) that policies aimed at balancing universities and higher education goals of equity/equality and quality/development would require trade-offs. While equity/equality is what motivated the struggle against apartheid and continues to be an extremely persistent and pervasive demand, human resource development cannot be neglected. Both in the short term and in the long run, economic development constitutes a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for the possible enhancement of the conditions of the people even if it entails the privileging of a certain layer of the educational and occupational structure and does not also generate greater equality (Badat, Wolpe & Barends, 1993; Wolpe, 1993).

Rather than approach the accomplishment of one as necessarily excluding the other, higher education transformation should focus on concurrently reducing race, gender, and class inequalities; contributing to economic growth and the construction of a democratic society; and increasing people's welfare and enriching the intellectual and cultural life of the society (Badat, Wolpe & Barends (1993). When tensions, paradoxes, difficult policy choices and serious social dilemmas arise, they would have to be addressed creatively as part of overall economic and social policy changes. How WCU addresses the tensions, contradictions and paradoxes of the post-apartheid higher policy imperatives is the subject of chapter 5.

Beyond the Binaries

Having looked at the global-local and quality/equity binaries framing higher education policy debates in South Africa, I draw on Nitsch's (2010) beyond-binaries conception to broaden the discussion beyond the limiting confines of the mainstream debates. Nitsch advocates for an approach that deals with and explains the background of the participants in the debate and the national and international contexts thereof. Such a framework recognizes the diversity of multiple societal contexts of higher education in South Africa: local, provincial, national, continental, international, and trans-national/global.

South Africa's higher education system must address the concerns of six distinct groups (Nitsch, 2010). The groups comprise of the most localized black rural population; the black South African urban/township population; the colored and Asian; the new suburban Black Empowerment middle class; the white suburban and farmer middle and upper class; and the multi-ethnic new national state government and related non-governmental and corporate management elites. Although I do not adopt the 6-groups scheme as is (because the focus of the research project is on non-South African students), the notion that "local" is not a homogeneous collective informs the student identity markers that I adopt for the institutional policy landscape (see chapter 4).

Beyond these national population groups, Nitsch (2010) sees South Africa being challenged by both the legal and illegal influx of immigrants and refugees from less developed African countries. Controversial and ill-accepted, the refugees can be grouped together with the six local/domestic groups (above) to constitute what Nitsch characterizes as the contexts or stakeholders of internal Africanization or the new South African integrative nationalizing of higher education. Categorizing immigrants from African countries together with six

local/domestic groups raises the fundamental questions around citizenship and belonging that I address in chapter 7, which focuses on non-national student experiences.

Aside from internal Africanization, the context of external Africanizing of South African higher education consists of other southern African countries as neighbors; other less and least developed African countries; Afro-American (Caribbean) countries and the Afro-American population groups in America; African diaspora groups in countries outside Africa, in particular those in the former colonialist countries. As already pointed out, the bulk of non-national students at WCU and other South African universities are from neighboring countries in southern Africa. To the best of my knowledge, any Afro-American students studying in South Africa come on short-term study abroad programs.

Beyond the African contexts outside South Africa, Nitsch (2010) distinguishes between foreign national and trans-national contexts of internationalizing South African higher education. Non-African, less- and least-developed countries, among which are "failed states," look to South Africa as an emergent developing country for humanitarian intervention. Major emergent developing countries (India, China, Brazil etc.) tend to share the extreme social class divisions and ethnic diversities with South Africa. Former Soviet Bloc countries maintain cold-war-based semi-imperialist relationships with particular African countries and their national liberation parties. The rest consist of former Western colonialist countries (including the white Commonwealth countries and Germany/Italy); non-colonialist Western and East Asian developed countries (Scandinavia, Japan, and South Korea); the U.S. as (post)imperial power; and trans-national governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Considering this diversity and multiplicity of contexts, Nitsch (2010) does not find it helpful to subsume higher education into only two categories, globalized versus localized. He

argues that a student from one of the ex-Bantustans or an impoverished refugee from the Democratic Republic of the Congo will have different needs related to Africanization in higher education than a student from the academic elite of another African country or an Afro-American student from the U.S. Similarly, the aspirations for internationalizing higher education on the part of Chinese or Indian students are not the same as those of Swedish and German students in South Africa. Nitsch's (2010) arguments provide a crucial alternative framing of the debates around globalizing and Africanizing higher education in South Africa which generally revolve around the compatibility of the two imperatives, without problematizing the local-global binary.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented bodies of literature that portray the globalizing and Africanizing contexts, policy imperatives, and agendas of South African higher education as at odds with each other. The chapter argues that the global-local and quality-equity frameworks are limiting because South Africa plays such a central regional role that the country and its public universities can and should never be talked about in just global and national terms. The historical ties between South Africa and neighboring countries in Southern Africa complicate the designation of non-national African students as international/foreign students.

Swaziland nationals (the Swati) are an illustrative example of the nature of the regional ties, and of the complexity of boundaries and nationalities in the southern Africa region. Mpumalanga (one of South Africa's nine provinces), is mainly populated by the Swati people, and their language, Siswati, is one of South Africa's 11 official languages. Swaziland nationals are particularly significant for this study given that they are designated as foreign/international students in South African universities. In light of the history of Swaziland-South Africa migration, the volume of Swati people who are South African citizens, and intermarriages among

the Swati and South Africans, it is complicated to designate Swaziland nationals as foreign/international students in South African universities. In cognizance of this complexity, I expand the global-local and quality-equity binaries to include regional solidarity imperative in the mapping of WCU's institutional policy landscape (see chapter 4).

The equity-quality binary is equally limiting because it does not capture the ways in which the black South African student activists' demands to decolonize the curriculum construct quality in terms of broad access and equity rather than merely in terms of the hegemony of western thought and culture or white European apartheid-era practices. These constructions are obviously contested, and the contestations are particularly significant because they get at the heart of what is understood as public and which understandings should be privileged above others. Whereas the debates around measurement of quality and equity lie outside the scope of this research, the data chapters that follow engage with equity/racial justice, quality and other policy imperatives and discourses (social cohesion and regional solidarity) in so far as the discourses have implications for how higher education stakeholders think differently about the notion of public. Different understandings of the notion of public provide valuable insights into the challenges/opportunities facing higher education efforts in Africa as institutions with limited resources attempt to concomitantly cater to competing national, regional and global demands.

Chapter 4

Institutional Policy Landscape

Introduction

Preceding chapters have provided a background to the study, the historical overview of

public higher education in South Africa, the institutional background and context of World Class

University (WCU), and the binarized global-local and quality-equity paradoxes of the country's

higher education sector. In this chapter I turn to a mapping and analytical description of the

institutional policy landscape (Figure 2). The mapping sheds light on the contours and

configuration of the contests at WCU to negotiate what it means to serve conflicting demands

and mandates, and shows how actors and policy pressures are situated in relation to each other.

The chapter thus sets up the context for chapters 5, 6 and 7, which will expand on how student,

administration, state, regional and global actors perceive the meanings and contestations

generated within and across the contours of the landscape, and how those perceptions shape

institutional policy choices and student experiences and opportunities.

The four-quadrant mapping of the institutional policy landscape is largely based on the

analysis of political and policy imperatives at WCU when the study was conducted between July

2014 and August 2016. During 2015 and 2016, the nature and scope of policy debates were

mainly informed by the demands of the #FeesMustFall student protests (see chapter 6).

According to Jansen (2017), the student protests consisted of "small and disparate groups of

[student] protestors [that] form, split apart, and re-form in another image, disappearing and re-

appearing" (p. 8). The political and policy imperatives being both context-specific and in a state

of constant flux, one might reasonably expect that the policy landscape might look different in

South Africa's other public university contexts, even at the same university at different time periods.

Figure 2: Institutional Policy Landscape

Although the four-quadrant framework predominates in my mapping and framing of the institutional policy landscape and debates, I must point out that the horizontal and vertical lines suggest that the configuration could as well be organized into two sets of two-quadrant fields grouped together based on nationality and race, respectively. In that sense, the horizontal line demarcates South Africans (irrespective of race) and non-national/international students while the vertical line demarcates an overtly black consciousness and a multiracial sensibility.

I deploy broken lines for both the race and nationality divides to underscore two important points drawn from Thompson (2006).[23] The first point is an acknowledgement that the notions of race and nationality are social constructs, meaning a set of ideas about human

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[23] Thompson's argument relates specifically to race, but I am also extending it here to include nationality.

difference rather than an irrevocable fact of human biology. The fact that racial and national identities are socially constructed accounts for why I make the lines broken rather than solid. Thompson's second important point is that social constructs have very real consequences, and so should not to be dismissed lightly. This accounts for why, although socially constructed, racial and national identities constitute an integral part of the policy landscape. The broken lines, therefore, capture how the racial and nationality boundaries among the quadrants are self-imposed or prescribed rather than fixed. As chapter 2 shows, the racialization of relations and life opportunities within South Africa during apartheid distorted the sense of shared humanity and shared futures that otherwise should govern how South Africans relate among themselves and with the region, and how to equalize access to resources and opportunities.

Aside from the tenuous and fluid nature of the borders and boundaries between and among the quadrants, I am also cognizant that the policy features covered and discussed in this chapter do not capture the full spectrum of WCU's policy landscape. I therefore leave the outer edges of quadrants open to acknowledge the reality of constant influx characterizing the policy landscape. While the oval at the center represents WCU as an institutional entity, the arrows denote the pressures bearing on the university. I use the bright and faded color shades to approximate the degree to which WCU recognized the pressures through formal institutional structures with Transformation and Internationalization marked as the two most prominent discourses in policy debates.

The chapter is organized around what I saw as three key features/attributes of the institutional policy landscape. I start with two contrasting pairs of discursive frames that define the parameters of the policy discourses and debates at WCU: Nationalism and Internationalism, and Black Africanism and Multi-racialism. Then, I move on to four policy discourses and

organizing logics that correspond with each of the four quadrants: Transformation/ National

Racial Justice and the Rainbow Nation/ National Social Cohesion at the national level, and

Internationalization/International Recognition and Regionalization/ Regional Solidarity at the

supra-national level. I end with the dominant racial and national identity markers associated with

each of the four quadrants: Black South African, Multi-racial South African, Black African, and

Multi-racial/national. Before I describe each of the features/attributes in detail, I first distinguish

among policy as text, policy as practice and policy as discourse.

Policy as Text, Practice, and Discourse

Most scholarship on South African higher education policy addresses either policy as

text – that is policy documents/frameworks, and/or policy as practice – that is how policy

frameworks are enacted in practice (e.g. Mabokela & Mlambo, 2017; McLellan, 2008). This

mirrors Ball's (1994) characterization of policy as text and action, and words and deeds, and

what is intended. These two domains of policy are crucial for understanding why and how policy

is formulated and enacted, and how it affects the people for whom it is intended. However, a

focus on just policy as textual expression and policy as practice fails to account for the discursive

domain of policy, what Robus & Macleod (2006) refer to as the mundane talk of individuals

responding to macro-level structures and processes that concern them.

Spratt (2017) alludes to two schools of thought about the relationship between individual

actors and their use of discursive practices: a post-structural view stemming from European

philosophy and cultural thought, and an Anglo-American understanding of discourse as a

linguistic practice. The understanding of discourse that I adopt here is not preoccupied with

linguistics per se, but the means by which people represent their views of the world. It

emphasizes how language and meaning construction sets limits upon what can be said and

thought, and who can speak, when, where and with what authority (e.g. Bacchi, 2000; Ball, 1990; Codd, 1988). Focusing on the social effects of the use of language (either spoken or written), the view of discourse as a linguistic practice frames discourse as both socially constructed and socially constitutive. According to Spratt (2017), discourse is both socially constructed and socially constitutive in that it emerges from the social action of groups of people, but at the same time people also mold the social world in ways that shape people's perceptions and behaviors. The significance of discourse, therefore, lies in its social function, and in the way in which it mediates power and control. For instance, with globalization increasingly influencing and shaping educational policy discourses, policy makers around the world are constantly borrowing and abridging the capitalist ideas dominating the globalization discourses.

A crucial starting point for understanding the idea of policy as discursive activity is therefore a close analysis of items that make it to the political agenda to see how the construction or representation of those issues limits what is talked about as possible or desirable, or as impossible or undesirable (Bacchi, 2000). Beyond asking why and how some issues make it to the political agenda while others do not, the approach considers the ways in which the terms of a discourse limit what can be talked about. The approach also focuses on the ability of dominant groups, that is those who are deemed to hold power, to make discourse and remain dominant, and the tendency of those regarded as lacking power to be effected by or constituted in discourse.

Loosely positioned on the left of the political spectrum, the policy-as-discourse approaches that I draw on capture the ways in which bodies of knowledge, interpretive and conceptual schemes of interpretation attached to specific historical, institutional and cultural contexts, define the policy terrain in ways that complicate attempts at progressive social change (Bacchi, 2000). Policy-as-discourse scholarship links the non-innocence of how problems get or

do not get framed within policy proposals with possibilities for action and constraints on change. The approach is, therefore, particularly useful for making sense of the great lengths to which WCU brands itself with respect to just two (international recognition and national racial justice) of the four policy logics noted in the mapping above.

While both policy as text and policy as practice are germane to my study, I pay particular attention to policy as discourse. I do so because the discursive domain of policy provides the space for institutional actors to engage with and respond to policy both as text and as practice, through public debates or activism for instance. In that sense, the discursive domain is important for understanding a central component of my research, that is, which and how discourses get formalized/institutionalized in the university, and which do not, and why.

Discursive Frames

The first feature/attribute of the institutional policy landscape is the two contrasting pairs of discursive frames that defined the parameters of the policy discourses and debates at WCU: Internationalism and Nationalism, and Black Africanism and Multi-racialism (Figure 3). According to Mumby & Clair (1997), a discursive frame is a deeply structured and partial symbolic apparatus with which to make sense of the world. It "provides the fundamental categories in which thinking can take place [and] establishes the limits of discussion and defines the range of problems that can be addressed" (p. 202).

Figure 3: *Discursive Frames*

NATIONALISM

BLACK-
AFRICANISM

MULTI-
RACIALISM

INTERNATIONALISM

I use the term Internationalism to denote the imagination of the world as a single and connected space in which localities are integrated into larger systems of global network, such as economic interdependence (Maringe & Foskett, 2010; Rizvi, 2011). Nationalism, on the other hand, refers to an imagined community in a territorialized (local/nationalistic) discursive context (see Çınar, 2010; Haidt, 2016; Holmes, 2009; Miller, 2003). In the post-apartheid South Africa case, Nationalism has been premised on the populist notion of South African exceptionalism (Chéry, 2017; Cornelissen, 2017). The idea of South African exceptionalism holds that, rather than fall victim to the underdevelopment problems experienced by other African states, the country is such a unique case on the continent that it is able to control its own fate (Lazarus, 2004). As described by Nkosi (a black South African student activist), the exceptionalism finds expression in the patriotism that he internalized following a barrage of "proudly South African" television shows, sports and even beer adverts aired during his upbringing. "[I grew up] being

told that we are the most developed country in Africa, we have got the best opportunities on the continent." As I will explore in further detail later in the chapter, this exceptionalism has serious implications for thinking about the historical, current and future relations between South Africa and, in particular, immediate neighbors in the southern African region.

My choice of the term Black Africanism recognizes the pivotal role that race plays in how opportunities to access higher education have historically been distributed in South Africa (Mabokela & Mlambo, 2017), and consequently, the foregrounding of blackness in the racialized student activism on the WCU campus. As black South African student activists are quick to point out, they are engaged in the struggle for emancipation from the denigration, marginalization and subjugation that black South Africans suffered at the hands of a white minority during apartheid. The current and ongoing "black struggle" recently manifested through the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall student movements has a long history linked to the Black Consciousness Movement (Howarth, 1997; Lloyd, 2003; Macqueen, 2014; More, 2012) and other earlier anti-apartheid/colonial and liberation movements.

Unlike the racial singularity of Black Africanism, Multi-racialism espouses racial and cultural pluralism. The pluralism corresponds with the Rainbow Nation discourse, National Social Cohesion logic, and Multi-racial South African demographic group addressed below.

Figure 4: Potential for Coalitions across Quadrants

NATIONALISM

BLACK-AFRICANISM

National Racial Justice

National Social Cohesion

Regional Solidarity

Global Recognition

MULTI-RACIALISM

INTERNATIONALISM

While the most easily recognizable relationship between the discursive frames is oppositional (racial essentialism versus multiracialism, and internationalism versus nationalism), the fact that each quadrant shares a discursive frame with another quadrant suggests that there is potential for building coalitions across quadrants (Figure 4). For instance, a common black African identity and a common history of colonial subjugation link the National Racial Justice and Regional Solidarity logics in ways that could see black South Africans and fellows black Africans from across the continent participating together in ongoing decolonization struggles. Such coalitions failed to materialize, however. As will be evident in chapter 6 on the #FeesMustFall student protests, institutions with limited resources are severely constrained from pursuing academic excellence for international recognition while simultaneously being responsive to the racial justice and educational equity imperatives unique to their post-/neo-colonial contexts.

Policy Discourses and Organizing Logics

The second feature/attribute of the policy landscape is the four policy discourses and the corresponding organizing logics. As discussed earlier, discourses pertain to the use of language by social actors to represent their view of the world. Far from being simply random ways of talking, discourses are the means by which powerful groups exert influence in society because they are grounded in ideologies (Spratt, 2017). Spratt sees discourse and ideology as closely related concepts: ideologies are shaped through the dominant discourses of powerful groups and vice versa. While the speaker may be unaware of the ideologies that they espouse, dominant ideologies are propagated when they adopt common sense language that has been naturalized in everyday speech. The veneer of common sense masks the power relations that justify and propagate dominant ideologies, and serves to make some positions seem more rational than others. Since the ideology phenomenon is often applied to economic and political theory and policy at a broader scale than that of an individual university, I opted to use organizing logic to refer to the ideas, ideals and persuasions providing the rallying point for the policy discourses most dominant in the policy debates at WCU.

As shown in Figure 5 below, the policy discourses are connected to each other in several significant ways. Transformation and Rainbow Nation are linked based on being national-level discourses; while Internationalization and Regionalization are connected in that they are both supra-national discourses. In a separate pairing arrangement, Transformation and Internationalization are both institutionalized within the university, while Regionalization is linked with Rainbow Nation in that neither is institutionalized. I will return to the institutionalization of the policy discourses later in the chapter and explore the subject in more detail in chapter 5.

Figure 5: Policy Discourses

Policy Discourses

	Institutionalized	Not Institutionalized
National	TRANSFORMATION	"RAINBOW NATION"
Supra-national	INTERNATIONALIZATION	REGIONALIZATION

As shown in Figure 6 below, each of the four policy discourses corresponds with one of the four quadrants, and is an articulation of two discursive frames. Quadrant 1 (Transformation), for instance, is an articulation of both Nationalism and Black Africanism. These two discursive frames (Nationalism and Black Africanism) together capture an exclusively South African brand of identity politics premised on blackness (Howarth, 1997). Quadrant 2 (Internationalization), on the other hand, is an articulation of both Internationalism and Multi-racialism. Although these two discursive frames (Internationalism and Multi-racialism) together acknowledge individuals' racial and national identities, they construct the university as a multiracial, multicultural, and multinational space.

Figure 6: Policy Discourses and Discursive Frames

NATIONALISM

	1 Transformation	4 "Rainbow Nation"	
BLACK-AFRICANISM			**MULTI-RACIALISM**
	3 Regionalization	2 Internationalization	

INTERNATIONALISM

Racial and National Identity Markers

The last feature/attribute of the institutional policy landscape is the dominant racial and national identity markers associated with each of the four quadrants: *Black South African, Multi-racial South African, Black African,* and *Multi-racial/national*. This racial categorization is different from the four racial categories operationalized during apartheid: *African, Colored, Asian,* and *White*. In the dissertation, I deploy the former because the apartheid-era racial categories were intended to distinguish between South Africans only and so cannot account for a post-apartheid student population that includes non-South African students.

Figure 7: Racial and National Identity Markers

NATIONALISM

BLACK-AFRICANISM

1
Black, South African

4
Multi-racial, South African

MULTI-RACIALISM

3
Black, African

2
Multi-national, Multi-racial

INTERNATIONALISM

Even though not every student fits perfectly into or subscribes to the notion of racialized identity politics, the country's history of systematic racial ordering and discrimination under apartheid (Seekings, 2008) makes race a paramount organizing principle in policy debates at WCU. The categorization which I use here puts Black South Africans in their own group in recognition of their expectation to be the primary beneficiaries of the post-apartheid government's pursuit of a mass-based tertiary education system (Ramphele, 1999). Although mainly made up of white South Africans, the Multi-racial South African group also includes South Africans of any race who subscribe to racial and cultural pluralism. The last two groups consist of non-South Africans: Black Africans from other African countries, and those of any other race or nationality. While none of these racial and national identity markers are fixed, the construction and deployment thereof were at the center of the competing policy imperatives at WCU, which I now turn to.

Policy Imperative 1: Transformation

The Transformation discourse emphasizes locally driven post-apartheid demands for redress, democratization and racial equity following the entrenched, racially divisive and exclusionary policies of the apartheid era. According to Prof. Thulani (a black non-national top administrator), Transformation was part of the official anti-apartheid repertoire in South Africa even before 1994. He further pointed out that Transformation is understood differently in South Africa: "elsewhere in the world people would talk about reform; those more radical than others would call it radical reform."

Transformation relates directly to the persistence of racial and socioeconomic inequalities bequeathed by apartheid; in its broadest sense, it deals with empowering the black South Africans who suffered marginalization during apartheid (Jansen, 2015[24]) and creating a more equitable society that reflects different races, genders and socioeconomic groups (Osman, 2015[25]). Osman underscores the need for greater representation in universities to ensure that the professions, and those who teach them, better depict the country's demographics; as well as spatial transformation in terms of equity and access to opportunity in South African's cities. Transformation, therefore, expresses the need for 1) racial distribution of students and faculty to mirror the country's racial demographics 2) an Africanized curriculum to replace the dominantly Eurocentric curriculum and 3) the institutional culture to be responsive to the academic and other needs of black South Africans.

Despite the general acceptance at WCU that Transformation was a kind of self-evident good involving changing the complexion of the university, Aryan (an Indian South African lecturer) pointed out that the term was "a kind of floating signifier" carrying different meanings

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[24] https://theconversation.com/the-best-universities-know-that-talent-cant-be-contained-within-borders-40986

[25] https://theconversation.com/what-architects-must-learn-from-south-african-student-protests-50678

for different people. Maxwell (a black South African student activist), for instance noted that black or white PhD holders produced in the past 20 years essentially perpetuated the same academic traditions that existed during the apartheid and colonial era. He, therefore, argued that Transformation should not be just about having black academics, but rather, changing the content of what was being taught. In turn, Prof. Thulani (the black non-national top administrator) pointed out that the agitation for filling the curriculum with black/African authors needed to take into account that such a curriculum, however radical, had its own weaknesses. He argued, "You can write a radical critique of Fanon or Walter Rodney as much as you can do for Marx."

While the official language widely recognized and deployed by institutional and state bureaucrats was Transformation, black South African student activists popularized decolonization. The students explained their choice of the decolonization language as an expression of their frustration with the perceived reluctance of formerly white institutions to become more inclusive and to attend to the needs of students in a society that was supposedly no longer based on whiteness/white supremacy. As Prof. Aristle (a black non-national professor) pointed out, the notion of decolonization "assumes that the current condition or situation in South Africa is still a colonial condition, starting with the name of the institutions, culture, what is being taught and how, and who is teaching." As championed by the most radical among black South African student activists, the decolonization discourse agitated against what the students saw as institutionalized racism and whiteness; confronted hierarchies in institutional governance and other structures; and put pressure on the university to transform in more fundamental and radical ways.

Unlike the technocratic Transformation terminology used mostly by administrative bureaucrats, the radical decolonization stance invoked notions of power and hierarchies and

focused on the roles and positionality occupied by black person within the university: who taught, what was taught, who was financially excluded (Maxwell). Decolonization advocates consistently lamented that more than two decades since the end of apartheid, those who expected to be the beneficiaries of the government's post-apartheid equity focus were still asking:

> Why do we still have this conversation (Transformation) [after] 21years of democracy? Why are the same issues raised and debated in the 1990s still issues 20 years later? Why do universities still have poor students who are overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, black? Why is it that the curriculum is still unchanged – still Eurocentric, with some exceptions? Why is [the] faculty still predominantly white? (Prof. Nolan, an Indian South African professor).

Bongi (a black South African student activist) characterized the decolonization agenda as encompassing the cause of workers, students, black and women lecturers, and as involving moving away from what she called colonial or white pedagogy. As spelled out in a petition and online site, radical student activists wanted a fundamental change in the curriculum; the racial and gender composition of staff; and funding for [black South African] students. Mpho (one of the senior black South African students who embraced and espoused the radical stance) underscored the need to dismantle "symbolic white power" as demonstrated by the fact that campus buildings were all named after white individuals. From the perspective of the radical activists who purported to champion the struggle of the black South African students, "the ruling ANC had both failed and sold out. Its pragmatism and reform is a compromise, a departure from the kind of radical politics that would take us to the black emancipation." (Maxwell). They challenged the idea of non-racialism and transformation through the market economy as pushed by the ANC because, as far as they were concerned, it maintained the status quo.

Black South African student activists' shift from Transformation to the decolonization language is illustrative of the uneasy relationship between Transformation and the Rainbow Nation concept (see below). I do not include the term decolonization itself in the mapping of the

institutional policy landscape because research participants understood Transformation and decolonization discourses as functioning as two different points on a continuum, with latter being a more radical version of the former. The association between Transformation and decolonization discourses was clearly discernible in the polarizing student politics pitting student formations aligned to the ruling African National Congress and the radical opposition, the Economic Freedom Fighters (see chapter 6).

Policy Imperative 2: Internationalization

In contrast to Transformation, WCU's Internationalization Policy was framed around integrating into the competitive and globalized knowledge economy which is premised on market-oriented international norms, standards, and best practices. WCU openly aspired to earn a place among the top 100 universities in the world. To accomplish this goal, the university sought to expand the proportion of graduate students (which was at around 33% at the time of the study) to 50% of total enrollment, in an effort to generate the research outputs valued in international university rankings systems. Aside from graduate students, the university also sought to increase the proportion of international students (currently at around 10%) to 30% of total enrollment. The non-national students are perceived as more adequately prepared to succeed and graduate on time than black South African students who have high dropout rates and face pressures to go work soon after the undergraduate degree.

Given South Africa's isolation during apartheid, the internationalization of the country's universities is a relatively recent phenomenon. Focusing on the system level, Rouhani (2007) points out that, more than a decade after the end of apartheid, internationalization remained a peripheral issue on government policymakers' agendas and was handled on an ad hoc basis, with no long-term vision. In fact, at the national decision and policymaking levels,

internationalization was not explicitly listed by name as a policy objective of higher education in South Africa (McLellan, 2008). Despite the growth of an international student "industry" globally, in South Africa internationalization was not regulated and the activities of key stakeholders[26] were not coordinated. Without guidance from the national ministry of education, and lacking formal institutional policies, internationalization was left to individual and organizational agency (Dolby, 2010).

In spite of an apparent lack of regulatory coordination at the national level, McLellan (2008) indicates that the tone in South African higher education policy documents clearly understands that, rather than seek to address national needs only (access, equity, redress, poverty alleviation, labor and skills shortages), the higher education system must recognize the global context. To that end, South African policy priorities should include producing a labor market with necessary global skills; and international competitiveness and keeping up with market-oriented international norms, standards, and best practices.

By embracing the international recognition logic, WCU acceded to the unequal terms dictated by mainstream and depoliticized internationalization templates that exclude and alienate historically marginalized black South Africans. According to Jessop (2007), the production and uses of knowledge in the era of the globalized knowledge economy have become increasingly subordinate to an economizing logic oriented to profit-and-loss calculation. This profit orientation directly contradicts Transformation/Decolonization demands for racial justice.

The internationalization discourse at WCU was built on historical inequalities linked to the country's racially segregated education system during apartheid. While historically black

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[26] Various government departments; the higher education sector, including institutions and statutory bodies such as Higher Education South Africa and the Council on Higher Education; professional associations such as the International Education Association for South Africa; student formations; and donors.

universities might embrace and use the international status and recognition rhetoric, they were not really trying to position themselves as world class sites for higher education, nor could they because limited resources severely constrained their ability to attract the best students and faculty, or generate significant quantities of internationally recognized research. Thus, the pressure to internationalize was uniquely acute at historically white universities, and these universities were at the center of battles for transformation and decolonization.

Policy Imperative 3: Regionalization

To make sense of the Regionalization discourse at WCU, this section draws on Knight's (2012) conceptual framework for the regionalization of higher education. The notion of region has traditionally been defined in geographic terms and primarily as a collection of nation states in a particular geographically designated area such as the major world regions Africa, Europe, Latin America, or smaller regions such as South East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In an interconnected and interdependent world, regions can, however, be overlapping, multi-layered, multi-actor, and multi-faceted, making them politically, economically, socially, functionally, and culturally defined to include sub-national and supra-national sub-regional, regional and pan- regional levels (e.g. Anglo/Franco/Lusophone Africa, Arab States, Asia Pacific Economic Community or Mercosur). In some cases, the nation state is no longer always at the core of a region. For instance, culturally based regions do not need to be based on boundaries anymore; the connections and interactions among key actors are of greater import than the defining perimeter.

Given the different disciplines concerned with the topic of regionality, interpretations and permutations of the concept of region range from regionalism, regionalness, regionalization, regional integration, inter-regional cooperation. While the suffix "ism" relates more to an

ideology or set of beliefs, "-ization" focuses on the process of becoming, and "-tion" reflects a condition. Each has a different relationship to the higher education sector. The first, regionalism, points to higher education in more of a reactive position to the the changing notion and increasing importance of region. The second refers to how higher education can be used to achieve regional economic integration in the wake of globalization and the importance of the knowledge economy. In this case, the higher education sector itself may have a limited influence over what role it plays to enhance the regional integration. The third, regionalization (the focus of this chapter), attributes a proactive role and agency to higher education and pertains to the process of intentionally building connections and relationships among higher education actors and systems in a region. In southern Africa this intentionality is most clearly expressed in the SADC Protocol of 1997 (see below).

In both apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, ways of understanding regionalism vis-à-vis nationalism has had far-reaching consequences for drawing and setting boundaries internally and within the southern African region, and for making claims at certain resources such as access to higher education. In cognizance of times when post-apartheid South Africa's Africa policy has coalesced around the notion of an African Renaissance, here, I distinguish the southern African region (the Southern Africa Development Community – SADC) from Sub-Saharan Africa and/or the rest of the continent. Devised by Thabo Mbeki, the African Renaissance idea involves five areas of engagement with the African continent: the encouragement of cultural exchanges; the emancipation of African women from patriarchy; the mobilization of the youth; the broadening, deepening, and sustaining of democracy; and the initiation of sustainable economic development (Mulaudzi, 2006).

