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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PRIORITY

IN 57698

PAGE 1 OF 8 PAGES

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SECRET

251456Z

CITE

DIST 25 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 25 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT: APPRAISAL OF THE SECURITY OF THE GUERRILLA
BASE AND PHOU PHA THI, SITE B5, AS OF 25 FEBRUARY 1968

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE FIELD NO.

SOURCE:

(b)(1)S

(b)(3)

3,4 (b)(1)

1. SINCE 25 JANUARY 1968, WHEN [] WAS PREPARED TO
APPRAISE THE SECURITY SITUATION AT PHOU PHA THI (UH 6663), THE
ENEMY HAS EXERTED MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD
FOR A THREE-BATTALION ATTACK ON THE SUMMIT OF PHOU PHA THI.

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9

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(b)(3)

PAGE 2 OF 8 PAGES

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IN THIS PREPARATORY EFFORT THE ENEMY HAS FOCUSED HIS ATTENTION ON PENETRATING FROM THE EAST THE 12-KILOMETER DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND SITE 85 WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED BY IRREGULAR FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL VANG PAO, COMMANDER OF THE SECOND MILITARY REGION. IN PENETRATING THE DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI THE ENEMY HAS CONCENTRATED ON ESTABLISHING POSITIONS WHICH COULD SERVE AS A FIRE BASE FROM WHICH HE COULD BRING THE SUMMIT OF PHOU PHA THI WITHIN RANGE OF HIS ARTILLERY AND MORTARS. DURING THE PAST 30 DAYS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF PHOU PHA THI ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ENEMY EXTENDED ROUTE 602 WESTWARD IN THE DIRECTION OF PHOU DEN DIN (UH 7660) TO ENABLE HIM TO MOVE SUPPLIES AND TROOPS FROM SAM NEUA TO THE OUTER PERIMETER OF THE IRREGULARS' DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI. ENEMY SOLDIERS AND COOLIES SUCCEEDED IN EXTENDING ROUTE 602 BY ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS IN LESS THAN ONE MONTH. BY 21 FEBRUARY 400 COOLIES WERE WORKING ON THE ROAD AS FAR WEST AS UH 801597. ON 21 FEBRUARY AIRCRAFT STRUCK AND CUT THE

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PAGE 3 OF 8 PAGES

92
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NEW ROAD EXTENSION. THIS CUT WILL ONLY INHIBIT TRUCK TRAFFIC FOR A FEW DAYS IF THAT LONG. [] CONTAINED INITIAL REPORTING ON THE ROAD CONSTRUCTION OF THIS ROUTE 602 EXTENSION AND [] FURNISHED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ROAD-BUILDING IN THE AREA AROUND PHOU PHA THI. [] CONTAINED INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE EXTENSION OF THE ROAD AS OF 21 FEBRUARY.

B. ON 20 FEBRUARY THE ENEMY OVERRAN MUONG YUT (UH 704563), ABOUT SEVEN KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF THE CREST OF PHOU PHA THI, AND THEN SPREAD APPROXIMATELY ONE BATTALION ALONG THE RIDGE LINE NORTHEAST BACK TO PHOU HOUAY HQO (UH 735585). ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDING AUTO-DEFENSE DE CHOC (ADC) TROOPS LOCATED IN THE MUONG YUT AREA REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO STOP THIS ENEMY PUSH, THE ENEMY DROVE THEM BACK EACH TIME AND INFLICTED RELATIVELY HIGH CASUALTIES. SEE []

[] FOR DETAILS ON THE ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH OF THE 12-KILOMETER PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI. OTHER REPORTS ON ENEMY MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION AROUND PHOU PHA THI WERE []

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PAGE 4 OF 8 PAGES

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(classification) (dissem controls) 3.4(b)(1)

AND] ADC TROOPS.

ARE CONTINUING TO EXERT EFFORTS TO RETURN TO THE AREA, AND BY 24 FEBRUARY A SPECIAL GUERRILLA COMPANY HAD REACHED MUONG YUI AND WAS READY TO ATTEMPT TO REOCCUPY IT.

C. ON 21 FEBRUARY FOUR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BATTALIONS ARRIVED AT PHOU DEN DIN, AND SOME UNITS FROM THIS FORCE TOOK UP POSITIONS AT UH 7764, ABOUT FOUR KILOMETERS NORTH OF PHOU DEN DIN.] CONTAINED A REPORT ON THIS MOVE. SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THESE NORTH VIETNAMESE BATTALIONS MAY HAVE ORIGINATED AT MUONG LIET (VH 1163).] REFERRED TO ANOTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BATTALION TO THE EAST IN POSITION BETWEEN UH 905647 AND UH 915642.

D. ON 17 FEBRUARY ADC TROOPS TOOK A MAP OUTLINING THE ENEMY'S PLAN FOR HIS ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI FROM THE BODY OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER KILLED IN AN AMBUSH, ABOUT EIGHT KILOMETERS EAST OF PHOU PHA THI.