The Regionalization discourse at WCU recognizes that South Africa's history, development prospects and interests remain closely bound up with those of its neighbors in the southern African region (Saunders, 2011) such that South Africa can and should never be talked about in just national terms. In fact, post-apartheid South African political culture and the ruling African National Congress (ANC)'s foreign policy discourses express a long-term commitment to regional integration (Flemes, 2009). For instance, a statement from Department of International Relations and Cooperation indicates that since 1994 South Africa envisions the highest possible degree of economic cooperation with its southern African neighbours, including mutual assistance and joint planning of regional development initiatives leading to integration consistent with socioeconomic, environmental and political realities (Saunders, 2011).

The regional sensibility is a function of several key factors. Firstly, the long history of labor migration of workers from the Southern Africa region to South Africa's industrial heartland (Booth & Vale, 1995; Vale, 1987; Wilson, 1976) means these neighboring countries served as South Africa's key labor reserves for its mining industry. South Africa's workforce has always comprised a significant number of migrants from Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other countries in Southern Africa (see Wilson, 1972, 1975, and 1976 on the origins, development, and impact of the coercive apartheid-era labour system and migration to South African mines, and Crush & Tshitereke, 2001 on post-apartheid debates on foreign labor). Without discounting the construction of a vast recruiting apparatus to scour the South African rural countryside for labor and efficiently deliver it to the mines, Crush & Tshitereke (2001), argue that, without access to labor from neighboring countries, the South African gold mines

would have shut down. In fact, they point out that by the 1970s, nearly 80 percent of South Africa's mine workforce was foreign.[27]

Secondly, in supporting the anti-apartheid struggle, SADC countries bore the brunt of the apartheid regime's destabilization policy that left more than a million of the region's people dead and is estimated to have cost the regional more than $60 Billion in destroyed infrastructure and lack of development opportunities (Booth & Vale, 1995; Khadiagala, I999; Hentz, 2005). The destabilization came about because apartheid South Africa's regional strategy rested on three historical realities: economic muscle/power, ability to provide and control the region's infrastructure, and support from conservative governments in major western capitals (Vale, 1983).

For a decade, from the later 1970s, the apartheid South African regime engaged in a war of terror against its neighbors to try to flush out the ANC from where it had set bases in neighbouring countries and prevent largely ANC-aligned guerillas from undertaking operations to end apartheid (Saunders, 2011). Prompted by a deepening paranoia over its security, the regime unleashed a military campaign known by the generic term "destabilization" (Booth & Vale, 1995) that would be accomplished in part by providing military support to local groups wishing to challenge governments in the neighbouring states that had offered the ANC sanctuary. For instance, the apartheid regime associated with disaffected groups in Mozambique in 1976 and in present day Zimbabwe after the collapse of Rhodesia in 1980 with the aim of disrupting the ruling FRELIMO government and the new democratic government in Zimbabwe, respectively (Vale, 1983).

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[27] Their numbers for "foreign" most likely included black South Africans from the Bantustans.

Although the anti-apartheid ANC forces were the eye of the destabilization policy storm (Vale, 1983), the resultant death and destruction wreaked on the region by apartheid South Africa stands as one of the lesser acknowledged crimes of the 20th century (Saunders, 2011). For example, a January 30 1981 Matola raid aimed at destroying the ANC headquarters in Maputo and capturing ANC leaders resulted in extensive damage to two ANC centers and abductions of several persons. Other examples include a mid-December 1982 pre-emptive strike on ANC establishments in Maseru, Lesotho; acts of sabotage inside Zimbabwe; a 1985 raid on Gaborone, Botswana; and extensive raids into southern Angola.

In spite of the costs of the destabilization policy, the countries in the region welcomed South African students and shouldered the responsibility to educate and train many of the professionals who are currently the mainstay of South Africa's economy. Prof. Lindela (a black South African former top administrator) recounted how he spent four years enrolled at the National University of Lesotho, and in his first three months, South Africa invaded Lesotho. The raid killed 42 ANC people in Maseru. In light of this history, Prof. Lindela indicated that he found it immoral for WCU to make a distinction between domestic South African and SADC students. The emergence of post-apartheid South Africa as the most popular study and work destination for education migrants and professionals from SADC countries underscores the necessity of factoring the regional dimension in discussions on the policy imperatives confronting South African public universities in the post-apartheid era.

Thirdly, the regional sensibility is a function of South Africa's sprawling business interests and expansive investments across the region (Alden & Soko, 2005; Carmody 2012). Regarding the expansive investments, Jared (a WCU Postdoctoral Fellow with research background and interests in one of the SADC countries) spoke pointedly about the need for

South Africans to recognize that they do have certain kinds of moral debt toward the rest of the continent:

> South Africa makes a lot of money from other countries in Africa through its own businesses. So, it's not like these people (SADC nationals) are coming here leaching off of South African tax money. South Africa tax money is coming from South African businesses paying taxes here making money in many other parts of the continent. There are South African banks in Nigeria, mining in DRC and other places, South African chain stores like *Games,* fast foods like *Steer* that are in Tanzania, Kenya, and all these places. Can't just say, oh well, it's South Africa subsidizing foreign countries. Foreign countries subsidize the South African tax base indirectly.

Not only has South Africa actively encouraged regional expansion by its companies through the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation, which has invested in 60 projects in 21 countries (Carmody, 2012), but South African corporations established themselves through the purchase of privatized assets and outright displacement of local businesses in neighboring states (Alden & Soko, 2005). The sprawling businesses suggest that, although South Africa is rhetorically committed to neoliberal "good governance", business interests take priority in its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (Taylor, 2011). While Jared did not advocate a tit for tat accounting of how much each African country paid in various forms to help the ANC during the anti-apartheid struggle, he saw South Africa's business interest in the region as cause for advancing the regional solidarity cause.

This history of regional migration, regional support for the anti-apartheid struggle, and South African business interests in the region accounts for why notions of national belonging are fraught with moral/ethical implications pertaining to boundary drawing and economic logics which I discuss in more depth in chapter 8. For now, I would like to highlight the SADC subsidy as one of the most significant intentional region building and regional cooperation endeavors in the higher education sector. The SADC subsidy is a key part of the SADC Protocol on Education and Training. Signed by Heads of State and Government in 1997, the Protocol sought to establish a legal and institutional framework to promote regional integration in specific priority

areas of education, training, research and development. An acknowledgement of the need to develop the human resource capacity of the region, the Protocol was envisioned as a means to overcome the disadvantages faced by individual states in their attempts to build successful education systems (Watson, 2010). Article 7.A.5. of the Protocol stipulates that students from and studying in another SADC country shall be treated as home students for purposes of fees and accommodation. As the study destination for the bulk of mobile students in southern Africa, South Africa hosts and subsidizes disproportionately more regional students than any other SADC country. As Figure 8 below shows, the blue line is the average full cost of study, the green line is the proportion that the student pays, and the difference is the subsidy.

Figure 8: Average Full Cost of Study and Percentage cost of Tuition – 2010 to 2015[28]

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Full cost	R 47 101	R 50 619	R 55 843	R 60 710	R 65 320	R 71 967
Tuition only	R 18 275	R 19 660	R 21 689	R 22 861	R 25 745	R 27 881

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
[28] Adapted from VitalStats: Public Higher Education (2015) –
http://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/VS2015%20Online%20Version.pdf

The Regionalization discourse, therefore, captures the recognition of the roles that countries in the SADC played in supplying migrant labor for South Africans mines, in supporting the struggle against apartheid, and as investment destinations for South African capital. Although the SADC subsidy suggests a recognition of the regional ties, and gestures toward regional cooperation, it is not clear that South Africa cares a lot about the relationship with other SADC countries in the sense of egalitarian ties. To that end, I use Regional Solidarity in the mapping to stress South Africa's identity and role in the region as a hegemon, rather than an egalitarian partner.

The status of South Africa as a hegemon or an egalitarian partner is significant in the context of realist interpretations of nation states as self-serving entities i.e. they are looking out for their own interests and tend to undertake international relations in ways that maximize those interests.[29] This characterization of nation-states relates directly to the ubiquitous state interests around the world premised on maximizing economic gain in international relations. While the modern capitalism driving these self-interests is morally condemnable, the idea came about because of the understanding that it was not okay for strong powers to control all markets. Instead, all states should be able to mobilize their advantages in relation to other states (through liberalizing trade for instance). Yet, contrary to the realist argument/interpretation, South Africa is actually not liberalizing educational trade. Rather than liberalize educational trade, the country is subsidizing the education of more than 70% of its foreign student population (the SADC students), a policy that research participants perceived as premised on moral and utilitarian arguments. Prof. Richard (a white South African former top administrator), for instance noted:

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[29] See, for instance, Dube (2006) on South Africa's self-interest in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

> I think that that [SADC subsidy] is one of the most farsighted measures that have been put in place…the more we assist those countries prospering the more we benefit from that, number one. Number two, if these countries don't prosper we don't have markets to export to and more of their citizens might want to come into South Africa. If one is thinking about it, South Africa could be benefiting from the talent in these countries that might end up spending time in South Africa, or might have all of their careers in South Africa and not going back home and contributing to the skills base and talent pool in South Africa.

The moral argument is clearly articulated by Prof. Fidelis (a non-national black professor directly involved with internationalization in one of the faculties):

> South Africa owes the rest of Africa in many ways. South Africa was the last to become independent and the support they got from the rest of Africa is quite substantial and for them to pay in that way in terms of subsidy I think it makes sense for me.

The moral argument gets at what the state can do, for instance through expanding access to higher education to redistribute goods/resources in ways that compensate for or correct historical injustices. Mobilizing the moral care argument, as in beseeching the paternal state to provide higher education, raises questions about the extent to which that which can be paid for with money, both internally in South Africa and regionally, actually addresses the historical injustices equitably. Although they are not saying it explicitly, the black South African student activists are arguing that higher education is a key reparation resource. However, while free and subsidized higher education could be provided to South African citizens and SADC nationals, respectively, the majority of people could still say the moral debt has not been paid. This is particularly true in higher education sector where the proportion of the black South African and SADC population that accesses higher education in South Africa's top-rated universities is remarkably small compared to the population that does not benefit therefrom.

Policy Imperative 4: Rainbow Nation

Considering South Africa's apartheid past, which produced imbalances and inequities in a nation of divergent peoples (Woodrooffe, 2011); the idea of a democratic South African nation was driven by the logic of national social cohesion among and between the country's divided

communities and individuals (Abrahams, 2016). As a national metaphor in the reconciliatory post-apartheid context, the Rainbow Nation discourse describes South Africa's diverse racial make-up and cultural pluralism and denotes a commitment to the ideals of national reconciliation (Buqa, 2015; Evans, 2010; Marschall, 2010; Moller & Dickow, 1999). Coined by Desmond Tutu and popularized by Nelson Mandela during the advent of democracy, the Rainbow Nation concept encapsulates the unity and coming together within multiculturalism and diversity of South African people (Buqa, 2015). Given its emphasis on multiracialism, multiculturalism and inclusive citizenship in the context of ethnic and linguistic diversities, the metaphor of the rainbow nation is comparable to the melting pot and salad bowl discourses in the U.S. (Evans, 2010).

As part of the institution's policy rhetoric, around diversity for instance, the multiracial and inclusive sensibility of the Rainbow Nation discourse appeared to be the only space available at WCU for remnants of white supremacism to exist. However, the discourse played a remarkably subservient role to the robust institutional mobilization around transformation/decolonization that manifested as a racialized agenda defined and directed by black South African activists.

The traction of the decolonization agenda reflected a backlash against the failure of the Rainbow Nation metaphor and the national social cohesion project to yield a just and equal society. The post-apartheid social reform aimed at dismantling the deep-seated socio-economic effects of apartheid, creating a reconciled national identity, and promoting a new racially and ethnically neutral South Africa was successful only in creating the appearance and illusion of unity and stability deemed crucial to the resurrection of the South African economy (Evans, 2010; Woodrooffe, 2011). Buga (2015) notes that for South Africans who, more than two decades into

the democratic transition, do not have water to drink or a place to sleep, the Rainbow Nation

became an empty term. Consequently, race and color have remained the principal axes of

consciousness as South Africans continue to think of themselves as either black or white people

(Buqa, 2015). These sentiments were particularly widespread among black South African student

activists such as Mpho:

> This is where the disjuncture then happens between us and management (the political elites and university administrators) at WCU, but also between us and that political elite that comes out of the 60s, 70s and 80s. [They say] we are misguided and we do not know what we are talking about because [their] imagination is that of the rainbow nation [and] of a democratic transition. Our imagination is a different one, one of decolonizing the country and decolonizing the universities.

The disjuncture came about because, no matter how Nelson Mandela and others pushed the idea

of a reconciled national identity, it did not dismantle the deep-seated socio-economic effects of

apartheid (Evans, 2010).

The rainbow nation concept grew out of favor and was rejected by the majority black

South Africans, not just because the demographics and political leadership in the country had

changed, but also because of its connection with global capitalism. The celebration of the

rainbow nation and a multicultural South Africa rationalized the neoliberalization of the

economy, put in place after 1994. To the extent that the neoliberal economic model decimated

the left wing and weakened workers' unions, black nationalists argued that the rainbow nation

concept had proven to not work for the majority of working class families.

I include the National Social Cohesion logic in the mapping of the policy landscape in

recognition of voices within the institution as in the country as a whole, which emphasize that

racial and other differences should be recognized and appreciated, but should not stand in the

way of race-blind policies. However, given its limited visibility and lack of traction in policy

debates, I do bring up the national social cohesion logic and the corresponding quadrant as needed, but otherwise focus attention on the other three quadrants.

Conclusion

An analysis of boundary drawing, this chapter presented the institutional policy landscape at WCU as both racialized and nationalized. It discussed how the notions of race and nationality were wielded by different actors to demand that the university prioritize particular policy imperatives (e.g. Transformation and Internationalization). The organizing logics for each quadrant (i.e. national racial justice, national social cohesion, regional solidarity, and international recognition) played a pivotal role in shaping the economic logics regarding where and how institutional resources should be allocated and spent (addressed in the next chapter). The availability of resources and their allocation had a bearing on why the policy discourses might have or might not have taken off in particular ways.

Centered on the history of institutionalized racial injustices of the apartheid era, the Transformation quadrant rested on an economic logic framed around equity. The equity argument was especially significant and particularly powerful because of how it enabled #FeesMustFall (the subject of chapter 6) to take off when the racialized and nationalist student demands essentially undercut the rest of WCU's post-apartheid policy imperatives. The equity logic became so much bigger that it either blocked out and eclipsed the rest, or pulled and swayed everything else into new orbits. This was because the national racial justice demands held disproportionately more focus that then denied the rest of the policy imperatives the power to stand on their own. As a result, the rest had to be renegotiated and re-narrativized in relation to Transformation/Decolonization, or incorporated into the equity logic.

In terms of resource allocation, proponents of the equity logic made a compelling case for investing in access for and the success/throughput of historically marginalized South Africans. The equity notion recognized that, owing to exclusionary and elitist policies of apartheid, the majority of black South Africans were saddled with weaker K-12 backgrounds and often faced academic and financial limitations. In light of their limiting socioeconomic backgrounds and financial exclusion from well-equipped pre-college educational facilities, the students rejected the narratives that characterized them as "underprepared for college." Rather than let themselves be blamed for deficiencies directly linked to the country's apartheid history, the student protesters demanded that WCU commit significant resources toward reforming the curriculum, and providing comprehensive publicly-funded financial support.

The equity logic offered a potent critical lens with which the black South African students came to engage with the national social cohesion, regional solidarity/cooperation, and international recognition/competition thrusts of the other quadrants. The student activists recognized and argued that the notions of merit and quality valued within internationalization circles, for instance, excluded most of them. This was because the competition-for-status terms guiding WCU's internationalization policy and practice were evidently dictated by Euro/American-centric models that privileged depoliticized conceptions of merit and quality.

Contrary to the student activists' singular focus on equity, conceived within national parameters, WCU relied on the blackness of the regional non-national students to hold together the tensions between Transformation and Internationalization. WCU admitted significant numbers of black students from the SADC region and the rest of the continent who got counted in both the Transformation and Internationalization quadrants. Their presence on campus made

the university appear more racially integrated, internationalized, and responsive to regional calls for geopolitical redress and development cooperation.

Despite being utilized to orchestrate a response to, and mediate the conflicting national racial justice and international recognition logics, in reality the regional students were not fully accounted for in institutional discourses, policies and structures for either Transformation or Internationalization. This was because the non-national African students did not constitute the historically marginalized black South Africans targeted by and benefitting from the South Africa government's post-apartheid equity policies; nor were they the typical self-funding international customer that many destination countries rely on for much-needed source of income. Consequently, the regional non-nationals were denied the space to act in solidarity with the equity logics driving black South African student politics in ways that would have effectively drawn institutional attention to their needs (the subject of chapter 7).

Chapter 5

Institutionalization of Competing Policy Imperatives

Introduction

Chapter 4 mapped the discursive frames, policy discourses and logics, and racial and national identity markers characterizing the institutional policy landscape at World Class University (WCU). The institutional policy landscape provided an analytical tool for visualizing the meaning-making processes emerging from institutional actors' interactions with competing internal and external policy pressures and with each other. This chapter addresses how WCU administrators responded to the national racial justice, national social cohesion, regional solidarity, and global recognition imperatives of the post-apartheid higher education landscape. In particular, the chapter focuses on which policy discourses and logics were institutionalized in the university, which were not, why this was the case, what effects this had on institutional resource allocation, and what it meant for services that could and could not be delivered to different groupings of student populations. Student constituencies' responses to these institutional structures and corresponding service delivery regimes is the subject of chapters 6 and 7.

I use the notation "institutionalized" to denote the existence of explicit official policy texts and the allocation of targeted institutional resources such as policy frameworks, and budgets in pursuance of the policy imperatives. Both the national racial justice and global recognition logics were articulated through an extensive range and reach of agendas, policies and formal structures (e.g. physical offices and staff/personnel) that supported the transformation and internationalization agendas, respectively. The institutionalization of the national racial justice logic is of particular significance because it also found expression in the robust student political

activism and mobilization covered in chapter 6. However, neither the national social cohesion nor regional solidarity logics had any such institutional support.

I argue that the institutionalization of transformation and internationalization, but not of rainbow nation and regionalization discourses, constitutes WCU's institutional response to a very complex political terrain, involving setting limits upon what can be said and thought, and who can speak, when, where, and with what authority (e.g. Bacchi, 2000; Ball, 1990; Codd, 1988). WCU's efforts to balance and integrate demands and/or claims for higher education equity, social cohesion,[30] cooperation for intra-regional development, and the internationalization goals of their higher education systems have implications for thinking about the nature, the role, and the place of public universities in the post-apartheid era. The limited policy attention given to the regional cooperation and national social cohesion logics indicates how WCU both reflected and fomented the political tensions regarding to whom public universities belong: are they an apparatus of state power; are they an organization for students, and which students; are they universal as their name implies; or do they belong unto themselves?

WCU's relationship with the state is obviously important for our understanding of how public university administrators manage the tensions and contestations that arise from conflicting global, regional, and national imperatives in post-apartheid South African higher education. In a study that adopts a state-centric framework to analyze the expansion of the BRICs'[31] higher education systems, Carnoy et al. (2013) posit that universities may initiate responses to the ideological components of globalization (as constituted through notions of elite/world-class research-type universities), but states are the locus of change. In support of the claim, the authors

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[30] I pointed out in chapter 4 that the social cohesion logic has limited visibility and traction in policy debates at WCU. For that reason, the logic and the corresponding rainbow nation discourse are not part of the discussion in this chapter.

[31] Brazil, Russia, India and China.

point out that BRICs public universities depend at least in part on the state for funding and are often propelled by state-sanctioned initiatives to operate as they do. In fact, they argue that the BRICs states use the expansion of university education to achieve legitimacy: policies that expand higher education respond to domestic demand by families and enterprises for more higher education, and to international ideology that places a high value on elite research universities.

The state-centric conceptual framework fails to treat public universities as autonomous actors whose academic goals do not always align with the political goals of the state. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, vocal elements of the post-apartheid South African state and radical student political activists linked higher education with a transformation agenda premised on redress, equity and racial justice (see also chapter 6). Alongside this imperative, the country's top-ranked public research universities such as WCU also proactively sought to recruit international students to raise the institution's global profile, a response to the dictates of globalization in higher education. Strikingly, the institutional drive to recruit non-national students from the immediate SADC region, negatively correlated with institutional support systems available for these same students. Chapter 7 discusses the experiences of the non-national students and focuses on why the internationalization structures in place in the university did not work for them.

Beyond examining how a state-funded and state-regulated public university such as WCU interacts with and responds to state mandates, there is need to focus on human agency and how it shapes the relations and interactions between people and groups within public universities themselves, the higher education sector, or the state. Within-the-institution contradictions, for instance tensions among different actors/groups within the same organization, are an important

reminder that organizations are not necessarily internally coherent. This will be evident in chapters 6 and 7 where I address the consequences of institutional actions on students' experiences—and particularly, the experiences and relations among non-national and domestic students.

To understand how WCU managed the competing imperatives and visions of post-apartheid South African higher education, I first describe the institutionalization of the transformation and internationalization discourses at the system/national and institutional levels, particularly national and institutional strategic plans and policies and the infrastructure provided to support the implementation thereof. Next, I reflect on the conspicuous absence of formal institutional structures of the regionalization discourse and the corresponding regional solidarity logic. Having established the limited attention given to the regional solidarity aspects at both system (state) and institutional (university) levels, chapters 6 and 7 turn to what the institutionalization reveals about internal disagreements (among student, administration, state, regional and global actors) generated by the competing demands for equity, redress and racial justice; national social cohesion; intra-regional development cooperation; and global recognition. Doing so is crucial for understanding and unravelling the social function of policy discourses and discursive activities in mediating power and control over narratives pertaining to the role and mission of public universities in South Africa.

Institutionalization of Transformation: System level

The racial justice logic undergirding the transformation agenda in South Africa is clearly articulated, not only by student protesters, but also by policy makers and government officials. For example, Professor Bengu (Minister of Education during the early period of transition to democracy) pointed out that "the higher education system needed to be transformed to redress

past inequalities, serve a new social order, meet pressing national needs, and to respond to new

realities and opportunities" (Ministry of Education, 1997, p. 3). Key among the untenable

legacies of the apartheid era were an inequitable distribution of access and opportunities for

students and staff along lines of race, gender, class and geography. This included gross

discrepancies in the participation rates of students from different population groups; imbalances

in the ratios of black and female staff compared to whites and males; and disparities between

historically black and historically white institutions in terms of facilities and capacities (Ministry

of Education, 1997).

Two post-apartheid policies provided a framework for creating a new, equitable system

of higher education: *Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher*

Education and the *National Plan for Higher Education in South Africa* (Mabokela & Mlambo,

2017).[32] Although these policies make reference to the need and intention to position South

Africa to participate in a rapidly changing and competitive global context, both are essentially

domestically focused. Below I provide a brief overview of the tenets of both policies.

The first policy on transforming higher education, the White Paper, aimed to redress

inequalities of apartheid in line with the overall ruling African National Congress (ANC)'s

equity and redress policy (Mabokela & Mlambo, 2017). It "outlines a comprehensive set of

initiatives for the transformation of higher education through the development of a single

coordinated system with new planning, governing and funding arrangements" (Ministry of

Education, 1997, p. 4). The White Paper envisioned transformation of the higher education

system and its institutions as requiring increased and broadened participation, responsiveness to

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[32] While this chapter covers the two policies as a form of institutionalization of the transformation discourse and agenda at the system/national level, Mabokela & Mlambo (2017) actually offer a critical policy analysis of the policies.

societal interests and needs, and cooperation and partnership in governance. The increased and broadened participation mandate pertained mainly to black, women, disabled and mature students, but also included the generation of new curricula[33] and flexible models of learning and teaching, and modes of delivery that would accommodate a larger and more diverse student population. Responsiveness to societal interests and needs would involve restructuring the higher education system and its institutions to equip the nation to participate in an increasingly technologically-oriented economy and a rapidly changing and competitive global context. Lastly, cooperation and partnership in governance would re-conceptualize the relationship between higher education and the state, civil society, and stakeholders, and among institutions to affirm diversity, promote reconciliation and protect the dignity and respect for human life.

The second policy, the National Plan for Higher Education, was formulated in 2001 in response to the criticism that the White Paper 3 not only lacked an assessment mechanism of the system and an implementation strategy, but also that it did not pay sufficient attention to black academic and administrative staff (Odhav, 2009). Envisioned as an implementation framework for the transformation visions and goals articulated in the Education White Paper 3, the National Plan for Higher Education signified a shift in overall policy from a single focus on access and equity toward efficiency of the higher education system (Fiske & Ladd 2004; Ministry of Education, 2001). Among other things, the policy "establishes indicative targets for the size and shape of the higher education system, including overall growth and participation rates, institutional and programs mixes and equity and efficiency goals [and] provides a framework and

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[33] Chapter 3 covered how the change trajectory of curricula development immediately following the end of apartheid leaned more on the reform than overhaul side. Jansen (1999) describes it as cleansing of the syllabi from the most offensive racist language and a purging of controversial and outdated content.

outlines the process for the restructuring of the institutional landscape of the higher education

system" (Ministry of Education, 2001, p. 10).[34]

The White Paper 3 and the National Plan for Higher Education are not the only

system/national level policies that have a bearing on the conceptualization and

institutionalization of transformation at WCU. As Table 1 shows, the university has developed

institutional versions of national-level anti-discrimination, employment equity, sexual

harassment, disabilities, and HIV/AIDS policies.

Table 1: Transformation-related Policies at National and Institutional Levels

	Institutional Policy/Draft Policy	Institutional Support Documents	Framing National Legislation
Discrimination	Anti-discrimination Policy Employment Equity Policy	Codes of Good Practice Employment Equity Plan	Employment Equity Act Employment Equity Amendments
Sexual Harassment	Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures	Codes of Good Practice	Sexual Offenses Act Equality Act
Disability	Policy on the Employment and Advancement of Persons with Disabilities	Disability Accommodation Fund Codes of Good Practice	Integrated National Disability Strategy White Paper
HIV/AIDS (Wellness)	HIV and AIDS Policy	Codes of Good Practice	HESA Aids Policy framework guidelines South African National Aids Strategy

These institutional versions of national policies center the national role of WCU, and tie the

university closely to nationally-oriented ways of thinking about citizen rights/legal rulings of

state departments such as Labor, Home Affairs, and Social Development. The Department of

Social Development, for instance, is responsible for management and oversight over social

security, encompassing social assistance and social insurance policies that aim to prevent and

alleviate poverty in the event of life cycle risks such as loss of income due to unemployment,

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[34] The debates on how to conceptualize, negotiate, and operationalize institutional responsiveness in relation to the quality and equity imperatives of the post-apartheid South African higher education are discussed in chapter 3.

disability, old age or death occurring.[35] While the national role of public universities makes sense, not all of their students, staff and faculty are South African citizens, and so they cannot make claims to services that are configured within nationalist parameters. As chapter 7 will explore in greater detail, the limited attention given to regionalist permutations of higher education provision in the country impacts negatively on non-national student experiences.

Institutionalization of Transformation: Institutional Level

WCU framed its transformation visions/goals as informed by the need to respond to the social, economic, political and cultural imperatives to redress the inequalities and injustice generated by apartheid and address the impact of these inequalities. The transformation goals were in turn guided by national development goals, equity legislation, the values enshrined in the South African Bill of Rights and the Constitution, the United Nations Millennium Declaration, and the university and country's location on the African continent. WCU's transformation agenda found expression through an elaborate transformation infrastructure consisting of many units, committees and forums. The organogram below outlines the roles played by key transformation stakeholders at WCU, and the linkages within the transformation framework.

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[35] http://www.dsd.gov.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=54

Figure 9: Transformation Governance[36]

The Transformation Office was responsible for policy development; monitoring and advising university stakeholders (e.g. the Student Representative Council, Institutional Culture Committee,[37] Senate and Council) on the institution's transformation priorities; supporting institutional culture initiatives; coordinating transformation activities; and communicating the university's transformation objectives. The office understood its mandate as encompassing employment equity, diversity, equity and social justice (conceived around social asymmetries in areas such as race, sex, culture, (dis)ability, and place of origin), and sexual orientation and

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[36] WCU Webpage

[37] Responsible for identifying, investigating, reviewing and analyzing barriers to employment equity (e.g. unjust discriminatory practices) and providing possible solutions/interventions to prevent the recurrence of such practices.

gender identity advocacy. The office also coordinated school- and department-level committees,

mainly staffed by faculty members and responsible for ensuring accelerated implementation,

policy development and oversight. The two primary committees—the Transformation

Implementation and Transformation Steering committees—are detailed in the table below.

Table 2: Transformation Committees

	Membership	**Duties and Responsibilities**
Transformation Implementation Committee	Vice Chancellor (Chair), Deans of Faculties, DVCs,[38] Head of Transformation Office, and two academic staff members	Oversee the appointments of the of African, Colored, and senior lecturers under the diversifying the academy program, and provide strategic oversight on the advancement of senior lecturers to associate professors and associate professors to full professorship Responsible for monitoring and reporting on the progress made on the implementation of the eight key transformation action areas Monitor faculty demographics against targets and staff movements, and track the support provided to the newly appointed employees including retention strategies Assume responsibility for the Vice Chancellor's Equity Fund that is targeted at the appointment of staff from all designated groups
Transformation Steering Committee	All key university constituencies: DVC Transformation (chair), Faculty Transformation Chairs, SRC,[39] Institutional Culture Committee, University Forum, All resident Council, PGA,[40] Senior Director of HR, Dean of Student Affairs, Head of Transformation Office	Advise on implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the institutional transformation programs and the university transformation plan Receive progress reports on faculty transformation projects Input on policy and institutional debates from transformation perspective Provide support to faculty transformation committees and student transformation efforts more generally Ensure the development and the implementation of the University Transformation Plan and Charter

As one mid-level administrator directly involved with the Transformation Office pointed

out, the transformation agenda was being driven by Transformation Committees in respective

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[38] Deputy Vice Chancellors

[39] Student Representative Council

[40] Postgraduate Association

schools or departments. The institutionalization of the transformation agenda suggests

institutional commitment to changing organizational culture and operational norms to

accommodate historically marginalized black South Africans. However, institutional efforts

lacked buy-in from the black student constituency whose views were that, both nationally and

within the university, the pace of transformation had been slow. As noted in chapter 4, Mpho (a

senior South African black student activist) captured fellow black South African students'

sentiments of regarding WCU's transformation bureaucracy:

> This is where the disjuncture then happens between us and management (the political elites and
> university administrators) at WCU but also between us and that political elite that comes out of
> the 60s, 70s and 80s. [They say] we are misguided and we do not know what we are talking about
> because [their] imagination is that of the rainbow nation [and] of a democratic transition. Our
> imagination is a different one, one of decolonizing the country and decolonizing the universities.