ACCORDING TO] WHICH WAS BASED ON AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF THESE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS (WHICH WERE WRITTEN

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PAGE 5 OF 8 PAGES

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 (dissemination) (control) (b)(3) 34(b)(1)

IN VIETNAMESE), THE ENEMY PLANNED TO USE AT LEAST FOUR BATTALIONS IN HIS ATTACK ON SITE 85, WITH ONE BATTALION EACH ATTACKING HOU EI HOK (UH 6561), HOU EI MA (UH 6253), HOU EI MOUN (UH 5664), AND HOU EI KHA MOUN (UH 6868). ONE COMPANY WAS TO ATTACK EACH OF FOUR MAJOR TRAILS LEADING TO THE TOP OF PHOU PHA THI. IN ADDITION THE ENEMY CALLED A SERIES OF PROPAGANDA MEETINGS FOR OFFICIALS AT VILLAGE AND C-NTON LEVEL TO ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION OF ATTACKING PHOU PHA THI IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NEO LAO HAK SAT OFFICIALS IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE TOLD THOSE ATTENDING THE MEE... 3S THAT THEIR FORCES ASSISTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD ATTACK IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH AND USE 120MM MORTARS AND FROM TEN TO TWENTY AIRCRAFT.

CONTAINED REFERENCES TO ENEMY PLANS FOR THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI. (b)(3), RESPECTIVELY)

2. SINCE THE ADC DEFENDERS OF PHOU PHA THI WERE THROWN BACK WITH SUCH HEAVY CASUALTIES WHEN THEY TRIED TO ELIMINATE ENEMY UNITS THAT HAD PENETRATED THE PERIMETER FROM PHOU HOU EI HAO (UH 735585) TO MUONG YUT, ADC COMMANDERS RESORTED

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PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

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(classification) (dissem controls)

TO SENDING OUT SMALL PATROLS TO SELECT TARGETS FOR AIR STRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRE. THIS EFFORT HAS IDENTIFIED HARD TARGETS WHICH HAVE BEEN STRUCK EFFECTIVELY BY AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE. THIS HARASSMENT BY FIRE IS RETARDING ENEMY ACTIVITIES BUT IT IS NOT ELIMINATING THE ENEMY PRESENCE IN THE 12-KILOMETER DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI.

3. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS MADE UP OF IRREGULARS FROM GENERAL VANG PAO'S FORCES HAVE ALSO BEEN ACTIVE IN THE AREA EAST OF SAM NEUA IN AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICAL BASE WHICH SUPPORTS THE EXPANSIONIST EFFORT IN AND AROUND PHOU PHA THI. THIS RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT HAS BEEN PRODUCTIVE AND TARGETS IDENTIFIED BY THESE TEAMS HAVE BEEN EXAMINED ON PHOTOGRAPHY, WITH THE RESULT BEING THAT 61 TARGETS EAST OF SAM NEUA CITY HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR DESTRUCTION BY AIR STRIKES.

4. IN THE PERIOD 23 TO 25 FEBRUARY GENERAL VANG PAO HAS

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PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES

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(release/edition) (release controls)

(b)(3)
34(b)(1)

TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF PHOU
PHA THI:

A. TWO 4.2-INCH MORTARS HAVE BEEN SENT TO PHOU
PHA THI.

B. ONE ADDITIONAL 105MM HOWITZER HAS BEEN SENT TO
PHOU PHA THI.

C. THE GARRISON AT THE TOP OF PHOU PHA THI HAS BEEN
INCREASED BY 50 MEN.

5. AS A RESULT OF THE ENEMY'S PENETRATING THE 12-KILOMETER
RADIUS AROUND PHOU PHA THI IN FORCE AND OCCUPYING KEY POSITIONS
(SIC)
WITHIN THE LOWER RIGHT-HAND/QUADRANT OF THIS PERIMETER AS
WELL AS POSITIONS JUST OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER AT PHOU DEM DIN.
HE REPRESENTS AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE TACAN
SITE AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS AT PHOU PHA THI. IT IS CLEAR THAT
THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS GAINS
IN THE PHOU PHA THI AREA DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WHILE MAKING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS FINAL ASSAULT BY THREE OR FOUR BATTALIONS.
IF, HOWEVER, ADC UNITS CONTINUE TO HARASS SUCCESSFULLY THE
ENEMY ON THE GROUND AND IF AIRCRAFT CONTINUE TO STRIKE ENEMY
CONCENTRATIONS IN AND AROUND PHOU PHA THI AND IN THE AREA EAST

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(classification) (dissem controls)

OF SAY NEUA THE TACAN AND OTHER SITES AT PHOU PHA THI WILL
CONTINUE TO BE VIABLE FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE
TO PREDICT, HOWEVER, THE STATE OF SECURITY AT PHOU PHA THI
BEYOND 18 MARCH BECAUSE OF THE ENEMY'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE
TO ESCALATE HIS COMMITMENT IN THIS AREA.

6. THE AMBASSADOR HAS READ THIS REPORT AND HAS OFFERED
NO OBJECTIONS.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC
REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~ / NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM /
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1968 FEB 29 10 31 AM
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• ROUTINE

IN 59894

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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CONFIDENTIAL

281456Z

CITE

DIST 28 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 26-27 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT: FURTHER INFORMATION ON PATHET LAO ATTACK ON
PAK OU, NORTH OF LUANG PRABANG

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (27 FEBRUARY 1968) FIELD NO :

SOURCE:

1. ON 26 FEBRUARY 1968 ABOUT 50 ENEMY SOLDIERS, INCLUDING MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE, ENTERED THE VILLAGE OF PAK OU (TH 1517) NORTH OF LUANG PRABANG IN TWO COLUMNS. THEY LINED UP INSIDE THE VILLAGE AND CALLED OUT THE WORD "CHIEF" IN LAO. WHEN THE CHIEF OF POLICE, LIEUTENANT PHANG, STEPPED OUT OF HIS HOUSE TO SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING, THEY SHOT AND KILLED HIM. THEN THEY WENT INTO HIS HOUSE AND TOOK SEVERAL ITEMS, INCLUDING ONE FM-5 POLICE RADIO. THEY THEN WENT TO THE HOUSE OF THE PAK OU CANTON CHIEF WHERE A PARTY WAS BEING HELD FOR LOCAL SENIOR OFFICIALS; THEY CAPTURED THE PAK OU CANTON CHIEF, THE MUONG SAI DISTRICT CHIEF, AND ONE POLICEMAN. THEY KILLED THE YOUNGER BROTHER OF THE MUONG SAI DISTRICT CHIEF.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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THEY LATER ALLOWED THE TWO CHIEFS TO ESCAPE, BUT STILL HOLD THE POLICEMAN. THE PAK OU CANTON CHIEF WAS WOUNDED AND IS NOW IN LUANG PRABANG HOSPITAL. ONE COMPANY OF LAO ARMED FORCES TROOPS PURSUED THEM ON 27 FEBRUARY. [COMMENT:] REPORTED THE ATTACK ON PAK OU.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID USIS CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [] REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM GROUP-1

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SNIE 58-1-68
31 October 1968


APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2005

(b) (3)

SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 58-1-68

Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Laos Over the Next Year

Submitted by




DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf
31 October 1968

Authenticated:


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Nº 119

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring:

Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR

CONCLUSIONS

A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 56,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. And we do not think that the RLG could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, lest such a move provoke US entry into the Laotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communists to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla outposts, in order to strengthen their ultimate bargaining position. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be halted as a prerequisite to discussions of an internal settlement that must be based on "the realities of the current situation."

C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter Hanoi's intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further reinforcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi's calculations concerning Laos, in general we believe that the Communists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction.

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DISCUSSION

1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provoking a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory.

2. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with military factors operating on the RLG and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side.

3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Jarres Agreements, which established a tripartite government—rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.

I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the Communists are developing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. Moreover, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have demanded that the internal settlement must take into account "the realities of the current situation."

5. In private, PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such "realities" mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and one-half the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvanna no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present government is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying the ground work to claim a larger role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction.

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6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrangement, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a "permanent feature" of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year absence seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) spokesman in Vientiane. The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage.

7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political indoctrination programs. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying to consolidate their hold over the rice-rich Sedone Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been attached to the Communist administration for the first time.

8. By the fall of 1967, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962.¹ The Communists finally responded by turning an RLG offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Communists administered a series of defeats to the RLG which added up to the worst government setback since the precarious days of 1961 and 1962. The psychological impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.

9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted themselves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than heretofore. RLG forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the

¹ See centerspread maps.

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area around Muong Phalane. RLG progress has been nil in the Sedone Valley in the south, in Borikhane Province, and in other potentially significant regions.

10. These developments in the military and political fields seem to form part of a pattern related in large part to Communist strategy in South Vietnam. In anticipating that 1968 would be a "decisive" phase in Vietnam, Hanoi moved to increase its logistic capabilities in Laos, strengthen its forces there, recover lost ground, and set back and demoralize RLG forces. And in their recent statements they have set the stage for demanding a new settlement on more favorable terms should the situation in South Vietnam move into serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed a stronger military position while at the same time they are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into a more active political phase in Laos.

II. CAPABILITIES

11. Our estimate of current PL/NVA strength in Laos is about 98,000 (51,000 PL and 47,000 NVA), compared to about 72,000 a year ago. The most important increments have been in combat troops, where PL strength has grown from 28,000 to 31,000 and NVA strength from 16,000 to 25,000. To oppose these Communist forces the RLG has a total of some 100,000 men. These include approximately 29,000 combat troops of the regular army (FAR), about 5,000 combat troops of the neutralist forces, and some 39,000 guerrillas, about 22,000² of whom are Meo tribesmen commanded by General Vang Pao in the northeast.³

12. PL and FAR troops are probably about evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops or battalions, and man for man the Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, however, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat. This qualitative inferiority is somewhat compensated for, however, by air support provided by Royal Lao Air Force T-28s, additional T-28s operating out of Udorn in Thailand with Thai pilots, and USAF aircraft operating out of Thailand. In good weather, the Lao fly about 100 tactical sorties per week, the Thai pilots about 70, and the USAF some 100-200. Such success as the RLG has enjoyed since 1962 is due largely to the combination of this air support with effective use of friendly guerrilla forces.