The disjuncture between students and university administrators (and state actors) came

into sharp focus during a heated exchange at an open discussion forum co-hosted by a diversity-

focused unit in the university and a student-led group as part of an initiative to stimulate student

engagement with topical and important social issues relating to diversity, leadership, and

governance. At this particular session, the subject was "Who owns WCU?" The most common

refrain from student contributors was that WCU operated within capitalist logics and served the

interests of powerful white people who dominated the University Council for instance. Despite

the incorporation of two student representatives in the Council, the majority of students felt that

their voices were not being heard and their demands for radical transformation were not being

addressed.

The institutional transformation policy in place when I conducted fieldwork came about

as a result of stakeholder conversations convened by the university's top administrators on

successes and failures of existing structures. The engagements led to the development of a

statement and strategic plan comprising eight key transformation priorities or action areas: diversifying the academy, curriculum reform, student admissions, promoting diverse resident life experience, institutional culture, institutional naming, language, and insourcing all outsourced activities. The rolling out of the action plans also included identification of relevant administrators who would be responsible for implementing each action area, and annual targets and measures that would be written into both the institutional scorecard and the performance contracts of the administrators.

The first priority, described as the single biggest transformative issue at WCU, was diversifying the academy. Although there had been a decline, Tables 3 and 4 show whites and men were still disproportionately represented in the academy, particularly among Professor, Associate Professor, Senior Lecturer and Lecturer positions. As Table 4 shows, out of the 78 male full professors, only nine were black South African, and out of 43 female full professors, only 1 was black South African. Unsurprisingly, one of transformation's key performance indicators at WCU was employment equity. The key employment equity objectives at WCU included implementing affirmative action measures to redress historic unfair discrimination and disparities; eliminating all forms of unfair discrimination in employment and other operational practices, systems, policies and procedures; ensuring the development and implementation of programs aimed at the advancement of diversity and maintenance of human dignity; and outlining monitoring and accountability measures.

Table 3: Academic Staff Demographic Profile[41]

Population	2010	2016	2017 Target
African	10%	15%	17%
Colored	3%	4%	5%
Indian	9%	10%	10%
White	55%	46%	45%

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[41] Source: WCU Employment Equity Plan

International	24%	25%	23%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Table 4: Academic Staff by Academic Description[42]

Occupational Levels	Male				Total Males	Female				Total Females	Foreign Nationals		Total
	A	C	I	W		A	C	I	W		Male	Female	
Head of Schools	2	1	2	11	**16**	0	2	1	6	**9**	5	0	**30**
Professor	9	3	10	78	**100**	1	1	3	43	**48**	60	6	**214**
Associate Professor	9	1	9	69	**88**	9	5	6	61	**81**	53	28	**250**
Senior Lecturer	15	3	8	65	**91**	16	6	15	92	**129**	71	35	**326**
Lecturer	43	13	22	118	**196**	73	26	47	145	**291**	64	48	**599**
Associate Lecturer	32	4	18	35	**89**	45	8	24	68	**145**	25	19	**278**
GRAND TOTAL	**108**	**24**	**67**	**365**	**564**	**144**	**46**	**95**	**409**	**694**	**273**	**136**	**1667**

The diversification of the academy primarily targeted increasing the representation of African and Colored staff in the academy and professoriate. To show their commitment to diversifying the academy, WCU administrators announced tens of millions of Rands intended for addressing the underrepresentation of black and Colored academics at senior levels. Within five years, the university would recruit more than 20 academics and seek to promote 30 African and Colored academics who were in the system from senior lecturers to associate professors and from associate professors to full professors. The particular task of diversifying the academy would be coordinated by the DVC: Advancement, HR and Transformation and managed on a daily basis by the Head of the Transformation Office. However, it was the responsibility of all senior and middle managers (the VC, DVCs, Deans of Faculties, Directors, Heads of Divisions, Heads of Schools and Heads of administrative departments) to implement the provisions of the Employment Equity policy.

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[42] Source: WCU Employment Equity Plan. KEY: A – African, C – Colored, I – Indian, and W – White.

Rather than continue relying on the initiative of individual academics, Schools and Departments, and students, the second priority was to adopt a proactive strategy to curriculum reform. Depending on discipline, the curriculum reform might require the inclusion of new subject matter and reference material, a greater heterodoxy or rethinking the teaching pedagogy by either contextualizing the subject matter with the use of relevant local examples and/or using alternative technological instruments to transmit knowledge and enhance understanding. The curriculum reform priority would be coordinated by the DVC: Academic and managed by the Centre for Teaching and Learning.

The third priority, student admissions, aimed to strike a balance between demographic diversity in order to address historical redress and generate the soft skill sets[43] deemed crucial for 21st century citizens and professionals in multicultural South African and global workplaces. The emphasis on promoting demographic diversity and fostering intercultural personal skills and cultural tolerance across racial, ethnic and religious boundaries gestured toward discursively bringing together transformation and internationalization goals even when in reality WCU had not managed to bring the two together. While administrators expressed satisfaction with the university's overall 75% black and 25% white demographic profile,[44] there was recognition that this demographic pattern was not equally spread across the institution, which suggested the need to increase the proportion of particular populations such as talented students from rural schools in programs such as Medicine. The agenda to address demographic and class diversity across all programs would be managed by the DVC: Academic in conjunction with the relevant Dean.

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[43] For instance, intercultural personal skills, cultural tolerance across racial, ethnic and religious boundaries.

[44] The 75% figure for blacks includes all non-white local South African population groups (e.g. Coloreds and Asian), and black non-national students. The inclusion of the non-national students here is an example of how WCU relies on the blackness of this group when the university runs the numbers for Transformation.

With less than 3% of white students in residences, the fourth priority was geared toward promoting diverse residence life experience. Increasing the representation of white students in residences was presented as a strategic priority on the grounds of both pedagogy and institutional goals, rather than as according white students preferential treatment at the expense of other student populations. Beyond increasing the proportion of white students, diverse residence life was also conceived around establishing an environment in which persons from multiple religious backgrounds – Christian, Hindu, Muslim, traditional African, Jewish, atheist – and cultural experiences have significant presence within residences. The Dean of Student Affairs would coordinate diversity initiatives including ways to mitigate any adverse effects thereof on poor students.

The fifth priority, institutional culture, stemmed from the recognition that significant numbers of black students continued to feel marginalized at WCU even though they constituted the majority of students. To address the many allegations of racism consistently received from both staff and students, the Transformation Office would establish an advocacy campaign to identify the sources of friction between various groups and develop strategies to create a more socially inclusive institutional environment for academic, professional, and administrative staff, and to investigate and undertake disciplinary processes for racism allegations. The initiatives around institutional culture would be jointly managed by the DVC: Advancement, HR and Transformation, and the Dean of Student Affairs.

The sixth priority pertained to the need for a proactive strategy on the naming of institutional buildings and other sites. The naming would need to strike a balance between names derived from sponsorships and donations, and those that emanated from strategic considerations such as the establishment of an institutional identity, and the naming strategy should be informed

by both western and indigenous traditions. The task would be managed by an existing Naming Committee under the direction of the DVC: Advancement, HR and Transformation.

The seventh priority underscored the importance of keeping English as a primary language of instruction in recognition of the language's primacy in global economic and political interactions. However, multilingualism was also deemed an important part of WCU's global recognition aspirations. WCU administrators saw the need to create the resources and instruments to enable staff and students to develop competence in one of at least two African languages located within the two major language clusters of Nguni and Sotho, and to adopt South African Sign Language as part of the linguistic repertoire. The language and multilingualism initiative would be overseen by the DVC: Academic and managed by the Academic Planning and Development Committee.

Finally, the transformation plan responded to increasing calls by students, staff and external stakeholders such as unions for all services that were outsourced over the past two decades to be insourced. WCU acknowledged the plight of grossly exploited and in some cases even abused workers who serviced WCU. Despite the acknowledgement, administrators claimed that the university would not be able to insource these services and put the workers directly onto the institutional payroll without increasing student fees by an additional 15% above the normal annual increase. This being an untenable option for students and families, an alternative was to get an equivalent increase in the subsidy from the state, which was unlikely in the near future. In the short-term, the university would adopt stopgap measures such as writing into existing contracts clauses that required companies to abide by certain minimum salary thresholds and observe labor relations requirements, and assist workers in establishing cooperatives so that they could bid competitively for contracts. In the long-term, the university would partner with civil

society organizations, unions and other universities to launch a national campaign to push for more subsidies to universities.

Black South African students' concerns with institutional racism and the slow pace of transformation, which gave rise to the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall movements, played a major role in prompting WCU administrators to rethink the university's transformation project. Whereas prior approaches to institutional transformation featured administrators in agenda-setting roles, the breakout of the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall in 2015 upended these relations as students took over the agenda-setting role, albeit for a limited time. Thus, the power and reach of the transformation apparatus was at various moments mediated by the power and reach of the transformation logic as defined by WCU administrators and black South African student activists. Minimal to no space was available for non-South African students and white South African students to play a part in setting the terms of the debates. In the next section, I look at how the pressures exerted by the global recognition logic translated into the internationalization policy at the national, higher education system, and institutional levels.

Institutionalization of Internationalization: System level

Although the post-1994 period saw an influx of non-national students into South Africa, and reconnection with the world was seen as one of the urgent post-1994 matters that needed the attention of higher education leadership, Jooste (2015) points out that between 1994 and 2000, internationalization was not one of the priorities in the country's universities. In fact, up until 2000, not more than 20% of South African universities actively pursued the concept of comprehensive internationalization. In my 2016 interview with Mr. Mamello (a high-ranking Department of Higher Education and Training – DHET official), he indicated that up until that time (2016), the country had no official policy on internationalization. However, work on a

national policy framework had started in 2011 and the DHET published a draft of the policy

framework in April 2017. The absence of government or any higher education system policy did

not preclude the country's higher education institutions from being approached by universities in

the international higher education community to engage in collaborative activities. In those

instances, engagement in higher education internationalization relied on the vision, leadership

and drive of individual universities. Consequently, tertiary institutions struggled with

establishing institutional identities and developing a systematic and uniquely South African

model of internationalization (Cross et al. 2011).

Before discussing the 2017 *Policy Framework for the Internationalisation of Higher*

Education in South Africa (hereafter, the National Policy Framework), I turn briefly to some of

the key official government documents/statements relating to internationalization of higher

education in South Africa prior to the National Policy Framework. To the best of my knowledge,

one of the first government policy documents to explicitly mention internationalization by name

as a policy objective of higher education in South Africa was the 2013 *White Paper for Post-*

School Education and Training: Building an Expanded, Effective and Integrated Post-School

System. The then Minister of the DHET described the policy document as "a definitive statement

of the government's vision for the post-school system, outlining our main priorities and our

strategies for achieving them" p. vii. The 75-page paper includes a 677-word section on

internationalization, which singles out strong international partnerships and links, research

partnerships, exchanges of students and staff, and the free movement of academics and students

across borders as ways to improve international communication, cross-cultural learning and

global citizenship.

An earlier policy, the *National Development Plan* of 2012, had set up a number of internationalization-related goals and targets for higher education sector. These goals included international exchange partnerships, expanded research capacity and improved research output through the support of postgraduate study and research partnerships, and the establishment of South Africa as a preferred study destination for non-national students and a hub for higher education and training in the southern African region. The notion of positioning South Africa as a regional higher education hub is closely tied to ratification of the 1997 SADC Protocol on Education and Training by the South African government in 2000. I discuss the SADC Protocol latter in the chapter.

According to Mr. Mamello, the National Policy Framework for internationalization was intended to provide the higher education system with parameters for when they engage internationally. This was in recognition of the emergence of post-apartheid South Africa as a knowledge hub on the African continent, a sought-after destination for international research collaboration, and a recipient of requests from foreign institutions to offer joint programs and qualifications. He characterized the National Policy Framework as a fine balance between allowing universities enough space to formulate their own policies and a bit of dos and don'ts that would protect the integrity and reputation of the higher education system and of the country.

The DHET's approach of regulating internationalization practices without being too restrictive on universities, indicates a consciousness to the fact that "the university has [its] own [academic] imperatives, the government has [its] own [political] imperatives – the two do clash at times" (Prof. Derek, a black non-South African professor). Prof. Cloud (an Indian South African Professor at a public university originally created for the Colored) recounted an incident where the state's political goals conflicted with one top university's academic goals. A few years

back, the DHET had proposed to recruit students for all public universities on a central basis. The top-rated university resisted the government proposal to centralize student recruitment. While a centralized student recruitment regime could have been rationalized on the grounds of transparency and equalizing access opportunities, the international-status conscious university successfully fought to reserve the right to recruit students with the profiles that would enable it to maintain a competitive edge on the global higher education stage.

On why the country and the higher education system needed a national policy on internationalization, Mr. Mamello stressed the importance of coming up with rules of engagement that would regulate the activities that relate to internationalization by higher education institutions and other role players in the sector. He pointed out that the National Policy Framework would have a component on joint degrees and prohibit trading on education and making profits unethically. Rather than frame the regulations as uniquely South African, Mr. Mamello posited that there was actually a new movement internationally to come up with policies to spell out rules of engagement and regulate ethical internationalization practices. For example, he mentioned that until as recently as 2010, the Norwegians did not have an Internationalization Policy, but as of 2012 they had a draft that they shared with the DHET.

The National Policy Framework itself covers several key components. These include responsibilities of government and institutions in advancing internationalization of higher education in South Africa; guidelines for student and staff mobility and international research collaboration; cross-border and collaborative provision of higher education; the governance, administration and reporting of internationalization of higher education; internationalization at home and the internationalization of the curriculum; and quality assurance and accreditation. It spells out that the practice of internationalization in the country's universities should give

precedence to South African interests. Thereafter the order of priority would be the interests of

SADC states, then the rest of the African continent; then the global South and emerging

economies, and then the world beyond.

The stated goals of internationalization include enhancing the reputation, quality and

relevance of the country's higher education sector. To do so, South African universities will have

to attract talented and highly qualified people, and develop strategic alliances for enhanced

bilateral, multi-lateral and regional cooperation. To that end, South African higher education

institutions are host to growing numbers of non-national students, particularly at the postgraduate

level. The framework acknowledges that the presence of these non-national students on South

African campuses requires clear national and institutional policies, processes and services.

However, no attention is paid to the fact that, in practice, the internationalization goals sit in

tension with the transformation agenda's focus on expanding access and making universities

responsive to the needs of historically marginalized black South African students.

The National Policy Framework calls for the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) and

the DHET to optimally coordinate their activities and processes to facilitate access to a

transparent and streamlined visa application and approval process for inbound non-national

students. The call was necessitated by the two Departments' sometimes contradictory policies

around the flow of non-nationals into the country. Mr. Mamello did not want to speak on record

regarding the tensions between the DHET and the DoHA, but he mentioned that:

> This [issue of relations with the DoHA] is a difficult one, you know, for us…we [are] dealing
> with a different animal altogether when we talk about the DoHA. Both in terms of the policy,
> which I think we do understand, but then we are also dealing with personalities.

As an expression of the DHET's stance, the National Policy Framework, as well as the

other earlier internationalization-related documents, pitch internationalization as contributing to

an increase in knowledge production, intellectual property and innovation in South Africa, and as assisting in strengthening all South African universities. This perception of internationalization revolves around legitimizing universalizing concepts and approaches generated by western scholars and emanating from the realities and experiences of countries in North America and Europe (Cross, et al., 2009). Given how processes of internationalization often serve to maintain longstanding global hierarchies of flows of knowledges and people (Forstorp 2008), Cross et al. (2009) describe South Africa's so-called return to the international community and the increasing inclusion of international, intercultural and global dimensions in university curricula as bordering on an uncritical celebration of globalization.

As most research on internationalization focuses on what is going on *across* national borders (most often in the global north), very little attention has been paid to the dynamics that shape internationalization *within* borders, particularly in countries of the global south. Increasingly, scholars have examined the challenges that policy makers face when they must strike a balance between national concerns for racial justice and educational equity, and global pressures to internationalize higher education (e.g. Majee & Ress, 2018; Maringe, 2013, McClellan, 2008). Contrary to the situations in global south contexts such as South Africa, in most countries in the global north, this has not been conceptualized as a core tension facing policymakers, though its U.S. correlate is becoming clearer as states disinvest in public higher education and universities face pressures to increase out-of-state (including international) enrollments.

In the next section, I show how the International Education Association of South Africa (IEASA) has been foremost in championing and shaping the internationalization discourse across the higher education sector. A non-statutory membership organization of International Office

Directors and staff in South Africa's universities, IEASA describes itself as the most recognized voice for advancing the internationalization of higher education in South Africa.

The International Education Association of South Africa (**IEASA**)[45]

IEASA draws its members from South African educational institutions, and training and research facilities that enroll non-national students; and corporations, professional associations and service providers, foundations, governments and governmental departments with special interest in international education exchange. The organization was established to address the need for universities and universities of technology in South Africa to respond to international educational trends. IEASA postulates: "if South Africa is to remain competitive within the global economic environment it is important that our higher education provides opportunities for students to obtain a global perspective to their studies." To that end, the organization's mission is to advocate, promote and support internationalization by providing a professional forum for institutions and individuals to address challenges and develop strategic opportunities in international education.

To accomplish its goals, IEASA has placed itself at the center of any policymaking that affects international education, where the association can best monitor government policy and procedures on issues affecting international students and academic or administrative visitors from abroad. Apart from dealing with international education policy, IEASA provides a set of services for, facilitates networking among, and offers training to internationalization

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[45] I have not been able to find any scholarly information about IEASA. At one point, I emailed an individual working in the IEASA office in Pretoria, who I had been in touch with regarding other matters, to find out if they knew of internal or external documents detailing the founding of the association and/or how the organization has evolved over the years. I did not receive any response. Therefore, this section is based on material from the IEASA website (http://www.ieasa.studysa.org/), the Association's *Study South Africa* yearly publication, plus what I was able to piece together from the IEASA conferences that I attended in 2015 and 2016.
Note: Most recently, I became aware of Nico Jooste's Ten Years of IEASA History (2007), an insider's perspective on the establishment and evolution of IEASA that is consistent with the account in this section.

professionals/practitioners. The services include disseminating information to prospective and registered non-national students and to local students going abroad; creating opportunities for South African students to take advantage of exchange agreements and study abroad, and assisting with the re-assimilation into South Africa of South African students returning from a study period abroad.

To facilitate networking, IEASA maintains directories of international educators and their associations, as well as of research material on international education. In addition, the association organizes regional conferences, workshops, and seminars, which foster linkages among South African institutions and public and private organizations interested in supporting the promotion of international exchange; and encourages publications in southern Africa on issues regarding international education. The organization's training function concerns setting up, marketing and running Study-Abroad Programs; evaluating credentials and non-national student recruitment; government regulations; advising and counseling; and obtaining travel and accommodation grants for students and staff to enable participation in exchanges. The association is also preoccupied with developing and monitoring internationally recognized standards in international education exchange practices in South Africa.

The yearly IEASA publication (*Study South Africa: The Guide to South African Higher Education*) clearly constitutes an institutional branding project geared toward recruitment of both degree-seeking and non-degree-seeking non-national students. Printed on high-quality glossy paper, the publication features colorful pictures of the South African flora and fauna, university campus buildings, grounds, and surroundings; a diverse selection of students engaged in an equally diverse range of activities such as learning, leisure and graduation; and maps, graphs, charts and tables depicting, for instance, student enrollments by nationality, major, and level of

study. Over the years, each issue has included news; messages (e.g. from the Minister of

Education, IEASA, Universities South Africa[46]); an overview of the higher education landscape;

a higher education destination map; university profiles (composed by the universities themselves)

detailing institutional vision, mission, location, etc.; useful contacts (e.g. IEASA, Higher

Education South Africa, DHET, DoHA, Council for Higher Education, South African

Qualifications Authority); and useful information for non-national students (e.g. application and

entrance requirements).

Here I provide two examples showing how the institutional branding posture adopted by

South African universities in the IEASA publication is tailored toward attracting non-South

African students.

> 7 reasons to study at the University of Cape Town (UCT): is top-ranked university in Africa
> where all courses are taught in English. UCT is located in Cape Town, South Africa. The
> university offers a wide range of study options, excellent student support, a diverse environment
> for global citizens, and excellent student research resources (15th Edition, p. 46-47).

> Why choose the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN): is one of the four top African universities
> and rates among the top 400 universities in the world. According to Academic Rankings of World
> Universities, UKZN ranked in the top 3% of the world's universities. The university has 5
> campuses in Durban and Pietermaritzburg with four colleges and 19 schools offering
> approximately 2,000 programmes. A truly South African university that reflects the diverse
> society in which it is situated, UKZN has an international reputation for academic excellence,
> outstanding research output and African scholarship, and has links with over 200 international
> institutions (15th Edition, p. 56).

Even a quick scan of the *Study South Africa* titles reflects a techno-rational conception of

education mobility that assumes that internationalization is value-free, and so does not engage

with or question the underlying global north imaginaries. Examples of such titles are *The*

International Guide to South African Universities and Technikons (2001), *Internationalization in*

a Changing World: Higher Education's Response (2013), and *The Knowledge Race: South*

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[46] Formerly Higher Education South Africa (HESA), Universities South Africa is an association of the country's
public universities.

Africa's Response to Global Knowledge Creation (2015). Most of the topical issues and features

deal with connecting South African higher education to the global knowledge production system

and adopting comprehensive internationalization strategies and policies.

Only rarely has internationalization been addressed in relation to or in the context of the

country's higher education transformation imperative. For instance, one of the topics covered in

the 2009 edition was *Higher Education, Transformation and Africanisation: A Paradigm Shift*,

by Professor Nyameko Barney Pityana, then Vice Chancellor at the University of South Africa

(UNISA). In the article, Professor Pityana acknowledges the extensive post-apartheid legislative

developments relating to higher education, and the robust efforts to undo the legacy of apartheid

and white minority hegemony over the academe. However, despite all the progress made in

restructuring the country's higher education system, he notes that the institutions continue in

large measure to reflect the apartheid past. For instance, while the historically black and

disadvantaged institutions continue to admit overwhelmingly black students (because their

culture and ethos of disadvantage offer no attraction to previously advantaged students), the

institutions that benefitted from the largesse of apartheid continue to glory in that benefit. Even

where significant numbers of black students are being admitted at formerly white universities,

the academic staff still remains predominantly white, and the prevailing culture in these

institutions is so alienating that it inhibits the academic success of the black students.

The appearance of Prof. Pityana's paper in the 2009 *Study South Africa* is significant

because it offers a rare but needed critique of the tendency to celebrate the benefits of

internationalization without due attention to the transformation imperative. As Prof. Pityana

argues:

> …our higher education institutions have embraced the neo-liberal and modernist logic that is long
> on aspirations of excellence, and that seeks to mirror the Anglo-Saxon models of universities and

their traditions, which have been elevated to a value and standard that constitutes the sole benchmark of excellence, but which are short on relevance and critical consciousness (p. 40).

Prof. Pityana points out that even though the expressions "world-class" and "African" appear side by side in the strategic statements of many South African universities, this has not induced the universities to embrace the logic of an African character and identity as the ultimate goal of the academic enterprise. By discussing the internationalization and transformation/Africanization discourse together, he challenges the culture whereby internationalization scholars, practitioners, and policymakers' singular focus on the global recognition logic is driving internationalization policies around the world. Nestled within the dominance of the new orthodoxy of the knowledge economy (Naidoo, 2011), the internationalization policies place high value on elite, world-class and research-intensive universities but neglect the unique historical contexts of places such as South Africa that have been shaped and continue to be shaped by apartheid.

Institutionalization of Internationalization: Institutional Level

WCU's Internationalization Strategic Framework articulates a vision and strategic choices geared towards asserting the university as an internationally-leading, research-intensive institution firmly embedded in the top 100 among the world's universities. Although the Strategic Framework stresses that the pursuit of global competitiveness does not preclude or negate the university's strategic role as a leader in a local and regional context, university administrators spoke plainly to me regarding their overriding ambition to be a top university in the 21st century, innovative, and globally competitive – a response to the global university ranking systems. For instance, Prof. Denis, who is one of the top non-white administrators during the study, alluded to the tension between internationalization and transformation goals and the way the latter plays a subordinate role to the former:

> Any [transformation] initiatives must be compatible with the university's fundamental mandate to be a globally competitive, research-intensive institution that is responsive to local development imperatives. They must also be cognizant of the university's finances and should not jeopardize the fiscal health of the institution.

While other factors such as teaching and learning, academic freedom, tradition, facilities, and student experience are acknowledged as contributing to the reputation of higher education institutions, research excellence is widely regarded as the key reputation builder in the age of the knowledge economy (Overton-de Klerk & Sienaert, 2016). Ideas about the status, reputation, quality, and competitiveness of higher education institutions have been drastically shaped by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). First published in 2003, the ARWU was followed in 2004 by the Times Higher Education QS Top University Ranking (Hazelkorn, 2014). Hazelkorn notes that, despite criticism and some boycotts by higher education institutions, the rankings have been a game-changer for higher education and research, intensifying cross-national comparisons of performance and productivity.

These global rankings systems accounted for Prof. Denis's estimation of what it would take to earn a place among the top 100 universities in the world: "you have to be research-intensive, provide professionals with globally competitive recognized skills." According to Prof. Thulani (a black non-South African top administrator), the idea of a research-intensive university was behind the university's drive to expand postgraduates[47] to 50% and non-national students to 30% of total student enrollment. Figure 10 shows that the proportion of non-national students was approximately 10% at both the University of the Witwatersrand and Stellenbosch, and 20% at UCT between 2007 and 2012. The drive to recruit postgraduate students (who are key to generating research) and non-national students (who usually graduate on time and proceed to postgraduate studies) reflects the key role that research output plays in improving institutions'

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[47] The South African equivalent of Graduate students.

position on the league tables. WCU administrators regarded research intensity and high concentrations of postgraduate and non-national students as the surest way to break the top 100 of these particular systems.

Figure 10: Headcount Enrollment by Nationality[48]

|	Inter-national	Local	Inter-national	Local	Inter-national	Local	Inter-national	Local	Inter-national	Local	Inter-national	Local
	WITS		UCT		UJ		UKZN		UP		SU	
2007	10.83%	89.17%	22.14%	77.86%	3.86%	96.14%	6.95%	93.05%	6.35%	93.65%	8.43%	91.57%
2008	10.51%	89.49%	21.68%	78.32%	4.21%	95.79%	6.96%	93.04%	6.20%	93.80%	8.88%	91.12%
2009	9.76%	90.24%	20.65%	79.35%	3.95%	96.05%	6.81%	93.19%	6.28%	93.72%	10.28%	89.72%
2010	10.03%	89.97%	21.29%	78.71%	4.59%	95.41%	6.47%	93.53%	6.46%	93.54%	10.90%	89.10%
2011	10.36%	89.64%	20.87%	79.13%	4.65%	95.35%	6.42%	93.58%	6.93%	93.07%	9.59%	90.41%
2012	10.23%	89.77%	20.94%	79.06%	4.96%	95.04%	6.66%	93.34%	7.55%	92.45%	11.27%	88.73%

Aside from the rankings, Prof. Evans (a white South African professor and administrator) pointed out that the government paid universities in the form of credits and subsidies for research generated through publications. The centrality of internationalization to the university's research agenda was evident from the placement of the internationalization portfolio (e.g. the Partnerships Office and Research Development Unit) under the Deputy Vice Chancellor (DVC) for Research and Postgraduate Affairs, as indicated in Figure 11.[49] In what could be interpreted as a fragmented institutionalization of internationalization, the DVC-Research was put in charge of the research and postgraduate aspects, while the Registrar oversaw the International Office

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[48] Adapted from WCU Enrollment Report for 2007 – 2013.

[49] I will have more to say about the International Student Office, and its placement under the Registrar, in chapter 7.

(noted as ISO in Figure 11), which managed the administrative aspects, and the Dean of Students looked after the service provision components. This structure was singled out by non-national students as contributing to WCU's failure to effectively attend to their needs (see chapter 7).

Figure 11: Institutional Structures for Internationalization

Most of the participants I spoke with regarded the 50% postgraduate and 30% non-national student targets as more aspirational than tangible targets the university was moving towards. However, the very fact that the numbers constituted WCU's official internationalization policy indicated the centrality of world university rankings to the policy and raised questions about the feasibility of carrying out internationalization and transformation simultaneously. As Prof. Lindela pointed out, while rankings should not be glorified, any university wanting to be a global university has to realize that other people from outside (he specifically mentioned students from Asia) look at the rankings and take them seriously in making a choice about the universities to attend. Noah (a black South African mid-level administrator involved with crafting the

university's strategic goals) indicated that when he took up his position, the university had already adopted the top-100 vision. He expressed a strong dislike of the vision because "I think it is stupid – nobody plans for rankings!" He went on to frame the top-100 language as a proxy that WCU administrators used to think about and make claims for world class-ness, research excellence, and global competiveness.

One of those administrators, Prof. Evans stated that the goal of 50% postgraduates was implausible given how the university needed tuition income from larger numbers of undergraduate students – at most, the university could afford no more than 35 – 37% postgraduate students. A former Vice Chancellor from another university dismissed the very idea of 50% postgraduate and 30% international students as crazy, setting the university up for failure because the demand for undergraduate degrees far outweighed that for postgraduate studies. Also, significant numbers of black South Africans from poor backgrounds were under pressure to join the labor market soon after completing undergraduate studies.

Among the individuals directly involved with crafting the university's existing internationalization policy was Prof. Richard. He noted that the 50% postgraduate students proposition also ran up against the DHET's own plans, which focused on expanding undergraduate access for black South Africans. He pointed out that deliberations between the university and the DHET were complicated by the fact that some individuals within the DHET held "quite parochial strong political perspectives" which did not consider long-term futures. While it was understandable that the DHET officials were under political pressure to maintain high undergraduate enrollments to accommodate swelling numbers of domestic black students seeking access into universities, the university argued that postgraduate enrollment was also

"part of the future of the country in terms of high level skills to begin to really push technological advancement."

Prof. Hadasah (a non-white South Africa professor and member of one of the university's top governing bodies) pointed out that internationalization at WCU had since been taken for granted by top administrators as a good thing. However, other top administrators acknowledged the challenges facing the university's efforts to internationalize. To start with, the university had struggled for a long time with creating an internationalization policy and implementing it (Prof. Thulani). As one of the architects of the university's internationalization policy, Prof Richard described the state of internationalization at WCU between 2007 and 2012:

> Very little conscious strategic attention was given to internationalization as a strategy for the university. We had an International Office, but it was really about, sort of, looking to the interests of the small number of international students who came to the university and, to some extent, the international visitors. There wasn't any particularly sort of strategy – we were taking things as they came.

When Prof. Richard was appointed the top administrator responsible for the internationalization portfolio, he did not have any particular background in internationalization. At that time, internationalization revolved around student enrolments and research outputs. Having seen the need to "shift from an organic to a strategic model/approach," his office had deliberately moved to strengthen ties and linkages with other African universities. However, in spite of the good that administrators like him saw in strengthening university partnerships across the continent, the university never put significant financial resources behind the strategy. When leadership changed (bringing in a new Vice Chancellor and Deputy Vice Chancellors), the idea of internationalization came to revolve around revenue generation through study abroad programs, whereby large numbers of students, especially from wealthy countries, came and spent

a semester or month at WCU. However, as with the previous strategy, the university did not put significant resources behind the study abroad idea for it to thrive.