13. For several years, Souvanna and other RLG leaders, including the military, have felt that if it were not for the presence of NVA troops, RLG forces could probably quickly dispose of the PL threat. In our view, this is probably too optimistic. Although in terms of present strengths on both sides, Royal

² This figure is for background use only and is not to be used or republished in any other publication by holders of this estimate.

³ See Annex for a detailed breakdown of order of battle for both Communist and RLG forces.

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Lao combat forces would then outnumber those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions that will continue to limit FAR effectiveness whatever enemy it confronts. We do believe that the PL need a considerable amount of NVA support to mount a major attack, and that without it, the RLG could almost certainly contain them. We also believe that in northern Laos the Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the PL. But RLG forces could probably not reduce PL forces and territory very rapidly—if at all—without substantial outside logistical and air support.

14. We continue to estimate, however—as we did in March 1968⁴—that the combined PL/NVA forces now in Laos have the military capability to reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do so without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North. And we do not think that RLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

15. There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun most of Laos. They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. The Communists would necessarily feel considerable uncertainty over US countermoves in the Laotian corridor, especially at a time of changeover in American administrations. And, as long as the outcome in Vietnam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new political settlement there had been tested.

16. We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on RLG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, where General Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas have long been a thorn in their side, particularly in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces, they will probably make a considerable effort to reduce a number of guerrilla sites and consolidate their claims. They will probably also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest Provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the south, they will maintain the threat to the Mekong from Thakhek to Champassak Province. They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs. And, of course, they will protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor.

⁴See SNIE 58-68, "Communist Intentions in Laos," dated 21 March 1968, SECRET.

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
17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotiations on better terms.

18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi's calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi's policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them.

19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military campaign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control.

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ANNEX

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MILITARY CAPABILITIES

1. Order of battle information on the Communist forces in Laos is derived from a number of sources. The most important are informants contacted by clandestine friendly guerrillas and by road-watch teams. Other useful information is obtained from prisoners and ralliers, from civilian refugees—particularly low-level administrative functionaries—and from special sources. The estimates of enemy strength are best in those provinces where friendly guerrillas and other assets are most active: Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Khammouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Attapeu, and Sedone. It is least reliable along most of the South Vietnamese border, in northern Phong Saly, southern Sayaboury, and northeast Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces. In the other provinces, where we rely largely on the Laotian Army reporting, the quality varies—it is reasonably good for Vientiane and Borikhane, but poor for Champassak, Sithandone, and Wapikhamthong. Estimating the number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Pathet Lao (PL) troops is also complicated by the mixture of NVA and PL personnel within many individual battalions.

2. On the whole, we think the estimates are reasonably accurate and support our conclusion that Communist strength in Laos is greater than at any time in the past. Strengths fluctuate somewhat between the dry and rainy seasons, however, as the NVA tend to put combat troops in for the dry season campaign—particularly elements of the 316th NVA Division—and then withdraw them during the rainy season. NVA combat troops outnumber the PL troops in the southern provinces of Saravane, Attapeu, and Sedone, where, as might be expected, the defense of their supply and infiltration corridor to South Vietnam is most critical. There are about an equal number of NVA and PL troops in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province. In the remaining provinces, the PL outnumber the NVA substantially, and there are no known NVA battalions at all in four provinces: Sayaboury, Vientiane, Champassak, and Wapikhamthong. The dissident neutralist troops are all in Xieng Khouang and Phong Saly Provinces.

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TABLE A

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS

North Vietnamese Forces

Independent Infantry	16,500	
Troops and Advisors in Mixed Units	7,800	
AAA	200	
Total NVA Combat Troops	24,500	
Command and Support Troops	8,000	
Engineers and Coolies	14,700	
TOTAL NVA Forces		47,200

Lao Communist Forces

Independent PL Infantry	6,500	
Infantry in Mixed Units (with NVA troops or advisors)	15,000	
Dissident Neutralist Infantry	2,600	
Armor	400	
Artillery	3,500	
AAA	3,000	
Total Lao Communist Combat Troops	31,000	
Command and Support Troops	15,400	
Engineers and Construction Troops	4,800	
TOTAL Lao Communist Forces		51,200
GRAND TOTAL		98,400

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TABLE B

ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES

FAR (Royal Lao Army)		
Infantry	27,400	
Artillery	1,000	
Armored	700	
Total Combat	29,100	
Support Troops	16,900	
TOTAL FAR		46,000
FAN (Progovernment Neutralist Forces)		
Infantry	5,000	
Artillery	400	
Armored	100	
Total Combat	5,500	
Support Troops	3,000	
TOTAL FAN		8,500
ADC ("Auto-defense de Choc"—Regional Defense Forces)		5,000
RLAF (Air Force)		1,500
River Flotilla		500
GUERRILLA FORCES ^a		
Northwest Tribal Guerrillas (Yao and Others)	7,000	
Northcentral Tribal Guerrillas (Irregulars in Luang Prabang and Phong Saly Provinces)	2,000	
Meo Tribal Guerrillas	22,000	
Central Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao)	4,000	
South Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao & Kha)	4,000	
TOTAL Guerrillas		39,000
GRAND TOTAL		100,500

^a Figures in this category are for background use only. They are not to be used or re-published in any other publication by holders of this estimate.