While the under-resourcing of the study abroad project severely constrained its growth, WCU channeled much of the internationalization resourcing to the office of Research and Postgraduate Affairs, which included the recruitment of postdoctoral students. According to Prof. Evans, the university "has been pushing very hard using its own funds and also funds from donors to recruit international postdoctoral students who spend two years here and publish." Because of this push, he reported that the Humanities had seen an increase of postdoctoral students from 22 to 40 in the last 2 years. Prof. Evans further pointed out that most of the postdoctoral students were from Europe, the U.S., and Canada where the job market was flooded. He worried that instead of advancing the goals of transforming the university or promoting regional development by filling the postdoctoral positions with black Africans, WCU put the bulk of internationalization resources into becoming a safety net for unemployed PhDs from the global north.

Prof. Thulani brought up an internationalization framework which he had developed during his tenure as a top administrator in one of the Faculties. During that time, he appointed an Assistant Dean for Internationalization and pushed for each Faculty to produce an internationalization plan specific to their disciplines. He also indicated that, in addition to their Oxford, Harvard, and UCT partnerships, they worked on developing relationships with universities in Latin America and India. Lastly, he spoke about the Human Rights Exchange Program WCU had been engaged with involving a U.S. partner.

At the time of the study, there were a couple of work-in-progress efforts to further institutionalize the internationalization goals of the university. The university had just rolled out

an International Working Group, which was made up of the offices of the Registrar, Research Development, Strategic Partnerships, Dean of Student Affairs, and others. The Working Group had infused "renewed enthusiasm and an intentional effort to actualize the strategy by moving to what the tangibles are, to make sure partnerships start working" (Catherine, a white South African top administrator). In another development, one of the DVCs was to travel to France in connection with an exchange program hammered out with the French Embassy involving French-speaking and South African universities.

So far in this chapter, I have shown that transformation was conceived as part of the broader process of South Africa's post-apartheid political, social and economic transition, including political democratization, economic reconstruction and development, and redistributive social policies aimed at equity (Ministry of Education, 1997). On the contrary, the internationalization policy was premised on and driven by a global recognition logic. To the best of my knowledge, there had not been any structured or intentional policy conversation between the internationalization and transformation structures within the university or at the system and national levels. It is possible that such conversations happened beyond my observation. However, the fact that any such deliberations were not readily discernible in the official policy documents that I reviewed or in the public discourses and debates on campus, suggests the inconsequential import of any such behind-the-scenes deliberations for shaping institutional policy and practice.

Invisibility of Regionalization Structures

In spite of being the most visible and extensively institutionalized, transformation and internationalization were not the only policy demands being felt by WCU and the South African higher education system in general. The *White Paper for Post-School Education and Training: Building an Expanded, Effective and Integrated Post-School System* acknowledges that while

South Africa is the eleventh most popular destination worldwide for mobile students, and the top destination for students in Africa, the majority of non-national students studying in the country come from the immediate SADC region. The 2017 National Policy Framework on internationalization also recognizes the presence of regional students in South African universities: of the 73 859 non-national students (7.5% of the total student population) enrolled in the public higher education institutions, 73% were from SADC countries, 16% from other African countries, and 9% from the rest of the world. Figure 12 shows the proportion of non-national students at WCU by region.

Figure. 12: International Student Enrollments at World Class University[50]

The context, significance and implications of the regional student and staff mobility was addressed in chapter 4, and the experiences of non-national students at WCU is covered in chapter 7. Here I show that, while the proportions of students coming from the rest of Africa and

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[50] Adapted from WCU Enrollment Report for 2007 – 2013.

the rest of the world have been on a steady decline, there has been a steady increase of the proportion of students from SADC. Conspicuous for their absence are formal institutional structures (e.g. physical offices, staff/personnel, and student mobilization) that would indicate that WCU acknowledged, espoused and regarded regional student mobility as a strategic policy priority issue. Even in terms of non-national student advocacy, the most established and significantly coordinated student mobilization that existed at WCU prior to my fieldwork was in the form of country/region-specific student clubs such the Zimbabwean or West African Student Associations.

While the National Policy Framework for internationalization notes that the presence of these students requires clear national and institutional policies, processes and services, chapter 7 will show a dearth of institutional effort to put in place formalized institutional support structures specifically tailored for the regional students. The Framework includes the 1997 SADC Protocol on Education and Training among policy documents that have informed higher education internationalization in South Africa. The SADC Protocol makes provision for the harmonization of the region's higher education systems, and the relaxation and eventual elimination of immigration barriers to facilitate regional mobility of students and academics for the purpose of study, research, teaching and training. To that end, the Protocol makes several key stipulations, for instance, higher education institutions should reserve at least 5% of admissions for students coming from SADC nations other than their own, and treat students from the SADC countries as home students for purposes of tuition fees and accommodation. Consistent with the Protocol's stipulations on fees, SADC students enrolled at WCU pay the equivalent of in-state tuition – meaning that South Africa tax dollars subsidize their education. Figure 13 shows the cost of study for SADC students in South African universities as a percentage cost of tuition.

Figure 13: Cost of Study Showing Percentage Cost of Tuition[51]

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Full cost	R 47 101	R 50 619	R 55 843	R 60 710	R 65 320	R 71 967
Tuition only	R 18 275	R 19 660	R 21 689	R 22 861	R 25 745	R 27 881

Prof. Lindela (a former black South African top administrator) characterized the SADC subsidy as part of South Africa's vision of building economic communities in Africa through regional human resources skills development. Along the same vein, Catherine (the white South African top administrator) conceived of the subsidy through the lens of the overall mandate of universities: to extend research and grow the knowledge base. Even though sometimes one cannot measure the benefits right away, Catherine expressed faith that, through research collaborations for instance, alumni would come back to benefit the alma mater (and, thus, South Africa). Prof. Aristle, however, argued that the benefits of the SADC subsidy do not accrue only to South Africa's neighbors. In the wake of the South Africa's critical unemployment crisis, Prof. Aristle saw the need to rethink economic development from the current framework of what

[51] VitalStats: Public Higher Education (2015).

he called a "balkanized pseudo state" to innovate along regionally-funded and -regulated centers of excellence, for instance. I return to the notion of regionally-funded and -regulated universities chapter 8.

Conclusion

The SADC Protocol is the higher education sector example of how South Africa's post-apartheid relationship with the southern African region has been mired in contradictions. On the one hand, South Africa bases its regional role on the principles of equality and symbiotic partnership, non-hegemonic tendencies, and partnership (Tjemolane, 2011). On the other hand, while the country' neighbors acknowledge the positive potential of membership in SADC, they fear and detest South Africa's dominance (Hentz, 2005). No less significant, sections of the South African government, particularly the DoHA, have been the most vehement opponents of the SADC protocol's provisions on the free movement of people in the region (Mulaudzi, 2006).[52]

Although South Africa is ready to pay the costs of co-operative hegemony (e.g. capacity building for regional institutions and peacekeeping), the regional acceptance of South African leadership is constrained by the regional destabilization legacy of the apartheid regime (Flemes, 2009) covered in chapter 4. Because of this history, South Africa's cache and power of attraction as an African leader acting in the name of African interests is more accepted in global settings (e.g. the G8 or WTO), but very restricted within the region – in some areas, it is actually viewed with suspicion and hostility within Africa (Alden & le Pere, 2009). This is partly because neighboring countries have not forgotten how the apartheid regime destabilized them before

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[52] For a discussion of the changes in the regional pattern of co-operation–conflict in Southern Africa, see da Silva (2016).

1990, and South Africa's economic dominance[53] only reignites suspicions of South Africa's historic hegemonic role in the region (Saunders, 2011).

Considering the complicated relationship between South Africa and her SADC neighbors, the recruitment of SADC students as part of the drive and the pressure for WCU to increase its position in the rankings as a way to integrate into the global intellectual economy is not without contestation. According to Catherine (the white South African top administrator), students from the SADC region are welcomed and valued because they all hail from such good schools and have such sound academic backgrounds that they come to the university and graduate in record time. Given the unpleasant experiences of non-national students at WCU detailed in chapter 7, Catherine's allusion to SADC students as being welcome and valued should be taken to mean that the university recognizes the instrumental value of the SADC students vis-à-vis the institutional aspiration for international reputation.

One could reasonably argue that the internationalization infrastructure at WCU (e.g. the International Office) does not preclude SADC students from the constituency it serves. After all, they are "international" students. However, as I argued in chapter 4, due to their backgrounds, the SADC students have such different relationships with the South African state, and have such needs from the country's universities that they cannot be casually written off as international students. While some of these students come from privileged backgrounds or are fully funded for their entire studies in South Africa, collectively they are not really a source of income for South Africa in the same way that self-funding international students are to universities in the global north. The students' own concerns with the lack of institutional attention paid to their needs, and their push to set up formal support systems within the university, is the subject of chapter 7.

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[53] South Africa produces approximately 80% of Southern Africa's GDP (Alden & le Pere, 2009).

Chapter 6

Possibilities and Limitations of #FeesMustFall

Introduction

The two preceding chapters laid out the competing policy imperatives and the institutionalization of transformation and internationalization policy discourses at World Class University (WCU). The meanings, shape and form that transformation and internationalization took were a product of political actions/activities, perceptions, and relationships among institutional actors. The tensions between the policy imperatives and discourses particularly manifested in the political mobilization and activism among student constituencies situated in different quadrants of the institutional policy landscape, which I introduced and discussed at length in chapter 4. This chapter focuses on the 2015-2016 #FeesMustFall (#FMF) student protests in recognition of the fact that, at the time of the research, the protests were the most recent and most far-reaching manifestation of domestic student political mobilization and activism in post-apartheid South Africa. The robust student political activism at WCU and other public university campuses across the country made the student body a crucial site for exploring contested conceptualizations of the policy imperatives at WCU, including the nature of non-nationals' participation in the #FMF protests.

In addressing student political mobilization and activism at WCU, the chapter focuses in particular on four student factions. Three of the factions were affiliated with some of the major national political parties (the ruling African National Congress, and two opposition parties: the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters), and one faction was not affiliated with any national political party. Based on conversations with research participants from other South African universities, the configuration of student political factions varied by campus. For

instance, AfriForum Youth was the student faction affiliated with AfriForum, a right-wing Afrikaner-rights organization that epitomizes Afrikaner nationalism and is opposed to social transformation and racial community integration. According to Tendai, a non-national student leader, the AfriForum faction tended to play a significant, public, and visible role at traditionally Afrikaner universities such as the University of Pretoria, the University of the Free State, Stellenbosch University, and the North-Western University. Such Afrikaner-rights student groups generally did not exist at historically white, English-medium or historically black universities, and if they did, they did not have a notable presence.

The student political factions mobilized and aligned students on campus based on different interpretations of who the post-apartheid South African public university belongs to and who it should serve. The chapter, therefore, pays attention to how this mobilization of resources and groups of people shaped what the #FMF protests came to be about and how that opened and closed spaces for certain student constituencies to participate. I argue that the #FMF student protests offered great promise for interrupting longstanding claims of Euro/American internationalization templates to be universal, neutral, objective, disembodied and techno-rational. Unfortunately, the dominant ANC- and EFF-aligned factions conceived the struggle against lack of access to higher education in South Africa within nationalistic and racialized conceptions of racial justice. In essence, and understandably, the two factions asserted that the South African public university should primarily belong to, and serve historically marginalized black South Africans. The pursuit of a purely South African racial equity agenda revealed the incredible limitations of a nationalist movement that was not able to articulate and accommodate a regional or Pan-African vision or agenda.

By confining the conception and enactment of historically marginalized students' struggles within national parameters, the #FMF movement reflected the ahistorical argument underpinning xenophobia in South Africa and essentially evolved into black South African struggle that offered little to no place for non-black and non-South Africans. The student activists failed to recognize that the historical ills that the nationalist student movements were seeking to redress and rectify were indistinguishable from the harm that SADC countries suffered due to their support of the anti-apartheid struggle. This failure of black South African activists to regionalize and Pan-Africanize the racial justice struggle at WCU explained the rise and existence of the Non-affiliated faction as a platform and space for regional non-South Africans to articulate and politicize their experiences. However, the Non-affiliated faction also came to represent and articulate the interests of some white South Africans (e.g. Jewish students), which delegitimized the faction in the wake of the black South African sensibilities that drove the #FMF protests. The national and racial sensibilities reduced the space for non-national and non-black students to act in solidarity with black South Africans in the struggle for racial and economic redress, and weakened the national social cohesion logic.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of the #FMF movement in the context of the #RhodesMustFall (#RMF) protests that preceded #FMF. The following section, on student mobilization, discusses how different student political factions map onto the discursive frames, policy discourses and logics, and racial/national identity markers of the institutional policy landscape. The next section turns to how the contours, intersections and schisms of the student mobilization shaped different student factions' participation in the #FMF protests, and how each faction rationalized their stance. In the last section, I consider WCU students' low levels of involvement in political activism; political polarization among

student factions; and the oversized role played by nationalistic sensibilities and rhetoric of

blackness to question the legitimacy of existing structures of student representation.

#FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall

#FMF has been characterized as an uprising against black South Africans' lack of access

to and financial exclusion from higher education in post-apartheid South Africa (Booysen, 2016).

#FMF was itself inspired by and followed in the heels of the #RMF student movement that was

originally directed against the statue of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT).

The #RMF student protests started when Chumani Maxwele, a black South African student at

UCT, threw faeces on the statue of Cecil John Rhodes on 9 March 2015 (Pillay, 2016). Pillay

argues that Chumani's act of defiance and disgust at the symbolism attached to Cecil Rhodes

reflected a growing mood of discontent among South Africans and emboldened a collective of

students, workers and staff to demand the removal of the statue and what they called the overdue

process of decolonizing the university. According to Luescher (2016):

> The Cecil John Rhodes statue became the focal point of black student protests against the legacy
> of British imperialism, apartheid, capitalist exploitation of Africans and lack of transformation
> evident in contemporary institutional commemoration, the institutional culture and "whiteness" of
> the university, as well as the demographic make-up of UCT staff and the content of the
> curriculum (p. 53).

A full list of the #RMF demands appeared in a 2015 Change.org online petition[54] and

included replacing memorabilia celebrating white supremacists with black historical figures;

adopting a curriculum that centers Africa and the subaltern; removing academic and financial

barriers that limited access for and retention of black students and academics; and ending the

exploitation of low-wage workers on campus. Subsequently, the #RMF movement awakened a

spirit of mass action across South African public universities and inspired nation-wide #FMF

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[54] https://www.change.org/p/the-south-african-public-and-the-world-at-large-we-demand-that-the-statue-of-cecil-john-rhodes-be-removed-from-the-campus-of-the-university-of-cape-town-as-the-first-step-towards-the-decolonisation-of-the-university-as-a-whole

student protests targeting financial exclusion, institutional racism, the slow pace of transformation (including curriculum), and outsourcing of "non-core" labor to private companies.

Sparked by the announcement of a 10.5% fee increase for the 2016 academic year, #FMF protests started when students at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) shut down the university by blocking entrance into and out of the university (Booysen, 2016; Glenn, 2016; Pillay, 2016). Students were angry that the corporate models of management that universities had adopted in response to budget cuts for higher education from the ANC government had resulted in the costs being passed down to them and their families.[55] Glenn (2016) argues that the spread of the protests to other public university campuses was enabled by digital activism on Facebook, Twitter, and instant messaging. Following mass marches to Parliament in Cape Town on October 21, the ANC Headquarters in Johannesburg on October 22, and to the Union Buildings in Pretoria on October 23, Jacob Zuma, then President, announced that there would not be fees increase for 2016.

One of the most significant aspects of #RMF and #FMF is that both included demands to end the outsourcing of labor on campuses. As Shannen Hill (2018)[56] argues, the focus on ending outsourcing needs to be understood in the context of the students' backgrounds and the striking parallels of the treatment of workers in the post-apartheid era to that of the apartheid era. Many of the student protestors were first generation students whose parents' socioeconomic circumstances and work experiences were similar to those of low-wage workers on the university campuses. Tebogo (a black South African student leader affiliated with the EFF) made reference to this class link between student protestors' access to higher education and low-wage parents'

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[55] The "Who owns WCU?" debates alluded to in chapter 5 speak to these concerns.

[56] Fall they Must: Black Consciousness in South African Art and Activism Today. Presentation given at the *Whirling Return of the Ancestors: Honoring Ancestors in Ancestors in Africa and Beyond: Arts and Action* seminar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 04/06/2018.

working conditions. He argued: "the fact that we live in townships is violent to us, the fact that

our mothers are being paid so little in this university [as low wage workers] is violence to us."

Coming from families that were experiencing workplace exploitation, these first generation

students saw the issue of rising tuition rates and contracting of local labor as part of the same

struggle.

The other significant aspect of #RMF and #FMF is that both protest movements started at

historically white universities before spreading to other public universities and were mainly led

by black students from privileged backgrounds. Jansen (2017) points out that the student leaders

who reacted so vehemently against symbols celebrating white supremacists at English-origin

campuses such as UCT, Rhodes University, and the Wits, and who drove the protest movement

on behalf of poor students, were themselves self-funding, black, middle-class students, who had

experienced racial integration in top public and private schools. While I recognize that some of

the #FMF student leaders came from poor family backgrounds, most of the leading student

activists that I interacted with at WCU fit Jansen's (2017) description. For instance, Phineas (a

black South African student leader) had grown up in the suburbs (not townships, as most poor

black South Africans), had gone to a formerly white-only government high school, and had come

to WCU on a hockey scholarship.

The attendance of middle-class black students at top public and private schools is well

known, but Jansen's (2017) claim that these students had experienced racial integration in these

schools needs to be qualified. Nkosi (a black South African student activist who went to a

predominantly white private high school), for instance, pointed out that admission at a

predominantly white high school and the "rainbow nation" rhetoric did not necessarily translate

into racial integration. Out of the 84 students in his cohort, 69 were white, nine were black, three

were Indian, and three were colored. Not only did the school have a disproportionate number of white students: "if you look at my matric dance[57] pictures, everyone's date was a person from the same race." Although he interacted with some of the white, Chinese and Indian students, integration really happened within racial groupings not across them.

In fact, it was during Nkosi's time at the high school that he started to engage critically with the disproportionate representation of white people in certain spaces, and with the perception among white students that if blacks are still poor 20 years after the end of apartheid, they have only themselves to blame. Coming into the high school, Nkosi had felt that it was normal that wealthy white people occupied wealthy spaces and that he had made it into the school because any black person who wanted to could gain access into such spaces. The predominantly white high school bears striking resemblance to educational enclaves in colonial Africa, such as universities. As mechanisms of cultural colonialism, they were capable of deeply westernizing African elites and perpetuating cultural colonialism but subsequently became hotbeds of political activism as nationalists agitated for the end of colonial rule and the establishment of African self-government (Mazrui, 1975).

Nkosi recalled that towards late high school, "I started having heated discussions with my white friends about black economic empowerment, quotas in sports teams and racial transformation in general." Attending the private predominantly white school enabled Nkosi to develop a level of mastery of the English language and familiarity with the mindset of his white counterparts that uniquely positioned him and other privileged-background black students to embrace student activism and champion the cause of poor black South Africans students in public universities.

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[57] Prom dance in the U.S.

While recognizing the very crucial linkages between #RMF and #FMF, I limit the discussion in this chapter to the latter, which broke out during the course of my fieldwork. Also, rather than dwell on the particular details of what happened from day to day during the #FMF protests, the chapter focuses on the different conceptualizations among the four student constituencies of what the mass protests were about, who could participate, and how.[58]

Student Mobilization

Among a range of interpretive frames deployed in the existing literature on #FMF is a claim that, despite being at institutions separated by geography, racial composition, socio-economics, and quality, #FMF was a movement that spoke with a singularity of purpose (Molefe, 2016). But, rather than a large, homogeneous, like-minded group of activists fitting comfortably under the conceptual umbrella of "the Fallists," Jansen (2017) portrays the student activists as "small and disparate groups of protestors" that "form, split apart, and re-form in another image, disappearing and re-appearing in what has become known as a leaderless movement" (p. 8). More precisely, he describes the shifting nature of the movement as crystallizing into a particular form:

> Student political organizations took shape, faded away, reasserted themselves, took front stage then back stage, broke old and formed new alliances [producing] a new set of actors who are more emphatically *black conscious* in their orientation, openly violent …in their approach (p. 61).

This fragmentation and progression from broad-based and peaceful to racialized and violent protests is consistent with what I witnessed at WCU. I, therefore, step back to look at the seldom-addressed permutation of the #FMF protests – the fractured student politics on South African university campuses as illustrated by the positioning of the four student factions in different quadrants of the institutional policy landscape. Shaped over time by power struggles for

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[58] For an annotated timeline covering 2014-2015 pre-#FMF context, the October 2015 height of the protests, the rest of 2015, and the evolution of the protest up to June 2016, see Booysen (2016), and for the perspectives of sitting Vice Chancellors of the most troubled universities, see Jansen (2017).

the control of the Student Representative Council (see below), political activism at WCU created

opportunities and possibilities for coalition building among student factions. However,

fragmentations within national and racial groupings made certain coalitions unlikely or even

impossible.

Figure 14: Institutional Policy Landscape

In Figure 14 above, I use the colored rings to approximate where each student political

faction was situated in the institutional policy landscape. I represent the ANC faction (green) as

heavily concentrated in the Transformation quadrant with limited presence in the other three; and

the EFF (red) and DA (rainbow colors) factions as only present in the Transformation and

"Rainbow Nation" quadrants, respectively. Concentrated in the Regionalization and

Internationalization quadrants, the Non-affiliated faction had varying degrees of appeal among black and white South Africans.

I look at the hotly contested SRC elections as the vehicle through which student activism and politics found expression at WCU. During the #FMF protests, the SRC constituted a vital stakeholder in the university mainly because WCU operates under the notion of co-operative governance, whereby various decisions require consultation with the SRC and its participation in institutional decision-making structures. Considered a statutory structure as provided for in the Higher Education Act, the SRC is elected annually by the student body[59] and consists of 15 elected members. Being the highest decision-making structure of student governance at WCU, the SRC exercises political, economic and administrative oversight of the activities of student organizations.

The main duties of the SRC include managing and administering student representation at different levels; advising on the development of academic programs and student-learning experiences; and participating in the development and implementation of institutional and national policies on higher education. While the SRC was the one governance structure that represented all the students in the university, it is crucial to point out that other bodies, such as the Postgraduate Association (PGA) played a pivotal role in representing specific segments of the student population and specific aspects of student needs.[60] The PGA was different from the SRC in that it operated outside the political paradigm that animated the SRC campaigns and governance style. Far from pursuing an overtly black and national consciousness agenda, the

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[59] Every registered student, irrespective of nationality, is eligible to vote in the SRC elections.

[60] Along with the SRC President, the Chairperson of the Postgraduate Association sat on the University Council.

PGA embraced and celebrated the racial and national diversity that characterized the

postgraduate student body that it represented.

I focus on the dynamics around and outcomes of the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 SRC

elections (see Figure 15) because fieldwork for the study spread across the first three of the four

years (2014 – 2016). Apart from that, these four years mark the period just prior to, during, and

immediately following the #FMF protests. I was fortunate to be on site at key moments during

this period to witness the SRC election process before, during and post-#FMF.[61] Although 2017

lies outside the fieldwork phase, I include the year here because the key political currents that I

discuss in this chapter culminated in the EFF faction winning majority seats for the first time

ever in the history of WCU's SRC elections.

Figure 15: Student Representative Council Elections

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
[61] I do acknowledge the 2016 round of student protests (that broke out in September and led to the shutting down of the research site and many other campuses in the country) but use *post-#FeesMustFall* to denote the period after the protests started in September 2015.

The ANC-aligned Faction

The ANC-aligned faction arose from an alliance between the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), the South African Student Congress (SASCO), the Youth Communist League, and the Muslim Student Association. It described itself as having its roots in the National Democratic Movement and as invested in workers' issues. Going back many years, the ANC faction had been the majority party in the SRC. Apart from giving the faction ultimate say in student governance, its majority status during the 2014 to 2016 years (see Figure 15 above), by necessity, meant that the leaders of the ANC-aligned faction became some of the key public faces of the #FMF movement. Although the #FMF has often been dubbed "the leaderless movement," the key figures who represented the students at meetings with university administrators, organized and led events such as marches, and spoke in public on behalf of the rest of the students were mainly former and current SRC office holders or candidates.

As the major national party leading the anti-apartheid struggle, the ANC has historically spoken in ways that resonate with the majority of black South Africans more than any other political party. Similarly, the ANC-aligned faction has traditionally claimed the black struggle mantle by representing and fighting for the black students who perceive themselves as victims of persistent institutional racism at WCU. As pointed out during an interview I did with Farai (a former non-South African student leader with the Non-affiliated faction), the ANC-aligned faction had more student support on campus precisely because it was seen to resonate more with poor black South African students. The founding of EFF in 2013 and the subsequent emergence of EFF faction at WCU and other South African university campuses, however, challenged the ANC's long-cherished credentials as the party that leads the black struggle in South Africa.

The EFF-aligned Faction

Unlike the ANC-aligned faction, which had been around for a long time, the EFF faction had only been in existence at WCU since 2014. The EFF-aligned faction branded itself as a radical, revolutionary, leftist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and militant economic emancipation movement that drew inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition and Fanonian schools of thought.[62] Tebogo (one of the top EFF student leaders) pointed out that both the national EFF party and campus faction identified with black consciousness politics; and articulated "a Bikoist argument that we cannot be liberated by our oppressor." Although he claimed that EFF neither rejected nor was against white membership, he unequivocally stated that the party was for black people and viewed collaboration with white people as legitimizing black people's oppression.

Without question, the EFF was foremost in championing the decolonization agenda that took South African public universities by storm in 2015 and 2016. According to Tebogo, the EFF faction believed that as long as white professors dominate the academy, "they are going to continue to reproduce these ideas that maintain the status quo that oppresses black people and keeps them on the receiving end always." He expressed disdain that "some campus buildings are named after people who participated in the oppression of our people," yet black thinkers and academics such as Professor Sobukwe were not commemorated, and if mentioned at all, were belittled. Tebogo stressed that the decolonization agenda should extend to other sectors beyond the university. He noted, for instance, that white judiciary still dominated the legal profession such that the country's legal institutions focused on protecting white people from being investigated for the inhuman treatment suffered by black people during apartheid, including violent process of land dispossession.

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[62] http://www.effonline.org/about-us

Asked how he came to embrace the EFF faction's ideological stance and vision, Tebogo

recounted how the *Black Thought Symposium*, where students came together to discuss the

writings of Fanon, Biko and Sobukwe, raised his political consciousness and led him to

appreciate the EFF's protest culture. "They used to make us see why there is a need for protest,

told me that our lives are a perpetual state of protest, our mere existence here is a negation of an

order." Tebogo's remarkably lucid responses captured the compelling depth of emotions that

resonated with black South Africans who still felt alienated in their own country more than two

decades after the democratic transition. Here, he alluded to the inclusion of black bodies in the

white space of the WCU:

> The EFF did not have the funds that the other organizations use to market themselves. All we had
> was the theatrics and performance which was symbolic to say the university is a crime scene and
> you have already been deemed as a criminal…Black people were only allowed to be in this
> university around the decline of apartheid. Naturally, it was formed for white people, and
> obviously, us being here is a protest in itself. Either consciously or unconsciously, blackness
> defies everything. There was no place for us in history, we are present in our absence…there is no
> place for black people in this history, and in that omission our presence comes from that, which is
> protest in itself.

Aware that the EFF faction was perceived by other political factions within the university

as a violent, aggressive and disruptive, Tebogo affirmed that, as a protest movement, they were

unapologetic about questioning the legitimacy of the university's white and liberal tendencies.

Tebogo linked the pride with which the EFF owned and staunchly defended its protest culture to

the fact that violence remained the perpetual reality of too many black lives in the post-apartheid

era:

> The fact that we live in townships…is violent to us, the fact that our mothers (unskilled university
> workers, for instance) are being paid so little in this university…is violence to us, the fact that
> students are suffocated, black students in one way or the other, psychologically, socially or
> economically, that is violence for us, the fact that you have to stand in a line of NASFAS.[63]

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[63] National Student Financial Aid Scheme

In the three years that I visited the research site, the EFF faction never won a seat on the SRC. Some of the reasons for failing to win SRC seats relate to the EFF faction's initial perception that the legitimacy of the SRC structure itself needed to be questioned. In fact, the EFF faction was suspended from running in 2015 for disrupting an SRC election debate during the run-up to the elections. When the faction participated in the elections in 2016, it did not win any seats. However, it romped to a 12-seat victory in 2017. I explain this turn of events later in the chapter.

Figure 14 shows a heavy concentration of both the ANC- and EFF-affiliated factions in the Transformation (top left) quadrant. This can be explained by the fact that both factions generally valorized Marx and Lenin, Fanon and Biko, and were "very explicitly for black students" (Nkosi, a black South African student activist), whose struggle they purported to champion. Ironically, the notion of the "black child" as used by the ANC and EFF factions was limited to South African blacks, and so excluded other blacks from other African countries. The narrowly nationalist and racialized thrust of the ANC- and EFF-aligned factions seemed to come from an understanding that South Africa has such a unique racist history that the equity and redress focus of the post-apartheid dispensation should prioritize black South Africans. When I put it to Nkosi that the focus on black South Africans somewhat neglected or trivialized the needs of non-South African students on campus, he did not mince his words:

> The urgency lies with the black South African struggle…there is a black South African struggle that needs to be fought for, and I don't think it's mutually exclusive to an international student struggle. But because of the fact that the decolonial project, because South Africa does have a unique colonial struggle of its own, where ours is not a colonial struggle that ended in the 60s…ours is one that ended in the 90s, and is still going on to this day because of an entrenched white society. Because of that, the priority has to be how do we, at home, decolonize ourselves from a white community that is in close proximity to us, that is immediate to us. As a result of that prioritization, it leaves very little room for any other constituency, not out of malice or out of any bad spirit, but out of the fact that all the resources need to be pumped into the immediate decolonial project…Ours is one that is immediate and is still going on to this day, because white people are still present so the priority has to lie there.

The commonality on prioritizing the needs of black South Africans notwithstanding, the ANC and EFF campus formations exhibited the antagonistic and tumultuous relationship that also exists between their parent national parties. The antagonism might partly be explained by the fact that Julius Malema founded the EFF after being expelled from the ANC, where he had been President of the party's Youth League. In line with its parent national party, the EFF faction on campus had carved out a space for itself as the radical version of the ANC by espousing the revolutionary positions/stances of the ANC of the anti-apartheid struggle.[64]

The Democratic Alliance Student Organization (DASO)

Similar to the ANC- and EFF-aligned factions, DASO was the campus outfit of a South African national political party, the Democratic Alliance. As outlined in the Democratic Alliance's policy platform, "Open Opportunity Society for All," the faction perceived two of the discursive frames of the institutional policy landscape (*Nationalism* and *Black Africanism*) as often leading to a state of oppressive totalitarianism that needed to be vigorously engaged with in open and intellectual debate. Consistent with the national party's position, the DASO's stance on race was based on an inclusive logic whose guiding rationale was that one cannot entertain identity politics without dividing the society.

The DASO Dossier, which outlines the organization's mission, vision, and principles, specifically expresses concern with nationalism, racial or ethnic tribalism, religious fundamentalism, and socialism. The concern is premised on the idea that "social constructs, which create categories of race, class, gender and nation, are secondary factors that must never interfere with the primary good of the free society" (p. 7). The affirmation of and emphasis on

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[64] Julius Malema recently sparked an outrage when he alleged that Nelson Mandela compromised the fundamental principles of the revolution (see for instance https://theconversation.com/how-compromises-and-mistakes-made-in-the-mandela-era-hobbled-south-africas-economy-52156).

the individual contrasted sharply with the ANC- and EFF-aligned factions, for whom race historically determined and continued to determine who got included/excluded in higher education as well as who graduated or dropped out. As pointed out by Luyanda (a black South African DASO leader), "the message of multiracialism is at the center of our message." However, DASO had failed to gain traction with non-national students, and so the faction's exclusively South African student constituency meant that multiracialism and multiculturalism did not translate to or include multinationalism.

Luyanda originally started with SASCO. SASCO describes itself as a non-capitalist student movement striving for the transformation of the whole South African higher education system in order to achieve a non-sexist, non-racial, working class biased and democratic education system and a socialist society. Luyanda indicated that he left SASCO for DASO because he believed in a multiracial society in which people tolerated each other. He pointed out that, although SASCO documents made claims to multiculturalism and non-sexism, in reality the organization did not follow through on the ideals. I was curious as to why, as a black South African, he did not join ANC or EFF. He pointed out that, although DASO took the transformation/decolonization agenda (e.g. free education) as the common concern of the collective South African society, he did not subscribe to the ANC and EFF factions and their parent parties' divisive rhetoric or what he saw as their confrontational approaches/tactics to addressing the ills of the past.

As I concluded fieldwork in August 2016, the Democratic Alliance (DA) had just pulled stunning victories in key local government elections, a development which led Mmusi Maimane, the DA leader, to claim that the tide in the country was turning.[65] The victories were widely

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[65] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-election-idUSKCN10G2GA

publicized as news outlets and discussion forums made allusion to a bruised ANC and a galvanized DA;[66] a historic ANC loss as opposition wins in Nelson Mandela's birth place for the first time since apartheid;[67] and a major shift in South African politics as the DA breaks out of its Cape enclave.[68] Whether the DA was actually gaining ground, or whether disillusioned ANC supporters had just not gone to the polls might be inconsequential for this study. What was significant was that whatever the national gains were in the local government elections, they did not translate to university campuses. In fact, DASO at WCU did not put up any candidates for the 2016 SRC elections at all.

According to Luyanda, the DA-aligned faction had candidates who could have run in the 2016 SRC elections, but the organization did not have the structures in place to support the candidates. In a university with more than 30,000 students, the DASO membership was as low as 60. Mpho (a black South African activist) explained the largely dormant state of the DASO and a noticeable absence of the student faction's active participation in the transformation debates as a factor of the faction's non-racial stance:

> There might be black people in those organizations [but] these are black people who want to protect white people. These are anti-black organizations to be more forthright. Any project that is premised on blackness cannot include DASO and the Non-affiliated formation…. In their arguments race does not matter, it is merit that matters.

I will have more to say latter about the anti-black label and the accompanying conflation of merit with anti-blackness, but suffice here to point out that, given the populism that attended the #FMF agenda, the DA-aligned faction was in a way forced to lend support to the cause of the black South African struggle. However, unlike the no-fee-increase stance of the EFF, the DA faction

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[66] http://www.news24.com/elections/news/election-wrap-a-bruised-anc-a-galvanised-da-20160807

[67] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/south-africa-elections-anc-defeat-nelson-mandela-bay-opposition-birthplace-first-time-apartheid-a7197606.html

[68] http://theconversation.com/major-shift-in-south-african-politics-as-the-da-breaks-out-of-its-cape-enclave-63619

argued that fee increments should not be above the prime lending rate and the inflation rate of the South African Reserve Bank. In recognition of the dormancy of DASO, in the rest of the chapter I do bring up the organization as needed, but mainly focus on the three most visible and vocal factions: the ANC- and EFF-aligned, and the Non-affiliated.

The Non-affiliated Student Faction

Founded in 2013, the Non-affiliated faction set itself apart from the national party-aligned student formations that dominated the WCU student political landscape. The organization claimed to be a non-ideological and apolitical student activist movement without any affiliation with national political parties. It branded itself as very activism-based, hyper-pragmatic, with a focus on campus-specific issues and measureable outcomes such as maximizing students' academic performance and increasing throughput. The faction was governed by four guiding principles: inclusivity, independence, impact, and integrity. As stated in the faction's campaign manifesto, the two considerations most pivotal to the identity and operation of the organization are:

> **Inclusivity**: we seek to include all students from all racial, ethnic and religious backgrounds, all genders, creeds and identities.

> **Independence**: we seek to give direct solutions to students, cutting out the middleman, cutting out outside politics, we seek to account only to the students and to make our own solutions for our own challenges.

The Non-affiliated faction prided itself for being multi-ethnic, non-racial, and multi-national in its conception and composition. Of the seven original founding members, two were non-national students and five were South Africans. Dumisani (one of the organizations' founders) pointed out that at the strategy session marking the inception of the organization, "there was some Jewish presence, Italian, Greek, there was even like a British guy… but there

was also like Congolese, DRC…West Africans like Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabweans, and local

black South Africans."

While some of these groups, particularly the Italian, Greek and Hindu Association, were

negligible in terms of member numbers, the commonality across all these individual groupings

was that they felt alienated and even antagonized by the nationalist and racialized thrust of the

student factions affiliated with national political parties. Consequently, the Non-affiliated

factions tended to galvanize international students as well as domestic students not aligned with

any of the national political parties represented on campus (Tendai, a non-South African student

leader). As Nkosi acknowledged, the Non-affiliated faction was "the only organization, to this

day, that makes the effort, concerted effort to aggregate the issues that are faced by international

students and tries to solve them." For example, the formation was the only one that had a

scholarship program for non-national students. Based on conversations with leaders of the

faction, funding for the scholarship came from wealthy Jewish businesses and individuals. I

discuss the faction's connection with the Jewish community below.

The inclusion of non-South African blacks in its leadership and membership ranks

enabled the Non-affiliated faction to claim a degree of racial and national diversity unimaginable

in the ANC- and EFF-aligned factions. The survival and legitimacy of the Non-affiliated

formation on a South African campus, however, hinged less on serving the needs of non-national

students, than on the extent to which it was able to make claims to champion the needs of the

majority black South African students. It turned out the Non-affiliated faction appealed to those

among black South Africans who rejected and were antagonized by the tendency of ANC and

EFF student factions to become beholden to national political parties rather than attending to the

concerns and needs of students viewed as less important members of those parties (e.g. non-national students and white South Africans).

The very conception, existence and thriving of the Non-affiliated faction was rooted in the unmet needs of non-national and non-black students who felt that they were marginalized by a student political regimen premised on an exclusively South African black consciousness. The ways in which these non-nationals organized around what they perceived as WCU's lack of responsiveness to their needs is covered in chapter 7. In this chapter, I limit the discussion of the Non-affiliated faction to how it came into being and the place it came to occupy in domestic student politics, in particular the #FMF protests.

Dumisani admitted during a follow-up 2016 interview that the Non-affiliated faction had become a sort of fringe organization failing to attract significant numbers of the majority black South Africans:

> Sometimes it becomes easier to pull to the international base because it's a base that you have got easy access to and some of them have to stay for longer because they have to do masters, so you wind up having a base of people, your support becomes disproportionally international.

However, Tendai (a non-South African student leader) pointed out that non-national students tended to regard the electoral process for SRC positions (whereby candidates campaigned on the ticket of national political parties) as stacked against their participation. This perception led to voter apathy among the non-national students, which impacted negatively on the Non-affiliated faction's mobilization efforts. No less significant, some of the postgraduate non-national students who might otherwise have supported the Non-affiliated faction perceived SRC elections as being primarily for undergraduates. If politically engaged at all, the non-national postgraduate students tended to identify more with the Postgraduate Association, which called for a non-racial, non-gender, intersectional, multi faith, ideologically diverse, non-partisan dialogue around #FMF.

The non-engagement stance of many of the non-national students accounts for why Prof. Sihle (a black South African citizen originally from one of the SADC countries) characterized "the black foreign nationals" as potentially depoliticizing academic spaces at WCU and other South African higher education institutions. In his view, "blacks who have no politics" can easily buy into the "merit and standards" discourse such that the domestic black South African student struggles are none of their concern. These views echo those of some black South African student activists such as Mpho: "Look at all of the…activism that is geared towards transforming the university, international students don't participate in those kinds of things." Ultimately, Prof. Sihle argued, the non-involvement of the non-national blacks in South African political struggles made it easier for the complexion of the academic spaces to change (universities appear more black, and so more transformed), but without facing the apartheid ghost.

Aside from non-national students, the Non-affiliated faction also galvanized other pockets of the domestic student population that felt disconnected from the main parties, such as Jewish students and other whites. In its organic form, the Non-affiliated faction treated the transformation/decolonization discourses and politics – as championed by the ANC and EFF factions – as purely nationalistic and racialized, and so not inclusive of non-national and non-black student constituencies. Farai, a former non-national member of the SRC on the Non-affiliated faction ticket, indicated that most local South African black students politically aligned with either the ANC or EFF factions perceived members of the Non-affiliated faction as "a bunch of rich kids from nice affluent suburbs" who did not render support for the transformation/decolonization goals of the university.

The Non-affiliated faction was perceived as depoliticized in part because of its appeal to the Jewish student community. The Jewish Student Association was one of the constituencies

that embraced the Non-affiliated faction as a welcome alternative to national party-aligned

factions. The Jewish Association was particularly attracted by the Non-affiliated faction's claim

to be apolitical, and the notion that the organization cared about nothing but student issues.

Adina (a Jewish Student leader affiliated with the Non-affiliated faction), articulated the

organization's position:

> [We] feel as a student body that we need to prioritize student issues, we can all have individual views, but frankly, we don't feel a need as a party to try and change international policy that does not affect students within the university. Resources are limited, we feel unable to do that with [university] students sleeping hungry.

The claim that the Non-affiliated faction was apolitical was, however, inconsistent with

clear ideological and political positions espoused by the organization. Nadia, an ANC faction

student leader criticized the Non-affiliated faction for being sympathetic towards Israel, a state

that the ANC faction regarded as stifling the Palestinian cause for self-determination. After he

had parted ways with the Non-affiliated faction, Nkosi pointed out to me that the organization

was funded by a strong Jewish constituency whose goal was to neutralize the anti-Israel, pro-

Palestinian stance of the ANC-aligned SRC. Based on this disclosure, it would be correct to say

that the faction was not aligned with any national political party, but given the pro-Israel

orientation, and the influence of the Jewish funders, the organization could not claim to be

apolitical.[69]

The Non-affiliated faction's association with the Jewish Student Association was one of

the rival formations' favorite punching bags. The contention around Jewish presence at the WCU

was particularly significant because Jewish students made up a mere 2% of the student body.

Adina indicated that WCU was perceived to be Jewish because many Jewish alumni donated to

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[69] The highly contested Israel-Palestinian politics were expressed on campus through hostile relations between the Palestinian Solidarity Committee (affiliated with the ANC-aligned formation) and the Jewish Student Association (affiliated with the Non-affiliated formation).

the university and that gave the sense that Jewish money controlled everything in the university. Aside from that, the Jewish student community had the most holidays, which the university accommodated. Lastly, out of interest in being part of the university, many of the Jewish students on campus were very vocal. The association of the Non-affiliated faction with the Jewish Student Association accounted for why the faction was dismissed by other factions as serving Jewish rather than the majority black students' interests.

The Non-affiliated faction reached its height in the 2014 elections (i.e. the year before #FMF) when they won seven out of the 15 SRC seats (see Figure 15). The faction subsequently suffered a resounding loss in 2015 when they won only three seats before losing all the 15 seats to the ANC faction in 2016. By the 2017 elections, the faction had disbanded as its top leadership endorsed the EFF faction, which went on to win the majority seats. This development seems almost inconceivable given that those students who had joined the Non-affiliated faction between 2014 and 2016 had done so because they disliked, disagreed, and were passionately opposed to national party politics on campus. These students had read the ANC and EFF factions as an expression of the unwelcome reach of national/parent parties on campus. However, the ANC and EFF factions found ways to frame the Non-affiliated faction as a Jewish interest group rather than as looking out for the needs of non-South African and non-black South African students. In doing so, the ANC and EFF factions could and did take apart the Non-affiliated faction without acknowledging their own nationalist bent and the black essentialist brand of their student politics and governance.

Because of their focus on inclusivity, both the Non-affiliated faction and DASO rejected race as the rallying point for their campaigns and priorities. The refusal and failure to racialize their politics gave the ANC and EFF an excuse to present both factions as irrelevant during a

period marked by the resurgence of black essentialism. The politics of blackness enabled the

ANC and EFF factions to interpret and dismiss the Non-affiliated and DA factions for

trumpeting inclusiveness yet continuing to exclude historically marginalized black South

Africans.

Participation in #FeesMustFall

In this section, I turn to the participation of the four factions in the #FMF protests. I argue

and show that, in its conceptualization and enactment, the #FMF agenda came to articulate the

radical leftist positions of the EFF, which wound up bounding the student protests within just one

of the four quadrants (see Figure 16). As discussed earlier, this top left quadrant espoused a

national racial justice logic and translated into calls for free higher education.

Figure 16: #FeesMustFall

The #FMF demands for free higher education were bolstered by the revelation that the ANC government's own internal study affirmed the feasibility of free higher education. The internal study was produced by a Working Group established by the Minister of Higher Education and Training in March 2012. The Working Group had reported that, although it would require significant additional funding, free university education for the poor in South Africa was attainable. Having never been made public, the report was only released after Amandla.mobi, an independent South African community advocacy organization, submitted a Promotion of Access to Information Act application after outbreak of the #FMF protests.[70]

ANC Faction

If the individuals serving in the SRC led by the ANC-aligned faction traditionally took on ANC positions and looked up to national party leaders as gate-keepers into the world of national politics, one would have expected them to tow the party line, or be strategic if there was any need to call national leaders out. But with the radical EFF driving the populist decolonization agenda from outside the WCU SRC structures, the ANC-dominated SRC confronted the challenge of identifying with and defending the increasingly unpopular ruling ANC linked to intra-elite conflict, corruption, ineptitude and the weakening of state institutions (Everatt, 2016; Reddy, 2010).

Consequently, ANC-aligned student leaders were forced to adopt and champion some of the radical positions put on the table by the EFF: rejecting fee increases, calling for free tertiary education, and renaming buildings after black nationalist heroes. As noted by Booysen (2016), at the height of the national #FMF movement, the protest was taken to seats of power in Cape Town (Parliament), Johannesburg (the ruling ANC's Luthuli House headquarters) and Pretoria

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[70] https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-29-blades-2012-report-free-university-education-for-the-poor-is-feasible-and-should-be-pursued/#.WnOMaajtyUk

(the state president's official residence, the Union Buildings). The ANC-aligned SRC played a central role, if not a leading role, in organizing such marches, and representing the movement, which pitted the ANC-aligned student political faction against the parent organization.

The #FMF protests highlighted the fundamental contradiction at the core of the ANC-aligned faction's dual identities – a student governing body elected to look out for the interests of students, and a political branch of a national political party struggling to contain the fall-out over fees increases amidst an erosion of trust among the national electorate. An EFF-leaning blogger[71] claimed that Luthuli House, the ANC Headquarters, provided the ANC-aligned faction with funding, support, and occasional orders to pacify student populations and halt protests. In charge of the SRC at WCU, the ANC-aligned faction's leadership came to be the key faces of the student protests, playing a crucial role in halting fee increases for 2016, galvanizing students, and driving free education to the top of the higher education policy agenda.

The EFF-leaning blogger argues that the ANC faction also played a central role in the dissolution of student unity and the obstruction of that very agenda by being complicit in the decision to prematurely terminate the 2016 phase of the protests (e.g. before the insourcing commitment had been won). Once the #FMF movement came around to confronting the ruling ANC, the alignment between the ANC-aligned faction and the parent national body got disrupted. Restoring the relationship between the ruling ANC and the ANC-aligned formation could only happen at the cost of the #FMF agenda as conceived from the perspective of the EFF faction.

One choice for the ANC-aligned faction to champion the cause of the marginalized black South Africans and rescue such from financial exclusion without ruffling the feathers of their parent party would have been to raise funds from the corporate world and put it into student

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[71] https://undressingtheuniverse.com/tag/pya/

scholarships. The majority-ANC SRC of 2014-2015 actually launched such a campaign, seeking

to raise R1 Million to assist some of 2,788 students whose National Students Financial Aid

Scheme (NASFAS) applications had been rejected due to insufficient funds. The highly

publicized and broadly supported campaign, however, lost some of its luster as #FMF protesters

shifted to address the perceived lack of transformation at former white universities and an

unresponsive state.

EFF Faction

In a political environment punctuated by a swelling tide of anti-ruling party sentiments,

the EFF-aligned faction stood to gain a significant measure of legitimacy and relevancy among

black South African students by pitching itself as the revolutionary party that could usher in

radical transformation. The faction's claim to revolutionary credentials is consistent with the

parent EFF party's self-description as:

> A radical, leftist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and militant economic emancipation movement that brings together revolutionary, fearless, radical, and militant activists, workers' movements, nongovernmental organizations, community-based organizations and lobby groups under the umbrella of pursuing the struggle for economic emancipation.[72]

The national EFF party conceived the pillars for economic emancipation as including the

expropriation of South Africa's land (without compensation) for equal redistribution;

nationalization of mines, banks, and other strategic sectors of the economy (again, without

compensation); and free quality education, healthcare, houses, and sanitation.

As Nkosi noted:

> The EFF has assumed this position and a monopoly over radical student demonstrations and politics to a point where they have succeeded to a large extent, especially in the first-year constituency, in making the [ANC-aligned faction] seem like it's not a radical organization.

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[72] http://www.effonline.org/about-us

One of the reasons why the EFF-led radical elements of the #FMF protests gained so much traction was that they capitalized on black South African students' frustration with the slow pace of institutional transformation. The EFF activists (both in the national party and student faction on campus) drew inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition and Fanonian schools of thought in their analyses of the state, imperialism, culture and class contradictions in the neo-colonial economic system, which they saw as keeping the oppressed under colonial domination and subject to imperialist exploitation. On campus, the EFF faction interpreted the slow pace of institutional transformation through this Marxist framework for understanding capitalist systems of oppression and the persistence of racial and socioeconomic inequalities at WCU and across the higher education and other sectors in the country.

Being the opposition party at the national level, and having no seats in the SRC (until 2017), the EFF was not shackled with the realities and constraints of governance, and so had much more latitude to advocate for a radical decolonization agenda. As pointed out above, the EFF-conceived decolonization agenda came to rest on disrupting institutionalized structures of power, including proceedings in parliament at the national level, and the academic program at the university level. The EFF-aligned student activists were, therefore, foremost in advocating a prolonged shut-down of the university even after President Zuma had buckled under pressure and announced that fees would not increase for 2016. The insistence on continuing the protests until the state had committed to free higher education and the university to insourcing all outsourced services eventually led to the dissolution of the student unity that had sustained the #FMF movement long enough to win a no-2016-fees-increase concession from the government.

I argue that the ANC and EFF factions took a narrowly racialized and nationalized stance as a function of dog whistle politics at WCU. While the ANC and EFF factions' pro-Palestine

(anti-Israel) stance projected the factions as against colonial establishments, those who supported the Non-affiliated faction and DASO (e.g. whites and Jewish students) or those who stayed disengaged from political activism on campus came to be labelled and castigated as anti-black, outsiders, and colonial-minded. Given that the ANC (national party) has historically supported liberation movements, and given the ANC faction's pro-Palestinian sentiments, it was particularly surprising that the ANC faction espoused racialized rhetoric that otherized those among students who did not subscribe to nationalistic and racialized politics. Ultimately, the anti-black rhetoric became a powerful mobilization strategy to win poor black South African students to the ranks of ANC and EFF factions by characterizing the Non-aligned and DA factions as anti-liberation. The mobilization strategy premised on nationality and blackness, thus, alienated non-national and non-black student constituencies such that the exclusion constituted a rallying point for the Non-affiliated faction to mobilize as well.

Non-affiliated Faction

Once the nationwide #FMF protests started, the Non-affiliated faction was in a quandary. The legitimacy of the financial and academic exclusion issues that animated the #FMF movement were hardly questioned. However, the fees protests manifested as the South African black child's struggle. If fees increases ended up being scrapped, as happened for the 2016 academic year, the benefits would accrue to all students, including non-nationals. Regardless, the #FMF student movement was essentially conceived around the needs and concerns of the black South African students. The quandary then for the Non-affiliated faction was whether to join the #FMF protests whose shifting demands had the potential to shut down the university indefinitely, or have nothing to do with the student protests. Support for shutting down the university would arouse the consternation of the non-South African and white voter bloc and funder base who

preferred a negotiated settlement that did not involve disrupting the academic program, and non-participation came with the risk of becoming irrelevant at this defining moment in the history of student activism in South Africa.

As a means for mass mobilization, #FMF leaders routinely engaged in *toyi-toyi*, a protest tradition dating back to the anti-apartheid struggle involving singing freedom songs and accompanying dances and performances that engender shared sensory disposition and sensibility among the marginalized (Jolaosho, 2015). As Dumisani indicated, the Non-affiliated faction's white South African student constituency did not espouse the shut-down-the-university and *toyi-toyi* protest approach adopted by the #FMF movement:

> The white kids would be the receiving end of things like gates being shut. Because maybe I do wanna just go home, and now there is a bunch of black kids blocking me, and now I panic because I am a girl, I am small they are banging on my car.

Ultimately, the leadership of the Non-affiliated faction distanced the organization from the 2015 phase of the #FMF protests: not only was their messaging more constrained, but none of the members participated in the protests in their official capacity. Dumisani was forthright in attributing the decision to stick with what he characterizes as the non-violent, non-partisan, and inclusive organizational mandate to the fear of alienating the organization's white/Jewish voter (and obviously the funder) base.

According to Nkosi, there was no space at all for an independent, non-ideological, idealistic and non-racial organization to exist in a post-#FMF era informed by the politics of blackness and the prioritization of the working class black child. In his view, it was problematic for the Non-affiliated faction to assume equal opportunity for everybody within a system that does not have equal opportunity to start with. As a former member, Nkosi had been with the Non-affiliated faction before. I asked him in what ways the formation had been relevant before

#FMF. He argued that once people started meaningfully interrogating the system and questioning

why gross inequalities persisted in universities, a realist and pragmatic orientation to solutions

that did not have an ideological backing, became irrelevant. For him, an ideological orientation

allowed for discussing the black reality, that is, what it means to be a black child in the university.

He pointed out that when #FMF broke out, the Non-affiliated faction never allowed him (as a

black South African student) space to raise the questions of the black reality. If he raised those

questions during meetings, the response would be "you can't have that conversation here man,

we equal…Why black? Everything is non-racial, we just need to solve [the academic] problem."

The fact that the Non-affiliated faction took and maintained a non-participatory stance

during #FMF was the clearest indication for Nkosi that the faction was not ready and relevant for

the current political climate. He postulated that for the black South African child, #FMF was a

clarion call for every student political faction to come to the fore for black South African

students. That the Non-affiliated faction did not show up for the #FMF protests confirmed for

Nkosi and many black South African student activists their belief that the interests of working

class (read *poor black South African*) students and their families were not a priority that the

faction had at heart. He recounted how someone from within the Non-affiliated faction posted on

the formation's Facebook page that they did not support shutting down the university. Without

hiding his frustration with the non-participatory stance, he reported that he had exclaimed: "You

are crazy! We do support shutting down the university!" He had no doubt in his mind that if the

Non-affiliated movement had been running the SRC, they would have never let the #FMF

movement happen.[73]

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[73] Nkosi's case represents a discernible pattern of key student leaders switching from one student political faction to another, or indicating the likelihood of aligning themselves with a political faction other than the one they started with. To keep this chapter at a reasonable length, I have elected to save the discussion of what the switches bring to

The criticism levelled against the Non-affiliated faction often failed to take into account the precarious situation that non-national students (who gravitated towards the Non-affiliated faction), particularly fellow blacks from neighboring countries, faced in a country where xenophobia is an ever-present threat. It also raises questions about how non-national students interpreted and responded to rising forms of South African nationalism, and the possibility that they joined the ANC or EFF factions. Although I have not been able to verify any numbers of non-national student membership in ANC-, EFF-, and DA-aligned factions, it was apparent that the fact that campus student politics were structured along national party politics significantly curtailed non-national students' disposition to join the party-aligned factions. Henry (a non-national student leader who had joined one of the party-aligned factions at another of the country's public universities) told me:

> Honestly there was no room at all (for non-national student participation in campus student politics). We have had international students, like right now, they always run independently but [it is] difficult to get even 400 votes. Every year we have them running, but independently, but they do not make it if they run alone. And, it's very difficult for an international student to be a member of, for instance, SASCO (ANC-aligned). They do not really feel like they are catered for by political parties.

Similarly, Tendai (one of the key non-national student leaders at WCU) pointed out that although the EFF faction enjoyed some support from non-national students (mainly Zimbabweans), none of the party-aligned student factions had a demonstrable record of including non-national students. Non-national students generally did not join these factions, and during his four years at WCU, none of the factions had ever fielded non-national students among their SRC candidates. I discuss the experiences of non-national students at length in chapter 7.

The Legitimacy of Representation

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our understanding of the political process of mobilizing resources, groups and individuals at WCU for a separate journal article.

The fractured understandings among the political factions and the competing agendas espoused by each raise crucial questions regarding the legitimacy of representation. For instance, who (if at all) should represent white students, the so-called apolitical black students, and Jewish students? Given the weight of oppression felt by black students at formerly white universities such as WCU, Jansen (2017) doubts that there is clarity about the role of whites in an essentially black struggle, or that cross-racial solidarity is possible and sustainable. He argues that as moderate white and black students withdrew from this essentially black political arrangement that #FMF became, the focus of student politics gradually moved to a narrow agenda of free public education for all. Consequently, the movement lost its broad, non-racial appeal, particularly for "white progressive students, who were left stranded and without a sense of how to participate in a resurgent black political moment" pg. 62.

In fact, the ANC-aligned leadership of the SRC perceived white students as having no legitimate claims to support services from the university. Nadia (one of the ANC-aligned SRC leaders) did not think that white students had any special needs that warranted representation in student governance. Although I was not able to get data on the proportion of white students at WCU and at other public universities who were poor or had special needs, Nadia's comment underscores that she sees the ANC-aligned faction as more concerned with racial nationalism than with economic equality. This might explain why some of white students wound up joining the Non-affiliated faction. Unfortunately, the inclusion of white students within the Non-affiliated faction compromised the organization's legitimacy in the eyes of most black South Africans, particularly the ANC and EFF stalwarts.

The issue of who got included and excluded was particularly evident during an "Inclusiveness Week" at WCU. On one of the days, I attended and observed an event dubbed

"Trip around the world through food, music and dance." For the event, a big tent was pitched at the heart of campus and tables were set up organized by country. The idea was for students from different countries (e.g. India, the U.S., Bulgaria, Ghana, South Africa, DRC, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Turkey, Mexico, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) to showcase their food and other cultural artifacts. Curious about a Palestinian Solidarity Committee (PSC) table set outside the tent, I sought to understand what the group was about. They claimed to be representing the "Forgotten People": Tibetans, Western Saharans, Native Americans, Yazidis, Khoisan, and Palestinians. Their leaflet read:

> As students of a democratic, post-apartheid South Africa, and as beneficiaries of a liberation struggle against racism, sexism, and exploitation, we stand with all those still engaged in struggle to liberate themselves from racism, apartheid and injustice… Human rights violations by Apartheid Israel are as unacceptable as they were under Apartheid South Africa.

Apart from the feeling that I knew too little about these struggles, I wondered how inclusive the "Inclusiveness" event could possibly be. By setting up their own table outside the tent, the PSC were sending a clear message that the purported inclusiveness gesture of setting up country-designated tables inside the tent was in fact exclusive of other nationalities. This group of "dissenters" was making a claim that there was an implicit exclusion on the part of the university, by leaving the colonized and the "oppressed" outside of the "big tent" of university education. The metaphor here is a striking illustration of efforts to make the "forgotten people" invisible, even delegitimizing them. Similarly, the out-sized dominance of the national racial justice logic and the transformation imperative in South African universities wound up trivializing, silencing and delegitimizing the voices advocating for social cohesion and inclusivity (cooperation across racial and national categories).

Student Involvement

Whether taken separately or together, the #RMF and #FMF student movements might give a misleading impression of massive broad-based political consciousness and activism at WCU and in South African public universities. It is crucial, therefore, to point out that the period after the end of apartheid has been marked by a decline in student political activism at South African universities and technikons (Cele, 2009). Cele notes though that protest actions mainly about financial exclusion have nonetheless remained common at historically black institutions. According to Jansen (2017), these students at historically black universities, such as the Tswane and Durban Universities of Technology, expressed frustrations around the fact that they had been protesting for years about financial exclusion but they were never taken seriously until the #FMF protests began at former white universities.

Across the continent in the course of the 1990s, the concurrent expansion, diversity in student ranks and privatization of higher education, and the growth and increasing diversity of institutional student bodies, all had the effect of reducing student activism (Luescher-Mamashela & Mugume, 2014). According to Luescher, Klemenčič & Jowi (2016), the expansion of a depoliticized student body is not unique to the African higher education context. In the wake of the marketization of higher education, students tend to shift their focus away from national politics and rather concentrate on "getting in, though, and out," to find employment (Klemenčič, Luescher & Mugume, 2016, p. 25). The irony has been that, while many students have gained access through student demand for increased access, this has not necessarily translated to more political activism once the students get to campus (Cele, 2009). Cele argues that this lack of political activity can be accounted for by the fact that for students taking extra classes to address academic development gaps they reject politics because it affects educational and occupational outcomes. Other factors highlighted by Cele include students being concerned more with finding

jobs, completing studies and paying off debt than financial difficulties of fellow students; dissatisfaction with the public demonstration methods used by national political student organizations; and lack of confidence due to the perceived self-interest and corruption of SRC members and members of political organizations.