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Diff bet this prog & prog of RLG is that RLG is already well on the road to achieving its program.

FBI TAKE FROM 0900 NOV 26

SUMMARY:

1. PLNA 23/11 - PROGRAM OF THIRD EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE OF NLHX
2. RPNF 24/11 - PROGRAM SUMMARY - (a) COMMUNIQUE (b) NEUTRALISTS HALL 3RD SESSION
3. RPL 24/11 - PROGRAM SUMMARY - (a) HAIL SUCCESS OF EXTRAORDINARY SESSION (b) REPORT OF PHOUZE

1. PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY (CLANDESTINE) IN ENGLISH 23 NOV '68

PROGRAM OF THIRD EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE OF NLHX --- Sam Neua November 23 (KPL) -- At its recent third National Congress held in the liberated zone of Sam Neua, the NLHX (Laotian Patriotic Front--KPL) adopted its new political program submitted by PHOU MI VONGVICHIT, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the NLHX.

After the victorious conclusion of the war of resistance of our people of various nationalities against the French colonialists and the U.S. interventionists, our country was recognized as a sovereign, independent and unified country with the territorial integrity. This is a victory of historic significance which opened very bright prospects for our fatherland and our people to build a free and happy life.

But right after the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the ending of the French colonial rule, the U.S. imperialists jumped in to carry out their interventionist and aggressive schemes against our country.

Their plot is to occupy our country and convert it into a new-type colony and military base. In execution of this dark scheme, the U.S. imperialists have brought off a handful of henchmen and relying on them they have turned the puppet army and the Vientiane Administration into their instruments, and at the same time, used the Thai militarists as their stooges and built bases in Thailand as a springboard to carry out a special war and neo-colonialism in our country.

Over the past 14 years, under the signboard of economic and military aid, they have made deep inroads into our country and turned the areas under the Vientiane administration's control into a new-type colony, sent advisers and weapons, pressed their stooges to draft more youths into the so-called National army and beefed it up with a view to expanding their aggression in our country.

Of late, they set up groups of bandits and commandos under direct U.S. command and intensified U.S. air raids against our country in a very savage manner, causing untold sufferings and mournings to our people. They have trampled upon the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 on Laos and the tripartite agreements in Laos, undermined, by means of their lackeys, the various coalition governments in which the Laotian patriotic front and other patriotic forces had their representatives and sabotaged the implementation of the policy of National concord, national unity, peace, independence and

neutrality advocated by the Laotian Patriotic Front.

In the areas under the Vientiane administration's control, a series of anti-popular and anti-national policies have been carried out widely and ruthlessly at U.S. bidding. The people's democratic liberties have been trampled upon and squashed. Many patriots have been arrested and persecuted. Public order and security have not been maintained. All commercial rights are in the hands of a number of influential businessmen. Production has been slowed down, the kip devaluated and the people impoverished day after day.

The nasty culture constantly encouraged by the U.S. and its lackeys has poisoned the mind of countless youths. Buddhism has been offended seriously, and in many places, pagodas have become market places or breeding grounds for depraved American culture and way of life. The traditional culture and the fine customs and manners of the nation are being trodden underfoot. (? Chaos) reigns in society, with robbery rampant and prostitution spreading.

It is clear that the U.S. imperialists are sticking to their policy of aggression against our country. Therefore, they are arch enemy of our people of all nationalities. As for the ruling clique, lackeys of the U.S. imperialists, they are selling out the country to enrich themselves. They are betraying the people, and as such, are also our enemy.

Our people cherish peace and desire independence and freedom very much. We decidedly will not return to slavery.

As far back as early 1965, the Laotian Patriotic Front solemnly declared to the nation and the world its political objective: to strive to build a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, united and prosperous Laos. This objective entirely conforms with the supreme interests of the fatherland and the earnest aspirations of the people of all strata, hence the warm response, sympathy and support it receives from the entire people of Laos and the world public.

Our people's struggle against the U.S. and its henchmen in the last 14 years have recorded very big victories. Two-thirds of the country and half of the population have been liberated, and the patriotic forces have grown up ceaselessly. In the free zone, the above-said political objective has been materialized: economy and culture are developing continually, unity among the various nationalities is strengthening, law and order is firmly maintained, and the material and cultural life of the people is improved day after day. Consequently, the prestige and influence of the Laotian Patriotic Front is incessantly enhanced at home (and--ed) abroad.

The valiant, persistent struggle of our people has inflicted on the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys many heavy defeats, in the military and political fields. Yet, the enemy persist in their scheme of aggression and betrayal. Now, in the face of their imminent total collapse in South Vietnam and their growingly serious setbacks here, the U.S. imperialists are doing their best to bolster up their flunkies. They are frantically building the so-called defence forces and relying on the militarists in Thailand in the hope of prolonging their war of aggression in our country and maintaining tension in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Although our armed forces and people have won very great victories, our country and people are facing a very urgent situation due to the above-said acts and schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges.