My discussion of student involvement at WCU encompasses participation in campus SRC and national municipal elections as well as in the #FMF protests themselves. Lesedi (another top ANC-aligned SRC leader) acknowledged her concern with voter apathy and disengagement among the student body, not only with regards to voting in SRC elections, but political activism in general: "we have always been concerned by the voter turnout… a few students take part in the transformative activities on campus, and governance." According to Loretta, a black South African citizen originally from a neighboring country, the SRC was not even close to being truly representative: only between 23 and 24 % of the students participated in the 2015 and 2016 SRC elections, and the participation rate came down to 18% in the 2017 elections.[74]

The low turnout for SRC elections and low participation rates in student government was not unique to WCU or in South Africa. As noted by Henry (a non-South African student who served as a top ANC-aligned SRC leader at another South African university) his university reported a similar low turn-out for the 2016 SRC elections: out of 28,000 students, less than 5,000 voted in the elections. The same applied to student participation in local government elections. According to Dumisani, out of approximately 35,000 students and academic staff at WCU, the DA got only 300, EFF 500 and ANC 800 votes in the 2016 elections. Henry indicated that one of the key reasons why students did not participate was the widespread concern that

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[74] This trend was not new: according to a WCU student newspaper, the final voter count for the 2011 SRC elections totaled a mere 4,871. This means that just over 16% of the students took to the poll.

when the candidates came into power, they focused on themselves or were controlled by university administrators at the expense of the students.

Aside from voter apathy, there has also been indications that, contrary to the narrative of broad-based support for the #FMF movement, the majority of students neither participated in the protests nor supported the shutting down of the campus. During the period that WCU was shut down towards the end of September and the beginning of October of 2016, some among the university community questioned why a few hundred students should be allowed to hold the rest of the university hostage. University administrators referred to these views as coming from the "silent majority" and claimed that following the closure of the university many emails and calls had been received from students and parents who were "concerned, angry and anxious about the future of the University, and who want classes to resume." One such email message from a student read: "Well done to capitulating to the mob…and so the loud minority are set to get their way. A 1,000 thugs…close down a campus of 30 000+."

The WCU administrators seem to have acted on the indications that the majority of students and staff did not support the disruption of the academic program. To that end, the administrators ran a poll to "gauge the thoughts of staff and students on the resumption of the academic programme." Out of the more than 20,000 responses received, 77% voted in support of the academic program to resume, and only 23% were in support of keeping the university closed. Therefore, the degree of publicity that the #FMF generated is not necessarily consistent with the idea that protests gained widespread support among the student body.

Conclusion

Given that radical EFF ideas on decolonization ended up being the logic and vision driving the #FMF student movement, it is crucial to consider how the ideas sat in tension with

the university's internationalization imperative discussed in chapter 5. Motipi (one of the black South African SRC leaders) expressed wariness about internationalization and stressed that it "must not come at the expense of an education which is going to be prejudicial to Africa and does not benefit Africans." While Motipi's allusion to "Africa" and "African" here gestures toward Pan-African sensibilities, I argue that the Pan-African consciousness was weakened by the EFF- and ANC-aligned factions' nationalistic conception of the black student struggle. This nationalistic politics curtailed the possibilities for solidarity between black South Africans fighting against persistent racism in the post-apartheid era and fellow black Africans (particularly from settler colonies such as Zimbabwe and Kenya) whose countries' experiences with colonialism could have informed the black South African struggle.

Tebogo, the EFF-aligned faction leader, registered his disapproval of the elitist and internationalized university, which he regarded as a deliberate scheme to divert attention away from the radical transformation imperatives of the post-apartheid era. He described the university's selective admission policies as an eye-of-a-needle system that excluded millions of black South Africans. Not only was the university itself built on stolen land, black people were taken violently to come and build the city where the university currently sits. Yet, the more fees went up, the more the same black people were pushed out, and the curriculum remained dominated by pro-capitalist white liberal ideologies.

The EFF faction questioned the university's treatment of non-South Africans from the continent as international/foreign students. If the university really cared about internationalization, Tebogo argued, it would recognize the common African identity and work towards building a united Africa rather than accept colonially imposed borders. Similarly, the ANC-aligned faction claimed that they subscribed to the notion of Afro-politanism and was both

concerned and involved with international issues such as what is going on in Syria with refugees, Palestine, Israel, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Nadia, for instance, called for black African universities for black African students, and African solutions to African problems.

Ironically, however, the EFF- and ANC-aligned factions' leaders emphasized the importance of a supranational horizon to student politics yet otherized non-national black students. I recognize that the very nationalistic shape of #FMF and a Pan-African vision are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but argue that the scourge of xenophobia (more appropriately termed Afro-phobia) and the overwhelmingly negative experiences of non-national black students (see next chapter) put the two at odds with each other at WCU.

This failure to regionalize and Pan-Africanize the racial justice struggle weakened the potential for #FMF to speak to historical inequalities across national boundaries. The nationalist views were particularly evident in my conversations with Mpho (a black South African activist). He faulted the SADC students studying in South African universities for being comfortable with the status quo in the country, consequently failing to consider the struggles of the black South Africans as their own struggle too. His concern, that non-national African students were not throwing their weight behind the South African black struggle, however, failed to account for the fact that the struggle was narrowly conceived; nor did it put any responsibility on black South African students to acknowledge the black struggles in other African countries, such as the erosion of democratic institutions. Therefore, to the extent that the black South African identity politics essentially drove the student-led transformation agenda, it stood in sharp contrast to the internationalization agenda, which celebrated multi-national and multi-racial identities.

Chapter 7

Possibilities and Limitations of Non-national Student Organizing

Introduction

This chapter examines how non-national students at World Class University (WCU) experienced and understood the difficulties they faced, both as students and as non-nationals in South Africa; and how they worked to organize in response to these difficulties. Their organizing navigated institutional structures and systems; and institutional policy logics, discourses, and practices; and was shaped and often constrained by these. I have written about non-national student organizing and about domestic student organizing (the #FeesMustFall movement) in separate chapters because non-national and domestic students failed to conceive of their demands on the university as part of the same struggle, or to work together in significant ways to support each other's' demands. Thus, the previous chapter showed that the nationalist character of the racial justice struggle championed by black South African student activists at WCU and the influence of openly partisan national political parties curtailed the space available to non-national students to politicize and organize around their own experiences. This chapter shows how non-national students maneuvered within the constraints of WCU and national student movements to attempt to voice their concerns and demand that the institution address their experiences.

Although there is a great deal of literature on international student experiences, including robust coverage of the population's marginalization and vulnerability in many institutions and countries, little has been written that analyzes the agency of migrant students in making claims for rights under various identities and across various spatial scales (Robertson, 2013). This chapter provides an overview of the context of the widespread and persistent anti-immigrant hostility in South Africa and the roles that xenophobia plays in "dividing and conquering" the

world. I then draw on diverse non-national student narratives to show that anti-immigrant

hostilities in South Africa pose serious threats to the lives and livelihoods of those perceived as

"outsiders", including education and economic migrants, and refugees and asylum seekers

(Misago et al., 2015).[75] Next, I discuss two different forms of organizing (country-specific

associations and the Non-national Student Council (NNSC) through which non-national students

mobilized around the collective hardships that they faced as students and as non-nationals, and

around which they engaged with institutional discourses, practices, and systems.

The third organization through which non-national students were trying to organize was

the Non-affiliated faction, which I covered in detail in the previous chapter and will be referring

to in this chapter. The Non-affiliated faction was unique and significant in that it straddled the

domestic and non-national student mobilization domains: it was one of the key players in

domestic student politics, including running for SRC elections; at the same time, it made the

cause of non-national students one of the cornerstones of its mobilization strategy. As a bridge

between national and non-national student activism divides, the Non-affiliated faction offered an

alternative form of student organizing and solidarity possibilities among domestic black South

African and non-national black student constituencies. However, these possibilities failed in

practice to materialize, in large part because the internal politics of black South African political

parties so fully dominated in the university space. In relation to these politics, the Non-affiliated

faction's cross-national agenda—just like the national social cohesion logic—could never play a

significant role in shaping student organization or activism.

As I will show, some of the problems that the non-national students organize around are

the same as the problems that poor black South African students face (e.g. economic and social

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[75] In addition to non-nationals, Misago et al. (2015) includes locally defined "outsiders" e.g. domestic migrants and ethnic minorities among the targets of xenophobia in South Africa.

hardships created by exam and move-in schedules, and unexpected or too-high fees in general). I, therefore, also reflect on the possibilities (or lack thereof) for the creation of the NNSC to foster cross-national solidarities between black South African and non-national African students.

International/Migrant Student Activism

Around the world, much of the available literature on student mobilization in higher education focuses on the activism of domestic students, and the consequences of their activism on national politics and institutions (e.g. Fleet & Guzman, 2017; Luescher-Mamashela & Mugume, 2014; Shin, Kim, & Choi, 2014; Snider, 2017; Klemenčič, 2014; Suoranta & Fitzsimmons, 2017). These domestic student movements are diverse and range from protests to bring about or prevent change in policies, institutional personnel, social structures/institutions, or cultural aspects of society to revolutionary movements that contribute to the downfall of governments (Gill & DeFronzo, 2009). While student dissent is hardly a novel phenomenon, Rodan (2008) notes that activism has been less visible among the growing populations of full-fee-paying international university students. Rodan sees this invisibility as a function of international students' "visitor" status, which dictates "a minimal risk policy in terms of a focus on study and avoidance of any untoward encounters with authority" (p. 50).

I draw on Robertson's (2013) discussion of the social and political consequences of the education-migration nexus in Australia[76] to focus attention on migrant student activism in the context of internationalized university spaces created by the international education industry. Robertson explores how international students in Australia are constituted as socially and spatially situated subjects, and how the spatial organization of the city and the campus impacts

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[76] Robertson describes Australia as a global leader in interlinking international education and skilled migration in ways that have blurred boundaries around student, consumer, worker, migrant and ethnic identities, and have given rise to very pronounced student activism. This has particular relevance to South Africa because the country is the most popular study destination in Africa and actively looking to absorb education migrants in critical skill areas into the labor force.

and is impacted by their activism. She argues that the intersection of education and migration policies in Australia has shifted the framing of international students from transient consumers to potential citizens. As boundaries around the categories of student, migrant, and worker have become increasingly fuzzy, discourses of human rights and consumer rights become intertwined in ways that produce multiple subjectivities and problematize previous ideas of belonging, citizenship, and rights.

The international student activism in Robertson's (2013) study occurred in Melbourne between 2005 and 2010 and included a protest against unfair assessment; a fight for a campus prayer room; and labor protests within the retail service and taxi industries. Robertson examines this activism as "a process which has increasingly jumped scales across campus, city and nation… [and] has mobilized complex networks of association to make claims to intersecting identities and multiple belongings" (p. 973).

The forms of organizing and activism that the student migrants employed in Melbourne linked in to existing concerns of established student, migrant, ethnic and labor networks within Australian cities in dynamic ways. For instance, when the campus Islamic Society led a 16-month-long campaign to protest the university not honoring a promise to provide a dedicated Muslim prayer room on campus after a renovation, it built on existing networks across the multi-ethnic Muslim community, the multi-faith community, and the student union movement. Robertson argues that constructing solidarities that cut across the boundaries of local student/international student, Muslim/non-Muslim and student/worker was an essential component of "the complex pastiche of subjectivity making" (p. 982), and of the success of these movements.

The agency of international student protesters in Australia provides a useful reference and comparative point for understanding the possibilities and limitations of non-national student organizing in South Africa. Robertson (2013) posits that beyond the rights owed to them by educational institutions as consumers of education as product, the claims of international students are tied to overlapping identities and belonging within different networks, and so are also about their rights to the resources and spaces of these networks, which stretch within and beyond the university. This agency gestures towards a new politics premised on residence rather than nationality, or on a selective deployment of the two. In contrast, in this chapter I describe the campus-contained, non-networked struggles that I saw resulting from non-national student mobilization at WCU. These struggles reflected the institutional segregation that existed between national and non-national students, which was fed by the continued legacies of apartheid segregationist tactics; South African politicians' use of xenophobia as a key tool of division; and nationalized class, race, and gender dynamics. Before turning to non-national student mobilization at WCU, I first discuss the context of xenophobia in South Africa.

The National Context of Xenophobia

As part of a political discourse that prioritizes indigeneity and promotes a South African exceptionalism (Gordon, 2015), xenophobia in South Africa is often expressed through discriminatory attitudes and remarks, institutional or social exclusion, harassment by government officials, and overt forms of interpersonal and collective violence (Misago et al., 2015). The nativist discourses that tie one's rights to one's national origins have encouraged and legitimized new forms of bias, administrative discrimination and anti-foreigner policing (Landau, 2005). Misago (2017) argues that xenophobic violence in South Africa is primarily "politics by other means" as its instrumental motives are located in the local political economy and micro-political

processes at play in many of the country's towns, townships and informal settlements. Misago posits that the violence is organized and led by local "violence entrepreneurs" attempting to claim or consolidate the power and authority needed to further their political and economic interests.

Just as with nativism, which was part and parcel of the apartheid regime, xenophobia has a rather weird relationship to both apartheid politics and post-apartheid nationalism. As I discussed in chapter 4, post-apartheid nationalism has been premised on the populist notion of South African exceptionalism (Chéry, 2017; Cornelissen, 2017) which celebrates South Africa as an exception from underdevelopment problems experienced by other African states. The idea that the country is such a unique case on the continent that it is able to control its own fate (Lazarus, 2004) might explain how it made sense in the post-apartheid period for black South Africans to organize as nationalists, against white South Africans and blacks from other African countries. For xenophobia to make sense and be deployed as it is, regional solidarity approaches adopted in the fight against apartheid and the promise of the rainbow nation had to disappear from post-apartheid discourses of nationalism. The silencing of acts and voices of regional solidarity suggest the "great victory" of "neoliberal" approaches over the ANC's more communist approaches to cross-national (black) identity.

Xenophobic violence was most intense and widely scrutinized in May 2008 when just over two weeks of attacks across the country left at least 62 dead, 670 wounded, dozens raped, more than 100,000 displaced, and millions of Rands' worth of property looted, destroyed or appropriated by local residents (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, 2008). Since the mid-2008 wave, almost every month there has been at least one attack on groups of foreign nationals in the country. Between mid-2009 and late 2010, there were at least 20 deaths,

over 40 serious injuries, at least 200 foreign‑run shops looted and more than 4,000 persons

displaced due to violence targeting foreign nationals (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in

South Africa, 2011). Table 5 shows the numbers for 2011-2013.

Table 5: Xenophobia Statistics, 2011-2013[77]

	Incidents	**Deaths**	**Serious Injuries**	**Displaced**
2011	154	99	100	1,000
2012	238	120	154	7,500
2013	250	88	170	7,000

Although the majority of those attacked were foreign migrants, a third of those killed

were South African citizens who had married foreigners, refused to participate in the violent

orgy, or had the misfortune of belonging to groups perceived to be "not South African enough"

(Landau, 2011). Misago et al. (2015) also note that, across the country, the violence tends to

occur in poor and economically marginalized informal settlements where citizens, many of

whom are themselves internal migrants, and immigrants meet amidst poor living conditions and

a general scarcity of public services, employment, and business opportunities.

Victimhood in the Wake of Xenophobia

The national context of intense and long-standing xenophobia significantly impacted non-

national students' experiences at WCU and in South Africa. Research participants' accounts

demonstrated their experiences with anti-immigrant hostilities and how the hostilities posed

serious threats to their lives and livelihoods. For instance, Fungai, a postgraduate student from

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[77] UNHCR ROSA (2013). These numbers vary depending on their source. For instance, unpublished UNHCR statistics on data compiled from the UNHCR xenophobia hotline show that in 2011, at least 120 foreign nationals were killed (five of them burnt alive), 100 were seriously injured, at least 1,000 displaced, and 120 shops and businesses permanently or temporarily closed through violence or selective enforcement of bylaws. The differences in the numbers have been attributed to the absence of reliable statistics or any credible basis upon which to measure the true scale of immigration (Crush & Williams, 2001). Given that the data is gathered mainly by humanitarian‑based organizations and research entities whose work is often not national in scope, the discrepancies in the numbers might even hint at possible underreporting of the extent and scale of the xenophobic violence in the country.

Zimbabwe, described how his wife, who was visiting during the 2012 wave of xenophobic attacks reacted: "My wife was saying I hate this country. She was here when some of the things were happening. She said I don't like this place, the violence, the crime, xenophobia…"

Based on WCU's internal record, 73% of WCU's non-national student populations live off campus and so are not as sheltered from the threat and fear of violence as might be imagined for students living on the university campus.[78] A significant portion of these students—both undergraduate and postgraduate students—shuttle between campus and residences in the townships and the economically marginalized informal settlements described above. Even the privileged among non-national students—those who live on and off campus and have family resources on which to draw to support their physical safety—were consciously aware of the risks they faced. In response, they took a range of actions to try to protect themselves from direct acts of xenophobic crime. For example, Melody, a wealthy undergraduate from the DRC, described the weeks immediately following the 2012 attacks: "I missed 4 weeks of class. I stay alone and could not come out [of the apartment]. My parents were not comfortable with me taking public transport [to the university]."

Students were also extremely wary of what they viewed as xenophobia-fueled daily and petty crimes (e.g., muggings, robberies, car thefts) against non-nationals. While crimes of these sorts are ubiquitous in South Africa, the non-national students with whom I spoke believed that criminals intentionally targeted foreigners, and that (or perhaps because) the law enforcement apparatus lacked the commitment to protect foreigners. Again, in response to these experiences,

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[78] One of the major reasons why many non-national students opted to find off-campus accommodation is that WCU policy required them to pay 75% of their tuition and fees (including the whole year's accommodation costs) by March of each academic year. Most off-campus housing arrangements allowed students to do monthly payments for rent, which was more feasible for families relying on monthly incomes.

students took a range of actions to try to protect themselves. For example, Valentine, an

undergraduate student from the DRC whose family was wealthy said:

> I have never experienced being attacked, but whenever I am out there, I am scared about being
> attacked. I have put some precautions [to keep myself safe]. I cannot be out of my place at
> midnight and go out and take any cab home.

But despite these precautions—many of which were extremely costly for students—many

students experienced such crimes. Thokozani, a postgraduate student from Zimbabwe, lived in

what she thought was a safe neighborhood. Nonetheless, she recounted a story of getting mugged

in broad daylight as she was walking home from the mall on a Sunday afternoon. She had passed

a car parked on the curb, which appeared to have developed mechanical problems. The driver

and another person looked busy trying to fix it. Just as she walked past, however, the car drove

past and came to a stop in front of her, and the men came out brandishing a knife. Although they

did not harm her physically, they got away with her phone and other valuables.

Nyasha, a postgraduate student from Zimbabwe, narrated her own experiences of how

driving a vehicle with license plates from her home country increased the liability of being easily

recognizable as a black foreigner in South Africa. At one point, she drove to a shopping mall,

parked outside and went in. When she came back after about 15 minutes, someone had stripped

the car. In an attempt to get to the ignition, possibly to start the car and steal it, the person had cut

the dashboard, leaving all the wires hanging out. Although Nyasha proceeded to file a report

with the police, she knew that nothing would come out of it: "they don't insure foreign cars. If it

goes missing, it's just one of those things."

Even when resources allowed them to protect themselves, however, non-national students

were constantly reminded of their liminal status in South Africa and at the university. Emma, a

postgraduate non-national student from Zambia,[79] had made a choice to live in university

residences, partly because her PhD scholarship covered accommodation expenses, but also

because of security concerns. She recounted the harrowing experience of dealing with the death

of a fellow national who had been murdered by one of the people in the neighbourhood where he

had been living. It had taken two weeks to discover his body.

> The first experience that gave me an insight [into the realities of xenophobia] was the fact that one of my fellow Zambian students was killed. It was us the fellow Zambians who had to bury that student in the absence of the parents. The body had decomposed and could not be sent back home.

This experience left such an indelible mark on Emma that South Africa impressed her as an

unsafe place for non-national students and other foreign populations.

The context of xenophobia is particularly important because the majority of South

African citizens identify foreign African nationals as the group they least want to come and live

in South Africa (Gordon, 2015). Despite cases of hospitality, tolerance, and some South Africans

defending the rights of non-nationals, Misago et al. (2015) point out that South Africans are

generally uncomfortable with the presence of Black and Asian non-nationals in the country. This

explains why Clementine, another undergraduate student from the DRC, brings up the case of a

welcoming and hospitable South African as an exception to the rule:

> I personally am not safe because you don't know how they [South Africans] react. Even talking in French or Swahili, you really will be scared because you see some other people gossiping about us: 'I don't know what she is doing here' Some of the South Africans have understood this, they know and are starting to accept us because one day I met one person in a bank and he was telling me, 'don't consider yourself as a foreigner because we all come from the same continent, foreigners are white people.' That is what he told me. So, some understand this, but some don't.

Thandiwe, the postgraduate student from Zimbabwe, lived in the townships and

commuted to campus by public transport. She spoke about the decision to keep her non-national

identity under cover and maintain distance from people she did not know:

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[79] I have changed this and select countries of origin to protect the identity of the research participants.

For me, it's tough, very tough. When I come here to campus, I [just] talk to Stefani (a fellow postgraduate student from the same country). Even when I am talking to you, I can say anything, but when I get to a taxi, I can't even speak loud [because] I are afraid someone will know that I am not a South African. It's difficult. Even neighbors, I can't tell them that I am not SA. It's risky. When xenophobic attacks start, you can't befriend neighbors. You just keep to yourself.

Aside from ordinary citizens, corruption tied to anti-immigrant sentiments is also rampant among government officials, the police, and private organizations contracted to manage and provide services, promote urban development, or manage detention and deportation processes (Misago et al., 2015). As described later in the chapter, this caused serious difficulties for many non-national students trying to navigate visa processes.

In much of the available literature on xenophobia (e.g. Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Gordon, 2015, Misago, 2017; Schierup, 2016; Zihindula, Meyer-Weitz, & Akintola, 2017), the primary driver of xenophobia is understood to be competition for economic and other opportunities. Because black South Africans most often feel they are competing with other black African immigrants for jobs and other resources, they respond in xenophobic ways to their presence in South Africa. This construction has given xenophobia in South Africa its *Afrophobic* permutations (Abdi, 2011; Akanle, Alemu & Adesina, 2016; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016; Chigeza, De Wet, Roos, & Vorster, 2013; Gordon, 2015; Oloyede, 2011).

Contrary to the competition-for-resources theory, Nyasha, a postgraduate student from Zimbabwe, theorized xenophobia as arising from self-hate instead:

The reason why black South Africans attack other Africans is probably self-hate…Apartheid was a system put in place to achieve certain objectives: marginalizing certain people out of the economy, but also for you to internalize that as a black person you are not the normal, you are inferior. I concede there aren't enough jobs and resources. Black people are suffering in this country because apartheid structures are still in place. [But] why do black people then attack only black people not the white people? I think it's because a black person looking at another black sees themselves.

Nyasha felt that "no person in their right minds will come live in one of the most violent countries in the world… research [shows that] South Africa is the place where people die the

most, but there is no war." However, as economic and political circumstances worsen in

neighboring countries, migrants continue to flock to South Africa. As Thandiwe pointed out,

many of the migrants, especially undocumented migrants, came because they believed that South

Africa was a country of economic opportunities: "when you come you think you could find jobs

all over the place."

For the non-South African participants in this study, being a student is one of a limited

number of ways to maintain legal status in the country—it comes with some serious costs, but

provides a potential pathway to a future life in South Africa that is quite different than the other

pathways available (i.e., asylum or staying in the country illegally). Thandiwe recounted how the

illegal pathway often involved taking advantage of corrupt immigration officials to come into

and stay in South Africa on a long-term basis without the requisite immigration paperwork. Once

cleared at the port of entry to enter the country (usually by road), non-nationals would find cross-

border bus drivers who they could pay to have their passport stamped out at the port of exit, and

deliver it back to their families in the home country while the passport holder him/herself

remained in South Africa. That way the passport holder did not overstay the days that would

have been stamped in the passport at the port of entry.[80] But, without a passport in South Africa,

the foreign nationals would have to either evade police officers or bribe them to avoid arrest,

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[80] Currently, SADC nationals entering South Africa do not require a visa prior to arriving at ports of entry. Although they can request to stay in South Africa for up to 90 days on a single entry, South African Home Affairs officials use their own discretion on the number of days they stamp in individuals' passports. In my own experiences at the Beit Bridge border post (South African border with Zimbabwe – the busiest port of entry into South Africa), immigration officials often gave as little as two weeks or a few days (instead of the 90 days) to try and curb the incessant flow of immigrants from Zimbabwe.

imprisonment, and deportation when found without the passport. Thandiwe was fair skinned enough to get away from being profiled as a foreigner based on her complexion.[81]

Pursuant to her characterization of South Africa as an inhospitable place, Nyasha described WCU as an uncaring and insensitive institution. The university wanted non-national students to register and study there, but the institution did not care "what cost it is financially, emotionally, socially." Most poignantly though, Nyasha argued that WCU alienated both the black non-national and the black South African students. Whereas the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall protests and other ongoing transformation/decolonization struggles spoke to the alienation of black South Africans in their own country's universities, xenophobia in all its forms reflected the unfortunate path taken by the historically marginalized in South Africa to otherize and exclude fellow Africans from the gains of the anti-apartheid struggle.

Indeed, the alienation faced by black South Africans in their own country and the concerns raised by non-national students, including financial precarity and inhospitable institutional cultures, are not divorced from each other. For instance, during registration at the beginning of the year, the university did not provide any temporary accommodation for undergraduate students, whether they were non-nationals or South Africans who came from other provinces, to keep their luggage and sleep when they arrived for registration. The students needed temporary accommodation because they could only move into residences after the beginning of February, yet registration happened around mid-January. This meant that when students showed up for registration, they needed accommodation for the two- to three-week interval between registration and moving in. In this and other instances, both domestic and non-

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[81] South Africans are generally regarded as lighter in complexion than nationals from the rest of the other SADC countries.

national students had common grounds for their claims that institutional structures did not serve them well and resulted in large, unexpected expenses for students.

The precarity faced by non-national students at WCU was not just limited to victimhood in the wake of xenophobia. Other concerns encompassed students' ability to afford application and registration fees and upfront payment of tuition; inadequacy and unresponsiveness of existing institutional support systems; and absence or lack of institutionalized representation in student governance structures. Clearly, most of these concerns resonate with black South African students' concerns as well. To understand the solidarity possibilities offered by these common struggles, I now turn to how non-national students at WCU succeeded or failed to organize themselves and a broader network in response to the precarity they faced in trying to navigate higher education in South Africa.

Mobilization of Non-national Students

Whereas the previous chapter featured black South Africans making direct citizenship demands on both the university and the state, this chapter focuses on the kind of claims that non-national students could make at WCU. When I began fieldwork in 2014, non-national students initially organized themselves across their existing country-specific clubs, societies, or associations (e.g., Zimbabwean, Congolese, and Malawian student associations). These associations mainly existed as social-support groups for students from the same country/region.

During the course of the fieldwork, some leaders of these associations grew increasingly frustrated with the fragmenting effects of organizing the non-national student body based on national identity/background, the tendency to predominantly organize around social events, the lack of interest in political activism, and the limitations created by the country-based organizations. Eventually, these leaders led efforts to form a Non-national Student Council

(NNSC) which I will come back to after describing the country-specific organizations, the problems they faced, how two of them operated, how class and gender intersected with the (limited) goals of the organizations; and why they were not very powerful, were not representative, and were not able to form a greater whole.

Country-specific Organizations

Student clubs, societies, and organizations (CSOs) at WCU were governed by specific rules and policies. For any CSO to be recognized and be approved to operate at WCU, it had to submit an application to the SRC and attach a list of 40 registered students interested in joining the CSO. The SRC would then assess the application and determine whether or not the CSO would be an asset to the University. While these rules ensured that CSOs existed to serve the interests of WCU students, several countries, such as Zambia, Lesotho, and Malawi did not meet the 40 student-member threshold and so were inactive/dormant during the time of the study.

Even when a CSO had more than 40 student members interested in joining, the non-national student associations faced a number of challenges ranging from lack of organizational capacity, lack of student interest in joining or participating in activities, and internal squabbles linked to ethnic rivalries. I discuss these challenges in relation to the Zimbabwean and Congolese associations, which were among the largest, most visible, and most vibrant country-specific student associations. The Zimbabwean association, for instance, had between 120 and 150 registered and paying members.[82] In particular, I focus on the kind of organizing (or lack thereof) of these associations and what made them not to be powerful vehicles for change.

Tendai, one of the Zimbabwean association leaders, indicated that he was very disappointed by the difficulties involved in growing the association's membership, and noted

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[82] While the membership of the Association was large compared to other country-specific Associations, it was small when compared to an average of 1,000 Zimbabwean students attending WCU between 2014 and 2016.

that at any given time, the majority of the members were first year students. As Tendai

explained, this was because the association leaders did not have ready access to all the

Zimbabwean students in the university:

> We had a lot of challenges with requesting the information when we wanted to recruit new
> members. We thought the International Office was equipped with the information we needed.
> When we initially made the request, we thought they were able to provide us with a separate list
> of Zimbabwean students so that we could communicate with them. But,it seems they were
> reluctant to do so for some reason I still find difficult to understand. We had a lot of fights about
> this. I was always taking issues with the International Office as to why they could not provide us
> with that list, as that list was going to be vital in terms of our recruitment. They were probably not
> sure that they could give us that information. There was a certain hesitance.

Emma, a Malawian student, explained how this failure to access student contact information

accounted for their struggle to establish the Malawi Association:

> We have tried [without success] to go to the database through the SRC to capture every
> [Malawian] student. But also, there are some [students] that are not interested. You cannot force
> them so the number has not been good enough to register.

As a result, the most viable member recruitment opportunity came during orientation week for

first year students that was held at the beginning of each year. During the orientation week,

different CSOs could set up "recruitment" tables in a designated area. As students came by to

check out the tables, representatives would explain what the association was about and invite the

new students to join.

To become a member, a student had to fill out a membership form and pay a subscription

fee of R200 per year. The funds went towards social events and other activities organized by the

association during the year. Since joining CSOs was optional, leaders of the country associations

struggled to strike the right balance between pegging the membership fees to make it affordable

for the average student and raising enough funds to provide a range and quality of programming

that would keep current members excited and attract new ones. This balance was extremely

difficult to strike such that the leaders ended up asking anyone who wanted an association t-shirt (which should have been part of the membership package) to pay an extra R50.

The possibility that the country/region-specific student associations could be truly representative of non-national students' concerns and needs was significantly limited due to the difficulties involved in growing membership and the lack of funds to expand programming beyond social events. Beyond that, the Zimbabwe association in particular was assailed by a crisis of legitimacy and representation. If the association was established and purported to represent Zimbabwean students at WCU, some among the Zimbabwean student community felt that a leadership committee entirely staffed by the Shona[83] did not show a commitment to representing the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Zimbabwean student body. Tendai also noted that many Zimbabwean students had expressed displeasure at the messaging on t-shirts printed by the association which they interpreted as lending support to one of the country's political parties. This disgruntlement suggested the students wanted the association to operate above what they saw as divisive political affiliations, and ethnic and linguistic identities.

Impact of Class and Gender on Engagement

A group of Congolese students (Melody, Clementine, and Valentine), all coming from wealthy backgrounds, captured and expressed the different inclinations for and lack of interest in joining the country/region specific associations. I have grouped and discussed the three Congolese students as sharing privileged backgrounds that cushioned them against the financial precarity faced by other non-national students at WCU. The three's financial stability, however, led them to very different approaches to engaging with fellow non-nationals and the country

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[83] The largest ethnic and linguistic group in Zimbabwe.

associations, from Melody's total disengagement, and Clementine's selective engagement, to Valentine's total engagement.

Melody was in her second year of her Bachelors of Science.[84] She lived by herself in a two-bedroom apartment in an affluent and predominantly white residential suburb. She indicated that she was spending approximately R72,000 on accommodation and utilities (excluding food).[85] The neighborhood's exclusive location gave her a high level of security. In fact, some of the suburb's streets had recently been boomed in order to provide the high-income residents with more security and exclusivity. Melody impressed me as someone who took her well-off circumstances to mean that she could forego the sense of community that came with associating with fellow Congolese students. When I asked her about the Congolese association, she responded: "Honestly I don't even know about the Congolese association. I do not care about all those things. I am just here to study."

Clementine had finished her third year in Economics the previous year, but was registered as an occasional student in order to re-take a course to boost her grades enough to be admitted into the postgraduate program. She was not comfortable discussing what her parents did for a living but indicated that she came from a privileged background: her parents paid for her from their pocket, two of her siblings were in the U.S. and one was with her in South Africa, and while in South Africa, she lived in the suburbs, not the typical "black" townships where most non-national students from limiting socioeconomic backgrounds stayed. One of the two neighborhoods she had lived was the same as the one Melody lived in.

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[84] Degree programs and other details have been changed to protect the identity of the research participants.

[85] Other students who lived off campus indicated that they paid roughly 3,500 Rands per month in accommodation costs, which translates to 42,000 Rands per year. The cost of staying on campus ranged between approximately 30,000 to 70,000 Rands.

Unlike Melody, who did not feel a need for the home country support system, Clementine saw some benefits of the Congolese association: "Sometimes it is really good to have those parties because it allows us to relax and think other issues than academic." Additionally, she appreciated the fact that the association was a place one could go to if they had concerns or were facing hardships: "If you go to them, they try to help you. Even if you have a financial problem, you talk to them they can try to find a solution to help you." The association also provided a platform to deliberate on the political situation at home. However, Clementine kept engagement with fellow Congolese students and the university community to the bare minimum: "I really do not have friends. Most of my time I spend reading at home and watching TV and going to shopping mall. I am not a kind of person who like parties."

The main reason for Clementine's disengaged approach was that the programming of the association was skewed heavily towards partying, which she did not find useful. She was not alone. Edmore, a non-national who had served in the Zimbabwean association, argued that the Association had set a very bad precedent by developing a reputation as a type of social club geared toward merely providing members with the space to get together and know each other. While the social aspects were important, Edmore was disappointed that there was a lack of interest among the association leaders to embark on substantive activities, for instance cultivating relationships with the embassy as a form of civic and political engagement with both the host and home countries. The partying tradition is part of the reason why one of the country/region specific associations had a hard time attracting postgraduate students, many of whom regarded the associations as entertainment packages for undergraduate students.

Valentine was in his 2rd year in Business and considered himself to be "one of those 1.9999% privileged people" at WCU. His background afforded him and his siblings, who were

with him in South Africa, the liberty to decide where they wanted to go and study, whether it was

at the undergraduate or postgraduate level. By the time he completed high school, his parents had

made it clear that they wanted him to go and study overseas:

> They never told me to go to South Africa [but] asked me to choose. I picked South Africa,
> Belgium, and France. But, after sending my documents, I just felt like French as a language is
> dying these days. I said I can have an opportunity to learn English, and it would be more
> advantage to go in an English country. I was told in South Africa you can get an opportunity to go
> to Australia.

Valentine was an active member of the Congolese association, taking part in organizing social

events (e.g. parties, braai dinners), educational programs (e.g. Math workshops), and providing

support for Congolese students on campus. In addition, he was an integral part of the

negotiations and planning around the formation of the NNSC discussed below.

While issues of gender and safety might play a role,[86] the differences in engagement

levels could better be explained by the students' post-graduation trajectories. For both Melody

and Clementine, South Africa was a transit point where they could learn English and obtain

bachelors and honors degrees. Eventually they both wanted to go abroad (Melody to Germany or

the U.S, and Clementine to Canada) for further studies. In contrast to the desire to escape the

travails in one's home country, Valentine intended to return to the DRC, and saw involvement in

student politics as preparation for participation in the political process at home. During my study,

he was working under the tutelage of senior Congolese students activists who were working with

Congolese Student Associations across South African universities.

Ultimately, the country/region-specific associations had limited representative, financial,

and organizational capacity to mobilize in ways that would influence institutional policy at

WCU. For this very reason, Tendai and other non-national leaders saw the need to establish the

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[86] While some of the social events were day-time, the partying type accompanied by heavy drinking happened at
night. Despite all the precautions the organizers could take (such as encouraging attendees to be in the company of
trusted friends), women tended to end up in compromised situations once they got drunk.

NNSC, with the goal of fostering a diverse and inclusive environment for non-national students, and of uniting and amplifying their voices in championing their cause to enhance their experiences at WCU.

The Non-national Student Council (NNSC)

Spearheaded by some of the leaders of the Zimbabwean, Congolese and West African associations, the NNSC was envisioned as providing an organized platform and a united front for non-national students to deliberate on issues of mutual concern and to raise the grievances of the foreign student community and bring them to the attention of the SRC and the university at large. The NNSC made consumer and citizenship claims premised on their membership as registered students of the university; claims for regional redress premised on the history of hardships created in their home countries by the apartheid regime; and claims that hinged on the prospects of future South African citizenship. Thus, the theoretical basis of their claims encompassed both claims to belonging (at WCU and in the country), and claims to the right to recognition of difference (premised on the historical relationship between their country of citizenship and the apartheid regime). The NNSC members strategically played their WCU student status and their non-South African status off each other by characterizing the collective welfare of non-national students as integral to both WCU's internationalization efforts (emphasizing their non-national citizenship) and the country's efforts to balance demands to expand and equalize higher education (emphasizing both their potential future as highly trained residents in South Africa, and broader claims of SADC membership).

The NNSC's approach utilized a broad range of discourses, legal regimes, and historical and current approaches to understandings regional dynamics to try to claim rights and resources. For example, on the one hand, NNSC members read the equality, non-discrimination, and other

tenets undergirding the South African Constitution and Bill of Rights as equally applicable to them as to South African citizens. Doing so allowed the NNSC to assert that non-national students be treated in the same way as South Africans, particularly in terms of registration requirements and fee regimes. On the other hand, and contrary to the "treat-us-as-South-Africans" stance, whose legal basis lay in the SADC Protocol, the NNSC was keen to have the university recognize that their non-national status made their experiences and needs fundamentally different from those of domestic students. Some of the most obvious differences related to study permit requirements and victimhood in the wake of xenophobia. Based on these differences, the NNSC argued that, beyond the support given domestic students, they needed additional support in processing their study permits with the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA), and additional protective measures to shield them from xenophobia.

While the express purpose of the NNSC was to advocate for the non-national student population and to promote and safeguard their interests, the non-national student leaders couched their cause within the scope of the university's own self-proclaimed policy priorities. For instance, Tendai pointed out that the goals of the NNSC were "consonant with the need to create opportunities and empower the historically disenfranchised because non-national students must become part and parcel of the full South African experience during their stay in the country."

At the same time that Tendai portrays non-national students as integral to the post-apartheid equity and redress imperatives, he argued that WCU's aspirations to become one of the top 100 universities in the world was unimaginable if the university did not recognize the indispensable contributions of non-national students to the international character of the university. As described by Prof. Rheno (a white mid-level South African administrator), WCU administrators envisioned an institutional environment where people from different nationalities

worked together in ways that allowed for cross-pollination of ideas and the stimulation of each other's thinking, a cosmopolitan vision tied to national, regional, and global identity and citizenship. As Tendai argued about this approach to internationalization:

> We have seen recently that the university wishes to espouse diversity of international students. Any university that wishes to be recognized internationally has to revisit its policy and accommodate international students who go a long way in terms of the brand of the university.

By framing the NNSC as founded on values of diversity, cooperation, inclusion, and mutuality, the non-national student leaders sought to marshal the support of significant voices and constituencies within the university administrative structures (e.g. the SRC, the International Office, the Dean of Student Affairs' Office, etc.) behind their cause. In practice, however, the non-national student leaders capitalized on WCU's preoccupation with both (domestic) equity and redress *and* international recognition to agitate for more institutional responsiveness to the needs and concerns of the non-national student population.

The non-national student leaders who spearheaded the establishment of the NNSC came up with a comprehensive list of non-national students' concerns in a 2015 Memorandum of Demands (MoDs) and a separate letter which they tendered to top WCU administrators through the Dean of Student Affairs' office. While the SRC assisted in the process of drafting the MoDs, Tendai notes that "the intention was to have more capacity on our own because we are in a better situation to understand what our problems are." These concerns ranged from representation in student governance, financial issues (application fee, upfront payment, and financial aid), and complains against the International Office (IO). In addition to presenting the MoDs, the non-national student leaders also sought face-to-face meetings with top university administrators to follow up on the concerns laid out in the MoDs.

NNSC Goals: Representation in Student Governance

The involvement of the SRC in guiding the process of drafting the MoDs exemplifies the spaces and opportunities available for black South African leaders and their non-national counterparts to work together on issues that affected them as students. For a brief period, the SRC (mainly composed of black South Africans affiliated with the ANC) worked closely with members of the NNSC to create a document that would be recognizable and powerful to the WCU administration. The opportunity for solidarity was soon scuttled, however, when the 2014-2015 ANC-led SRC deployed a white South African student to the International Student Officer portfolio of the 15-member SRC instead of assigning one of the two international students elected to the SRC that year to the position. Many non-national students I spoke with felt that the issues they faced were so multifaceted and complex that it was outright naive and disrespectful to have a local and white student preside over the grievances of close to over 3,000 non-national students.

Non-national students' grievance about representation was particularly poignant because the SRC was deeply dedicated to direct representation of black South African students through the SRC—that is, a white South African student would never have been appointed to manage, represent, or speak for black South African students, when black South African students were represented directly on the SRC. To have two non-national students elected to the SRC but basically excluding them from representing non-national students was therefore viewed as a particularly harsh blow to non-national students' ability to represent themselves, their experiences, and their needs. Below, I briefly describe how the portfolio assignment eroded non-national student leaders' trust that the SRC had their interests at heart, subsequently closing what space there had been for solidarity.

Having won the majority of seats in 2014 (see chapter 6), the ANC-aligned faction used their discretion to allocate the SRC portfolios. I asked Nadia (a top South African ANC-aligned SRC leader) what the logic was behind allocating the International Student Affairs Officer portfolio to a white South African. She responded:

> I do not think that it is fair to say that an International Affairs Officer needs to be an international student or black South African. If international students cooperate with this person, there is no way that person would not do everything in their capacity to ensure that their issues are heard. So, if there was a problem with Sharon [the International Student Affairs Officer, aligned with the Non-affiliated faction] this year, then that is not because she is a white South African but it is because she was probably a bad SRC member.

In contrast to the incompetence narrative from the ANC-aligned SRC leader, Sharon (the white South African International Student Officer in the SRC) herself and her colleagues in the Non-affiliated faction read the portfolio assignment as a politically-motivated and intentional strategy meant to set up Sharon for failure and thus discredit the Non-affiliated faction for poor performance in the SRC in order to undermine its legitimacy. Sharon indicated that she was aware that the combination of her racial and national identities made her unsuitable to serve in the International Student Affairs Officer capacity:

> I think it was a slap in their [non-national students] face to put a white South African female who does not relate in any way…just by my nature; I don't know what they go through. I have done a lot of work to try and understand what they go through, how they feel, but it would have been more fitting from the majority party (the ANC-aligned faction) to put a black international student or even just a black student. I am well aware that I can't speak on behalf of international student issues, but they put me in that awkward position even though I don't always necessarily know what is going on. It looks bad from all sides. I have tried my best, but you can only do so much. I don't know if it's my fault, but I agree that I should not have been put into this position because there were people better qualified to do it.

Where Sharon mentioned "better qualified" people to serve as the International Student Affairs Officer, she was referring to the two non-national students aligned with the Non-affiliated faction, who were part of the SRC that year. Non-national students themselves felt that it was intuitive for any one of those two to be appointed as their representative on the SRC. The

fact that the ANC-aligned majority party decided otherwise gave some credence to the politicking charges laid on the ANC-aligned faction by Sharon and the Non-affiliated faction, but also spoke to an evidently paternalistic attitude on the part of the SRC. For instance, Nadia's assertion that non-national students should just cooperate with whoever is appointed to the International Student Affairs Officer portfolio underscores the attitude that the SRC can get by without giving the non-national students the space to vote in a representative of their choice, whoever the SRC gives the non-national students, they should learn to get along with him/her.

This position, that the SRC reserves the right to give the non-national students a leader chosen by a few individuals elected by majority South Africans, stood in stark contrast with the wishes of the non-national students themselves, who in turn decided to work tirelessly to establish an NNSC, in part in order to elect their own representative to the SRC. In this sense, the SRC's decision forced non-national students to try to create a new organization that did not mirror the political party structure, goals, and presentation of the black South African student organizations. This also, in turn, undermined non-national student support for or involvement in the Non-affiliated faction on campus, thus creating an even greater schism between domestic and non-national student organizing and networks. In this regard, domestic student leaders' efforts to destabilize the Non-affiliated faction worked, and weakened the domestic networks in which non-national students were involved.

By trying to discredit the Non-affiliated faction through Sharon, the SRC was keeping non-national students and their representation in the domestic sphere, tied to a domestic political organization that they wanted to discredit as an option to anyone (but probably particularly black South African students). Non-national students are secondary to this battle, which is why the two non-national SRC members were not appointed to this position. The ANC leaders' blithe claim

that anyone can represent anyone is in turn a clear indication of the ANC faction's interest in sidelining non-national students (and, perhaps, in not battling xenophobia as they should have, but instead fueling it), which is then reflected throughout the student organization as well, making it impossible for non-national students to feel comfortable being part of the platform. After all, plenty of non-South Africans were aligned with the ANC during the anti-apartheid movement.

In both the 2015 MoDs and the letter sent by Tendai, on behalf of the NNSC, to the Dean of Student Affairs, the non-national student leaders proposed to amend the SRC Constitution to allow for permanent, directly-elected representation of non-national students on the SRC in order to sustain a unified, vibrant, and integrated non-national student community in the university. In the letter, Tendai argued that designating a non-national student spot in student governance structures was fundamental to sustaining a cohesive and integrated institutional environment. The SRC Constitution already provided for permanent representation of students (domestic or non-national) in the Sports Council, the All Residence Council, and the Postgraduate Students Association. Given those provisions, advocates of the NNSC wanted the SRC Constitution to be amended to allow for the creation, ratification, and recognition of the NNSC as a legitimate umbrella student body representing all non-national students.

NNSC Goals: Financial Redress

In advocating for the creation of the NNSC and pushing to elect their own representative to the SRC, the non-national student leaders framed the financial burdens, concerns, and needs of non-national students as different from those of domestic students. For instance, at the time of the study, prospective non-national students were required to pay a non-refundable application fee of R750 (compared to the R100 that prospective domestic students paid) and an additional

international registration fee of R5,030 (not applicable to domestic students). Prior to 2014, non-national students also had to pay the full 100% of their tuition and accommodation fees (if staying in university residences) for the whole year before they could register at the beginning of the academic year. Similar to the international student registration fee, the upfront payment was not applicable to domestic students. Effective in 2014, the university lowered the upfront fee payment to 75%. The NNSC leaders described the upfront payment requirement as an invidious financial burden that compounded the challenges facing those among the non-national students who came from limiting socioeconomic backgrounds.

The NNSC leaders' claims were consistent with an internal WCU survey carried out by one of the Faculties (Schools) to assess the ability of non-national postgraduate students to meet the financial costs of studying at WCU. Findings from the internal survey showed that approximately 60% of African postgraduates (both SADC and non-SADC) paid the international student fee from their own or their families' resources, thus disproving claims that governments or sponsors paid the fee on behalf of most students. In fact, virtually all foreign postgraduate students who participated in the survey indicated that they had difficulties in paying fees and other expenses at WCU. Half expressed extreme difficulty in paying fees and expenses; almost all students from African countries claimed to know someone who chose not to attend WCU because of the high fees the school charged.

These findings from the survey suggested that the international student fee presented both an obstacle to postgraduate student recruitment and a very significant burden on those students who enrolled. The conclusion of the survey was that the gains from abolishing the fees would likely far outweigh the revenue lost thereby. These gains included efficient throughput, equal opportunity, and the enhancement of the WCU's reputation, especially on the African continent.

The report therefore supported the abolishment of the supplementary fees levied on non-national students.

The survey findings echoed NNSC leaders' assertion that the 75% upfront payment requirement was "excessively high and burdensome to foreign students as many are still unable to register within the required timeline during the registration period" (MoD, 2015). For instance, in cognizance of the financial challenges faced by non-national students, both the NNSC leaders and the Non-affiliated faction (the student political faction at WCU that paid the most attention to non-national students – discussed in chapter 6) called for supplementary fees levied on non-national students to be lowered or dropped altogether. Whereas the NNSC leaders advocated for sensible and justifiable fee regimes for non-national students, the Non-affiliated faction called for a total removal of surcharges on all non-national students.[87]

The Non-affiliated faction felt that the R5,030 international student fee was so arbitrarily exorbitant (it was equivalent to 10% of student fees for most non-national students) that it made higher education in South Africa accessible only to the wealthy. In framing the non-national African students as financially needy, the Non-affiliated faction was essentially challenging the premise that only black South Africans were the rightful beneficiaries of the post-apartheid government's equity focus. Although this implies a broader equity argument for all international students, the argument was predicated on the financial precarity of students from the SADC region and the rest of the continent. Similarly, the NNSC leaders argued that rigid fee requirements failed "to take into account the fact that foreign students are not immune to the challenges that local students face" (MoDs, 2015). The only difference was that NNSC and Non-

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[87] Whereas the NNSC was not affiliated in any way with South African national politics, the Non-affiliated faction comprised of non-national and domestic students while trying to provide alternative student organizing within the existing student political structures, but without being affiliated with the major South African political parties.

affiliated faction leaders' argument was fundamentally a regionalist argument for geopolitical redress. Despite the different positions of the NNSC (reduce the fee) and Non-affiliated faction (scrap the fee), both treated the supplementary fees as posing a systemic barrier to the entry of a significant proportion of non-national students who came from limiting socio-economic backgrounds.

While the upfront payment requirement was unique to non-national students, financial and academic exclusion challenges were not unique to non-national students. As covered in chapter 6, the #FMF movement was driven by historically marginalized black South Africans' financial struggles that threatened to make higher education unaffordable. The financial exclusion language adopted by NNSC leaders was remarkably similar to how black South Africans cast themselves as systematically excluded and discriminated against at the formerly-white WCU. The common financial predicament of both the non-national students from other African countries and South African students, and the deployment of equal opportunity and equity language presented spaces for solidarity that both domestic and non-national students did not focus attention on.

Another type of claim was occasionally made, which noted that significant numbers of non-national students enrolled at WCU had been resident in South Africa for substantial amounts of time prior to admission, only that they were not classified as citizens or had not yet met the criteria for citizenship and permanent residence. These students drew on the prior-residence and intention-to-stay factors to argue that fees regimes towards non-national students must be sensible and justiciable to reflect the contextual fabric of its international student community. Quite different from making claims about regional redress (that all students from the SADC region should have the same fee structures, the claim here is that as South Africans-in-waiting,

they deserved the same rights as South African citizens. Conceptually, casting themselves as to-be South African citizens who should just have the same rights as current South African citizens, is also different from universalist human right claims. Since this was not a widespread claim among non-national students, I mention it here in passing to note that by pushing for what domestic students already have (citizenship), de facto the claim undermined black South African students that, beyond national citizenship, they need further resources/redress.

NNSC Goals: Reform of the International Office

The primary institutional target of the students' ire was the International Office, which the students described as an extension of the loathed Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) in that the office was concerned more with ensuring that the university complied with immigration regulations than with supporting the students. In its MoDs to the university administrators, the NNSC leaders were forthright with their displeasure:

> The International Office has consistently failed to meet [its] existential purpose. The International Office is repulsive and indifferent to the external challenges that international students face. The bearers of the office lack a basic understanding of the plight of international students and are thus unable to fulfil the obligations that the International Office demands.

The NNSC leaders' complains against the International Office bear a striking resemblance to black South African student activists' charge that the institutional culture and systems at WCU were inhospitable to them, yet this was conceived as a common struggle on neither side.

I was struck by the almost unanimously negative perception that non-national students had of the International Office. The International Office identified its most important functions as providing information, guidance, and advice on WCU and on studying (and living) in South Africa; immigration issues, including application procedures for study visas and renewals of study visas; and approved medical aid service providers. More importantly, the office understood its role as ensuring that all non-national students were in compliance with university and

government requirements prior to registration. Non-national students felt that the International

Office took a hands-off approach to dealing with them and their needs. Nyasha, for instance,

pointed out that if students approached the International Office, they were told to deal with the

DoHA on their own. As long as they did not have a receipt from DoHA to show that they had the

requisite study permit, they were not tolerated on campus, let alone allowed to attend classes.

Prof Jean (a white European former WCU student) shared similar sentiments. She recalled that,

during her time as a student at WCU, "when interaction with the International Office did happen,

it was not useful."

One particular case illustrates the disjuncture between what the non-national students

expected from the International Office and how the students got treated. Benjamin was a

postgraduate student from one of the SADC countries, who exemplifies one of several migration

pathways into South Africa: young people who felt they could get ahead through migrant manual

labor, realized they couldn't, returned home, and were able come back with a different

immigration status. Having lost both parents, Benjamin initially came to South Africa as an

undocumented migrant farm worker. After working as a farm laborer proved unviable, he went

back to his home country, where he completed an undergraduate degree before going back to

South Africa for postgraduate studies. However, without any savings or source of income, he

remembers that the first thing he wanted to do when he registered was to deregister:

> If you don't have money everything works against you. I had to pay R1,775 for the VFS and also
> had to pay [R96] for the police clearance, all these costs associated with radiological (R500-600),
> the medicals (R200-300). I did not have that money. My appointment dates arrived when I did not
> have enough documents. You could not submit with insufficient information. I tried to do that, it
> did not work.

The financial challenges inevitably put Benjamin on a collision course with the

International Office, whose duty was to make sure that the university was in compliance with the

country's immigration laws regarding the admission of non-national students. When he

registered at the beginning of the year, he had undersigned to submit the requisite documents[88]

by 31 March. He was not able to meet the deadline. Part of the reason was obviously financial,

but Benjamin also had to deal with bureaucratic inefficiencies. For instance, a three-week

waiting time for a police clearance certificate extended to six or even seven weeks. Instead of

putting in place structures that facilitated an expedited application process for the police

clearance, the International Office instead "threatened me in the first place that probably I was

illegal here and that I was not supposed to be here."

The claim that the International Office used "threatening" language also came up in my

interview with Anesu, another non-national student from SADC dealing with critical financial

challenges. She indicated that the International Office kept sending her emails threatening to

deregister her if she did not clear her tuition and medical aid arrears. One such communication

from the International Office read: "Your fees are still outstanding, your [student] card will be

blocked unless the fees are fully paid by the end of September."[89]

Benjamin's case links clearly to the claims made by black South African students that

they deserved a higher education system that recognized the systems of oppression under which

they had lived and gone to school—claims that they felt had largely been ignored by the

structures put in place within the institution and by the state to serve the students. Prof. Pauline

(a top black South African administrator) acknowledged the students' concerns regarding

unresponsive institutional practices and she attributed the problems to structural misnomers.

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[88] Among the documents that non-national students were required to submit before they were allowed to register were valid passport and study visa, medical aid coverage, and police clearance.

[89] The access card was needed to enter and exit campus premises and to access the library and other facilities on campus. De-activating the card would have literary barred Anesu from coming into campus or leaving unless she used the visitor entrance and exit points.

Having used the organizational chart visual (Figure 17) in chapter 5 to show the conceptual and structural bifurcation between Transformation and Internationalization, I bring it up again here to show that the placement of the International Office under the Registrar's Office conceptually and structurally separated it from the Dean of Students' Office, whose express mandate was the student services function.

Figure 17: Structural Misnomers

Organizationally, this structural arrangement suggests that the International Office existed outside both the Transformation and Internationalization goals of the university: unlike the Transformation Office and the Strategic Partnerships Office, the International Office did not fall under the DVCs responsible for Transformation and Internationalization, respectively. Placing the International Office under the Registrar's Office appealed to the bureaucratic and legislative logic to monitor the compliance of non-national students with immigration regulations per DoHA requirements. This calculation, however, meant that the non-national students would

have to shuttle between the Dean of Students' Office for student services (health, counselling, accommodation, etc.) and the International Office for visa-related and immigration-specific services. While the International Office provided information on the procedures and could check the progress of students' study permit applications online, they did not submit the applications to the DoHA on behalf of the students, neither did they follow up for the students. They were not acting, in other words, like a student services office, but like an unhelpful and limited DoHA office.

The NNSC felt that the International Office could and should do more to support them in dealing with the DoHA, mainly because corruption has been a longstanding institutional feature of the interaction between the South African state and migrants (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001). Along with confronting targeted corruption, those designated as "outsiders" also face disproportionate difficulties in accessing employment, accommodation, banking services, and health care, along with extortion, arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation (Landau, et al., 2013). The rampant levels of corruption linked to anti-foreigner sentiments within the DoHA, including the police, made the payment of bribes for every DoHA interaction so routine that most non-nationals had resigned themselves to the situation.

Nyasha, the Zimbabwean postgraduate student recounted the collusion between DoHA, VFS,[90] and middlemen that she encountered in application and registration processes.

> I remember going to Home Affairs trying to get her (daughter) a study permit…I could not get the help that I needed and ended up being told (by DoHA personnel) to go to a certain guy who is a Nigerian. It was only him who could get us access in the system. When we spoke to him, he actually said 'My sister, there is no way you are actually going to access VFS without going through us because we are working with the guys in VFS and we are making sure the system does not work so that you come to us you pay us.' So you pay the Nigerian guy his fee and then the VFS fee. What normally happens, it used to be R425. Now, because they have hired VFS for study permits, you pay R1,800 (to VFS). Before, you could actually put all your application for

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[90] An external service provider engaged by the Department of Home Affairs to handle all new study visa applications effective 2015.

family together. Now, they say each person should apply on their own: three kids that's R1,800 times 3. If it's permanent residence, that's R3,800 times 3. And then, there is a middleman. Their system is always down.

When I brought up the issue of the collusion between the DoHA, VFS, and the middlemen to university administrators, they sounded surprised that this was going on, unanimously stated that this was unacceptable, but faulted the students for not reporting these occurrences to the university. For instance, Jane (a black South African mid-level administrator in Student Admissions) responded: "Really! [This is my] first time hearing this. Those students should make the university aware of this…we can only get involved if we know." Prof. Thulani (a black non-national top administrator) used the same language:

So they are not really going to Gillian (the International Office)? What I found out, even with academic staff members, they fall into the hands of these [scammers] despite my long preaching they still go to these funny white lawyers who can't even fill the forms properly. When they finally come, they filled the wrong forms. But, why did you go there? This lawyer is incompetent! I will talk to [the Registrar] about that, that they should not go to anybody not even Home Affairs before they come to us.

None among the non-national student participants I interviewed reported having brought the corruption issues to the attention of the International Office. Generally, the students had come to expect that the International Office regarded the DoHA part of the immigration process as the student's responsibility, not the school's. As already pointed out, while the International Office provided information of the procedures and could check the progress of students' study permit applications online, they did not submit the applications to the DoHA on behalf of the students, neither did they follow up for the students. Thus, the NNSC was pushing for redress—that is, asking WCU to just do as well as other universities were already doing in recognizing the difficulties that they face and in serving them through the International Office, not just policing them.

At least one other South African public university (hereafter U21) had managed to strike a healthy balance between non-national student needs and the DoHA's immigration requirements. Prof. Derek (a black non-South African professor at WCU) applauded U21 for having found ways to soften its rules well enough to allow non-national students accessibility to campus, while at the same time satisfying the imperatives of the DoHA. According to Prof. Derek, one way U21 did that was by allowing part-time foreign students the privileges of full-time students in terms of registration, while shielding them against the DoHA. Hama (a non-national student leader at U21) also mentioned that there were instances whereby U21 would register non-national students who, having not been cleared by the DoHA, did not have study permits yet.

The legality of U21's interventions on behalf of non-national students is obviously questionable, neither should one rule out institutional self-interest (increasing proportion of non-national students). However, both Prof. Derek and Hama did not conceive of U21 as flagrantly disregarding the country's immigration laws. Instead, they recognized that the DoHA was traditionally beholden to an institutional culture of immigration protectionism (Vigneswaran, 2008). Given these hurdles, U21 had taken up the task of ensuring that non-national students were spared some of the most convoluted immigration processes. Despite having comparably more resources, more non-national students, and more international recognition, WCU had not been proactive in finding a middle ground to address the constraints within which non-national students were operating in South Africa. Instead, it stuck with the rules and made it clear that the students would not be permitted to register until they had produced their valid study visas.

The money needed for bribes, on top of the money needed for the legal transactions required of non-national students, was well beyond the financial capacity of most non-national students. While it might be argued that non-national student who does not have financial

capacity to afford has a right to a WCU education, for poorer students, every additional Rand really mattered. Unfortunately, students who thought they could just squeak by would then find that, in fact, there were all sorts of hidden fees that they had to pay as non-national students. This included unexpected medical expenses, unexpectedly high fees for non-national students, and unexpected bribes. These students argued that the International Office could receive all students' visa application packets and submit them to the DoHA on behalf of the applicants. That way, the International Office, not the student applicants, would follow up on the outcome of submitted applications, and would have to negotiate the moments in which bribes were demanded, if they were demanded of the International Office in the first place (students expected that the demands would not come, if the International Office were directly engaging with the DoHA). Students had precedent for making this demand: other rapidly-internationalizing universities played this role for students, exactly because of the known issues that students faced in dealing with the DoHA.

Contrary to calls from other non-national student quarters to dissolve the International Office, the NNSC leaders recognized that institutional structures played a significant role in how the office functioned. The NNSC leaders, therefore, called instead for the university to broaden and redefine the mandate of the office in ways that would restructure it (e.g. put it under the Dean of Student Affairs) and professionalize it by staffing the office with people with appropriate backgrounds and experiences, and providing sufficient resources to adequately serve non-national students.

Conclusion

I argued in the previous chapter that student activism dictated by national politics and driven by the particular needs of black South African students accounted for the emergence of the Non-affiliated student faction. While the Non-affiliated faction was foremost in championing

the cause of non-national students and appealed to some South African student constituencies (e.g. the Jewish students) not served well by student factions aligned with national political parties, it failed to attract the majority black South African students, who tended to join factions aligned with the ruling African National Congress and the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters and Democratic Alliance.