Therefore, it is the sacred, most immediate task of our entire people irrespective of sexes, ages, nationalities, social strata, religions and political leanings, to unite with one another, step up the struggle, and defeat the neo-colonialist special war of the U.S. imperialists and all the treacherous acts of the henchmen of the U.S. in order to build a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, united and prosperous Laos, thus contributing to the defence of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

On the basis of the correct line of National salvation already mapped out and in the light of the new developments of the situation, the Laotian Patriotic Front laid down the following policies with a view to attaining at all costs its stated political objective:

1 Point one:

--To strengthen the militant unity and endeavour to broaden the National United Front, and actively mobilize all the forces of the country in order to defeat the U.S. imperialist aggression and overthrow the traitors.

--To respect and protect the throne, and unite broadly with all organizations, social strata, nationalities, religions and political parties, and all forces and all individuals who love the country and peace and are apposed to the U.S. and their lackeys, so as to build a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, united and prosperous Laos.

--To strengthen and consolidate the militant alliance between the Laotian Patriotic Front and the Patriotic Neutralist Forces.

--To welcome and support all forces, individuals, personalities, intellectuals, students, soldiers, policemen, and employees of the Vientiane administration who are against U.S. aggression and for freedom, democracy, and justice.

--To be ready to enter into friendly co-operation on an equal footing with those forces and individuals who have broken with organizations controlled by the U.S.-puppets and wish to enter into alliance or co-ordinate action with the Laotian patriotic front or the Patriotic Neutralist Forces with a view to opposing the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.

2 Point two:

--To observe equality in all fields and build the unity and relations of mutual assistance among the various nationalities so as together to fight the U.S., save the country, and build a happy life for all.

--To do away with all prejudices, grudges, and contradictions created by the imperialists and their henchmen among the various nationalities in Laos and overcome the differences among the latter. All nationalities are equal in interests and duties in all fields and are dutybound to build unity, conduct the struggle against the U.S. and its servants and help each other make progress and build the country.

--To actively assist all nationalities, especially the minorities in developing economy, in study, in improving their material and cultural life, in preserving their own customs and traditional culture, and in combating dangerous diseases detrimental to the national progeny so as to help increase the country's population.

--To actively form a contingent of cadres and intellectuals of minority origin thus enabling the National minorities to build a more and more advanced life and join in the management of the country.

3. Point three:

--To respect, and protect buddhism, and unite with all religions, thus contributing to realizing National unity and strengthening the National forces against U.S. aggression.

--To oppose all acts of sabotage by the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen against buddhism, such as distorting buddhist catechism, controlling buddhist monks and forcing them to serve criminal schemes, destroying pagodas or using them to preach decadent American culture, sowing discord among various buddhist factions, ect.

--To respect and defend buddhism, preserve the purity of monks and their right to practice buddhism, protect pagodas, encourage unity and mutual assistance among monks and believers of various buddhist factions, and encourage solidarity among the priests and followers of other religions.

4. Point four:

--To ensure all democratic liberties of the people and create conditions for the people to bring into fuller play their role as master of the country and of their destiny.

--To ensure the rights of Laotian citizens of both sexes to vote and stand for elections, and the freedoms of association, meeting, demonstration, speech, press and belief, and ensure the inviolability of the person, the right of ownership, the mail privacy, and the rights to free movement and residence.

--To oppose unwarranted arrests, terrorist acts, and looting by the henchmen of the U.S. imperialists--especially the policies of discrimination, retaliation and persecution of patriots, the concentration of the people in refugees centres, solidarity villages, rehabilitation zones, ect.-- Foreible conscription to serve the aggressive schemes of the U.S. imperialists and the interests of the henchmen of the U.S., exploitation of manpower, and looting of the people's property, to demand the dismantlement of refugees centres, solidarity villages, rehabilitation zones, etc. and the release of all patriots under detention.

5. Point five:

--To achieve equality between men and women, and bring into play the role and all-round capacity of women in the struggle against U.S. aggression, for National salvation, and National construction.

--To realize equality between men and women in all fields, political, economic, cultural and social, encourage women to take part effectively in activities for Natinal Salvation and construction and protect the health of women, expectant mothers, and children.

--To do away with all acts of contempt or oppression toward women, actively create conditions for women and help them to raise their culture and political level and work in their specialties so they may make worthy contributions to the struggle against U.S. aggression for National salvation, and in national construction.

--To train and foster women cadres, including women of minority nationalities, so as to mobilize all the capabilities of women for the revolutionary cause of the whole country.

6. Point six:

--To build a people's democratic, National Union administration which will

ensure National sovereignty and serve the interests of the people.

--To oppose the scheme of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys to control the Vientiane administration and use it as an instrument of the U.S. neo-colonialist aggressive policy.

--To set up a democratic, National Union Government representing the interests of all nationalities and an independent and sovereign Laos, and carry out policies of National construction along the line of peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, unity and prosperity.

--To hold democratic elections at hamlet and village levels, and to select and appoint truly patriotic and popular representatives to the administration at other levels, in order to best serve the interests of the fatherland and the people.

--To hold general elections to elect a National Assembly truly representing the interests of the people of all strata and nationalities, in line with the amended election law of 1957.

--To help the administrative personnel at all levels and of all services to enhance their love for their country and people, heighten their sense of duty and improve their professional standards, combat corruption and the abuse of power to oppress subordinates and exploit the people.

7 Point seven:

--To build patriotic and people's armed forces and security forces to defend the country and maintain law and public order.

--To oppose the scheme of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen to control the Vientiane army and police and their scheme to turn these forces into a mercenary army for aggression in Laos, to oppose the building of bandit and commando groups by the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen with the aim of looting the people and disturbing public order and security.

--To build patriotic armed forces comprising the regular army, the regional army, the militia, and the people's police, absolutely loyal to the fatherland, with high fighting capacity, and able to fulfil the duty of saving and defending the country.

--To help the officers and men of the armed forces and police deepen their love for the country and people, and heighten the sense of discipline and responsibility, pay attention to raising the tactical, technical and cultural standards of the officers and men and improve their material and cultural life, to care for the wounded and the sick army men, and assist the families of those who fall on the field of honour.

8 P.8, --To build and develop a National, self-supporting economy, improve step by step the people's living conditions and bring prosperity to the country.

--To eliminate all forms of economic penetration and retardation by U.S. imperialism, all forms of monopoly and exploitation by the ruling circles who are lackeys of the U.S. imperialists, to ban the use of power to grab land, forests, mountains, rivers, streams, and the vestiges of the forced labour system and to campaign for the reduction of land rents, cattle rents and usury rate.

--To build an independent, self-supporting and prosperous economy composed of industry, agriculture, forestry, trade, communications and transport, finance (ellipses as received) on the basis of the full utilization of the great economic potentials of the country and developing the people's spirit of self-

reliance along with seeking aid from all countries without political conditions attached, with a view to meeting the urgent requirements of the people's life and National construction.

--To develop agriculture and forestry. The state will undertake the building of water conservancy projects while guiding and helping the people to expand irrigation, improve the methods of cultivation, animal husbandry, forest exploitation and protection. The state also helps the mountain people of various nationalities to settle in areas with favourable conditions for the stabilization and boosting of production.

--To actively develop industry and rehabilitate and develop handicrafts. Attention will be paid to all the three aspects: expanding state enterprises, encouraging private investments and encouraging industrialists and traders to build enterprises jointly with the state.

--To expand home trade and develop foreign trade. The state organizes goods interflow, encourages and helps businessmen expand trade to the remotest areas, apply a correct customs policy in trading with foreign countries.

--To build a stable economy and finance and an independent currency. (as received--ed) to work out a fair and reasonable tax policy and a correct monetary and price policy so as to stimulate and develop production, ensure the state budget, and contribute to stabilizing the people's life.

--To expand transport and communications throughout the country, with special attention to building more roads and transport means in the mountain areas. Along with investing in transport, the state encourages private investments so as to expand the transport service with a view to facilitating the movement of the people and boosting economy and culture.

9. Point nine:

--To develop the National progressive, culture and education, (as received--ed) raise the cultural and scientific standards, expand medical work and protect the people's health.

oppose the depraved and borrowed culture and the corrupt education aimed at realizing the U.S. imperialists neo-colonialist policy.

--To speed up the literacy campaign so as to gradually wipe out illiteracy among the people, restore and vigorously multiply primary and secondary schools, open more vocational schools, build higher learning institutions with a National and progressive content. To use the National language as teaching medium at all levels and branches of education, to send students to study abroad along a correct line so as to better serve the fatherland after their return.

--To develop a National and progressive culture and art, safeguard the Laotians' fine customs and habits, protect the historical relics of various nationalities, launch a movement for a new, civilized way of life, a number of nationalities to perfect their written languages and to popularize the standard Laotian spoken and written language.

--To give particular care and assistance to the intellectuals and cultural and art workers to help them develop their talents in service of the fatherland and people.

--To actively train and foster medical workers along with building a network of hospitals, dispensaries, sterility houses and inoculation stations from the central down to the lowest levels including those in remote places.

To launch a disease prevention movement and a sports and physical culture movement along with striving to eradicate a number of dangerous diseases such as malaria, venereal diseases, and leprosis, to reduce the infantile mortality rate with a view to protecting the people's health and increasing the nation's population.

10 Point ten:

--To ensure the people's interests and take care of their life, give relief to victims of accidents and ensure social justice and progress.

Peasants of all nationalities will have land to till, the poor and the needy will receive farm tools, and all peasants will be helped and guided in boosting production and in study.

--Workers and other labouring people in the towns will have their life and jobs secured. Workers, in particular, will be protected by labour laws and social insurance, and first and foremost, enjoy an equitable and rational wages system and the 8-hours workday with one holiday every week.