This chapter explored how a new organization—the NNSC—arose in response to the limitation of the domestic student factions and Non-affiliated faction's ability to represent or fight for non-national students' rights and needs at WCU. It described how the NNSC constructed and exercised non-national students' rights to speak out about how the university should and should not be behaving in particular ways towards them. The NNSC attempted to pull non-national students together above and beyond their home country affiliations, and to create a new, numerically large, student faction to intervene in university politics. The creation of the NNSC and its form were in part inspired by non-national students' anger at having the domestic student party structures refuse to allow non-national students to speak for themselves. On the other hand, the NNSC offered the possibility of having non-national students and their needs be represented by non-national students themselves. This claim—that non-national students should be able to represent themselves as a faction—mirrored and played off of long-standing claims by black South Africans that they must be able to represent themselves and their own experiences directly.

The organizing among non-national students at WCU notwithstanding, their claims were limited in scope. Unlike the black South African students, for whom demands made on the university also reflected demands made of the state, the non-national students channeled their demands to the university, but not directly to the state. The NNSC's mobilization was confined

within the university and among the non-national student community, without forming networks of association across spatial scales and intersecting identities as was the case in Robertson's (2013) study. The limited scope of the NNSC's mobilization can be explained by the fact that, despite the deeply moral/ethical issues around borders and belonging in the SADC region (which I come back to in the next chapter), the South African DoHA as well as black South African student activists were not predisposed to view non-nationals' belonging and residency or citizenship claims as valid. Ultimately, the xenophobic violence targeted at black African nationals and the cumbersome immigration system underscored the necessity of non-nationals to deploy the notion of difference to demand the intervention of the university to shield them against both xenophobia and the chronic levels of corruption within the DoHA. This accounts for why the possibility for domestic and non-national students to organize a broader network in response to the precarity they faced in trying to navigate higher education in South Africa failed.

Chapter 8

Borders, Boundaries, and Belonging

Introduction

While the workings of a global economy and the increasing interconnectedness of societies pose common problems for education systems around the world (e.g. equality of educational opportunities for differently-situated social groups), regional, national and local responses to these problems vary (Arnove, 2013). In South Africa, the longstanding patterns of racialized educational inequalities linked to the pre-1994 apartheid mandate of higher education, the regional armed struggle against apartheid, and South Africa's economically hegemonic role in the region all impose unique demands on the country's public universities seeking to serve as regional higher education hubs and knowledge production nodes.

In this concluding chapter, I revisit the discursive tensions between the higher education policy imperatives at World Class University (WCU). These tensions have shaped ongoing policy debates around the roles and purposes of public higher education, including what the public university is and can be to different stakeholders (e.g. historically marginalized black South African students, white South African students, and black students from other African countries). The tensions also point to the roles of the nation-state and public universities in encouraging or discouraging immigration, out-migration, and internal movement, and shed a spotlight on some of the consequences of the country's migration policies on non-national student experiences. Along with a re-cap of the dissertation's key arguments and analytic points, I will discuss the study's contribution to research, policy, and practice, and end with some ideas for future research.

Conflicting Imperatives

My dissertation research focused on institutional efforts to expand, equalize, and internationalize higher education in post-apartheid South Africa in the context of education migration in southern Africa, and on domestic and non-national student organizing in response to institutional policies and practices. It showed that contestations around national racial justice and social cohesion, regional cooperation, and global competitiveness encapsulate ideas about the kind of African university South Africa's public higher education institutions can be at a time when neo-national tendencies drive the demands for institutional transformation. Here I dwell the most on the racial justice (Transformation) and international recognition (Internationalization) because these were the most institutionalized among the policy imperatives.

Although several individuals denied there being tension between the Transformation and Internationalization goals of the university, most research participants, and particularly top university administrators, were candid about the conflicting imperatives. Prof. Denis, for instance, spoke about the "the tension between our multiple goals: the goal of how to be nationally responsive and globally competitive … how to be an innovative institution, yet address the historical backgrounds of our society." He framed the tensions as far from being uniquely South African: "You go to any global university, you will confront competing priorities, and do those competing priorities conflict with each other? Absolutely!"

If global universities can expect to deal with competing priorities, Prof. Denis sees the responsibility of administrators as figuring out how to undertake one or the other, but to manage the balance between these competing imperatives. He argues that in South Africa, the balance is essential for addressing the historical disparities bequeathed by apartheid, for building a collective national identity, and for creating the necessary social environment for students to thrive in the non-racial work environment of the 21st century both in the country and across the

globe. Even as WCU pursued Transformation, Prof. Denis felt that the university must remain involved in the global struggle to attract the best academic and research talent.

Despite having earlier dismissed the notion of tension between Transformation and Internationalization goals, Prof. Lindela eventually came around to articulate some of the dynamics of the tension:

> How does one reconcile the diaspora thing and attend to Transformation? Politically, we talk about getting expertise to drive the things we want to do. How does that tally up with the Transformation agenda? Let's say you want Kwame Appiah, top philosopher, to be a joint appointment with WCU, which is what some of the institutions in Middle East do, – then someone says he is a Ghanaian. That is stupid… it's that tension!

While both Prof. Denis and Prof. Lindela spoke of the tensions from an administrative perspective, Prof. Aryan (an Indian South African lecturer) addressed the siloed nature of Transformation and Internationalization discourses from the perspective of a former student activist and now a faculty member:

> I am someone who works on Transformation issues. International student experiences is not one of the big issues on my agenda, neither is it on the Transformation agenda of any student or academic activist. If we read across [the] Transformation discourse, it is important to point out the silence when it comes to the question of international students.

This conceptualization of Transformation and Internationalization accounts for why the #Rhodes/FeesMustFall (#R/FMF) protests to transform and decolonize South African public universities manifested as a racialized and nationalistic agenda defined and directed by black South African student activists.

As imagined and enacted through the #R/FMF movements, the Transformation agenda came to be about democratizing and diversifying the country's public universities, but not in the

sense of also including or taking care of the needs of non-national students. That is why, as Prof. Jean pointed out, WCU could diversify academic staff and students in terms of nationality, gender, and sexuality, but as long as these constituencies were not South Africans, the #R/FMF activists did not regard the university space as transformed. Thus, the most radical among Transformation advocates did not see the recruitment of non-national black African staff members from other parts of the continent as advancing the process of overcoming the legacy of apartheid that systematically excluded black South Africans from the academy. Given these sentiments, Prof. Aryan applauded the research that I was doing because it highlighted "the ways in which there is actually a massive gap in the Transformation discourse that potentially allows it to become simply a kind of work for nationalism."

As a demand for a particularly narrow form of public university premised on neither national social cohesion, regional solidarity, nor global status/recognition, the 2015-2016 #R/FMF student protests cast the notions of the Rainbow Nation, Regionalization, and Internationalization as representing non-public mandates of the South African public universities. As justified and as logical as black South Africans' demands were, their model of "the public"— and of the Black public in particular—silenced and excluded significant constituencies at WCU, including non-black South Africans and non-national Black students from SADC.

It is especially noteworthy that the black South African student activists who championed the #R/FMF student protests perceived Internationalization as premised on a model of merit and quality that they associated with neoliberalism, technocracy, and white supremacism. The students' clamor for redress and racial equity and the imagination of a decolonized university was not an assault on merit and quality, however; merit and quality as concepts were not objectionable in themselves. Rather, their linkage with white supremacism is what was

objectionable to the black South African students. In essence, the black South African students' argument was not to do away with quality and merit, but to broaden it in ways that would make the notions racially egalitarian in the post-apartheid South African context. Such egalitarian notions recognized historical and racialized injustices and gestured towards channeling higher education as a key reparation resource.

I argued that black South African students' struggle against financial and academic exclusion, and against western-centric curricula and instructors, offered great promise for interrupting longstanding apartheid-rooted claims of Euro/American higher education templates as universal, neutral, objective, disembodied and techno-rational. However, solidarities imagined and enacted within exclusionary national citizenship claims (regarding who are and should be the legitimate beneficiaries of the post-apartheid government's equity and redress policies) stoked resentment over real and perceived regional competition for higher education, jobs, and residence opportunities. Consequently, the narrowly nationalistic conceptions of racial justice failed to Pan-Africanize the black South African student activists' struggle, and thus continued to promulgate the logic underpinning xenophobia in the country and erase the complex, cross-border histories of anti-apartheid movements and apartheid government destabilization that mutually shaped and continue to shape South Africa and the SADC region. In other words, the current movements erase the history of Black SADC members' suffering in support of Black South Africans' freedom, and the shortcomings of South Africa's foreign policy approaches vis-à-vis crises in neighboring countries.[91]

Institutional Response

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[91] For instance, in the wake of economic and political crises in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, President Thabo Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" approach to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has been widely criticized by the West as well as in both South Africa and Zimbabwe (see Adelmann, 2004; Sachikonye, 2005).

Contrary to domestic student activists' singular focus on transforming public universities in line with racialized and nationalized racial justice, equity, and redress imperatives, WCU administrators were concerned with how to balance and integrate internal demands and/or claims for higher education equity with the internationalization goals of the country's higher education system. Prof. Denis, for instance, spoke candidly about striking the right balance between the conflicting policy priorities:

> I am not interested in creating an uncompetive black institution because that reinforces inequality, but want to create a cosmopolitan, diverse institution that is globally competitive. If you are 100% black and equalize the playing field, but are not research intensive, you have reinforced inequality, you have not challenged it. To challenge inequality, do both transformation and global competiveness – then, you have broken the racial and class logic of our system.

Since student enrolment and staff recruitment were at the heart of debates pertaining to expanding, equalizing, and internationalizing WCU, Prof. Denis tackled these issues head-on in one of his public addresses. He laid out two approaches to student enrolment and staff recruitment, which he labeled multiculturalism and non-racialism/racial integration.

The first approach, multiculturalism, conceives of racial and cultural groups as homogenous in that the groups are separable and equally easily conceptualized to be treated as distinct entities for enrollment and recruitment purposes. The practice of the policy ranges from implicit to explicit quotas, often enforced with the intention that a university retains a historical racial or cultural character to adopting racial federalism, a principle whereby distinct campuses come to represent distinct racial and cultural interests. Prof. Denis cited the Universities of Stellenbosch and North West as examples of places where this approach is reflected. While 68% of the students are still white at the former, the latter constitutes a federal university comprising distinct campuses of racialized ethnic student groups. More or less the same applies to most of

the historically black universities that have largely remained completely black in the post-apartheid era.

At WCU, the quota system existed only in Health Sciences, which admitted 60 first-year medical students broken down as follows: "20% of our students are reserved places for rural students, 20% for urban 1 and 2 (i.e. poor urban schools), then 20% is for racial (i.e. African and Colored), and 40% is straight merit" (Prof. Denis). Non-national students could not exceed 10% of the intake.

By contrast, the non-racialism/racial integration approach rejects cultural homogeneity, instead re-envisioning organizational spaces for the emergence of new national identities. Students and staff from a variety of racial, religious and cultural backgrounds are enrolled as individuals. Additionally, the university is organized to enable constant intermingling and reciprocal engagement of these individual students and staff. Speaking directly to the substantive intent of the South African Constitution, this approach holds that students and staff come to interact with each other as individuals and not as representatives of racial or cultural entities, and allows for identities to evolve into a non-racial one where one can simultaneously be Afrikaner and South African, African and human.

While top administrators at WCU espoused non-racialism/racial integration as the preferred approach for positioning the university as both locally responsive and globally competitive, the salience of race in #R/FMF for instance, configured non-racialism as a negation of efforts to confront the entrenched institutional racism still prevalent in universities more than two decades after the official end of apartheid. This is why, despite all the talk about framing people as individuals rather than members of racial or cultural groupings, Prof. Denis himself explicitly mentioned the goal of achieving a 75% black and 25% white student ratio at WCU.

Given the country's historical context of entrenched racial segregation during apartheid, my research acknowledges the valid demands by black South African students that the post-apartheid dispensation should actualize a radical transformation in terms equality of access to and success in higher education. However, my guiding interest was not in South Africa per se, but rather the understudied phenomena of inbound student mobility to and their activism in global south study destinations. Focusing on the regional student as an analytic category often overlooked in the international higher education literature was vital for understanding the migration conditions and the claims of regional non-national students in a host country that is caught up in internal battles that are simultaneously intertwined with deeply troubling histories at the regional level.

Inbound Regional Student Mobility

My research shows that the battle for increased racial and social justice, and the approaches imagined by WCU, have been conceived in South African higher education within, rather than across, state boundaries. The study put the understudied phenomena of inbound student mobility to global south study destinations at the heart of the story and focused on the regional student as an analytic category often overlooked in the international higher education literature. It tells the story about the SADC region and about how people are making sense of the supposedly post-apartheid, postcolonial period in which people in southern Africa are struggling each day to build a bright future for themselves, even as they continue to face so many inequities and so many biases around the world.

While Transformation advocates felt that the university would never transform if the priority was on Internationalization, university administrators argued that the university would never truly become a world class institution if it was exclusively internally-oriented. This

situation put non-national students and academics in the uncomfortable position of being welcomed with one hand and then being regarded as objects of suspicion and sometimes of division. Catherine (the white South African top administrator) indicated that within the context of limited university places,[92] WCU wanted to grow the non-national student population, but there was pressure from the government to make undergraduate places available to South Africans first before non-national students. In response to the pressure to get as many South African undergraduate students in the university as possible, universities desiring to enroll non-national students turned to postgraduate (graduate) enrollments instead.

The recruitment of non-national postgraduate students has been critical in top South African universities because, as Loretta (a black South African citizen originally from one of the SADC countries), rightly pointed out, the country can never maintain globally competitive universities with its own black South African nationals. As a global south study destination, South Africa might be able to attract short-term study abroad students from the global north, but as noted earlier, the bulk of the country's non-national student population comes from the immediate SADC region. Given the neo-national thrust of domestic student mobilization (chapter 6) and the pervasive nature of xenophobia (chapter 7), the presence of these black African students on South African campuses raises crucial questions about borders, boundaries, and belonging, which I now turn to.

SADC Region and Porous Borders

The study's focus on regional education migration highlighted an important lacunae in policy as text, practice, and discourse in South African public universities. Despite the fact that the bulk of non-national students and staff come from the immediate southern Africa region,

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[92] According to Prof. Denis, out of approximately 60,000 applicants, WCU admits 5,800 from the top end of the pool.

policymakers, administrators, and WCU faculty and students have largely neglected to consider what Luescher et al. (2016) characterize as the regionalization of internationalization in the South African higher education sector. The regionalization of internationalization includes the development of supra-national initiatives, policies, and common protocols aimed at harmonizing the African higher education space, such as regional university associations and networks and continent-wide initiatives for collaboration in research, quality assurance, capacity building, and staff and student mobility. These supra-national developments constitute a proposition to look beyond institutional and national contexts towards the regional and continental dimensions of higher education and a Pan-African change agenda that has implications for how we understand and assess the purposes of public higher education and the sense of moving across borders in the SADC region.

Prof. Richard, a former top administrator directly involved with establishing internationalization structures at WCU, spoke of the SADC subsidy as a possible avenue for South African universities to operate outside a limiting institutional and national scope:

> I could see that [SADC subsidy] resting on a recognition that in many ways the frontiers of this country are very porous and that the future of this country is closely linked to the future of our neighboring countries.

If the frontiers of countries in the SADC region are porous and if the past, present, and future of the region's countries are intertwined, what does it mean that the countries are constituted as separate nations?

I draw on Ferguson's (2006) discussion of Lesotho and the politics of the nation-state legitimacy to argue that constructions of the local and so-called national economies in the SADC region do not exist separately from an encompassing set of relations with a wider South African system. Ferguson argues that the logic of the international order of states is to segment off

exploited and impoverished regions within discrete national compartments that mask "the relations that link the rich and poor regions behind the false fronts of a sovereignty and independence that have never existed" (p. 65). As a country entirely surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho is arguably on one extreme end of the spectrum of SADC countries' relationships with South Africa. However, the case provides a useful lens for understanding whether and how Lesotho nationals and the rest of SADC students can make claims to higher education and other opportunities in South Africa; and if so, what claims, as well as why or why not the claims can be viewed as appropriate and valid.

Ferguson (2006) points out that Lesotho's political independence and territorial sovereignty have been universally acknowledged since 1966 when the former British colony gained independence. However, Lesotho has historically been so thoroughly dominated by South Africa economically and politically that the nation-state's ''independence'' is difficult to locate. This domination can be traced back to the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in 1867 and 1886, respectively. As increasing numbers of Basotho (now Lesotho nationals) flocked to work in South Africa, most families came to depend on cash remittances from men working in the South African apartheid mines. Considering how Lesotho became a little more than a labor reserve for the South African economy, Ferguson characterizes the small, economically dependent and geographically surrounded territory an odd candidate for national independence in 1966.

At independence, migrant labor to South Africa remained the predominant form of employment for the Basotho. As indication of Lesotho's continuing economic dependence on South Africa, the latter's firms dominated local banking, manufacturing, and commerce. Aside from economic dependence, Ferguson notes that there was "repeated and unsubtle South African

interference in electoral processes and a substantial presence of white South Africans in key government positions" (p. 54). Given these circumstances, Ferguson argues that Lesotho's sovereign status was accepted by the international community less as an endorsement of any internal capabilities to function economically or politically, but more as a response to its status as a British ex-colony.

Ferguson's key argument is that the uncontested construction of Lesotho as a sovereign nation-state is responsible for localizing responsibility for poverty within national borders while obscuring regional connections. This outcome is particularly evident in how poverty has overwhelmingly been treated in the "development" discourse as a lack of some combination of skills, inputs, and resources among the Basotho, and so an attribute of Lesotho's national economy and a matter of national policy. Conspicuously absent from the "development' discourse that frames poverty in Lesotho in technical and national terms is any reference to South African state policy, enforced low wages, influx control, or apartheid. Ferguson invokes the historically and structurally regional causes of Lesotho's predicament to question "the idea that a small, dependent labor reserve could be analyzed as a national economy" (p. 61).

Although Lesotho is a particularly clear case of the politics of nation-state legitimacy, Ferguson argues that it is not unique in the SADC region or around the world. He alludes to the case of Mexico to show that none of the so-called impoverished nations of the world are truly sovereign or independent, nor is there a truly national economy. Despite economically dominating Mexico, a national(ist) frame of reference allows the U.S. to constitute their southern neighbor as a sovereign nation, and so to "manage and contain the political implications of the massive poverty of its labor reserve within the ideological borders of *Mexico's problems"* (p. 64). In the case of southern Africa, the regional politico-economic relations constitutive of

political and economic instability (e.g. in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the DRC) are constituted in the postcolonial era as local and internal to the concerned nation-states.

Ferguson's (2006) argument that the *national* economy of Lesotho does not exist separately from an encompassing set of relations with a wider South African system underscores the importance of incorporating the irreversible and constitutive influences of historical processes on constructions of the local (Balagopalan, 2002). Just as Mexico has been used as a labor pool for U.S. businesses without giving Mexican workers an easy path to citizenship, the South African economy has been built, to a great extent, on the backs of migrant workers from SADC countries. Moreover, the end of apartheid was only gained in part because of the losses suffered by SADC leaders and citizens standing in solidarity with, and actively protecting, South African freedom fighters.

Based on the traditional notion of national belonging, non-national students from Lesotho and other SADC countries would have no claims to South African higher education and other opportunities and rights designated for citizens (e.g. scholarships and political activism). I bring Ferguson's critique of the unquestioned legitimacy of Lesotho as a nation-state to bear on how I examine and analyze if and how non-nationals from SADC countries can (and cannot) make claims to belonging, citizenship, consumer, regionalist or other rights in South African public universities, and on what is possible and impossible in how the universities respond to the claims.

The issue of higher education provision in the context of borders and belonging claims has relevance beyond South Africa and the SADC region. For instance, there are striking parallels (as well as differences) between the SADC and South Africa case with the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Service, which designates approximately 1.2 million young adults commonly known as

Dreamers as undocumented immigrants. Brought into the country without proper entry

documentation, the Dreamers have lived the majority of their lives in the U.S. (Ishiwata &

Muñoz, 2018). Unlike the Dreamers, the bulk of SADC students generally are neither born nor

raised in South Africa and so their status in the country is not really contested. While recognizing

these key differences related to where the state boundary and citizenship rights are drawn, I here

highlight some of the relatable situations of the Dreamers in the U.S. and SADC students in

South Africa.

Similar to the case of non-national students in South African universities, recent literature

on Dreamers currently enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities show that uncertainties

surrounding legal status pose unique challenges to the students, including financial precarity and

lack of access to forms of social capital that facilitate postsecondary success (Amuedo-Dorantes

& Antman, 2017; Bjorklund, 2018; Gámez, Lopez, & Overton, 2017; Martinez, 2014; Pfleger,

2016; Sahay et al, 2016). The Dreamers also confront anti-immigrant sentiments (Bjorklund,

2018) and a complex anti-migrant terrain characterized by uncertainty over their long-term

legislative fate (Allen-Handy & Farinde-Wu, 2018). The funding relationships that colleges and

universities have with the state constrain the role that they can play in supporting regional non-

national students and Dreamers in both the South Africa and U.S contexts.[93]

As Nyasha (a black postgraduate student from one of the SADC countries) argued,

however, WCU did not alienate just the non-national students, but even the black South African

students: the university did not care "what cost it is financially, emotionally, socially" to attend

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[93] But, as noted in chapter 6, public universities in South Africa are also constrained by the dominance of economistic logics from serving historically marginalized black South Africans well, a point that could also be made regarding minoritized students in the U.S. as well.

the school. That WCU does not serve its students well (chapters 6 and 7 discuss at length the unpleasant experiences of local and non-national students, respectively) underscores the problems of neoliberalization of the university (Mercille & Murphy, 2017; Newfield, 2008; Shore, 2010; Smeltzer & Hearn, 2015; Stein & De Oliveira Andreotti, 2017), whereby public universities enroll more students, confront more external and internal demands, and have many fewer resources to accomplish it all at once. When the university is de-funded, as has been the norm in the era of neoliberalization, it fails to perform its core functions. In turn, when the university fails to perform its core functions, it is easy to blame it for not producing results and so find excuses for further de-funding it. In these circumstances, it is students who have the most to lose, and most particularly already-marginalized students, who suffer the most by the withdrawal of state support for public education.

The neoliberalization of the university is not unique to South Africa or the global south. The consequences of neoliberalization in the U.S. context are especially telling because the country's higher education system has historically been known for providing broad access to top quality education, which Newfield (2011a)[94] describes as consisting of intense, individualized attention and feedback to each and every student. Newfield (2011b)[95] argues that the convergence of the American right's cultural and financial campaigns against public education have systematically undermined the ability of public universities to sustain the egalitarian vision that would have supported social development for all.

For instance, due to massive budget cuts, the University of California system has steadily squeezed undergraduate instruction such that students are herded into huge lectures where

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[94] https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/we-need-higher-ed-uncut_b_859973.html
[95] https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/still-unmaking-the-public_b_840727.html

learning is based on the testing of passively acquired knowledge. Consequently, students find themselves in 70- to 80-student classes, 400-person lectures with one Teaching Assistant for every 100 students, and little to no individual mentoring by a regular faculty member. Because public universities cannot afford to spend shrinking resources on small-scale forms of active learning in tutorials and seminars, these universities have steadily fallen further behind elite private universities (e.g. Harvard and Stanford), which further widens the inequalities of higher education opportunities among the mass middle class and far fewer top earners.

The situation is worse in the South African context because the country's public universities have far fewer resources to start with, yet the country's top-rated universities such as WCU find that they have to take global university rankings seriously to attract the kinds of faculty members and students that would make them globally competitive. The notion of strengthening South African universities by pursuing an internationalization project that prioritizes knowledge production, intellectual property and innovation amounts to legitimizing what Cross, et al. (2009) sees as universalizing concepts and approaches generated by western scholars and emanating from the realities and experiences of countries in North America and Europe. Therefore, the alienation of poor students at WCU is not just a function of the history and legacies of apartheid, but also South Africa's so-called return to the international community and the increasing inclusion of international, intercultural and global dimensions in university curricula which border on an uncritical celebration of globalization (Cross et al., 2009).

By focusing on South Africa's engagement with its immediate neighbors, the dissertation project put regional non-national students at the center of institutional responses to the tension between demands for racial justice/educational equity and the pursuit of global recognition. The research shows how regional non-national students were utilized by South African public

universities to mediate the tension between national and global policy imperatives. The instrumental role that these students were made to play while denying them the full rights of South African nationals represents a failure on the part of the South African state and its public higher education system to recognize, in more substantive ways than the SADC subsidy, the SADC region's shared history and shared future. The failure is evident in the limited institutional policy attention given to SADC students, their negative experiences with administration, and the nationalist character of black South African student activism.

The repercussions of the non-national status on SADC students' immediate wellbeing led them to make consumer and belonging claims premised on hardships created in their home countries by the apartheid regime; their membership as registered students of the university; and the prospects of future South African residency. The students engaged with institutional discourses, practices, and systems within the context of widespread and persistent anti-immigrant hostility in South Africa, which disproportionately targets foreign African nationals. Unlike South African students, whose #R/FMF protests did not just engage the university, but the state as well, SADC students found the scope of their protests limited to engaging with the university. This limitation suggests that inconclusive debates around borders, boundaries, and belonging complicate the validity of SADC students' belonging claims, which leads to very differential capacities for creating change.

While the study is specific to higher education in South Africa, the analytic framework I have developed is relevant for designing and implementing effective and ethical interventions to the world's most daunting challenges, including vastly unequal access to life opportunities and regional histories of colonialism and extraction. The study's focus on education migrants' experiences is especially pertinent in the wake of increasing volumes of migration for education,

for climate change, for work opportunities, and for survival across the SADC region, on the continent, and around the world. It underscores the need for more research that recognizes our shared humanity and connections to one another and to education systems in ways that do not otherize and criminalize "outsiders" as is predominant in South Africa. The study suggests that researchers, policymakers, administrators and funders in Africa need to consider an inclusive regional change agenda that engages with how we understand and assess the purposes of national public higher education systems and the sense and meaning of moving across national borders.

Future Research Directions

My dissertation research shows the limitations of nationally-bounded conceptions of the roles and purposes of public universities in regionally interconnected contexts. As a way to analyze the broader struggles and questions around borders, boundaries, and belonging in the context of increasing levels of migration, my future research interests reach beyond individual universities or countries to consider cross-national higher education models for creating alternative modes, processes, and communities of knowledge that take the African continent as the unit of analysis.

These research interests recognize that higher education institutions around the world are widely regarded as playing a crucial role in generating and disseminating knowledge. Historically, across Africa as across much of the world, higher education has been nationally-oriented and -organized and, thus, knowledge generation has been as well. Increasingly, new higher education initiatives and institutions in Africa are regionally- or continentally-focused, indicating a fundamental shift towards thinking of cross-national responses to the continent's colonial legacy and development challenges. Little is known, however, about if and how knowledge generation is being reimagined as part of this shift.

Considering this gap, my future research trajectory revolves around how ideas of regionalism, African Renaissance, Pan-Africanism, and Ubuntu (humanism) manifest in cross-national higher education provision and knowledge generation endeavors. I am especially interested in how cross-national epistemologies and ideals are deployed to denationalize, decolonize and deracialize imperial constructs – from universities to state boundaries and nationalist movements – and to foster the development of the continent.

I am fascinated by the argument that Africa needs to adopt its own order of knowledge or episteme apart from the epistemological locus in the West (Mudimbe, 2016), and am keen to interrogate both the dilemma of reaching the African epistemological locus without recourse to established Western methods (Ogot, 2009), and the theoretical and practical opportunities to escape it. That is why, beyond studying individual universities or countries, I am more interested in cross-national models for creating alternative modes, processes, and communities of knowledge.

I see the cross-national focus as crucial for shedding light on the broader struggles and questions around boundaries and belonging in the contemporary contexts of high population mobility across national borders (Ferguson, 2015), and rapidly transforming relations of power among state and non-state actors. These interests are particularly pertinent to the global south in general because African higher education scholars such as Mazrui (1975) identify the Arab world (for sharing the African continent with black people) and the Black Diaspora, including black Americans, South Americans, and Caribbeans as the most natural allies in Africa's efforts at counter-penetrating the preeminence of Western knowledge systems.

The future research project will focus on region/continent-wide knowledge producing institutions operating within an "African renaissance" framework, such as the African

Association of Universities (AAU), the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), and the Pan African University (PAU). Just as with past and current liberatory social movements (e.g. Negritude, Garveyism, the Civil Rights Movement, Black Consciousness, Black Identities, and Black Feminism) these cross-national bodies are prompted by a commitment to Pan-Africanism and African renaissance. They share the conviction that research and the generation of new forms of knowledge are key to transforming Africa and constituting African-led efforts to revitalize higher education on the continent. All organize across geographic, disciplinary, and linguistic boundaries, and actively encourage cooperation, collaboration, and knowledge exchange among African universities, research organizations, and other training institutions. Additionally, they all seek to challenge the fragmenting effects of colonialism on African scholarship, and to work towards a prosperous and integrated Africa.

The organizations' cross-national approach to revitalizing, integrating, and reorienting African higher education systems to address the continent's socioeconomic inequalities, political fragmentation, and marginalization in the global political economy; as well as global processes that particularly impact the continent (such as climate change) represents a notable departure from the dominant nationally-constituted, nationally-funded, and nationally-regulated approach to higher education policy and practice. My goal is to understand the articulation and intersection of nationalist, regionalist, Pan-Africanist, and African Renaissance sensibilities (discourses, ideas and practices), both as factors of history and imagined futures for African higher education.

The AAU, CODESRIA, and PAU are vital for understanding the broader trends in the African political economy and the continent's social, economic, and cultural development in the context of globalization. I intend to explore how the organizations succeed or fail to establish an alternative knowledge generation model, and why. Of particular interest are the ways in which

the organizations conceptualize boundaries and belonging in the context of increasing levels of migration. Equally important is how they go about trying to harmonize the continent's education systems, stem the endemic tide of brain drain, provide for the utilitarian mobility of students and scholars, secure the participation and cooperation of African states, and mobilize adequate resources to sustain the envisioned continent-wide forms of knowledge generation, including knowledge generated on its own terms.

This project is important because it highlights the possibilities for alternative forms of and approaches to knowledge generation, and new forms of belonging and institutional functioning that wrestle with the notion of knowledge decolonization differently than current national models and nationalist movements. Reimagining knowledge generation in African universities means reimagining much of what currently exists politically, economically, etc. By situating the study around higher education institutions that straddle Africa's diverse geographical, historical, social/cultural, and philosophical contexts, I hope to seriously engage with alternative possibilities for Africa playing a different role in the global higher education landscape. A clear understanding of the meaning, purposes, scope, possibilities and limits of current cross-national and Pan-African approaches will challenge current nationalized approaches to decolonizing the knowledge generation process.

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