Employees of both public and private services will be given suitable jobs, conditions to improve their cultural and professional levels continually and will enjoy an equitable and rational wages system.

--Demobilized servicemen will be ensured jobs.

--To do away with famine which is still chronic in some areas, develop mutual assistance among the people of all nationalities and, at the same time, work out a policy to relieve victims of natural calamities, famine, etc., especially war victims.

--To give the best possible medical care to victims of social diseases and take correct measures to check social evils, reform and give jobs to those spoiled by depraved culture in order to turn them into honest people for the benefit of national construction.

11 Point eleventh:

--To protect the interests of overseas Laotians and the legitimate interests of foreign residents in Laos, enhance the National pride and uphold the National sovereignty of Laos, and defend overseas Laotians from discrimination, bullying and arbitrary dispossession of their property.

--Foreign residents who respect Laos' sovereignty will be properly treated and their legitimate interests will be protected. They will be helped in difficulties, and commended for their contributions to the building of friendship with the Laotian people, and to the defence and construction of Laos.

12 Point twelfth:

--To carry out a foreign policy of peace, independence, neutrality, solidarity and friendship with the people and governments of all peace-and-justice loving countries.

--To oppose all schemes of intervention and aggression under whatever forms by the imperialists and other aggressive forces against Laos, and apply an independent foreign policy aimed at ensuring the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos.

--To live in peace and friendship, and establish diplomatic relations with those countries which respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Laos.

--To strengthen the friendship and solidarity and lasting co-operation

on the principle of equality with the people of Vietnam and Cambodia in the resistance to U.S. aggression, for National salvation, in the defence of independence and National sovereignty and for National construction.

--To respect and scrupulously implement the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, respect and scrupulously implement all agreements signed with other countries in conformity with the interests of Laos, and abolish all treaties that run counter to the National interests of Laos.

--Not to join any military alliances, not to allow any foreign country to establish military bases in Laos or use the Laotian territory for the purpose of aggression against other countries, not to accept protection by any aggressive military bloc.

--To strengthen friendship and solidarity with the peace-and-justice-loving people throughout the world, support the National Liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, support all movements for peace, democracy and social progress in the world.

The above-mentioned political objective and 12-point policy fully conform with the Laotian people's aspirations and ensure the interests of the nation and all nationalities and the Laotian people of all strata.

The Laotian Patriotic Front calls on all cadres and personnel in various branches, all army-men, the people of all social strata and nationalities, and all those who love their country and peace to strengthen further their unity and wage a resolute struggle to force the U.S. imperialists to end all acts of intervention against Laos, without all their military advisers and personnel and all weapons and war means from Laos, and let the Laotian people live in peace and (words indistinct) their country in peace, independence, neutrality, democracy and prosperity.

So long as the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in Laos persist in their scheme to scheme to conquer this country and betray the Laotians interests, sabotage the peace, independence, neutrality, democracy and unity of this country, and obstruct the realisation of the above-said goal and policy on the whole territory of Laos, the entire Laotian people will have to strengthen further the National United bloc and make all-out efforts to build and consolidate the liberated zone, turning it into a still firmer prop for the struggle to foil all the dark schemes of the enemy and win complete victory.

The Laotian Patriotic Front calls on the peace-and-justice-loving people and governments all over the world to support the just struggle of the Laotian people and take appropriate measures to check the U.S. imperialists' intervention and aggression against Laos, and force them to let the internal affairs of Laos be settled by the Laotians themselves.

The just struggle of the Laotian people, enjoying warm sympathy and support from the peace-and justice-loving people throughout the world, is bound to win.

The political program of the Laotian patriotic front will surely be materialized.

Let the entire people of Laos unite millions as one man. Let them fight resolutely against the U.S. aggressors, to save the country, and build a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, united, and prosperous Laos.

2. RADIO OF THE PATRIOTIC NEUTRALIST FORCES 24 NOV 68

PROGRAM SUMMARY NOV 24

(a) - COMMUNIQUE -- Communique of the NLHX Central Committee denouncing the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in intensifying criminal air raids against the Laotian people.

(b) - NEUTRALISTS HAIL 3RD SESSION --- Article: Our Patriotic Neutralist Forces wholeheartedly hail the success of the third extraordinary session of the NLHX National Congress. Exposes the aggressive feature of the U.S. imperialists who have attempted to take over the world and to transform Laos into a new type of colony. Reviews the Laotian people's victories scored in the Geneva Conferences and in Laos during the past. The Patriotic Neutralist Forces are resolute to follow the policies and plans made at the session.

3. RADIO PATHET LAO (CLANDESTINE) IN LAO TO LAOS 24 NOV 68

PROGRAM SUMMARY NOV 24

(a) - HAIL SUCCESS OF EXTRAORDINARY SESSION -- Editorial: Wholeheartedly hail the glorious success of the extraordinary session of the NLHX National Congress.

(b) - REPORT OF PHOUKE -- Additional report of PHOUKE SIPRASEUTH, NLHX member and representative of the NLHX supreme command, read at the third extraordinary session of the NLHX National Congress.